

The trial through which men shall pass like Osiris is death; the solace held forth to them is the promise of a renewed life, of the same rebirth as was effected for Osiris. Such beliefs do not originate from the later epoch in Egyptian history; already in the IVth dyn. (c. 3000 B.C.) we find as an essential principle that any man receiving the funeral cult should be assimilated to Osiris. The funeral rites are connected with imitative magic; the dead man becomes identified with Osiris murdered and dismembered by Seth, then restored, vivified, and avenged by Isis and Horus; if those rites once proved efficacious for Osiris, they shall still prove so when repeated for any man. Therefore the mystery of the *perjt āat* must be renewed for the benefit of every dead man. On the day of the funeral a little sacred drama is performed in the chapel of the tomb; the defunct is said to be Osiris, his wife Isis, his sister Nephthys; his son and his friends assume the parts of Horus, Anubis, and Thōth, or, should the family decline to actually play the parts, professional priests take their place. In the course of this sacred drama the same rites occur—opening of the mouth, vegetal and animal rebirth—which are depicted upon the walls of the tombs, especially the tombs of the XVIIIth and XIXth dynasties (cf. Schiaparelli, where abundant material drawn from the tombs of Seti I. [XIXth dyn.], of Rehmarā [XVIIIth dyn.], etc., is brought together; cf. G. Maspero, *Études de mythologie*, Paris, 1893-1911, i.; Moret, *Mystères*, p. 36 ff.). Among those rites some—e.g., the opening of the mouth—were known without restriction, and formulæ and mimic are displayed upon the walls of the tombs; but certain others were kept secret, for they are only alluded to, or represented by enigmatic figures with hardly a legend to explain them. This 'mysterious' part of the rites is probably what the texts call the 'sacred rites celebrated in conformity with that secret book (*sesta*) of the officiating priest' (Moret, *Mystères*, p. 18), or the 'rites of Abydos of which the defunct must be "informed"' (*reh hert Ibdw*, C. R. Lepsius, *Denkmäler*, Berlin, 1849, ii. 127), which answers to the expression used by Iamblichus (vi. 5. 7) to designate the mysteries: τὰ ἀπόρρητα, τὰ κρύπτα ἐν Ἀβύδῳ. We may suppose that a formal initiation was necessary to be 'well informed' of these rites and admitted to their benefits. The most important of them is, according to documents, the one here called the mystery of animal rebirth. To effect the rebirth of Osiris, Anubis 'passed' under a hide, which thus became the cradle (*meshent*) of the god recalled to life (*Book of the Dead*, xvii. 18). This rite, applied to men, is often depicted in the Theban tombs: an officiating priest, called the *tikenw*, is drawn along on a sleigh, crouching in the same recumbent position as the fœtus in the womb (Moret, *Mystères*, p. 82 f.; principal source, tomb of Montwerj-hepsef and Rehmarā); in the same position again 'he lays himself down under the hide of a cow, in the land of transformation,' or 'the earth that reneweth life' (Rehmarā); when he issues from the skin, he is supposed to be born to a new life. Such an allegory is certainly analogous in its meaning to the *dikṣā* in Vedic ritual. Here the sacrificer passes under the hide of an antelope and, like a fœtus, evolves from that matrix to a new life (S. Lévi, *La Doctrine du sacrifice dans les Brâhmanas*, Paris, 1898; cf. Moret, *Mystères*, p. 84 f.). This rite admits of two explanations: on the one hand, the hide is that of Osiris's enemies; Seth, or an animal standing for Seth, has been sacrificed in order that his blood may rejuvenate the defunct; on the other hand, the very mimicking of birth, the imitation of the reclining attitude of a fœtus in the womb, possesses a magic virtue which operates in favour of the

defunct. Thus Anubis did for Osiris; thus would the *tikenw* or the *sem* (officiating priest) do for the benefit of the initiated defunct in the course of the funeral. Though the latter are especially described in the Theban tombs of the XVIIIth and XIXth dynasties, they had been in use ever since the Ancient Empire; the texts in the Pyramids (Vth and VIth dynasties) allude to them, and the rites of rebirth are figured in an allegorical yet clear manner on the famous *stela C 15* in the Louvre (Moret, *Mystères*, pl. i. pp. 66-71); they belong therefore to the ancient treasure of the Osirian cult. Since the New Empire the Egyptian deceased in state of grace often receives the epithet 'he who reneweth life (after death),' *whem anḥ* (*mḥet met*) (K. Sethe, *Urkunden*, Leipzig, 1906-09, iv. 196).

Any one who is buried according to the rites and 'consecrated in a perfect manner' (*lahw āger*) must therefore be considered as an initiate to the Osirian mysteries. But was that initiation conferred only upon the deceased, and at the time of the funeral? On this important point the texts give hardly any information. We possess no text describing the initiation of a living man and corresponding to the precious text of Apuleius for the mysteries of Isis (cf. Moret, *Kings and Gods*, p. 177 ff.), yet the formulæ engraved on the funeral *stela* furnish us with some statements, and, if we examine the latter in the light of the mysteries of Isis, so strongly influenced by the old Egyptian mysteries, they become much clearer. The man who in his lifetime sought to be initiated to the Isiac mysteries derived from his initiation a double benefit: (1) a long and happy life on earth; and (2) a rebirth, after death, to a blissful life near Isis, so that the Isiac feels like the Eleusinian initiate: 'death is no more an evil, but a boon' (*ib.* p. 194 f.). This state of grace conferred by initiation answers exactly to what the Egyptians called 'state of an *lmahw* (*amakhw*), a word which is generally translated 'liegeman,' 'attached to such or such a god,' or 'devotee.' A funeral formula often found since the Ancient Empire tells us that 'the *lmahw* comes forth after a very happy and prolonged old age among the liegemen of Osiris' and finds a 'good sepulture near the great god.' The state of *lmahw* was a consequence of the funeral rites, but we often see it also conferred by special favour in one's lifetime (cf. Moret, 'La Condition des fœaux,' *RT* xix. [1897] 114). A man might be *lmahw* towards the father or head of the family, towards the king, or towards a god; if the meaning of this word is, as the present writer believes, 'initiate,' it comes to mean that the initiation was conferred by the father upon his children (as in Eleusis, where the mysteries were originally a family cult), by the king upon his liegemen (a text from the XIIth dyn. [Cairo, 20538, ii. 1. 14] says: 'The enemy of the king has no tomb, but he whom the king loves enjoys rest as an *lmahw*'), or by a god upon his devotees. This would explain the epithet *neb lmahw* ('possessor of the state of *lmahw*') which is applied to all the dead, and also to living men who are in a state of grace—'initiated.' In Eleusis too all men, and even women and sometimes slaves, might be admitted to initiation; the number of Isiac initiates was very great.

4. The rites of initiation.—In the mysteries of Isis the neophyte, after a baptism that cleanses his body and soul, undergoes in the night a secret course of probation; he 'draws nigh to the confines of death,' then treads 'the threshold of Proserpine, approaches the gods above and the gods below, and, at break of day, he reappears crowned with palm leaves, his head in a halo of rays, like unto the sun' (Apuleius, *Met.* xi.; Moret, *Kings and*

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It was of the essence of the mysteries to establish a way of communion between the votary and the saving deity who was the protector of the society. Sometimes this was accomplished by a sacred meal, such as many societies in Greece celebrated on fixed days at the tombs of founders of families and clans. At Eleusis the drinking of the draught called *kykeon* was one of the most solemn acts of the festival. If we trace these meals of communion backwards, we must suppose them to have originated in that ceremonial eating of the sacred animal or plant which belongs to the rudest tribes. But we must beware of the aberrations of a certain school of anthropologists who tend to overleap all the long series of changes which took place before these savage beliefs became humanized. These writers assume that the notion of a ceremonial eating of a divine victim persisted, not only into the more civilized pagan mysteries, but even into early Christianity. They take ancient religion at its lowest, not at its higher levels. Magic and materialism no doubt persisted, but all the nobler spirits warred against them.

When a way was once opened between the votary and that aspect of the divine nature with which he could hold intercourse, there followed an *épanouissement*, or enlightenment, which led in some cases to visions such as Apuleius records as seen by his Lucius, to whom Isis appears as he sleeps in a vision of the night and says:

'Above all, remember and retain in your heart that the remaining space of your life on earth is dedicated to me, to whom you owe all your being.'

This would lead, not to a denial of other deities, but to a special self-consecration to the service of one.

All the mysteries professed to guarantee not only happiness in the present life, but a favourable reception in the world of the dead. They extended men's views to take in the future life as well as the present one. In the passage just cited Isis says to Lucius:

'In my keeping you will live happy and honoured; and when, having fulfilled the allotted space of life, you shall go to the shades below, there also in that underworld I shine through the darkness . . . and you shall often adore me as your protectress.'

The same language, under similar circumstances, would have been uttered by Cybele or Mithra. Each deity of the mysteries attached to himself a body of votaries who were willing to trust him, and whose safety he guaranteed amid the sorrows of life and on the dangerous journey to the world of the dead.

3. Influence on early Christianity.—The question how far early Christianity was affected by the mystic sects of the Græco-Roman world is one which has been much discussed in recent years, and opinions on the subject differ widely. We must distinguish between direct influence, any borrowing by the first preachers of Christianity from the pagan mysteries, and indirect influence, exerted rather by the atmosphere which the mysteries diffused than by direct pressure. The former can have been but slight, since everywhere Christianity and the pagan mysteries were bitterly opposed one to the other. But the latter, or perhaps tendencies arising from that spiritual condition of the world which favoured the spread of the mysteries, must have been considerable. It is clear that these cults smoothed the way for the spread of Christianity.

In the teaching of Jesus Christ, as reported in the Synoptic Gospels, we find little that is akin to the mystery-cults. The preaching is public; there were no ceremonies of purification and communion; comparatively little is said as to the future life. But, when we turn to the Pauline Epistles and the Fourth Gospel, the case is already different. Returning to our statement that the essential

features of the mysteries were rites of initiation, rites of communion, and a great concern as to the future life, we find that by the end of the 1st cent. all these features were becoming prominent in Christianity. St. Paul placed baptism and the Christian sacrament on a high and spiritual level. And the relation of the believer to the exalted Christ is obviously in a measure parallel to the relation between the pagan votary and his saving deity, though, of course, in an infinitely nobler sphere. The doctrine of heaven and hell, on the other hand, of future reward and punishment, has no great place in the Pauline scheme; St. Paul seems to have expected the total annihilation of the wicked rather than their relegation to a place of punishment. As long as the Christians were in constant expectation of the Second Coming of their Master, belief in individual destiny to happiness or misery in a spiritual world could not take deep root, although R. H. Charles maintains¹ that such beliefs did at the beginning of our era find a place in the thoughts of orthodox Jews. But the concrete views of heaven, hell, and purgatory which became usual among Christians after the Apostolic Age were taken direct from the teaching of the pagan mysteries, as has been proved by Dieterich in his *Nekyia*, where he analyzes the *Apocalypse of Peter*, and shows its pagan roots. At the same time, other elements prominent in the mysteries made their way into Christianity—the great stress laid on the sacraments, and the intercessory powers of the priesthood.

The intellectual elements in Orphism and kindred doctrines, views as to the origin of the world, the nature of the deity, and the like, did not enter much into orthodox Christianity, but were taken over by some of the Gnostic sects, who prided themselves on their *γνῶσις*, or saving knowledge of secret truth. Cf., further, MYSTERIES (Christian).

LITERATURE.—The literature of the subject is enormous in extent, and nothing like a full bibliography can here be given. Very little of it is in English. The great work of C. A. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, Königsberg, 1829, is still indispensable. A very readable account of the mystery-religions is given in A. Maury, *Religions de la Grèce antique*, Paris, 1857-59, but it is somewhat out of date. Of recent short works, G. Anrich, *Das antike Mysterienwesen*, Göttingen, 1894, is about the best, moderate and trustworthy. A. Dieterich, *Nekyia*, Leipzig, 1893, G. Wobbermin, *Relig.-geschichtl. Studien zur Frage der Beeinflussung des Urchristentums durch das antike Mysterienwesen*, Berlin, 1896, and R. Reitzenstein, *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*, Leipzig, 1910, all contain useful matter, but the last is very speculative and extreme. As to the amount of influence exercised by the mysteries on early Christianity there is at present a wide variety of opinions. In K. Lake, *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, London, 1911, and P. Gardner, *The Religious Experience of St. Paul*, do. 1911, more influence is attributed, at all events on the classes who accepted Christianity, than is allowed by conservative writers, or, in the opposite camp, by A. Schweitzer, *Paul and his Interpreters*, Eng. tr., London, 1912. A very learned and moderate estimate is set forth by H. A. A. Kennedy, *St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions*, do. 1913. P. GARDNER.

MYSTERIES (Roman).—There is very little to be said on the subject of Roman mysteries. In the Roman religion proper there were ceremonies of a secret character, as in almost all religions, but these had nothing in common with mysteries as defined in art. MYSTERIES (Greek); they were mere survivals of the rites of primitive Latium which had to be kept up because on their continuance prosperity, public and private, was supposed to depend. Their meaning was often obscure or forgotten.

As early as the 3rd cent. B.C. Italy was invaded by Greek and Oriental mystic societies, the character and history of which have been sketched above (see MYSTERIES [Greek], p. 77).

In 204 B.C., at the end of the war with Hannibal,

¹ *Religious Development between the Old and the New Testaments*, London, 1914, ch. iv.

focalized, or clearly differentiated into a subject-object state. The 'subject' and 'object' are fused into an undivided *one*. Whatever is seen, heard, or felt in these moments is flooded with an inrush from the abysses of the inner life. Deep-lying powers, not ordinarily put into play, seem suddenly liberated. The usual insulations, which sunder our inner life into something like compartments, seem shot through. The whole being—in an integral and undivided experience—*finds* itself. Not only so, but transcendent energies from beyond the margin appear to 'invade' the individual self, a larger, environing consciousness, an enfolding presence, makes itself felt. These undifferentiated experiences—J. A. Stewart, in his *Myths of Plato* (London, 1905), calls them 'transcendental consciousness'—occur in a great variety of fields, in numerous ways, and with all degrees of depth and inclusiveness. Lofty appreciation of beauty or sublimity, absorbed enjoyment of music, serene companionship with nature, sudden insight into the meaning of a truth, the awakening of love, moral exaltation of life in the pursuit of duty, illustrate some types of experience which immensely transcend 'knowledge'—experiences in which 'subject' and 'object' are fused into an undifferentiated *one*, and in which self is identified with object.

Religious mystical experience is an intense, and strikingly dynamic, variety of this fused, undifferentiated consciousness. The individual soul feels invaded, vitalized with new energy, merged with an enfolding presence, liberated and exalted with a sense of having found what it has always sought, and flooded with joy. In many instances, especially with persons of peculiar psychical disposition, the mystical experience is attended with unusual phenomena, such as automatic voices or visions, profound body changes, swoons, or ecstasies. These physical phenomena are, however, only the more intense and excessive resonances and reverberations which in milder degrees accompany all psychical processes. They mark no rank of sainthood, and indicate no miracle-working power. The mystical experience, especially in the loftiest spiritual geniuses of the race, may very well be the emergence of a new type-level of life, a higher manner of correspondence with ultimate sources of reality, an *élan vital* of the soul, a surge of the entire self towards ineffable fullness of life. It may be, in the higher sphere of the inner life, an instance of what biologists call a tropism, *i.e.* an inherent tendency of a living thing to turn towards the sources of its nutriment. We are here primarily concerned, however, with the fact of such an experience and with its functional value. The mystical experience itself, as an inner life-event, is unmistakably one of the great tap-roots of personal religion, bringing, as it does, to the recipient undemonstrable, but at the same time irrefragable, certainty of higher personal life in contact with the personal self, and revealing a superaddition of life-functions and new depth-levels of truth. It is not necessary to conclude that 'oracular communication,' or mysterious information, or ideas with novelty of content come into the world through the secret door of mystical openings. 'Ideas' and 'communications' and 'information' prove always, when they are examined, to have a historical background. They show the marks of group-experience, and they do not drop ready-made into the world from some other region. The mystical experience has undoubtedly a noetic value. But it consists in leaps of insight through heightened life, in an intensifying of vision through the fusing of all the deep-lying powers of intellect, emotions, and will, and in a corresponding surge of conviction through

the dynamic integration of personality, rather than in the 'gift' of new concrete knowledge-facts.

'Mysticism,' on the other hand, in its narrow and exact historical significance, is a doctrine of union with the Absolute. It implies a certain metaphysical conception of God and of the soul, and it implies, further, a 'mystic way' of attaining union with the Absolute. The fundamental metaphysics in which the doctrine of Christian mysticism is grounded is Greek rationalistic metaphysics, formulated by Socrates and his great successors, Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. God, according to this Greek interpretation—and for the present purpose the variations of it may be ignored—is Absolute Reality, Pure Being, Perfect Form, with no admixture of 'matter,' *i.e.* with no potentiality or possibility of change. God is That-which-absolutely-is, one, permanent, immutable, and free of everything that implies process or 'becoming.' He cannot, therefore, be found in finite things, or in transitory happenings, or in passing states of mind. He is utterly beyond the *here* and the *now*. He is for ever above all that can be seen or felt or known or named. There is, however, something in the human soul which is unsundered from the Absolute, something which essentially is that Reality. There are many names for this 'unsundered something' in the soul—'pure reason,' 'active reason,' 'creative reason,' 'recollective faculty,' 'apex of mind,' 'abyss of mind,' 'ground of consciousness,' 'synteresis,' 'divine spark,' 'word of God,' 'inward light,' 'uncreated centre.' However it may be named, it is conceived as an original ground or junction of soul with God, an unlost and inalienable soul-centre, the source and basis of all real knowledge of absolute truth, of the idea of the Good, and of all ideas of universal significance. The soul can know super-empirical reality only because, when it sinks to its deepest centre, it is one with that reality; it is identical with what it knows.

This intellectual formulation—and it is the metaphysics underlying historical mysticism—necessarily involves a *via negativa*. The Absolute Reality, the God with whom the soul seeks to be united, is above and beyond all that is concrete and finite. To ascribe any finite qualities or characteristics to Him is to limit Him. We can preserve the infinite oneness and wholeness of His being only by eliminating all that is finite in our account of Him. He is not 'this'; He is not 'that'; He is not 'this.' The soul that would reach the goal of bliss in union with Him must therefore rise above (or sink below) states and processes, above emotions and thoughts, above aspirations and deeds, and find, in wordless communion, in a consciousness transcending images, ideas, or states of any kind, a junction of soul-centre with Absolute Reality—a flight of the alone to the Alone.

The 'mystic way,' 'this flight of the alone to the Alone,' is described as steep and hard, lonely and arduous, a way of 'ladders' and 'steps' and 'ascents.' The historic 'grades' which divide 'the way' into well-marked levels, or heights of ascent, are the 'purgative,' the 'illuminative,' and the 'unitive' stages. The attempts to formulate mysticism into a fixed doctrine or systematic description of the spiritual life are necessarily only partially successful, and the carefully labelled stages of the 'mystic way' only loosely sum up and recapitulate the unfolding processes of the soul on its way to God. Like the metaphysics with which mysticism is allied, these formulations are partly true and partly false.

LITERATURE.—See list of authorities at end of art. MYSTICISM (Christian, Protestant).
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which can never be acquired by the worldly-minded. The steps in the process are similar to those which are the commonplaces of mystics generally. (1) The first stage is purgation. As Lao-tse says, 'Only one who is eternally free from earthly passions can apprehend the spiritual essence of *Tao*.' Chuang-tse says of the sages, or perfect men, 'They wear the forms of men, but are without human passions.' The process is a long and painful one, and Lieh-tse (Licius) is represented as telling an ambitious disciple of his own experiences as a novice, when for the space of three years his Master did not deign to bestow a glance on him, and nine years passed before he attained that inner unity which was his aim. 'I have not yet succeeded in cleansing my heart of impurities and discarding wisdom,' is the confession of a professed teacher, who failed to achieve such harmony with *Tao* as would have enabled him to overcome the opposition of material laws. (2) The second stage is illumination, when virtue requires no longer a conscious effort, but becomes an unconscious habit. Lao-tse constantly deprecated the interested 'virtue' of his own times, when the would-be 'virtuous' were characterized by acute self-consciousness and were actuated by mercenary motives. (3) Many instances are given of the third stage, when an inner unity is attained, notably by Lieh-tse (3rd cent. B.C.)—e.g., that of Shang Ch'iu K'ai, who thus explained his extraordinary independence of natural laws: 'My mind was simply One, and material objects thus offered no resistance. That is all'; and Tse Hsia, who said: 'The man who achieves harmony with *Tao* enters into close unison with external objects, and none of them has the power to harm or hinder him.' This is the goal of Taoist ambition, viz. to attain to such an unconscious harmony with nature as to become the unresisting vehicle of *Tao*, and partake of its properties which render the Taoist immune from the limitations which are imposed upon the uninitiated by the laws of matter, space, and time. This third stage included also that independence of external aids which is expressed by Lao-tse in the words, 'Without going out of doors, one may know the whole world,' etc.

The later history of Taoism goes to show that, in grasping the husk, i.e. the phenomenal powers which initiates were reported to exercise, the kernel was sacrificed, i.e. that unity of thought and intention, that conformity to nature, that contempt of the merely formal and external, which was the alleged secret of these attainments; and Taoism degenerated into a system of charlatanism, including the search for the 'pill of immortality,' the 'philosophers' stone,' and the traffic in amulets, charms, incantations, and exorcisms which are the chief stock-in-trade of its modern representatives. Not only so, but the pure abstractions of Lao-tse gave place to a ritual system, more mechanical and gross than the polytheism and idolatry against which the original Taoism was a protest; and a Taoist 'pope' now presides over the hierarchy, whose chief revenues are derived from the sale of meaningless autographs, of supposed virtue in the dispersion of demons, etc., and the Master of Heaven himself is open to engagements at the houses of officials and land-owners for the purpose of exorcizing evil spirits and other ghostly influences.

Tao is not only the source from which all things proceed, but also the goal towards which all things tend. The means by which that end is attained are simple, and generally available, demanding not exceptional gifts or acquirements, but only the precondition of absolute self-abnegation. To abandon the vaunted 'wisdom' of the schools, to avoid preconceptions, to lay aside self-consciousness, to throw open every avenue of thought and feeling to the

entrance of *Tao*, are the necessary steps to that final consummation, viz. return to *Tao*. Ambition, luxury, wealth, pleasure, must have no place in the life-programme of the Taoist. He must not 'strive' even for the promotion of virtue, nor 'lift up his voice in the streets' even in the propagation of his own tenets. Hence arises the doctrine of quietism, which is practically equivalent to non-interference. Lao-tse's treatment of this theme is highly paradoxical. He speaks of *Tao* as eternally inactive, yet all-effective, and exhorts his disciples to practise inaction, or, as it is expressed by his great exponent, Chuang-tse, 'Resolve your mental energy into abstraction, your physical energy into inaction.' Another phrase of Chuang-tse may, however, be quoted to show that this dictum is not to be too literally interpreted: 'While there should be no action, there should be also no inaction.' From this we may gather that by action is meant impertinent, ignorant, and aggressive interference, such as that which was producing disaster in the China of his day, and that inaction does not imply total cessation of activity, for, if the Taoist utterly refrains from taking a part in the battle of life, he ceases to be a vehicle or instrument of *Tao*; and, as a matter of fact, all the early philosophers were quite ready to impart the details of their system to ardent disciples. Their enunciation of these principles was, indeed, charged against them as a contradiction of their own theory of non-resistance, as it might justly have been represented had their utterances been taken literally. What they aimed at was the elimination of every purely human element which might obstruct the free operation of *Tao*, the impersonal force that makes not only for efficiency but also for righteousness; and they urged that, if every man, in whatever state he found himself, would thus submit to the overruling influence of *Tao*, the State would be tranquilly ordered, and all the forces of nature would be at his disposal. Some interesting illustrations of this unconscious (i.e. non-self-conscious, or subconscious) working are given in the writings of Chuang-tse and Lieh-tse.

In the sphere of morality the same principle holds good. The 'virtues,' so blatantly advertised and applauded, are by Lao-tse regarded as mere shadows of departed realities and desperate apologies for their absence. 'Cast off your Holiness, rid yourself of Sagacity . . . discard Benevolence, and abolish Righteousness' are samples of his vigorous protests against the 'vain oblations' which were laid on the altar of conventional morality, in an age when these things were valued for their rarity, and when spurious imitations were almost universal. Virtue which is artificially developed is valueless when compared with that which is the unconscious expression of the *Tao* within. It is only when the root (*Tao*) is present that the flowers (true virtue) will bloom naturally and spontaneously.

The fact that the possession of *Tao* is, potentially, available to all induces a breadth of sympathy between man and man; hence Lao-tse says: 'He who has no faith in others shall find no faith in them'; 'Among men reject none'; 'To the good I would be good, to the not-good I would also be good, in order to make them good'; 'Even if a man be bad, how can it be right to cast him off?'

To religion, in the ordinary sense, there is no reference, no idea of personal relation to God, who is only once referred to by Lao-tse, and then in an ambiguous phrase, no suggestion of duties, liturgical or eucharistic, as owing to Him. The whole duty of man is fulfilled when he submits his will and surrenders his being to the influence of *Tao*, so as to become the unconscious or subconscious agent of that great overruling principle and power. Such a theory, however, did not long survive, and

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Christian groups and a striking dominance of these forces over the intellects and wills of the primitive believers.

There are many diverse strands in the Christianity of St. Paul and many historical influences converge in him, but no strand is more clearly in evidence than the mystical, and no influence is more certain than that which led him to expect a direct personal experience of the divine Presence. There are numerous autobiographical passages in the Epistles, which describe this 'experience of divine Presence' (e.g., Gal 1¹⁵⁻¹⁶ 2²⁰ 4⁹, 2 Co 3¹⁸ 4⁶ 12¹⁻⁴, Ro 8²⁻¹⁶, Eph 3¹⁴⁻²¹), but the consciousness of the interrelation of the human spirit and the divine Spirit is not incidental; it is interwoven in the entire fabric of his Epistles. There are indications of Stoic influence in his conception of God as Spirit, and there are evidences of familiarity with the experiences and terms of the Oriental mystery-religions which were already invading the empire in St. Paul's time, but the most important source of his faith in an immediate, divine, environing Presence, in whom men can live and move and be, was his own first-hand experience of what occurred to him personally, and what occurred in the groups of believers in the cities of his missionary activity. For him, 'to live is Christ' (Ph 1²¹), which means that to live a life of real spiritual significance is to partake of the divine nature, appropriate it in the formation of a 'new man,' and re-live, both in joy and in suffering, a kind of life which, like Christ's, reveals God. The central 'mystery' of Christianity, the secret of its power and promise, is the experience of Christ in the inner life, supplying within a conquering, resurrection life, overcoming sin, and creating a spirit of love (Col 1²⁷). The ethics of St. Paul is inherently bound up with his faith in, and mystical experience of, an inflooding divine Spirit—whether called 'God in you,' or 'Christ,' or 'the Spirit of Christ,' or 'the Spirit.' Something from a 'world above,' 'a spiritual realm,' comes into man and inaugurates in him a new life, an immortal nature, a new kind of man-nature, 'created after God in righteousness and holiness of truth' (Eph 4²⁴).

The influence of the Johannine writings on mysticism has been far greater than that of the writings of any other NT author, and yet the term 'mystic' does not as properly belong to St. John as to St. Paul. St. John is primarily a theologian, occupied and absorbed with interpreting the eternal significance of the Incarnation. There is far more evidence in his writings than in those of St. Paul of Platonic influence, though it is probably a Platonism that has filtered in through Philo and other Jewish interpreters. There are for this author two worlds—the world that is 'above,' the world that is 'true' or real, and the world that is of darkness and shadow and evil. Christ is eternally 'of God.' In Him is life of the real and eternal order. He is truth, as it is in its pure effulgence. His incarnation exhibits in 'this world' of shadow the intrinsic nature of the world 'above'—the world of spirit and light and life and truth—the God-nature, which nothing 'from below' could ever truly reveal or even adumbrate. It is, thus, wholly through Christ's mediation that men like us—empirical, natural beings—can partake of life. All that we can have we 'receive.' Spiritual life, the life of God, is not in us or of us. It is 'from above' and is appropriated by 'faith,' by 'knowing Him,' and by a sacramental eating of His flesh as the soul's bread and by drinking His blood as the soul's life-substance. Everywhere in these writings we are impressed with the interior depth of the author. We feel sure that, either inwardly or outwardly, he has 'lain on Christ's bosom,' and that his personal testimony, 'Of His

fullness have we received,' is profoundly true. But these writings predominantly turn our gaze, not to the immense resources of the soul's inner experience, not to the native testimony of the heart's kinship with God, but to the historical Person who was the Logos of God, in whom the glory of God is revealed, and from whom we may receive eternal life. We do not find primarily in St. John an interpretation of experience, but rather a theological interpretation of Christ as 'the way,' theological indeed, but so extraordinarily wonderful that it has ever since ministered to and fed the deepest life of man.

LITERATURE.—See list of authorities at end of art. MYSTICISM (Christian, Protestant).
RUFUS M. JONES.

MYSTICISM (Christian, Roman Catholic).—The word 'mysticism' is modern. The older expression is 'mystical theology,' which originally meant the direct, secret, and incommunicable knowledge of God received in contemplation, as opposed to 'natural theology,' the knowledge of God obtained through creatures, and 'dogmatic theology,' the knowledge of God by revelation. In comparatively recent times, however, 'mystical theology' has also been taken to mean a science dealing with the phenomena connected with this mystical knowledge of God (such as visions and locutions), with the dispositions for it, and its various external effects (ligature, quietude, ecstasy, levitation, etc.). This use of the expression is improper, just as if 'dogmatic theology' were used as the name for the method of learning dogma and for the consideration of the effects of dogma on the mind and conduct. In the earlier and strict sense mystical theology is an experience, not a science, for it cannot be expressed in words.

1. **Mystical theology in the early Church.**—The belief in mystical theology and its connected phenomena was taken over by Christianity from Judaism. But the prophets of Israel and their schools, the pure mystic desire and praise in some of the Psalms, the hidden wisdom of Job and the Sapiential books, were things of the past in the 1st century. Judaism tended to regard God as so transcendent and ineffable that He could deal with creatures only by angelic mediation; the creation and the theophanies were thus explained. It was the fashion to see or write of apocalypses, symbolic visions, angel-ministers. Philo finds his Neo-Platonist conceptions of contemplation symbolized in the OT, but he is not following a Jewish tradition. In the NT mysticism is not directly described or taught; it is far less on the surface than in the OT; yet it seems to be hinted at (e.g., 1 Co 2⁸⁻¹⁴ 6¹⁷) and even pre-supposed. And, further, the attendant phenomena are frequently mentioned: visions, dreams, trances, angels and devils, revelations, extraordinary gifts of the Holy Ghost, of which the chief is prophecy.

We know very little about the early years of Christianity. False apocalypses and Sibylline books testify (if testimony be needed) to the continuance of a belief in vision and prophecy. The *Pastor of Hermas* bears so striking a likeness to the symbolical visions of mediæval mystics that it is hard to regard it as fiction. If the writer was older than his brother Pius (pope c. 140-155), his earliest experiences may well have fallen c. 99-99, before the death of St. Clement. For the 2nd and 3rd centuries it will be sufficient to instance the visions of St. Perpetua († 203), those mentioned by St. Cyprian († 258) (see Harnack, 'Cyprian als Enthusiast,' *ZNTW* iii. [1902] 177). The prophecies of Montanus (began 155?), Priscilla, and Maximilla († 179) were rejected by the Church, not because locutions and raptures were suspect, but because these prophets claimed to add something to the

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the eyes; this was the error of the Anthropomorphites (x. 5). Our Lord has taught us by His example to retire from the noise and confusion of the world, in order that, while we dwell in the body, we may in some part prepare ourselves to receive a certain similitude of that future blessedness which is promised to the saints (x. 6), to be united to the Father and the Son, as they are united to one another (x. 7).

The first anchorite to dwell at Scete, the famous St. Macarius of Egypt († 389), is the reputed author of some epistles and homilies of extraordinary beauty. *Hom. viii.* (PG xxxiv. 527 ff.) is a record of personal experience, and demands quotation:

'A certain one enters to bend the knee, and his heart is filled with the divine working, and his soul exults with the Lord as with a bridegroom, according to the word of Esaias the prophet, saying: "As the bridegroom rejoiceth over the bride, so shall the Lord rejoice over thee"; and it comes to pass that, having been without leisure all the day, in this one hour he gives himself to prayer, and his inner man is rapt away into prayer, to the immeasurable depth of the other world, in much sweetness, so that his mind is afar, being aloft and carried thither away, so that at that time oblivion comes into the considerations of the understanding, because they have been filled up and taken captive unto divine and heavenly things, to the infinite and incomprehensible, to things wonderful and that may not be expressed by human mouth; so that in that hour he prays, and says: "Would that my soul had gone forth together with the prayer!"'

Macarius describes how 'grace' comes, sometimes as burning fire, sometimes more slowly; this lamp is always alight, but, when it shines brighter, it is because it is set aflame by the inebriation of the love of God. He relates spiritual experiences—a cross of light within the soul; the being caught in ecstasy, and finding himself before the altar in the church and being given three loaves to eat; a garment of light bestowed on him; a light in the heart, opening out the way to a deeper and secret light, so that the whole man was bathed in the sweetness of contemplation,

'so that no longer could he contain himself, but became as a fool and a barbarian to this world through the exceeding love and sweetness by reason of the hidden mystery, so that the man at that time was made free and attained to the perfect measures, and was clean and free from sin; but after this, grace withdrew, and the veil of the contrary power came across; but yet it partially shines, and he stands one step below perfection.'

For there are twelve steps: 'He who is rich in grace stands ever night and day on the summit, and is free and pure, for he is on high and captive'; but, if he never descended one step, 'he could not receive the ministry of the word, nor take care for himself or for the morrow, but could only sit in one corner uplifted and inebriated.' It is therefore impossible to remain long in the highest degree. In *Hom. i.* Macarius describes the life of the soul in God. As Origen had given 'Christ and the soul' as one of the interpretations of the Sponse and the Bride in the Canticle of Canticles, so Macarius habitually speaks, just like a medieval mystic, of the heavenly Bridegroom.

'Such a soul, putting away the shame of her face, and no longer mastered by the disgrace of her thoughts nor caused to commit adultery by the evil one, has communion with the heavenly Spouse, as being herself simple (μονότροπος); for, wounded with His love, she languishes and faints (if I may dare to speak thus) for the beautiful spiritual and mystical commerce in the incorrupt union of communion in holiness. Blessed indeed and happy is such a soul, which, conquered by spiritual love, has been worthily affianced to God the Word' (*Ep. ii.* [PG xxxiv. 416]).

Palladius tells us that this great ascetic was said to live in a continual ecstasy (*ἀδιαλείπτως ἐκστασθεῖς*), and to have more commerce with God than with earthly things (*Hist. Laus. xvii.*). This is his advice on prayer:

'It is not needful to speak much, but to stretch forth the hands, and say: "Lord, as Thou wilt, and as Thou knowest, have mercy." And if warfare should come: "O Lord, help." And He knoweth what is expedient, and hath mercy upon us.'

On Macarius's views see J. Stoffels, *Die mystische Theologie Makarius*, Bonn, 1908, and in *Theol.*

Quartalschrift, xcii. [1910] 88, 243; and C. Gore, in *JThSt* viii. [1906] 85. According to J. Stiglmair (*Sachliches und sprachliches bei Makarius von Ägypten*, Feldkirch, 1912), the works attributed to Macarius are a conglomerate, in which it is impossible to distinguish what is authentic from the additions by an editor (Constantinopolitan?) of the 5th or 6th century.

St. Nilus, in the 4th cent., gave clear instructions on pure prayer, without images (*de Oratione*, 56 f., 85, 117, 119 [PG lxxix.]).

Diadochus, bishop of Photice in Epirus, wrote *Capita centum de perfectione spirituali*, at a date which is unknown; the work was known to Maximus Confessor and to Photius (Latin version in PG lxxv.; Greek version in a rare volume *Philocalia*, Venice, 1782, and in a recent edition by J. E. Weis-Liebersdorf, Leipzig, 1912). The love by which a soul adheres to God and loses all love of itself is called by Diadochus *ἐν ἀσθήσει καρδίας* (14, 16), and it cannot be exercised save when the conscience is pure (23). The soul's natural perception, or 'accurate taste of the things which it judges' (30), has been split in two by original sin (25, 29). But, besides the ordinary use of our reason, there exists another use, without this division:

'That which comes to the soul from the Holy Ghost is simple, and no man can know it, save those who willingly release themselves from the pleasures of this life on account of the hope of what is to come, and dry up the corporal appetite by temperance' (25).

The joy with which the soul then rejoices, and which it can even communicate to the body, is an unerring admonition of eternal life (25). This joy and consolation are carefully to be discerned from false or diabolical consolations (30 f.). So there are two kinds of charity, a lower and a spiritual; and two kinds of humility (cf. *The Cloud of Unknowing*, below), of which the higher is the result of contemplation (95). Diadochus is aware of the special difficulties of beginners (93), of the special graces which they receive (88), and of the aridities and seeming dereliction which ensue (69). A man should speak only when he has a moderate illumination; for, when he has none, he is ignorant, and when he has much, it allows him not to speak. For then the soul, inebriated with the love of God, wishes to enjoy with silent voice the contemplation of the glory of the Lord' (8). Diadochus speaks from personal experience (cf. 91). He wrote for monks (52 f., 68). He teaches that the gift of 'theology' (cf. 68, 72) or contemplation is above all other gifts of God for inflaming the soul with love (67).

The Greek Fathers speak from tradition, and in rhetorical language, of leaving all creatures in order to arrive at the knowledge of God which is given to the pure in heart. A well-known passage of St. Gregory of Nyssa is unusually explicit and practical. He develops the *locus communis* which Clement had long before borrowed from Philo, that God is to be seen only in the darkness, as by Moses; so that, in order to rise to this knowledge, a man must put away all that enters through sense, that he may climb the steep mount of 'theology' (*de Vita Moysis, mystica interpretatio* [PG xlv. 372-377]).

Among the Latins St. Ambrose was apparently a mystic (cf. *Epp. i.* 29, in *Ps 118*, serm. xi.). St. Augustine's *Confessions* are too much read to need more than mention. It is not rare for him to refer to mystical sight ('Lo, now we have rejoiced in some inward sweetness; lo, in the summit of the mind ["acie mentis"] we have been able to see something that is unchangeable, in a momentary flash,' on *Ps 41*, no. 10), and he constantly shows the effects, in the burning and ever-present longing for the heavenly country, which he manifests more

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is possible even for those in the world and the marriage state (*in Ezech. II. v. 19f.*). The active life may assist the contemplative, provided that tranquillity of mind is not too much impeded. Christ has given us an example of the union of the two lives (*Mor. xxviii. 33, vi. 56*), which is especially necessary for those who undertake the pastoral office (*Reg. past. ii. 7, etc.*). The conditions for the contemplative life embrace not only tranquillity and retirement, but severe self-discipline (*Mor. vi. 59f.*) and great love (*ib. vi. 58, etc.*) of God and of the neighbour. The immediate preparation is given from tradition as well as experience:

"The soul must first have learnt to shut out from its eyes all the phantasmata of earthly and heavenly images, and to spurn and tread under foot whatever presents itself to the thought from sight, hearing, smell, bodily touch, or taste, so that it may seek itself interiorly as it is without these sensations" (*in Ezech. II. v. 9*). After this 'the first step is that the soul should collect itself together ("ut se ad se colligat"), the second, that it should look upon its own recollection ("ut videat qualis sit collecta"), the third, that it should rise above itself, and yield itself up by effort to the contemplation of the invisible Creator' (*ib.*). The effort is 'a great striving of the mind, when it raises itself up to heavenly things, when it fixes its attention on the spiritual, when it tries to pass over all that is bodily seen, when it narrows itself that it may be enlarged. And sometimes, indeed, it prevails, and soars above the opposing darkness of its blindness, so that it attains to somewhat of the uncompassed Light ("incircumscriptum lumen") by stealth and scantily; but for all that, to itself straightway beaten back it returns, and out of that Light into which panting it had passed, into the darkness of its blindness sighing it returns, and 'by the very tasting, it faints away' (*ib. II. li. 12*).

This 'periodicity' of contemplative prayer is constantly dwelt upon by St. Gregory: the soul is 'beaten back' and sinks down by the weight of her corruption (*Mor. v. 27f., viii. 50, x. 13, xxiv. 12, etc.*), and the brief space of the highest experience is but the 'silence in heaven for half an hour' of Rev 8¹. All this describes the mystical prayer which was later to be labelled 'active contemplation,' and is sought by the soul. But St. Gregory does not omit the 'passive' states, when the soul is caught away ('rapt') into God and inflamed, so that, although yet in the flesh, all carnal thought is subdued, though God is not seen 'as He is' (*Mor. iv. 45*). Often the mind of the just is so suspended in contemplating things on high that outwardly their face seems to have been struck with stupefaction ('obstupuisse' [*Mor. xii. 35f.*]; the mind is often caught in ecstasy ('rapt', 'in excessu suspenditur' [*ib. xxiv. 12*]). The subsequent effect of the divine vision upon the soul is noticed, not merely detachment and contempt of the world (*Ep. i. 5, Mor. vii. 7*), but the experience of being above it and that it is a passing show (*Dial. pref. and ii. 32*: 'Animas videnti Deum angusta est omnis creatura'). Self-knowledge and humility are the fruits of contemplation (*Mor. xxxv. 3, in Ezech. I. viii. 11, 17, etc.*).

Though in contemplation the mind is expanded (*Mor. v. 50, Dial. ii. 32*) and the soul is filled with peace (*Mor. v. 9*) and with marvellous sweetness, and is afire with love (*ib. v. 58, etc.*), yet it is impossible in this life to see God as He is—that is reserved for heaven.

"The soul beholds something beneath His brightness by which refreshed it may progress . . . it does not yet behold that which God is, but that which is under Him" (*in Ezech. II. li. 14*). He is seen 'per aenigmati speculum,' not 'per speciem,' 'for the darkness of our corruption hides from us the incorruptible Light; and how far off it is, is shown, for that we can see it in some measure, and yet the Light cannot be seen as it is. If the mind could not see it at all, it would not even see that it is afar off; and if it perceived it perfectly, it would not see it as though through darkness. Therefore, because it is not altogether seen, nor again altogether unseen, it is rightly said that it is "seen from afar"' (*ib. xxxi. 101*).

Many quotations from the *Moralia* and a few from the *Hom. in Ezechielem* are collected by Blossius in his *Psychagogia*, bk. iv. It is noticeable that in those great works St. Gregory never speaks of any accidental psycho-physical effects of

contemplation, although his *Dialogues*, intended for popular reading, are full of miracles, prophecies, and visions.

2. The Middle Ages and Scholasticism.—We have seen that in the Patristic period mystical theology was fully recognized, and that the method of approaching it by abstraction was traditional. For the succeeding period there are materials to be found in the Lives of the saints, which are extremely numerous throughout the Middle Ages, and are usually the work of contemporaries. Special mention has to be made of St. John Climacus († 605-606); also of St. Maximus Confessor of Constantinople († 662), an ascetic writer as well as an acute theologian, who wrote some comments on pseudo-Dionysius. It was doubtless through his influence at Rome that the Areopagite was quoted by the Lateran Council of 649. The abbot Thalassius, a correspondent of St. Maximus, has left some notes on mysticism. These three Greek writers agree in insisting that all images and imagination are to be put away in prayer (Climacus, *Ladder of Perf.*, degree xxviii. 45; Maximus, *Cent. v. 69*; Thalassius, *Cent. ii. 26*). Among the Latins may be noted Rabanus Maurus († 856), especially in his *de Puritate Cordis*, John Scotus Erigena (9th cent.), who translated pseudo-Dionysius into Latin, St. Peter Damian († 1072), and Hugh of St. Victor († 1141).

St. Bernard of Clairvaux († 1153) had a great influence on the history of mysticism. A well-read and acute theologian as well as a man of genius, his mystical experiences are important records. Note his description of the 'third chamber of the Spouse,' the perfect peace of the soul (*Serm. in Cant. xxiii. 15*), and that of the visitations and absences of the Spouse:

'I confess that the Word has come to me (I speak as a fool), and that many a time. And though He has often entered into me, I have not perceived when He came in. I have felt Him to be there, I remember His presence, sometimes I have had prescience of His advent, but His entrance I could never feel, nor even His departure' (*ib. lxxiv. 5; cl. xxxii. 2*).

Here is a remarkable comment on 'murennulas aureas et vermiculatas argento' (*ib. xli. 3*):

'This means, I think, nothing else than to weave certain spiritual likenesses, and in these to bring the meanings of Divine Wisdom into the sight of the mind which is contemplating, in order that it may perceive, at least by a mirror and in a riddle, what it cannot as yet look upon face to face. What I speak of are things divine, and wholly unknown but to those who have experienced them, how, that is, in this mortal body, while yet the state of faith endures and the substance of the clear Light is not yet made manifest, the contemplation of pure truth can yet anticipate its action in us, at least in part; so that some, even among us, to whom this has been granted from above, can employ the Apostle's words "Now I know in part," and again "We know in part, and we prophesy in part." For when something from God has momentarily and, as it were, with the swiftness of a flash of light, shed its ray upon the mind in ecstasy of spirit, immediately, whether for the tempering of this too great radiance, or for the sake of imparting it to others, there present themselves certain imaginary likenesses of lower things, suited to the meanings which have been infused from above, by means of which that most pure and brilliant ray is in a manner shaded, and both becomes more hearable to the soul itself, and more capable of being communicated to whomsoever the latter wishes.'

This is perhaps the earliest account of the distinction between *pure contemplation*, in which reason as well as imagination remains in darkness, and nothing is understood by it, and *revelation*, in which the pure intellectual conceptions are made comprehensible by means of the imagery or words which the mind habitually employs. St. Bernard suggests that this translation into 'phantasmata' is the work of the angels.

A contemporary of St. Bernard, Richard of St. Victor († 1173), makes the same distinction between contemplation 'not by a mirror and in a riddle, but in simple truth, without any veil or shadow of figures,' on the one hand, when the mind goes forth out of itself, and, on the other hand, the action by which the mind draws in this

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Nazirites.

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Oath (Introductory and Primitive), Obscenity, Ordeal (Introductory and Primitive), Orgy, Palmistry.

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Mundas, Musahar, Narbada, Nasik, Nepal, Oraons, Orissa, Out-Castes (Indian), Panchpiriya, Pandharpur, Parasnath.

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Numbers (Semitic).

CURTIS (WILLIAM ALEXANDER), D.D., D.Litt.

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Orthodoxy.

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Ostyaks.

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Nahmanides.

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Patimokkha.

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Music (Buddhist), Paticca-Samuppada, Perfection (Buddhist).

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Numbers (Introductory).

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Patagonians.

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Obedience.

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Paul.

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Ordeal (Iranian).

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Nomism.

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Editor of the Contemporary Science Series; author of *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, and other works.

Nietzsche.

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Panchala.

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Pastoral Peoples.

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Nature (Greek).

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Narayana, New Dispensation.

St. Thomas has, however, incautiously followed St. Augustine, *de Gen. ad litt.* xii., in admitting that the beatific vision was granted to Moses and St. Paul, when rapt out of their corporal senses; he did not notice that St. Augustine distinguishes the beatific vision from intellectual visions only in degree, not in kind, so that he is not to be followed here. Dominican theologians have rigidly followed St. Thomas; some Benedictines have added St. Benedict to Moses and St. Paul; some Carmelites have added Elias the prophet; the Jesuit theologians have wisely agreed with Albertus, Alexander of Hales, and Bonaventura in denying that the *lumen gloriæ* has ever been given in this life except to Christ, though some of them have suggested that such a rapture may have been granted to the Blessed Virgin.

It follows from St. Thomas's epistemology that man's intellect in this life is not radically incapable of receiving pure intellectual species such as it will con-naturally receive after death. If it should receive any, however, it will not understand them in the ordinary way, except 'convertendo se ad phantasmata'—by forming examples of them in the imagination, and translating them thus into images and human words. Hence St. Thomas's theory of prophecy and visions (*Summa*, II. ii. qu. clxxi.; *Quæst. de Veritate*, xii.): God can communicate truth to man in three ways: (a) by 'corporal vision' of something real, together with an intellectual 'light' to judge of it; (b) by an 'imaginary vision,' which is the proper medium of prophecy (in this vision images are either produced or re-arranged in the imagination), together with intellectual light to judge its meaning—these are usually to the eye ('visions' proper) or to the ear ('locutions'); they are difficult to distinguish from the images which a lively imagination forms for itself, they may be imitated by the devil, or they may be falsified by admixture from the man's own activity; (c) by an 'intellectual vision' of pure truth without any phantasmata: this is the angelic kind of knowledge by pure infused species, the same as that given after death, and it is not in itself liable to error (so St. Thomas, with all theologians, after St. Augustine). In order, however, that the prophet may understand and communicate the truth which he has received, he must needs 'turn to phantasmata':

'Ita clare veritatis cognitio infunditur ut . . . ex veritate iam perspecta, ipse sibi imagines formare possit, quibus utatur propter naturam nostri intellectus' (*de Ver.* xii. 12 corp.); 'secundum intelligentis arbitrium in imaginativa congrue formantur imagines' (*ib.* ad 2).

These images and words can express pure truth only in an inadequate and symbolic way; they are therefore a grievous source of error, except in so far as 'intellectual light' guides the prophet to translate suitably. If the images are infused together with the truths themselves, then an imaginary vision accompanies the intellectual vision, and we are face to face with the phenomena so vividly described by St. Bernard. Intellectual vision is higher than prophecy (*ib.* xii. 7 and *Summa*, II. ii. qu. clxxiv. 3); in it the absolute simplicity of the divine light is, as it were, 'contracted and specified' by conjunction with the angelic light, which is less simple and universal, and more adapted to our nature. To fall back into imaginations is a weakness, due to defect of intellectual light.

St. Thomas teaches, with all earlier and later theologians, that Adam in the state of innocence could see God after this angelic fashion by pure species, as the angels do by nature (*de Ver.* xviii. 1 ad 12), 'per intelligibiles effectus' (*Summa*, I. xciv. 1), though his mind worked as ours does by 'turning to phantasmata'; only his imagination was the servant of his intellect, whereas ours is frequently its master. He could therefore 'consider' intellectual truths and God Himself by using his imagination to subserve his intellect, without fear of its leading him into error.

In all this St. Thomas is elaborating an older theory, which we have seen described by St.

Bernard and Richard of St. Victor as regards the contemplative state. We should anticipate that St. Thomas also must regard mystical theology as the angelic consciousness communicated to man, and we might confidently argue to this from the fact that 'intellectual visions' are not peculiar to prophecy, but are understood by all mediæval writers to be common in the saints. But, as a fact, St. Thomas incidentally confirms our anticipations by a clear statement.

He asserts that Adam's knowledge was 'contemplation,' and that 'in contemplation God is seen by a medium which is the *lumen sapientiæ*, which elevates the mind to perceive the divine, but not so that the divine essence is immediately seen; and thus by grace He is seen by him who contemplates after the state of sin, though more perfectly in the state of innocence' (*de Ver.* xviii. 1 ad 4).

Therefore contemplation restores to man by grace some measure of that angelic knowledge which Adam had of God before the Fall. Adam's infused knowledge was 'from the irradiation of the Divine wisdom' (*ib.* xviii. 2), and we receive the same by the 'gifts of the Holy Ghost' (these are infused at baptism) of wisdom and of understanding, which cause in us 'a certain affinity to the divine' (*in 3 Sent.* dist. 36, qu. 2, art. 1, sol. 1), and this 'leads us to a kind of deform and in some wise explicit contemplation of the articles which faith holds in human fashion as it were under a veil' (*ib.*).

'Hence faith, which causes us to hold the spiritual veiled, as it were, "by a mirror and in a riddle," perfects the mind in a human way, and therefore it is a virtue. But if the mind is so far uplifted by supernatural light, that it is introduced to behold the spiritual things themselves, this is above human measure; and this is done by the gift of understanding' (*ib.* art. 2, sol. 1).

St. Thomas seems to have been conscious of possessing something of this gift which is above faith, when in his dying act of faith in the Real Presence he declared:

'If there be in this world any knowledge of this sacrament that is stronger than faith, I wish now to use it, to affirm that I truly believe,' etc.

In his *Comm. on 1 Tim.* vi. he says that it is impossible to 'comprehend' God; but to touch Him (*attingere*), though impossible by nature, is to be our aim, in this life by grace, in the next by glory. This experience of God is a 'nobler faith,' though the virtue has a stricter right to the name (*de Ver.* xii. 12, corp.).

But St. Thomas nowhere treats the question which he thus incidentally answers. We can simply conclude that he is in harmony with tradition, but that he does not regard mystical experience as real knowledge until it is translated into phantasmata, nor as a part of dogmatic science. We are not to be surprised that in his disquisitions on the active and contemplative lives (*in 3 Sent.* dist. 35, qu. 1, and *Summa*, II. ii. qu. clxxx.) he describes contemplation 'humano modo,' as the brief rest of the mind upon the great verities at which it has arrived by argument and investigation, avoiding any mention of mystical prayer. He means by the contemplative life the life of study and passion for truth, as opposed to the life which uses the body to do external works. In the Order of Preachers, to which he belonged, he thinks the perfect admixture of the two is to be found in the combination of study with preaching. He did not simply distinguish the two lives as that of prayer and that of works of charity. The theory just exposed as latent in St. Thomas has not been discovered by most of his followers and commentators, but it is discernible in his predecessors. What is more, it justifies and explains the practical advice which we have traced from early times up to St. Thomas's own master, Albertus, that in prayer images and phantasmata should be put aside, and then the intellect can receive pure spiritual species, though secretly and obscurely, while its ordinary use remains in abey-

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Papacy, Persecution (Roman Catholic).
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Pawnee.
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Personalism.
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Philosophy (Chinese).
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Names (Primitive, Egyptian), Personification (Introductory and Primitive).
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Nature (Roman).
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Passibility and Impassibility.
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Nyaya, Patanjali.
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Personification (Egyptian), Philosophy (Egyptian).
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Mythology, Personification (Greek).
- GARDNER (PERCY), Litt.D., LL.D., F.S.A.**
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Mysteries (Greek, Phrygian, Roman).
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Nonjurors.
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Ordination (Jewish), Parsiism in Judaism.
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Nature (Hindu), Nimavats, Pantheism (Hindu), Persecution (Indian).
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Mutilations, Need-Fire.
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Music (Greek and Roman).
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Ordeal (Malagasy).
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Mysticism (Russian).
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Names (Hebrew).
- GRAY (LOUIS HERBERT), Ph.D. (Columbia).**
Editor of *The Mythology of all Races*; author of *Indo-Iranian Phonology* (1902); translator of *Vāsavadattā, a Sanskrit Romance by Subandhu* (1913).
Muskhogeans, Names (Indo-European), Oahspe, Old Age (American, Iranian).

the two greatest of writers on mysticism, the Carmelites St. Theresa of Jesus († 1582) and St. John of the Cross († 1591). The incomparable charm of St. Theresa's personality and her robust common sense have given immense popularity to her writings, which are the most complete and vivid descriptions ever penned of the successive phenomena of the inner experiences of a saint. Their value as testimony can hardly be exaggerated. They contain much excellent counsel and many new and necessary distinctions. St. Theresa, however, differs greatly from other mystics in her estimates of the various facts, and she is the starting-point of a new tradition. In her earliest work she distinguishes the degrees of prayer according to their psychological effects: the first is meditation, in which all the powers of the soul act naturally and freely; they work hard with small result (*Life*, chs. 11-13); the second includes 'recollection' and the 'prayer of quiet,' wherein the will is united to God, while the imagination and intellect remain free to help or hinder this delightful union (14-15); in the third degree these powers are also drawn into union, without either being lost or yet able to tell how they work; this causes an inebriation, a glorious folly, and leaves behind it greater effects than quietude (16-17); the fourth state is a complete union of all the powers, so that it is impossible to speak or read; this lasts a bare half-hour, but may lessen and return so as to occupy hours; but the utmost point of transformation in God lasts only an instant. When the effects extend even to the body, insensibility, ecstasy, rapture, or flight of the spirit is produced, and even levitation (18-20). She speaks further of locutions (25), of intellectual and imaginary visions (27-29), of appearances of Satan (31), hell (32), and saints (33); she tells of the great value of seeing the humanity of Christ (37), of the gift of miracles (39). She concludes with more purely mystical visions of 'the truth itself,' and how all things are in God (40). The concluding chapters of the *Life* are later than the rest; but her last work, *The Spiritual Castle*, is more important still, having been composed after she had long been in the highest states which she had not yet attained when she wrote her *Life*. In this final work she places 'recollection' and 'quiet' in the fourth 'mansion' of the soul, 'union' in the fifth, complete union and ecstasies in the sixth, together with the vision of the humanity of Christ, the wounds of love, the pains of longing, etc. The seventh mansion is spiritual marriage, an anticipated heaven, in which the soul begins to understand the graces which it has received, and is continually conscious of the presence of the three Persons of the Blessed Trinity.

Now, though St. Theresa intends those degrees to represent stages of perfection, yet the main distinction between the four original degrees is psychological, not really according to the quantity of mystical light, but to the perceived effect of that light on the soul and body. Those degrees are roughly equivalent to the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth mansions. When the saint herself reached the seventh mansion, she discovered to her surprise that the psychological effects, which had reached their culmination in ecstasy, ceased or diminished (she had occasional raptures later on), and that she could experience even higher communications than before without any suspension of the bodily faculties; nay more, that the peace of 'quiet' or 'union' was no longer needed, for she could be conscious of the mystical Light, and of the Trinity, while giving her mind fully to necessary occupations. This should not have astonished her directors, for the beatific vision itself will not impede the intellectual, sensible, or corporal powers of

man in heaven, and St. Thomas teaches that intellectual visions do not of themselves impede the use of the senses (*de Ver.* xii. 9 ad 4; *Summa*, II. ii. qu. clxxiii. art. 3), although 'the more the mind is abstracted from the body, the more it receives the influence of spiritual substances' (*in 4 Sent.* dist. 50, qu. i. art. 1), according to the traditional doctrine; so that naturally St. Theresa herself found in the seventh state that her mystical consciousness, though permanent, was more vivid in the time of prayer, when distracting occupations were set aside.

Thus the smooth ascent of the original four degrees is roughly broken in *The Spiritual Castle* by the addition of the seventh, which reverses the process. St. Theresa's classification has been followed by most subsequent writers, and of late years it has been adopted by Poulain. His view is that mystical states are accompanied by a 'ligature' or tying up of the powers, which in the lower degrees (recollection, quiet) has only a partial and slight effect upon the intellect and imagination, but in 'full union' prevents all the powers from working in their natural way, and, finally, in ecstasy affects even the body. This ligature, after having produced its full effect in such ecstasies, disappears in the seventh mansion, or 'transforming union,' which is characterized by the appearance of a kind of double consciousness. This sudden reversal of the sequence seems to set us in front of an insoluble problem. Poulain is dissatisfied with the idea that his ligature is the natural result of attention to spiritual things, and that even ecstasy is but the natural effect of extraordinary mental concentration. He inclines to see in the ligature a sealing up by God of the doors of consciousness, in order that the soul may not be distracted from the heavenly vision. But then, why does it cease in the highest degree?

The simplest reply is to deny that St. Theresa's important and excellent analysis necessarily corresponds to an ascending scale of mystical elevation or of moral sanctity. It does not seem to be paralleled in the experience of most of the great mystics, and it is well known that the details of St. Theresa's 'mansions' are almost wholly from her own history, and cannot be verified in other saints. It is easy enough to obtain testimonies from persons who frequently experience the lower degrees of prayer that the phenomena of 'ligature' correspond exactly to the familiar experience that, while one is listening to the conversation of one person, one can hear, without understanding, what another person says. In such prayer the intellect, being engaged upon pure intellectual knowledge in an inchoate manner, feels blank and inactive; the will is drawn to God, without sensible fervour; the imagination may run wild, because the will prefers to leave it alone rather than detach itself from the act of loving, in order to control its vagaries. But in those persons to whom 'translation' into sensible impressions is easy, or when the communications are somewhat obscured by images and less 'pure' (as St. John of the Cross has it), the imagination also is occupied with holy things, and the lower appetite is filled with peace and joy; thus we have the prayer of quiet or of union. As to the effect on the body, St. John of the Cross teaches that ecstasy and sudden rapture are due to bodily weakness: as the man grows more spiritual by the effect of the intellectual light, his soul and body are spiritualized, so as to become a fitter vehicle to endure the higher kinds of union without any 'ligature' or bodily ecstasy. Psychologically it is probable that Ribot is right in holding that 'attention' is not the intensification of one faculty, but the detaching of the others; absence of mind is a mark of concen-

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Nagas.

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Pessimism (Indian).

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Philanthropy.

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The Races of Man, History of Anthropology,
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Old Age (Introductory and Primitive),
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Names (Japanese).

OL. IX.—A*

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Ritual and Belief*.

Phallism.

HETHERWICK (ALEXANDER), M.A., D.D., F.R.G.S.

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Nyanjas.

HEWITT (JOHN NAPOLEON BRINTON).

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ington, D.C.

Nature (American).

HICKS (ROBERT DREW), M.A.

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Peripatetics.

HODSON (THOMAS CALLAN), I.C.S. (retired).

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(1908), *The Naga Tribes of Manipur* (1911).

Nagas.

HOLDSWORTH (WILLIAM WEST), M.A., B.D.

Tutor in New Testament Language and
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Gospels, Gospel Origins*, and other works.

Patience.

INGE (WILLIAM RALPH), D.D.

Dean of St. Paul's; author of *Christian
Mysticism* (1899), *Studies of English Mystics*
(1906), *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*
(1907), *Faith and its Psychology* (1908).

Neo-Platonism.

IVERACH (JAMES), M.A., D.D.

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Is God Knowable? (1887), *Evolution and
Christianity* (1894), *Theism in the Light of
Present Science and Philosophy* (1900),
Descartes and Spinoza (1904).

Perception.

JOHNSTON (REGINALD FLEMING), M.A. (Oxon.),
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(1908), *Lion and Dragon in Northern China*
(1910), *Buddhist China* (1913).

Old Age (Chinese), Ordeal (Chinese).

JOLLY (JULIUS), Ph.D. (Munich), Hon. M.D. (Göt-
tingen), Hon. D.Litt. (Oxford).

Ord. Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative
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University of Calcutta; Geheimer Hofrat.

Pariah.

(*Obscure Night*, iii.), in which God humbles, detaches, and purifies the higher part of the soul for that more perfect union of which St. John speaks in *The Spiritual Cantic* and *The Living Flame of Love*. It is to be noted that the method of prayer inculcated for the 'night of the senses' is exactly the traditional one; the 'night of the spirit' is also traditional—the great desolation, trial, purification, taught by almost all mystics.

Something of the tradition of St. John of the Cross was preserved in subsequent writers of the Carmelite Order, among whom may be particularly mentioned Joseph a Jesu Maria († 1626), whose most useful Spanish treatise (1658–59, Ital. version 1654–69) gives in its first part an excellent theory, with practical advice, of contemplation, and Thomas of Jesus († 1627), a great mystic, who closely agrees with the doctrine of Aquinas as above described, adding much which is less to the point from St. Bonaventura, and (especially) Hugh and Richard of St. Victor. Mystical contemplation is knowledge like that of the angels, and is above faith, though below the beatific vision. He distinguishes the lower degrees, which are habitually exercised by the gifts of the Holy Ghost of wisdom and understanding, from the higher, which are never habits, but infused acts, in which experimental knowledge of God is attained by a kind of touch (cf. *Living Flame*, ii.) and embrace (*Via brevis et plana*, 14; *de Contemplatione Divina*, i. 5, v. 2, 14, vi. 1; *de Oratione Divina sive a Deo infusa*, iv. 2, etc.). A later Carmelite, Philippus a SS. Trinitate († 1671), is at times an astonishingly foolish writer. Having declared that we must rise to God from the contemplation of creatures, he wastes a large part of his work upon a summary description of all created things and their uses, with such comments as the following (in the chapter on precious stones): 'lapis iaspis confortat stomachum.' He suggests that mystical contemplation is not by infused intellectual species, but by a partial and blurred communication of the *lumen gloriæ*—an opinion which appears to contradict all Christian mystics, in particular, St. Gregory, St. Thomas, and St. John of the Cross. The Dominican Vallagornera († 1665), though he follows Philippus, is a far better authority. He has filled his book with quotations from St. Thomas, but has no philosophical explanation of mystical philosophy to offer.

5. The reversal of tradition.—St. Francis of Sales († 1622), who shows himself in his *Traité de l'amour de Dieu* as a theologian of wide and profound thought, has given in that work fine descriptions of contemplative prayer, which his subject causes him to treat from an affective point of view. Some of his spiritual letters, and those of St. Jeanne Françoise de Chantal, contain instructions on the traditional method which are of inestimable value.

But at this very time the dogmatic theologians were rising up against mystical theology. The great Dominicans, following the example of St. Thomas in his *Summa*, ignored it; the great Jesuits denied its very existence. For example, Théophile Raynaud († 1663) explains why the 'prayer of silence' and 'spiritual sleep' must be impossible (*Heteroclitia Spiritualia*, ii. 5). Supernatural contemplation, he insists, is the same as 'vulgar mental prayer,' only in a more perfect degree; it culminates in a 'simple intuition of God,' which is a judgment of the reason, completing and crowning a complex theological discursus. Suarez († 1617), the most voluminous of Jesuit theologians, works out precisely the same view at length (*de Virtute Religionis*, tract. IV. ii. 9–20). He admits that God can infuse pure intellectual knowledge (ib. 14–15), and did so in Adam's case, and also in that of the Blessed Virgin Mary, St. John

Baptist, and probably many others; but this is a process altogether above nature; it cannot be begun by man; it is very rarely granted, by some singular privilege, or for the sake of some great public utility, 'for God disposes all things sweetly, and does not perform these miracles without a great cause.' Therefore this miraculous kind of contemplation 'is not counted among the kinds of mental prayer'; it is not to be prayed for, or desired, or in any way procured.

This entire reversal of tradition was little noticed at the time, and many books on mysticism continued to be published by Jesuits as well as others. But the holy Cistercian Cardinal Bona († 1674), in his learned and pious *Via compendii ad Deum*, states boldly that the pure prayer which he inculcates, exercised without phantasmata, by the help of aspirations, 'is universally denied by the schoolastics,' but is admitted by holy and mystical writers. St. Theresa's famous Jesuit confessor, Balthasar Alvarez († 1580), succeeded in justifying before his superiors his own mystical method of prayer; but it was declared unsuitable to other Jesuits, who made meditation obligatory in their society soon after the death of their great founder. Mercurian, who was general of the society from 1573 to 1580, forbade the use of the works of Tauler, Ruysbroeck, Suso, Harphins, St. Gertrude, and St. Mechtilde. Yet some of the chief mystical authors of the 17th cent. are Jesuits, such as Alvarez de Paz († 1620), Sandæus († 1656), and Godinez († 1644); and the older tradition was carried on by various Jesuit ascetical writers, of whom Surin († 1665) is the most celebrated. Other books may be cited: that of the Franciscan Cardinal de Lauria († 1693), who followed mediæval authorities and also the experiences of his friend Joseph of Cupertino, a saint whose life is as touching and poetical as it is extraordinary; and the Benedictine Augustine Baker († 1641), whose many treatises were fused into the celebrated *Sancta Sophia* by Serenus Cressy.

The dangerous absurdities of the Quietists, led by Molinos († 1696) and Mme. Guyon († 1717), did more even than the theologians to bring contemplative prayer into disrepute. The great Bossuet († 1704), indeed, taught the traditional method with his accustomed lucidity, in some opuscles and in some of his letters. Yet the doctrine which prevailed in practice, even in the religious orders, was that discursive meditation, with much movement of the imagination, was suitable to all (except a very few extraordinary and favoured souls), and even to enclosed nuns. It was said to be not only possible, but easy, for every one; and for three hundred years pious souls have been in the habit of supposing their failure in meditation to be a sad and rare phenomenon, due to their own wickedness and laziness, and a peculiarity too disedifying to be owned except in confession. It has been as though St. John of the Cross had never penned his denunciations of directors, who bind souls to seek 'particular knowledge,' to 'apply the senses,' work the imagination, and deduce conclusions by the reason. 'Contemplatives,' 'mystics,' have become a byword, as if they were imaginative, idle, weak-minded, sickly persons—the very antithesis of the real article. But then the popular idea of mystical graces among the educated, the learned, and the students of that *ars artium, regimen animarum*, has been that they consist mainly in revelations and imaginary visions, in ecstasies and raptures (regarded as miracles intended by God to reveal the sanctity of the recipient), stigmata and levitations, and that the safest and most authorized among them are visions of our Lord's Passion, or consolations from His humanity, such as the sight of His sacred heart, or the reception of Him in the arms in the form of an infant, and so forth. Contemplation has been

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Mysticism (Introductory; Christian, New Testament, Protestant), Oversoul, Peculiar People.

JOSEPH (MORRIS).

Senior Minister of the West London Synagogue; author of *Judaism as Creed and Life* (1910).

Old Age (Hebrew and Jewish).

JOYCE (GEORGE HAYWARD), S.J., M.A. (Oxon.).

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Nihilianism.

JUYNBOLL (TH. W.), Dr. juris et phil.

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Ordeal (Arabian and Muhammadan).

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Noachian Precepts.

KEITH (ARTHUR BERRIEALE), D.C.L., D.Litt.

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Numbers (Aryan), Om, Ordeal (Hindu).

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Professor of New Testament Literature and Exegesis, New College, Edinburgh; author of *St. Paul and the Mystery Religions* (1913).

Mysteries (Christian).

KENT (ROLAND G.), A.M., Ph.D.

Professor of Comparative Philology in the University of Pennsylvania.

Path.

LAGRANGE (MARIE-JOSEPH), Docteur en Droit, Maître en Théologie.

Directeur de l'école biblique et archéologique de Jérusalem; correspondant de l'Institut (de France, Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres).

Palmyrenes.

LANGDON (STEPHEN HERBERT), B.D., Ph.D., Hon. M.A. (Oxon.).

Shillito Reader in Assyriology and Comparative Semitic Philology in the University of Oxford; Curator of the University Museum, Babylonian Section, Philadelphia; author of *Nco-Babylonian Royal Inscriptions* (V.A.B. vol. iv.), *Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms*, *A Sumerian Grammar*, *Babylonian Liturgies*.

Mysteries (Babylonian), Names (Sumerian), Ordeal (Babylonian).

LEHMANN (EDVARD), D.Theol., D.Phil.

Professor ord. Theologiæ in the University of Lund, Sweden.

Mysticism (Primitive), Nature (Persian).

LINDSAY (JAMES), M.A., B.Sc., D.D., F.R.S.L., F.R.S.E., F.G.S., M.R.A.S.

Author of *Studies in European Philosophy*, *Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of Religion*, *The Fundamental Problems of Metaphysics*.

Neo-Kantism.

LOWIE (ROBERT H.), Ph.D.

Associate Curator, Department of Anthropology, American Museum of Natural History; Secretary, American Ethnological Society; President (1916), American Folk-Lore Society; associate editor of the *American Anthropologist*.

Ojibwa, Peyote Rite.

MACALISTER (ROBERT ALEXANDER STEWART), Litt.D., F.S.A.

Professor of Celtic Archæology in University College, Dublin; formerly Director of Excavations of the Palestine Exploration Fund; author of *A History of Civilization in Palestine* (1912), *The Excavation of Gezer* (1912).

Philistines.

MACCULLOCH (JOHN ARNOTT), Hon. D.D. (St. Andrews).

Rector of St. Saviour's, Bridge of Allan; Hon. Canon of the Cathedral of the Holy Spirit, Cumbræ; Examiner in Comparative Religion and Philosophy of Religion, Victoria University, Manchester; author of *The Religion of the Ancient Celts*.

Music (Primitive and Savage, Celtic), Nameless Gods, Nature (Primitive and Savage), Nose, Ordeal (Celtic), Parable (Ethnic), Perfumes.

MCINTYRE (JAMES LEWIS), M.A. (Edin. and Oxon.), D.Sc. (Edin.).

Anderson Lecturer in Comparative Psychology to the University of Aberdeen; Lecturer in Psychology, Logic, and Ethics to the Aberdeen Provincial Committee for the Training of Teachers; formerly Examiner in Philosophy to the Universities of Edinburgh and London; author of *Giordano Bruno* (1903).

Panpsychism, Phrenology.

MACLEAN (ARTHUR JOHN), D.D. (Camb.), Hon. D.D. (Glas.).

Bishop of Moray, Ross, and Caithness; author of *Dictionary and Grammar of Vernacular Syriac*, *Ancient Church Orders*, and other works; editor of *East Syrian Liturgies*.

Nestorianism, Ordination (Christian).

MAGNICOLO (NICOL), M.A., D.Litt.

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Mysticism (Hindu).

MCTAGGART (JOHN MCTAGGART ELLIS), Litt.D. (Camb.), Hon. LL.D. (St. Andrews).

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Personality.

MAGNUS (LEONARD A.), LL.B.

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Music (Slavic).

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Professor of Rabbinical Literature in the Dropsie College, Philadelphia.

Philosophy (Jewish).

- MARGOLIOUTH (DAVID SAMUEL), M.A., D.Litt., F.B.A.
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Names (Arabic), Nature (Muhammadan), Old and New Testaments in Muhammadanism.
- MARTIN (ALEXANDER), D.D.
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Pessimism and Optimism.
- MEAD (GEORGE ROBERT STOW), B.A. (Cantab.).
Editor of *The Quest*; author of *Quests Old and New* (1913), and other works.
Occultism.
- MELLONE (SYDNEY H.), M.A. (Lond.), D.Sc. (Edin.).
Principal of the Unitarian Home Missionary College, Manchester; Lecturer in the History of Christian Doctrine in the University of Manchester; author of *Studies in Philosophical Criticism*, *Eternal Life Here and Hereafter*, and other works.
Paradox.
- MENANT (DELPHINE).
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Parsis.
- MENZIES (ALLAN), D.D.
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Paul.
- MICHAUD (EUGÈNE), Docteur en Théologie.
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Old Catholicism.
- MINNS (ELLIS HOVELL), M.A.
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Ossetic Religion.
- MOCKLER-FERRYMAN (AUGUSTUS FERRYMAN), F.R.G.S., F.Z.S., Lieut.-Colonel.
Author of *British West Africa* (1898), and other works.
Negroes and West Africa.
- MOFFATT (JAMES), D.D., D.Litt.
Professor of Church History in the United Free Church College, Glasgow; author of *Critical Introduction to New Testament Literature*, and other works.
Names (Christian), Parousia.
- MOGK (EUGEN), Dr.Phil.
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Muspilli.
- MORET (ALEXANDRE), Docteur ès-Lettres.
Professeur agrégé de l'université; Directeur-adjoint à l'École des Hautes-Études; Conservateur du Musée Guimet, Paris.
Mysteries (Egyptian).
- MOSS (RICHARD WADDY), D.D.
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Nicolaitans.
- MULLINGER (J. BASS), Litt.D. (Camb.).
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Patarini, Perfecti.
- MURAOKA (HANICHI), Dr.Phil. (Stras.).
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Music (Japanese).
- MURRAY (JOHN CLARK), LL.D. (Glas.), F.R.S.C.
Emeritus Professor of Moral Philosophy in McGill University, Montreal; author of *A Handbook of Psychology*, *A Handbook of Christian Ethics*, and other works.
Peevishness.
- NICHOLSON (REYNOLD ALLEYNE), M.A., Litt.D., LL.D.
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Nasir ibn Khusrāu.
- NIVEN (WILLIAM DICKIE), M.A.
Minister of the United Free Church at Blairgowrie; formerly co-examiner in Mental Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen.
Naturalism.
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Parable (Introductory and Biblical).
- OLLARD (SIDNEY LESLIE), M.A.
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Oxford Movement.
- OTTLEY (ROBERT LAURENCE), D.D.
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Passivity, Peace.
- PARSONS (RICHARD GODFREY), M.A. (Oxon.).
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Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism.
- PATON (LEWIS BAYLES), Ph.D., D.D.
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Philo Byblius, Phœnicians.

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Muses, Myrmidons, Ordeal (Roman), Ostracism.
- PETERS (JOHN P.), Ph.D., Sc.D., D.D.
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Nethinim.
- PHILLIPOTS (BERTHA SURTEES), M.A. (Dublin).
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Old Age (Teutonic).
- PINCHES (THEOPHILUS GOLDRIDGE), LL.D. (Glas.), M.R.A.S.
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Music (Babylonian and Assyrian), Parthians.
- PLATT (FREDERIC), M.A., D.D.
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Perfection (Christian).
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Mysticism (Buddhist), Nature (Buddhist), Nihilism (Buddhist), Nirvana, Padmapani, Philosophy (Buddhist).
- PRINCE (JOHN DYNELEY), B.A., Ph.D.
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Music (Muhammadan).
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Pangenesis.
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Phrygians.
- REES (THOMAS), M.A. (Lond.), B.A. (Oxon.).
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Nature (Christian).
- REVON (MICHEL), LL.D., D.Litt.
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Nature (Japanese), Old Age (Japanese).
- RICE (B. LEWIS), C.I.E.
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Mysore State.
- RIVERS (W. H. R.), M.A., M.D., F.R.S., F.R.C.P.
Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; President of the Anthropological Section of the British Association, 1911; author of *The Todas, History of Melanesian Society, Kinship and Social Organisation*.
New Britain and New Ireland, New Caledonia, New Hebrides.
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Nirmalas, Panjab and North-West Frontier Province.
- ROYCE (JOSIAH), Ph.D., LL.D.
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Negation, Order.
- SCOTT (CHARLES ANDERSON), M.A. (Camb.), D.D. (Aber.).
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Paulicians.
- SCOTT (ERNEST FINDLAY), B.A., D.D.
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Ophitism.
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Neo-Hegelianism.
- SEATON (MARY ETHEL).
Mediæval and Modern Languages, Tripos, Class I., 1909 and 1910; sometime Lecturer at Girton College, Cambridge.
Music (Teutonic), Ordeal (Slavic, Teutonic).
- SELBIE (JOHN ALEXANDER), M.A., D.D.
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Ordeal (Hebrew).
- SELIGMAN (CHARLES G.), M.D.
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Nuba.

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Philosophy (Greek, Roman).

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Nalanda.

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Old Age (Roman).

SPENCE (LEWIS), F.R.A.I.

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Paraguay, Peru.

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Professor of Philosophy in the State University of Iowa; author of *The Psychology of Religion.*

Old Age (Psychological).

STEWART (GEORGE WAUCHOPE), M.A., B.D.

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Mnsic (Hebrew).

SWANTON (JOHN REED), Ph.D.

Ethnologist in the Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.; President of the Anthropological Society of Washington, 1916.

Natchez.

TEMPLE (Lt.-Col. Sir RICHARD C., Bart.), C.B., C.I.E.

Hon. Fellow of Trinity Hall, Cambridge; late of the Indian Army; Deputy Commissioner, Burma, 1888-94; Chief Commissioner, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 1894-1903; editor of the *Indian Antiquary* since 1884.

Nicobars.

TENNANT (FREDERICK ROBERT), D.D., B.Sc.

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Natural Law, Occasionalism, Original Sin.

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Pantheism (Greek and Roman).

THOMAS (EDWARD JOSEPH), M.A. (St. And. and Camb.), B.A. (Lond.).

Under-Librarian of Cambridge University; editor of *Buddhist Scriptures*; joint-editor of *Mahāniddesa and Jātaka Tales.*

Mysticism (Buddhist).

THOMSON (J. ARTHUR), M.A., LL.D.

Regius Professor of Natural History in the University of Aberdeen; author of *The Study of Animal Life, The Science of Life, Heredity, The Bible of Nature, Darwinism and Human Life, Outlines of Zoology, The Biology of the Seasons, Introduction to Science, The Wonder of Life.*

Ontogeny and Philogeny, Parasitism, Parthenogenesis.

THURSTON (HERBERT), B.A., S.J.

Joint-editor of the Westminster Library for Priests and Students; author of *Life of St. Hugh of Lincoln, The Holy Year of Jubilee, The Stations of the Cross.*

Office, The Holy.

TURNER (JAMES), M.A. (Edin.), B.A. (Oxon.).

Examiner in Philosophy in the University of London.

Ontology.

VINOGRADOFF (Sir PAUL), D.C.L. (Oxford and Durham), LL.D. (Cambridge, Liverpool,

Calcutta, and Harvard), Dr. Hist. (Moscow), Dr. juris (Berlin), F.B.A.

Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence in the University of Oxford; Fellow of the Imperial Academy in Petrograd; Foreign Member of Royal Danish and Norwegian Academies; Corresponding Member of the Academy in Berlin.

Ordeal (Christian, Greek).

VOLET (GEORGES).

Late Priest of the Eglise St. Denis, Paris, and editor of *Le Catholique Français.*

Petite Eglise (Anticoncordataires).

WADDELL (L. AUSTINE), C.B., C.I.E., LL.D., F.L.S., F.R.A.I., M.R.A.S., M.S.B.A., Lt.-Colonel I.M.S. (retired).

Formerly Professor of Tibetan in University College, London; Hon. Correspondent of the Archaeological Survey of India; author of *The Buddhism of Tibet, Tribes of the Brahmaputra Valley, Lhasa and its Mysteries.*

Padmasambhava, Patna.

WALSHE (W. GILBERT), M.A.

Author of *Confucius and Confucianism, Ways that are Dark*; formerly editor of *China.*

Mysticism (Chinese).

WATKINS (OSCAR DANIEL), M.A.

Vicar of Holywell, Oxford.

Penance (Anglican).

WATSON (EDWARD WILLIAM), D.D.

Canon of Christ Church, and Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Oxford.

Novatianists.

WEISFORD (ENID ELDER HANCOCK).

1st Class Honours Tripos Certificate (Cambridge); temporary Lecturer at Newnham College, Cambridge.

Nature (Lettish, Lithuanian, and Old Prussian, Slavic, Teutonic), Old Prussians.

WENLEY (ROBERT MARK), D.Phil., LL.D., D.Sc.,
Litt.D., D.C.L.
Professor of Philosophy in the University of
Michigan; author of *Modern Thought and
the Crisis in Belief, Kant and His Philo-
sophical Revolution*.
Neo-Cynicism, Neo-Pythagoreanism,
Pancosmism.

WERNER (ALICE), L.L.A. (St. And.).
Lecturer in Swahili, School of Oriental Studies,
London; Goldsmiths' Scholar, Newnham
College, Cambridge, 1878-80; Mary Ewart
Travelling Scholar, 1911-13; formerly
Associates' Fellow, Newnham College,
Cambridge; author of *The Language
Families of Africa*; translator of *An Intro-
duction to the Study of African Languages*.
Nama, Nyika.

WESTERBY (HERBERT), Mus.Bac., F.R.C.O.,
L.Mus. T.C.L.
Tallis Gold Medallist; author of *The Piano
Works of the Great Masters, A History of
Pianoforte Music, The Music of the
Russian Church*.
Music (Christian).

WHITLEY (WILLIAM THOMAS), M.A., LL.D.,
F.R.Hist.S., F.T.S.
Secretary of the Baptist Historical Society;
formerly Principal of the Baptist College
of Victoria, and Secretary of the Victorian
Baptist Foreign Mission.
Persecution (Modern Christian), Phila-
delphians.

WHITTUCK (CHARLES AUGUSTUS), M.A. (Oxon.).
Vicar of St. Mary-the-Virgin, Oxford; late
Fellow of Brasenose College, Oxford; author
of *The Church of England and Recent
Religious Thought*.
Obscurantism.

WIDGERY (ALBAN G.).
Director of the Seminar for the Comparative
Study of Religions, and Professor of Philo-
sophy, Baroda, India.
Needs.

WOODHOUSE (WILLIAM J.), M.A.
Professor of Greek in the University of
Sydney, New South Wales.
Nysa, Old Age (Greek), Omphalos.

YOUNGSON (JOHN W.), D.D.
Of the Church of Scotland Mission, Poona, India.
Nanak.

CROSS-REFERENCES

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In addition to the cross-references throughout the volume, the following list of minor references may be useful:

TOPIC.	PROBABLE TITLE OF ARTICLE.	TOPIC.	PROBABLE TITLE OF ARTICLE.
Musorites . . .	Sects (Christian).	Onciromancy . . .	Dreams, Divination.
Ma'tazilah . . .	Sects (Muhammadan).	Ongons . . .	Buriats.
Muyscas . . .	Chibchas.	Ophiolatry . . .	Serpent-worship.
Naassenes . . .	Gnosticism.	Orders, Holy . . .	Ministry.
Nahuans . . .	Mexicans.	Orders, Religious. . .	Religious Orders.
Nairs . . .	Nayar.	Orientation . . .	Points of the Compass.
Nakedness . . .	Dress.	Orphism . . .	Mysteries (Greek), Greek Religion.
Nasoreans . . .	Mandæans.	Osages . . .	Siouans.
Navel . . .	Omphalos.	Ovaherero . . .	Bantu and East Africa.
Niamis . . .	Negroes and West Africa.	Owl . . .	Animals.
Nichiren . . .	Japan, Sects (Buddhist).	Pācittiya . . .	Vinaya.
Nigerians . . .	Negroes and West Africa.	Pain . . .	Suffering.
Nigganthas . . .	Jainism.	Pārājikā . . .	Vinaya.
Night . . .	Light and Darkness.	Paramita . . .	Bodhisattva, Perfection (Buddhist).
Nirgranthis . . .	Jainism.	Paritta. . .	Magic (Buddhist).
Nomads . . .	Pastoral Peoples.	Passamaquoddies. . .	Algonquins (Eastern).
Norn . . .	Doom, Doom-myths (Teutonic).	Passion-play . . .	Miracle-plays.
North, South, East, and West . . .	Points of the Compass.	Passions . . .	Emotions.
Nndity. . .	Dress.	Patriarchy . . .	Mother-right.
Oberammergan . . .	Miracle-plays.	Paulianists . . .	Samosatenism.
Occam . . .	Scholasticism.	Peacock . . .	Animals.
Old Believers . . .	Sects (Russian).	Pedagogics . . .	Education.
Old Man of the Mountain . . .	Assassins.	Penitentiary . . .	Prisons.
Ona . . .	Patagonians.	Penobscots . . .	Algonquins (Eastern).
Oñbanakis . . .	Algonquins (Eastern).	Petrobrusians . . .	Sects (Christian).

LISTS OF ABBREVIATIONS

I. GENERAL

A.H. = Anno Hijrae (A.D. 622).
 Ak. = Akkadian.
 Alox. = Alexandrian.
 Amer. = American.
 Apoc. = Apocalypse, Apocalyptic.
 Apocr. = Apocrypha.
 Aq. = Aquila.
 Arab. = Arabic.
 Aram. = Aramaic.
 Arm. = Armenian.
 Ary. = Aryan.
 As. = Asiatic.
 Assyr. = Assyrian.
 AT = Altes Testament.
 AV = Authorized Version.
 AVm = Authorized Version margin.
 A.Y. = Anno Yazdagird (A.D. 639).
 Bab. = Babylonian.
 c. = circa, about.
 Can. = Canaanite.
 cf. = compare.
 ct. = contrast.
 D = Deuteronomist.
 E = Elohist.
 edd. = editions or editors.
 Egyp. = Egyptian.
 Eng. = English.
 Eth. = Ethiopic.
 EV, EVV = English Version, Versions.
 f. = and following verse or page.
 ff. = and following verses or pages.
 Fr. = French.
 Germ. = German.
 Gr. = Greek.
 H = Law of Holiness.
 Heb. = Hebrew.
 Hel. = Hellenistic.
 Hex. = Hexateuch.
 Himy. = Hinyaritic.
 Ir. = Irish.
 Iran. = Iranian.

Isr. = Israelite.
 J = Jehuist.
 J" = Jehovah.
 Jerus. = Jerusalem.
 Jos. = Josephus.
 LXX = Septuagint.
 Min. = Minæan.
 MSS = Manuscripts.
 MT = Massoretic Text.
 n. = note.
 NT = New Testament.
 Onk. = Onkelos.
 OT = Old Testament.
 P = Priestly Narrative.
 Pal. = Palestine, Palestinian.
 Pent. = Pentateuch.
 Pers. = Persian.
 Phil. = Philistine.
 Phœn. = Phœnician.
 Pr. Bk. = Prayer Book.
 R = Redactor.
 Rom. = Roman.
 RV = Revised Version.
 RVm = Revised Version margin.
 Sab. = Sabæan.
 Sam. = Samaritan.
 Sem. = Semitic.
 Sept. = Septuagint.
 Sin. = Sinitic.
 Skr. = Sanskrit.
 Symm. = Symmachus.
 Syr. = Syriac.
 t. (following a number) = times.
 Talm. = Talmud.
 Targ. = Targum.
 Theod. = Theodotion.
 TR = Textus Receptus, Received Text.
 tr. = translated or translation.
 VSS = Versions.
 Vulg., Vg. = Vulgate.
 WH = Westcott and Hort's text.

II. BOOKS OF THE BIBLE

Old Testament.

Gn = Genesis.	Ca = Canticles.
Ex = Exodus.	Is = Isaiah.
Lv = Leviticus.	Jer = Jeremiah.
Num = Numbers.	La = Lamentations.
Dt = Deuteronomy.	Ezk = Ezekiel.
Jos = Joshua.	Da = Daniel.
Jg = Judges.	Hos = Hosea.
Ru = Ruth.	Jo = Joel.
1 S, 2 S = 1 and 2 Samuel.	Am = Amos.
1 K, 2 K = 1 and 2 Kings.	Ob = Obadiah.
1 Ch, 2 Ch = 1 and 2 Chronicles.	Jon = Jonah.
Ezr = Ezra.	Mic = Micah.
Neh = Nehemiah.	Nah = Nahum.
Est = Esther.	Hab = Habakkuk.
Job.	Zeph = Zephaniah.
Ps = Psalms.	Hag = Haggai.
Pr = Proverbs.	Zec = Zechariah.
Ee = Ecclesiastes.	Mal = Malachi.

Apocrypha.

1 Es, 2 Es = 1 and 2 Esdras.	To = Tobit.
	Jth = Judith.

Ad. Est = Additions to Esther.	Sns = Susanna.
Wis = Wisdom.	Bel = Bel and the Dragon.
Sir = Sirach or Ecclesiasticus.	Pr. Man = Prayer of Manasses.
Bar = Baruch.	1 Mac, 2 Mac = 1 and 2 Maccabees.
Three = Song of the Three Children.	

New Testament.

Mt = Matthew.	1 Th, 2 Th = 1 and 2 Thessalonians.
Mk = Mark.	1 Ti, 2 Ti = 1 and 2 Timothy.
Lk = Luke.	Tit = Titus.
Jn = John.	Philem = Philemon.
Ac = Acts.	Ho = Hebrews.
Ro = Romans.	Ja = James.
1 Co, 2 Co = 1 and 2 Corinthians.	1 P, 2 P = 1 and 2 Peter.
Gal = Galatians.	1 Jn, 2 Jn, 3 Jn = 1, 2, and 3 John.
Eph = Ephesians.	Jude.
Ph = Philippians.	Rev = Revelation.
Col = Colossians.	

III. FOR THE LITERATURE

1. The following authors' names, when unaccompanied by the title of a book, stand for the works in the list below.

- Baethgen=*Beiträge zur sem. Religionsgesch.*, 1888.
 Baldwin=*Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology*, 3 vols. 1901-1905.
 Barth=*Nominalbildung in den sem. Sprachen*, 2 vols. 1889, 1891 (²1894).
 Benzinger=*Heb. Archäologie*, 1894.
 Brockelmann=*Gesch. d. arab. Litteratur*, 2 vols. 1897-1902.
 Bruns-Sachau=*Syr.-Röm. Rechtsbuch aus dem fünften Jahrhundert*, 1880.
 Budge=*Gods of the Egyptians*, 2 vols. 1903.
 Daremberg-Saglio=*Dict. des ant. grec. et rom.*, 1886-90.
 De la Saussaye=*Lehrbuch der Religionsgesch.*, 1905.
 Denzinger=*Enchiridion Symbolorum*¹¹, Freiburg im Br., 1911.
 Deussen=*Die Philos. d. Upanishads*, 1899 [Eng. tr., 1906].
 Doughty=*Arabia Deserta*, 2 vols. 1888.
 Grimm=*Deutsche Mythologie*⁴, 3 vols. 1875-1878, Eng. tr. *Teutonic Mythology*, 4 vols. 1882-1888.
 Hamburger=*Realencyclopädie für Bibel u. Talmud*, i. 1870 (¹1892), ii. 1883, suppl. 1886, 1891 f., 1897.
 Holder=*Altceltischer Sprachschatz*, 1891 ff.
 Holtzmann-Zöpfel=*Lexicon f. Theol. u. Kirchenwesen*², 1895.
 Howitt=*Native Tribes of S. E. Australia*, 1904.
 Jubainville=*Cours de Litt. celtique*, i.-xii., 1883 ff.
 Lagrange=*Études sur les religions sémitiques*², 1904.
 Lane=*An Arabic-English Dictionary*, 1863 ff.
 Lang=*Myth, Ritual and Religion*², 2 vols. 1899.
 Lepsius=*Denkmäler aus Ägypten u. Äthiopien*, 1849-1860.
 Lichtenberger=*Encyc. des sciences religieuses*, 1876.
 Lidzbarski=*Handbuch der nordsem. Epigraphik*, 1898.
 McCardy=*History, Prophecy, and the Monuments*, 2 vols. 1894-1896.
 Muir=*Orig. Sanskrit Texts*, 1858-1872.
 Muss-Arnolt=*A Concise Dict. of the Assyrian Language*, 1894 ff.
 Nowack=*Lehrbuch d. heb. Archäologie*, 2 vols. 1894.
 Pauly-Wissowa=*Realencyc. der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, 1894 ff.
 Perrot-Chipiez=*Hist. de l'Art dans l'Antiquité*, 1881 ff.
 Preller=*Römische Mythologie*, 1858.
 Réville=*Religion des peuples non-civilisés*, 1883.
 Riehm=*Handwörterbuch d. bibl. Altertums*², 1892-1894.
 Robinson=*Biblical Researches in Palestine*², 1856.
 Roscher=*Lex. d. gr. u. röm. Mythologie*, 1884 ff.
 Schaff-Herzog=*The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Relig. Knowledge*, 1908 ff.
 Sohenkel=*Bibel-Lexicon*, 5 vols. 1869-1875.
 Schürer=*GV*², 3 vols. 1898-1901 [*HJP*, 5 vols. 1890 ff.].
 Schwally=*Leben nach dem Tode*, 1892.
 Siegfried-Stade=*Heb. Wörterbuch zum AT*, 1893.
 Smend=*Lehrbuch der alttest. Religionsgesch.*², 1899.
 Smith (G. A.)=*Historical Geography of the Holy Land*⁴, 1896.
 Smith (W. R.)=*Religion of the Semites*², 1894.
 Spencer (H.)=*Principles of Sociology*², 1885-1896.
 Spencer-Gillen^a=*Native Tribes of Central Australia*, 1899.
 Spencer-Gillen^b=*Northern Tribes of Central Australia*, 1904.
 Swete=*The OT in Greek*, 3 vols. 1893 ff.
 Tylor (E. B.)=*Primitive Culture*², 1891 [⁴1903].
 Ueberweg=*Hist. of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., 2 vols. 1872-1874.
 Weber=*Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud u. verwandten Schriften*², 1897.
 Wiedemann=*Die Religion der alten Aegypter*, 1890 [Eng. tr., revised, *Religion of the Anc. Egyptians*, 1897].
 Wilkinson=*Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, 3 vols. 1878.
 Zunz=*Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der Juden*², 1892.

2. Periodicals, Dictionaries, Encyclopædias, and other standard works frequently cited.

- AA=Archiv für Anthropologie.
 AAOJ=American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal.
 ABAW=Abhandlungen d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
 AE=Archiv für Ethnographie.
 AEG=Assyr. and Eng. Glossary (Johns Hopkins University).
 AGG=Abhandlungen der Göttinger Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
 AGPh=Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
 AHR=American Historical Review.
 AHT=Ancient Hebrew Tradition (Hommel).
 AJPh=American Journal of Philology.
 AJP=American Journal of Psychology.
 AJRPE=American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education.
 AJSL=American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literature.
 AJTh=American Journal of Theology.
 AMG=Annales du Musée Guimet.
 APES=American Palestine Exploration Society.
 APF=Archiv für Papyrusforschung.
 AR=Anthropological Review.
 ARW=Archiv für Religionswissenschaft.
 AS=Acta Sanctorum (Bollandus).
 ASG=Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften.
 ASoc=L'Année Sociologique.
 ASWI=Archæological Survey of W. India.
 AZ=Allgemeine Zeitung.
 BAG=Beiträge zur alten Geschichte.
 BASS=Beiträge zur Assyriologie u. sem. Sprachwissenschaft (edd. Delitzsch and Haupt).
 BCH=Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique.
 BE=Bureau of Ethnology.
 BG=Bombay Gazetteer.
 BJ=Bellum Judaicum (Josephus).
 BL=Bampton Lectures.
 BLE=Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique.
 BOR=Bab. and Oriental Record.
 BS=Bibliotheca Sacra.
 BSA=Annual of the British School at Athens.
 BSAA=Bulletin de la Soc. archéologique à Alexandrie.
 BSAL=Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie de Lyon.
 BSAP=Bulletin de la Soc. d'Anthropologie, etc., Paris.
 BSG=Bulletin de la Soc. de Géographie.
 BTS=Buddhist Text Society.
 BW=Biblical World.
 BZ=Biblische Zeitschrift.

- CAIBL* = Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
CBTS = Calcutta Buddhist Text Society.
CE = Catholic Encyclopedia.
CF = Childhood of Fiction (MacCulloch).
CGS = Cults of the Greek States (Farnell).
CI = Census of India.
CIA = Corpus Inscript. Atticarum.
CIE = Corpus Inscript. Etruscarum.
CIG = Corpus Inscript. Græcarum.
CIL = Corpus Inscript. Latinarum.
CIS = Corpus Inscript. Semiticarum.
COT = Cuneiform Inscriptions and the OT [Eng. tr. of *KAT*²; see below].
CR = Contemporary Review.
CeR = Celtic Review.
CIR = Classical Review.
CQR = Church Quarterly Review.
CSEL = Corpus Script. Eccles. Latinorum.
DAC = Dict. of the Apostolic Church.
DACL = Dict. d'Archéologie chrétienne et de Liturgie (Cabrol).
DB = Dict. of the Bible.
DCA = Dict. of Christian Antiquities (Smith-Cheetham).
DCB = Dict. of Christian Biography (Smith-Wace).
DCG = Dict. of Christ and the Gospels.
DI = Dict. of Islam (Hughes).
DNB = Dict. of National Biography.
DPHP = Dict. of Philosophy and Psychology.
DWAW = Denkschriften der Wiener Akad. der Wissenschaften.
EBi = Encyclopædia Biblica.
EBr = Encyclopædia Britannica.
EEFM = Egypt. Explor. Fund Memoirs.
EI = Encyclopædia of Islâm.
ERE = The present work.
Exp = Expositor.
ExpT = Expository Times.
FHG = Fragmenta Historicorum Græcorum (coll. C. Müller, Paris, 1885).
FL = Folklore.
FLJ = Folklore Journal.
FLR = Folklore Record.
GA = Gazette Archéologique.
GB = Golden Bough (Frazer).
GGA = Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen.
GGN = Göttingische Gelehrte Nachrichten (Nachrichten der königl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen).
GIAP = Grundriss d. Indo-Arischen Philologie.
GIRP = Grundriss d. Iranischen Philologie.
GJV = Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes.
GVI = Geschichte des Volkes Israel.
HAI = Handbook of American Indians.
HDB = Hastings' Dict. of the Bible.
HE = Historia Ecclesiastica.
HGHL = Historical Geography of the Holy Land (G. A. Smith).
HI = History of Israel.
HJ = Hibbert Journal.
HJP = History of the Jewish People.
HL = Hibbert Lectures.
HN = Historia Naturalis (Pliny).
HWB = Handwörterbuch.
IA = Indian Antiquary.
ICC = International Critical Commentary.
ICO = International Congress of Orientalists.
ICR = Indian Census Report.
IG = Inscript. Græcæ (publ. under auspices of Berlin Academy, 1873 ff.).
IGA = Inscript. Græcæ Antiquissimæ.
IGI = Imperial Gazetteer of India² (1885); new edition (1908-09).
IJE = International Journal of Ethics.
ITL = International Theological Library.
JA = Journal Asiatique.
JAFI = Journal of American Folklore.
JAI = Journal of the Anthropological Institute.
JAIOS = Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JASB = Journal of the Anthropological Society of Bombay.
JASBe = Journ. of As. Soc. of Bengal.
JBL = Journal of Biblical Literature.
JBTS = Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.
JD = Journal des Débats.
JDTb = Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie.
JE = Jewish Encyclopedia.
JGOS = Journal of the German Oriental Society.
JHC = Johns Hopkins University Circulars.
JHS = Journal of Hellenic Studies.
JLZ = Jenier Litteraturzeitung.
JPh = Journal of Philology.
JPTb = Jahrbücher für protestantische Theologie.
JPTS = Journal of the Pali Text Society.
JQR = Jewish Quarterly Review.
JRAI = Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute.
JRAS = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
JRASBo = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay branch.
JRASC = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Ceylon branch.
JRASK = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Korean branch.
JRGS = Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.
JRS = Journal of Roman Studies.
JThSt = Journal of Theological Studies.
*KAT*² = Die Keilinschriften und das AT² (Schrader), 1883.
*KAT*² = Zimmern-Winckler's ed. of the preceding (really a totally distinct work), 1903.
KB or *KIB* = Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek (Schrader), 1880 ff.
KGF = Keilinschriften und die Geschichtsforschung, 1878.
LCB = Literarisches Centralblatt.
LOPh = Literaturblatt für Oriental. Philologie.
LOT = Introduction to Literature of OT (Driver).
LP = Legend of Perseus (Hartland).
LSS = Leipziger sem. Studien.
M = Mémoires.
MAIBL = Mémoires de l'Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres.
MBAW = Monatsbericht d. Berliner Akad. d. Wissenschaften.
MGH = Monumenta Germaniae Historica (Pertz).
MGJV = Mittheilungen der Gesellschaft für jüdische Volkskunde.
MGWJ = Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums.
MI = Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas (Westermarck).
MNDPV = Mittheilungen u. Nachrichten des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
MR = Methodist Review.
MYG = Mittheilungen der vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft.
MWJ = Magazin für die Wissenschaft des Judentums.
NBAC = Nuovo Bullettino di Archeologia Cristiana.
NC = Nineteenth Century.
NHWB = Neuhebräisches Wörterbuch.
NINQ = North Indian Notes and Queries.
NKZ = Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift.
NQ = Notes and Queries.
NR = Native Races of the Pacific States (Bancroft).
NTZG = Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte.
OED = Oxford English Dictionary.
OLZ = Orientalische Litteraturzeitung.
OS = Onomastica Sacra.
OTJC = Old Testament in the Jewish Church (W. R. Smith).
OTP = Oriental Translation Fund Publications.
PAOS = Proceedings of American Oriental Society.

<i>PASB</i> =Proceedings of the Anthropological Soc. of Bombay.	<i>SBAW</i> =Sitzungsberichte d. Berliner Akademie d. Wissenschaften.
<i>PB</i> =Polychrome Bible (English).	<i>SBB</i> =Sacred Books of the Buddhists.
<i>PBE</i> =Publications of the Bureau of Ethnology.	<i>SBE</i> =Sacred Books of the East.
<i>PC</i> =Primitive Culture (Tylor).	<i>SBOT</i> =Sacred Books of the OT (Hebrew).
<i>PEFM</i> =Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Memoirs.	<i>SDB</i> =Single-vol. Dict. of the Bible (Hastings).
<i>PEFSt</i> =Palestine Exploration Fund Statement.	<i>SK</i> =Studien und Kritiken.
<i>PG</i> =Patrologia Græca (Migne).	<i>SMA</i> =Sitzungsberichte d. Münchener Akademie.
<i>PJB</i> =Preussische Jahrbücher.	<i>SSGW</i> =Sitzungsberichte d. Kgl. Sächs. Gesellsch. d. Wissenschaften.
<i>PL</i> =Patrologia Latina (Migne).	<i>SWAW</i> =Sitzungsberichte d. Wiener Akademie d. Wissenschaften.
<i>PNQ</i> =Punjab Notes and Queries.	<i>TAPA</i> =Transactions of American Philological Association.
<i>PR</i> =Popular Religion and Folklore of N. India (Crooke).	<i>TASJ</i> =Transactions of the Asiatic Soc. of Japan.
<i>PRE</i> =Prot. Realencyclopädie (Herzog-Hauck).	<i>TC</i> =Tribes and Castes.
<i>PRR</i> =Presbyterian and Reformed Review.	<i>TES</i> =Transactions of Ethnological Society.
<i>PRS</i> =Proceedings of the Royal Society.	<i>ThLZ</i> =Theologische Literaturzeitung.
<i>PRSE</i> =Proceedings Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.	<i>ThT</i> =Theol. Tijdschrift.
<i>PSBA</i> =Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology.	<i>TRHS</i> =Transactions of Royal Historical Society.
<i>PTS</i> =Pāli Text Society.	<i>TRSE</i> =Transactions of Royal Soc. of Edinburgh.
<i>RA</i> =Revue Archéologique.	<i>TS</i> =Texts and Studies.
<i>RAnth</i> =Revue d'Anthropologie.	<i>TSBA</i> =Transactions of the Soc. of Biblical Archaeology.
<i>RAS</i> =Royal Asiatic Society.	<i>TU</i> =Texte und Untersuchungen.
<i>RAssyr</i> =Revue d'Assyriologie.	<i>WAI</i> =Western Asiatic Inscriptions.
<i>RB</i> =Revue Biblique.	<i>WZKM</i> =Wiener Zeitschrift f. Kunde des Morgenlandes.
<i>RBEW</i> =Reports of the Bureau of Ethnology (Washington).	<i>ZA</i> =Zeitschrift für Assyriologie.
<i>RC</i> =Revue Critique.	<i>ZÄ</i> =Zeitschrift für ägypt. Sprache u. Altertumswissenschaft.
<i>RCel</i> =Revue Celtique.	<i>ZATW</i> =Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft.
<i>RCh</i> =Revue Chrétienne.	<i>ZCK</i> =Zeitschrift für christliche Kunst.
<i>RDM</i> =Revue des Deux Mondes.	<i>ZCP</i> =Zeitschrift für celtische Philologie.
<i>RE</i> =Realencyclopädie.	<i>ZDA</i> =Zeitschrift für deutsches Altertum.
<i>REG</i> =Revue des Études Grecques.	<i>ZDMG</i> =Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.
<i>REg</i> =Revue Égyptologique.	<i>ZDPV</i> =Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins.
<i>REJ</i> =Revue des Études Juives.	<i>ZE</i> =Zeitschrift für Ethnologie.
<i>REth</i> =Revue d'Ethnographie.	<i>ZKF</i> =Zeitschrift für Keilschriftforschung.
<i>RGG</i> =Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.	<i>ZKG</i> =Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte.
<i>RHLR</i> =Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature religieuses.	<i>ZKT</i> =Zeitschrift für kathol. Theologie.
<i>RHR</i> =Revue de l'Histoire des Religions.	<i>ZKWL</i> =Zeitschrift für kirchl. Wissenschaft und kirchl. Leben.
<i>RMM</i> =Revue du monde musulman.	<i>ZM</i> =Zeitschrift für die Mythologie.
<i>RN</i> =Revue Numismatique.	<i>ZNTW</i> =Zeitschrift für die neuest. Wissenschaft.
<i>RP</i> =Records of the Past.	<i>ZPhP</i> =Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Pädagogik.
<i>RPh</i> =Revue Philologique.	<i>ZTK</i> =Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.
<i>RQ</i> =Römische Quartalschrift.	<i>ZVK</i> =Zeitschrift für Volkskunde.
<i>RS</i> =Revue sémitique d'Épigraphie et d'Hist. ancienne.	<i>ZVRW</i> =Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft.
<i>RSA</i> =Recueil de la Soc. archéologique.	<i>ZWT</i> =Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie.
<i>RSI</i> =Reports of the Smithsonian Institution.	
<i>RTAP</i> =Recueil de Travaux relatifs à l'Archéologie et à la Philologie.	
<i>RTP</i> =Revue des traditions populaires.	
<i>RThPh</i> =Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie.	
<i>RTr</i> =Recueil de Travaux.	
<i>RVV</i> =Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten.	
<i>RWB</i> =Realwörterbuch.	

[A small superior number designates the particular edition of the work referred to, as *KAT*², *LOT*³, etc.]

ENCYCLOPÆDIA

OF

RELIGION AND ETHICS

M

MUNDAS.—The Mündās are a tribe of Northern India, numbering, at the Census of 1911, 574,434, of whom 410,440 were found in the Province of Bihār and Orissa, 67,252 in Bengal, and 91,293 in Assam, where they have emigrated in search of work on the tea-plantations. The headquarters of the tribe is Chotā Nāgpur, and the Rānchi District in particular. The word Mündā is of Skr. origin, meaning 'head-man of a village,' and it was applied to them by their Hindu neighbours, while they call themselves Horo-ko, 'men,' the same root appearing in the tribal names Kol and Orāon (*qq.v.*).

1. Physical characteristics and language.—The skin colour of the Mündās is dark brown, not uncommonly approaching black; the head inclines to be long or dolichocephalic, the nose is thick, broad, sometimes depressed at the root, the lips thick, the facial angle comparatively low, the face wide and fleshy, the features irregular, the figure squat, the limbs sturdy and well-formed, the stature short (S. C. Roy, *The Mundas and their Country*, p. 362). The tribal language, known as Mündārī, is spoken by a collection of tribes, including Santāls, Mündās, and Hos, who inhabit a compact block of country on the Chotā Nāgpur plateau, and by one or two outlying tribes in the south of the Orissa States and the east of the Central Provinces. But before the advent of the Aryan-speaking tribes into Northern India there is evidence that Mündārī dialects were current over the greater part of the Indo-Gangetic plain. The theory of F. Hahn, that the Mündā and Dravidian languages belong to the same family, has been controverted by G. A. Grierson:

'The two families only agree in such points as are common to most agglutinative languages, and there is no philological reason for deriving them from the same original' (*Linguistic Survey of India*, iv. [Calcutta, 1906] 31.).

W. Schmidt (*Die Mon-Khmer-Völker: ein Bindeglied zwischen Völkern Zentralasiens und Austro-nesiens*, Brunswick, 1906) has shown that the Mündā languages can no longer be referred to an assumed Dravido-Mündā family, but are a sub-family of the Austro-Asiatic group, and therefore allied to the languages spoken by the Mōns, Palaungs, and Wās of Burma, the Khāsis of Assam, the pagan tribes of the Malay Peninsula, and the Nicobarese (see art. KOL, KOLARIAN).

2. Theories of origin.—Risley (*TCi.*, Introd. xli) established on the basis of anthropometry that there was no physical difference between the Kolarian (*q.v.*) and the Dravidian-speaking tribes, and he identified the Mündās with the latter; in other words, he assumed that they were immigrants from Southern India. S. C. Roy (p. 43 f.) points out that their traditions suggest that they came from the Himālayan region, and he has collected references from Vedic and later Hindu literature connecting them with the non-Aryan races known collectively as Dāsa and Dasyu—general terms for the aborigines who resisted the Aryan-speaking tribes. But these do not specially refer to the Mündās. Grierson suggested that the Dravidian ethnic type may really be that of the Mündās; that the former intermarried with Mündās, while their descendants retained their own language. Gait points out that the absence of Mündā languages anywhere in the south of India stands in the way of this hypothesis. The wide currency of Mōn-Khmēr dialects in Northern India can be explained only on the supposition of a migration of these people from Further India.

'Except where it has been influenced by immigration from the north-west or north-east in comparatively recent times, the general uniformity of physical type throughout India seems to show that the speakers both of the Mündā and of the Dravidian languages must have been settled there for countless ages, during which intermarriage and climatic influences and environment gradually destroyed the former racial distinctions and evolved an uniform type' (*Census of India*, 1911, i. 825).

3. Social structure, totemism, and occupation.—Mündās, except as regards the Bhumij and Khangār tribes, are endogamous, and intermarriage with other neighbouring tribes is prohibited. The tribe is divided into a number of exogamous sects (*kili*), many of which are of totemistic origin. So great is the Mündā's respect for his totem that he prevents it, if he can, from being eaten by men of other castes or tribes in his presence. As examples of these totemistic sections S. C. Roy (p. 407 ff.) gives the Soē *kili*, which takes its name from the soē fish; the Horo (or tortoise) *kili*; the Nāg (or serpent) *kili*, and so on. By the more Hinduized Mündās their section names have been modified in order to assimilate them to the Hindu *gotra*, or sections. Thus the Sāndi (or bull) section has been transformed into the Sāṇḍilya *gotra*, which sprang

from the ancient *r̥ṣi*, or saint, *Sāṇḍila*, and so on (p. 410f.). In early days the functions of the *mūṇḍā*, or secular head-man, and the *pāhān*, or ecclesiastical head-man, were not differentiated. Later on, villages, generally twelve in number, were grouped together in a local body (*paṭṭī*) under a chief known as *manki*. The offices of the *mūṇḍā* and the *manki* gradually came to be hereditary, and the *mūṇḍā*, or village-chief, was assisted by a council (*pañch*), which arbitrated on the basis of local customary law in disputes between the villagers. Originally hunting and iron-working were their chief occupations, but these were gradually replaced by agriculture. Drinking was a tribal propensity, and, according to their legends, the mysterious root used in the manufacture of rice-beer was revealed to their first parents by their god Singbonga.

4. Religion.—Their legend of the creation of the world and of the origin of the human race is thus told :

'Otē Borām and Sing Bonga were self-created, and they made the earth with rocks and waters, and they clothed it with grass and trees, and then created animals, first, those that are domesticated, and, afterwards, wild beasts. When all was prepared for the abode of man, a boy and a girl were created, and Sing Bonga placed them in a cave at the bottom of a great ravine, and, finding them to be too innocent to give hope of progeny, he instructed them in the art of making *illī*, rice beer, which excites the passions, and thus the world became peopled. When the first parents had produced twelve boys and twelve girls, Sing Bonga prepared a feast of the flesh of buffaloes, bullocks, goats, sheep, pigs, fowls, and vegetables, and, making the brothers and sisters pair off, told each pair to take what they most relished and depart. The first and second pair took bullocks' and buffaloes' flesh, and they originated the *Kols* (Hos) and the *Bhūmī* (Matkum); the next took of the vegetables only, and are the progenitors of the *Brāhmins* and *Chattris* (*Kṣatriya*); others took goats and fish, and from them are the *Gūdras*. One pair took the shell-fish and became *Bhuiyās* [q.v.]; two pairs took pigs and became the *Santāis*. One pair got nothing, seeing which the first pairs gave them of their superfluity, and from the pair thus provided spring the *Ghāsīs*, who toil not, but live by preying on others. The Hos have now assigned to the English the honour of descent from one of the first two pairs, the elder. The only incident in the above tradition that reminds of the more highly elaborated *Santāl* account is in the divine authority for the use of strong drinks' (Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, p. 185).

Other tribal legends have been collected by S. C. Roy (App. i.).

The *Mūṇḍā* divinities have no image or symbol, but they may, when propitiated by sacrifice, take up their abode for a time in places specially dedicated to them, such as masses of rocks or more particularly in small patches of forest carefully preserved and left untouched as refuges for the sylvan gods when the jungle was cleared. These groves (*jāhira*, *sarnā*) are sacrosanct, and, if a tree be cut down, the deities show their displeasure by withholding seasonable rain (Dalton, p. 185f.). The other centres of religious and social life are, first, an open space (*akhrā*), where public meetings are held, disputes investigated, crimes punished, and on moonlit nights and during festivals the young folk dance and sing in the presence of the elders seated round the arena on slabs of stone; secondly, the tribal cemetery (*sasān*), where the deceased members of each family are commemorated by large slabs of stone lying prostrate or propped up by smaller stones. If a *Mūṇḍā* dies abroad, his bones will, if possible, be conveyed to the family cemetery.

At the head of the divine pantheon stands Singbonga, usually identified with the sun, a beneficent but somewhat inactive deity, who concerns himself little with human affairs, the direction of which he entrusts to departmental deities. When his subordinates permit sickness or other calamity to attack men, he is propitiated, by way of appeal, with sacrifices of white goats or cocks. Next in order of dignity comes Burubonga, Marang Buru, or Pāt Sarnā, a mountain-god, who dwells on the highest hill or rock in the neighbourhood. He

is represented by no visible object, the sacrifices being made to him on a globular mass of rock. Next come the village tutelary deities (*hātu bongāko*), who assist in agriculture and hunting, and order every human event. They are worshipped in the sacred grove at stated times by the *pāhān*, or village-priest. In the last class are the house-gods (*orā bongāko*), the spirits of the deceased ancestors of each family, who are worshipped in the house-chapel (*āding*) by the house-master. These classes of deities alone are the object of worship, and are to be carefully distinguished from the host of malevolent spirits who must be appeased or propitiated. They are believed to be the earth-bound spirits of persons who died a violent or unnatural death, and their propitiation is conducted, not by the regular village-priest, but by a class of ghost-finders (*nājo*, *matī*, *deonrā*) who are not infrequently drawn from tribes other than the *Mūṇḍā*. With these may be grouped the elemental spirits or nature-gods, such as *Ikirbonga*, who rules over wells and sheets of water, and *Nāgā-erā* or *Nāgē*, serpent-gods, who haunt the swampy lower levels of the terraced rice-fields, and are ordinarily benevolent, but, if offended, are aroused to mischievous activity, and require propitiation conducted by a ghost-finder or by the village *pāhān*. The special village-god is *Desvālī*, or *Kārāsarnā*, who lives with his consort *Jahir Būrhi* or *Sarbūlsarnā* in the sacred grove. In addition to these various gods there are benevolent guardian spirits, like *Achraebonga*, who looks after married women. But he is supposed to punish them severely if, during their periodical visits to the house of their parents, they pilfer anything.

According as a man has led a good or an evil life, he will be sent back to the world by Singbonga as a man, a beast, a bird, or an insect. At the time of death the soul (*roā*) goes to *Jom Rājā*, the Yama of the Hindus, who lives in the south. The *Mūṇḍā* idea of metempsychosis is elementary, and is probably, to a large extent, borrowed from the Hindus.

5. Festivals.—The *Mūṇḍā* festivals are connected with the phases of the agricultural seasons. They are as follows: (1) *Māgē Parab*, held after the harvest in January, when the divine ancestors are invoked to bless the household; (2) *Phāgū*, held in the spring month *Phālguna* of the Hindus, corresponding to the *Holi*, or vernal, festival of the Hindus; (3) *Sarbūl* or *Bā Parab*, 'flower feast,' in March-April, to commemorate the flowering of the sacred *sāl* tree (*Shorea robusta*); garlands of its leaves are worn, and all the food eaten that day is served on its leaves; (4) *Honba Parab*, in April-May, when rice-sowing begins; (5) *Batauli*, after the transplantation of the rice; (6) *Karam*, when a branch of the *karam* tree (*Nauclea parvifolia*) is set up, worshipped, and then flung into water, apparently as a rain-charm; (7) *Kolomsingbonga*, in November, held at the threshing-floor after the rice has been harvested; (8) *Sohorāi*, in October-November, when cattle are adored; (9) *Sosobonga*, held about August and apparently intended to exorcize evil spirits, the chief part being played, not by the *pāhān*, or village-priest, but by the ghost-finder, *matī* or *deonrā*. For details of these festivals see S. C. Roy, p. 472ff.

6. Christianity.—The most remarkable event in the modern history of the tribe is the conversion of large numbers to Christianity. Buddhism and the earlier *Brāhmanism* have left little or no trace of their influence. If modern Hinduism is to play any part in the evolution of their religion, it will probably be through preachers of the *Vaiṣṇava* sect. L. S. S. O'Malley (*Census Report, Bengal, 1911*, i. 220f.) thus sums up the question of Christian conversion among these people:

'One reason why the aboriginal tribes are more receptive of Christianity than other communities is that a convert to Christianity is not so completely cut off from his relations and friends. In parts of Rānchi where the Christian community is strongly represented, not only have their heathen brethren no objection to eating with the Christians, but a renegade Christian can be re-admitted to his original tribe. A further attraction is the hope of obtaining assistance from the missionaries in their difficulties and protection against the coercion of landlords. Keenly attached to their land and having few interests outside it, they believe that the missionary will stand by them in their agrarian disputes, and act as their legal adviser. It must not be imagined that Christian missionaries hold out such efforts as an inducement to the aboriginals to enrol themselves in the Christian ranks, but the knowledge that the missionaries do not regard their duties as confined to the care of souls, but also see to the welfare of their flock, has undoubtedly led to many conversions. To their credit, be it said, the missionaries have not failed in this trust, and the agrarian legislation, which is the Magna Charta of the aboriginal, is largely due to their influence.'

Christianity has also influenced the tribal customs of those who have not embraced it.

'There is, I believe, no question that a generation or two back the Mūṇḍās invariably burnt their dead; but with the spread of Christian customs and with the diminution of the fuel supply, for the last generation or so, burial has almost entirely superseded cremation, and there are very few Mūṇḍās now who can say what their ancestral custom was. The Christmas festival is now generally recognized among the heathen Mūṇḍās as the Paus Parah (the feast of the month Pūa, December-January), and I have no doubt that in another ten years it will be confidently claimed as a traditional Mūṇḍā festival.'

According to the latest figures, the Christian Mūṇḍā community numbers 80,292, of whom 66,992 live in the Rānchi District (*Census Report, Bengal, 1911, i. 220*). This large conversion is the result of the labours of various missionary bodies: the German Evangelical Lutheran Mission, started at Rānchi in 1845, which in 1869 split into two sections, one of which joined the Church of England; the Roman Catholic Mission, established at Rānchi in 1874; the Dublin University Mission, established at Hazāribāgh in 1892 and at Rānchi in 1901. A full account of the missionary and social work of these bodies is given by S. C. Roy (p. 227 ff.). A strange episode which deserves notice is the outbreak in 1895 headed by a youth named Birsā Mūṇḍā, who claimed to be an incarnation of Bhagvān, the Hindu Divine Father, and preached a doctrine compounded in the main from Christian and Hindu sources. After some resistance and bloodshed the movement was suppressed; the leader was arrested and died in prison (*ib. p. 325 ff.*).

LITERATURE.—Sarat Chandra Roy, *The Mundas and their Country*, Calcutta, 1912; H. H. Risley, *TC*, do. 1891, ii. 101 ff.; E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, do. 1872, p. 161 ff.; *IGI* xviii. 281, xxi. 203 f. W. CROOKE.

MURDER.—See CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS.

MUSAHAR (generally derived from Hindi *mūs*, Skr. *mūṣa*, 'rat,' 'mouse,' because the tribe eat these animals; others regard it as the corruption of some non-Aryan term).—A non-Aryan, forest, hunting, and out-caste tribe of N. India, numbering, at the Census of 1911, 699,207.

In Bengal their religion 'illustrates with remarkable clearness the gradual transformation of the fetishistic animism characteristic of the more primitive Dravidian tribes into the deified Hinduism practised in the lower ranks of the caste system' (H. H. Risley, *TC*, Calcutta, 1891, ii. 116).

Of the standard gods Kālī alone is admitted to the honour of regular worship, the men of the tribe offering a castrated goat, and the women five cakes, that she may aid them in childbirth. In parts of the Gayā district, however, a more primitive cult of the goddess is practised.

'Her shrine stands at the outskirts of the village, and she is regarded as a sort of local goddess, to be appeased on occasion, like the Thakurānī Māl of the Hill Bhuiyās, by the sacrifice of a hog. It is curious to observe that the definite acceptance of Kālī as a member of the Hindu system seems rather to have detracted from the respect in which she was held before she assumed this comparatively orthodox position. Her transformation into a Hindu goddess seems to have rendered her less malignant. Her worship, though ostensibly put forward

as the leading feature of the Musahar religion, seems to be looked upon more as a tribute to social respectability than as a matter vitally affecting a man's personal welfare' (*ib.*).

Next to Kālī come six personages, known as *bir* (Skr. *vīra*, 'hero'), who are regarded as spirits of departed Musahars and are excessively malignant. Of these Rikmun is regarded as the tribal progenitor.

'On ordinary occasions the Birs are satisfied with offerings of sweetmeats prepared in ghi (clarified butter), but once in every two or three years they demand a collective sacrifice of a more costly and elaborate character. A pig is provided, and country liquor, with a mixture of rice, molasses, and milk is offered at each of a number of balls of clay which are supposed to represent the Birs. Then a number of Bhakats or devotees are chosen, one for each Bir, with the advice and assistance of a Brahman, who curiously enough is supposed to know the mind of each Bir as to the fitness of his minister. The shaft of a plough and a stout stake being fixed in the ground, crossed swords are attached to them, and the Bhakats, having worked themselves up into a sort of hypnotic condition, go through a variety of acrobatic exercises on the upturned sword-blades. If they pass through this uninjured, it is understood that the Birs accept the sacrifice. The pig is then speared to death with a sharp bamboo stake, and its blood collected in a pot and mixed with country liquor. Some of this compound is poured forth on the ground and on the balls of clay, while the rest is drunk by the Bhakats. The ceremony concludes with a feast in which the worshippers partake of the offerings' (*ib. ii. 117*; cf. the Dāsadh rite, *ERE* iv. 853).

In the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh the caste follows ancestor-worship, a tribal hero named Sadalā Lāl being specially invoked with the sacrifice of a hog and the dedication of native spirits, flowers, and a piece of cloth. Various evil spirits are supposed to cause disease and death, and to them hogs and liquor are offered near one of the sacred fig-trees in which they are believed to dwell. In other places they practise the cult of tribal ancestors named Deosī and Ansārī, the latter being identified with the well-known deified bridegroom Dullā Deo. Another deity, who seems also to be a tribal hero, is worshipped under the title of Banrāj, 'forest king.' In connexion with him, probably as his consort, a female deity known as Bansaptī (Skr. *Vanasaptī*, 'queen of the wood') is invoked as the forest guardian, and it is by her command that the trees bear fruit, the bulbs grow in the earth, the bees make honey, the silkworm breeds, and lizards, wolves, and jackals, useful as food to man, multiply their kind. She is also the goddess of childbirth, and grants offspring to barren women, while in her name, and by her aid, the medicine-man or sorcerer expels devils from the bodies of the possessed. In her name and to her honour the new fire is set alight in the brick-kiln. Woe to the man who takes a false oath in her name! She abides in a little clay altar or platform smeared with river water and cowdung in the corner of the hut; but she has no image or symbol. The offering to her consists of fruits, grasses, or roots; but, if the worshipper asks any special favour, he cuts the ball of his finger with some blades of the holy *kūśa* grass (*Poa cynosuroides*), and lets a few drops fall on the altar—a rite which has been supposed to be a survival of human sacrifice. She is supposed to be married periodically to the phallic god Ganśām, who seems to have been adopted from the non-Aryan pantheon under the name of Ghana-śyāma, 'dark as the heavy clouds of the monsoon'—possibly one of the many cults which have been combined in the worship of Kṛṣṇa. His place is sometimes taken by Bhairon, who has become a manifestation of Siva.

LITERATURE.—The most elaborate account of Musahar beliefs is that by J. C. Nesfield, *Calcutta Review*, lxxxvi. (1883) 1-53, which seems to include material from some of the allied tribes. In addition to Risley's art. quoted above, see W. Crooke, *TC*, Calcutta, 1896, iv. 12 ff.; A. Baines, *Ethnography* (= *GLAP* ii. 5), Strassburg, 1912, p. 781. W. CROOKE.

MUSES.—The conception of the nature of the Muses, of their character and attributes, became

fixed at a very early period; for we find it expressed in the poems of Homer and Hesiod in substantially the form which it subsequently retained during the predominance of Hellenic culture. The Muses were the daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne (Memory), nine in number (Homer, *Od.* xxiv. 60), and named Clio, Euterpe, Thalia, Melpomene, Terpsichore, Erato, Polymnia, Urania, and Calliope (Hes. *Theog.* 50 ff.). They were pre-eminently the goddesses of song, wherewith in their home on Mt. Olympus they enchanted the divine gathering (Hes. *Theog.* 40 ff.; Hom. *Hym. Apoll.* 189); Apollo was their choir-master, accompanying their anthems with the music of his lyre (Hom. *Il.* i. 603; Pind. *Nem.* v. 22 ff.). At Delphi in the precinct of Apollo they joined the Graces in the dance led by Artemis (Hom. *Hym.* xxvii. 15), or danced by night on Mt. Helicon round the fountain of Aganippe (Hes. *Theog.* 1-10). Their divine wisdom embraced the past and the future as well as the present (*ib.* 38), and they were the source of the poet's inspiration when he essayed to celebrate the feats of men (Hom. *Il.* ii. 484). This does not mean merely that they supplied him with the form in which he clothed his thoughts as they strove for utterance, but rather that they alone were cognizant of the truth, which he repeated as their mouthpiece. Hence the Muses were the source of human wisdom when it was expressed in speech, not merely by the poet, but by the king in his capacity as dispenser of justice (Hes. *Theog.* 80 ff.). The home of the Muses was the country adjacent to Mt. Olympus, which was known as Pieria, and their cult was widely extended in the north of Greece, particularly along the coast of Macedonia and Thrace. In the neighbourhood of Mt. Athos was placed the scene of their contest with Thamyris, who arrogantly challenged them to a trial of skill, and was punished with blindness and the loss of his power of minstrelsy (Hom. *Il.* ii. 594 ff.; Eur. *Rhes.* 916 ff.; Eustath. *Il.* p. 299. 5). At a very early date the cult of the Muses passed southward to Boeotia (Strabo, p. 410), where Mt. Helicon became the centre of their worship (J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias*, London, 1898, v. 152 f.). From Boeotia it may be supposed to have spread to Delphi, and to have reached Attica by way of Eleutherae (Paus. i. xix. 5). It was perhaps owing to Delphic influence that Apollo first became associated with the Muses, who were originally independent of him.

Although the meaning of the name (*μοῦσα* = *μουσα*) is not discoverable with certainty, the attempt to connect it with the Latin *mons*, owing to the occupation by the Muses of Mt. Olympus and Mt. Helicon (J. Wackernagel, in *Zeitschr. für vergleich. Sprachforsch.* xxxiii. [1893] 571), cannot be approved. It is much more probable that it was a cognate of *μολομαι*, *μῦναι*, *μῦρος*, and *μενείω* (cf. Lat. *mens*, *monere*), and that its original meaning was 'inspirer,' or 'inspiring power' (cf. Plat. *Cratyl.* 428 C), that is to say, the psychical effect of some unseen agency insinuating itself upon us from without (K. Brugmann, in *Indogerm. Forsch.* iii. [1893] 253-259). From this fundamental signification the later senses of song and musical skill would readily emerge. The development is such as we should expect—from the vague sense of a mysterious force, indwelling or external, which characterizes certain individuals and is associated with certain forms of emotion, to the definite conception of a personal agency which imparts the power of song. We conclude, therefore, that the traces which are still to be found of a wider activity pursued by the Muses belong to an earlier stage in their history. This remark applies especially to their occasional identification with the nymphs who presided over the waters of sacred fountains (W. H. Thompson, on Plato, *Phædr.* 278 B

[London, 1868]; schol. Theocr. vii. 92; Lycophr. 274)—evidence which appears to support the view that the differentiation of the two terms was effected only by gradual stages. For it must be remembered that a draught of water from a sacred spring was believed to cause inspiration (see art. POSSESSION [Greek]), and that the Muses were put on a level with the Nymphs as a source of prophetic ecstasy (cf. *μοῦσάληπτος*, *νυμφάληπτος*). From this point of view it is not surprising that the Muses should occasionally take the place of the Nymphs as the nurses and attendants of Dionysus (Eustath. *Od.* p. 1816. 5; Plut. *Mor.* 717 A; Diod. Sic. iv. 4; *IG* v. 46, *μουσαγέτης* [Naxos]), or that Sophocles, in describing the opposition of the Thracian Lycurgus to the gods, should speak of him as 'provoking the Muses that love the flute' (*Ant.* 965). Moreover, the Muses instructed Aristæus in the arts of healing and prophecy (Apoll. Rhod. ii. 512).

The course of development, as affected by local worship and traditions, serves to explain the various accounts given of their parentage, condition, and number. Apollo, usually their chief (*Μουσαγέτης* [Paus. i. ii. 5, etc.]), is also mentioned as their father (Eumel. frag. 17). Others made them daughters of Pierus (Cic. *de Nat. Deorum*, iii. 54; Paus. ix. xxix. 4), or even of Uranus and Gaia (Cornut. 14). No doubt each of the different sanctuaries claimed to be the original home of the cult, and some such rivalry is implied in Ovid's story (*Met.* v. 294 ff.) that the daughters of Pierus—or Pierian Muses—ventured to contend with the Muses of Helicon and were turned into magpies. The Muses, as was to be expected in view of their history, are usually represented as maiden goddesses; but, since it was natural to ascribe the eminence of highly gifted poets and musicians to a special relationship with the patronesses of song, the tradition of their celibacy was not invariable. Thus Linus is called the son of Urania, Orpheus of Calliope, Hymenæus of Clio, and Thamyris of Melpomene (schol. Eur. *Rhes.* 347). The parentage of Rhesus, the son of Strymon and one of the Muses (Eur. *Rhes.* 920 ff.)—Euterpe, according to one account (schol. Eur. *Rhes.* 347)—is another testimony to the close connexion of their worship with Thrace. Nothing is more significant of the gradual growth of the cult than the variety of report concerning their proper number. The reason for the selection of the number nine, which, as we have seen, was fixed at an early date, has not been discovered; but it is worthy of mention that the same number was attributed to the Korybantes, Telchines, and Kouretes (*FHG* i. 71; Strabo, p. 473), and it has been conjectured that a company of nine was required for the performance of certain sacred dances (Gruppe, *Gr. Myth.* p. 1077, n. 1). There is evidence that three Muses were worshipped at Asara, Delphi, and Sicyon (Paus. ix. xxix. 2; Plut. *Mor.* 744 C; *Anth. Plan.* iv. 220), and seven at Lesbos (*FHG* iv. 458). Two Muses are attested by Cornutus (*loc. cit.*), four by Aratus (J. A. Cramer, *Anecdota Græca*, Oxford, 1835-37, iv. 424), and eight by Crates of Mallus (Arnob. *adv. Nat.* iii. 37). Some of these examples may be due to late literary combinations, but enough remains to show that the number nine was not always and everywhere an essential feature in the worship of the Muses.

Besides the nine names recorded by Hesiod, to which subsequent tradition firmly clung, several others occur sporadically. Some of these, such as Theoria and Praxis (Cornut.), Nete, Mese, and Hypate (Plut. *loc. cit.*), Melete, Mneme, and Aæde (Paus. ix. xxix. 2), are obviously the inventions of a late period. Others, such as Cephiso, Apollonis (for which Achelois has been conjectured as a substitute), and Borysthenis (Enmel. frag. 17), which

appear to have belonged to water-nymphs before their functions were entirely differentiated from those of the Muses, never obtained more than a local circulation.¹ The origin of the Hesiodic list is past discovery; but some of them at least—e.g., Urania as the daughter of Uranus—probably had a separate existence before they were joined together in the sisterhood which was required for the original source of the *Theogony*.

There is no evidence of an early date bearing on the diversity of functions subsequently assigned to the several Muses of Hesiod's list. The distribution with which we are familiar appears for the first time on works of art belonging to the Roman period (Bie, in Roscher, ii. 3238 ff.). It is not based on any logical system of classification; for Clio, Urania, and Euterpe, as the Muses of history, astronomy, and flute-playing, are not grouped according to the same principle of division as the six who represent the various kinds of poetry. There are also several divergent arrangements, in some of which the Muses represent branches of philo-

sophy, as well as the arts of rhetoric and husbandry (schol. Apoll. Rhod. iii. 1; Plut. *Mor.* 744 D; *Anth. Pal.* ix. 504 f.). It is probably to be inferred that the traditional distribution rested upon a classification of poetry into three branches, epic, lyric, and dramatic, each of which comprised three species. In that case Clio and Urania represented the historical and astronomical epics respectively, and Euterpe the music of the flute as distinguished from that of the cithara and lyre, and so far as it constituted a branch of lyric poetry. But, if tragedy and comedy were placed under the protection of Melpomene and Thalia, there was nothing left but the mime to be assigned to Polymnia (Gruppe, p. 1090).

LITERATURE.—H. Deiters, *Über die Verehrung der Musen bei den Griechen*, Bonn, 1863; P. Decharme, *Les Muses*, Paris, 1869; F. Roediger, 'Die Musen,' in *Neue Jahrbücher für class. Philologie*, suppl. vol. viii. (1875-76) 251 ff.; O. Bie, *Die Musen in der antiken Kunst*, Berlin, 1897, and art. 'Musen,' in Roscher, ii. 3238-3295; O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie*, Munich, 1906, p. 1075 ff.; L. R. Farnell, *CGS*, Oxford, 1896-1909, v. 434-437.

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MUSIC.

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MUSIC (Primitive and Savage).—1. Music in savage life.—While the quality and range of savage music differ considerably in various regions, there are but few tribes which can be said to be indifferent to music. Of many of them, indeed, it may be asserted that music accompanies every action of life, and that they have a largely developed love of and capacity for it. This is true of some of those tribes which are deficient in musical instruments, like the Fuegians,² while even such a low race as the Bushmen were extremely musical and had many instruments (§ 5). Even the African Pygmies are 'innately musical,' possess many melodious songs as well as instruments of their own (drums, horn trumpets), and borrow stringed instruments from higher tribes when they can.³ Generally, it may be said that work, especially work which can be performed in a rhythmic manner, is accompanied by singing.⁴ Men on the march keep time to the songs sung, and before a fight, as with the Maoris, 'war songs are sung to work them up to fury for battle.'⁵ All feasts partake largely of a musical character, whether at marriages or funerals or upon other occasions. At these feasts, and, indeed, at many religious ceremonies, dancing occupies a prominent place, and it is accompanied by singing, playing of instruments, rhythmic clapping of hands, and movements of the limbs and head. Often each dance, as with the Bushmen, has its own special tune.⁶ Similar or various instruments are often combined to form an orchestra.

A simple instance of this is found in the case of the Samucos and Moxos, with whom a number of Pan's-pipe players combine

to produce monotonous, yet harmonious, music.¹ More elaborate is the Fijian orchestra of twenty to thirty players,² or the orchestras which many African chiefs possess—consisting mainly of drums and trumpets, but sometimes also of the native piano, bells, rattles, zithers, etc.³—or the Javanese orchestra of gongs, Jews' harps, bells, and xylophones.⁴ In many instances care is taken to attune the instruments, so that harmonious music will be produced; in others, again, noise seems to be mainly sought after.

Frequently European music is appreciated even by tribes which have few or no instruments of their own; the Andamans delighted in regimental band music, the Fuegians were equally appreciative, and the Maoris, with no drums of their own, took pleasure in listening to the European drum.⁵ The Tengers compose music on the European model; and many tribes, even those of Torres Straits, easily pick up our tunes and whistle or hum them.⁶ The same receptiveness is seen where new instruments are introduced from other tribes or races possessing them, as in the case of the Pygmies already cited, or where African tribes under Muhammadan influence have adopted a native fiddle, or the Bechuana the European mouth harmonica.⁷

A practical rather than a musical purpose is served by the drum or gong in signalling or conveying messages. For this see DRUMS and CYMBALS, vol. v. p. 92^b; *Handbook*, pp. 226, 232, 243; Wallasehek, p. 112.

2. Religion, magic, and music.—As many savage dances are of a religious or ceremonial character, it is obvious that music, even on this ground alone, must play a large part in religion. The words of the songs or hymns and the swell of the music, as well as the rhythmic motions of the dance and the fact that so many are taking part in the same action, heighten the religious feel-

¹ The names Neilo, Tritone, Asopo, etc., in Ezech. frag. 41 K., are taken from a comic description of the Muses as fishwives.

² C. Wilkes, *Narrative of the U.S. Exploring Expedition*, Philadelphia, 1845, i. 142.

³ H. H. Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate*, London, 1902, ii. 5421.

⁴ See on this point K. Büchner, *Arbeit und Rhythmus*, Leipzig, 1909.

⁵ J. Hawkesworth, *Voyages*, London, 1778, ii. 344.

⁶ G. W. Stow, *The Native Races of S. Africa*, London, 1905, p. 102.

¹ A. d'Orbigny, *L'Homme américain*, Paris, 1839, ii. 150, 231.

² T. Williams, *Fiji and the Fijians*, i, London, 1858, p. 164.

³ Instances in R. Wallasehek, *Primitive Music*, p. 131 ff.

⁴ *Handbook to the Ethnographical Collections, British Museum*, London, 1910, p. 103.

⁵ E. H. Man, *JAI* xii. (1882-83) 891 (Andaman); Wallasehek, p. 571. (Fuegians), 109 (Maoris).

⁶ B. Thomson, *Savage Island*, London, 1902, p. 218.

⁷ *Handbook*, p. 243; G. Fritsch, *Die Eingeborenen Süd-afrika's*, Breslau, 1872, p. 190.

ing. Other ritual acts of a communal character—e.g., processions round fields and the like—are largely musical (see PROCESSIONS AND DANCES). At the initiation of youths to manhood or to tribal mysteries music, vocal and instrumental, as well as dancing plays a large part. In religious worship music is either itself an act of worship or the accompaniment of such acts.

The Fijian priests used large mussel-trumpets in the temples.¹ Drums were sounded while human sacrifices were made in Ashanti.² In Polynesia the god Tane was saluted with every kind of drum; that instrument being himself or his embodiment, its sound was his voice.³ Among the Hottentots one class of verses consisted of hymns, prayers, invocations, and songs of praise to Tsuni Goam and other gods.⁴ The Malays used drums to accompany invocations to spirits. In sacrificing the Kenyahs sound drums 'to keep away from the worshippers all sounds but the words of their own prayers.'⁵ Among the Musquakie Indians a man takes a drum with him when he goes to the forest to pray, and keeps time on it as he intones his prayer. With this people a whistle is used to summon ghosts, but, as these are called for purposes of sorcery, it is regarded as an accursed instrument.⁶ With the Zulus songs were sung after the elient sacrifice of and feast upon a black ox to cause rain, and also at the feast of firstfruits.⁷ With the Haldas reed instruments are used to imitate the voices of the spirits in the religious ceremonies.⁸

Music also plays its part in most shamanistic ceremonies—e.g., in exorcism or in cases of sickness.

With the Gilyaks dancing to the music of a tamhourine is part of the operation.⁹ The beating of gongs and drums accompanies the long rite of exorcism with the Klemantans, the operators also whistling or breaking out into a chant.¹⁰ During the ceremonies of healing in connexion with the Navaho sand pictures chants are sung by the priest and officiants.¹¹ With the Menomini Indians, when the medicine-man is curing sickness, he sings and strikes a rattle and his assistant beats a drum.¹²

See also GONGS AND BELLS, DRUMS AND CYMBALS.

3. Sacred properties of musical instruments.—Because musical instruments are used in sacred ceremonies, or for other reasons, they are sometimes regarded as themselves sacred or as possessing magical properties. Sometimes they are tabu.

Among the Uaupes, with whom large pipes or trumpets—*jurupari* pipes—are blown at the celebration of the mysteries, no woman may see them on pain of execution.¹³ In New Guinea women may not look at certain flutes, else they would die.¹⁴ The Malu music in Murray Island is so sacred that no woman or child may hear the tunes and live.¹⁵ The Musquakie Indian hides his prayer-drum in his wigwam when it is not in use.¹⁶ Among the Malays part of the regalia includes royal drums, pipes, and flutes supposed to have come into existence of themselves. They give miraculous powers to the king, and some of them are so sacred that none can handle or use them save one tribe of Malays, and only at 'the proper time and season.' Sounded at any other time or by any other person, they would cause instant death.¹⁷

Some instruments are regarded as possessing magical or divine properties.

Of this the best example is the Polynesian drum already referred to as an embodiment of the god Tane (§ 2). With this Bush Negroes of Dutch Guiana the drum is thought to have a soul; it is given drink from time to time and is supposed to lead men into the other world.¹⁸ Among the Batuma some drums had fetish properties or were emblems of sovereign power. One drum had a smaller drum as its wife and a still

smaller one as its prime minister.¹ In Uganda, when the drum Kaula had a new cow-skin put on it, the cow's blood and also that of a man decapitated were run into the drum, in order that new life and vigour would be given to the king when it was beaten. Temple drums contained fetishes.² Similarly among the Araucanos wizards have drums inside which are small white stones to which healing powers are attributed.³ In many instances instruments used in ritual are regarded as sacred, like the rattle and hull-roarer of the Navaho shamans, or the drum used by the Chippewas in religious dances. In Saa and San Cristoval large houses are made for the drums, which are much valued.⁴

See also BULL-ROARER, DRUMS AND CYMBALS. For the sacred drum of the Lapps see LAPPS,⁵ and of the Buddhists see CHARMS AND AMULETS (Buddhist).

Sometimes music, whether the instruments used or the songs sung, is held to have been first communicated by the gods.

In Manipur the deity long ago distributed songs among the tribes. The Marrings caught them in a wide-meshed basket, but they escaped; hence they have no songs.⁶ Among Australian tribes the songs are believed to be obtained by birds from spirits of the dead in dreams or while awake.⁷ The Navaho gods Hasjelti and Hostjoghon are the great song-makers of the world, and myth tells how they communicate the sacred songs and dances to men.⁸ With the Zulus the *amatongo*, or spirits, cause men to compose songs when they are about to become diviners.⁹ Among the Maoris, as among the folk of Europe, songs have been learned from the fairies.¹⁰ The Maidu Indians believe that the original sacred rattle as well as the dances was given them by two old diviners long ago, who told them that the spirit of sweet music was in the rattle, and that, when it was shaken, songs would sound better, and, when prayer was made for grasshoppers, it would be answered.¹¹ Similarly the Menomini Indians think that the Good Mysteries gave the drums to be used in making medicine or in doing harm to enemies, and the rattle to invoke the *manidos*.¹² In the Torres Straits Islands the old culture-heroes are thought to have taught the sacred dances and cults with their sacred songs.¹³ The Asaha people think that music and dancing were first learned from a hunter who heard the songs of a party of forest spirits.¹⁴

4. Songs.—Most savage poetry is made to be sung. As has been said of the Melanesians, they have no conception of poetry without a tune, although tunes without words exist.¹⁵ Generally there is a great variety of songs—for dances and feasts, for funerals, for war and the chase, love-songs, songs of labour, and the like—but the class which is probably the most primitive of all is that which is extemporized upon the events of the day. These naturally differ much in character, being more elaborate or more simple, but they are mostly of the nature of a rhythmic recitative, the same line being constantly repeated by the bard and then sung by all as a kind of chorus. Sometimes songs are unaccompanied by any instrument; Hose and McDougall say of the Punans:

'The finest songs are sung without accompaniment, and are of the nature of dramatic recitals in the manner of a somewhat monotonous and melancholy recitative.'¹⁶

More generally, however, songs are accompanied either simply by clapping, slapping the body, stamping, beating the ground, striking sticks together, and the like, or by the use of some of the various instruments already described. Even when singing softly to himself a native will play some instrument—e.g., the Ba-Mbala play the drum, native piano, or harp.¹⁷ As already stated, many

¹ W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, London, 1829, II. 283.

² *Handbook*, p. 242; Wallaschek, p. 111.

³ H. O. March, *JAI* xxii. [1892-93] 323; W. W. Gill, *Myths and Songs from the S. Pacific*, London, 1876, pp. 106, 219. The drum was surmounted by a representation of Tane's head.

⁴ T. Hahn, *Tsuni-Goam*, London, 1881, p. 27 f.

⁵ C. Hose and W. McDougall, *Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, II. 54.

⁶ M. A. Owen, *Folk-lore of the Musquakie Indians*, London, 1904, p. 135 f.

⁷ H. Callaway, *Religious System of the Amazulu*, Natal, 1870, pp. 69, 409.

⁸ *Handbook*, p. 261.

⁹ *Ib.* p. 61.

¹⁰ Hose-McDougall, II. 131 f.

¹¹ *8 REW* (1891), p. 257 ff.; cf. *ERE* I. 823.

¹² *14 REW* (1896), pt. I. p. 63, 149; cf. *FL* II. [1891] 449 f. for a similar Apache custom.

¹³ A. R. Wallace, *Travels on the Amazon*, London, 1853, p. 349.

¹⁴ Wallaschek, p. 93.

¹⁵ Myers, in *Essays and Studies presented to W. Ridgway*, p. 561.

¹⁶ Owen, p. 135.

¹⁷ W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, London, 1900, pp. 25 ff., 401.

¹⁸ L. G. van Panhuys, *Actes du 1^{er} Congrès international de l'histoire des religions*, Leyden, 1913, p. 55.

¹ Johnston, p. 630.

² J. Roscoe, *The Baganda*, London, 1911, p. 27 f.

³ R. E. Latham, *JAI* xxxix. [1909] 352.

⁴ R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 338.

⁵ Cf. also D. Comparetti, *The Traditional Poetry of the Finns*, Eng. tr., London, 1898, p. 277.

⁶ T. O. Hodson, *The Naga Tribes of Manipur*, London, 1911, p. 68 f.

⁷ N. W. Thomas, *Natives of Australia*, London, 1906, p. 128.

⁸ *8 REW*, p. 277.

⁹ Callaway, pp. 263, 273.

¹⁰ G. Grey, *Polynesian Mythology*, London, 1856, p. 213; cf. *Journal of the Folk Song Society*, IV. [1911] 174, and *passim*, for W. Highland instances.

¹¹ *FLR* v. [1892] 121 f.

¹² *14 REW*, pt. I. p. 93; cf. *ERE* VI. 316.

¹³ *Report Camb. Anthropol. Exped. to Torres Straits*, Cambridge, 1901-12, VI. 45.

¹⁴ O. R. Day, in A. F. Mockler-Ferryman, *Up the Niger*, London, 1892, p. 274.

¹⁵ Codrington, p. 334.

¹⁶ II. 192.

¹⁷ E. Torday and T. A. Joyce, *JAI* xxxv. [1905] 413.

songs are sung by an individual, while the others sing a chorus—the same word, line, or distich being taken up after having been repeated many times by the singer. The song may then be closed by a long-drawn shout or cry, as with the Sakai.¹ Other methods exist.

In Savage Island there is a long solo on the drums—the same bar repeated. Then follows a gesture 'dance' to this accompaniment. Then the leader sings, while the drum rhythm does not vary, until at last it quickens at the end. All the performers now sing—the leader taking the melody, the chorus the second part.² With the African Pygmies some songs have a melody, a strophe, antistrophe, solo part, and chorus.³ In the Banks Islands, 'a song has certain regular successive parts with distinctive names, each introduced by a vocalic prelude which marks the *gau-as*, the knee, or turn, of the song.' Some are led off by a single voice, some with many; or the singers are divided: some start the song; the rest follow with an answering part.⁴ Among the Ba-Mbala men and women sing alternate verses of a song.⁵

In many cases *Märchen*, or stories, contain metrical parts—a recurring formula or recitative—or songs which are sung by the teller of the tale or by the listeners—the *cantefable*. These are found not only in European, but in Eskimo, Negro, Basuto, and other tales.⁶

While it is possible for any one to describe in a rhythmic manner events which have happened to him, as when among the Basutos the friends of a hero press him to narrate his deeds, which he does with emphasis, becoming poetical, the crowd repeating some of the lines,⁷ there are often professional makers of songs or of tunes, or professional musicians. Even in Australia such bards exist, the office being sometimes hereditary.⁸ In general they are much esteemed, more especially where they are the repositories of the heroic deeds or traditions of the tribe.

It is worth noticing that some songs are made up of words unintelligible even to those who sing them. This is either because they are mere musical sounds, or because songs in the language of another tribe have been adopted, or more usually because the words are so archaic that their meaning has been forgotten.⁹ Emotional and religious formulae often thus persist when the words have passed out of common use, just as stone knives continued to be used in ritual after metal had been discovered.

Brinton says that all the American Indian languages examined by him had a poetic dialect different from that of ordinary life.¹⁰ According to Codrington, in Melanesia words not in common use are thought poetical and are used in songs. In the Banks Islands there is a poetic dialect—of archaic or borrowed words, or of contracted or lengthened words. On one side of Mota songs are composed in something like the language of Gaus, and *vice versa*.¹¹ The Formosan priestesses had a jargon of their own for their chants and incantations, unintelligible to the uninitiated.¹² This is analogous to the fondness for half-understood foreign or barbarous words in magic formulae everywhere, as is seen in the Greek magical papyri and in Gnostic documents.

5. Distribution of musical instruments.—Nearly every tribe and race has musical instruments of some sort, the exceptions being found at the lowest stage of culture.

The Fuegians have none, but keep time to a song by jumping.¹ The Veddas of Ceylon have no instruments, though some of them borrow drums from the Sinhalese. Time is kept in their dances by slapping chests, bellies, and thighs with the open hand, or by waving objects rhythmically.² The Andaman Islanders have merely a hollowed-out trunk used as a sounding board, which is stuck in the ground and kicked with the heel to mark time in the dances. Time is also kept by clapping, or by slapping the hollow between the outstretched thighs.³ In Australia there was no native musical instrument except an opossum skin rolled up with either inside or stretched between the knees and beaten. In W. Victoria the rolled-up rug contained shells to jingle. Sticks or boomerangs were also struck together or on the ground. The nose flute is known at Port Essington—perhaps a Malay borrowing. Shell-rattles and drums have been borrowed in the north from the Papuans.⁴ Similarly, the Tasmanians use sticks to beat time.⁵ The dwarf Ahongo, W. Africa, strike two pieces of wood together while singing, and have no musical instrument.⁶ Deficiency in musical faculty and lack of instruments are asserted of the Charruas and Guaranis, the latter of whom strike the earth with hamboos while singing hymns to Tamol.⁷

Some tribes know no more than one musical instrument.

The Damaras had nothing but the bow converted into a musical instrument by tying string and handle near the centre, holding the bow against the teeth, and striking the string with a small stick. With this the gallop or trot of animals was perfectly imitated.⁸ The Eskimos have no other instrument than a kind of tambourine or drum.⁹ Among the Alnus the only instrument is a small bamboo Jew's harp.¹⁰

Some of these peoples belong to the lowest culture, yet most of them are fond of singing; some possess comparatively elaborate songs, and appreciate European music.

The Bushmen, another low people, 'had invented a greater variety of musical instruments than any other S. African people, and there was greater compass and variety in the refrains which accompanied their dances.' They had the musical bow (a more elaborate form than that of the Damaras), a bow the string of which was vibrated by blowing through a quill fixed upon it (the *goorra* or *goura*), a wind-stringed instrument, used also by the Hottentots, a reed flute, drum, and bells of hide.¹¹

At low levels of culture the variety of musical instruments is usually considerable, and they may be roughly classified as instruments of percussion, stringed, and wind instruments. As the instances among peoples without musical instruments would seem to show, instruments of percussion—some form of the drum, which is well-nigh universal—may have been invented first. Stringed instruments probably came next—the hunter's bow, as with the Damaras, being easily convertible into a primitive form of these. Wind instruments, at least in their more elaborate forms, were probably invented last. The reed is easily formed into a kind of pipe, and in fact is so used at low levels of culture.¹² This order is not an absolute one, and in various districts one form of instrument may have preceded others which came first in other districts.

Whistles and flutes made of human or animal bones have been found in deposits of the palaeolithic and neolithic ages, the flutes being pierced with holes at regular intervals or consisting of two bones, which, when joined, would make modulated tunes. Although these discoveries seem to give priority to wind instruments, it is obvious that others—e.g., drums of wood with skin covering—being of more perishable material, were less likely to be preserved.¹³

¹ J. Deniker, *The Races of Man*, London, 1900, p. 209; Wilkes, I. 127.

² Seligmann, *The Veddas*, pp. 214, 217, 220, 342.

³ E. H. Man, *JAI* xii. 378, 389 ff., 399.

⁴ Thomas, p. 126; R. Etheridge, *JAI* xxiii. [1893-94] 320 ff.

⁵ G. T. Lloyd, *Thirty-three Years in Tasmania and Victoria*, London, 1862, p. 50.

⁶ O. Lenz, *Skizzen aus Westafrika*, Berlin, 1878, p. 111.

⁷ F. de Azara, 'Reisen in der südlichen Amerika,' in *Journal für die neuesten Land- und Seereisen*, Berlin, 1808-28, vi. 111 f.; d'Origny, ii. 310.

⁸ F. Galton, *Narrative of an Explorer in Tropical South Africa*, London, 1853, p. 117.

⁹ *Handbook*, p. 253; H. Rink, *Tales and Traditions of the Eskimo*, Edinburgh, 1876, p. 34; D. Oranz, *History of Greenland*, London, 1820, p. 162.

¹⁰ *Handbook*, p. 63.

¹¹ Stow, pp. 102, 105 ff., 109, 135; H. Balfour, 'The Goura,' *JRAI* xxxii. [1902] 156 ff.; Fritsch, p. 126.

¹² F. H. A. von Humboldt, *Reise in die Aequatorialgegenden des neuen Continents*, Stuttgart, 1815-32, iv. 465.

¹³ T. Wilson, 'Prehistoric Art,' *Report of U.S. National Museum*, Washington, 1890, p. 524 ff.; *Guide to Antiq. of Stone Age*, Brit. Mus., London, 1902, p. 62; *ERE* vii. 780b.

¹ A. Hale, *JAI* xv. [1885-86] 296 f.

² Thomson, p. 222.

³ Johnston, II. 543.

⁴ Codrington, p. 335.

⁵ Torday-Joyce, *loc. cit.*

⁶ See *CF*, p. 480 f., for a discussion of these in relation to the origin of the ballad; in addition to ref. cited there see D. Macdonald, *Africana*, London, 1882, I. 48; E. Casalis, *Les Dausouts*, Paris, 1859, p. 800.

⁷ Casalis, p. 844.

⁸ Thomas, p. 127; Wallaschek, p. 63.

⁹ Hodson, p. 67 f. (Manipur); O. G. Seligmann, *Melanesians of British New Guinea*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 151 (Koita of W. New Guinea); Thomas, p. 123 (Australia); Callaway, p. 413 (Zulu); G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, London, 1910, pp. 421, 423 (New Britain, Samoa). Among the Veddas many songs begin with a variant of certain untranslatable lines (O. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911, p. 360).

¹⁰ *Proc. Numismatic and Antiquarian Society*, Philadelphia, 1887, p. 19; cf. also Owen, p. 48, for the 'old language' of Musquakie songs.

¹¹ Codrington, p. 834

¹² G. Taylor, *FLJ* v. [1887] 150.

Metal trumpets and bells have been found in deposits of the bronze age.¹

(1) *Instruments of percussion*.—Among instruments of percussion the *drum*, in some shape or form, is of almost universal occurrence (see DRUMS AND CYMBALS). It is lacking among the Maoris, whose range of instruments is small, the Haidas, who beat boards with sticks, some S. American tribes, and the Thonga of S. Africa.

The *rattle* is known among the Gilyaks,² the Barotse, Ba-Ngala, and other African tribes,³ Australian natives (an importation), Papuans,⁴ extensively among the N. American Indian tribes, who had few instruments save this and the drum,⁵ and some S. American tribes—Samucus, Uaupes, Abipones, and Lengua.⁶ Held in the hand or hung about the body, rattles serve to mark the rhythm of a dance; but, as among the Virginian Indians, several rattles of different tones are used together with effect.⁷

Bells, from those of hide made in spherical shape and filled with pebbles, as used by the Bushmen, to the beautifully-toned metal bells of other peoples, which are sometimes sounded in concert, are known among aboriginal tribes in India, widely in Africa, among the Maoris, several American Indian tribes, and the Mongols and Indo-Chinese races.⁸ Gongs (often made of hollowed wood and elaborately carved) are known in most parts of Melanesia and Polynesia, in some parts of Africa, in Malaysia, among the Lushai of India, the Nahuatl of Mexico, and widely among the Mongols.⁹

The so-called native *piano* is found very widely among African tribes. It usually consists of a piece of hollowed wood to which are fixed a number of strips of metal, slightly curved at the free ends. These are twanged with the fingers of one or both hands. Sometimes a resonator is attached—a gourd or even a human skull (Ba-bangi of the Congo).¹⁰ With these may be compared an instrument from the New Hebrides, consisting of a block of wood with four projecting tongues which are vibrated by the fingers and give out different notes.¹¹

Another instrument found widely in Africa is the *xylophone* (*timbala*, *marimba*). In this strips of wood or metal of varying lengths are attached to a wooden frame with some form of resonator, or to a gourd (sometimes each strip to a separate gourd). They are beaten with sticks, and a considerable compass is sometimes attained.¹² A similar instrument is known among the N. American Indians, and in Borneo and Java.¹³ Its simplest form occurs among the Punans; they lay

¹ *Guide to Antiquities of the Bronze Age*, Brit. Mus., London, 1904, pp. 28, 80, 106; R. Munro, *Prehistoric Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1899, p. 201 f.

² *Handbook*, p. 61.

³ *Id.* p. 210; J. H. Weeks, *JRAI* xl. [1910] 402; Wallaschek, p. 104.

⁴ Seligmann, *Melanesians*, p. 151; A. C. Haddon, *JAI* xix. [1889-90] 374 f.; Codrington, p. 339 (castanets of seeds and shells attached to ankles).

⁵ *Handbook*, pp. 261, 274; *14 RBEW*, pt. i. p. 77 f.; *NR* i. 201; *FL* ii. 450; *FLR* v. 122; Owen, p. 133 f.; D. G. Brinton, *Ancient Nahuatl Poetry*, Philadelphia, 1887, p. 21.

⁶ Wallaschek, p. 103; d'Orbigny, ii. 149; W. B. Grubb, *An Unknown People in an Unknown Land*, London, 1911, p. 74 f.

⁷ J. Smith, in J. Pinkerton, *General Collection of Voyages*, London, 1803-14, xiii. 88.

⁸ See GONGS AND BELLS; Stow, p. 109 (Bushman); Wallaschek, p. 106.

⁹ See GONGS AND BELLS; Seligmann, *Melanesians*, p. 151 (Koita); *Handbook*, pp. 186 (Melanesia), 232 (Ba-Ngala, etc.); J. Shakespear, *Lushai Kuki Clans*, London, 1912, p. 28; Brinton, p. 21 (Nahuatl); Wallaschek, p. 104 f.

¹⁰ L. Decle, *Three Years in Savage Africa*, London, 1893, p. 98; Macdonald, i. 272; Johnston, p. 664; *Handbook*, s.v. 'Piano,' in Index (illustrations on pp. 223, 232).

¹¹ *Handbook*, p. 136.

¹² Macdonald, i. 27 (E. Africa); *Handbook*, pp. 205, 210, 226, 232, 243; Johnston, p. 666; H. A. Junod, *The Life of a S. African Tribe*, Neuchâtel, 1912-13, ii. 253; Wallaschek, p. 116 f.

¹³ Wallaschek, p. 117; H. L. Roth, *JAI* xxii. 63 (Borneo); *Handbook*, p. 108 (Java).

strips of hard-wood across the shins of the operator, who beats them with two sticks.¹

Midway between instruments of percussion and wind instruments is the *Jews' harp*, of which one form is the musical bow already mentioned. Its widest distribution is among the Papuo-Melanesians, but it occurs among the Ainus (their only instrument) and the Gilyaks, in Java, Borneo, the Philippines, and among the Aracanos.²

(2) *Stringed instruments*.—Of stringed instruments the most common is some form of *harp* or *lyre*, of which a simple kind is the musical bow already described. Harps are found among the Punans and Kayans of Borneo, made of thick bamboo, from the surface of which six longitudinal strips are separated and raised at their ends by little bridges.³ Bamboo harps are used by the savage races of the Malay Peninsula, perhaps of Malay derivation.⁴ Harps and lyres are also found among many African (Bantu and some Negro) tribes and among the Malagasy,⁵ the last resembling the bamboo harp of the Punans. Some African harps seem to be derived from ancient Egyptian types. Rude stringed instruments are found in the Solomon Islands and New Britain.⁶

Violin-like instruments are found among the Gilyaks (of one string played with a bow),⁷ the Kamchadals,⁸ the Lushai (resembling the bamboo harp),⁹ the Semang,¹⁰ in the Nicobar Islands,¹¹ in Java, Borneo, the Philippines, and Sumatra,¹² and sporadically in Africa, especially where Muhammadan influence has penetrated.¹³ The Apache Indians have also a species of violin;¹⁴ a one-stringed violin is used by the Chaco Indians (Lengua) of Paraguay;¹⁵ and a stringed instrument is in use among the tribes of the Sepotuba river, S. America.¹⁶ A species of *guitar* is widely used in Africa, and occurs also among the Kamchadals and Ostiaks, in Tibet, among aboriginal tribes of India, the Kayans and other tribes of Borneo, the Sakai, and some tribes of the Amazon; and a primitive *banjo* is used in New Britain.¹⁷

A primitive Æolian harp is found in Guiana.¹⁸ Reference may here also be made to what is really a wind instrument—the *turnan*, or bull-roarer (q.v.).

(3) *Wind instruments*.—Wind instruments are of great variety, and some of them have been developed from utilizing the reed as a kind of pipe or flute. In some cases shells form trumpets, and, as has been seen, the whistle was used in pre-historic times. A compound string and wind instrument—the *goura* of the Bushmen—is noted above.

Pipes and flutes of various kinds (already known in pre-historic times) are found among the aboriginal tribes of India (Karens, Santals, Gonds,

¹ Hose-McDougall, ii. 192.

² A. C. Haddon, *JAI* xix. 376; J. H. Holmes, *JRAI* xxxviii. [1903] 284 f. (Elema); Codrington, p. 339 (Solomon Islands); Williams, i. 163; other Melanesian regions cited in Wallaschek, p. 120; *Handbook*, pp. 61, 68 (Ainus, Gilyaks); Hose-McDougall, ii. 166 (Kayans); *JAI* xxii. 62, 251; other ref. in Wallaschek, p. 120; Hale, *JAI* xv. 298 (Sakai).

³ Hose-McDougall, ii. 167, 192; *JAI* xxii. 63.

⁴ W. W. Skeat and C. O. Blagden, *Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, ii. 117.

⁵ H. H. Johnston, *JAI* xlii. [1883-84] 468, *Uganda Protectorate*, ii. 630, 664, 753, 778; Torday-Joyce, *JRAI* xxxv. 413 (Ba-Mbala); *Handbook*, pp. 205, 226, 243, 247.

⁶ *Handbook*, p. 136.

⁷ *Id.* p. 61.

⁸ G. Kennan, *Tent Life in Siberia*, London, 1870, p. 110.

⁹ Shakespear, p. 28.

¹⁰ N. Annandale and H. C. Robinson, *Fascioli Malayenses*, London, 1903-06 (*Anthropology*, pt. i. p. 19).

¹¹ *Handbook*, p. 77.

¹² *Id.* p. 103; Wallaschek, p. 128.

¹³ *Handbook*, p. 243.

¹⁴ *FL* ii. 450.

¹⁵ Grubb, p. 75.

¹⁶ T. Roosevelt, *Through the Brazilian Wilderness*, London,

1914, p. 136.

¹⁷ Kennan, p. 111; Wallaschek, p. 121 f.; *Handbook*, p. 72 (Tibet); Hose-McDougall, i. 121 (Kayans); Hale, *JAI* xv. 298 (Sakai); H. W. Bates, *The Naturalist on the Amazons*, London, 1893, ii. 203.

¹⁸ E. F. im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883, p. 310.

Khonds), the Kayans of Borneo, the wilder and more civilized tribes of Indonesia, the Nicobar Islanders, most African tribes, widely in Polynesia and Melanesia, and among many N. and S. American tribes. Common to the Tipperahs, the Lushai, and the Kayans, and other eastern tribes, is a gourd in which some narrow bamboo pipes are inserted, each with its free end open and a lateral hole or stop cut in it. The player blows into the neck of the gourd, and the air enters the base of each pipe through an oblong aperture filled by a vibrating reed, the pipe emitting a note only when its hole is stopped.¹ A pipe inserted in a huge gourd and giving out a hollow, moaning boom is known among the Parecis Indians of Brazil.² Nose-flutes occur among the Kayans, the Sakai, and other wild tribes of Borneo, generally throughout Indonesia (except with the civilized Malays), Polynesia, and Melanesia, among the Botocudos, and with the Bechuana in Africa.³

The use of the nose-flute in the East has been explained as the result of the caste-system in India, whence its use may have spread, which forbade a Brâhman to touch with his lips a flute which a low-caste man might have made and used. Among the Botocudos its use is explained by the large lip-ornament worn.

A double flute occurs in Savage Island (played with the nose) and elsewhere in Melanesia, in Guiana, and among the Iroquois.⁴ The *syrinx*, or Pan's-pipes, is known in Sumatra, among the Baganda, in Samoa, generally throughout Melanesia, and among many S. American tribes, and it was also used by the ancient Peruvians.⁵ Horns are known in Sumatra, among several African tribes, and in Paraguay.⁶ Trumpets or largo tubes are found among the Khonds, Malays, Malagasy, many African tribes, Sameans, Tahitians, Maoris, in New Guinea, Torres Straits, and New Britain, with the Uaupes, Abipones, Botocudos, and other S. American tribes.⁷ Those of the Malagasy, Polynesians, and Melanesians are made of shells; those of the Uaupes are long tubes of bark.

Whistles are known in most parts of the world. The Maoris make them of the bones of slain enemies. The Ba-Mbala use them in war and hunting, this use being common elsewhere, though they are also used as musical instruments.

Eolian flutes—bamboo rods pierced and placed in trees—are found in Aurora, Melanesia.⁸

(4) Thus, while instruments of percussion have an almost universal range, stringed instruments are comparatively rare in N. and S. America, Melanesia, and Polynesia, and wind instruments are universal in N. and S. America, though commoner in the latter than in the former.

6. Characteristics of savage music.—A scientific examination of savage music is a thing of recent growth. By the aid of the phonograph it is now possible to obtain permanent records of tones, so that they may be carefully examined and analyzed. Musical instruments can also be studied from an individual as well as from a comparative point of

view. The results of these investigations will throw light upon the origin of music and the history of its growth. Savage melodies are never long; they consist of a few notes, and a phrase tends to be endlessly repeated. A primitive people like the Veddas have two-note songs with a descent from the higher to the lower tone. Other songs have a third note of a higher pitch, and others, again, have a fourth note, usually a tone below the tonic.¹ Generally, however, savage music is more complex than this. Even pre-historic flutes have a wider range, one of these showing the first four notes of the diatonic scale.² Savages also sometimes use smaller intervals than those to which we are accustomed—*e.g.*, quarter-tones. The degree of development varies. Thus the Tongans had a native scale limited to *a, c, d, e* flat, and *f*, without any indication of a chord. Yet they have now adopted our notation and compose music on the European model.³ The Thonga, again, have music based on a seven-interval scale, recognizing major and minor keys, and following a certain system of harmony.⁴ In many cases the melody is of the simplest possible kind, as is obvious where only two notes are employed, and is nothing but a species of rhythm—the only kind of music which many savages recognize. In many instances savage notation is incorrectly observed because it has been recorded in our own heptatonic scale, whereas other and simpler scales are sometimes all that are known. The nature of the scale will always be largely affected by the character of the instruments used and the range of notes possessed by these. Both major and minor keys are used by savages, some preferring the one to the other, probably, however, without any clear connexion between these and a joyful or melancholy mood respectively.⁵ While harmony is a much later development than melody, and does not exist at all with many savage peoples, some degree of knowledge of it is found even at low levels—*e.g.*, among the Hottentots, Bechuana, Solomon Islanders, Fijians, etc.—while the orchestral use of instruments shows that it is in part at least understood and appreciated.

7. The origin of music.—Much discussion has taken place regarding the origin of music. H. Spencer was of opinion that emotional speech with its different cadences was the foundation of musical development; the chant is a copy of the voice raised in moments of emotion, and both show the same characteristics distinguishing them from ordinary speech—loudness, different timbre, rapid variation, increased intervals.⁶ This theory, however, has been strongly opposed on various grounds, and it does not correspond to the facts as revealed by the most primitive music known to us. Darwin's conclusion was that musical notes and rhythm were first acquired by the male or female progenitors of mankind for the sake of charming the opposite sex. Thus musical notes became firmly associated with some of the strongest passions that an animal is capable of feeling. This also has been strongly criticized, and it is not by any means proved that, *e.g.*, the female bird is charmed by the song of the male, while there is no evidence that at low levels of humanity music is one of the factors in love-making, as one would expect it to be if this theory were true. Much more probable are those theories which connect the origin of music with man's innate love of rhythm, rhythmic action and rhythmic speech. The most primitive forms of song or chant are rhythmic with the minimum of melody. Now, savages are fond of repeating a phrase in a rhythmic manner, and it is

¹ C. S. Myers, in Seligmann, *The Veddas*, ch. xiii. p. 341 ff.

² Wallaschek, p. 151.

³ Thomson, p. 225.

⁴ Junod, ii. 267 ff.

⁵ Wallaschek, p. 145 ff.

⁶ H. Spencer, 'On the Origin and Function of Music,' *Fraser's Magazine*, lvi. [1857] 396.

¹ T. H. Lewin, *Wild Races of S.E. India*, London, 1870, p. 217; Shakespear, p. 28 (here one of the pipes serves as a mouth-piece); Hose-McDongall, i. 121, ii. 163 f.; *JAI* xxii. 63.

² Roosevelt, p. 193.

³ Hose-McDongall, i. 121; Skeat-Blagden, ii. 117, 136; *Handbook*, p. 163 (Polynesia), 136 (Melanesia); Williams, i. 103; *Handbook*, p. 226 (Bechuana); A. H. Keane, *JAI* xiii. 206 (Botocudos).

⁴ G. Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, p. 305; Codrington, p. 337; Wallaschek, p. 96.

⁵ Wallaschek, p. 97; Johnston, ii. 605; Turner, pp. 125 (here the pipes are left long, the ends being enclosed in a bag which is beaten with a stick), 312; Codrington, p. 337; *Handbook*, p. 136; Williams, i. 163; *L'Anthropologie*, x. [1899] 492 (Solomon Islands); d'Orbigny, ii. 150 (Samucos), 231 (Moxos).

⁶ Wallaschek, pp. 100, 102 (W. Africa, Sumatra); *Handbook*, p. 210; Johnston, ii. 604, 778, 877.

⁷ Skeat, p. 40; *Handbook*, p. 247; Johnston, pp. 542, 604, 877; Junod, ii. 251; Wallaschek, p. 102 (Guinea, of brass); Wallace, p. 349 (Uaupes); M. Dobrizhoffer, *Account of the Abipones*, Eng. tr., London, 1822, ch. 41, *passim*; *Handbook*, p. 285 f.; *ZE* xix. [1867] 19.

⁸ Codrington, p. 340.

almost inevitable that, as a result of such repetition, the voice will utter the words or sounds in varying tones, generally two, a higher and a lower. This would be still more accentuated where, as is generally the case, the rhythmic utterance is the accompaniment of the rhythmic dance; the voice keeping time to the movements of the body would almost necessarily utter different tones. The different tones emitted by primitive musical instruments—e.g., by beating on various things serving as drums—would be apt to be imitated by the human voice. Similarly, where the taut string of a bow was twanged to produce a musical note, it was soon found that by shortening the string another note could be produced. Great advances were possible as soon as man came to appreciate the difference between mere noise and tone.

C. S. Myers concludes his analysis of the simple songs of the Veddas, Malu, and Kenyahs by showing that the beginnings of music depend on eight factors: (1) discrimination between noises and tones; (2) awareness of difference in loudness, pitch, duration, character, and quality; (3) awareness of absolute pitch; (4) appreciation and use of (small) approximately equal tone-distances; (5) appreciation and use of (larger) consonant intervals and the development of smaller intervals in relation thereto; (6) melodic phrasing; (7) rhythmic phrasing; and (8) musical meaning.¹ But probably the real factors were much less numerous than these.

LITERATURE.—H. Balfour, *The Natural History of the Musical Bow*, Oxford, 1899, 'The Goura, a Stringed wind Instrument of the Bushmen and Hottentots,' in *JRAI* xxxii. [1902] 156 ff., and 'The Friction-Drum,' *ib.* xxxvii. [1907] 87 ff.; F. Boas, 'Chinook Songs,' in *JAFI* i. [1888] 220; M. E. and A. W. Brown, *Musical Instruments and their Homes*, New York, 1888; J. O. Dorsey, 'Ponka and Omaha Songs,' in *JAFI* ii. [1889] 271; E. Grosse, *Die Anfänge der Kunst*, Freiburg, 1894; E. Gurney, *The Power of Sound*, London, 1880; A. W. Howitt, 'Notes on Songs and Song-makers of some Australian Tribes,' in *JAI* xvi. [1887] 327; C. S. Myers, 'The Beginnings of Music,' in *Essays and Studies presented to William Ridgeway*, Cambridge, 1913, p. 560 ff., 'Ethnological Study of Music,' in *Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor*, Oxford, 1907, p. 235 ff., 'Music,' in C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911; M. V. Portman, 'Andamanese Music,' in *JRAS*, new ser., xx. [1888] 181; J. F. Rowbotham, *A History of Music*, London, 1885-87; G. W. Torrance, 'Music of the Australian Aborigines,' in *JAI* vi. [1887] 335; E. B. Tylor, 'The Bow as Origin of Stringed Instruments,' in *Nature*, xlv. [1891] 184, *Anthropology*, London, 1904; R. Wallaschek, *Primitive Music*, do. 1893.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

MUSIC (American).—Musical expression has been very generally developed into a conscious art by the American Indians. It is not an art characterized by either complexity or science, but it does show æsthetic sensibility and expressive power, while the universality of its appeal is evidenced in the use made of the aboriginal melodies by musicians of the cultivated world.

1. Instruments.—Of the three types of musical instrument, percussion, wind, and stringed, the last were rarely natively known to the aboriginal American. Brinton mentions four cases of stringed instruments of primitive type in the hands of American aborigines ('Native American Stringed Musical Instruments,' *American Antiquarian*, Jan. 1897); M. H. Saville adduces good evidence for the use of such an instrument in pre-Columbian Mexico (*American Anthropologist*, x. [1897] 272 ff., 'A Primitive Mayan Musical Instrument,' *ib.* xi. [1898] 280 ff., 'The Musical Bow in Ancient Mexico'); and R. Lehmann-Nitsche (*Anthropos*, iii. [1908] 916 ff.) describes a curious musical bow, having certain affinities in its mode of playing with the flute, in use among the Tehuelche and Araucanian Indians; but it is uncertain whether knowledge of such instruments dates from pre-Columbian times. C. Lumholtz (*Unknown Mexico*, New York, 1902, i. 474-476) describes a musical bow, formed of a monochord and gourds in use among the Tepehuanes of N. W. Mexico, which he regards as an aboriginal instrument. A similar bow is used by the Apache Indians of the United States (G. A. Dorsey, *Indians of the Southwest*, Chicago, 1903, p. 190).

¹ *Essays and Studies presented to W. Ridgeway*, p. 576.

The most important of the native American instruments is the drum. This varies in type from the Eskimo tambourine-like hoop with taut skin, through single- and double-headed instruments, great and small, culminating in the huge snake-skin drum whose booming from the temple of the Aztec war-god brought dread to the heart of the Spaniard. The *teponaztli* of the Aztecs is the most interesting of the native drums; it consisted of a hollowed block provided with a sounding-board in which were cut two tongues of differing thickness whose vibrations produced tones commonly in the interval of a third, although drums have been found containing the interval of a fourth, of a fifth, of a sixth, and of an octave. The drum is very generally regarded with a kind of veneration—naturally perhaps in view of its intimate association with the emotional and religious life of the Indian. Among the Ojibwa (Chippewa) there is a 'religion of the drum.' According to their tradition, it was derived from the Sioux at the time when they made peace with the latter tribe. It is a religion inculcating peace and social responsibility, its important ritual being the 'drum-presentation' ceremony (see *Bull.* 53 BE, p. 142 ff.).

Next in importance to the drum, among native instruments, is the Indian flageolet or flute. This instrument seems to have evolved from the bone whistle with a single vent or stop. In its developed form it is provided with a mouth-piece and has from three to six finger-holes. The double flute is also found with as many as four finger-holes to each reed. In Peru a species of syrinx with from five to eight reeds was in use, and the Pan's-pipes is also to be found among the Mexican Indians of to-day, although in the latter case perhaps of European origin. Neither flute nor pipes were constructed to scale, unless fortuitously. The materials of which these instruments are made are bone, wood, pottery, and even stone. Whistles of like materials and in a great variety of forms are abundant and ingenious, pottery examples being frequently modelled after the bird or animal whose call is imitated by the instrument. There is a keen sense of propriety in the use of these instruments, governed doubtless by religious sanction.

E.g., in the *Hako* ceremony, the priest remarks of the song telling of the flocking of the birds: 'We do not use the drum as we sing it, but we blow the whistle. The whistle is made from the wing bone of an eagle. In this song we are singing of the eagle and the other birds, so we use the whistle' (*22 RBEW* ii. 185).

Again, Garcilasso remarks of the Peruvians that the flute was not used in warlike music, but only in festivals and triumphs. For war were reserved the drum and the native trumpet, which might be of wood, pottery, or, as with the Mexicans, conch shells.

Other instruments native to the American include the ubiquitous and multiform rattle, essential alike to dance and 'medicine'; bells, of pottery, copper, bronze, or gold (in forms obviously evolved from the gourd rattle), found in the more civilized communities; and noise-producers, such as the Hopi *truhkanpi*, a notched stick with bone rubber, and the widely used bull-roarer (*q.v.*); while the curious whistling bottles of Peru, double or with double vents, which when filled with water and swayed to and fro give forth musical notes, deserve mention as musical curios rather than as proper instruments.

2. Records and transmission.—J. F. Rowbotham (*History of Music*, 3 vols., London, 1885-87, iii. 198) maintains that the N. American Indians sometimes recorded their melodies by means of notched sticks, rise and fall of tone being indicated by the position of the notches. The Chippewa, with their elaborate development of pictographic signs, preserve their songs by these mnemonic aids written upon birch-

bark rolls. *Quipus* were used by the Peruvians for a similar purpose (cf. Garcilasso de la Vega, *Royal Commentaries*, Eng. tr., London, 1809-71, bk. iii. ch. xxvii.), and in both Peru and Mexico there appear to have been bards whose business it was to transmit the national song. The germ of this institution appears in many a tribe where rites and mysteries are transmitted in traditional songs. Since the study of Indian music has become serious, many records have been taken, either by transcription into the European notation or by the use of the phonograph.

3. Song.—Indian music is primarily vocal. To be sure, melodies are played upon the native flute, and Garcilasso is authority for the statement that the Peruvians knew a kind of ensemble performance of flutes or pipes; but, even where so used, the flute seems to be regarded as merely a substitute for the voice.

'They played upon these flutes,' says Garcilasso (bk. ii. ch. xxvi.), 'airs of which the words were rimed, composed in a spirit of gallantry upon the rebuffs or favours received from their mistresses.'

In N. America this instrument is commonly called the 'lover's flute,' since its music is regarded as a substitute for vocal song from the bashful lover (cf. Burton, *American Primitive Music*, pp. 83-86).

While their music is thus vocally conceived, the Indians generally appear to have no clear conceptions of the difference between the verbal and tonal materials of their songs.

To the Ojibwa, says Burton (*loc. cit.*), 'whatever departs from plain prose is *nogaman*, song, which means that his poetry is not only inseparable, but indistinguishable from music.'

Burton found difficulty more than once in convincing an Indian who sang new words to an old melody that new music was not being offered. But the words themselves need not be significant apart from the air. Frequently they are meaningless, sometimes because the original meaning is forgotten, sometimes because archaic or foreign, sometimes because originated as mnemonic syllables or ejaculatory refrains, or as pure nonsense. It is the common thing for an Indian song to require a story to explain its meaning. In short, the verbal elements of Indian music form a kind of notation, dimly analogous to our *do re mi* method of denominating the scale.

Frances Densmore, writing of the Mide society songs, says:

'The songs of the Mide represent the musical expression of religious ideas. The melody and the idea are the essential parts of a Mide song, the words being forced into conformation with the melody. To accomplish this it is customary to add meaningless syllables either between the parts of a word or between the words; accents are misplaced, and a word is sometimes accented differently in various parts of a song; the vowels are also given different sounds, or changed entirely. . . . The writer has even been informed that it is permissible for different members of the Mide society holding high degrees to use slightly different words for the songs, but the idea of the song must always remain the same. The words serve as a key to the idea without fully expressing it. Sometimes only one or two words occur in a song. Their literal translation is meaningless, but to an instructed member of the Mide society they bear an occult significance. Many of the words used in the Mide songs are unknown in the conversational Chippewa of the present time' (*Bull. 45 BE*, p. 141.).

Le Jeune's *Relation* of 1634 contains an interesting account of Montagnais music (*Jesuit Relations*, ed. R. G. Thwaites, Cleveland, Ohio, 1896-1901, vi. 182 ff.), indicating the same general character:

'They use few words in singing, varying the tones and not the words. . . . All their religion consists mainly in singing. . . . Not one of them understands what he is singing, except in the tones which they sing for recreation,' etc.

Interesting too, though chiefly as a token of the fundamental identity of N. and S. American conceptions, is Garcilasso's naive comment on Inca music:

'Each song has its particular air, and they could not sing two to the same tune; for the lover who would serenade his mistress indicated the state of his passion upon his flageolet by the diversity of the sound, sad or gay, making known to his beloved the joy or sorrow of his heart. But were he to give two different songs to the same air, each would be confused,

and the gallant defeated in his effort to make his feeling known' (*Royal Commentaries*, bk. ii. ch. xxvi.).

4. Mode of composition.—Aristotle's remark that poetry first takes form in hymns to the gods and personal lampoons seems to have a fair illustration in native American song. Various writers have noted the Eskimos' love for contests in satirical song, with which they while away their long winter evenings; while satire and lampoon are not uncommon in Indian song. These songs naturally vary indefinitely with occasion and mood. On the other hand, religious song (and, as Le Jeune says, Indian religion is mainly song) is strongly conservative, even while it marks almost every phase of native life.

Advocates of the 'communal origin' of poetry find good materials in the recreative type of song, but the evidence in the case of the more serious compositions points in another direction. Songs which have to do with tribal traditions, with rites and ceremonies, with love and death, and even cradle-songs, while they tend to assume a traditional form and come to be sung in chorus, in many if not all cases owe their composition to the stress of an inspirational moment on the heart of the individual composer (cf., e.g., the accounts of the origins of the *Hako* and *Mide* songs in *22 RBEW* ii. and in *Bull. 45 BE*). Song, with the Indians, is, in fact, much more than verbal music; it is a part of life itself, and is efficacious in altering life's destinies. They use their songs, says Le Jeune (*loc. cit.*), for a thousand purposes; they sing in sickness and in health, at the feast, and in peril and suffering:

'During the time of our famine I heard nothing throughout these cabins, especially at night, except songs, cries, beating of drums and other noises; when I asked what this meant, my people told me that they did it in order to have a good chase, and to find something to eat.'

Burton tells of an old pagan whom he could not persuade to sing hunting-songs out of season. The priest who gave Alice Fletcher the *Hako*—which is a ceremonial prayer for life—told her that it must not be sung in winter, but only in spring, summer, or autumn, when life was stirring; similarly, the several songs must be sung at suitable times:

'Sometimes the songs of the nest and the wren are sung early in the day, as these songs were made in the morning. The song of the owl must be sung toward night' (*22 RBEW* ii. 168). The song is, in short, a kind of spell, helping to tide over the exigencies of life and invented to meet them.

The Navaho myth of the man who discovered the use of corn as food begins: 'A man sat thinking, "Let me see; my songs are too short; I want more songs; where shall I go to find them?"' Hasejidi, the white-maize spirit, appeared to him, and led him to a country where he learned the use of corn and the appropriate songs, which he brought back to his own people (*8 RBEW* (1891), p. 278).

An interesting feature of Indian song is the sense of personal proprietorship which attaches to compositions. Burton states it thus:

'A has no right to sing B's songs; B did not compose them, but they came down to him through his family, or from some chief who taught him, and B alone should say whether they might be given to another' (p. 118 f.).

So in Le Jeune's *Relation* of 1636:

'Each has his own song, that another dare not sing lest he give offense. For this very reason they sometimes strike up a tune that belongs to their enemies, in order to aggravate them' (*Jesuit Relations*, ix. 111).

The personal song is evidently a portion of the 'medicine' which every Indian owns, and it is potent in the same way. A special type of song comprises the spontaneous melodies coming in dream and dance, to which the Indian attaches especial significance as revelations of superhuman power, many of them being associated with some animal, revealed as the tutelary of him to whom the song is given. Perhaps the most picturesque and affecting aspect of Indian life is the death-

song with which every Indian seeks to face his end, sometimes composed upon the spot, sometimes prepared in advance; if possible, every Indian dies singing; and the breath of life goes forth to the spirit-world as a breath of song.

5. Structural traits.—The study of the structure of Indian music, in spite of the serious attention devoted to it, is hardly more than begun. From investigations already made it is evident that there are many types of Indian music, perhaps as many as there are linguistic stocks, each with its structural peculiarities. On certain points, however, there is an approach to agreement, and these we may broadly summarize.

(a) From the Arctic southward, American music is primarily (though not exclusively) drum-song. The voice and the drum are the Indian's instruments, and his music is a kind of concord of the two; the drum is the instrument of his rhythmic, the voice of his melodic, expression. But his drum-rhythms are not primarily guides to the rhythms of the voice; rather they are the rhythms of movement, of the dance, to which the rhythms of vocal utterance may, or may not, conform. White observers have been astonished at the apparent duality of the Indian's time-sense—his drum being beaten to one time, his song sung to another time, and this even when the drum is obviously used as accompaniment. In sixty-three out of ninety-one Mide songs recorded with the drum accompaniment, Frances Densmore found the metric units of voice and drum to differ from each other. In one instance the metric units of voice and drum were so nearly alike that the same metronome indication was used for each; at the beginning the drum-beat was slightly behind the voice, but it gained until with the voice, and then gradually passed it. Normally, when drum and voice have the same metric unit, they are slightly in sequence in beat (*Bull.* 45 BE, p. 5 f.).

'I have heard Indian music wherein the conflict between voice and drum was much more marked than is the case between 3-4 and 4-4' (Burton, p. 46).

The voice is sometimes made to mark its own time by rhythmic pulsations (cf. 22 RBEW ii. 282); while, again, both voice and drum employ rhythmic accents, or beats, to mark the metric units. The vocal rhythm frequently changes even in the course of a brief song, but the recurrence of rhythmic figures, or motives, serves to give outline and unity to otherwise formless compositions.

(b) The question of the range of tone-material and of the existence of scales in Indian music is still moot. Early observers, struck by the strangeness of the intervals which they seemed to detect in Indian singing and by the constancy with which these intervals were repeated, jumped to the conclusion that the American Indian possessed an ear of unusual delicacy of discrimination, and scales of a refinement which the white man's could not duplicate. More careful studies have led to the reverse view, that Indian music is built upon scales in the making, or even that it is essentially adiatonic. The latter is the view of Hopi music adopted by Gilman. He characterizes Pueblo song as a kind of rote-song having no fixed intervals:

'The singer's musical consciousness seems restricted to a few intervals of simplest vibration ratio approximately rendered, and to melodic sequences formed by their various analysis and synthesis and rendered with a certain loose fidelity. If a scale were in his mind, even dimly, it should make itself known in a more uniform interval production and in a more impartial use of the tones continually at hand in the fancy. The hearer seems witness to a wholly strange method of musical thought and delivery. The total complex of tone, timbre, and articulation—doubtless at times movements, and other noises also—moves on apparently without guidance by any vanguard of fancied tones at fixed intervals' ('Hopi Song', in *Journal of Am. Eth. and Arch.* v. [1903] 5).

Other authorities do not go to this radical extreme, but credit the Indian with an adumbrate

consciousness of a scale or scales, which his lack of musical standards prevents him from clearly finding, or, if found, from holding. Burton says:

'The Ojibways recognize all the intervals of our major diatonic scales, but the fourth and the seventh rarely occur in the same song' (p. 41),

and he indicates a pentatonic major and minor and a hexatonic major and minor scale as in use among them. Frances Densmore's study of the music of the same people is in substantial agreement with this. A similar view—interesting, as coming from S. America—is taken by F. J. de Augusta with respect to Araucanian song (*Anthropos*, vi. [1911] 685 f.). Alice Fletcher says of the Omaha music:

'The octave is seemingly the only fixed interval. The songs are not built on any defined scale.' Nevertheless, the Omaha have 'a standard of musical tones,' as witnessed by their drum-tuning and by their recognition of 'good singers' (27 RBEW, p. 374).

Another interesting observation is that the Omaha object to the rendering of their songs on the piano as unsupported arias; when rendered with harmonic chords, 'That sounds natural,' was their comment. Burton found the Ojibwa lively in their appreciation of harmonizations of their melodies. This aptitude of the native ear for the appreciation of harmony seems to lend some colour to the supposition that they do actually (even if imperfectly) think their music in harmonic intervals.

(c) A third structural feature deserving note is the predominance of downward progressions in their melodies; like the ancient Greek, the Indian thinks his music mainly in the descending order. Melodic form is fluid and undeveloped, but repetition, balance, and antithesis give form to their better pieces. Further, uncertainty of form is partially offset by definite conventions of execution, amounting to artistry. The accomplished singer affects a vibrato, or wavering of the voice, a drawling tone, a portamento or slurring, an ornamentation of grace-notes. In many of the Omaha societies a fine was imposed if a member made mistakes in singing (A. C. Fletcher, 27 RBEW, p. 373). Finally, the inner harmony of a general tonality is set by the mood of the composition, or perhaps keyed by the incessant drum, whose drone serves as a tonal background for the melodic broiery.

6. Adaptations.—No account of Indian music would be complete without mention of the use of themes caught or imitated from Indian melodies as the foundations of artistic compositions. These vary from simple harmonizations of Indian songs (many of which have been published by the Wawan Press, Newton Center, Mass.) to elaborate symphonic compositions. The most notable works of this nature yet achieved are doubtless Dvořák's 'New World Symphony,' MacDowell's 'Indian Suite,' and Coleridge-Taylor's 'Hiawatha' music.

LITERATURE.—F. R. Burton, *American Primitive Music*, New York, 1909, is a careful and readable introduction to the subject; it contains harmonizations of twenty-eight Ojibwa songs. N. Curtis, *The Indian's Book*, New York, 1907, contains melodies from some eighteen tribes. Thorough studies are F. Densmore, 'Chippewa Music,' forming *Bulletins* 45 and 53 BE (1910, 1913), and B. I. Gilmore, 'Zuni Melodies' and 'Hopi Songs,' in *Journal of Amer. Ethnology and Archaeology*, i. [1891], v. [1903]. Alice C. Fletcher, 'A Study of Omaha Indian Music,' in *Papers of the Peabody Museum*, vol. i. no. 6 [1893], *Indian Story and Song*, Boston, 1900, 'The Hako,' 22 RBEW ii. [1904], 'The Omaha Tribe,' 27 RBEW [1911], and 'The Study of Indian Music,' reprinted from *Proc. of Nat. Acad. of Sciences*, i. [1915] 231 ff., contain indispensable material. Special mention may also be made of: J. Reade, 'Some Wabanaki Songs,' 'Aboriginal American Poetry,' *Trans. Royal Soc. of Canada*, v. ii. [1888]; W. Matthews and J. C. Fillmore, 'Navaho Music,' *Mem. of the Amer. Folklore Society*, 1897, pp. 255-290; F. Boas, 'The Central Eskimo,' 6 RBEW [1889], p. 409 ff.; W. J. Hoffman, 'The Mide'wiwin,' 7 RBEW [1891], p. 149 ff.; J. Mooney, 'The Ghost-Dance Religion,' 14 RBEW i. [1896] 653 ff.; S. Cullin, 'Games of the North American Indians,' 24 RBEW [1907]; F. Russell, 'The Pima Indians,' 26 RBEW [1908], p. 3 ff.; F. G. Speck, 'Ceremonial Songs of the Creek and Yuchi Indians,' *Anthropological Publications of the Museum of the Univ. of Pennsylvania*, vol. i. no. 2 [1909]; A. T. Cringan, 'Description of Iroquois Music,' *Archaeological Report of Ontario* for 1898. T. Baker, *Über die Musik der*

nordamerikanischen Wilden, Leipzig, 1882, is one of the earliest scientific studies in this field. The *Report of the U.S. National Museum for 1896*, Washington, 1898, contains an account of native American musical instruments (pp. 561-684). Periodical articles of importance include: A Génin, 'Notes sur les danses, la musique et les chants des Mexicains anciens et modernes', *REH* iv. [1918] 301 ff.; F. Boas, 'Chinook Songs', *JAFLL* [1888] 220 ff.; 'Songs and Dances of the Kwakiutl', *ib.* p. 49 ff.; Washington Matthews, 'Songs of Sequence of the Navajos', *ib.* vii. [1894] 185 ff.; Alice C. Fletcher, 'Indian Songs and Music', *ib.* xi. [1898] 85 ff.; E. Sapir, 'Song Recitative in Palute Mythology', *ib.* xxiii. [1910] 455 ff.; W. Thalbitzer, 'Eskimo-Musik- und Dichtkunst in Grönland', *Anthropos*, vi. [1911] 485 ff.; F. J. de Augusta, 'Zehn Araukanerlieder', *ib.* 684 ff.; R. Lehmann-Nitsche, 'Patagonische Gesänge und Musikbogen', *ib.* lii. [1908] 910 ff., containing a discussion of the origin of stringed instruments in use by American Indians; E. Fischer, 'Patagonische Musik', *ib.* p. 941 ff.

H. B. ALEXANDER.

MUSIC (Babylonian and Assyrian).—As the inscriptions seem to furnish no easily recognizable indications of a musical notation, very little can be gathered concerning the music of these nationalities (see, however, below, § 6). The representations of musical instruments in their bas-reliefs, however, make it clear that they not only loved music, but had also made some progress in the art—progress fostered originally, in all probability, in their temple-ritual.

i. Its antiquity in Babylonia.—As their sign-list implies that the Sumerians (the non-Semitic inhabitants of Babylonia) had musical instruments before they settled in that tract, they must have had music in practically pre-historic times. It is true that G. A. Barton, in his *Origin and Development of Babylonian Writing* (=BASS ix. [1913] pt. i.), gives (p. 186) only three forms, of which the third (*balag*) seems to be merely a variant of the second (*tigi*); but this number could probably be increased. The three characters in his list express various ideas derived from music, such as 'to be joyful', 'to strike,' etc.

2. Musical instruments.—These were sufficiently numerous, judging from what we find in their sculptures, and may be classified as follows.

i. INSTRUMENTS OF PERCUSSION.—(a) *Drum* (Sumerian *dla*, Semitic *dlu*, according to Langdon, though *lū* would seem also to have been used).—The earlier forms were very large—indeed, one relief (about 2500 B.C.) shows an instrument nearly as high as the man who, with his left hand, seems to be striking it (B. Meissner, *Grundzüge der altbabylonischen Plastik*, Leipzig, 1914, p. 14). It looks like an enormous tambourine resting edgewise on the ground, and was probably moved from place to place by rolling. For the later (Assyrian) portable forms see G. Rawlinson, *The Five Great Monarchies*, London, 1862-67, ii. 160.

(b) *Tambourine* (Sum. *liliz*, Sem. *lilisū*, according to Langdon; *tabbalu* [F. Thureau-Dangin, *Huitième Campagne de Sargon*, Paris, 1912, p. 26 f., 1. 159]).—The forms shown naturally do not differ much from the modern instruments, but the rim was in some cases not provided with rings or disks (see Rawlinson, ii. 158; E. de Sarzec, *Découvertes en Chaldée*, Paris, 1884-1912, pl. 39, no. 5).

(c) *Cymbals*.—Late forms are given in Rawlinson, ii. 158 f. Those with rounded backs have a loop, those with conical backs a fixed rod, by which to hold them.

ii. STRINGED INSTRUMENTS.—(a) *Harp*.—The earliest example (c. 2500 B.C.) is probably that in de Sarzec, pl. 23, which shows considerable development, and has 11 or 12 strings. An Assyrian harp with 16 strings is shown in Rawlinson, ii. 153, where there is also an Elamite harp of 19 or 20 strings. According to Langdon, this was the Sum. *balag*, Sem. *balaggu* or *balangu*. Thureau-Dangin renders the group *giš zag-sal* by 'harp.' In *WAI* ii. 44, 55, *giš zag-sal-sisa* is rendered by *išar[ti]*, 'the straight'—a word translating *sisa*, and therefore qualifying *giš zag-sal*.

(b) *Dulcimer*.—A primitive form of this (? before 2500 B.C.) is shown in a relief, originally inlaid, found at Bismaya (E. J. Banks, *Bismaya*, New York, 1912, p. 268). It had 5 or 7 strings and was played with a plectrum. For the Assyrian form see Rawlinson, ii. 161; A. H. Layard, *Monuments of Nineveh*, London, 1849, i., plates 12, 22 (held with a downward slope), and 73. In the first case the musicians welcome Aššur-našir-pal on his return from a bull-hunt, while the last celebrates the capture of the Babylonian city Dilman (Dailani) by Sennacherib.

(c) *Lyre and cithara*.—Though these must have been among the earlier stringed instruments, the extant pictures are mainly of a late date (see Rawlinson, ii. 154-155, 158). Being rather rectangular in form, they did not, apparently, give a wide range of notes. The number of strings of a lyre varied from 4 to 10 (see Rawlinson, ii. 154, also 153, where a 4-stringed lyre similar to a 'trigon' is shown). A band of foreign musicians (captives) is shown in Rawlinson, ii. 164=Brit. Mus., Assyrian Saloon, no. 14. Notwithstanding their likeness to the Israelitish captives in Sennacherib's Lachish reliefs, it is doubtful whether they wore of that nationality, since those sent by Hezekiah were not captives. That the yoke or cross-piece of their instruments terminates in swans' (?) heads, however, would probably present no difficulty.

(d) *Guitar*.—This rather resembles the Egyptian *nefer*, or banjo, which may have been borrowed from Babylonia (F. W. Galpin, in Stainer, *Music of the Bible*, p. 45). This was known in Babylonia at a very early date (*ib.* pl. i. B). The form is similar to that used later in Assyria (Rawlinson, ii. 156).

iii. WIND INSTRUMENTS.—(a) *Pipe, whistle, or flute*.—This probably became a favourite instrument after the arrival of the Sumerians in Babylonia, where reeds are plentiful. The common Sumerian word for the pipe or flute is *gi-gid*, 'long reed,' or *gi-sir*, 'reed of music,' in Semitic *mēlilu*, from *ēlilu*, 'to make a joyful sound.' According to the *Descent of Istar into Hades*, rev., lines 49 and 56, this was the instrument of Tammuz, who possessed one made of the sacred lapis lazuli. When Tammuz joyfully played thereon, the mourners, male and female, played with him, and then the dead might arise and enjoy the incense. The flutes depicted on the Assyrian monuments are played in pairs (Rawlinson, ii. 157). The Elamite double flute was similar to the Assyrian (Layard, ii., plates 48, 49).

(b) *Trumpet*.—Pictures of this instrument are rare, the most noteworthy example being that in the hands of a director of works in Sennacherib's time (Layard, ii. 15=Brit. Mus., Nineveh Gallery, 51, 52). It was probably not a speaking-trumpet, but an instrument conveying orders by its note.

(c) *Horn*.—Though the inscriptions do not seem to refer to this as a musical instrument, it is probable that they used it as such. The Sumerian for 'horn' is *si*, Sem. *garnu*, Heb. *geren*.

(d) *Other wind instruments*.—According to Langdon, the Sum. *tigi*, Sem. *tigā*, was an ordinary reed-flute, and something similar is to be understood by the *gi-erra*=*gan bikiti*, or 'reed of wailing.' The *gi-di*, Sem. *takaltu*, and the Sem. *pagā*, he suggests, may be bagpipes.

3. Singers.—Of these there were many classes, but we have still much to learn about them. Some were probably for secular performances only.

(a) *Nāru* (sem. *nārtu*).—These are expressed by the character *lul*, preceded by the determinative for 'man' or 'woman.' *Lul* was possibly the picture of a harp or lyre, to which they seem to have sung. According to Sennacherib, a choir of these, male and female, was sent to Nineveh by

Hezekiah, and accompanied his tribute (see above, § 2, ii. (c)). The native Babylonian (or Assyrian) *nāru*, however, seems to have been a kind of precursor, who sang or intoned portions of their ritual. One of these, named Qisīā, chanted the songs used at the funeral of one of the Assyrian kings, and was aided by a choir of young women (*mārāti*, 'daughters'; R. F. Harper, *Assyrian and Babylonian Letters*, Cambridge, 1911, no. 473).

(b) *Kalū*.—This word is derived from the Sum. *gala* (dialectic *mulu*), and seems to mean, properly, 'male servant,' 'deacon.' He was the specialist in temple-music through the study which he had devoted to it:

'O temple, thy deacon (*mulu-zu*) is not present—who decideth thy future?

The deacon (knowing) thy chant is not present, thy future to the harp he singeth (not)' (Langdon, *Babylonian Liturgies*, p. viii).

Words given as synonyms of *kalū* in *WAI*, pl. 21, line 38 ff., are the Sum. *ir*, or 'mourner,' the *sur(a)*, a special singer, the *sura-gala*, or chief of the same class, the *lagar* (dial. *labar*), 'deacon,' the *nunuz* (?) *pa*, 'declarer of oracles,' and others.

The lists connect with the *kalū* the *lallaru* and the *munambū*, the former rendering the Sum. *ilu-ali*, 'he who chants mournfully' (Langdon), and the latter *ilu-di*, perhaps 'the soft singer.' These are given in *Cuneiform Inscr.*, pt. xix. pl. 41, and follow the *gala-maḫa*, Sem. *kalamahhu*, 'the high' or 'chief *kalū*' (K. 4323, l. 17). The Sum. *ilu* forms part of two words for *zammeru*, the usual word for 'singer,' in *WAI* ii. pl. 20: *ilu-dudu* and *ela-i-lu* (lines 7 and 9). The fem. was *zammeru*, translating the Sum. *sal-ulili* and *sal-ula* (?) *la*. These words possibly contain the root of the name of the 6th month of the Babylonian year, Ululu or Elul, the month of the mourning for Tammuz, snatched away to dwell in the under world. The goddess Ištar, spouse of Tammuz, seems to have had a special *kalū*, or class of *kalē*, devoted to her, possibly under the leadership of a *gala-maḫa* (see above).

4. The divine patrons of music.—Besides Ištar, the chief patron of Babylonian music was the god Ea, who figures in the lists as the great creator of all things, apparently before the appearance of Merodach as the father of the gods. Written with the sign for 'singer' (*nāru*), he bore the name *Dunga*, and, with that for 'harp' (*balag*), he was called *Lumḫa*.

5. Musicians.—Besides being a singer, the *nāru* was probably a player of the lyre or cithara. A somewhat uncertain name is *lu balag-ga*, Sem. *mušēd*, possibly a harpist. From what has been said above, it will be gathered that musicians, as well as singers, must have held official posts. The Assyrian bands were various; the simplest consisted of two harpists, but one of four players shows a tambourinist, a lyre-player, a player on a small cithara of varied compass, and a cymbalist (Rawlinson, ii. 158). These were apparently foreigners. The largest band depicted is that in which the Elamites come out to welcome their new king, Umman-igāš, whom an Assyrian eunuch is installing. There are eleven instrumentalists, with harps, double pipes, a small drum, and a kind of dulcimer. Three of the leading performers (men) have one foot raised, as though half dancing as they advance. These are followed by women and children, clapping their hands, and possibly singing (*ib.* ii. 166 = Brit. Mus., Nineveh Gallery, 49). The band which played to summon the people to worship the great golden image set up by Nebuchadrezzar in the plain of Dura (Dn 3⁵, etc.) consisted of a number of instruments of which the cornet or horn (*qarnā* = *qarnu*, § 2, iii. (c) above), the flute, the harp, the sackbut, the psalter, and the dulcimer are specially mentioned. Notwith-

standing its suitability in such a case as this, the drum does not appear, but the piercing sound of the cornet would naturally form a good substitute.

6. Possible indications of a notation.—These are to be found in certain tablets from Babylon, of late date, now in the Royal Museum, Berlin, and edited by George Reisner (*Sum.-bab. Hymnen*), who has tabulated them in two classes (Introd. p. xvi), namely, vocalic characters, both singly and in groups, and words or ideographs expressing words. The former consist of the vowels *a*, *e*, *i*, and *u*, which are placed at the beginning, in the middle (before the *caesura*), and at the end of the lines to which they refer. Were they placed over the words, and not in the margins and blank spaces, it might be contended that they stood for four notes of a scale. It seems more likely, however, that they indicate the tones attached to the lines, in chanting which, in that case, considerable latitude was allowed. As a mere conjecture, it might be suggested that *a* stood for an even tone, *e* (= *qabū*, 'to speak') for modulated chanting, *i* ('sublime,' 'exalted') for a high tone, and *u* (= Addu, Hadad) for one which was deep, thunderlike. The difficulty, however, is that this takes no account of the words, among which are *annū*, *ilī*, or *lī* (?), 'loud,' *nu-idim*, 'not weak,' 'not silent' (= *lā ulālu*, *lā sukutū*). In one place *e* is placed over *a*, and in another *i* over *i* (? part-singing). All this would seem to imply considerable elaboration, whatever interpretation be placed on these mysterious characters. In some passages the character *meši*, Sem. *manzū*, followed by *lu*, *la*, and *gub*, 'passing,' 'hovering,' and 'standing'—so, apparently, the general meanings—appears. This would indicate some such rendering as 'sound,' 'music,' for *meši* = *manzū*.

7. References to music in the historical inscriptions.—The word used in these seems to have been *ningūtu*, *ningūtu*, 'joy,' 'merrymaking,' or the like. Sargon of Assyria (722-705 B.C.) constantly uses it to indicate the rejoicings at his military successes, in which, however, musicians took part. In other passages the word may be translated in the same general way, but that in which Aššurbanipal is directed by Ištar of Arbela to eat food, drink wine, make music (*ningūtu*), and glorify her divinity (G. Smith, *Hist. of Assurbanipal*, London, 1871, p. 125, 65-66) is possibly correctly rendered—as is also the passage in his great cylinder where the kings of Arabia are described as having been compelled to wear badges and work at the rebuilding of Bit-ridāti, and are said, whilst engaged thereon, to have passed their time in 'singing (and) music' (*ina ēlīli ningūti*), in order that the Assyrian king should 'build (that palace) from its foundation to its coping with rejoicings and festivities' (*ina ḫidāti ū risāti*).

LITERATURE.—The Introduction to G. Reisner, *Sumerisch-babylonische Hymnen*, Leipzig, 1896; J. Stainer, *Music of the Bible*, ed. F. W. Galpin, London, 1914; S. Langdon, *Babylonian Liturgies*, Paris, 1912. T. G. PINCHES.

MUSIC (Buddhist).—The history of ancient Indian music, including that of the centuries when Indian culture was predominantly Buddhist, has not yet been compiled, and probably, from lack of materials, never will be. The classical literature of Buddhism does not contribute much to such materials, but some features of interesting suggestiveness may be pointed out. On the psychological side, a very keen emotional susceptibility to the charm of music, either sung or played, is alluded to as an ordinary phenomenon. In one of the late (*vijā*) parables in the *Piṭakas* certain persons are supposed to hear its sound for the first time, the instrument being concealed. They ask what it is, 'the sound of which is so fascinating, so charming, so intoxicating, so entrancing, so ravishing, so

captivating' (*Samyutta-Nikāya*, iv. 196 f.), and their hearers, in replying, agree with their opinion. Some of these adjectives are applied to music yielded by 'the five kinds of instruments, when well played upon,' for the skilled musician (*Dialogues of the Buddha*, Oxford, 1899-1910, ii. 214), and a similar æsthetic effect is said to have been derived from a golden and a silver network of bells, hung round the mythical palace of the 'great king of glory,' and shaken by the wind (*ib.*). A similar charm, in the later commentaries of Baddhaghosa, is ascribed to the song of the *karavika* bird. The possession of a musical speaking voice, holding men spell-bound, was held of sufficient importance to record supreme distinction in this gift in the order's list of such brethren as were foremost in certain attainments. The champion in question was the Thera 'Dwarf' Bhaddiya (*Aṅguttara-Nikāya*, i. 25; *Psalms of the Brethren*, London, 1913, ccxxv.; the commentarial tradition held that he was born under a former Buddha as a 'variegated cuckoo,' *kokila*). Yet another bird was brought in to compare with the sweetness of Sāriputta's voice—the *sālikā* (*Psalms of the Brethren*, 1232 f.). But the Buddha's voice was compared to the celestially sweet vocal organ, with its eight characteristics, of the Apollo of the Brahma-heavens—Brahmā Saṇaḥ-Kumāra, the Eternal Youth (*Dialogues*, ii. 245, iii. 173; *Kathāvatthu*, xii. 3).

A second point of interest, already alluded to, is the names and varieties of instruments mentioned in this literature. They are sometimes called collectively *turiyā* (see *Dialogues*, ii. 18, n. 1); sometimes *pañchaṅgikā* (*turiyā*), 'fivefold' (*Samyutta-Nikāya*, i. 131; *Psalms of the Sisters*, London, 1910, pp. 83, 183). These the commentaries enumerate as *ātata*, *vitata*, *ātata-vitata*, *ghana*, *susira*, the first three of which are varieties of tom-tom, and the other two respectively yet another instrument of percussion (a species of cymbal) and a wind instrument (a species of reed or pipe). It is curious that the seductive *vīṇā* is not included in this list. The word *turiyā* (Skr. *turya*, *turiyaka*) came, centuries later, to bear the meaning of 'fourth' (*cha-tur-*) part or state, but its original meaning, in these earlier books, in connexion with music, is very obscure.

Other instruments with which we meet are drums—the *duṇḍubhi* ('Striking salvation's drum, Ambrosia's alarm' [*Majjhima-Nikāya*, i. 170 f., quoted in *Psalms of the Sisters*, p. 129]) and the *bheri*, *mutiṅga*, *saṅkha*, *paṇava*, and *deṇḍima* (*Dialogues*, i. 89), the third and fourth of these five being the chank (shell) and a kind of horn. Concerning the chank, which is also a species of horn, another parable is told (*Dialogues*, ii. 361). Here again the fivefold adjectival formula is used to describe the charm of its sounds.

More material of this kind might be extracted by a thorough sifting of the early, the middle, and the later or mediæval strata of the Bddhist literature. Here let it suffice to name one more feature that is suggestive, namely, the reference to all congress work concerned with canonical (but unwritten) texts, or records, as 'singing-together' or 'singing-through'—*saṅ-gīti* (*Vinaya Texts*, iii. [=SBE xx. (1885)] 372 f.). A similar idiom is used for the procedure observed by contemporary Brāhmins when meeting to go over their *mantras* (*Majjhima-Nikāya*, ii. 170). It is fairly evident that, in the absence of written documents, the time-honoured Indian custom of intoning or chanting the memorialized runes was adopted by the Indian Buddhists. Cf. art. HYMNS (Bddhist).

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

MUSIC (Celtic).—I. Musical instruments.—Little is known of the music of the ancient Celts,

as the classical references to it are few and casual, and native evidence is lacking save in the case of the Irish texts, which cannot be taken as decisive for the earlier period. Some classical authors refer to the trumpet (*carnon*, *carnux*).¹ It was used to summon assemblies and also in battle, especially in the charge and as loud and clamorous accompaniment of the war-cries for which the Celts were famous.² The pipe of the trumpet was made of lead, and the bell was in the form of an animal, according to contemporary accounts. Archaeological research has discovered several trumpets of the bronze or early iron age. These are made of cast bronze, or of tubes of sheet-metal riveted together. Some are of very fine workmanship, and one of the early iron age (late Celtic period) found in Ireland has its disk extremity ornamented in hammered work. These trumpets are of two varieties—with the mouth-piece at one end or at the side. Straight cylinders have also been found, evidently parts of some larger instrument.³ The Celtic trumpet is figured also on Roman monuments.⁴ Horns are referred to by classical writers as used both in war and by swincherds to call together the swine.⁵ These as well as pipes and reeds of different kinds are also mentioned in Irish texts, and bone flutes have been discovered in Thor's Cave, Staffordshire.⁶

'The Courtship of Ferb' speaks of seven *cornaire* (horn players) with *corns* of gold and silver. These, however, may have been the trumpets already referred to. Instruments of ox-horn were also in use.

An Irish poem of the 11th cent. on the fair of Carman mentions pipes, and these are probably a form of the bagpipe, as the plural name *pipai* is still used in Ireland, as in the Highlands of Scotland, for this instrument. The Irish form differs in some particulars from the Scots; its scale is more complete and full, while the reeds are softer. While the bagpipe has become the characteristic Highland instrument, it has ousted the harp at one time so popular.

The harp or lyre (*chrotha*, Ir. *cruith*, *crot* [= Welsh *croth*, a fiddle]) was used by the bards of Gaul as an accompaniment to their chants, and is figured on Gaulish coins.⁷ It was common also to Irish, Welsh, and Highland music, and is frequently referred to in the Irish texts. In early times its power over the mind of men was the subject of a myth which recurs constantly in Irish story. The reference is first to the harp of the god Dagda, one of the Tuatha Dé Danann (see CELTS, § V.).

With it he played 'the three musical feats which give distinction to a harper, viz., the Suantraighe, the Gentrailge, and the Goltraighe. He played them the Goltraighe until their women and youths cried tears. He played them the Gentrailge until their women and youths burst into laughter. He played them the Suantraighe until the entire host fell asleep.' Before this the harp is said to have come itself from the wall to its owner, killing nine persons on its way.⁸

The number of strings on the harp varied. The so-called Brian Boru's harp in Trinity College, Dublin, must have had thirty strings. Others had eight. But in some early texts reference is made to three-stringed harps, and in a story of Fionn in the *Agallamh na Senorach* to each string is attributed one of the powers of Dagda's harp.⁹ In a story

¹ Polybius, ii. 29; Diod. Sic. v. 80; Eustathius, ad *Iliad*. xiv. 219; Lucan, l. 431 f.

² Cæsar, de *Bell. Gall.* viii. 20; Diod. Sic. loc. cit.; Polyb. loc. cit.

³ E. Munro, *Pre-historic Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1899, p. 201 f.; J. Romilly Allen, *Celtic Art in Pagan and Christian Times*, London, 1904, p. 118; *Guide to the Antiquities of the Bronze Age*, British Museum, do. 1904, pp. 23, 80; E. O'Curry, *On the Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish*, do. 1873, lii. 341 ff.

⁴ S. Reinach, *RA* xlii. [1889] 320; G. Dottin, *Manuel pour servir à l'étude de l'antiquité celtique*, Paris, 1906, p. 217.

⁵ Polyb. ii. 29, xli. 4.

⁶ O'Curry, pp. 306, 312, 325 f.; Romilly Allen, p. 118.

⁷ Diod. Sic. v. 31. 2; Amm. Marc. xv. 8. 8; C. Jullian, *Recherches sur la religion gauloise*, Bordeaux, 1903, p. 58.

⁸ 'Battle of Magh Tuireadh,' *Harleian MSS.*, cited in O'Curry, iii. 214.

⁹ O'Curry, iii. 223.

in the *Book of Leinster* (Dublin, 1880) this three-stringed harp is called a *timpan*, and elsewhere the *timpan* is differentiated from the *cruit*, or harp; it appears to have been played with a bow or wand with hair. It may, therefore, have been a species of violin or fiddle, and separate references to a stringed instrument of the violin type exist.¹

The origin of the harp is the subject of an Irish myth. A woman walking on the sea-shore saw the skeleton of a whale. The wind striking on the sinews made a pleasing sound, and, listening to its murmur, she fell asleep. In this position her husband found her, and, perceiving that the sound had caused her to sleep, he made a framework of wood, put strings from the whale's sinews on it, and so made the first harp.²

Bells of the bronze age have been found in Ireland. They are spherical or pear-shaped, and contain loose clappers of metal or stone, producing a feeble sound. These may have been the kind of bells which were hung on valuable cows and on horses.³ Gongs are also mentioned—e.g., the plate of silver over Conchobar's bed struck by him with a wand when he desired silence.⁴

An instrument to which most soothing powers are ascribed is mentioned in many texts—the musical branch, or *craebh ciúil*, carried by poets and kings. This O'Curry conjectures to have been a branch or pole on which a cluster of bells was suspended.⁵ When shaken, it caused all to be silent; in other words, it was a signal for silence. But in some cases mythical qualities are ascribed to the branch. Cormac Mac Art's branch of golden apples produced the sweetest music and dispelled sorrow.

'Sweeter than the world's music was the music which the apples produced; and all the wounded and sick men of the earth would go to sleep and repose with the music, and no sorrow or depression could rest upon the person who heard it.'⁶

In tales about the Irish Elysium reference is often made to trees growing there which produce marvellous music, causing oblivion to those who hear it. These trees are different from the instrument called *crann ciúil*, or 'musical tree,' which O'Curry describes as a generic name for any kind of musical instrument—harp, *timpan*, or tube.⁷

Special names were given to the players upon these various instruments, the name being taken from that of the instrument itself—e.g., *pipaire*, 'piper'; *cruitire*, 'harpist.'

2. Songs and chants.—The bards of the ancient Celts, frequently referred to by classical writers and corresponding to those of the Irish and Welsh Celts,⁸ composed poems of various kinds—epic, satiric, panegyric. Some of these were improvised and were sung to the accompaniment of the lyre. Glimpses of these bards, attached to the train of chiefs or great men, and singing their praises or those of their guests on festive occasions, are found in classical sources.⁹ They sang also of the heroic deeds of the past and of great warriors.¹⁰ They were doubtless also the composers of the battle-hymns which warriors sang before or after battle while they beat their arms in rhythmic cadence or danced. These may have been invocations of the gods, or traditional warrior-songs, or even spells to ensure divine help.¹¹ Individual warriors sometimes improvised their own songs. Chants were also sung by the priestesses of the Isle of Sena in order to raise storms.¹² Traces of

archaic hymns, doubtless of the order of spells, are found in Irish texts, and Irish druids used incantations for their magical actions. Of the words of the hymns or chants of the continental Celts no trace now remains. See BARDS, CHARMS AND AMULETS (Celtic), HYMNS (Celtic), MAGIC (Celtic).

3. The love of the Celtic peoples for music is reflected in well-nigh every old legend and tale, and is a well-known characteristic, while the peculiarly intense emotional effects produced on the people by their own songs or instrumental music are very striking, and are felt by those who have even the slightest strain of Celtic ancestry. Nowhere is this love of music better seen than in the tales of the Celtic Elysium—a land where music, sweet, delightful, and soothing, is constantly resounding. Not only do the birds on the trees sing most ravishingly, but there are trees themselves which produce music, like the silver tree with musical branches in the story of Cúchulainn's sickness.¹ 'There is nothing rough or harsh, but sweet music striking on the ear,' says the mysterious visitant in the story of Bran. Even its stones are musical. There is a stone 'from which arise a hundred strains'; it is not sad music, but it 'swells with choruses of hundreds.'² 'Harpers shall delight you with their sweet music,' says the maiden who would lure Oisín to the Land of Yonh.³ Mider describes Elysium to Etain as 'the wonderland where reigns sweet-blended song.'⁴ Its inhabitants 'hear the noble music of the *sid*,' says Loegaire MacCrimthainn after his sojourn there.⁵ The same idea recurs in later Celtic fairy-lore. The belated traveller passing by fairy-mound or fairy-haunted spot, hears the most ravishing music. All this is the expression of a racial love of music, passionate and satisfying.

The love of the pagan Celts for music remained when they became Christian. This is borne witness to by the hymns composed by early Celtic saints⁶ and by ecclesiastical music, and also by the secular music—vocal and instrumental, as well as dance music—so prominent in the social life of all Celtic regions. Of late years in Wales, the W. Highlands, and Ireland there has been a great revival and development of the native music. This is a popular movement and already has been productive of interesting results.

LITERATURE.—This is mentioned throughout the article.

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

MUSIC (Chinese).—It is questionable whether any nation has had a higher idea of the importance and power of music than the Chinese. Its mysterious influence has been a theme of their writers through all the ages, for the art of producing harmonious sounds which move the human heart has been known in China since the remotest antiquity. Its discovery is attributed to the Emperor Fū Hsi (2352 B.C.), the invention of the lute being ascribed to him. Doubtless, however, the Chinese not only brought their own music with them into China, but found the aborigines possessed of a system, and possibly the two were amalgamated.

At first emperors had their different systems until Hwang Ti, the Yellow Emperor (2697 B.C.), introduced order; a note was fixed for the base note, sounds had names given to them, etc., and music was considered to be the key to good government. Succeeding emperors followed his system. Hymns were composed by these rulers, and the Great Shun (2255 B.C.) composed a piece

¹ *Irish Texts*, I. 205 f.

² K. Meyer and A. Nutt, *Voyage of Bran*, London, 1895, I. 11 f.

³ *Transactions Ossianic Society*, IV. 234 f.

⁴ *Ir. Texts*, I. 113 f.

⁵ S. H. O'Grady, *Silva Gadelica*, London, 1892, II. 290 f.

⁶ See HYMNS (Irish Christian).

¹ O'Curry, III. 361, 363, 365; cf. 323 f.

² *Transactions of the Ossianic Society*, Dublin, 1854-61, v. 96 f.

³ *Guide*, p. 28; O'Curry, III. 323.

⁴ 'Courtship of Emer,' O'Curry, III. 315.

⁵ III. 314 f.

⁶ W. O. E. Windisch and W. Stokes, *Irische Texte*, Leipzig, 1880-1909, III. 211 f.; O'Curry, III. 317.

⁷ J. A. MacCulloch, *Religion of the Ancient Celts*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 380; O'Curry, III. 323.

⁸ Cf. C. Jullian, 'De la littérature poétique des Gaulois,' *RA* XL [1902] 304 f.

⁹ Apollon, *Hist. Rom.* IV. 12; Athenæus, IV. 37, VI. 49.

¹⁰ Lucan, I. 447 f.; Diod. Sic. v. 31. 2; Amm. Marc. xv. 9. 8.

¹¹ Apollon, *Celtica*, 8; Livy, x. 26, XXI. 23, XXIII. 24, XXXVIII. 17; Polyb. III. 44; Diod. Sic. v. 29. 4.

¹² Pomp. Mela, III. 6.

entitled 'Ta Shao,' which is generally believed to have exercised such a wonderful effect on Confucius, 1600 years after, as to make him lose the taste of his food for three months. It was 'perfect in melody and sentiment,' while the martial music, 'The Great War-Music' of King Wu (i.e. 'The Warrior,' 1122 B.C.), though perfect, did not meet with the Sage's approval.¹ The Master again was delighted on visiting the City of Wu (i.e. 'The Martial City') to find that, notwithstanding its position, favourable for military operations, the people had been converted from a delight in military pursuits to a love of stringed instruments and singing.²

Some of the reforms which Confucius instituted were in connexion with music.³ He declared that it is not the sounds produced by instruments alone that constitute music.⁴ As to the playing, he said that the parts should sound together at the commencement. Then 'as it proceeds they should be in harmony, severally distinct and flowing without break, and thus on to the conclusion.'⁵ The Master himself both sang and played.

Mencius endorses the dictum of the ancients that music, if rightly employed, is conducive to good government.⁶

'In music of the grandest style there is the same harmony that prevails between heaven and earth.'⁷ 'Music is an echo of the harmony between heaven and earth,' and 'has its origin from heaven.'⁸ 'The fervency of benevolence, the exactness of righteousness, the clearness of knowledge, and the firmness of maintenance, must all have their depth manifested in music.'⁹

In the Book of Poetry it is said: 'The dancers move with their flutes to the notes of the organ and drum.'¹⁰ This refers to the sacrifice to the ancestors some centuries before the Christian era. The dancing, of which there were six kinds, was not what in the West is understood by that term, but grave evolutions and posturing intended to show veneration and respect.

The performance of this ritual music at the Chinese imperial court and at religious ceremonies such as those already mentioned, and those of worship to heaven and earth, to the sun and moon, and to Confucius, have been kept up until recently during all the centuries that have elapsed since the early Chinese historic periods. These ceremonies are much alike. Music of a solemn character accompanies the worship, the offerings made, and the hymns sung.

Confucius spoke of 'music that has no sound.'¹¹ This is not the Chinese equivalent of 'songs without words,' but it is deep and silent virtue. Thus it will be seen that music with these Chinese sages connoted more than the simple word 'music' in English.

The superior man, so the Master said, must take music and apply it: 'to act and to give and receive pleasure from what you do is music.'¹² No wonder that some of this music is said to have 'embraced every admirable quality.'¹³ 'The sages found pleasure' in it 'and (saw that) it could be used to make the hearts of the people good.'¹⁴ The airs of the *Shang* were conducive to 'decision in the conduct of affairs,' i.e. 'bravery'; the airs of the *Khi* produced 'a spirit of righteousness' in giving 'place to others' even at a loss.¹⁵ 'Where there is music there is joy.'¹⁶

But this ancient music has perished, leaving abstruse, obscure theories ill understood. The execrated Tsin Shi Hwang Ti (200 B.C.), the builder of the Great Wall and the destroyer of the

literati, was also the tyrant at whose mandate music books and instruments perished, leaving scarcely a remembrance behind them. As with the classics, however, ancient literature and instruments again saw the light of day, being rescued from hiding-places. Notwithstanding this, though attempts have also been made to revive the glories of ancient music's 'golden tongue,' the music of the Chinese sages remains practically unknown, though some pieces are supposed to represent it.

Times have also radically changed even with such a conservative people as the Chinese, and the professional musician is not now highly respected. Music, which Confucius considered as completing a man's education,¹ is entirely neglected as a part of a scholar's course, and is not studied seriously. Some of the educated are able to play the flute, the *ch'in*, and a few other instruments, while the common people delight in the banging of the sonorous booming gong, the rattling drum, the shrieking clarionet, and the screeching violin. Music always accompanies marriage, funeral, and religious processions.

The music of China has not been appreciated by the foreigner, who has considered it monotonous, noisy, and disagreeable. It has been much misrepresented and misunderstood, but there are indications that 'her strange, weird, almost ghostly music is winning its way to an appreciation it is worthy of.'² There are many excellent Chinese melodies. The instructions as to playing the scholar's lute far surpass in delicacy and refinement anything in the West.

The emperor Hwang Ti is said to have been the inventor of the *liu*, a series of twelve bamboo tubes, each tube representing a semitone, so that the twelve tubes render the twelve chromatic semitones of the octave. The emperor sent to Bactria for the bamboos, as there, in 'the Valley of Bamboos,' they grow of a regular thickness. The hollow piece between two joints, or *septa*, was taken, and the note which one of the tubes produced was selected as the base or tonic. Similar tubes of different lengths were used for the other notes of their chromatic scale, nearly identical with ours. Several accounts more or less fantastic are given as to why this division into twelve semitones was employed, such as the singing of birds, rolling waves, and voices of men and women of a wild tribe, etc. These tubes have each a name, and they are supposed to be connected with the dualistic system of Chinese philosophy, half of them being classified under the *yang*, or male principle, and the rest under the *yin*, or female. The different Chinese months and hours were also assigned to these tubes. There is an absence of tempering in Chinese music, so that to our Western ears some of the Chinese intervals sound too sharp or too flat.

Their scale being theoretically correct is too perfect for practice.³

It is this as well as the general absence of piano effects and gradations of sound, there being no crescendos, legatos, etc., that makes Chinese music often so discordant to the foreigner, and the high pitch increases its unpleasant nature.

Though theoretically there is this chromatic scale approximating to that in the West, a pentatonic scale is in use. The five planets were looked on as the bases of the five notes. At one time (1100 B.C.), however, a heptatonic scale was developed by the addition of two more notes to the five. It then consisted of five full tones with two

¹ Legge, i. 75.

² S. Pollard, 'Infantide in China,' in *Christian World*, 28th Aug. 1913.

³ W. E. Soothill, 'Chinese Music,' etc., in *Chinese Recorder*, xxi. 222.

¹ See J. Legge, *Chinese Classics*, Hongkong, 1861-73, i. 3, 23.

² *Ib.* p. 183.

³ *Ib.* p. 27.

⁴ *Ib.* ii. 20 ff.

⁵ See J. Legge, 'The *Liki*,' *SBE* xviii. (Oxford, 1885) 99.

⁶ *Ib.* p. 100.

⁷ Legge, *Chinese Classics*, ii. 189 f., note.

⁸ *Ib.* iv. 897; see also pp. 373, 587, 631.

⁹ Legge, 'The *Liki*,' p. 279.

¹⁰ *Ib.* p. 106.

¹¹ *Ib.* p. 130.

¹² *Ib.* p. 276.

¹³ *Ib.* p. 107.

¹⁴ *Ib.* p. 112.

semitones, but even then the Chinese gamut was not identical with ours.

This lasted till the time of Kublai Khān (A.D. 1280), when the Mongols who then conquered China brought a new scale and notation, which, with a slight modification, lasted the century of Mongol rule. The native Ming dynasty (1368-1644) excluded the half-tones. The late Manchu dynasty (1644-1912) again made some slight alterations. Now, though theoretically there is a chromatic scale approximating to that in the West, the Chinese are content with a pentatonic scale, having dropped the two half-tones to which most of them have never taken kindly. At the same time, they are further content with fourteen sounds, their music being generally confined within these narrow limits.

As to the notation, there is no stave, the characters representing the notes being written in vertical columns in the same way as in books. To distinguish between a grave and an acute note, a little addition is sometimes made to the character standing for the higher note. In fact, Chinese solmization is imperfect. The musical notation is of such a character that to know exactly how a piece should be played a Chinese musician first requires to hear it played. For some instruments the notation is of a most complex character, containing the fullest directions as to the mode of playing, but generally the Chinese characters simply show that a certain sound is to be produced, in which of the two octaves often being unindicated. Further, it is simply a note, no indication of its length being given, though signs or dots to the right are occasionally inserted in manuscripts to indicate a longer holding of that note. Nor are rests ordinarily shown, nor time, etc., except that a space between two notes may mean either a rest or the end of a verse. Emphasis may be shown by a note being written larger.

Time and measures are thus not always indicated. Four time is the only time known scientifically, but others are heard in practice. The drum or castanets are the instruments which give the time in a band, and on no account is the one or other left out in an orchestra. The pentatonic scale is closely adhered to, whence no sharps, flats, or naturals are found.

The Chinese scale may be said to be neither major nor minor, but to participate of the two. Chinese melodies are not majestic, martial, sprightly, entrancing, as our music in the major mode; and they lack the softness, the tenderness, the plaintive sadness of our minor airs.¹

But this is true of Chinese music played by the Chinese on their own instruments. When transferred to our notation and played on our instruments, the melodies may be described as major.

Chinese vocal music is most disagreeable to European ears, as the Chinese do not sing in a natural voice.

The sounds seem to proceed from the nose; the tongue, the teeth, and the lips have very little to do except for the enunciation of some labial words.²

The *voix de tête* is generally used. The singing is in unison, no parts being known, though there is an ancient book containing the rudiments of harmony. The guitar is usually the accompanying instrument. A kind of recitative is used in the theatre. Chords, counterpoint, etc., are unknown. On some instruments two strings are played simultaneously. In chanting in Buddhist temples each priest sings in the key best suited for him. Indian music was introduced by the Buddhists.

As Chinese music may be divided into ritual (or sacred) and popular, so the instruments may be similarly divided—the former of a complicated structure, and the latter of a common form. The

spiritual principle of music being derived from heaven, the materials of which the instruments are made are earth-derived, and, as there were eight symbols (of Fu Hsi) which express all changes in the universe, the materials from which musical instruments are made are likewise eight. These are stone, metal, silk, bamboo, wood, skin, gourd, and earth, and are supposed to correspond with certain points of the compass and seasons of the year.

Stone chimes were held in high esteem, and there was also the 'single sonorous stone.'¹ The stone chimes are used only in court and religious ceremonies. There are two stone flutes. A conch shell is used by soldiers, watchmen, etc.

Under metal are classed bells, gongs, hell-chimes and gong-chimes, cymbals, and trumpets; and the *la-pa* is a trumpet with sliding tube.

Under silk are the *ch'in* (lute with seven strings) and the *sé* (which has now 25 strings). The latter is supposed to have a compass of five octaves. The four strings of the *p'i-p'a*, or balloon guitar, represent the four seasons. It often accompanies the flute, and is the instrument used by the blind singing-girls, who ply through the streets at night with their duennas, ready for hire. Others also use it. The *san-hsien*, or three-stringed guitar, is a favourite instrument of ballad singers. The *yueh-ch'in*, or moon-guitar of four strings, is also used to accompany ballads and songs. There are one or two varieties of violins—one with four strings and one (the rebeck) with two. In both of these instruments the bow strings pass between the violin strings, so that the player has not only to play the correct note, but must take care that he does not produce a wrong one by the bow string grating against wrong strings. The foreign harp-sichord, as it is called, is something like a zither, but has sixteen sets of fine wires with two bridges.

Under bamboo are included a Pandean pipe, used only in ritual music, and several kinds of flutes, the clarinet, etc.

Wood is employed in castanets, the wooden fish used by priests, and one or two curiously-shaped instruments.

Different kinds of drums account for the use of skin.

The *shêng* has the wind-chest sometimes made of gourd. The tubes which rise from the chest are reeded as in a harmonium, and are said to have given the idea for the construction of that instrument. It is used in the worship of Confucius, and is the most perfect of all Chinese musical instruments. In fact, it is nearly perfect—sweet in tone and delicate in construction.

The principles embodied in it are substantially the same as those of our grand organs. . . . Kratzenstein, an organ-builder of St. Petersburg, having become the possessor of a *shêng*, conceived the idea of applying the principle to organ-stops.²

An ocarina was made of baked clay or porcelain. Some of these instruments are most ancient in their origin.

The Chinese, as a rule, do not appreciate Western music, though, when taught, they play the harmonium well, and the Christians enjoy singing in church and school. The Chinese voice can be made to do almost anything if taken early enough and properly trained. The present writer has heard foreign music most beautifully rendered by German-trained Chinese.

LITERATURE.—J. A. van Aalst, *Chinese Music*, China I.M. Customs, 11 Special Series, no. 6, Shanghai, 1884; E. Faber, 'Chinese Theory of Music,' in *China Review*, i. (Hongkong, 1873-74) 324 ff., 384 ff., ii. (1874-75) 47 ff.; see also *China Review*, ii. 257, v. (1876-77) 142, xii. (1884-85) 402, xv. (1886-87) 54; Mrs. Timothy Richard, 'Chinese Music,' in *Chinese Recorder*, xxi. (Shanghai, 1890) 805 ff., 839 ff.; W. E. Sootbill, *ib.* p. 221 ff.;

¹ van Aalst, p. 48.

² F. Warrington Eastlake, 'The Chinese Reed Organ,' in *China Review*, xi. [1882] 35, quoted by van Aalst, p. 801.

¹ J. A. van Aalst, *Chinese Music*, p. 22; cf. Mrs. T. Richard, 'Chinese Music,' in *Chinese Recorder*, xxi. 339 f.

² van Aalst, p. 24.

J. Edkins, *ib.* xv. [1885] 61 ff.; W. N. Bittan, *ib.* xl. [1890] 195 ff.; *Notes and Queries on China and Japan*, Hongkong, Feb. 1870, p. 2 ff.; *Chinese Repository*, iv. [Canton, 1834-35] 4, 143, vi. [1836-37] 154, viii. [1839-40] 33 ff., xx. [1851] 34; S. W. Williams, *Middle Kingdom*, revised ed., London, 1833, i. 424, 672, ii. 93 ff.; G. T. Lay, *The Chinese as they are*, do. 1841, p. 75 ff.; J. Dyer Ball, *Things Chinese*, do. 1902, art. 'Music.'

J. DYER BALL.

MUSIC (Christian).—I. INTRODUCTORY.—1. Origin.—All authorities are agreed that the music of the early Church was of Hebraic origin. It is known that the apostles, as Hebrews, engaged in prayer and praise in the Temple, and they would undoubtedly utilize the same chants used there by the people in response to the Levitical choir.

The first record of Christian worship is that memorable hymn sung at the institution of the Lord's Supper: 'And when they had sung a hymn, they went out unto the mount of Olives' (Mk 14²⁶).

It was the custom at the Passover Feast to sing certain of the 'Hallel of Egypt' Psalms (Ps 113-118). The most prominent of these, Ps 114, 'In exitu Israel,' has been associated 'throughout the ages' with the chant known as 'Tonus Peregrinus,' which, leaving out intonation notes, may be shown as follows:



In the Anglican Church this melody is likewise associated with the Communion service—where it is intoned to the 'Nunc Dimittis' at the close. The origin of this chant does not seem to have been traced, nor do we know the melodies to which the hymns of the NT were set, i.e. the Magnificat (the 'Hymn Evangelical' of Isaac Williams), the song of Zacharias after the birth of St. John the Baptist, the Angels' song at the birth of our Saviour—later expanded into the 'Gloria in excelsis,' and the 'Nunc Dimittis'—associated as they are with Christian worship from the earliest times.

Music must have played an important part in early Christian worship, if we judge by St. Paul's references to it in his Epistles—written not very long after the Ascension of Christ—since he repeatedly admonishes the adherents to sing and make melody in 'psalms and hymns and spiritual songs,' while he seeks to regulate the order of worship in his Epistle to the Corinthians (1 Co 14²⁶), where he says: 'When ye come together, each one hath a psalm.'

The liturgy of the Christian Church was largely founded on the Jewish model, the oldest form being the vigil celebration, which later was divided into Evening, Night, and Morning forms of service.

The mode of Jewish worship, viz. the precentor singing the psalm as a solo, with the congregation joining in the refrain, or *cantus responsorius*, was copied by the early Christians, and was later highly elaborated as regards the solo portions.

Regarding the melodies used originally for the chanting of the Psalm little is known. In an illuminating article in *Musical Times*, January 1914, A. M. Friedländer (a Jew) says:

'We do not know the musical interpretation of the musical signs used in the Book of Psalms.' What is known is that 'for the cantillation of the Holy Law and Prophets' the latter differs widely from that used for the Pentateuch. The author proves that there is a strong similarity between (1) the Jewish system of accents fixing the modulations of the voice employed in the cantillations and the early European system of musical notation known as 'neumes'; and also between (2) the cantillations used for the chanting of the Prophets 'and the oldest known music of the Catholic and Protestant Churches'—a particular instance being given in the melody known as the 'Ambrosian Te Deum,' the origin of which has hitherto been shrouded in mystery.

Hebrew origin has also been claimed for the

melodies which have come down to us as the 'Gregorian or Psalm tones,' which were collected and codified by St. Ambrose in the 4th cent., and again to some extent during the time of St. Gregory the Great († 604) in his *Antiphonarium*, a copy of which he had nailed to the altar of St. Peter's in Rome as a standard of reference. It was this system or collection of Church song that was introduced by St. Augustine into Britain in A.D. 597, when he founded the Augustine school of music at Canterbury. There is, however, no definite proof of Hebrew origin, though circumstances certainly favour the idea that it is highly probable.

The Jews themselves at the present time chant the Psalms, but, as mentioned above, cannot identify the ancient musical signs particularly associated with them. No doubt the early Christians may possibly have set the ancient melodies differently. These melodies would be brought by Christian converts to Rome, and during the era of persecution they would be sung in the catacombs. During that time of struggle we may expect the evolution only of the fittest.¹

2. Early musical material available.—As regards the form of the music in use in the early Christian era, it is sufficient to say that the song melodies or cantillations were entirely dependent on, and subordinate to, the varying accent and metre of the text; and, as Hebrew poetry is mostly constructed on a responsive basis or in parallelisms, it is inferred that the Psalms were chanted antiphonally or as a solo with a limited congregational refrain. This responsive method passed on to the Church of Milan in the 4th cent. and to Rome shortly afterwards. As in the Temple service, the female voice was excluded.

Incidentally, the titles to some of the Psalms (Ps 22, etc.) indicate that they were sung to secular melodies. This example of appropriating the best secular melodies is one that has been followed throughout the ages.

Any knowledge of harmony at this time seems to be entirely wanting, while instrumental music with the Hebrews seems to have been confined to *selah* interludes, or flourishes on trumpets, hand clappings, and sweeping chords on instruments of the harp type.

Such, then, together with the NT hymns and, in addition, the melodies composed by the early Christians themselves, seems to have been the musical material available at this time. Thus the musical foundation of the early Church seems to have been decidedly Hebraic—although at the time Greek philosophy and Greek art were dominant, Greek influence being shown by the fact that the earliest liturgies are written in Greek. Probably Greek melodies were also borrowed from the Greek metrical songs and adapted to the unmetrical Church Psalms, antiphons, prayers, responses, etc.; the early Fathers, however, shunned the Greek instrumental accompaniment as being previously associated with pagan rites (see below, § XV.).

We have spoken of the introduction to the Church of Milan of responsive or antiphonal methods of chanting from the East in the 4th century. At an earlier period (early 2nd cent.) Pliny (*Ep.* xvi. 'de Christianis,' 7) had mentioned that the Christians sang 'by turn among themselves,' while St. Ignatius, bishop of Antioch in the 2nd cent., is also credited with its introduction both by Amalaricus (*de Ecclesiasticis Officiis*, iv. 7) and by Socrates (vi. 3), who says:

'Ignatius . . . saw a vision of angels hymning in alternate chants the Holy Trinity.'

¹ See, further, J. Stainer, *The Music of the Bible*, new ed., London, 1914, pt. iv. 'Vocal Music of the Hebrews.'

Philo describes the singing of the Jewish monastic sect of the Essenes (Therapeutæ).

They used two choirs, 'one of men, the other of women. . . . They then sing hymns to the praise of God, composed in different kinds of metre and verse, now with one mouth, now with antiphonal hymns and harmonies' (*de Vita Contemplativa*, p. 484 f. (Mangey)).

This method of singing alternately at the interval of an octave in pitch differed from the Greek idea of antiphony, since in their case the method was simultaneous (and not alternate) and was termed 'magadizing.' Since in the early Church the sexes were divided, the antiphonal response of women's (or boys') and men's voices at the octave was quite a natural one. This method has recently been revived in High Anglican services.

'Such a method is quite destructive of the genuine effect of antiphonal chanting, which ought to be equally balanced on each side of the choir' (Bumpus, *Dict. of Eccles. Terms*, p. 23).

It must be remembered that circumstances compelled the singing to be in unison and unaccompanied—certainly a crude and primitive method executed under trying conditions, though the situation would be lightened by the emulation which the division of the sexes would create. This method developed later on, as the congregations were better organized and the antiphonal singing was led with a double choir. Anglican choirs to-day sing antiphonally in the Psalms, but not the congregation. This could be easily remedied.

3. Orders of service.—By the middle of the 4th cent. the growth of the power of priests had led to the concentration of the devotional offices in their own hands and to the formation of definite orders of service or liturgies, and in this matter the Churches of the East in Syria and Egypt led the way. In the Eastern liturgies of St. Mark and St. James we find that the people are allotted such responses as 'Amen,' 'Kyrie Eleison,' 'And to thy spirit,' the 'Thrice Holy,' and others. Prayers, readings, and chanted sentences were delivered by the priests or deacons and a choir of singers, the responses being rendered by the people, as above. The Council of Laodicea (341–381) allowed only appointed singers 'to sing from the book'; this probably was intended to refer to the priest's part or to sentences allotted to him. The constituted liturgy of the ordinary service was termed the 'Office.'

4. Other musical features.—Besides the Psalms and hymns other musical features arose. The 'Psalm tones' were sung, not in our scales, but in the primitive 'modes' of the time. Many of these did not end on the 'final' of the mode, since the idea of tonality or key was undeveloped, and, to obviate the inconclusive effect, 'antiphons,' consisting of a verse from a Psalm and terminating on the final, were sung both before and after the Psalm. These antiphons varied with the season; sometimes they were sung to the word 'Alleluia,' (as originally found in the Psalms themselves), and these 'Alleluia' chants taking a florid turn were named 'tropes.' The antiphon was known in the East in the 4th cent., and in the 5th cent. it was also inserted in the Communion service or Mass.

The liturgy of the Mass was a matter of slow growth. On the 'perpetual miracle' of transubstantiation the Roman Church built up an elaborate service, High Mass being musical throughout. The ordinary Mass includes introits, collects, epistles and lessons, graduals, tracts, gospels, offertories, communions and post-communions. In the High, or sung, Mass there follow in order the introit (verse of a Psalm), 'Kyrie,' 'Gloria in Excelsis,' the gradual (consisting of a Psalm verse sung to ancient plain-song on the steps of the ambon) or an 'Alleluia' verse or a tract (a Psalm verse also set to ancient Church song, sung

slowly), and on certain festivals an animated antiphonal hymn termed a 'sequence' (see A. Riley, 'Concerning Hymn Tunes and Sequences' [*Church Music Soc. Papers*, 4 and 5], ch. viii.). The Confession of Faith, or 'Credo,' is sung next by the choir, and is followed by the often elaborate offertory (during the offering), the 'Sanctus,' 'Benedictus,' and 'Agnus Dei' (after the consecration), all sung by the choir.

II. THE AGE OF UNISONAL SONG.—I. Plain-song.—St. Ambrose, as has already been mentioned, is credited with the codification of the plain chant melodies and their classification into four 'authentic modes,' or scales, as most easily represented by the white notes only of the piano thus:

Dorian	D to D, or <i>r</i> to <i>r</i> .
Phrygian	E to E, or <i>m</i> to <i>m</i> .
Lydian	F to F, or <i>f</i> to <i>f</i> .
Mixo-Lydian	G to G, or <i>s</i> to <i>s</i> .

Later St. Gregory († A.D. 604), it is related, supplemented the labours of St. Ambrose, though history is not very definite on this point;¹ but he is credited with the extension, or the recognition of the extension, of the existing modes upwards thus:

Hypo-Dorian	A to A, or <i>l</i> to <i>l</i> .
Hypo-Phrygian	B to B, or <i>t</i> to <i>t</i> .
Hypo-Lydian	C to C, or <i>d</i> to <i>d</i> .
Hypo-mixo-Lydian	D to D, or <i>r</i> to <i>r</i> .

These were known as the four 'plagal modes.'

Antiphonal song is said to have been introduced into the Church of Rome by Pope Celestine I. (422–432). It was further encouraged by Leo the Great (440–461), who established a singing-school of plain chant in Rome.

Gevaert (*La Mélodie antique*) ascribes the 'compilation and composition of the liturgic songs' to the Greek popes at the end of the 7th and the beginning of the 8th centuries.

'The Antiphonarium Missarum received its definitive form between 632 and 716; the Antiphonarium Officii was already fixed under Pope Agathon (678–681).' Gevaert says also that 'the oldest chants are the simplest. . . The florid chants were of later introduction, and were probably the contribution of the Greek and Syrian Churches' (Dickinson, p. 110 f.).

No definite system of notation arose before the 7th cent., and the monks had to refresh their memories of the traditional melodies by means of a series of scratches and dots termed 'nenms.' Singers then, as later, took liberties with the melodies, so that musical knowledge of this period is somewhat vague; but, as every monastery became a singing-school, the knowledge of the Church song was spread abroad. The Milan and Gallican Churches had adopted other forms of the chant, but the Roman version with the aid of Charlemagne (768–814) prevailed. In 790 two monks, taking with them the *Gregorian Antiphonary*, reached the monastery of St. Gall in Switzerland, with which certain monks of Irish nationality were prominently connected. St. Gall henceforth became an important centre or music-school, and that *Antiphonary*, as the oldest MS extant, still exists. A facsimile was published by L. Lambillotte at Brussels in 1867.

The 'Gregorian or Psalm tones' consist of eight tones with various introductory notes or intona-



tions and endings, which, together with the irregular 'Tonus Peregrinus' and 'Tonus Regius,' make up some 46 chants in all.

¹ See Dickinson, *Music of the Western Church*, p. 107.

Various versions of the 'Psalm tones' existed in the Meehlin Office Books, the English Sarum Psalter, and the Roman and French Psalters; and, the chant having degenerated throughout the ages, a reform and restoration movement was carried on through the monks of Solesmes (who published their *Paltographie musicale* in 1889) and the Cecilian Society. Pope Pius X. also decreed the restoration of the plain chant in an authorized form in 1903 and again in 1912. The 'Psalm tones' are to be sung in unison as intended. They were originally unaccompanied from necessity; there can, however, be no objection to judicious organ accompaniment, if congregational singing is intended, so long as it is in keeping with the mode and the spirit of the Psalm.

Plain-song, or chants, broadly speaking, may be classified into (1) simple syllabic melodies, and (2) florid, or melismatic, song.

It has also been classified into periods thus: (i.) the first six centuries A.D.; (ii.) the next seven or eight centuries. Its decline dates from the introduction of the *organum* in the 9th cent. and the development of polyphony, and continued till (iii.) the debased period, from the 16th cent. to 1880; (iv.) its revival by the monks of Solesmes and the pope's decrees of 1903 and 1912, the latter of which points out 'that the entire congregation should take part in executing those portions of the text which are assigned to the choir.'

Since the Roman Church has never really encouraged congregational music, this is certainly a step in the right direction, and the result will be watched with interest. The step from concertized Masses sung only by the choir to the Office and Mass sung only in plain-song is, however, an extreme one. The strength of plain-song is its startling contrast to modern music as heard everywhere around us. Its primitive or undeveloped sense of key, its vague rhythm essentially fitted for prose only (well-defined rhythm is absolutely necessary for unanimous and hearty congregational singing), its limited compass, and its unharmonized or unaccompanied presentation are all useful as a means of contrast. But, when used to the entire, or almost entire, exclusion of ordinary fully-developed music, it becomes dreary in the extreme—its primitiveness becomes only too apparent.

Plain-song in its best form is eminently fitted to the traditional congregational responses, and in the 'Psalm tones' for the chanting of the prose Psalms; there are also some fine ancient hymn melodies which have survived the test of time and are found in many Hymnals. It should, however, be remembered that plain-song is essentially men's song (i.e. of monastic origin), and fitted principally for male voices; and to have the proper effect it must be rendered in unison by voices in which the male element preponderates.

LITERATURE.—D. A. de Sola, *The Ancient Melodies of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews*, London, 1857; C. Engel, *The Music of the most Ancient Nations*, do. 1864; A. M. Friedländer, 'Notes on Facts and Theories,' etc., in *Musical Times*, Jan. 1914; K. Weinmann, *Hist. of Church Music*, New York, 1910 (with bibliography); F. A. Gevaert, *La Mélodie antique dans le chant de l'église latine*, Ghent, 1895; J. B. Rebours, *Traité de psallique*, Paris, 1907; G. Grove, *Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, ed. J. A. Fuller-Maitland, London, 1904-10, s.v. 'Ambrosian Chant,' 'Gregorian Modes,' 'Modes,' 'Plain Song,' etc.; *A Grammar of Plain Song* (the Benedictines of Stanbrook), do. 1905; F. Burgess, *The Teaching and Accompaniment of Plain Song*, do. 1914; 'A Revised Gregorian Tonalé,' *Musical Times*, Aug. 1915; J. Stainer and H. B. Briggs, *Manual of Plain Song*, do. 1902; M. Springer, *Art of Accompanying Plain Chant*, New York, 1908; H. Grace, 'Plain-Song, Pros and Cons,' *Church Music Society Paper*, London, 1915; R. W. Terry, *Catholic Church Music*, do. 1907; F. C. C. Egerton, *Handbook of Church Music*; *A Practical Guide to Plain Song of the Roman Mass*, do. 1900 (with bibliography).

2. The carol.—As one of the earliest forms of Church music, the carol merits separate attention.

It was a festal hymn designed for special occasions and usually written in metrical form. Hymns were in use before Christ (see the Delphic Hymn to Apollo [280 B.C.] with melody in *Musical Times*, June 1894; also Duncan, *Story of the Carol*, p. 9 f.). Augustine gives an interesting definition of a hymn. The 'Gloria in excelsis,' or 'Angels' hymn,' has been termed the first carol of the Church.

Clement, in the 1st cent., exhorted his brethren to keep in 'the first place the day of Christ's birth' (Duncan, p. 10), and Telesphorus, bishop of Rome, instituted in A.D. 129 the custom of singing Christmas carols, ordaining then the singing of the 'Angels' hymn' (ib. p. 11). Prudentius (b. 348) is known as the first writer of carols, and St. Jerome testifies in the 5th cent. that carols were in use. Early examples are the well-known 'Corde natus' of Prudentius and the 5th cent. 'A solis ortus cardine' (ib. p. 17). Julian (*Diet. of Hymnology*, p. 207) states that many of the early Church lyrics in various forms partook of the character of the carol. Charlemagne encouraged the use of carols and hymns, and condemned the vulgar type of songs which had crept into the Churches.

In the canons of Elfric made in 957 priests are admonished to keep the song-books for the various services at hand.

Minstrelsy at this time was very popular, and with the preaching of the Crusades in 1095 arose the Order of Troubadours and the Crusaders' hymns. The rise of the miracle-play and pageant brought the carol 'Orientis partibus,' the melody of which is preserved in our Hymnals, and from the 12th cent. onwards the carol is preserved to us in frequent quaint examples, some of which are very popular in their refreshing and unstilted melody. They take various forms, and composers like the English Marbeck and Byrd wrote them, while Bach harmonized specimens.

In Duncan's *Story of the Carol* an example of an early carol of the 11th cent., 'Congaudeat turba fidelium,' taken from the Swedish collection *Piæ Cantiones* (1582), is to be found.

LITERATURE.—E. Duncan, *The Story of the Carol*, London, 1911 (with bibliography); J. Julian, *Sacred Carols, Ancient and Modern*, do. 1909; Grove, s.v. 'Carol,' etc.; J. A. Fuller-Maitland, *English Carols of the 15th Century*, London, n.d.; J. P. Migne, *Dictionnaire de Noels*, Paris, 1867; H. J. L. J. Massé and C. K. Scott, *A Book of Old Carols*, London, 1907; *Corley Carol Book*, do. 1902. See also bibliography in Duncan.

III. THE RISE OF POLYPHONY.—So far Church song had been confined to melody. The first step away from this took the shape of *organum*, or the organizing of a rigidly concurrent accompaniment of fifths or fourths on the organ, which was introduced into the Church about the 7th century. To modern ears this effect, taken by itself, would be extremely crude, but, sustaining a large body of men's voices singing in unison, would probably be quite tolerable.

This organ effect was tried also by the choristers, and probably with more euphonious results. Later the experiment of voices singing a drone or stationary bass, combined with previous efforts, gave the necessary beginning in polyphony, or the art of harmoniously weaving the various voices together. Guido of Arezzo, in the 11th cent., wrote an account of the methods of *organum*, or diaphony, and examples are given in the *Musica* of Johannes Cotto (c. 1100).

The introduction of other intervals besides those of the 5th and 4th, and more definite indications of time and rhythm come next in order, first in two and then in three parts, until we come to the composition of the early sacred motet, in which (as in all early monk-made music) the melody is put into the tenor part.

The canon, or imitation by one voice of another voice part, and vocal interchange of the parts occur

in 13th cent. music. This device became more and more artistically worked—indeed, too much so for the unsympathetic ears of one John of Salishury (1120–80), who complains that the congregation is depraved by listening to these ‘enervating performances’ in ‘the re-doubling of notes, repetition of phrases, and clashing of voices’ (*Polyeraticus*, i. 6). These devices of descant became more and more florid, so much so that Pope John XXII., in 1322, forbade all descant except the simple addition of octaves, fourths, and fifths, unless for special occasions. Musical composition at this time—i.e. from the 11th to the 15th cent.—was one long experiment. The conditions were anything but simple. The notation was the indefinite square note system used for plain-song; bar-lines were wanting. Many different clefs were used, and composition was attacked mostly from the mathematical aspect, and became a tangled and abstruse contrapuntal puzzle. The scale itself was not understood, and ideas of interchange of key were strictly limited by the hexachord (or six note) arrangement.

As already mentioned, the theme, often that of a secular song, was put in the tenor, and various parts were added in an artificial style. This tenor melody arrangement was termed *faux-bourdon*, ‘false bass,’ since the effect of its heing sung by high men’s voices was to make the lower voice stand out above the higher or boys’ voices—a kind of inverted or top-heavy effect being produced:



as written the effect.
(melody in black notes).

Of great historical interest is the famous rota ‘Sumer is icumen in,’ a four-part canon with a pes, or foundation, of two parts making six part harmony, written about 1226, in the handwriting of John of Fornsete at Reading Abbey. Between this and the compositions of John of Dunstable († 1453) there is little worthy of note. Dunstable was well known on the Continent through his motets, and he seems to have been the first to attempt to practise independent part-writing with success.

1. A capella masses and motets.—English Church composers were now pre-eminent from about 1530 to 1561, after which Palestrina and the Italians came to the front. In the interval after Dunstable’s death the Flemings were pre-eminent through the Netherlanders Jean Okeghem († 1513) and Josquin des Prés (1445–1521). Josquin des Prés was at this time the ‘idol of Enrope,’ his compositions being sung everywhere. They are now being revived (see John Hullah, *Hist. of Modern Music*, p. 49 f.). In the meantime a setting of the Passion music by Richard Davy, famous as the earliest known (c. 1490–1504), is to be noted.

The three great English cathedral composers before the Reformation were Christopher Tye (1510–72), Robert Whyte († 1574), and Thomas Tallis († 1585). At this time the Mass music in England had grown to be very elaborate. The ‘Gregorian tones’ were in common use before and after the Reformation, but the Reformers rightly aimed at making the words clear, and later John Marbeck († 1585) was given the task of making plain settings of the Church service. English pre-Reformation Church composers played an important part, but unfortunately most of their MS works are still locked up in college and university libraries (see H. Davy, *Hist. of English Music*, London, 1895).

The Church works of this period, we must remember, are purely *a capella*, or unaccompanied. This *a capella* style reached its climax in Palestrina

(1526–94), who clothed the learning of the Netherlands school with spirituality and dignity. Palestrina’s works are written in both (a) simple chordal style, and (b) the complicated polyphonic style of the period, which in its substance is based on imitative work and lacks the defined periods of the simple secular style. His work was founded upon the Gregorian chant, and the Marcellus Mass is still a model of the more elaborate *a capella* style. Palestrina overshadowed somewhat the fine works of his contemporaries, Willaert, the two Gabriellis (Andrea and Giovanni), Vittoria, the two Anerios (Felice and Giovanni-Francesco), Tallis, C. Goudimel († 1572), and others. For Palestrina see W. S. Rockstro, *Hist. of Music*, ch. vii.; Hullah, p. 87 f.; and G. Baini, *Memoirs of Palestrina*, Rome, 1828, Germ. tr., Leipzig, 1834; see also Grove, s.v.

Adrian Willaert, though a Fleming, was chapel-master from 1527 to 1563 at St. Mark’s, Venice. Prompted by the existence of its two opposite music galleries, he wrote compositions for double choir, thus presenting effects of contrast and climax.

Out of emulation G. Gabrieli (1557–1612) wrote a twelve-part Psalm, as C. von Winterfeld says, for ‘three choruses, one of deep voices, one of higher, and the third consisting of the four usual parts.’

‘Like a tender fervent prayer begins the song in the deeper chorus, “God be merciful. . . .” Then the middle choir continues with similar expression, “And cause his face to shine upon us.” The higher chorus strikes in with the words, “That thy way may be known upon earth.” In full voice the strain now resounds from all three choirs, “Thy saving health among all nations”’ (Winterfeld, *Johannes Gabrieli und sein Zeitalter*, Berlin, 1834, ap. Dickinson, p. 170).

The strong point of the best of this mediæval unaccompanied Mass and motet music is its detached, exalted, and mystical air, as exemplified in Palestrina. Its weak point is the lack of the emotional interpretative element; this was left to the ceremony and ritual of the Church to suggest and foster. Nevertheless, it was this that led to its decay and disuse and the substitution of the newer style described below, § XII.

After Palestrina the motet was cultivated by all grades of composers. The pre-Reformation motets of the English composers C. Tye, J. Taverner, J. Shepherd, R. Fairfax, W. Byrd, and O. Gibbons in pride of place stand next to those of Palestrina. In Italy itself the fine motets of T. L. Vittoria (1560–1608) were followed by the more modern works of A. Scarlatti, L. Leo, F. Dnrannte, and G. B. Pergolesi, in the latter half of the 17th cent., and these are still worthy of study. The sceptre then passed to Germany, where the great Johann Sebastian Bach (1685–1750) reigned supreme, whose magnificent motets for double chorus, such as ‘Be not afraid,’ and ‘Blessing, Glory and Wisdom,’ astonish and gratify the artist. Handel’s motets are also very fine and well worth reviving.

The motets of Haydn and Mozart are really cantatas. In England the motet was continued under the name of the ‘full anthem.’ S. Wesley’s motets are fine examples of the earlier style. In later times we have also worthy examples by Brahms, Hauptmann, Rheinberger, and Cornelius. Mendelssohn’s ‘Hear my Prayer’ is really an anthem.

2. Passion music.—(a) We have already mentioned the earliest example of Passion music—an English work by Davy. From the 4th cent. onwards, the history of the Passion has been set forth in Holy Week in musical form.

At first, after the Greek manner, the events of the sacred Passion were disposed in dialogue form and chanted and interspersed with choruses, arranged like those of Æschylus and Sophocles. An ancient plain chant named ‘Cantus Passionis’ has come down to us, but its origin and date are

unknown. The subsequent manner was to divide the words spoken by (1) the narrator, (2) our Lord, and (3) the apostles, or chorus, among three priests or deacons, and each one had his own chant. This manner seems to have prevailed generally till about 1550 or 1570. The interesting Passion music of Richard Davy, who was organist of Magdalen College, Oxford, in 1490, is according to St. Matthew, and for four voices; it is not written in a plain-song, but in free early 16th cent. style. It was discovered in a MS choir-book at Eton College containing originally 66 motets and 28 magnificats. Davy composed also a 'Stabat Mater,' motets, etc. This is a specimen of the pre-Reformation treasures still in existence, but as yet mostly neither transcribed nor reproduced in any form (Davey, p. 90).

A Passion according to St. John comes next (c. 1560-70), and after that an early Protestant work is found in Keuchenthal's Book (see Winterfeld, *Der evangelische Kirchengesang*, Leipzig, 1843-47), published in 1573, in which there are short choruses for the people or crowd, and soliloquies in recitative form. Vittoria in 1585 wrote a similar work in artistic style which, rendered by the pontifical choir in Rome, has since remained a classic (Grove, s.v. 'Passion Music'; Naumann, *Hist. of Music*, pp. 431, 478).

(b) These works prepared the way for the Passion oratorios of H. Schütz (1585-1672) and J. Sebastiani (1672), who introduced in them Protestant chorale melodies, of R. Keiser (1673-1739), who introduced the sentimental element, and for the climax, the magnificent Passion oratorios of Bach. Graun's 'Der Tod Jesu,' produced in 1755, Haydn's 'Seven Last Words' (1785), Beethoven's 'Mount of Olives' (1803), Spohr's 'Calvary' (1833), and many English works down to the sincere and popular Stainer's 'Crucifixion' (1887), may be mentioned.

LITERATURE.—C. E. H. de Coussemaker, *Dramas liturgiques du moyen âge*, Rennes, 1880; see also literature below, § XI., and Dickinson, p. 275 ff.

3. The effect of the Reformation.—We now come to the movement which exerted marked influence on the course of Church music. We have to remember that so far the music of the Church had been practically confined to the priests and the choir. The music-schools were in the hands of the priests, and no effort seems to have been made to train the lay element or congregation, so that their part was limited practically to an occasionally ejaculated 'Kyrie' or 'Amen'; the rest involved listening to complicated compositions in the polyphonic style set to Latin words, and to the Psalms and the Office, also in Latin, as set to the ancient plain-song of the Church. The congregation was thus practically ignored. Hence the natural demand of the Reformers for simplicity and for a share in the worship (see Naumann, p. 429).

IV. ENGLISH CATHEDRAL MUSIC.—The music of the Reformed Church resolved itself into (a) that performed by the choir, in England known as cathedral music, and (b) congregational responses, chorales, metrical Psalms, and hymns.

Here it should be noted that the Reformation took a comparatively mild course in England. Henry VIII. threw off the pope's authority in 1534. The dissolution of the monasteries began in 1536, some 600 monasteries and convents being destroyed. Previous to this every monastery and abbey had acted as a school of music or song-school for the training of the singing priests and boys. The choirs at this time of cathedrals, abbeys, universities, the Chapel Royal, and private chapels of large estates had been well supplied with Mass and motet music by Tallis, Tye, R. Whyte, Fairfax, Taverner, Shepherd, and others. In 1536 Church

music and organ playing were reckoned among the eighty-four 'faults and abuses of religion,' and, despite the later publication of the Six Articles in which they were defended, enormous damage was done, innumerable MSS by pre-Reformation composers being destroyed. Choirs were dispersed and organs broken up.

It is interesting to relate that Messrs. Novello are now, in their 'Cathedral Series,' publishing some of the best of the English pre-Reformation compositions which have survived, and so far had lain in oblivion. The boy king Edward VI. was won over to the cause of the Reformation, and reforms in doctrine and ritual were brought forward. The Book of Common Prayer took the place of the Missal and Breviary. The Mass was abolished and the Communion Service as set forth in the first Prayer Book of Edward VI. in 1549 took its place.

1. The Anglican service.—The order of the ordinary services was founded to some extent on the ancient Latin Office named the Hours, certain items being omitted. It contains the responses for the people, the canticles, the daily portion of the Psalms, and room for a hymn or anthem, and also the Litany, as compiled from the old litanies of the English Church and set as before to the old plain-song. The Communion Service was framed on the ancient use of the church of Sarum (Salisbury).

The order is one which gives considerable latitude, since responses, creed, Psalms, and canticles may be said or sung. In a full choral or cathedral service these are all sung, the canticles ('Te Denm,' etc.) being taken to anthem-like settings; other grades of service depend on taste and the capacity of the choir, the canticles being chanted and the anthem perhaps omitted. The acknowledged guide to the full choral service is now the *Cathedral Prayer Book* (Novello and Co.).

The first musical reform of the services of the Church was accomplished by John Marbeck. In 1550 Marbeck made a plain one-part or unison setting (founded to some extent on Sarum use) of the various responses and liturgical portion of the services, as well as of the canticles which were set to Gregorian chants; the Psalter was not given. The Communion Service commenced with a verse from the Psalms as an introit, and the Commandments, 'Gloria in Excelsis,' 'Credo,' 'Sursum Corda,' 'Sanctus,' 'Benedictus,' 'Pater Noster,' and 'Agnus Dei' followed. At the revision of the Prayer Book in 1552 the introit, 'Benedictus,' and 'Agnus Dei' were excluded and the 'Gloria' put at the end. Marbeck's settings have certainly an Elizabethan ring about them, but they are devotional even if lacking in characterization.

LITERATURE.—S. Royle Shore, 'The Choral Eucharist since the Reformation,' *The Cathedral Quarterly*, April 1913; D. Slater, 'Additional Notes on Communion Services between the Elizabethan and early Victorian Epochs,' *ib.*, July 1913.

2. Choral settings of the Anglican Service.—(a) The first book of full choral settings of the Service was published by John Day in 1560. It contained settings of the 'Te Deum'—with the Ambrosian melodies in the tenor part—and a fine Communion Service by T. Causton († 1569), also settings of the Litany, the Lord's Prayer to a chant, and various anthems by Tallis and others. Tallis and Tye both embraced the Reformation. Tye, in obedience to the universal demand which set in for the metrical versions of everything, made a setting in 1553 of such a version of the Acts of the Apostles. Of this he completed fourteen chapters in all. These were set in a kind of metrical anthem form, displaying the usual fugal and canonic entries, but in simple and clear style. Some portions were afterwards arranged as Psalm tunes, such as the one

known as Sonthwark. Tye's Service in G minor has recently been re-published.

Previous to the Reformation Tallis († 1585), who wrote mostly in the Dorian mode, had composed his important five- and six-part motets and a Mass in F. His motet, or 'Song of Forty Parts,' written for eight choirs of five voices each, still remains a wonder of counterpoint. His anthems in Day's Service-Book and others, his nine tunes in Parker's *Metrical Psalter* of 1560, and his harmonization of the Church responses and Litany with melody in the tenor keep his name ever before us. It is well known that congregations sing, not the tenor plain-song in his festal responses, but naturally the upper soprano or added part. The original arrangement is suitable only for men communities (see also Barrett, *English Church Composers*, p. 23).

Richard Farrant († 1581) is known for his solid and solemn Services and anthems. His association with 'Lord, for thy tender mercies' sake' is doubted. N. Patrick, N. Strogers, R. Whyte, and W. Mundy († c. 1591) are likewise well-known names of the pre-Reformation period.

(b) *Elizabethan and Stuart periods.*—W. Byrd († 1623), though a Romanist at heart and a composer of important compositions for the Roman Church, wrote anthems and Services for the Reformed Church. His anthem 'Bow thine Ear' and the canon 'Non nobis domine' preserve his renown. Other works of this period were T. Morley's († c. 1604) fine Burial Service and T. Tomkins' († 1656) Service in C. The Services and anthems of Orlando Gibbons (1583-1625), the leading composer of this polyphonic period (and known as 'the English Palestrina'), are masterpieces of their kind. His 'Hosanna to the Son of David' is still a favorite, and an advance on the heavy style of Tallis and Byrd (see also Barrett, p. 58).

The Stuarts did little for English music, and cathedral choirs were much reduced at this time. Adrian Batten († 1673), who was about the first composer to use bar-lines, is noted for his devotional full choral Communion Service.

The historic Barnard's *Collection of Church Music*, quite a repository of this period, was published in 1561 in the usual parts. These parts were dissipated through the Civil Wars and were not got together again till 1863.

The Puritan interregnum now intervened, and Parliament decreed that organs should be taken down and choral music books destroyed, as already mentioned.

After the Restoration E. Lowe's *Short Directions for the Performance of the Cathedral Service*, published in 1661, and J. Clifford's *Collection of Services and Anthems* (1693) and *Chants* were certainly needed (see Rockstro's interesting account of the English school of the Restoration [ch. xv. p. 162]). The chants at this period for the Psalms and canticles were the ancient Gregorian tones.

One sign of the changed times is seen in the action of Charles II., who, 'tyred with ye grave and solemn way' of Tallis, Byrd, and Gibbons, 'ordered ye composers of his Chappell to add Symphonys etc. with Instruments to their Anthems . . . to be done when he came to ye Chappell . . . after ye French fantastical light way' (T. Tudway's [† 1730] collection quoted from Bumpus, *Hist. of Eng. Cathedral Music*, p. 123).

In order to meet the king's tastes Pelham Humphreys (1647-74) was sent to France to acquire the prevailing Italian style. Humphreys introduced the declamatory recitative style and more dramatic feeling into his anthems, and they are still used. For Humphreys see Hullah, p. 120 f.

The early anthem was practically a motet—i.e. written in full chorus and more or less involved contrapuntal style—and the modern anthem may be said to date from about the time of Humphreys and Purcell, with the introduction of more dramatic

feeling or necessary characterization of the emotions, solo (or 'verse') passages, and accompaniments in the Italian style.

The anthems and Services of J. Blow (1648-1708) are characterized by vigour, pathos, and freshness, and give evidence of a new element of imagination. These, with the melodious anthems by Michael Wise († 1687) and the pathetic and expressive works of R. Langdon († 1803), pave the way for Henry Purcell (1658-95), the premier genius of English cathedral music. By this time the cathedral establishments had been fully restored after the Commonwealth. Purcell's Church works comprise 3 Services, 32 anthems, and 20 interesting anthems with orchestral accompaniment. The last, written for the Chapel Royal, are mostly verse anthems, i.e. intended for solo voices with short refrains for chorus and with introductions and interludes for the stringed instruments. They are characterized by brevity of movement and frequent changes of tempo—strong contrasts intended to claim the royal interest (see G. P. E. Arkwright, 'Purcell's Church Music,' *Musical Antiquary*, Jan. and July 1910). Refined melody and harmony combined with great ingenuity are Purcell's characteristics. His remarkable 'Te Deum' and 'Jubilate' for four voices, strings, trumpets, and organ, and the anthems 'Out of the Deep' and 'O give Thanks,' sung at the Purcell Commemoration Festival in 1895, may be mentioned as examples. For Purcell's harmonies see Barrett, p. 97.

Anthems by W. Child († 1697) and B. Rogers († 1698)—known for his Service in D—and also the works of Henry Aldrich († 1710) and the original R. Creighton († 1736) close this period.

(c) *1700-50.*—In this period we have J. Clarke († 1707) with his sympathetic 'I will love thee,' W. Croft's (1678-1727) 'majestic and melodious' *Thirty Select Anthems*, Service in A, and Burial Service, the 'Chanting Services' of J. Hawkins († 1729) and T. Kempton († 1762) (i.e. the Psalms set to a single chant—interspersed with florid verses set anthemwise), J. Weldon's († 1736) deeply religious and modern *Six Select Anthems*, J. Bishop's († 1737) Service in D, the simple melodious Services of C. King († 1748), the Evening Services of T. Kelway († 1749), and J. Travers' († 1758) Service in F. The melodious anthems of Maurice Greene († 1755) show Italian and German influence. Greene was organist of St. Paul's Cathedral from 1718 and the friend of Handel, who took great delight in playing the cathedral organ.

As regards the parish churches, the music appears not to have been of a high order. The manners of the time have been described in Addison's *Tatler*. The services were interrupted with noisy and tricky solos on the trumpet and stops of the mixture type (mounted cornet).

(d) *Later Georgian period.*—In 1760 appeared W. Boyce's unique collection of cathedral music, of which modern editions, discarding the old clefs, appeared at a later time. Boyce (1710-79) himself, with his massive, dignified, and finely-written anthems, which are considered cathedral classics, and his contemporaries, J. Kent († 1776), W. Hayes († 1777) and his son Philip († 1797), and J. Nares († 1783), who wrote in the popular style, open this period.

B. Cooke († 1793), the writer of glees, chants, and Psalm tunes, is known for his solid Service in G; chants by the clever organist, T. S. Dupuis († 1796), Jonathan Battishill's († 1801) beautiful seven-part anthem 'Call to remembrance,' S. Arnold's († 1802) *Collection of Cathedral Music* (1790), W. Jackson († 1803) of Exeter's simple and practical congregational 'Te Deum' in F (a composition which should be sung fluently in chant style and which would be improved by a modern

accompaniment), J. Alcock's († 1806) 'Miserere,' and T. Ebdon's († 1811) 'Service in C' complete the period.

At this time the music in our cathedrals had once more sunk to a low ebb. Fortunately, owing to the 19th cent. High Church or Tractarian movement and the efforts of S. S. Wesley, the necessary administrative and musical reforms were introduced.

(c) 19th century.—During this time also support for Church composers was lacking somewhat, and cheap adaptations of foreign oratorios undermined our unique school of English cathedral music. Nevertheless J. Clarke Whitfield († 1836), with his simple melodious anthems, Samuel Wesley (1766–1837), son of Charles Wesley the brother of the great John Wesley, a musical genius and great organist, and known for his scholarly motets, and T. Attwood (1767–1838), a pupil of Mozart, in his Service in F and fine modern anthems, kept in touch with the best traditions. Attwood was organist of St. Paul's Cathedral in 1833, when Mendelssohn played the organ there on a certain memorable occasion. J. Pring († 1842), who wrote anthems in Boyce's style, and W. Crotch († 1847), known for his pleasing anthems and Service in F, also belong to this period.

The devotional and elevated Services and anthems of T. A. Walmisley († 1856), the noble Services and 'Wilderness' anthem of S. S. Wesley († 1876), a fine organist; the Service in F of Henry Smart († 1879), the leading English organ composer, the devotional and melodious anthems of John Goss († 1880), as well as the solid eight-part Service in C and fine anthem 'It came even to pass' of F. A. G. Ouseley († 1889), have kept up the noble traditions of the past.

It is difficult to write of later English composers, but the names of C. V. Stanford, J. Stainer, A. S. Sullivan, J. Barnby, G. J. Elvey, and E. J. Hopkins bring memories of finely-written works, which above all are endowed with melody and modern style. It only remains for our Church composers to cling off the influence of Mendelssohn and Spohr, to keep in touch with past traditions while using virility of style and all modern resources to maintain English cathedral music as the noblest school of Church music since the days of Palestrina.

LITERATURE.—Reference may be made to the following selected works: J. S. Bumpus, *Hist. of English Cathedral Music*, 2 vols., London, 1903; Myles B. Foster, *Anthems and Anthem Composers*, do. 1901; W. A. Barrett, *English Church Composers*, do. 1882; *English Music* ('Our Cathedral Composers'), do. 1908; *Church Music Society Occasional Papers*, do. 1910–15; A. M. Richardson, *Church Music*, do. 1904; J. Baden Powell, *Choralia*, do. 1903; G. P. E. Arkwright, 'Purcell's Church Music,' *Musical Antiquary*, Jan. and July 1910; J. F. Runciman, *Old Scores and New Readings*, do. 1898, etc. 1. 'Our last great Musician.' Different points of view will be found in the two following works: T. F. Forth, *Sanctity of Church Music*, London, 1914; R. B. Daniel, *Chapters on Church Music*, do. 1894. See, further, *Cathedral Prayer Book*, do. 1891; J. Jebb, *Choral Service*, do. 1843, *The Choral Responses and Litanies*, 2 vols., do. 1847–57 (contains the various ancient usages).

3. The Anglican chant.—It has been said that 'the principle of using harmonized chants for the Psalms and canticles is neither specially English, nor is it the product of the Reformation or the English type of Service' (Royle Shore, 'The Early Harmonized Chant of the Church of England,' *Mus. Times*, Sept. Oct. Nov. 1912, p. 585 f.). In England harmonized chants were probably in use a century before the Reformation. Abroad they were in use at the beginning of the 16th cent. and probably before that. The early harmonized chants consisted of the 'Psalm tones' with melody in the tenor, and, like all early music, were barless. They still survive under the name of *faux-bourdon*s, and are in regular use as such to the Psalms or Magnificat with alternate verses rendered in unison. As the

tenor plain-song melody has mostly disappeared; however, the connexion hardly exists now. As with the old Psalm tune, the *faux-bourdon*, or tenor melody, does not favour mixed congregational singing, and the Anglican chant with melody in the soprano is the natural outcome. In the old plain chant Psalters every word was noted—i.e. had a note to itself. This was succeeded by the long note for reciting purposes and the bar-lines to ensure correct endings. These bar-lines have unfortunately proved to be a snare, because the latter measured portion should always be recited as freely and at the same speed as the first portion of the chant. The weak point of the Anglican chant in long settings is the over-repetition of the same harmonies. Hence unison verses are desirable with changed harmonies. More varied forms, as with plain chant, are also to be wished for. The earliest double chant dates back to one of Byrd's *Collection*—1641. In this class it is desirable that the second half of the chant should be responsive or sequential in form.

LITERATURE.—*The Barless Psalter*, London, 1913; P. A. Wales, *Rhythmic Psalter*, Oxford, 1910; A. M. Richardson, *The Psalms: their Structure and Musical Rendering*, London, 1904; *The Responsive Psalter*, do. 1913; *Faux-bourdon Magnificats and Harmonized Plain Chant Settings* by Tallis, Byrd, Gibbons, etc., for the Canticles and Psalms, do. 1916; H. Grace, 'Old English Service Music,' in *Mus. Times*, July 1915. It must be noted that these ancient harmonized chant settings of the Psalms were much longer compositions than the ordinary Anglican chant, as they were liable to alteration, repetition, or general free treatment. They were also more richly harmonized. Refer also to J. Heywood, *Art of Chanting*, London, 1893; J. S. Curwen, *Studies in Worship Music*, i. 117; Grove, s.v. 'Chant'; R. Bridges, art. 'English Chanting,' in *Musical Antiquary*, April 1911.

V. IRISH CHURCH MUSIC.—Early Irish Church music is surrounded with something of mystery. An Irishman, St. Gall, founded the musically famous monastery called after him, and it was an Irish monk who introduced the Roman chant to Cologne about 1025.

'Irish Psalmody and Hymnody were distinctly Celtic in the first half of the 7th century'—which is assumed to be about the time that plain-song reached Ireland—'and were mainly adaptations of the old Irish pre-Christian melodies. . . . The Irish were the earliest to adopt neums as a musical notation of plain chant,' and 'they modified and introduced Irish melodies into the Gregorian chant' (Flood, *Hist. of Irish Music*, p. 8).

Early in the 9th cent. organs were introduced. Giraldus Cambrensis († 1220) wrote:

'Only in musical instruments I find commendable the diligence of that nation; in these it is incomparably superior to every other nation we have seen' (*Topographia Hibernica*, lii. 10).

Among the ancient Church MSS the Kilcormick Missal of 1458 deserves mention. The ancient cathedral of Christ Church, Dublin, kept the light burning with its choral Services, except from 1559 to 1595. Versions of the metrical Psalms were first printed in 1637, but no music for them appeared for over a hundred years. The Commonwealth made its anti-musical effect felt there also.

The subsequent Church musical history of Ireland does not seem to be marked in any way. Although Ireland possesses a store of unique and beautiful folk-melodies, and though Irish hymn-writers are well known, it does not appear to have any essentially distinct hymnody or school of composers of sacred music.

LITERATURE.—W. H. G. Flood, *Hist. of Irish Music*, Dublin, 1905; J. S. Bumpus, 'Irish Church Composers' (*Musical Association Papers*, vol. xxvi., London, 1900); M. Conran, *National Music of Ireland*, do. 1846–50.

VI. WELSH CHURCH MUSIC.—The early musical history of Wales is also somewhat clouded. A 6th cent. saying of the bard Taliesin, 'No musician is skilful unless he extols the Lord,' implies ancient interest in sacred music. Beyond this and the well-known 12th-cent. passago from Giraldus Cambrensis (*Descriptio Cambriae*, iii. 3), to the effect that the Welsh sang not in unison but in parts, there is little definite information about Welsh

music before the beginning of the 19th century. A Welsh tune is mentioned in Ravenscroft's *Psalter*, and it is said that the hymns of Rees Prichard (1579-1644) were sung throughout Wales in his days. Edmund Prys (1541-1624) was the author of a Welsh metrical version of the Psalms.

In modern days, however, Welsh hymns are well worthy of study. It is calculated that there are some 4000 of them. They are mostly emotional in type, but grave and solemn themes are to be found, both traditional and modern. A number appear in the English *Hymnal*.

LITERATURE.—Reference should be made to the *Hymnals* of the various Welsh denominations and to Grove, and especially to A. Riley, 'Concerning Hymn Tunes and Sequences' (*Church Music Soc. Papers*, 4 and 5), London, 1915, ch. vii.; E. Walker, *Hist. of Music in England*, Oxford, 1907, p. 325 f.; H. F. Chorley, *The National Music of the World*³, London, 1911.

VII. AMERICAN CHURCH MUSIC.—The music of America began in a religious atmosphere. The Pilgrim Fathers sang the old Psalm tunes of their fathers, and the *Bay Psalm-Book*, published 1640 at Cambridge, Mass., exerted a wide influence, over 70 editions being published. The musical settings were limited, and Ravenscroft was drawn upon. The first organ was imported, after much opposition, in 1713, and choirs and singing-schools were formed not long afterwards. W. Billings' *New England Psalm Singer* appeared in 1770 and Isaac Watts' *Hymns* began to make headway, while modern music might be said to have made its advent with the Handel and Haydn Society, founded in Boston in 1815. The Church tunes of Lowell Mason († 1872), a leader of American music, exercised strong influence.

Of modern American composers of sacred music H. W. Parker, J. C. D. Parker, and Dudley Buck must be mentioned as having done good work.

The weakness of the American non-liturgic Churches is the want of a definitely authorized order of services. The great freedom of choice opens the way equally to the American gospel hymn (mostly fit only for shouting at a street corner) and some tawdry operatic-like chorus from a modern Mass.

'Happy are the people who, like the Germans or the Scots, have inherited in the past generations such noble things as the chorales with their splendid tunes, or the metrical Psalms with their fine melodies from different quarters' (Fuller-Maitland, *Church Music Society Paper*, London, 1910, p. 18).

Musically speaking, there are great opportunities for American Churches if wisely guided.

LITERATURE.—L. C. Elson, *The National Music of America*, Boston, 1900; F. L. Ritter, *Music in America*, London, 1884; N. D. Gould, *Hist. of Church Music in America*, Boston, 1853; J. S. Curwen, *Studies in Worship Music*, i. 57; P. Lutkin, *Music in the Church*, Milwaukee, 1910.

VIII. METRICAL PSALMODY.—1. The Lutheran chorale.—It was the belief of the Middle Ages, following the dictum of St. Paul, that women should keep silent in the churches, and until the Reformation all singing of Psalms and hymns was restricted to the male choir and the clergy and conducted in Latin. The 16th cent. brought the invention of printing and the Reformation, and it might be said that, in one sense, the Reformation was a movement for the rights of the people—in this case, the right of the people to participate fully in divine worship. Up to the 10th cent. German congregational song had consisted of one phrase, 'Kyrie Eleison,' usually an ejaculation only, but sometimes set to a plain-song melody as a kind of refrain and termed a *Leisen*.

Among the numerous German popular songs were many of a religious nature, some of them written by well-known poets. In the 14th cent. many of these were adapted to secular tunes.

The *Hymn Book of the Bohemian Brethren*, an order virtually founded by Hus, the Bohemian martyr, led the way in 1505. These hymns were

founded upon (1) the Psalms, (2) the old Latin hymns, and (3) the old vernacular religious songs and the tunes from older melodies both secular and religious.

Luther, in his *Formula Missæ* of 1523, removed from the Mass everything savouring of the act of sacrifice and intercession through the saints. Three years later he added to it congregational chorales, while the Creed, 'Agnus Dei,' and 'Sanctus' were, he ordered, to be sung in metrical form in German. A little before, in 1524, he had been moved 'after the example of the Prophets and ancient Fathers of the Church to make German Psalms for the People' (*Letter to George Spalatin*), and in that year his *Christliche Lieder, Lobgesänge und Psalmen* appeared. It included eight metrical hymns and a selection of metrical Psalms with five tunes—German psalmody was always of a mixed nature.

Other collections followed with the tunes derived as before from (1) Latin hymns, (2) popular religious songs, (3) secular songs, (4) melodies of the knightly Minnesinger and Meistersinger guilds, and (5) foreign tunes. These tunes showed great variety of metre; the arbitrary equalizing and drawing out the rhythm was a later innovation. Some of the tunes were adaptations by Luther, but Crüger (1644) was the principal later contributor, while Bach harmonized a large number in different styles for different purposes (see C. Sanford Terry, *Bach's Chorales*, London, 1915).

In accordance with the monastic custom, the melodies when harmonized were put in the tenor part, the upper parts, or descant, being sung by boys. Played on the organ, these upper parts proved an obstacle to the congregation, and the organ in the Lutheran Church was allowed to be used only alternately or to preludize. In motet settings for the choir alone the organ could, of course, be used.

The Lutheran Church continued the unison singing of Psalms and chorales without organ accompaniment till about 1650, when it was found possible to use an independent chordal accompaniment, and so the bogey of descant was put down.

For the same reason—the distraction of descant upper parts—the Genevan Church banned the use of the organ altogether for the next two centuries, and the Scottish Church, as founded on the Genevan order, followed suit. This is the result of the monastic arrangement of the melody for men (tenor part) instead of the natural highest voices, those of women and children. This tenor arrangement continued for a long period—in Scotland down to about 50 years ago, the precentor usually being a tenor.

LITERATURE.—G. R. Woodward, 'German Hymnody' (*Musical Association Paper*), London, 1905-06; *Songs of Syon*, do. 1904; Grove, s.v. 'Chorale,' 'Luther'; G. W. Stewart, *Music in the Church*, ch. v.; J. Zahn, *Melodies of the German Church Song*, 6 vols. (8306 chorales), Gütersloh, 1889; Dickinson, p. 223 f.; E. Naumann, *Hist. of Music*, Eng. tr. 2, ch. xiii.; Curwen, ii. 121-151.

2. Genevan psalmody.—Eighteen years after Luther's first collection there appeared in 1542 the 30 metrical Psalm versions of Clément Marot, a French poet. Sung to secular melodies, they became extraordinarily popular at the frivolous court of Francis I.

John Calvin, the French Protestant convert, had arrived in Strassburg as a refugee, and, following Luther's example, brought out in 1539 a collection of 18 Psalms with tunes mostly of German origin. This Strassburg collection became later the foundation in both music and words of the first Bourgeois, or French, *Huguenot Psalter of Geneva of 1542*, the music of which was edited by Louis Bourgeois, a Parisian music-master settled in Geneva. Meanwhile in 1539 (the same year as the Strassburg

collection) one Symon Cock published *Two Hundred and Fifty-nine Hymns or Sacred Songs*, arranged in groups under the heading of the music of the tune appropriate to the particular motto, the melodies being of mixed origin, as before. Next year the same publisher brought out the remarkable *Souter Liedekens Collection*, 1540, containing the whole of the 150 Psalms in a metrical version in the Flemish language, each Psalm being preceded by its appropriate tune, the tunes, as before, of mixed origin; but a 'large proportion of the music is adapted to that of the popular songs of the day—the titles of the same being given' (see *Mus. Times*, April 1913, p. 240). It must be remembered, however, that at this period little distinction can be made between secular and religious style in song. This work contained also versions of the canticles and sacred songs of the Bible, together with the Lord's Prayer, Apostles' Creed, etc. In 1556 Clemens von Papa harmonized a selection of the melodies.

Bourgeois had charge of the French Geneva Psalter from 1542 to 1557, and this collection was much drawn upon later for English, Genevan, and Scottish Psalters. The 1562 edition contained 125 tunes, including those to the 'spiritual songs' (canticles, etc., in metrical form).

During Queen Mary's reign English and Scottish Protestant refugees gathered together in Frankfurt and Geneva, and in 1556 we find the first *English Genevan Psalter* issued for them with the approval of Calvin. It contained 51 Psalms in the Sternhold and Hopkins version, each one set to a double common-metre tune, and was published by Crespian. As the French metres were different, these tunes must have been adapted or composed specially. It is noteworthy that 42 of these tunes were transferred to the Scottish Psalter of 1564, and 32 of them appear in the complete work of 1635.

LITERATURE.—O. Donen, *Clement Marot et le psautier huguenot*, 2 vols., Paris, 1878-79; Grove, s.v. 'Bourgeois,' etc.

3. English psalmody.—Meanwhile vorsifiers of the Psalms had been busy in England and Miles Coverdale's *Thirteen Goostly Psalmes* appeared in 1539 with settings to Gregorian tones and tunes of German origin. This work was prohibited.

About 1546 Wedderburn's Scottish version appeared, but without music.

Authorized by Edward VI., Thomas Sternhold's first version of 19 Psalms appeared in 1547, and the whole of the Psalter by one Robert Crowley in 1549. The latter contained a plain chant for the chanting of the metrical version, an intermediate device frequently copied in later works, especially in the Walloon and Scottish Churches. The year 1553 saw Francis Seagar's 19 Psalms set to music in four parts in motet style.

With the accession of Queen Elizabeth in 1558 the *Genevan Psalter* of the English and Scottish refugees became popular in England. The Psalter itself was completed by 1562, but it did not contain more than 65 tunes, cross-references being made where necessary. The following year, 1563, saw the first harmonization of the tunes in four parts with additions and settings of specimen verses only, Day being the publisher. Up to this time the melodies only had appeared. The Reformed Church of Calvin did not allow singing in parts till the 19th cent., but for private use Bourgeois had issued in 1547 a complete Psalter harmonized in four parts, the melody as usual in the tenor part. Le Jeune's more elaborate motet settings appeared in 1580; his simple settings did not appear till after his death in 1601-02.

In the English Reformed Church there were two musical currents running side by side. The more artistic side, with its unique traditions of cathedral music, was maintained in the cathedrals and larger

churches, where choirs and organs were available. In the ordinary parish churches metrical Psalms only were sung. 'Lining out' by the 'clerk,' or precentor, was the order, singing in unison without organ accompaniment the rule. Zeal for the Reformation did not favour artistic musical development for the time being, though later on music advanced till the Puritan Commonwealth came into power.

Metrical Psalm-singing became the visible sign of the Reformation. By the year 1600 '6000 people, old and young of both sexes,' could be seen at St. Paul's Cross after the service, singing together (*Strypo's Annals* [see Curwen, i. 1]).

There was but one obstacle to general and hearty congregational singing in the churches, and that was the melody in the tenor part. The reform of this was furthered principally by the German Osiander and Lobwasser Psalters of 1586 and 1594 respectively. S. Marshall, who edited the latter (Basel, 1606), refers to the tenor melody arrangement as being unsuitable.

'For it brings those unlearned in music (the larger part of the congregation) often into a state of uncertainty so that they often know not what is being sung, because the melody is crowded among the other voice parts, some of which are being sung above, some below' (see Stainer, 'On Musical Introductions in certain Metrical Psalters,' *Musical Association Lecture*, London, 1900, p. 25).

At this time, as in the later Scottish Psalter of 1635, no bar-lines existed, and, though the lines contain notes of various lengths and are in varied rhythm, yet the notation is frequently erratic with regard to both the uncongregational syncopations (borrowed from cathedral choir music) and balance of sentences. It was probably this kind of thing that prompted the exposition of the rudiments of music which began to appear in all psalmody collections.

Notable English Psalters and psalmody collections were as follows:

1579—William Damon's *Collection*, in four parts to specimen verses and in plain style: settings in motet style were issued in 1591.

1592—T. Este's *Psalter*, with 57 tunes; better harmonizations.

1599—R. Allison's *Psalter*; melody given to treble part; 10 tunes for use in common.

1604—W. Barley's *Psalter* (a later ed. of Este); settings by Morley and Bennett.

1621—T. Ravenscroft's *Psalter*; leading work; 100 settings; tunes classified.

1623—G. Wither's *Hymns and Songs of the Church*; consists of paraphrases of Bible canticles; contains 16 tunes by Gibbons in two parts.

1636 and 1648—G. Sandys' *Psalter*, to a new version with 24 two-part tunes by Lawes; later in three parts.

In 1649 the Commonwealth came into power and a high standard of music was not encouraged. The metrical Psalms were sung in unison without organ, and by the time of the Restoration in 1660 the tunes in use had dwindled down to half a dozen.

1671—J. Playford's *Psalter*; 47 tunes. Playford began the 'barbarous method' in England of ignoring the original marked and varied rhythm, so essential for good singing and congregational interest, and reduced all notes to the same length.

1677—Three-part edition of Playford containing the whole of the 'Church tunes,' with melody in the treble.

1698—Tate and Brady version, with supplement of tunes mostly from Playford; editions down to about 1860.

From this time (1698) on miscellaneous collections of psalmody by illiterate editors swarmed under such titles as *Harp of Zion*, *Melodies of the Heart*, etc.

1718—J. Chetham's *Collection*, widely circulated.

1843—J. P. Hullah's *Psalter*; old style with syncopated effects.

1847—W. H. Havergal's *Old Church Psalmody*.

1852—H. E. Dibdin's *Standard Psalm Book*.

Metrical psalmody flourished in English parish churches till about 1860. Since then it has practically been confined to Presbyterian churches.

4. Psalmody ornamentation.—One past feature should be noted, viz. the craze which set in about 1650 or earlier for ornamenting the notes of the tune. The 1659 Gobert edition of the *Godeau Metrical Psalter* issued by the French Catholics (but later suppressed) gives directions for ornamenting by means of slurs, shakes, and turns. This absurd

idea was no doubt prompted by the Italian solo graces of the period and also possibly by florid figures of plain-song. This corruption lasted for some time; Chetham's Psalter of 1718 gives instances of the 'old way' of singing, as it was termed, and there are reminiscences in Jackson's 'Te Deum' in F. Interesting to relate, this method still prevails in the remote Highlands of Scotland, where, however, the ornamentation has rendered the ancient melodies of Scottish psalmody practically unrecognizable (for examples see Lachlan Macbean, *Songs and Hymns of the Gael*, Stirling, 1900), and they have become, to all intents and purposes, different tunes. See also Stewart, p. 152f.

5. Scottish psalmody.—Scottish psalmody, like English psalmody, is essentially founded on that of Geneva. The Scottish Protestant refugees, together with John Knox and other Scottish leaders of the Reformation, assembled together for worship in Frankfurt and Geneva, and, as mentioned, their manual was the English Genevan Psalter, from which many tunes were transferred to the first Scottish Psalter of 1564.

In Scotland from the 13th cent. onwards music had been taught to the boys at the old Church (Grammar) or 'Sang Schules,' and this was continued after the Reformation till about 1700. With the advent of the Reformation chanting was no doubt discontinued and organs were removed (see Livingstone's reprint of the 1635 Psalter, Glasgow, 1864, dissertation i. pp. 2, 15). Thomas Mace, in his remarkable and quaint *Musick's Monument* of 1676, directs attention to the 'sang schules' of Scotland as being worthy of imitation in England (see W. Milne Gibson, *The Old Scottish Precentor*, p. 6, 'Sang Schules').

In 1566 a MS harmonized version of the 1564 Psalter was made or 'noted' by Thomas Wood, vicar of Sanctandrous. The harmonizations were done by the Scottish organists and priests, David Peebles, J. Angus, Andrew Blackhall, John Futhie, and Andrew Kemp (for an account of this remarkable first harmonized Scottish Psalter see J. W. McMeeken, *Scottish Metrical Psalms*, p. 107f.).

From 1700 psalmody was at a low level, but a revival took place in Aberdeen about 1750, which the evangelist Wesley's visit in 1761 further stimulated, and the good example thereupon spread throughout Scotland (see Stewart, p. 151f., and Gibson, pp. 25f., 35).

Notable Scottish Psalters are the following:

1564—*Scottish Psalter*, founded on the Genevan collection of 1556 issued for the English and Scottish refugees; contained 105 proper tunes, melodies only.

1566—Harmonized version, ed. T. Wood.

1596—Andrew Hart's ed. of *Scottish Psalter*, containing metrical doxologies.

1615—Ed. of *Scottish Psalter*, containing also 12 common tunes as a separate class.

1625 and 1629—E. Raban's *Aberdeen Psalter*, harmonized in four parts and with tunes in reports (see Gibson, p. 19).

1631—In 1631 King Charles tried to foist on the people the high-flown version (really by Earl of Stirling) which his father James I. was reported to have made. This, along with Laud's Liturgy, was rejected, and the episode was ended by the romantic revolt of Jenny Geddes in St. Giles' Cathedral in 1638.

1635—This important and unusually complete Psalter contained, besides the proper tunes, 31 common tunes and 8 in reports, i.e. constructed in imitative form; also the usual metrical spiritual songs, metrical Lord's Prayer, Creed, etc. The tunes were of Genevan, English, and Scottish origin with their original and varied rhythm and metre. The weak points were the harmonies—which are poorly done—and, for the rest, those of the period, viz. the general unsuitableness of most double common-metre tunes, the syncopated effects, and the indefinite tonality and rhythm common to this early polyphonic period.

Reference should be made to the fine Livingstone reprint of this Psalter.

1650—The new Scottish authorized version of the Psalms (as at present in use) appeared, but unfortunately no tunes were provided, and Scotland before long became dependent

on imported English collections, though a number of the fine Scottish tunes were kept alive.

Various Scottish collections of tunes now appeared, such as those of T. Bruce (1726), T. Moore (1750), R. Bremner (1756), J. Thomson (1778), R. Gilmour (1793), and H. Boyd (1793). The Steven Collection of 1800 brought in the florid emotional tune; and the collections of J. Robertson from 1814 on ('Seraph' selection, 1827), W. Mitchison (1830), J. Turnbull (1840), A. Hume (1844), Bonaccordi (1845), G. Cameron (1855) (continued by J. S. Marr) also included these tunes together with those in previous use.

Official Church collections began to appear from 1845, eschewing tunes with repeats, but also (under English editorship) omitting many of the fine national tunes, and the introduction of the cut-leaf system, while favouring precursors of very limited capabilities, has also restricted the choice generally to a few favourites, which are unduly repeated in various settings, with the inevitable clashing of associations.

Fortunately, the traditions of the grand old psalmody still prevail in Scotland and in parts of Ireland and Wales, to the great gain of the congregational singing. While all Churches admit the Psalms as the foundation of the musical service, the chanting of some of them at least is necessary if the congregation is to obtain the bird's-eye view or insight into the meaning of the whole. If chanting, however, is admittedly difficult for the choir, it is much more so for the congregation, who almost invariably do not possess pointed Psalters; hence the chanting of the Psalms can rarely become universally congregational in aspect. Therefore it is best to use also the metrical version, presuming that all worship should be congregational—except the anthem, which, as the 'sermon of the choir,' is an instrument for good. The authorized Scottish version is by far the nearest to the Bible version, though revision is certainly required in some respects; the provision of additional (and alternative) metres would also be a gain. Concerning the congregational element see H. C. Shuttleworth, *The Place of Music in Public Worship*, London, 1893; also Stewart, ch. x.

LITERATURE.—Curwen, i. 'The Old Parochial Psalms'; Daniel, *Chapters on Church Music*, Appendices A and B; H. A. Glass, *Story of the Metrical Psalter*, do. 1883; Grove, s.v. 'Psalter,' etc.; H. Davey, *Hist. of English Music*, London, 1895; F. L. Ritter, *Music in England*, do. 1884; *Oxford Hist. of Music*, Oxford, 1901-05, iii.; reprints of the *Este* and of the *Ravenscroft Collections*; J. W. McMeeken, *Hist. of Scottish Metrical Psalms*, Glasgow, 1872; G. W. Stewart, *Music in the Church*; J. Love, *Scottish Church Music*, Edinburgh, 1891; W. M. Gibson, *The Old Scottish Precentor*, Aberdeen, 1907; C. G. McCrie, *Public Worship of Presbyterian Scotland*, Edinburgh, 1892, p. 337.

IX. MODERN HYMNODY.—The first stage in this period is occupied by the hymns of Isaac Watts, based mostly, like those of Luther, on the Psalms. It was, however, the Wesleyan revival that again brought about real congregational worship. Just as the singing of the Lutheran chorales and the metrical Psalms of the Genevan English and Scottish Reformers carried through and firmly established the Reformation, so the Wesleyan hymn was a great means of reviving the whole Church in Britain. Previous to the last revival ordinary English Church psalmody had once more subsided into a moribund condition. Only in the English cathedrals was a higher order of musical service kept up, and that with fluctuations. To both sides the Wesleyan revival was, through its music and its hymns, an element of good; the new energy of its rhythm and its fervour carried all before it. Needless to say, however, like all novelties and new movements, it was carried to excess in the florid repeating tunes of last century. This element has now died out, and in its place we have the tunes of Dykes, Barnby, Smart, Sullivan, Monk, Hopkins, and others. These tunes preserve the variety of rhythm and the energy which the Wesleyan movement revived, but with the addition of the element of sentimentality—an element not necessarily weak or bad, but which has been overdone, probably as the result of the Mendelssohnian

wave, the effect of which is not yet spent. The best collections are *Hymns Ancient and Modern, English Hymnal*, and *Scottish Hymnary*.

LITERATURE.—J. Julian, *Dictionary of Hymnology*², London, 1907; W. G. Horder, *The Hymn Lover*, do. 1889; J. Brownlie, *Hymns and Hymn Writers*, do. 1899; J. Heywood, *Church Hymnody*, do. 1881; R. E. Welsh and F. G. Edwards, *Romance of Psalter and Hymnal*, do. 1899; A. Riley, 'Concerning Hymn Tunes and Sequences' (*Church Music Society Papers*, 4 and 5), do. 1915; W. S. Pratt, *Musical Ministries*, New York, 1901; J. T. Lightwood, *Hymn Tunes and their Story*, London, 1914; W. Cowan and J. Love, *Musica of Scottish Hymnary*, do. 1901; historical ed. of *Hymns Ancient and Modern* (literary introd.).

X. THE CHURCH CANTATA.—By the word 'cantata' was originally meant anything that was sung, as the word 'sonata' meant a piece that was sounded or played. The modern cantata differs from the oratorio only in its exclusion of the dramatic and epic elements—*e.g.*, the soloists do not represent certain personages—and it is usually not laid out on so large a scale. The Church cantata is practically analogous to the modern anthem, but it is usually on a more extended scale and generally given orchestral accompaniments. Handel's 12 fine Chandos anthems, written (1718-20) while he was acting as chapel-master and organist at the princely estate of Cannons near Edgware, are really Church cantatas. The 6th Chandos anthem, *e.g.*, contains four solos and four choruses, the opening one of which is built up on the English Psalm tune, 'St. Anne.' Handel manages to incorporate something of the unique style of English cathedral music as instanced in the works of his great predecessor, Purcell.

The daily musical service at Cannons was 'performed by a choir of voices and instruments superior in numbers and excellence to that of any sovereign prince in Europe' (*Handel* (Great Musician Series), p. 63 f.).

The Church cantata as defined seems to have first developed in Germany, flourishing especially in the time preceding Bach. Cantatas were written for the great festivals of the Church in accordance with the Christian year and for festal occasions. D. Buxtehude, G. P. Telemann, and Bach's uncles, Michael and Johann Christoph, wrote specimens before Bach himself wrote his 295 Church cantatas, of which 193 have survived. The German chorale is particularly identified with these cantatas, and they usually comprise a chorus, founded on a chorale which is repeated by itself, with recitatives, arias, and duets. They were usually written for four voices and full orchestra, and comprised from four to seven movements, the text being verses from the Bible and chorales.

In the Advent cantata 'Sleepers, wake' (written 1742), the opening chorus is built up on the fine stately chorale 'Wake, awake' (employed also by Mendelssohn in 'St. Paul'): the second verse is sung as a separate movement (later with elaborate accompaniment), and the third verse in four parts concludes the cantata; two recitatives and two duets complete the whole. The orchestra parts are for strings, two oboes, and organ.

These beautiful works are only recently becoming known in this country. No doubt they will yet earn full recognition in Britain and America.

English composers have also made a special feature of the Church cantata. The following are the most representative cantatas for the special festivals of the Christian year.

ADVENT.—'Sleepers, wake,' and 'God's Time' (Bach); 'The Two Advents' (Garrett); 'Voces clamantium' (termed a motet) (Parry); 'Advent Hymn' (Schumann).

CHRISTMAS.—'The Holy Child' (Adams); 'The Story of Bethlehem' (West); 'Christmas Eve' (Gade); one of the six portions of Bach's 'Christmas Oratorio.'

CHRIST'S CRUCIFIXION.—'The Last Night in Bethany' (Lee Williams); 'Watch ye' (Bach); 'Olivet to Calvary' (Mauder); 'Stabat Mater' (Dvorák and Stanford).

EASTER.—'Christ lay' (Bach); 'The Transfiguration' (Cowen). WHITSUNTIDE.—'God so loved' (Bach); 'Veni Creator' (Mackenzie); 'Light of Life' (Elgar); 'The Story of Bethany' (Edwards).

CHRIST'S ASCENSION.—'Ascensiontide' (Coward); 'God goeth up' (Bach); 'The Ascension' (Steanne).

HARVEST.—'Lauda Sion' (Mendelssohn); 'Jubilee Cantata' (Weber); 'Harvest cantatas by Garrett, Lee Williams, West, and Mauder.

GENERAL.—13th, 42nd, and 95th Psalms (Mendelssohn); 13th Psalm (Liszt); 'God, thou art great' (Spohr); 'Rebekah' and 'The Lord is King' (Barnby); 'Daughter of Jairus,' 'St. Mary Magdalene,' etc. (Stainer).

LITERATURE.—Grove, *s.v.* 'Kirchen Cantaten'; G. W. Stewart, *Music in the Church*, 'Bach's Cantatas'; E. O. Prout, *Some Notes on Bach's Church Cantatas*, London, 1907.

XI. ORATORIO.—It will be easily understood that Passion music is bound up with the early oratorio. The early miracle-plays and renderings of Passion music inevitably suggested the oratorio. *Commedia Spirituale* were performed in Italy in 1243 and 1298, and *Geistliche Schauspiele* became common in Germany about 1322.

The term 'oratorio' originated in Rome, where St. Filippo Neri († 1595) gave 'Azioni Sacre' in the oratory adjoining the church. The sermon occupied the first portion; the second consisted of a dramatized story from Scripture written in verse and set to simple music as chorus and solo by the chapel-master Animuccia. It will be remembered that Vittoria, the composer of more advanced Passion music, was a contemporary, and also lived in Rome. In 1600 the sacred drama, 'L'Anima ed il Corpo,' was produced by Emilio del Cavaliere in Rome. Other similar works followed, and these, together with the still interesting oratorios of G. Carissimi (1604-74) (with their advanced type of recitative and chorus) and the works of Alessandro Scarlatti (1693 and 1705) (who employed the old Church style), all prepared the way for the masterly works of Handel.

Handel in his youth wrote an oratorio in the dramatic 'Passion' style while at Hamburg in 1704, and in the Italian manner at Rome in 1708, but not till 1720—when he composed his first English oratorio 'Esther'—does he reach a position of supremacy. His immortal 'Messiah' was written in 1742, and performed in Dublin; the others which still claim the affections of the public are 'Judas Maccabæus,' 'Samson,' 'Israel in Egypt,' 'Solomon,' and 'Jephthah,' his last work, written when blindness was approaching. His mighty choruses, built like a cathedral combining science, symmetry, and artistic truth, and the telling and direct solos, which in their characterization go straight to the heart, will always appeal to lovers of good music. Inspired by Handel's success, Haydn wrote his 'Creation,' though in a very different style—in fact, in the language of the orchestra rather than the voice—and it was produced in 1798. Since then a succession of fine works in different styles has been presented in Spohr's 'Last Judgment,' Mendelssohn's 'St. Paul' and 'Elijah,' Brahms' 'German Requiem,' Sullivan's 'Prodigal Son,' Mackenzie's 'Rose of Sharon,' and Elgar's 'Vision of Gerontius.'

LITERATURE.—For the study of the subject generally refer to A. W. Paterson, *Story of Oratorio*, London, 1902; Grove, *s.v.* 'Oratorio,' 'Passion Music,' etc.; G. P. Upton, *The Standard Oratorios*, Chicago, 1886; A. Mees, *Choirs and Choral Music*, London, 1901; F. L. Ritter, *Music in America*, do. 1884; Introduction to *Bach's Matthew Passion*, ed. Novello; E. O. Prout, *Some Notes on Bach's Church Cantatas*; *Handel* (Great Musician Series), do. 1890; A. Schweizer, *J. S. Bach*, Leipzig, 1903, tr. E. Newman, London, 1911; A. W. Pollard, *English Miracle Plays*, Oxford, 1890; Stewart, *Music in the Church*, *s.v.*

XII. THE MODERN CONCERTIZED MASS.—The modern Mass is entirely different in style from the early polyphonic and unaccompanied Masses which culminated in those of Palestrina. It was, in fact, founded on Italian opera, which originated in the Florentine G. Caccini's efforts (1558-1640) to emulate the Athenian drama. A declamatory recitative, followed by the accompanied recitative, evolving later into the grand aria with all the Italian's passion for melody and display, together with the addition of simple chorus-work, provided the

material. The composers of this period wrote for both Church and opera, and the spirit of the theatre invaded the Church. The demand for melody got the better of ecclesiastical tradition. Women were admitted into the Church choirs, and the prima donna was given an opportunity to display the new florid vocalism.

But 'the first step in the decay of true Catholic sacred music was the introduction into it of orchestral instruments.' Through them it assumed 'a sensuous character.' 'The virtuosity of the instruments at length called forth in the singers a similar virtuosity, and ere long the secular operatic taste penetrated into the Church. Certain portions of the sacred text, like the *Christe eleison*, were marked out as standing texts for operatic airs, and singers trained in the manner of the Italian opera were brought into the Church to deliver them' (Richard Wagner, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Leipzig, 1871-83, ii. 335; cf. Weinmann, *Hist. of Church Music*).

It was natural, to some extent, that the music of the Mass should follow the style of the cantata, oratorio, and opera with their fully developed florid arias, duets, etc., complete orchestra, and declamatory chorus. Hence we find that the Masses of Haydn, Mozart (with the possible exception of the 8th and 9th), Cherubini, Beethoven, Bach (a Protestant), Verdi, and Gounod are lacking in true ecclesiastical style, and are unsuited for liturgical purposes. They are, in fact, purely in concert style. The *Ab Mass* of Schubert, however, and those of Rheinherger, Kiel, Havert, and Grell are more in accordance with ecclesiastical requirements and traditions as being free at least from theatricality. The first step towards better things was the foundation of the St. Cecilia Society in 1863, having for its aim the cultivation of plain chant, congregational singing, and polyphonic vocal music (see, however, R. W. Terry, 'Sidelights on German Art: the great Church Music Imposition,' *Musical Times*, Aug. 1915, and the *Paris Schola Cantorum*). Later followed the pope's rescript in 1903 and 1912 in favour of plain chant (see above), which, if not followed to extremes, should do much to restore the standard desired.

LITERATURE.—Weinmann, *Hist. of Church Music*; Dickinson, *Music of the Western Church*; Grove, s.v. 'Mass,' etc.; Curwen, *Studies in Worship Music*, ii. 71.

XIII. CONGREGATIONAL SERVICES. — 1. The people's part.—The concert element unfortunately enters largely into many of the choral settings used in the Anglican and other Episcopal Churches. The ambitious Church composer cannot or does not always repress the temptation to make a telling effect at the expense of the sanctity of the musical worship which he leads, and the same is not unknown in nonconformist and American churches, especially where the admiring congregation have delegated their own part to a professional quartette of soloists. The people, or congregation, have, or should have, a well-defined part, and that not a small one, in the conduct of divine worship.

A German lady who had lived in England is quoted by Curwen as saying, 'In our Lutheran service, the clergyman does everything. We, the laity, remain passive; we have nothing to do but sing 2 or 3 verses, and this is done in such a dragging, lifeless and unvaried fashion that it must prove a torment to any musical ear' (Curwen, ii. 145).

The music of the Lutheran and Calvinistic Churches in Germany and throughout Europe is still unfortunately in a primitive condition. The chorales are sung sitting, and so slowly that breath must be taken every two or three notes without regard to phrasing or verbal or musical structure. The motet of the choir affords relief to what is, musically speaking, a very unsatisfactory service. In the city churches of Denmark, and throughout Scotland, Wales, and Ireland (with the exception of some churches in the Highlands or remote districts), the introduction of hymns of varied and often quick rhythm has given the services an element of brightness. In Denmark and Scotland congregational responses have also been introduced.

2. Types of service.—A comparison of the musical services (ancient and modern) is most instructive. First we have the original primitive type in which the minister does everything; then Psalms or hymns are introduced for the people; next comes the discovery that the people have the right also to take part in the prayers, amens, and responses, not only in the ordinary services but also in the Communion and supplicatory services like the Anglican Litany. Meanwhile, a choir is introduced to lead the praise; the introduction of an anthem or motet proves, or may prove, of real devotional value; but here the choir may overstep its proper function, provide a musical display, and take over the portions which should belong to the congregation.

Take the choral Anglican service: the anthem like settings of the 'Te Denm,' 'Benedictus,' and other canticles in which the congregation cannot join are distinctly out of place (except as an anthem), since they are the property of the congregation. In the Communion Service, again, the singing of the Creed usually makes it a choir Creed, not a Creed of the Church, or the people; in the same manner the elaborate settings of the 'Agnus Dei' and 'Gloria in excelsis' defeat their object. It is perfectly appropriate to reserve the 'Sanctus' and 'Benedictus' for the choir and priest—though the beautiful Anglican Communion Service, like the Litany, is admittedly already much too long. What has often been called the 'tyranny of the choir' is due to this tendency to appropriate and concertize certain portions of the service. One might say that it is due to (1) the demands of the Prayer Book, (2) musical ambition, and (3) acquiescence of musically uneducated clergy. The inevitable tendency of such things is towards a purely concertized service, as in the Roman concertized Mass, until some pope can arise and direct the attention of the clergy and Church musicians to the first principles of Christian worship.

LITERATURE.—Stewart, ch. x. 'The Congregation'; F. G. Edwards, *Common Praise*, London, 1887.

XIV. MUSIC OF THE EASTERN CHURCH.—The Eastern Church has been described as the Mother Christian Church. The patriarch of Constantinople at the close of the 6th cent. claimed superiority over the Christian Church. In 606, however, the supremacy was given to the bishop of Rome, and the Eastern Church ultimately separated and went on its own way. The present powerful Greek Church comprises (1) the Orthodox Church of Greece and the Greek colonies of Asia Minor and the Churches of Serbia and Bulgaria, (2) the Russian Church, and (3) the Churches of Syria, Egypt, Armenia, and Kurdistan.

1. The Greek Church.—The liturgical music characteristic of the Eastern Church is somewhat primitive, sung only by priests and a male voice choir unaccompanied. The congregation have no part, and stand throughout. The liturgical melodies and choral sentences, as in the examples given in S. G. Hatherly's *Byzantine Music*, are primitive in both structure and tonality; they consist of short sections frequently repeated, and the tonality is vague, resembling the Gregorian modes and represented entirely by the white keys of the piano; one specimen given according to the use of the Greek Church at Constantinople shows, however, Turkish or Eastern influence in its chromatic intervals (see also 'Bryennius' and 'Church Modes,' in Riemann's *Dictionary of Music*). Like plain-song the music is unbarred and unrhythmical.

The earliest tunes employed in the Greek Church were not written; all singing except that by trained choirs was forbidden, and the tunes were handed down traditionally. St. John of Damascus arranged the hymns in use for ritual purposes and

wrote on musical theory, based on the eight Byzantine modes. After the 9th cent. few hymns were written, though fresh settings were made occasionally as the service became fixed. Among the composers of these John Cuccuzels is the best known for his settings of the Psalms and hymns (c. A.D. 1100). He also added to the signs for musical notation.

Oriental influence came through the Arabo-Persian school in the 14th century. The Greek theorists consider their system similar to the Oriental.

In the usual Greek service the choir sing antiphonally, the resting section furnishing a drone or stationary bass. The vocal production is apt to be nasal. Reformers have made attacks on the notation, which is one great difficulty, different systems of neums having been used. Part-singing was sanctioned for the Greek Church at Athens in 1875—to be used on special occasions only—and a new system of versification was introduced about that time. The Psalms are sung to what are believed to be Hebrew melodies.

2. The Russian Church.—As indicated, the Russian Church is a branch of the original Greek Church. Till about the year 1700 Russian Church music was traditional in origin. Neums were in use for notation as copied from the Greek service-books. According to A. Soubies (*Histoire de la musique en Russie*, Paris, 1893), the Czar Alexia brought musicians to Kieff, who executed before him choral pieces in eight, twelve, and twenty parts.

In the 18th cent. a five-line plain-song notation was adopted, and part-singing became popular; the theme, however, was placed in the bass. The Psalter was paraphrased by Titow, and metrical versions were sung.

About 1750-75 reforms were introduced in the court choir, and new music in the Italian style was introduced under Bortnyansky († 1825). Not long after the decease of the latter the national movement under Balakireff exercised great influence, and new music preserving the tonality and genre of the old melodies was composed. Much of this is simple and massive in style, and depends upon nuance and expressive effects. The text is usually taken from the Psalms. More elaborate polyphonic settings are adopted for the Creation Hymn, the Evening Service, and other parts of the liturgy (see W. H. Frere, 'Notes on Russian Church Music,' *Cathedral Quarterly*, Christmas, 1914).

In recent years non-liturgical pieces have been used in the Russian Church set in thoroughly modern style, but unaccompanied in the *a capella* mode. In a programme of Russian Church music performed in New York in Dec. 1914 occur the following:

Four-, five-, and ten-part 'Cherubim Songs' by Bortnyansky, Rimsky-Korsakoff, and Rachmaninoff; eight-part 'Easter Verses' by Smolensky; eight-part 'Nunc Dimittis' by Gretchaninoff; six-, seven-, and eight-part motets by Nikolsky, Tchesnokoff, Arkhangelsky, and others (*Organist and Choirmaster*, Jan. 1916, p. 384).

One feature of Russian choirs is their cavernous bass voices, singing an octave below the ordinary bass, and creating a kind of organ *bourdon* pedal effect.

LITERATURE.—H. J. W. Tillyard, 'Greek Church Music,' in *Musical Antiquary*, March 1911; Curwen, li. 44; S. G. Hatherly, *Byzantine Music*, London, 1892; Rebours, *Traité de psaltique*; J. M. Neale, *Hymns of the Eastern Church*, London, 1882; A. P. Stanley, *Lectures on the Hist. of the Eastern Church*, do. 1861; A. Pouglin, *A Short Hist. of Russian Music*, tr. L. Howard, do. 1915. A cantation of the Faithful Departed was sung to a Kieff melody at the Gregorian Festival in St. Paul's Cathedral in June 1915 (music published by Novello).

XV. INSTRUMENTAL MUSIC IN CHURCH.—It is well known that instrumental music played an important part in both Greek and Hebrew temple rites.

1. Primitive instruments.—In Greek ritual

trumpets and elarions were prominent. In the Hebrew Temple at the beginning of the Christian era the harp, lute, flute, trumpet, and drum were used as accompaniment to the Psalms and canonical hymns; yet, owing to the necessity of avoiding comparison with pagan rites, instrumental music was forbidden in the early Christian Church. Justin Martyr (103-167; *Quæst. a Gent. Christian. propositarum*) argues against it (C. Sayle, *In Praise of Music*, London, 1897, p. 52). On the other hand, Clemens Alexandrinus, also in the 2nd cent., quoting the Psalmist in favour of instrumental music, says:

'If you are able to accompany your voices with the lyre or cithara, you will incur no censure' (*Pæd.* li. 4).

St. Jerome (345-420) says:

'That which David made for the worship of God, inventing musical instruments.'

St. Augustine (354-430) likewise encourages 'the singing of Psalms to the lyre or psaltery' (J. A. Latrobe, *The Music of the Church*, London, 1831, p. 42). This regulation, or partial allowance, of instrumental music in the service of the Church seems not to have affected the Eastern branch, since in the Greek Church instrumental accompaniment has never been allowed, probably from its proximity to the pagan East.

Where instrumental help was allowed, it is easy to understand that the lyre, cithara, etc., would soon give way to the organ; the advantage of having the accompaniment under the control of one person would be apparent, and from the 5th cent. onwards the organ became supreme. Ancient MSS of the 8th, 9th, and later centuries show the use of the harp, the square stringed psaltery, the rotta or crwth (of the viol species), and trumpet, which the minstrel galleries seen in ancient churches both on the Continent and in England confirm.¹ In the minstrel gallery of Exeter Cathedral are representations of a cithern, bagpipe, harp, violin, tambourine, etc. In recent times a bagpipe lament has been played in York Minster. A MS of Charlemagne's time depicts King David 'singing Psalms, assisted by four musical instruments, the pneumatic organ, a sort of violin, a trumpet and a set of bells' (E. J. Hopkins and E. F. Rimbault, *The Organ*, London, 1877, p. 32).

Aelred, or Ethelred, the abbot (1109-66) of Rievaulx Abbey (Yorkshire), in his *Speculum Charitatis*, speaks of the 'common people' admiring 'the sound of organs, the sound of cymballs and musical instruments, the harmony of the pipes and cornets' (Prynne's tr.; see Davey, p. 19).

Again, in the poem by Houlate, written in 1450, occurs this passage:

'Clarlions loud knellis
Portatives [organs] and bellis.'

John Case, writing in the *Praise of Musicke* in 1586, says:

'In our English Church the Psalmes may be song, and Song most cunningly and with diverse artificial instruments of musick' (Sayle, p. 83).

Later Fynes Morrison, in his *Itinerary* written at the end of the 16th cent., speaking of the Lutheran Church, says:

'Before Divine service they had music in the gallery of the Church, of wind instruments, namely organs, cornetts, sagbuttes, and the like' (quoted by H. Antcliffe, 'The Orchestra in Church,' *Organist and Choirmaster*, Jan. 1916, p. 386; see also K. *Psalter and its Bearings on the Hist. Mus. Antiquary*, Oct. 1910).

About A.D. 1600 instrumental accompaniment for oratorio was introduced. G. Gabrieli (1557-1612) had used four sackbuts (trombones) as an accompaniment to his 'Surrexit Christus'; but probably they were used only to double the vocal parts.

In the first 'sacred drama,' 'L'Anima ed il Corpo,' produced by Emilio del Cavaliere in Rome in 1600,

¹ See Neumann, fig. 196, and p. 484.

an orchestra of remarkable composition, consisting of a double lyre, a harpsichord, a large or double guitar, and two flutes, was used.

T. Coryate (1577-1617), describing a visit to Venice which must have occurred not long after the above event in Rome, says:

'At that time I heard much good musick in St. Markes Church.' 'Sometimes sixteene . . . Instrumentall musitians . . . played together upon their instruments, ten sagbutts, foure cornets and two viedgambas of an extraordinary greatness, also treble viols and theorboes together with seven pair of organs . . . standing all in a rowe together' (*Coryate's Crudities*, in Sayle, p. 112).

In England also about this time (1604) Henry Peacham says:

'Wherein doth our practice of singing in our churches differ from the practice of David? . . . Doe wee not make one signe in praising and thanking God in voyces and instruments of all sorts?' (Sayle, p. 139).

Following the Reformation came a period when instrumental music in church was tabned. The loss of boys' choirs necessitated separate instrumental help later after the Restoration. In 1661, at a festival at St. George's Church, Windsor, two double sackbuts and two double courtals were placed in the choir to help the weaker parts, while in 1664 at Westminster Abbey and again in 1673 in the Chapel Royal cornets were used for the treble parts, 'there being not one lad for all that time capable of singing his part readily' (M. Locke, *Present Practice of Music Vindicated*, London, 1673, quoted in Bumpus, *Eng. Cathedral Music*, pp. 122, 126).

It will be remembered that after the Restoration King Charles II. in 1660 sent Pelham Humphreys to France to learn the Italian style. Evelyn, writing in his diary on 21st Dec. 1662, remarks:

'One of his majesty's chaplains preached, after which, instead of y^e antient, grave and solemn wind music accompanying y^e organ, was introduced a concert of 24 violins between every pause, after y^e French fantastical light way, better suiting a tavern, or a playhouse, than a church. This was y^e first time of change, and now we no more hear the cornet¹ wch gave life to y^e organ; that instrument is quite left off, in which the English were so skillfull' (Bumpus, *Eng. Cathedral Music*, p. 124).

2. The orchestra.—The modern orchestra may be said to date from about 1676, when the Italians Stradella (in his oratorio 'John the Baptist') and Alessandro Scarlatti were writing for the usual foundation of strings with various wood and brass wind instruments added for variety and colouring effects. Before that the older lutes, viols, flutes, cornets, etc., were used in the manner of vocal parts.

At this time Italian music was pre-eminent. Our English Purcell took the Italian school as his model, and his 'Te Denm' and 'Jubilate,' written in 1694 with accompaniment for strings, trumpet, and organ, was a remarkable achievement.

We now come to the time of Bach († 1750) and Handel († 1759). Handel's oratorios were given in the concert room; Bach's Church cantatas were rendered in church and had an accompaniment of strings, oboes and bassoons, and high-pitched trumpets in addition to the organ. After the death of Handel the spirit of the orchestra invaded all branches of music. Haydn and Mozart were chapel-masters with modern orchestras at their command, and they composed Masses in concert style for church use, with accompaniment for full orchestra; their example has since been followed and only in recent years has declined. In England the Handel Commemoration held in Westminster Abbey in 1784, in which an orchestra of 250 instrumentalists took part, was a striking event. An orchestra in church on the occasion of festivals or oratorio presentations is now a common occurrence in this country. In St. Paul's Cathedral,

¹ The ancient *cornet* was of wood (leather-covered) and resembled a flute with a trumpet mouth-piece. The *shawm* was a primitive clarinet and the *sackbut* an early form of trombone. All these were made in sets, small and large (see Stainer, *Music of the Bible*, also *English Music*, pp. 349 and 4531).

for instance, fine renderings are given with orchestra of the principal oratorios.

It only remains to mention the English village orchestra which, as late as the middle of last century, was to be heard in most village churches. It consisted generally of a violin, bass, a flute or clarinet, and a bassoon. Their performances were perhaps not artistic, but their banishment by means of the harmonium was nevertheless a loss to the musical life of the countryside.

3. The organ.—The earliest mention of the organ as understood in the modern sense is with regard to the Roman *hydraulus*, or hydraulic organ, invented some three centuries before Christ. It is supposed, from references in the Talmud, to have been used in the Temple worship. Later it seems to have been heard in the Roman theatres. It was famed for its loud note (single notes only) and light touch (see J. W. Warman, 'The Hydraulic Organ of the Ancients,' *Musical Association Lecture*, Jan. 1904, also *English Music*, London, 1906).

Organs seem to have been in common use in the Spanish churches in A.D. 450, according to Julianus, a Spanish bishop (Hopkins and Rimbault, *The Organ*, London, 1877), while Pope Vitalian introduced the organ to Rome in the 7th cent. in order to assist the congregational singing. There were organs in Aix-la-Chapelle in 811. A hundred years before this the Anglo-Saxons were using organs in England, and they were introduced into Ireland in the 9th century. In the 10th cent. there appears to have been a remarkably large organ in Winchester Cathedral, blown by twenty-six bellows and containing four hundred pipes. In Scotland Fordun describes the use of the organ at the re-interment of the English Queen Margaret at Dunfermline in 1250.

So far the organ was a most cumbersome instrument, and in place of keys had rods or levers. In the 11th cent. clumsy short wooden keys were invented. These were beaten by the fist in much the same way as the keys for the church tower carillon, or peal of bells. As to organ-builders, the earliest known was a priest Van Os, who built the organ for St. Nicholas church, Utrecht, in 1120. Organ pedal keyboards in rudimentary form appeared in the 15th cent. as well as distinctive names for the stops, but the compass was still very limited.

Modern organ-playing is said to have begun in Italy with Francesco Landino († 1390), organist of St. Lorenzo in Florence. The church organ had hitherto been used to lead out the plain-song—in unison only. There were, however, smaller organs used which could be moved about. The positive, often circular in shape, had one or two rows of pipes. The portative, so small that it could be placed on the knees, was blown with one hand and played with the other, and it was on this smaller organ that organ-playing, as an art, originated. There was also, later on, the small reed organ called the *regals* in use; it was portable like the others (Hopkins and Rimbault, p. 39).

In the next century we find that organists of repute begin to appear.

The great popularity of the Lutheran chorale in Germany led to its being treated in artistic form for the organ and played as a prelude, or *Choralvorspiele*. Originally the organ was played only between the verses as mentioned, but in 1650 Samuel Scheidt († 1654), in his *Tablatur Book*, begins to treat the organ as an accompaniment also for the singing. In the Roman Church organ interludes helped to spread out the Magnificat to the necessary length when sung in procession. The greatest of Dutch organists, Jan Swelinck († 1621), at Antwerp, and Geronimo Frescobaldi († 1640).

who had 30,000 listeners when he first played in St. Peter's, Rome, in 1614, were noted for their extemporizations of such interludes.

In the English Church the choir dominated the situation, and the organ had no pedals. No distinguished executants arose until the Reformation. With the advent of Queen Elizabeth in 1558 the influence of the Geneva Protestants, who did not believe in instrumental worship, began to be felt. Their demand was for simplicity in worship. As a result the Puritan party in England decreed in 1571:

'We allow not the tossing of the Psalms from one side to the other, with intermingling of organs.'

Matters came to a climax during the Civil War in 1644, when the destruction of church organs was ordered by Parliament (see Hopkins and Rimbault, p. 91 ff.).

After the Restoration in 1660 organs were re-erected in great haste in the cathedrals and churches, and organ-builders were imported, including 'Father' Smith, who built the organ in St. Paul's Cathedral. Parcell, the great English predecessor of Handel, wrote a 'Voluntary for ye Double Organ.' By 'double' is meant a 16-foot pedal organ. A custom arose at this time in England of playing a middle voluntary after the Psalm, generally on the mounted cornet (a mixture stop) or trumpet; it usually served only as a means of vulgar display. In addition to the middle voluntary, other features of the times were the interludes at the end of each line of the metrical Psalms, with a flourish or shake at the end, the sitting down for the metrical Psalms (except at the 'Gloria'), and the later introduction of barrel organs. The interludes and sitting down still persist in the Lutheran Church abroad.

The musical inefficiencies of the country and smaller town churches at this time are quaintly described by Mace (*Musick's Monument*). He says:

'I shall not need to blazon it abroad in Print how miserably the Prophet David's Psalms are (as I may say) tortured or tormented.' He advocates that 'it is better never to sing at all than to sing out of tune,' and thence goes on to say that organists are 'a constant charge, a terrible business,' and that a 'Parish clerk' could be easily taught 'how to pulse or strike most of our common Psalm Tunes' (cp. Williams, *Story of Organ Music*, p. 216).

With the 19th cent. English organists began to come to the front, represented by such men as Russell, Adams, S. S. Wesley, Smart, and others, and at the present time English organists and organs easily occupy the front rank.

In Scotland the organ was practically unused in church from the Reformation up to 1864, when it was re-introduced (McCrie, p. 337; Stewart, p. 157).

LITERATURE.—C. F. A. Williams, *Story of the Organ*, London, 1903, *Story of Organ Music*, do. 1905; H. C. Lahee, *The Organ and its Masters*, do. 1909; H. Statham, *The Organ and its Position in Musical Art*, do. 1909; J. I. Wedgwood, *Dictionary of Organ Stops*, do. 1905; H. W. Richards, *The Organ Accompaniment of the Church Services* (Anglican), do. 1911.

In conclusion it may be said that music is the most powerful ally that the Church has at its disposal. It can touch the emotions and the heart where all other means fail. If the organist is in earnest (and the minister is sympathetic), he becomes the active colleague of his minister in his great calling. The best results, however, can follow only if both keep an open mind and 'live to learn.' The study of the past is the best corrective for the present.

LITERATURE.—E. Dickinson, *Music of the Western Church*, London, 1902; G. W. Stewart, *Music in the Church*, do. 1914; J. S. Curwen, *Studies in Worship Music*, do. i. 1830, ii. 1835; F. G. Edwards, *Common Praise*, do. 1887; T. F. Forth, *Sacred Music of the Church*, do. 1914; W. S. Pratt, *Hist. of Music*, do. 1911; E. Naumann, *Hist. of Music*, Eng. tr. 2, do. 1900; W. S. Rockstro, *Hist. of Music*, do. 1886; John Hullah,

Hist. of Modern Music, do. 1897; J. E. Matthew, *Handbook of Musical History* (with Bibliographies), do. 1898, *The Literature of Music*, do. 1898; J. S. Bumpus, *Dictionary of Ecclesiastical Terms*, do. 1910; *Prayer Book Dictionary*, do. 1912; C. F. A. Williams, *Story of Notation*, do. 1903.

HERBERT WESTERBY.

MUSIC (Egyptian).—1. Sources.—It is unfortunately impossible to derive much information with regard to ancient Egyptian music from the writings of the classical authors. They confine themselves to general observations, none of which carry us very far, and some of which are demonstrably inaccurate. Diodorus (i. 81), indeed, is responsible for an observation on the subject which led, for a time, to the mistaken idea that the Egyptians were an unmusical race. 'It was not customary,' he says, 'for the Egyptians to practise music, because they considered it effeminate and undesirable.' On what grounds his statement is based it would be difficult to say, and he himself admits that the Greek poets and musicians visited Egypt in order to improve their art. Plato (*Legg.* ii. 656 f.), on the other hand, ascribes a very high antiquity and a very noble character to the sacred music of the Egyptians, whose rules concerning it were, according to him, most rigid, only certain kinds being allowed by Government. This is confirmed by Strabo (xvii. 1), who says that 'the children of the Egyptians were taught letters, the songs appointed by law, and a certain kind of music, established by government, to the exclusion of every other'; and, further, that vocal and instrumental music was usually admitted in the worship of the gods, especially at the commencement of the services, except in the temple of Osiris, where neither singers nor players on the flute or the lyre were allowed to perform. It is questionable how much of this confident assertion is the result of actual knowledge; the statement as to the limiting of the kinds of music certainly does not agree with what is known from more reliable sources. Herodotus (ii. 79) speaks of his surprise at finding that the song called *Maneros* by the Egyptians, a dirge said to have been named after the son of the first king of Egypt, was similar to the Cyprian dirge *Linos* or *Alinos*. This, however, is practically all that can be gathered from such sources.

2. System of music.—The paucity of information is still more deplorable when we come to the question of the system of music used by the Egyptians. No specimens of their musical notation have been preserved to us, for reasons which are manifest. Almost the whole of our knowledge of the life of ancient Egypt is derived from sculptures, wall-paintings, and reliefs; and, while musical scenes and instruments are there depicted with considerable frequency, it is obvious that nothing more is to be expected from such sources. A musical score would scarcely lend itself to representation in granite or limestone. The increasing care with which MSS on papyrus are now being collected and examined may in time provide us with the necessary information; but up to the present it is lacking.

Something may be inferred from the construction and range of the musical instruments represented on the monuments and wall-pictures, but the limits of such inference are narrow. It is, for example, probably a fair inference from the material mentioned above that the music of the Egyptians was not only in unison, but that they were accustomed to harmony, and that they had even attained to considerable skill in the building up of harmonic effects. The opposite view has been frequently expressed, but the testimony of the monuments seems conclusive on the point. One representation, for example, shows a harp of ten strings, and a lute on which at least three times as many intervals must have been producible in

union with a lyre of only five strings. Others show pipes playing together of such various lengths that they must have been designed to play in harmony and not in unison. In fact, there are repeated representations of what might be called an orchestra, and it seems out of the question to suppose that these aggregates of instruments were designed only to multiply the melody.

Instances of the various combinations of instruments found in these orchestras are given by Wilkinson (*The Ancient Egyptians*, ed. 1871, i. 86-89). The fact that the harp is the instrument most frequently depicted, and that it evidently formed the basis of Egyptian instrumental music, suggests the further inference that the Egyptian harmony was purely diatonic, and that every piece must have been played, from beginning to end, in the same key; for, before pedals were invented, the harp could play only a straight up and down diatonic scale. Little more than this can even be inferred, much less asserted. Students of this aspect of the subject must be referred to the various musical works mentioned in the Literature at the end of the article, where they will find all that can be made of it.

3. Importance of music in ancient Egypt.—There is, however, abundant evidence of the important place which music held in Egyptian life. Its origin was ascribed to divinity—sometimes to the goddess Isis, but more particularly to the god Thoth, or Tebuti. Among the sacred books attributed to him are two *Books of the Singer*. From a very early date it appears to have been the custom that a regular part of the royal establishment should consist of a band of instrumentalists and singers. Thus under the Old Empire we have mention of a certain Ra'henem, 'the superintendent of the singing,' who was also, with a somewhat curious jumbling of duties, superintendent of the royal harim (Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, p. 250). Another reference gives us the names of three 'superintendents of the royal singing,' two of whom seem to have been singers themselves, for they observe that 'they daily rejoice the heart of the king with beautiful songs, and fulfil every wish of the king by their beautiful singing' (*ib.* p. 250). Some of these choir-masters appear to have been of high rank—they are called 'royal relatives'—and to have held priestly as well as musical office, being priests of the king and of his ancestors. Under the New Empire there are also references to men who were singers to Pharaoh, and particularly to one man, Neferonpet, who was 'superintendent of the singers to Pharaoh' and also 'superintendent of the singers of all the gods' (*ib.* p. 251). This points to a regular organization of the sacred music of the whole Empire; and the probability is that there was a stereotyped form of religious music, preserved and maintained by the priests, in which, however, part was sometimes taken, especially in the time of the New Empire, by lay performers—more particularly by women. Under the XVIIIth dynasty many women of high rank were appointed to offices connected with the worship of the temple of Amen, some of them bearing the title *gemät en Amen*, 'singer of Amen' (Budge, *History of Egypt*, 1902, iv. 179 f.). In fact, Erman states that 'we scarcely meet with one lady under the New Empire, whether she were married or unmarried, the wife of an ecclesiastic or layman, whether she belonged to the family of a high priest or to that of an artisan, who was not thus connected with a temple' (p. 295). The chief duty of these women was to play the sistrum before the god. In some of the wall-pictures of the time of the New Empire, particularly in those of the tomb of Ramessu III. (dynasty

XX.), priests are represented as performers upon the harp. Altogether, therefore, it may be concluded that music, at least in its higher branches, was held in very high estimation by the ancient Egyptians, and occupied no small place in their life. The more secular branch of the musical profession in Egypt seems to have held a very different position, and to have performed music of a very different type, which was mixed with other elements of a sufficiently frivolous kind—a fact which may account for the misleading statement of Diodorus already quoted. The representations which have been preserved show that secular music was used mainly in connexion with festivals and entertainments not always of the most decorous type, according to our ideas, and was frequently accompanied by the performances of professional dancers and jugglers. It is perhaps permissible to infer that the average of musical taste in Egypt was not very different from what it is in our own land.

Variations in the current musical taste may be traced from the pictures of social life. Under the Old Empire instrumental music seems to have been performed solely by men, and to have served mainly as an accompaniment to the voice. In the time of the New Empire women-players on the lyre, the lute, and the double pipe are met with.

The singers seem at all periods to have marked the rhythm by clapping the hands—in fact, this simple method of marking time is so inseparable in the Egyptian mind from the idea of music that the word 'to sing' is written in all periods by the hieroglyphic sign of a band. Blind performers were not unknown—a representation from Tell el-Amarna shows a blind harpist accompanying several blind choristers who mark the rhythm with the clapping of hands.

4. Musical instruments.—When we come to the question of the musical instruments employed by the Egyptians, there is no lack of reliable material, the mural decorations of the various tombs abounding in representations of the different instruments. Of these the *harp* seems always to have been the chief and the favourite. It is found in various forms and various degrees of elaboration, ranging from small instruments with six or seven strings, which could be easily carried, and were frequently played by performers seated or kneeling on the ground—the instrument being either rested on its own base or supported on a light stand—up to very large and elaborate ones, whose base was enlarged to form a resonance-chamber, and which sometimes carried as many as twenty strings; these were played by performers standing, and seem to have been more or less reserved for music of a more elevated, possibly altogether of a religious, type, as the performers upon them appear to have been priests. A very small harp with four strings, and played by a performer who rests it on her shoulder (Wilkinson, i. 121), is considered by Naumann to be the first authentic form of the Egyptian harp. Erman, however, refers it (p. 252) to the time of the New Empire, and his opinion is to be preferred. The greatest elaboration of the harp is reached in the time of dynasties XIX. and XX. The representations of priests playing the harp in the tomb of Ramessu III. show instruments which are not only distinguished by the number of their strings, but are also very elaborately decorated, the framework being carved and inlaid with gold, ivory, tortoise-shell, and mother-of-pearl, and ornamented with various figures. The chief distinction between the Egyptian and the modern harp is that in the former the front support or pole is lacking, and there are no pedals, so that change of key can have been accomplished only by retuning the instrument by means of the pegs. The strings of the harp, as also those of the lyre, appear to have been of catgut; in one

specimen of the latter they have been found still in position, and so well preserved as to sound when struck. Several smaller instruments of harp type but of unusual shapes were also in use, and are figured by Wilkinson (i. 119).

Of smaller instruments, the *lute* or *guitar* is the one most frequently met with; its symbol 𓪓 , *nefer*, is one of the commonest hieroglyphic signs. Its Egyptian name was derived from the Semitic *nbl*. It appears to have been played chiefly by women, and was sometimes slung by a band round the neck. The body was of wood, sometimes covered with leather. Originally it was an exceedingly primitive instrument, with only one string, but later it became possessed of three, which were played by means of a plectrum. The strings were fastened at the lower end to a triangular piece of wood or ivory, and at the upper extremity of the handle they passed over a small crossbar and were secured either by pegs or by being passed through an aperture in the handle, round which they were then bound. The lute does not appear to have had any bridge.

The *lyre* was probably not a native Egyptian instrument, but a foreign importation. It does not make its appearance before the time of the XVIIIth dynasty except on one occasion. On the wall of the tomb of the prince Khnem-hetep at Beni Hasan (dynasty XII.) it is represented in the hands of one of a company of Aamu or Bedawin who are being introduced to the prince. In this case it is being played by a man; but as an Egyptian instrument it seems to have been more frequently played by women. It is found of various shapes and sizes, ranging from small instruments with five strings, which were carried under the arm and played either with or without a plectrum, up to large ones of eighteen strings, reaching a height of about six feet, and standing on an ornamental base. Specimens of the Egyptian lyre in the Berlin and Leyden museums show one of its arms shorter than the other, in order possibly to provide an easy method of tuning, by sliding the strings along the bar on which they were tightened.

Of *wind instruments* almost none but wooden specimens have been preserved. Pictures in the monuments, however, show troops accompanied by trumpeters who use a very simple straight trumpet of about 18 inches in length, and made apparently of brass or some similar metal (e.g., the representation of the battle of Ramessu II. against the Kheta). Various kinds of flute are represented. In the time of the Old Empire there were two sorts in use, one of extraordinary length—4 or 5 feet—which was held by the player obliquely behind him, and a short one, varying in the specimens preserved from 7 to 15 inches in length. Later, in the time of the New Empire, these seem to have been almost superseded by the double pipe, an instrument with the mouth-pieces brought together and the tubes separating in V-shape and terminating in bell-shaped mouths. This form of pipe is frequently figured, being played mostly by female performers, and often as an accompaniment to dancers.

The flutes preserved are of wood, ivory, horn, or bone, but others were made of reeds; and, in 1859, W. M. Flinders Petrie found at Illahun, in the tomb of a lady named Maket, two musical reeds incased for protection in a larger reed. The scale indicated by their holes is the major scale (*Ten Years' Digging in Egypt*, London, 1893, p. 124).

Garstang's excavations at Beni Hasan in 1902-04 provided good specimens of several of the instruments described above. A harp of five strings presented no differences of any importance as compared with already-existing specimens in Paris, Turin, and the British Museum. A drum, 65 centimetres in length and 29 in breadth, was

carved from a single cylinder of wood. Its ends were of parchment, connected together by a network of leather thongs. These thongs were tightened by being twisted with a short stick, so as to enable the pitch of the instrument to be maintained. Two flutes were of considerable interest, and were the subject of an article by Southgate in the *Musical News* of Aug. 1903. They are respectively 90 and 95 centimetres in length, made of the water-reed (*Arundo donax*). Each has four notches, the tubes are open throughout, and a slight thinning at the mouth-end suggests that a mouth-piece of some sort may have been attached. There are three finger-holes 5 millimetres in width, the distances of these from the mouth-end being 62.5, 68.6, and 81 centimetres in the shorter flute, whose natural note is *f*. The natural note of the longer tube is *c* natural. The notes produced by the finger-holes are in the one case *c*, *f*, *g*, *b* flat; and in the other *f*, *f* sharp, *a* sharp, and *c*. An Arab flute-player at Beni Hasan had no difficulty in playing these ancient instruments, which very much resembled his own flute in principle, though the latter was made out of an old gun-barrel. The date of the tomb in which these objects were found is unfortunately somewhat uncertain, but they may be ascribed to the period of the Middle Kingdom.

Among *instruments of percussion* there were several forms of drum, cymbals, castanets, the tambourine, and the sistrum. The commonest form of *drum* is a long narrow cylinder of wood or copper covered with parchment at both ends, the parchment being strained by braising cords. It occurs chiefly in military scenes. During the march it was slung in a vertical position over the drummer's shoulder, and he played it by beating it with his hand. Another type of drum was mere like the side drum of present times in shape, with this difference, that its sides were convex, giving it the shape of a small cask. This type was beaten with two drumsticks. A form of drum frequently represented corresponds to the *darabuka* used at the present time by peasant women and the Nile boatmen. It is of funnel shape, and was apparently made of pottery, with parchment strained over the wide mouth. The Egyptian *cymbals* were smaller than those now in use, ranging from 5½ to 7 inches in diameter. In other respects they were similar to them, and were made either of brass or of an alloy of silver and brass. *Castanets* were in the form of slightly curved sticks of wood or ivory, about a foot long, and often terminating in a human head. The *tambourine* or *timbrel* appears to have been a favourite instrument in religious ceremonies as well as in secular music. It was played by either men or women, but oftener by the latter. Three types are represented—one circular, one square or oblong, and a third of two squares, separated by a bar. There is no direct evidence of the existence of the metal rings or disks found in the frame of the modern instrument; but, from the way in which the performer is seen to wave it over his head, it may be concluded that these existed. There remains the *sistrum*, which was the sacred musical instrument *par excellence*, if indeed it may be called a musical instrument. It consisted of a handle, generally carved in the shape of a head of the goddess Hathor, from the upper end of which rose an arch of bronze ribbon, somewhat in the shape of an elongated horseshoe. Through holes in the sides of this arch there were loosely inserted three or four metal bars, bent at each end to keep them from slipping out. When the sistrum was waved, these bars, striking on the bronze arch, emitted a tinkling sound. The sistrum was used in the most solemn religious services, and was frequently carried by women of the most exalted

rank. Several sistra have been preserved, varying from 8 to 18 inches in length. Models of sistra in enamelled ware were often deposited in tombs, being first broken in sign of mourning.

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MUSIC (Greek and Roman).—Any tradition as to the first stages of development of Greek music is veiled in mythical obscurity. It is natural that with a lively and artistic people, such as the Greeks were, the culture of music should have been very wide-spread. There was a great abundance of popular melodies, which brightened up the everyday life of the people (see Bücher, *Arbeit und Rhythmus*); their social life was enlivened by love-songs and drinking-songs, and they glorified the gods at their festivals, as well as the victors in the national games, with choral songs accompanied by dances. Pindar, from whose pen there are still in existence forty-four odes of the last-mentioned kind, was a composer as well as a poet. The oldest piece of Greek music which has come down to us—leaving out of account as unquestionably spurious the composition of three verses of the Homeric Hymn to Demeter—is the beginning of a melody to Pindar's first Pythian Ode. The Jesuit Athanasius Kircher published it in his *Musurgia universalis* (Rome, 1650). It is true that the manuscript to which he appeals has not been found, and therefore the genuineness of the melody has been doubted in various quarters. Von Jan (*Musici scriptores Græci*; see also *Supplement*, 'Melodiarum reliquiæ') has not admitted it to his list at all. The most reliable information on all questions relating to the history of Greek music is to be found in Hugo Riemann's *Handbuch der Musikgeschichte*, i. i. (the Pindar melody is given on p. 131).

The epoch-making researches of Rndolph Westphal (*Die Musik des griech. Altertums und Griech. Harmonik und Melopoeie*) require critical testing, because Westphal, with more imagination than discretion, has advanced a great many uncertain hypotheses. F. A. Gevaert's *Hist. et théorie de la musique de l'antiquité* must also be used with caution, as he depends too much upon Westphal's hypotheses. The same applies to Gleditsch, who treats the music of the Greeks as an appendix to metrics in Iwan Müller's *Handbuch der klass. Altertumswissenschaft*, vol. ii.

Out of the choral lyric sprang the drama, which in the classical period was chiefly musical drama. The comparative criticism which Aristophanes in his *Frogs* devotes to the art of Æschylus and Euripides is aimed at their music quite as much as the contents of their dramas. There is also extant a short fragment of a melody from the *Orestes* of Euripides (see von Jan's *Supplement*, p. 4 f.).

Alongside of the drama, from about B.C. 400 the dithyrambus assumed an important part in the perfecting of musical expression; and the primitive *vbos* became from that time the field in which ever-increasing virtuosity could display its skill. In correspondence with the freer formation of the lyrical rhythms, from this time onwards the voice-part paid more attention to the distribution of the accents, which in the Greek language have a

musical meaning of their own (cf. Crusius, 'Die delphischen Hymnen' in *Philologus*, liii., Suppl.). Besides songs accompanied by stringed instruments (*κιθαριδική*) and those accompanied by wind-instruments (*αὐλοφδική*), there was also pure instrumental music (*κιθαριστική* and *αὐλητική*). Guhrauer has shown (*Altgriech. Programm-musik*) that the instrumental music of the ancients was essentially 'programme' (i.e. illustrative or descriptive) music, especially in the case of the Pythian νόμος, which represented Apollo's fight with the dragon.

The great importance which the Greeks attached to music is also shown in the fact that music culture and instruction were subjects of minute State control. Even Plato, who in his *Politeia* expresses himself a pronounced opponent to art, gives in that work most detailed attention to the regulating of music. On the high estimate of the ancients of the ethical value of music, and the controversy of the schools of philosophy about it, see Ahert, *Die Lehre vom Ethos in der griechischen Musik*. Sparta especially, acting under government orders, took an interest in music, and we find Terpander of Lesbos, the oldest musician of importance, active there in the 6th or 7th cent. B.C. His name is closely connected with the history of citharodic music.

Songs in ancient times, whether sung by individuals or by a choir, were in unison throughout, with the exception that boys' and men's voices were an octave apart from each other. Moreover, the independent tones of the accompanying instruments, which may have been inserted between, must not be understood as a second part in the sense attached to that expression by an ear accustomed to harmony. Westphal's contentions about polyphony rest partly on arbitrary conclusions and partly on a misunderstanding of the word *πολυφωνία*, which does not have the same meaning as our modern 'polyphony' (see Graf, *de Græcorum veterum re musica*; for information about stringed instruments see von Jan, *Die griech. Saiteninstrumente*, and art. 'Saiteninstrumente,' in Baumeister's *Denkmäler des klass. Altertums*, iii.).

The bow was entirely unknown to the ancients; the strings were either plucked with the fingers, as we play our harps, or beaten with a small plectrum (*πλήκτρον*), like our zither or the cymhal of the gypsies. The stringed instruments may be divided into two chief classes: the older simple *λύρα* (called in Homer the *κίθαρις* or *φόρμιγγις*), and the *κithára*, which is distinguished from the *λύρα* by its large square sounding-board. The original number of strings was seven. How they were tuned, if in the Dorian octave (see below) with the omission of the third highest degree, just as, we are informed, Terpander used it, or otherwise, we cannot now determine. Each string gave only one sound; the Greeks knew nothing about shortening the strings by means of bridges. The flageolet seems to have been the only known means of getting from the string a note different from the fundamental one. Besides the seven-stringed lyre, there were also in common use a number of different harp-like instruments with a far greater number of strings.

The class of wind-instruments is represented by the *αὐλός*, which in size and pitch resembled our clarinet rather than the flute, as it had a double set of reeds, and was blown from the end (see von Jan, art. 'Flöten,' in Baumeister).

It is peculiar to the Greeks that almost invariably two *αὐλοί* were used at the same time by one player—a fact which Gevaert tries in vain to gloss over. The oldest representative of *αὐλός*-playing is Olympus, who, like Terpander, was from Asia Minor, and belonged probably to about the same

time. The oldest so-called enharmonic scale is ascribed to him, and is, according to Riemann's convincing hypothesis (p. 43 f.), the five-note scale without semitones, which makes its appearance as the earliest stage among other peoples as well—*d c g a h d'*. From *d* to *d'* is the Phrygian octave, and Olympus came from Phrygia. After they had become acquainted with the full seven-note octave, people felt in these old melodies the intentional omission of the third note in each tetrachord, *f* and *c*. When the series of tones was transferred to the Dorian octave *c-c'*, and by this transposition the third tone was omitted, they had reached the second stage of development of the enharmonic *c f a h c'*, where twice an interval of a semitone and one of two whole tones succeed one another. Riemann demonstrates the same arrangement in Japanese music. Finally, by means of inserting the quarter-tone (*dieais*) between *c* and *f* as well as between *h* and *c'*, they again made up the tetrachord to four notes. This is the latest form of enharmonic, and the only one recognized by later theorists.

Among other instruments, apart from cymbals, kettle-drums, and castanets, which serve the purposes of rhythm only, not of harmony, we must mention the organ because of the great importance which it has assumed in Christian times. It appears for the first time in Alexandrian and Roman times as *hydraulus*, 'water-organ'—so called because the air-supply was obtained by means of water-pressure—but it had only a limited and wholly secular use. The Alexandrian and Roman epochs (cf. Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte Roms*?) show, indeed, a wide-spread musical activity, but it was not sufficiently creative; it lived entirely in the traditions of the classical Greeks. In fact, an attempt was made in Hadrian's time, as by Julian afterwards, to approach still nearer to these by means of a reform to the archaic (cf. Möhler, *Gesch. der alten und mittelalterl. Musik*, p. 34 f.). The early Christian music, therefore, which grew out of the musical life of the Romans, seemed to be a direct continuation of the ancient Greek. Attempts to show the close connexion between the two have been made, especially by Gevaert (*La Mélodie antique dans le chant de l'église latine*), and Möhler ('Die griech., griech.-röm., and alchrist.-lat. Musik,' in *RQ* ix. Suppl.). Abert (*Die Musikanschauung des Mittelalters und ihre Grundlagen*) acknowledges a direct connexion for the East only, while the Christian music of the West is a thing really new and only artificially adapted to the ancient theory by the scholars of the Middle Ages.

Along with the development of practical music theoretical investigation of music was also proceeding. The first important stride was made by Pythagoras, when he showed how the numerical proportions of the consonances correspond to the varying lengths of a string. The later Pythagoreans were aware that the notes are due to aerial vibrations, which have similar underlying relations to one another. The only consonances recognized by the ancients were the octave, the fifth, and the fourth; it was much later that they became conscious of the third as a harmonious chord (cf. Graf, *Die Theorie der Akustik im griech. Altertum*). The proportion of the third 4:5 seems to have been hit upon more by accident as one of the results of many calculating experiments; it was as unknown to Pythagoras as the small whole-tone 9:10. He got by the addition of two large whole-tones the very large third 64:81, and, as the difference between this and the fourth, the very artificial semitone 243:256. An excellent example of these Pythagorean studies is the *Sectio Canonis* of the great mathematician Euclid

(von Jan, *Musici scriptores Græci*, p. 148 f.; on pp. 115-147 is collected all that is known about the Pythagoreans).

An attitude of opposition to the Pythagoreans was assumed to some extent by the school of Aristotle. What we find scattered through the different writings of Aristotle about music, von Jan has carefully gathered together at the beginning of his collection. Bk. xix. and part of bk. xi. of the Aristotelian *Problemata* treat of weighty musical questions. These are reproduced and annotated in von Jan, p. 39 f. But his treatment is superseded by the edition of Gevaert and Vollgraf (*Les Problèmes musicaux d'Aristote*), which handles the subject from new and fruitful points of view. The most important pupil of Aristotle, with regard to music, and at the same time the greatest musical theorist of antiquity, was Aristoxenus, whose *Elements of Harmony* should be studied in Maeran's *Ἀριστοτέλεως ἁρμονικὰ στοιχεῖα* (Oxford, 1902) instead of in the somewhat profuse treatment of Westphal (Leipzig, 1883-93). Aristoxenus managed to find the proper medium between the empiricism of the practical musicians, which was based on no principle, and the too abstract theory of the Pythagoreans. A very important source of information is found, again, in the three books *de Musica* of Aristides Quintilianus (ed. Albert Jahn, Berlin, 1882), who lived in the 1st or 2nd cent. A.D. We get the greatest amount of historical information in the book preserved under Plutarch's name, *Περὶ μουσικῆς* (ed. Weil and Reineck, with Fr. tr. and notes). A little later lived Ptolemæus, the great geographer and astronomer, whose *Harmonics*, along with the commentary of Porphyry, represents the last great system of ancient musical theory. Both of these works were largely supplemented by Bryennius the Byzantine, who belonged to the 14th century. The newest (!) edition of all these three books is that of John Wallis, in his *Opera mathematica*, iii., in the year 1699.

Among other Greek writers special mention is due to Alypius in the 4th cent. A.D., as the man who has handed down to us most fully the Greek system of notation, by writing out and describing altogether fifteen transposition-scales in the three kinds of tones, so that—with the omission of the last six series—he has really given and described thirty-nine scales through two octaves and in two kinds of musical characters (von Jan gives the tables on p. 367 f.).

The Greeks had a double musical notation. The newer employs the well-known letters of the Ionic alphabet, and that in descending order; the older consists of heterogeneous signs, and up to the present time neither its origin nor the system of its composition has been explained. Only the practical meaning of the signs has been made quite clear. In the older system the raising of a note a quarter-tone or a semitone was signified by a different position of the same sign. The newer notes used to be called singing-notes and the older ones instrument-notes, but the Delphian discoveries have shown us that their use was not originally distinguished in that way. Among the Latin writers Boethius, who was a contemporary of the great Theodoric, is worthy of mention on account of the authoritative position which his work, *de Musica*, held all through the Middle Ages. We now find the most lucid collection of sources in Riemann, pp. 10-26.

With regard to the extant specimens of music, the three Hymns of Dionysius and Mesomedes were the first to be made known; they belonged to Hadrian's time, and were communicated by the father of Galileo in 1581. In 1650 there followed Kireher's Pindar melody. All the other pieces we

owe to the last decade of the 19th century. There is the fragment from Euripides' *Orestes*, preserved on papyrus; and there are also the two Hymns to Apollo, apparently from the 2nd cent. B.C., which the excavations of the French at Delphi have brought to light; and, lastly, the only completely preserved piece, the Epitaph of Seikilos. All these are admirably brought together in von Jan's *Supplement*; the Seikilos song is given in facsimile in Möhler, *Geschichte*, p. 19.

The basis of the ancient Greek tone-system was the tetrachord, i.e. a succession of a semitone and two whole tones—*e f g a*; and there may have been an ancient sort of singing theme, which moved only within the compass of these notes—the tonic *a* and the dominant *e* (cf. the frequent recitative conclusion *a e* in modern music). The addition of a second similarly constructed tetrachord above it—*h c' d' e'*—gives rise to the Dorian octave *e-e'*. It corresponds to our A minor, for *a* is the tonic, and the Dorian octave therefore contains the notes for melodies which reach as far as a fifth above the tonic and a fourth below it. The key-note *a* is called μέση (the names of the notes are feminine, χορδή being understood); the lowest is the ὑπάτη (the idea of high and low is here apparently reversed; probably the designation is due to the position of the strings on certain old instruments); the highest, *e'*, in contrast to this, is called νήτη (= νεάτη, lit. 'the lowest'). The stringed instrument was held on the left side, so that the lowest string was farthest away from the body. As the tonic was the one which sounded most frequently and loudest, it was struck with the thumb; and then the index-finger came on the next lowest. This finger is called δ λιχανός (from λείχω, 'lick,' lit. 'licking finger'); and hence the note *g* itself is called ἡ λιχανός. The names of the remaining notes are simply derived from their position, the Dorian octave being named in this way:

$\begin{matrix} e & f & g & a & h & c & d & e' \\ \text{ὑπάτη} & \text{παρυπάτη} & \text{λιχανός} & \text{μέση} & \text{παραμέση} & \text{τρίτη} & \text{παρανήτη} & \text{νήτη} \\ & & & & \text{or} & & & \\ & & & & \text{παραμέσος} & & & \end{matrix}$

The upper tetrachord can also be added in such a way that the μέση is its starting note. Then it is called, not *h c' d' e'*, but *a b c' d'*. The two tetrachords are drawn so nearly together by this process that the two form only seven tones. From συνάπτω, 'join together,' the notes of this upper tetrachord are called the *συνημμένοι*, and in contrast to this the notes of the tetrachord first described are the *διεξευγμένοι*. The παραμέση drops out, *b* is called τρίτη, and so on. Thus, for example, the νήτη of the combined tetrachord is the same note as the παρανήτη of the other, namely *d*. By introducing the note *b*, they now made use of this tetrachord as a means of modulating from A minor to D minor. The Dorian octave was extended in both directions, a combined tetrachord *h-e*, the ὑπατοι, being added below (*e-a* are called, in contrast to this, the μέσοι); and similarly a combined *c'-a'*, the ὑπερβολαιοι, was added above. Now we have two complete octaves, with the exception of the note *a*; this is added and is therefore called the προσλαμβανόμενος. In this way the complete system of fifteen notes is formed—or eighteen rather, as the three notes of the combined tetrachord are usually added. In reality it consists of sixteen notes, two of which (*c'* and *d'*) have double signs; *a* is now really μέση, for it stands at the interval of an octave from the προσλαμβανόμενος as well as from the νήτη ὑπερβολαίων.

The Dorian octave *e-e'* is one of the seven possible sections from the infinitely continuous diatonic scale without chromatic signs. In our music there are only two of them in use, namely,

the (descending) minor scale *a'-a* and the major scale *e-c'*. In Greek music we find all the seven used. They are called the seven ἀρμονίαι, from ἀρμόζω, 'fit together,' because the combination of semitones and tones in each scale was in a different order. Coming downwards from *e* to *e'* of the Dorian scale, *d-d'* is called the Phrygian octave, *c-c'* the Lydian, *b* Mixolydian, *a* Hypodorian or Æolian, *g* Hypophrygian or Ionic (Iastic), and *f* Hypolydian. Thanks to Boethius, these names came to be used in the Church music of the Middle Ages, but, through a confusion, possibly due to the transference of the names to the transposition scales (see below), the Church notes are placed differently and in an inverted order:

	Ancient.	Middle Ages.
Dorian	<i>e'</i>	<i>d</i>
Phrygian	<i>d'</i>	<i>e</i>
Lydian	<i>c'</i>	<i>f</i>
Mixolydian	<i>h</i>	<i>g</i>
Hypodorian	<i>a</i>	<i>a</i>
Hypophrygian	<i>g</i>	<i>h</i>
Hypolydian	<i>f</i>	<i>c'</i>

(cf. Möhler, *Gesch.* p. 79 f.).

The position of the tonic in the Greek octaves is still an unsolved problem. If, as in the Dorian, it is to be looked for at the fourth stage from below, then, for example, the Phrygian would be a G major with a large seventh, the Lydian an F major with an exceedingly large fourth. Perhaps several octaves have the same tonic (as Dorian and Æolian, which at that time stood in the relation of authentic and plagal to each other), and differ only in the compass of the notes used in the melody. Probably the scales were originally accidental, i.e. they contained the tones of certain melodies which were well known in particular localities (hence the names), and not until some time later, when they were united in a system, were they conceived as essential, i.e. always depending on a fixed tonic.

Up to this point the basis of our examination has been the diatonic scale without chromatic signs. Now each of the seven octaves can be transposed to our scale of equal temperament of twelve semitones; thus arise the τρόποι, or transposition-scales, which are called likewise by the names Dorian, Phrygian, etc. If, in the octave *e-e'*, we raise *f* and *c* to *f#* and *c#*, we get a Phrygian octave, and if we also raise *g* and *d*, the Lydian is formed. To correspond to this Riemann composes the Lydian τρόπος like the scale with four sharps, and transcribes in C# minor the pieces handed down in this kind of scale. In all other writers we find them transcribed in D minor. For Bellermand and Fortlage, who started the investigation of Greek musical notation in 1847, regarded the Hypolydian octave (*f-f'* without signs) as the fundamental scale, and so related the transposition-scales to this octave that, for example, the Dorian τρόπος was fixed as B minor with five flats, for in this way *f-f'* gives a Dorian octave. Riemann (pp. 186, 193 f.) rejects this raising as groundless and misleading. The setting up of these scales presupposes a knowledge of tempered pitch. (Properly speaking, there could be only twelve, but they went far beyond the octave, and so Alypius counts fifteen specially-named τρόποι.) As a matter of fact, practical musicians made use of tempered pitch even in classical times, and Aristoxenus made it the basis of his theory, in opposition to the Pythagoreans, who contended from the speculative standpoint for the pure pitch.

With the seven ἀρμονίαι and the twelve τρόποι or τόνοι in diatonic succession the wealth of the Greek tone-system is not exhausted. The two inner notes of the tetrachord could always be lowered according to the character of the piece of music, and were therefore called the variables, in oppo-

sition to the two outside notes, which always formed a fourth. If the third note was lowered a semitone, there arose the series of $\frac{1}{2}$ tone $\frac{1}{2}$ tone $1\frac{1}{2}$ tone— $c f \sharp a$. This is the chromatic genus, in contrast to the diatonic. The third genus of tone was two enharmonic already mentioned, where two quarter-tones are followed by an interval of a third, $c f a$ — f now occupying the third place in the tetrachord. Besides these three genera, there were numerous intermediate gradations used by the virtuosi; and the fragments of music which have been preserved also show mixtures of chromatic and diatonic elements, about which the writers on theory give no information. We can see from the scales of Aristides (p. 21) that the scale-system was not so systematically complete in Plato's time as it appears later (cf. Laloy, in *RPh* xxiv. 31 f.).

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MUSIC (Hebrew).—1. Origin.—Hebrew tradition ascribes the origin of music to Jubal, one of the three sons of Lamech. 'He was the father of all such as handle the harp and organ' (RV 'pipe,' Gn 4²¹). He had an elder brother Jabal, who is likewise described as 'the father of such as dwell in tents, and of such as have cattle' (v. 20). The close relation thus assigned to the fathers of the pastoral and the musical arts—they are represented as being born of the same mother, while Tubalcain, the first smith, was the son of the other wife of Lamech—witnesses to the belief that the origin of music is to be found among a people of pastoral habits. The shepherd playing on his pipe to call the sheep (Jg 5¹⁶ RV), or to beguile the tediousness of his watch, appeared to the Hebrew mind the earliest type of musician. Similarly the Greeks ascribed to Pan the invention of the syrinx. It may be that the inclusion in Cain's family-tree of the originator of the art of music indicates a tendency on the part of the compiler to view with disfavour the arts which had banished the severe simplicity of primitive times. But, if so, this is a view which, so far as music is concerned, finds no further expression in the Bible, where music is consistently regarded with favour as the natural utterance of the joy which fills the heart, and the fitting channel whereby the voice of man may convey to God his gratitude and devotion.

2. Music in rejoicing.—In the Bible the employment of music in connexion with religion is a later development. The first uses to which it was put

were secular, and in the social life of the people it played an important part. It was used on occasions of rejoicing. Victory in battle is celebrated in song (Ex 15^{1a}, Jg 5^{1a}). The women welcome the conqueror with music and dancing. So Miriam and the women celebrate the discomfiture of Pharaoh's host (Ex 15^{20a}), and Jephthah's daughter brings her fate upon herself, in consequence of her father's rash vow (Jg 11^{34a}). After his victory Jehoshaphat goes up to the Temple 'with psalteries and harps and trumpets' (2 Ch 20²³). At feasts and convivial meetings there were song and instrumental music (Is 5¹², Am 6⁵, Sir 32⁵⁻⁹), and, among the features which go to make up the happy life which Job grudges to the wicked, music is not forgotten (Job 21¹²). The merry-making at the vintage festival took the form of dance and song (Jg 9²⁷ 21²¹, Is 16¹⁰). One of the outstanding features in the marriage celebrations was the festal procession with music and dancing to the house of the bridegroom (1 Mac 9³⁷⁻³⁹). It was such a familiar sight that the very children in the markets used to imitate it in their sport (Mt 11¹⁷). To Jeremiah the ceasing from the streets of the voice of the bridegroom and of the bride is typical of the desolation which is to overtake the land (Jer 7³⁴ 16⁹ 25¹⁰). The long-lost son is welcomed home with music and dancing (Lk 15²³). It appears likewise to have been the custom on occasion to speed the parting guest with music (Gn 31²⁷). At any public ceremony, such as the coronation of the king, music played an important part (1 K 1⁴⁰, 2 K 11¹⁴). In all ranks of society it was esteemed. The king had his singers and instrumental performers (2 S 19³⁵, Ec 2⁸); the young men at the gates entertained themselves with music (La 5¹⁴); the shepherd lad had his lyre (1 S 16¹⁶); the harlot used song and playing to augment her blandishments (Is 23¹⁶); in the Exile the Jews used to take their lyres with them, as had doubtless been their wont at home, when they gathered together for social intercourse, though they had no heart to sing (Ps 137¹⁴).

3. Music in mourning.—But music was not employed only on joyful occasions. It had its place also in the ceremonial of mourning. The dirge was a recognized form of Hebrew poetry. It was sung in connexion with the obsequies. Jeremiah composed one for Josiah, which was sung by the singing men and the singing women (2 Ch 35²⁵), and David's lament over Saul and Jonathan has been preserved (2 S 1¹⁸⁻²⁷). It became the custom to employ professional mourners to bewail the dead. The lamentation began in the home (Mt 9²³), and was continued as the funeral procession marched with mournful music to the grave. Flutes are the only instruments of which we read in connexion with funerals (Mt 9²³). The use of music at funerals became so firmly established that, according to Maimonides, the poorest husband was expected to provide at least two flute-players and one mourning woman for the funeral of his wife (Comm. in *Mishnaïoth*, ch. 4).

4. Hebrew susceptibility to music.—Evidence of the susceptibility of the Hebrew temperament to music is supplied by the cases of Saul and Elisha. When Saul is troubled by an evil spirit, his melancholy is dispelled by the playing of David (1 S 16¹⁶⁻²³). When as a young man he meets the company of prophets working themselves up into an ecstasy by the music which accompanies them, Saul too is carried away and prophesies (1 S 10⁵). The same thing happened on a later occasion when he attempted to take David prisoner as he was dwelling in Naioth with Samuel and the prophets. The various messengers whom he sent were all overcome by the spirit and prophesied; and, when Saul himself came to

achieve the capture, he too was carried away (1 S 19²⁰⁻²⁴). There is no express mention of music in the latter passage; but doubtless this was the method by which the prophets produced that state of ecstasy suggested by the description of them as 'prophesying.' So, when Elisha desired to prophesy, he called for a minstrel, and by the aid of the music the hand of the Lord came upon him (2 K 3¹⁵).

5. Music in religious worship.—It was natural that an art which played such an important part in the social life of the people should have its place in religious worship. Of the history of its introduction in this connexion we have, however, no record. If we accept the account of Chronicles, then it is to David that is to be assigned the credit of making provision for the musical service of the Temple. But it is characteristic of the Chronicler to antedate the religious practices of his own day. So, however valuable his account as furnishing a picture of the Temple service in post-Exilic times, it is quite unreliable as evidence regarding the conditions in the first Temple. There is no mention of sacred singers or musicians in the Pentateuch, and it is hardly credible, if the musical service of the first Temple was in the highly organized state described in Chronicles, that no regulations regarding it should be laid down there. But, while we cannot accept the account in Chronicles of the elaborate arrangements made by David, that does not mean that the whole musical service was a post-Exilic development. There must have been a considerable musical staff in the first Temple, for we read of a body of singers, called the children of Asaph, in the list of those who returned from the Exile (Ezr 2⁴, Neh 7⁴⁴). These would be descendants of those who had held office before the fall of Jerusalem, for it is impossible that the organization of a staff of Temple musicians was the work of the Exile. From Am 5²³ and Is 30^{29, 32} we know that the use of music in connexion with religious worship was an established practice. Indeed, it is probable that the association extends much further back than the time of David. Among the ancient Hebrews there was not the sharp distinction between the sacred and the secular that obtains with us. Many of the social festivities with which music was associated had a certain religious significance. The great historical feasts which assumed such importance in the Jewish religion were originally rustic festivals to celebrate the more important agricultural events of the year. It is natural that the music which played such an important part in these social celebrations should have a place in the religious festivals which took their place. The dance and song which were features of these rustic festivals were retained in the religious procession, such as is described in connexion with the bringing up of the ark to Zion in 2 S 6. Thus, gradually and naturally, music was associated with religious celebrations. As these celebrations became more elaborate, the provision for the employment of music in connexion with them would become more complex. Whether David had any part in the organization of the musical arrangement in divine worship we cannot tell. In the book of Samuel he is described as a skilful player upon the lyre (1 S 16¹⁸), and in Am 6⁵ there is a reference to his invention of musical instruments (Nowack would read 'all kinds of songs' instead of 'instruments of song'). But there is nothing in the earlier historical books, with the exception of the two psalms attributed to him in the appendix to 2 Sam., to identify him with the David who figures in Chronicles as the founder of the Temple psalmody. The instruments of song which he invented, alluded to in Am 6⁵, are such as are in use at

banquets rather than those intended for worship. And there is a striking contrast between the scenes at the bringing up of the ark described in 2 Sam., where David danced and leapt before the ark, and the stately ceremonial on the same occasion described in Chronicles. It may very well be that David, an expert musician, interested himself in the wider use of music in religious services. But, if he did, we have no data upon which to come to a decision as to the extent and character of his work.

For the same reason we are unable to form any clear idea of what was the nature of the musical service in the first Temple. We may confidently assume that the musical staff would be on a very much more modest scale than Chronicles alleges. It has been thought by some that the people took a more active part in the musical service than in later times (Cheyne, *Origin of Psalter*, p. 194). But how far this participation extended, and what precisely was the nature of the musical side of the service, we have no means of determining. With regard to post-Exilic times our information is somewhat fuller. There was a large staff of Temple musicians. They were grouped together in guilds called by the name of the head of the family from whom they were descended—e.g., Asaph, Heman, Korah. The headings of many of the Psalms indicate that they are taken from the collection which bore the name of one of these guilds. Previous to the time of Ezra and Nehemiah the musicians were distinguished from the Levites (Schürer, *HJP* II. i. 271; art. 'Priests and Levites,' in *HDB* iv. 92^b), but from this time onwards they were included among them. Their particular function was to accompany the daily burnt-offering and other parts of the service with song and instrumental music. To what extent the people joined in the musical service is uncertain. Probably their participation, in later times at any rate, was restricted to occasional responses such as 'Amen,' 'Hallelujah' (1 Ch 16³⁸, Ps 106⁴⁸), 'For His mercy endureth for ever' (Ps 136; cf. Jer 33¹¹). The instruments generally used at the Temple service were the two stringed ones, the *kinnôr* and the *nebel*, of which a considerable number were employed in the Temple orchestra, and the cymbals, of which there was only one pair played by the conductor to mark the time. These instruments appear to have been supplemented on occasion by flutes (Is 30²⁹, Ps 5, superscription 'Upon Nehiloth,' which is taken by some to indicate accompaniment by flutes [see Delitzsch, *ad loc.*]). There likewise fall to be included in the list of instruments used in worship the trumpets, which were played, not by the Levites, but by the priests. They were used at the daily offering and other parts of the service, and were likewise sounded from the roof of the Temple to announce the dawn of the Sabbath (Josephus, *BJ* iv. ix. 12). According to the account given in 1 Ch 15^{16st}, the singers played their own accompaniment, whereas in Ps 68²⁵ the singers are distinguished from the instrumentalists, and march first in the procession. Perhaps the latter arrangement was a later development (Ewald, *Die Dichter des alten Bundes*, Ia. 212). From the descriptions given of the dedication of the Temple (2 Ch 7⁶), and of the consecration of it after its cleansing by Hezekiah (2 Ch 29²⁵⁻³⁰), it appears that the singing and the instrumental performance by the Levites and the blowing of the trumpets by the priests all took place simultaneously. But in the second Temple the blowing of the trumpets, at any rate, did not accompany but succeeded the performance by the choir and musicians. There have even been some who maintain that the instruments did not accompany the voices at all, but played interludes at pauses in the singing by

the choir, and that the word 'Selah,' which occurs occasionally in the Psalms, indicates that the instrumental interlude should here begin (so Diestel, in Schenkel's *Bibel-Lexikon*, iv. 260 f.). To take the word 'Selah' as a sign for some kind of instrumental interlude is perhaps the most satisfactory interpretation. But it does not follow that the instruments were entirely silent during the singing of the choir. They may have been supplying an accompaniment, and at the sign 'Selah' may have been meant to play alone, perhaps louder than previously. It is not likely that the instruments were restricted to these interludes in the singing. The Hebrews had little knowledge of music save as an accompaniment to the voice. Musical instruments were to them pre-eminently 'instruments of song' (1 Ch 16⁴², 2 Ch 7⁶ 34¹², Am 6³, Neh 12²⁷).

It is a point of dispute whether there were any women among the Temple musical staff. One or two passages seem to favour the positive. Ezr 2⁶⁵ and Neh 7⁶⁷ speak of singing women among the returned exiles. According to 1 Ch 25⁴, Heman had three daughters who with their brothers were instructed for song in the house of the Lord. And in Ps 68²⁵ the damsels with timbrels are described as taking their place among the singers and players. But it is not said in Ezr 2⁶⁵ and Neh 7⁶⁷ that the female singers there mentioned belonged to the Temple musicians, who have already been mentioned earlier in these chapters. And the verse in Ps 68 describes, not a Temple service, but a religious procession. This leaves only the reference to the daughters of Heman. In view of the general tendency of the post-Exilic cultus to exclude women from office, we should require fuller evidence to convince us of the fact that they had any recognized place on the musical staff of the second Temple.

6. Character of Hebrew music.—We have no data upon which to base any conclusions as to the essential character of the music of the Hebrews. We do not know, e.g., what was the nature of the scale or scales which it employed, or what the structure of its melodies. The Hebrews do not appear to have had any system of musical notation.

It has been suggested that we may find such notation in the Hebrew accents; but there is no evidence that these had any musical significance, or served any other than a rhetorical purpose (cf. Forkel, *Gesch. der Musik*, i. 152 ff.). Some of the superscriptions of the Psalms appear to contain musical directions, and, were we certain of their significance, we might get more insight into the character of Hebrew music. For instance, some have thought to find in the direction 'Upon Sheminith' (Pss 6. 12, 1 Ch 15²¹), which they translate 'in the octave,' proof that the Hebrews had, like ourselves, a scale of seven steps. That translation might be accepted, were we satisfied on other grounds of the employment of such a scale among the Hebrews. But, apart from independent proof, it is quite unjustifiable to assign this interpretation to the phrase, and base upon it a conclusion as to the nature of the Hebrew scale. The words might mean various other things—e.g., the kind of instrument to be employed, one with eight strings, or the musical mode to be chosen, the eighth. Probably there were various modes in use among the Hebrews, as with the Greeks. Some of the other superscriptions have been taken as indicating that a certain mode is to be employed—e.g., Pss 8. 81. 84, 'Upon Gittith,' which may be a mode called after Gath (Ewald, *op. cit.* p. 223), Ps 9, 'Upon Muth-labben,' Ps 56, 'Upon Jonath-elem-rechokim,' Ps 57, etc., 'Al-taschith,' in which cases we seem to have the opening words of songs which indicate either the melody or the mode to be employed. But the whole question of the superscriptions of

the Psalms is very obscure, and there is so little unanimity among scholars as to their significance that we can draw no conclusions from them as to the character of Hebrew music. From what we know of the music of kindred peoples we shall probably not be far wrong in concluding that Hebrew song was more or less a kind of musical declamation to a chant consisting of a few notes within moderate compass, the accompanying instruments being employed mainly in marking the rhythm. There is no evidence that the Hebrews had any knowledge of harmony. Their musical performances, both vocal and instrumental, would be all in unison. Some would cite 2 Ch 5¹³, 'the trumpeters and singers were as one, to make one sound to be heard,' as direct evidence to this effect. One might as well assign a technical musical significance to Chaucer's description of the singing of the birds, 'al of oon accorde.' The phrases in Chronicles are designed to indicate the unanimity of the performance. To regard them as proof of unison performance in the technical sense is to attribute to the writer an acquaintance with harmony, while at the same time we quote his words to prove that Hebrew music had no harmony. Probably the Temple music was, at first, at any rate, of a very noisy character. The root idea of the Hebrew verb 'to praise,' from which the word for 'psalm' is derived, is 'to make a noise,' and Cheyne finds a hint of 'the humble origin of the Hebrew *t'hillah*' ('psalm') in the shouting of the Arabs as they enter the sanctuary (*op. cit.* pp. 194, 460). To make a loud noise to Jahweh appears to have been the prominent feature in the Hebrew conception of praise. In La 2⁷ the noise made by the Chaldean soldiery in the Temple is compared to the sound of the worshippers at some festival.

7. Musical instruments.—The Hebrews had a variety of musical instruments. Almost no information is given in the Bible as to their construction or use, nor have any contemporary representations of them been preserved. But there are many such representations of the instruments in use among the neighbouring Oriental peoples to be found among the Egyptian, Assyrian, and Babylonian monuments, and we may safely assume that the instruments of the Hebrews were not essentially different. The instruments mentioned in the Bible fall into three groups: (i.) instruments of percussion, (ii.) wind instruments, and (iii.) stringed instruments.

i. INSTRUMENTS OF PERCUSSION.—These mark the rhythm, and would probably be first in the order of development, the rhythmical element in music being the feature which makes the strongest appeal to the primitive mind. The following are the instruments of percussion mentioned in the OT.

(a) The *tōph* (תוף, 'tabret' or 'timbrel,' LXX *τύμπανον*), a kind of hand-drum formed of a frame of wood with a piece of skin stretched over it. The usual shape is circular, but occasionally on the monuments we meet with a square shape also. It was struck with the back of the hand or with the fingers, and was usually played by women. It was employed on occasions of rejoicing, and served to mark the rhythm for song or dance, or for the other instruments. It does not appear to have been used in the Temple worship, but in religious processions it had its place (2 S 6⁵, Ps 68²⁵ 149³).

(b) The *mēsillatim* (מְסִילִים) or *selselim* (סִלְסִלִים), a term which occurs only in 2 S 6⁵, Ps 150⁵, 'cymbals,' LXX *κύμβαλα*. These were made of brass (1 Ch 15¹⁰) and were similar in shape to those in use among ourselves. They were reserved chiefly for religious purposes, and were used in the Temple worship by

the conductor to give the beat to the performers (1 Ch 15¹⁹ 16⁵). In Ps 150⁵ some have thought to find in the twofold designation of the cymbals (*šilšēl-shāma*, *šilšēl-thēru'ah*, 'loud cymbals,' 'high sounding cymbals,' AV) a distinction between two different kinds of instrument, regarding the former as castanets and the latter as ordinary cymbals. But it is questionable whether the distinction is more than a rhetorical device, and, even if this be not the case, whether *šilšēl-shāma* is a fitting designation of castanets.

(c) The *mēnā'anīm* (מְנַאֲנִים), which are mentioned in 2 S 6⁵, rendered 'cornets' in AV, 'castanets' in RV, and in RV marg. properly *sistra*. The *sistrum* was a kind of rattle, consisting of a handle supporting an oval metal frame, through which ran a number of cross bars with projecting ends, upon which rings of metal were placed. When the instrument was shaken, these rings jangled. The *sistrum* was derived from Egypt, where it was used in the worship of Isis.

(d) The *shālīshīm* (שָׁלִישִׁים). We meet with this term only in 1 S 18⁶. What instrument is meant is uncertain. AV and RV render merely 'instruments of music,' AV marg. 'three-stringed instruments,' RV marg. 'triangles or three-stringed instruments,' LXX κύμβαλα. The etymology suggests an instrument in triangular form, but whether a small triangular harp similar to the Greek *τρίγωνον* or a triangle such as we still have in our orchestras is uncertain. There is no representation of the triangle as an instrument of percussion in the ancient Oriental monuments.

ii. WIND INSTRUMENTS.—(a) The *hālāl* (הָלַל) or 'flute.' We meet with several varieties of flute on the ancient monuments, single flutes, double flutes, flutes with mouth-pieces, cross-flutes, flutes varying in length and in the number of the finger-holes. We have no means of deciding which of these were in use among the Hebrews. The flute was employed by them on various occasions: at feasts (Is 5¹²), at marriages (1 Mac 3⁴⁵), on occasions of mourning (Jer 48³⁸, Mt 9²³; Josephus, *BJ* III. ix. 5), in religious processions (1 K 1⁴⁰, Is 30²⁹). There is difference of opinion as to whether flutes were employed in the Temple service in OT times. If *nēhīlōth* in the superscription of Ps 5 be, as maintained by some recent commentators, another term for flutes, this would be strong evidence as to their use. But the interpretation of the term is very obscure. By the time of the Talmud, at any rate, they had a recognized place in the daily service. On twelve days in the year a flute was played before the altar to accompany the singing of the Hallel.

(b) The *ugāb* (עֻגָב). Some think that this term denotes 'wind instruments' in general. Where it is taken as signifying one instrument in particular, opinion is divided between the 'bagpipe' and the 'syrinx.' We meet with these two instruments in the list given in Dn 3⁵, the *šumphōniāh* (שֻׁמְפוֹנִיָּה, AV 'dulcimer') being generally taken to be the bagpipe, and the *mashrōkīthā* (מַשְׁרוֹקִיתָה, AV 'flute') the syrx or Pan-pipe. Neither of these instruments is mentioned in connexion with religious worship.

(c) The *shōphār* (שׁוֹפָר) or *keren* (קֶרֶן), 'horn,' was made of a ram's horn, and hence was crooked in shape, though in later times it appears to have been straightened. Its loud tone made it useful for giving signals. Thus it was used in war to summon the army (Jg 3²⁷), to give the signal of attack (Job 39²⁴) or of withdrawal (2 S 2²⁸), to announce important events—e.g., the ascension of the king (1 K 1³⁹), the approach of danger (Am 3⁶), the beginning of the year of Jubilee (Lv 25⁹), the New Year festival on the first day of the seventh month (Lv 23²⁴). The blowing of the *shōphār* on New Year's Day still remains an outstanding feature of the celebration in the Jewish Synagogue.

(d) The *hāšōšērah* (חֲשׁוֹשֶׁרֶת), 'trumpet,' is described by Josephus (*Ant.* III. xii. 6). It was made of metal, was not quite a cubit long, somewhat thicker than a flute, widening at the mouth to receive the breath, and bell-shaped at the lower end like the war trumpet. Like the *shōphār*, it was occasionally used to give the alarm (2 K 11¹⁴). It is seldom mentioned in the earlier history, but in later times it was appropriated to ecclesiastical use, and the blowing of it became the exclusive privilege of the priests. Trumpets were usually played by themselves, though occasionally we find them combined with other instruments (2 Ch 5¹²). Blasts of the trumpets were intercalated at various points in the daily service.

iii. STRINGED INSTRUMENTS.—Throughout the OT, with the exception of the book of Daniel, only two stringed instruments are mentioned, the *kinnōr* (כִּנּוֹר) and the *nebel* (נֶבֶל). In ancient times stringed instruments were played either with the hand or with a plectrum, the use of the bow being as yet unknown. We read of the *kinnōr* being played with the hand (1 S 16²³ 18¹⁰ 19⁹), and there is no express mention of the plectrum in the OT. But we are hardly justified in concluding that it was not in use among the Hebrews. The frame of the instruments was made of wood, and the string of gut, sometimes of twisted thread. The stringed instruments were those most generally in use among the Hebrews. Their music was of a bright character, and we find them present on occasions of festivity, at feasts (Is 5¹²), at domestic celebrations (Gn 31²⁷), at festal processions (1 S 10⁵, 2 S 6⁵), and the like. On occasions of mourning the sound of their music is silent (Is 14¹¹, La 5⁴, Job 30³¹). In their grief the exiles in Babylon hang their lyres on the willow trees (Ps 137³). Stringed instruments were used chiefly to accompany singing (1 K 10¹²). Hence they played a most important part in the music of the Temple, constituting, in fact, the main body of the orchestra (1 Ch 16⁶, Ps 33² 57⁸ 150⁴ etc.). Of the two instruments the *kinnōr* appears to have been the more popular. It was in the hands of all classes. The shepherd lad played upon it (1 S 16¹⁶), the harlot sang her songs to it (Is 23¹⁶), it was used on occasions of merry-making (Job 21¹²), mingling with joyful song and sound of the tabret (Gn 31²⁷). Scriptural allusions to the *nebel* mostly refer to its use in religious worship. But we do occasionally meet with it in scenes of revelry (Is 5¹², Am 6⁵). Whether the prophetic denunciations of such convivialities are to be taken as implying a reproof for the profanation of the sacred instrument (Weiss, *Die musikalischen Instrumente in den heiligen Schriften des AT*, p. 22; E. C. A. Riehm, *Handwörterbuch des biblischen Altertums*², Bielefeld, 1893-94, 1030ab) is open to doubt.

We are not in a position to decide with certainty as to the shape and character of the *kinnōr* and the *nebel*. *Kinnōr* (AV and RV 'harp') is usually rendered by the LXX *κithára* or *κινύρα*, on five occasions by *ψαλτήριον*, and once by *ὄργανον*. *Nebel* (AV and RV usually 'psaltery,' occasionally 'viol,' Is 5¹² RV 'lute') appears as *νάβλα* in certain books and as *ψαλτήριον* (once *ψαλύς*) in others. If the evidence of the LXX is of any weight, then we must regard the *kinnōr* as a kind of lyre. According to Josephus (*Ant.* VII. xii. 3), the *κινύρα* is a ten-stringed instrument with twelve notes, played with the fingers. It is expressly stated in the book of Samuel that David played the *kinnōr* with the hand. It is perhaps pressing the language unduly to insist that he did not use a plectrum (see editor's note, Wellhausen, in *PB*, 'Psalms,' p. 223). Whether Josephus is right or not in his contention as to the use of the fingers for the *kinnōr*, his statement regarding the number of

strings of the *nebel* is not in accordance with Ps 33² 92³ 144⁹, where we read of a ten-stringed *nebel*. The Greek and Latin Fathers find the distinction between *kinnōr* and *nebel* in the position of the resonance-box, in the former beneath and in the latter above the strings. This description of the *kinnōr* would apply to instruments of the lute family as well as of the lyro, the resonance-box in both types of instrument being beneath the strings. But against the identification of the *kinnōr* with the lute may be urged the fact that there is no evidence on the monuments of the use of the latter instrument among Semitic peoples, and the unlikelihood of Greek writers who were familiar with the *κithάρα*, or lyre, using the term to designate an instrument of an entirely different character. If we regard the *kinnōr* as an instrument of the lyro type, it is probable that the *nebel* was a kind of harp. We read of its being played as one marched along. It must then have been much smaller than the harp represented on the Egyptian monuments, which one played kneeling or standing. There is an Assyrian harp seen on the bas-reliefs which we may well conceive to have been somewhat similar to the Hebrew *nebel*. It is triangular in shape; above there is a curved frame which acts as the resonance-box, and below there is a horizontal bar or bridge, between which and the upper frame the strings are stretched. It is played with both hands without a plectrum. As we have said, we have no certain evidence upon which to base in attempting the identification of the two stringed instruments familiar to the Hebrews; but, if we are to decide upon any at all, we incline to instruments of the lyre and the harp type.

In addition to the stringed instruments to which we have referred, there is another mentioned in Dn 3³, the *sabbekkhā* (שַׁבְּכָה, LXX σαββύκη, AV and RV 'sackbut'). The sackbut was a kind of trombone, but the *sabbekkhā*, if we are to identify it with the Greek σαββύκη, was a stringed instrument introduced into Greece from the East. It appears to have been a small harp, not unlike the *τρυβανον* in shape and tone, and among the Greeks it was generally played by Oriental women.

LITERATURE.—A full list of the older literature will be found in J. N. Forkel, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Musik*, Leipzig, 1783–1801, I. 173 ff. In addition to the articles on the subject in the histories of music, the text-books on Hebrew archaeology, and the Bible dictionaries, the following may be mentioned: J. L. Saalschütz, *Geschichte und Würdigung der Musik bei den alten Hebräern*, Berlin, 1829; G. H. A. von Ewald, *Die Dichter des alten Bundes*, Göttingen, 1835 ff., I. 209 ff.; F. Deltzsch, *Physiologie und Musik*, Leipzig, 1868, *Bibl. Comm. über den Psalmen*, do. 1883, p. 25 ff., Eng. tr., London, 1887–89, I. 39 ff.; H. Graetz, 'Die Tempel-psalmen', *Monatshefte*, 1878, pp. 217–222, 'Die musikalischen Instrumente im Jerusalemlischen Tempel und der musikalische Chor der Leviten', *ib.*, 1881, pp. 241–259; E. Schürer, *HJP* II. i. 270 ff.; J. Weiss, *Die musikalischen Instrumente in den heiligen Schriften des Alten Testaments*, Graz, 1895; J. Wellhausen, Appendix on 'Music of the Ancient Hebrews', in *PE*, 'Psalms', London, 1898; J. Köberle, *Die Tempelänger im Alten Testament*, Erlangen, 1899; A. Büchler, 'Zur Geschichte der Tempelmusik und der Tempel-psalmen', *ZATW* XIX. [1899] 96–133, 329–344, XX. [1900] 97–135; T. K. Cheyne, *Origin of the Psalter* (BL, 1889), London, 1891; W. R. Smith, *OTJC*, do. 1892; J. Stainer, *Music of the Bible*, do. 1914.

G. WAUCHOPE STEWART.

MUSIC (Indian).—i. Introduction.—A great deal more is generally known of Hindu religion than of Hindu music. An account of the connexion between the two would be incomplete without an attempt to convey to the reader some idea of what Hindu music is.

The first thing one has to grasp is the immense antiquity of the art of music. The systems now flourishing in India and China have been transmitted without material change for so many centuries that we can point to no date as marking an advance or dividing one art period from another.

Of ancient Greek musical art the notation has been preserved, and we are able to piece together the actual scales upon which the music was founded. Beyond this, there are the writings of theorists, which do not always agree with one another, and a few relics in the shape of hymns with their notation. We can gather from the evidence available that the Greek and Hindu systems were elaborated on slightly divergent lines from a common source, and for that source we must look back far beyond the time when either Greek or Indian civilization came into existence.

A close parallel may be drawn between the theories of Aristoxenus (350–320 B.C.) and of Bharata, the earliest Hindu writer on music. Although the latter's treatise, the *Nāṭya Śāstra*, was written in the 5th cent. A.D., the system which it describes probably dates back many centuries before that time. Neither Aristoxenus nor the originator of Indian theory, whoever he may have been, could have had any accurate knowledge of partial tones. In attempting to formulate a classification of intervals they both took as their unit the smallest perceptible difference of pitch; to Aristoxenus this was known as the smallest enharmonic diesis, and to the theorist of India as the interval of one *śruti*. It is obvious that one cannot accept theories founded upon such a basis as literally accurate. The *śruti*, or diesis, cannot be regarded as a unit for the measurement of intervals. It is, however, a good working terminology to designate the just semitone as the interval of two *śrutis*, the minor tone as three *śrutis*, and the major tone as four *śrutis*. In drawing a marked distinction between the major tone and the minor tone the Indian theorist showed greater perspicacity than either Aristoxenus or Pythagoras. The Indian theorist had this advantage, however, that he confined his attention to the plain diatonic genus, instead of ranging over all possible 'colourings' of chromatic and enharmonic. Had the ancient theorists of Greece or India known of partial tones, they would have explained their intervals by working down from the greater to the less; as it is, we cannot be surprised at their attempting to synthesize them from the diesis or *śruti*.

2. Modes.—The world's earliest music was modal.

To obtain a rough idea as to what is meant by mode let us take a simple melody such as 'God save the King,' beginning on the note C with a pedal bass on the C an octave below, and play the air successively as modified by a key signature of one sharp, without sharps or flats, with one flat, two flats, three flats, four flats, and five flats. The result would be more in keeping with the mode in each case if suitable changes were made in the melody. It will be seen from this that every complete parent scale gives seven modes differing widely from one another in 'ethos.' If, instead of tempering the three chief major triads C E G, G B D, F A C, upon which the C major scale is based, we tune them in natural or just tuning, that is to say, without beats, we shall find that out of the five tones of the scale three are major and two minor. It will be found also that our parent scale can be made to assume four forms by varying the sequence of major and minor tones; the chief basis of the scale, the concord C E, will remain in every case; the three chords above-named will be present in some and absent in other forms of the scale.

With his usual thoroughness in point of classification, the Indian theorist noted these possibilities and grouped his parent scales under the category of *grāmas*. Let the figures 2, 3, and 4 denote the intervals of 2, 3, and 4 *śrutis*; the just major scale of Europe may then be represented thus:

C4 D3 E2 F4 G3 A4 B2 C.

Indian modes in which the sequence of intervals was in the same order as in the just major scale, that is, 4 3 2 4 3 4 2, or 3 2 4 3 4 2 4, or 2 4 3 4 2 4 3, etc., were said to be in the *madhyama grāma*. The other important *grāma* was the *śadja grāma* in which the order was 4 3 2 4 4 3 2, 3 2 4 4 3 2 4, etc. The corresponding C major scale would be

C4 D3 E2 F4 G4 A3 B2C. Here A is in tune not with F and C but with D.¹ The Indians did not regard the scales 3 4 2 3 4 2 and 3 4 2 3 4 2 as separate *grāmas*, as they could be formed chromatically from the *śaḍja* and *madhyama grāmas* (a chromatic change is effected by substituting 42 for 24). The Hindus use a tonic sol-fa system in which *sā, ri, ga, ma, pa, dha, ni, sā* take the place of *do, re, mi, fa, sol, la, si, do*, with this difference, that the same terminology is used whatever the mode may be.

Thus the bass note of the drone is always *sā*, and the second note of the mode is always sung as *ri*, whether it is a semitone, minor tone, or major tone above *sā*. To revert to our illustration of the formation of the modes by alteration of the key-signature, C would always be *sā*, and D, whether flat or natural, would still be *ri*. With a little careful study the table on p. 46 will give an idea of the scales of some of the representative modes of Indian music.

3. Main features of Indian music.—The musical instruments of ancient times, some of which have survived to the present day in India, were of poor tonal quality compared with those of modern Europe. The voice is usually accompanied by drums tuned to *sā*, and by the *tamburā*, a stringed instrument without frets, of rich and slightly nasal tone, which furnishes a drone consisting of *sā* and *pa*, or, occasionally, *sā* and *ma* if the mode requires it. The partial tones of this instrument are so powerful that it is a simple matter to sing the major third from the bass (known as *ga tīra*) in correct intonation. The four-*śruti ri* is also taken with the greatest of ease.

(a) *Rāgas and rāginīs*.—The Indian modes, owing to that genius for elaboration which the Hindu has shown in other arts, have been split up into a large number of melody-types known as *rāgas* and *rāginīs*. A *rāga* must begin with a certain note and end with a certain note, the melody must centre round a certain fixed note or pair of notes, certain well-defined melodic progressions must be prominently used, and the notes of the scale must be sounded in ascent and in descent according to fixed rules. The result is that composing a melody in a given *rāga* is like building a toy house out of bricks of a given pattern; improvisation is made easy. Each *rāga* has a specified time of the day at which it may be performed. Singers of the old-fashioned type are very strict on this point, and many are the traditions and superstitions which have gathered round the names of some of the *rāgas*. Thus the *rāga dipaka* (Skr. 'light' or 'illuminating') is not sung nowadays in Hindustan, as it is believed to entail terrible consequences to the singer. Hindu music, whether secular or religious, may be sung equally well by a Muhammadan or a Brāhman singer. If there is any difference of style perceptible, it may be said that the Muhammadan prefers music of a lighter as also of a more impassioned type, while the mood of the Hindu singer is more contemplative. The general feeling at a Hindu *jalsā*, or concert, favours music of a devotional or serious character.

(b) *Chants*.—The *sāman* chants of the Sāmaveda are the oldest extant music of the Hindus. The Hindu poet has always had at his disposal certain fixed chants or melodies which serve as moulds in which to fashion his song. Every metre has its own peculiar chant. Chants of this kind for religious hymns were known as *sāmans* and are mentioned in the Rīgveda. We may, therefore, conclude that the chants of the Sāmaveda are older than the Vedas themselves. We think that it can be demonstrated, however, that it is wrong to go further and regard the chant as the precursor of all music. The Sāmaveda gives directions as to rhythm corresponding closely with the practice of plain-song in Europe, coupled with signs to repre-

¹ A fifth to be in tune must contain 13 *śrutis*, and a fourth 9, a major third 7, and a minor third 6.

sent the *anudātta* ('not raised') and *svārīta* ('sounded'). More complete instructions are to be found in the *Brāhmaṇas* and in modern commentaries. It is quite clear that the chant made use of a complete tetrachord to represent the four chief positions of the voice known as *udātta* ('raised'), *anudātta* ('not raised'), *svārīta* ('sounded'), and *prachehāya* ('deep shadow,' precise meaning unknown, probably the same in pitch as the drum which invariably accompanies the chant). The intervals between the notes of this tetrachord and of other notes which may be added to it above and below are not now, and probably never were, rendered in the same manner throughout India. In this we can trace the workings of the 'Bharata mata' and 'Hanumant mata,' two rival schools of Indian music the origin of which is lost in antiquity. There is reason to believe that the musical systems of the 'Bharata mata' and 'Hanumant mata' were built up originally from pentatonic music.

4. Music and religion.—Hindu music is not merely the handmaid of religion, but an integral part thereof; it has grown up with the religion and has been subjected to the same influences. Thus the division into *rāgas* has its counterpart in the institution of castes, and *yoga* has affected music and religion alike. The Theosophical Society's treatise on *Thought-forms* (London, 1905) shows that there are people who entertain the belief that music has its mystical side, and that the impression which it conveys to the clairvoyant can best be described in terms of geometrical forms and ever-changing colour. For many centuries the belief has been held in India that each *rāga* has its appropriate picture. In old houses in Bengal a series of paintings of *rāgas* and *rāginīs* may frequently be seen adorning the walls, while numerous examples may be found in public and private collections outside India (cf. V. Smith, *Hist. of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1912).

Originally there were six *rāgas*, and each *rāga* had six *rāginīs*. Of the six *rāgas* five are said to have come from Śiva's mouth, and one from Pārvatī's. The names of the six *rāgas* are variously given; so far as can be ascertained, the Bengalis give the list as *bhairava* ('terrible'), *śrī* ('fortune,' 'beauty'), *megha* ('cloud'), *pañchama* ('fifth'), *vasanta* ('spring'), and *nāṭanārāyaṇa* ('dance of Viṣṇu'), while the musicians of Central India prefer *kauṭika* ('Kauṭika's *rāga*'), *hindola* ('swing'), and *dīpaka* ('light,' 'lamp') to the last three. It is worthy of note that of the nine *rāgas* named five are transilient and only four have complete scales of seven notes. The pictures of three of these *rāgas*—*śrī*, *nāṭanārāyaṇa*, and *bhairava*—are respectively the deities Lakṣmī, Viṣṇu, and Śiva. Lakṣmī is painted of a bright golden complexion, seated on a lotus, holding a lotus in one hand and a *chakra* (discus) in the other; Viṣṇu is repre-



Kinnara, from wall-painting.

SCALES IN INDIAN AND ENGLISH TONIC SOL-FA WITH SRUTI INTERVALS SHOWN BY DOTS.

Name of rāga.	0	100	200	300	400	500	600	700	800	900	1000	1100	1200	Name of grāma to which scale belongs.
<i>Bilaval</i> . . .	sā (d)	ri (r)	ga (m)	ma (f)	pa (g)	dha (l)	ni (t)	sā (d)	<i>Madhyama</i>					
<i>Kāfi</i> . . .	sā (r)	ri (m)	ga (f)	ma (t)	pa (l)	dha (t)	ni (d)	sā (r)	<i>Ṣaḍja</i>					
<i>Bhairavi</i> . . .	sā (m)	ri (f)	ga (t)	ma (l)	pa (t)	dha (d)	ni (r)	sā (m)	<i>Madhyama</i>					
<i>Yaman</i> . . .	sā (f)	ri (t)	ga (l)	ma (t)	pa (d)	dha (r)	ni (m)	sā (f)	<i>Madhyama</i>					
<i>Khamāj</i> . . .	sā (g)	ri (t)	ga (t)	ma (d)	pa (r)	dha (m)	ni (f)	sā (g)	<i>Ṣaḍja</i>					
<i>Jivanpuri</i> . . .	sā (t)	ri (t)	ga (d)	ma (r)	pa (m)	dha (f)	ni (g)	sā (t)	In other grāmas ; pa and ma being taken as consonant with sā, the ordin- ary grāmas are excluded.					
<i>Kṛtāḍa</i> . . .	sā (t)	ri (t)	ga (d)	ma (r)	pa (m)	dha (f)	ni (g)	sā (t)						

NOTE.—The vertical columns marked 100, 200, etc., show the relative position of the twelve semitones of equal temperament.

sented as of dark complexion, dressed in yellow, holding in one hand a club, in another the conch-shell, in the third the *chakra*, and in the fourth the lotus; Śiva is represented as dancing while the universe is being destroyed, beating time on his *ṅṇḍima* (a small drum shaped like an hour-glass), and apprising humanity by a blast on his horn that destruction is not annihilation, but merely a prelude to a new birth. Other connexions between representations of Hindu gods and the art of music may here be conveniently noted. Śiva is often pictured holding a *tamburā*, the instrument the drone of which is identified with the mystic syllable *om* (q.v.), which is also believed to be inherent in Viṣṇu's conch-shell and in his rapidly spinning *chakra*. Sarasvatī is generally represented with the



Kinnara, from wall-painting.

vinā, and Kṛṣṇa carries the *murali*, or Indian flute. The accompanying illustrations taken from wall-paintings in the Buddhist caves at Ajanta (200 B.C. to A.D. 600) show the conch and the *murali*.

5. **Musical knowledge.**—Until recent times the knowledge of music was strictly confined to hereditary musicians. In order that the *rāgas* should be kept pure, singers were taught to reverence them and to contemplate with closed eyes the picture of the *rāga* before attempting to sing it; and special short compositions were learnt by heart in which the distinguishing features of the *rāgas* were made



Wall-painting, Cave II.



Wall-painting in verandah, Cave XVII.

plain. Any one desirous at the present day of ascertaining the correct features of any *rāga* would turn to the *dhruvāda*,¹ the subject of which is invariably taken from the philosophy or the epics.

Latterly a change has come over the scene. As British sway has been extended, Court singers have been compelled to seek a livelihood in the native States which remain, or to lose touch with their old traditions. The general awakening of India has led to a desire on the part of the public for tuition in singing and playing. Musical education has been thrown open to the public and secularized, but the secrets of the 'Bharata māta' tuning have been withheld. Many Indian scholars have sought to grasp the problem of Indian musical theory, but with the means at their disposal it was impossible that they should succeed. In the British India of to-day many musical academies flourish, whose professors are entirely ignorant of the theory which they try to teach, and which grind out pupils who spread all over the land the vogue of the European harmonium, sometimes tuned in equal temperament, but often with no more tuning than is given by the graduated length of the vibrators as they come untouched from the hands of the manufacturers. On the Bombay side the popularity of the *saṅgīt* drama has further debased the music of this ancient land.

6. **Musical performances.**—Among religious and musical performances of a popular character at the present time may be mentioned the *kīrtan*, the *kathā*, the *bhajan*, and the chanting of the *Purāṇas*. The *kīrtan* in Bengal is generally confined to Kṛṣṇa and his amours, the performance being a combination of singing and chanting, generally accompanied by a drum. On the Bombay side no distinction is generally observed between the *kīrtan* and the *kathā*. The *kathēkārī* marks the time with two pieces of bamboo held between his fingers and clicked together; he marches up and down as he sings; he has a prompter to help him, and is accompanied by a drum mounted on a stand and of late years by the harmonium. His subjects are taken from the *Mahābhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The performance is held in the courtyard of a temple and is attended by people of both sexes, to whom the *kathēkārī* explains his meaning between the verses of his song. The *bhajan* differs more in method than in form from the *kīrtan* or *kathā*. It may

¹ For derivation and meaning see Fox Strangways, *The Music of Hindostan*, p. 286.

deal with any devotional subject, and is generally sung by several persons in unison, and the audience are encouraged to join in. There is no explanation between the verses. All these forms of religious song are generally simple, i.e. of the hymn type. Occasionally a *kirtan* singer will indulge in free fantasia (*karana*) in the middle of the hymn. When the *Purānas* are recited, the reciter sits on a plank with the *tulsi*-pedestal in front of him, upon which he places his sacred books. The performance begins with an invocation and a short period of contemplation; the *paurāṇik* then gives out his subject, and both recitation and explanation are thenceforth chanted. In some parts, such as Bengal, the *paurāṇik* has a drum behind him and blows occasionally upon a conch-shell.

Performances which take one back to pre-Aryan times are not unknown. The *gambhīrā* of Bengal is a dance and song in which topical subjects are dealt with, and which appears to be connected with the worship of evil spirits. Among the lower classes there is an annual ceremony at which, after a period of silence and contemplation, one of the assembly becomes inspired. He is called the *gājan sannyās*, and upon him devolves the duty of singing the *gājan* song, which is similar to the *gambhīrā*.

Bengal differs from the rest of India in stereotyping certain tunes according to the manner of Europe. The usual Indian custom is to keep the *rāga*, or melody-type, permanent, but to allow the feeling or caprice of the moment full play in the matter of the actual details of the melody. One Bengali tune is known as 'Bāñl'; it is sung by a special class of ascetics, and its burden is the transitory nature of human life. The tune, 'Rāmp-rasādi,' another favourite in praise of Durgā Devī, was composed in the 18th cent. by a devotee of the goddess named Rāmp-rasād.

To turn from the religious to the ethical aspect of the subject, it is to be observed that ballad singers and bards whose verses touch upon epic or historical and genealogical topics or draw lessons of a moral character from the facts of everyday life are known throughout the length and breadth of India. It

will be sufficient to describe a recent performance of Marāṭhī ballads, or *pawadas*. The performers consisted of a drummer, a player on the *chhatārī* (an instrument with one string which emits a drone), a cymbal player, a *jilkarī* (whose duty it is to fill the pauses with a prolonged 'ee' sound oscillating in quarter-tones above and below the note of the drone), and the chief performer, who sang the ballads, which were set to perfectly simple music. One of the ballads recounted the exploits of a famous robber who began his career of crime exasperated at the tyranny and dishonesty of the village *savehar* ('money-lender'). It suggests that extortion has been encouraged by a strong government which enforces the decrees of the civil courts, and that the Mārwarīs have become so filled with pride that they may be described as having grown three tufts of hair (*shendi*) on the crown of the head in place of one. Another ballad recalled to mind the fables of La Fontaine, and pointed the moral that a friend in need is a friend indeed.

That view of life which distinguishes between what is sacred and what is secular was altogether foreign to the India of yesterday. Religious observances accompanied the smallest details of daily life, and music and religion went hand in hand. Nowadays many parts of India are coming under the sway of commercialism, and as a sign of the change which has supervened we may instance the fact that the *sūtradhāra*'s invocation to the deity at the commencement of a drama is frequently omitted. The *sūtradhāra*, or professional dramatic singer, is indeed not often to be seen. Singing parts are given to ill-trained boys, and, to fortify or even drown their voices when it is necessary to disguise a defective knowledge of the scale, one or two harmoniums and a set of drums which are vigorously banged are placed in front of the stage.

Explanation of bhajans.—*Intonation.*—The correct intonation will be obtained on a keyed instrument by tuning the keys of C major and D flat major as just major keys.

Time.—The figures 1, 2, 3, 4 show the four parts of the measure. The chief beat is at 1, the medium at 2 and 4, and the weak (or silent beat) at 3. There is no secondary beat at the middle of the bar as in 2/4 time.

Rāga.—Both *bhajans* are in a corrupt form of *rāga*.

BHAJAN I.

Raga—Jīvanpurī

Tālā—Trivat

Drone.


3 REFRAIN.

4

1

2

glide




Ko — na kha — ba — ri — yā — lo — ha — mā — ri —



bi — nā Rā — — ma Ra — ghu — nā — — tha da — yā — — gha — na —



Bha — va du — kha bhan — ja — na ja — na ma — na — ran — — — ja — na



vā — — ko kha — ba — ra ka — ra de — — — ha — mā — ri — —

TRANSLATION: Refrain, 'Who but Rāma Raghunāth the merciful will take care of me?'

1st verse, 'The dispeller of Life's ills, enchanter of the mind, of Him give me tidings.'

(The three remaining verses are omitted.)


BHAJAN II.

Rāga—Vasant

Tālā—Trivat

Drone.

REFRAIN. 3 4 1 2



TRANSLATION: Refrain, 'The good days are rolling past. O my soul, remember the name of Rāma, and cast away all desires connected with the world. When you depart from this material world, not a piece will go with you. As we sow so shall we reap.'

1st verse, 'You have been through a lac and eighty-four lives, by good luck you have a man's body, in which you have done no good works. When the fight with Yama begins, then shall you feel repentance.'

(Remaining three verses omitted.)

LITERATURE.—W. Jones, 'On the Musical Modes of the Hindus,' *Asiatick Researches*, iii. [1786] (reprinted in Jones's *Works*, London, 1807, iv. 166 ff.); A. H. Fox Strangways, *The Music of Hindostan*, Oxford, 1914; A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Essays in National Idealism*, Colombo, 1909; S. M. Tagore, *Six Principal Rāgas*, Calcutta, 1877, *Eight Principal Rasas of the Hindus*, do. 1880, *The Seven Principal Musical Notes of the Hindus, with their presiding Deities*, do. 1892, and *Universal History of Music*, do. 1896; Erwin Felber, *Die indische Musik der vedischen und der klassischen Zeit*, Vienna, 1912; Maud Mann, 'Some Indian Conceptions of Music,' *Proceedings of the Musical Association*, 1911-12; C. R. Day, *The Music and Musical Instruments of Southern India and the Deccan*, London, 1891; Bhavanrav A. Pingle, *Indian Music*, Bycalla,

1898; E. Clements, *Introd. to the Study of Indian Music*, London, 1913. E. CLEMENTS.

MUSIC (Japanese).—1. Origin and history.—Native Japanese music finds its origin in prehistoric, mythological times. According to tradition, the offended sun-goddess hid herself in a cave so that the world became dark; then myriads of the gods, seeking to propitiate her, enacted amusing scenes before the cave, and the goddess Uzume danced and sang. Dressed in strange fashion, and playing

on the cords of six bows, she danced to the time of her singing, so that all the gods burst into laughter and the floor of heaven shook. Thereupon the sun-goddess in wonder opened the door of her cavel, and the world again grew light.

Approaching the period of actual history, the first emperor, Jimmu, is said to have sung songs of his own composition for the consolation and cheer of his soldiers upon the field of battle, words and music alike being original.

In primitive times also there was a dance called *utagaki*, in which hundreds of men and women moved in ranks in time to music. Unlike many Western dances, the movement was slow and solemn, the dancers executing the figures singly, not in couples. A vestige of this dance may be found in the still extant *bon-odori* as performed in country districts.

In the reign of Kimméi (A.D. 560) and of Suiko (A.D. 612) Chinese music, *kuregaku*, was brought to Japan through Korea; and from that time both music and dancing increased in popularity. About A.D. 700 the court established an imperial bureau of music with an official and many subordinates, those connected with it numbering perhaps over four hundred.

The old indigenous music, called *ôuta*, continued to be used at all grave and serious meetings of the court; and the old songs, *kumemai* and *azuma mai*, were sung at the *Dai josai*, or great harvest festival, held upon an imperial accession to the throne, whilst Chinese and Korean music was associated with Buddhist ceremonies and services, and with the more private gatherings of the court circle.

In the reign of Shomu (about A.D. 724) Indian abtots came to Japan and introduced the music of India to such effect that the old native forms gradually gave place to the more delicate foreign styles; and the *saibara* songs, once popular only among the common people, became favourites in court circles as well.

From the reign of Enyu (A.D. 970) and Kwazan (A.D. 985) famous Japanese and Chinese poems became current as songs sung in irregular time; and from the reign of Goshirakawa (A.D. 1156) *imayô*, of more modern style, in $\frac{3}{4}$ time, became popular.

The music introduced from China and Korea, slightly modified to suit Japanese taste, was long used in the court and on occasions of ceremony, suffering at times the vicissitudes of fashion; and the musical profession came to be regarded as hereditary with the descendants of those Koreans who first brought it into the country. Even to the present era of Taishô more than ten musicians of the court are their descendants, and the late Empress Dowager was especially fond of this music, frequently summoning before her those skilled in its production.

2. Musical instruments. — The playing of the *biwa*, a four-stringed instrument resembling the violin, by blind men became a custom as far back as A.D. 984; and their singing of *heike*, war-stories of the Hôike family, began in the reign of Gotoba (A.D. 1184) and continued to be popular even until the latter part of the Meiji era.

During the Middle Ages popular entertainments among the peasant class included the playing of the flute and the drum, together with dancing, rope-walking, sword-swallowing, and fire-spitting. From these crude amusements may have originated the *dengaku* and the *sarugaku*, which a little later developed into the original forms of the *nôgaku* and the *yôkyoku*, which are still popular. In the performance of this music, drums, both large and small, long hand-drums beaten with the fingers, and the flute are used as an accompaniment to

song, the whole slightly resembling Western opera.

The *kyôgen*, developed from the more comic *sarugaku*, is associated with the more serious *nôgaku*. Both were popular in *samurai* families. At the beginning of the Meiji era, through the abolition of the Bushi class, these forms suffered decline; but by the middle of that era, through the patronage of the court, they recovered their standing, and are now much favoured both by the nobility and by the common people.

In modern times the music of the common people has been largely confined to the *samisen*, a three-stringed instrument developed in modification of a two-stringed instrument introduced from Loohoo Islands. Its resonance-box is made of cat-skin, and its strings can be pitched as in the violin, while a plectrum is used instead of a bow. It is easily played, and its timbre and tone are very clear and penetrating. It is the king of musical instruments in Japan. The *samisen* is not used in connexion with the *nôgaku*, but is the chief instrument in the rendering of *jôryû*, *nagauta*, *tokiwazu*, etc. A small *samisen*, called *kokyû*, was played with a bow; but its use is gradually being forgotten in spite of the fact that its tones were very sweet.

The *chikushigoto*, which is also called *koto* for short, is a sort of harp with thirteen silk strings over a large resonance-box. It is a development of the *koto* used in the classical music. Since about A.D. 1650, when a blind man named Yatsushirô composed dozens of new *koto* songs, this *chikushigoto* has been regarded as more refined and elegant than the *samisen*, and in consequence has been much used by the upper classes. Now, however, it holds a place of importance in the music of all classes.

3. Characteristics of Japanese music. — Japanese music may be roughly divided into two classes: classical and modern; the former is used in ceremonies of the court and the latter in more popular ways. Each consists of five tones; but, as there are some differences between ascending and descending intervals, flats and sharps occasionally occur, so that the actual number of tones is increased to six or seven.

The classic scale had its origin in China, and was introduced into Japan through Korea. It has two scales, called *ryo* and *ritsu*. The derivation of the *ryo* scale is not unlike that of the Pythagorean scale, and is as follows:

A sound produced by a long string of the length '1' is regarded as the fundamental tone, and a sound produced by $\frac{2}{3}$ 1 as the fifth, and that of $\frac{3}{4}$ 1 as the second. Thus, by starting from the fundamental tone the following scale will be obtained by raising it to the fifth and lowering the latter to its fourth and so on alternately.

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

Besides these five sounds, if we add $\frac{3}{2}$ 1, $\frac{4}{3}$ 1, which are occasionally used, we have seven sounds as follows:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

c, d, e . . . being given, we can make a comparison with the natural scale; but a difference of about one comma, as in the case of the Pythagorean scale, is found when we compare the vibrating number with the exact natural scale.

In a similar manner the *ritsu* scale is found to be

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 99



stringed instrument, may be taken as an illustration.


The order of tuning is as follows:

Taking *e* as the fundamental tone and then descending to its fifth, *a* is fixed; from *a* the following *e* is fixed, and from *e* descending to its fourth *b* is fixed. These three tones can be exactly fixed, but the half-tone from *b* to *c* must be judged by ear only, and therefore it is hard to tell whether it is $\frac{11}{12}$ or $\frac{24}{25}$.

Westerners seeing this scale have often passed the hasty judgment that all modern Japanese music is based upon a minor scale (A minor in the diagram); but, when examined closely, the tonic is found to be never *a*, but in some tunes the melody ends in *e* and in others in *b*.

The music ending in *b* is an abnormal style. As among the ancient Greeks, it ends on the dominant instead of the tonic; but in homophonous music, as the tonic does not govern the harmony, this does not produce any peculiar impression. There

is difference of opinion concerning its scale, but Uyehara is probably right in the following:



(*∪* indicates a half-tone, — a whole tone, 0 the absence of tone).

The peculiarity of modern music is its recurring use of half-tones and of frequent modulations. Because of the modulations, the scale seems to consist of seven tones, but in reality there are only five, and the descending and ascending tones are the same as in the minor scale of Western music.

Ancient Japanese music was of course homophonous; but the music received from Korea and China, called *gagagu*, 'classical,' formed a harmonic orchestra, the instruments being the flute, the flute with reeds, fifteen pipes with reeds, the drum, the

An example of *ritsu* scale songs.



An example of modern scale songs.



long drum beaten on both sides, a metal instrument like a triangle, a four-stringed instrument like a violin, and an instrument with thirteen silk strings like a harp. It is interesting to note that they were able to tune those fifteen reeds to a uniform temperament.

Of course, this harmonic music was very primitive and simple. Japanese popular music is mostly homophonous, even when many different musical instruments are used together. Because of the absence of fixed keys, like those of the piano, there is no necessity for (musical) temperament. Even the *shakuhachi*, which has fixed holes, can be controlled by the fingers and lips, and pure tuning attained as with stringed instruments. In general, the Japanese seem to dislike tempered tuning.

Yet Western music has not been entirely rejected. Since the accession of the late emperor (1868) Western music has been adopted in the army and navy; and since 1882 the Department of Education and the Imperial Bureau of Music in the Household Department have included it. Thus it is coming to have an increasingly dominant influence. In view of the vulgar and immoral character of much Japanese popular music, since the beginning of the Meiji era music in the *ryo* and *ritsu* scales has been adopted in common education; and now the natural scale is coming to be used, so that it is possible that harmonic music will dominate in Japan; but, on the other hand, one cannot believe that the time will come when the people will abandon their old, popular music. As the music from China and India was received and gained a place by the more purely native type, so doubtless will the Western be received.

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HANICHI MURAOKA.

MUSIC (Jewish).—Art is the means by which man seeks to interpret the aspirations of the mind to the senses. The Jews appear in history already barred off by their rigid iconoclasm from the expression of feeling through the pictorial and plastic arts, nor had they settled habitation or surplus resources long enough to find such expression through the allied art of architecture. There remained only for this people the sister arts of poetry and music, in each of which they have contributed much to the treasure-store of civilization. But, little as Hebrew poetry has diverged from the original field of its art—the expression of religious emotion—even less has Jewish music, the forms and style of which had crystallized before the Jews came under the influence of modern musical development. This development reaches back only a few centuries; and the Jews have touched it only since their release from the Ghettos.

For the Biblical period see **MUSIC (Hebrew)**. It is probable that Jewish music at first displayed little original characteristic, being merely a provincial variety of the general art which spread, as the survivals show, from the Hellenic region to Dravidian India. It is evident from such allusions as those of Ps 137 that the Jewish musicians had a reputation beyond their own borders. The traditions of the First Temple were revived in the Second, if on a more modest scale. It is from the Hasmonean and Herodian epochs that we derive the Talmudic traditions of Temple music. The *shôphâr*, the rude bugle of ram's horn, sounded in conjunction with the straight silver trumpets as a signal for the Temple routine as well as in the intervals (*selah*) of the Psalm with

the daily sacrifice, is obviously the same instrument as is still sounded by the Jews on the Day of Memorial each September. Under the cymbal-beat (which took the place of the later cheironomy and the modern baton) of Ben Arsa, the last conductor, a small orchestra, resembling modern combinations more than anything else in antiquity, accompanied the Levitical singers, in the unison, with an occasional much-repeated melodic figure on the larger harps. The only thing approaching instrumental solo music, besides the blasts of the trumpets and horns, was a wailing flute melody, played twelve days a year before the altar. The last leader and trainer of the Temple choir was Hogras, whose described technical procedure confirms what analogy indicates, that the singing was nasal, shrill, and full alternately of intricate graces and of sudden pressures on emphatic notes, to an extent which would deprive it of melodious significance for a Western ear.

Yet this was the primal source of the music of the Diaspora, for, as R. Joshua ben Hananiah, himself a Levite and a chorister, afterwards told, the choristers went in a body on certain occasions from the altar to a synagogue within the Temple precincts, and sang in both services. The Synagogue took over from the Temple the silence of the women worshippers, the unison of boys and men in the singing, and its character as a cantillation rather than a melody—features still differentiating the worship-music of the Jew from that of his Western Christian neighbour. The dispersal of the Temple musicians made little difference, since it had been deliberately arranged that the voices could give adequate rendition without instruments. Though in the earlier centuries of the Diaspora many endeavours were made to check the Jewish tendency to songful utterance, no attention was paid to this ascetic principle where worship was in question. In those earlier centuries a desire is already evident to enhance the importance of song in worship. The officiant was required to have a clear enunciation and a pleasant voice, and the voluntary assistance of good vocalists in leading the chanting is repeatedly recorded with high approval. In prayer proper, 'Amen' and similar responses were all that the congregants added, and this was in a loud exclamation, without regard to tune or time. But the praises were, on the contrary, deliberately sung, at first in a responsive antiphony, to a chant possessing easily-remembered melodic features, and afterwards more and more in general unison; and the same rendition was followed as other passages beyond the Psalms and the earliest hymns were added to the ritual.

The intonations of the officiant known as the *zoreh* ('reader'), *sheliach shibbur* ('emissary of the congregation'), and later as the *hazzan* ('overseer,' originally rather a warden or beadle), were not tuneful in the modern sense. Among the Jews the desire to read the Scripture publicly in the manner described in Neh 8¹ had early resulted in all the proceedings in synagogue and school alike being carried on in a form of musical declamation. Early Jewish music, like much of their ritual music still, was cantillation, vocal movements depending not upon the rhythm and sequence of the sounds chanted, but upon the rhythm and sequence of the syllables to which they are chanted. In consequence, characteristically Jewish music, however melodious it may appear when sung with a text, loses its melodic meaning when played on an instrument.

The first portion of this antique cantillation to take definite shape was the intonation traditionally utilized for the reading of the Scriptural lessons. This was due to the early acceptance of the dia-

critical signs attached to the Biblical text as the Massoretic accentuation. A master of the 3rd cent. deprecates the ingratitude towards the Giver of their voice of such as 'read [the Scripture] without tunefulness and repeat [the Mishna] without chanting' (Talm. Bab. *Mcgillāh*, 32a; *Pesikta Rabbathi*, ed. M. Friedmann, Vienna, 1880, p. 127a; *Yalkut*, *Proverbs*, 932 [ed. Zolkiew, 1858]). Even the Mishna itself had diacritical points added for the chant later on; and a MS so pointed was available in the 15th century. The Talmud and the Codes are still studied in the academies of Jewry with a sing-song intonation, which is found considerably to assist in the prosodic comprehension of the unpointed text. Some such prosody or accent (both, of course, meaning 'singing to speech') was found necessary by all the ancients before the introduction of punctuation; and, precisely as with the plain-song of the Church, private *memoriae technicae* developed in the synagogue into a set system of accentuation and of musical interpretation of the accents.

The musical interpretation of the three 'poetical' books (Job, Psalms, Proverbs) has been lost since the 14th cent., the congregational recital of the Psalms having eventually turned the frequent repetition of an identical verse-accentuation into a fixed melody steadily recurring. But the 'prose' Scriptures (the remaining books) were recited by an individual; and here the accents are still followed in each case. From a very early period a musical principle has flourished in Jewish music, no doubt derived from the Babylonian art, as it still survives in the *rāga* of India. This is the specific association of some model melodic phrase, some particular mode or scale-form especially, with each mental attitude or an occasion associated with such sympathy. Not only is this principle in action in the interpretation of the Biblical accents, the same signs being sung on a similar melodic outline though in a different key or mode according to the occasion, but it also determines the 'prayer-motives' (as the writer terms the outlines of melody developed in chanting the devotions), which differ in tonality rather than in tune. All this is so reminiscent of the musical theory and practice of E. Asia, in Greek mode, Perso-Arab scale, and Indian *rāga*, that the writer would trace it back to the Temple, and see in the 'headings' of the Psalms, not bold shots of the Massoretes at a meaning, but geographical names (as in the Greek system, instruments tuned on which were actually in use in the Temple) of the respective scales in which the chief musician was to lead the rise and fall of intonation. This rise and fall was still found designated by the teacher's finger (the Greek *χεῖρουργία*) when Petahiah of Regensburg visited Baghdād synagogues in the 12th cent., and it has been quite recently noticed among Yemen Jews.

The Hebrew accents, like the *neums* of the Church plain-song, appear to have been originally rough diagrams of this movement of the teacher's finger. A trope (brief melodic phrase) is chanted on the tone-syllable marked by the accent, and the general reciting-note carries on to the next accented syllable. Here and there tropes are strongly reminiscent of similar phrases used in church or mosque, but in all the traditional uses this feature is prominent, that the outline of the trope varies not, whether according to the book being read or the service at which it is read, while the tonality, the mode or scale-form employed, does so vary.

The same modal feeling appears in the *hazzanuth*, or intonation of the prayers by the officiant. Here not only the well-known modes of the Church plain-song usually called Gregorian are utilized, but also others surviving only in the Byzantine

and Armenian Churches, as well as the Hungarian-Wallachian gypsy melody and the Perso-Arab system. Another very characteristic difference is the style of florid melodious improvisation which embroiders the outline traditional motive with elaborated vocal agility. The outline motives themselves, like the cantillation of Scripture, may have taken shape about the commencement of the mediæval period. But the intricate vocalization, which well-nigh fatally overlaid Jewish music later on, developed in recent centuries among the Jews of N. Europe, isolated in their Ghettos from the artistic awakening of the Western world. Only the last generation has seen the great work of reformation executed by the scholarly men, learned in modern music as in traditional Hebrew lore, who made the introduction of choral numbers into the Jewish services possible. And the tasteless, excessively florid style is not yet extinct; it flourishes among the Jews of E. Europe even when they migrate to Britain or America; and it is this vocal gymnastic which finds a large sale as 'Hebrew' gramophone records, and so is presented to the general world as the typical Jewish music.

The manner in which the traditional 'motive' (usually the concluding phrase of a prayer leading into a benediction with congregational response) is amplified into *hazzanuth* depends on the custom of the locality and the powers of the officiant, who accommodates the traditional strain to the structure of each sentence by embroidering it with melismatic ornament as the text suggests an emphasis warranting departure from the continuous reciting-note. No two transcriptions of this most characteristic Jewish music will therefore coincide in anything beyond tonality and broad outline of melody, becoming at last identical only in the fixed closing phrase of the passage. In the cantillation of Scripture, on the contrary, the earliest transcription printed (in J. Reuchlin, *De Accentibus*, Hagenau, 1518, bk. iii. *ad fin.*), when divested of quaint harmonization and reversal avowedly added by the transcriber, is found identical with the latest now in use in the synagogues.

At the same time, it is evident that the contemporaneous musical fashion of the outer world has been constantly finding its echo within Jewry. The adoption of the neo-Hebraic poetry in hymns for Jewish worship from the earliest mediæval days provided material for the imitation by Jews, or often direct utilization, of the folk-song of their European neighbours. From the 9th cent. these borrowed airs began to find their way into the synagogue, where they are still preserved, often with a Jewish flavour added in transmission. Such transmission has been, until quite recently, entirely oral. First came the chants for versicles, often strikingly similar to Gregorian intonations; then more definitely tuneful short melodies, quite a number of which were adopted by the Jews in Spain before 1492 and are still deservedly treasured among their descendants. Tunes of the Minnesinger period came into Jewish music with the increasing neo-Hebraic hymns of the later Middle Ages. In the 11th cent. in Spain, and in the 15th in Germany, allusion is made to the wideness of the practice of singing Jewish hymns, in synagogue and at home, to the tunes of secular folk-songs, even as was similarly done for the music of the Mass. Among the Spanish Jews the Hebrew text chosen often reproduced the opening words of the secular song to the same tune, as when the air of 'Señora' was sung to the hymn commencing 'Shem Nora' ('Name Sublime'). This resembles the change of the German drinking song, 'Innsbruck! I must leave thee,' into the hymn, 'World! I soon must leave thee.' Indeed, the very first

secular song of the many which Luther adopted for the tune of a chorale had already been so utilized by the German Jews for their still most popular hymn. A considerable number of the tunes occasionally used for domestic hymns have the name of the original song recorded. Those used in synagogue are of greater antiquity or, if of recent composition, usually by Jews trained in modern music.

From the 16th cent. on, and to a certain extent still, until the Jewish immigrants into emancipated lands become acclimatized, the stream westward of escape from the obscurantist conditions of E. Europe has coloured Jewish music with tints which differentiate it greatly from that of the modern world at large. Aspirants for positions as *hazzan*, or precentor, travelled about from congregation to congregation, bringing new melodies, synagogal or domestic, and fortifying and unifying the older traditional material. They even re-uscitated ancient Temple features, the accompaniment of the tenor by lads' voices in unison, while a bass hummed a figured re-inforcement below, the tenor adding runs and turns and grace-notes lavishly, supporting his jaw with his hand behind his ear like a London costermonger, or getting striking effects by inserting his thumb in his mouth, as did Hogras in the Temple (Talm. Bab. Yômā, 386) or the singers on the Nineveh slab depicting the capture of Susa.

The first musician, in the modern sense, who worked in Jewish music was Salomo de' Rossi, one of a school of Jewish masters who succeeded each other at the court of Mantua from 1542 to 1628. Leo of Modena induced other Italian Rabbis to join in a pastoral advocating the introduction of mensurate and polyphonic music into the synagogues. But little progress was made elsewhere until the Jewish Renaissance burst in Germany in the early 19th century. The progress since made has been rapid, and the Jew now officially utilizes all the wealth of scientific vocal music that his neighbour uses. But not instrumental: the organ has been made the test between 'orthodox' and 'reform'; and the instrument which was once objected to in the early Church as a form of 'Judaizing' is now considered by traditionalist Jews to introduce a 'Christianizing' tone into their own worship. Not even in Scotland has the 'kist o' whistles' been so wrangled about. Not that instrumental music is itself objected to; at Jewish weddings it has for ages been deemed indispensable, and ingenious stratagems are recorded in the Middle Ages to secure it in face of prejudice and persecution. The objection is to the use of any instrument needing tuning on the Sabbath, and to the introduction into Jewish worship of tones specially associated with the ritual of another creed.

Around the marriage ceremonies and the family table gathers the vast repertory of tuneful hymns and tender intonations which outside the synagogue ritual constitute Jewish music.

Transcriptions of the cantillation by the grammarians have been many, from Reuchlin onwards. Writers of instrumental music have transcribed many a tender Jewish air, strains having been even selected as subjects for orchestral writing. The greatest popularity to music presumably Jewish, though actually only to a small extent so, was given by Byron's *Hebrew Melodies* (1815), written for application to such airs in imitation of Moore's immensely successful *Irish Melodies*. In every country of Europe and in America collections of Jewish music, traditional and original, have appeared from the pens of precentors and choir-masters. The greatest of these precentors was S. Sulzer (Vienna, 1804-90), and of these choir-

masters L. Lewandowski (Berlin, 1823-94). De Sola, Hast, and Mombach, of London, Naumbourg of Paris, Consolo of Florence, also deserve mention; and especially A. Baer of Gothenburg, whose presentation of traditional Jewish intonations (Frankfort, 1878 and 1883) is monumental. Specimens are more easily available in E. Paner's *Traditional Hebrew Melodies* (London, 1896).

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
MUSIC (Muhammadan).—I. The chant.—In considering the subject of Muhammadan music, the attention of the student must primarily be drawn to the Arabic chant-song. The Arabs, as far back as their system of singing is known, always delighted in rhythm rather than in melody, following no fanciful system of tone-beats, but the natural quantity of their own syllables, from which they built their metre.

This phenomenon becomes apparent at once, if, quite apart from music proper, the metre of such characteristic Arabic poetry as the following stanzas be examined:

'La 'dmuka lida'a fāuqa 'lardi bāgi
wama tilmā 'i hādim gāru qātin
wala mimma fādhu 'lāhu wāgi
wadhābun fāuqahu 'aqdu 'inīdgi.¹

Here the art of the poet has grouped together words which are naturally so accented as to carry a distinct, although to our ear slightly irregular, metre. It was most easy and natural to intone such poems as these, and it was from inherent accentuation of this character that the chant-songs of the Arabs, scant indeed in melody, but strong in rhythm, originated. Melody in Muhammadan chanting is purely secondary to the rhythm of the language, and was really used only to avoid a too constant monotony. This will be at once apparent to any one who listens to a Muslim chanting his Qur'ān. Thus, the first accented stanza of the *Fatḥa* (the first *sūrah* of the Qur'ān)² should be

I.³



II.



¹ Extract from poems of Shaikh Nāṣif al-Yazīgi.

² 'In the name of God the Merciful and Gracious; thanks to God the Lord of worlds,' etc.




³ None of the following musical examples has been published before. These specimens with many others were collected by the writer from native singers and represent current musical style.

compared with the Yemeni cantillations (pls. I. and II.) in which, it will be observed, the voice-stress corresponds precisely with that of the spoken words as given above, while the melody—what there is of it—is strictly adapted to the natural accentuation.

The Arab, unlike the Turk and Persian, has no deep-rooted antipathy to monotony, which, coupled with the powerful metre of the Arabic language, tends to fascinate and almost to hypnotize rather than to weary the listener. The following *adhān* ('call to prayer') of the *muaddhins* of Yemen (pl. III.) will serve to illustrate how little the pure






III.

Ad libitum.



IV.

Ad libitum.



Arab cares for melodious variation. It will be noticed that the only departure from the monotony of the dominant tone is a roulade of five notes, from which the singer immediately hastens to return to the monotonous cantillation on the dominant. There are many airs to the *adhān*, differing according to locality, but they are all essentially identical in principle. The Baghdadī *adhān* (pl. IV.), given here, is perhaps a little less monotonous than the Yemeni call to prayer, and yet the same roulade, with only a slight variation, is heard in both these chants, and, in fact, is the prevailing form of variation in almost every *adhān* among the Muslim peoples, changes being made chiefly in the tempo of the roulade and occasionally in a chromatic. It should be noticed that the roulade always occurs on the stress syllable of the most important word. It is probable that this style of chant is much more ancient than Islām, and dates from the earlier polytheistic religious chant-songs of the Arabs.

2. The song proper. — Strictly speaking, the above specimens do not constitute Arab music in the true sense of the word. When Muhammad appeared in a vision to Dinawāri¹ and stated that music was an acceptable art, provided that the reading of the Qur'ān attended its performance, the intention was probably not to refer to mere cantillations like the above, but to genuine songs or musical declamations of poems. It is clear that implicit approval of beautiful singing is found in the Qur'ān, xxxi. 18: 'Verily, the least pleasing of voices is the voice of asses!' Furthermore, there are many allusions to real song-music in the interesting treatise of al-Ghazālī (D. B. Macdonald, *JRAS*, 1901, p. 200 ff.).² This Arabic author alludes to the importance of correct rhythm, referring with approval to the practice of beating time on the hand-drum. He also essays to derive music from the noises produced by animals, stating that the human throat is similar to the animal throat. It is quite evident that the better class of Arabic authors understood very well the effect of music on the human brain. Thus, Abu Sulaimān³ most astutely said that singing does not put into the heart what is not already in it, but merely stimulates to action what is already in the soul. Al-Ghazālī divides Arabian songs into seven categories, viz. (1) pilgrims' songs (religious); (2) war-songs, stimulating the faithful to holy warfare; (3) verses sung at the moment of attack, forbidden, however, to be sung in warfare with Muslims; (4) lamentations; (5) songs of joy; (6) love-songs; (7) songs expressive of religious ecstasy. With the characteristic Semitic tendency to classify, al-Ghazālī goes on to enumerate what is unlawful in connexion with musical performance, viz. pipes, stringed instruments, and the *kuba*⁴-drum. On the other hand, the tambourine, with or without bells, he regarded as perfectly permissible as an instrument of accompaniment. Blasphemous and obscene poetry was, of course, barred, and equally objectionable were verses describing the charms of any particular woman. Only descriptions of the most general nature were allowed, so that the listeners might apply such rhapsodies to their

¹ Dinawāri († 896) was the author of the *Long Narratives*, ed. V. Girgas, Leyden, 1888.

² Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Abu Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) was a distinguished Arabic philosopher and theologian. He was professor in the college of Nizām al-Mulk at Bagdad in 1091 and the author of about sixty-nine works (C. Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur*, i., Weimar, 1893, pp. 421-426, and D. B. Macdonald, 'The Life of al-Ghazālī,' in *JAOS* xx. [1899] 71-132).

³ Alluded to by al-Ghazālī; probably Abu Sulaimān al-Darānī of Syria, who developed the doctrine of gnosis (*ma'arifa*).

⁴ *Kuba* means 'cup,' 'bowl,' from the stem *kāb*. This must refer to some round pottery drum like the Egyptian *qarabaka*, distinct from the tambourine.

V.

$\text{♩} = 208.$

Yin-'am bi é.....

..... lén.....

..... il - ke - lām..... we'l 'al -

..... bi 'a..... si.....

dim.

..... We bes-si li.....

Kutr il - me-lām..... ma

dām..... ti ra - si ma

dām..... ti ra.....

si..... 'ill il - ke -

..... lām..... we ḥal-lil me -

lām..... w'aš -

..... rab mu-dām.....

in..... kun-ti..... sa - ḥi.....

ma lak u ma l'ah-lil ḡa-ram ḥaqq a -

Bis.

..... ga - yib. Ya..... lē-li ya.....

ḥal - lik fi ḥāl - - ak w'es - se -

..... lām di er - rai sai - yib ma lak u

ma..... l'ah - lil ḡa - ram.....

haqq..... a - ga - - yib.

wives or permitted slave-girls, and not adulterously. The rule is also laid down that a faithful Muslim must not listen to any music at all, if he finds that it stirs up in him thoughts contrary to the moral precepts of the Qur'an. Unless the Muslim truly loves God, he must never listen to music, as this would in such a case be an additional danger to his soul. It is proper to add that all Arabic authorities were not of the opinion of al-Ghazālī as to the lawfulness of music. Thus, Mālik ibn Anas al-Himyārī al-Madānī¹ distinctly states that no music of any sort is permitted to the faithful; but al-Ghazālī (*op. cit.* pp. 244-250) replies at length to such puritanical strictures, and goes so far as to lay down rules for ecstasy caused by the hypnotic influence of the Arabic rhythm. Thus, he warns the ecstasies never to weep, tear their garments, or dance, unless they are irresistibly compelled so to do. A listener to music must never strain for ecstasy, but, so far as possible, exert self-control. Here it should be noted that the conventional prolonged exclamation *a-a-ah*, so often interspersed by appreciative or polite listeners between the stanzas of Arabic love-songs, is an unquestionable survival of the earlier habit of falling into ecstasy on hearing a ravishing verse.

The Egyptian-Arabic love-song here given (pl. V.) is an excellent illustration of the more extended melodious development of the song proper among the Arabic-speaking nations, as compared with the religious chant. The metre of these songs is sustained with extreme regularity throughout, supported by the hand-drum, or *darabūka*,

keeping up the incessant tempo

against which the metre of the song often runs in syncopation. This tempo is without doubt the parent of that of the modern Spanish Bolero dance.² Inasmuch as all the verbs are in the masculine form in such productions as that given in pl. V., there can be little doubt that the tradition is correct which states that this sort of song was originally addressed to boys who were kept for the purpose of sodomy. Such music was therefore particularly offensive to sincere Muslims, and would certainly come under the category stigmatized by al-Ghazālī, although there is nothing obscene in the words themselves. A deeply religious Yemeni, on hearing one of these love-songs, remarked to the writer of this article that the truly faithful could have nothing in common with music of this character, but should confine themselves to the traditional religious chants alone.³

It may be interesting at this point to give also a specimen of a Turkish love-song of the ordinary Perso-Turkish type (pl. VI.) as a contrast to the above distinctively metrical Arab production. The Turks, like the Persians, have permitted a more extended melody to develop, and do not as a rule accompany their songs with a drum, but with the flute-pipe or with strings. They very frequently, however, sing without any accompaniment at all, as their songs, which are more of the recitative type, do not require the support of a steady tempo.

Turkish songs from the interior, such as the Diarbekr productions, are more metrical in character and also more melodious from the European point of view—a fact which is no doubt due to the

¹ The founder of the Maliki school of canon law (718-795), a conservative and dignified legal authority (I. Goldziher, *Muhammedanische Studien*, Halle, 1889-90, ii. 213 ff.).

² The Bolero melody is in triple time and generally syncopated to the same metre as the above style of song.

³ Showing that the ancient rigidity of rule still persists among the stricter faithful.

VL

$\text{♩} = 108.$

Agh yar.... i - len e - yi bi..... va

fagh gez - i - me..... böy..... le

her..... da..... i - ma gez - i - me

böy..... le her..... da..... i - ma

ju - ru - mum ne dir..... Söy - le ba -

na gez - i - me böy - le.....

her..... da..... i - ma.

Kurdish influence of the region. Kurdish songs show generally a well-marked melody, although of limited range, almost Arabian in its regular rhythm, which is, however, more apt to be in three beats, instead of the Arabian four or five time. Many of the higher class Persian melodies are beautiful, judged even according to European standards, as they often combine a tender melodious strain, almost always sad, with a well-marked metre.

3. Musical instruments.—The instruments used in Muhammadan music differ, of course, according to nationality. Among the Arabs proper, the most common instrument of percussion is the *tabla*, or tambourine drum. The Egyptians have used from time immemorial the *darabuka*,¹ or large pottery hand-drum, which, as indicated above, marks the chief rhythm of the song. They also use a smaller drum, which is trilled constantly with little sticks for the purpose of producing an unvarying support to the *darabuka* tempo-drum. In Tunis the *ṭap-deba* is almost identical with the *darabuka*, and they likewise have the tambourine, as well as *seqâseq*, or cymbals. The most purely Arabian wind instrument is the seven-holed simple flageolet-flute, which is a great favourite, in spite of the earlier denunciation of 'pipes.' Of the flute there are many varieties, such as the N. African *magrâme*, or double-pipe, the Tunisian *gasba*, or flageolet, etc. The most primitive Arabic stringed instruments are the two-stringed violin and the *ūd*, or lute, whence the European lute (= *al-ūd*) and its descendant the mandoline are derived. It is strange that stringed instruments as well as wind instruments should have been forbidden by the earlier religions opinion (see above), but this was probably because of the association of these instruments with irreligious subjects. At the present day the Muslim peoples use very generally the guitar and mandoline, and frequently the ordinary European violin. They also delight in a native zither (*qanûn*). It must be remembered that all these instruments were primarily employed to accompany song, and rarely, if ever, to play independent melodies. An apparent exception to this rule is the funeral dirge-air often played on flutes without song, especially on the N. African coast.

¹ Evidently identical with the *kuba* (see above, p. 54, note 4).

The exception is only apparent, however, because the instruments play what was originally a conventional death-wail sung by the mourners. The omission of the song may be due to European influence.

4. Notation.—The Muslims use the European system of notation, especially in the larger centres, but there still exists in many corners the old traditional Persian tonic sol-fa system, according to which the tones were indicated by well-established signs, each representing a note of the scale and each bearing both Persian and Arabic names, as follows:

do re mi fa sol la si
 Persian: *yek dâk sîk chahâr'k panj'k šek'k hæftak*
 Arabic: *qil mîd sîk mazmûm ramî ḥasîn saḥsîn*

In the Persian terms the numeral element *yek*, *dâk*, *sîk*, 'first, second, third (tone),' etc., plays the chief part, while the Arabic terminology employs only the Persian *sîk*, 'third tone,' making use of arbitrarily applied native descriptives for the others.¹ The higher fa-sol register is called *alîn*, 'high'; the middle register, fa-sol-la-si-do-re-mi, is known as *wasfî*, 'middle,' while the term for the lower, do-re-mi, is *sdala(i)* (cf. Ali al-Ghaonthi, *Treatise on Music* [Arabic], Tunis, 1904).²

5. Characteristics of singing.—The Arabic method of singing, like that of all the western Orientals, is to use head-tones as much as possible. Chest-tones, such as are cultivated in European music, are very objectionable, even to the better educated Arabic-speaking people, who, like their nearer Oriental neighbours, the Turks and Persians, have also the greatest detestation of harmony in any form. Deliberate flattening or sharpening often takes place, especially when a pathetic effect is sought. This has given rise to the statement that quarter-tones are of common occurrence in Arabic songs. While this is literally true, it is a variable quantity in their music, as the same singer will often sing a stanza with, e.g., a flattened roulade and then repeat the same roulade in the ordinary manner. In spite of these un-European characteristics, a well-balanced Arab chorus—for they sing in chorus whenever possible—chanting in unison and accompanied by strings, wood-wind, and percussion, has a powerful effect even on a European listener, provided that he is sufficiently unprejudiced to lay aside for the moment his harmonic training, and allow himself to be swayed by the quavering yet never-varying movement of the shrill, but rarely untrue, voices and instruments, sustained by the ceaseless thrum of the hand-drums.

LITERATURE.—Ahmed Effendi Amin, *Comparison between Arabic and European Musical Notation*, Bulaq, 1902; *JA*, 8th ser., no. 5, xviii. [1891] 278-355; *Traité des rapports musicaux*, tr. from Saif al-Din Abd al-Mumin Baghdadî's letter to Sharaf al-Din (cf. also *JA*, 8th ser., no. 5, xviii. 270-355); A. Christianowitsch, *Esquisse historique de la musique arabe aux temps anciens*, Cologne, 1863; 'M. Collangettes, 'Étude sur la musique arabe' (*JA*, 10th ser., no. 5, iv. [1905] 385, 422, and viii. [1906] 149-190); S. Daniel, *La Musique arabe, ses rapports avec la musique grecque et le chant grégorien*, Algiers, 1863 and 1870; Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazâlî, *Iḥyâ 'Ulûm ad-Dîn*, tr. D. B. Macdonald, 'Emotional Religion in Islâm as affected by Music and Singing,' in *JRAS*, 1901, pp. 195-252, 705-748, and 1902, pp. 1-23; Ibn Khaldûn, *Extrait sur la*

¹ The *k* in Persian *dâk*, *sîk*, etc., is probably not the diminutive *k*, seen, e.g., in *mardak*, 'little man,' but rather a shorter form of Persian *gah*, 'time.' An aged Turkish teacher of music named the sol-fa notes to the writer as follows: *ek-gyah*, *dâ-gyah*, *si-gyah*, etc., which can only mean 'one time, two times, three times,' etc., conventionally applied to the tone-names and their signs (*gyah* is the Turkish palatalized pronunciation of Persian *gah*). The Arabic names for the notes may be rendered as follows: *qil* really = 'the train of a garment' and here 'lower part'; *mîd* possibly = 'mover,' from *mîd*, 'agitate,' 'move'; *mazmûm*, from *zamma* or *damma*, probably means 'tied,' 'joined'; *ramî* = 'a quick going' (it can hardly be *ramî*, 'sand'); *ḥasîn* is the Persian form of the Arabic stem *ḥasana* and = 'beautiful'; *saḥsîn* is a variant of *ḥasîn* with preformative *sa*, dubious in meaning in this case.

² *Sa'ala(i)* means 'clear the throat,' 'cough,' and was hence applied to the bass register.

musique, ed. M. de Hammer, *Fundgraben des Orients*, v. 6 [1818], 801-807; Ibrahim Bey Mustapha, 'La Valeur des intervalles dans la musique arabe,' *Bull. Institut égyptien*, II. viii. [1888] 247-250; R. G. Kiesewetter, *Die Musik der Araber*, Leipzig, 1842; A. Laffage, *La Musique arabe, ses instruments et ses chants*, Tunis, 1905; J. P. N. Land, 'Recherches sur l'histoire de la gannio arabe,' *VI Congress of Orientalists*, [1885], pt. 2, pp. 155-163; E. W. Lane, *Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians*, London, 1846, ch. xviii.; Rahabab, *Collection of Various Melodies (Arabic)*, Cairo, 1842; Mikhail Meshagab of Damascus, *Arabic Music*, tr. Eli Smith, *JAOS* I. [1840] 171-217; P. Tripodo, *Lo Stato degli Studi sulla musica degli Arabi*, Rome, 1904. J. DYNELEY PRINCE.

MUSIC (Slavic).—The Slavs have always been renowned for their music. As early as A.D. 591 the Byzantine historians record that among the Avar captives there were three Baltic Slavs, who were untrained to arms and were employed as professional players on the *gusli* (see below, p. 58^b). In the 10th cent. a band of Slav instrumentalists performed at the Byzantine court. The Arabian historians of the same epoch speak of a Slav seven-stringed instrument (probably the *gusli*); and mediæval Russian Chronicles abound in references to the musical tastes of the princes, differentiating between the ecclesiastical and the popular style.

A fresco of the year 1073 at Kiev represents Russian musicians, dressed much like Western troubadours, and playing flutes, long horns, cymbals, a guitar-shaped instrument (possibly the parent-form of the theorbo), and a seven-stringed harp or psalter. The musical profession ranked so high that in the mediæval ballads such a hero as Dobrynya Nikitič was not disgraced by assuming the disguise of a *skomordkh*,¹ or wandering minstrel.

Slav countries are surprisingly rich in popular song. Apart from the traditional festival hymns and melodies (some of these very ancient, and pagan in origin) current history has been related in the *Byliny*, and the verse orally conserved. This democratic historiography survived down to the Napolconic era.

Such popular song and melody were secular, often semi-pagan, and, as such, fervently persecuted by Church and State. Progressively with the decay of the South Russian civilization and Kievan State (13th to 14th cent.), the Eastern Church became more ascetic; and, under the Tatar ascendancy and after, the minstrels who had been honoured by the princes of Kiev ultimately became strolling vagabonds.

The northern plains, however, were too vast for persecution to be able to extirpate popular customs. In the 'fifties and sixties' of the 19th cent. the ancient folk-songs were diligently and exhaustively compiled.

The Church had her own school of music, derived from Byzantine models. In the late 15th cent., after the Tatars had been subdued, the Moscovite princes cultivated foreign arts; thus, in 1490, Iván III. summoned an organist to Moscow; Iván IV. greatly favoured German musicians; and his son Theodore was presented by the king of England with an organ, a clavichord, and skilled players.

The end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th cent. brought Russia under Polish influence, and new Western instruments were introduced (such as the pandora, the theorbo, and the violin), as well as the Western pentaline system of notation. In the 15th cent. chamber-music was performed at the Polish and Moscovite courts; and Sigismund I. of Poland imported Italian music.

i. The characteristics of primitive music.—The genuine popular music of the Slavs is probably an independent outgrowth of Aryan folk-song, akin to Indian and Greek melody, but not identical nor borrowed.

¹ Probably derived from σκώμματος.

Melodic development apparently falls roughly into three periods. The octave is divided diatonically into the intervals of our modern scale—not according to the Pythagorean fifths or like the Oriental scale, which has seventeen intervals (made up by differentiating between the sharp of one note and the flat of the succeeding note).

All primitive music was designed as an indispensable accompaniment to ritual or epic verse; thus, such music is a *récitatif* that follows the metre and the words, rising and falling with the natural variations of the speaking voice, the tempo and rhythm being determined by the phrases out of which the verse is built up.

Our modern diatonic scale admits of majors and minors, and also of accidentals within the strict limits of the twelve admissible semitones, whereas ancient scales have no majors or minors. The ancient Greeks could modulate from one of their eight scales into any other; the primitive Russian Slav scale in each stage of development was invariable, exactly as no modern musician could introduce a third- or quarter-tone.

Music without words—music as an art *per se*—evolved only very late, after the Middle Ages; verse or poetry as an art *per se* very much earlier. Furthermore, in primitive melody the spoken phrase which governs the rhythm can move only within a limited compass, very much less than that of the voice—e.g., within a fourth or a fifth. The whole melody is very short and repeated without variation; it is unharmonized, and based on unharmonical intervals.

(a) *First period.*—The first period in folk-song, and the most barbarous, is based on the interval of the fourth upwards and fifth downwards, and comprises only whole tones. To this class Highland and Chinese music are said to belong. This has been called the period of the triachord, i.e., only three notes were available in each limit of the fourth or the fifth—e.g., C D F.‡

(b) *Second period.*—The second stage added some new notes to the octave, and is styled the period of the tetrachord—e.g., C D F G—or the fifth. Ancient Greek, primitive Slav, and mediæval Western European music are said to belong to it. The octave is divided C—F, F—C', C'—F'. The music may now rise a fifth, as well as sink a fifth. The melody still has to follow the words in rising or falling phrases within these limits. As yet the leading note has not come into vogue; and the characteristic scale of this epoch impresses the modern ear as an irregular minor scale. The music still being a *récitatif*, the rhythm and tempo have to be strictly adjusted to the metre of the words. At this point, therefore, a brief account of the metre must be interpolated.

On the one hand, the ancient Greek hexameter was a strictly regular quantitative four-beat, or, again, the iambus and the trochee three-beats, the metrical stress determining the rhythm and the tempo. The length of the vowel formed the basis for the measurement of the beats. But even in ancient Greek and Latin the influence of the tonic accent was beginning to make itself felt, and to induce irregularities, such as lengthening in *arsis*, the shortening of unaccented long terminations. Quantity disappeared very early, however, in the development of the Slav languages; Serbians alone has retained a fixed distinction of long and short syllables, the length of which is unaffected by the stress. Modern metre in all the Slav languages, including Serbian, is stressed, or accentual. On the other hand, all modern poetry is strictly accentual.

The early Slav metre was in a transitional stage. Although quantity had disappeared, metre was still regulated by the long groupings of three or more syllables that had constituted the ancient quantitative foot; and the metrical—and therefore rhythmical—unit became a group of syllables with a dominating accent. Furthermore, when in the course of the 14th cent. the vowels *ѣ*, *ѡ* had become mute, whilst the old traditional songs and melodies were maintained, great irregularities of tempo were the natural result; it was as though we attempted to read as a melody and metrical scheme the verses of Chaucer, and systematically disregarded the final *e*'s, which in modern English have lost all phonetic value.

The scansion of early Slav folk-songs is closely akin to that of Vedic hymns; it can be analyzed into lines of twelve, sixteen, or twenty syllables; but, in Slav, quantity has vanished, the accent generally falls on the third syllable in each group of four, and the lines almost invariably terminate with a dactylic word. When the vowels *ѣ, ѓ* became mute, false accents had to be introduced so as to coerce the poem into conformity with the laws. It was a favourite device to introduce assonant terminations as well as alliterative words or repetitions as part of the style; highly inflected languages lend themselves very readily to this device. Gradually these assonant terminations became a regular system of rhyme, while alliteration and repetition were left as a mere embellishment. Thus the same influences as in Western Europe operated to convert syllabic alliterative metres into fixed accentual metre with short metrical feet. When this process was complete, words and melody, metre and tempo, could be combined without mutual violence. To sum up: a primitive pre-Slav Aryan metre *— — — — —* became the accentual *— — — — —*, and, through irregularities and deviations from the strict scheme and the partitioning of the four-beat, finally evolved into the modern *— — — — —*, or trochaically *— — — — —*, or anapestically *— — — — —*.

When, in the poem, these syllabic feet irregularly comprised more than four syllables, the bar corresponding to such a foot had to be lengthened, and thus the tempo varied.

(c) *Third period.*—From this consideration of metre we may proceed to what is regarded as the third stage of Slav music. This synchronizes with the development in Western Europe of the modern scale, thirds being introduced as a basic division of the octave, in addition to the fourths and fifths of the previous epochs; and thus part-singing and harmonization at last were rendered possible. The leading note had already made a first appearance in the south, in Little Russia (which up to 1654 belonged to Poland), together with chromatic augmentations and diminutions of the fourth and fifth—a change possibly due to Oriental influence or Polish permeation. Thus the styles of N. and S. Russia became differentiated, the south advancing long before the north.

(d) *Artistic growth.*—From this point forward Russian folk-melody had thirds, chromatics, the leading note, and consequently regular majors and minors with tonics and dominants. The artistic development proceeded apace. Music and poetry soon started on their separate paths as different and independent arts. We shall now briefly trace this artistic growth of Russian music.

Ivan IV. had a vocal unconducted choir at his court. This practice was continued by his successors. The most notable choirmaster was D. M. Bortnyanski (1751–1825), who was musically trained in Italy and reformed the Imperial Court choir. Francesco Araja (1700–67) was the creator of the first opera in Russia, in Italian and with an Italian troupe. A. N. Verstovski (1799–1863) introduced Russian opera in Russian; but it was M. I. Glinka (1804–57) who, with his *Life for the Tsar* (1830), created Russian opera in the national style and with Slav rhythm and harmony. Since then César Cui, Borodin, Musorgski, Rimski-Korsakov, etc., have acquainted the world with the great musical genius of Russia, with its strongly marked features and characteristic harmonies. It is noteworthy that Debussy and many of the modern French school derived some of their inspiration from the great Russian masters. And, withal, this great Russian school drew upon the native melodies for its thematic material. These are to our Western ear untuneful, for they are based on a cruder scale. They are unjoyous, like the steppes. Modern Russian opera often gives the impression of a richly orchestrated folk-song, with a strange and compelling beauty all its own; for, after the first Byronic effusions of the 'twenties' of the 19th cent., Russia in all of the arts turned to her national resources and built out of them a literature, an art, and a music second to those of no other people.

(e) *Church music.*—The music of the Church in Russia has had a history apart. After the conversion of Vladimir I. in 980 Greek schools of

singing were founded at Kiev. The Chronicles make a clear distinction between popular and Church music, stating of one prince that he loved the *gusli* and his wine, of another that he loved Psalm-singing. This ecclesiastical music was Ambrosian, and based on four of the ancient Greek scales, viz., the Phrygian, Dorian, Hypophrygian, and Hypolydian (see MUSIC [Greek]). Russian Church melody could modulate within the limits of these scales. Gregorian music was not allowed to penetrate into the realm of the orthodox Church.

Unlike the popular music, which was oral and traditional, Church music was written: the notes, indicated by signs, or 'semiographs,' were super-scribed above the words. The choir-leader conducted by cheironomy—a sort of deaf and dumb musical alphabet. This arbitrary and awkward method lasted down to the end of the 16th cent., and was for long championed by the conservative against the new Western pentatonic notation, which supplanted it by the end of the 17th century. For a time both systems were used concurrently. Tempo indications were abbreviations of Slav words.

All singing was at first in unison, as the harmonics of this music were, like those of the popular songs, based on fourths and fifths, and not on thirds.

2. The musical instruments.—In the mediæval Chronicles the names of the instruments are often loosely used, and it is difficult to define exactly what instrument is intended.

(a) *Stringed.*—The most ancient of the stringed and plucked instruments is the *gusli* (with the conventional epithets 'made of the plane tree' and 'sonorous'). It was a zither-like box, with seven or eight strings, plucked by the right hand, and damped by the left. A later development of the *gusli* was the psalter, with eleven strings and a rounded body, with one end narrower than the other. The player pressed the narrower end to his chest, and plucked the strings with his right hand. Later still we find the cymbals, a rectangular trapezoidal case on which metal strings were strung, to be struck with a hammer. It might have fifteen or more cords; it was introduced only in the 17th century.

Other stringed instruments were the *domra*, *balalaika*, *bandura* (or *koba*), *theorbo*, and *guitar*, all of which had long necks, upon which the strings were strung, admitting of fingering, and carried over a sounding-box; they were plucked with the fingers or a plectrum. The *domra* was common in Great Russia, the others in Little Russia; they were largely of Polish origin.

The *domra* had three strings tuned in fourths, and an oval body; the *balalaika* had a triangular body, with three strings tuned A E A', and a bent head. These instruments mark a great advance, for the cords were stopped with the left hand, so as to form the notes and intervals. The *domra* and *balalaika* were shrill and inharmonious. The *pandora*, or *bandura*, resembled a lute, and might have any number of strings—six at the least. The *theorbo* was a highly complicated bass lute, derived from Italy through Poland, with three separate sets of cords allowing of the playing of several parts at the same time.

Stringed instruments played with the bow came into use only in the 16th century. The earliest form is the three-stringed lyre, neckless, its body somewhat like that of a viol-da-gamba; the strings were sounded by a wheel, turned by a handle at one end. Another bowed stringed instrument, probably of Tatar origin, was the *gudok*; it had two strings, a pear-shaped body, and an Asiatic crescent-shaped bow. The Russians added a third string. The instrument was held downwards like

a 'cello. Two strings were tuned in unison, acting as pedal-points, and never fingered; the third was tuned a fifth higher and fingered. Very much later violins, violas, and 'cellos were introduced from abroad.

(b) *Wind*.—Trumpets are mentioned as early as the 11th century. Wood-wind instruments also occur early. The most ancient seems to be the *dudki*, or pipe, with the mouthpiece at the end. Double-pipes (*svirily*) are still used in White Russia; these are two pipes lashed together, one being shorter than the other; a development from this was the *tsévnitsa*, the Greek *σῦριξ*, seven pipes in one frame.

Reed instruments are also found quite early, and were specially used in funeral rites; they had seven intervals. A double instrument of this type was called the *surna*, a kind of hautboy.

(c) *Percussion*.—Drums came into orchestral use in the reign of Ivan IV.; the earliest form perhaps is the *nakry* (two clay pots with leather stretched over the top). Similar instruments were the *ložki*, or wooden spoons, or xylophone, first used in the 18th cent.; *taralki*, or timpani, are recorded as far back as the 11th cent., as well as the *bubny*, or tambourines.

From the middle of the 17th cent. Russian orchestration was enriched through communications with Italy, directly and indirectly, through Poland and Germany. This cultured elaboration of the rich primitive music of the Slavs has put Russian music in the first rank.

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LEONARD A. MAGNUS.

MUSIC (Teutonic).—Teutonic mythology differs from classical in not ascribing a divine origin to music as distinct from poetry. Yet musical powers were often an attribute of gods and supernatural beings, as of Oðin, Bragi, and frequently the water-divinities, and in individual human beings song-craft was looked upon as a divine gift, or, indeed, as directly due to divine inspiration and intervention.

According to the earliest records, music, especially song, played a large part in awakening and in expressing religious and national feeling, as well as martial ardour and festive mirth. Tacitus says that the ancient songs of the Germans, 'which are their sole forms of chronology and history,' sing the praises of their divine progenitors (*Germ.* 2); this is borne out in historic times by the evidence of Jordanes for the Ostrogoths (*de Getarum Orig.* 4), and by the celebration in song of heroes of later days, such as Arminius (*Tac. Ann.* ii. 88), Alboin of Lombardy (Paulus Diaconus, *de Gest. Langobardorum*, i. 27), and Charlemagne. Song and the clashing of arms were the accepted means of inspiring to the fight, and of disheartening the foe, and the variety of sound ranged from 'a loud yell' (Ammianus Marcellinus, XXVIII. v. 6) to dissonant clamour, from a rhythmic battle-ery (*Olafs Saga hins Helga*, 92; *Forrnanna Sögur*, iv.) to heroic chants (*Tac. Hist.* ii. 22; *Amm. Marc.* XXXI. vii. 11). Triumphal songs after the battle are known in at least one instance to have been accompanied by dancing (Gregory, *Dial.* iii. 28). Although there is little evidence for the practice of merely festive music in the primitive Teutonic period, it is noteworthy that many of the later words for music are intimately connected with, if not actually derived from, roots denoting joy or bliss—e.g., *glêd*, *drêam* (Grimm, *Teut. Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1882-88, p. 901).

During the period of settlement of the Teutonic

peoples after the great migrations all these uses of music became increasingly important, especially on the national and religious side, as might be expected in a race in which religious feeling was so closely identified with its strong national consciousness. In connexion with religion music assumed a twofold significance.

(1) It was an integral part of such ritual as was practised—e.g., singing and dancing were used by the Langobards in their worship (Gregory, *loc. cit.*). At Upsala the sacrifices were accompanied by 'unseemly' songs (Adam of Bremen, *Gesta Hammaburg.* iv. 27 [*MGH*, 'Script.' vii.]), and it would appear from the degenerate behaviour of 'the mimes on the stage, and the unmanly clatter of the bells,' which aroused the disgust of Starkaðr (Saxo Grammaticus, *Danish History*, tr. O. Elton, London, 1894, vi. 185), that this side of the ceremony was much developed. At funerals dirges were sung, telling the prowess of the dead; the account of the funeral lament for Attila (Jordanes, 49) can be paralleled by the fragmentary indication of the dirge (*geomorgyd*) sung for Bêowulf (l. 3151). At weddings songs were sung, but not necessarily of a religious character (*Saga Herrauðs ok Bosa*, 12; *Forrnaldar Sögur*, iii.).

(2) The second great religious use of music was in the magic art, in which the chanting of spells must always have been a chief element; and in the north, where this art was so much developed, we have ample evidence of the importance of vocal music as an adjunct of sorcery. The two main forms of incantation were the *galdr* and the *seiðr*, the beneficent and maleficent charms. The *galdr* must from its very name have been sung; the *seiðr* we know to have been performed with elaborate musical ceremonial. Thus in *Orvarodds Saga* (ch. 2) the *seiðr-kona*, or sorceress, appears accompanied by a choir of fifteen boys and fifteen girls, skilled in singing. So, too, in *Eiriks Saga Rauða* (ch. 4) the prophetess requires one of the women present to sing a certain spell; a Christian woman unwillingly complies, and sings so sweetly that the witch announces that many unwonted spirits have been lured thither. Elsewhere we again find the sweetness of the song apparently increasing its potency, as in the *seiðr* that lured the boy Kári to his death (*Laxdæla Saga*, 37). Music produced by an abnormal instrument can have a supernatural effect, as in the ballad of the minstrel whose harp, strung with three locks of a drowned girl's hair, sings of itself, and accuses the murderer. An inspired musician can, like Orpheus, charm animals by his song, as does Horant the Dane (*Kudrun*, 388).

Heroic traditions, from being celebrated in communal song (Jordanes, 4), passed into the keeping of the *scôp*, whose chief function was to commemorate national prowess, or, like the Northern *scalds* later on, to celebrate the deeds of hero patrons. The Old English poems *Widsôð* and *Dêor* afford glimpses of the wide-spread fame and the varying fortunes of these minstrels; their reputé was great, and the divine inspiration and supernatural powers ascribed to them appear in such tales as that of Horant, already cited, or of Sigurðr, who, at a wedding-feast, by his harp-playing caused not only the guests but even the very tables and dishes to dance (*Saga Herrauðs ok Bosa*, 12; *Forrnaldar Sögur*, iii.). The *scôp* and the *scald*, who were often men of good birth, catered for the courts, and provided the chief entertainment at feasts by chanting heroic lays, either traditional or improvised. Their skill redounded to the credit of the court, and keen interest was taken in their rivalry and their singing-contests. Popular tastes, on the other hand, were provided for by the wandering minstrel or glee-man, and how familiar and acceptable a figure he was is proved by the legend

of Alfred penetrating, thus disguised, into the Danish camp. The susceptibility of the Teutonic races to music is proved by the honours heaped upon the singer, and also by the wide diffusion of the lyric gift. Nothing is more striking in the Icelandic sagas than the facility with which men and women of almost all classes 'sing a stave,' i.e. improvise to suit all occasions. The Goths seem to have quickly fallen under the influence of Roman music, as in the case of the ex-emperor Attalus (cf. H. Bradley, *The Goths* ['Story of the Nations'], London, 1887, pp. 95, 101). Throughout the heroic poems and tales we can trace the enjoyment of courtly music, and the story of Cædmon illustrates the shame felt by the ungifted man at the exposure of his deficiency.

We have hardly any knowledge of the nature of pre-Christian Teutonic music, but the strong rhythm of the alliterative poetry presupposes a marked musical rhythm. It is practically certain that harmony was unknown in instrumental and in vocal music. Such technical knowledge as we possess can be deduced only from the instruments known to have been used, i.e. horns and harps. The first instrument of the primitive Teuton was probably the horn, originally the natural horn of an animal, later a reproduction in bronze. Then the shape was altered, as can be seen from the bronze horn found in Denmark, which is twisted somewhat into the shape of a G, and apparently is the prototype of the modern Scandinavian *lurs*. Expert judgment believes this horn to have been in the key of Eb, of which it produced the first eight harmonics. By far the more important and more characteristic instrument is the harp, for which the Teutons have a separate native name, and which, although here experts differ, the northern nations probably evolved for themselves independently of existing forms in the south; it is a moot point how much they owed to their Celtic neighbours, past masters of the harp. That bow-instruments were originally unknown to the Teutons is borne out by the fact that the word *hearpan* is used to translate *citharisare*, and therefore distinctly implies plucking or twanging the strings. Early contact with the Romans introduced them to such instruments as bells and bagpipes, and later to all the varieties of the *psalterium*.

After the advent of Christianity the history of Teutonic music is for centuries identical with that of Church music; the Church absorbed almost all musical interest, and certainly controlled all technical and artistic progress. Secular music was steadily discouraged; throughout the Merovingian laws the seductions of heathen songs are denounced, while in England the famous letter of Alcuin (*MGH*, 'Script.' xv. 'Epist. Carol.' ii. 124) and the pleasing anecdote of Aldhelm (William of Malmesbury, *de Gest. pontif. Anglorum*, v. 190) illustrate the Church's severe attitude towards secular music, but also its readiness to use Christian music as a means of attraction.

The Roman Church had a struggle to enforce its liturgical music upon the Teutonic churches, which seemed to realize the danger to their individuality in the adoption of the standard Church music, i.e. the Gregorian plain-song or unaccompanied unison chant. Once converted to the Roman usage, however, the Teutonic monks were active in spreading it, as did St. Boniface among the Germans; and the monastery of St. Gall can claim to have perfected in the 9th cent. the new liturgical chant known as the 'sequence.' Moreover, it is to Teutonic monks, such as Alcuin, Notker, and Odo, that we owe the chief literary evidence on the ecclesiastical modes.

In the development of the second great school of music, the polyphonic, Teutonic clerics again fur-

nish some of the most valuable evidence on theory. The *de Harmonica Institutione* of the Flemish monk Hucbald describes the first attempts at the forms of harmony later known as 'organum' and 'descant'; at the end of the following century comes the more advanced work of Otger of St. Pons, probable author of the treatise *Musica Enchiriadis*. After the death (c. 1050) of Guido of Arezzo, the chief exponent of the new system, the Teutonic monks—e.g., Berno of Reichenau, William of Hirschan, and Aribio Scholasticus—seem to have shared in the temporary reaction against polyphony. But Teutonic musicians soon recovered their progressive spirit, as is shown by the work of Franco of Cologne, and in the development of that contrapuntal art which has aptly been likened to a Gothic cathedral they led the way, through the English supremacy of the 12th to the 14th centuries, up to the 'Golden Age' of the Netherlands in the 15th century.

In the English period the chief names in theory are those of Walter Odington in the late 13th cent., and Simon Tunstede, who at the end of the 14th cent. describes the method of introducing *fauxbourdon* into the old descant. England has the distinction of preserving five early specimens of counterpoint, one of which, the famous *rota* or six-part canon, 'Sumer is i-cumen in,' dating from c. 1240, precedes any similar composition extant by more than a century; it is a secular song, but was probably composed by a cleric. By the end of the 15th cent. many English composers were at work, but produced less original music, because of their dependence on the Netherlands school; again, in the 16th cent., the influence of Palestrina was predominant.

The Netherlands school begins with Guillaume Dufay, and rises to its height in the 15th cent. with Johannes Okeghem, master of the canon, and his pupil, Josquin des Prés. The pupil soon outstripped the master, infusing into the latter's dry and intellectual style—in which it is perhaps not fanciful to see the influence of the northern land and of the Teutonic character—greater artistic and devotional feeling. An interesting point in the Flemish school is the novelty of basing its mass-themes on popular melodies. The influence of the school is shown by the fact that Dufay's contemporary, Willaert, founded the Venetian school, while Palestrina himself, the culmination of mediæval counterpoint before it yields to homophony, was taught by the Flemish master, Goudimel.

With the Reformation a great change came over music in the Teutonic countries. The main cause was the secularization of the art by freeing it from an enforced dependence on the Church and her requirements, while in Church music itself a change equally great appears, due first to its loss of symbolic significance, and secondly to the introduction of congregational singing in the vernacular. In England the 16th cent. saw a great secularization and diffusion of music, but the composers of Church music, such as Tallis, Byrd, and Orlando Gibbons, were still at the head of their profession, and the emancipation of English music was not completed until the Commonwealth.

The development of Church music in Germany during the Reformation is foremost in interest and importance. Throughout the Middle Ages there was a strong current of religious musical feeling, rising to flood-height, first, from the 13th to the 14th centuries, when the Minnesinger wrote religious as well as courtly lyrics, and then in the 15th and 16th centuries, when the Meistersinger accomplished their important work of popularizing sacred music; both schools based their music on the ecclesiastical modes, the Meistersinger, however, with little inspiration. The practice of fitting

popular melodies to sacred words had prevailed before the Reformation; but the contrapuntal treatment tended to obscure the melody, and Luther's work lay in the restoration of rhythm to Church hymns—a step important in ensuring their popularization. It is doubtful now whether Luther undertook much composition himself, yet the name 'Luther's hymns' is hardly a misnomer, so great was his encouragement to hymnodists to adapt tunes already familiar in Church or folk-song, and to develop the wonderful chorales now familiar to every Protestant country. Later, at the end of the 16th cent., these simple tunes were again obscured by contrapuntal treatment for choir-singing; but the influence of monody restored the simplicity of effect suited to express the exalted national and religious aspirations of the Reformed Church. Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries hymnody flourished under the Silesian and Pietistic schools. The same period saw in England also a popularization of hymnody—to which the Reformation had given little impetus—under the influence first of Watts and the Independents, then of Wesley and the Methodists.

The remarkable production in Germany during the 18th cent. of Church music of the highest order is a subject beyond the scope of this article (see MUSIC [Christian]); but it may be suggested that it was the result of individual genius, as of Bach, working on traditional forms and originating new ones, with an entire emancipation from ecclesiastical rigidity, yet with a restraint which kept the work, unlike much similar Italian production, within the bounds of religious propriety. This is illustrated by the growth of the new oratorio; starting, as in Italy, from the miracle-play, it was given a new direction in Germany by combination with the lately emancipated Passion music, and drew fresh strength from that peculiarly Teutonic form, the chorale. Thus in the later development of religious music in Teutonic countries we see that its greatness was largely due to its closeness to national tradition; and Germany perhaps owed her musical supremacy in part to the fact that, even after the secularization of the art, her greatest musicians were content to submit to the disciplinary forms of Church music.

LITERATURE.—P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *The Religion of the Teutons*, tr. B. J. Vos, Boston and London, 1902, p. 885 ff.; R. von Liliencron, 'Musik,' in H. Paul's *Grundriss der german. Philologie*, iii. xiii. 2, Strassburg, 1900, p. 655 ff.; Martin Gerbert, *Scriptores Ecclesiastici de Musica*, San Blas, 1784; C. E. H. de Coussemaker, *Scriptores de musica mediæ ævi*, 4 vols., Paris, 1864-70, *Hist. de l'harmonie au moyen âge*, do. 1852; G. Grove, *Dict. of Music and Musicians*, ed. J. A. Fuller-Maitland, London, 5 vols., 1904-10; *Oxford Hist. of Music*, ed. W. A. Hadow, Oxford, 1901-05; C. Engel, *Musical Instruments*, London, 1876, ch. vii. 1.; R. C. Hope, *Medieval Music*, do. 1894; J. K. Paine, *Hist. of Music*, Boston, 1907; E. Dickinson, *Music in the Hist. of the Western Church*, London, 1902. M. E. SEATON.

MUSKHOGEANS.—The Muskhoceans constitute a sedentary and agricultural American Indian linguistic stock whose territory covered the major portion of the present States of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, and the western part of Tennessee, the principal tribes being the Choctaw and Seminole (*q.v.*), Creek, and Chickasaw, besides the minor tribes of the Alibamu, Apalachee, Bayougoula, Chachehuma, Chatot, Chula, Hitchiti, Huma, Ibitoupa, Kasikta, Koasati, Mobile, Mugulasha, Naniba, Ofogoula, Tangipahoa, Taposa, Tawasa, Tohome, and Yamasee. The tribal organization and system of government were closely analogous to those of the Iroquois (*q.v.*). The number of gentes varied from 28 among the Creek to 12 among the Chickasaw, 10 among the Seminole, and 8 among the Choctaw. The phratry system is recorded among Choctaw and Chickasaw, the latter having 2 phratries of 4

and 8 gentes respectively: Panther-Wild Cat, Bird, Fish, Deer; Spanish (Ishpani)-Raccoon, Spanish, Royal (Mingo), Skunk, Squirrel, Alligator, Wolf, Blackbird. Intermarriage between members of the same gens was forbidden; descent was in the female line. As regards the designations of the gentes, we are expressly informed by Adair (*Hist. of the Amer. Indians*, p. 16) that the Muskhoceans 'bear no religious respect to the animals from which they derive the names of their tribes, but will kill any of the species, when opportunity serves.' Since, however, he repeatedly notes the decay of old custom and belief among the Muskhoceans, we cannot assume that the usual tabus regarding the totem did not originally prevail among them. As among the Iroquois, the civil chiefs were distinct from the war-chiefs; and, among the Chickasaw, the chieftainship was hereditary in the Mingo gens, and the chief religious official in the Wild Cat (Adair, p. 31). So far did the Muskhoceans carry the distinction between civil and military affairs that, notably among the Creek, there were 'white towns,' devoted to civil government and peace ceremonies, and 'red towns' for ceremonies of war.

The towns, which, when in strategic positions, were strongly walled, contained a public square, each of whose enclosing buildings comprised three rooms. The structure on the east side was for the chief administrative councillors, that on the south for the war-chiefs, that on the west for the principal religious paraphernalia,¹ and that on the north for the inferior chiefs. The square itself was the scene of public business and great religious ceremonies, such as the *busk* (for which see *ERE* iii. 507^a and *HAI* i. 176-178); and there such aliens as possessed no clan rights might sojourn as public guests. The house of the religious leader formed an asylum, and certain towns, notably the Creek Kusa, were veritable 'cities of refuge,' such a city being 'a place of safety for those who kill undesignedly' (Adair, pp. 112, 159).

Shamans underwent an initiation of sweating and taking emetics;² before and during the *busk* and other festivals, as well as in time of war, abstention from various foods and from sexual intercourse was required; menstruous women were obliged to retire to small huts constructed specially for them; and a widow was compelled to remain single for four years (three, among the Chickasaw), unless she could induce the eldest brother of her deceased husband to have relations with her. Among food-tabus particular interest attaches to that by which the Alibamu, after a white man had eaten, threw away all the food that he had left and washed everything that he had used.

The religious centre to which reference has already been made contained various figures, those among the Bayougoula, *e.g.*, being the bear, wolf, opossum, and birds (cf. also Adair, pp. 30-32), while the Mobile possessed clay images of men, women, and animals. Among the Muskhoceans, moreover, fire was sacred, and the flame kindled at the *busk* might not be extinguished until the following *busk*, when it must be put out as being no longer ritually clean.

Information regarding the Muskhocean morality is scarcely sufficient to afford a basis for judgment.

¹ Among these special mention should be made of five copper and two brass plates preserved at Tukabatchi and still in existence, though, according to tradition, they had formerly been more numerous. From the account given by William Bolsover (in Adair, p. 178 f.) it would appear that at least some of them are of European origin, two even bearing the stamp Æ (see, further, *HAI* ii. 194).

² Initiation may also be implied in the Alibamu usage of causing the children of both sexes to pass in procession at one of their festivals, and to be so severely flogged as to draw blood, after which they were required to listen to an address by one of their elders.

Among some tribes marriage is said to have been only for a year, though it was normally renewed if children were born, one of the signs of such renewal being the annual hoeing of the wife's maize-field by her husband's relatives.

'It was formerly reckoned adultery, if a man took a pitcher of water off a married woman's head, and drank of it. But their law said, if he was a few steps apart, and she at his request set it down, and retired a little way off, he might then drink without exposing her to any danger' (Adair, p. 143).

For the first crime of adultery the man was flogged and had his ears cropped, and the woman's hair was shorn; for the second offence the noses and upper lips were cut off; for the third death was the penalty. The Cherokee had, in virtue of their extreme matriarchal system, no punishment for the adulteress, although in very flagrant cases they, like the Choctaw, submitted the woman to the fate recorded in Jg 19²⁵. After a man's wife had proved false to him, he was forbidden to sustain further marital relations with her.

The burial customs of the Muskogean varied in different tribes. The Chickasaw and Creek interred the dead beneath his house. Among the Choctaw the corpse was placed upon a scaffold near the house, where it remained three moons. At the beginning of the fourth, it was dismembered, and the bones, after being denuded of flesh, were put in a chest and laid in the 'bone-house'—a covered scaffold with open ends. Each clan had its own bone-house, and it was held to be unlawful to mingle bones of strangers with those of kinsmen. Over one of these mortuaries Adair (p. 183) saw 'the carved image of a dove, with its wings stretched out, and its head inclining down.'¹ It was also customary, when passing the spot where a distinguished warrior had been killed, to cast a stone there.

Like so many other American Indian peoples, the Muskogean burned alive captives of war, so that the Yuchi even called the Creek Kópa ('man-burners' [A. S. Gatschet, quoted in *HAI* i. 365]), and they also practised ceremonial cannibalism, especially eating the heart of their enemy.

According to the general Muskogean tradition, their original home was west of the Mississippi, roughly localized around the Upper Red River, Arkansas; but the Kasihta believed themselves to be descended from the sun (*HAI* i. 661). Linguistically it is interesting to note that the Hitchiti and Creek had an archaic dialect known as 'woman's talk' (*ib.* i. 551; cf. also i. 759).

LITERATURE.—Summarized accounts are given in such works as T. Waltz and G. Gerland, *Anthropol. der Naturvölker* iii., Leipzig, 1892; H. R. Schoolcraft, *Hist. and statist. Information . . . of the Ind. Tribes of the U.S.*, Philadelphia, 1851-57; T. L. McKenney and J. Hall, *Hist. of the Ind. Tribes of N. America*, do. 1854; and especially the artt. on the various Muskogean tribes and towns in *HAI*. For the older sources see P. Margry, *Découvertes et établissements des Français dans l'ouest et dans le sud de l'Amérique septentrionale*, Paris, 1875-86; B. F. French, *Hist. Collections of Louisiana*, New York, 1846 ff.; J. G. Shea, *Early Voyages up and down the Mississippi*, Albany, N.Y., 1861; E. G. Bourne, *Narratives of the Career of Hernando de Soto*, New York, 1904; Gentleman of Elvas and L. H. de Biedma, in *Hakluyt Soc. Publications*, ix., London, 1851; A. G. Barcia Carballido y Zuñiga, *Ensayo cronológico para la hist. general de la Florida*, Madrid, 1723. The fullest account is given by J. Adair, *Hist. of the American Indians*, London, 1775; see also L. N. Baudry des Lozières, *Voyage à la Louisiane*, Paris, 1802; A. S. Le Page du Pratz, *Hist. de la Louisiane*, do. 1758; D. Coxe, *Descrip. of the Eng. Province of Carolina*, London, 1741; W. Bartram, *Travels through N. and S. Carolina*, etc., Philadelphia, 1791; T. S. Woodward, *Reminiscences of the Creek, or Muscogee Indians*, Montgomery, Ala., 1859; A. S. Gatschet, *Migration Legend of the Creek Indians*, Philadelphia and St. Louis, 1884-88 (vol. ii. = *Trans. of Acad. Sci. St. Louis*, vol. v. pts. 1-2). For the language see J. C. Pilling, *Bibliog. of the Muskogean Languages* (= *9 Bull. BE*), Washington, 1889.

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¹ If this is correct—and there seems to be no reason to doubt it—we have here an American instance of the belief in the dove as a death-bird, for which see O. Schrader, *Sprachvergleichung und Urgesch.*,² Jena, 1907, ii. 141 f.; A. C. Kruijt, *ERE* vii. 243; N. W. Thomas, *ib.* i. 525^a.

MUSPILLI.—*Muspilli*, a Tentic word that has given rise to much debate, occurs in an O.H.G. poem of the 9th cent. relating to the end of the world, and in the O.Sax. *Heliand*. In the former we read that at the last day it is impossible for one relative to help another before the *muspille*; in the latter (v. 4358), that *mudspilli* comes like a thief in the dark night, and that at the end of the world its power passes over mankind (v. 2591). In both sources the word means the 'day of the sons'—the end of the world. It appears also in the Norse myth of Ragnarök, and would seem to have been brought to Iceland from Germany. In the Eddic songs the sons of Muspell are mentioned as adversaries of the gods (*Voluspá*, 51; *Lokasenna*, 42), and Snorri, on the basis of this text, tells of a realm of fire called Muspellsheimr, and governed by Surtr, the king of fire (*Gylfaginning*, K. 4 ff.). The northern sources, however, make no reference to Muspell as the father of these sons or the lord of that world.

Scholars are far from unanimous as regards the origin and literal meaning of *muspilli*. Some (e.g., Grimm, Müllenhoff, Kögel, Martin, Kauffmann, von Grienberger, Braune) regard the word as having originated in Teutonic heathenism, while others (e.g., Bugge, Golther, Detter, Dorff, Hagen, Mogk, Olrik, Grau, Sperber) take it to be a Teutonic Christian term which first appeared in Germany under the influence of Western Christian literature, and passed thence to the north. Similarly, there is great difference of opinion as to the interpretation of the word. Those who take the former view connect the second element with O.H.G. *spilden*, O.N. *spilla*, 'destroy,' 'annihilate,' and the first with *mū*, 'earth' (Kögel), or with *mud*, 'sward,' 'turf' (Martin), or *mūza*, 'heap of earth' (von Grienberger), so explaining the word as meaning 'earth-destroyer,' and as a poetic expression for fire. Most of those who argue for the Christian origin of the term trace in its first component the M.H.G. *Mund*, 'mouth,' in its second the O.H.G. *spel*, 'utterance,' 'word,' and explain it variously as 'oral announcement,' 'prophesying' (Detter), 'oral decision,' 'judgment,' 'Last Judgment' (Dorff), or as *oris-eloquium*, 'oracle' (Hagen). Sperber would trace the word to a conjectural A.S. compound, *mudes-bill*, 'mouth-sword,' and sees in this a poetic figure for 'sentence at the Last Judgment.' Finally, Bugge connects the first element with Lat. *mundus*, 'world,' and interprets the whole as 'discourse regarding the world's end,' 'what is announced about the end of the world.' What we actually know of the word *muspilli* is that it is found only in connexion with ideas relating to the end of the world, and that it occurs only in poetic works either based upon or influenced by Western Christian literature.

LITERATURE.—A synopsis of the literature is given in W. Braune, *Althochdeutsches Lesebuch*², Halle, 1902, p. 190 f.; cf. also J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*⁴, Berlin, 1876, ii. 674 ff. (Eng. tr., T., 1893, p. 11, 558, 601, 807 f.); K., unde, v., Berlin, 1883, p. 66 f.;, der germ. Philol., ii., Strassburg,, 7A xxxviii. [1894] 189 ff.; J. R. von Grienberger, in *Indogermanische Forschungen*, xvi. [1904] 40 ff.; F. Kauffmann, in *Zeitschr. für deutsche Philologie*, xxxiii. [1901] 5 ff.; W. Golther, *Handbuch der germ. Mythologie*, Leipzig, 1895, p. 639 ff.; F. Detter, in *Beiträge zur Gesch. der deutschen Sprache und Literatur*, xxi. [1896] 107 ff.; S. Dorff, in *Archiv für das Studium der neuern Sprachen und Literaturen*, cx. [1893] 1 ff.; S. N. Hagen, *Moderne Philologie*, Chicago, 1904, p. 397 ff.; H. Sperber, *Sproketenskaptig Sällskaps i Uppsala Förhandlingar*, Uppsala, 1909; S. Bugge, *Studien über die Entstehung der nord. Götter- und Heldensage*, Munich, 1889, p. 447 ff.; G. Grau, *Quellen und Verwandtschaften der alt. germ. Darstellungen des jüngsten Gerichts*, Halle, 1908; A. Olrik, *Aarbog for nordisk Oldkyndighed og Historie*, Copenhagen, 1902, p. 224 ff.; W. Braune, in *Beiträge zur Gesch. der deutschen Sprache und Literatur*, xl. [1916] 425 ff.

E. MOGK.

MUTILATIONS.—In the religions of an-

tiquity and the practices of modern savagery there is complete evidence of mutilation of the human body as a definite part of the ritual, the ceremony, or the action in which it takes place, and the only question which needs close attention is the relationship between religious rite and savage practice.

Examples of both rite and practice must be the starting-point, and it will be found that there is no clear line of separation by peoples, race, or in stages of civilization between religious rite and savage practice. Thus in Hebrew history the mutilation of Abraham is the beginning of a religious rite which has continued through all subsequent periods (Gn 17); the blood-letting of the four score men who came from Shechem, Shiloh, and Samaria was an offering to propitiate Jahweh (Jer 41^b); the marking by a burnt or incised sign was an indication of adherence to a centre of worship (Dt 32⁵, Rev 7², 13¹). These are all religious rites; and side by side with them are practices which may properly be termed savage. The story of Nahash the Ammonite offering to make a covenant with the men of Jabesh 'that I may thrust out all your right eyes' (1 S 11); the pursuit of Adoni-bezek the Canaanite, and after his capture the cutting off of his thumbs and great toes (Jg 16^a); the punishment by the loss of a hand (Dt 25¹¹); and the remarkable demand of Saul carried out by David for trophies of the Philistines (1 S 18²⁵) are all practices of ordinary life unconnected with ritual or religions. Herbert Spencer, who has examined these rites and practices so carefully,¹ would reduce both classes to a common denominator by the theory that the practices were for the purposes of securing and indicating the marks of subjugation of the conquered to his conqueror, the slave to his master, and that they were repeated as religious rites for the same reason—the subjugation of the worshipper to the god.

The difficulty of accepting this conclusion from evidence is that both rite and practice run in parallels, not in layers, or, if there is any evidence in the priority of record, it is, as in the case of the Hebrews, in favour of the religious rite having preceded the practice. Spencer's examples from savage life deal with rulers deified after death, survivals as sacred custom, practices which have a sacramental nature, and ceremonies performed by priests (p. 59); and it is difficult to establish from these the priority of practice over the ritual of religion. In the religions of Greece and Rome the relative positions of the two are equally indeterminate. If the reign of Constantine V. in the 8th cent. 'was a long butchery of whatever was most noble, or holy, or innocent, in his empire,' and included the offering of a trophy of noses from his mutilated enemies,² it may be that such barbarism is an inheritance from one of the destroyers of Rome; but in the ancient religions there are mutilation rites which, though perhaps adopted from aboriginal religions, were definitely incorporated in Greek and Roman religions. At the annual festival of the Phrygian goddess, Agdestis, young men made themselves eunuchs, and L. R. Farnell thinks that the rites of this cult may belong to the various stocks of Asia Minor who had been nursed in the older religion.³ There is no trace of such an origin in the Roman stories of Attis by Catullus⁴ and by Arnobius,⁵ and it is difficult to believe that the charge brought against the Romans by Arnobius was not a generally accepted part of their religious cult. A long note

by J. G. Frazer on the small mound of earth surmounted by a finger made of stone which Pausanias¹ describes as existing on the road from Megalopolis to Messene, and identifies with the story of Orestes biting off the finger of one of his hands, establishes the fact of mutilation of the fingers by various peoples, and concludes that 'a practice so wide spread' may well have 'left its trace in the legend about Orestes.'² One further point is to be made from the fact that religious mutilations are personal and voluntary in contradistinction to savage practice, where mutilations are imposed by compulsion upon conquered enemies or enslaved peoples or persons. This contrast is illustrated by two independent pieces of evidence. Arnobius³ relates that the daughter of a Gallus cut off her breasts out of devotion to Aphrodite the mother. A curious passage in the *Old Irish Treatise on the Law of Adamnan*⁴ says that before Adamnan's time 'it was the head of a woman or her two breasts which were taken as trophies.' The trophy and the sacrifice in those two cases do not seem to belong to the same plane of thought, and yet they belong to the same range of civilization.

Spencer⁵ finally produces a most fascinating argument in proof of his proposition that mutilations develop from savage practice into religious ritual, namely, that it would follow that 'some connexion must exist between the extent to which they are carried and the social type, and he then groups the facts presented by fifty-two peoples.

'Of peoples who form simple societies' they practise mutilation either not at all or in slight forms. 'Of societies practising mutilations that are moderate, the simple bear a decreased ratio to the compound,' while among 'societies distinguished by severer mutilations' these relations are reversed.

The argument would be unanswerable if the examples were complete, but it leaves untouched the complex problem preserved by the religions and practices of antiquity. Only if the gods of men are in all cases a development of the oppressions and tyrannies of one class over another, one dominant personality over the group, can Spencer's simple theory be accepted. As it is, it appears that there are two streams along which mutilations have travelled, no doubt reacting upon each other, but independent in origin. This conclusion is quite in keeping with the accumulating evidence that early religions owed much of their ritual to the practical necessities of life, in which they largely took the place of both political and police control in the societies to which they belonged.

A list of the several kinds of mutilations adopted is not a cheerful contribution to the subject, but it is nevertheless well to have them in this form for purposes of reference. It can easily be compiled from Herbert Spencer's researches already so extensively used in this article. It includes tails of hair, scalps, eyes, fingers, hands, thumbs, great toes, noses, ears, lips, jaws, teeth, hair, castration, circumcision, blood, cuts, and lacerations.

See also AUSTERITIES, § 8.

LITERATURE.—This has been cited throughout the article.

LAURENCE GOMME.

MYCENÆANS.—See ÆGEAN RELIGION.

MYRMIDONS.—The name of the Myrmidons is familiar as belonging to the Thessalian followers of Achilles at the siege of Troy (Hom. *Il.* ii. 684). Æschylus wrote a tragedy entitled *Myrmidons*, which seems to have contained the death of Patroclus as its principal incident (A. Nauck, *Tragicorum Græcorum Fragmenta*², Leipzig, 1889, p. 42), and the title, if not the plot, was appropriated by Accius. According to one account, they com-

¹ *Ceremonial Institutions (Principles of Sociology, pt. iv.)*, London, 1879, pp. 52-80.

² E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. J. B. Bury, London, 1901-00, v. 180.

³ *CSS* iii. 308.

⁴ 'Devolvit illa acuta sibi pondera silice' (*Carm.* lviii. 5).

⁵ *adv. Gentes*, v. 61.

¹ VIII. xxxiv.

² Frazer, *Pausanias*, London, 1898, iv. 357.

³ *adv. Gentes*, v. 7.

⁴ Ed. and tr. Kuno Meyer, Oxford, 1905, p. 2.

⁵ P. 79.

prised all who had abandoned Ægina in company with Pelens when he emigrated to Phthia from his original home (Strabo, p. 433). It was generally believed in antiquity that their name was derived from *myrmex* (μύρμηξ), 'an ant.' Their origin was accounted for in various ways. It was said that Myrmidon, the eponymous ancestor of the clan, whose name appears more than once in the heroic genealogies (Hellanicus, frag. 17; Apoll. Rhod. i. 55), was begotten by Zeus, after he had assumed the form of an ant in his intercourse with Eurymedusa, the daughter of Cleitor (Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* ii. 39, p. 34 P.). That is, of course, a story of a very common type, but there is another more generally attested. Hesiod (frag. 76) related that Æacus, the son of Zeus and Ægina, whose name was given to the island previously known as Cēnone, when he was grown to man's estate, chafed at the loneliness of his home; and that Zeus accordingly transformed all the ants in the island into men and women. In consequence of their origin, they came to be known as Myrmidons (Hygin. *Fab.* 52; Lucian, *Icarom.* 19; Nonn. *Dionys.* xiii. 206 ff.). It is natural to infer from Hesiod's language that Ægina was removed by Zeus to the shores of an island which was previously uninhabited. But in other authorities (Strabo, p. 376; Ov. *Met.* vii. 520-660; Hygin. *loc. cit.*) the legend of the transformation, which is described by Ovid with a wealth of rhetorical detail, appears in a different setting. The cause of the desolation of Ægina is ascribed to the jealous malignity of Hera, who wreaked her vengeance upon the island called after her rival by destroying its inhabitants with a pestilence. Then Zeus answered the prayer of Æacus, who begged for a new population, by bringing the Myrmidons into existence. According to others, the transformation took place in Thessaly and at the bidding of Peleus (Lycophr. 176). Strabo has preserved a euhemeristic variant (p. 375), according to which the Myrmidons were so called from their ant-like method of life; for they were said to have excavated the ground in order to cover the rocks with soil fitted for agriculture, and to have dwelt in their underground workings to avoid the need of bricks.

If we allow that the derivation of the name is well founded, the legendary evidence justifies the conclusion that the ant was a sacred animal in Thessaly, or in Ægina, or in both. But the ultimate explanation of its sanctity is still to seek. The adoration of an animal from which descent is claimed, as in this case through Myrmidon, was formerly held to be 'an example of straightforward totemism' (A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, London, 1899, ii. 197), and an exact parallel was discovered in the Incra stock or clan of ants among the Ashantees of W. Africa (*ib.* i. 69). Similar instances of the connexion of an animal with a god, or of an animal identified with the founder of a clan, were claimed as establishing that totemism was once prevalent in Greece (*ib.* i. 267; W. Robertson Smith, in *EB*⁹ xxi. 135). But most of them are capable of other and simpler explanations, such as the desire to propitiate and so to avert an agricultural pest in the case of the mouse-Apollo (W. Warde Fowler, in *CLR* vi. [1892] 413) and the fox-Dionysus (W. Ridgeway, *ib.* x. [1896] 21); and, since the existence of totemism is unproved for any Aryan race (J. G. Frazer, *GB*³, pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 4, *Totemism and Exogamy*, do. 1910, iv. 12), it is now admitted, even by those who formerly advocated this solution, that it is uncertain whether a survival of totemism is to be recognized in Greek post-Homeric legends of animal descent (A. Lang, in *EB*¹¹ xxvii. 90). Other inferences which have been drawn from the

legend of the Myrmidons are equally insecure. Thus, whereas one investigator regards it as the expression of a belief that the ruling family was of separate origin from the masses (O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie*, Munich, 1906, p. 441), another holds that it was invented to prove the autochthonous origin of the Æacids (K. Tümpel, in Roscher, ii. 3313). It has also been suggested that the story of the Myrmidons retains a trace of the Oriental belief in ants as protectors of hidden springs of water, on the ground that the legend of Æacus is to be interpreted in the light of the magical incantations used by rain-makers (Gruppe, p. 801; Tümpel, in Roscher, ii. 3314), and it is possible that the story of the ant-origin was a piece of popular etymology invented to account for the currency of the name (Lang, *Myth*, ii. 196). In that case, while we should have to look elsewhere for an explanation of the word, the folk-story would still continue to challenge investigation.

It should be added that the derivation of the name Myrmidon is not universally accepted.

LITERATURE.—The chief authorities have been mentioned throughout. The fullest collection of the facts is in K. Tümpel, art. 'Myrmidon,' in Roscher, ii. 3312-3314.

A. C. PEARSON.

MYSORE STATE.—1. Description.—Mysore is one of the principal native States in India, about the size of Scotland. It is situated in the south, on an elevated plateau, rising from about 2000 ft. above sea level along the northern and southern frontiers to about 3000 in the central parts, broken up longitudinally by lofty ridges of rocky hills. The surface is studded with many steep and isolated peaks, called *droogs* (Skr. *durga*), often crowned with the remains of old fortifications. The form of the country is that of a triangle, with apex to the south, where the mountain-ranges of the Western and Eastern Ghats, which form its sides, converge in the towering mass of the Nilgiris. Its chief river is the sacred Kāvērī (the *Χάβηρος* of Ptolemy, vii. i. 13), whose upper basin occupies all the south. Running from west to east and receiving many tributaries, it encloses in its course the island of Seringapatam (Srīrangapatna), and passes out of the State to the low country in the Niagara-like Kāvērī Falls at the island of Sivasamudram, the site of the first electric power installation in India. The north is drained by the Tungabhadra, which flows across the north-west into the river Krishna, beyond the limits of the State, receiving on its way its chief tributary in Mysore, the Haggari or Vedāvati. In the east is a system of three rivers rising near Nandidroog—the Pennēr, the Pālār, and the Ponnār, which find their way to the Bay of Bengal. In the extreme north-west the Sharāvati hurls itself down the Ghats towards the Arabian Sea in the Gersoppa Falls, with a leap of 832 feet.

The western portion of the State, called the Malnād or Malenād, the hill country, is a highland region of noble mountains and mighty forests, filled with the most diversified and picturesque scenery. The remaining and much the larger portion is known as the Maidān or Bayal-shime, the plain or champaign country. In its northern parts are open valleys of black soil, growing cotton or millets; in the south and west are extensive tracts irrigated by channels drawn from rivers, covered with plantations of sugar-cane and fields of rice, with gardens of coco-nut and areca palms. The high-lying lands of red soil in the east are cultivated with *rāgi* and other grain crops dependent on the rains, while in the central parts are stony and wide-spreading pasture grounds, covered with coarse grass and dotted with groves of trees.

A distinguishing feature of the country is the series or chains of reservoirs, called tanks (Kan.

Kere), formed by embanking at every favourable point the streams which gather from the hill-sides or higher slopes, in such a way that the outflow from one at a higher level supplies the next lower, and so on all down the course of the stream at a few miles apart. They vary in size from small ponds to extensive lakes, miles in circumference; and their number is not less than 30,000. Bountiful rain causes them to show up as smiling mirrors all over the landscape when viewed from a height. But in failure of the rains they often dry up, while in great floods many suffer damage from the bursting of the embankments, or *bunds*. Equally notable are the irrigation channels drawn from rivers, especially in the south. Immense dams, called *anicuts* (Kan. *aneṇṇaṭṭe*), built across the river, retain the upper waters at a high level and permit only the overflow to pass down stream. The channels, or *kālvē*, taken off from these dams are led over the country on either bank, winding round all the contour of the ground as far as the waters will flow. The total length of the channels amounts to over 1200 miles. They, as well as the tanks, are mostly works constructed by the old rulers, but have been improved by modern engineering science.

The importance of provisions for storing the water will be recognized when it is stated that the annual average rainfall ranges from over 360 ins. on the crest of the Western Ghats to as little as 19 ins. in the north centre. But these are extremes experienced only in limited areas. The excessive rains of the Malnad rapidly diminish eastwards, and from 20 to 37 ins. may be taken as the annual average for the greater part of the State. The heaviest rain falls in the evergreen belt of forest, the next in the belt of deciduous forest, and the least rainy parts are those in the dry belt.

The area of the State is 29,475 sq. miles, which includes that of the civil and military station of Bangalore, 13½ sq. miles, an 'assigned tract,' under British administration. The population, by the census of 1911, numbered 5,806,193, of whom 2,934,621 were males and 2,871,572 females. The mean density of population was 197 per sq. mile, but the south and east are more thickly populated than the west and north. The two principal places in the State are Bangalore, the administrative capital and seat of the British cantonment (population 189,485), and Mysore, the dynastic capital and residence of the Mahārāja (population 71,306). To these may be added the Kolar gold fields (population 48,635).

2. History.—In its history, which has now been brought pretty fully to light by a study of the vast array of its inscriptions,¹ the State has passed through many vicissitudes. The earliest period to which this can be traced with certainty is the time of the Maurya emperor Aśoka (3rd cent. B.C.). His edicts have been discovered incised on rocky hills in three places in the north—evidence that it was included in his empire. Many Buddhist coins of the first centuries have also been found to the west of Chitaldroog. The south there is reason to identify with the Mahisamandala to which Buddhist missionaries were sent in his time, as well as to the neighbouring Vannāsa or Banavāsi country on the north-west. But even previous to this his grandfather Chandragupta (the Sandrakottos of the Greek historians), contemporary with Alexander the Great, had, according to Jain traditions, abdicated the throne and accompanied the great Jain teacher, Bhadrabāhu the Śrntakevali, on the migration which he

led from the north of India to the south in order to escape the twelve years' famine which he had predicted. On arriving at Sravana Belgola in Mysore, Bhadrabāhu felt that his end was near. He therefore sent the Jain *saṅgha* who had accompanied him on to Punnāta in the south-west of Mysore, under Viśākha. He himself remained at Sravana Belgola and died there on the Kalbappu hill, now called Chandragiri, attended in his last moments by a single disciple, none other than Chandragupta, who also died there later as an ascetic.

To the Mauryas succeeded the Āndhras or Śāta-vāhanas in the north. The latter name took the form Śālivāhana, after whom an era, long known as the Śaka-kāla, but eventually and still as the Śālivāhana-śaka, dating from A.D. 78, was established. The north of Mysore has even in modern times been designated the Śālivāhana country. The kings of the dynasty generally bore the name Śātakarni. On their disappearance in the 2nd cent., the greater part of Mysore was taken possession of by the Gangas, a royal line of Jains from the north of India. They may be connected with the Gangaride, described by Roman authors as among the principal subjects of Chandragupta in the Ganges valley. The Gangas ruled over Mysore for 800 years, and from them it acquired the name of Gangavādi, the subjects of which are still represented by the Gangadikāras, the principal agricultural class of the State, their name being a contraction of Gangavādikāra. The Ganga capital was at first Kuvālā, or Kovalāla (Kolar), but in the 3rd cent. was removed to Talakāḍ on the Kāvēri, in the south-east of Mysore. In the north-west arose the Kadambas, a Brāhman family, who were kings over the Banavāsi country till the 6th century. In the north-east the Pallavas of Kānchi, of Parthian origin, were the overlords, the actual rulers being the Mahāvalis, or Bāpas. After the Pallavas were overthrown, they continued to be represented in Mysore by the Nonambas or Nolumbas, whose territory was known as Nonambavādi or Nolumbavādi. Their subjects survive in the existing Nonabas.

The Chalukyas (whose name suggests a connexion with Seleukeia), claiming to come from Ayodhya, appeared in the Deccan in the 4th century. At the end of the 6th cent. they subdued the Kadambas, and, having established themselves at Vātāpi (Bādāmi in the Bijapur District), entered upon prolonged struggles with the Pallavas. The Satyāśraya, or Western, Chālukyas long dominated the north of Mysore, where Belgāmi was their seat of government. But from the latter half of the 8th cent. there was a check to their power for 200 years from the Rāshtrakūṭas, or Rāṭṭas (progenitors of the Mahrattas of the Bombay country), whom they had on their advent overcome. The Rāshtrakūṭas seized the Ganga kingdom of Mysore, and appointed their own viceroys to govern it. But before long they reinstated the king, in conjunction with the Pallavas. The Western Chālukyas again secured the ascendancy in 973, and held it for 200 years more. They were then ousted by their general, who was a Jain and of the Kalachurya family.

But the Cholas from the Tamil country in the south had, in their career of conquest, overturned the Ganga power in 1004 and held possession of the south and east of the State till 1116. The Hoysalas, a Jain family from the hill country in the west, then expelled them and became rulers of the whole of Mysore and beyond, up to the Krishna river, till overwhelmed by the Muslim invasions from the north in the 14th century. They had previously acquired possession of the Chola country to the south, but were exposed to

¹ Published, with text and tr., in *Epigraphia Carnatica*, 12 vols., Bangalore, 1886-1905, of which L. Rice, *Mysore and Coorg from the Inscriptions* (London, 1909), is a compendium.

attacks on the north-west from their rivals, the Señas, or Yādavas, of Devagiri.

The Hindu empire of Vijayanagar was now established, and continued till 1664, although the capital was destroyed a century before. It was the overlord of all the southern kingdoms, including Mysore. But, after its power was broken in 1565, the Sultāns of Bijapur, with the aid of Mahratta forces, held the north and east, while in the south rose to independence the Mysore royal house of Wodeyars. Except during the Muhammadan usurpation of Haidar 'Alī and Tipu Sultān (1761-99), from which they were released by the British, they have held the sovereignty till now. But, owing to the deposition of the Rāja for misrule, the country was under British administration for 50 years till 1881.

3. Name.—The name of the State, properly Maisūru, is that of the capital, and may be explained as meaning 'buffalo-town.' The Sanskrit *mahisha*, 'buffalo,' becomes *maisa* in Kannada, and *ūru* is the Kannada for 'town' or 'country.' It derives its origin from the legend of the destruction of Mahishāsura, a minotaur or buffalo-headed monster, by Chāmūṇḍi or Mahishāsura-mardini, the form under which the consort of Śiva is worshipped as the tutelary goddess of the ruling family. The name may be traced in the Mahisha-maṇḍala, or Buffalo country, of Aśoka's time (3rd cent. B.C.). A possible ground for the appellation may be found in the fact that buffalo-worship was, and remains, a special cult of the Todas of the Nilgiris, the southern part of Mysore. The language of this interesting primeval tribe is that of Mysore in the old form. The earliest mention of them so far discovered is in a Mysore inscription of 1117, but they must have been settled there for ages before. They have orders of priests consecrated to the service of the buffalo; their temples are dairies where buffalo-milk is the holiest offering, and where the bell worn by the buffalo-cow is the most sacred symbol. Their affinity to hill tribes in Mysore is attested by the fact that their *pālāl*, or priests, who are chosen only from the Paiki, or highest clan, describe themselves as *Der Mokh*, i.e. *Devara makkalu*, or 'God's children,' which is also the case with the *mande* and *grāma patels* in Manjarabad. Then there are the well-known Hale Paiki in the Nagar Malnād. The *mand* of the Todas corresponds to the *mandu* of Coorg and the *mande* of Manjarabad. The buffalo is a sacrificial animal among the lower orders throughout the south of India, and is periodically slaughtered with special rites in the groves or before the shrines of the *grāma-devatā*, or village-goddesses.

4. Animism.—The worship of these deities gives expression to pre-animistic and hylozoist or animistic beliefs that probably had their origin in remote ages, long before any organized systems of religion. But they retain their hold on the multitude of the submerged, who are too low in the scale of humanity to count upon interest on the part of the great gods. Thus serpents and trees, or other objects, which are closer at hand and invested with mystery, are propitiated, with a view to good gifts and the warding off of portentous evils. The serpent venerated is the *nāga*, or deadly cobra, and its worshippers, called Nāgas, were a widely spread race in pre-historic times. Many minor royal families in the west claim to be of Nāga descent. Effigies of the cobra are set up to this day at the entrance of most villages or towns for the adoration of the public, and ceremonial offerings are made to the living cobra. Few natives will consent to kill one, and the body of one that has been killed is solemnly cremated. A cobra often takes up its abode in a deserted ant-

hill, which becomes its shrine. To embrace this was a recognized mode of taking sanctuary.

The sculptured images of serpents mentioned above generally consist of three slabs erected in a row, facing the rising sun, on a raised platform. The first bears the figure of a male cobra, with one or more heads of an odd number up to seven; the middle one shows the form of a woman from the waist upwards, crowned with a tiara, in the upper half, ending in a serpent in the lower half, sometimes holding a young serpent under each arm; the third slab has two serpents intertwined in congress, as in the Æsculapian rod or the *caduceus* of Mercury, with sometimes a *linga* engraved between them. The stones are worshipped by circumambulation, chiefly by women, with a view to obtaining offspring.

The *grāma-devatā*, or village-goddess, is familiarly spoken of as Amma, the mother, or in the honorific plural Ammanavarū, which is the Amnor of the Todas. Māramma or Māriamma is perhaps the commonest, and most villages have a Māri-guḍi; but she sometimes bears various local names combined with *amma*. Though emphematically styled 'mother,' she is more feared lest her wrath should be aroused than loved as a tender protector. In some respects she seems to correspond to Durga, or Kālī, also called Chāmūṇḍi, and is explained as one of the furies attendant on that goddess. She reminds one of the demon of love, anger, evil, and death, called Māra, who opposed Buddha and the spread of his religion.

The class of deities known as *bhūta*, demon spirits, or the occult powers of nature, are worshipped under the form of a few naturally rounded stones placed together either under a tree or in a small shrine, and smeared with oil and turmeric. Charms to avert the evil eye, engraved on stones, called *yantra kallu*, are often erected at the entrance of villages. Similar ones on medals or metal plates are hung round the necks or waists of children.

5. Jainism.—The adoption of primitive animistic beliefs into Jainism is regarded as one evidence of its antiquity. The view now held is that it did not originate with Mahāvira or Vardhamāna, but some centuries earlier, the 8th B.C., with Pārśva or Pārśvanātha, the Tirthankara who preceded him. For the Nirgranthas mentioned in the early records of Buddhism were followers of Pārśva. But Mahāvira was a reformer, who promoted Jainism and introduced new features into it. He lived a little before Buddha, but they were for some time contemporary. Mahāvira had three personal disciples who succeeded him as teachers and were styled Kevalis. The next succession of Jain teachers after them were the five Śrutakevalis. Of these the last was Bhadrabāhu. He it was under whose influence Chandragupta became an ascetic and journeyed in his company to the south, where both died at Śravaṇa Belgola in Mysore, in the circumstances related above. The story is met with in ancient records, and is repeated down to modern times. It is also supported by local memorials of antiquity at Śravaṇa Belgola and Seringapatam, in which the summit of the hill on which they died at the former place is described as consecrated by the footprints of the inseparable pair (*yugma*) Bhadrabāhu and Chandragupta.

Jainism no doubt already existed at that time in Mysore and other parts of S. India. Though its antiquity and its priority to Buddhism are now generally known, and it was freely distributed in upper India, it is singular that the first discovery by Europeans of the Jains as a sect should have been made in Mysore, and that not till so late as the beginning of the 19th century. The discovery was due to Colonel Colin Mackenzie, who at that period made the survey of Mysore. It is thus only in recent years that the Jains have received special attention and the distinction between them and Buddhists, of whom they had been considered an offshoot, has been established. Their creed is called

the Jina-śāsana, a leading doctrine of which is the *śyādvāda*. The Bhavyas is another name for the Jains in inscriptions.

There are two divisions of the Jains—the Digambara (sky-clad or nude) and the Svetāmbara (white-clad). Those in Mysore belong to the former, and there is reason to believe that the separation took place when Bhadrabāhu forsook the north for the south. They are composed of *yatis*, or clerics, and *śrāvakas*, or laity. Only the former now discard clothing and that only at meals; at other times they are covered with a yellow robe, becoming Pītāmbara. The Jain images of the Tīrthankaras, many of colossal size, are always nude. The priests claim to be of the Śrī-Mūla-saṅgha, which was formed by Arhaddali, it is said, into four, namely, the Sena, Nandi, Deva, and Simha *saṅghas*. The *saṅghas* are composed of *gaṇas*, and the *gaṇas* of *gachchas*. The seat of the chief *guru*, or high priest, in Mysore is at Śrāvana Belgola, and he claims jurisdiction also over the Jains in Delhi, and certain places in North and South Kanara. From the beginning of the 12th cent. the Śrāvana Belgola *gurus* have the distinctive title of Chārukīrti Panditāchārya. They are of the Kōṇḍakundānvaya, Nandi-saṅgha, Deśi-gaṇa, and Pustaka-gachcha. They had a subordinate establishment at Maleyūr, in the south of Mysore, which is now closed. Its *gurus* apparently had the name Bhaṭṭakalanka Deva. The other existing seat of a Jain *guru* is at Humeḥa, in the Nagar country to the west, dating from the 8th cent., but it is in a very reduced condition. The *gurus* bore the name Devendrakīrti Bhaṭṭāraka.

Jainism enjoyed royal patronage down to the 12th century. It was greatly promoted by Samantabhadra in the 2nd cent., and was the State creed in the time of the Gangas, of some of the Rāshtrakūṭas and Kalachuryas, and the early Hoysalas, also of the minor States of Pannāta, of the Śāntaras, the early Changālvās, and the Kōṅḍālvās. But the extinction of the Rāshtrakūṭas in 982, the Chola conquests in 1004, the conversion of the Hoysala king in 1098, and the assassination of the Kalachurya king in 1167 were severe blows to its influence. It had been opposed on its religious side by the Brāhman reformers Kumārīlabhaṭṭa and Sankarāchārya in the 8th century. Sectarian bitterness then became pronounced, and at about the same period the Jain leader Akalanka is said to have overcome the Buddhists in disputation before the royal court at Kānchi, in consequence of which the latter were banished to Ceylon. On the other hand, in 1368, in the reign of Bukka-Rāya of Vijayanagar, when the Jains or Bhavyas complained of being persecuted by the Bhaktas, or Vaiṣṇavas, the king summoned the leaders of both parties before him, and, after full inquiry, took the hand of the Jains (as the record graphically puts it) and, holding it in the hand of the Vaiṣṇavas, decreed that no differences could be recognized between them, and that each might freely carry on their respective religious ceremonies without interference. Even before this broader views had been spreading among the Jains, for we find Jina described in 1151 as the Universal Spirit who is Śiva, Dhātṛī (Brahmā), Sugata (Buddha), and Viṣṇu, while for a generation following there were chiefs who supported all four creeds.

The Jains were the earliest cultivators of Kannada, the language of Mysore, and created in it an extensive literature of great excellence and variety. Their numbers in Mysore were returned as 17,630 in the census of 1911, an increase of 28 per cent in the last decade. But they are not a proselytizing sect, and this accession is due to the Śāḍas, a class of Vokkaligas, or cultivators, in the central parts, having entered themselves as Jains.

Such they no doubt were originally, but at the present time only one section worship Jina, the other two sections being worshippers respectively of Viṣṇu and Śiva. All eat together and intermarry, the wife adopting the practice of her husband. A few Jains also have migrated from the Rājputāna States. These are Svetāmbaras, and are money-lenders or merchants. Most of the Jains are traders and landlords, some are workers in brass and copper, but few are farmers. There has been some movement among the Jains of recent years in organizing their members and opening communications with those in other parts, for which there are now so many facilities.

6. Buddhism.—Buddhism was, of course, the official creed in such part of the north of Mysore as was included in the Maurya empire in the time of Aśoka, the 3rd cent. B.C., towards the close of his life, though he is considered by some to have been a Jain in his earlier days, and was probably brought up as one. Be that as it may, Buddhism was carried in his reign by missionaries to Mahishamandala, the south of Mysore, and Vanavāsī (Banavāsī) in the north-west. These countries, which were beyond but bordering on the Maurya empire, were thus newly brought into connexion with the religion at that time. There is no evidence that it made much progress, but Rhys Davids has found mention in early Pāli writings of Buddhist scholarship in Karnātaka. Certain references also occur in inscriptions. One informs us that a Buddhist affixed a challenge to the main door of the palace at Talakād, the Ganga capital, in A.D. 247, claiming that no disputants would be able to stand up against him. But a Brāhman took up the challenge, and, when the Buddhist denied the existence of the soul, refuted and overcame him, making him crouch down like a vanquished elephant. The Bāna king in 338 is said to have been like Bodhisattva in compassion for all living things. A grant to a Buddhist by the Ganga king Maṭṭha (357-370) has been obtained, the site of which was apparently near the old religious centre Avani in Kolar District, and the donation was made for the benefit of a *vihāra*.

As Pāthak has pointed out, 'the Buddhist writer, the Jaina writer Brahmanasiddhanta, and the Brahmanical writer Mādhavāchārya are all agreed in dating the final failure of Buddhism from the time when the Brahman reformers Kumārīlabhaṭṭa, Akalanka-deva, and Sankarāchārya appeared in Southern India, i.e. the 8th century (JRASSO vol. 190, pp. 101).

The victory of Akalanka the Jain over the Buddhists and their consequent banishment to Ceylon have been already mentioned. Still, even as late as 1055, a Buddhist *vihāra* was erected in Belgola in the north-west, and a Buddhist *śrāvaka* or monk was living there in 1098, while a Jain *śrāvaka* town named Kalavati is mentioned even in 1100.

It is of interest to note that an effort has been quite recently made to revive Buddhism in Mysore by missionaries connected with the Buddhist of Burma and Ceylon. Two branches of the Sakya Buddhist Society have been started, one in the civil and military station of Bangalore in 1904, and one at the Kolar *śrāvaka* town in 1911. They were at the time of the 1911 census 111 in number, though only 19 were returned in 1901. The increase is due to converts. The religion seems to appeal especially to the Śūdras, and to the lower and middle classes in the Kolar region. There are no Jains at the *śrāvaka* town.

7. Saivism and Vaishnavism.—Hinduism is principally a mixture of the worship of Śiva and Viṣṇu. It is a religion which can be assigned for the most part to the period which existed from the earliest times. The gods were generally represented by images. They found a place in the popular imagination, and their counterparts, or avatars, of the gods were the

They were sometimes combined under their names Hari and Hara. Hindus in 1911 numbered 5,340,908, or 92 per cent of the population.

The common symbol under which Śiva is worshipped is the *līṅga*, or phallus, a solid, round, stumpy pillar, fixed in the centre of a flat circular slab representing the *yonī*, but there is practically no consciousness of their significance, and the worship is free from anything indecorous. Facing the *līṅga* is the recumbent bull Nandi, the vehicle of Śiva. But the god is also sculptured in anthropomorphic forms, bearing certain emblems, or posing in particular attitudes. The spread of Śaivism in the south seems largely due to a teacher named Lakulīśa (also written Nakulīśa), who can be traced to the 1st cent., and was believed to be an incarnation of Śiva. He was born in Kārohana (Kārvān in the Baroda State), and is mentioned in the *Vāyu* and *Līṅga Purāṇas*. His system was that of *yoga*, or asceticism, which was followed by the Pāsupatas, so called from Pāsupati, a name of Śiva. It was known as the Lākula-siddhānta, Lākulāmnāya, and Lākulāgama. His being sculptured as Śiva with a club, which is the meaning of his name, suggests comparison with Hercules and his club. He had four disciples—Kūṣika, Gārgya, Kauruṣa, and Maitreya—who gave rise to four branches of the sect. The Lākula system was established at Mewar in Rajputana and other places in the north. In the south the Pallava kings of Kānchi had the bull, or Nandi, as their crest, and the *khatvāṅga*, or Śiva's club, on their banner. The Mahāvali, or Bāpa, kings in the east of Mysore claimed to have made Paramēśvara (or Śiva)—worshipped by all the three worlds, the lord of gods and demons—their door-keeper, which probably means that they had erected a notable temple of Śiva at the entrance of their capital. A Bāpa queen built the Śiva temple at Nandi, at the foot of Nandidroog, before 806, and the Kālāmukhas, adherents of the Pāsupata system, were at that period established on the hill and parts around.

In the 8th cent. arose the great Śaiva reformer Sankarāchārya, who recognized the Pāsupatas. He was the founder of the Smārta sect, and established his principal *math*, or monastery, in the west of Mysore, at Sringeri, the head of which is styled the *jagad-guru*, or priest of the world, and is widely acknowledged as a pope in the south.

On the north-east of Mysore we have a record of the Nonambas or Nalambas, who were descendants of the Pallavas, dated in 943, which brings to notice a *muninātha* named Chilluka, in whom Lakulīśa is said to have been born again, fearing lest his name and works should be forgotten. This points to a fresh revival of the system after some decline. In 1020 a Lakulīśa appears at Melpādi in N. Arcot. He may be the same as the one to whom a grant was made in 1035 at Belgāmi, in N.W. Mysore, by the Chalukya king Jayasimha, for the Pancha-Linga temple, which is described as the Kālāmukhi-Brahmachāri-sthāna. The Kālāmukhas (or black friars) were exponents of the Lakulīśa system, and they are explained to be a branch of the Sakti-parshva, of the Mūvarakoneya-santati of the Parvata-vaṇi. At the end of the 11th and during the 12th cent. there was a wider adoption of the Lakulīśa system, under the Hoysala kings. The principal centres were Dorasamudra (Halebid), Arsikere and its neighbourhood, but especially Belgāmi. Here an eminent line of learned *gurus* who were Kālāmukhas is mentioned in connexion with the Koḍiya-maṭha attached to the Dakṣiṇa-Kedāreśvara temple. In 1162 it was visited by Bijjala, the Kalachūrya king, who was a Jain. So impressed was he by the erudition of the high priest and the unstinted charities dispensed by the institution—food and medicine being given freely

to all comers—that he added to its endowments. And, among other extensive praises, it is said to be a place where commentaries were made on the Lākula-siddhānta, the Patañjali, and other Yoga systems. Towards the close of the 13th cent. we are informed, in a record in Tiptur taluq, of apparently a new Lākula-samaya, which perhaps refers to some fresh features introduced into the system. At the same date grants were made to the Pancha-Linga to the west of Chitaldroog. Below the Anki-maṭha at this spot is a series of subterranean caves with special arrangements for *yogāsana*.

Though in this form more a philosophic than a popular creed, it doubtless had its influence on the people in general. But in the middle of the 12th cent. took place the revival which resulted in the establishment of the Lingāyat, Jangama, or Vira-Śaiva religion. This was a revolt against Brāhmanism, and it still persists as the popular faith of the Kannada-speaking people. Basava, the prime minister at Kalyāna of the Kalachūrya king Bijjala, whose sister the king had married, was the moving spirit of this reformation. He was an Arādhya Brāhman of Bāgevaḍi in Bijapur District. He had refused to be invested as usual with the sacred thread, which involved adoration of the sun, and had then retired to Sangamesvara, where he was initiated in the tenets of the Vira-Śaiva creed. This, according to one account, was originally founded by five sages—Ghaṇṭakarna, Gajakarna, Renuka, Dāruka, and Viśvakarna—who, in the present Kali age, acquired the names Ēkorāma, Paṇḍitārya, Revanasiddha, Marulasiddha, and Viśvārya. Their seats are at Kedarnāth (in the Himālayas), Śrīśaila (Karnūl District), Bālehalli (in W. Mysore), Ujjini (on the Mysore-Bellary frontier), and Kāśi (Benares). Channa-Basava, the son of one of Basava's sisters, is considered a joint promoter with his uncle of the Lingāyat faith. Ēkorāma is no doubt identical with Ekāntada-Rāmāyya, who, in a record of the end of the 12th cent., is related to have signally defeated the Jains. He was a Śaiva Brāhman of Alande in Gulbarga District, and settled at Ablūr in Dharwar District, where, by means of a miracle, he gained his victory, certified by the king Bijjala, who was himself a Jain. The epithet before his name signifies that he had only 'one aim,' the worship of Śiva. Finding Basava freely spending the public funds for his religion and putting his own adherents into all offices, the king interfered, and incontinently ordered two pious Lingāyats to be blinded. This cost him his life, for he was poisoned or assassinated. His son resolved to avenge his death, and Basava fled to Ulavi on the west coast. It was besieged, and, when the place was reduced to extremity, Basava in despair threw himself into a well and was drowned. But, according to the Lingāyats, he disappeared into the Līṅga at Sangamesvara.

The new faith, however, rapidly spread, and within 60 years after Basava's death, or by 1228, it was embraced from Ulavi, near Goa, to Sholapur, and from Bālehalli (in Kadūr District) to Sivaganga (Bangalore District), superseding that of the Jains, many of whose images and temples were adapted for Śiva-worship. Virtually all the States in Mysore professed it, especially those in the north and west.

The *sthāvara*, or fixed *līṅga*, as an object of worship in a temple, was by it brought more home in the *jaṅgama*, or movable *līṅga*, attached to the person. This is a small acorn-like black stone, enshrined in a silver reliquary suspended from the neck or bound on the arm. It is worn throughout life and buried with the body at death. The *karma-mārga*, or way of rites and ceremonies, especially animal sacrifices, which promised salva-

tion in three births, gave place to the *jñāna-mārga*, or way of wisdom, by concentration on the *linga* in one's own hand, which promised salvation in one birth. The sect was originally recruited from all castes, and observances of caste, pilgrimage, fasts, and penance were rejected. Basava taught that all holiness consisted in regard for three things, *guru*, *lingam*, and *jangam*—the guide, the image, and the fellow religionist. But caste distinctions are maintained in regard to social matters, such as intermarriage. Initiation is by a priest of their own sect.

Since the decline of the Jains, the Lingāyats have to some extent preserved and cultivated the Kannada language. Their sacred books—the *Basava-Purāṇa* and *Channa-Basava-Purāṇa*—dated 1369 and 1585, are written in it. The number of Lingāyats in Mysore was returned as 729,431 in the 1911 census, but they also exist in larger numbers in the south Bombay Districts (1,339,248) and in the adjoining Districts of Madras (134,592) and Haidarābād (over 750,000), as well as some in other parts. They have numerous *maths* all over the country, but the chief one seems to be the *Murigi math* to the west of Chitaldroog.

For the worship of Viṣṇu the earliest incident met with is his appearance before Bali in his incarnation as a Brāhman dwarf. Begging for only three paces of ground, on this being granted, he assumed his own proportions and in three strides compassed heaven, earth, and the lower regions. In the time of Bāna, Bali's son, Kṛṣṇa is said to have invaded his territory and overcome Siva, who fought for Bāna. The thousand arms of the latter were cut off, except two, with which he was compelled to do homage. Perhaps, in other words, all Bāna's battalions were destroyed except two, which surrendered. These stories, whatever basis they may have, clearly point to a supersession of the Siva-cult by that of Viṣṇu, and refer to an early period. The Ganga king Viṣṇugopa, of about the 4th cent., was devoted to Nārāyaṇa (Viṣṇu). From this god the Chalukyas obtained their crest of the boar, another of his incarnations. But the tendency was to harmonize the two. Thus, the Vijayanagar kings had the boar crest, though they signed themselves after Virūpākṣa, a name of Siva. The Mysore kings claim descent from Kṛṣṇa, and, along with devotion to Sri-Ranganātha, worship Chāmnṇḍi.

An undoubted historical event is the arrival of the Vaiṣṇava reformer Rāmāṇjāhārya, also called Emberumānar, at Tonnūr in Mysore, whither he had fled for refuge from persecution by the Chola king, who was a Saiva. About 1098 he converted the Hoysala king Bitti-Deva, who was a Jain, and who now took the name Viṣṇuvardhana. Rāmānuja also established the sect of Śrīvaiṣṇava Brāhmanas, but records show the existence of Śrīvaiṣṇavas more than a hundred years before. He set up the *Yatirāja math* at Melkote and received large grants of land from his royal convert on both banks of the Kāvēri. Under the Hoysalas temples were erected for both Viṣṇu and Siva. And in subsequent periods they were jointly recognized in the combined form of Harihara, composed of Hari (Viṣṇu) and Hara (Siva). The fine temple of Hariharesvara at Harihara on the Tungabhadra was erected by a Hoysala general in 1224. But a record of 1130 says, with reference to their special symbols:

'Whether holding the *śankha* (conch) or the *kapāla* (skull), why make a difference? Whether the *chakra* (discus) is in the hand or the *triśūla* (trident), why distinguish between the weapons? In token of which they assume one form with separate hearts—the joyful Hari and Hara.'

One of a century later says:

'The celebrated Siva acquired the form of Viṣṇu, and Viṣṇu acquired the great and famous form of Siva, in order that the

saying of the Veda (that they were one) might be fully established.'

In the 14th cent. Keśava or Viṣṇu is identified as follows:

'Ho whom the Saivas worship as Siva, the Vedāntins as Brahmā, the Bauddhas as Buddha, the Naiyāyikas as Karta, the Jainas as Arha, the Mīmāṃsakas as Karma.'

8. Brāhmanism.—Brāhmanas are said to have been introduced into Mysore from the north of India in the 3rd cent. by the Kadamba king Mukanna in the west, and the Pallava king Mukuntī in the east. There are now three principal sects—the Smārtas, 63 per cent, founder Sankara in the 8th cent.; the Śrīvaiṣṇavas, 10 per cent, founder Rāmānuja in the 12th cent., forming two branches, Vaḍagalai, or northerners, and Tēngalai, or southerners; and the Mādhyas, 23 per cent, founder Mādhyāhārya in the 13th cent.; there are also a few Bhāgavatas, 4 per cent, whose origin seems to be very ancient. A non-Brāhman sect of Vaiṣṇavas are the Sūtānis, followers of Chaitanya, who worship Kṛṣṇa and are priests to the Holeyā and other lower orders.

9. Muhammadanism.—The Muhammadan religion came in with the Muslim conquests of the 14th cent., and the domination of Bijapur and the Mughals in the north and east after the overthrow of Vijayanagar. During the usurpation of Mysore by Haidar 'Alī and Tipu Sultān at the end of the 18th cent. vast numbers of captives taken in war were transported wholesale, with their wives and families, from their native countries to other parts of the kingdom and forcibly converted to Islām, the boys being trained for military service in Chela battalions. The number of Muhammadans in the 1911 census was 314,494, or 5 per cent of the population. Nearly all are Sunnis, settled in the country for some generations. Mappilas, or Moplahs, are immigrants from the Malabar coast, and Labbai from the Coromandel coast.

10. Christianity.—Christians in the 1911 census were returned as 59,844, an increase of 19½ per cent on the previous decade. They include 42,543 Roman Catholics, 6656 Anglicans, and 9050 other Protestants. The great majority of the Indians and Anglo-Indians belong to the first, and of Europeans to the second. Some stray Dominicans apparently visited the country in the 14th cent., followed by Franciscans in the 16th. But it was in the middle of the 17th that Jesuits began regular work. That order was suppressed by the pope in 1773, and, soon after, Tipu Sultān razed all the churches except two to the ground. J. A. Dubois became head of the Mission at the beginning of the 19th cent., and spent many years in Mysore. There is now a bishop in Bangalore, and stations are established in many of the principal parts. There are several Protestant missions at work, the oldest being the London Mission, which began in 1820, and the Wesleyan in 1835. Some years before this a Wesleyan missionary from Jaffna, named Elijah Hoole, seems to have visited Mysore, where he had an interview with Dubois, who is said to have expressed the opinion that the conversion of the heathen was a hopeless task. Both missions have a number of stations and institutions, the former in the east and the latter in the south and west, each with head-quarters in Bangalore. The London Mission were pioneers in female education, in 1840. The Wesleyans started the teaching of English to the natives; also a printing press for vernacular works. More recently they have established hospitals. The American Methodist Episcopalians began work in 1880, and minister chiefly to the Anglo-Indians in Bangalore, but also have an Industrial School for Indians at Kolar. The Church of England Zenana Mission have hospitals for women in Bangalore and Channapatna, and visit Musalmān families in

their homes there and at Mysore. A United Theological College was opened in Bangalore in 1914, to which the various missions in South India send selected students to be trained as preachers to their countrymen. The ideal of a Nationalist Indian Protestant Church seems to be in the minds of a few Indian Christians, but its realization has yet to come.

The Brāhma Samāj is represented by 65 members of the Sādhāran section in Bangalore. Theosophy has also been brought to notice in the same place. The Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A. have made very substantial progress there, and the Salvation Army has taken over the silk farm started by Tata under Japanese management. A Social Service League has recently been established in Mysore.

11. Conclusion.—With so much religious activity in the past, and so many different agencies in operation at the present, Mysore has proved itself a favourable meeting-place for many creeds. And in view of the long predominance of Jainism, immediately followed by the establishment of the still popular Vira-Saiva or Lingāyat faith, it might perhaps on good grounds be described as a home of dissent. On the other hand, on the side of orthodoxy, two chief Hindu reformers made it their abode. The State, as it now exists, has not been blind to the drawbacks of a purely secular education, while still desiring to maintain the neutrality in religious matters which has been the policy of the British Government. Private agencies have, of course, as far as they were able, supplied a counterpoise. But the State was in favour of more public recognition of religion in the educational system. Arrangements were accordingly made in 1908 for the introduction of moral and religious teaching in the colleges and schools. Suitable

books for the purpose were published by Government and by private agency, and it was hoped that an abiding impression for good would be made on the boys and girls receiving the instruction. After a time it was found advisable in colleges to adopt weekly lectures by professors and pandits in place of daily half-hour religious and moral lessons. In the higher schools teaching was based on the *Sanātana Dharma* text-books and prescribed books on morals. In the lower classes instruction was imparted by the narration of simple stories containing moral precepts, with the help of wall-pictures. In the village elementary schools a short prayer in Kannada was recited both at the beginning and at the close of the day's work, followed by verses relating to daily conduct from the *Dharmabodhini* and other books. The latest official statement on the subject was to the following effect: after five years' experience it is still difficult to say what real advance has been made, and whether any of the desired results have been achieved. In the higher institutions, where the subject is in the hands of capable teachers, the lessons are instructive. But in the lower schools the want of trained teachers to handle the subjects and the paucity of suitable text-books have made the teaching to lack in interest and to become more or less stereotyped. It is a question whether in the long run it is not wiser to leave this branch of education to the parents and communities concerned. But, after discussing the matter, the Representative Assembly of 1915 has voted for the continuance of religious instruction.

LITERATURE.—L. Rice, *Mysore*, revised ed., 2 vols., London, 1897; J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*, tr. A. K. Beauchamp, Oxford, 1906; F. Buchanan, *A Journey from Madras through the Countries of Mysore, Canara, and Malabar*, London, 1807, reprinted Madras, 1870.

LEWIS RICE.

MYSTERIES.

American.—See SECRET SOCIETIES (American).

Babylonian (S. LANGDON), p. 70.

Christian (H. A. A. KENNEDY), p. 72.

Egyptian (A. MORET), p. 74.

Eleusinian.—See 'Greek, Phrygian, etc.'

Greek, Phrygian, etc. (P. GARDNER), p. 77.

Mithraic.—See MITHRAISM.

Phrygian.—See 'Greek, Phrygian, etc.'

Roman (P. GARDNER), p. 82.

MYSTERIES (Babylonian).—Since the belief in life after death held no important place in Babylonian religion, and their conception of existence in the nether world was gloomy and foreboding, they necessarily evolved no mystic rituals and doctrines to provide the soul with immunity when it descended to Arallū. The precautionary measures for those who died consisted in providing them with bread and water for their journey, continuing the celebration of the breaking of bread and pouring out water for their souls at sacred family feasts or in the official cult. But these simple measures to secure the soul repose in the lower world were known to all and concealed from none. If the Babylonians possessed any cult-mysteries, we must look for them in connexion with the celebrations of the death and resurrection of the nature-god Tammuz. There is no doubt that the liturgies sung at the midsummer wallings for the young god of vegetation who had died and was sought for by his weeping mother and consort were accompanied by a mystic pantomime. It is very probable that the celebrants made an image of the young god, and clothed him in some sacred garb, adorned his bark with flowers and grain, and cast him upon the waters of the canals and rivers. His descent beneath the waves symbolized his transportation to Arallū by demons. In the celebration of this festival the celebrants probably chose one of the priestesses to play the part of the

weeping mother Innini (Ishtar), who sighs for the departed lover and finally herself descends to Arallū to seek for Tammuz. She rouses him from his sleep and returns to earth bearing him in her bosom. The liturgies of this festival consist largely in dialogues and monologues uttered by Tammuz and Innini, and it is difficult to understand how the celebration could have been performed unless a priest acted those parts in which Tammuz appears as a young god shepherding his sheep, becoming the bridegroom of Innini, and reposing in Arallū, where he utters dialogues with the descended goddess. It is possible that, as in certain Greek mysteries, only women were admitted to some parts of this pantomime. The doctrine inculcated by this ceremony explained the mystery of the death and revival of vegetation. Undoubtedly the priests taught the people that the mystery consisted in the death of a god, in the consequent disappearance of the mother-goddess, in his resurrection, and in the return of the mother-goddess; finally, the reviving life of the earth depends upon the marriage of these deities. During the Sumerian cults of emperor-worship which thrived from the age of Dungi, second king of the dynasty of Ur, to the end of the Sumerian dynasties of Isin and Larsa the king himself was regarded as Tammuz. This identification was based upon an ancient belief that some mysterious connexion existed between the king and nature. Not only do the

liturgies of the cults of these deified emperors speak of the kings as controlling the beneficent life of the earth and bestowing rains, sunshine, and harvests, but, after the belief in the deity of kings was abandoned, the Semites continued to attribute this mystic power to their kings. In the earlier period we possess Sumerian hymns which celebrate the marriage of the divine king with the mother-goddess; the ceremony of the marriage of a nature-god with one of the married types of the mother-goddess at the spring equinox characterizes Sumero-Babylonian religion. This mystic rite, in fact, seems to have been severed from the Tammuz-Innini cult and attributed to married types of the nature-gods, as Ninib and Gula, Nebo and Tashmet, Marduk and Zerbant, and performed at the New Year festival in the spring. Although the doctrines concerning life and death in nature were not concealed from the people, it is probable that the actual ceremonies were regarded as mysterious and sacred acts. Tammuz is the only important god who is never represented in art, and we have also no representations of the marriage ceremonies. It is practically certain that only priests and priestesses were allowed to perform in these celebrations, but no references to initiation have been found.¹

In the later periods of pessimism and philosophic speculation this cult was brought into connexion with the life beyond the grave in so far as their conceptions of that life permitted human worship to send aid to departed souls. We possess a Semitic composition known as the 'Descent of Ishtar,' which probably represents mystic speculation on this point and a ceremony to comfort the dead.² According to the last line, 'May the dead arise and smell the incense,' the priests chanted this hymn to comfort those who had gone to Arallū. Here we have a long description of how Ishtar descended by the seven gates of hell to the lower world. No reason for this perilous journey is given, but from the liturgies of the Tammuz-Ishtar cult we know that the descent was made to rescue the young god. Her disappearance from earth is marked by the cessation of plant and animal activity. She is imprisoned by Erishkigal, queen of the lower world, and afflicted with bodily disease. The gods interfere and send a messenger (*Ašû-šunamir*, 'His going forth is glorious') to Erishkigal to secure the release of the goddess of all life. By his pleasing appearance he overcomes the wrath of the under-world deity and causes her to swear in the name of the great gods (to release Ishtar).³ The hymn here introduces a ruse by which Ea the water-god prevented his messenger *Ašû-šunamir* from attaining immortality. This is an old motif in the Sumero-Babylonian theory of the fall of man to show how man (on this theory) lost eternal life by the jealousy of the water-god, patron of all knowledge. The motif is worked into this mystic

hymn to emphasize the condition of the dead, who cannot hope to attain the water of eternal life. Having thus sworn under the persuasive influence of the comely messenger, Erishkigal orders the spirits of the lower world to wash Ishtar with the 'waters of life,' by which she is healed; she is then conducted by the seven gates to earth. The water-god also commissions his messenger to try another method to bring back Ishtar in case the queen of Arallū refuses to give her up.⁴ The hymn implies here that Tammuz is also in the lower world. The last lines (46-58) run as follows:

'If she grant thee not her deliverance so to her repeat thy effort.
Tammuz, the husband of her maidenhood,
Wash with clean water, anoint with good oil.
Clothe him in a radiant garment and let him play² the flute of Iopis-lozuli.
May the whores³ reel their bodies.
[Then] Belili⁴ had completed her precious things,
She whose lap was full of jewels;
She heard the wailing of her brother; Belili smote her precious things,
And her chamber was filled with jewels.
'Oh mine only brother not shouldest thou bring me to shame.
On the day when Tammuz plays for me the flute of Iopis-lozuli, and when on that (day)⁵ with him they play to me on a flute of porphyry,
Yea with him the men wailers and the women wailers play to me,
May the dead arise and smell the incense.'

We have here a cryptic hymn whose composition is illogical in places, many ideals being abruptly introduced, and the whole composition bears the impress of a mystic cult. The real object of this hymn, which was probably accompanied by a pantomime, was to comfort the souls of the dead and assist them to arise for the *parentalia*. The flute-playing of Tammuz, who knows the sorrowful abode in Arallū, has a powerful effect upon those who sleep in that shadowy and silent land. Like Orpheus, whose music on the lyre appeased the deity of Hades and secured the release of Eurydice, so the music of Tammuz secures the release of his consort Ishtar. At the same time on earth the sacred women celebrate the myth of Tammuz and Ishtar, while the divine sister Belili wails for his return to earth. It is improbable that this composition belongs to the ordinary Tammuz liturgies sung at the midsummer wailings, for these were invariably said in Sumerian and were composed in liturgical style.

The adaptation of this cult to mystic purposes was probably more widely spread in the late period of Babylonian and Assyrian history than has commonly been supposed. This seems to be the only trace of a mystic cult in Babylonia.

On the other hand, their world views were wholly under the influence of the doctrine concerning mystic wisdom revealed only to the initiated by divination. All events in the world are regarded, not as results of natural causes or the exercise of the free will of man, but as the 'decision' (*piristu*) of the gods. This word is often replaced by the word *niširtu*, 'treasure,' 'secret knowledge,' and both have been rendered by 'mystery' in Assyriological works. These mysteries (this secret knowledge concerning the future) were revealed by the gods to the priests of divination (*barā*, 'diviner,' *barātu*, 'divination'), who were initiated into the study of divination. The principal subjects of this extensive discipline consisted in interpreting the divine secrets by hepatoscopy, astrology, lecanomancy⁶ (especially the method of pouring oil upon water in a bowl), terastocopy, and oneiromancy. According to Berossus,

¹ So the present writer understands a disputed line Rev. 46.

² Read *im-tal-lai*?

³ Prostitutes in the temple-services of Ishtar who took part in Tammuz celebrations.

⁴ Sister of Tammuz.

⁵ *HAR=šutu*.

⁶ Only these three are referred to in the official directions for the initiation into the mysteries of divination (H. Zimmern, *Ritualtafeln für den Wahrsager*, Leipzig, 1901, no. 24).

¹ The liturgies of the Tammuz-cult were sung in Sumerian by the Semites, who borrowed the entire ceremony. These liturgies were provided with an interlinear Semitic version; therefore the words of the ceremonies were certainly public property.

² The text will be found in IV Rawlinson 2 (Piches), London, 1891, plate 31. The colophon does not say that it is a copy from a Babylonian source, but part of a Sumerian original has been found. An Assyrian duplicate of Obv. 33-45 has been recovered by L. W. King (*Cuneiform Texts*, xxxiv. 18, Ki. 1904-10-9, 159+k. 7600, London, 1914). We have here in all probability a mystic composition from the late Sumerian period.

³ The objects of the oath are not given. Here Rev. 18-20 follows a passage showing how Ea deceived his messenger *Ašû-šunamir* by telling him to ask for the mystic water-vessel in order to drink the water of life and obtain immortality. He asks for this and instead he is told that he has asked for what no man should ask for. Wherefore she curses him with disgrace and poverty. This is a repetition of the ruse which Ea invented for Adapa, whom he advised to refuse the water of life. Both *Ašû-šunamir* and Adapa are mortal protégés of Ea, who fears that in their missions before the gods they will obtain the gift of immortality and hence he will lose them in his worship.

the seventh pre-diluvian king was *Eēdēwāpaxos*,¹ in whose reign arose a fish-man from the Erythraean Sea and revealed the mysteries to this king. At any rate such must have been the nature of the revelation to this king, for in historical times the gild of diviners recognized Enmeduranki, a mythological (?) king of Sippar, as the founder of this art. Only descendants of this king were admitted to this gild and taught the principles of divination, and this secret knowledge was transmitted from father to son. Physical and mental soundness was required of all applicants for initiation. The technical books for each department of divination are extensive and are written in a peculiar mixture of Semitic and Sumerian which must have obscured their meaning. These books were probably the sacred possession of the gild of diviners. Kings not infrequently publish in their historical inscriptions a full copy of the report of the diviners on certain royal undertakings.² We possess a very large number of letters and reports³ from astrologers to the kings of Assyria concerning the events about to occur, as they were revealed by the conjunctions and positions of the planets, constellations, and atmospheric conditions. These reports are really extracts from the mystic book of astrology which gave instruction on every possible astral condition. It seems, therefore, that the diviners had no hesitation about publishing the results of their prognostications, even when in certain cases (as in dreams) similar data might be used by laymen and the proper results inferred from published reports. The oracles of Arbela, upon which the kings of Assyria particularly depended, were all published and became common property.⁴ Nevertheless the *barā* priests certainly guarded the books of divination as mystic treasures. At the end of tablets of this class we find the literary note, 'The secrets of divination; the instructed shall teach the learner and the uninstructed shall not read.'⁵ Tablets containing the mysteries of divination were called the 'sacred possession' of the gods.⁶

The Babylonians believed that Ea the water-god in several successive revelations had communicated to the pre-diluvian kings all knowledge useful to man, and 'since that time nothing material has been added by way of improvement to his instructions.'⁷ The various reports (by Berossus) of

their beliefs concerning the revelation of the sciences and arts and of the origin of the world and of man are confused. In some sources the being which arose from the sea was Ea (Oannes) in the reign of the fourth king. The revelations to later kings were made by mythical fish-deities sent by Ea and similar in form to him. The Greek sources of Berossus generally recognize four revelations under the first, third, sixth, and seventh kings (Alorus, Amillarus, Daos, and Euedoreschus). Berossus also reports that 'Ea (Oannes) wrote concerning generation and civil polity,' and that Cronus (*sic!*) appeared to the tenth and last pre-diluvian king, who is the hero of the Flood. Cronus commanded him 'to engrave in writing the beginning, the middle, and the end of all things, and to place it in Sippar.' After the Flood Xisuthros the king was transported to the land of the blest to dwell with the gods, and he instructed those who survived the Flood in a ship to return to Sippar, excavate these writings, and make them known to all men.¹ From this we infer that the Babylonians did not regard the sciences or the knowledge of the beginning of things as mysteries. The hero of the Flood has the title *hasisatar* (Xisuthros), 'the extremely wise,' and Adapa, a mythical hero and creation of Ea, has the same title, but they are not connected with mysteries in any of our known sources, although Adapa became symbolical with 'sage.' According to the Semitic Babylonian version of the fall of man, Anu the heaven-god cursed mankind with disease because Ea had revealed to him 'the things of heaven and earth and given him a wily heart.' This most probably refers to knowledge of good and evil and not to the mysteries of divination. A historical inscription of Asurbanipal describing the education of that king has the following much disputed passage:

'The . . . of the sage Adapa I learned. The hidden secrets of all writing, the tablets of heaven and earth,² I read, and disciplined myself. In the assembly of scholars I busied myself with the decrees (of the gods). The mysteries³ of heaven with the wise masters of oil-divination (!) I . . . The dreadful secrets which are not to be revealed I read.'⁴

From this passage we may infer that this king was admitted to the gild of the *barā* priests.

LITERATURE.—A. Jeremias, *Handbuch der altorientalischen Geisteskultur*, Leipzig, 1913, pp. 10-20. For the cult of Tammuz, S. Langdon, *Tammuz and Ishtar*, Oxford, 1914; H. Zimmern, 'Der babylonische Gott Tamūz,' *ABAW* xxvii. (1900). For mysteries of divination see *Literature under DIVINATION* (Assyrian-Babylonian), to which add E. G. Kianber, *Politisch-Religiöse Texte*, Leipzig, 1913. See also a suggestive art. by A. Boissier, in *Archives suisses d'anthropologie générale*, Geneva, 1914, nos. 1 and 2. S. LANGDON.

MYSTERIES (Christian).—I. The problem.—In Hellenic and Hellenistic usage the terms *τὰ μυστήρια* and (far more frequently) *τὰ μυστήρια* describe a secret cult, initiation into which presupposed a course of special preparation. It was sacrilege for an initiate to divulge anything that he had seen, heard, or experienced in the solemn esoteric ritual (see MYSTERIES [Greek, Phrygian, etc.]). The same terms occur in the NT, more especially in the Pauline Epistles, and the question has arisen whether, in those early Christian documents, Christianity is ever regarded as a mystery-religion. We know that the first Christian missions to the pagan world were carried on in an environment in which mystery-cults were influential. It can scarcely be doubted that many of St. Paul's converts would be drawn from the religious associations which those cults had brought into being.

¹ Cory, *Ancient Fragments*, p. 29.

² This probably refers to the books of astrology and perhaps also to those of hepatascopy.

³ For *AD-SAD* read *AD-HAL=piristu*.

⁴ O. F. Lehmann, *Samasumukin*, Leipzig, 1892, pl. xxxiv. 13-16.

¹ Variants, *Eēdēwāpaxos*, *ʾAēdēwāpaxos*, Eboranchus.

² For such reports of liver omens published in the historical inscriptions of Nabuna'id see S. Langdon, *Neubabylonische Königinschriften*, Leipzig, 1912, pp. 266-270 and 286-289. The same king publishes a dream and its interpretation (ib. p. 279), and a dream of Asurbanipal with its interpretation occurs in the historical inscriptions of that king.

³ R. Campbell Thompson, *Reports of the Magicians and Astrologers*, London, 1900. A number of letters to Assyrian kings contain such reports (R. F. Harper, *Assyrian and Babylonian Letters*, 14 vols., Chicago, 1892-1915).

⁴ The mysteries of Arbela stand apart from those of the *barā* priests, and appear to be unique in Babylonian and Assyrian history. The prophets and prophetesses of this oracular spot do not appear to have employed any of the ordinary means of discovering the will of the gods but to have replied from inspiration solely. Besides Arbela Aššur also was recognized as an oracular spot (see Langdon, *Tammuz and Ishtar*, Oxford, 1914, pp. 128-141).

⁵ So the colophon K. 7628 in the British Museum. K. 9736 has *la mūdū-u la immar*, 'the uninstructed shall not read.' Agumkakrime, a Cassite king, adds the same colophon to a historical inscription which was obviously intended for public information (V. Rawlinson, 33). The scribe was probably a Cassite who did not understand the colophon and added it as evidence of pedantic learning.

⁶ *Ikkibu* of Nebo, god of writing and learning (Zimmern, *Ritualtafel*, pp. 156, 2; 118, 46); *ikkibu* (*nig-gig*) of Nebo and Lugai (i.e. Marduk) (K. 7628); *ikkibu* of Nabu, Lugai, Shamash, and Adad (V. Rawlinson 33, viii. 30-32). *Ikkibu* is a loan-word from Sumerian *nig-gig* > *ig-gig* and generally means, 'abomination,' an act which one is forbidden to do, and hence by metonymy came to mean, 'object which one is forbidden to touch.'

⁷ Berossus, in Syncellus, *Chronicon* (I. P. Cory, *Ancient Fragments*, London, 1832, p. 23).

Did the early Christian missionaries assimilate their gospel to the esoteric doctrine and ritual which made so powerful an appeal to Graeco-Roman society?

2. Use of *μυστήριον* in NT.—An examination of the significance of the term *μυστήριον* in the NT must start from the usage of the LXX. There are about a dozen examples of *μυστήριον* in the LXX, and, except for two passages in the characteristically Hellenistic *Wisdom of Solomon* (14^{12, 23}), in which its technical significance is obvious, it seems usually to mean 'secrets' or 'secret plans' either of God or of men. The single instance found in the Gospels (Mt 13³⁵=Mk 4¹¹=Lk 8¹⁰) follows the LXX, as denoting the secret plans of God concerning His Kingdom which are being revealed in the words and deeds of Jesus. This meaning fits a considerable number of the Pauline examples, e.g., Ro 11²⁵, 1 Co 15⁵¹, etc., in which *μυστήριον* stands for a 'secret purpose' of God, revealed to the Apostle, shedding light on problems which would otherwise remain wholly perplexing. For St. Paul the Christian prophet is the man who knows all *μυστήρια* (1 Co 13²; cf. 1 Co 4¹), i.e. the secret mind of God. For his thought, however, one secret Divine purpose overshadows all others, the admission of the Gentiles to a full share of Christ's salvation on equal terms with the Jews. This he designates *μυστήριον* in various important passages, all belonging to the Imprisonment Epistles (e.g., Eph 3^{10, 610}, Col 1^{25a, 43}). It is noteworthy that in several other instances (e.g., Ro 11²⁵, 1 Co 2⁷ 15⁵¹, Eph 1⁹, Col 1²⁶, 2 Th 2⁷) the term has a distinctly eschatological outlook. But enough has been said to indicate that St. Paul's use of *μυστήριον* has no suggestion of an esoteric cult or ritual. As a matter of fact, it is generally associated with verbs of revelation (*ἀποκαλύπτειν*, *γνωρίζειν*, *φανεροῦν*).

One example stands by itself, and deserves attention because of its relation to later Patristic usage. In Eph 5³², when dealing with the bond between husband and wife, St. Paul adduces Gn 2²⁴ as enforcing their unity, and adds: 'This *μυστήριον* is far-reaching: I interpret it of Christ and the Church.' As the result of an exhaustive examination of the use of *μυστήριον* by Justin Martyr, H. von Soden has shown that he constantly uses it as equivalent to *παραβολή*, *σύμβολον*, and *τύπος*. Here, therefore, the OT passage is regarded as pointing forward to the relation between Christ and the Church. This explanation covers the four occurrences of *μυστήριον* in the Apocalypse. Von Soden further points out that Justin is the first Christian writer who employs *μυστήριον* to describe the Christian faith, which he compares with the pagan *μυστήρια*. Even more significant for the drift of Christian thought is the fact that Tertullian regularly translates *μυστήριον* by the Latin *sacramentum*. We must, nevertheless, guard against forming hasty conclusions from these data. For, as von Soden observes, 'sacramental conceptions and theories do not link on to the terms *sacramentum* and *μυστήριον*, but to ritual acts which had no such designations originally, and even later did not in the first instance receive them on account of their form' (*ZNTW* xii. 224). Indeed, this terminology was a very gradual adaptation to an already established practice.

3. Relation of St. Paul to mystery-religion.—In one of the passages cited above (1 Co 2⁷) St. Paul makes a distinction between the usual theme of his preaching, 'Jesus Christ and him as crucified,' and a 'wisdom' (*σοφία*), a 'Divine wisdom' *ἐν μυστηρίῳ*, which has been hidden, a more advanced stage of Christian instruction intended only for the 'mature' (*τοῖς τέλει*). His language in this

context might certainly suggest that he has availed himself of mystery-terminology in writing to people who must have been already acquainted with it. Would this imply that he was in sympathy with mystery-conceptions? Some scholars have laid emphasis on the occurrence in the Epistles of terms and ideas which they regard as definite evidence of a direct kinship between St. Paul and the mystery-religion. Let us briefly examine some typical examples.

(a) *Terms*.—St. Paul's favourite antithesis between *πνευματικός* and *ψυχικός* has been explained from Hellenistic religious usage. There can, indeed, be little doubt that within the sphere of mystery-cults *πνεῦμα* and *νοῦς* have become religious terms. But it is also plain that the contrast between *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή*, so fundamental for St. Paul, is exceedingly rare in Hellenistic religion, since *ψυχή* is apt to retain its significance as the higher element in human nature in opposition to *σῶμα*. The present writer has attempted to prove that St. Paul's religious use of *πνεῦμα*, *ψυχή*, and their derivatives has its genuine roots in the soil of the OT (*St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions*, pp. 155-158). To take another instance: in the mystery-documents *γνώσις* seems usually to mean that immediate apprehension of God which results in salvation or, more strictly, deification (e.g., *Poimandres*, ed. Reitzenstein, p. 336, line 24 f.). It is a practical experience rather than an intellectual process. Without question St. Paul regards *γνώσις* as a supernatural gift (e.g., 1 Co 12^{8, 13}, etc.). In one of his profoundest utterances (Ph 3¹⁰) it describes the most intimate fellowship conceivable between the soul and Christ. But here also account must be taken of the prophetic conception of the 'knowledge of God,' which is a revelation to the inner being. We may therefore speak of a striking affinity between the OT idea and that of Hellenistic religion, while admitting that, in the employment of the term and the conception which it embodied, St. Paul presupposed his readers' acquaintance with these through the medium of the mystery-religions. A somewhat similar conclusion may be reached as regards his use of *μεταμορφοῦσθαι* and cognate expressions (e.g., 2 Co 3¹⁸, Ro 8²⁹, Ph 3²¹). There are probably points of contact here between St. Paul's thought and the mystery-idea of transformation by the vision of God. But in the latter the chief emphasis falls on a quasi-magical transmutation of essence. The nature of the Apostle's conception of the *πνεῦμα*, which is the instrument in the process, sets in the forefront its moral significance.

(b) *Conceptions*.—Perhaps even greater stress is laid upon alleged parallel conceptions in St. Paul and the mystery-cults. Thus, e.g., the death and restoration to life of such mythological personages as Adonis, Attis, and Osiris, which, in the mystic drama, so affected the initiates as to produce a certain consciousness of entrance through passionate sympathy upon a life which the grave could not quench, are compared with St. Paul's teaching of redemption through the crucified and risen Jesus. But evidently this affinity did not appeal to the Greeks themselves, for the Apostle mentions that to them the preaching of the Cross was folly (*μωρία*). As a matter of fact, no real comparison is legitimate. The Greek legends of these so-called redeemer-gods have no hint of the forgiveness of sins. This forms the core of St. Paul's gospel. In the one case an imposing ritual excites the emotions. In the other, men, as constrained by the love of Christ, surrender their lives to His obedience. They assent to that estimate of things which is involved in the Cross. That implies a new moral attitude to the world and to God. A similar distinction may be traced between the idea

of salvation (*σωτηρία*) in the mystery-religions and that proclaimed by St. Paul. In the former salvation has mainly in view the pressure of Fate, Necessity, and those ills which belong to the limitations of earthly existence. It is invariably conceived as a *character indelebilis*. For St. Paul its atmosphere is the love of God revealed in Jesus Christ. From the very nature of the case it is charged with moral implications. It is mediated to the believer by the Spirit, and the Spirit is the Divine response to faith.

It is natural that St. Paul's conceptions of Baptism and the Lord's Supper should be investigated with a view to the discovery of affinities with mystery-ritual. It is highly probable that baptismal rites and sacramental meals, in so far as we can interpret the meagre and obscure data, were conceived in Hellenistic religion as working *ex opere operato*. No such idea is discernible in the utterances of St. Paul. In the case of both sacraments faith is for him the indispensable postulate of all that possesses spiritual value. Bartlett's definition of a sacrament (*ERE* ii. 377) is essentially true to the Apostle's standpoint: 'a symbol conditioning a present deeper and decisive experience of the Divine grace, already embraced by faith. But all is psychologically conditioned, being thereby raised above the level of the magical or quasi-physical conception of sacramental grace.'

The attempt of R. Perdelwitz (*Die Mysterienreligion und das Problem des I. Petrusbriefes*, Giessen, 1911) to find echoes of mystery-religion in 1 Peter is ingenious but quite unconvincing.

LITERATURE.—On *μυστήρια* in NT: H. von Soden, *ZNTW* xii. (1911) 158-227; J. Armitage Robinson, *St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians*, London, 1903, pp. 234-240. In favour of an intimat relation between St. Paul and the mystery-cults: W. Bousset, *Kyrios Christos*, Göttingen, 1913, pp. 125-186; A. Dieterich, *Eine Mithrasliturgie*, Leipzig, 1910; R. Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, do. 1904, *Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen*, do. 1910. Against the foregoing view: C. Clemens, *Der Einfluss der Mysterienreligionen auf das älteste Christentum*, Giessen, 1913; E. von Dobschütz, *Studien und Kritiken*, lxxviii. (1905) i. 1 ff.; P. Gardner, *The Religious Experience of St. Paul*, London, 1911; H. A. A. Kennedy, *St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions*, do. 1913; A. Schweitzer, *Die Geschichte der paulinischen Forschung*, Tübingen, 1911, pp. 141-184. H. A. A. KENNEDY.

MYSTERIES (Egyptian).—I. Introductory.—Herodotus and Plutarch tell of the existence of 'mysteries' in Egypt, and explain them thus:

'At Sais is the burial-places of ons whom I scruple to name [Osiris]. . . . On the lake [of the temple], the Egyptians represent by night the sufferings undergone by Him (τὰ δεικνύει τὸν πάθων αὐτοῦ), and this representation they call Mysteries (τὰ καλῶσι μυστήρια). All the proceedings in these Mysteries are well known to me; but my lips shall piously refrain from mentioning them' (Herod. ii. 170f.).

'Isis would not that her own woes and grievous journeyings, that the deeds of his wisdom and heroism should fall into oblivion and silence. She therefore instituted holy, sacred Mysteries (τελεραί) which would afford an image, a representation in mimic scenes of the sufferings he endured (εἰκόνας καὶ ὑπονοίας καὶ μίμημα τῶν τότε παθημάτων) that they might serve as a pious teaching and a consolatory hope to the men and women who passed through this same hardships' (Plut. *de Is. et Osir.* xxvii.).

From such statements we may infer the following definition: the Egyptian mysteries are rites in which recitation and mimic action are associated, i.e. dramatic performances of mystical character. Such dramas enact the Osirian legend; they teach a lesson and hold out consolation to the men who view them; the latter, being bound to observe secrecy upon those mysteries, are 'initiates.' It has been alleged that Herodotus and Plutarch, influenced by the Orphic and Eleusinian rites, transposed them to Egypt, and applied the name of 'mysteries' to ceremonies having no kind of analogy with the rites of initiation (C. Soudille, *Hérodote et la religion de l'Égypte*, Paris, 1910, p. 284), but the author of such an assertion makes light of the Egyptian sources themselves, which,

on the contrary, confirm the statements of the Greek writers on every point.

2. The Osirian mystery.—The most explicit Egyptian text is a *stela*, dated from Senusret III. (XIIIth dyn., c. 1875 B.C.): a high official, Igernefert, tells how he conducted a ceremony called 'the ceremony of the golden chamber for the mystery (*sēsta*) of the lord of Abydos (Osiris)'; it has been published by H. Schaefer, *Die Mysterien des Osiris in Abydos*, Leipzig, 1904.

Let us briefly recall the Osirian legend.

The Good Being (Unnefer) reigned over Egypt, and, with the help of his sister and spouse, Isis, he taught his subjects agriculture and all the arts and crafts; he also conquered the rest of the world in order to civilize it. His brother Seth (Typhon), however, murdered him, and launched the coffin containing the body into the Nile. It drifted away to Byblos, and was discovered there by Isis, who took it back to Buto in Egypt. Seth again found the corpse, and cut it into pieces, which he cast into the Nile. Isis resumed her mournful quest, searched for and found the fragments, and wherever she found a piece she raised a tomb over it. Then Horus, the son of Osiris, Thôth, and Anubis, his friends, came to Isis' help in order to 'avenge' Osiris; they justified him before the court of the gods, and restored his mummified body to life and immortality. Thus could Osiris hand over his realm to his son, Horus, who became the patron and ancestor of the Pharaohs (cf. A. Moret, *Kings and Gods of Egypt*, Eng. tr., London, 1912, p. 77f.).

Such was the subject of the mystery (*sēsta*) of Osiris. Igernefert, to whom Senusret III. has committed the preparations for the performance, attends first to the properties and requisites for scenery. He procures a barge which is to stand for the solar bar, a statue of Osiris adorned with lapis-lazuli, electrum, and precious stones, and also movable shrines in which to place the statue. In his capacity of 'head of the mystery,' Igernefert conducts the process of fabrication, and appoints sets of 'hourly priests' to execute the rites. When the action begins, he plays the part of Horus (*samer-f*, 'the beloved son'); after him, the principal parts are those of Anubis and Thôth, played by other high officials. The drama has several acts.

(1) It opens with a procession (*perjt*) of Anubis (*Upuaut*), who comes to protect (*nednu*) his father Osiris, and, with the help of Horus, defeats the adversaries of the barge (*nesmet*), and overthrows the foes of Osiris. Those adversaries are figured by supernumeraries who come to blows with the subjects of Osiris, and the fights are sometimes pictured (A. Moret, *Mystères égyptiens*, Paris, 1913, p. 15); Herodotus alludes to them (ii. 61, 132). We may suppose that now Osiris was shown sailing out in his barge, in order to conquer and civilize the world, after his triumph over his adversaries.

(2) The death of the god is treated next. No less reticent than Herodotus (ii. 170) and Diodorus (i. 21), Igernefert only points to this second act with a periphrasis: 'I conducted the great outing and I followed the god upon his steps.' Now, the expression 'great outing' (*perjt āat*) means the 'great mourning.'

Was, then, the murder of Osiris represented? We do not know. The texts in the Pyramids (Vth-VIth dyn., c. 2600 B.C.) describe the quest and discovery of the sacred corpse:

'They found Osiris such as his brother Seth did tell him (*nedj*) on earth, at *Nedj*' (N, 1263), and further: 'Isis embraced his body after she found him, stretched upon his side, on the shore of Nedj' (N, 863f.).

Other texts recall the woeful lament that rose up then to the throne of Rā:

'O Rā, hast thou not heard the voice that hath risen on an evening upon the shore of Nedj, the moaning cry of all the gods and goddesses' (W. Golenischeff, *Die Metternichstele*, Leipzig, 1877, l. 461f.).

It may be that the procession of the *perjt āat* would carry out realistically the search for and finding of Osiris's body while reciting the lamentations. At any rate the body of the god, richly adorned, was carried in a barge to his tomb at

Peker (the archaic cemetery of Abydos, where E. Amélineau claimed to have found the 'tomb of Osiris' within the enclosure of the tomb of King Chent [*Le Tombeau d'Osiris*, Paris, 1899]). The calendar of festivals at Medinet-Habu places the *perj'at* on 22nd Thôth (H. C. Brugsch, *Thesaurus*, Leipzig, 1883-91, p. 224); other texts assign to it different dates, and Plutarch places the funeral festivities of Osiris in the month of Athyr (Schaefer, p. 25, n. 4).

(3) After the burial we witness the resurrection and triumph of the god. Igernefert says:

'I have avenged Unnefer (Osiris) on this day of the great fight, I have smitten all his foes upon the river of Nedit' (l. 21).

Amid the cheers of his people the god sailed back in his barge to his city of Abydos; he re-entered his palace as a king (ll. 21-24), and received there his 'purification,' i.e. the rites which would ensure his life and triumph, at least until the next panegyrics. Here again the same circumspection as above is observed; the process of Osiris's resurrection, though it must necessarily be understood, is no more clearly alluded to than his death. Igernefert reveals only the outward pomp of Osiris's pageant; the fight against the adversaries of the god corresponds to the spectacle witnessed by Herodotus at Papremis (ii. 63): around the image of the god and on its way to the temple a battle is fought, but the god enters his temple despite his opponents.

This is the most complete account that we possess of an Osirian 'mystery,' but other documents preserve descriptions of festivals which include certain episodes of a mystery. Thus the feast celebrated on 1st Pakhon, when the king is seen cutting a sheaf with his sickle and sacrificing a white bull, seems to actualize the death of Osiris, god of vegetation (Moret, *Mystères*, p. 7f.). Another ceremony, the erection of the *ded*, the Osirian pillar, symbolizes the resurrection of the god and is associated with fighting and shouting (ib. pp. 12-15); the *Sed* festivities bring before our eyes the coronation and victory of resuscitated Osiris (ib. p. 16). Still more valuable are the rituals in the temples which describe the secret ceremonies of the passion and resurrection of Osiris. They were celebrated in small temples or in chapels erected for the special use of the god, such chapels being found in all large Egyptian temples. Of these ceremonies some would take place daily, others only at certain festivals; doubtless their rites formed the secret part of the 'mystery,' the part which Igernefert piously refrains from explaining and in which the death and resurrection of Osiris are acted.

We must remember that Igernefert, in order to celebrate the Osirian mystery, had appointed sets of 'hourly priests' (*wmo-tio*), and 'he had taught them the rites of every day,' in his capacity of 'head of the mystery.' Now, the Ptolemaic temples have preserved in their Osirian chapels texts and pictures illustrating the rites which the hourly priests recited and acted during each of the twelve hours (*wmo-t*) of night and of day. It is a sacred drama played by priests who assume the different parts of the Osirian family; we see Shû and Geb, the father and grandfather of Osiris; Horus, his son; Anubis and Thôth, his brothers or relatives; the four children of Horus; the goddesses Isis and Nephthys, wife and sister of Osiris; and, lastly, reciting and officiating priests. The scenery given by the reliefs consists of an image of Osiris swathed in the funeral shroud, a bed upon which the divine mummy is stretched, and several requisites, such as crowns, sceptres, weapons, libation vases, paint and incense boxes. The drama opens at six p.m. and closes twenty-four hours later; it falls into twelve hours of night (from six

p.m. to six a.m.) and twelve hours of day (from six a.m. to six p.m.). Its subject is the passion and resurrection of Osiris. From the first to the last hour the rites lead, step by step, towards the triumph of the god; yet this gradual advance is hardly felt because each hour is scenically treated as forming a complete little drama in itself, in which the god passes from death on to resurrection. At the beginning of each hour Osiris is led back to his initial state of distress, from which he is wrenched irresistibly by the power of rites and formulae, only to be brought back anew at the close of the hour (texts of Philæ, Edfu, Denderah, published by H. Junker, 'Die Stundenwachen in den Osirismysterien,' *SWAW*, phil.-hist. Klasse, liv. [1910]; the author makes a mistake in beginning with the hours of day, as the rites, as in any other festival, begin at six p.m.; the right order is twelve night hours followed by twelve day hours; for the bas-reliefs showing the scenery cf. A. Mariette, *Denderah*, Paris, 1880, iv.; E. A. W. Budge, *Osiris*, London, 1911, ii. 21 ff.; Moret, *Mystères*, pp. 20-36).

If we group together the actions and recitations during the course of these twenty-four hours, the scheme runs as follows:

(1) Isis and Nephthys have searched and found the body of Osiris upon the river of Nedit; woe and prolonged lament (cf. the papyrus of Berlin published by J. de Horrack, *Les Lamentations d'Isis et Nephthys*, Paris, 1866; Moret, *Kings and Gods*, p. 81f.).

(2) On hearing the cries, the gods come in haste; Horus, Anubis, and Thôth carry magical implements and vases filled with fresh water; Osiris is cleansed of all stains by four libations and fumigations.

(3) Divine magic effects a series of miracles: (a) the dismembered body of Osiris is restored; (b) by unctions with oil and paint and by the agency of the adze of Anubis mouth, eyes, and ears in the Osirian body are 'opened'; (c) the members are put into motion, and each organ recalled to life (these rites are more elaborately developed in a special ritual called 'Opening of the mouth' (*trap-re*; cf. E. Schiaparelli, *Il Libro dei funerali*, Turin, 1879)); (d) other methods are used to revive Osiris's body: it is buried in the earth that it may germinate and give forth sprouts, as tokens of the rebirth of the god; these proceedings of resurrection by plant-growth are fully developed in rites celebrated in the Choniak festivals (text of Denderah; V. Loret, *RT* iii. [1882], iv. [1883], v. [1884]; Moret, *Kings and Gods*, p. 85; on sprouting Osiris cf. Moret, p. 94 and pl. xi); (e) Osiris is also revived by simulating an animal rebirth; the priest who plays Anubis lies in a recumbent position—which is that of the fœtus in the mother's womb—under the skin of some sacrificed animal. He symbolizes Osiris being conceived anew, being reborn in the hide, and issuing, as if from the matrix, after assimilating to himself the life of his sacrificed adversary, Seth (fourth hour of day; Moret, *Mystères*, pp. 31-34).

(4) About mid-day, as the result of all these various rites, Osiris is alive. He is fed with offerings, adorned, and crowned; he also recovers the privilege of 'creative voice' (*maâ brw*) or 'just of voice' (*Maaspero*), by which he is able to baffle all dangers, and to create instantly whatever in any emergency necessity demands.

Such, in brief, were the proceedings when the 'great mystery' (*sesta wr*) or other great rites (*lahw wrw*) were celebrated. We may conclude that the 'purification' (*âbu*) of Osiris mentioned by Igernefert (l. 21) as complementary to the mysteries celebrated at Abydos was also in itself a sacred drama; it actualized the resurrection of Osiris and his rebirth to a life eternal, by a process which remained a secret to the majority of men.

3. Application to men.—We have fairly precise information, therefore, regarding the rites, secret or otherwise, which were celebrated in those sacred dramas for the benefit of Osiris. Yet such ceremonies can deserve the name of mysteries only when, spreading beyond the precincts of the temple, they extend their efficacy from the god down to a certain class of men whom we call 'initiates.' Did the mysteries of Osiris possess an operative power for the man 'well informed' of them? The author of *De Iside et Osiride* answers categorically:

'Isis instituted those mysteries that they might serve as a lesson of piety and consolation for the men and women who should suffer the same trials' (xxvii.).

Gods, pp. 179, 192). For the Eleusinian also 'to die' (*τελευτᾶν*) was the same as 'to be initiated' (*τελειοθῆναι*) (P. Foucart, *Les Mystères d'Eleusis*, Paris, 1914, p. 56). The course of 'trials' was connected with processions, dramatic scenes, and revelations disclosed by the hierophant. Is it overbold to find in this scheme the outlines of the old Egyptian initiation? The Isiac baptism corresponds to the purifications with water and incense; the simulated death and 'imperilling of life' to the ritual death and rebirth 'under the hide' in the Osirian worship; the descent into hell to the journeyings of the barge into the west (Amenti); the glorious reappearance to the final transformation of the Osirian dead into the sun Rā, or into a 'follower' of the god Rā, who is borne through the firmament in the solar barge. Egyptian 'initiation' is described in no text as yet known, but the successive episodes mentioned above are all quoted here and there in funeral formulæ. Under the Ancient Empire the dead hope to 'wander on the lovely paths of the west where the *maḥw* are wandering'; the *stelæ* from the XIIth and XVIIth dynasties (Louvre C 3, C 55) describe the admission of the 'consecrated' (*lahw*) into the solar barge, his sojourn among the gods, and his bliss in paradise; the *Book of the Dead* and the *Book of Hades* reveal the ways to Hades and the passages which open the gates. A *stela* from the XIIth dyn. (Munich, n. 40), the interpretation of which given by E. Lefébure (*PSBA* xvi. [1894] 31) may be accepted, states that certain privileged men could 'pass under the hide,' i.e. simulate in their lifetime a mimic rebirth (cf. Moret, *Mystères*, p. 88 ff.). Besides these ritual trials, the postulant would attend processions (the funeral *stelæ* speak of 'beautiful festivals of the gods which the defunct yearns to witness'; cf. Schaefer, *Mysterien*, p. 22); he would also be taught a lesson and learn a script:

'I am a *lahw*, perfect and well equipped, whose mouth is learned' (Sethe, *Urkunden*, I. 122); 'I know all the secret magic of the court' (ib. p. 143).

The king in Egypt was indeed the great magician, the head of the mysteries (Moret, *In the Time of the Pharaohs*, Eng. tr., London, 1911, p. 302), and he was obliged to be, in his lifetime, initiated to the mysteries. We know that in the course of the *Sed* festivals, celebrated by every king, the rites of ritual death and rebirth were executed for his own personal benefit (Moret, *Mystères*, pp. 73-84). Even the foreign kings received initiation: when Cambyes entered Egypt, he asked to be initiated to the great mystery of Neit at Sais (Naophore statue in the Vatican; cf. K. Piehl, *Inscriptions*, Paris, 1897, i. pl. 32 f.). Now, the king in Egypt is the type of the superman, made divine by the rites, whom men resemble after death, and whom all living try to imitate. The initiate (*maḥw*), or 'devotee of the king,' would probably receive initiation in his lifetime, by a special favour of the Pharaoh.

5. Conclusion.—In brief, the Egyptian mysteries, like the Eleusinian and Isiac mysteries, claim to prepare for a 'good death' and to reveal the way to re-enter upon a 'new, blissful life.' Every notion that we have of them is connected with the cult of Osiris, who is, in the Egyptian pantheon, pre-eminently the 'dead and resuscitated' god. But we must not forget that every god in Egypt had his own mysteries, though we do not know them, possibly because the essential theme of these various secret rites was the Osirian practice, which summed up all the Egyptian knowledge on the problem of death and resurrection.

LITERATURE.—This is sufficiently quoted throughout; on the *titenu* see G. Maspero, 'Le Tombeau de Montouherkhepeshef,' *Mémoires de la mission française au Caire*, v. 3 [1893] 435-463; N. de G. Davies, *Five Theban Tombs*, London, 1913, plates II.-xvi.

A. MORET.

MYSTERIES (Greek, Phrygian, etc.).—In the present article we shall give a brief account of the mysteries which were practised in Greece and the Greek lands, both in the earlier times of Greek dominance and in the Hellenistic age. First we shall set forth the facts, so far as they can be recovered and established, in regard to the actual religious practices which come under this head; afterwards we shall consider what is the general character of the mysteries, their tendencies, and their influence on thought and life. The more systematic and intellectual teachings of pagan writers influenced by the mysteries on such subjects as cosmology and astronomy come under other headings; see COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Greek), SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Greek). Our exposition is confined to the main outlines and what is tolerably clear. The subject lends itself to almost limitless speculations, in which, as a matter of fact, those who have written on the mysteries have usually indulged. It is very tempting to proceed from the known to the unknown, and to use the key of the mysteries to explain a vast deal of ancient thought and belief. However legitimate such speculations may be, they would be out of place here.

We refrain from speculation with the more satisfaction because the only basis on which it can be built—the statements of ancient writers—is of a most flimsy description. All our knowledge has to be gained from fragmentary statements by writers of late period and little critical power. They usually have some point to prove, and do not hesitate to colour their statements accordingly. As it was of the very essence of the mysteries that they were rites done in secret, the nature of which it was strictly forbidden to the initiates to reveal, it is clear that a number of baseless and worthless accounts of them would be in circulation. And even the archaeological material which in some departments of Greek life and history furnishes a clear and objective test of statements made by the writers almost fails us in this field. Inscriptions mention at most the public and outward rites of the mysteries, not those which were professedly secret. And such monuments as Greek vases, though they sometimes give us useful hints as to ceremonies of initiation and the like, do not reveal any secrets. The Christian Fathers, who tell us more about the mysteries than pagan writers, are perverted by strong prejudices, and lay bare only the more repulsive aspects of the rites which they mention.

1. Religious practices.—(a) *Eleusinian mysteries*.

—By far the best known, and the most characteristic, of the really Greek mysteries were the rites celebrated at Eleusis in honour of Demeter and her daughter Persephone. We also know more about them, as their seat was within a few miles of Athens, and the Athenians took the most prominent part in their celebration. The view maintained by P. Foucart,¹ that they were imported from Egypt, has met with little acceptance. They have a long history. Their origin goes back before the arrival in Greece of the conquering tribes from the north who were called Hellenes. There can be little doubt that originally the people of Eleusis, whose land is specially adapted to the growing of corn, celebrated on the spot some of those rites supposed to increase the fertility of the soil of which we find traces in many parts of the world, and which were especially at home among the primitive populations of Asia Minor. How far such simple agrarian rites could be regarded as mysteries—i.e., how far their details were regarded as the property of particular families or clans, and kept from the view of their neighbours—we have

¹ *Les Mystères d'Eleusis*, Paris, 1914.

little means of judging. But it was natural that, when Greece was overrun by more warlike and less civilized tribes from the north, the local clans should tend more and more to keep to themselves the sacred proceedings on which, as they supposed, the fertility of their land depended.

Then by degrees the old vegetation ritual of Eleusis was dragged into the current of the anthropomorphic religion of Greece. Whatever may be the meaning of the first syllable of the name Demeter, which does not seem to be a mere variant of γῆ ('earth'), the latter part of the word, μήτηρ ('mother'), is pure Greek, and marks the incorporation of the worship in that of the Attic deities. At the same time the deeds and ritual, the original object of which had been merely the furthering of the fertility of the soil, became charged with a higher meaning, and became an acted parable of the relation of the spirit of man to the divine basis of the world, and assured to the *μύσται* the protection of Persephone in the world beyond the grave. In the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* poetry takes over the main events of the mythology of Eleusis, and works them into a pleasing and artistic form. In Greek sculpture and vase-paintings the forms of Demeter and Persephone, with their favourite Triptolemus, appear continually in the most charming art-representations, and the ritual of Eleusis, while retaining some of its strange archaic guise, was moulded into an Athenian holiday. Later still the philosophers and the reflective poets of Athens found in the Eleusinian rites a body into which they could introduce such ideas as divine retribution and the immortality of the soul.

In the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*, probably dating from the 7th cent. B.C., there is narrated the story of the carrying away of Persephone, while she gathered flowers in a meadow, by Hades, ruler of the world below; and it is told how Demeter refused to be consoled for her loss, and, to punish gods and men, refused her aid in the production of corn from the soil. Earth became unfruitful, and the human race would have perished but for the interference of Zeus, who arranged that Persephone should be restored for a time to her mother, and should every year pass eight months of the twelve on the green earth. The parable of the growth of corn is transparent. In this hymn we see a purely agricultural festival shot through with poetry and human interest by the literary genius of the Greeks. But the element of mystery is almost eliminated. The hymn does not really reflect the local worship of Eleusis, which at the beginning was probably very crude, but which underwent great modifications under the influence of Athenian religion. It was probably in the 6th cent. that Dionysiac and Orphic elements made their way into the cultus and again modified it. Iacchus, who was a form of Dionysus, became thenceforth a chief person in it, though exactly how he was related to the original two goddesses is not altogether clear. But the general result of his interposition is manifest. The mysteries of Eleusis ceased to be a mere agricultural rite, and became more closely concerned with the life beyond the grave, in which the initiated had great advantages over those who failed to partake of the rite.

Certain inscriptions¹ which survive help us to reconstruct in a great measure the external semblance of the rites. Unfortunately the most important of these dates from the age of Hadrian. But, since that age was conservative and antiquarian, just before the transformation which ancient religion underwent in the time of the Antonines and the Severi, we may regard it as enabling us to recover at least a picture of the

external ordering of the Eleusinian festival in the great time of Athens.

On the 13th day of the month Boedromion, the young men (*ἐφῆβοι*) of Athens were mustered and went in procession to Eleusis, to bring thence in sacred procession what are called *τὰ ιερά*, sacred objects required for the solemn procession from Athens to Eleusis which took place a few days later. On the 15th of the month those who wished to become initiates of the goddesses assembled, in order to be ranged under the guidance of experts called the *μυσταγωγοί*, and to receive instruction as regards their behaviour at the festival. Those only were admitted who were free from crime or ignominy; and purity of heart and life was enjoined on the votaries. Absolute secrecy as to all that they might hear or see was imposed on them.

Next took place the ceremonial purifications. These were of two kinds—on the 16th of the month was proclaimed the ceremonial bathing in the sea (*ἐλάσε μύσται*), which was a form of purification. Later took place the sacrifice of purification, in which each of the *μύσται* brought to the goddesses their favourite offering, a young pig.

On the 18th took place the solemn procession of the *μύσται* and the officials from Athens to Eleusis. The cavalcade started with the dawn; but it moved slowly. It conveyed the sacred statue of Iacchus; and at many points on the road, according to cherished traditions, halts were made and sacred dances performed. The *μύσται*, as they moved, sang hymns in honour of Iacchus. They reached the sacred precinct at Eleusis by sun-down, and there had to find shelter and rest in preparation for the doings of the next day. Of course, the sacrifices and the processions could be seen by all. It was only when Eleusis was reached that the veil fell, and thenceforth for four days the secret rites, the nature of which we can very imperfectly recover, took place.

The sacred site at Eleusis has been thoroughly excavated by the Greek Archaeological Society, and is familiar to visitors to Athens. Its centre was the great hall of initiation, in which beyond doubt all the rites took place; the mere plan of this hall gives us some evidence, though mostly negative, as to the character of the rites. At the beginning of the 5th cent. a smaller hall was destroyed by the Persians; and after their retreat it was rebuilt on a more magnificent scale. It was almost square in form, 170 ft. in length and in breadth, with two entrances on each of three sides. Round the walls inside ran series of stone seats eight ranks high, capable of seating about 3000 people. The roof, or possibly an upper storey, was supported by rows of columns, 42 in number. There is no appearance of a raised stage, or of underground passages, or any possibility of those stage-effects, mysterious appearances and disappearances, visions of Hades and of future rewards and punishments which the earlier modern writers on the Greek mysteries commonly assumed to have existed. All that took place must have taken place out in the midst, with the view of the *μύσται* greatly impeded by the columns.¹

At the season of celebration there was no moon in the evening. The *μύσται* fasted by day, and in the evening penetrated into the hall through the surrounding gloom. Their religious feelings had been greatly stirred, and they were prepared to receive strong religious impressions. But how those impressions were made we can only conjecture. Sacred movements were performed, while the voice of the hierophant gave utterance to brief statements of an enigmatic kind to which the *μύσται* had to attach such meaning as they could. It is almost certain that Mystery-plays were acted, the subjects of them taken from the myth of the carrying away of Persephone, and probably from some of the more obscure tales in regard to the birth of Iacchus, his death, and his revival.

Besides the attendance at sacred dramas the *μύσται* went through other rites. They solemnly partook of a draught called *κυκεών*, made of meal and water; they also handled certain sacred objects, transferring them from basket to box, or from box to basket, according to a fixed ritual; and at the end of the festival they emptied of water some vessels called *πλημοδαί*, calling on the sky to give rain, and the earth to yield her increase. The last action was probably very early in origin, being obviously a relic of sympathetic magic, according to

¹ For an account of the sacred place and a plan of the 'hall of initiation' see P. Gardner, *New Chapters in Greek History*, London, 1892, ch. xiii. A full and judicious account of the cultus and festival will be found in CGS iii. ch. ii.

¹ W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*², Leipzig, 1893-1901

which the pouring of water, when accompanied by the proper spell, has a tendency to produce rain.

The return to Athens, like the setting out, was public. The people of the city came out to meet the returning procession, and with dance and song, and with contests in wit and scurrility, the *μύσται* returned to their homes.

Readers may naturally think that a ritual so simple and so wanting in depth of teaching could not have justified the tone in which some of the great Greek writers have spoken of the mysteries of Eleusis. The poet Sophocles and the painter Polygnotus confine happiness in the next world to those who had been initiated in the mysteries of Eleusis, that is, probably, so far as their fellow-citizens were concerned. The Christian Fathers evidently look on the mysteries as in a measure rivals of the Christian hope. And that there was an ethical element in them we may judge from the speech of Andocides to his judges: 'You are initiated, that you may punish impiety, and save those who defend themselves from injustice.' Cicero, in his *de Legibus*,¹ expresses the view that Athens had produced nothing better than the mysteries of Eleusis, not only in regard to the ordering and civilizing of life, but in regard to the furnishing of a good hope in death. But it is of the very nature of the mysteries, as we shall presently see, to produce effects out of proportion to their obvious outward show.

(b) *Andanian and other mysteries.*—The Eleusinian mysteries were the most notable of those of distinctly Greek type. But in the pages of Pausanias and of the *Corpus Inscriptionum Græcarum* we come on the tracks of many others. In fact, it is not possible to draw a rigid line between the public cults of Greek cities and the mysteries, since with many of the former there were connected rites which had to be performed in secret.

E.g., at the Arrhephoric festival at Athens, the two Arrhephoric girls, who had an abode on the Acropolis, 'place on their heads objects which the priestess of Athena gives them to carry, the nature of which is known neither to the giver nor to the bearer. The maidens go down by a secret underground passage leading through a precinct near the temple of Aphrodite in the Gardens. Below they leave their burdens; and take up in exchange something covered up.'²

In the same way, though the Attic Thesmophoria were among the most noteworthy public festivals, there were as part of the festival certain rites which could be performed only by burgher ladies, who had to prepare themselves by sexual chastity, and were not allowed to reveal them.

At Andania in Messenia there were celebrated mysteries in honour of a group of deities, Demeter, Hermes, the Great Gods, Apollo Karneios, and Hagna. Hagna ('the pure one') is doubtless Persephone. Who the 'Great Gods' were may be doubted; it is conjectured with probability that they were the Kabeiroi (q.v.). In that case, the mysteries of Andania must have been a combination; yet Pausanias tells us that they were very ancient, having been celebrated by the Messenians before the coming of the Laconian conquerors. Of the public or visible phenomena of these rites we have a very full account in an inscription³ which has come down to our time. Its date is 91 B.C., late in the Hellenistic age; but, as all the rites which it prescribes are taken from sacred books, they are probably of considerable antiquity.

The mystery (*τέλεσις*) is to be celebrated by male and female votaries chosen from among the citizens. There are very stringent regulations as to the dress to be worn, which must be simple and not adorned with gold. A procession is to be arranged, headed by a benefactor named Mnasiestratus, the priest and priestesses of the deities, the president of the festival, with other officials, and sacred virgins conducting the cars in which are arks containing the objects of the mysteries. The victims for sacrifice follow. Tents are to be set up for the visitors, but they are to be of the simplest kind. Next follow

regulations as to finance, and as to the sacrifices to be offered, which are on a large scale, including, as one item, a hundred lambs. After the sacrifices what remains is to be consumed at a sacred banquet partaken of by the *μύσται* of both sexes, with the priest and priestesses, the musicians, and the assistants. Finally, the male votaries are to draw up and submit to the magistrates a report of the proceedings and the names of the transgressors whom it has been necessary to punish.

This long and minute inscription enables us easily to follow the visible course of the mysteries; but it omits precisely the things which would most interest us—the course of the secret rites and the doctrines which they taught or embodied.

At Andania, as we have seen, the Kabeiroi had a share in the local mysteries. But the most important seat of the cultus of these deities was the island of Samothrace, where in full summer their rites were celebrated. Lemnos was also a seat of their worship; and in recent years a Kabeirion has been excavated at Thebes, where have been found Greek vases painted with scenes connected with the cult, the interpretation of which presents great difficulties. It is very difficult, from the scraps of information which have come down to us, to reconstitute the character of the Kabeiric mysteries. A few points are regarded as made out. In the first place, the rites seem to be in origin pre-Greek, whether Phœnician or Pelasgic, but they were afterwards Hellenized. The deities themselves were known as Axiokersos and Axiokersa, a pair, with a child Axieros, and a fourth being, called Cadmilos. If we subtract the affix 'Aξίος,' which is doubtless the Greek word meaning 'venerable,' we have Kersos, Kersa, and Eros. But Eros here is not, as has often been supposed, the Greek deity of love; the word may be merely the Greek *τέλεσις*, 'sacred.' By the Islanders two male figures of the group were identified with the Dioscouroi, Castor and Pollux; and the mysteries certainly had a nautical character, the gods to whom they belonged guaranteeing to sailors a safe passage through the sea. At Thebes, on the other hand, the Kabeiric mysteries seem to have taught some lore as to the origin of man and the productive powers of nature. But it is of little use to try to recover both the dream and the interpretation. The matter is fully discussed by L. Bloch, in Roscher's *Lexikon*, s.v. 'Megaloí Theoi.'

(c) *Dionysiac mysteries.*—Besides the Greek mysteries which belonged to definite places and to particular deities, there were others which were practised by societies which sprang up in various places, and admitted of something like a religious propaganda. These appear to have originated, or, at all events, to have spread, in the 6th cent.—a time of great mental progress and unrest. An important part in their spread is attributed to Pythagoras, a native of Samos, but a great traveller, whose influence spread as far as Italy, and to Onomacritus, an enigmatic personage who dwelt at Athens in the time of Pisistratus, and has been regarded as the author of poems which passed under the names of Orpheus and Musæus. The deity with whom these mysteries were specially concerned was Dionysus, although Æschylus in his *Bassarids* boldly says that Orpheus was not a worshipper of Dionysus but of Helios or Apollo.

None of the Greek deities was so important in the festivals of Athens as Dionysus. And no deity takes so many aspects in Greek religion. His original seat was in Thrace; and he seems to have been the vegetation-spirit of some of the tribes of the north, who worshipped him with rude orgies in the mountains Rhodope and Pangæum. In a sort of reaction against progressing civilization these rites spread over Greece, and found a second home in Boeotia. From the *Bacchæ* of Euripides we may gather their general character, which is marked by wild ecstasy, by wandering in the

¹ li. 14.

² Pausanias, i. xxvii. 8.

³ H. Sauppe, *Die Mysterieninschrift von Andania*, Göttingen, 1860; cf. O. T. Newton, *Essays on Art and Archaeology*, London, 1880, pp. 177-184.

mountains, by the tearing and devouring of sacred animals, and by sexual irregularities. They were largely confined to women, and were secret. But so far we may regard them as a mere survival of barbaric cultus. It is when they are associated with the name of Orpheus that they take another and a more important aspect.

(d) *Orphic mysteries*.—Orpheus was regarded as a native of Thrace; and it seems strange that so gentle and attractive a figure should be associated with so wild a country. But two things may be noted: (1) that on the southern shore of Thrace there lived from very early times a population gentler and more Hellenized, whom the Greeks called Pæonians; and (2) that Orpheus did not harmonize with the Thracian religion, and was finally done to death by raging Thracian women. It would seem that Orpheus, whether an actual person or the mere personification of a tendency, represents a Greek revised version of the worship of Dionysus, in which the savage elements were, at least in the better times of Greece, eliminated, and religious and philosophic elements implanted in it. Some modern writers, misled by the analogy of Gnostic and heretic sects in the early Christian Church, have regarded the Orphics as an organized sect with leaders and special rites and doctrines. But this is a delusion. The best account of the Orphic teachers occurs in Plato:¹

'There are quacks and soothsayers, who flock to the rich man's doors, and try to persuade him that they have a power at command, which they procure from heaven, and which enables them, by sacrifices and incantations performed amid feasting and indulgence, to make amends for any crime committed by the individual himself or by his ancestors . . . and they produce a host of books, written by Musæus and Orpheus, which form their ritual. . . . Their Mysteries deliver us from the torments of the other world, while the neglect of them is punished by an awful doom.'

The special form of Dionysiac worship to which these people were attached is connected with the name Zagreus, which was applied to the chthonic Dionysus. The legends which told the story of the birth, death, and resurrection of Zagreus are of a particularly revolting kind, and Clement of Alexandria, who dwells on them, wins an easy victory over heathenism. Zagreus was the child of an amour of Zeus and Persephone. While still an infant he was entrapped by the Titans, who attracted him with toys and then tore him to pieces and devoured him. Only the heart survived, which was rescued by Athene and carried to Zeus, who slew the murderers with his thunderbolts, and produced from the heart another Zagreus. It is not hard to understand how this unsavoury story may have been moralized, as other unpleasant stories in the sacred books of many nations have been. A myth is often interpreted in the light, not of history, but of inner experience. In all of us, the Orphic teachers maintained, there is a divine element not wholly overwhelmed by the wickedness of which the Titans are the emblem. By innate impurity men are condemned to a cycle of births and deaths, the *κύκλος τῆς γενέσεως*, from which they can escape and be made fit for communion with the gods only by purification and initiation in the mysteries.

A special feature of Orphism was the careful instructions which it gave as to the route to Hades. Certain inscribed gold tablets found near Sybaris in Italy, and dating from about 200 B.C.,² were placed in tombs, and furnish to the dead a guide to the happy part of the world of shades, telling him with what words he must address the guardians of the spring of memory and other servants of Persephone.

The death and revival of the deity of the mysteries is a feature of the cultus not only of Zagreus,

but of Isis and of Cybele. Osiris was slain by Typhon, and Isis searched long before she discovered his body. The death or self-mutilation of Attis, the young favourite of Cybele, and his rebirth were recorded in a drama yearly enacted in the spring.¹ A pine-tree was selected as a symbol of Attis, and the identification was completed by fastening to the tree an image of the deity. The tree was cut down and carried into the sanctuary of Cybele, whereon great wailing ensued, and the *μύσται* gashed themselves with knives to signify their participation in the suffering of their patron. On the next day Attis was restored to life. In this case we see clearly that the original meaning of the rite was sympathy with the death of vegetation in the winter and its revival in the spring. But from that rite of purely naturalist religion to the death to sin and revival to a better life the spirit of man passed by a gradual enlightenment; the events in the world of nature became a reflexion of the life within.

Our knowledge of Orphism has been considerably increased in recent years through the discovery at Athens of a precinct of Dionysus which was the seat of the worship of a *θλασος* called the Iobacchi, and in it a long inscription which reveals to us the constitution of the *θλασος* and the character of its cult.³ A great part of the inscription deals with the necessary, if not inspiring, subject of finance. But we have also record of a curious sacrifice performed in the month Elaphebolion. Persons selected by lot from among the Iobacchi personated various deities and heroes, Dionysus, Kore, Palæmon, Aphrodite, and Proteurhythmus, and received portions of the flesh of the sacrifice. It is conjectured that under the name Proteurhythmus we must suppose Orpheus to be intended; it was quite a custom of the mysteries to celebrate gods and founders under names peculiar to the special cult. But in this inscription again it is the visible acts of cultus that are mentioned, not the meaning attached to those acts.

Maass, in his *Orpheus*, maintains that the Orphic societies were not always attached to the worship of Dionysus; sometimes other deities, such as Kore or Hekate, took his place. Any chthonic cult might have an Orphic aspect. And the Orphic writings were accessible to persons outside the *θλασος*. The Orphic hymns which have come down to us are of late origin, but it may be that in character they reproduce early ones. These hymns, with their fantastic cosmogonies, cannot be treated here.

Approaching the time of the Christian era, we find Orpheus in literature and art taking the place of a shepherd of souls, who had himself descended into the realm of Hades in his search for his wife Eurydice and so was able to guide others through its perils. Thus we are not surprised to find that he often appears in the paintings of the Christian catacombs as a symbol of Christ.

(e) *Spread in the age of Hellenism*.—The age which immediately followed the great conquests of Alexander and the establishment of the Greek kingdoms of Asia seems to have witnessed the low-water mark of religion in Greece and Asia. The breaking up of nationalities in the Persian empire necessarily involved the abasement of the national religions; and the victorious Greeks and Macedonians had little to put in their place. In the new-founded and enlarged cities which arose everywhere in S. Asia from the Ægean Sea to the Ganges, the conquerors introduced the cult of their own gods; temples of Zeus, Apollo, and Artemis sprang up, and festivals on the model of those in Hellas were instituted. But these cults had little vitality; they were encouraged by the rulers for

¹ Firmicus Maternus, *de Erroribus profanorum*, rel. 27.

² See E. W. T. Maass, *Orpheus*, Munich, 1895, pp. 18-32.

¹ Rep. p. 364, tr. of J. L. Davies and D. J. Vaughan, Cambridge, 1858.

iii. [1892] 111-118.

merely political reasons, and they took no hold on the people. The only forms of worship which had any force were the cultus of the *Tύχη*, or Fortune, of cities and the deification of the reigning monarchs, which were not religion at all in the sense of an approach to the unseen spiritual powers, but only a glorification of outward success and prosperity.

Hence we need not be surprised to find that before long, especially in the 2nd cent. B.C., the stronger religions of W. Asia revolted against the Hellenic influence. In India the Greek deities were driven out by Buddhism and Hinduism. The religion of the Magi in Persia and Media revived, and was adopted by the conquering Parthians. In Egypt Isis, with her new consort Sarapis, recovered lost ground. In Judea took place the notable revolt under the Maccabees, which placed the religion of Jahweh in an unassailable position. It was natural that at the same time the mystery-religions should have issued from obscurity and gained converts in crowds; for religion is like a plant which, when it dies down, sends out from the roots fresh shoots. And, as these religions embodied a profound tendency of the age to transfer the stress of religion from the State-cults to private beliefs, they gained from that general instability of States which made place for the rise of Rome.

In the Hellenistic age there took place in the great cities of Hellenic origin the same process which is notable in our own days. The population flocked into them, and became more and more cosmopolitan. Phœnicians and Jews, Ionians and Italians, followed trade wherever it led. At the same time the trade in slaves settled in the country districts swarms of captives, Phrygians and Thracians, Syrians and Greeks. All these incomers brought with them their deities and the traditional rites with which they were worshipped. From Phœnicia came the cult of Baal and Astarte; from Phrygia came the worship of the great goddess Cybele, with whom were associated the effeminate Attis and the more majestic figure of Sabazius, who combined the functions of the Greek Zeus with those of Dionysus. The cult of Sarapis and Isis, which had its origin in Egypt, spread in the course of the last three centuries B.C. into all the great commercial towns. And somewhat later, at the beginning of our era, the religion of Mithra, which was a curious outgrowth of the old religion of Persia, spread westward from Cilicia, and became a formidable rival to Christianity, having a great hold of the Roman legions. The Jews also made many proselytes; and their worship, which was regarded by the historians of the time as in the same class with the other cults which have been mentioned, attracted especially the women of the wealthier classes.

It would be a long and difficult task, and, in fact, impossible, to disentangle the complex threads of the religions of the age; we do not know enough of the peculiarities of each. There was a constant influence of one on another. For example, the repulsive rite called *taurobolium* (*q.v.*), which consisted in bathing votaries in the blood of a newly slain bull, seems to belong primarily to the worship of Cybele and Sabazius, but it became a feature of the cult of Mithra. Apuleius, in his curious work, *The Golden Ass*, is evidently anxious to show that the rites of Isis are of a higher and better kind than those of Cybele, Hecate, and other deities; but he altogether fails to impress on the reader wherein this superiority consists, or wherein his hero Lucius becomes the better when he forsakes other deities to become a votary of Isis. The Mithraic religion has been studied with the most minute care and good judgment by

F. Cumont,¹ who has set forth views in regard to it which have been generally accepted by scholars; but, in the absence of any extant literature to enlighten us, we have only the vaguest notion of the real attractions of the cult. See art. MITHRAISM.

2. General character and tendencies.—All these religions, by the very necessity of circumstance, were not local or civic, but appealed to men as individuals and in groups. All of them were proselytizing, and offered to mankind, in competition with one another, a better way of life. All that we can attempt is to sketch the general tendencies which were common to them all, so that they made a definite class.

From the point of view of this article, their most important characteristic was that they were *mysteries*. One and all belonged to those only who were initiated, and had secret practices and doctrines which it was not lawful to reveal. The secrecy of the cults carried with it the necessary consequence that their principles were handed down, from generation to generation, by a set of priests or hierophants, who usually claimed extensive powers, and offered themselves as the only legitimate way by which the deities could be approached. They held the keys of the gate, and by their aid only could the would-be votaries attain to a divine communion. We find in later classical writers—Apuleius, Lucian, Juvenal—very unattractive pictures of these hierophants, who were frequently eunuchs, and made a shameless trade with sacred things.

But what constituted the attraction of these societies? Why were the priests able to attract the men and women who were dissatisfied with their lives and anxious for a better hope? What could they offer to the votaries? The best answer may be given in a single word. The great need and longing of the time was for salvation, *σωτηρία*. Men and women were eager for such a communion with the divine, such a realization of the interest of God in their affairs, as might serve to support them in the trials of life, and guarantee to them a friendly reception in the world beyond the grave. To attain peace of mind, a position of confident hope amid the blows of circumstance, they would make trial of any secret cult which came their way, perhaps of one after another, until they found one to satisfy their needs.

The communion with some saving deity, then, was the end of all practice of the mysteries. And those of the Græco-Roman world had in common certain features, as to which the best modern writers have come to a general agreement. These features, briefly, are the following.

The entry into any of the societies, or *θλαστοί*, was through certain rites of purification. We have already seen that this was the case at Eleusis, and it seems to have been so in other instances. Sometimes the purification was accomplished by baptism in water; sometimes there was a more repulsive baptism of blood. The blood-purification of which we hear most was the *taurobolium*. A more ordinary purification in Greece was that by the blood of a sacrificed pig. We must not suppose that, in origin, these ceremonies arose out of a sense of guilt or unfitness for converse with the gods. At first the uncleanness from which they liberated men was only formal, and the rite partook of the nature of magic. But by degrees more lofty conceptions made their way into men's minds; and it is to be supposed that many a votary of Cybele or Mithra may have looked back on the blood-bath as marking his entry into a better state of existence.

¹ *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra*, 2 vols., Brussels, 1896-99.

a sacred stone which represented the Phrygian Mother-goddess was brought from Pessinus to Rome, and her worship thus gained a footing in the city. Private societies, even among the higher classes, were formed to carry on her cult. Not long afterwards, in 186 B.C., nocturnal festivals attended by many irregularities, held in honour of Dionysus, spread rapidly over Italy. The Roman Senate regarded the matter in the severest light, and many men and women who were denounced as having taken part in such rites were put to death; but the movement was too wide-spread to be trampled out. The natural attitude of a patriotic Roman towards such religious developments is exactly expressed by T. Mommsen:

'Of course all rational men were agreed in the condemnation of these spurious forms of religion, as absurd as they were injurious to the Commonwealth.'¹

It is characteristic of Mommsen that he would not recognize that the mixed people of Lower Italy might have religious needs which the stiff old religion of Rome could not satisfy. The age of Augustus saw some revival of the old Roman religion, which, however, could not be galvanized into real life. In the age of the Antonines, and still more in that of the Severan emperors, Rome and Italy were inundated by a great variety of Oriental religious cults—private cults which had no connexion with the State, but were kept up by *thiasoi*, small coteries of votaries. The ladies of the Severan dynasty, Domna, Mæsa, Mamaea, and Soæmias, were natives of Emisa in Syria, and closely attached to the worship of the Baal there venerated—a cultus which Elagabalus, the son of Soæmias, introduced as the imperial religion. These ladies had talent and character; and the Semitic rites which they favoured became fashionable. But, apart from that, their age was an age of syncretism in religion and the *superstitio* which goes with it. Many high-born women became Jewish proselytes. In the later age of Aurelian and Diocletian the religion of Mithra, which had, for reasons which it is hard to discern, become the ruling cult of the Roman army, was spread to all the confines of the empire, especially

Gaul and Germany. Mithraism and the worship of the Phrygian Great Mother, which was somehow blended with it, were essentially mystery-religions. The seats of Mithraic worship were caves and underground shrines; and the rites were so secret, so secret that we know very little about them, though many Mithraic shrines have been discovered, and sculptured remains abound. To show the prevalence of the ideas of the mysteries in this age, we need only appeal to two writers: Plutarch¹ says that it is from the mysteries that we gain our best knowledge of the dæmonic element in life; and Clement of Alexandria, though he makes a bitter attack on the pagan mysteries as rivals of Christianity, yet chooses to express his own faith in phrases borrowed from them:

'O truly holy Mysteries, O light undefiled. I am led by the torch-bearer to be initiated into heaven and God. Through initiation I become holy; the Lord is my hierophant, and as photogogos seals the votary for himself.'²

This brief statement is sufficient to show that in the Roman empire the prevalence of the mystery-religions is not a Roman development, but represents the suffocation of the Roman spirit. As J. Strzygowski expresses it,³ the West expires in the embrace of the East. It is a process parallel to, and contemporary with, the conversion of the Roman empire to the Christian faith. In the 'Greek' section (p. 82) Apuleius is quoted; and what is there said as to the influence and character of the pagan mysteries and their relation to Christianity in the eastern part of the Roman empire, applies also in the western part, though the difference always subsists that in Greek-speaking countries more was made of the intellectual aspects of the mysteries, in Latin-speaking countries of their rites and practices.

LITERATURE.—Four good books serve to guide the student through the confused medley of religions in the Roman empire: W. W. Fowler, *Rel. Experience of the Roman People*, London, 1911; T. R. Glover, *The Conflict of Religions in the Early Roman Empire*, do. 1909; S. Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*, do. 1905; J. Réville, *La Religion à Rome sous les Sévères*, Paris, 1886. P. GARDNER.

MYSTERY-PLAYS.—See MIRACLE-PLAYS, MYSTERIES, MORALITIES.

MYSTICISM.

Introductory (R. M. JONES), p. 83.

Primitive (E. LEHMANN), p. 85.

Buddhist (L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN and E. J. THOMAS), p. 85.

Chinese (W. G. WALSHE), p. 87.

Christian—

New Testament (R. M. JONES), p. 89.

Roman Catholic (J. CHAPMAN), p. 90.

Protestant (R. M. JONES), p. 101.

Christian—

Russian (K. GRASS), p. 103.

Greek.—See MYSTERIES (Greek, Phrygian, etc.), NEO-PLATONISM, PINDAR, PLATO.

Hebrew and Jewish (J. ABELSON), p. 108.

Hindu (H. MACNICOL), p. 113.

Muslim.—See SŪFĪS.

Persian.—See SŪFĪS.

Roman.—See MYSTERIES (Roman).

MYSTICISM (Introductory).—'Mysticism,' in common speech-usage, is a word of very uncertain connotation. It has in recent times been used as an equivalent for two characteristically different German words: *Mysticismus*, which stands for the cult of the supernatural, for theosophical pursuits, for a spiritualistic exploitation of psychical research; and *Mystik*, which stands for immediate experience of a divine-human intercourse and relationship. The word 'mysticism' has, furthermore, been commonly used to cover both (1) the first-hand experience of direct intercourse with God and (2) the theologico-metaphysical doctrine of the soul's possible union with Absolute Reality, i.e. with God. It would be conducive to clarity to restrict the word 'mysticism' to the latter significance, namely, as an equivalent for the German word

Mystik, and as designating the historic doctrine of the relationship and potential union of the human soul with Ultimate Reality, and to use the term 'mystical experience' for direct intercourse with God.

First hand, or mystical, experience is primarily a psychological question; the doctrine of mysticism is essentially a metaphysical problem. Mystical experience is as old as humanity, is not confined to any one racial stock, is undoubtedly one of the original grounds of personal religion, and does not stand or fall with the truth or falsity of the metaphysically formulated doctrine of mysticism. Mystical experience is marked by the emergence of a type of consciousness which is not sharply

¹ *de Defectu oraculorum*, xiv. 417 C.

² *Protrept.* 120, 1.

³ *Kleinasiën*, Leipzig, 1903, p. 234.

¹ *Hist. of Rome*, Eng. tr., London, 1888, bk. iii. ch. xlii.

MYSTICISM (Primitive).—Religions mysticism in the higher sense of the word, as an intuitive and ecstatic union with the deity obtained by means of contemplation and other mental exercises, is very rarely found among primitive races. They lack, as a rule, that idea of God as a spiritual and universal being which is the theoretical presupposition of this elevating of the mind; and their lower stage of reflexion does not allow them to pass through the series of abstractions and psychological analyses ordinarily involved in the practices of the mystics.

Nevertheless, as the idea of gods or ghosts as spiritual powers which take possession of man is current among the primitive peoples, and in so far as the sorcerer's art actually aims at inducing a possessed state of that sort, we very often meet with a 'mystical union' in the lower sense of the word, and, in fact, must regard it as typical of primitive religion.

1. Mana, etc.—This is seen most clearly in the earlier stages of primitive religion—nowadays termed 'pre-animistic'—where there is as yet no mention of gods or personal spirits, but holiness is conceived simply as a number of unpersonal or undifferentiated powers reigning over mankind and nature, but abiding in some elected persons (chiefs or sorcerers) whose nature fits them to be the instruments of these powers—the *mana* of the Melanesians, the *orenda* of the Iroquois, powers which, on the one hand, make the chiefs and their property tabu, and, on the other hand, enable them, without any consecration or other special ceremony, to exercise strong influences not only on the members of the tribe but even on nature, procuring rain and fertility, or, on the contrary, provoking thunder, hurricanes, etc.

In so far as *mana* is identical with the tabued man's nature itself (his special soul), we can hardly speak of a possessed state or of mysticism at all. But in some cases the *mana* is considered not merely as a faculty in the individual, but as a power *in se* of a certain superhuman character which partially takes up its abode in favoured persons. As to the Great Spirit of the Algonquins, we do not know whether it signifies only the powerful human soul or an independent being. At any rate, when the inward power in chiefs or sorcerers is conceived as a partaking of a superhuman power working through their actions, the phenomenon must be designated as a case of mysticism. And what is especially to be noted is that the type of holiness realized by these persons is essentially the same as is shown in all mystics of the world, viz. a holy man is endowed with certain gifts (a higher nature) that make him godlike—according to the ideas of the godhead—or at least enable him to exert influences which surpass the ordinary human faculties.

2. Shamanism.—Most forms of shamanism come within the sphere of mysticism. The ceremonies of the Yakuts in Siberia, as described by W. Radloff (*Aus Sibirien*, Leipzig, 1893, ii. 1 ff.), exhibit the manifold endeavours of the shaman to communicate with the deity and to penetrate into the heavens, in whose highest region Ulgūn Bai ('the heavenly god') resides. The trances of the shaman, produced by means of ecstatic dancing, reduce him to a state of unconsciousness in which his soul has left the body to unite with the god or at least to dwell in his immediate presence. The most characteristic moment is the 'shamanizing' itself. The medium or instrument of this process is the shaman's drum, which he, as a result of the magical faculties acquired by his trances, fills with demoniac forces; the ghosts of the lower world now reside in the drum, by aid of which the shaman is able to provide himself and the people

present with new vital force, to heal disease, promote fertility, etc. The mystical element in this process is the presence of the divine essence in the shaman and his distribution of it to others.

These shamanistic phenomena are found in Arctic Asia and America, and seem to be confined to this ethnologic and climatic zone; but, as shamanism, at least in its Siberian shape, is largely influenced by the great Indo-Iranian religions of Asia, especially in regard to mythological figures and cosmology, we cannot regard it as a genuine type of primitive mysticism.

3. Fetishism.—A truer illustration is afforded by African fetish-priests (*gangas*, etc.). According to the record of A. Bastian (*Deutsche Expedition an die Loango-Küste*, Jena, 1874-75, i. 55 f.), the natives of the Loango Coast, in cases of grave sickness, send for two priests, who, by means of dances round the fire, jumping, and whirling, fall into a trance and enter into a state of possession during which the voices of the demons inspiring them are heard through these skilful ventriloquists.

4. Medicine-men.—The medicine-men of the Indian tribes in many cases also assume the powers of demons by dressing in fantastic garb—hides, skulls, masks—and imitating the actions of the impersonated demon or animal, its movements, its howling, etc. In this way the medicine-man directly represents the spirit whose help is wanted. He even tries by means of trances, intoxications, or sweat-baths to induce a state of unconsciousness in order to lay himself open to the approach of the spirit.

Higher ideas of the godhead, such as have arisen among several Indian tribes, endow this relation to the spirit with a noble character. C. A. Eastman, a born Indian, bears witness to spiritual experiences of a wider range in describing a young man's religious initiation, broadly interpreted indeed, in modern Christian language:

"That solitary communion with the Unseen which was the highest expression of our religious life is partly described in the word *hambeday*, literally "mysterious feeling," which has been variously translated "fasting" and "dreaming." It may better be interpreted as "consciousness of the divine."

The first *hambeday*, or religious retreat, marked an epoch in the life of the youth, which may be compared to that of confirmation or conversion in Christian experience. Having first prepared himself by means of the purifying vapor-bath, and cast off as far as possible all human or fleshly influences, the young man sought out the noblest height, the most commanding summit in all the surrounding region. Knowing that God sets no value upon material things, he took with him no offerings or sacrifices other than symbolic objects, such as paints and tobacco. Wishing to appear before Him in all humility, he wore no clothing, save his moccasins and breech-clout. At the solemn hour of sunrise or sunset he took up his position, overlooking the glories of earth and facing the "Great Mystery," and there he remained, naked, erect, silent, and motionless, exposed to the elements and forces of His arming, for a night and a day to two days and nights, but rarely longer. Sometimes he would chant a hymn without words, or offer the ceremonial "filled pipe." In this holy trance or ecstasy the Indian mystic found his highest happiness and the motive power of his existence.

When he returned to the camp, he must remain at a distance until he had again entered the vapor-bath and prepared himself for intercourse with his fellows. Of the vision or sign vouchsafed to him he did not speak, unless it had included some commission which must be publicly fulfilled. Sometimes an old man, standing upon the brink of eternity, might reveal to a chosen few the oracle of his long-past youth' (*The Soul of the Indian*, Boston and London, 1911, pp. 6-8).

LITERATURE.—The facts of primitive mysticism must be sought for in the special ethnological works. For American shamanism, e.g., see W. J. Hoffman, 'The Midé'wiwin of the Ojibwa,' in 7 *REBW* [1891], p. 156, and the works mentioned above. General aspects are treated in E. Lehmann, *Mysticism in Heathendom and Christendom*, Eng. tr., London, 1910, ch. i. f.

E. LEHMANN.

MYSTICISM (Buddhist).—There is no mysticism in Buddhism, if the word 'mysticism' is understood quite strictly: immediate, non-discursive, intuitive, relation with the Absolute, whether personal (Christian, Muhammadan, Bhāgavata

mysticism) or impersonal (Neo-Platonism, Vedānta proper). The relations of the mystic with the Absolute, in contradistinction with the mediate relations of the devotee through faith, prayer, and liturgy, are merely quiescent or passive; they aim at absorption, at the merging of individual thought and being in the Absolute; and the process is carried on under the impulsion, the guidance, the grace, the essential attractive power of the Absolute.

There is no Absolute according to all the 'orthodox' forms of Buddhist thought—whether Little or Great Vehicle—and, therefore, there is no Buddhist mysticism.

But the word 'mysticism' may be, and as a matter of fact often is, employed with less accuracy, and it frequently covers the whole field of extra-rational intuitions and practices by which some supra- or extra-rational aim is obtained, as well as the fantastic cosmological theories of the stages by which the soul ascends to the Absolute.¹ Methods of concentration of thought, trances, ecstasies, are, in fact, usually found along with a thoroughgoing mysticism, the auxiliary and preparatory part of the *śravis*, or attainment of knowledge; and, where such practices are found, there is 'mysticism,' even where the essential characteristic of mysticism, immediate, intuitive relation with the Absolute, is wanting.

(1) It should be observed that, if Buddhism ignores every positive and real Absolute, it has an absolute aim, viz. the destruction of the 'contingent,' of the 'caused existence' (*samskṛta*); the obtaining of the 'uncaused' (*asamskṛta*). Merging into nothingness is, in Buddhism, the counterpart of the 'merging into the One' of the Vedānta or Neo-Platonism. Buddhism agrees with monism so far as the relative or contingent is concerned. The difference is evident enough: no immanence, no attractive power, can be asserted of the 'not to be reborn'; and, when the texts say that 'there is an Unborn (*ajāta*), an Uncaused, an Immutable,' they mean only that there is a way leading to the death without rebirth. But the fact is important that *nirvāṇa* is described in 'mystic' phrases—borrowed from Brāhmanism.

(2) To realize its aim, the 'most orthodox' Buddhism relies on rationalistic devices. It cannot be too much emphasized that Buddhism pretends to be rationalistic and 'scientific,' though it need hardly be said that the reason and science of India in the 6th cent. B.C. are not in every way our reason, our science.

Many of the current Indian theories of cosmology and science, especially medical science, are treated as accepted facts in all the Indian philosophies. But on the basis of their own standard of scientific knowledge—transmigration, e.g., is a scientific fact—the Indian philosophies developed consistent and logical systems, using legitimate methods of evidence and proof, and (excepting the purely orthodox ritualism) rejecting sacrifice as a means.

Primitive Buddhism, like the orthodox systems, was entirely rationalistic, differing only in method, in that it refused to give any answer to certain ontological questions which it considered useless, and in more rigid accuracy, at least sometimes, putting blame and ridicule on the people who endeavour to be reborn in Brahmā's heaven. Nobody has ever seen Brahmā, not even the *ṛṣis* of old. Buddha condemns the principle of authority, and explains in so many words that the Truths are of no avail, when they are accepted on his

authority, when they have not been ascertained and realized by personal effort. Buddha knows only observable facts: 'given the colour and the visual organ, there is visual knowledge, . . . there is desire, there is act, there is rebirth,'¹ and he will be satisfied when he has found the therapeutic of desire—as a good physician who does not care for metaphysics: physics are a large enough field, when the patient is suffering.

But, in the Indian systems, beside the rationalistic method was the method of trance, devices intended to produce ecstasy in which the Truth is realized. In Buddhism the goal is not reached by this means. The practice of trance, however, may form a part of the training in winning the detachment necessary for realizing the Truths, and thus it may have its place in the therapeutic of desire. Trances are therapeutically indifferent: when undertaken with desire, in order to obtain advantages in this life or reward in another birth, they are bad—from the point of view of the aim to be obtained, i.e. *nirvāṇa*. When undertaken in order to strengthen the power of thought, the power of will, or to confirm the knowledge obtained by discursive means, trance is good; and some Buddhists willingly admit that it cannot be dispensed with. There have been monks addicted to *dhyāna*, who were opposed to the partisans of the rationalistic study of *dharma*, as we know by a single reference.

The knowledge which liberates from rebirth is not a gnosis; it is the deliberate and true appreciation of the natural impermanency of things, of the natural painfulness of life. It is a 'correct act of attention' (*yoniso manasikāra*). Such knowledge cuts the roots of desire and, therefore, of life.

Trances do not confer on the ecstatic an increase of knowledge, a more accurate or a more extended intelligence of the nature of suffering.² They confer a firmer knowledge, which enables the ecstatic to look always at things as they are, without being ever deceived by their apparent stability or pleasantness. After again and again practising the *asubhabhāvanā*, the beauty and the flesh of a woman are no longer seen, but only the skeleton and the following putrefaction. When a man has practised the concentrations of 'the realm of non-matter' (*ārūpyasamāpatti*), he forgets how to see colours, how to hear sounds, how to smell odours, and becomes inaccessible to the desires which are born from the senses: through such concentrations he may obtain the privilege of remaining for centuries in the highest heavens; but a Buddhist looks at them as useful steps towards *arhat*-ship. Moreover, concentration, whatever its object, gives to the mental organism a special vigour: to look at something blue till one sees the 'blue' with the closed eyes does not, by itself, eradicate desire; but it is an excellent device, because it makes the beginner fit for better and more specific exercises—the contemplation of the Truths. But trances, as they are of no avail when they are not guided and dominated by the 'correct act of attention,' are by no means indispensable. To obtain deliverance, it was enough for Gantami the Meagre to understand that 'death is the end of life,' and to realize, merely by the sight of the dying out of the lamps of the convent, the universal rule of decay.

(3) It may be observed that the position of penance (*tapas*) and devotion (*bhakti*) is parallel to the position of concentration or ecstasy; like the latter, both penance and devotion are secondary.

A certain amount of asceticism (*brahmacharya*), in the sense of abstinence from physical pleasures,

¹ *Sathiyutta, passim*.

² See, however, C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, London, 1914, p. 125 f. (on the *prajñā* and the 'supernormal' consciousness). There is in the attainment of the four Truths a mystical element. They must not merely be known (*viññāta*) but realized (*sākṣātkṛta*).

is indeed necessary, and there cannot be hope of eradicating desire if a man lives in the very fire of passion, i.e. in secular life, or transgresses the moral rules (*śīla*); but *śīla* and penitential observances (*vrata*) are by themselves not merely of no avail, but form one of the bonds (*samyojana*) broken by the converted. Nevertheless, Buddha does not reject penance, and some of his disciples are indeed very good ascetics, living in cemeteries, eating just enough not to starve, and keeping similar rules (*dhuta*-precepts), which, according to tradition, Buddha permitted, but refused to make compulsory.

On the other hand, devotion to the Master is utterly meaningless and deceitful to one who does not know the Truth: 'Anyone who sits near me, and even touches my garment, if he does not see the Law, is indeed very far from me'; but, when the theoretical and rigid Udayin rebukes the simple-souled Ananda: 'Why do you care for the cosmical power of the Master?',¹ Buddha rebukes Udayin: 'If Ananda were to be reborn, he would obtain, owing to his confidence in my power, seven heavenly births, seven births as a king; but he will be in this life liberated from existence.'

The consistent adherence of historical Buddhism to its rationalistic tenets, coupled with its comprehensiveness—Buddhism makes allowance for the mysticism, asceticism, and devotion which are permanent features of Indian life and thought—explains the longevity of the True Law. From the earliest times to the rising of Amitābhisma and Tantric Mahāyāna there has been no transformation of the essence of the True Law, the whole of which is summarized in the four Truths; but there has been a large development of all the subsidiary elements.

LITERATURE.—C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, London, 1914, p. 112 ff.; and the art. *TRANCEN* (Buddhist).

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN and E. J. THOMAS.

MYSTICISM (Chinese).—The theories of Lao-tse (Laocins) bear many resemblances to the Brāhmanical philosophy, and present many parallels to the teaching of the Greek mystics. His theme is *Tao*, a term already familiar to Chinese thought long before his time (6th cent. B.C.), but which he informed with a new and transcendental meaning, so profound as to render any comprehensive definition of it impossible. *Tao* is the Ultimate Reality, anterior to and higher than heaven, existing before time began, and precedent to the manifested God. It is the principle or law of nature, eternal, unchanging, and all-pervading, and as such must have existed prior to any personification, which can only be regarded as a development and corporate expression of that principle. It is the First Cause of all existence, manifesting itself in the creator and the visible universe. The idea of the creator, as expressed by theists, is, almost inevitably, influenced by anthropomorphic conceptions, but Lao-tse attempted to go a stage backward, and to picture a condition of things when the only existence was that of *Tao*, the principle or law which is the root of all phenomena, and by which all nature is ordered and controlled. No name or title was adequate to describe this principle, and Lao-tse was forced to content himself with the ambiguous term *Tao*, i.e. 'the way,' or the principle in operation, as reflected in the course of nature, a term which later exponents of the Taoistic school applied in a somewhat different manner. This principle is devoid of personality, and is without any of the attributes which are associated with humanity, including that of consciousness; in other words, its action is represented as necessary and

automatic. It can be defined only in negative terms, such as 'colourless,' 'soundless,' 'immaterial,' for the reason that it is invisible, inaudible, intangible. Lao-tse was most anxious, it would seem, to avoid the possibility of his *Tao* being regarded as, in any sense, comparable with the various deities which were supposed to preside over the several departments of nature and those which were associated with the names of deceased individuals, producing that very element of division and decentralization which was the antithesis of his idea of centrality and unity. His conception of creation was that out of *Tao*, the eternal ultimate principle, came the One, i.e. the Great Monad, or material cause of the universe; the One produced the two primary essences, the *yang* and the *yin* (=positive and negative), representing and embracing all the great antinomies, male and female, light and shade, etc., and these gave birth to the three powers of nature—heaven, earth, and man—whose co-operation resulted in the production of all creatures. *Tao* is not only the ultimate source of all existence, but it pervades, influences, and harmonizes all the phenomena of nature, and its quiet but all-effective operation is the exemplar upon which all human activities should be modelled, in contradistinction to the bustling officiousness and blustering self-assertiveness which were characteristic of his times, and which had wrought such havoc in national and social conditions. This is the groundwork of Lao-tse's philosophy, and supplies the motive of his theory of inaction, or non-interference, which occupies so prominent a place in the *Tao-Teh King*, and which is intended to inculcate the importance of attaining that complete vacuity and extinction of desire which alone can induce to the possession of *Tao*, and the entire surrender of man's being to its all-potent influences, with the result that the advanced scholar becomes exempt from the trammels of matter and the limitations of space and time. The line of argument thus faintly sketched was the natural reaction of Lao-tse's despondency at the political chaos of the period of the Chow dynasty in which he lived; the internecine struggles of the petty States which composed the empire; the race for advancement which characterized the official classes; and the abandonment to pleasure and licentiousness which was almost universal in the case of those who had the opportunity of indulging themselves.

There is little or no theological element in Lao-tse's philosophy, and the place which he gives to heaven is subordinate and secondary, contrary to the earlier usage which represented *Tao* as an attribute of heaven. The conception of God was of little consequence, since he did not anticipate the possibility of approach to or affinity with Him, but, since his aim is to glorify *Tao* as the supreme principle, and model, he naturally decided on giving it the paramount position. His disciple, Chnang-tse (Sancius), however, approximates more closely to the orthodox opinion, regarding T'ien, or God, as the great First Cause, and *Tao* as the virtue or manifestation of the divine First Principle, which he, in one passage, describes as the 'happiness of God.' It would seem that *Tao*, with Sancius, was equivalent to the *Teh* of Lao-tse, i.e. the virtue, or transmitted energy of heaven, whilst *Tao* is its inherent principle. The verdict of posterity was in favour of Chuang-tse's interpretation, and later Taoism was developed on the theological side, until its final concretion in a Taoist pantheon.

Tao is the natural heritage of man, but, in the majority of cases, that inheritance has been set aside by other interests. The quest of *Tao* may, and must, be undertaken, if men are to regain that tranquillity, that complete contentment,

¹ *Anguttara*, i. 227; the voice of a Tathāgata goes through the complete universe of 1,000,000,000 worlds.

before the beginning of the Christian era Taoism had already degenerated into a system of magic. Later developments witnessed the worship of Lao-tse, with sacrificial accompaniments; and succeeding generations betrayed an ever-descending scale of deterioration and degeneration. At the end of the 5th cent. temples and monasteries were established, in imitation of Buddhist institutions, and the approximation of the two systems continued until it became a matter of difficulty to distinguish between them, and Buddhist and Taoist 'priests' are employed at the same time for the conduct of funeral ceremonies, etc.

The foregoing outline of Chinese mysticism, as represented by its most characteristic exponents, will suggest many points of contact with Western systems, notably that of Plotinus, with which it is in agreement on (a) the subject of the ultimate unity, which is inaccessible to knowledge and can be apprehended only by an intuitive instinct, illuminated by occasional lapses into a state of ecstasy, such as are illustrated in various passages in the writings of Lieh-tse and Chuang-tse; and (b) the view that the Ultimate Source of all existence cannot be identified with the whole or any part of the material universe, being itself above existence, and, from a material point of view, non-existent. The idea of the immanence of the deity in creation, which was upheld by the Confucian school, is condemned by the Taoists.

The doctrine of relativity, suggested by Lao-tse, is developed with great freedom and boldness by Chnang-tse, who argues from this standpoint the utter illisiveness of sense-knowledge. The so-called 'contraries' are all, in a sense, identical, because of the 'all-embracing unity' which is behind them. The inference from this doctrine is that 'virtue implies vice,' and that they are inseparable, so that to aim at being 'virtuous,' in the conventional phrase, is less admirable than to remain quiet and unaffected by external things.

The four characteristics of mysticism which are outlined in W. R. Inge's *Christian Mysticism* (London, 1899) are faithfully portrayed in the system with which we are here dealing, viz. (1) esoteric knowledge, based upon the deposit entrusted by Lao-tse to the Warden of the Western Pass, and the mystic principles which can be learned only in silence and subordination at the feet of an expert; (2) quietism, which underlies the whole teaching of the *Tao-Teh King*, and is the logical application of nature's principles to human conduct; (3) introspection, which alone can produce that mental vacuity which induces to the full possession of *Tao*, and which excludes the intrusion of the material objects of sense and desire—a persuasion which contributed, in the later developments of Taoism, to a great increase of asceticism and renunciation; (4) contempt and neglect of material things, which is reflected in the paradoxes of all the great Taoist teachers; in their disdain of pomp and riches, their condemnation of governmental methods and of education, and their depreciation even of the conventional 'virtues.'

LITERATURE.—T. Watters, 'Lao-tzu, A Study in Chinese Philosophy,' in *The Chinese Recorder*, Foochow, 1868, republished, London, 1870; J. Chalmers, *Lao-tse*, Hongkong, 1868; R. K. Douglas, *Confucianism and Taoism*, London 1889; J. Legge, *SBE* xxxix. [1891], xl. [1891]; P. Carus, *Canon of Reason and Virtue (Lao-Tze's Tao teh king)*, Chicago, 1903; Spurgeon Medhurst, *The Tao Teh Ching*, do. 1903; E. H. Parker, *China and Religion*, London, 1905; H. A. Giles, *The Sayings of Lao-tzu*, do. 1911, *Taoist Teachings*, do. 1912; *Musings of a Chinese Mystic*, with introd. by Giles, do. 1911.

W. GILBERT WALSH.

MYSTICISM (Christian, NT).—The mystical aspect in the NT is the best available illustration of the position taken above (MYSTICISM [Introductory]). The NT contains a very slender show-

ing of mysticism in the technical sense. Hellenic influence, so far as it is in evidence here at all, is of a Stoic tendency rather than a Platonic. The finite human spirit is conceived, especially in the Pauline writings of the NT, as environed by the divine Spirit and as capable of being flooded and filled to all fullness with God. No sacred 'mystic way' is indicated, but all souls lie open-windowed to God and may have a revelation of Him, 'the eyes of the heart being enlightened.'

Christ's own personal experience, as it comes to light in the Gospels, is the supreme model of true mystical experience. All His words and acts are penetrated with an infinite depth of experience and are fused with a warmth and intimacy of direct fellowship with God. He reveals an interior *sense of life* which explores and possesses new depths of reality and which releases for Himself and others new energies by which to live. The active forces of His will appear always to spring from a life-conjunction with the Beyond. His ethical ideals—in the Sermon on the Mount, e.g.—are inherently bound up with His prayer-experience. The kingdom that is to come is the growing sway of the will of the Father to whom He prays, and it is possible only through expanding correspondence with a world of higher forces and of perfect conditions. The 'altered fashion of countenance,' the transfigured form and face, which marked His prayer-experience before the journey to Jerusalem, is such an experience as might well attach to a supreme crisis of personal decision. Prayer of illumination, altered face, changed form, glorified figure, the radiation of light, have marked many mystics, and these features seem to have characterized the Master as He adjusted His soul to the unseen realm, as He formed His momentous decision to be faithful unto death in His manifestation of love. The agony of sweat as He rose, in the shadow of the Cross, to the experience of communion and fellowship of suffering with His Father, and was enabled to cry 'Abba,' is psychologically true to nature and bears the genuine mark of mystical experience.

The most important fact of this personal life, which ever since has poured streams of power into the life of the world, is its complete adjustment to a realm of unseen reality, and its consciousness of correspondence with a personal heart and will, constituting the essence of that unseen realm. Through all the story and behind all the teaching is the inner fact of personal experience of God. In great moments of intercourse there is a flooding consciousness of sonship rising even to the adoration, 'This is my beloved son,' and in times of strain and tragedy the onward course is possible because the Abba-experience is absolutely real. A synoptic writer has reported a saying, which may indeed be coloured by later theology, but which declares a central truth: 'No man knoweth the Father save the Son' (Mt 11²⁷). Only a son knows a father; the way of inner love-experience is the only way to the secret. This primary feature of mystical experience seems to be the very warp and woof of Christ's inner life.

Our accounts, even in the Synoptics, indicate that it was the consciousness of a divine Presence that built the apostolic Church. Such sayings as 'Lo, I am with you always,' 'Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst,' are saturated with group-experience, and the early account in Acts of meetings 'in the upper room,' and of 'the Agape,' shows the richness and inner power of an invisible fellowship. Even when we allow for a legendary strand in the early narratives, we still find ourselves confronted in Acts with unmistakable evidences of the extraordinary revelation of spiritual forces in the early

faith once delivered. The idea of teaching by women was ridiculed by their opponents, and it was pointed out that the phenomena were those of 'possession.' It is interesting to notice that these prophets prepared themselves for ecstasy by emptying their mind of all thought (*ἐκένωσαν ἀνάστα*), and this state was succeeded by an uncontrollable frenzy (*ἀκόσμιος παρά ψύχης*) (Apollinarius, *ap. Eus. HE* v. xvii. 2). Tertullian tells us (*de Exhort. Castitatis*, x., one MS) that placing the head downwards was a preparation for hearing voices. An adversary of the Montanists, Miltiades, wrote a book, *How a prophet ought not to speak while in ecstasy*. Tertullian's defence, *de Ecstasi*, in seven books, is lost. The theory originated by Ritschl, and at one time popular, that Montanism was a recrudescence of primitive 'enthusiasmus,' has no support in extant sources. See art. MONTANISM.

Clement of Alexandria († c. 215) is the first Christian writer on mystical theology. Against the gnostic lecturers, who pretended to teach a secret doctrine handed down to them by disciples of the apostles, the recipient of which was raised to a higher level than the ordinary Christian, and became a 'knower' or 'gnostic,' Clement delineates the true 'gnostic' or ascetic, whose elevation above others is not acquired by human learning but by mortification and contempt of the world, and implies a life of self-conquest and of contemplation of God. From Philo Clement has borrowed the idea that God is to be sought, as Moses sought Him, in the darkness (*Strom.* ii. 2 and v. 12)—a saying which paves the way for the Areopagite and St. John of the Cross. God is to be reached by faith and by abstraction:

'Going forth by analysis to the First Intelligence,' taking away depth, breadth, length and position, leaving a monad, then abstracting what is material, 'if we cast ourselves into the vastness of Christ, thence if we proceed forward by holiness into His Imensity, we may in some fashion enter into the knowledge of the Almighty, recognising not what He is, but what He is not' (*ib.* v. 11).

This is the familiar *via negationis* of reasoning; but Clement means more than the attainment of an abstract ideal. The search, he goes on, is unseen and invisible; the grace of knowing (*γνώσις*) is from God through His Son. For God has no shape or place or motion or state or seat or right or left; the First Cause is not in space, but above space and time and speech and thought. The first stage of the quest (which corresponds to the three days of Abraham's journey) is the perception of beauties; the second is the desire of the good soul; in the third the mind sees spiritual things, 'the eyes of the understanding being opened by the Teacher who rose again the third day.' But this is not to see God as He is, which cannot be in this life (*Strom.* v. 11-13). In vii. 3 the contemplation of the gnostic is again spoken of (see also vii. 13), and vii. 7 deals with his continual prayer. This high contemplation is a special gift:

'Whether it is the Father Himself who draws to Himself every man who lives purely, and has gone forward to the intuition (*ἐννοια*) of the blessed and incorruptible Nature, or whether our own free will, having arrived at the knowledge of the good, leaps and jumps over the boundaries (as the gymnasts say), at any rate it is not without a special grace that the soul wings its way and is raised above what is above it, putting aside all that has weight' (v. 13).

In contemplation (*θεωπία*) the divine image is sealed upon the soul, which was made in God's image, by the Son, who is the perfect Image,

'so that the gnostic becomes a third image (*εἰκὼν*), as far as may be, being made like unto the Second Cause, unto that which is truly Life, by which we live the true life' (vii. 3).

Origen († 251) frequently refers to contemplation, and many times distinguishes the two lives, the active and the contemplative, which he was possibly the first to compare with Martha and Mary as their types (frag. 80 in *Joann.*, ed. E. Preuschen, Berlin, 1903, p. 547). He often speaks of rising above

sense and figures and shadows to one mystical and unspeakable vision (*e.g.*, in *Joann.* xiii. 24, *Celsus*, iii. 56). He lived with his disciples a life of asceticism, resembling that of the monks later on (cf. F. W. B. Bornemann, *In investiganda monachatus origine quibus de causis ratio habenda sit Origenis*, Göttingen, 1884), and he claims that, by abstinence and discipline, communion with God and prophecy and other 'spiritual gifts' can be attained. In an interesting passage he quotes the pagan Celsus's taunt, that no Christians would understand his mysticism, when he announced to them: 'If you close up the senses and look up with the mind, and if you turn from the flesh, and awaken the eye of the soul, thus, and thus only, shall you see God.' Origen replies that this is just what the true Christian does. When the eyes of Adam and Eve were opened (Gn 3^d), their inner eye was closed, but Christ came that those who see not may see, and that those who see may be made blind; and, in fact, by this shutting of the eyes of sense and opening of the better eye, God and His Son, who is Word and Wisdom, are contemplated (*c. Cels.* vii. 39).

A new period opens with the development of monachism in the 4th century. Thousands fled from the world, not merely to avoid temptation, but in order to attain perfect purity of mind and body and, in particular, purity of prayer, the prayer without images, which is so often mentioned in the Lives and apophthegmata of the Fathers. Retirement was necessary for contemplation (Basil, *Reg. fus. Tr.* 5 f.), and contemplation was the one thing necessary for the monk (Cassian, *Coll.* i. 8, x. 7; Basil [?], *Const. mon.* 1). The founder and model of Egyptian monachism, St. Antony, sometimes remained all night in ecstasy ('in excessu mentis') and complained when sunrise interrupted his prayer (Cassian, *Coll.* ix. 31):

'And he also delivered this celestial and more than human judgment as to the end of prayer: "That prayer is not perfect in which the monk understands himself or his own prayer"' (*ib.*).

This famous sentence applies in some measure to all mystical prayer, even its inchoate degrees. St. Athanasius tells us practically nothing of St. Antony's contemplation, but dwells upon the attacks made on the saint by devils (these remind us of many later instances, including the Curé d'Ars), and diabolical appearances in every form. Antony's power over demons is paralleled by many subsequent saints—*e.g.*, St. Benedict and St. Ignatius.

The Conferences of Abbot Isaac on prayer, reported by Cassian († c. 435), have had enormous influence. He teaches that monastic life tends to uninterrupted prayer and purity of thought (*Coll.* ix. 2). Prayer is multifarious, and its kind depends on the degree of purity attained, as well as upon accident and industry, so that it is not uniform (ix. 8). Out of any form of prayer most fervent and fiery prayers may surge up, so that the soul, after the manner of an incomprehensible and devouring flame, flies forth beyond all things, and pours out unspeakable prayers, which the Holy Ghost supplies, so that not only the mouth cannot speak them all, but the mind cannot recall them afterwards (ix. 15). This fiery prayer, known to few, and ineffable, transcends all human sense, and is described by no sound of voice or movement of tongue; but the mind is illumined by a celestial light (ix. 25). Tears are a grace, but not when they are forced (ix. 28-30). The means of attaining to continual prayer, so far as this is possible, is by short but fervent prayer. The most useful ejaculation is 'Deus, in adiutorium meum intende; Domine, ad adjuvandum me festina' (x. 9 f.). It is wrong to have any imaginary form of God before

than any writer; and the desire is joy: 'for he who desires, though his tongue is silent, yet sings in his heart' (on Ps 86). St. Augustine's description of the active and contemplative lives, typified by Peter and John (in *Joann.* tract. cxxiv. 5), and his long discussion and classification of visions—corporal, spiritual (i.e. imaginary), and intellectual (*de Genesi ad litt.* bk. xii.)—are classical.

St. Benedict († c. 543), whose Rule for religious life was to be almost universal in the West until the 13th cent., says but little about contemplative prayer (*Prol. in Regulam*, fin., 52, etc.). He insists upon the conditions for it—separation from the world, obedience, silence, and, above all, humility, which will lead the monk to perfect charity (*Reg.* 7). He continues the tradition that prayer should be brief and 'pure' (29). He would have sent an inquirer in the first place to Cassian and the *Sayings of the Fathers* (cf. 42, 73).

The two writers within the Patristic period whose influence was greatest upon the Middle Ages are incontestably pseudo-Dionysius, and St. Gregory the Great, the former at the end of the 5th cent., the latter at the end of the 6th. Dionysius is first quoted by Monophysites; but he became an authority in East and West, and was long regarded as the chief of the Apostolic Fathers. His works form a system, of which the tiny treatise *Of Mystical Theology* (PL cxxii. 1171) is the climax. He carries on the tradition of the Greek Fathers, and probably knew the passage of St. Gregory of Nyssa referred to above; but he is influenced mainly by the Neo-Platonist, Proclus, from whom he has been shown by J. Stiglmair to borrow largely (*Das Aufkommen der pseudo-Dionysischen Schriften, und ihr Eindringen in die christliche Litteratur bis zum Lateranconcil 649*, Feldkirch, 1895; also *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, vii. [1898] 91, viii. [1899] 263; *Katholik*, xc. ii. [1910] 55). He asserts the transcendence of God with extreme expressions, exaggerated from the Platonic *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*: God is *ὑπερούσιος, ὑπεράγαθος* (*Myst. Theol.* 1), *ὁ πάντων ἐπέκεινα, ὑπὲρ θαρξῆαν καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀγαθαρχῶν* (*Ep.* 2). This is the *via eminentiæ ad Deum*, and is beyond the assertive theology (*καταφατικὴ θεολογία* [*Myst. Theol.* 3]) which describes the Trinity. But a yet higher way is the *via negationis*, by which not only all that is sensible (*ib.* 4), but all intellectual notions (*ib.* 5), are denied of God. Elsewhere (*de Div. Nom.* vii. 3) he enumerates in order the ways in which our intellect forms the idea of God: first, from the order of the universe, which came forth from Him, and contains likenesses of which He is the exemplar, then by abstraction and eminence (*ἐν τῇ πάντων ἀφαίρεσει καὶ ὑπεροχῇ*, i.e. we abstract all the perfections of nature, and attribute them to God in a higher sense, because He is their Cause):

'Wherefore God is in all things, and apart from all things; and God is known by knowledge, and by ignorance, and there is intuition and consideration and science of Him, and touch and perception and opinion and imagination and name, and all the rest, of Him; and He is neither conceived, nor spoken, nor named; and He is none of the things that are, nor is He known in any of them. And He is all in all things, and nothing in none; and He is known to all through all things, and through none of them to none.'

And yet all this is but reasoning up to a paradoxical but necessary ideal—it is philosophy, not mysticism—and Dionysius goes on:

'And there is, besides, that most divine knowledge of God, which takes place through ignorance, in the union which is above intelligence, when the intellect, quitting all things that are, and then leaving itself also, is united to the super-lucent rays, being illuminated thence and therein by the unsearchable depth of wisdom.'

Thus the philosophical process of abstraction and negation which justifies the mystic in transcending reason is emphatically distinguished from the mystical operation of rising above the world and self to God. The former results in an abstract idea; the

latter carries the soul away above all intelligence into union. Clement of Alexandria had somewhat slurred over this difference, numerous later writers, mediæval as well as modern, have neglected it, and the dogmatic theologians eventually denied it. But the very existence of the mystic faculty depends upon this fundamental distinction.

The mystical ascent is described by pseudo-Dionysius in a celebrated paradox, as the entry into the night which is brighter than light:

'The super-unknown, the super-luminous and loftiest height, wherein the simple and absolute and unchangeable mysteries are cloaked in the super-lucent darkness of hidden mystic silence, which super-shines most super-brightly in the blackest night, and, in the altogether intangible and unseen, super-fills the eyeless understandings with super-beautiful brightnesses' (*Myst. Theol.* 1).

This literal translation reproduces the neologisms of the original. The next sentence is the only one which gives practical advice, and it was cited throughout the Middle Ages as the *locus classicus* for the method of contemplation:

'And thou, dear Timothy, in thy intent practice of the mystical contemplations, leave behind both thy senses and thy intellectual operations, and all things known by sense and intellect, and all things which are not and which are, and set thyself, as far as may be, to unite thyself in unknowing with Him who is above all being and knowledge, for by being purely free and absolute, out of self and of all things (τῇ ἐαυτοῦ καὶ πάντων ἐκστάσει), thou shalt be led up to the ray of the divine darkness, stripped of all, and loosed from all.'

Every mystic has recognized his own experience in this striking passage: the strange intuition, which is only impeded, not assisted, by the senses and the reason, which is utter darkness to the mind, yet floods it with incomprehensible knowledge. There is nothing new in the doctrine; just below we encounter the familiar reference to Moses in the darkness of Sinai; and the notion of God's transcendence and immanence, extravagantly worded by Dionysius, can be found rhetorically polished in St. Basil's *Hom. x., de Fide*, and frequently elsewhere. But the 'ray of darkness' is a fine expression, and so vivid a summary was of real service to clench tradition. Dionysius, however, was obliged further to elucidate his own paradox, and to explain (*Ep.* 1) that 'ignorance' and 'darkness' are not to be understood 'privatively' (*κατὰ στέρησιν*) but 'by excess' (*ὑπεροχικῶς*), as darkness by excess of light (*Ep.* 5):

'Do thou super-truly deny that the Light that is, is not known to those who possess it. Ignorance about God is truly knowledge [read: ὅτι οὗτος γινώσκει τὴν κατὰ Θεὸν ἀγνοσίαν] . . . and if any one, seeing God, understands what he has seen, he has not seen God, but something of those things of His which exist and are known' (*Ep.* 1)—another famous assertion, which has been precious to after ages.

There are only a few lines of Dionysius which speak of mystical theology and its method (viz. *de Div. Nom.* vii. 3, *Myst. Theol.* 1, and *Epp.* 1 and 5). As to the preparation for it, especially the moral purification on which other writers insist, he has not a word, nor as to its degrees, variations, or difficulties. The writer himself is far more a speculative theologian and philosopher than a mystic.

St. Gregory the Great († 604) offers a sharp contrast. In place of a short, scholastic statement, he sets before us many beautiful and diffuse descriptions of his personal experience. These are to be found chiefly in the *Morals on Job* and the *Commentary on Ezekiel*; those on *Kings* and *Canticles* are less to be trusted, as they were made up from stenographic notes of lectures and were disowned by St. Gregory. As a theologian, the great pope sums up the doctrine of the Latin Fathers, especially St. Augustine. Naturally he teaches that there are two lives, the active and the contemplative, symbolized as usual by Martha and Mary, Rachel and Leah (*Mor.* vi. 61, in *Ezech.* ii. ii. 9f.). The contemplative life is the higher; it may be dangerous for some (*Mor.* vi. 57), yet it

truth to itself, by much discussion and reasoning, and makes it comprehensible to itself, by drawing it down into the ordinary intelligence, by bringing reason to bear upon it, and adapting images to it (*Benjamin major*, iv. 11). Among other mystical writers of the period, Guigo the Carthusian and especially Gulielmus of St. Thierry, near Rheims, deserve notice.

The 13th cent. saw a great wave of mysticism which passed over Europe, together with the rise of the mendicant orders; it was followed immediately by the maturity of Scholasticism, the converse, though not the contradictory, of mystical theology. Many of the great theologians were also mystics, yet the great commentaries on the *Sentences* and the *Summa* of theology did not include mystical theology in their field. In the discussions of 'the two lives,' which invariably form part of the course, contemplation is understood as the conclusion of rational discourse, not as intuitive experience. The Franciscan, St. Bonaventura († 1274), has been entitled 'the prince of mystical theologians' in a large sense, on account of his pious meditations on the Passion and his ascetical writings. He makes a few rare references to mysticism (e.g., *de Triplici Via*, iii. 7). The following declaration is of first-rate importance:

'I admit, however, that the mind's eye can be fixed on God in such wise that it looks at naught else; yet it will not perceive nor see the glory of the Light itself, but will rather be raised up into the darkness; and to this knowledge it will be elevated by the removal of all things, as Dionysius says, and he calls this knowledge "learned ignorance." For this knowledge it is, in which the affection is set on fire, as is well known to those who are accustomed to ecstasy ("ad anagogicos excessus"). In my opinion, this manner of knowledge is to be sought by every just man in this life. If God shall perform aught beyond this, it is a special privilege, not the common law' (*Comm. in Sent.* ii. dist. 23, art. 2, qu. 8, concl.).

Thus mystical experience is declared to belong to the *lex communis*, and not to be an exception, a privilege, a miracle. Another passage explicitly refuses to formulate any theory as to mystical knowledge:

'If you ask how this [repose to the reason, when the whole affection goes forth to God, as Dionysius describes] takes place, inquire of grace, not of learning, of desire, not of intelligence, of the groaning of prayer, not of the study of understanding' (*Itinerarium*, ad fin.).

In the famous opusculum *de Adhaerendo Deo*, ascribed to the Dominican Albertus Magnus († 1280), the traditional method of prayer is lucidly set forth: internal recollection, the mind stripped naked of all phantasms and images, simplified and tranquillized in God (ch. 5; cf. his *Paradisus animæ*, 33).

St. Thomas Aquinas († 1274), though an ecstatic, has left us no disquisition on mystical theology, and there are only a very few casual references to the subject in the whole of his voluminous works. It is just possible, however, to discover his view, which depends on his Aristotelian theory of cognition. This theory teaches that, just as our senses perceive objects by means of an impression on the sense-organ (e.g., the image on the retina, communicated to the brain), which impression is not itself perceived but is the 'medium by which' we perceive the objects, so our intellect knows by means of impressions (*species impressæ*) which are the 'medium by which' it knows ideas (*ideæ, verba mentis, species expressæ*).

i. In man's present state the only *species impressæ* that he receives are conveyed to the mind through the senses ('nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu'); they are but attributes of material objects 'abstracted' (i.e. considered apart) from the objects. Hence, by means of these impressions, the mind (a) directly knows abstract qualities (*quidditates*) which exist individually in material objects, but it knows them, not as existing individually, but as potentially universal. Further, (b) our intellect

knows the individual things themselves indirectly by their qualities, and (c) it can arrive at some kind of knowledge of non-material things by reasoning from its abstract ideas (*Summa Theol.* I. lxxxv. 1). Thus it cannot know God directly, but can argue to His existence and His nature from creatures by abstraction and negation. But intellectual ideas thus formed in the mind are not really understood by the mind unless it represents them by the imagination; it 'turns to images' ('convertit se ad phantasmata') so that it may behold the universal in the particular, wherein alone it has real existence (*ib.* lxxxiv. 7).

St. Thomas points out that 'each man can experience this in himself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms for himself some *phantasmata* (imaginings) after the manner of examples, in which he can inspect, as it were, what he wishes to understand; and hence it is that likewise when we wish to make someone understand something, we set examples before him, out of which he can form *phantasmata* for himself in order to understand.'

We can represent to ourselves spiritual truths and spiritual substances (God and angels and souls) only by images, which we know to be inadequate, but yet in which we behold something more than the phantasma:

'Intellectualis cognitio non sistit in phantasmatibus, sed in eis contemplatur puritatem intelligibilis veritatis' (*Summa*, ii. li. qu. cxxx. art. 5 ad 2, according to the best text).

ii. But a disembodied soul or an angel is an intelligence independent of a bodily organ; hence it understands spiritual things as they are, without 'turning to phantasmata.' As it cannot get impressions by the bodily senses, since it has none, its impressions (*species impressæ*) must be 'infused' in some way, natural to it, but unknown to us; these *species* will not be abstractions from matter, but purely non-material; they will not be multiple and complex representations (as ours are) of objects which are unities, but one and total. Such pure intellects, instead of knowing the universal in the particular, know the particular in the universal in one glance; they do not argue from fact to fact, from premiss to conclusion, but in one act know the conclusion and the premisses in it. Thus the angelic cognition resembles the intuitive perceptions of sense rather than the analytic and synthetic process of reason. Its knowledge is direct, immediate, intuitive, in comparison with the abstracting and reasoning of a mind which is in partial dependence on the brain; but still it is mediate, indirect, in so far as an 'impression' is needed as the 'medium by which' it knows. It is possible in this angelic manner to know God intuitively instead of by reasoning, but impossible to know Him 'as He is'; for an impression in a finite mind must be finite, and cannot adequately represent the infinite; and, however much the *species* representing God be increased in clarity and splendour, they must infinitely fall short of His ineffable glory.

iii. But angels and men have as their reward the 'beatific vision' of God 'as He is,' in which God is seen by means of Himself, He Himself being united immediately to the human intellect as *species impressa*, so that He is both the thing seen and the 'means by which' it is seen—this divine impression is called the *lumen gloriæ*. Thus the blessed participate in their measure in the act in which God knows Himself without medium, and are united to Him as Act (God is *actus purus*) in so far as may be, without losing their own individuality, which retains all its former powers and activities; they are transformed into God without ceasing to be themselves. They see God wholly, yet in varying degrees; as He is, but not completely, 'totum non totaliter, clare non comprehensive.'

As this is the end for which man is made, and his reward, it is not given to man in his state of probation.

ance. This lofty angelic knowledge is utter ignorance (until it is perhaps symbolically and tentatively translated) to the intellect itself, but it inflames the will with intense love and desire. The soul loves and desires without understanding; it longs for and partially enjoys it knows not what. This is the 'ray of darkness' of Dionysius, the wisdom which is ignorance, the 'cloud of unknowing,' the obscure night of the spirit, the analogical way to the unseen and incommunicable.

Are we to brush aside this theory as founded upon an obsolete epistemology? Let us note, at any rate, (1) that our employment of phantasmata in order to understand is simply a fact of experience; (2) that the distinction between the lower and the higher powers of the soul, though neglected or denied by many moderns, is more vividly experienced even in quite inchoate mystical states than it ever is by our ordinary consciousness, and ought to be accepted as one of the facts to be explained rather than as a theory to account for the phenomena; (3) that the possibility of cognition by purely intellectual species, while it may seem a somewhat wild hypothesis of Scholasticism and, from the philosophic point of view, nothing more, is in reality less a tradition from Patristic days or a deduction from a ready-made theory of cognition than an explanation of real mystical experience. It seems extremely probable that the origin of the theory was not so much the attribution of a supposed angelical faculty to contemplatives as the ascription of mystical intelligence to the angelic nature.

It would seem that theologians, themselves mystics, evolved the idea of spiritual intelligence from their own experience, and attributed it in a yet higher and purer form to the spiritual substances with which they seemed to be in communion as well as to read of in Holy Scripture. We may safely take the large lines of the Scholastic theory as a working hypothesis: that the human mind in its natural and ordinary operation is cognizant of spiritual things only indirectly, by abstraction from sensible images, and then by the way of 'eminence' and of negation, whereas mystical knowledge is a different operation of the same faculty, whereby it knows spiritual things directly by means of purely non-material impressions received from them in some unknown manner.

3. Post-Scholastic mystics.—This hypothesis will suggest an explanation of the phenomenon of visions so common at all periods, but particularly remarkable in the case of the 'revelations' published by many female saints of the Middle Ages. Many of these were mystics of a high order, but mystics whose impressions are easily and regularly translated into imagery. The revelations of St. Catherine of Siena († 1380) become profound instructions on the spiritual life; those of St. Catherine of Genoa († 1510) contain dogmatic theology of extraordinary beauty and value. St. Gertrude impresses us with the vastness of her theological horizon, in spite of the pictorial nature of her conceptions, like those of the two Mechtildes (St. Mechtilde of Hackeborn [† 1298]; Mechtilde of Magdeburg, whose visions were written in old German [† 1280 or 1285]), but these are narrower and more 'devotional.' St. Bridget of Sweden († 1373) heads the long list of ecstasies who receive 'revelations' about the details of our Lord's Passion (the most read of these is perhaps Catherine Emmerich [† 1824]); the accounts given by these various seers are impossible to reconcile with each other. St. Hildegard († 1179) and St. Elizabeth of Schönau († c. 1165) were prophetesses, who attributed to a divine source much curious information which they published. The writings of Angela of Foligno († 1309), Juliana of Norwich (living

1412), and many others are interesting and edifying documents. It would seem that the value of all these revelations varies according to the intellectual power of the recipient of the mystical light, and her power of 'translating' what she has experienced, as well as according to the amount of light received. Delusions are always exceedingly common in such cases, even in real mystics of holy life, and may occur in the case of saints who have insisted that all their words came from God (see Poulain, *Grâces d'oraison*, ch. xxi.). When the Church 'approves' the published revelations of a holy person, this only means that they contain nothing contrary to the Faith, and may be read without harm. It is not necessary to regard revelations as mere imagination (though, of course, they often are no more than this), with no spiritual light behind them, simply because they are mistaken or even absurd; they are sometimes mingled imagination and badly-interpreted light.

The English group of mediæval mystics has been neglected until recently: Margerie Kempe (c. 1290?); then the hermit Richard Rolle of Hampole († 1349), whose writings, both in English and in Latin (the latter translated by Richard Misyn), have a peculiar charm. The form of his mystical experiences is less picture than music and song. Walter Hilton († 1396), a Carthusian, was much influenced by Rolle; his best known work is *The Scale of Perfection*; his other works have never been published. At the end of the 14th cent. an unknown mystic published some wonderful tracts, of which the chief is *The Cloud of Unknowing*, a marvellously clear and practical little treatise, an admirable guide for contemplative prayer. It seems to sum up the doctrines of St. John of the Cross two hundred years beforehand.

In Germany Master Eckhart of Cologne († 1327), a Dominican, was suspected of Quietism, and, though he submitted to censure with all humility, some propositions attributed to him were proscribed by John XXII. in 1329. False mysticism, such as that of the Beghards (condemned at Vienne, 1312), was rejected by his followers, the great Dominicans Henry Suso († 1366), a mystic of poetical temperament and extraordinary austerity, and J. Tauler († 1361), the great preacher, whose instructions are still of great practical value. The *Theologia Germanica* appeared about 1350; the *Neun Felsen* of Rulman Merswin of Strassburg was long ascribed to Suso (see also F. Pfeiffer, *Deutsche Mystiker des XIVten Jahrh.*, Leipzig, 1846); the Flemish Ruysbroeck († 1381) was a follower of Tauler; his writings rank high as personal documents, and are on fire with love, though somewhat lacking in logical sequence. They were much used by the Franciscan Henry Herp or Harpius († 1478) in his *Theologia Mystica*. From the congregations founded by Ruysbroeck at Grönendaal came the famous Thomas à Kempis.

The chancellor of Paris University, Jean Gerson († 1429), in his *Mystica Theologia*, places the mystic faculty in the 'synderesis' (or habit of first principles of action), which he calls the 'apex mentis.' There are passages on mysticism among the eursions and somewhat paradoxical treatises of the pious Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa († 1464). The Benedictine Blosius (Louis de Blois, † 1565) wrote admirable ascetical works for cloistered religious. He continues the tradition that the practice of continual aspirations is the best means of attaining pure prayer and 'union with God without any medium.' His *Instructio Spiritualis*, composed for his own use, is one of the best books of direction for contemplatives.

4. The Discalced Carmelites.—The great saints of the 16th cent. were largely engaged in reforming the Church; but in the tranquillity of Spain arose

tration; and intense involuntary concentration on the most absorbing and delightful vision is commonly held by theologians to be a sufficient explanation of most ecstasies, which are commoner in women than in men, and are more frequent in persons of feeble intellect like St. Joseph of Cupertino than in the strong-minded like St. Francis de Sales or St. Vincent de Paul. All this tends to show that it is safest to regard St. Theresa's original four degrees as psychological varieties which are not always successive stages nor always signs of definite degrees of perfection.

Some of the many confusions and apparent contradictions in St. Theresa's writings may be explained by her having subordinated her own views to the dicta of some of her confessors. For example, she herself suffered grievously for about eighteen years from inability to meditate; yet in her latest work (*The Interior Castle, or the Mansions*, 6th mansion, ch. vii.) she declares that it is a delusion when people think that they cannot meditate, however sublime their prayer may be, and in her *Way of Perfection* she describes meditation as quite easy; yet in the same chapter of the 6th 'mansion,' her experience and common sense induce her to correct this astonishing doctrine, and she adds:

'Souls led in supernatural ways, and raised to perfect contemplation, are right in declaring that they cannot practise this kind of meditation; as I said, I do not know why, but as a rule they are unable to do so. Yet they would be wrong in saying that they cannot dwell on these mysteries, nor frequently think about them, especially when these events are being celebrated by the Catholic Church.'

This is, of course, quite accurate, if we understand that, *in the time of prayer*, contemplatives are utterly unable to think about mysteries without detaching themselves at least partially from the prayer, whereas *out of prayer* they can think about the mysteries of religion even more easily and more fruitfully than can the ordinary Christian. But St. Theresa does not make this distinction. She is even less convincing when she thinks that contemplatives cannot meditate 'because they see the mysteries of Jesus Christ with a simple gaze.' She herself had so many intellectual and imaginary visions of definite facts or mysteries that she does not appear to realize that others receive only a pure intellectual light, without differentiation or definition. No one would gather from her writings that the mystic in general aims simply at union with God, above all sense and imagination and feeling. She belongs really to the same category as the great St. Gertrude or St. Bridget, not to that of St. Gregory, St. Bernard, and St. John of the Cross. Her matter-of-fact Spanish character desired definite knowledge, and she astounds us by the statement:

'When imaginary visions are divine, they seem in a manner more profitable for us than others, as being more suited to our nature—with the exception of the visions sent by our Lord in the seventh mansion, which far surpasses all others' (6th mansion, ch. ix.).

St. John of the Cross, a disciple of St. Theresa, refers his readers to her admirable descriptions of mystical phenomena, but he will give none himself; and he refuses to estimate prayer according to its effects upon soul and body, bringing peace, joy, terror, and longing to the one, and sharp pain, dislocation of the bones, raising from the ground, insensibility, or apparent death to the other. He tests all such manifestations, on the contrary, by their influence on union with God; none of these psychical and psycho-physical phenomena is a proximate means of union, and the same is true of every sort of vision, locution, etc. None of these things is to be desired or prayed for; and, if they occur, they must not be attended to. It is not necessary even to decide whether visions and locutions are from God, from the imagination, or from

the devil; they are merely to be set aside and never thought of; by this means they can do no harm if they are not from God, while, if they are divine, they will produce their due effect without our attending to them. All our effort is to be to attain union with God, i.e. with His will. The 'purer' the rays of infused contemplation, the less they are perceptible, and the less their effect on the imagination and the sensible affections. No one is to desire the joy of the 'prayer of quiet' or the inebriation of the next degree, but merely the dry and pure contemplation, which produces joy and inebriation only in the highest part of the soul. Aridity is not to be feared, for it is the thirst of the soul for God. St. John is drawn to treat of the ascetical side of the contemplative's life in a manner which is disconcertingly austere in *The Ascent of Mount Carmel*, an unfinished work. But it should be recollected that the utter renunciation and self-abandonment which he preaches would be as imprudent to attempt as they would be impossible to practise for an ordinary Christian, whereas for the mystic this entire stripping of all is accomplished readily and with interior relish.

But who is to be started on this ascent? The ancients had usually left undetermined to whom was applicable the advice to leave all forms and shadows and to grope for God in darkness and renunciation; but they had recommended universally the practice of aspirations, which would lead men insensibly to the heights of prayer. But in the 16th cent. formal 'meditation,' by the use of the imagination, together with elaborate thinking out of a subject, was becoming common. When is it right to renounce meditation of this kind, and to follow the ancient and contradictory rule of ceasing imagination and thought, in order to unite the will alone to God? St. John of the Cross gives a plain and categorical reply, which has been persistently neglected ever since his day. His first statement of the rule is in *The Ascent*, ii. 13; he repeats it more clearly in *The Obscure Night*, i. 9, and sums it shortly, with further remarks, in *The Living Flame*, iii. 34 f. Many people in the world, he says, and most (though not quite all) who enter a contemplative order develop an inability to meditate when they pray, accompanied by anxious aridity, in which they constantly think of God, yet can get no consolation either from God or from creatures; this is the 'night of the senses,' caused by the commencement of infused contemplation, which is as yet imperceptible because weak and unaccustomed, but is sufficient to wean the soul from the pleasure that it once took in meditation and sensible devotion, and to cause a desire of solitude and repose, together with the loss of the power of fixing the imagination. In this state the soul is to abandon itself to God, and be content in prayer with a loving attention to Him, without attempting to comprehend its own state or to possess any particular knowledge; and it will find itself marvellously sustained by the interior nourishment which all-unconsciously it absorbs in this fervent but arid prayer. (Indeed, the one sure proof that the soul is doing right is to be found in its swift progress in virtue.) If the soul attempts to act with the imagination, it spoils God's work; and St. John of the Cross indulges in violent objurgations of the directors of souls who insist upon imaginative and discursive meditation, because the mind seems to be doing nothing, wasting its time, and mooning away in laziness; such false guides are painting their wretched daubs where God is limning with His own delicate touch (*Living Flame*, loc. cit.). After the 'night of the senses' follows the 'night of the spirit,' with its terrific interior (and usually also exterior) trials

thought to be mainly the sensible tasting of mysteries, especially of the Passion. Art began no longer to represent the saints as kneeling calmly in adoration, but as waving their arms and stretching their necks and rolling their eyes, in ecstasies of sensuous longing, while they tear aside their clothes to relieve their burning bosoms; the Roman and Bolognese schools of painting and the Berninesque school of sculpture join with baroque architecture in emphasizing the 17th and 18th cent. conceptions of devotion.

This is the popular side, though the true teaching was never lost, and St. John of the Cross was honoured, if not read. The 18th cent. writers were chiefly compilers—e.g., Reguera († 1747), who followed Godinez, and the Benedictine Schram († 1797), who followed Reguera. The tendency of the period is to enumerate all the extraordinary manifestations that can be found, and to classify them in a theoretical scale which bears no relation to facts. Some short but valuable practical instructions occur in the *Homo Apostolicus* and the *Praxis confessorii* of St. Alfonso di Liguori († 1787). The *Manuel des âmes intérieures* of Grou (a Jesuit until the suppression [† 1803]) is one of the best guides for contemplative souls. The best known author of the 18th cent. is Scaramelli († 1752). His *Direttorio mistico* is a valuable summary. He closely follows the views of Suarez. Like the rest of this school, he explains away the traditional advice to reject imaginations in prayer, as referring to the formation of an abstract ideal of God by the reason, by the *via eminentiæ* and *via negationis*—the very confusion which pseudo-Dionysius has so carefully avoided. Hence Scaramelli can agree with Suarez that supernatural contemplation is but the crown of a process of reasoning; the contemplation of God in *caligine* is the contemplation of an intellectual abstraction; hence its vagueness, hence it cannot be described! But one wonders how it can cause burning and ecstatic love, and this is left unexplained. This abstraction is all that is perceived in almost all the degrees of mysticism. The intuition of God by 'infused species' is given to a few, but probably only in the highest degree, that of 'spiritual marriage,' and this grace is not to be wished or asked of God. The only mystical state which may be desired (and only if God has already raised the soul to the mystical state) is the contemplation of the abstract idea of God!

The 19th cent. was singularly barren. The most remarkable publication was *Die christliche Mystik* (Regensburg, 1836-42) by J. J. von Görres; it is mainly a dissertation on the external phenomena of mysticism (such as stigmata, prolonged fasts, bilocation, etc.), a repellent treatise, founded to some extent on doubtful sources. Yet it is not to be denied that this psycho-physical side demands scientific investigation. It seems certain that St. John of the Cross is justified in his view that the body is somehow 'spiritualized' by contemplation. Such facts as the power of saints over the animal world and the power of reading thoughts, e.g., are proved beyond cavil; whether to some extent some of these phenomena are the results of mystical graces, or wholly independent of them, is a question to be examined. Levitation seems to occur apart from ecstasy in states of prayer which are not very advanced. J. Ribet's *La Mystique divine* (Paris, 1879-83) is a creditable work for its day.

6. Recent Roman Catholic writers.—Saudreau and Poulain have abandoned the false road taken by their predecessors, though they have chosen different paths. The many volumes of the former are valuable and helpful. While it is easy to criticize many details in his work, the whole of it is in general devoted to the restoration of the older tradition and to the justification of the prayer of

aspirations and of loving attention to God. Poulain has accumulated a great store of information, admirably arranged, and he gives excellent counsels. His classification has been criticized above; it must be added that for traditional contemplative prayer he has substituted a new 'prayer of simplicity,' which differs from it very little, but is said to be wholly non-mystical, and is placed before, instead of after, the 'night of the senses.' Lehodey follows Poulain. Zahn has stereotyped the popular 18th cent. view, described above, to a degree which no serious author of that date had ventured. He takes the view of Suarez and Scaramelli as to contemplation and infused prayer, but goes further in that he even throws doubt upon the existence of 'intellectual visions' (*Einführung in die christl. Mystik*, p. 509 f.). Lamballe regards contemplation as merely the exercise of faith, with the help of the 'gifts of the Holy Ghost,' which (against the theologians) he seems to regard as extraordinary graces; he teaches the traditional method. Putting Zahn aside, it may be said that all recent Roman Catholic writers are agreed that it is permissible and proper to desire mystical prayer, though not its extraordinary by-products and psycho-physical effects.

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MYSTICISM (Christian, Protestant).—Protestant mysticism was born out of the mysticism of the Roman Catholic Church and has been profoundly influenced by it throughout its entire course of development; but other influences besides the old mysticism came into operation in the formation of Protestant mysticism, and the new forces helped to give a new direction to it. The most important new influence was the NT, now freshly alive in the 16th cent. in the tongue of the common people, and felt to be the master model of all religious experience and of all true piety. The great classics of medieval mysticism, especially the anonymous *Theologia Germanica* and the *Imitation of Christ*, still spoke to the hearts of all serious seekers for inward religion. All early Protestant mystics either read these

books or got from others the substance of the message which they contained. At the same time the re-discovery of the gospel, with its concrete revelation of God and man and life, brought a new spiritualizing power to bear on the minds of men, and, as a consequence, the new mysticism was far less negative in its way of approach to God, more practical and social in its outlook, and more eager to minister to the entire life of man.

Luther himself was an intense admirer of the *Theologia Germanica* and of John Tauler's sermons, and there is a mystical depth always in evidence in Luther's accounts of his own religious experiences and in his spiritual insight into the meaning of faith as the way of personal salvation. The mystical element is, however, much more marked and emphatic in the contemporary so-called 'spiritual' reformers towards whom Luther early took up an antagonistic attitude—a group best represented by Thomas Münzer, Hans Denck, Johann Bunderlin, Christian Entfelder, Sebastian Franck, and Caspar Schwenckfeld. All these men were mystical in the primary sense. They found a religion which had its main roots in personal inward experience. They all exalted the inward, living, invisible word of God above the outward, written word, the Scriptures, and they insisted that salvation is the formation of a divine life in man himself—a life which re-creates human nature and produces in its direct operations a nature saturated with love both in its upward relation with God and in its outward relations with men.

The Anabaptists, of whom Balthazar Hübmaier (b. 1480) may be taken as a typical representative, often began their religious activity as a result of direct experiences, and they strongly emphasized the importance of a religion of life, but in most respects they were non-mystical. They treated the gospel as a new law to be literally followed and obeyed. They held that the true Church is a visible church of adult believers, formed on the apostolic model. They sometimes exalted visions and indulged in prophecy, but in these matters they believed that they were merely following, as in all matters of their faith, the Scriptural models. The Familists, or Family of Love, founded by Henry Nicholas of Münster (b. 1501), were a strongly mystical people. The founder was a sensitive recipient of 'openings' and what he believed to be 'communications,' and he believed himself chosen to be a 'revealer of the divine Word.' The type of religion which the Familists promulgated, and which became wide-spread in England during the first half of the 17th cent., was marked by an intense purpose to rise above everything outward and to exhibit in worship and in daily practical life the actual spirit and love of Christ. They highly valued silence as a way of worship, and they endeavoured to live so obedient to the 'Light' and 'Seed' of Christ within them that they should become perfect and complete, what they called 'godded men.'

The greatest of all early Protestant mystics was Jacob Boehme (born a few miles from Görlitz in Silesia, 1575, died 1624). Though an uneducated man, a shoemaker by trade, Boehme read much, and gathered into his meditative and original mind many strands of previous thought-systems. Apart from the Bible, he was influenced most by the writings of Caspar Schwenckfeld (1489-1561) and those of Valentine Weigel (1533-88). Through Weigel, and Weigel's master, Paracelsus (1493-1541), he absorbed the alchemical aspirations of the time, and inherited the baffling terminology of alchemy, astrology, and theosophy. This inheritance largely determined the fundamental form of Boehme's universe and also his conception of man as an epitome of the universe, i.e. a micro-

cosm. The living and permanent core of Boehme's message, however, sprang out of his own deep experience and his own vivid apprehension of the meaning of Christianity as a way of life. In the year 1600, as in 'a flash of lightning,' he felt that 'the gate of his soul was opened' and that he saw and knew what no books could teach. Under much persecution and struggle and with frequent successive 'openings,' he slowly matured his message and gave it in a long series of books, hard to comprehend but, nevertheless, containing much real insight.

The main ideas are these. Behind the visible, material, temporal universe there is an invisible, immaterial, eternal universe, which is the *mother* of the one that we see. This unoriginated matrix, ground, or abyss eternally evolves, or differentiates, into divine Personality within, and differentiates outwardly into visible and invisible worlds of matter and life and consciousness, through which the principles of darkness and light are revealed in temporal forms. Both root principles—a no and a yes—are present in every person, and the destiny of every soul is settled by its choice of principle. The light, or love principle—the heart of God—has been perfectly revealed in the incarnation of Christ. To be 'saved' is to be united with His life, to live in His love, to die to the isolated self, and to rise by a new birth into His Spirit and power and become a branch of Christ's life-tree. Salvation is not the result of opinions, of belief in creeds, or of the performance of outward sacraments or of membership in an outward Church, but rather it is the result of an inward union of heart with the revealed life of God, of an Abba-crying spirit in the soul; in short, salvation is the life of God brought to a personal conscious expression in the life of a man, so that 'the Lily-Twig' blossoms in a new individual form. See, further, art. BOEHME.

Boehme's entire writings were translated into English by John Sparrow and John Ellistone during the years 1647-61. They became a powerful influence in England, and contributed largely towards the formation of the inner life of the religious societies of the Commonwealth. A minor mystical group, owing its organizing life directly to Boehme's influence, was 'the sect of the Behmenists,' the leaders of which were John Pordage (b. 1607), Jane Leade (b. 1623), and Francis Lee (b. 1661). This movement, which culminated in the formation of 'the Philadelphian Society' (1697-1703), was visionary, confused, and devoid of the spiritually robust characteristics of the great Teutonic mystic himself.

George Fox (1624-91), the founder of the Quakers, plainly showed the influence of Boehme, gave the mystical movement a strong social direction, and is one of the most impressive and typical of Protestant mystics. Like Boehme, he went through a long period of baffling search, ending in a great mystical experience, which opened the gate of his soul and gave him remarkable religious insight and power. The main religious ideas which formed his message—delivered with marked success in England and America—were the following. There is a 'Light' or 'Seed' of God in the soul of every man. The soul obedient to the divine endowment increases its measure of light, triumphs over the innate tendencies to sin, and becomes a spiritual instrument or organ of the present, living, inward Christ, who is the only Head of the true Church. The best preparation for worship, as also for public service of any kind, is inward hush or silence, the suppression of self and selfishness, the inward reception of grace, and an attitude of waiting for a clear intimation of the Spirit's guidance.

From the opening of the 18th cent. Protestant mysticism in Europe, especially in England and

Holland, was strongly influenced by Quietism as expressed in the works of Molinos, Mme. Guyon, and Fénelon. This Quietistic influence is most noticeable in the ministers and leaders of the Society of Friends (the Quakers) of that century, who greatly admired the writings of this group of mystics. For fully a century the social aspirations of Friends became subordinated to the intense desire for quiet inward communion (see, further, FRIENDS, SOCIETY OF).

In William Law (1686-1761) Protestant mysticism in the 18th cent. attained its most perfect expression. He shows throughout his life the influence of the English Platonists, Whichcote, Smith, More, and Cudworth, but he early formed his mind directly upon the great models of mystical piety. In his first creative period, in which he produced *Christian Perfection* (1726) and *A Serious Call to a Devout and Holy Life* (1729), he strongly follows the lines of classical, mediæval mysticism, with much emphasis on self-denial and negation. These two books represent the culmination in England of the type of Christianity embodied in the sermons of John Tauler, the *Theologia Germanica*, and the *Imitation of Christ*, though with less of a metaphysical cast and with more practical adjustment to life.

In the second period, which dates from 1733, Law was not so influential upon English thought, but he became far deeper in life and insight and more conscious of direct inward relation with a universe of invisible reality. In the group of writings of this period, of which *The Spirit of Prayer* (1749), *The Spirit of Love* (1752), and *The Way to Divine Knowledge* (1752) are representative, we have the noblest English interpretation of Jacob Boehme's mystical message.

From the beginning of the English Reformation to the present time British poets have shown deep sympathy with and clear appreciation of mysticism. John Donne, George Herbert, Thomas Traherne, and Henry Vaughan in the 17th cent. were strongly influenced by Platonism and by classical mysticism, and they all gave expression in their poetry to the intimate inner relation of the soul with God. In the 19th cent. Wordsworth, Coleridge, Tennyson, and Browning, foremost among English poets, were mystical both in their own personal experiences and in their interpretations of the soul's deepest life. William Blake (1757-1827), deeply versed in the writings of Boehme and possessed of a peculiarly marked psychical disposition, was the most distinctly mystical poet of the 19th cent. in England, as Ralph Waldo Emerson was in America.

The closing years of the 19th and the opening years of the 20th centuries have been marked by a wide-spread popular revival of mysticism among Protestant denominations, which has found expression in an extensive body of religious literature. The present return to mysticism is, however, in marked contrast to the great flowering periods of mysticism. In all those characteristically different movements the leaders and exponents were themselves luminous mystics who interpreted their own experiences, while to-day, on the other hand, very few first-hand prophets of mystical religion have appeared and the present movement has been in the main confined to the historical and psychological interpretation of mysticism as revealed in the autobiographies and expositions of dead prophets, though this may be, and probably is, the necessary preliminary stage to a far profounder return to a religion of the inner way.

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MYSTICISM (Christian, Russian).—The idea that the mysticism of the Byzantine Church found its direct continuation in Russian mysticism is at variance with historic fact. At first sight this seems strange; for the Russian cast of mind, with its predominantly emotional bent, could not but provide a most excellent soil for mysticism. Moreover, the religious spirit of the Russian people is certainly in great measure of a mystical character, while the mystagogical worship of God in the dimly-lit Russian churches is adapted to foster mystical feelings. Nevertheless, mysticism, in the sense of a mystical theory, does not exist in the Russian Church. The worship of God is there a sacred ritual, and the mystagogical theory underlying it is no longer understood. The devotional literature of the Russians is not really mystical, but ascetic; the theological literature, again, is stringently orthodox, i.e. it sets forth the sacred doctrines of the divine Trinity and of Christ's divine humanity; and the ecclesiastical censorship takes care that views of an alien kind shall not intrude. Mysticism, on the other hand, is in its inmost nature indifferent to matters of ritual and logical distinctions regarding God. Its aim is rather to apprehend God in feeling as the all-embracing Unity. It thus very naturally seems heretical, and in reality it has an undesigned tendency to heresy; in point of fact, certain heretical sects, as the Khlysti and the Skoptsi, are stigmatized in Russia as mystical, but, while they are genetically connected with sectarian movements in the ancient Byzantine Church, they, like these, are not mystical in the proper sense, but ecstatic. Their aim is not to become one with God in emotion, but, by the use of all kinds of nerve-stimulating devices, to bring down the spirit of God upon themselves, and so become organs of the spirit's influence upon the world. In all religious emotion, however, there is a strong impulse to gain a clear comprehension of itself in an adequate theory; but, as neither the Russian Church itself nor its sects could provide the people with a theory that would correspond to their highly developed religious emotion, and as, further, the people, being at a relatively low stage of intellectual development, were unable to construct such a theory for themselves, it is quite intelligible that, when they came to adopt the culture of Western Europe, they would take over its mysticism as well. In Russian literature the Masonic Order and the British and Foreign Bible Society are usually referred to as the channels by which the mystical pietism of Western Europe found its way into Russia. In reality, however, the process cannot be rightly attributed to these bodies; all that we can say of them in this respect is that they were used in part by W. European mystics, or by Russians who through W. European influence had become mystics, as media for the introduction of mystico-pietistic views into Russia. In the present article, accordingly, our object will be to narrate the history of mysticism in Russia by treating

in chronological order its outstanding representatives.

1. Grigóri Sávvitch Skovorodá.—The series¹ opens with the Little-Russian philosopher Grigóri Sávvitch Skovorodá (1722–94). He was a man of broad sympathies, and in his lifetime made a powerful impression upon the narrow circle of his countrymen in which he moved, while, after his death, his numerous though not voluminous writings—principally in dialogue form—continued to exercise a growing influence upon Russians who laid stress upon the subjective side of religion. His writings, notwithstanding all their learned phraseology, are composed in popular style, and his rather frequent use of ecclesiastical Slavic modes of expression does not detract in Russia from their popular character. Their profound religious contents are expressed in a highly original form. Skovorodá was a thorough mystic, as appears even from the visions ascribed to him in the biography written by his friend M. Kovalinski (1796; Charkov ed. [see Lit.], containing many of his writings, i. 1–40). In the vision connected with his conversion he attained to oneness with God, feeling that he was no longer an organism with bodily parts, but an undivided being burning with the fire of God's love and circling around in space (p. 28). The leading principle of his writings is that the one true way to the knowledge of God is the knowledge of self, which is found in the ancient heathen world no less than in Christianity (ii. 94, 105), and, just as he thus makes no real distinction between the heathen and the Christian knowledge of God, so—in conformity with the general trend of mysticism—his conception of God shows a pantheistic tendency (e.g., ii. 123, where he identifies God with nature). For him, as for all mystics, the letter of Scripture is a matter of indifference, since he searches the word for its inner sense; and he is similarly unconcerned about the ceremonies of the Church (i. 34, quotation from MS in Ern's work, p. 245; ii. 57). This explains why he was always falling into disputes with the clergy, and why he lost his position as a teacher in the clerical schools of Perejaslavl and Charkov.

If what has been said regarding Skovorodá might suggest that he was a mystic dependent upon himself alone, there are other elements of his thought which point distinctly to the influence of other minds. Such elements are his conception of the ideal spiritual world as the basis of the material world, and of the ideal spiritual man as the prototype and final cause of man in his earthly state (e.g., ii. 256, 258, 51–54, 17). As regards the former, Skovorodá himself refers to Plato (p. 256), while the latter is in the first instance a synthesis of the Platonic idea of man with man as depicted in certain OT passages and as used to typify Christ in the exegesis of the early Church; as a matter of fact, Skovorodá was well versed both in the classics and in the Church Fathers (i. 14). His conception of the ideal man, however, as not only the prototype, but also the moral pattern, of man as he now is—whose task it is to transform himself into the ideal—points to the influence of W. European mysticism and theosophy as operative from the time of Jacob Boehme, though we have no direct evidence of the connexion. Still, we know that, while Skovorodá spoke and wrote Latin with ease (cf. his Latin letters, i. 41–109), he

was equally a master of German. He had travelled widely over Western Europe, and had visited many of its savants; in particular, he had formed (1773) a close friendship at Lansanne with one Daniel Meinhard, with whom he felt himself so much at one that subsequently he sometimes signed his letters and writings with his friend's name (i. 29 f.). Such were in all likelihood the channels by which he came into touch with the ideas of W. European mysticism.

2. Johann Georg Schwarz.—While Skovorodá was in some sense an isolated figure, it was Johann Georg Schwarz (1751–84), a native of Transylvania, who, though not himself the author of any religious work, inaugurated a vast influx of mystical-pietistic literature from Western Europe into Russia. In that capacity he was of more importance to Russia than in his brief period of personal activity in Moscow, profound as were the effects of his work there; moreover, this activity was rather on the lines of the Enlightenment and only incidentally religious. The spread of W. European mysticism in Russia is usually ascribed by native writers to the Order of the Rosy Cross, and, when the process is associated with an individual, the name of Nikolai Ivánovitch Nóvikov stands first, that of Schwarz occupying only the second place. It was not till 1781–82 that Schwarz, then travelling in Germany, became acquainted with the Order of the Rosy Cross in Berlin, and was made a member of it by F. C. Wöllner, a minister of State, who was head of the order in that city. But, in point of fact, Schwarz was even then a mystic—an adherent of Jacob Boehme and of St. Martin (who himself had at one time been in personal intercourse with Russians, as, e.g., Prince Alexe Golizün)—and as such had exercised no small influence in Russia before his journey to Germany.¹ As regards his work from 1782 onwards, again, he explicitly denies that the order was in any way responsible:

'It is true that I am a freemason; and so are some of my friends . . . but the Society (of Learned Friends) is not a masonic one. . . . How can any one in the 18th century come to believe that freemasonry is a religious communion and can be taught from a chair?' ('A Note of F. G. Schwarz,' printed in *Yearbooks of Russian Literature and Antiquity*, v. ii. 110).

It is also true that Nóvikov, who certainly exercised a greater influence upon the rise of the Enlightenment in Russia than did Schwarz, had, even before he came to know the latter (1779), already published translations of Pascal's *Pensées* and several of Jung Stilling's shorter compositions in *The Dawn*, the journal edited by him in Petrograd in 1777–79. But these few writings of mystical tendency were as nothing compared with the mass of W. European works of other kinds which the journal published in translation. Nóvikov's later journals, which he issued under various titles in Moscow until 1785, make it quite clear that he did not become a mystic even after he had made the acquaintance of Schwarz. He was undoubtedly a religious man, but his predominant interest lay in the union of science and faith—a tendency which is quite foreign to mysticism, and, as a matter of fact, his journals contain a large number of articles directly opposed to mysticism in their general purport. While he certainly did his utmost to support Schwarz's efforts to disseminate mystical literature in Russia, yet, when he was subsequently (after Schwarz's early death) summoned to answer for his conduct in a court of law, he made an explanation which there is no reason to discredit:

'At first we printed books of various kinds; but afterwards, as we came to see that the religious books were in greater demand, we printed them in greater numbers' (from the records of his trial, in 'Fresh Information regarding N. I. Nóvikov and the members of the Typographical Company,' communicated by D. J. Ilovaiski, *Yearbooks of Russian Lit. and Ant.* v. ii. 110).

¹ Schwarz had gone to Russia in 1776, and became a professor in the University of Moscow in 1779.

¹ The well-known German mystic Quirinus Kuhlmann, who arrived in Moscow on 28th April 1669, and was there burned as a heretic on 1st Oct. of the same year, does not really belong to the series, and needs but a passing reference. He had no command of the Russian language, and his influence in Russia was confined to the German residents of Moscow. It was for his aspersions upon the Lutheran clergy that he was arrested and condemned.

Schwarz had learned Russian, and in his very effective educational work in Moscow, where he soon exhausted his strength, was sincerely concerned with the religious development of his pupils, though he treated their creed with all respect; for mysticism, making little of confessional differences, is always tolerant. While his work at the University and at the Gymnasium (which he recognized by introducing a new educational scheme) was restricted to giving instruction in the German language and literature, he gave on his own initiative and in his own house a course of lectures on the history of philosophy (1782), in which, from the religious as well as the philosophical point of view, he dealt critically with Spinoza, Rousseau, and the Encyclopædists (then greatly in vogue among the Russian youth); he also delivered a lecture on the three species of knowledge—the zetetic, the pleasure-giving, and the useful, interpreting the last as religious knowledge, and extolling the Bible as its most trustworthy source. He exerted an even more direct influence upon the younger generation through the seminary for the training of teachers and professors which he instituted in 1779, and through the school of philology and translation which he opened in 1782 with sixteen students. Under his direction these students translated numerous works by W. European mystics and pietists, as well as writings of the Greek Fathers, and in this work he gradually secured the help of his personal friends, whom in 1782 he united in an association known as the 'Society of Learned Friends.' The foundation of the Moscow Order of Rosienicians was purely incidental; the order had a membership of only nineteen (of whom Nývikov was one). In 1782 and the year following the association executed Russian translations of works by Tauler, Arndt, Bunyan, and St. Martin, and of hundreds of other writings by anonymous or less known German and English religious authors of mystical or pietistic leanings. In the work of publication Schwarz was assisted by Nývikov, who placed at his disposal the University Press leased by him from 1789. Religious books printed there were still subject to the clerical censorship, but this obstacle was removed when, in consequence of a new enactment, the Society of Learned Friends was enabled to open a number of independent printing establishments. In 1784 the society gave place to the 'Typographical Company.' The works thus published were sold not only in Moscow, but also in Smolensk, Kiev, Tula, and other towns. In the same year Schwarz died, in a village near Moscow, of an illness due to overwork. While Schwarz's religious activities had led to troubles with the government—troubles which, among other things, caused him to resign his chair—the bitter animosity of the empress Catherine II. against the Freemasons broke fiercely over Nývikov in her last reactionary period. As early as 1787 such books as had been issued without the sanction of the clerical censorship and were still lying in the booksellers' shops had been confiscated, and in 1792, at the commencement of his trial, 18,000 of the 23,000 copies still held in stock were burned, and the rest made over to the academy. For his share in the publication and distribution of the books Nývikov was sentenced to rigorous confinement in the fortress of Schlüsselburg, from which he was liberated, in shattered health, at the accession of Paul I. (1796). But the numerous copies already in the hands of the public were beyond the reach of the persecution.

3. Alexander Feódorovitch Lábsin.—The second great influx of W. European mystical literature into Russia was pre-eminently due to the energies of Alexander Feódorovitch Lábsin, a man of unassuming and deeply religious character. He had

no desire to court public attention, preferring to do his work in the background; thus, *e.g.*, his signature on the title-page of his translations was simply 'U. M.', i.e. Utchenik Múdrosti, 'pupil of wisdom.' This explains why the publication of such literature was ascribed by its enemies to the Russian branch of the British Bible Society—an idea that still persists among Russian writers. But Lábsin, who was a follower of Schwarz and a member of the Society of Learned Friends, and who had already, under Schwarz's directions, been engaged in the translation of mystical works, had resumed his labours as soon as the greater freedom granted by the government of Alexander I. opened a way for the publication of such writings, i.e. even before the formation of the Bible Society in Russia (1812). Lábsin's activities in this direction fall into two periods, the first extending from 1803 to 1806, the second from 1813 to 1822. The latter, however, owed its inception not so much to the Bible Society (which, in Russia as elsewhere, maintains its principle of issuing the text of Scripture without annotations of any kind) as to the religious awakening which, arising out of the wars of freedom, spread to Russia too. In his first period Lábsin translated and published many of the writings of Jung Stilling and Eckartshausen, his favourite authors.¹ In 1806 he issued his journal, the *Messenger of Zion* (*Sionski Věstnik*), in which he called for a more inward and spiritual grasp of religion. Nearly all its articles were from his own pen, the rest being furnished by like-minded friends; he also reprinted in it a number of Skovorodá's works. Though the journal had a very small circulation—93 subscribers, including 33 clergymen—it met with opposition on the part of the Church, and, when the authorities demanded that not only the journal but all further translations should be brought under the clerical censorship, Lábsin simply stopped the paper and for the time abandoned his translation work. In a few years, however, he resumed the latter in consequence of the growing support extended to him by Alexander I. and many officials of State, who, after the wars of freedom, had themselves come under the influence of the religious awakening. In this period Lábsin issued new editions of the works of Jung Stilling and Eckartshausen already published by him, and he translated a number of other writings—*e.g.*, the former's *Siegesgeschichte der christlichen Religion in einer gemeinnützigen Erklärung der Offenbarung Johannis*, and the thirty numbers of his popular periodical, *Der graue Mann*. To these he added renderings of Jacob Boehme's *Der Weg zu Christo*, the more important works of Francis of Sales, Ambrosius Lombaise, Dousetan, and Adam Sigismund Fleischner, and anonymous writings of a similar character. Here he also secured the help of friends: F. Lubjanóvski translated Jung Stilling's *Heimweh*; W. M. Popóv, an adherent of Madame de Tatarinova (see below), translated Lindl's *Sermons* and Gossner's *Geist des Lebens und der Lehre Jesu Christi in Betrachtungen und Bemerkungen über das ganze Neue Testament*, i. 'Matthäus und Markus'; Sophie Meshitchérskaja, sister of the chief procurator to the Holy Synod, executed Russian versions of English tractates exhibiting the same trend of thought. The translations of works by Tauler, Arndt, and St. Simon which had been published under Schwarz's direction were once more given to the public, while fresh work was done in translating A. Kempis's *Imitatio Christi*, selected writings of Madame Gnyon, and Dutoit's *Philosophie chrétienne*. In 1816 the

¹ Another book greatly prized by Lábsin was the compilation of mystical thoughts from the Byzantine Church entitled *Φλοκαλία*, which he read in the Ecclesiastical Slavic edition. The first Russian tr. of this by Feophan († 1804) appeared at a much later date.

emperor bestowed an order upon Lábsin 'for the publication of religious books in the native language,' and rewarded the editor of Madame Guyon's works with a large gift of money. In 1817, at the instance of the emperor, Lábsin resumed the issue of his *Messenger of Zion*, which now attained a vast circulation throughout Russia, although, as it could not permanently evade the spiritual censorship, it was discontinued in the following year. Translations of mystico-pietistic works, however, were now subject to the secular censorship only, not to the clerical—a privilege which Lábsin and his collaborators owed to Prince Alexander Golzün, minister of public instruction and a devoted adherent of mysticism. Golzün, in fact, had these writings sent in vast quantities—to a maximum of 2000 copies for each eparchy—to the schools under his department, using the Commission for Clerical Schools as the distributing agency; and he also sent them to the bishops and provincial governors. The writings by which the orthodox clerical party sought to counteract this literature he did not allow to pass the censorship, and he even reprimanded the censor for having sanctioned Stanewitch's *Discourse at the Grave of a Child upon the Immortality of the Soul* (Petrograd, 1818), which was directed mainly against Jung Stilling's *Stiegesgeschichte*. At first, however, Lábsin was countenanced by some of the higher clergy with whom he had been associated in the Bible Society—notably by the metropolitans Michail, Seraphim, and Philaret, of whom the first two had in their youth belonged to Schwarz's circle, while the third subsequently (1834) published a new translation of the *Imitatio Christi*, which had all along formed his favourite reading, and which he called the 'book of sweetness.' Few original works of a mystical character in the Russian language, apart from the articles in the *Messenger of Zion*, appeared at this time; such, however, were the *Fruit of the Lover of Truth*, and *Features of the Spiritual Church*, by Lopuchin, a privy councillor, and Krülov's *Reflection upon the True Religion*, all of which were published without clerical censorship, and distributed by Golzün.

The second influx of mystico-pietistic literature, however, was soon brought to a standstill by the reactionary policy adopted by Alexander I. in the closing years of his reign, just as the first had been stopped thirty years previously by the empress Catherine. In 1822 Lábsin was sent to Sengilé in the government of Simbirsk in consequence of an outspoken declaration over the emperor. The real champion of the reaction, the thoroughly unscrupulous Count A. A. Arakchejev, by whom the emperor latterly suffered himself to be ruled in all things, made use of the clerical party, which had been roused to action by Stanewitch's book, as a means of overthrowing Prince Golzün. The movement found a pretext especially in the work of Gossner already mentioned, which Arakchejev stigmatized as at once impious and revolutionary, and more generally in the mystico-pietistic literature disseminated by Golzün. As the latter was also president of the Bible Society, he was deprived of his office as minister of public instruction (1824), and the society itself was prevented from carrying on its work—on the ground that it was responsible for the circulation of the literature in question, whereas, in fact, Golzün had worked here quite independently of the society; and, moreover, if he and his mystically disposed group, which was held together chiefly by the conception of the 'inward Church,' belonged to the society, its membership included likewise many high officials of State not greatly concerned with religious matters, and even the chief representatives of the Orthodox, as well as of the Roman Catholic and Protestant clergy.

Golzün's successor in office, Admiral A. S. Shishkov, ordered many of the mystical books found in the schools and booksellers' shops to be confiscated, and sent to the clerical academy of Petrograd in order to be examined by a commission appointed for the purpose. This commission, however, did not begin its work till 1830, and finished it only in 1843. In 1846 the Holy Synod gave orders that all surviving copies found in the dioceses should be sent to it. To what extent, if at all, this injunction was obeyed is not yet clearly known, but it is certain that many volumes remained in the hands of the public, and are to this day greatly prized, more especially among sectarians.

4. Madame de Krydener, Lindl, Gossner; Madame de Tatarinova, Kotélnikov, Dubovizki. —While Lábsin had exercised an extraordinary influence upon those around him by personal contact, he had not stood forth publicly as the herald of the new faith, seeking rather to disseminate it by the written word only. Even in Russia, however, the religious awakening of Western Europe did not fail to find impassioned preachers and strenuous organizers of devotional meetings. Although Madame de Krydener (1764-1824) exercised her pietistic ministrations mainly in foreign countries, and, as far as the Russian Empire is concerned, laboured only in her native province of Livonia and for a very short time in Petrograd, she nevertheless played a great part in the movement by which the awakening was carried from the west to the east of Europe, winning for it the favour of Alexander I., in whose personal circle she lived during 1815 in Heilbronn, Heidelberg, and Paris, and upon whose entourage—notably Prince Golzün (see above)—her influence was likewise very great. From 1819, again, the Roman Catholic preachers Lindl and Gossner (1820-24) laboured successively in Petrograd as apostles of Pietism. The former obtained the use of the Maltese church near the Pagenkorps, while to the latter the emperor assigned a large hall, in which he addressed audiences of about 2000 persons.

While the ministrations of these three leading representatives of mysticism were attended by Russians who were familiar with German and French, it is obvious that no far-reaching or permanent result could be secured except by persons who were able to address Russians in the Russian language. This advantage was possessed by another Livonian lady of rank, Catherine von Buxhövdén, who married the Russian lieutenant-colonel Tatarinov, and in fact almost became a Russian herself, even leaving Lutheranism for the Greek Orthodox Church. Having been deeply stirred by the W. European revival, she founded in 1815 her 'Brotherhood in Christ' in Petrograd. In that association she endeavoured to furnish the new spiritual religion with distinctively Russian forms, borrowing these from the ascetic and ecstatic Skoptsi ('self-mutilators'), though rejecting their fundamental demand of sexual mutilation. Her devotional gatherings in the residence assigned to her in the Michael Palace—and from 1822 in other places—were conducted on the lines of the Skoptsi meetings, and were devoted partly to delirious dancing in fantastic dress, and partly to prophetic discourse. In the latter she had the services of prophets whom she had won from the Skoptsi community in Petrograd, but she also took part in it herself, using it as a means of propagating the deepened spirituality of Pietism, while at the same time she took upon herself the benevolent work of the Pietists among the sick and the poor. But, as she gradually cast off the people of humbler rank who had rallied to her from among the Skoptsi, she came at length to form a sort of religious focus for the bureaucratic, military, and hereditary aristocracy.

crazy of Petrograd. Among those who took part in her devotional gatherings were Prince Golftzin, W. M. Popov, the director of his department, General I. A. Golovin, Prince I. Engalytchev, and Princes N. and S. Kropotkin. She was befriended by the emperor Alexander I., and, together with her chief prophets from the Skoptsi sect, was repeatedly called to his presence for the purpose of conversing on religious themes; he also granted her a large pension, and even in his reactionary period his protecting hand shielded her and her circle from the attacks of Arakchejev and Shishkov. It was not till a much later time, in the reign of Nicholas I., that she and her chief adherents suffered arrest, she herself being confined in a remote monastery (1837-47). Her followers, however, still continued to hold religious meetings in Petrograd, though now in secret, and she even found ways of advising them from her distant abode (in Moscow from 1847); nor was her circle dissolved until her death.

While it was only at the outset that Madame Tatárinova sought to extend her influence to the common people, the Esa-ul (Cossack officer) Ievlampi Kotelnikov, who founded another sectarian community of similar nature, confined his labours entirely to that class. Having been deeply moved, in the early twenties of last century, by his reading of the Russian NT published by the Bible Society, and of mystical books, especially Lopuchin's *Features of the Inward Church*, he proposed to institute a truly spiritual Church in contrast to the external Orthodox Church, which he stigmatized as the 'Babylon' and the 'harlot' spoken of in Revelation. He devoted his mind largely to the study of that book, which he interpreted in a very fantastic way, following here the characteristic ideas of the Khlysti. He claimed to be the forerunner, John, and asserted that Christ had been spiritually born in the emperor Alexander I. The latter was at the same time the second of the apocalyptic angels, the Bible Society being the first. He won numerous adherents in his native stanitsa of Verechnkurmojárskaya, in the neighbouring Cossack stanitsas on the Don, and in the town of Novotcherkask. In his devotional meetings it was the practice to read the Russian Bible and mystical works of the kind circulated by Lábsin, but these gatherings were otherwise of an ecstatic type like the religious services of the Khlysti (see MEN OF GOD); Kotelnikov's adherents, in fact, called themselves Duchonosti, 'Vehicles of the Spirit.' He expounded his ideas in a number of writings, and it was the fact of his having sent copies of these to the higher clergy that led to his arrest in 1824. In 1826 he was sent to confinement in the Solovézki monastery on the White Sea, where he died in 1852. Nothing is known of the further history of his community.

That it was possible, however, to propagate the more inward type of religion in the forms of the Orthodox Church is shown by the labours of Alexander Petróvitch Dubovízki († 1852). Dubovízki, a landowner, had been spiritually awakened by an employé of Madame de Krydener who had entered his service after taking part in her devotional meetings in Switzerland and Livonia (1816-20). In 1822 Dubovízki began to hold similar meetings in the settlements of Lepégi and Górovo in the government of Rjasán, where he had an estate, and at these gatherings he not only expounded the Scripture to the peasantry, but distributed copies among them. To those who took part he gave the name of 'true inward worshippers.' In Górovo he erected a chapel which was open to all, though in it he used to urge the peasants to be diligent in attending the Orthodox Church for

the worship of God and the observance of the Lord's Supper. In 1823 he removed to Petrograd, where in his own house he assembled his servants for devotional services of a similar character. Here he made the acquaintance of Madame Tatárinova, but took an attitude of decisive opposition to her schismatic ecstasy. Then, as a result of the reaction, he was sent to a monastery in 1824. Here, however, he threw himself so zealously into the religious life of the monks that he was liberated in 1826 on the recommendation of the monastic authorities and of Philaret, as also on the ground that his orthodoxy was recognized by the metropolitan Scraphim, who had been mainly instrumental in procuring his condemnation for preaching without authority. In 1829, after brief periods of residence in Petrograd, Lepégi, Górovo, and other places, Dubovízki settled in Moscow, where he arranged his large domestic establishment, consisting of sixty-eight persons, wholly on monastic lines. He wore iron chains upon his body, and the entire household lived on lenten fare. Here, too, he instituted a school for the education not only of his own children, but of those of the congenially minded archimandrite Platón, as well as peasant children from his estates. The foreign teachers, both male and female, whom he engaged for this work were one after another converted by him to Orthodoxy. As it was one of his leading convictions that in the Church of Christ, besides the public services, there might be, and had in fact once been, more private gatherings for mutual edification, he used to assemble his household in a special oratory for devotional exercises. It was on account of these domestic services that he was again arrested in 1833; he was confined in various monasteries, and, stricken in years as in health, died in 1842.

5. Vladimir Sergéjewitch Solovjév.—Since the period of the Napoleonic wars, Russia, like W. Europe generally, has had no further revivals of religion; nor can we speak of another large influx of W. European mystical literature into Russia. The explanation lies not only in the growing religious indifference of the educated classes in Russia during the latter half of the 19th cent., but also in the increasing disinclination of these classes to depend wholly upon W. Europe for the satisfaction of their spiritual needs—in a word, the endeavour to realize a distinctively Russian type of culture. Within recent times, no doubt, a sense of religious need has been awakened among Russians of every class by the popular philosophy of Tolstoi. While Tolstoi, however, as regards his own personal experience, interprets the religious relation in the sense of a mystical pantheism, and while his writings are pervaded by a general strain of mysticism, yet in these writings the strictly religious interest rather gives way to the interest of an ascetic morality and of social problems. Although the asceticism preached by Tolstoi associates him more closely than he supposed with the Orthodox Church, to which, in his criticism of its doctrines, he stood sharply opposed, the longing of the Russian people for a theory of life corresponding to its mystical religion of emotion has found its fulfilment in the views of Vladimir Sergéjewitch Solovjév (1853-1900), a thinker who stood forth as a genuine Russian and a loyal son of his Church.¹ On a superficial view, indeed, Solovjév might be regarded as one of the long succession of philosophical theologians and theological philosophers who in Russia have sought to provide a theoretical justification for the teaching of the Church; thus he finds a rationale not only for the doctrines of the Trinity and the Two Natures, but also for the Seven Sacraments and the conveyance of the

¹ Cf. his *La Russie et l'Eglise universelle*, Paris, 1889, 21906.

priestly character by the laying on of hands. On a closer view, however, his mysticism, like mysticism generally, shows a certain unconformity with the doctrines of the Church. Though he frequently seems to speak in terms of theism, his idea of God is essentially pantheistic; he teaches the eternity of the world, speaks of an ante-temporal fall, and sometimes denies the personal immortality of the individual. Such departures from the teaching of the Church, however, do not seem to have impaired the influence of his writings¹—an influence which has been constantly on the increase since his death; in certain circles, indeed, they may even have added to it. The joint-editor of his works, E. L. Radlov, who writes the biographical sketch, has justly said (*Collected Works*², vol. x. p. xxxv) that his mysticism is always the central and fundamental element of his teaching. Here he not only shows the influence of such Western mystics as Scotus Erigena, Jacob Boehme, and Swedenborg, but has also drawn upon Neo-Platonic mysticism, which is much more closely allied to his Church. Thus the union with God which is attained by attenuating self-consciousness to a mere sense of existence he describes precisely as do the Neo-Platonists (see below). Still, this dependence does not preclude his having experienced and reflected upon the mystical form of religion in a way peculiarly his own. His mysticism is indeed of so decided a kind that he assigns the most important place in his theory of knowledge to mystical faith. His leading ideas are as follows:

The reality of the external world cannot be apprehended by reason, but is to be grasped by faith alone, faith finding the ground of phenomena in the same reality as is directly experienced by the believer in his appropriation of faith ('Criticism of Abstract Principles,' *Works*, ii. 326, 330 f.). The object of this faith is therefore the absolute existence of objective reality. The interaction between the ideal essence of the ego and the ideal existences of all other objects is called 'presentation,' and this produces in our reason those durable, definite, self-consistent, and self-identical images of objects by means of which we combine and organize the whole indefinite mass of single impressions (p. 336). We perceive these images, in the first instance, immediately, and prior to all our sense-perceptions, to which we then transfer them (p. 338). Our knowledge of nature, if it is to be genuine and objective, must be brought into relation with this mystical knowledge (pp. 346, 349 ff.).

In conformity with his theory of knowledge Solovjov deals specially with the knowledge of God. Human personality, he says, is in a sense itself divine, or, more precisely, it participates in deity. It has the negatively unconditioned quality of aspiring after perfection, and this aspiration carries with it the claim of being realizable ('Lectures on the Divine Humanity,' *Works*, iii. 19); in other words, man will not consent to be a mere phenomenon, and this very refusal indicates that he is something different, something more (p. 21). But the ultimate truth lies in the fact that he is also positively unconditioned, i.e. he has the power of appropriating to himself the fullness of being. Faith in himself is at the same time faith in God. Deity belongs to God in His eternal reality; man aspires to and yearns for it, and finally reaches it (p. 25). The reality of God, however, cannot be logically demonstrated, but can be apprehended only by faith, exactly as the reality of the world and each separate object (p. 32 f.). When we abstract from all definite manifestations of our outward and inward life—not merely from our sense impressions, but also from our feelings, thoughts, and wishes; when we concentrate all our capacities in the one focus of our immediate spiritual existence; when we let ourselves sink into the silent and motionless calm from which the turbid stream of our present being wells forth without disturbing its purity and its peace—then in the source of our own spiritual life we are inwardly in touch with the source of universal life, and we know God as the principle or substance of the All (p. 87). We cannot doubt the reality of that which operates palpably within us, and the operation of which is given in our very perception ('Justification of the Good,' *Works*, viii. 191, 193 f.). Feeling its reality in ourselves, we realize that we are already united with that supreme reality, and we posit the (inward, subjective) beginning of the coming union of the world with God (p. 196). This may be expressed in the form of a behest: 'Have God within yourself; do not sever yourself from the All, but associate yourself with the All' (p. 202 f.).

If Solovjov, in these developments of his thought, reminds us of the fundamental principle of Skovorodá (with whom he was connected on his mother's side), viz. that the true path to the knowledge of God is self-knowledge (cf. § 1), he resembles him also in the fact that between man as he now is and God he

places the ideal man, though with a peculiar and much broader basis of argument. The material side of nature, existing as a part, strives to be transformed into the All, into God ('Criticism of Abstract Principles,' *Works*, ii. 318). Nature is the second Absolute, which attains its ideal reality in man (p. 319), and, as nature strives to rise to the human stage, there are at bottom only two realities, viz. the absolutely existent, God, and that which is absolutely becoming, man (p. 323). Man is the connecting link between the deity and the world of nature; by 'man,' however, is meant here not man as known to us, but ideal and perfect humanity—the Sophia, which was eternally consummated in the plenary divine entity, i.e. Christ ('Lectures on the Divine Humanity,' *Works*, lii. 121). This humanity, accordingly, is co-eternal with God Himself (p. 122). Man in his present state presupposes the eternal humanity, or ideal man (pp. 123, 126). The organism of this universal humanity consists of the body of God and the eternal soul of the world (p. 127). The earthly individual man, just as he did not exist before his birth, passes away at death (p. 128). The evil in man in his phenomenal state lies in the fact that he usually feels himself isolated, and only in rare moments of clarity realizes his unity with all other things, with God (p. 130 f.). This evil impulse towards isolation he shares with all empirically existing things (p. 132). In reality, however, ideal humanity, or the world-soul which unites in itself all individual souls, had already, in the cycle prior to the present, broken away from its unity with the All and tried to find itself in its separation; for otherwise evil could not have appeared in phenomenal man and the phenomenal world (pp. 140–142). In that empirical world everything has fallen asunder into parts and particles seeking to assert themselves in opposition to one another. God, however, desires to bring the world-soul back to Himself by a gradual process. To begin with, the world-soul in phenomenal man, as prepared for it by the long process of religious history, comes to know itself again in its unity with the divine Logos, i.e. the pure form of the universal unity; moreover, it recognizes itself also in all nature, of which phenomenal man feels himself to be the concentration (p. 150 f.). Such is the philosophical rationale of the union of deity with a human soul in the person of Jesus Christ (p. 162), and this union becomes a continuous process by the gradual voluntary transformation of phenomenal man to the divine. Thus from the God-man there comes at last the man-God (i.e. man as having assimilated Deity), or universal humanity, the universal Church or spiritual humanity (p. 180 f.).

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MYSTICISM (Hebrew and Jewish).—Ever since the Pauline antithesis of law and faith stamped Judaism as a religion of unrelieved legalism, the possession of anything approaching the nature of a mystical element has been steadily and strenuously denied to the religion of the Jew. Formalism—which, truly enough, pervades and colours Judaism through and through—is taken to be the irreconcilable enemy of mysticism, whose fundamental axiom is the freedom of the human spirit to seek out, in all ways possible to it, the means of union with ultimate reality—God. But this attitude towards the question only shows how, like many other psychological concepts, mysticism, no matter of what brand, scarcely admits of rigid definition. Its phenomena are so complex, its elements so intermingled with other elements in the mental and spiritual make-up of men, that it is impossible to lay down any law as to where it may or may not be found to exist. Thus, if one wonders how mysticism can be a feature of Judaism, one can equally wonder how a Christian theologian

¹ These have already appeared in two collected editions, of one of which there has been a second issue.

like St. Augustine could be called a mystic. Was he not a rigid upholder of an iron system of dogma and authority in the early Church? And yet his *Confessions* are thoroughgoing mysticism, showing him to have gained the core of his religion from certain 'first-hand' experiences which, to him, implied direct intercourse between the soul and God. A similar argument can be applied to Aristotle. Cold, analytic philosopher as he was, positing an utterly transcendent God who 'thinks his own thoughts' and who dwells in the peace of his own completeness, Aristotle's 'active reason' possesses a decidedly mystical turn, and must have exerted no small influence on many a type of mysticism in the succeeding centuries. One is drawn to the irresistible conclusion that religion, in order that it should not be barren and lifeless, must give prominence to something more than historicity and tradition. It must lay stress on the element of personal inward experience, on the great fact of the soul 'athirst for God, yea, even for the living God.' Judaism amply fulfils these conditions.

The beginnings of Judaism lie, of course, in the OT. In fact, everything in Judaism seeks to find its confirmation in some expression, whether clear or veiled, in the OT. Hence the OT is pivotal for any consideration of Jewish mysticism in all its phases and developments. The mysticism of the OT clusters mostly round the visionary experiences of the prophets. Isaiah's vision of a God whose 'train filled the Temple' points to the all-inclusiveness of Deity. Ezekiel's fits of ecstasy are characteristic of the mood of many a mystic in all ages. The prophet's higher insight into the will of God and his satisfaction at the attainment of this insight are an example of the 'illumination' which is always one of the steps on the mystic's ladder. Some of the other books of the OT show forth other constituents of the mystical consciousness. Thus, the Psalmists often brood on the divinity manifested in the beauteous world of nature. 'Who layeth the beams of his upper chambers in the waters; who maketh the clouds his chariot; who walketh upon the wings of the wind. Who maketh winds his messengers; his ministers flaming fire' (104³⁴). The universe is one uninterrupted revelation of the divine. Ps 139-15 portrays the mystic sense of the boundless, and the human aspiration to reach it as the goal of the truest safety from the ills and anxieties of the normal finite experience. Other passages paint the 'nearness' of God and the joys of intimate converse with Him. The treatment of prayer and the specimens given of individual prayers are fine examples of what one might call 'erotic mysticism.' The soul passionately yearns for God, and God reciprocates the yearning in terms of the love between man and woman. 'Whom have I in heaven but thee? and there is none upon earth that I desire beside thee' (Ps 73²⁵). Here is the insatiable craving of the mystic, the infinity of love's desire. 'Yea, I have loved thee with an everlasting love; therefore with loving-kindness have I drawn thee' (Jer 31³). It is doubtful whether the intensity of intimacy connoted by the Hebrew *ahabbāh* ('love') and *hesedh* ('loving-kindness') is ever done justice to in a translation. Finally, there is the angelic lore of the OT. The sight of an angel or the hearing of its voice brought about a feeling of being environed with God. It had the effect which every mystical experience in all ages had, viz. it flooded the seer with a new power.

Upon these mystical strains pervading the OT was built the variegated edifice of the two separate schools of mystical thought which followed on the close of the OT canon, viz. (a) the Palestinian, or Rabbinic, or Talmudic Midrashic, and (b) the Jewish-Hellenistic, which had its chief centre in

Alexandria—then the intellectual capital of the world.

Let us consider (b) first. The theology of Judaism was studied side by side with the works of Plato and Aristotle, and thus was produced that curious blend of Jewish and Greek thought the most famous monuments of which are the writings of Philo, the apocryphal Wisdom of Solomon, and fragments (preserved only by Eusebius, in *HE* vii. 32. 17 and *Præp. Evang.* viii. 10, xiii. 12) of an Alexandrian peripatetic philosopher Aristobolus, who, according to Schürer (*GJV*³ iii. 391 f.), was a contemporary of Ptolemy Philometer in the middle of the 2nd cent. B.C. Aristobolus develops a mystic cosmogony in which the Pythagorean theories of the influence of numbers play a part. His conception of divine creative activity is drawn from the Stoic idea of *πνεῦμα*, God's power penetrating and permeating all things. He has references to the *νοῦς* ('reason') of Plato. The main trend of his thought, however, is Aristotelian; but—and here he is the precursor of the Philonic method—in spite of his devotion to Greek thought, he is an upholder of the Jewish doctrine of God in so far as he believes that the Deity is at once transcendent and immanent. God is greater than the universe, outside it, and separated from it. But God works in the universe by means of His 'wisdom,' which is an emanation from Him but yet has no separate existence apart from Him. God is 'in heaven,' i.e. in distant isolation, but yet 'the earth is his footstool,' i.e. the world is permeated with the divine traces. The apocryphal Wisdom of Solomon is characterized by a similar fusion of Greek and Jewish mystic notions of the divine relations to the cosmos. The Stoic conception of an immanent *πνεῦμα* comes out in vii. 25:

'For she is a breath of the power of God,
And a clear effluence of the glory of the Almighty.'

The same thought is continued in 26 f. In viii. 19 f. we have a hint of the Platonic theory of pre-existence:

'For I was a witty child
And had a good spirit,
Yea, rather, being good, I came into a body undefiled.'

In xviii. 14-16 wisdom becomes a personality and seems to have affinities with the 'Word' in the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel. But—and here the essentially Jewish side of the case comes out—wisdom, although a potency *outside* God, is yet at the same time wholly *in* God. The author, as a Jew, and therefore deeply concerned with safeguarding what he and his predecessors understood by the unity of God, is obviously at pains to make this vital point clear. Philo elaborates all these concepts with the hand of the master—and adds many new ones too. He makes a sharp distinction between God in Himself and God revealed. The reconciliation between these two views is never effected, and this defect is one of the flaws in his mystic philosophy. On the first view, God is pure being, unknowable, outside the material universe. On the second view, God is immanent in man and the universe, and is all-penetrating, all-filling. Philo's Jewish sympathies are apparent in his treatment of this branch of his subject. The Jewish idea of God as creator and sustainer of the universe held a foremost place in his mind, and many an interpretation given by Palestinian Rabbis of the first centuries of Christianity and incorporated in the Talmud and Midrashim (particularly in the early sections of *Br'eshith Rabba*) is a reflexion of Philo. It is in the presentation of his Logos idea that Philo is most important for an understanding of Jewish mysticism. Whatever extraneous teachings may have gone to the making of the Logos, there can be no doubt that it was much influenced by the OT notions of angels. There is a wide gap between God the infinite, the

all-holy, and man the finite and imperfect. How is the chasm to be bridged? The OT writers and, after them, the Rabbis of the Talmud and Midrashim overcame the difficulty by the introduction of the angel. Pure God did not really come into contact with impure man, but His angels did. And who were the angels? They were emanations of the divine, offshoots of deity, part and parcel of God's own being. Reading his OT in some such light as this, Philo laid it down that the universe was filled with divine potencies (*δυνάμεις*). These potencies, while they are in one sense attributes and self-revelations of God, are in another sense personal beings of a spiritual kind, 'incorporeal souls,' who 'report the injunctions of the father to his children and the necessities of the children to the father' (*de Somniis*, i. 22). There are various gradations of these potencies, but at the head of them and constituting the principle of unity among them all is the Logos. Heaven and earth subsisted in the Logos before their material creation—an idea voiced by the Rabbinical literature in many curiously naive ways (see *Brēshith Rabbā*, i.-iv.). It is from the Logos that there emanate the potencies which are the real creators of matter. Hence God is the ultimate creator of all, but never through direct contact. He works through the Logos, who again works through these potencies (called Logoi). Platonic and Stoic elements are apparent throughout, but so also is Rabbinic angelology. Thus in *Brēshith Rabbā*, viii. 3f., the grammatical plural in the words, 'And God said, Let us make man,' is explained by the statement that, when God was about to create the first man, He took counsel with the ministering angels. Hence the blame for the evil in man is partially removed from the Deity and placed upon the shoulders of the angels. The Rabbinic interpretation of the Hebrew word *Amōn* in Pr 8³⁰ gives to the Tōrah very much the same rôle as Philo attributes to the Logos. It is God's workman or servant in the work and administration of the universe. The human soul is an emanation from the Logos, and makes man akin to the 'incorporeal souls'—the angels, *i.e.*, not those who have descended upon earth to become bound up in mortal bodies, but those who, 'having received greater and more divine intellects,' shun earth altogether in order to be 'lieutenants of the Ruler of the universe as though they were the eyes and ears of the great being beholding and listening to everybody' (*de Somn.* i. 22). Christian mysticism is a greater debtor to Philo than is Jewish mysticism, which betrays Philonic influences only in spasmodic passages in the cosmological sections in the Talmud and Midrashim as well as in the philosophic systems of two great mystic theologians of the Middle Ages, viz. Solomon Ibn Gabirol (c. 1021-1058) and Abraham Ibn Ezra (1092-1167) (*qq.v.*).

We shall now consider (a) the Talmudic and Midrashic mysticism. Teachings essentially Jewish in their origin are found in combination with doctrines belonging to Mithraism, Gnosticism, and Neo-Platonism. Essentially Jewish is the *sh'khināh* mysticism. The *sh'khināh* is the universally diffused Divine Presence which forms the idealized environment of the Jewish nation in all the lands of the latter's dispersion. But in order that the individual Jew should, in himself, realize the *sh'khināh* he must be 'healthy, wealthy, and wise,' *i.e.* he must lead a life of religious and moral purity, he must be self-reliant and self-conquered, he must be intellectually great in the knowledge of the highest lore—the Tōrah. Sin and *sh'khināh* are mutually antithetic. 'God is the dwelling-place of the universe; but the universe is not the dwelling-place of God' is a prominent Rabbinic dictum. Essentially Jewish is the doctrine of the two opposed divine attributes—the *middath had-din* and the

middath hā-rahāmīm—which operate upon man for good or for evil in ways very much resembling the powers of the angels; and Jewish too is the enumeration of the ten agencies through which God created the world, viz. wisdom, insight, cognition, strength, power, inexorableness, justice, right, love, and mercy (*T. B. Hāgigāh*, 12a; cf. *Mishnāh Abhōth*, v. 1, where it is said that the universe was created by 'Ten Words'; cf. also *Brēshith Rabbā*, iv. 6, based on Ps 33⁹). Rabbinic angelology is by no means of pure breed, but owes much to Zoroastrian and Mithraic influences. Man's prayer, his recovery from sickness, his safety from danger, his fortunes after death are all under angelic domination—there being two main divisions of angels which are named respectively *familiā shel mādālāh* and *familiā shel mattā*, *i.e.* the heavenly host above and the heavenly host below, both of which figure largely in the Jewish Prayer Book. The counterpart to the personified Logos of Philo is found, in Rabbinic mysticism, in the angel Metatron, who is often styled 'Prince of the Presence' (*Sar-hap-pānim*) as well as 'Prince of the world' (*Sar-hā-ōlām*), and who, like Enoch in the Apocrypha (see *Jub.* iv. 23; *2 En.* liii. 2), is often described as the heavenly scribe. He plays a principal part in the cosmic processes, being a personified emanation of the Deity, an ever-present guide and instructor of mankind, taking up the divine work at points where its omnipotence cannot, if one may so speak, reach. In *Brēshith Rabbā*, v. 4, it is stated that 'the voice of God became Metatron over the waters.' One great formative influence acting on Rabbinic mysticism came from the direction of the Gnosticism current in the first centuries of the common era. Gnosticism owed much to the Apocrypha and the Jewish Apocalypses; hence—strangely enough—the influences of the latter literatures were brought to bear upon Rabbinism through an alien medium. The prohibition against discussing the first sections of Genesis and Ezekiel (known as *Ma'aseh Brēshith* and *Ma'aseh Merkābhāh* respectively) is an echo of the secrecy which hedged round the doctrines of the Gnostics. Thus in the *Mishnāh (Hāgigāh*, ii. 1) it is said:

'It is forbidden to explain the first chapters of Genesis to more than one person at a time. It is forbidden to explain the first chapter of Ezekiel even to one person unless he be a sage and of an original turn of mind.'

To belong to the inner circle of discipleship among the Gnostics presupposed an exceptional amount of self-discipline. 'A certain youth,' says *T. B. Hāgigāh*, 13a, 'was once explaining the Hashmal [Ezk 1⁷, translated 'amber' in the AV] when fire came forth and consumed him.' When the question is asked, 'Why was this?' the answer is, 'Lāw mātī zimnēh,' *i.e.* his time had not yet come. His youthful age had not given him the opportunities for the mature self-culture necessary to the mystic apprehension. It was a dangerous knowledge for the uninitiated. An extraordinarily weird anecdote in *Brēshith Rabbā*, ii. 4, attributes mortal injury to Ben Zoma (Rabbi of the 2nd cent. A.D.), who was once 'contemplating the creation.' The words of Pr 25³, 'it is the glory of God to conceal a thing,' were quoted in support of their opposition to these Gnostic attempts at unravelling the secrets of the divine relation to the cosmos. But, paradoxically enough, the great ally of Gnosticism—magic—received countenance from many a Rabbinic mystic of the most orthodox type. Thus a passage in *T. B. Sanhedrin*, 67b, says that R. Hanina and R. Hoshaiah (Palestinian teachers of the 3rd cent. A.D.) used to engage themselves with the laws of creation every eve of Sabbath and used to create a calf of three years old and eat it. The magic potency resident in the permutations and combinations of the letters of

the Hebrew alphabet—and more especially the letters comprising the Tetragrammaton—is a more prominent theme of this branch of Rabbinic mysticism. *T. B. Brākhōth*, 55a, says that 'Bezalel knew how to combine the letters by which heaven and earth were created.' *T. B. Qiddushin*, 71a, speaks of a Divine Name composed of twelve letters, the secrets of which were at one time revealed to every one, but, after a time, only to the 'most meek among the priests.' The reference is obviously to a manipulation of the letters of the Tetragrammaton. *T. B. Makkōth*, 11a, relates the legend of King David, who, on making excavations for the Temple and finding that the waters of the ocean were moving upward and threatening to destroy the world, asked for permission to stop its rising by inscribing the name of God on a potsherd and throwing it into the sea. According to *T. B. Yōmā*, 73b, the information given by the Urim and Thummim was through the medium of the Hebrew letters either thrusting themselves bodily forward (*bōltin*) or combining themselves in different ways (*mīstārfin*).

All the above-mentioned elements of Rabbinic mysticism are the prelude to the great mystical books which comprise the mediæval Kabbālā, whose most famous manual is the *Zōhār*—although there is one book whose importance for Jewish mysticism is only second to that of the *Zōhār*, but which in all probability dates from the time of the Mishnāh (according to Reitzenstein, it is a product of the 2nd cent. B.C.). This is the *Sēfer Yēšārā*. Both the mediæval Kabbālā and the *Sēfer Yēšārā* elaborate some or all of the following elements of Rabbinic mysticism: (a) the *sh'khināh*, (b) the Holy Spirit (*rūah ha-kōdesh*), (c) angelology, Metatron, Mēmrā ('word', 'logos'), (d) mysticism of the Genesis cosmogony and of the chariot of Ezekiel, (e) the magic powers of the Hebrew alphabet, (f) emanation from the Deity, (g) the conception of *simšim*, or divine self-limitation, (h) the conception of erotic relations between the Deity and the cosmos, (i) the re-incarnation of the soul, the ecstasy of the soul's union with God, (j) the Tōrāh as the material embodiment of the divine and as the only 'mystic way' towards the realization of the divine. The *Sēfer Yēšārā* is grounded upon (e). It gives us a mystical philosophy drawn from the sounds, shapes, relative positions, and numerical values of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet. Hebrew phraseology expressing essentially Jewish thought is put into a framework unmistakably Gnostic. The world was brought into being by means of 'thirty-two wonderful paths of wisdom.' These are (a) the ten cardinal numbers from 1 to 10, (b) the twenty-two letters of the Hebrew alphabet (divided into the three 'mother' letters, viz. *āleph*, *mēm*, *shin*; seven double letters, viz. *bēth*, *gīmel*, *dāleth*, *kaph*, *pēh*, *rēsh*, *tāv*, and twelve 'simple' letters). Concerning these twenty-two letters, the book says:

'God engraved them, hewed them, weighed them, interchanged them one with another, combined them, and formed by them the soul of everything which has been created and of everything which will be created.'

Herein is contained the book's philosophy of the cosmos, which is explained in something like the following way: in the beginning God created the three primordial substances, air, fire, and water (the initial letters of each are the three 'mother' letters mentioned above). Just as there could be no form in any script which did not contain these three 'mothers' (all the other letters being in the naive imagination of certain early Kabbālists 'born' from them), so there could be no form in the world of sensible objects without these three primordial elements. But in reality these three are emanations from three still more previous

elements, viz. heaven, wind, and earth; and the natural opposition (represented by an opposition of sex) of these two sets of three keeps the equilibrium of the universe. The seven 'double' letters (*i.e.* according as they have *dāghesh* or not) are emblematic of the seven world-forces, each of which has its opposite to combat—thus (1) wisdom, whose opposite is folly; (2) riches, whose opposite is poverty; (3) seed, whose opposite is sterility; (4) life, whose opposite is death; (5) dominion, whose opposite is servitude; (6) peace, whose opposite is war; (7) beauty, whose opposite is ugliness. The world of nature as well as the world of morality is kept in order by the right interplay of these forces. The twelve 'simple' letters represent twelve attributes of the First Cause—the idea being based upon twelve different terms or phrases by which the OT designates the nature and activity of the Godhead. S. D. Luzzatto in his *Wikkūah 'al ha-Kabbālāh* (Göritz, 1852), following the opinions of Judah Halevi in the *Kūsārī*, iv. 25, has given a fine elucidation of the philosophy of the *Sēfer Yēšārā*. Form (typified by the three 'mother' letters), matter (typified by the seven 'double' letters), and number (typified by the cardinal numbers, one to ten) are, in prototype, aspects or emanations of the divine. Hence we are led on to the consideration of (f), viz. the treatment of emanation in Jewish mysticism. Professed by the early Gnostics, the theory of emanation reached its highest development in Plotinus, from whom it passed, through the medium of Avicenna, to the philosophers and Kabbālists of the Middle Ages. Solomon Ibn Gabirol (*q.v.*) based his philosophy upon the belief in emanation. God is the essence of all existence, the life of the world, and in Him substance and form find their complete unity. But how is God, then, differentiated from the world? By the fact that substance and form are the products, not of God; who is, in Himself, incomprehensible, but of the will of God, which is the first emanation from the divine and which is a sort of intermediate link between the great Unknowable and the cosmos. This will is immanent everywhere and is compelled by its very nature to be eternally creative. From it emanated matter, form, spirit, and soul, all of which are eternally creative by reason of the powers emanating from them. Gabirol's influence told deeply upon the numerous Kabbālists in France, Spain, Germany, and Italy during the succeeding centuries. A mystic work termed *Bāhār* ('Brightness'), composed by a French Kabbālist of the 13th cent., develops a doctrine of emanation which differs considerably from that of Gabirol. While the latter maintained that the world existed in God potentially from all eternity (God having called the actual world into being by a *creatio ex nihilo*), the *Bāhār* holds the eternity of the actual world. What, then, was creation? It was an emanation of the 'hidden light' from God. This the *Bāhār* calls the 'first *sfirāh*,' which gave birth to the second *sfirāh*, viz. 'wisdom,' from which emanated the third *sfirāh*, viz. 'intelligence.' These three form the primary principles of the universe, and from them emanated, in succession, seven lower *sfirōth*, which gave form to all material things. There is a transition from the infinite to the finite, and conversely, the finite reacts upwards upon the infinite. But the philosophy of the book is markedly inconsistent. Greater consistency combined with a deeper philosophic insight is to be found in the work of Azriel, a Spanish Jew (1160–1238), who is, however, overshadowed by Isaac ben Sheshet of Gerona, the author of the mystic work *Shār hash-shamayim* ('Gate of Heaven'), and Nahmanides (1194–1270) (*q.v.*). According to the latter, ten powers emanated in succession from the

Deity in the creation of the cosmos. These he calls 'ten *sṣfirōth*.' The first emanation was 'wisdom,' which is likewise termed *rēshīth* (i.e. 'beginning') or *n'kuddāh* (i.e. 'point'). It is from 'wisdom' that all the other nine *sṣfirōth* emanated, in just the same way as a point is really the beginning of a line, i.e. it becomes a line when prolonged in both directions. Nahmanides is extremely vague in his characterization of the relations between the several emanations. But he differs from most of his predecessors in so far as he gives a high place to the spiritual side of man, viz. prayer, communion with God, the soul. In this respect he may be regarded, in conjunction with Abraham Abulafia, as the forerunner of the *Zōhār*—the chief of all the Jewish mystical text-books of the Middle Ages. Abulafia emphasized the necessity of the ascetic life and of contemplation. To him the various combinations of the letters composing the Tetragrammaton and the names of angels meant the revelation of secrets otherwise unknowable and leading to an ecstatic state of union with the divine and a deeper knowledge of the depths of the *Tōrah*. In the *Zōhār* the latter branches of Jewish mysticism are elaborated with an exceptional wealth of detail. While purporting to be but a commentary on the Pentateuch, it is in reality quite an independent compendium of Kabbalistic theosophy. Criticism has long ago demonstrated the untenability of the view which ascribes its authorship to a Rabbi of the 2nd cent. A.D., viz. Simeon ben Yohai. It is a syncretism of Jewish and foreign elements. The former consist of doctrines taken from the Talmudic and Midrashic literature. The latter are 'naturalized' products of Neo-Platonism, Gnosticism, and (according to a newer theory) Sūfi mysticism. The *Zōhār* is also indebted to Solomon Ibn Gabirol and Abraham Abulafia. According to the *Zōhār*, the soul of the *Tōrah* is its mystical sense; and man, having the privilege to behold everywhere the divine image—the world being an embodiment of God—can make his way to union with the divine reason by an understanding of, and a life led in accordance with, the mystic sense of the *Tōrah*. The universe is a series of emanations, and man may, through the instrument of the *Tōrah*, recognize the divine hand everywhere and ascend to the 'Cause of Causes.' God is styled *En Sōf* ('No End'), a being utterly void of attributes, who can only be postulated negatively. The world can come into contact with the *En Sōf* only by means of intermediaries. These intermediaries are the 'ten *sṣfirōth*,' or ten emanations. The first *sṣfirāh* was latent in the *En Sōf* as a dynamic force and is called *kether* ('crown') or *n'kuddāh pshūtāh* ('a simple point'). The first manifestation of the divine is a point, i.e. a unity, unanalyzable, and yet possessing the All. It is the Hegelian idea of 'das reine Sein.' The starting-point of everything is the thought as it existed in God. It is in this 'thought' that everything was originally embraced. The first of the *sṣfirōth*—the 'crown'—is the primordial divine thought or will which, emanating from the *En Sōf*, contained within itself the plan of the universe in its infinity of time and space, in its endless variety of form, colour, and movement. 'Wisdom' and 'intelligence' are the second and third of the *sṣfirōth*, and are parallel emanations from the 'crown.' There is a sexual relationship between them. Wisdom is the 'father,' i.e. the masculine active principle, which engenders all things and imposes on them form and measure. Intelligence is the 'mother,' the passive receptive principle. Out of their union comes a 'son,' who is 'reason,' and reflects the characteristics of both parents. The *Zōhār* elaborates this sexual idea, applying it to the relations between the deity and the *sh'khināh* as well as to the elucidation of

Biblical references to persons and events. The remaining seven *sṣfirōth* are mercy, justice, beauty, victory, glory, foundation, and royalty (or kingdom). The last *sṣfirāh* is the sum of the permanent and immanent activity of all the other *sṣfirōth*. A pervading element of the *Zōhār* is the emphasis laid on the deep spirituality of prayer and upon its effects in bringing about many a change in the material world. In fine, every good act done by man, every good thought of his, leaves its impress upon the 'upper' as well as upon the 'lower' world. These two worlds are really but one, and are equally an emanation of divine spirit. There is a *sh'khintā 'ilāā* ('upper Divine Presence') as well as a *sh'khintā tatāā* ('lower Divine Presence'), and every time man utters a prayer or performs an act of benevolence, a union between the two 'worlds' is effected. The idea is expressed uniquely by a constantly-recurring phrase about the patriarchs of the Jewish race as being 'the upper chariot' (*rtikhā 'ilāā*) on which the deity ascends to heaven and descends to earth. The *Zōhār* influenced the view of many a mediæval Christian scholar who claimed to find support for certain dogmas of Christianity in the abstruse and occasionally ambiguous *Zōhāric* terminology. In the Jewish domain its influence on mediæval Hebrew poetry and liturgy is inestimable. Although many of its devotees were in later ages led away into moral and religious extravagances, which were anything but creditable to religion and morals, it nevertheless conferred upon Judaism a service of imperishable worth. It rescued it from the dead hand of formalism by revealing the eternal spiritual treasures concealed beneath the words of the Law and the Prophets and the Hagiographa. The whole subsequent course of Jewish mysticism—a powerful revival of which took place among the Jews of Poland in the 18th cent.—consists mainly of developments and elaborations of *Zōhāric* doctrines.

A word is due to the Hebrew poets and theologians of the Middle Ages who, quite independently of the recognized text-books of Jewish mysticism, were temperamentally steeped in the feeling of the unity which lies at the root of all things, and who taught that there is a Soul in the universe to whom man ever longs to give his worship and adoration. The secular poems and, more particularly, the liturgical compositions of Ibn Gabirol are instinct with mystical sentiment. The *Kether Malkhūth* ('Royal Crown') is one of the most beautiful descriptions ever penned of the truth of the Divine indwelling. The universe is composed of spheres one within the other; and the author's wealth of Biblical knowledge combined with his education in the philosophy of Plotinus is expended in showing how the glory of God is the secret of the universe, how all the elements of earth and 'every common sight' arouse the human heart to the feeling of the one central all-sustaining life. (M. Sachs, *Die religiöse Poesie der Juden in Spanien*, Berlin, 1845, has given a fine poetic rendering into German. Extracts have also been translated into English verse by Mrs. Henry Lucas in *JQR* viii. [1896] 239.)

The theological treatise of the Spanish-Jewish sage Bahya Ibn Pakuda (first half of the 11th cent.), written in Arabic and known in its Hebrew translation as *Hōbbhōth hal-L'bhābhōth* ('The Duties of the Heart'), expresses the rapture of ultimate communion with the Divine, the joys of beholding the beauty of a higher world accessible only to the choice spirits of mankind, in language of rare passion and intensity. The true Jewish life is, to Bahya, a continual advance, a ceaseless aspiration; and the goal is reached only when the intellect has come to 'know' God and the heart to 'love' Him. Hence Bahya's mysticism has a twofold

foundation. God must be 'experienced' both intellectually and emotionally. But God in His essence is really unknowable. He is 'more hidden than anything which is hidden, further away than anything which is far.' Hence how can He be known? Only, answers Bahya, by man's reflexion upon His greatness and goodness as manifested in the wondrously accurate workings of the natural world. To this end man must go through all the stages of a life of purgation and purification. Guided in this aim by the laws of the Tōrah and the prescriptions of the Rabbis, he will finally reach that pinnacle of faith and love when he will be able to say, as did one of the saints, 'Oh! my God, Thou hast caused me to suffer hunger, Thou hast left me naked, Thou hast set me down in the darkness of the night, . . . even though Thou burn me with fire I shall but continue to love Thee and rejoice in Thee.' But Bahya, while favouring a certain measure of asceticism, felt, like the best mystics of all nations, the beautiful necessity of man co-operating with his fellow in all true works of goodness and use. Man realizes the Divine Presence all the more when many share the vision.

The Spanish-Jewish poet and theologian Judah Halevi (c. 1085-1143) rises to rare heights of mystic perception in his religious poetry as well as in certain portions of his philosophical treatise *Kūṣārī*. (A new and complete edition of the poetry under the title of *Diwan des Abū-l-Hasan Jehuda Ha-Levi* was brought out by H. Brody, Berlin, 1911, for the Mekizé Nir-Damin Society.) Spiritual love has never been more rapturously sung in the Hebrew language. The wooing of God by the soul, God as the friend to whom the soul turns when the hour is darkest, the sense of both body's and soul's complete subjection to God—all these and many kindred outpourings of the mystic are prominent throughout. But the poet had another ideal besides God. This was the rehabilitation of Zion. Isaiah's striking pictures of Jerusalem as the bride of God, as well as the Rabbinic-mystic interpretations of 'dove,' 'my beloved,' 'love,' and similar words and phrases in the Song of Songs are the foundations on which the poet builds up the edifice of his mystic vision concerning the new Jerusalem and an Israel restored thereto. In the *Kūṣārī* the idea is philosophically applied to the *sh'khināh*. In ii. 14-18 it is said that only Palestine could be the land of prophecy, the land where the first germs of religion grew, because only there could the *sh'khināh* exist—the *sh'khināh* which ever waits and yearns to become joined with the men who have rendered themselves morally and physically fit to receive the gift.

The poet and theologian Moses Hayyim Luzzatto (born at Padua 1707; died 1747) claimed to have received divine revelations from a heavenly genius (*maggid*), and his numerous mystical works, written in Hebrew and Aramaic—in some of which he imitated the language of the *Zōhār*—fell under the ban of the religious leaders of his day. His ethical treatise *Meṣillath Yeshārīm* ('Path of the Upright') is based on a saying of a famous miracle-working Rabbi of the 2nd cent. A.D., Phinehas ben Jair. It details the steps by which man renders himself worthy to receive the Holy Spirit. To follow out the full spiritual content of the Law is, to Luzzatto, the goal of him who is at once gifted with *hōkhmah* ('wisdom') and *yirāh* ('fear of God'). The road lies through 'carefulness,' 'diligence,' 'cleanliness,' 'abstemiousness,' 'purity,' 'piety,' 'humility,' 'fear of sin,' 'holiness.' The result is the incoming of the Holy Spirit. After such an exercise man becomes a true 'disciple of the wise,' a 'sanctuary,' an 'altar.' The *sh'khināh* 'rests upon such a one just as it rested upon the real Temple in Jerusalem.'

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The mystical spirit is alive in many a Jewish poet and theologian to-day; but the mystical life is absent. Modern conditions are unfavourable to the cultivation of the quietude and introspection which are, and always were, an indispensable ingredient of mysticism.

See, further, art. *QABBĀLĀ*.

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J. ABELSON.

MYSTICISM (Hindu).—Mysticism has been defined by Edward Caird as 'religion in its most concentrated and exclusive form,' as 'that attitude of mind in which all other relations are swallowed

up in the relation of the soul to God' (*The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, Glasgow, 1904, ii. 210). This is, perhaps, in view of the variety of forms that mysticism has assumed in different ages and among different peoples, as near as one can approach to a definition of the content of the term. It is a temper, a spirit, rather than a clearly definable attitude to the universe, but it is a temper and spirit that under various aspects appears among all races and in all periods whenever religion and the relation of the soul to the unseen powerfully occupy the attention of men. There are no peoples who have been more powerfully and continuously affected by the thought of a spiritual world than have been the peoples of India, and it is accordingly to be expected that among them the mystical temper of mind should be found. Again and again in long tracts of sterile formalism or from the midst of the grossest superstition groups of earnest seekers discover themselves whose insight and desire pierce to the heart of things. They are not Hindus, but super-Hindus; they are of the true mystic brotherhood. But, while the sense of the reality of the spiritual creates this temper among Hindus no less than among earnest souls elsewhere, we find that Hindu thought possesses two characteristics which are closely related to each other and indeed complementary, and which at the same time belong to the very nature of mysticism. Those are its doctrine of *māyā* and its monism. That occupation with the spiritual world which is of the essence of mysticism inevitably involves a view that at the least lightly esteems the world of sense. It is true that in much Hindu thought this has been carried further, and a doctrine has been formulated that denies any positive reality to the world at all. This may be a step beyond the requirements of the mystic attitude, but in its contempt of the finite Hindu thought is in fullest accord with the mystic spirit in almost all its manifestations. So also in its determined quest for an ultimate unity Hinduism discovers itself as at one with mysticism, since, as William James affirms, 'mystical states of mind in every degree are shown by history, usually tho not always, to make for the monistic view' (*Pragmatism*, London, 1907, p. 151). The 'four marks,' indeed, which James has propounded as distinctive of the mystic state and which are certainly applicable to many phases of mysticism, viz. ineffability, noetic quality, transiency, and passivity, are to be found upon much of Hinduism, and demonstrate its kinship with that type of reflexion. The ineffability which is here placed first among the marks of mysticism is no doubt a characteristic of any deeply felt and vivid experience of the divine nearness, and it is to be found alike in the theistic religion, which is overwhelmed with a sense of the love of God, and in the pantheist, which cannot use the discourse of reason or of speech since it has reached the bourne where difference is lost. Both these types of mystical experience are found striving to express themselves in Hinduism. The religion of the *Upaniṣads* in its possession of 'noetic quality' also betrays undoubted kinship with mysticism, while passivity, or 'the mystic vice of quietism,' is an obvious characteristic of a great part of the Hindu religious attitude and life.

In Hinduism, indeed, in nearly all its manifestations, in its most philosophical flights as well as when it approaches pure shamanism and magic, there are to be found indications of the mystical temper of mind. One reason for this appears to lie, as far as we can pierce the secret of the soul of a race, in the intense preoccupation of the Indian people from the earliest or at least from the

immediately post-Vedic times with the desire to escape from self-hood (*ahamkāra*) as the one way to ultimate peace. The passion of this pursuit was, perhaps, intensified by the accompanying belief, wherever it may have been obtained, in the power of *karma* and in the long travail of transmigration. The only deliverance from the endless revolution of the wheel of *samsāra* was realized to lie in an escape to a region which, because there is no consciousness there, must necessarily be a barren and an empty land. Thus the quest of Hinduism is impelled onward by two allied impulses which at the same time strengthen and contradict each other. It is an escape and an attainment, but in the escape from the bondage of the self the union with the ultimate One is emptied of all sense of realization and, in the words of Bāhva to Vāskali, 'That *Ātman* is silence' (*Saṅkara on Brahmasūtra*, III. ii. 17). It is this contradiction that gives to so much of Indian thought that 'troubled intensity' which Caird (ii. 233) finds also in the writings of Plotinus, justifying the claim for it, as for them, that it is among the highest expressions of the mystic spirit.

1. Vedic period.—In the Vedic period the indications of the mystic attitude are as yet few. The religion of the hymns is for the most part objective in its character, and in the hymns to Varuna, where it is most deeply felt and most spiritual, it seems to display more affinity with the unmystical attitude to God of the Hebrew prophets than with the pantheism to which ultimately it was transformed. There are some signs, however, in hymns that are supposed to belong to the close of this period that pantheistic and mystical speculation was already beginning to cast upon the Indian spirit the spell that ever since has held it fast. In the great Hymn of Creation (X. cxxix.) two agents are seen at work calling forth being from non-being, and with their discovery Indian thought seems to be setting its face towards at least the possibility of that union or identification of the spirit of man and the spirit of the universe which is the goal of mystic aspiration. These two agents are *tapas* and *kāma*. To these early thinkers the distinction of the material and the spiritual was not yet clearly formulated, but this *tapas*, or heat, which in another hymn (X. exc.) is said to produce the order of the world (*ṛta*), has in it as truly the seed of mystic speculation as had the fiery breath from which Heraclitus and the Stoics saw all things evolve. With this word and the ideas that it suggests is connected the long history of Indian asceticism as proceeding from belief in the power over things of the ardour of a mind restrained and concentrated. The thought of the creative power of *kāma*, or desire, has proved no less influential in the development of Indian religious ideas. If we may take this, 'the primal seed and germ of mind (*manas*)' (X. cxxix. 4), as representing the idea of an *élan vital* in the universe, the source and spring of the continual flux of things, then we can see why the aspiration to escape to the region of peace, to the final unity, has impelled so much of the mystic thought of India towards the overcoming of desire. Round *tapas*, on the one hand, with its suggestion of a way to obtain power over the outer world have gathered often methods of magic rather than of pure mysticism, while, on the other, the more spiritual path to a more ethical goal, which we find in Buddhism, and in such teaching as that of the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (g.v.), appears to have its starting-point in the clue to the change and movement of the universe that these ancient thinkers sought in *kāma*.

These hints, whether of a primal undifferented unity, which seems indeed to be nonentity but

which grows by its own mysterious operation into manifoldness, or of some inchoate Logos or mind stuff presiding over the development, are full of mystic affinities. Of a different kind is the mysticism of the famous *Puruṣa sūkta* (X. xc.). In this hymn we are told that from the body of a primeval giant, *Puruṣa* ('man'), the world is fashioned. The primitive mythological conception that is here made use of is enwrapped in mystic and pantheistic thought, for the *Puruṣa* is 'this whole (universe) whatever has been and whatever shall be,' and the act of creation is the offering of him as a sacrifice by the gods. Further, it is one of the axioms of mysticism that there is a correspondence between the microcosm and the macrocosm, the seen and the unseen worlds. It appears to be some such thought that is behind the crude symbolism of this hymn. 'The created universe,' says Swedenborg, 'is man in an image.' 'From that universal sacrifice,' says the *Puruṣa sūkta*, 'sprang' the universe. 'The *Brāhmaṇa* was his mouth. . . . The moon was produced from his soul; the sun from his eye' (X. xc. 12 f.). 'Albion or man,' according to William Blake (*Jerusalem*), once contained 'all the starry heavens.' Thus one mystic voice calls to another across millenniums.

2. The *Upaniṣads*.—When we pass to the *Upaniṣads*, we are definitely in the midst of Indian mystical speculation. From this period onwards the thought of India seldom lacks the marks of this type of reflexion. There are two dangers that beset it on the right hand and on the left, tempting it aside from the middle path of mysticism proper, i.e. of the religious goal of oneness with God, reached by the way of immediacy. These dangers—of what is merely metaphysics on the one hand, and of what is no better than magic on the other—are about the path of the Hindu thinker and the Hindu seeker from this time onward throughout the whole course of their religious history. The former danger is most apparent in the *Upaniṣads* and the systems that are built mainly upon them; the latter in the popular worships. Yet it is possible to find what is of the very stuff of mysticism in its various forms alongside of both of those counterfeits.

The *Upaniṣads*, according to Royce, 'contain already essentially the whole story of the mystic faith' (*The World and the Individual*, p. 156). In the first place, they seek undeviatingly the changeless One, the reality of all that is; and, in the second place, they find him, as has so often been the experience of mystic thinkers, in a region beyond the reach of finding, a place of contradictions and negations.

'All this is Brahman (neuter) . . . He (It) is myself within the heart, . . . smaller than a mustard seed, smaller than a canary seed, or the kernel of a canary seed. He also is myself within the heart, greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than the heaven, greater than all these worlds' (*Chhândogya Up.* iii. 14). 'Thou art woman, thou art man; thou art youth, thou art maiden; thou art an old man tottering along on thy staff; thou art born with thy face turned everywhere. Thou art the dark-blue bee, thou art the green parrot with red eyes, thou art the thunder-cloud, the seasons, the seas. Thou art without beginning; thou art infinite, thou from whom all worlds are born' (*Svet. Up.* iv. iii. 4). And yet at the same time 'He, the Self, is to be described by No, no.' 'He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended' (*Bṛhad. Up.* iii. ix. 26, iv. iv. 22).

This *ātman*, in a word, in the later phrase which we have already quoted, 'is silence.'

These passages, which could, of course, be multiplied, could at the same time be closely paralleled from the mystic literature of all periods, Christian and non-Christian. The ineffable One to whom or which they journey is often for them all 'the divine dark,' 'the still wilderness where no one is at home.'

'The *Nescio*, *nescio* of Bernard is identical in meaning with the *Neti, neti*, it is not so, it is not so, of the sage Yājñavalkya.

In the very contrast of the finite with the ineffable this mysticism lives, whether it be Hindu or Christian mysticism' (Royce, p. 172).

The ultimate One in the *Upaniṣads*, as in the Neo-Platonists and in so many mystics, is at once everything and nothing—everything because it includes all the universe in itself, and nothing because as such it transcends all speech and thought. This contradiction is deeply wrought into mystical reflexion, so that it seems ever reaching after large utterance, but reaching vainly. It is present on many pages of the *Upaniṣads*. They seem to hover on the brink of revelations which they just fail to attain. They would pass beyond the 'dyke,' the boundary.

'That Self is a dyke, a boundary . . . when that hank has been crossed, night becomes day indeed, for the world of Brahman is lighted up once for all' (*Chhândog. Up.* viii. 4).

But the question arises whether this monism is not so thoroughgoing that, while it may supply what we may call mystic speculation, it does not leave room for religion. This is a charge that especially lies against Śaṅkara's interpretation of the *Upaniṣads*, which is usually called the Vedānta, though there are other and less completely monistic interpretations than his. An evidence of the mystical character of the *Upaniṣad* religion is to be found in its tendency towards certain classic heresies and vices to which the mystic has always been liable. One of these is the arrogant and complete identification of the soul and God, with the consequent disappearance of anything that can be properly called religion.

Uddālaka Āruṇi says to his son, 'That which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, O Śvetaketu, art it' (*Chhândog. Up.* vi. 11. 3). Would he cast his son into the abyss of unconsciousness? It is because Śaṅkarāchārya's doctrine led to this goal that the theist and mystic, Mahārṣi Devendranath Tagore, rejected its interpretation. 'What we want,' he says, 'is to worship God. If the worshipper and the object of worship become one, then how can there be any worship?' (*Autobiography of Devendranath Tagore*, p. 72).

This *advaita* doctrine may agree with some passages of the *Upaniṣads*, but other passages indicate that to many of those seers this was not apparent as the conclusion of their reflexion. The peril of this view is recognized more than once. They were not, indeed, as mystics seldom are, governed in their thinking by the rules of logic. At first in the case of one inquirer in the *Chhândogya Upaniṣad* it was satisfying to his heart to know that the goal was like a dreamless sleep, but on further consideration the prospect seemed less pleasing, and he returned to his teacher saying that such a one 'is gone to utter annihilation.' 'I see,' he said, 'no good in this' (VIII. x. 4). So Maitreyi protests against such a 'bewildering' prospect (*Bṛhad. Up.* ii. iv. 13).

In the case of many mystics there is this vacillation between a goal of complete peace and silence and one in which communion and the intercourse of love and trust are possible. On the one hand, the mystic cries with the Sūfi saint, 'Lo, I am debarred by plurality from the vision of unity'; on the other, he says with Yājñavalkya, 'How, O beloved, should he know the knower?' There is a continual struggle between the desire for a complete absorption which cannot be conscious at all and the need to realize what is attained. The intellectual character of so much of *Upaniṣad* teaching obscures the sense of the latter need. That it was not absent is indicated by the use, e.g., by Yājñavalkya himself in one passage of the favourite mystic symbol of a spiritual marriage to represent the final union with the Absolute.

'As a man, when embraced by a beloved wife, knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within, thus this person, when embraced by the intelligent (*prājña*) Self, knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within' (*Bṛhad. Up.* iv. iii. 21).

This is not a condition of unconsciousness. It is what the mystics call 'the orison of union,' what

Ruysbroeck describes as 'the dim silence where all lovers lose themselves' (*L'Ornement des noces spirituelles*, new ed., Brussels, 1900).

Mysticism is in most danger when it is most intellectual. It is true of much in the *Upaniṣads* that it is seeking to discover the relations of man with the universe rather than his relation with God. It is often concerned with the relation of the knower and the known rather than with that of the worshipper and God. It gives a metaphysic rather than an ethic or a religion. In the broad lines of its aspiration, however—its craving for an ultimate unity, a craving often filled with deep emotion, its discontent with the finite, its conviction that what is deepest within is nearest akin to what is highest above—its value as mysticism is unchallenged. The more theistic *Upaniṣads*, such as the *Kāṭha*, are those in which the mystic emotion is most present.

'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor by the understanding, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses, by him the Self can be gained' (*Kāṭha Up.* i. ii. 23). 'The Self-existent pierced the opening (of the senses) so that they turn forward: therefore man looks forward, not backward into himself. Some wise man, however, with his eyes closed and wishing for immortality, saw the Self behind' (*ii. iv. 1*).

This combination of introversion and desire is the mystic's path to God. There is a passage in Plotinus, curiously parallel to this one, where he compares men under the influence of the discursive reason to 'a number of faces which are turned outwards, though inwardly they are attached to one head.'

'But if one of us, like one of these faces, could turn round either by his own effort or by the aid of Athens, he would behold at once God, himself and the whole' (quoted in Caird, *ii.* 298).

3. The *bhakti* school.—It must never be forgotten that the differentia of all Indian thought lies in the fact that the doctrine of *karma* and *saṁsāra* is for it an axiom. The goal of all mysticism is the same, namely the 'unitive life,' but its conception of that goal and of the path to it is largely influenced by its thought of that from which it seeks escape, whether sin or *saṁsāra*. The law of *karma* and rebirth is so largely a physical law that the moral elements in the way of deliverance are not so prominent as in Western mysticism. With the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, however, the moral element is strongly emphasized, and along with this goes in this Scripture an acknowledgment of the value of *bhakti* ('loving faith') in bringing about the desired union, which marks it as belonging less to the philosophical than to the emotional mysticism of the Hindus. The soul, being 'a portion' of the Lord (xv. 7)—what other mystics might call an 'uncreated spark' of the divine—returns to its home in God.

The seeker, becoming 'free from the thought of an I,' 'recognizes by devotion (*bhakti*) in verity who and what I am,' says Kṛṣṇa; 'then becoming me in verity, he speedily enters into me' (xviii. 55). 'Surrendering all the laws come for refuge to me alone. I will deliver thee from all sins; grieve not' (xviii. 66). 'In (Kṛṣṇa) seek refuge with thy whole soul; by his grace thou shalt win supreme peace, the everlasting realm' (xviii. 62).

These words give the keynote of the emotional mysticism which centres chiefly in the names of Kṛṣṇa and Rāma, and which is described by the general name of *bhakti* (see BHAKTI-MĀRGA). While the mysticism of the *Upaniṣads* was sometimes too cold, that which we find here is sometimes warm with a too earthly passion. The method of all mysticism is love, and in the whole *bhakti* movement this is the accepted means by which the worshipper and the object of his worship are brought together.

'*Bhakti* leans to love very perceptibly, even to erotic passion, but it expresses affection of a pure sort as well as that of a sensual nature; which latter aspect, however, is to be found and cannot be ignored. In fact the danger of *bhakti*, become too ardent and lapsing into mystic eroticism, is apparent in the mediæval expression of this emotion. It is not intellectual, yet the play of meaning between faith and love (perhaps trust) is

generally present' (Mopkins, *JRAS*, July 1911, p. 733). The object of this worship is Bhagavat, the Blessed One, 'who makes blessed his *bhaktas*, those who have made him theirs and are devoted to him' (*ib.* p. 733).

The history of this school has been dealt with in detail in the art. BHAKTI-MĀRGA. It will be enough to indicate here some of the more distinctively mystical elements in its religious practice and belief. The strength of the emotion is seen resulting in something like hysteria in Chaitanya (1486-1534) and his followers, and in sensuality in the Vallabhas. In the *Chaitanya-charit-amṛt*, which is said to be a contemporary Bengali biography of the saint, we read of tears of rapture, swoons of love. Chaitanya on one occasion is said to have 'manifested a marvellous power; everyone who danced around him saw that the master was gazing only at him.' The climax of this *bhakti* is the *mādhura rasa* in which 'the votary serves Kṛṣṇa as a lover offering his or her own person' (*Chaitanya-charit-amṛt*, p. 244). The peril of such unbridled emotionalism is seen in those practices of the Mahārājas of the Vallabha sect which were exposed in the Bombay courts in 1863. This *mādhurya* is expressed by Mīrābāī, who was queen of Udaipur in the 15th cent., in these words which are attributed to her: 'There is but one male in existence, namely my beloved Kanaī Lāl (Kṛṣṇa), and all besides are females.'

Other and higher aspects of mystic aspiration are to be found in Rāmānanda and Tulsī Dās in the north, in Tukārām and the Marāṭha saints in the west, and especially in Mānikka-vāsagar and the Śaiva saints of the south. The note of all those saints is the desire to draw near to God, to find Him in a personal, inward experience. 'The worship of the impersonal,' says Tulsī Dās (*Rāmāyaṇa*, tr. Growse, Allahābād, 1883, vii. 106), 'laid no hold of my heart.' The comparison of the seeker to a child who has lost his mother occurs frequently; or, again, God is the element in which the soul lives.

'Devotion to Rāma,' says a sage in Tulsī Dās's *Rāmāyaṇa* (*loc. cit.*), 'is like the element of water and my soul—which is, as it were, a fish—how can it exist without it?'

So Tukārām in one of his *Abhāṅgas*:

'As the bride looks back to her mother's house
And goes, but with dragging feet;
Even so it is with my soul, O Lord,
That Thou and I may meet.

As a child cries out and is sore distressed,
When its mother it cannot see,
As a fish that is taken from out the wave,
So 'tis, says Tuka, with me.'

The desire for nearness to God is the characteristic of all this movement of devotion:

'But now where'er I sit,
Or stand or walk, Thou art forever near'
(Śivavākyaṁ, in L. D. Barnett, *Heart of India*, London, 1903, p. 92).

Kabīr († 1518) and the group—Nānak and the Sikh *gurus*, Dādū, etc.—that are associated with his modes of thought differ from those named above in the fact that Muhammadan teaching has had an influence upon them by the side of Hinduism. Whether Kabīr was by birth a Muhammadan or a Hindu, he not only was associated with Rāmānanda but also probably came under Śūfī influences. He says, like the rest, 'Thou art the ocean; I am the fish of the water.' He tells the Yogī, 'Your Lord is near, yet you are climbing the palm-tree to seek him.' 'When I lie down I lie prostrate at his feet.'

It is the faith of these saints that the God who is very far off and 'whose name is unutterable' has drawn near to men, whether by an *avatāra* (see INCARNATION [Indian]) or by means of a *guru*, or even by the medium of the divine name. 'Without the *guru*,' says Nānak, 'none has found God.' Behind all the thought of the *bhakti* school there is the idea of God as a being lifted above the world,

with which His relation has somehow to be mediated, and at the same time the conviction that it owes all its reality to Him. The antinomy is one that is familiar to all students of mystic thought. The idea of emanations is a favourite method by which mystic thinkers have sought to safeguard the Absolute in His relations with the universe. Closely parallel to the fivefold hierarchy of existence of Plotinus is the doctrine of *vyūhas*, or lower manifestations of the *para* form, or transcendent essence, of the Godhead. These are partly mythological, partly metaphysical, and are to be found in the *Mahābhārata* (*Sānti Parvan*, cccxli. 70-73) as well as in the system of Rāmānuja († 1137), the philosophical theologian of the *bhakti* school. Vāsudeva, Saṅkaraṣaṇa, Pradyumna, Aniruddha, and Brahmā form a series of intermediaries between the Supreme Reality and the created world. So also Śrī, or Lakṣmī, the wife of Viṣṇu, typifies, according to Rāmānuja, the activity of the Supreme Spirit in the region of the finite.

The sacramental meal has its place in some of these cults, just as it has in Christian mysticism. It is specially important in the practices of the Kabīr Panth, where the *Jot Prasād*, a ceremony of initiation and communion, has for its aim the bringing of the worshipper into fellowship with God. Betel-leaves upon which has been written the secret name of God are eaten. The food presented to the initiates, which is chiefly coco-nut and the consecrated betel-leaf, 'is regarded as Kabīr's special gift and it is said that all who receive it worthily will obtain eternal life' (G. H. Westcott, *Kabīr and the Kabīr Panth*, Cawnpore, 1907, p. 132).

4. False mysticism. — Alongside of the true mysticism which has been an element in Hindu thought throughout its whole history there has been a false mysticism closely allied to magic, and to it some reference must be made. The difference between mysticism and magic, according to E. Underhill, is that 'magic wants to get, mysticism wants to give' (*Mysticism*, London, 1912, p. 84). The ascetic who by *tapas* or by *yoga* practices obtained powers that made the gods fear him, or whose personality was enlarged and the power of his will made dominant over nature, was not often seeking spiritual or unselfish ends, though some sought to climb by this ladder to spiritual union. The methods of *yoga* were partly physical—breathing exercises and postures—and partly intellectual. It is not easy to define the limits that in these practices separate the legitimate use of means towards a spiritual goal from magic arts. The *yoga* ritual certainly often agrees with the definition of a magical rite as 'a tremendous forcing house of the latent faculties of man's spiritual nature' (A. E. Waite, *The Occult Sciences*, London, 1891, p. 14). The self-hypnotism produced by constant repetition of the name of the god and by the use of *mantras*, or spells, belongs rather to the region of magic or 'Mysticismus' than to that of genuine mysticism. Some of the modern interpreters of Hinduism seek to explain the 'feeling of peace and calm' produced by repetition of a *mantra* on the ground that it 'sets up certain vibrations' (*Text Book of Hindu Religion and Ethics*, Benares, n.d., p. 167).

Another group of those dangerous or degraded mysticisms have kinship with the sympathetic magic of primitive peoples and are based on the notion of the analogy of the physical and the spiritual.

'Armed with this torch,' the occultists 'explore the darkest, most terrible mysteries of life' (Underhill, p. 192).

This is indeed, rightly used, a valuable means to the discovery of truth, and has been made use of by most of the great mystics, but we have already

seen its dangers in the 'spiritual nuptials' of Kṛṣṇa and his worshipper. In the erotic and bacchanalian symbolism of the Śāktas the dangers of this method are exhibited at their very worst. This sect has its roots in the very ancient worship of the female principle in the universe, with its 'sex emblems and fertility goddesses.' The Śakti worship of the Tantras, with its appeal to fears and passions that are deep in the human soul, with its suggestion that in the forces of lust and death may be found the key to the 'inmost, ancient mysteries,' has had a wide-spread influence, especially in Bengal.

'Hear me, friends,' says Chāṇḍīdās (14th cent.), a follower of the Sahajīyā cult, which owed its origin to the Vāmāchāri Buddhists, 'how salvation may be obtained through love for a woman' (D. C. Sen, *Bengali Language and Literature*, Calcutta, 1911, p. 44). 'Tantrism,' says L. de la Vallée Poussin, 'rests on the principle that "of all illusions"—and everything is illusion—"the illusion called woman is the most sublime," the most necessary to salvation.' 'No infamy, not excluding incest, is omitted from this worship of woman (*strīpūjā*) the supreme divinity' (*Bouddhisme: Opinions sur l'histoire de la dogmatique*, Paris, 1909, pp. 403, 405). 'He who worships the great Adyā Kālī with the five *makāras* and repeats her four hundred names becomes suffused with the presence of the *devī* and for him there remains nothing in the three worlds that is beyond his power' (*Mahānirvāpa Tantra*, viii.). The five *makāras* are *madya*, wine, *maṃsa*, flesh, *matsya*, fish, *mudra*, mystic gesticulations, and *maithuna*, sexual indulgence.

'The drunken consciousness,' says William James, 'is one bit of the mystic consciousness.' If that be so, Śāktism may claim a place in mysticism.

5. Modern mysticism. — That mysticism has not yet died out of India is evident when we hear the old cry for the One echoing through the writings of Swāmī Vivekānanda:

'Where is there any more misery for him who sees this Oneness in the Universe? . . . this Oneness of life, Oneness of everything' ('God in Everything,' in *Speeches and Writings*, Madras, n.d., p. 421 f.).

A truer mysticism expresses itself in the *Autobiography* of Mahārṣi Devendranath Tagore, a book that is classed by Miss Underhill with the *Testament* of Ignatius Loyola and the *Journal* of George Fox. And we find the same passion for oneness with God expressing itself again and again in the finest and most truly Indian hymns of the young Christian Church, those, e.g., of N. V. Tilak, the Marāṭhī poet. Thus:

'As the moon and its rays are one,
So may I be one with Thee!
This is my cry to Thee, my Lord,
This is this beggar's plea.'

LITERATURE. — The mystical element in the *Upaniṣads* is expounded in J. Royce, *The World and the Individual*, 1st ser., New York, 1900, lect. iv. The mystical element in the *Bhakti* religion is frequently referred to in N. Macnicol, *Indian Theism from the Vedic to the Muḥammadan Period* ('The Religious Quest of India' series), London, 1916, where a bibliography will be found. One Hundred Poems of Kabīr, tr. Rabindranath Tagore, do. 1916, and the *Autobiography* of Devendranath Tagore, do. 1914, give examples of Indian mysticism at two widely separated periods, while the prefaces to both those books by Evelyn Underhill provide interesting comparisons with the teaching of Western mystics. See also the artt. on the various saints referred to above, as well as BHAKTI-MĀRGA, INCARNATION (Indian), etc.

N. MACNICOL.

MYTHOLOGY. — By 'mythology' is properly meant the scientific and historical study of myths; but the word is often used in a looser sense to mean the body of myths belonging to any people or group of peoples. It is by no means easy to define a myth; but all myths seem to have certain characteristics in common. In the first place, they are traditional; this may mean that they go back to a 'mythopoeic age,' which represents a certain stage in the development of human thought. But some myths, such as those of the Holy Grail or of the Charlemagne cycle, or many legends of the saints, have arisen in historic times. A traditional story must, however, have had an origin, often perhaps in some individual imagination. In such a case it seems necessary that the story must so far express or coincide with the contemporary spirit as to be taken over by it and become common property.

A myth is usually, directly or indirectly, in narrative form; its difference from ordinary tales seems to lie partly in the fact that it is believed to be substantially true, at least by those among whom it is first repeated; it thus differs from a parable or allegory, as well as from a fiction or romance. Moreover, most myths, if not all, are ætiological; that is to say, they grew up or were invented to explain certain phenomena, beliefs, or customs. Thus the relation of mythology to religion and theology becomes clear, if we accept the definition quoted by W. Warde Fowler:

'Religion is the effective desire to be in right relation to the Power manifesting itself in the universe' (*Religious Experience of the Roman People*, London, 1911, p. 8).

For mythology, by its explanations and illustrations of the nature and character of the gods or other powers, would help man to keep his relations with them on a right basis. The relations of mythology and ritual, or the various forms of religious worship, are also very close, since ritual supplies the means whereby the desire contained in the above definition of religion can be made effective; and these means evidently depend on the nature of the powers to be worshipped or propitiated.

In relation to magic, mythology serves a similar function, except that in this case the powers to be dealt with are of a lower and often of a malevolent order. Between mythology and folklore it is not easy to draw a definite line. Much folklore is mythology in the making; much may be a survival of broken-down myth. In primitive ages mythology and history are often inextricably mingled, and many of the early speculations of natural science have been embodied in mythical form.

1. *Classification of myths.*—One of the chief problems that are met in the study of comparative mythology is the question how far similarity in myths must be held to imply a common origin, and how far such similarity may be due to psychological laws, to the tendency of the human mind under similar conditions and in a similar stage of development to produce similar myths. In some cases, in European peoples, e.g., influence and reaction seem to offer the most probable explanation. But, when we find similar tales told to explain similar phenomena or customs in places so far removed from one another as Greece and Australia, direct influence from one on another seems precluded. Here the analogy of art forms, and especially of decorative forms, is instructive, when we find identical patterns, arising independently from similar technical conditions, in early Europe and in America. It seems that in the case of myths also similar tales in remote regions may be of entirely independent origin. On the other hand, we often find, side by side or even confused together in the mythology of the same people, myths belonging to strata remote from one another in the course of development. Such myths may either be survivals from a primitive age or be borrowed from a people in a more primitive or a more advanced stage. Any classification of myths is, for these and other reasons, full of difficulties, and admits of a great deal of cross-division; it must in many cases involve a choice between various theories as to the origin of the myths. There are, however, many myths which fall indisputably into one of the classes given below; they are classified according to the phenomena, institutions, or beliefs with which they are associated.

(1) *Periodic natural changes and seasons.*—Many myths are connected with the regular alternation of day and night and of winter and summer. The sun and the moon are usually regarded as persons. In addition to tales connected with the daily course of the sun and his nightly voyage of return from

west to east, we also find many others concerning his annual variations, and especially the winter and summer solstices. Rites on these occasions, often of a magical character with fires and dances, exist throughout the world, and various stories are told to explain them. The god is often represented as absent or distant for half the year; but it is not easy to distinguish between such tales and those connected with the 'year spirit,' or the growth and fall of vegetation. The moon and its phases are commonly believed to have an intimate connexion with the birth and growth of both animals and plants. Sun and moon are consorts in many mythologies, the sun being usually male and the moon female; but this relation is sometimes inverted. The stars also have a place in many mythologies, especially in those of peoples who, like the Chaldeans in Babylonia, gave much study to astrology. The myths connected with the 'year spirit' have attracted much attention from modern mythologists, and appear to be of almost universal diffusion; they also have an intimate connexion with human activities, whether of a practical kind, as in sowing, harvest, etc., or in special rites or customs intended to stimulate or maintain the activity of nature. These rites and the stories connected with them mostly represent the death or departure and the renewal, resurrection, or return of some person or persons on whose life and vigour the growth and fertility of crops, trees, and other vegetation are believed to be dependent. The tales of Adonis and of Persephone suffice to show the kind of myth which accompanies such rites. Sometimes the tale is not of death, but of departure and return, as in the celebration of the absence and return of Apollo at Delphi.

(2) *Other natural objects.*—It seems to be an almost universal tendency for primitive man to impute a personal existence to natural objects, especially conspicuous objects. In its most primitive form, the fetish or animistic stage, this may not lead to the production of myth; but the polydæmonic and polytheistic stages that follow lend themselves to extensive mythological development. Trees, e.g., and bushes are in many parts of the world believed to be inhabited by beings who may either be identified with them or regarded as having a separate existence but taking refuge in them. The dryads and other tree-myths of Greece are a familiar example. Rivers are frequently thought of as persons, and receive divine honours, and many tales are told of them. We also find what seem at first more like abstract impersonations, such as heaven and earth, the sea, etc. But some of these appear to be quite primitive, though they do not often develop into myth, apart from their association with definite gods.

(3) *Extraordinary or irregular natural phenomena.*—It is easy to understand how these, even more than the regular vicissitudes of nature, gave rise to stories explaining their origin or cause. Strange rocks or fissures were attributed to supernatural agency, just as they are still attributed in many countries to saints or to the devil, in both cases probably substitutes for the gods of an earlier mythology. Eruptions and earthquakes are attributed to the struggles of subterranean monsters, storms and tempests to special gods. The winds, whether beneficent or maleficent, are in many places regarded as persons, often rushing on wild horses; in some cases, as W. Mannhardt points out,¹ the devastation wrought by them is attributed to creatures who are not to be regarded as personifications of winds or storms, but rather as wild beings of rocks and woods. The tale of the universal flood and its survivors is known not only in Mesopotamia, but also in widely remote regions.

¹ *Antike Wald- und Feldkulte*, p. 96.

Eclipses of the sun and moon are often regarded as due to a monster or dragon who tries to swallow them, and has to be driven away by human agency. Such swallows, often of their own offspring, occur in many mythologies, perhaps not always due to a similar origin.

(4) *The origin of the universe.*—Speculation as to the origin of the visible world occurs in many primitive mythologies; it varies between the two extreme notions of a creator existing independently of the world and fashioning all things by his will and some form of evolution. Many systems combine both theories in varying proportions. There often exists in the religion of primitive peoples a vague belief in a supreme god or all-father, which can hardly be derived from a more advanced monotheistic system. But the creation of things is not as a rule attributed to him; it is usually assigned to some being or set of beings of an intermediate character. The notion of a primeval chaos out of which the cosmos is gradually evolved is not uncommon. Sometimes the earth is fished up out of the water by some creative agent; sometimes, as in early Greek mythology, water is the origin of all, or else the marriage of earth and heaven.

(5) *The origin of the gods.*—In many mythologies, both of a primitive and of a highly developed character, the gods, even if immortal, are not thought of as having always existed, and stories are told as to their origin, birth, and family relations, and their substitution for an earlier dynasty of gods. Often these earlier gods have little mythological personality, and are little more than abstractions, made up to explain the existence of their successors. Sometimes we find a belief that the present dynasty of gods, as it has begun, is also to pass away or be superseded; a familiar example is seen in the Scandinavian legend of the twilight of the gods. We also find tales of gods coming from elsewhere, as in the Greek stories of the wanderings of Apollo or of Dionysus. In some cases these may actually record the route by which the worship of the god was spread; but there is here a danger of confusion with similar tales due merely to the annual vicissitudes of nature mentioned under (1).

(6) *The origin of animals and of mankind.*—These two are often intimately connected, and the possibility of the one being produced by or transformed into the other is a common belief. It is especially found in connexion with the system of totemism (*q.v.*), in which particular animals or even plants are regarded as the ancestors or kindred of certain families or groups. A creator god is sometimes vaguely believed in; but the creation of living things, as well as of the universe, is very commonly assigned to some intermediate creator, sometimes in animal form; a well-known example is the mantis grasshopper, which is regarded as the creator in S. Africa. The tale of men being moulded of clay and then given life, known to us in Greece in the myths of Pandora and of Prometheus, is also found elsewhere. Another story of wide prevalence is that men were made from stones or rocks, as in the tale of Deucalion and Pyrrha, or that they sprang from the ground as the result of the sowing of some strange seed, such as dragon's teeth.

(7) *Transformations.*—A belief in the possibility of transformation of men into animal and other forms is almost universal, and is implied in innumerable stories. For classical examples, we need only remember the title of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*. The power is commonly attributed to witches and wizards of all sorts, and also especially to sea-creatures and other elemental spirits, as in the case of Proteus and Thetis, and numerous

examples from northern folklore and fairy-tales. A curious and sinister form of the belief is seen in lycanthropy (*q.v.*) and the tales in which men are supposed to change into a wolf, a leopard, or other beast of prey. The transformation of men or of beings in human form into trees or bushes is the basis of many tales; their transformation into stones is also common, and is often represented either as a punishment for some offence or as due to magic. See art. *METAMORPHOSIS*.

(8) *Heroes, families, and nations.*—It is a usual thing for any family or tribe to trace its descent from a common ancestor, and traditions of relationship are often embodied in elaborate genealogies. Such tribal heroes are often regarded as capable of performing many things beyond the powers of modern men, and numerous and varied tales are told of their exploits in destroying giants or monsters, of their beneficial inventions, and of the social institutions which they founded. Tales of a heroic age may sometimes have no such racial relation; but it seems usually to be the case that the heroes of them are, if not regarded as ancestors, at least of a tribal or national character. Even the heroic saints who replace them in more recent tales are as a rule specially associated with some particular place or nation.

(9) *Social institutions and inventions.*—All the arts of war and peace, the chief advances in civilization and social organization, and the material means by which they are attained are very commonly attributed to gods or to tribal heroes. The gift of fire, or the stealing of fire from heaven, attributed in Greece to Prometheus, is a subject for stories in almost every region of the earth; tales are also told of the invention of metal-working and other crafts. Customs and institutions, alike of primitive and advanced races, are frequently said to have been ordained by the gods or established by a legendary hero, and various tales are told both of their foundation and of the penalties that follow breaches in their observance.

(10) *Existence after death and places of the dead.*—The belief in continued existence after death is almost universal, though this existence is often of a shadowy and unsubstantial kind. On the other hand, the dead are often thought of as having considerable power either for good or for evil, and are accordingly objects of worship. There are often found side by side the two inconsistent notions that the dead may be found or invoked near their tombs, where they are sometimes seen in the form of a serpent or other animal as well as in a human apparition, and that they go away to some distant and mysterious place of the dead. This is usually towards the sunset or the west, and is either on an island or separated from the land of the living by an ocean or a river, which has to be crossed by boat. Charon, the ferryman of the dead, is familiar from Greek myth, and has his counterpart in many other regions. Sometimes the land of the dead is a dark and dismal region below the earth, approached by caves or chasms; many tales are told of men who have visited it and returned. Tales of the transmigration of the souls of the dead into men or animals are not uncommon. Tribal or national heroes are often believed to return and help their descendants or successors in times of great stress. The belief that the happiness or misery of existence after death depends upon conduct or ceremonial observance in life is very wide-spread; and many tales record instances to prove it.

(11) *Dæmons and monsters.*—The imagination of man often peoples wild or desolate places with terrible or horrible creatures; it has been said that the savage is never less alone than when he is alone; and even among civilized people we often find an unreasoning fear of the dark or of the

waste. This often finds expression in tales of beings that inhabit these regions, whether of human or monstrous form. Rivers also and pools are inhabited, sometimes by nixies or water-nymphs, sometimes by horrible monsters like the Scottish kelpie or the Australian *bunyip*. Floods and other disasters, such as the devastating of the land, are often attributed to these monsters, and their destruction or taming affords an opportunity for the prowess or power of heroes and saints, as in the case of Bellerophon and the Chimæra, St. George and the Dragon, or St. Martha and the Tarasque. The centaurs and satyrs, too, are examples of wild creatures of the wood and mountain. The struggle between gods or heroes and such monsters often comes to symbolize any struggle between good and evil, or between higher and lower ideals.

(12) *Historical events*.—It is usually difficult and often impossible to draw any clear line between history and myth. Many mythical traditions, such as that of the siege of Troy, are now generally considered to have a historical basis; on the other hand, many historical personages, such as Alexander in the East or Charlemagne in the West, have become the centres of cycles of myths. The notion of what is historical evidence, and also of what events are probable or possible, varies greatly from age to age and from place to place. And, while it does not follow that, because we find certain improbable or impossible elements in any story, the whole story is entirely mythical, we are often confronted in such cases with the difficulty that what seem to us the probable and improbable elements often rest on precisely the same authority. It is impossible to lay down any rules for discriminating between historical and mythical tales; nothing is much help except a wide experience of such tales, coming from various regions and various strata of development. It is, *e.g.*, often difficult, if not impossible, to tell whether some mythical heroes are early gods whose divinity has become humanized or actual men who have come to acquire divine or semi-divine honour. The question is of great importance in view of the Euhemeristic theory, mentioned below, which would give history a leading place as a source of myth.

The above classification cannot, of course, be regarded as exhaustive; but it includes most of the commoner classes of myths.

2. *Origin of myths*.—Numerous theories exist as to the origin of myths, and most of them are to a greater or less extent tenable; here the main difficulty and confusion arise from the indiscriminate way in which one theory or another has been applied as a kind of universal key to solve all mythological problems. Most myths, and still more most gods and other mythical personages, are of a highly complex character, and are compounded of elements varying in origin as well as in stage of mythical development. Myths may therefore be classified, not only according to the phenomena, actions, or beliefs with which they are associated, but also according to the origin of the ideas which they express.

(1) *Meteorological*.—The tendency, in a primitive age, to assign a personal existence to the sun, the moon, and other heavenly bodies has already been noticed. The stories that are told about them are for the most part such as might be told about any other god or hero, and give little scope to the elaborate allegorical or figurative interpretations that were applied too literally by Max Müller and other advocates of the 'solar myth.' Few mythologists, *e.g.*, would now derive the tale of Heracles and his death by the shirt poisoned with Nessus' blood from the sun setting amid red clouds. To take another example, while there may be some

elements derived from a wind-god in the mythology of the Greek god Hermes, the attempt made by W. Roscher¹ to derive all his functions from this conception is an example of misapplied ingenuity.

(2) *Physical*.—This class corresponds to the myths connected with various natural phenomena, and need not here be further commented on.

(3) *Ritual*.—Many myths originate in the explanation of ritual practices. The value of a ritual custom in preserving the tradition of some event is fully recognized; and a similar origin comes, partly by analogy, to be assigned to many practices which had their origin in magic rites or other different sources. For instance, it was the custom for the Greek women of Thebes and other towns to conduct nightly dances on the mountains in honour of Dionysus at certain seasons; and hence arose the story that the god himself had once led his Mænads over Cithæron. Again, the common custom of celebrating annually in spring the departure or death and resurrection or return of a person representing the spirit of the year or of vegetation led to the growth of such beautiful myths as that of the loss and return of Persephone. It is difficult to set a limit to this influence of ritual on myth; for even in cases where the myth has a different origin the manner in which it is celebrated or commemorated often comes to react upon the tale itself.

(4) *Historical or Euhemeristic*.—The most extreme application of this theory was made by the philosopher Euhemerus, towards the end of the 4th cent. B.C. He maintained that all myth was of historical origin, and that the gods were men who had performed great exploits or conferred benefits upon their fellows. In proof, he quoted the grave of Zeus shown in Crete. The theory was recently rehabilitated by Herbert Spencer's attempt to derive religion from ancestor-worship; but it would not now be accepted by mythologists except within certain limits. We have already noticed that tales of historical events of persons often show mythical accretions or transformations. But the great mass of mythology cannot be explained as transmuted history. See art. EUHEMERISM.

(5) *Artistic*.—When artistic representations of mythical subjects exist, they often have considerable influence on the form of myths. The mixed Oriental monsters which we know as sphinx and siren, *e.g.*, were borrowed by Greek art merely as decorative types. There is no reason to suppose that even in the time of Homer these monsters were thought of under what later became their recognized forms. The representation of mythical scenes was often transferred from one tale to another, and so the artistic tradition came to influence the mythical one.

(6) *Ethical*.—Some mythical stories seem either in origin or in form to be mainly ethical in character, to be, in short, tales with a moral. A familiar example is offered by *Æsop's Fables*; but it is uncertain how far these are of a traditional character. The same doubt occurs in other cases, such as the myth of the choice of Heracles. Though such myths usually have an artificial appearance, some of them may be of a primitive origin, especially those which tell of retribution following the breach of some divinely sanctioned law or custom, or of a prohibition to see or touch some sacred object.

(7) *Mystical or allegorical*.—Mystical interpretations of myth have been prevalent at various times—*e.g.*, among the Neo-Platonic school in Greece. But such interpretations are mostly fanciful, and have very little connexion with the origin of the myths. It has been thought that such allegorical

¹ *Hermes der Windgott*, Leipzig, 1878, also *Lexikon*, art. 'Hermes.'

interpretations were taught in the Greek mysteries; but this is not now believed to have been the case, apart from the simplest and most obvious symbolism. Myths of an entirely allegorical character, such as that of Cupid and Psyche, are mostly of late origin.

It is clear that myths vary considerably according to the form in which they are repeated or preserved and the character or status of those who repeat them. The science of mythology is concerned mainly, if not exclusively, with myths of a genuinely popular character and of spontaneous growth, but these are often modified or transformed according to the media in which they are preserved. Thus official mythology, whether preserved in temple records and sacred books or in other works of a systematizing character, will tend to produce a deceptive uniformity, by suppressing differences and variations which are often interesting and by passing over apparently irrelevant or unseemly details, which would often have given a clue to the origin or meaning of the myth. The same is true to an even greater degree of the myths preserved to us in poetical form. The more serious poets often give them an ethical character, and use them to embody deep religious truths or subtle studies of character; others use them freely as themes for imaginative embroidery, so that it is difficult to distinguish the myth itself from mere fiction. Plato's rejection of the unworthy stories of the gods from his ideal State shows what treat-

ment of mythology we must expect from philosophers; we have already noticed the fanciful methods of interpretation of the Neo-Platonists, and the later artificial allegories. On the other hand, some quite early speculations of philosophers, both in the moral and in the physical world, may have come to be preserved in mythical disguise.

The study of mythology is for all these reasons obscure and difficult, but, when rightly and cautiously pursued, it abounds with evidence as to the primitive aspirations and beliefs of mankind, and as to the various stages of moral and intellectual development.

LITERATURE.—The literature of the subject is very extensive and miscellaneous; the following are a few of the works that deal with mythology in its wider aspects: J. G. Frazer, *GB*³, London, 1911 ff. (very full bibliography in vol. xii., 1915); A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, do. 1887, art. 'Mythology' in *EB*¹¹; W. Roscher, *Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*, Leipzig, 1884 ff.; E. B. Tylor, *PC*, London, 1873; F. Max Müller, *Lectures on the Science of Language*⁶, do. 1871, *Selected Essays*, do. 1881; L. R. Farnell, *OGS*, Oxford, 1896-1909; L. Preller, *Griechische Mythologie*⁴, ed. C. Robert, Berlin, 1894, *Römische Mythologie*⁵, ed. H. Jordan, do. 1881-83; O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religion*, Munich, 1906; G. Wissowa, *Religion und Cultus der Römer*², do. 1912; J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*², Cambridge, 1903; W. Mannhardt, *Antike Wald- und Feldkulte*, Berlin, 1877, *Mythologische Forschungen*, Strassburg, 1884; J. Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*⁴, Berlin, 1875-78; tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1882-88; E. S. Hartland, *Legend of Perseus*, do. 1894-96; E. Rohde, *Psyche*³, Tübingen and Leipzig, 1903; A. W. Howitt, *Native Tribes of S.E. Australia*, London, 1904; H. H. Bancroft, *NR*, do. 1876-76.
E. A. GARDNER.

N

NABATÆANS.—The Nabatæans were an Arab race which, from about the 6th cent. B.C., occupied the south and east of Palestine, the old Edomite country, with Petra as a capital and centre of their caravan trade. Though Arab by race, they used a dialect of Aramaic for writing and commerce. Before the Hellenistic period almost nothing is known of them. Probably they are the same as the Nahajāti mentioned by Ašurbanipal (7th cent. B.C., *KB* ii. 216 ff.); Josephus, followed by Jerome, identified them with the OT Nebaioth (Jos. *Ant.* i. xii. 4; Jerome, *Quæst. in Gen.* 25¹³ [*PL* xxiii. 977]); etymologically the connexion is uncertain, though Lagarde maintains it (*Bildung der Nomina*, Göttingen, 1889, p. 52 n.).

The Nabatæans first appear in 312 B.C., when Antigonus sent two expeditions against them, according to Diodorus (xix. 94), who gives an account of their habits and trade. At times they made themselves troublesome on the shores of the Gulf of 'Akāha by preying upon merchant ships (Agatharchides, in *Geogr. Gr. min.* i. 178). Their first known ruler, Aretas I. (in Nabatæan Hārethath), is named (169 B.C.) in 2 Mac 5⁶; we also learn that they were on friendly terms with the Maccæes (1 Mac 5²⁵ 95⁵). The decay of the Greek kingdoms of Syria and Egypt gave them an opportunity of expansion which was vigorously used by Erotimus (? a Græcized form of Aretas II.), the real founder of their power (Justin, xxxix. v. 5 f.). The Nabatæan kingdom, called Nebātu in the native inscriptions, extended from Petra northwards east of the Jordan, over Hanrān (after 88 B.C.), at times even as far as Damascus (in 85 B.C., and again c. A.D. 34-62), and southwards into N. Arabia, as far as the north-east shore of the Red Sea. In 85 B.C. Aretas III. ruled in Damascus and struck coins there, 'of king Aretas Philhellene'; not long after

the Nabatæans began to come into collision with the Romans under Pompey and Scarnus (Jos. *Ant.* xiv. i. 4-ii. 3, v. 1, *BJ* i. viii. 1). They managed to retain a tolerable measure of independence as 'allies' or vassals through the varying fortunes of the Roman campaigns, and reached a high state of prosperity during the long reign of Aretas IV. (9 B.C.-A.D. 40). By this time their warlike and nomadic habits had been exchanged for settled life and the steady pursuit of profitable trade; their well-equipped caravans looked like armies on the march; and the enterprise of their merchants has left traces as far as Rome and Puteoli, and near Denderah in Upper Egypt (see Strabo, xvi. iv. 21, 23, 26; *CIS* ii. 157-159; *PSBA* xxvi. [1904] 72). Then in A.D. 106 the short-sighted cupidity of Trajan reduced Petra, and the Nabatæan kingdom was absorbed into the Provincia Arahia (Dio Cass. lxxviii. 14). The following is a list of the Nabatæan kings: ¹ Aretas I., 169 B.C. (2 Mac 5⁶); Aretas II., c. 110-96 B.C. (= Erotimus); Obedas I., c. 90 B.C. (Jos. *Ant.* xiii. xiii. 5, *BJ* i. iv. 4); Rahiluz I., c. 86 B.C. (*CIS* ii. 349=NSI, p. 250 n.); Jos. *Ant.* xiii. xv. 1, *BJ* i. iv. 7); Aretas III. Philhellene, c. 85-60 B.C. (*CIS* ii. 349=NSI, p. 250 n.); Malichus I., c. 50-30 B.C. (*CIS* ii. 158, 174=NSI 100, 102; Jos. *Ant.* xiv. xiv. 1 f., 6, xv. vi. 2, *BJ* i. xiv. 1, xv. 1, xviii. 4, xxii. 3); Obedas II., c. 30-9 B.C. (*CIS* ii. 354=NSI 95); Aretas IV. Philopatris, 9 B.C.-A.D. 40 (*CIS* ii. 160, 197-217, 354; NSI 78-91, 95, 96, 102; 2 Co 11²³); Malichus II., c. A.D. 40-71 (*CIS* ii. 195, 218, and 182=NSI 92, 99; Jos. *BJ* iii. iv. 2); Rahilus II. Soter, A.D. 70-? 106 (*CIS* ii. 183, 161=NSI 97; *ib.* 101, p. 255 n.); ? Malichus

¹ NSI=G. A. Cooke, *North-Semitic Inscriptions*, Oxford, 1903; RES=Repertoire d'épigraphie sémitique, Paris, 1900 ff. The numbers after CIS II., NSI, RES, refer to inscriptions unless otherwise stated.

III., A.D. 106 (*CIS* ii. 218 = *NSI* 92).¹ Strabo tells us that the kingship and chief offices were hereditary and descended to the eldest son (*XVI. iv. 25*); associated with the king was a high official called 'brother' in Nabataean and *ἐπίτροπος* in Greek (*NSI*, p. 246 n.). The inscriptions clearly point to a tribal form of government (*φύλα*, often in Greek inscriptions from Haurān); a tribal district had at its head a shaikh, called *ἐθνάρχης* (2 Co 11³²; also in Greek inscriptions from Haurān), or *στρατηγός* when he held military authority (*NSI*, p. 247 f.; Waddington, *Inscriptions grecques et latines de la Syrie*, no. 2196; cf. *Jos. Ant.* XVIII. v. 1); possibly 'the chief of the camp' (*NSI* 96) was the heir to this post. Another title for the governor was 'eparch' (*ib.* 87, 93; cf. 107; like *στρατηγός*, the Greek word is Aramaized). An interesting feature of Nabataean social life is the independent position held by women; they could possess and bequeath property; sometimes descent is reckoned through the female line; the queens are often represented on coins (*ib.* pp. 221, 246, 256).

Most of the inscriptions have been found in the three chief Nabataean settlements, Petra, Hegra (in N. Arabia, c. 340 miles south of Petra), and Haurān. A great number of Nabataean graffiti, belonging to the 2nd and 3rd centuries A.D., are inscribed on the rocks in certain wadis of the Sinaitic Peninsula (*CIS* ii. 490-3323; see *NSI*, p. 258). The splendid rock-tombs at Hegra display the finest inscriptions (*CIS* ii. 197-307), and testify to the importance which the Nabataeans attached to the family burying-place. Petra is famous chiefly for its ruins, dating from the pre-Hellenistic period down to the first half of the 3rd cent. A.D.; three or four valuable inscriptions have been found there, in addition to numerous graffiti (*CIS* ii. 349-489). At Petra, on a height (en-Negr) overlooking the main group of tombs, exists the most complete specimen of an ancient Semitic sanctuary that is known, a rock-hewn place of sacrifice open to the sky.

The chief god of the Nabataeans was Dūshara, whose worship was centred at Petra (cf. Epiphanius, *Her.* li. 22), and from Petra spread with the advance of the people. By Greek and Latin writers he was identified with Dionysos-Bacchus; there are coins of Bostra in Haurān of the 3rd cent. A.D. which show a wine-press and the legend *Ἰακτρία Δουσάρια*; but the god of a race which was once nomadic and dwelling in the desert cannot originally have had a Bacchic character; most likely he was a solar deity. Now and then he is styled 'lord of the temple' (*CIS* ii. 235; *RÉS* 1088), 'who is at Bostra' (*NSI* 92, 101), once 'who separates the night from the day' (*RÉS* 1102). Dūshara is merely a title = 'owner of Shara,' probably a place; his name is unknown, unless it was A'ara; the two are sometimes combined (*ib.* 1096, *Δουσαρεῖς Ααρα*, and 676), but separated in *NSI* 101. A'ara may lie behind the Orotal = Dionysos of Herod. iii. 8; and possibly A'ara may be a form of the ancient Arab deity Rūda (M. Lidzbarski, *Ephemeris für semitische Epigraphik*, Giessen, 1900-12, iii. 90-93). Sometimes with Dūshara we find 'and his *mōthab*' (*CIS* ii. 198, 250 = *NSI* 80, 94), which may mean 'and his spouse' (see *RÉS* 1099). The chief goddess of the Nabataeans was Allāt, 'the mother of the gods' (*CIS* ii. 185, 193 = *NSI* 80). Other deities named on the tombs are Manūthu (*CIS* ii. 197, 198 = *NSI* 79 f.), a goddess, perhaps 'Fate'; and the gods Qaishah, Hubalu (*ib.*), She'a-alqum = 'the protector of the people,' the god of the caravan (*NSI*, p. 255 n.). The expression 'the divine 'Obadath' (*CIS* ii. 354 = *NSI*

95) may imply nothing more than *divus*, and not the deification of the king after death.

The Nabataean dialect, in which a good many Arabic forms and idioms occur, belongs to the group of Western Aramaic, and is closely related to the Aramaic of Ezra (? 4th cent.) and of Daniel (2nd cent.). In many respects it is older than Palmyrene, and agrees with the Aramaic of Ezra, while Palmyrene comes nearer to that of Daniel (see S. A. Cook, *JQR* xvi. [1903-04] 274 ff.). Even after the break up of the Nabataean nationality in A.D. 106 the language and script continued in use here and there; e.g., a sepulchral inscription from Hegra is dated A.D. 267 (Jausen-Savignac, *RB* v. [1908] 241 ff.), and an inscription has been found at en-Nemāra in Haurān dated A.D. 328 (Dussaud-Maccler, p. 314 ff.), which, though written in Nabataean characters, is composed in classical Arabic, and shows that the latter had by this time almost supplanted the Nabataean dialect (Lidzbarski, *Eph.* ii. 34 ff.).

LITERATURE.—For the dialect, and references to the Nabataeans in Arabic writers, see T. Nöldeke, *ZDMG* xrv. [1871] 122 ff. For Hegra and its tombs, C. M. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1883; J. Euting, *Nabatäische Inschriften*, Berlin, 1885, who also collected the *Sinaitische Inschriften*, do. 1891. For Petra see the magnificent work of R. E. Brünnow and A. von Domaszewski, *Die Provincia Arabia*, Strassburg, 1904; G. H. Dalman, *Petra und seine Felsheiligtümer*, Leipzig, 1908; and A. Münsil, *Arabia Petraea*, Vienna, 1907-08. G. A. COOKE.

NĀGĀS.—As connoting a religious body, the word *nāgā* is said to be a corruption of the Skr. *nagnakāḥ*, Hindi *naṅgā* or *nāṅgā*, 'naked,' and to mean a naked religious mendicant. There is no sect called 'Nāgā,' but the Vaiṣṇava Vairāgis, Śaiva Sannyāsīs, and Sikhs have each a sub-sect known by this name.

These men, in their excess of zeal, leave off all covering, and in former times went about entirely naked. At the present day they wear the minimum of clothing that the laws regarding decency allow. Most of them, with the exception of the Sikh Nāgās and the Jaipur Nāgās, to be presently described, are the offshoots of Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva mendicant communities, of which they are worthless and profligate members.

In former times they were distinguished as travelling about in armed companies that developed into bands of desperadoes. There are numerous stories current in India regarding sanguinary battles between Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva Nāgās, in which there is reason to believe that they were assisted, and perhaps instigated, by the other members of their respective communities. The most famous, which is still remembered, occurred at the religious festival at Hardwar in 1760, when the Śaiva Nāgās expelled the Vaiṣṇava Nāgās from the sacred spot. It is said that no fewer than 18,000 of the latter were left dead upon the field.¹ During the Marāṭhā wars the Śaiva Nāgās, often called 'Gosains,' made themselves notorious in Central India. They attacked Colonel Goddard in his famous march from Bengal to Bombay in 1778, and, under a condottiere named Anūpgir Himmat Bahādur, they played a prominent part in the fighting in Bundelkhand.²

For the Sikh Nāgās our only authority is Wilson. Neither Trumpp nor Ibbetson mentions them, nor does their name appear in the Census reports.

According to Wilson, they 'are said to differ from those of the Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva sects in abstaining from the use of arms, and following a retired and religious life. Except in going without clothes, they are not distinguishable from the Nirmalas' (*Religious Sects*, p. 275).

¹ F. V. Raper, in *Asiatic Researches*, Calcutta, 1789-1830, xi. 455; cf. K. Raghunāthji, in *IA* ix. [1830] 278.

² See *IGI* vi. 349, ix. 71, x. 177, xii. 15, xiv. 19, 318, xix. 401, xxii. 279.

¹ *CIS* ii. 181 f.; Schürer, *GVV* i. 728 ff.; R. Dussaud and F. Macler, *Mission*, etc., Paris, 1903, p. 69 ff.; A. Jausen and R. Savignac, in *RB* viii. [1911] 273 ff.

Under the British Government the marauding bands of Nāgās have disappeared, and the only organized body of these men is found in the State of Jaipur. Here¹ there is a corps of irregular infantry composed of 5000 Nāgās. They are Vaisnavas, and form a military order within the Dādūpanthī sect.

They are reputed to be faithful and daring, and, as such, are more feared than the other troops of the State. They will not undergo any discipline, wear no uniform, and are armed with sword, spear, matchlock, and shield. During the general mutiny of 1857, these were the only body of men really true to the chief, and, but for them, the so-called regular army would have rebelled.²

According to Sherring (iii. 60), they are separated into three sub-castes: (1) Dādūpanthī, (2) Rāmnanthī, and (3) Viṣṇuswāmī. The first consists of the followers of Dādū, and the second of those of Rāmnanth; Sherring gives no information regarding the third. All these Jaipur Nāgās are vowed to celibacy, and their numbers are replenished by children placed by parents under their charge as disciples. For further particulars regarding them see art. DADŪ, vol. iv. p. 386.

LITERATURE.—H. H. Wilson, *Religious Sects of the Hindus*, London, 1861, i. 187 (Vaiṣṇava), 238 (Śaiva), 275 (Sikh) (a summary of Wilson's notices will be found in E. Balfour, *Cyclopædia of India*, London, 1885, ii., s.v. 'Naga'); M. A. Sherring, *Hindu Tribes and Castes*, Calcutta, 1872-31, fil. 13, 60. See also the various references given in the footnotes.

G. A. GRIERSON.

NĀGAS.—1. Habitat and distribution.—The Nāga tribes occupy the mountain ranges which form the eastern boundary of Assam. In accordance with the results of the linguistic survey, they are classified geographically and philologically into four sub-groups: (1) the Nāga-Bodo; (2) the Western Nāga; (3) the Central Nāga; and (4) the Nāga-Kuki. The Nāga-Bodo group occupies the Kachar Hills and the hills north-west of Manipur. The Nāga-Kuki group falls almost entirely within the area of the Manipur State. The Western and Central tribes are under direct British administration. The area of the Nāga Hills has undoubtedly been a meeting-point for many lines of movement, and the relationships of the several tribes have yet to be decided. Kuki influence is evident in the south, and it is quite certain that contact with Bodo-speaking peoples has modified the speech and probably the rest of the social life of the Kabui and Kachchha Nāgās in important respects. All belong to the Tibeto-Burman group of languages.

To the Nāga-Bodo group belong the Kachchha and Kabui Nāgās. The Western Nāga group includes the Angamis, the Kezhamas, the Rengmas, and Semas. In the Central group are the Aos and Lhotas, while to the Nāga-Kuki group are assigned the Sopvoma or Mao Nāgās, the Tangkhuls, and minor groups in Manipur. There are Nāga tribes, north, north-east, and east of the Nāga Hills in areas which are not within the scope of British influence and authority. It would be easy to push the classification of these people into much minutest detail, as villages tend to differ from their neighbours by reason of the separatism which marks them so notably.

2. Organization and structure.—The family, or extended household, and the clan—a group of families descended, according to common belief, from a common ancestor—are well defined units in Nāga communities, and are patrilineal and exogamic. A Nāga village consists of a number of clans, each of which as a rule inhabits a definite area. As a social whole a Nāga village was seldom capable of rigorous common action, mainly by reason of the clan feuds whose bitterness and intensity have often been noticed. Nevertheless it acts on occasions as a whole. Still less social coherence in political action was possessed by the

tribe as a whole, in spite of its common language and customs.

The principle of exogamy is here sometimes explained and justified by the belief that it was laid down by revelation of supernatural authority—a late belief—or by the belief, probably more archaic, that infraction of this rule would surely cause wide-spread social misfortune. Further and fuller knowledge of the social structure of Nāga communities is likely to disclose interesting limitations on the law of exogamy and to reveal the existence at no distant date of that particular mode of definite exogamy called 'cousin-marriage' as well as of cyclic exogamy.

Exogamy is tempered to a greater or less extent by the habit of local endogamy. This 'habit' may be a survival of a state of affairs in which there was a definite law of endogamy, sanctioned by beliefs similar to those which give force to the law of exogamy. In one interesting group (Tangkhul Nāgās, 'cloth-weaving Nāgās') economic motives have occasioned local endogamy. But for various reasons local endogamy has been modified, at least in individual cases, as by marriages of ambition—of alliance at a price—with the daughters of a strong and powerful village whose protection might, it was hoped, be thus secured. It has been modified also in those cases where one village establishes a hegemony over its neighbours.

In practice the mother's kin are often completely neglected, and people marry into their mother's clan, but the practice of unlimited patrilineal exogamy is in many cases definitely unknown and marriages with the mother's clan are forbidden, at least for two generations. Whether this rests on any, and, if so, on what belief, is not yet clear. Mere practical convenience, ignorance of language and customs, and apprehension of close contact with strange customs will account for the habit of local endogamy, even apart from religious or economic sanctions.

Divorce is common and results from infidelity or incompatibility of temper. If the wife is unfaithful, the husband recovers the marriage-price; if the husband is in fault, the parents of the girl get some money and a pig; in cases of mutual incompatibility the marriage-price is refunded. Polygamy exists when the man's resources permit it. The marital relations are in such cases, in theory at least, regulated by custom. Polyandry, if it exists at all, is only a polite term for prostitution and would probably be described as such by the local expert. Not so long ago in many Nāga villages the standard of female chastity was as high after marriage as before marriage it was low.

The social fabric thus viewed is simple. The other main lines of social organization rest on sex and on age distinctions. The laws of marriage, the laws affecting sexual relations in general, are, it would seem, fairly simple. Sexual relations with women are permitted even when marital relations are forbidden. Marriage, therefore, is here recognized as a social institution for the procreation of members of the social group. Since they believe that members of the social group are recurring units (see below, p. 124^b), clearly the function of marriage is the production of such recurring units. The idea that Nāgās practised infanticide rests on the custom of killing the children of slaves or children of incestuous connexions. The lines of social classification, based on age, physical and social maturity, are fairly clearly marked—by differences in coiffure, dress, and ornaments as well as by various tabus (*gennas*; see below). The bachelors' house, which in some cases has a counterpart in a spinsters' hall, is a wide-spread institution, though in modern times it is disappearing.

Nāga villages are of the permanent type and

¹ See IGI xiii. 397, and *Rājputānā Gazetteer*, 1879, ii. 161.

² *Rājputānā Gazetteer*, loc. cit.

occupy well-defined areas. The people subsist by rice-cultivation, wet and dry. The terraced fields, constructed in some cases by organized labour, are admirably irrigated, often by elaborately planned channels. The dry cultivation varies in extent. Pressure of population has often led to the formation of new villages. Certain features of the agricultural ritual show that in earlier days Nāgas were nomad cultivators periodically seeking fresh sites. Fishing, hunting, trade, cloth-weaving, basket-weaving, metal work, and pottery are minor, subsidiary industries, 'protected' by interesting tabus (see below). Nāga village government is often described as democratic. It is certainly difficult in many cases to discover one authority, but in the village and clan *gennaburas*, who are distinguished from their fellows by interesting privileges and disabilities and are surrounded by important tabus, resides a very considerable measure of authority, which varies according to their individual capacity and ability, and rests upon their position as representing the social unit in its religious activities.

3. Religious beliefs. — The activities of the creator deity seem to have ceased with the acts of creation. In some cases he is identified with the earthquake deity, in consonance with the theory that earthquakes caused the earth to emerge from a waste of waters. The earthquake deity, again, seems to be one with a deity whose function it is to exclude the unworthy from heaven and its bliss. Wide-spread, however, is the belief that the creator's sons (the number varies) are now charged with the duty of watching over mankind and of punishing those who are guilty of what in Nāga opinion is wrongdoing. Quite independent of these divine beings are the powers, nameless and formless, who inhabit hill and forest, river and pool—powers who by nature are ill-disposed to man. They are periodically placated. If an epidemic breaks out, in addition to the village *genna* there are rites to discover and placate the author of the plague. The majority of these beings are not of human origin, except in the sense that all such beliefs are of social human origin, while a few are human beings who have achieved a measure of divinity. These were, in a few notable cases, men who in life were reputed to have possessed great, unusual powers which their death and in one or two instances the manner of their death only intensified and enhanced.

The belief is found that the world was once a waste of waters from which by means of an earthquake (the area is liable to seismic disturbance) the hills were made to emerge. Elsewhere the story of a flood appears: two members of the tribe alone survived, from whom are sprung the present race. Others declare themselves sons of the soil who have issued from a cavern in the ground. Others, again, preserve recollections of migrations due to religious and political schisms.

The belief in the importance of omens and dreams is general. Witchcraft exists, and there are men who are reputed to be able to change themselves at will into tigers. Nāgas were notorious head-hunters. The practice was in part religious, resting on the belief that the success of agricultural operations would be secured by sprinkling the blood of an alien over the fields; in part social, since the man who had taken a head had attained to social maturity. Often, again, heads were taken merely as a proof of success. Further, since those whose heads are cut off, and who are in other ways mutilated, are segregated in the after world and are incapable of rebirth, a permanent diminution of the social stock of an enemy village was thereby effected.

The beliefs as to twins are varied and curiously

assorted. In some cases they are regarded as lucky, as indicating agricultural prosperity; in other cases the parents are looked on as sub-human, as animals, and to be shunned. There is also some evidence that in one or two villages the practice prevailed of putting to death all children who were born in a particular way. The belief also exists that between the father and the unborn child there is a bond such that the acts of the father may affect the unborn child injuriously. He is therefore, as elsewhere, required to abstain from all acts held to be injurious to the child. In the rule requiring unmarried girls to abstain from the flesh of male animals may be detected a survival of the belief that impregnation can be effected by means of food. Married women are constrained to abstain from certain articles of food while pregnant, lest the qualities of the food that they eat should be transmitted to their children.

Oaths are in general held to be of value by Nāgas. In many cases the sanction works almost automatically. By extending the effect of the imprecation beyond the individual to a household, clan, or village additional solemnity is obtained. The formularies are often picturesque in their details, but, as contact with civilization increases, it is to be feared that the simple faith which held to the truth in real fear of the consequences of perjury is sadly diminished. Covenants sanctioned by a conditional curse, with the blood of a slaughtered victim as its vehicle, are often established between Nāga villages, and for a good while observed by the contracting parties.

The belief that individuals are reborn is held by many, if not by all, of the Nāga tribes. Some think that man has seven existences on this earth and that he then is lost or absorbed. Some recollect and relate their genealogies with considerable care. The necessity for identifying a new-born child, and for ascertaining which of its ancestors has been reborn, occasions the rites of omen-taking associated with birth and name-giving rites. The custom of erecting stone monuments is in part influenced by the desire to perpetuate the stock, since it is believed that, as long as the stone stands, so long and thereby will the family endure. Viewed in another aspect, this practice gratifies the vanity of the living, and may be viewed as propitiating and securing the aid of the dead. Whether to these beliefs or to beliefs and practices of a far different origin is to be assigned the erection of the elaborate stone circles—some of which still exist in excellent preservation, as notably that at Kuilong—is a question of some difficulty, and the materials for answering it are not yet available.

In societies arranged as are Nāga groups, in definite strata according to age and social maturity, rites generally exist to effect and facilitate the passage from one age and maturity stage to another. Birth, marriage, and initiation rites exist, but are not very definitely nowadays oriented by the idea of the typical *rite de passage*. Birth rites are marked mainly by a desire to facilitate the birth, and rest on a crude appreciation of hygiene. There are simple rites—family rites—for ear-piercing and first hair-cutting. The initiation rites, such as they are, which are practised when a lad enters the bachelors' house for the first time and thus begins his education are extremely simple.

The marriage rites are far from elaborate. The girls in many cases have a considerable voice in the disposal of their persons; the bride-price varies greatly and is influenced by social standing, etc., though in many villages it is definitely fixed by custom. Marriage by servitude is rare. The betrothal forms a distinct stage. A mock fight—whether a survival of capture, which is generally regarded as improbable, or a *rite de passage*—effect-

ing the severance of the bride from the group of the unmarried is a very general feature. It is said that, if the bride's party wins, she will rule the roost, and will live long. It is a period of some danger to the young couple. In some cases they must not cohabit within the house for some days. In other cases the bride stays with her people, is visited there by her husband at night and by stealth till she is admittedly *enceinte*, when she moves to his house with rites and sacrifices. In other cases representatives, generally children, of the bride and bridegroom's party sleep in the bride's new home for the first night. That marriage is an institution ordained for the procreation of children to the maintenance of the social fabric would be recognized by Nāga communities, yet the absence of definite fertility rites as part of the marriage ceremony is noteworthy. It may rest, perhaps, on imperfect observation.

The cycle of life ends with death—the portal to another world. To usher the deceased into that other world, to secure the living from the force which compassed the death, to separate the dead from the living, are the purposes of funeral rites here as elsewhere. These are modified in every detail of mode, place, and time of sepulture, and duration and social extent of *genna*, by considerations of the social importance and status of the deceased and of the manner of his death. Since it is held that those who die in certain ways—those who are killed by wild animals, die of snake-bite, or are drowned, and women who die in child-birth—are entirely dead, socially and spiritually as well as physically, it is necessary in mortuary ritual to deal in one way with those who are deemed capable of rebirth, and in a very different way with those whose manner of death argues them to be incapable of rebirth perhaps as victims or objects of divine displeasure by reason of some sin of which they have been guilty as individuals or vicariously as members of the community to which the actual offender belonged.

It is significant that the Nāgas bury those who are to, or may, be reborn in the direction whence they deem their ancestors to have come. The reason is clear: those who are buried there are their ancestors and, since their ancestors are by this belief a constantly recurring element in the social fabric from which the authority of custom derives no inconsiderable part of its validity, this spot, their burial-ground which they revere, is indeed in their view the origin of the village.

Sin, sickness, and death are closely connected. The sin which occasions sickness and death may be that of some member of the community other than the unfortunate individual on whom the punishment has fallen; yet to rites of expiation necessary in this view of the causation of sickness they add practical—often sound—treatment, based on a knowledge of the properties of jungle herbs, and on the employment of some simple surgical devices, above all of massage, in a crude and violent form.

4. *Gennas*.—The word *genna* means 'forbidden.' In practice it extends beyond the tabu and includes a series of ritual acts or states which involve the participation of entire social groups. It requires the exclusion of all persons who are not members of the social group affected. All members of the social group affected separate themselves from other social groups, and separate themselves as far as possible from their normal mode of life while the *genna* state lasts. It is thus a means of restoring and of publicly asserting and indicating the unity of the group. There are *gennas* affecting villages, clans, households, age groups, and sex groups. The necessity for asserting and restoring the unity of the group may be periodically recurrent or may be specially produced by some sudden emergency.

There are thus periodic as well as special *gennas*, occasioned, e.g., by earthquakes. It is almost possible to estimate the social importance of any event by ascertaining the duration of the *genna* required to restore the current of social life to its normal flow and the social groups which it affects. In the limited sense of tabu, in the sense of a prohibition of the use of things, it rests upon the recognition of the fact that things possess qualities and upon the attribution of permanently or temporarily dangerous qualities, socially dangerous qualities, to things whose use to members of other social groups or to members of the particular group in other times and in other circumstances is innocuous or even beneficial.

LITERATURE.—A. W. Davis, in *Assam Census Report*, 1891, i. 237-251; W. McCulloch, *Munnipore and the Hill Tribes*, Calcutta, 1859; *Assam Census Report*, 1911; T. C. Hodson, *The Naga Tribes of Manipur*, London, 1911; G. A. Grierson, *Linguistic Survey of India*, Calcutta, 1903-09, iv.

T. C. HODSON.

NĀGĀRJUNA.—See DOCTISM (Buddhist).

NAGUALISM.—See ANIMALS, vol. i. p. 496b.

NAHMANIDES. — Nahmanides (Moses ben Nahman, RaMBaN, also called Bonastruc de Portas) was born about 1195 at Gerona in Catalonia in Spain. He was a member of one of the best Jewish families in Gerona, and his early education was in the hands of famous teachers. At a very early age he began to show his wonderful mastery of the Talmudic literature. When he was fifteen years old he wrote a compendium on parts of the Rabbinic law, and shortly afterwards he composed a work, *Milhāmōth Adhōnai*, in defence of R. Isaac Alfasi. Nahmanides was soon known as a great Talmudical authority. He wrote commentaries to various tractates of the Talmud, and glosses (*novellae*) on the whole of the Talmud. He also wrote important Hālakhic works. Of his private life little is known except that he was a Rabbi and teacher in Gerona and Barcelona. As he studied medicine, he may have also practised as a physician.

Nahmanides was not only a great Hālakhist; he also wrote homiletico-exegetical and devotional works. He was first and foremost an intense Jew, devoted to Judaism with every fibre of his heart. He was well versed in philosophy, but philosophy was to him a secondary consideration; his first and main consideration was Judaism. But he was no fanatic. He was orthodox without being intolerant. This is seen in his attitude to Maimonides. Although by nature the antithesis of Maimonides, he held the latter in the highest esteem. In the great Maimonides controversy, which raged with such force many years after Maimonides' death, Nahmanides tried to keep the balance between the two opposing parties, although his natural sympathies must have been with the anti-Maimonists. His attempts at reconciliation failed; but never did a harsh word against Maimonides escape his mouth or his pen. His failure to end this controversy Nahmanides must have regarded as a tragedy in his life. This happened about 1232.

The second tragedy in Nahmanides' life was his disputation with Pablo Christiani, which took place in 1263 at Barcelona in the presence of King James of Aragon and his court and many ecclesiastical dignitaries. The disputation was forced upon Nahmanides, and lasted four days (July 21-24). As doubts were raised by the Dominicans as to the result of the disputation, Nahmanides published the controversy. The publication of this work was construed by the Dominicans as a blasphemy against Christianity, and Nahmanides was sentenced to exile. Expelled from Aragonia,

he stayed for a short time in S. France, and in 1267 he migrated to Palestine.

Early in life Nahmanides began to turn his attention to the study of the Bible. He was known as a great Biblical scholar, and he was frequently consulted by Christian scholars on Biblical questions. But it was in Palestine that he wrote the greatest part of his commentary on the Pentateuch and that he completed it. To Nahmanides the Tōrah was the most perfect teaching that could be given to man. Everything good was contained in it. There was nothing that required justification or help from philosophy. Everything in it was perfect. All that was wanted was that it should be understood. For Nahmanides there was no need to reconcile reason with religion (as Maimonides and other mediæval Jewish philosophers tried to do). His aim was to reconcile man with religion (Schechter, *Studies in Judaism*, p. 137)—we say 'man' and not 'Jew,' because, according to Nahmanides, Christians and Muhammadans were also heirs of the Tōrah. The Bible, Nahmanides says, speaks to the whole of mankind.

Nahmanides was very broad-minded and very tender-hearted. He was emphatic in the prohibition of cruelty to animals. He believed in bodily resurrection and in transmigration of souls. It was clear that to a nature like that of Nahmanides mysticism should appeal, and we find in his writings elements of *kabbālā*. Nothing human was to him contemptible. The human being a part of the divine, its actions were willed by God and were thus holy. This view is most prominent in his book on marriage (*Iggereth haq-Qōdesh*). His book on mourning (*Tōrath hā-Adām*) is also very interesting. Nahmanides was human. Indifference to pleasure and pain (for which certain philosophers strove) he declared to be ungodly. Man should rejoice on the day of joy and weep on the day of mourning. He had a great mind and a large heart. Man was his concern. It was largely to his desire to make the people happy, to provide them with material for edification and 'sweet words' on Sabbaths and festivals, that we owe his commentary on the Pentateuch—his greatest work.

In his commentary on the Pentateuch we have the whole Nahmanides before us—the great scholar, the profound believer, the man of tender feeling, and the Jew with his unbounded love for Judaism. His commentary shows a deep knowledge of the Bible and of the whole Rabbinic literature. The commentary is built on sound exegesis. But we can see on every page the Talmudist and often also the *kabbalist*. He constantly tries to show the greatness, depth, and wisdom of Judaism. His antagonism to Ibn Ezra can be explained only by the fact that Ibn Ezra appeared to him as too dry a philologist. Nahmanides wanted to penetrate into the heart of the Tōrah. Exegesis alone was not sufficient for him. Hālakhic exposition and homiletic interpretation were indispensable for a true understanding of the Tōrah. But throughout his commentary we can discern a sound judgment for exegesis. He was the first Jewish commentator to give at the beginning of each of the five books of the Pentateuch a short summary of the contents of the book. In his commentary on the book of Job also, which is purely exegetical and surpasses his commentary on the Pentateuch, he gives a short summary of each of the speeches of Job and his friends.

In Palestine, where he spent the last years of his life, Nahmanides built synagogues, organized communities, and gave lectures and sermons for the edification of the people. His letter from Jerusalem to his son and some notes on the state of things in Palestine (published in the *editio princeps* of his commentary on the Pentateuch) show how

great was his love for the Holy Land. He died about 1270, and was buried at Haifa.

LITERATURE.—See, for a detailed bibliography, *JE* ix. 911. See especially J. Perles, art. 'Nahmanides,' in *MGWJ* vii. (1858); S. Schechter, 'Nachmanides,' in his *Studies in Judaism*, London, 1896; S. Krauss, art. 'Nahmanides and Maimonides,' in *Hagoren* (Hebrew periodical), v. (1905).

SAMUEL DAICHES.

NAIADS.—See NATURE (Greek).

NAILS.—See HAIR AND NAILS.

NĀLANDĀ.—Nālandā, in Magadha, was celebrated for many centuries as the seat of the most renowned Buddhist monastic university in India—'the mine of learning, honoured Nālandā' (*der Fundgrube des Wissens Sri Nālandā*), as Tāranātha, the historian of Buddhism, calls it (*Gesch. des Buddhismus*, p. 152).

The variant name, Nālandra, occurs in Tibetan books (*JASB*, pt. i. vol. ii. [1882] p. 115). Local Brāhmins affirm that the original name was Kundilpur. Buchanan-Hamilton heard the name Pampāpuri applied to the place, apparently by a Jain. All the ancient names, including Nālandā, are now forgotten. The site, which has been identified with certainty, is usually described under the name of Bargāon ('village of the *bar*, or banyan tree'). Bargāon, a village of 600 inhabitants, now a station on the Bihār light railway, is in the Bihār subdivision, Patna District, 'Bihār and Orissa' Province, and is not many miles distant from Rājagriha, the early capital of Magadha or S. Bihār, and other famous places in the Holy Land of Buddhism, lat. 25° 8' N., long. 85° 26' E. A small village, Begampur, adjoins Bargāon on the north. The principal mass of ruins lies to the south of Bargāon.

The Jains of Bihār town affirm that Rājā Śrenika (Bimbisāra), who lived about 500 B.C., and, according to them, was a Jain, resided at Nālandā, where a Jain temple of comparatively modern date exists. The ancient remains seem to be wholly Buddhist. The Buddhist sanctity of the place goes back to the very beginnings of Buddhism. The site of the first monastery is said to have been a grove presented to Buddha, while his favourite disciples, Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana (or Mudgalaputra), were born and died at neighbouring villages. Their names are often connected directly with Nālandā, the Nāla of Fa-hien. Tāranātha observes that Āśoka may be regarded as the founder of the Nālandā monastery because he made costly offerings at the shrine of Śāriputra and erected a *stūpa* in his honour. Several Āśoka *stūpas* stood at or near Nālandā. According to the Chinese pilgrims, Hiuen Tsiang and I-tsing (I-ching), who both resided at Nālandā for a considerable time, the earliest monastery was founded by Rājā Śakraditya not long after the Buddha's death. His name is not otherwise known, and his date cannot be fixed. His modest foundation, a temple 50 ft. square, was so added to by many successive kings, of whom Hiuen Tsiang names five, that it grew into a gigantic establishment, comprising a multitude of temples, monasteries, with their lecture-rooms and other appurtenances, *stūpas*, and all kinds of sacred edifices. A large number of noble tanks secured an ample supply of water. In the 7th cent. of the Christian era the Nālandā establishment undoubtedly was the most important and splendid of its kind in India, or, in fact, in the world. It was the principal centre of Buddhist learning, and was crowded with students from every quarter. It was truly a great university. The professors gave instruction in the Vedas and other Hindu books, as well as in the Buddhist scriptures, and every form of art was cultivated with success.

The most detailed description of the complex of buildings is that recorded by I-tsing, but his language is not easy to understand fully, and the drawing which he prepared to illustrate his text unluckily has been lost. The main block of buildings was an oblong rectangle containing eight distinct halls or temples, three storeys in height, each of about 10 feet. The structures were built essentially of brick, stone being used only for minor and ornamental features. The eaves of the block projected, making a covered way or verandah running all round. All the larger spaces were paved with bricks, small spaces outside, roof terraces, and the floors of rooms being covered with an almost indestructible concrete cement, highly polished. I-tsing describes the way in which it was made. The roofs seem to have been often flat, and adapted for walking. The whole group was surrounded by an enclosing wall, as at Kasiā.

Hundreds of sacred spots, appropriately marked by monuments of various kinds, surrounded the central block of buildings. Many are catalogued by Hiuen Tsiang, from which the following may be selected for mention. To the east, a great *vihāra*, or temple, 200 ft. high, where Buddha had resided; further north the *vihāra* of Rājā Bālāditya, 300 ft. high, magnificently decorated, and enshrining a notable statue; to the east of that *vihāra* a standing statue of Buddha in copper, 80 ft. high, erected by Pūrṇavarman, Rājā of Magadha, and a descendant of Aśoka, about A.D. 600; and, further north, a lofty brick statue of Tāra Bodhisattva, which was the object of costly worship. The Rājā Bālāditya mentioned probably was Narasimhagupta Bālāditya, who reigned about A.D. 500. The copper statue of Buddha 80 ft. high was a work unequalled in the world. King Harṣa, or Śilāditya, the friend of Hiuen Tsiang, was building a temple covered with brass (or bronze) plates, which was still unfinished when the pilgrim left India.

The biographer of Hiuen Tsiang observes that 'the monasteries of India are counted by myriads, but this is the most remarkable for grandeur and height' (Beal, *Life of Hiuen-Tsiang*, p. 112). He notices the rich ornament of the towers, the fairy-like turrets, the red pillars, and numberless other beauties, not forgetting the 'deep translucent ponds,' adorned with blue lotuses. Hiuen Tsiang and I-tsing use similar language, permitting no doubt that every resource of art was lavished on the buildings. It is clear that a great school of local artists must have existed in order to carry out those works, and that the artistic influence of Nālandā must have been felt in China and over the whole Buddhist world. We are told of one eminent Chinese artist, Sing-yun or Prajñādeva, who painted a picture of Maitreya Buddha and the *bodhi*-tree during his stay at Nālandā. When returning to China, he took with him his painting, which was probably on silk.

The site of Nālandā has never been properly surveyed, examined, or excavated. The rough and inaccurate surveys which have been published were made long ago. Buchanan-Hamilton's notes appeared in 1838, those of A. Cunningham in 1871, and those of A. M. Broadley in 1872. There is nothing of later date. Since Broadley's crude efforts, much of the ruins must have been destroyed. The site has been a quarry for bricks during many centuries, and the opening of the light railway must have largely increased the demand. When the Archaeological Department comes to examine the site, possibly not much will be left to explore. Cunningham and Broadley found the great rectangular central mass of buildings easily traceable in a line of mounds running north and south, about 1600 ft. long by 400 broad.

Numerous *stūpas* and other remains were visible in the immediate neighbourhood; what may be left now is not known. It is understood that the area has been protected from further spoliation since 1910. Many fine examples of sculpture probably still exist, and a considerable number of specimens were removed to the Indian Museum, Calcutta, in 1891. Buchanan-Hamilton published outline drawings of six good examples. Two sculptures are figured and described in *Ann. Rep. Arch. Surv. of India*, 1903-04, pp. 213-236. The Nālandā sculptures deserve special illustration and study, which they have not yet received.

A detailed history of Nālandā would be a history of Mahāyānist Buddhism, from the time of Nāgārjuna in the 2nd cent. A.D. (?), or possibly even from an earlier date, until the Muhammadan conquest of Bihār in A.D. 1197—a period well over a millennium. All the most noted doctors of the Mahāyāna seem to have studied at Nālandā. Tibetan Buddhism is an offshoot of the teaching of Nālandā and its rival, the Vikramaśīla monastery, which was probably situated at Patharghātā in Bhāgalpur. When Hiuen Tsiang was at Nālandā (A.D. 637 and 642-3) studying the *Yoga śāstra*, the head of the establishment was the venerable Śīlabhadra, then of great age, who received his visitor with the utmost courtesy and generosity. I-tsing, who spent ten years at Nālandā (675-685), warmly admired the regulations of the monastery and the strict discipline enforced on more than 3000 resident monks. Out of the crowds of foreign students who arrived, not more than 20 or 30 per cent were sufficiently advanced to proceed with the courses of study. Some sort of matriculation test seems to have been compulsory in order to weed out the weaklings.

After the 7th cent., when the guidance of the Chinese pilgrims is lost, the notices of Nālandā are few and scanty, but there is no reason to doubt that the establishment continued to flourish as the headquarters of Tantric Buddhism throughout the long domination of the Pāla kings, and that it was destroyed, like the other Buddhist institutions of Bihār, by Muhammad the son of Bakhtyār in A.D. 1197. The monks who escaped slaughter fled to Tibet, Nepāl, or S. India, the buildings were reduced to ruinous heaps, and the rich libraries were consumed with fire.

LITERATURE.—I. CHINESE PILGRIMS.—Hiuen Tsiang, in S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, 2 vols., Boston, 1885, or reprint, London, 1906, and *Life of Hiuen-Tsiang*, do. 1888, new ed., 1911; T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, 2 vols., do. 1904, 1905; I-tsing (I-ching), in J. Takakusu, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion*, Oxford, 1896, and, with other pilgrims, in E. Chavannes, *Voyages des pèlerins bouddhistes; mémoire . . . sur les religieux éminents*, Paris, 1894, esp. sect. 41.

II. GENERAL.—Tāranātha, *Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien*, tr. A. Schiefner, Petrograd, 1869; W. Wassiloff, *Le Bouddhisme*, tr. G. A. La Combe, Paris, 1865, Germ. version, Petrograd, 1860; J. Fergusson, *Hist. of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, 2 vols., London, 1910.

III. ARCHAEOLOGICAL EXPLORATION.—M. Martini (Buchanan-Hamilton), *Eastern India*, 1, London, 1838; A. Cunningham, *Arch. Surv. Rep.*, 1, Simla, 1871; A. M. Broadley, *Ruins of the Nālandā Monasteries at Burghon*, Calcutta, 1872, and in *J.A.S.B.*, pt. I. vol. xli. [1872]; T. Bloch, 'The Modern Name of Nālandā,' *J.A.S.B.*, 1909, pp. 440-443.

VINCENT A. SMITH.

NAMA.—The Nama are a branch of the tribe commonly called 'Hottentots' (*q.v.*), or, by themselves, 'Khoikhoi.' They now live chiefly in the south-west territory, north of the Orange River, though a small number (62, according to the census of 1904) are found within the limits of the Cape Colony. The names of Great and Little Namaqualand indicate their habitat through a considerable period, though they removed further and further to the north in the course of the 19th cent., while the Cape Records show that, in 1665, they were living as far south as Olifant's River, near the

present town of Clanwilliam. Brincker, writing in 1899 (*Mitt. des Seminars für orientalische Sprachen*, II. iii. 128), estimated the number of 'Hottentots' in German S.W. Africa at 20,000. He appears to include the whole of these under the designation of 'Nama,' though, strictly speaking, it will not cover them all. He speaks, e.g., of 'aus der Capcolonie eingekommene Namas,' but Jonker Afrikaner's people, whom he reckons among these, were a sub-branch of a distinct tribe, the Khaunas ('Cauquas'). The Nama 'have always been, and still are, by far the most powerful tribe among all the Khoikhoi' (T. Hahn, *Tsuni-Goam*, London, 1881, p. 102). Reports of them reached Van Riebeeck during the first years of the Dutch settlement at the Cape, and he sent more than one expedition to their country, chiefly attracted by rumours of copper-mines there. The first Europeans to come in contact with them were Cruythof and Van Meerhof, who, in 1661, visited the kraal of the chief 'Akembie' and entered into friendly relations with him. They described the Nama as larger in form than other Hottentots (Alexander, in 1836, says that 'their general height was five feet six or five feet seven' [*Expedition of Discovery into the Interior of Africa*, i. 96]) and better dressed. They were acquainted with the art of smelting copper and iron, and wore many ornaments of those metals. Their style of living, dress, and weapons seem to have been much the same as when visited by Alexander, except that the latter traveller found them using 'some old muskets and long guns obtained from the colony, for four, six, or eight oxen each piece' (p. 96). In 1681 a party of Nama came to Cape Town, bringing presents of cattle and copper ore; and a return visit was paid by Governor Van der Stel in 1685, when he succeeded in reaching the famous Copper Mountain—now the Ookiep mines. It is uncertain whether these were first worked by the Nama, the Bushmen, or some unknown immigrants in early times; but that they were worked before the advent of Europeans, and that 'not without a certain skill and good instruments,' admits of no doubt (Brincker, p. 128). The Bushmen are still employed by the Ovambo to dig up copper ore.

The various 'Hottentot' tribes appear to have been more or less at feud with each other when the Dutch first settled at the Cape, though it may be doubted whether their feuds were invariably of a serious character. The accounts scarcely seem compatible with their having lived, like the Somali of the present day, in a chronic state of raiding or being raided. The Nama sometimes attacked the tribes in the neighbourhood of the Cape Peninsula, but, in general, kept on good terms with the colonists. In 1761 Governor Tulbagh sent out an expedition under Hendrik Hop, which not only crossed the Nama country but penetrated beyond the Orange River (then for the first time seen by Europeans) about as far as 27° S. The journal of the expedition is, says Theal (*Hist. and Ethnogr. of Africa*, iii. 391), an interesting document, drawn up by men 'who were diligent observers, and one of them had the advantage of being acquainted with the Hottentot language.'

At this time the 'Little Namaquas' were found to be very much impoverished, and the 'Great Namaquas' had retreated northwards, considerably reduced in numbers owing to an epidemic of small-pox. About the same time they seem to have come into collision with the Herero or Damara, who had reached this point in their migration from the north-east, and by 1791 we hear that the latter had been conquered and robbed of their cattle by the Nama. The feud thus begun went on more or less continuously till quite recent times. This state of things reached its height during the third

quarter of the 19th cent., when Nama chiefs armed with guns became dangerous freebooters, terrorizing the country with their lawless bands of horse-men.

The tribes anciently settled in Great Namaqualand who may be counted as real Nama are:

The !Aolnin or Gajmen, called by the Boers 'Topnaars,' from their being farthest north of all the tribes—i.e. at the 'top' of the country; the !kha-ragai-khoi or 'Fransmannen,' also known as 'Simon Copper's people'; the !baboben or 'Veld-schoendragers'; the !gami !nu'n or 'Bondelzwarts'; the !khan !gōan or 'Zwartboois'; others, such as the so-called 'Red Nation' (*Rooi Natie*) or !Khauben, the Kha-rol-ban of Keetmanshoop, and the !ogain or 'Grootdooden,' came in at various times from the south, as did the clan of the Afrikaners already referred to, who figure so largely in Moffat's narrative.

The present-day Nama have largely adopted European clothing and ways of living, and it is estimated that about two-thirds of them are converts to Christianity. They are passionately fond of hunting (which, and cattle-lifting, they formerly considered the only occupations worthy of a man); and they make excellent herdsmen and waggon-drivers, but they show little disposition towards hard and continuous work, for which, indeed, their physique is not fitted. They are quick-tempered, passionate, and, in moments of excitement, ferocious, but in general good-natured and kindly, easily influenced for good or for evil, and capable of great devotion when once their affections are gained.

Their religion is apt to be emotional, not to say fanatical, and to take forms more easily appreciated in the 16th cent. than at the present day.

Hendrik Witbooi and his people might have been seen engaged in religious services of the most enthusiastic description, with hymn-singing, prayer and fervent oratory, and immediately afterwards mounting and riding off to attack the Herero, rob them and kill as many as possible;—being indeed, as they imagined, the executors of God's judgments on those people, whose possessions were therefore assigned to them by the Divine decree' (Brincker, p. 127).

But there is no ground for questioning their sincerity, or the fact that in many cases a high level of character was reached. Moffat's account of Christian (formerly Jager) Afrikaner (*Missionary Labours*, pp. 109, 111–113) will be remembered by most readers, and—to name no more—Alexander (i. 217) speaks almost as highly of Hortman (Houtman?), a chief of the Bondelzwarts.

Intellectually, many of them have shown marked ability. Christian Afrikaner seems, from the account already mentioned, to have been a thoughtful man, with a thorough grasp of such affairs as came within his scope; and, more recently, Abraham Platje made his influence felt outside his own community. Of Aramap, a member of the Afrikaner clan who was a noted warrior in his day and defeated the Herero in 1835, Alexander says that he was a modest and unassuming little man who, on closer acquaintance, was found to possess 'a daring mind, good judgment and very active habits' (ii. 151). His description of Hendrik Buys, chief of the Veldschoendragers, is also full of interest.

Unless we are to accept the view that the only qualities desirable in a subject population are those of a strong and serviceable machine, the Nama are a people with valuable possibilities, and their extinction would be a matter for regret.

This extinction, though referred to by many writers as a certainty, is not likely to be more than partial. The mixed race known in Cape Colony as Griquas, in German S.W. Africa as 'Bastards' (their settlements are in and about Rehoboth and Grootfontein), have plenty of vitality, good looks, and intelligence, and (Brincker, p. 130) supply the best skilled workmen to be found in Cape Colony. The German authorities have of recent years recognized their importance as a factor in the community. The original settlers in Namaqualand migrated from the Cape about 1868 and therefore derived their origin from other tribes

than the Nama; but they have, no doubt, intermarried to a large extent with the latter.

The N. African origin of the 'Hottentots' was suspected long ago by Moffat (p. 5), and suggested independently, from the linguistic point of view, by W. H. I. Bleek (*De Nominum Generibus Linguarum Africa Australibus*, Bonn, 1851, pp. 45-60), J. C. Adamson (*JAOS* iv. [1854] 2, 448), and J. R. Logan ('Ethnology of the Indo-Pacific Islands,' in *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, vii.-ix. [1853-55], esp. viii. 229ff.). The Hamitic affinities of the Nama speech maintained long ago by R. Lepsius (*Nubische Grammatik*, Berlin, 1880, Introd. p. xvi) have now been fully demonstrated by C. Meinhof.¹ Its deviations from the Hamitic type are to be explained by its having assimilated Bushman words and forms; and, in any case, it is the branch most remote from the parent stock. Though much Hottentot tradition has been irrecoverably lost and much is recorded in a form calculated to obscure its real meaning, we can still trace remarkable points of contact with the Galla, Masai, and other Hamitic and half-Hamitic tribes of Eastern Equatorial Africa. Like the Galla, they consider the hare unlucky (the hunter whose path it crosses will take nothing) and abstain from eating its flesh (Brincker, p. 179; Alexander, ii. 250). In the Galla saga of the origin of death, however, the creature cursed is not the hare, but a bird, a species of hornbill; on the other hand, the aversion to the hare is shared by the Abyssinians, and may therefore have some connexion with the old Semitic prohibition. A number of tales are almost identical in the folklore of the Hottentots and Bantu, except that the exploits attributed by the latter to the hare are performed, according to the former, by the jackal, which is also connected by the Galla with the same or nearly the same incidents. We may instance the well-known story where the hare kills the lion by inducing him to swallow a hot stone (Schultze, *Aus Namaland und Kalahari*, xlv.; Bleek, p. 5; for Bantu, MS material); or the 'Uncle Remus' episode where Brer Rabbit makes a riding-horse of Brer Fox, which is told by the Nama (Schultze, xxxiv.) of the jackal and the hyena.

Some unexpected light seems to be thrown on the extraordinary myth of Tsui ||Goab and his wounded knee by the Masai and Nandi traditions recorded by Hollis. The Nandi (A. C. Hollis, *The Nandi*, Oxford, 1909, p. 98) say that the first Dorobo produced from his leg a boy and a girl, who were the progenitors of the human race. (The Dorobo, as by some S. African tribes the Bushmen, seem to be postulated as outside mankind.) Among the Masai the myth has been partly forgotten and has assumed the form of a fairy-tale, 'The Old Man and his Knee' (Hollis, *The Masai*, Oxford, 1905, p. 147 ff.). There is therefore some ground for supposing, with Meinhof (*Die Dichtung der Afrikaner*, Berlin, 1911, p. 34), that the old interpretation 'Wounded Knee' is really the correct one. Hahn also mentions, on the authority of Wuras, that the Good being (Tsui ||Goab) is supposed by the !kora to live in the Red Sky and the Evil Being (||gannab) in the Black Sky. Hollis tells us that, in the Masai belief, 'there are two gods, a black one and a red one,' the former, however, being good and the latter malevolent (*The Masai*, p. 264). This may

¹ *Lehrbuch der Nama-Sprache*, Preface, p. 61., *Die Sprachen der Hamiten*, *passim*.

be something more than an accidental coincidence, but it is to be feared that it is too late in the day to obtain a clear statement of the !kora tradition. Another point is touched on by Hahn (pp. 62, 105): 'The !kora say that the snake and the first man originally lived together.' The Masai elders relate that 'when God came to prepare the world he found three things in the land, a Dorobo, an elephant, and a serpent' (Hollis, *The Masai*, p. 266).

Very little is known as to the tribal organization of the Hottentots during the time when it still existed unimpaired. It is generally stated that their chieftainships were hereditary, unlike those of the Galla, who elect their chiefs for a term of years. As, however, the hereditary principle is recognized by some Hamitic peoples, there is perhaps no need to suppose that it was imposed by the Dutch administration on the mistaken assumption that it already existed. It is possible, however, that we have a hint of parallelism with Galla institutions in the statements that the 'Cochoquas' (whose territory extended north-west of Cape Town, as far as Olifant's River) were 'in two divisions under the Chiefs Oedason and Gonnema' (Theal, ii. 126), and that the same was the case with the 'Chainouquas,' the next tribe to the east, of whom Theal says:

'There was still in name a chief of the Chainouquas, but in fact that tribe was now divided into two clans under the captains Klaas and Koopman' (ii. 210).

Apart from the wrong use of the word 'clan' in this passage, it may be permissible to doubt whether the bisection of the tribe was merely accidental, as here supposed. The Galla regularly have two chiefs (not appointed simultaneously, so that one is always junior to the other), each presiding over one section of the tribe. Alexander, in answer to a question as to the succession among the Nama, was told that 'the eldest son of the last chief is selected' (ii. 171); but, though he was a careful observer, some other information elicited on the same occasion (whether through an interpreter or from Dutch-speaking natives remains uncertain) suggests that he should be read with caution. He says, e.g., that 'nothing is known of lucky or unlucky days, omens,' etc. (i. 172), and elsewhere that some of the Nama 'even have no names' (i. 165). The best recent account of this people is Schultze's *Aus Namaland und Kalahari*, which contains, *inter alia*, a collection of sixty-eight folktales and fables, taken down at first hand.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works specified under Literature in art. HOTTENTOTS may be mentioned: L. Schultze, *Aus Namaland und Kalahari*, Jena, 1907; G. McCall Theal, *Hist. and Ethnography of Africa south of the Zambesi*, 3 vols., London, 1907-10 (vols. II. and III. correspond to vols. I. and II. of the *Hist. of S. Africa* in the earlier ed.); *Nieuwste und deknopte Beschrijving van de kaap der Goede-hoop, nevens een Dagverhaal van eene Rys naar het Binnenste van Afrika door het Land der kleine und groote Namaquas*, Amsterdam, 1778 (a Fr. ed. was published simultaneously), containing the journal of Hendrik Hop; J. E. Alexander, *An Expedition of Discovery into the Interior of Africa, through the hitherto undescribed Countries of the Great Namaquas, Boschmans, and Hill Damaras*, 2 vols., London, 1838; P. H. Brincker, 'Die Eingeborenen Deutsch-Südwest-Afrikas,' in *Mitteilungen des Seminars für orientalische Sprachen*, Berlin, 1899, II. iii. 125-139; C. Meinhof, *Lehrbuch der Nama-Sprache*, Berlin, 1909 (= *Lehrbücher des Seminars für orientalische Sprachen*, xxiii.), and *Die Sprachen der Hamiten* (with appendix by F. von Luschan, 'Hamitische Typen,' illustrated with photographs), Hamburg, 1912; R. Moffat, *Missionary Labours and Scenes in Southern Africa*, London, 1842; J. Irlé, *Die Herero*, Gütersloh, 1906, containing much valuable firsthand information as to the Nama and Herero wars between 1860 and the German annexation.

A. WERNER.

NAMES.

Primitive (G. FOUCART), p. 130.
 Arabic (D. S. MARGOLIOUTH), p. 136.
 Babylonian (A. T. CLAY), p. 140.
 Buddhist.—See 'Indo-European.'
 Celtic.—See 'Indo-European.'
 Chinese (J. DYER BALL), p. 143.
 Christian (J. MOFFATT), p. 145.
 Egyptian (G. FOUCART), p. 151.
 Greek.—See 'Indo-European.'
 Hebrew (G. B. GRAY), p. 155.
 Hindu.—See 'Indo-European.'

Indo-European (L. H. GRAY), p. 162.
 Iranian.—See 'Indo-European.'
 Japanese (T. HARADA), p. 167.
 Jewish (I. ABRAHAMS), p. 169.
 Lapp (C. J. BILLSON), p. 170.
 Muslim.—See 'Arabic.'
 Roman.—See 'Indo-European.'
 Slavic.—See 'Indo-European.'
 Sumerian (S. H. LANGDON), p. 171.
 Syriac (E. W. BROOKS), p. 175.
 Teutonic.—See 'Indo-European.'

NAMES (Primitive).—I. DATA.—In lists to which new references are being added daily we find abundant information concerning the names of non-civilized races in almost all parts of the world, but the connexions between these facts are not noticed during a first reading. The synthetic attempts at explanation by the totem (J. G. Frazer), by animism (E. B. Tylor), and by tabu (S. Reinach) cover only some of the phenomena or submit to a one-sided theory facts which cannot in their entire range logically be adjusted to it. The best method seems to be to try to classify the principal groups of facts relating to the name without first connecting them with each other, and retain only the facts which constantly recur among the majority of present-day non-civilized races, and consequently among races and tribes which never could have had historical connexions with each other.

1. Name-giving.—A general characteristic is the importance attached to the giving of the name among the uncivilized. The personality—and the rights and obligations connected with it—could not exist without this preliminary condition. The giving of the name, either at birth or in certain fixed circumstances (in the case of successive names), is generally a solemn social ceremony, with a fixed ritual of a public character. The choice of the name may be reserved to certain persons other than the parents—e.g., the chief (cf. J. Henry, *L'Ame d'un peuple africain, les Bambara*, Münster, 1910, p. 170), who sometimes explains in public the reasons of his choice, and then communicates it to the mother. The name is conferred either by a representative of the social group or—most frequently—by the father or mother, showing the double bond uniting the child to the social group and to one or both of the parents (see MOTHER-RIGHT).

Name-giving does not necessarily take place at birth. It may be deferred until suitable circumstances arise in the phenomena of the exterior world (astrology, seasons, signs of nature, etc.) or simply until the lapse of an astronomical period of time (e.g., the 20th day among the Oraibis, with exposure to the rays of the sun; cf. H. R. Voth, 'Oraibi Natal Customs,' *Field Columbian Museum, anthrop. ser.*, v. vi. no. 2, Chicago, 1905, p. 47). In the instances quoted in § 3 much longer intervals of delay will be found. In such cases provisional designations are invented for practical purposes, such as recognition and address. This is the first sign that the essential purpose of the name is not identification or recognition.

2. Classes and varieties.—It is impossible to mention here all the kinds of titles suggested to the mind to designate human beings, but, if we attempt to classify the thousands of individual cases according to the circumstances in which the names are assigned, we find that the classes of names may be suggested by: (1) sex, (2) order of birth, (3) the repetition of the names of near relatives or of paternal or maternal ancestors, (4) order of age, (5) name of the clan, group, tribe, or nation, (6) a characteristic circumstance (change of office, condition, etc., initiation, etc.). The name may be derived from (1) a physical feature, (2) an onomastic list of animals, plants, inanimate things,

and phenomena of nature, (3) names of gods, spirits, fetishes, the dead, etc., (4) a motto or an allusion to a historical or mythical fact, or a eponymous sentence, (5) a statement derived from a historical fact or from the life of an individual, (6) a connexion between the individual and his human or supernatural protectors. But such lists are never complete, and are of no real use. Enumerations like those given by A. van Gennep (*Les Rites de passage*, Paris, 1909, p. 88) are neither complete nor comprehensive; there is no logical connexion between the twelve or fifteen kinds of names which they place in groups. They will be found in the present article arranged and explained in a different way.

The attention of ethnologists should be drawn to the innumerable 'designations' employed by primitive races either among themselves or before strangers in order to hide their real names. These are not names; they have none of the characteristics of names. Their apparent multitude has misled many investigators; their elimination, on the other hand, leads to the surprising discovery that the number of real names is very small and shows that the choice of these names by primitive peoples all over the world has always been guided by the same four or five ideas.

3. Change of name.—(a) *Ordinary men.*—The name is independent of the physical existence of the person. In other words, not only is it not necessarily given at birth, but it may be changed once or oftener in the course of life, either in circumstances determined beforehand or as a result of certain unforeseen circumstances.

A great many races may be cited among whom a provisional name, purely for practical purposes, is given to the new-born infant, and its real name (that of an ancestor, or the so-called totemic or theophoric name) is conferred, with a prescribed ceremony, when the child reaches a certain age marked by some visible sign (first tooth, end of suckling, puberty, etc.).

Thus, in Australia and among the Malays, children are named at first according to their order of birth. Tylor (*PC* i. 253 ff.) gives similar facts for America, among the Dakotas and the Sioux. In Africa—e.g., among the Basonga (C. van Overbergh, 'The Basonga,' *Monogr. ethnogr.* iii, [1908] 277)—the provisional name is a diminutive of that of a man or woman of the village, who will be a provisional protector of the child. Among the Manjas (H. Gaud, 'Les Mandjas,' *Monogr. ethnogr.* viii, [1911] 327) the real name is not given until about the age of seven years. Name-giving is delayed among some races until adult age—e.g., among the natives of British Columbia (C. Hill-Tout, *JAI* xxxvii, [1907] 308-310). Young Australians do not give up their provisional names until the age of puberty (cf., e.g., *GE* 3, pt. ii, *Taboo*, London, 1911, p. 320).

In reference to successive name-changing, traditionally fixed cases must be carefully distinguished from exceptional circumstances. For the fixed cases the most constant phenomenon is the obligatory change of name at the time of general 'initiation' of the young men (this must not be confounded with 'secret societies').

The Waiyan (D. Livingstone, *Last Journals in Central Africa*, London, 1874, i. 81) and the Sherbro (T. J. Aldridge, *The Sherbro and its Hinterland*, London, 1901, p. 173) are two good examples from African peoples. The same change is practised in Polynesia (W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, London, 1830, i. 322-324, was the first to notice this custom, numerous examples of which have been collected since by anthropological literature).

Among other occasions on which the savage changes his name, the following are the most important. (i.) Parents change their names at the birth of their first child (see, e.g., T. Engels, 'Les Wangata,' *Revue Congolaise*, ii. [1911] 29, and cf. *GB*³, pt. ii., *Taboo*, pp. 331, 339, on the name of parents called 'Father of N' and 'Mother of N'). (ii.) Parents take a new name at the death of a child. This has two variants: (a) a person gives up his name and takes that of the deceased (Musquakies [cf. M. A. Owen, *Folk-lore of the Musquakie Indians of N. America*, London, 1904, p. 83]); and (β) all the chief members of the family change their names, either for a fixed time or altogether (savages of California, Colombia, Borneo, Tasmania, etc., cited by A. Bros, *La Religion des peuples non civilisés*, Paris, 1907, p. 197 ff.). These two processes, suggested by opposite reasons (see § 8 and II. below), really have a common source. Frazer's remarks on the duration of these changes of name (*GB*³, pt. ii., *Taboo*, p. 372) will be examined below (§ 10 (d)). (iii.) A person changes his name after any striking event in his life, sometimes by successive replacements, sometimes by accumulation. The most complicated systems (apparently arising from ethnic fusions) are observed on the west coast of Africa—Dahomey, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Benin (cf., e.g., A. Le Hérissé, *L'Ancien royaume du Dahomey*, Paris, 1911, p. 235 ff.). (iv.) Lastly, the most curious case of periodical adaptation of the name to regular exterior circumstances is that of the Kwakiutl Indians of British Columbia, where the nobles had a winter and a summer name (cf. *GB*³, pt. ii., *Taboo*, p. 386). Here we see that feature so characteristic of pre-Columbian American religions—the predominance of astrological and seasonal elements in the garb of religion and ethics.

From the long list of unforeseen events entailing a change of name the following are typical examples. The new name to be taken may be revealed by a dream or an oracle (e.g., in Dahomey). More frequently the name is changed after a dangerous illness; the new name is revealed by the medicine-man or the sorcerer (see, e.g., R. Schmitz, *Baholoholo*, Brussels, 1911, p. 327). The accession of a king may oblige all those bearing the same name to take a new name at once under pain of death (cf., e.g., A. Réville, *Les Religions des peuples non-civilisés*, Paris, 1883, i. 41; *GB*³, pt. ii., *Taboo*, ch. vi. § 4). The cases of this kind are connected with prohibitions, which will be discussed below (§ 10). Lastly, the new names conferred by the favour of the chief on his brothers, officials, and servants (Le Hérissé, p. 235) should rather be connected with the theory of accumulated names (see below, § 4).

(b) *Chiefs and priests*.—The names of the intermediaries between the community and the supernatural powers are subject to special rules. The name of an individual before the new condition is, as a rule, replaced by a new name, the choice and the conferring of which are the object of a ritual and processes of transmission fixed with the greatest care. This class of persons includes medicine-men, sorcerers, and members of already organized priesthoods, as well as chiefs, princes, and kings, the theory of the proceeding being the same for them all (cf. below) and differing only by the different degrees of evolution of the primitive idea. The giving of the new name might take place (1) at the professional initiation of the sorcerer or medicine-man, (2) at his entrance into the priestly body, (3) at the conclusion of the initiation or training in the college of priests, or (4) on the occasion of his first entrance into office. (For the most typical examples of these facts see works cited above.) For sovereigns or chiefs of groups

the protocol of the kings of Dahomey on their accession (Le Hérissé, pp. 13–16), with its barbarian complication, is a good example, half-way between the primitive method of the Bushongo (E. Torday and T. A. Joyce, *Les Bushongo*, Brussels, 1910, p. 108) and the learned and civilized elaboration of the coronation-names of the kings of Siam. The three great classes of names of royal accession seem to be: (1) the groups of theophoric or theogenic names showing the connexion between these sovereigns and the powers which rule the world or are the national protectors of the ethnic group; (2) the names expressing the rights of the new chief to govern a certain district or group of men; (3) the motto-names recalling directly or by allusion (by diction, sentiment, etc.) a great event of a mythological or historical kind.

The most typical African series has been collected in Dahomey by Le Hérissé (p. 13)—e.g., for Dako-Donou and for Ouè Gh'adja (= 'the fish-king of the ocean escaped from the net'), in which the theory of the divine origin of the monarchy is combined with the allusion to events of a historical kind in a manner which perhaps explains the origin and formation of the powers of royalty for a large part of the African continent (cf. KING [Egyptian]).

The successive and accumulated names (cf. § 4 below) of the kings of the Baviili are examined in R. E. Dennett, *At the Back of the Black Man's Mind*, London, 1906, p. 100 (in spite of its obscurities and lacunae, very excusable in such a new and complicated subject, Dennett's treatment of this subject is to be highly recommended). In the opinion of the present writer, these names are the most primitive examples accessible with any certainty of the way in which the name of the chief was conceived as having to express a necessary connexion with the supernatural beings or forces whose intermediary he was. E. A. W. Budge (*Osiris and the Egyptian Resurrection*, London, 1911, p. 242) has made a thorough comparative study of these African 'strong names' and those of the Pharaohs (cf. NAMES [Egyptian]).

4. *Superimposed or accumulated names*.—Along with names which are successively changed we find, though in a fragmentary state in different parts of the world, the practice of accumulating names. Accumulated names may be grouped in two categories. (1) Those of the first class, purely 'optical' in form, do not imply any essential change in the individual; they simply state his relation to his own people, or group, or to the world of spirits. Such, e.g., are the three names of the Ba'ngongo—the first is the individual name, the second, preceded by the sign *bôn*, is that of the mother, and the third, preceded by the prefix *a*, is that of the father (cf. Torday and Joyce, p. 108). (2) The second class comprises the names which, by being added to the first name, one after another, connect it with accumulated forces or protections, and each time add to the personality of the bearer.

Surnames, 'good' names, eponymous names, form a transition-group between these two groups. They must be carefully distinguished from simple indicating surnames, describing the individual, or referring to a memorable event which has happened to him (cf. § 3).

One of the best examples of the process of accumulating names, which has been very little investigated, is that of Dahomey (Le Hérissé, p. 235, unfortunately not clearly described), where the child, besides his apparent names (rank and place of birth, physical peculiarity, etc.) and his real secret name (derived from the protecting fetish of one of his parents), afterwards receives a name derived from that of the divine author of the life of the family-group (e.g., the names derived from *Sô*, the thunder-god, or *Haun*, the sky-god—*Sosau*, *Sosa*, etc., *Haunjo*, etc.), and then a name of a protecting spirit, revealed at a certain stage of adolescence by an oracle.

Although the theory cannot yet be demonstrated with the necessary number of proofs, the present writer suggests that the series of names given to one person, far from being a later complication, is a survival of a state which preceded changes of name and probably even the single fixed name.

5. *Names of the dead*.—Newly-born children receive the names of deceased members of their family, according to fixed rules, arranged beforehand in a definite order, or determined at the moment of birth by traditional processes (dreams,

divination, mantic ceremonies, canonical revelations, etc.).

Examples occur among all the races of the world. Of all the facts connected with names this is the one whose universality is the most remarkable.

Among the Wa'ngata of the African Congo the oldest child takes the name of one of the father's ancestors; for the others the father chooses the names of other ancestors, and sometimes allows these to be taken in the maternal line (Engels, p. 29). The first-born among the Waregas takes the name of the paternal grandfather, the second that of the father's eldest brother, the third that of the maternal grandfather, etc. (E. Delhaise, 'Les Waregas,' *Monogr. ethnogr.* v. [1909] 153). The Baholoholos give the child the name of a paternal ancestor or of a dead relative revealed by the sorcerer (Schmitz, 'Les Baholoholo,' *ib.* ix. [1912] 327). Among the Balubas the name given is that of a dead relative of the paternal branch (in which case it is given by the child's father), or, in certain cases determined by divination, of a relative of the maternal branch (in which case it is conferred by the mother) (Colle, 'Les Balubas,' *ib.* x. [1914] 251). Among the Tahwi of Guinea the child receives the name of a dead ancestor after a divinatory test (cf. below (2)); and the proceeding seems general there (M. H. Kingsley, *Travels in West Africa*, London, 1897). The mere enumeration of the known facts for the continent of Africa would exceed the limits of the present article, and those given here are only from the most recently published. For Asia and Australasia a series sufficient for demonstration was given by Tylor (*PC* ii. 3 ff.) with the necessary references, to which are to be added the innumerable facts gathered together since in the immense bibliography of ethnological periodicals. The examples taken from the Khonds and from New Zealand are typical for Asia and Australasia. The same abundance of definite facts exists throughout the whole of the New World, among the Algonquins, the Tacullis, the Nutkas, the Eskimos, the Kaloshes, the natives of Vancouver, and the Yumanas of California. It will be noticed that the giving of the name of the dead ancestor does not usually take place at birth (see above, § 1). Observations made by the first explorers of the New World show that the giving of the name of ancestors was practised by a multitude of races which are now Christianized or have disappeared (cf., e.g., the naive account of B. de Sahagun, *Hist. générale des choses de la Nouvelle-Espagne*, tr. D. Jourdanet and R. Simeon, Paris, 1880, p. 456, of the name given to the new-born child among the Aztecs, of one of his grandfathers, 'that he might share the fortune and the lot of this relative by carrying them on'; see also H. de Linschot, *Le grand Routier de mer*, Amsterdam, 1633). Lastly, the fact that a similar practice has been found among the latest non-civilized branches (Lapps) of the continent of N. Europe (G. F. Klemm, *Kulturgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1843-52, iii. 77) completes the convincing proof of the universality of the custom.

The giving of the name of dead relatives is either (1) subject to an order fixed by the law or custom of the social group, or (2) regulated by processes of divination. The first of these modes marks a considerable progress in evolution, and forms one of the rings of transition between the non-civilized stage and the semi-civilized. It cannot, therefore, be regarded as belonging to primitive peoples, and the cases enumerated above (§ 2) give a sufficient idea of it. On the contrary, the idea of having recourse to exterior aid, revealed by divination, in order to find out the name of the dead to be given to the new-born child, belongs rather to the group of concepts which may, relatively, be called primitive.

It is not surprising to find here an infinite variety of divinatory methods. Although the psychological mainspring is a single one, its external manifestation has assumed a thousand different aspects. The principal classes are: (a) indication by a dream; e.g., the dead of the Waregas indicate in a dream to the mother the name of the child about to be born, and among the Balubas their desire is shown by dreams of a mysterious kind, which are explained by the priest; the same methods recur in Brazil and over the whole of S. America; (b) the dream with direct meaning may be replaced by the vision of an abnormal or inexplicable phenomenon or by violent pains during accouchement (Baholoholos and Balubas), of which the priest gives the explanation, as in the case of the dream; (c) still more frequently the child itself reveals its name by (apparently, at least) indicating its desire when it is shown a number of objects that had belonged to various deceased ancestors (Guinea), either by looking as if it recognized them or by stretching its hand towards them (Belgian Congo); or it interrupts a list of names of ancestors recited to it by crying or sneezing (New Zealand, Tatar Cheremiss); (d) divination by the automatic combination of external material elements constitutes a kind of mystical writing; combinations of leaves, small sticks, strings, or movements in a liquid indicate the name of a dead relative to be given to the child, and are regarded as signs of the wish of invisible beings (the method of the Khonds—grains of rice thrown into a cup of water—is a good example); (e)

physical resemblance—blemishes, signs, or special marks on the body—between the new-born child and the dead person whose name he must take (Indian Nutkas, Indian Kaloshes, inhabitants of Vancouver in America; Wa-Nyikas, Guinea, Yorubas in Africa; the examples in Australasia have not yet been classified). This short list is all that can be given here.

6. Totemic name.—Besides a person's names, surnames, new names, successive or accumulated, modifying, strengthening, or adding to his personality, there are the names which have been classed by anthropological literature under the vague and incomplete term 'totemic' (see TOTEMISM).

The totemic name of a person may be traditionally constant. This tendency to fixity is a step towards the family name and the generic name of the social and religious group. It is often in such a case an embryo of the theophoric or theogenic names of advanced societies. We may therefore doubt *a priori* whether this fixity is a primitive characteristic. The totemic name revealed accidentally by an unforeseen event, by divination, or by a direct dream is, on the contrary, in the comparative frequency of its manifestation among present savage races, a probable survival of the primitive process of the individual choice of the totem. This is suggested, however, with the reservation of a more complete examination, which it is not possible in the present state of anthropological research to conduct with the necessary strictness. This presumption is strengthened by the observation of many cases in which the giving of the totemic name is the result of the direct use of divination, not accidentally, but regularly, either at birth or at a change in the personality of the individual. In such cases the divinatory proceedings are similar to those employed for the names of the dead given to newly-born children (see above, § 5), the most frequent being the chanted enumeration of lists of names of 'totems' or 'spirits', stopping at the one which coincides with the delivery of the mother or a cry of the child. The variants cited by Frazer (*Totemism and Exogamy*, London, 1910, i. 51 ff., for the Samoans, Quiches, Hervey Islanders, etc.) give illustrative examples. The names of the mysterious forces, beings, or 'spirits,' and of the animals, plants, or substances which they inhabit, of the colours which invariably attract them, and of phenomena by which they show themselves, form a significant list of what the primitive man wishes to get from the totemic name. The use of the constant traditional totemic name, afterwards common to a group, will be examined below (§ 11).

7. Pronunciation of the name.—The pronunciation of the name has effects regarded as irresistible—and by 'pronunciation' is meant, at least primitively, the 'declamation,' with chanted intonations, rhythm, and melopœia. The force of this pronunciation is the same for men, animate beings, visible or invisible, spirits, genii, demons, gods, spirits animating things apparently inanimate, etc.—for the weakest as well as for the strongest. Spirit-raising, exorcism, possession, sorcery, and oaths, in all their infinite variety, are based on this imperious handling of names. The chief operations of primitive magic-religion and black magic rest above all on the knowledge and pronunciation of the names which they claim to attract, subject, or obtain in an amicable or hostile manner. Commands of man to the beings or forces of this world cannot be imagined without the pronunciation of their names. Properly addressed, these beings cannot escape from the order given them. If spirits and the dead are subdued by the calling of their names, why be surprised at the idea that one may cause a man's death by taking away his name, or by incorporating it by sorcery with a substance that is to be destroyed? And why be astonished, on the other hand, that the

man can protect himself by entrusting his name to a material object with which he incorporates it, and then hiding in a place known to nobody? (For the innumerable circumstantial proofs of this general theory see the books mentioned above, §§ 1-6.) The affinity between the pronunciation of the name and the personality is as certain as a chemical reaction, with the same fatally necessary effects, even although it is without the wish or contrary to the wish of the person who pronounces it. The attracting takes place of itself, with all its inevitable consequences.

Hence the belief that the name attracts the fate of the person bearing it; e.g., the Wa'ngata (Engels, p. 30) believe that, if all the children of one family die at an early age, the cause is the danger which their name contains, and they call the next child 'He who is deprived of a Name,' in order to shield him from the unknown risk. Hence, in the majority of cases, the changes of name after an illness (see § 5), and also the idea of the Bechuana, Navaho Indians, and New Mexicans that the mere pronunciation of certain names of spirits or gods can cause real floods or storms, either at any time or at certain periods (e.g., in winter). The theory of unlucky names or names of evil augury of advanced religions is a normal evolution of these facts, which recur universally among non-civilized races.

The power of the name is naturally in proportion to that of the person whom it calls up, man, spirit, or god, and specialized in the attributes of that being. A practical consequence of this principle, important for the problem of totemism (q.v.), is that the carefully recited pronunciation of the totemic name of a dead person can recall that person to life (cf. Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, i. 43); and the fact that the dead gives over to death his personal name, but keeps his totemic name, is also important.

8. Names prescribed by circumstances.—One of the first consequences of the power of names is seen in the rule that certain names must be given to certain persons in certain fixed circumstances, which place them in fatal affinity with the power of certain forces or spirits (who possess or are prepared to protect these names). Physical marks, peculiarities of place or time of birth, natural phenomena, terrestrial or astronomical, the thousand alleged revelations of invisible wills, establish infinite varieties peculiar to each of the groups of non-civilized races, and cannot be further detailed here.

One case (not yet investigated) may help to the understanding of the general theory of such cases. It is that of the names of twins, whose appearance (in Africa chiefly) has always created characteristic religious manifestations. With most of the Bantu peoples twins must always receive the same names—e.g., Ahuri and Nobese for boys, Ahuda and Tindabe for girls, among the Manghattus (cf. *Monogr. ethnogr.* iv. [1899], where the author has unfortunately omitted to say what were the functions of the spirits to whom these names belong). The example of the Balubas (cf. Colle, p. 252) throws fresh light on the matter; twins there invariably receive the names of two former kings, Kyungu and Kahya, probably twins, who went mad. The divine character of mad kings and priests in the majority of non-civilized religions is well known, and this case of 'totemism' peculiar to twins should be carefully compared with the facts collected by E. S. Hartland in his *Primitive Paternity*, London, 1910.

9. Secret names.—A second inevitable consequence of a similar intrinsic power of the name is the development of the idea of withdrawing the name from the eventually dangerous use that might be made of it, by keeping secret the real names of persons.

(a) *Men*.—For men we have the series of secret names, universal among primitive races, the characteristic cases of which are found in the Indies, in the Far East, among the shamanist peoples of the north in Asia; in Senegal, Dahomey, the Congo, S. Africa, and Abyssinia in Africa; among the Araucanians, the Indians of Chile, the Colombians, the Navahos, the Indians of Texas and of other parts of the United States in the two Americas; and among all the races of Australasia (for an early list of these facts see Bros, p. 197,

and especially GB³, where will be found the chief bibliography on the subject down to about 1895).

This explains the custom of having for the individual an ordinary name, for daily use, and a real name, which he alone knows (or which even has sometimes been given to him at his birth by his parents unknown to him). Sometimes this name is given during the first years of life; sometimes it is revealed secretly to the individual, on a fixed occasion, by his parents, the fetish-man, or the priest, or by a priestly college (e.g., on the occasion of entrance upon the duties of diviner, sorcerer, priest, chief, king, etc.). The most frequent case is that of the secret name whispered by the mother in her child's ear on the day of his birth (cf. PC³ ii. 231 for the Mandingoes). He who possesses this secret name will never reveal it to anybody, and in all circumstances his ordinary name will be used, or the various accumulated names cited above (cf. GB³, etc.).

(b) *Spirits, gods, and the dead*.—Like men, spirits, genii (and later gods), and the dead have also secret names, for the same purpose of protection, or for keeping their powers intact. The secret name gathers strength from a prohibition (see below, § 10 (a)) of pronunciation, of pictographic representation, and later of representation in writing. The names of the protective spirits called totems share in these protections and prohibitions (cf., e.g., Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, i. 16). The secret of the real name of the gods leads us to the dividing-line between non-civilized and civilized. The knowledge of these secret names plays a considerable part in the magic-religion of advanced races (and in all their black magic); and the mystery of these secret names of the classical gods has been very often so carefully preserved by the depositories of this treasure that even to-day we do not know the real personal names of most of the great figures of past religions; it is only the apparent names that we know.

10. Forbidden names.—By a natural transition another consequence, even more varied in its manifestations, is to surround names with a host of protections or prohibitions, which ethnography has somewhat arbitrarily called 'tabus.' The cases of name-tabus can be counted by thousands. They may, however, be classified for practical purposes as follows. (a) The personal name of the individual must not be pronounced, in some cases even by himself. This prohibition is parallel to the custom of the secret name. It has the same variants and modes of time, place, and circumstance. This point was noticed during the first synthetic researches by Tylor (*Early Hist. of Mankind*², London, 1870, p. 142), and anthropological literature (especially GB³) has since accumulated so much information on it that simple geographical indications will be sufficient here, referring for enumerations to the two works cited.

Prohibition naturally increases in strictness according to the importance of the individual. It attains its maximum when the latter, on account of his virtues, has received a name which connects him with the world of supernatural forces (cf. below (b)). A corollary, which is not found among all primitive races, forbids the pronouncing of the names of near relatives (Nyassaland, Kafirs, E. Africa, Dayaks, natives of Celebes, Omaha and Dakota Indians, etc.).

(b) The same prohibition extends, in a more rigid form, to the world of gods, genii, spirits, and powers personified by animism. The names of these invisible beings must not be pronounced; they must not even be written when symbolical pictography and writing have acquired, among the semi-civilized, the magical value of the voice (China, Korea, Cambodia, etc.). The prohibition may be absolute (Mongols, Bechuana), at certain periods of the year (Central America), on certain

unlucky days (*passim*), or on certain occasions revealed by divination (*passim*).

(c) The same list of prohibitions applies to the names of personages who are no longer simply men, but who by consecration have been made intermediaries between men and the invisible beings, or have even been made members of this group of 'invisibles' (fetish-men, diviners, sorcerers, priests, chiefs, and kings). The secret name which they receive at initiation, entry into the priesthood, or coronation cannot be known (Siam, Dahomey); or, if it is known, it cannot be evoked or pronounced (Far East, Laos, E. Siberia, Ainus). Men who had a similar name must change it (cf. above). The prohibition against bearing a name similar to that of the chief goes even so far as to deprive of this name the dead who shared it during their lifetime (Polynesia, New Zealand, Zululand). Here and there 'primitive terror' has marred the ordinary language, by changing or disfiguring by homonymy or alliteration all the words in it which might evoke the name affected by tabu (Zululand, Tahiti, etc.). This fact is of interest in the morphology of primitive languages.

(d) Belonging to the world of the 'invisibles,' and *a priori* eventually dangerous, the names of the dead are the object of the same tabus. Here the prohibition shows interesting differences, resulting from the variable idea held concerning the nature of the spirits of the dead or the time during which they are supposed to be dangerous. The prohibition may refer to the name of the dead itself. In this case it is of perpetual duration among some peoples. More frequently it is limited either to the duration of the funeral ceremonies, to that of the mourning, or to the supposed duration of the bodily remains (the last two cases in primitive times are one and the same).

The examples collected by anthropological literature prove the universality of this class of tabus (Asia: Samoyeds, Chermis, Ainus; Africa: Kafirs, Zulus, W. Africa, and the majority of Bantu races; Australasia: the whole of Australia, Tasmania, Celebes, Borneo; America: Brazil, Peru, Paraguay, Mexico, the Indians of Texas, and of other parts of N. America).

The opposite custom, that of leaving the dead man's name with him, but changing those of all the survivors, was noted in connexion with the living (cf. above, § 3 (a)), but, in reality, it does not spring from the same initial motive as the preceding tabus. It is another means of warding off the same danger, by bewildering the dead or by withdrawing the living out of his power, by his ignorance of their new names. For the same reason, the name of the dead man was given at his death to a living being—in order to prevent him from doing harm and from wandering invisibly to inflict injury. Thus among the Tacullis, at a death, the priest 'seizes' the name of the dead from his mouth, and places it materially on the forehead of one of those present. It becomes incorporated in him, and it will pass, by the sexual act, into the embryo of the first child born to this man; the child will bear the name of the dead. At the funeral ceremony in Australia a young warrior takes the name of the dead man, pretends to go to the other world, and returns; he is henceforth regarded as belonging to the family of the dead man, for he has really become the dead man, who has now ceased to be dangerous. Among the Chermis, at the funeral feast, a man, made up and dressed like the deceased, takes his name, says that he is happy in the other world and has no desire to return from it, and disappears. This is a perfected variant of the same initial idea. In the case of very young children, however, who would not know any evil, we find the opposite practice. Their names are repeatedly called up, in order that they may become reincarnated in the only way which is possible to them, by animating the embryo in the womb of a pregnant woman (preferably the mother of the dead child). To facilitate the process the bodies of young children (Belgian Congo, ancient Egypt, Central America) are buried either in the houses or at the side of paths frequently trodden by the women of the town or village.

(e) With men, priests, kings, spirits, and gods, the rest of animate nature participates theoretically in this class of prohibitions. The logical consequences have been almost everywhere deduced by non-civilized peoples—hence prohibitions bearing the names of certain animals, plants, fragments of nature apparently inanimate but regarded as animated by a particular spirit, such as mountain-peaks, rocks, lakes, marshes, rivers, etc.; hence

also prohibitions regarding the names of certain sacred objects or even phenomena.

The sum-total of the name-tabus cited above amounts to several thousands, which are distinguished, in the principal subdivisions, by time, place, and circumstance, and characteristics at one time temporary, at another permanent. There can be no possibility, therefore, of finding them all at once in each of the non-civilized races. Nor can we expect each of these races to have traced to the end the pseudo-logic of the deductions drawn from the first rules of the subject. But we have the essential proof of the presumed primitive character of such tabus in the double fact (1) that the general features, explicable by the same initial data, recur in a whole group of peoples who could not have had any historical connexion with each other, and (2) that the majority of the lists of prohibitions, fragmentary or not, always recur identically with regard to a certain kind whenever inquiry is methodically made. There is therefore the greatest probability that we have here to do with authentic survivals of the ideas of primitive people.

11. Collective names.—Like the individual, the group also has its names. The most important is the name of the ancestor (see ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD), spirit, or tutelary spirits with whom the group has formed an alliance. From the smaller to the larger group, from the family to the tribe, to the people, to the confederation of tribes, to the semi-civilized nation, a series of names, sometimes superimposed, is the possession and exclusive property of the group. We find, again, for these collective names most of the variants cited above in the case of the individual, including the so-called 'totemic' name. These characteristics of collective names have the same consequences for them as for the individual names; hence totemic collective names, or others of a secret character, or specially reserved names (cf. below, § II.); hence also all the prohibitions or so-called tabus which concern them.

II. DISCUSSION.—The above facts show that a general explanation of all the phenomena could not be found in either the totemic or the animist theory. They reckon with only some of the facts. The explanation of 'prohibitions' by tabu is a pure tautology which explains nothing. In fact, the beliefs and usages relating to the name proceed from a far more general concept, to understand which we must completely remove 'civilized' people from our argument.

The nature of the name, as primitive man fancies it, its power, its dangers, its good or bad qualities, are connected with the idea of the articulated voice and its effects. The enunciation of the primitive name must be conceived not as a series of syllables articulated with more or less tonic accent, but as a chanted declamation, in which rhythm, note, and tone constitute the essential elements. Such an enunciation, therefore, is connected with the powers and nature of the *carmen* and with the general theory of voice-magic. Here we enter the sphere, known partly by anthropological literature, of the sympathetic and mimetic forces and of the irresistible power of the human voice, either unorganized or organized under forms which the term 'music' more or less completely includes (cf. J. Combarieu, *La Musique et la magie*, Paris, 1909, p. 125 ff.). But statements like these may be extended from the human voice—which is only a small section of the whole—to every 'voice' in the world, and, in the last analysis, to everything that is 'sound.' This statement can be easily verified, so that proof is unnecessary here. Now, if sound itself possesses such powers and effects, it is because it is one of the aspects of the very essence of life, perceptible by the senses. Sound is an emanation

of life, and the sound emitted by a being or an animate object is a function of that life.

If we accept these initial data, the chanted (or later declaimed) name is not merely an artificial imitation of what forms the very substance of the person; it is not even a simple 'double'; it is *this very substance*. The name of a person is his very soul—let us say his 'name-soul'—i.e. his reason for living, his life as far as it has any personality. But the ego and the life (not only the terrestrial life in the body of flesh, but life in itself) are not distinguished by primitive peoples. They associate both in one and the same substance. They naturally imagine them under an exclusively material form. They then notice the manifestations capable of being perceived by the senses. They notice that sound is perceived not only by the ears but sometimes also by touch (in the form of shock), and even by the eyes (luminous vibrations accompanying sound, vapours produced in the air by the emission of a sound or of the human voice). Sound, and consequently the song and the voice, appear to them finally as a characteristic aspect of that energy whose vibrations constitute life; and the various sounds peculiar to beings or animated objects are the essential manifestations of the ego peculiar to each of them. In reproducing them by his own effort the human being conquers the possessor of this ego by taking the secret of his life from him. That life may continue more or less to animate from a distance the being from whom it is drawn, but it is in the power of a new master. Thus the name of the dead man given to the newly-born child is justified. What survives of the man is not his apparition, shadow, or any other of these more or less fluid multiple survivals, which move in the various abodes of the dead; it is above all his 'name-person,' his 'name-soul.' The desire of the dead to become reincarnated (and as often as possible in their descendants) is shown by those dreams in which they speak to the expectant mother, and the pains which the diviner interprets; or, if they have already returned in the body of the newly-born child, they pronounce their name, they reveal their personality by the movements or cries of the child, who recognizes the objects presented to him or salutes the pronunciation of his name in the list enumerated by the priest. Thus by the same process one of the greatest problems of primitive thought is solved—to know the origin and the fate of the living being. Alongside of the body of flesh, the begetting, and the conception, the essential germ of life, independent of the sexual act of man, and the only depository of the real personality, becomes detached from an immense number of 'name-souls,' dwelling either in the same regions as living beings or on their immediate borders, and animating sometimes 'spirits,' sometimes animate things, and sometimes human beings by periodical returns to the body of man. In this way is explained the custom of making the tombs of children on footpaths trodden by a mother who, having lost a young child, calls it by its name, in order that it may come and reincarnate itself in the new germ within her. And all this reincarnation of the dead in new beings of the same family frees the survivors from two serious cares—preoccupation with the suffering and privations endured by the disincarnated 'name-souls,' and apprehension of the dangers which the miserable condition of these dead brings upon the living.

These dangers justify all the strange prohibitions or tabus which have been found to surround the names of the dead. Spells were cast by the simple pronunciation of the name; the dead would come to roam about their former dwelling-places; they would try to get possession of their goods again; they would have revenge for their

privations and sufferings; they would seize the bodies of the survivors by 'possession.' The suppression of their name among the living is one of the chief precautions to prevent them from coming back to the place where they lived. The changes of name among the survivors puzzle them and break the bond between them and the survivors (not to mention all the accessory precautions taken to prevent the return of the spirit of the dead [see art. DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD]). Sometimes a veritable plunder takes place; the 'name-soul' of the dead is taken from him at his death by a living person who plays the part of the dead man, and, having thus deprived him of all his power, prevents him for ever from acting, or substitutes his own will for the dead man's.

These prohibitions, disguises, or changes of the names of the dead or of their surroundings are, as we have seen (§ 10 (d)), most frequently limited to the material duration of the bodily remains. A magical bond unites the different parts, the whole of which form the being (see BODY). The body of flesh, or its debris, remains the necessary material support which enables the name-soul to continue in material proximity to the living. This support destroyed, is the name-soul condemned to dissolution? No non-civilized people has formally asserted this; nor has any one formally expressed its indefinite existence. Whether it is that our information is as yet incomplete, or that primitive thought has not the power to push to their conclusions the logical deductions from such problems, the ideas of non-civilized races on this point end in uncertainty. Some seem to have believed in the possibility of an indefinite prolongation, on condition of being maintained by reincarnations at intervals not too far apart. Hence the possibility of dead persons becoming reincarnated after several generations or after the complete disappearance of their mortal remains, on condition that their 'names' are evoked by certain persons provided with a special power (kings or priests); hence also the entirely logical consequence that certain 'name-souls' are more powerful and resist destruction longer than others, according to the quality or the rank of the persons who bear them, or, still more frequently, according to the 'totem' power of the 'spirit' to which the name gives the individual access. Here we see the first manifestation of the future theory of theophoric or theogenic names.

The facility of managing the 'name-soul' by the irresistible force of pronunciation has already (see I. 7 above) justified all the precautions taken by the living to prevent any one from using their names; it also justifies all the strange prohibitions of which the chief have been cited above. It explains the possibility of depriving of life the person whose name is evoked by artifice. With it is connected the tabu which not only protects the individual's name but also prevents him from pronouncing that of his near relatives or connexions, by reason of the increase of mysterious power given him by the bond of kinship. It gives the key to all the customs connected with secret names. It justifies the apparent absurdity of those kings who punish with death subjects who bear the same name as they. The capital penalty for making use of a chief's name in an oath is due to the same fears. Lastly, the dangers of the thoughtless or malevolent use of the names of invisible beings or supernatural forces rationally lead to the tabus regarding the names of gods, geni, spirits, totems, etc. These prohibitions have been taught and commanded to men by the leaders of the invisible world, in order to guard their independence; or they have been asserted by the chiefs of a human community in order to keep intact the depository of the secret powers by which man can command the masters of the universe; or, lastly, they have been issued in order to prevent vengeance, anger, or the misfortunes which would be let loose by the pronunciation of these dreaded names.

The material being is in constant change, normal or abnormal, regular or irregular. To changes of stature, appearance, physical aptitudes, family or social conditions, correspond new affinities with new categories of vital substances. Consequently a new name must be adopted, containing in its essential texture the harmony necessary between

the body and the vital principle which makes it a person. The innumerable varieties of name-changes are explained in the last analysis by this necessity of readjustment: name-changes in the different classes of age, at circumcision, at puberty, at initiation, at the first motherhood or fatherhood, or at old age, etc. The needs of a name-soul better suited to a new state, stronger and wiser, entail many consequences. The danger of possessing a name subject by affinity or weakness to the attacks of spirits has its remedy in a change of name after an illness. In the same way the need of new special forces for the functions of diviner, sorcerer, priest, chief, or king, presupposes the presence, within their bodily structure, of new name-souls, which introduce into it the powers or aptitudes formerly lacking. These new names, as we have seen (§ 4), come as entirely new entities, are superimposed on the old, or are substituted for them, and their virtue transforms the being inhabited by the new souls. The names of consecration, coronation, installation, priesthood (or their equivalents in the social organization of primitive man) transform the whole substance of those on whom they are conferred. The choice of appropriate names unites them with the groups of beings possessing invisible and mysterious powers. A new being is created, sharing both in the management of his own forces and in that of the human group which he represents. A natural evolution leads these sacred intermediaries to take the name even of one of the all-powerful masters, and then to identify themselves completely with him. A projection of the name-soul of the spirit is thus extended to the human body which it penetrates and transforms. It inhabits the body of the chief or of the priest. It *mizes* the divine substance with that of the human being. The king-god or the priest-god is created.

But at the limits of primitive thought the primitive peoples show us in germ a new evolution of this datum. For the confusion of names from simply taking the divine name is gradually substituted a compiled name of king or priest which will express no longer an identification of crude sympathetic magic, but a mixture (or rather a capacity for mixing) with one of the forces, manifestations, aspects, *âperal*, of the divine or supernatural being. Here we get a glimpse of the beginnings of more developed and infinitely more refined concepts. These lead civilized societies to the use of the theogenic name, the theophoric name, the eponymous name; then, later still, to the name of the protecting patron and to the mere pious intention, taking the place of the magical mixing, just as the prayer of the priest takes the place of the summons in the fetish-man's incantation.

But a more important fact dominates the subject and in a way constitutes the *summum* of the name-soul. If the millions of visible or invisible beings have all a vital principle of the same texture, the degrees of resistance to the overthrow of these principles vary infinitely for each of them. Nevertheless, none of them has theoretical immortality, nor has any one of them been imagined to be the first origin of life. Unable to conceive eternity metaphysically, the thought of primitive man solves the problem of the origins of creative life in its own way. It imagines for each of the different groups of beings an entity, a special name-soul, composed of all the 'name-forces' which it has detached from itself, of all the name-souls which it has put into the different persons or the different beings connected with it throughout the course of time. This entity is the supreme principle whose individual existences are only signs. Hence it is that the name of the clan, the tribe, or the nation, the totemic name, the

mysterious name, is so jealously guarded by the human group; it maintains the bond between the source of life and individual transient existences; it establishes the necessary mixture, the safeguard of the individual life, between the collective soul common to all and the special soul of each. The totem, the depository of the indefinite life of each by the indefinite life of all, gives, with the knowledge of its name and affiliation with its inmost substance, the knowledge of charms, powers, and secrets which are like the 'treasure of war' of the race, and the sum-total of which has made the quasi-omnipotent force of which it is the résumé. If, as everything goes to show, the first cause of the phenomena comprised under the name of 'totemism' is in the inquiry into the vital principle of the human group, an immense number of totemic facts, such as tabus of all kinds, food and other prohibitions, and totemic initiation-rites, are explained and logically connected. Those relating to totemic names are naturally in the first rank.

With the so-called totemic phenomena we reach the limit of non-civilized thought. It would be beyond the scope of this article to examine the conclusions which the magic-religion of more advanced societies draws from these elements. But it is necessary in conclusion to point out at least two of the most important immediate consequences: (1) in the supreme domain of the divine the power of the name leads to a profound modification in the concept of creation, or rather of demiurgy; established first on the organization of inert matter by the effort or the physical action of the demiurge, or on its material fecundation by the supreme being, or later on direct childbirth, drawn from the very substance of the organizing god, the idea of the beginnings of the living and organized world results in teaching that matter has been organized and vivified by the god pronouncing the irresistible words and denominating beings or things in the measure in which he thus gives them existence; (2) in the wide domain of magic an equivalent power is accorded to the 'figurations' of names, no longer chanted or pronounced by the voice, but reproduced by pictography and later by writing. Written magic transports into the representation of names all the forces, practices, and prohibitions connected with the pronounced names. The repertoire of 'written names' has the same sanctity and power in itself as its proper reading. It keeps them enclosed in itself, as if it were a living substance which all these fixed names animate by signs—the non-civilized man even going the length of eating and drinking it diluted in a liquid, or trying to make all the virtues of a magical or a sacred book pass into the body. The history of advanced religions shows us all that man can draw from this new subject, the destiny of 'names.'

LITERATURE.—There is no monograph on names. The authorities cited in the course of the art. contain the chief references to works on the subject. GEORGE FOUCART.

NAMES (Arabic).—I. Kinds of names.—The name (*alam*, from '*alima*, 'to know,' like *nomen* from *noscere*) can be of four kinds, according to most authorities, though some increase the species to seven. There is the name proper, *ism*; the paternal or maternal name, *kunya*; the relative name, *nisbah*; and the sobriquet or title, *laqab*. Some add the *takhallus*, assumed name; the '*uhdah*, functional name (this appears to be an Indian usage); and the *manṣab*, name of rank. The use of the first four goes back to remote antiquity. The word *ism* is Old Semitic, and indeed is probably the source of the word 'Semitic,' since the theory is plausible that the hero Shem is an inference from the phrase *anshē shēm*, 'men of

note.' The suggestion of Robertson Smith (*Kinship and Marriage*², p. 248) that its source is to be found in the verb *wasama*, 'to brand,' is erroneous, since that verb appears to be purely Arabic, and to be traceable by a tortuous course to the Greek *σαμβρας*, 'a horse branded with the letter S.' The verb from which *kunyah* is derived is found in the OT in the sense of 'giving a name of honour.' Another derivative is used in the Mishnāh for 'euphemism,' and the general sense of the verb in Arabic is 'to name indirectly.' The practice by which parents are called after their children is not wholly unknown outside Arabia—e.g., in the *Iliad* Odysseus calls himself (in Arabic *iktanā* or *kannā nafsahu*) *Τηλεμάχοιο φίλον πατέρα*—but in Arabia it became regular, and names of this kind ('Father of Zaid,' 'Mother of Amr') were given to infants. The existence of a son bearing the name which follows the words 'father or mother of' cannot be inferred, as indeed the Abu Zaid of the *Maqāmahs* of Ḥariri states that he has no son named Zaid. As a mode of address it is thought to be respectful, and it enhanced a man's dignity if the sovereign thus addressed him. Historians (e.g., Ṭabarī, ed. Leyden, 1879–1901, iii. 2208) sometimes give the date of the first occasion when this occurred in the case of an eminent man.

(a) *Kunyah*.—The *kunyah* as an indirect mode of address served somewhat the same purpose as is served by the surname and title in the European languages, where the forename is not ordinarily employed outside the family. Hence strangers, when talking to children, call them respectfully by the *kunyah* (Yāqūt, *Dict. of Learned Men*, v. 442). Certain *kunyahs* go regularly with other names, owing to the first owner of the name having had the same *kunyah*; thus an Abrahām (Ibrāhīm) is ordinarily Abū Ishāq (Isaac), a Zakariyya Abū Yahyā (John), an 'Omar Abū Ḥafṣ, and an 'Alī Abū'l-Ḥasan. Hence the *kunyah* could often be inferred from the name, and, according to the tradition, Muhammad explained the statement in the Qur'an that the Virgin Mary was addressed as 'Sister of Aaron' on an analogous principle.

In the common language many animals had *kunyahs*—e.g., 'Father of Job' for the camel, 'Father of Ravening' for the lion; these names are employed in the dialogue of fables. In the 19th *Maqāmah* of Ḥariri a number of similar appellations are collected, which, according to him, are the *kunyahs* employed by parasites and the euphemisms of Sūfis; the former are chiefly designations of meats and the like—'Father of Thaqif (strong?)' for vinegar, 'Father of Jamil (handsome)' for vegetables, 'Father of Jāmī (collector)' for the table or tray; the latter seem to be names for abstract ideas—e.g., 'Father of Yahyā (John, meaning in Arabic 'he shall live') for death, 'Father of 'Amrah' for hunger. Parallels to these can be found in other languages—e.g., Davy Jones for drowning, etc. A dictionary of these *kunyahs* was composed by al-Mubarak b. al-Athir († A.D. 1209), called *Kitāb al-Muraṣṣa*, ed. C. F. Seybold, Weimar, 1896.

(b) *Nisbah*.—The *nisbah* is an adjective which locates the person to whom it is given, whether as the member of a tribe, as the resident of some place, as following some particular trade, or in any other way. This adjective has all the multifarious senses of the preposition 'of.' In the OT it is found with the tribal and local senses—e.g., Y'hūdhi, Tishbi, and perhaps others, as in 'Ibhrī ('Hebrew'). Names of trades are sometimes formed in this way—e.g., *kutbī* ('bookseller'), but more usually on another principle; they are, however, treated as equal to *nisbahs*. A. von Kremer (*Culturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen*, Vienna, 1877, ii. 185) makes the observation that

the employment of trade-names as *nisbahs* dates from 'Abbāsid times; but this is unlikely. This form of appellation is not infrequently taken from a political or religious party—e.g., Sunnī, Shī'ī, meaning 'follower of the *sunnah*,' 'member of the *shī'ah* or party of 'Alī.' One important use of the *nisbah* is to indicate the patron of a manumitted slave; Zaidi might thus be the designation of one manumitted by a man named Zaid, as well as of a sectarian who held that a certain Zaid had a right to the sovereignty. This usage meets us most frequently in the case of persons manumitted by the sovereign. There are cases in which the *nisbah* is based on some more casual connexion, such as the name Badrī applied to Muslims who fought at Badr, or Alfi used of slaves purchased for a thousand (*alf*) coins. Naturally the same man may have numerous *nisbahs*. The most elaborate dictionary of these names is that by Sam'ānī († A.D. 1166), published by the Gibb Trust, London, 1912.

(c) *Laqab*.—The word *laqab* is probably identical in origin with the phrase *nigqbbhū bh-shēmōth* which occurs in the OT, where the former word appears to mean 'were designated,' but its exact sense is unknown. It can best be defined negatively as a name other than that which the holder received at birth, yet not substituted for it. When it is contemptuous, it may be called *nabaz*. In the 2nd cent. of Islām, as will be seen, something resembling systematic titles came into use; but the *laqab* in the sense of 'sobriquet' is found at all periods. Often it is taken from a personal defect; at times it commemorates some deed. The saying with reference to the two Khalifahs, 'Omar II. and Yazid III., 'the Slashed-face and the Diminisher were the best of the Marwanides, illustrates both origins (*Fakhrī*, tr. E. Amar, Paris, 1910, p. 208). Poets often received such *laqab* in consequence of a line that had attracted attention; so the chief of the Arabic poets al-Mutanabbi, 'the Prophet-aster,' is so called after a line in which he compares himself to a prophet; al-Ba'ith was named after a verse which began *ta'abatha* (Jāhiz, *Bayān*, Cairo, 1312, ii. 51); one Abdallāh b. Muṣab is known as 'the Dog's Visitor' (Ā'id al-Kalb) after a line in which he claimed to visit his friends' sick dogs (Mubarrad, *Kāmil*, Cairo, 1308, i. 322), etc. This practice was so common that there were special treatises written about it—e.g., by Muhammad b. Ḥabīb (Yāqūt, vi. 475). Cases occur in which the *laqab* is taken from a favourite expression of the person on whom it is bestowed; this appears to be the origin of the *laqab* Ḥais Baṣ, by which the poet Sa'd al-Saifi is ordinarily known (Ibn Khallikān, tr. W. M. de Slane, Paris, 1842–71, i. 561; the words mean about the same as the Hebrew *tōhū-bōhū*). The origin of these appellations was often forgotten, and they gave rise to mythical narratives; an example will be found in the case of the poet Muraqqish (*Aghānī*, v. 193).

The normal appellations of an Arab then bore some resemblance to Italian nomenclature, where the *ism*, *nisbah*, and *laqab* are regularly represented—e.g., in 'Marcus Tullius Cicero.' On the other hand, the Italian method ignores the *kunyah*, which often serves instead of the *ism*, which at times is forgotten (see a case in Yāqūt, ii. 48), and may never have been conferred; thus in the case of some men of eminence—e.g., the first Khalifah and his father (Abū Bakr b. Abī Quḥāfah)—there is no certain tradition of an *ism*. The employment of the *laqab* was in part due to the popularity of certain names, which rendered the *ism* insufficiently distinctive. When honorific titles came into use, they had a natural tendency to displace the original name; hence, e.g., the title Salādin (Salāh al-dīn) displaced the original name Yūsuf b. Ayyūb. The

modern European combination of forename and family-name is even now found only in those circles in the Arabic-speaking world which have been deeply influenced by Western practice. In these the name of the father of the first person who adopts the method becomes the family-name. The employment of a father's name as a surname is common, the word *ibn* ('son of') being in recent times ordinarily omitted; the Palmyrene inscriptions, however, show that this practice is not in itself modern, and Muḥarrad (*Kāmil*, ii. 130) quotes some early Arabic examples. The employment of the mother's name in lieu of the father's is not quite rare. Sometimes the reason lay in the history of the family; thus the first Maḥdī was called Ibn al-Ḥanaḥiyyah ('Son of the Ḥanīfite Woman') to distinguish him from the sons of 'Alī by the Prophet's daughter Faṭimah. Occasionally the mother was supposed to be the more distinguished; thus one 'Alī b. Muḥarak was known as Ibn al-Zābidah ('Son of the Female Ascetic') because of his mother's renown as a saint (Yāqūt, v. 300). The poet Ibn Mayyādah claimed that his mother was of noble family, whence he took her name (*Aghānī*, ii. 88). At times such surnames were given contemptuously (Yāqūt, v. 113, whose evidence on the matter may be accepted, though in this particular case he misunderstands his authority). According to the *Fakhrī* (tr. Amar, p. 180), when the father was unknown, the child might be called after the mother (as in a case in Yāqūt, vi. 475) or else Ibn Abihi, 'Son of his Father,' and examples of this phrase occur. The use of a daughter's name for a *kunya* is about equally common; it may be due to the absence of a son or to personal choice; the names Ahū Maryam, Ahū Ruḥm, and Ahū Hurairah are familiar; the last of these is often erroneously explained otherwise. The practice was not generally approved.

Within the family, or at any rate where informal language was used, the names were, as in the case of other languages, liable to the alterations which are expressed by the Greek word *ὑποκορισμός*; and for these the grammarians have drawn up rules. Normally the diminutive of a name, however, counts as a separate name; but at times it is used either affectionately or contemptuously as its substitute.

2. Classification of forms.—The classification of the forms of names given by the grammarian Zamakhsharī (*Mufaṣṣal*, ed. J. P. Broch, Christiania, 1879, § 4) is probably exhaustive. They are: (1) single words, (2) compound, (3) transferred, (4) invented. The compound may be made up either of a sentence—e.g., Ta'abbata sharran ('He put mischief under his Arm')—or of two elements made into one word (the examples given are foreign names to which popular etymologies are assigned, or Arabic words to which Persian terminations have been appended), or of a word followed by another in the genitive case—e.g., Abdu-llāhi ('Slave of Allah'). The transferred may be taken (a) from an object—e.g., 'Bull,' 'Lion'; (b) from an abstract noun—e.g., 'Excellence,' 'Despair'; (c) from an adjective—e.g., 'Perfect' (*Kāmil*), 'Handsome' (*Qāsim*); (d) from a verb either in the perfect—e.g., Shammara ('He girded his Loins')—or in the future—e.g., Taghlibu ('She shall Conquer'); (e) from an interjection; (f) from a sentence, as above. The invented is either (a) a normal formation, though not in ordinary use as a common noun—e.g., Ḥamdān from *ḥamida*, 'to praise'; or (b) an abnormal formation—e.g., Mauhab from *wahaba*, 'to give,' which has for its substantive *mauhib* in accordance with a general rule.

All these modes of forming names can be shown

to go back to remote antiquity; for, though comparatively few names of pre-Islamic Arabs are known, certain Biblical appellations of persons clearly bear the same relation to Arabic names as Hebrew forms generally bear to those of classical Arabic, i.e., are, unless appearances are entirely deceptive, derived from the latter, occasionally altered in accordance with sound-laws. Thus the Biblical Eli, Simeon, Gideon, Oreh, Zeb, are found in Arabic as 'Alī, Sam'ān, Gud'ān, Ghurāb, Dhi'b, etc. At times the root is lost in Hebrew, but the name survives—e.g., Zipporah, which may be interpreted Daffarah ('a woman who plaits her hair')—or the sense is lost in Hebrew, but preserved in Arabic—e.g., Reuben for Ri'bāl, 'Lion,' and perhaps Jacob, i.e., Ya'qūb, 'Partridge.' The use of the third person singular of the future as a proper name is common at this early period as afterwards—e.g., Jephthah, in Arabic Yaftah, 'He shall conquer,' identical in sense with the proper name Al-fath, 'Conquest,' and Joseph, identical in sense with the Arabic Yazid, 'He shall increase.' In the Arabic form the subject is ordinarily the holder, not, as in Hebrew, the deity.

3. Source of names.—(a) The sources from which proper names are drawn are practically unlimited; and their choice presents very different degrees of ingenuity. The simplest possible name for a child is clearly 'Child,' in Arabic al-Walid, or 'Posterity,' in Arabic Khalaf; Ukhayy, 'Little Brother,' is equally simple, Ubayy, 'Little Father,' Umaimah, 'Little Mother,' not very different. Other names merely indicate parental delight or affection—Maḥbūb, 'Beloved,' Huhba, 'Dilectissima,' Wahn or Mauhab, 'Gift.' Others involve a good wish—Sa'd, 'Good Luck,' Sa'id, 'Lucky'; similar to this are the names Ya'ish, 'May he live,' 'Ā'ishah, 'Destined to live,' though, as names of this sort had a tendency to provoke the envy of the demons, unlucky names were sometimes substituted—e.g., Yamūt, 'He shall die,' Qabīḥab, 'Ugly.' The last are uncommon, and such adjectives as signify good qualities or conditions are far more frequently used as proper names—Kāmil, 'Perfect,' Shujā, 'Hero,' Salim, 'Safe,' Muqātil, 'Fighting man,' Mujāhid, 'Warrior,' Mālik, 'Possessor,' Maṣūr, 'Divinely aided,' etc. The abstract nouns of these or similar roots likewise serve as proper names—al-Ālā, 'Sublimity,' al-Faḍl, 'Excellence,' Zaid, 'Increase,' Ridā, 'Favour.'

(b) Names of *beasts, birds, and plants*, and of other objects and animals, have been employed for this purpose from the earliest times. Thus among familiar Arabic names are Nimr, 'Panther,' diminutive Numair, Asad, 'Lion,' Thaur, 'Bull,' Dhi'b, 'Wolf,' of which the diminutive is Dhu'ail, Nusair, diminutive of Nasr, 'Vulture,' Ḥayyah, 'Eve,' i.e. 'Snake,' Qunfudh, 'Porcupine,' Hurairah, 'Kitten,' Kalh, 'Dog,' of which the plural Kilāh, 'Dogs,' is also in use as a proper name. The notion has at times been held that these are totem-names, and, when they belong to tribes, this theory may conceivably have some truth in it; in the greater number of cases the notion is fantastic. Other natural objects which furnish names to human beings are stars—e.g., Thurayyā, 'the Pleiades,' Badr, 'the Moon,' Hilāl, 'the New Moon'; mountains—e.g., 'Arafah, Raiḥān, 'Fragrant Herb,' Shaibah, 'White Hair'; whereas artificial objects are represented by such names as Shabakah, 'Net,' Qaṭīrān, 'Pitch,' etc.

(c) Names that are more decidedly *religious* in character are those in which the holder is brought into connexion with a deity, either as a slave (masc. 'Abd, fem. Amat), or as 'the man of' (Imru'u), or as 'the gift of' (Āṭā or Wahb), or 'the blessing of' (Barakat). A list of these theo-

phoric names for Arabio pagan antiquity was made out by J. Wellhausen (*Reste arabischen Heidentums*², Berlin, 1897). Names in which the god is associated with a verbal predicate (e.g., Yasma'il, Ishmael) are common in S. Arabia, but rare in Central Arabia, though perhaps not quite unknown.

(d) The tendency to employ *foreign names* seems to be traceable to antiquity in Arabia, and the ease with which words are naturalized in Arabio made them lose their foreign aspect in many cases. Thus Zainab probably stands for Zenobia, and Alexandros, in the form al-Iskandar, was thought to have the Arabio article for its prefix. Where names are borrowed from the closely allied Hebrew, Syriac, and Abyssinian languages, they are often indistinguishable from native formations. Hence the Arabic forms of 'Adam' and 'Eve,' Adamu and Hawwā'n, are easily interpreted as *fuscus* and *nigra* (*Letters of Abū'l-'Ala*, ed. D. S. Margoliouth, Oxford, 1898, p. 125).

(e) Further, it may be noted that in early Arabio the same names have a tendency to be used for both sexes, and masculine names are often found with feminine terminations. This phenomenon is often easily explicable. If an abstract noun is feminine in form—e.g., *maslamah*, 'safety'—when used as the proper name of a man, it is naturally not altered. The most common feminine termination is often used for intensification—e.g., *hārithah*, feminine of *hārith*, 'ploughman,' probably meaning 'ploughman habitually'; in this case too it would not be altered when used as the proper name of a man; e.g., one Hammād is commonly called al-Rāwiyah, 'the Professional Narrator.' But other cases are more difficult to explain—e.g., the employment of Jamilah ('Pulchra') as the name of a male slave (Yāqūt, v. 306), Umayyah ('Ancillula'), the ancestor after whom the Umayyads are called.

(f) The grammarians use the names Zaid and 'Amr as conventional words for the illustration of grammatical rules, and the latter, written with a final *w* to distinguish it from 'Omar, is one of the commonest names which meet us in early records. Its import is not quite certain, and many other names are formed from the same consonants; most probably it means 'life.' The name Muḥammad, the sense of which appears to be 'Laudatissimus,' was certainly in common use before the birth of its greatest bearer; but it was not particularly popular, so far as we can understand.

4. Principles of naming.—For the names of orthodox Muslims the basic traditions are collected by Bukhārī (Cairo, 1312, iv. 49–51), Muslim (do. 1290, ii. 167–170), Tirmidhī (do. 1292, ii. 136, 137), and Ibn Mājah (do. 1313, ii. 211, 212), who in the main are in agreement. The names which God loves best are 'Abd-Allāh and 'Abd al-Rahmān. That of which He most disapproves is Mālik al-amlāk, i.e. 'King of kings.' The Prophet objected to the names Rāfi, 'Exalting,' Barakah, 'Blessing,' Yasār, 'Wealth,' Rabāh, 'Profit,' and Aflah, 'Most Successful'; according to some, they were objectionable only when given to slaves, and the objection was apparently withdrawn. Names which meant ugly things should, according to the Prophet, be changed; thus for 'Asiyah, 'Rebel,' he substituted Jamilah, 'Beautiful.' But a name which implied the possession of a virtue should also be altered; hence for Barrah, 'Beneficent,' he substituted Juwairiyah, 'Handmaiden.' The names of prophets may be taken (Muḥammad called his son after Abraham); there is therefore no objection to the use of the name Muḥammad and its synonyms; but the name of the son born to the Prophet before conversion, Qasim, should apparently not be taken, or at any rate it should not be

used for a *kunyah*. Further, the name should be given on the seventh day.

The practice corresponds fairly well with the theory. The most popular of all names are certainly those of the Prophet. 'If you have a hundred sons, call them all Muḥammad,' is a saying of the pious (Jāhiz, *Ḥayawān*, Cairo, 1906, iii. 8). But those specially recommended in the tradition also enjoy great popularity, and the names of prophets mentioned in the Qur'ān are frequently employed, the most favoured being that of Abraham (Ibrāhīm). Further, the names of the early heroes of Islām are in common use, though the practice of the sects is naturally influenced by their political theories; the Shīah avoid the names of the first three Khalifahs, whereas in Umayyad times the names of 'Alī and his sons were avoided; if a man named his son Ḥasan, it was because parents were in the habit of cursing their children, and were unwilling to curse a name which they revered (Yāqūt, v. 311). As with other nations, children are called after friends or others whom the parents wish to revere; so 'Abd-Allāh b. 'Omar (prince and theologian) called his son after one Waqīd, though that name ('Burning') is ill-omened, and, owing to the popularity of a governor of Khorāsān named Silm, more than 20,000 infants born in the province were called by that name (Ṭabarī, ii. 489).

Of the rules given above the only one that is frequently violated is that which forbids the *kunyah* Abū'l-Qasim. Goldziher has devoted a monograph to this matter (*ZDMG* li. 156–166). Either the tradition was emended by the omission of the prohibitive particle, or it was thought to apply only to the time of the Prophet, or the combination Abū'l-Qasim Muḥammad was forbidden, but the *ism* or the *kunyah* might each be used separately. The last is said to have been the view of the first person named Muḥammad after the Prophet, one Muḥammad b. Ḥātib (*Latā'if al-Ma'ārif*, Leyden, 1867, p. 9). The names 'Abd-Allāh and 'Abd al-Rahmān, which are especially recommended in the tradition, are made to include names compounded of the word 'Abd and any of the ninety-nine names of the deity. These serve as substitutes for the old polytheistic names.

Certain other principles may be faintly traced in the ordinary nomenclature. Members of a family have a tendency to be called by names derived from the same root; so Ḥasan, Ḥusain, Muḥassan; Khālīd, Khallād, Makhlād, Mukhallād; and derivatives from the root *salima*, 'to be safe,' which have at all times been popular. In early times we find such derivatives used as alternative names for the same person, the same individual being optionally called Sallām and Snlaimān, or 'Abd-Allāh and Ma'bad (*Letters of Abū'l-'Ala*, p. 85); and indeed the Prophet calls himself both Ahmad and Muḥammad, while in what is ostensibly contemporary verse he is also called Mahmūd.

5. Women's names.—The choice of names in the case of women is, it would seem, more limited, and here Fāṭimah, the Prophet's daughter who survived him, has as many namesakes as her father. His other daughters and his wives have also many namesakes. Survivals from old times are Khālidah, the Biblical Khuldah (2 K 22¹⁴), Numa, the Biblical Naomi, and perhaps Laila, the Hebrew Lilith. In the family of 'Omar we find a daughter given the same name as a son, only with a feminine termination (Ḥafṣah and Ḥafṣ). It is not always possible to tell from the form of the name whether it is masculine or feminine; thus Ḥabīb, which is masculine in form, is also used for females, and, as has been seen, the converse case is frequent. The number of female names recorded in our authorities is meagre when compared with that of the male names; thus in

the lexicon of traditionalists by Ibn Ḥajar about a hundred pages out of twelve volumes are given to the women. The names of women, in Muslim opinion, are not to be mentioned, if they can be avoided. The poet Mutanabbī, in composing a dirge over a princess, gives her name as Fa'lah, i.e. the grammatical model according to which her name was formed.

Certain names were used properly for slaves; this was the case with the name Jamilah (quoted above) and its synonyms; the woman to whom the Prophet gave it complained of this, according to Baihaki (*Maḥāsin*, ed. F. Schwally, Giessen, 1902, p. 38). Names taken from gems appear to have been employed in this way; the poet Yāqūt, 'Ruby,' when he adopted a professional career, changed his name to 'Abd al-Rahmān (Ibn Khallikān, tr. de Slane, iv. 5).

6. Meanings of names.—There is a natural tendency to attach importance to the meanings of names, and to suppose that they have some effect on the fortunes of their bearers. There is a story that the general who won the victory for the 'Abbāsids was commanded to change his name by his master, on the ground that, unless it were changed, the enterprise would not succeed (Ibn Khallikān, ii. 100). Ṭabarī, in a character sketch (ii. 1886), relates how a master would call one of his slaves or freedmen by a lucky name such as Fath, 'Victory,' or Maimun, 'Lucky.' In an early work, the *Muwatṭa* of Malik († A.H. 179), the Prophet is represented as maintaining this theory. When there was a camel to be milked, he asked the name of each man who offered his services; the first was declined because his name was Murrah ('Bitter'); the second because his was Ḥarb ('War'); finally, one whose name was Ya'ish ('He shall live') was accepted. Similarly 'Omar, finding that a man was called Jamrah b. Shihāb ('Coal Son of Flame') and that his tribal and local names were all connected with fire, foretold that his house and family would be burned; and this actually occurred (*Muwatṭa*, Cairo, 1280, iv. 205).

7. Name-giving and name-changing.—The name is probably given by consent of the parents, and there appears to be no rule on this subject; Ṭabarī (ii. 1466) records a case in which the father, being absent at the time of the birth, hit on a different name from that given by the mother, who called the child after her own father; the father, though Khalifah, acquiesced in the name given by the mother. Names can be changed either by those who hold them or by some person whose authority they recognize: numerous cases are recorded in which the Prophet changed the names of his followers, and occasionally we read of the sovereign doing this at a later period; 'Omar, it is said, thought of compelling all Muslims to take the names of prophets. Slaves are apt to change their names on manumission, even when the original name was Arabic. Foreign names were changed into Arabic names in the time of the Umayyads, when the non-Arab Muslims were thought to be an inferior caste; but, when the Persian and Turkish dynasties commenced, this practice became less common. Converts to Islām, however, even in these days usually change their names, ordinarily selecting one which belongs to an Islāmic saint.

8. Honorific names.—The honorific title is found at the commencement of Islām, beginning with the case of the Prophet himself, who was not to be addressed in the style of an ordinary man (Qur'ān, xxiv. 63). On certain of his followers he conferred honorary titles, calling Abū Bakr al-Siddiq ('the Saint' or 'the Faithful Friend'), 'Omar al-Fārūq ('the Deliverer'), etc. Similar titles were be-

stowed on other eminent Muslims of the first generation—e.g., al-Waṣī on 'Alī, meaning 'the Trustee' or 'the Legatee,' al-Tayyar, 'the Winged' on his brother Jafar, who was transformed into a bird of paradise; and even heroes of the OT are honoured with such titles, Moses being usually called al-Kalīm, Abraham al-Khalil. Somewhat greater regularity is found after the rise of the 'Abbāsids, who took titles under which they reigned, al-Manṣūr, 'the Divinely-aided,' al-Ḥādī, 'the Guide,' al-Rashid, 'the Rightly-guided,' etc. This practice was followed by other dynasties which claimed the Khalifate, in Egypt, Spain, and S. Arabia. In the 4th cent. of Islām the Khalifahs began to bestow on semi-independent princes titles of which the second element is al-Daulah, 'the Empire'; the first occurrence of this appears to be in the case of al-Ḥasan b. 'Abdallāh b. Ḥamdān, governor of Maasil, called Nāṣir al-Daulah (Ibn al-Athir, anno 317). The most famous holders of such names belonged to the Hamdanid, Ghaznawid, and Buwaihīd families—e.g., Saif al-Daulah, 'Sword of the Empire,' Yamin al-Daulah, 'Right Hand of the Empire,' Bahā al-Daulah, 'Glory of the Empire.' Titles compounded with the word al-Dīn, 'the Religion,' begin to appear in the 4th cent., the first instance being apparently one where the word is an addition to al-Daulah, the title Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Daulah being bestowed in 388 on one Badr b. Ḥusnawaihī; they are still rare in the 5th cent. and apparently bestowed only on persons of the highest eminence in the State—e.g., Nizām al-Dīn on Yamin al-Daulah, the conqueror of India in 404, Dhakhīrat al-Dīn ('Store-house of the Religion') on the heir-apparent in 440. In the 6th cent. such titles become exceedingly common, being bestowed not only upon governors of provinces like Salāh al-Dīn ('the Prosperity of the Religion,' Saladin), but upon persons of literary or theological eminence—e.g., Shihāb al-Dīn ('Flame of the Religion') on the polygraph Yāqūt, Amīn al-Dīn on the calligrapher of that name. After this time they were regularly bestowed on those who distinguished themselves in these lines, whence in the lists of theologians and judges which the Egyptian chronicles of the Mamluk period contain such titles figure repeatedly. Titles compounded with other words are less common, but sometimes found; so al-Mulk, 'the Kingdom,' e.g., in Fakhr al-Mulk, Nizām al-Mulk, 4th and 5th centuries.

These titles were properly conferred by the Sultān, but their source is at times obscure; they were never hereditary. In Persia similar titles are still conferred; in Turkey their place has been taken by certain orders which bear a closer resemblance to patents of nobility.

LITERATURE.—A treatise on *Names, Kunyahs, Titles, and Nicknames* was composed by Jāhiz of Baṣrah († 255 A.H.; quoted in his *Bayān*, Cairo, 1813, i. 63), doubtless containing much curious information. A treatise on names called *Al-Sāmi fī'l-asāmī* by Maidānī († 518), author of the classical collection of proverbs, was highly praised (see Yāqūt, *Dictionary of Learned Men*, ed. D. S. Margoliouth, London, 1913, ii. 108). Special treatises on the *laqabs* of the tribes were composed by Muhammad b. Ḥabīb († 245) (ib. vi. 476). Of works in the hands of Arabic scholars that which bears most nearly on the subject is the *Ishṭiqāq* of Ibn Duraid († A.H. 321), ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Göttingen, 1854, which gives the etymology of the names of the tribes and their most important representatives. Of European works there may be mentioned the art. of I. Goldziher, in *ZDMG* li. [1897] 156 ff.; W. Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, London, 1903; Garcin de Tassy, *Mémoire sur les noms propres et les titres musulmans*, Paris, 1878; A. C. Barbier de Meynard, 'Surnoms et sobriquets dans la littérature arabe,' *JA* x. ix. [1907] 176-244, 365-428, x. [1907] 55-118, 193-273.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

NAMES (Babylonian).—I. Sources.—Hundreds of thousands of temple administrative documents and private contracts which are filled with personal

names, and also with names of countries, cities, rivers, canals, temples, streets, etc., have been found in the ruin-hills of Babylonia and Assyria. Besides this source of material for the Babylonian onomatologist there have been found a large number of tablets which belonged to the school libraries of ancient Babylonia, and also to the library of Ashurbanipal found at Nineveh, which contain lists of names of all kinds of stones, trees, animals, gods, stars, countries, persons, etc. New editions of texts will rapidly enlarge this material. When all the inscriptions of the various periods have been published, it will be possible to know the genealogy of families, *e.g.*, of Abraham's day better than that of many of the Christian centuries.

2. *Forms.*—The characteristic Babylonian personal name contains a sentence, which may be a statement of a fact in experience, a religious belief, a prayer, or a prophecy. As a rule, names are theophoric, although not a few substitutes are found, as, *e.g.*, epithets, titles, temple-names, etc. It would seem that up to a comparatively late date new names were occasionally coined as an expression of sentiment, but the occurrence of the same names for many centuries and other reasons suggest the idea that in the late millenniums the introduction of new names was rare.

3. *Writing of names.*—In all periods considerable attention was paid by the schools of scribes among the Babylonians to the study of personal names. The scribes wrote the names ideographically and phonetically, not as they were pronounced, but according to the elements of which they were composed. That is, it was the rule in all periods of Babylonian history for the scribes to know the meaning of the names, as is shown by the manner in which they wrote them. The name 'Na-bi-um-kn-du-ur-ri-u-šun-r, *e.g.*, could be written phonetically with eleven characters, or 'Nabûm-kudurri-ûsur, ideographically with four, but it was pronounced something like Nebuchadrezzar, as has been preserved by the Hebrews. This enables scholars at the present time to analyze and understand the meaning of Babylonian names in a way that is not possible with those of any other ancient people. Five name-books of five different periods have been published (see Literature below). These, besides the texts that have been published since the appearance of the name-books in the respective periods, furnish a nomenclature so extensive that it has no equal in ancient literature.

4. *Composite names with deity as element.*—The names of the patron deity or deities of a city conspicuously entered into the composition of the names of the people who resided in it. With the exception of tablets from one or two great cosmopolitan centres, like Babylon, it is generally possible to determine their provenance from a study of the personal names contained in them. Half a dozen tablets, *e.g.*, from Nippur of the Persian period contain more names compounded with the names of the gods Ellil and Enmashtu than thousands of tablets from other sites.

In the early Hammurabi period two-element names predominate; but, while this is also true in later periods, the number of those containing three elements is greater than in the early period. The different formations in all periods are numerous.

(a) *Two-element names.*—Two-element theophoric names consist of a substantive *plus* deity, as Amêl-Marduk ('Evil-Merodach'), and the name of a deity followed by a verbal form, or *vice versa*. When the deity is the first element, the verbal form can be the participle, as in Mušêzib-Bêl, 'One saving is Bêl'; preterite, as in Ibbi-Marduk, 'Marduk has created'; imperative, as in Silim-Bêl, 'Be merciful, O Bêl'; precativ, as in Lipšab-Adad, 'May he reverence Adad'; and present, as in Itamar-Adad, 'He will worship Adad'. Besides forms in the third person, there exist such forms as Taqîš-Gula, 'Gula, thou hast presented,' Lulšamar-Sin, 'May I worship Sin,' Atanab-Ilû,

'I sigh, O God,' etc. These name-formations occur also in reversed order, *i.e.* with the deity as the first element.

(b) *Three-element names.*—In three-element names many formations are possible, with the deity in the first, second, or third position. The most common are deity *plus* verb *plus* substantive, like Ašur-bânî-apal, 'Ašur is creating a son,' and deity *plus* substantive *plus* verbal form, the latter being either the imperative, like Nabûm-kudurri-ûsur (Nebuchadrezzar), 'O Nebo, protect the boundary,' or the preterite, like Ašur-ahu-iddin (Esarhaddon), 'Ašur has given a brother.'

The third element may be a suffix, as in Ilû-šur-šu, 'God has protected him,' Sin-išma-anni, 'Sin has heard me,' etc. Again, two verbal forms may follow the deity, forming a relative sentence, as Nabû-tahni-ûsur, 'O Nebo, protect what thou hast created,' Sin-tuhtahšî-lîšir, 'Sin, direct what thou has brought into existence.' A suffix may be attached to the divine element, as Ilû-šu-lbni, 'His god has created,' or a particle may precede the verb, like Ilû-ul-amši, 'God, I did not forget.'

When the deity is the second element, the first may be a substantive, as in Nûr-Bêl-lûmur, 'May I see the light of Bêl,' Šepi-Bêl-ašbat, 'I seized the foot of Bêl,' etc., or a preposition, as in Ana-Ašur-taklak, 'Upon Ašur I trust,' Itti-Ea-lubluš, 'With Ea may I live,' or the relative, as in Ša-Bêl-lîšîl, 'Whom may Bêl support.'

Other three-element formations with the verb in the first position are Ušur-amat-Ea, 'Protect the word of Ea,' Lûmur-dumqi-Bêl, 'May I see the favour of Bêl,' Linûb-lîbî-lîlani, 'May the heart of the gods be appeased,' etc. The second element may be a verbal suffix, as in Taqîš-šu-Gula, 'Gula, thou hast presented him,' Šušra-anni-Marduk, 'Guide me, O Marduk,' Lîšîr-ani-Samaš, 'May Šamaš direct me.' Also the second element may be a preposition, as in Atkal-ana-Marduk, 'I relied upon Marduk,' Upaq-ana-Marduk, 'I wait upon Marduk,' etc.

(c) *Names of four or more elements.*—Four-element names occur in a great variety of formations: Bêl-taddannu-bullî-šu, 'Bêl grant him to live whom thou hast given,' Sin-alk-idi-ia, 'Sin goes by my side,' Lûšsu-ana-nûr-Marduk, 'May I go forth in the light of Marduk,' Nabû-alsi-ka-abluš, 'Nebo, I cried unto, I live,' Sin-mâr-farrî-ûsur, 'O Sin, protect the son of the king,' etc. Names of even five and more elements occur, like Ašur-etil-lîlani-mukin-aplu, 'Ašur, the lord of heaven is establishing a son,' Ašur-etil-šamê-u-iršiti-bullî-šu, 'O Ašur, the lord of heaven and earth, give him life,' etc.

(d) *Feminine names.*—Feminine names are not as numerous as the masculine, though a large number have been found. As a rule the deity in feminine names is feminine, and the verbal form is also feminine. Only occasionally are feminine deities found in masculine names, and even then the predicate is masculine. The formations are similar to masculine names. A few may be given: 'Tabnî-lštar, 'Ishtar has given,' Gula-qâšat, 'Gula is presenting,' Ina-Ekur-bâlat, 'In Ekur she rules,' Ina-Uruk-dininni, 'In Erech judge me,' etc.

(e) *Names with element substituting deity.*—As in W. Semitic names, the elements *abu*, 'father,' *ummu*, 'mother,' and *ahu* 'brother,' are frequently found as substitutes for the name of a deity, or for the term *ilu*, 'god.' In fact, there were many such epithets or equivalents used in all periods. Even temple-names are used in this manner. In some instances it is clear that they refer to the deity—*e.g.* Tukulti-apal-Ešara, 'My help is the son of Ešara' (*i.e.* the god Enmashtu), Nabû-Ina-Ešgila-lûmur, 'May I see Nebo in Ešgila,' Ina-Ešgila-zêr-iddin, '[The deity, *i.e.* Marduk] in Ešgila gave seed,' Ezida-lîša, 'Ezida has presented,' etc. Not a few names have as an element the name of a city. Many of these are feminine: 'Ina-Akkadi-rabat, 'In Akkad she is great [namely, the goddess], 'Ina-Uruk-dininni, 'In Erech judge me,' 'Pa-an-Uruk-lûmur, 'May I see the face of Erech [*i.e.* the goddess of Erech], 'Ina-Nîsin-râmat, 'In Nîsin she loves.'

5. *Single-element names.*—The number of personal names composed of a single element is also large. These may be grouped as follows:

(a) *Trade names:* Âtû, 'Overseer,' Bâ'iru, 'Hunter,' Bânû, 'Builder,' Êšparu, 'Weaver,' Nappahu, 'Smith,' Pašaru, 'Potter,' Sangû, 'Priest,' Malûhu, 'Sailor,' etc.

(b) *Gentile names:* Akkadâ, 'The Akkadian,' Ašurâ, 'One from Ašur,' Borsippâ, 'One from Borsippa.'

(c) *Month names:* Ulûlâ, 'Belonging to Elûl,' Addarâ, Duzâ, etc.

(d) *Plant names:* Allanu, 'Oak,' Karânatu, 'Vine,' Nanašu, 'Plant,' Suhûtu, 'Ear of corn,' etc.

(e) *Animal names:* Nîrum, 'Panther,' Mârânu, 'Little Lion,' Šellihu, 'Fox,' Kalûmu, 'Sheep,' Nubtâ, 'Bee,' Šahîtn, 'Gazelle,' etc.

(f) *Other objects:* Inatum, 'Precious Stone,' Kuppu, 'Spring,' Inšahum, 'Ear-ring,' etc.

6. *Hypocoristic names.*—Hypocoristic, or abbreviated, names abound in all periods. Names which were composed of from two to six elements were generally abbreviated in everyday life. *E.g.*, the name, Sin-ahê-eriba (Sennacherib), 'Sin hath increased the brothers,' might be found abbreviated as Sinai, Ahêa, or Eribâ. Generally a hypocoristic ending was added to the element used like the ending *my* in 'Sammy' (Samuel). In Babylonia most of these endings had apparently a similar

meaning, while others may have had the force of a diminutive. The endings used were *a*, *ia*, *aja*, *ea*, *u*, *anu*, *uni*, *atu*, *utu*, *aitu*, *iātu*, *iautu*, *ānitu*, etc.

Examples of these are: Ap-la-a, Iz-kur-ri-ia, Nabā-aja, Si-in-ni-l, Ab-e-a, Nabū-u-a, Bal-ta-a-nu, A-ḥu-ni, Id-di-na-tum, Ib-nu-tum, Bu-un-na-ai-tum, A-ḥa-ti-ia-tum, A-bi-ia-u-ti, Ku-du-ra-ni-tum.

In many instances only the abbreviated name was employed, as if the individual had no other, or fuller, name; in others the full name as well as the abbreviated form is found in the literature. This ending is used also in connexion with one-element names, as Zumbā, 'Flee,' Suluppā, 'Date,' Puhhurā, etc. There is also a *fu'ulu* formation represented by many names—e.g., Buzzuru, Dullubu, etc.—which may be included in this class.

7. Names showing attributes of deities.—From the names there is obtained not a little data for the description of the divine nature as regards infinity, immutability, immensity, etc., as well as the attributes by which the activity of the deities is shown, as in creation, protection, justice, power, goodness, etc. For some of the ideas expressed practically every synonym in the language is employed.

Examples are: Bāši-llu, 'God exists,' Manum-balum-ilišu, 'Who can without his god [exist]?', Manum-kima-ili-ia, 'Who is like unto my god?', Bēl-dannu, 'Bēl is mighty,' Sin-kālāma-idi, 'Sin knew the people,' Samaš-iršu, 'Shamash is wise,' Sin-karābi-īme, 'Sin has heard the prayer,' Sin-mudammī, 'Sin is favourable,' Nabū-sālim, 'Nebo is gracious,' Tarām-Adad, 'Adad, thou art merciful,' Ilu-ippasram, 'God is appeased,' Sin-nūr-lāni, 'Sin is the light of the gods,' Ilu-bāni, 'God is creating,' Ašur-bāni-apal, 'Ašur, creates a son,' Sin-šum-imbī, 'Sin has pronounced a name,' Samaš-šum-ukin, 'Shamash has established a name [child],', Sin-aḥ-ušabši, 'Sin has brought a brother into existence,' Nabū-nādīn-napišim, 'Nebo is giving light,' Sin-mālik, 'Sin rules,' Marduk-hēl-usati, 'Marduk is the lord of help,' Nabū-ālik-idi-ia, 'Nabu goes by my side,' Samaš-rē-u-a, 'Shamash is my shepherd,' Ellil-hātin, 'Ellil is protecting,' Ašur-nāsir-apal, 'Ašur is protecting a son,' Nusku-kāšir, 'Nusku is keeping,' Bēl-mušālim, 'Bēl is preserving,' Bēl-ēfir, 'Bēl is saving,' Bēl-šum-ukin, 'Bēl has established a name.'

In other theophoric names the individual expresses some personal relation to the deity, or the deity is petitioned.

Sin-udlūl, 'May I serve Sin,' Pan-Samaš-lūmur, 'May I behold the face of Shamash,' Ana-Bēl-upāqu, 'Upon Bēl I wait,' Lūmur-dumqi-Bēl, 'May I see the mercy of Bēl,' Ana-Sin-ēmid, 'In Sin I rely,' Putur-Sin, 'Release, O Sin,' Samaš-liblūt, 'Shamash, may he live,' Sin-zēr-līšir, 'O Sin, direct the seed.'

Most of the gods are given credit for having created children, or having brought them into existence. All seem to have had the ability to protect, to direct, to preserve life, to grant prosperity, etc.; in short, it is impossible to differentiate and develop from the names the religious beliefs of the people with reference to this or that deity. This is, doubtless, due to the fact that the bulk of the literature from which the names are taken belongs to a comparatively late period, covering little more than the last twenty centuries of Babylonian history. And, when it is considered that the names of many of the deities arose through the use of epithets, or from the form in which they appeared in different centres, having been first written by a non-Semitic people, and that many of them go back to an original solar or lunar deity, concerning which at present little is known, we realize how futile it is to attempt, except in a general way, to give the attributes which are peculiar to the different deities. Moreover, these attributes are practically the same as those applied to other solar deities of the W. Semites. Notwithstanding this fact, the study of the Babylonian names is very important for the light which they throw on many obscure Hebrew names.

8. Foreign names.—Masses of foreign names are found in all periods, the study of which is so important for the correct understanding of the movements of people, due to persecution or captivity, or to the fact that at the time the ruling

dynasty was foreign. The tablets of the Hammurabi era contain many W. Semitic names of the Arabic, Aramaic, and Hebraic types. In the Cassite period (2nd millennium B.C.) Hittite-Mitannian as well as Cassite names abound, and those of other peoples are also represented. Comparatively few W. Semitic names, however, are found in this period. In the Assyrian period many of the latter are again in evidence; but especially in the Neo-Babylonian and Persian periods many of the names familiar in the OT occur. Their presence in these periods is, of course, due to the Assyrian and Babylonian captivities. In the Persian period also the nomenclature contains many Iranian names, and even a number of Egyptian; in the Greek period some Grecian names occur.

The study of these foreign names in the cuneiform literature is important also for the light which they throw upon the names themselves, owing to the fact that the exact pronunciation is often in question, since, as in the Semitic script, only the consonants are written. With the help of the writings of these foreign names in the cuneiform literature, where the vowels are always given, they can be vocalized, and often better understood.

9. The divine name.—The forms in which the name Jahweh appears are of special interest. Unfortunately the divine name has thus far been found only in personal names compounded with other elements. In the Assyrian inscriptions it is written Ja-u, as in Ja-u-ḥa-zi (Jehoahaz, *Iwaxas*), etc. The vowel *o* as well as *u* is represented by *u* in Assyrian; Ja-u here represents *ih*. In such instances the Hebrew letter *h* quiesces with the vowel; in other cases it is represented by *h*, especially in the late Babylonian inscriptions—e.g., Ja-ḥu-u-na-ta-nu (Jonathan), Ja-a-ḥu-la-ki-im, and Ja-a-ḥu-lu-nu. The Massoretic vocalization, therefore, of Hebrew names containing Jahweh as the first element can be said to be corroborated by the way in which the cuneiform and Greek have reproduced them.

The divine name as the second element appears in Assyrian texts in Ha-za-qi-Ja-u, Ha-za-ki-Ja-a-u, Ha-zi-qi-a-u (Hezekiah), Iz-ri-Ja-u, Az-ri-Ja-a-u, Az-ri-a-u (Azariah), Na-ad-bi-Ja-au, Na-tan-Ja-u (Nethaniah), etc. In Neo-Babylonian tablets the name appears written Ja-a-ma, which was pronounced Jāwa. Nearly a score and a half of Hebrew names containing this element have been found that have their exact equivalent or parallel in the OT. To quote a few: A-bi-Ja-a-ma (Abiah), Aḥi-Ja-a-ma (Ahijah), Az-zi-Ja-a-ma (Assiah), Ba-li-Ja-a-ma (Bealiah), Ba-na-Ja-a-ma (Benaiah), etc.

It is very probable that Jāwa represents the exact pronunciation of the divine name. This follows when it is considered that Hebrew names compounded with Ja-a-ma occur more frequently in the Nippur tablets of the Persian period than Babylonian names compounded with their prominent deities. It is reasonable to infer that Jāma is an adopted writing for the name of the god of the Hebrews, and represents the full pronunciation of the name. The form preserved in Greek by Theodoret, namely, *Iaβe*, and that in Arabic in a letter to de Sacy, namely, Jahwa or Jahwe, confirm this. This coincides with the pronunciation which for years has been adopted for the divine name, namely, Jahweh.

The Jews in Egypt, as is well known, wrote the divine name יהוה. This was surely pronounced exactly as the Jews pronounced it in Palestine. To say, therefore, that they vocalized these letters יהוה (Jahū) seems unreasonable. The characters must have been vocalized יהוה (Ja'wa), i.e. with a slight overhanging or final vowel, which may even

have been dropped. The same is true when the divine name appears as the final element in Hebrew names. It is improbable that יהו was pronounced *Jāhū*, as the Massoretes have pointed it; more probably it was *Ja'wa*, or apocopated as *Ja'w*.

Hebrew names compounded with אל are found in Babylonian tablets written with the plural sign after the character for 'god.' The Babylonian scribes apparently recognized the difference between the pronunciation of the Hebrew אל and their *ilu*, and, knowing, doubtless, that the Hebrew word for 'god' in general use, namely, אלהים , was a plural, in order to distinguish it from their own word for 'god,' wrote it ideographically in these names—*ILU-MES*, i.e. *ilu* with the plural sign.

LITERATURE.—E. Huber, *Die Personennamen in den Keilschrifturkunden aus der Zeit der Könige von Ur und Nisin*, Leipzig, 1907; H. Ranke, *Early Babylonian Personal Names*, Philadelphia, 1905; A. T. Clay, *Personal Names from Cuneiform Inscriptions of the Cassite Period*, do. 1912; K. L. Tallqvist, *Assyrian Personal Names*, Leipzig, 1914, *Neubabylonisches Namenbuch*, Helsingfors, 1905; see also Ranke, *Keilschriftliches Material zur altägyptischen Vokalisation*, Berlin, 1910. A. T. CLAY.

NAMES (Chinese).—Names occupy a very prominent position in Chinese national and social life.

1. **Names in ancient times.**—The Chinese believe that there is an order in the sequence of essentials, and that the men of old, who in the first place apprehended 'the great unseen principle of Good dominating and permeating the universe,'¹ assigned names among these essentials. 'Wherever there is form, there is also its name.'² It was necessary to adopt nomenclature corresponding to capabilities 'in order to serve the ruler, nourish the ruled, administer things generally and elevate self.'³

The ancient Chinese laid great stress on the proper application of names. 'If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things,' and this would lead to affairs not succeeding. 'The name without the reality is folly.'⁴ A bad name (or reputation) 'gets the credit of every vice,' and is a danger.⁵

2. **Family-names.**—Family-names are of great importance, and persons bearing the same family-name are considered both in law and by custom to be related, intermarriage as a rule being forbidden, though there may be no kinship at the present day between the parties. The same family-name offers a ready passport to intimacy. They are known collectively as 'The Hundred Family Names.'⁶ These comparatively few family-names (there are more than 200 in common use and over 2000 altogether) have sufficed from a period anterior to the Christian era for the hundreds of millions of this ancient people, forming thus a marked contrast to the limitless number of our modern surnames in the West.

One Chinese author (the compiler of *The Book of the Hundred Family Names*) has traced some of them back to their origin 3000 years ago, but the best account says that family-names came into existence only about 2000 years ago. The name Sing, applied to them now, in those early days really meant the place of birth.⁷ Under these circumstances it is not surprising that more than half of the family-names of the present day are derived from place-names. About a quarter are ancestral in origin, such as an ancient title or a

sobriquet. The rest are from many sources, as with European surnames. Those derived from animals are considered objectionable. Family-names cannot be changed; only Buddhist priests and nuns drop their family ties and names. A woman on marriage takes her husband's family-name, but adds her own to his in her signature, and is described by the two in legal documents.

3. **Individual names.**—i. **BOYS' AND MEN'S NAMES.**—(a) *The 'milk-name.'*—In the matter of individual or personal names there is a marked contrast, for a large variety of them are in use, the memorable events in life being marked by a new name.

The child is given a 'milk-name' when a month old by his father or grandfather, a feast being held at the time. This name is used by parents, relatives, masters, or privileged persons, and it is a great liberty and intolerable familiarity for others to use it. Among the poorer classes, however, this simple name may be the only one. At times this name indicates the numerical position of the individual bearing it in the family, as *Sextus*, etc., or sometimes, with an aged father, the father's age at the time of the child's birth, as 'Seventy-two,' or it may denote the age of the grandmother or possibly great-grandmother, as 'Eighty-four.' Among 'milk-names' are to be found such as 'Peace,' 'Brightness,' 'Enter Wealth,' and 'Spring Forest.' Should parents fear the loss of a child by death, a depreciatory name will be given, such as 'Dust-pan,' 'That Dog,' 'The Stupid,' 'Flea.' This is done with the belief that the evil spirits who might have taken the child will be thus deceived into thinking it of no account.

(b) *The 'book-name.'*—On going to school the boy receives from the father or the teacher a more elaborate and carefully selected 'book-name.' This is the name used in arranging marriages and in official registration. Examples are 'Worthy Prince,' 'Spring Dragon,' 'Literary Rank,' 'Celestial Emolument.' The 'book-name' is often preferred, and in that case the 'milk-name' is not used, though the contrary also happens. The greatest care is taken to record the names and genealogies of those entering on a literary career (which forms the high road to government employment), to prevent inconvenience in future.

(c) *Distinguishing appellations.*—Every gentleman of any scholarship or position has in addition one or more 'distinguishing appellations' used in social circles and by intimates—e.g., 'Scholarship Complete.'

(d) *Noms de plume.*—A nom-de-plume is also common and often very fantastic—e.g., 'The Weak Man of the River.'

(e) *The marriage-name.*—The marriage-name is taken at marriage or on coming of age at 16. It is given by the father, if alive; if he is dead, by an uncle or elder brother.

(f) *The official appellation.*—This is assumed on entering office or a public examination, and is used on visiting cards and by relatives. That of the viceroy Li Hung-Chang might be rendered in English as 'Literary Polish.' This name can be changed before obtaining rank, but not afterwards, unless a superior has the same.

(g) *The t'ong name.*—The *t'ong*, or 'ancestral,' name is largely employed in business matters, shares or partnerships being often held under it. It may embrace a whole family of brothers, or each may have a different one. It always ends with the word *t'ong*.

(h) *Nicknames.*—Nicknames are also largely used, based on some personal defect or characteristic.

(i) *Posthumous names.*—A posthumous name is awarded the deceased.

¹ L. Giles, *Musings of a Chinese Mystic*, London, 1906.

² See H. A. Giles, *Chuang Tzu*, London, 1889, p. 162 ff.

³ *Ib.* p. 163; see also J. Legge, 'The Texts of Taoism,' *SBE* xxxix. [1891], pt. 1. p. 337.

⁴ J. Legge, *Chinese Classics*, Hongkong, 1861, i. 56, note.

⁵ *Ib.* p. 128.

⁶ The word 'hundred' is here used in the sense of a large number, as, more *Sinico*, in the phrases 'The Hundred Officials,' 'The Hundred Traders.'

⁷ See *China Review*, xiii. [1884-85] 124.

(j) *Emperors' names*.—The emperors in China have not ascended their thrones under a personal name, but an auspicious combination of two characters forms the 'empire designation' or 'year title' of the reign. If anything inauspicious or unusual happened, these were changed (until recent times) for others. 'Compliant Rule,' 'Reason's Brilliance,' 'The Decree of Heaven' are examples of emperors' 'year names.'

ii. *GIRLS' AND WOMEN'S NAMES*.—Girls and women do not have such a variety of names as boys and men. They have a 'milk-name' and may have another one or two. Sometimes the 'milk-name' is changed on marriage if it clashes with one in the family which the girl is entering. As a general rule, girls have not received schooling or a literary education,¹ though there have been notable exceptions; nor has it been customary for a woman to hold office of any kind. Consequently 'book-names' and 'official names' have been practically unknown. Flowers predominate in the names of girls, and beautiful objects in nature are often selected for them. The desire of the parents for male offspring also appears in their names. Examples are 'Narcissus,' 'Jadestone,' 'Proud Phoenix,' 'Love of the Moon,' 'Virtuous and Rare,' 'Fear,' 'Slave-girl,' 'Lead on a Younger Brother.'

4. *Partial unity in the names in a family*.—It often happens that all the sons in a family will have in one of their respective names the same character as a part of their designations. Thus three brothers known to the writer bore the names Cheeoo Chee-yōng, Cheeoo Chee-Tsoong, and Cheeoo Chee-yung. This seems somewhat akin to the Jewish example of Ahijah and Ahimelech, but among the Chinese the father would not, like Ahitub, have the same portion of his name the same as his sons. With the Chinese there is a regular system employed for this. It often consists in the characters being taken from a book which lends itself well to the purpose, and, as each generation succeeds another, the next character is selected and appears as a component part in each of the names of the brothers of that generation.

5. *Absence of religious names*.—It is curious, considering the religious character of the Chinese, that the names of their deities are not employed in their personal names, as in India. The title 'Supreme Ruler' is doubtless considered too exalted to be dragged down to such common use, though occasionally 'heaven' ('heavenly' or 'celestial') does occur in some combination serving as a name—e.g., 'Heaven's Increase,' 'Heavenly Intelligence,' 'Heavenly Illumination.' Possibly the same feeling in a lesser degree militates against the employment of the names of the demi-gods and canonized heroes, but it must be remembered that it is not a Chinese custom to name children after others; in fact, the contrary is the case.

Some religious influence is noticeable, as, e.g., in the name 'Happy Birth,' derived from Buddhism. Taoism is responsible for another, if not more, viz. 'The Second God of Literature.'

6. *The meanings of names*.—Unlike European names, the significance of which is hidden from the mass of those who use them, and which require the labours of antiquarians and philologists to elucidate their origin and meaning, the Chinese names, whether they are those of individuals, places, cities, or villages, carry patent on their surface their import, and thus often show the reason for their selection.

7. *Names of relationship*.—The Chinese language is very rich in its nomenclature of relatives, and notes the differences between elder and younger

paternal and maternal uncles and aunts, elder and younger brothers and sisters, and cousins, giving distinctive names to them which show the exact relationships.

8. *Shop-names*.—It is the general custom to employ a combination of two or three Chinese characters for the name of a business, a firm, or a shop, the owners' or partners' names not appearing, except in the partnership book, and then very probably under the *t'ong* name. Auspicious designations are selected for this purpose, such as 'Expansive Profit,' 'The Three Unions,' etc.

9. *Names of vessels*.—Auspicious characters are also selected for the names of vessels. The large sea-going junks of former days, which went to the Straits and Eastern Archipelago and voyaged up and down the China Sea, bore names often composed of three characters in which the word 'gold' generally appeared.

10. *Names of the gods*.—The being who appears to be a conception of God in ancient China, and who was worshipped by the emperor, is known by the name of the Supreme Ruler. The Buddhas of Buddhism bear the names or titles known in India, translated or transliterated into Chinese. The gods and demi-gods of the Taoists, when not borrowed from Buddhism, are mostly deified human beings, and are generally known by some name or title which shows forth their power or the work which they perform in the hierarchy of celestial beings.

11. *Village-names*.—The family-names are often used, showing, in many cases, that the village has been founded by one of that family. There are not a few cases in which all the inhabitants belong to the same family or clan, while in other cases not one of the name remains. Two family-names are sometimes joined together in the village-name. As far as the writer's experience goes, these village-names in the south of China are permanent, but in the north they appear liable to change.¹ A temple will give a village a name, singly or in combination with a family-name or some incident connected with, or characteristic of, the village itself, its surroundings, or its inhabitants, any peculiarities being seized upon for the purpose, as 'Red Temple Village.' The writer in a journey passed two villages, the one 'Mud Village' (possibly deriving its name from the fact that sundried mud was largely used for building) and the other 'Brick Village' (where probably proper bricks were used).

12. *City-names*.—There are three classes of cities in China, and the names given to them show of what district (or county), prefecture, or province the city is the capital. Besides these politico-geographical names the city may also have another name in common use, and very likely others as well, derived from some legend or historical event in its past; e.g., 'The Expansive Western Provincial City' is also known as 'The City of Cassia Groves.'

13. *Names of flowers*.—In names of flowers the Chinese appear to have been influenced in much the same way as the West, except that names derived from foreign languages are not so common.² The influence of religious ideas appears to a small extent. One species of chrysanthemum is named 'Buddha's Seat'; a species of the citron is called 'Buddha's Hand'; the narcissus is 'The Water Genie'; the word 'heaven' ('heavenly' or 'celestial') occurs in several.

14. *Names of periods of time*.—Each year during a period of sixty years has a name. Two sets of

¹ See A. H. Smith, *Village Life in China*, Edinburgh and London, 1899, ch. iii.

² For the names given to the divisions and families of the vegetable kingdom see J. Dyer Ball, *Things Chinese*, p. 118.

¹ This is now being altered in China.

characters; one ten in number and the other twelve. each contribute one character in certain rotations to form these names. There is, unfortunately, no serial naming or numbering of these sexagenary cycles as they revolve through the ages. These combinations also serve as names of seconds, minutes, hours, days, and months, signs of the zodiac, points of the compass, etc. The four cardinal points of the compass—in fact, the eight principal points—have common names having the same meaning as in the West. Names are also given to terms of fifteen days each throughout the course of the year, appropriate to the season, such as 'Little Heat,' 'Rain Water,' etc.

15. Names of stars.—There were two principal periods of star-naming among the Chinese—that of primitive China (2300 B.C.) and that of the Chow dynasty (1120 B.C.—A.D. 220). The first naming was agricultural and domestic in character and then feudal.¹ The grouping of the constellations and the names of them and of the stars differ from those in use in the West. One of the best known to the common people is that of the 'Northern Measure or Peck,' the residence of the fates, which is Charles's Wain. The Milky Way is the 'Silver Stream' of heaven.

16. Technical and scientific terminology.—The terminology of technical and scientific subjects has been largely added to by the study of European science, art, and education. Many of these names have been adopted from Japan, the precursor of China in recent times in modern knowledge. The Chinese characters are largely used in Japan, so that the Chinese have found the new names which they require in many cases ready for their use. This enriching of the language began, however, before this by the instruction of the people in China itself in modern knowledge, and is still going on. Where new names to represent hitherto unknown (to the Chinese) matters, things, or processes were required, a translation was made, the new name being descriptive of the object to be named, or the sounds of the name in the European languages were transferred to the Chinese language.

The first Nestorian missionaries in China wisely adopted many Buddhist terms or names, and their Roman Catholic and Protestant successors followed their lead. The names thus taken over into Christianity have proved of much use in the religions instruction of the Chinese.²

17. A good name.—The term 'a good name' is largely used in China and connotes the same idea as in Europe. The Chinese would agree with Iago in its being 'the immediate jewel of their souls.' As an instance of its use the following saying may be quoted, 'He who does good hands down a fair name for a hundred generations.'³

LITERATURE.—On Chinese surnames, H. A. Giles, *Historic China, and other Sketches*, London, 1882, p. 353 ff. On Chinese names, *The Chinese Repository*, Canton, 1831-50, i. 491, iv. 153, 474, ix. 390, xii. 608; S. Wells Williams, *The Middle Kingdom*, new ed., New York, 1883, *passim*; J. Dyer Ball, *Things Chinese*, London, 1903, *passim*, *The Chinese at Home*, do. 1912, p. 751. For names among the ancient Chinese, J. Legge, *The Li Ki* (SSE xxvii. [1885], xxviii. [1885], *passim*; A. Forke, *Lin Heng*, London, 1907-12, pt. i. pp. 618, 468.

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NAMES (Christian).—Names applied to Christians by themselves or by others (nicknames) have been already noticed (cf. vol. iii. pp. 573-576). The present article is intended to sketch any special features in the personal names assumed by Christian individuals during the history of the Church. Such features are on the whole curious rather than numerous or even significant.

I. Christian indifference to names.—At the out-

set Christians saw no reason to differ from the other members of their world in nomenclature any more than in dress or in language.

'Christians are not differentiated from the rest of mankind either in locality or in language or in customs. . . . They dwell in cities of Greeks and of non-Greeks as their respective lot is cast, following the native customs in dress and food and the rest of life' (*Ep. ad Diognetum*, 5).

And what was true of the 2nd cent. has been true, in the main, of the succeeding centuries. Christians have generally taken current names. In no age of the Church could the mere name be taken invariably as a clue to the religion of its bearer. During the epoch of persecution this was intelligible, for any association of a personal name with the new faith would have instantly exposed the bearer of it to arrest. Christians were content as a rule with the generic name of 'Christian.' That was the badge of their fellowship and the red ensign of their confession before tribunals. But, even when the 4th cent. saw the end of persecution by the Roman empire, Christians continued usually to call themselves, as their pagan fellow-citizens did,¹ after colours (Albanus, Ater, Candidus, Rufus, etc.), jewels (Margarita, Smaragdus, etc.), numbers (Tertius, Quartus, Septimus, etc.), rivers (e.g., Euphrates, Nilus, Orontius, Rodane), and months (Aprilis, Dins, Januarius, Junia, Octobris, etc.), from agriculture (e.g., Fructuosus, Silvia, Tilia, Vindemialis), or from geography (Afra, Anatolius, Libya, Thalassius, Tiburtius, etc.), from a wish for good luck (e.g., Eutyches, Faustus, Felix, Secundus), and so forth. Names like Stercorius and Stercoria and the numerous animal-names (e.g., Aper, Asinia, Columbanus, Leopardus, Lupus, Turtura, Ulfilas=Wulfila) are attributed by Martigny to the strong sense of humility which pervaded some early Christians; but the literal significance of such names was not felt in every case, and not all of them (e.g., Aquila, Leo, and Ursula) connote humility.² Some names were naturally more attractive to Christians than others, but there was no serious idea of calling any of them common or unclean, and very little conscious emphasis on their etymology.

Perhaps the most striking proof of the indifference felt by Christians to names is the freedom with which they continued not only to bear but to confer names associated with the very mythology and idolatry against which they were arrayed. Sometimes these names are current modifications of an idol's or a pagan deity's name (like Heraclides, Jovianus, Phœbe, Olympius, or Posidonius), but in some cases the actual name is borne. Origen's life furnishes a significant proof that in the last quarter of the 2nd cent. there were Christian parents who evidently entertained no scruple about giving their children names which recalled pagan deities. Leonides called his boy Origen ('born of Horus'), and Leonides was far from being a worldly Christian. Ares, Bacchus, Ceres, Hermes, Mercuria, and Nereus appear among the names of Eastern martyrs, Eros is an episcopal name, St. Ambrose of Milan had a brother called Satyrus, three bishops in Chrysostom's age were named Ammon (i.e. after Jupiter Ammon, not after the OT Ammon), a Roman martyr is called Lucina, and an Alexandrian martyr bore the name of Aphrodisius. The instances of this practice are so numerous and cover so many centuries—they occur down to the 6th cent.—that we are justified in regarding it for the

¹ Thus in the 4th cent. we find a certain Christopher (Χριστοφορος), who had a Christian son, and yet the boy is called Paphnutius (*Heidelberger Papyrus-Sammlung*, i. [1906] 6). Probably the father was a Christian, but he did not choose a distinctly Christian name for his child, although the name may have been given in honour of the great Egyptian ascetic.

² Hrabannus, the great monastic scholar of the 9th cent., was called after the raven (*hraban*).

¹ See art. in *China Review*, xvi. [1887-88] 257 ff.

² See J. Edkins, *Chinese Buddhism*, London, 1880, ch. xxii.

³ J. H. Stewart Lockhart, *A Manual of Chinese Quotations*, Hongkong, 1893, p. 397.

most part as normal. The paradox is apparent to modern students, but it does not seem to have been visible to contemporaries as a rule. Thus, Apollonius, who was martyred in the reign of Commodus, is invited by the prefect to 'sacrifice to Apollo, and to the other gods, and to the Emperor's image,' the probability being, as F. C. Conybeare (*Monuments of Early Christianity*, London, 1896, p. 38) points out, that the scene was actually ἐν τῷ Ἀπολλωνίῳ, since Apollo is the first and only god mentioned by name. Here, then, we have a Christian martyred for declining to sacrifice in honour of the very god whose name underlay his own! But the incongruity was not felt, or, if it was felt, it was not remedied. When we discover that late in the 3rd cent. a Christian presbyter is called Apollon (Ἀπόλλων [*New Classical Fragments, and other Greek and Latin Papyri*, ed. B. F. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, London, 1897, no. 73]), and another Psenosiris, we do not require to set this down as a peculiarity of Egyptian Christianity; it was not confined to Egypt, and it survived as it had preceded that particular period.

2. Rise of a distinctive nomenclature.—But there are occasional indications of a break away from this habit of bearing names associated with mythological culture and the pagan cultus, and these indications are all the more interesting because they mark the first of the two paths along which the early Christians struck out a more distinctive nomenclature of their own, viz. (a) by adopting OT names, and (b) by appropriating the names of apostolic saints.

(a) From the scanty amount of extant evidence it would appear that some of the early Christians did feel uneasy under semi-idolatrous¹ names, and that they occasionally sought refuge from their embarrassment by exchanging them for OT designations. An early instance of this practice is mentioned by Eusebius (*de Mart. Palest.* xi. 8), in his account of the five Egyptian Christians who were arrested at Cæsarea in A.D. 310 and eventually put to death.

When the judge asked their spokesman what his name was, 'he heard the name of a prophet instead of his proper name. And so with them all. They had altered their names, to replace the names given to them by their parents, for the purpose of avoiding idolatrous associations. You would hear them calling themselves Elijah, Jeremiah, Isaiah, Samuel, or Daniel.'

In this way, Eusebius adds approvingly, they showed that they were true Jews of the kind praised by St. Paul (Ro 2²⁹), God's genuine Israel; their names as well as their deeds proved it. But it is plain, even from the tone of Eusebius, that this was not a line followed by the majority of Christians. The 6th cent. Procopius of Gaza, it is true, commenting on Is 44¹⁻⁵ (*PG* lxxvii. 2401), reports that during the fierce persecutions many Christians of pagan birth took Jewish names from the OT, like Jacob, Israel, Jeremiah, Isaiah, and Daniel, and with these sacred badges gladly went to martyrdom (μεθ' ὧν ὀνομάτων ἐπὶ τὰ μαρτύρια προθύμως ἑαυτοὺς ἐπέδιδσαν). Yet these are local and sporadic expressions of pious austerity. The records of the martyrdoms amply corroborate the impression that even the majority of the martyrs, who were the fighting line of the Church, died as they had lived under names which were often redolent of pagan associations.²

Furthermore, the adoption of OT names as more

¹ Athanasius (c. A.D. 332) notices that one of his five Meletian antagonists at court was called Gelæus (i.e. γελαῖος, 'ridiculous') Hierakammon; 'qui nominis sui pudens Eulogium se appellandum curavit' (*Fest. Epp.* iv. 6).

² Sometimes a martyr would refuse to give his or her name (e.g., Sanctus at Lyons [Eus. *HE* v. 1. 20], who would only repeat, 'I am a Christian'), either from an ecstatic indifference to the secular personality or to avoid identification (as in the case of Sahina [*Acta Pionii*, ix.], who, on the suggestion of Pionius, called herself Theodota, 'ne in mannis dominae implae posset incidere').

congenial to out-and-out Christians went forward more rapidly in some circles of the East than in the West. Possibly it is due to accident that most of the extant data point to Egypt, but the general difference of nomenclature between the Eastern (especially the Palestinian) and the Western Churches may be seen, e.g., in the early lists of bishops. The Jerusalem lists record a large proportion of OT or Jewish names: Tobias; Benjamin, Moses, Ephraim, Joseph, Levi, Elias, Hermon, Isaac, and Amos are more characteristic than Seneca or Narcissus. The Roman lists, on the other hand, do not contain any OT names. Even the names of the bishops of Antioch and Alexandria show no distinct Biblicizing tendency; the mere fact that the Antioch list contains names like Heron, Eros, Serapion, and Asclepiades proves that the archaic tendency of the Jerusalem nomenclature was not distinctively Eastern, although it may be felt to some extent in the adjoining Church of Syria. Recourse to OT names may be said, therefore, to have been Eastern rather than Western, and it was not by any means predominant even in the Eastern Church.

(b) The choice of apostolic saints' names began earlier, and began not as a protest but spontaneously. Hero-worship rather than a reaction against paganism was its spring. By the beginning of the 3rd cent., in some circles (Egyptian?) at any rate, Christians were fond of making their children namesakes of Paul or Peter. This is plain from the remarks of Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, as quoted by Eusebius (*HE* vii. 25. 14).

He is attempting to prove that the John of Rev 22³ need not be the apostle John, and he observes that in his opinion many during the apostolic age took the same name as the apostle John out of admiration for him, 'just as Paul and Peter are frequently given as names to the children of believers' (ὡςπερ καὶ ὁ Παῦλος πολλὸς καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ Πέτρος ἐν τοῖς τῶν πιστῶν παισὶν ὀνομάζονται).

But this inference is purely conjectural; there is no support for the opinion that people at that early period called themselves after John or any other apostle. The name was not uncommon, and its multiplication was not due to hero-worship. On the other hand, the fact from which Dionysius draws this inference is indisputable; his incidental allusion to contemporary usage proves that the prestige of the apostles had already begun to induce some Christian parents to call their boys after Paul and Peter. Paul is more common than Peter, and the names of other apostles occur only seldom. But it always remains doubtful whether the occurrence of a name like Paul means that it had been chosen out of special regard for the apostle.

It is more difficult to determine how soon and how far Christians assumed the names of men and women who had lived outside or after the apostolic circle. We can readily understand that the hero-worship of a pious contemporary which led to the adoption of his name would be natural, whether the new name replaced the old or was merely added to it. But the evidence, such as it is, needs to be sifted.

E.g., Jerome explains Cyprian's middle name (Thascius Cæcilius Cyprianus) by suggesting that it was adopted from the presbyter who had been the means of his conversion (*de Vir. Illust.* 67: 'Cyprianus . . . suadente presbytero Cæcilio, a quo et cognomen sortitus est, Christianus factus'). Inherently there is nothing improbable in this. It was legal, at any rate. The likelihood is, however, that it is one of Jerome's biographical errors,² for the presbyter's name, according to

¹ Abraham came into vogue throughout the Eastern Church by the 4th century. Ahel seems Christian in the 5th cent. letter preserved in *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, x. [1914] 800; he was a valet. But many of these OT names were due to Jewish influence; converts from Judaism already bore them.

² Another mistake of the same kind occurs in 6, where he derives 'Saul' (Ac 13⁹) from the proconsul Sergius Paulus ('ab eo, quod enim Christi fidei subegerat, sortitus est nomen'). But 'Paul' was an alternative birth-name for Saul, not a Christian name.

Pontius (*Vita Cypriani*, 4), was Cæcilianus, not Cæcilius. Still, Jerome would not have made this suggestion, if the practice had not been credible in his own day.

We may assume, therefore, that by the 4th cent. Christians sometimes adopted the name of a spiritual hero who had helped them. A century earlier we have the partial parallel of Eusebius in Cæsarea calling himself "Eusebius Pamphili" out of admiration for Pamphilus his friend.¹ But all doubt is removed by the contemporary evidence of Chrysostom (*in Gen. hom. xxi. [PG liii. 179]*). In commenting on Gn 4th, he contrasts the haphazard way² in which parents name their children nowadays (*καθάπερ οἱ νῦν ἀπλῶς καὶ ὡς ἐτύχε τὰς προσηγορίας ποιοῦνται*) with the pious care of the ancients, who made the child's name an incentive to moral excellence.

Nowadays they say, 'let the child be called by the name of his grandfather or great-grandfather; not so the men of old, who took the greatest pains to give their children such names as not only incited the hearers to moral excellence but proved instructive (*διδασκαλία φιλοσοφίας ἀπάσης*) in all ways to everyone else and to all succeeding generations.'

He exhorts Christian parents to name their children not after honoured and distinguished ancestors, but after saintly Christians conspicuous for goodness (*τῶν ἀγίων ἀνδρῶν τῶν ἀρετῇ διαλαμψάντων*), although neither parents nor children must rely on the mere name; the name without the corresponding character is of no avail (*οὐδὲ γὰρ ὀλίγησιν τι προσηγορία ἀρετῆς ἐρημος οὐσα*). The saintly men whose names are recommended may have included OT no less than NT figures; they certainly did not exclude pious contemporaries, for some of the Antiochene Christians called their boys after Meletius the bishop (Chrysostom, in *PG* 1. 515), feeling that even to have his honoured and holy name within their homes was a blessing and a source of strength.³

Here the 4th cent. is echoed in the 17th. This word of Chrysostom is precisely the argument and appeal of an English Puritan like William Jenkyn.

He had his congregation remember how good it was 'to impose such names as express our baptismal promise. A good name is as a thread tied about the finger, to make us mindful of the errand we came into the world to do for our Master' (*Exposition of Jude*, London, 1652, p. 7).

Only, as we shall see, the Puritan's models were strictly Scriptural; he would have indignantly repelled the desire to call Christian children after any saint later than the NT at any rate, and he would have denounced the superstitious belief, which Theodoret of Cyrrhus in Chrysostom's age expressly mentions, that such saintly names put their bearers under the ægis of patron-saints:

In a eulogy of the martyrs Theodoret declares that 'philosophers and orators are consigned to oblivion, and most people nowadays are ignorant of the names of kings and generals; but all know the names of the martyrs better than those of their dear ones (*τὰς τῶν μαρτύρων προσηγορίας μᾶλλον ἴσασιν ἅπαντες ἢ τὰ τῶν φιλάτων ὀνόματα*). In fact they are keen to confer martyrs' names on their children, thus securing protection and guardian care for them' (*de Græcarum Affectionum Curationibus*, sermo viii.).

¹ As Petrus, in the 11th cent., called himself Damian, out of gratitude to his brother, Damianus.

² The Italian Dominican, Campanella (1568-1639), makes the same criticism upon his contemporaries. In his *City of the Sun* (tr. in H. Morley's *Ideal Commonwealths*, London, 1839, p. 235) he notes that the inhabitants take a better way: 'names are given to them by Metaphysicians, and that not by chance but designedly,' etc.

³ In the 5th cent. Arlesius changed his name to Zeno, when he married the emperor's daughter, and reigned as Zeno (Evagrius, *HE* ii. 15); but this alteration of name was not religious. On the other hand, the Decian martyr Achatius (T. Ruinart, *Acta Primorum Martyrum*, Ratisbon, 1859, p. 202) tells the judge: 'si proprium nomen meum exploras vocor Agathos-angelus' (*car. lecti*. Agazangelus, Agathangelus). Witiza (Euticius), the second founder of monasticism in the West during the 8th cent., took the spiritual name of Benedict, by which he is known to fame. Two centuries earlier Gregory of Tours had changed his name, at his consecration, from Georgius to Gregorius, after his maternal grandfather, the holy bishop of Langres. There are numerous instances of this practice throughout the Middle Ages.

The cult of the saints developed this practice, however, in the Middle Ages. The popularity of certain names is explained in many cases by the local traditions of particular saints. It was an analogous but less supernatural feeling that led Alcuin, e.g., in the beginning of the 9th cent., to call his distinguished pupil Hrabanus by the name of Maurus, as if he were a second Maurus (i.e. equipped with the excellences of St. Benedict's famous disciple).

The use of definitely Christian names was helped by the rise of infant baptism. But it was not confined to the naming of children. Catechumens might change their names at baptism, or assume a 'spiritual' name,¹ and this was in vogue by the beginning of the 4th cent., if not earlier. Ignatius is the earliest Christian who is known to have assumed a second, 'spiritual' name; he took, at baptism, the title of Theophorus (*θεοφόρος*, 'bearing God,' or *θεόφορος*, 'borne by God') for religious reasons. Perhaps this explains why Theodorus (Eus. *HE* vi. 30) took the name of Gregory; Gregorius was not a specifically Christian name, but it was capable of a Christian suggestiveness (*γρηγόριος*, 'watchful'). The Samaritan (?) martyr, Peter Balsamus (Ruinart, p. 525 f.), told the magistrate that his paternal name was Balsamus, 'spirituali vero nomine, quod in baptismo accepi, Petrus dicor.' That was in A.D. 311, and it tallies with the data already tabulated (see, further, Ducange, *Glossarium*, Niort, 1883-87, s.v. 'Binomius').

(i.) Though Chrestus was used, one name in the NT was naturally left alone, the name of Jesus. St. Paul's friend 'Jesus, surnamed Justus' (Col 4th) had received the name as a Jew (=Joshua); but reverence prevented Christians from assuming it. For opposite reasons, Sapphira does not seem to have been appropriated by women—although it emerges in 17th cent. England (Bardsley, *Curiosities of Puritan Nomenclature*, p. 78), and a Presbyterian lady of 81 bearing this staid name appears on a burial register as late as 1704. As Judas was shared by several apostolic figures, the ill-fame of Judas Iscariot did not discredit it among Christians.

(ii.) Sometimes a name was added posthumously. John, the eloquent bishop of Constantinople, received the admiring title of Chrysostom (*χρυσόστομος*) after his death; and Henry Suso, the 14th cent. mystic, was similarly dubbed Amandus. But Suso had privately chosen this name; he did not allow it to be known during his lifetime, although he had changed his name from that of his irreligious father for the maiden-name of his pious mother, which he Latinized from Sues to Suso.

3. Formation of new names.—The creation of names went on; e.g., from (a) festivals of the Church, like Epiphanius (?) or Epiphania, Paschalis, Pascasus,² and Sabbatius, and from (b) qualities of mind or of the moral life. The latter class are naturally numerous, but they are not always distinctively Christian. Names like Aeternalis, Athanasius and Athanasia, Anastasius and Anastasia, Eucharistus, Evangelius, Martyrius, Patrophilius, Praulius,³ Pistus, Prosdoke (martyred, A.D. 306), Refrigerius and Refrigeria, Sanctus, and Sozomen tell their own tale. But other names of this class are not exclusively Christian. Thus Hieronymus was pre-Christian, while even Irene (*εἰρήνη*) was a pagan name, and continued to be used by pagans after Christians had adopted it (cf. *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, i. [1898] 114-116).⁴ We are on safer ground with names derived from divine names; Adeodatus and Adeo-

¹ This survives in the new name assumed by the pope on taking office. Adrian vi., the reforming pope, stood out against this, when he was elected in 1522. 'Contrary to the custom observed for five hundred years, he adhered to his baptismal name. He was determined, even as Pope, to be the same man as before' (L. Pastor, *Hist. of the Popes*, Eng. tr., London, 1891-1912, ix. 48).

² Just as in England children born at Easter were sometimes called Pash.

³ Theodoret (*HE* v. 33) notes, in connexion with Bishop Praulius of Jerusalem in the 5th cent., how admirably his disposition and hearing suited his name (*πράβλιος*, 'mcek-spirited').

⁴ Ireneus also is a pagan formation (cf., e.g., *Fayum Towns and their Papyri*, ed. Grenfell and others, London, 1900, p. 43).

data, Christopher,¹ and Cyriacus are rooted in the Christian soil. Yet caution is needed even here. No doubt names like Dorothea, Theodoretus, Theodosia and Theodosius, Theodoulos, Theognostos, Theoktista and Theoktistus, Theopemptus, and Theophylact were favourites² in the Church; but it must be remembered that similar names, like Dorotheus, Theocritus, Theodektes, Theodorus, Theodotus, Theognis, Theophanes, and Theophilus, were current in non-Christian circles before they were taken over by the Church, and that, while a name like Theopistus (a Roman martyr) seems a Christian formation, this was not the case with Theoteknus³ and need not be the case with some other names of the same class. Occasionally a name would be coined, in the OT fashion. Thus, in the (early) 5th cent. panegyric on St. Phocas (cf. *Analecta Bollandiana*, xxx. [1911] 252 f.), his Christian parents give him the name of Phocas (Φωκάς), because he is a 'light' to their home: ἐφάνη ἡμῖν φῶς ἀληθινόν, ὁ πρωτότοκος ἡμῶν υἱός.⁴ Such a source for names is natural and spontaneous, apart from any question of Scriptural precedent.

But, apart from the question of origin, the early Christians adopted or adapted a number of names as particularly appropriate to their faith—e.g., names derived from ἀγάπη (Agape, Agapetus, Agapins) and *xmo* (especially among the later Gauls), from εἰρή (Elpis, Elpidius, Elpisura) and *spes* (Spes, Spesina), and from joy (Exillaratus, Hilara, Hilaris, Hilarius). Whether the metal is Christian or not, the Christian stamp is obviously on names like Eleutherus, Macarius,⁵ Vigilantius, Vitalis,⁶ Vitalissimus, Viventius, Vivianus, Zoe, and Zotikos.

4. Some typical groups of early Christian names.—The data outlined in the previous paragraphs may be tested and illustrated by reference to one or two lists of bishops and martyrs in the early Church. Their contents are often significant.

(1) At the N. African synod of 256 the names of the 87 bishops who attended are mainly Latin, but only two are Scriptural (Peter and Paul); the rest are ordinary pagan titles.

(2) Seventy years later, at the Council of Nicæa, five-sixths of the names (there are 237 in all) are such as we meet in contemporary non-Christian life; of the remainder, we have 18 pious names like Eusebius (5), Hosius, Theodorus, Theodotus, and Theophilus, and the 19 Scriptural names include Moses, Paul (6), Peter (4), Mark (3), John, James, and Stephen, with one Polycarp.

(3) For Egypt in particular there is ample evidence in the writings of Athanasius, which tallies with these data. To take only a single item, almost at random: in A.D. 347 he (*Fest. Epp.* xix. 10) notes the appointment of new bishops called Psenosiris, Arion, Triadelphus ('instead of Serapammon'), Theodorus ('instead of Anubion'), and Orion ('instead of Potammon'); two OT

names occur among the episcopal lists (Isaac and Jacob); at Arsinoë Andreas succeeds Silvanus; and at Clysma Tithonas is grouped with Paulus. The small size of this group makes the variety of the names (mythological, local, and Scriptural) particularly significant.

(4) A century later, we discover that the (early) 5th cent. martyrology of the Roman Church which A. Urbain has edited (*TU*, new ser., vi. [1901], pt. iii.) contains about 800 names. The large majority are ordinary Greek and Roman names, even including Achilles, Hermes (2), Neptunialis, Orion, Romulus, and Toga. Moses is the only OT name, unless Abacuc (Abacum) is included. There are a few formations like Audax, Calumniosus, Chrises, Dynamius, Eunuchinus, and Poleminus. Paul (5), Peter (5), John (2), Philip, Marcus (2), and Timotheus (2) represent the Scriptural element—which once more is scanty. The most popular male name on the whole is Felix (18). The women's names include Agnes (2), Beatrix, Candida, Julia (6), Maria, Martha, Præpedita, Sophia (2), Sotere (3), Victoria (4), and Zoe.

(5) Later still, among the saints of Thrace and Moesia (not later than the 7th cent.; cf. H. Delehaye, in *Analecta Bollandiana*, xxxi. [1912] 163 f.), we come upon a deacon called Ammon, while the virgins who are his fellow-martyrs at Heraclea are Laurentia, Celsina, Theoclia, Theoktiste, Dorothea, Eutuchiana, Thecla, Aristainete, Philadelphie, Mary, Beronike, Euthymia, Lamprotate, Euphemia, Theodora, Theodote, Teteia, Aquilina, Theodoule, Haplodora, Lampadia, Procopia, Paula, Junilla, Ampliane, Persisa, Polynike, Maura, Gregoria, Kyria, Bassa, Callinike, Barbara, Kyriake, Agathonike, Jnsta, Irene, Matrona, Timothea, Tatiane, and Anna. The 38 martyrs at Philippopolis are called Orion, Anatolinus, Molias, Eudaimon, Silvanus, Sabinus, Eustathius, Straton, Bosbas, Timotheus, Palmatus, Mestus, Nikon, Diphilus, Dometius, Maximus, Neophytus, Biktor, Rhenus, Saturninus, Epaphroditus, Kerkas, Gaius, Zotikos, Kronion, Anthus, Oros, Zoëlus, Tyrannus, Agathos, Pansthenes, Achilleus, Pantherius, Chrysanthos, Athenodorus, Pantoleon, Theosebes, and Genethlios. The Scriptural (apostolic) element is noticeably small in these names of Christians outside the inner circle of the empire; there is a distinct proportion of 'spiritual' names, or at any rate of names with a pious application. On the other hand, mythological names like Ammon and Orion are still used freely.¹

5. Oblation of names.—Before passing on, we may notice the employment of names in the liturgy of the early Church. Lists of names were read aloud for a definite purpose; this broadened as the doctrine and cultus of the Church developed, but originally it was quite simple. The names of those who gave donations in money or otherwise (commemorial elements, endowing or building a church) were recited in public worship, that the faithful might requite them by praying for them. This practice occasionally led to fulsome praise, when the amount of each person's subscription was read out after his or her name, as Jerome pungently objects (in *Ser.* ii. [116], in *Ezek.* vi. [182-9]), yet in itself the custom was naive and pious. The names were written on two-leaved tablets or diptychs (διπτυχα). But these diptychs or registers soon embraced other names. They were used to bid the Church commemorate not only these benefactors after death but all the faithful dead, especially the martyrs and confessors. This became a regular part of the eucharistic worship, the names being at first recited usually by a deacon, after which (oblatio) the prayers (post nomina) were offered by a priest. The later liturgical variations are numerous and complicated (cf. *DCA* i. 560-563, ii. 1197, 1376-1377), but it seems plain that from the 3rd cent. onwards the names were recited in the eucharistic liturgy at the altar, and they came to include

¹ Phileas, bishop of Thmuis, speaks at the beginning of the 4th cent. about some martyrs at Alexandria as being *χριστοφόροι* (*Eus. HE* viii. 10. 3). But Rufinus shrinks from the term, and translates it by the colourless *beati*, just as he renders Eusebius's description of Phileas (φίλας) by *beati* in viii. 10. 11. The 10th cent. pope Christopher had to be deposed!

² Gregory of Nyssa's wife was called Theosebeia, and she lived up to her name.

³ The name belongs to a bitter persecutor of the Church, A.D. 303 (Ruinart, p. 374). As Eusebius remarks (*HE* ix. 2. 2), his conduct belied his name.

⁴ The Armenian version omits this derivation of the name. Similar formations are Lucellus and Photinus.

⁵ Eusebius (*HE* vi. 41. 17) mentions a Libyan martyr who was truly named 'Makar.' Similarly Theodoret (*HE* i. 3).

⁶ Vitalis in England seems (Bardsley, p. 132 f.) to have been originally a pre-Reformation name given to children christened before birth, 'in cases where it was feared, from the condition of the mother, they might not be delivered alive.' Like the cognate Creature, it was common to men and women, owing to the circumstances in which it had been conferred.

¹ It was against this tendency that the 19th canon of the Arabian pseudo-Nicene canons was directed ('Fideles nomina gentiliū filiis suis non imponent; sed potius omnia nomina Christianorum suis nominibus utantur, ut gentiles suis utantur, imponentque nomina Christianorum secundum scripturam in baptismo'). But this attempt to discourage native names as secular never succeeded; it was revived later, however, in the Puritan movement.

not only local but catholic saints. A similar extension took place in the diptychs of the living, which soon embraced not only donors but teachers, spiritual and imperial authorities, holders of clerical office and civil magistrates, and eventually the entire body of the faithful belonging to any church. In the Roman liturgy of the Mass the *commendatio pro vivis* precedes, the *commendatio pro defunctis* follows, the consecration. What underlies this offering of names is the sense of unity, the living and the departed alike being recognized as members of the one Church. But the practice naturally gave an opportunity for recognizing the orthodoxy or heterodoxy of the living or even of the dead. It was a convenient means of enforcing Church discipline. To have one's name on such a register was to be accredited a full and true member of the Church; to be omitted was a stigma and punishment, and attempts might even be made after a man's death (cf. the case of Chrysostom) to remove his name from the list as a posthumous censure on his life or opinions.

The practice thus passed into the rubric of prayers and masses for the dead, but it was steadily enforced on the special grounds of gratitude and unity, particularly the former. This is explicitly decreed in the 19th canon of the Portuguese Council at Merida, A.D. 688 ('Eorum nomina a quibus eas ecclesias constat esse constructas, vel qui aliud hanc sancte ecclesie videntur aut visi sunt contulisse, si viventes in corpore sunt, ante altare recitetur tempore missae, quod si ab hac decesserint aut discesserint luce, nomina eorum cum defunctis fidelibus recitetur suo in ordine'). The former recitation of names survives in the Bidding prayers of the English Universities, which gratefully commemorate the benefactions of the past, naming the donors singly, but praying only for the living (ecclesiastical, temporal, and academic authorities).²

6. Mediaeval practice.—On the whole, the same general features reappear in the Christian nomenclature of the Northern nations under the Church, from the 6th cent. onwards. The significance of names leads to the practice of onomantia; local and national names are usually retained; terms connected with pagan worship are either dropped or more frequently carried over with slight changes in the wording;³ and the new Christian names already consecrated by the Greek and Roman Churches make their way along the channels of the saints' calendars and traditions. Saints' names were generally the favourites. It is not unlikely that a certain impetus to the use of Biblical names was given throughout the West, from the 7th cent. onwards, by the Spanish bishop of Seville, Isidore, whose learned *Etymologiae* (bk. vii. chs. 6-10) brought out the religious significance of the Biblical names. A cult of such names began to spread. The old principle, 'bonum nomen, bonum omen,' regained its vitality in this department of nomenclature; but it was unable to overcome entirely the prejudice against OT names which were already borne by the Jews, and the anti-Semitic tendency hampered the free use of such names down to the 10th century. Not until the Reformation were such names adopted eagerly, and then it was by the Biblicizing Protestants on the Continent. How soon this practice began, and how characteristic it was of the new movement, may be seen from the Council of Bordeaux in 1539 (ix.), which decreed:

'Nomina sanctorum patrum veteris Testamenti affectare haereticorum est.'⁴

Montaigne's contemporary witness is also significant:

'Dira pas la posterité que nostre reformation d'aujourd'hui ait esté delicate et exacte, de n'avoir pas seulement combattu

les erreurs et les vices et rempli le monde de deuotion, d'humilité, d'obeissance, de paix et de toute espeece de vertu, mais d'avoir passé jusque à combattre ces anciens noms de nos baptêmes, Charlee, Loye, François, pour peupler le monde de Malthusalem, Ezechiel, Malachie, beaucoup mieux sentans de la foy?' (*Essais*, bk. i. ch. 46 [ed. Bordeaux, 1906, p. 356]).

Evidently this cult of Scriptural, and especially of OT, names was an innovation in the France of the 16th century. Up till then the Northern nations had for the most part shown a natural and healthy preference for names of native growth. This applies in the main to Teutons, Celts, and Saxons alike, as well as to the Slavs. Like the Goths, the Teutons still bore their ancestral names, such as Alfred, Arnold, Baldwin, Charles, Frederick, Gertrude, Henry, Hugo, Mildred, Sigismund, Theodoric, and Ulrica; saints' names from the Church's calendar came in, but they did not submerge their predecessors.

In Britain, where different racial strata affected the nomenclature, an examination of the names used by Christians yields an almost identical result. Thus in the list printed by E. Hübner (*Inscriptiones Britanniae Christianae*, Berlin and London, 1876, p. 94 f.), which comes down to the 11th cent., the majority of male and female names are drawn from the Celtic and Anglo-Saxon vernacular; there is a sprinkling of Latin names, and only one or two from Scripture—e.g., Jacobus (8th cent., Cardiganshire), Samson (9th cent., Glamorganshire), and Gideon (? Dorsetshire). Among the English nuns who assisted Boniface to spread monasticism through Germany in the 8th cent. we find native names like Walpurga and Lioba alongside of Thecla; it is exceptional to come upon even a saint who bears any name except a native one, in Gaul or in the Northern islands, and it is significant that in Britain no Saxon bishop is known to have taken a Biblical name. The change did not come, according to Camden, until after the Norman Conquest.

Then 'our nation (who before would not admit strange and unknown Names, but avoyded them therefore as unlucky) by little and little began to use Hebrew and sacred names, as Matthew, David, Samson, Luke, Simon, etc., which were never received in Germany until after the death of Frederick the second, about some 300 years since' (*Remains concerning Britain*, p. 53).

The use of Biblical names in pre-Reformation England has been traced to various sources, in particular to the popular dramatic mysteries and the Crusades (which popularized Ellis=Elias, and John especially). But it was the Norman influence that enabled Scriptural and saints' names, among others, to compete with the Old English ones successfully.

7. Puritan nomenclature.—The sudden enthusiasm for Bible-names in the 16th and 17th centuries throughout Puritan England replaced a sort of clerical system by an irregular freedom of choice on the part of parents.

'Previous to the Reformation,' as Bardsley writes (p. 48), 'the priest, with the assent of the gossip, gave the babe the name of the saint who was to be its patron, or on whose day the birth or baptism occurred'—'saint' including the great host of men and women notable in the Church's tradition and history.

The Puritans eschewed these as savouring of papacy and paganism, preferred godly names from Scripture, and took the choice into their own hands. Macaulay (*Hist. of England*, vol. i. ch. i. [ed. London, 1871, i. 40]) insists that their special preference for OT names was due to militant sympathies, and that the extreme Puritans were actuated in this, as in other matters, by their revolutionary, theocratic principles.

'They baptized their children by the names, not of Christian saints, but of Hebrew patriarchs and warriors.'

To some extent, this is true; it explains, e.g., how even Puritan girls could be disfigured by the name of Jael. But the reason was larger than mere militant piety. The Puritans were also driven by anti-ecclesiastical antipathies; in their passion for

¹ Cf. L. Duchesne, *Christian Worship*, Eng. tr., London, 1912, p. 179 f., and, for the earlier Gallican Mass, p. 203 f.

² Cf. T. Seccombe and H. S. Scott, *In Praise of Oxford*, London, 1910-11, li. 773-775.

³ E.g., the analytic formation of personal names which meets us in the OT involves, in pre-Celtic Ireland as in the Semitic East, the occasional incorporation of a god's name, and this practice was continued in Christian times with the aid of the words *mael*, "bald, tonsured," and *gille*, "boy, servant-boy" (J. Rhys, *Lectures on Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by Celtic Heathendom*, London, 1892, p. 215). A good example is Gilchrist, from *Gillecríst* ('Servant of Christ'). For name-giving in connexion with ethnic baptism see *ERE* ii. 369.

⁴ The habit persisted into the 17th century. In the list (1693) of 254 French Protestants recently sent to the galleys (E. Arher, *The Torments of Protestant Slaves*, London, 1907, pp. 271-280) we find Abraham (4), Aaron, Benjamin, Daniel (12), David (10), Elie (4), Israel, Isaac (6), Jacob, Joseph (8), Moïse (3), Samson, and Solomon, i.e. a fifth of the whole number. Three-fifths are Scriptural (NT) or 'saints' names.

sacred names they found that some of the NT names were, as they thought, compromised by associations with Church festivals and the calendar of the saints, and the result was that they felt shut up to OT names or to NT names which were innocuous and minor. In both ranges of choice they took names often irrespective of their original associations¹ or uncouth in the last degree. Girls were baptized as Aholiab and Drusilla, e.g.; or as Kerenhappuch (as late as the 18th and even the 19th cent.). The essential thing was that a name should be Biblical; as a rule, the Puritan extremists cared for little else. They swung to the opposite extreme from Royalists, who did not hesitate to use names like Cassandra, Diana, Lais, and Venus for their daughters. Biblicism and an equally artificial neo-paganism were at the corruption of nomenclature.

The practice extended to the habit of making names out of abstract virtues, as in the early Church. Puritan boys were baptized Perseverance, Humiliation, and Repentance—to quote only three cases. Even more whimsical was the construction of a name out of a phrase or sentence.

'Sometimes a whole godly sentence was adopted as a name. Here are the names of a jury said to be enclosed in the court of Sussex about that time.

Accepted, Trevor of Norsham.
Faint not, Hewit of Heathfield.
Make Peace, Heaton of Hare.
Redeemed, Compton of Battle.
God Reward, Smart of Fivehurst.
Standfast on High, Stringer of Crowhurst.
Earth, Adams of Warbleton.
Called, Lane of the same.
Kill Sin, Pimple of Witham.

Graceful, Harding of Lewes.
Return, Spelman of Watling.
Be Faithful, Joiner of Bridling.
Fly Debate, Roberts of the same.
Fight the good Fight of Faith, White of Emer.
More Fruit, Fowler of East Hadley.
Hope For, Bending of the same.
Weep not, Billing of the same.
Meek, Brewer of Okeham.²

In justice to these ultra-Puritans, however, we ought to remember that, whether they were conscious of it or not, they had a precedent for such compounds. The early Church had led the way, in making names not only out of abstract terms, as we have seen, but out of devout phrases. This uncouth formation of personal names was much older than the Puritans. In the martyr-list of the Carthaginian Church (6th cent.) Jan. 8th is the anniversary of the *depositio Quodvultdeus Episcopi*, and Jan. 5th celebrates the *depositio* of two bishops, one of them called Deogratias. The latter was the local bishop who was elected in A.D. 454, but we know of at least one earlier presbyter, bearing the name of Quodvultdeus, who consulted Augustine.³ Besides, the practice goes back to Hebrew custom, and it was the well-known OT instances that formed a conscious precedent for the English Puritans. Both in the construction of these phrase-names and in the predilection for OT names they were actuated by the feeling that the Bible (especially the OT) was a world, or rather the world, of God, which contained rules and standards for the outward as well as the inward direction of life. Where the Puritans differed from previous circles of Christianity, as regards nomenclature, at any rate, was in the extent to which they carried their imitation of the OT, rather than in the fact of that imitation. They felt that they did not need to look further than the Bible for 'a commodity of good names.'

These rough formations and the craze for Biblical names are ridiculed mercilessly by contempo-

¹ Bardsley (p. 78) is astonished at Antipas, who was 'a murderer and an adulterer,' but he has forgotten 'Antipas, my faithful martyr.' (Rev 213). It was this Antipas, and not the Herod of that ilk (Mt 141, Lk 97 1823, Ac 141), of whom Puritan parents thought when they baptized their babies by such a name.

² Hume, *Hist. of England*, London, 1789, ch. lxi.
³ The epitaph of an archdeacon Deusdedit in the 6th cent. is quoted by G. B. de Rossi, in *Roma Sotteranea*, Rome, 1864-77, iii. 239, 242. The first Saxon archbishop was also called Deusdedit.

rary dramatists and satirists, but in vain. Such extremists were impervious to humour. Fortunately, they were only a minority, even among earnest religious people, and the æsthetic sense of the majority prevented Scriptural names from swamping all others. Shakespeare makes Juliet declare:

'What's in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet . . .
Romeo, doff thy name.'

Bnt, as H. E. Maxwell observes, Shakespeare knew better than his heroine.

'Romeo and she would never have become, among Western nations at least, the type of all that is passionate and tender, had their sponsors named them Abraham and Sarah.'

He quotes two extreme cases of the contemporary fanatical habit.

One is of the sponsors 'who were answerable for the following entry in the baptismal register of Waldron:—

"Flie-fornication, the base sonne of Catren Andrewes, bapt. y^e 17th Desember, 1609." . . . A more charitable spirit moved the sponsors of another unwelcome little stranger, who is recorded in the Register of Kingsdown, in Kent, in 1581, as "Innocent Day, the base borne sonne of one Day" (Meridiana, pp. 267, 276).

But what artistic instinct did for some, good sense and native tradition did for others, and the eccentricities of the Puritans failed to raise rugged Semitic formations or moralistic names 'that would have made Quintilian stare and gasp' into a characteristic feature of English nomenclature.

8. Variations and peculiarities of later practice. —A sudden reaction set in soon on the Continent. The French Revolution produced an antipathy to the use of ecclesiastical and Biblical names; in fact, the legislature forbade any being conferred except those in general use 'dans les différents calendriers, ou ceux des personnages connus de l'histoire ancienne' (*La Grande Encyclopédie*, Paris, n.d., xxvii. 571). Anti-clericalism threatened to narrow the range of Christian nomenclature (the *prénom*), but this cloud passed, although it left, under the Code Napoléon, certain restrictions behind it.

In England, meanwhile, the dominance of the Bible continued to affect Christian names in some circles of the people, long after the Puritans had ceased to be a political power. The evidence for this lingering influence is scattered but ample. Let it suffice to quote a contributor to *NQ* IV. ii. [1868] 342, who notes the following strange names in a parish register of Donnybrook near Dublin:

'Ezble, the daughter of James and—Gudle,
Kesia, daughter to Thomas and Martha Wilkinson,
Wealthy, son to Symon and Eleanor Whathing,
Richards, son to Edward and Baptize Anderson,
Mahitable, daughter to Richard and Elizabeth Burnett,
Utilia, daughter to Richard and Elizabeth Deacon,
Anntistas, daughter to John and Sarah foley,
Imey, daughter to William and Elizabeth Mattashaw,
Abernathy, daughter to James and Elizabeth Bromlow,
Syabella, daughter to John and Margaret Wallis,
Regina, daughter to Magnus and Elizabeth Syck,
Kumie, daughter to John and Ann Dauncy,
Bathia, daughter to James and Elizabeth Bromlow,
Ananias, daughter to Peter and Sarah Portovine,
Levina, daughter to John and Margaret Griffith,
Ammoross Burges,
Teasia, daughter to William and Elizabeth Yonng,
Burlanah Bumbarry,
Amia, daughter to James Cosgrave,
Neptune, son of Harris and Mary Blood of Ringsend,
Deliverance Branan.'

These are all from the first half of the 18th century. But such eccentric names are no longer what they once were. What makes them remarkable is their singularity among the mass of normal names. The temper of mind which underlies them survives still, it is true, in some quarters, as occasional entries in baptismal and burial records prove.

E.g. the parish register of St. Faith's, Norwich, chronicled, as late as 1874: 'Dodo Eliza Delilah, daughter of Arphad Amhrose Alexander Habbakuk William Shelah and Virtue Leah Woodcock' (*NQ* vii. xii. [1891] 404 f.).

Against such names there is no law—except the unwritten law of good taste, and certain forms of piety count themselves free from that law. In fact, it is doubtful if any English law controls the giving of names. T. A. Ingram (*EBr*¹ xix. 159) refers to a 13th cent. injunction of Archbishop Peckham:

'Ministers shall take care not to permit wanton names to be given to children baptized, and if otherwise it be done, the same shall be changed by the bishop at confirmation.'

Legal authorities seem divided on the question whether such a change of name is permissible, but an English Church clergyman, though required to baptize a child by any name selected by the parent or godparent, may 'object to any name on religious or moral grounds, although the rubrics do not expressly say so.' This right of objection, however, would hardly be valid in the case of Scriptural names. So far as the clergy can exercise any real influence in the matter, it is probably by prohibiting silly or freakish names and by encouraging the choice of sensible Christian names—i.e. taking 'Christian' in its legal rather than in its strict sense.

From a Scottish statistical paper for 1860, printed in W. Anderson's *Genealogy and Surnames* (Edinburgh, 1865, p. 149), the registrar's figures show that, out of 3690 entries of male Christian names, the most popular were John (563) and James (503), that Thomas (189) and Andrew (102) outstrip Peter (64), and that, while Daniel occurs 17 times, there is not a single Paul in the list. But even the 'apostolic' names which do occur were not always chosen for religious reasons; patriotic and national interests were more commonly in evidence, when children were thus named.

9. Modern practice. — Modern practice has settled down into a rational liberty in the matter of Christian names, and this has been due to a growing recognition of the truth that it is possible to be religious without being Biblical. Many people do not profess any religious interest at all, but even those who have their children baptized are rarely guilty of giving them 'pious' names. The danger of sanctimoniousness has proved so real that the majority have long ago dropped belief in any specific virtue attaching to a Scriptural or even to a moral name. Family associations, some fashion of the day, or pure caprice are uppermost. Good taste and common sense control the average religious person in selecting names for his children, and, just as a sense of humour and of the fitness of things would probably prevent a rational non-Christian from labelling his offspring Jupiter or Semiramis, Napoleon or Messalina, so a member of the Church would hardly seek to prove his own piety or to ensure that of his children by dubbing them Methuselah or Rizpah, Jabez or Tryphosa, as if these names possessed any intrinsic virtue which might be transmitted to their modern bearers. He is more likely to be guilty of cruelty to children, in peace as well as during a war, by fastening upon them 'Christian' names derived from some contemporary figure or event, which he desires in his folly to commemorate.

LITERATURE.—For the early Church the materials are collected by J. A. Martigny, *Dict. des antiquités chrétiennes*, Paris, 1865, pp. 445–453, and after him, by J. Bass Mullinger, in *DCA*, London, 1880, ii. 1367 ff.; but, in view of subsequent discoveries and researches, especially among the papyri, Martigny's lists (e.g., of distinctively Christian names) need revision. Add: A. Harnack, *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten*, Leipzig, 1906, Eng. tr., *Expansion of Christianity*, London, 1907, bk. iii. ch. 3, excursus 2.

For the later periods, particularly in England, see W. Camden, *Remains concerning Britain*, ed. London, 1870, pp. 52–109; and C. W. Bardsley, *Curiosities of Puritan Nomenclature*, do. 1880.

¹ Cf. Dickens' satire in *Martin Chuzzlewit* (ch. II.: 'Mr. Pecksniff was a moral man: a grave man, a man of noble sentiments and speech: and he had had his christened Mercy. Mercy I ob; what a charming name for such a pure-souled being as the youngest Miss Pecksniff! Her sister's name was Charity': ch. ix., where he is drunk: "'Mercy and Charity,'" said Mr. Pecksniff, "Charity and Mercy. 'Not unholy names, I hope!'").

For the general subject, from the etymological or historical point of view, cf. the data and discussions in C. M. Yonge, *Hist. of Christian Names*, London, 1863, esp. i. 229 f.; F. W. Farrar, *Chapters on Language*, ed. do. 1873, p. 237 f.; P. Dudgeon, *Short Intro. to the Origin of Surnames*, Edinburgh, 1890; Herbert E. Maxwell's essay in *Meridiana*, Edinburgh, 1892, pp. 267–300; and J. P. Struthers, *What is Thy Name?*, Greenock, 1915. JAMES MOFFATT.

NAMES (Egyptian).—1. General introduction. —Egyptian civilization presents an exceptionally rich and interesting field for the study of names. On the one hand, in the remnants of its ancient beliefs that have survived throughout so many centuries Egypt still preserves several characteristics of primitive religion (cf. NAMES [Primitive]), practically unaltered, whose origin and exact meaning can be verified from the context; on the other hand, during the course of its long history it shows the successive evolutions which primitive notions contained in germ and which non-civilized races either kept as they were or confused and complicated, being unable to arrange them in a system; here they develop into the most refined conceptions of the contemporary theologies of Mediterranean civilization. Egypt therefore supplies us with the necessary connexion between primitive ideas on the name and the advanced theories of civilized religions.

2. Primitive elements. —To understand these elements it will suffice to refer to what is said about the irresistible power of the pronunciation of names among non-civilized races in NAMES (Primitive). Declamation or *melopœia*—the chanted voice of the oldest languages—is regarded as reproducing the harmonious sound, i.e. the material vibration, which is one of the signs of vital substance. This chanted voice (*khrou*; cf. G. Maspero, *Bibl. égyptol.* i. [1893] 101) engenders magical forces (*hikan*). All the texts, ritual, and magic of Egypt rest essentially on the fact that the name, thus understood, constitutes a material soul, and is the most secret part of the whole living being, since it is his very reason for living. The name is therefore the ego. It exists by itself. It is the most subtle of the various souls of the individual (see BODY [Egyptian]). It is the last term in the series of active principles which, gradually increasing in airiness and 'evocability,' result from the combination of body and bone with the blood, the double, the ghost, the shade, etc., to form the life *par excellence* (*önkhu*).

The Egyptian name is so definitely a soul—a living being existing by itself—that the most important and oldest liturgical texts make it the essential element in their magical operations (see below, § 5). There is therefore neither person nor living thing that does not possess a name, known or hidden. No being would be complete, or, rather, existent, if he had not his name, and a man's life can be taken from him by taking away his name by magic. Cursing or execration by the name of an individual lets loose upon him to injure him all the forces which the formula has 'bound to' the name.

This material soul (cf. Pyramid Texts, Ritual of Pepy II., line 669 = *RT* xii. [1892] 146) of the oldest lists is a thing which can be carried off, devoured, or struck. But it can also be seized in order to be incorporated in objects or figures which are vivified not for hostile but for beneficial purposes. The name of a dead man, declaimed and materially captured by the priest, is placed on his image or statue, and he lives again in it. This was the primitive meaning of the expression 'to commemorate the name of N.' The lifeless figures of a bas-relief or tomb-fresco, painted wooden dolls, become so many living servants of the dead man when the image has been provided with a name by

the officiant at the magical funeral ceremony. Painted objects or representations of fictitious offerings become a real sacrifice. No text could be more explicit on this point than the passage which mentions 'those things which chanted declamation makes real.'

These substitutions or magical exchanges of a name, which thus passes materially from one being to another, or from a person to his image, go still further. In order that the dead may not perish, they are transformed into other beings, and even into imperishable objects, by their names being conferred on those beings or objects. By mingling the substances the magical operation mingles the destinies. The chapters on 'Transformations' describe those strange means of escaping annihilation. The names recited on talismans or amulets enclose in these objects the vital principle of an individual. This is probably the explanation of the difficult formulae of the famous Pyramid Texts, where the phrase *am ranuf ni* ('in his name of') assimilates the dead king with groups of divinities or even objects of worship or sacred substances, and even confuses the 'royal name,' i.e. the soul of the king, with heavenly localities believed to be possessed of a personality of their own by their name.

Magic capable of producing such wonderful effects in names flinches before nothing. The popular tales and the sacred literature of the hymns and invocations record the prodigious effects of the declamation of names as quite natural. Since the whole world is made up of living names which animate every substance and every body, we need not be astonished that, by chanting these names, the priest-magician can command everything. If he 'knows the names' (*rokhū ranu*), he can with his voice cleave mountains, rend the sky, make the stars move more slowly or more quickly.

No Egyptian being, natural or supernatural, can avoid the calling of his name. The iconography and the texts leave no doubt about this fact. They show how the name can be materially seized, snatched from one person, and incorporated in another. In Egypt magic (mimetic or sympathetic) is based almost entirely on the use of this possibility, which is increased tenfold in power and varieties of use by the invention of written magic (see below, § 5). The priest-magician devotes all his learning and power to 'knowing' (*rokhū*) the exact texture of the name, its qualities, quantities, musical tonality, and scanned declamation. The magical chant (*khrou*) which exactly reproduces all those elements gives to him who possesses it the complete ownership of the name-souls thus evoked. To the irresistible call which attracts their vital substance all beings, visible and invisible, must answer. Spirits, genii, the dead, the most powerful gods, cannot avoid it. And, after the lapse of centuries, when individual magic, alongside of the official religion-magic, developed its dangerous occult power, the processes were not different. It is by the summoning of secret names that the sorcerer of the Latin-Egyptian *tabellæ devotionis*, in order to accomplish his evil works, subdues the spirits of the dead, the genii of the under world, and sometimes even the august deities of the classical pantheon. It was therefore dangerous to make use of a name, and consequently the Egyptians were prohibited from using the name of the gods or that of the Pharaoh outside of the liturgy and foreknown cases; hence, e.g., the punishments befalling those who in ordinary life make use of the oath or the curse on the royal name.

3. Secret names.—The person who is adjured or evoked, not being able to avoid the declamation of

his name, has naturally devised a means of resisting incantations and exorcisms. He keeps his name secret. From the most humble spirit to the most powerful of the gods, each has a 'secret name,' which no one is supposed to know. He defends it jealously as his very life. For, as the texts say, 'this is his name by which he breathes.'

Of the many examples in Egyptian literature none is clearer in this respect than the famous legend of the god Rā. He was stung by a scorpion, and nothing could cure him until, overcome by the pain, he told Isis his secret name, which she used to compose an invincible exorcism and drive out the poison (for the different versions of this classical episode see Maspero, *Histoire*, I. 167 ff.; and Budge, *Gods of the Egyptians*, I. 224 ff.).

But man also employs all his patience and ingenuity to find out the secret names in order to get possession of them. The priestly bodies of each of the provinces of feudal Egypt were engaged in committing to writing collections of formulae containing the knowledge of mysterious names. The medicine-men of the modern Congo do the same. Of those collections, which were at first passed on orally, an important part of what is known to us concerns everything connected with the fate of the dead. They are proved by philology (and often with the help of the natural sciences) to go back to the pre-historic period.

The lists called *Books of the Dead* and Pyramid Texts are based almost entirely on the knowledge of secret names. By them are annulled dangers from serpents, crocodiles, hippopotami, and monkeys armed with knives that lie in wait for the dead on the roads of the other world; the lions which guard the gates of Aulis are reduced to powerlessness; hostile spirits are dispersed; the protections and obstacles of the mysterious kingdoms have no longer any power when the hidden name of their spirit is pronounced. The fourteen secret names of the fairy barque and its principal parts place it at the disposal of the dead. The mysterious names of the thread which captures the souls of the dead, pronounced by the shade on its journey, enable him to escape it. By the same means he crosses the lakes of fire; he also knows the mysterious names of the magical weapons placed at his service to drive back or strike the hostile deities. Having at last arrived at the land of the dead, he causes the gates to open by his knowledge of the 'names' of the leaves and locks of the doors; he can find a place for himself there and obtains command over the inhabitants and the chief of the spirits by telling them that he 'knows their names' and by pronouncing imperiously the names of the guardians of the Seven Regions or those of the Twenty-one mysterious Pylones. It is not so much on account of his virtues and religious merits as by the knowledge of their secret names that he obtains from the forty-two judges of the dead the right to live in peace in the kingdom of Osiris. In the stellar or heavenly voyages which the theologies of the Pyramid Texts prescribe for the human soul, it is again by the pronunciation of the secret names that the dead sail across the spaces, conciliate the aerial groups of *kunmami*, compel the gods of lights or of dark spaces to give them help or allow them to pass, to let them sail with them, or to share their powers or their food with them.

These powerful collections, elaborated for the use of dead chiefs, then gradually for the use of all the initiated, were secret. Writing, by fixing them, has preserved them for science, so that we may say that on many points of the religion-magic of Egypt we know from the papyri secrets which the people of Egyptian civilization, with the exception of priests and compilers of books, did not know.

The priestly body naturally had similar collections of mysterious names for the living Egyptians. Only some of them have come down to us (especially from the medical papyri) for cases of illness, possession, bad dreams, etc., and for avoiding ghosts, noxious animals, and the other dangers of everyday life. Unfortunately we do not know the formularies for the great operations of national worship. Perhaps they have never even been written out on account of the gravity and the all-powerfulness of the use of such names. They may have been bequeathed orally from priest to priest at the time of initiation. We shall never know any but the apparent names of the greatest gods of Egypt. The real names of Amon, 'whose name is secret,' Atumu, 'the mysterious,' Min, and

many others are unknown. The only thing that we know of the most powerful of all, the sun Rā, is that he had a secret, all-powerful name, and that Isis alone knew it one day (cf. p. 152^b). We should remember that those formidable real names borne in classical antiquity by Zeus, Athene, Dionysos, etc., have never been found out—names which from century to century were known only by the priests in their service and the initiates of the great mysteries. We do not yet know the real name of Rome.

Private and personal magic made the same efforts as the national priesthood to know the names necessary for the good or evil operations which it had in hand. Like the magic of the temples, it utilized all methods to penetrate the secrets of the names. It arranged them in the same way in lists and tables. A 'curse table,' a charm, or an amulet of the magic of Græco-Roman Egypt differed in no way in composition and appearance from the means invented by the regular priesthood (cf. Budge, *Egyptian Magic*, pp. 177-179, and the important considerations on the Egyptian origin of the rites of Gnostic magic).

The irresistible power of the name and the knowledge of the name being united, man was theoretically all-powerful. How, then, were so many failures in practice to be explained? The answer is easy. Non-civilized races have often answered it in their way. To evoke a name is the most difficult thing imaginable. A name is too living and subtle a thing for a few pronounced syllables of it to be magically its exact counterpart. Even an extraordinarily detailed collection of hundreds of precautions was not sufficient to give faithfully the cadence, tonality, rhythm, and accent of each of the chanted syllables which constituted a name. A single mistake destroyed the whole evocation, as a single fault in syntonization destroys all means of communication between two stations of telephony or of wireless telegraphy. A thousand unsuccessful attempts were explained just as easily, so that one single apparent success might be remembered as a decisive proof.

4. Primitive elements which have disappeared or are absent.—All the preceding facts refer to primitive Egypt. But at the most ancient period accessible to research several of the characteristics pointed out with regard to primitive peoples are no longer found; name-tabus do not occur, except under the reverential form prohibiting the thoughtless use of divine names (see below, § 7); the prohibition of ordinary names does not appear; and that of the names of the dead and of kings is replaced by the exact opposite. In fact, nobody any longer makes a lavish use of invocations or formulæ in the name of the dead; and, far from prohibiting names similar to those of gods or kings, the great majority of the Egyptians give their children names like those of the reigning Pharaoh, or expressing devotion or consecration to this sovereign master. The children called 'Pepy is living' in the VIth dynasty, the Amenhoteps and the Thotmeses of the XVIIIth, those called 'Great is the heart of Psammetichus' under the Saïtes, and so on throughout each reign, are innumerable. The hundreds of names derived from those of gods (their apparent names, of course) also show all the imaginable ways of uniting man to his gods by a series of names of relation, protection, love, or devotion.

The longest list is that of the ordinary theophoric names ending in *mas* (e.g., Thotmas = 'Thôth has fashioned him'), *hotep* (e.g., Amenhotep = 'He is united to Amôn'), *miri* (e.g., Phtahmiri = 'He is the beloved of Phtah'), *setpu* (e.g., Rinsotpu = 'He is the chosen or the elect of Râ'), etc. Apocopated theophoric names form the next important group, constructed on a plan similar to the Semitic formation (e.g., Abdu, 'He is his Servant,' i.e. the servant of God). The rest of the list is made up of groups of designations referring to physical pecu-

liarities, of epithets of praise or of good luck, etc. (cf., for details, Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, p. 158 ff.). Surnames, eponymous names (*ran nesir*), the great name (*ran ad*), etc., are simply determinative of everyday life or the commemoration of a notable fact, without any special religious importance.

Two other characteristics deserve mention: (1) there are only very faint traces of the belief in the re-incarnation of the dead in newly-born children, showing that this belief possibly existed at a time untouched by research, in the most remote archaic period; and (2) two passages in the so-called 'popular' literature seem to allude to the possibility that the newly-born infant received a secret name from its mother at birth; but nothing definite is known on the point.

With regard to 'totemic' names, if Egypt ever passed through this phase, there is no trace of it left in the periods known to us. At the time of the most ancient monuments, in order to confer on her living subjects and on her dead most of the protections which the totem and its name give to primitive races, Egypt had an amazingly perfect system of affiliation to the cult of a certain protector-god, by initiation into the mysteries of the god. The title *amkhu* assumed by the initiates is followed by the name of the god, to whom the man henceforth owes special allegiance, and from whom he will receive protection in this life and in the life to come. The abandonment of the childish secret and of the materially magical association between the man and the depositary of life is replaced by initiation of a properly religious character, and the divine name, being united, but not confused, with that of the man, marks reciprocal obligations and duties, to which time by degrees gives a moral character.

5. Written names.—Among non-civilized races the vital principle of the name may be materially seized and incorporated in another person or thing (cf. NAMES [Primitive]). The latter is consequently transformed into a living person possessing the personality of the one whose name has been pronounced. This theory gave rise to fetishes and idols. It led semi-civilized Egypt to try to reproduce persons and objects, and thus she made her first attempts at painting and modelling. She advanced no farther in this respect than a score of other races in modern Africa. But, when by pictography she attained a kind of magical semi-writing, the consequences were incalculable. On receiving a name, the written forms lived the same magic life as living beings. Having arisen from ideograms, then from phonetic signs, of a value independent of the characters or forms which were drawn, they retained the faculty of keeping alive the sounds which they wished to express. It was possible from that time to *write* a name, and, by pronouncing the name on the writing, to enclose it for ever alive with all its magical powers in the signs traced by the hand of man. Written magic was created. Henceforward all that the voice had been able only to evoke, writing could *fix*. Names and their powers were contained on a stone, on a board, or on a papyrus-leaf. The tables and 'conjuring books' of priestly magic appeared. The thousand applications of the names of gods, spirits, forces, substances, the dead, belong to the subject of magic (*q.v.*), and need not be enumerated here. But we must notice the chief consequences in order to understand the history of names in Egyptian civilization.

(1) If an object or substance (e.g., a papyrus-roll) contains written names, each of the signs of the name has the same marvellous power as the soul of the person possessing the name. The essential condition is that during the writing out the names are pronounced aloud. Hence the ability to transfer the soul by contact or mingling to whatever the priest or sorcerer wishes. A formula applied

to the forehead, or, better still, boiled and diluted in a beverage, introduces into the body the 'name-souls' of the gods or spirits whose names it contains. All countries have employed this method in their magic, but it was Egypt that first practised it.

(2) Every 'resemblance' of a person may become his exact equivalent by having his name inscribed on it (the name, of course, being pronounced during the operation)—e.g., the statues, figures, and figurines of temples and tombs, and the figures of the servants of the dead in the frescoes and bas-reliefs; for the applications made by sorcery and magic see artt. MAGIC.

The operation of 'making the name live' often ran the risk of exposing the name, thus written, to the exorcism of an enemy. The prohibitive formulae were some protection against the danger. The hiding-place of the statues in the *serdab* of the Memphite tombs was another protection. Several isolated cases show greater ingenuity. Maspero (*Guide Musée Caire*, p. 225) cites a *ushabti* (or funerary statue), on which the engraved name of the dead man has been covered with a layer of enamel. The same precaution has perhaps been taken in the case of some of the wooden statues covered with thin painted stucco preserved in our Egyptian museums.

(3) Other more curious examples show that the name, in its written form, could as a real material soul be incorporated with any object whatever, that it was instantaneously transformed into a person, or that it changed into a kind of talismanic shelter which would hide and guard the life of the individual for ever. The most convincing examples are given in the *Books of the Dead*. Both in funerary and in ordinary life they try to enclose the name-soul in scarabæi (cf. Maspero, *Guide*, p. 533) or in amulets and talismans (cf. Budge, *Egypt. Magic*, p. 160, and *Gods of the Egyptians*, i. 301), of which the museums show ingenious varieties.

The most characteristic of these methods is undoubtedly the small stone cut into the shape of the hieroglyphic sign meaning 'name' (𐀀), or *rân*, with the name of the possessor engraved on it (cf. Maspero, *Guide*, p. 525). It is interesting to compare with these customs the passage in Revelation (217) where it is said concerning the Church of Pergamos that the neophyte received 'a white stone, and upon the stone a new name written, which no one knoweth but he that receiveth it.'

It is therefore the very souls of the persons whose names are written on them that those *rân*-figures contain. This explains (a) the sacred value of the royal statues in Amarna, representing the Pharaoh and his relatives holding tightly in their hands large talismans of this shape, on which are inscribed the names of the king and the god Atonu; there could be no surer means of securing for ever the union of the two substances, the divine and the royal; (b) the numerous scenes in which the king offers, as a valuable *ex voto*, a tablet on which his name is inscribed; he is consecrating his soul to his god; (c) the abundance of those *rân*s among the royal names in the sacrifice scenes and on the pieces of sacred furniture. Through time the barbarity of the primitive idea was softened, and what was originally a work of divine sorcery was transformed into a proof of piety. We now understand the religious meaning of the Egyptian statues in which the worshippers unite their eternal destiny with that of their god by kneeling and holding, not a representation of the god, but a tablet on which is engraved the *rân*, the divine name-soul; of their master.

We now seem to be far removed from those first ages of Egyptian magic, when a person hid his name in an object, as the hero Bitu hid his soul in the blossom of a tree; and far from the strange magic of the Pyramid Texts, in which the name-soul of the king animates his crowns, weapons, throne, and the parts of his dress, where it is mingled with the name-souls of the gods. Thus the kings of Egypt, like those of Dahomey, passed their divine soul into their staff or their sceptre of power. Nevertheless the mystic scene of the *ashdu* tree

shows us that at the height of the classical period the king was led on the coronation day in front of the god-tree at Heliopolis—the tree in which one of the souls of Atumu dwelt—and that there his name was engraved on the fruits of the tree. The name-soul thus penetrated into the eternal substance of the god and there mingled its destiny for ever. Over a score of bas-reliefs prove the survival of such ceremonies as late as the XXth dynasty. But, as a matter of fact, during the historic period these rites were simply traditional ceremonies to which only a symbolical value was attached; and we may be sure that, in the coronation ceremony, as in the family-worship of the dead, 'to make the name live' had acquired the high meaning of commemoration which it has in our own day.

6. Names and creation.—As we said above, from the neolithic age to the classical period Egypt passed through the successive conceptions to be seen arising and evolving in the various religions of non-civilized races. Like the most 'primitive' of those, ancient Egypt was acquainted with the vague 'sky-god,' indistinguishable from the substance of the sky, the general author of life and death. The great Horus of the earliest legends, the god Anhur, the thunder-god Minu, giver of the rain which engenders life, the mysterious Atumu hidden in the primordial water, and ten others of the same kind were distributed among the local religions of pre-historic Egypt. In order to organize and vivify inert matter, and to 'create,' man had believed that he obtained the fertilizing substance from himself, from his sweat or his tears (Horus), his saliva (Knumu and Hikiti), or his semen (Atumu) when he was imagined as of the male sex. A second, more advanced, theory believed in birth by the supreme god. There were sky-goddesses (the pre-historic Nuit, Hathor, Mihit, Neith, and the pre-historic Isis) who were at first believed to be capable of conceiving by their own energy, then (in a more learned theory) fecundated by an exterior divine principle (hence, e.g., the common idea of cow-goddesses suckling human beings, then fecundated in their turn by the song to whom they have given birth; cf. the final theory of the sky-goddess represented as a cow, suckling the sun in the form of a calf, which, having become a bull, is the 'husband of his mother' and fecundates her with a constantly renewed life). Such theories gradually gave place, partly at least, to clearer theories, in which man, understanding the rôle of the sun better, assigned the first place to that luminary, who, however, still used material effort, or at least action, in order to create. This stage, which non-civilized races never surpassed, the Egyptians exceeded by a long way through their knowledge of names, and their ability to deduce from them. Finding in the omnipotence of the chanted voice, and consequently in the power of the name, the solutions of the problems of primitive races, the Egyptians decided that, if names are the vital substances of all beings, it was by names that creation was effected. The latent life was organized by the god, who, by pronouncing the names of all personalities and entities, created them. The vibrations of energy, co-ordinated in sonorous waves, formed chanted words, attracted matter, and animated it with as many different forms as there were names. It was at Hermopolis that theology arrived at this clever idea, and Thôth (later Hermes Trismegistus) was 'the god who created by the voice.' This fact is important for the origin of systems infinitely more philosophical which came to light later—e.g., Pythagoras's system of numbers.

7. The name of the Eternal.—If the name is the divinely originated particle which animates every living thing, Egyptian theology, proceeding from

one difficulty to another, had to face the problem of the origin of the creator-god himself. Like Genesis and the ancient demiurgies, it could not believe that the god pre-existed before matter, and tried to imagine how he freed himself from it in order afterwards to organize it. The most important of the Egyptian texts on this point is ch. xxviii. of the *Book of the Dead*, where the supreme god, in order to show himself and to obtain possession of his own person, utters his name himself, and at the same moment exists apart from matter (cf. Budge, *Gods of the Egyptians*, i. 307, and Erman, *Egypt. Religion*, p. 156).

Having arrived at this point, the theory of names entered a new phase, less limited by verbal magic, in which the crudeness of the primitive data was transformed until it reached a high stage of refinement. The divine name tended to become a power rather than a material soul; and, as Egyptian theology realized better the many aspects of the god and his energies, it saw that this power, single in its essence, was multiple in its manifestations. It explained the matter by teaching that the god had as many name-souls as he had attributes or functions (*aperai*). Hence legends like that of the sun creating his names in order to organize his powers as master of the universe; hence the series of names possessed by the chiefs of the divine world; and hence the necessity that man should know those names of his gods and the value of enumerations and lists. The range of such a principle was considerable. Round primitive divine names (we are speaking only of their unbidden names) new secondary names described their divine activities. They created gods 'one in several persons,' and the theological task was refined and perfected from century to century. In spite of the difficulty of such researches, Egyptology can now find out the oldest names of the great gods of pre-historic Egypt; it has recovered for each of the independent nations the old primordial gods, the general author of life and master of invisible things, the sky-gods represented as a hawk (Horus, Montu), an eagle (Minu, Anhmri), a ram (Knumu, Amonu), or, if they are goddesses, as a vulture (Manit), a cow (Nuit, Hathor, Mihit), etc. Their names expressed a pure and simple quality: 'The Mysterious,' 'The Hidden,' 'The Very Strong,' 'He who is on High,' etc. But, in proportion as divine intervention ceased to be confined to vague initial functions, and as its beneficent and active rôle multiplied in definite activities, so the name-souls multiplied also, and created the series of 'secondary persons' of the god. The separate functions were at first probably quite humble. Khonsu, called Nofirhotpu, was a healer and exorcizer, while Khonsu, named Pairisakhru, replied by oracles, and Khonsu, 'the brilliant dweller in Thebes,' magically protected the products of the earth. Time modified what was originally too material in this division of the powers of Khonsu. The powers of the gods contained in their divine names became especially aids and divine virtues. In the case of the great gods their number was augmented by all that was expected from them on the earth. The list of these names gradually included all the ideas of the Egyptian on the *θεῖον*. At the same time, if each of the names continued to make a new soul for the god, these souls gradually became merely manifestations, for the sake of the material world, of a single soul, whose names are pious epithets. As the same task was carried on for each of the great local gods, no means of fusion was more efficacious in multiplying hypostases. It is no exaggeration to say that the evolution of the rôle of the name has played a part of the greatest importance in the history of Egyptian syncretism.

8. Names of children of the gods.—In the case

of human beings a parallel evolution appears. Royal, feudal, and priestly names had at first been simple magical statements of the bond uniting the god to the person who bears a theophoric or theogenic name. They had protected with their mysterious power those on whom they had been conferred. Later they had established the delegation of power possessed by the representative of the gods on the earth. The modern Negus of Abyssinia, who at his coronation took the name of 'He who watches on the Frontiers,' simply did what the Pharaohs of ancient Egypt did (cf. KING [Egyptian]). But a day came when the coronation names of these kings lost their power of materially mingling with the magical souls of the gods to indicate the moral rôle, of justice and beneficence, which the kings expected to inherit from them on the earth (cf. *ib.*). The names of the feudal nobility and those of the servants of the gods underwent similar changes as each had his task pointed out in this world by the divine organizers of the *κόσμος* (see DUALISM [Egyptian]).

There is no doubt that a similar course was taken by the ideas connected with the names of ordinary mortals. Theophoric names (apocopated or not) and names taken from those of the king had the same crude magical beginnings; they gradually became a sign of piety and devotion towards the sovereign or divine patron. With those who took the names of the deceased ancestors of the family the idea might have been to revivify those names; but it was no longer in the sense attributed to it by primitive peoples; it was for the same purpose which we have to-day when we call our children after those whom we have loved and who are no more.

When formal magic thus gave up its rights in the power of names and its irresistible effects, the Egyptian metaphysics of the last twelve centuries took up the study of the matter. The virtues of the names passed from the Hermopolitan deminrgy into the refined systems of Hermesianism and Trismegistus, whence they spread to the ancient classical world of the Mediterranean. But in the low levels of human thought popular magic clung firmly to the original ideas. It persisted in seeking evocation by the names of the forces which it wished to subject, and did not fear to subjugate even the gods of good to the service of the absurd or of the individual passions. Extended gradually towards the gods of evil, it spread its 'Egyptian sorceries' in the empire, and, surviving after the old religions from which it arose, continued to our day its puerile or hateful pursuits. It shows by its recent successes in handling the names in the lists of demonology that, if there are still any 'primitive people' in this world, they are not necessarily to be looked for among uncivilized races.

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NAMES (Hebrew).—I. INTRODUCTION.—A few well-attested names have survived from the earliest centuries of the Hebrew nation, a far larger number from various periods of the monarchy (c. 1050-586 B.C.) and again from certain periods

between the Exile and the Fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. Even before the last date, and still more subsequently, the growing practice of naming children after relatives, especially the grandfather—a practice which was little if at all in vogue among the Hebrews before the 5th cent. B.C.²—and also the practice of reviving distinguished names of the past,³ and the incursion of foreign names (e.g., Persian, Greek, Roman), were leading to a great falling off in the creation of Hebrew names, at all events of such names as were really fresh and not mere abbreviations or modifications of existing names. The present survey, therefore, takes nothing more than incidental notice of Jewish names after A.D. 70.⁴

Names are principally (1) names of places, and (2) names of persons; (3) a third class, tribal or clan names, consists of names in large part closely related to one or other of the first two classes. The names of a large number of places occupied in historical times by the Hebrews are known; but it is certain that many of them were in existence before the Hebrews settled in Canaan, and it is probable that with few exceptions the place-names of Canaan mentioned in the Bible were given by Semites indeed, but not by that particular branch of Semites known to us as Hebrews. The discussion of these names falls outside the present article,⁵ which will be concerned only with personal names.

The sources of our knowledge of Hebrew names are mainly three: (1) the OT; (2) the Aramaic papyri⁶ discovered at Elephantine (and Assuan), which contain the names of several hundred Jews living at Elephantine in the 5th cent. B.C.; (3) Babylonian business documents,⁷ especially those found at Nippur and dating from the reigns of Artaxerxes I. and Darius II. (464–404 B.C.). Except in special instances, names from these sources will be cited without reference; but, unless the context already makes the provenance of a name clear, the Elephantine names will be distinguished by the addition of (Egyp.), the Babylonian by the addition of (Bab.). The Biblical names can easily be traced in Hebrew dictionaries or Biblical concordances,⁸ the Egyptian and Babylonian in the indexes to the works of Sayce and Cowley, of Sachau, and of Hilprecht and Clay cited in the footnotes. In addition to the OT, such literary sources as the extra-canonical literature of the Jews contain some names not otherwise known; and to the discovery of ostraka at Samaria we are indebted for knowledge of an important

group of Hebrew names assigned by the discoverers to the 9th cent. B.C.; unfortunately no facsimiles of the ostraka have yet been published nor have the inscriptions been systematically edited, and we remain dependent on merely provisional information.¹ A certain number both of names known from literary sources and of others not so known have been found on seals, coins, etc.²

The material furnished by all these sources is considerable; but there are difficulties in the use of it, and consequent uncertainties in conclusions derived from it, which should at the outset be briefly indicated. (1) Proper names are peculiarly liable to corruption in the process of transcription; and a comparison of the forms in the Hebrew text and the Greek version of the OT shows how frequently as a matter of fact Hebrew names preserved in literary sources have been misread.³ Names derived directly from the cuneiform tablets, the Samaritan ostraka, or the Egyptian papyri are, of course, exempt from this particular danger, though occasional examples of obvious mistakes of the scribe or engraver⁴ are found. But even with these names we have to allow for uncertainties of decipherment; these may arise from injury to the material on which the names are written or inscribed, or from the ambiguity of certain signs—e.g., in the Egyptian papyri the letters *d* and *r* are quite indistinguishable. (2) The chronology of names is frequently uncertain. There are in this connexion two distinct questions: (a) When was a given name first formed?; (b) To what date is a particular use of the name to be assigned? In general with regard to (a) we can rarely assert more than that a given name had been first formed as early as such and such a date—the date, namely, of the first person to bear the name. Question (b) turns on the character or trustworthiness of documents; e.g., granted that the papyri are genuine, it is certain that the name Penuliah (פְּנוּלִיָּה), though unknown to the OT, had been created as early as the 5th cent. B.C., for it occurs several times in the Elephantine papyri. So also, granted the correctness of the text, the name Gabael (גַּבְאֵל) was created as early as the date of the book of Tobit—say the 3rd cent. B.C.; but, in view of the general character of that book, the genealogy in which this name occurs cannot be described as good evidence that Gabael was as ancient as the 9th cent. B.C., to which the story refers it. So also many names referred in Chronicles to periods centuries earlier than that work, or in P to the Mosaic age, cannot safely be accepted as possessing the antiquity attributed to them: some of them may be very ancient, some almost certainly are not; but all that can safely be affirmed is that they are at least as ancient as the book of Chronicles in the one case, and as the source P in the other.⁵ (3) Even when a name can be read with certainty, and its age determined, its meaning may be obscure or am-

¹ See D. G. Lyon's art. in the *Harvard Theological Review* for January 1911, based on information supplied by the excavator, G. A. Reisner; *The Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement*, April 1911, pp. 79–83 (S. R. Driver); *Revue Biblique*, April, 1911, pp. 290–293 (F. M. Abel); G. B. Gray, *ExpT* xxvii. [1915] 57–62.

² M. A. Levy, *Siegel und Gemmen*, Leipzig, 1869, c. iii. 'Siegel mit althebräischen Inschriften'; F. W. Madden, *Coins of the Jews*, London, 1903; cf. G. A. Cooke, *Text-book of North Semitic Inscriptions*, Oxford, 1903; M. Lidzbarski, *Handbuch der nordsemitische Epigraphik*, Berlin, 1898, and *Ephemeris*, i.–iii. [Giessen, 1900–12]; Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, *Repertoire d'Épigraphie sémitique*, i. and ii., Paris, 1900–15.

³ See, e.g., the notes to the lists of names in *HPN*, pp. 277–310, or cf. the equivalents in Hatch and Redpath's *Concordance to the LXX* (Supplement i.). The extent of corruption was, however, exaggerated by T. K. Cheyne (*EBi*, *passim*, *Critica Biblica*, etc.); see G. B. Gray, 'The . . . Textual Tradition of Hebrew Proper Names,' in *JQR* xiii. [1900–01] 875–391.

⁴ Cf. Lidzbarski, *Handbuch der nordsem. Epigraphik*, p. 128 f.

⁵ See *HPN*, ch. iii.

¹ G. B. Gray, *Studies in Hebrew Proper Names* (cited hereafter as *HPN*), p. 2 f.

² *Ib.*; also, in further detail and with some correction, G. B. Gray, 'Children named after Ancestors in the Aramaic Papyri from Elephantine and Assuan,' in *Studien zur semitischen Philologie* . . . Julius Wellhausen . . . gewidmet, Giessen, 1914, p. 163 ff.

³ *HPN*, p. 7, with the references in n. 1.

⁴ For these names see L. Zunz, *Namen der Juden* (1837), reprinted in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Berlin, 1876, li. 1–82; H. P. Chajes, *Beiträge zur nordsem. Onomatologie*, Vienna, 1900.

⁵ The present writer has discussed them elsewhere; see *EBi*, 8307–8320, where (3308) evidence is given for the statement above that many place-names were certainly pre-Hebraic.

⁶ A. H. Sayce and A. E. Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri discovered at Assuan*, London, 1906 (with index of the proper names); E. Sachau, *Aramäische Papyrus und Ostraka aus Elephantine*, Leipzig, 1911 (also with index of proper names).

⁷ H. V. Hilprecht and A. T. Clay, 'Business Documents of Murashu Sons of Nippur,' in Series A: *Cuneiform Texts of the Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania*, vols. ix., x., Philadelphia, 1898–1904; and A. T. Clay, *University of Pennsylvania, The Museum Publications of the Babylonian Section*, vol. ii. no. 1, do. 1912. A few Jewish names of the reigns of Cyrus and Darius are given in K. L. Tallqvist, *Neubabylonisches Namenbuch*, Helsingfors, 1905; cf. S. Daiches, *The Jews in Babylonia in the Time of Ezra and Nehemiah according to Babylonian Inscriptions*, London, 1910.

⁸ To facilitate reference Biblical names will generally be cited by the forms given in the EV; to which recognized dots under letters and the sign ' for y will sometimes be added.

biguons. As a matter of fact, the meanings of many Hebrew names remain quite uncertain, and some apparently obvious and straightforward names are ambiguous; e.g., does Azaniah mean 'God hears,' or, as Nöldeke thinks, 'God weighs'? Either meaning is possible enough; the root נח , 'to hear,' is familiar, though the verbal form in use is Hiphil, not Kal; the verb נח , 'to weigh,' is not actually found in Hebrew literature, but its existence is perhaps attested by כאונים , 'scales.' Even when the etymology of a name is clear and unambiguous and the meaning in part clear, the complete meaning may remain ambiguous. Azariah means 'Jahweh has helped'; but whom? and how? Such uncertainties can only be limited in proportion as it is possible to group and classify names. Before leaving this question of ambiguity, it should be remembered that the same name probably acquired different ranges of meaning at different periods and in different circles; and that the continued existence of some names was probably promoted by the ease with which the sense in which they might be understood could be modified. The various stories of the naming of children show how easily the real etymology, even if fairly obvious, could be set aside in favour of a false one. Samuel really meant 'name of God':¹ but it might be given by some one who wished to record that the child had been 'asked of God' (1 S 1²⁰). Jesus or Joshua certainly had originally no reference to deliverance from sin (Mt 1²¹), though it is not inconceivable that in certain circles even before the Christian era the name was sometimes chosen because this meaning had been imported into it.

Owing to the various uncertainties and ambiguities arising from the causes just indicated, it is obviously unwise to base any far-reaching conclusions on a single name, especially if that name is but once attested. Guided by this consideration, we may proceed first to a general survey of the meanings of Hebrew names, reserving for the close of our discussion some reference to their chronological distribution, and some account of one or two special problems.

II. CLASSIFICATION.—Hebrew names may be classified in respect of their formation,² as (i.) simple, i.e. consisting of a single element—e.g., 'Ikkesli, 'crooked'; or (ii.) compound, i.e. consisting of more than one element—e.g., Nathanael, 'God has given.' Compound names are most common, like the example just cited, sentences; simple names are commonly epithets; but some compounds are epithets—e.g., Obadiah, 'servant of Jah(weh),' and others in which the two elements are nouns in the genitive relation, and a large number of simple names are sentences or are derived from sentences; such, e.g., are those which consist of the 3rd pers. sing. of a verb; e.g., Nathan, '(he) has given.' The example just cited is really an abbreviation of such statements as 'God (or Jahweh) has given,' which fuller statements also occur as proper names (Nathanael, Elnathan, J[eh]onathan). Occasionally at least the same individual was known by both the longer and the shorter form; thus Ahaz, king of Judah, is named by the fuller form Jehoahaz in an inscription of Tiglath-pileser. So also in the Elephantine papyri כחיה and כחיה interchange, כחיה once appears as כחיה (see the notes in Sayce-Cowley on A. 9, D. 36), and כחיה of Sachau 4² is probably identical with כחיה of Sayce-Cowley H. 16,

J. 17. But, generally speaking, such longer and shorter forms are distinct names applicable to different people. Another considerable class of names (caritatives)³ consists of abbreviations or modifications of what were originally sentences—names in which one element is not simply omitted but is replaced by an ending, some modification especially in the vocalization often taking place in the other element also; in this way it is probable, e.g., that many names in א —are to be explained; thus Shimea (שמעיה) is probably an abbreviation of Shemaiah (שמעיה), Abda (עבדה) of Obadiah or Abdeel, or the like. In so far as such abbreviated or modified forms retained their meaning, it was the meaning of the sentences of which they were abbreviations that they would naturally express and suggest, though many such forms may of course have been peculiarly liable to be used also with fresh meanings alien from their actual etymology. Further probable examples of modifications of what were originally sentences are to be found, e.g., in names of the form קטל ; thus Zaccur, Hasshub, Jaddna, Malluch, Nahum, 'Azzur, 'Akkub, Sadduc (Jos. Ant. XVIII. i. 1), Shallum, Shammua; the frequently recurring נח and נח of the Elephantine papyri may some or all be modifications of Zachariah, Hashabiah, Jedaiah, Malchiah, Nehemiah, 'Azariah, 'Akabiah (cf. Aqbi-ia-a-ma [Bab.] and Phoen. Bel'akab), Zedekiah, Shelemiah, Shemaiah, Gedaliah, Nethaniah respectively, and should in that case be interpreted accordingly, '(Jahweh) has remembered,' 'regarded,' 'known,' etc.⁴ Differently vocalized, some of these names might be passive participles or adjectives; in that case they would be epithets, and Zaccur (not Zaccur) would mean 'remembered,' 'Azur (not 'Azzur) would mean 'helped'; Gadol (not Gaddul), though it would still be ambiguous (see below), might mean 'great.' But for the existence of names of the form קטל we do not rest only on the vocalization of MT; for (1) many Greek forms contain the reduplicated middle consonant: so Ζακχουρ , Ἀκκουβ , Σαλλουμ , Σαμμουε in the LXX, and Ζαδδουκος and Ιαδδουρ in Josephus; (2) the passive participles from the roots appearing in Shallum and Nahum would be not Shalum and Nahum but Meshullam, which frequently appears

¹ E. Renan, 'Des Noms théophores apocopes,' in *REV* v. 161ff.; Nöldeke, art. 'Names,' in *EBI*, §§ 49-57; Lidzbarski, 'Semitische Kosenamen,' in *Eph.* ii. 1-23.

² To be vocalized, perhaps, Gaddul, Nattun, rather than Gaddol (Sayce-Cowley), Nathun, though in the latter, as in other similar names, the Babylonian forms commonly show only the single middle radical; e.g., Na-tu-nu, A-ku-bu, Za-bu-dn; an instance of the reduplication in Bab. is Sa-at-tu-ru; cf. the Biblical כחיה pointed כחיה in MT, but probably enough originally pronounced כחיה .

³ Cf. Lidzbarski, *op. cit.* p. 21, from whom most of the examples given above have been cited. It is worth observing that most of these names first appear relatively late; an isolated early example would be the name of David's contemporary, if this were pronounced not דוד (MT; EV 'Zadok') but, as in some MSS of the LXX, Ζαδδουκ (cf. P. de Lagarde, *Bildung der Nomina*, Göttingen, 1889, p. 227ff.) like the Ζαδδουκος of a later age cited above. The name דוד of the Elephantine papyri in view of the consistent absence of the ד is probably neither Zadok (Sayce-Cowley) nor Zaddnk, but דוד , resembling in form דוד , Nathan, cited above. Similarly the Gileadite usurper (c. 740 B.C.) may have been named שלם (2 K. 15¹⁰), i.e. Stillel, rather than שלום (2 K. 16¹⁸⁻¹⁹); LXX has consistently in 2 K. 15¹⁰⁻¹⁵ Σαλλαμ , not as, e.g., in 1 Ch 24¹⁰ of another person, Σαλλουμ . So also שלם , Σαλλαμ of Jer 22¹¹ may have been שלם rather than שלום as in 1 Ch 3¹⁵. Apart from דוד and שלם the earliest attested examples of names of the form קטל are עוזר (Jer 23¹) and נחום (Nab 1¹). Most of these names are confined to, but some of them are frequent in, Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah; זכור and שכוע also appear in P; עוזר , זכור , שלום , and שכוע also occur, some of them frequently, in the Elephantine papyri, and עקוב and שכוע in the Babylonian tablets.

⁴ Cf. Nöldeke, 'Names,' in *EBI*, § 56.

¹ Against some recent attempts to explain the name otherwise, see S. R. Driver, *Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Samuel*, Oxford, 1913, pp. 16-19.

² Into details as to the various grammatical forms of the compound names it is impossible to enter here; see *HPN* under 'Grammatical Structure of Compound Names,' in the Index; and *EBI*, s.v. 'Names' (§§ 20-23, 75-70).

as a proper name, and Menuham.¹ It may well be that some names like Hanun which are pointed in the MT as passive participles were actually examples of the form *kattāl*, though Hanun in particular has the single *n* in Babylonian documents (Hilprecht-Clay, ix. 27. 59). But these ambiguities, like many others connected with names, it is rarely possible to eliminate with certainty in the case of particular examples; in general we may conclude that some examples of both forms—*kattāl* and *kāṭāl*—were in use. It is impossible to enter here into other certain or possible types of caritatives such as the form *kattai*, possibly a further modification of an original *katalyah*, so that, e.g., Zaccai (זכאי) as well as Zaccur would be derived from Zechariah.

Sentence-names are almost all of religious significance; so also are some of the names that are epithets, especially such of these names as are compounds; but epithets consisting of a single element are in many cases not of religious meaning. We may first survey those names which are simpler in form and secular or less markedly religious in meaning, passing then to those in which a religious meaning is at all events more obvious.

i. SIMPLE NAMES OR EPITHETS.—Jacob may or may not mean 'one that takes hold of another by the heel,' and the circumstances of the child's birth may or may not have been as described in Gn 25²⁵; but the story is good evidence that the circumstances of birth might suggest a child's name. So, again, though it is wholly improbable that Esau means 'red,' and not certain that it means 'hairy,' Gn 25²⁵ indicates that the physical appearance of the new-born child might suggest its name. Some of the Hebrew names have more or less clearly meanings that suggest such origins.

1. Circumstances of birth.—(a) Yathom, Yathomah, and, less clearly, Yathma²—names which occur in the Elephantine papyri—mean 'orphan' or 'fatherless,' and they were probably given to posthumous children. Nöldeke would interpret Jotham and Akkub (OT; Egypt; Bab.) in the same way; but both these names are ambiguous and may be quite differently explained (see above for Akkub, and ii. (4) below for Jotham). The mother of Azubah, 'forsaken,' may have died in childbirth.

(b) One or other of two children born at a birth might be called Thomas (תאם), 'twin'; and a small group of names is perhaps to be explained of the relationship established by the birth: Ahab means 'father's brother'; Ahiam should perhaps be vocalized 'Ah'em, 'mother's brother'; Ahumai, if not rather a caritative, may mean 'brother of my mother.' 'The idea is that the new-born child will at some future time stand by his mother, as if he were her brother' (Nöldeke, *EBi* iii. 3296).

(c) Becher (בכר), if vocalized Bechor, would mean 'first-born'; but both this name and Bichri may rather be derived from בָּכָר, a young camel (cf. 2 (e)). And, though Hakkatan may mean 'the youngest,' it is doubtful whether the proper name is to be so explained (see 2 (b) below).

(d) Among the clearest examples of this whole class are names that refer to the time of birth. Haggai (OT; Egypt; Bab.), a very popular name in and after the 6th cent., means 'festal,' i.e. born at the feast; and the earlier attested woman's name Haggith has the same meaning. Shabbethai

(OT; Egypt; Bab.) means 'Sabbatical,' i.e. born on the Sabbath; cf. שַׁבְּתָי (Sachau, *Tafel* 62, no. 1, col. ii. 4), Σαββαίος (Jos. *Ant.* XIII. iii. iv.), and Barsabbas (Ac 1²³ 15²³). Hodesh, if rightly read in 1 Ch 8⁸, may, like the more obvious Phen. בְּנוֹרָה, mean 'one born at the new moon'; and possibly פֶּסַח (MT, RV, Peseah) may mean 'one born at Passover' (but see also under 2 (d)).

(e) Place of birth or race suggested a few names: Jehudi, 'Jew'; Judith, 'Jewess'; Cushi, 'Ethiopian'; Beeri, 'belonging to (born at) Beer'; Baalmeoni (Samaritan ostraka), 'belonging to (born at) Baalmeon.' Most, however, of the numerous names ending in —, ē, are not *gentilicia*, but caritatives.

2. Physical characteristics.—(a) Sex perhaps suggested the name Geber, 'man,' or 'male' (cf. Job 3⁸ RV).

(b) Size apparently is referred to in Hakkatan, 'the small one' (rather than 'the youngest'; see 1 (c)). Gadol (Egypt), even if rightly punctuated so, is rather a sentence with suppression of the divine subject than an epithet, 'the large one.'

(c) There is more and better evidence that colour suggested names (cf. Gn 25²⁵), though not all of the following are equally certain: Laban, Lebanah, Libni, Labani (Bab.) may all mean 'white'; Haruz, 'yellow'; Zohar, 'reddish white'; Sheharhor, a name probably occurring on a Hebrew seal (*JA*, 1883, p. 156), 'black' (cf. Ca 1⁶).

(d) Defects gave rise to another group of names, though again some of the following might be questioned: baldness suggested Kareah (to be vocalized Kēreah) and, perhaps, Korah; dumbness, Heresh; crookedness, Ikqesh; scabbiness, Gareb; leprosy, Zeru'ah. Gideon, Gideoni, like the Arabic *jud'an*, may mean 'maimed'; Peseah, if vocalized Pisseah, would mean 'halting' (but see also under 1 (d)); 'Ater (OT; Egypt), if vocalized 'Itter, would mean 'left-handed'; but it is not improbably an abbreviation. Harim, Harum, Harumaph, may mean 'with slit nose.'

(e) Some of the rather numerous class of names derived from animals, plants, and various objects may have been given because the animal or object in question conspicuously suggested a physical characteristic detected in the infant or which it was desired the child should possess when grown up. But in any particular instance the original cause of such names is generally ambiguous; they may have reference not to physical characteristics, but to some accidental connexion of the object in question with the birth; according to Wetzstein, a Bedawi girl was called 'snow-flake' because it was snowy at the time of her birth (cited in *EBi* iii. 3300), and possibly the Hebrew Barak, 'lightning,' should be similarly explained; in such cases the name should really be classed under (1). Names derived from animals, again, have often been explained by social and religious developments (see below). But, with this warning as to the uncertain cause of these names, we can as conveniently here as anywhere give illustrations of the general class of names derived from animals, etc.

(a) Animals.—The majority of the proper names derived from animals and mentioned in the OT occur as names either of places or clans or of foreign individuals. As against some 80 such names of places, clans, or foreign individuals, there are at most some 20 of Hebrew individuals (all pre-Exilic); these include Deborah, 'bee'; Aiah, 'vulture'; Zimri, probably derived from *zemer*, 'a mountain sheep'; Jonah, 'dove'; Zibiah, 'gazelle'; Huldah, 'weasel'; Achbor, 'mouse'; Shaphan, 'rock-badger.' For other examples, many of which are uncertain, see *HPN*, p. 97 ff.

(b) Plants.—Names of individuals derived from plants are very few: Susanna, 'lily,' and Tamar,

¹ It is interesting, if not also significant, to note the form *kattāl* in modern names; in Algiers Abdallah becomes 'Abbād, in Syria 'Abd-el-Kādir becomes Kaddūra (cf. in Algiers Kaddūr). See A. Socin's art. 'Die arabischen Eigennamen' in *ZDJG* liii. [1899] 482–485, who compares with these Arabic formations the Hebrew חַתְּנִי, רִאשִׁי.

² Cf. *PSBA*, 1903, p. 259, where it is suggested that Yathom was originally read in 1 Ch 11⁴⁶.

date-palm,' are among the clearest; Hadassah, 'myrtle'; Rimmon, the father (? individual or clan) of Baanah and Rechab, means 'pomegranate'; Zethan is derived from *zayith*, 'olive.' Hi-il-lu-mu-tu (Bab.) may be identical with חלמל (Job 6⁶), 'purslain' (?).

(7) *Various objects*.—Bakbnk means 'pitcher'; Hotham, 'seal' or 'signet-ring'; Rizpah, 'pavement'; Achsah, 'anklet'; Shoham, 'onyx' (or some other precious stone); Keziah, 'cassia'; Keren-happuch, 'box of antimony.' Rebecca (MT Ribkah) may, like the Arabic *ribk*, mean 'a cord for tying lambs or kids.'

3. Mental and moral qualities.—Some names probably imply such qualities, and those not always of a desirable kind; e.g., Nabal means 'fool.' More intelligible are names denoting pleasantness, such as Na'omi, Na'amah, Na'aman, unless, indeed, some or all of these are rather connected with Adonis-worship.

ii. COMPOUND NAMES: NAMES WITH A RELIGIOUS MEANING, OR DERIVATIVES FROM SUCH NAMES.—Names of this class are more numerous than are those of class i., and they are far more frequently used; whereas most of the names cited under i. are known to have been borne by one, or perhaps two, individuals, many of the names of this class are known to have been borne by several persons, and some of them by more than a dozen different individuals.

It will be best to take primary account of the unabbreviated compound names—names, that is to say, in which both the subject and predicate of the sentence are expressed, or, in the case of compound epithets, in which both construct and genitive are expressed. The abbreviated names may sometimes be cited to enforce points that are established by the unabbreviated forms.

The subjects most frequently occurring in these sentence-names are (1) the proper name of the national God of the Hebrews, Jahweh, in one of several abbreviated forms;¹ (2) El, 'god'; (3) Ba'al, 'owner'; (4) Adoni, 'lord'; (5) Melech, 'king'; (6) Ab(i), 'father'; (7) Ah(i), 'brother'; (8) Am(mi), 'kinsman'; (9) S(h)em(n), 'name.' Some rarer elements in compound names, such as *ohel*, 'tent,' may be disregarded here; the others just cited refer to some divinity; whether they all refer to the same divinity is discussed below.

Of these subjects or divine elements in names, the most frequent is Jah(weh); the OT contains upwards of 150 different names into which the element Jah(weh) enters, and mentions over 500² persons whose names contain that element. The Samaritan ostraka, the Elephantine papyri, the Nippur tablets, and other sources add to this number both of names and of persons; e.g., out of some 400 Jews named in the papyri between 150 and 170 bear a name containing Jah(weh). Next to Jahweh, El is the most frequent divine element, the known personal names containing it and mentioned in the OT numbering about 113 (including some tribal names); next in frequency come compounds with Ab and Ah, each of these, however, entering into fewer than 25 names. Compounds with Am, Ba'al, Melech, Adon, number less than a dozen each, and Shaddai, Zur; and Shem form each of them a part of two or three names only.

¹ In the OT יהוה and יי (EV *Jehō*, *Jo*) at the beginning of names, and יה and יי (EV *'jah*) and occasionally יי at the end; in the Samaritan ostraka י at both the beginning and the end of names; in the Elephantine papyri יה and once or twice ייה at the beginning, and י at the end of names; on the Babylonian tablets from Nippur *Ja-a-bu* at the beginning and *ia-a-ma* (pronounced *ia-ma*) at the end.

² This includes a number of persons mentioned in Chronicles who may be fictitious; but the actual persons in question must number between 300 and 400 at least.

A few fresh names¹ belonging to some of these classes, but not recorded in the OT, can be gleaned from other sources; but the additions thus made to our knowledge are far less numerous than in the case of compounds with Jah(weh).

We turn next to the kind of predicates attached to these subjects.

(1) An interesting, and in some respects ambiguous, group consists of names which contain two of the divine terms, one being subject, the other predicate, though another view is sometimes taken of the relation of the two terms in some of these names. This group includes Eliab, Abiel; Eliam, Ammiel; Hiel (= Ahiel), Ahijah, Joah; Abijah, Joab; Elijah, Jo'el (probably); Zuriel, Elizur, Zuri-shaddai; Bealial (MT, Ba'al-yah); Adonijah; Malchiah (= Malchiyah); Elimelech, Malchiel; Abimelech; Ahimelech. Somewhat similar are the names in which the personal pronoun forms one of the elements: these are Elihu, 'he is (my) god'; Abihu, 'he is (my) father'; Jehu, 'He is Jahweh.' Alongside of Abihu (אביו) as the name of a man we find in the Elephantine papyri אביו used exclusively as a woman's name; since this ought strictly to mean 'She is (my) father,' but cannot well actually do so, we should perhaps see in it merely a feminine form of a name whose original significance had been lost.

(2) As many of the epithet-names noted under i. have reference to the circumstances of the birth of the child, so also have a number of the sentence-names: they assert something of God in reference to the birth. Since, however, the Hebrew sentence-names are incomplete, leaving the object of the transitive verbs that enter into them unexpressed, it is not, indeed, always possible to be certain that a particular name originally referred to the birth of the child; and, again, this very incompleteness of expression readily allowed any name, once it was current, to be used afresh with a different and wider meaning than it originally possessed. But with these possibilities in view we may now group together some names that most probably referred primarily to the birth, taking next names that predicate other activities of the deity, then those that attribute certain qualities to the deity, and then a small group in which the deity is the object of the sentence.

The object unexpressed but understood of the verbs meaning 'to give' used in proper names was primarily the new-born child. The chief verbs in question are *nathan*, *zabad*, and probably *nadab*; the names are Jonathan, Nethaniah, Elnathan, Nathanael, Nathan(e)l, Nethanmelech; Elzabad, Jehozabad, Zebadiah; Jonadab, Nedabiah, Abinadab, Ahinadab. The same idea is expressed in some compound epithet-names which describe the child as the gift of God: so Mattaniah, Mat(tat)hias, Mattithiah, Zabdiel. From these names we find a number of others derived by abbreviation, with or without other modification: so Nathan, and perhaps נח (Egyp.), Mattan, Matthal, Mattenai, Nadab, Zabad, Zabdi, Zabhud, Zabbai.

The gift of the child was often regarded as the answer to a petition that God had heard. Hence probably the names that predicate of God answering (*anah*), hearing (*shama*), listening (*azan*?) are closely related to those just discussed: such names are Ishmaiah, ייחמא (Egyp.), Shemaiah, Hoshama (= Jehoshama), Elishama, Anaiah, Azaniah. A frequent derivative is Shammua (OT; Egyp.; Bab.?). If Ananiah should be pointed Ananijah, 'Jahweh has answered me' (Nöldeke), we have a more directly expressed confession of the mother.

Birth was also regarded as due to an act of remembrance on the part of God (Gn 30²²); hence

¹ Abiha'al, Ba'alzamar, Khanan'am (Sam. ostraka); אכער (Egyp.).

perhaps we should class here compounds with *zakar*, 'remember,' and *hashab*, 'to take account of.' These compounds include the very popular name Zachariah (OT; Egypt.) with its almost equally frequent derivative Zaccur, and Hashabiah; perhaps also Hashabniah (for Hashabaniyah, 'Jahweh has taken account of me').

The preceding names would be suitable for any child. On the other hand, Pethaliah, 'Jahweh has opened (the womb)' (cf. Gn 30²³), would point to a first-born, while Eliasaph, 'God has added to, or increased (the family),' would point to a younger member of the family; on the other hand, Josiphiah, 'May Jahweh increase,' would be applicable at the birth of a first-born (Gn 30²⁴) or another equally. Of similar meaning may be Benaiah, Benaël (Bab.), 'Jahweh (or God) hath built up' (cf. Gn 30²⁵).

(3) It must suffice to refer briefly to some of the names that predicate other activities of God than those connected with birth; as some of the names just mentioned may have taken on a wider reference, so some of these, such as Nehemiah, 'Jahweh has comforted,' Rephaiah, Raphael, 'Jahweh (God) has healed,' might, if we were more fully informed, be seen to have had originally a reference to birth.

(a) The most general verbs of activity are predicated of God, viz. *asah*, 'to work,' 'make,' *bara*, 'to create,' in Eleasah, Asabel, Asalah, Jaasiel, Beraiah (only in 1 Ch 8²¹). (b) God interposes or exercises authority. He judges (Jehoshaphat, Shephatiah, Elishaphat, Yedoniah [Egypt.]), contends (Jeholairib, and probably Israel, Seralah), is king (Malchiah). (c) God helps (Azariah, Eleazar, Azareel), sustains (Semachiah, Ismachiah), carries (Amasiah; cf. Is 46³⁴), holds fast (Jehoahaz, Ahaziah), conceals (Elizaphan, Zephaniah), and strengthens (so, perhaps, Ezekiel, Hezekiah). (d) He delivers (Pelatiah, Elpalet, Eliphalet, Paltiel, Hoshaiah; cf. Isaiah, Joshua, Jesus), redeems (Pedahel, Pedalah, Pedahzur, Iphdeiah), guards (Shemariah). He is with men (Immanuel; Egypt. *imnū*) to help them, or on their side (Bab. Jahulakim, Jahulunū). Much the same idea is expressed by saying that Jahweh is the place of shelter or refuge (Mahseiah [Egypt.], Me'ozziyyah (Egypt.), and, if we re-point Ma'aziah, Me'ozziyyah also in OT), *מִצְלוֹתָיו* (Egypt.). (e) God brings back (Elishah, Yoyashib [Sam. ostraka]), or is hesought to return (cf. [?] Nu 10³⁹; Shubael, Shebuel), dwells (among His people, Shecaniah), blesses (Berechiah, Jeberechiah, Barachel), is gracious to (Hananeel, Elhanan, Hananiah, Jehoanan, Ba'ahanan), knows (Eliada, Beeliada, Jehoiada, Jedaiah), and enlightens (Pekahiah) (them).

(4) Qualities of God are literally or metaphorically, directly or indirectly, predicated in the following: He is strong (Amaziah), great (Gedaliah, Igdaliah, and perhaps Athaliah), good (Tobiah, Abitub, Ahitub), perfect (Jotham), high (Jehoram), incomparable (Micaiah, Michael), just (Jehozadak, Zedekiah), kind (Hasadiah); he is light (Neriaah, Abner), and fire (Urijah). In the ancient names compounded with Ab, Ah, and 'Am, it is asserted, if the obvious is the right interpretation, that the divine subject is the dawn (Ahishahar), dew (Abital; cf. *רוֹס*, Egypt.), pleasantness (Abino'am, Ahino'am), death (Ahimoth).

(5) In a small number of names the deity is not the subject, but the object of the sentence, the subject being (even if not expressed) a human being or human beings. With these names may be classed certain compound epithets which imply that God is the object of man's worship or the like. Such names are Shealti-el, 'I have asked God'; Elihoenai, 'Unto Jahweh are my eyes' (cf. Ps 123²); Hodaviah (OT and Egypt.), perhaps to be pointed Hoddiah, in which case it would mean 'Praise ye Jahweh' and resemble somewhat the curious name of the Elephantine papyri Penuliah, 'Turn ye to Jah(weh)'. Another example, concealed by the Massoretic punctuation, is perhaps Hachaliah, which, if pointed *חַלְיָהוּ*, would mean 'Wait for Jahweh.' Of the epithets it may suffice to recall the frequent Obadiah, and the less common Abdeel, 'Servant of Jahweh (God).'

III. CHRONOLOGY. — In the preceding general

survey only occasional reference has been made to the chronology of the names; here a little more may be said on the subject, though it is impossible to discuss it with any fullness. In the thousand years or more covered by this survey it would only be natural to expect that certain changes took place; and we can infer the nature of some of them with a tolerable degree of probability. Certain classes of names represented in the earliest periods disappear or nearly disappear later; others increase in popularity. If we accept the evidence of P on this point, compounds with Shaddai, the name of God which was, on the theory of P, characteristic of the patriarchal age, and Zur (Sur=Rock, obviously used as a name or epithet of God) were in use in the Mosaic age, but none is recorded later. We move on to surer ground when we say that compounds with Ab, Ah, and 'Am, which were rather frequent in the earlier periods, almost disappear after the 7th cent. B.C., two or three of each class alone surviving, and few if any fresh names of the class being created. The Biblical evidence on this point is discussed at length in *HPN*, p. 22 ff., and the conclusions there drawn are not appreciably affected by the fresh evidence that has since come to light. Thus, it is entirely in accordance with what the Biblical evidence leads us to expect that a fair sprinkling of these names is found in the Samaritan ostraka of the 9th cent. B.C. The only name of any one of these three classes that occurs with any frequency as that of a Jew in the Egyptian and Babylonian documents of the 5th cent. is Ahio or Ahijah (Egypt. *ahw*, Bab. *Ahi-ia-a-ma*). The rest are mostly the names of a single person; they are Abihu (and Abihi commented on above), Ahutab (=Ahitab), Ahiah (=Ahab), and a name unknown to the OT, *אֲחִיב*; the last is possibly a late formation, but probably not. Compounds with Ba'al, not infrequent in the Davidic age and, a century later, on the Samaritan ostraka, disappear altogether subsequently, except perhaps for one occurrence in the Babylonian tablets in the 5th cent. (Ba-li-ia-a-ma), where, however, the first syllable is marked in Clay's Index with a query. The compounds with *melech* are with one exception confined to the pre-Exilic period, though none of them even then occurred with any frequency; the exception is Malchiah, which was popular after the Exile both in Palestine and in Egypt. Infrequent in early times, compounds with *adan* and *shem* do not appear at all later.

The only two classes of compounds that are at all frequent later—and both these kinds are very frequent—are compounds with Jah(weh) and with El. Both classes were ancient, though in the earliest period, if we may safely draw conclusions from the book of Judges, they formed at first a very small proportion of the names in use; by the age of David, however, they together formed about a fifth, in the Samaritan ostraka about a quarter, and at the end of the 7th cent. B.C. more than two-thirds, of the names in use. If this very high proportion is somewhat lessened again later, it is not because older and discarded classes again became popular, but because caritatives (abbreviations) formed from names of this class gained in popularity; names like Menahem, Meshullam, Zaccur, Shilem, or Shallam occur with great frequency in the Elephantine papyri; but, though the deity is not expressly named in them, they differ totally from most of the names of one element in earlier times.

In the relative popularity of compounds with El and compounds with Jahweh there is some fluctuation; after an earlier period in which the more ancient compounds with El must presumably have preponderated over compounds with Jah(weh), the latter already in the Davidic period are more fre-

quent, and become increasingly so: among Jeremiah's contemporaries compounds with Jah(weh) occur six times as often as those with El. After that we can trace a difference of development among different groups of Jews: with the Jews of Elephantine compounds with Jah(weh) are still very frequent, and apparently a few fresh names of the type were created by them; but compounds with El have virtually disappeared, for the little special group of compounds with Bethel (see below) are different in character. On the other hand, at the same period in Nippur we find unmistakable Jewish names containing El as well as Jah, and probably compounds with El were there and then relatively to the compounds with Jah(weh) more numerous than in Palestine before the Exile. But in the post-Exilic Palestinian names we also note a renewal in the popularity of compounds with El; compounds with Jah still very largely outnumber them, but the disproportion is perceptibly less than before the Exile.

Names derived from animals, never frequent as personal names, are as such not found after the Exile; and more generally we may observe that the proportion of epithet-names is much smaller in the latest than in the earliest periods.

IV. *CONCLUSION.*—To what extent do these changes cast light on developments in Jewish religion? Does the practical elimination of all classes of compounds except those containing El and Jah point to the abandonment of other worships? To what extent do the names of any period reflect 'Israel's polytheism'? It will be possible to offer only a few brief remarks on these questions.

In the animal-names some, and pre-eminently W. R. Smith,¹ have found traces of totemism. That about a hundred places, clans, or persons, some belonging to, others not belonging to, Israel, named in the OT have names more or less clearly identical with or derivative from names of animals is altogether insufficient by itself to prove the existence of totemism. On the other hand, if other evidence tends to show that totemism may lie behind Hebrew social organization and religion, this would also satisfactorily explain certain features of the group of animal-names in the OT—and in particular the relatively small number of those that attach to individuals. Of this small number, four occur in the 7th cent., and may be connected with the existence, perhaps the recrudescence, of certain animal superstitions of which there is evidence.

We have references enough in the OT to the lapses of the Israelites into idolatry, to their forsaking of Jahweh for Ba'al, Moloch (=Melech), Astarte, and others; and we might expect to find in the names of the OT also abundant evidence of this. As a matter of fact, there are a few names compounded with Ba'al and Melech; on the other hand, there is none compounded with Astarte, though these are frequent enough in Phœnician. Unfortunately for the elucidation of the present question, Ba'al and Melech are not primarily proper names of a single deity, but terms applicable to many deities; the Hebrews could, e.g., address or describe Jahweh not only as 'my El' (e.g., Ex 15²), i.e. 'my God,' but also as 'my Ba'al' (Hos 2¹⁶). Further, as the name Elijah asserts that Jahweh is God, so Bealyah asserts that Jahweh is Ba'al, Malchiah that Jahweh is Melech ('king'). Inst., then, as at all periods, down to the very latest, the Hebrews used Jah(weh) and El indifferently in proper names as referring to the same God, viz. Jahweh, so it is at least possible that Ba'al and Melech, when used by the Hebrews in proper names, refer to Jahweh. And similarly the compounds with Ab, Ah, 'Am, Adon may be explained.

The opposite view to that just suggested has been recently stated afresh by H. P. Smith (see literature below). He finds that perhaps as many as 150 divinities other than Jahweh occur in the Hebrew names as preserved in the Hebrew text; and he argues that these are 'only a small proportion of the theophorous names which once existed in the Hebrew writings,' but have been mutilated by the removal of the strange god's name or by the substitution for it of El or Jah(weh). Among these strange gods Smith includes Ba'al, Melech, and also Ab, Ah, and 'Am. Now it is curious that all these terms are ambiguous (as we have seen); and that of the worship of Ab, Ah, and 'Am among the Hebrews we never hear, whereas the name of Astarte, of whose worship we do hear and whose name is unambiguously a proper name, enters into no Hebrew personal name. The last fact is indeed to Smith only fresh proof of the rigour with which 'names which gave offence have been removed from the texts.' But Astarte is allowed to remain in place-names! And there is another consideration which should restrain us from over-estimating the extent of the revision to which names in the OT text have been subjected, and the difference between the general character of the names of the OT and the names actually current in the several periods. And that is this: the names on ostraka, papyri, and cuneiform tablets present the same general character; e.g., among the 30 or 40 names of the Samaritan ostraka (9th cent. B.C.) there is about the same proportion of compounds with Jah, El, Ab, Ah, 'Am, Ba'al, Melech as in the names of the Davidic age recorded in the OT; but (as in the OT) there is no name compounded with Astarte.

One further point in Smith's discussion should be noted. He discounts the significance of such names as Bealyah, Abijah, which, if treated as sentence-names, assert that Jahweh was Ba'al ('owner') or Ab ('father'), by arguing that they were not sentence-names at all, but primarily names of compound divinities—fusions of the two distinct deities Ba'al and Jahweh in the first instance, Ab and Jahweh in the second—and that these names of deities were then used as names of men. Now it may be admitted (1) that there actually were compound divinities such as Ashtar-Chemosh of the Moabite inscription; and (2) that occasionally, probably as the result of abbreviation, men bore the names of gods.¹ But it would remain curious, if Smith's conclusions were correct, (1) that of so many of his inferential deities their worshippers were uncertain which way to take their names: there is no evidence that Ashtar-Chemosh could also be called Chemosh-Ashtar, but Abiel apparently could be called indifferently Eliab; Abijah, Joab; and so forth; (2) that such a large proportion of Hebrews whose names were identical with names of gods had names of compound gods.

It is probable then that Smith altogether exaggerates the frequency—whether in the original text of the OT or in the actual life of the Hebrews—of Hebrew names formed from names of deities other than Jahweh. But his material contains certain possibilities and may be consulted with advantage. We conclude with mentioning a few names at various periods which more or less probably contain the name of a strange god. Gad is the name both of a Syrian deity and of a Hebrew tribe; as a divine name the term probably enters into 'Azgad (Ezr., Neh.); but as early as J (Gn 30¹¹) gad was also a noun meaning, as in

¹ Cf. H. Meyersham, *Deorum nomina hominibus imposita*, Kiel, 1891, on Greek and Roman examples, with Addenda by G. Hoffmann, giving Babylonian, Egyptian, Syrian, Canaanitic, and Arabic examples (not all certain).

¹ 'Animal and Plant Names,' in *JPh* ix. [1880] 75-108.

Aramaic and Arabic, 'fortune,' and in this sense probably it entered into the names Gaddiyah (Egyp.), Gaddiel, 'Jahweh (God) is my fortune,' Edom in Obed-edom may be a divine name, as are the elements that follow נָדַר commonly though not invariably in other names. After the Exile a certain number of these names appear, in part perhaps as the result of intermarriage; this, combined with the growing custom of naming after the grandfather, might easily lead to the occurrence of some heathen names in Jewish families. Of such post-Exilic names we may note in addition to 'Azgad already mentioned Henadad, probably containing the name Hadad; Machnadebai, probably a corruption of מְנַדְבַּי, 'possession of Nebo'; Barkos, of which the latter half is identical with the final element in the Nabatean name כְּנֻס, 'Kaus has given'; Barnabas, which means 'son of Nebo.'¹ All these names are Biblical. The Elephantine papyri and the Nippur tablets contain large numbers of names compounded with names of deities other than Jahweh; but many of these certainly, and most, though not all of them, probably, were not names of Jews. On the other hand, the Elephantine papyri contain a little group of unquestionably Jewish names in which the familiar place-name Bethel seems to have acquired a divine character: Bethelnathan, 'Bethel has given'; Bethel'akab, 'Bethel has rewarded'; Bethel-shezeb (?), 'Bethel has delivered.' In the light of these we easily detect a similar name in Zec 7²—Bethelsharezer.

LITERATURE.—The study of Hebrew names can be carried on satisfactorily only by comparison with other Semitic names. The literature under NAMES (Sumerian) and (Syriac) must be consulted. Here some of the principal special literature on Hebrew names is given. For the interpretation or discussion of the names separately see especially Brown-Driver-Briggs, *Hebrew and English Lexicon*, Oxford, 1891-1906; Gesenius-Buhl, *Heb. und aram. Wörterbuch*³, Leipzig, 1910; EBI iii. 3271 ff.; HDB iii. 481 ff. For ancient interpretations see P. de Lagarde, *Onomastica Sacra*², Göttingen, 1887. For systematic treatment or discussions of the subject generally or special parts of it see E. Nestlé, *Die israel. Eigennamen nach ihrer religionsgeschichtlichen Bedeutung*, Leipzig, 1876; F. Baethgen, *Beiträge zur semitischen Religionsgeschichte*, Berlin, 1888; G. B. Gray, *Studies in Hebrew Proper Names*, London, 1896; M. Grunwald, *Die Eigennamen des AT in ihrer Bedeutung für die Kenntnis des heb. Volksglaubens*, Breslau, 1895; G. Kerber, *Die religionsgeschichtliche Bedeutung der heb. Eigennamen des AT*, Freiburg, 1897; F. Hommel, *Die altisr. Ueberlieferung*, Munich, 1897 (criticized in *Exp.*, 5th ser., vol. vi. [1897], pp. 173-190); F. C. Ulmer, *Die semitischen Eigennamen im AT*, pt. I, Leipzig, 1901; T. Nöldeke, 'Names,' in EBI iii. [1902] col. 3272 (full and important); H. P. Smith, 'Theophorous Proper Names in the Old Testament,' in *Old Testament and Semitic Studies in Memory of William Rainey Harper*, London, 1908, I. 35-64; G. B. Gray, 'A Group of Hebrew Names of the Ninth Century B.C.,' in *ExpT* xvii. [1915-16] 57-62.

G. BUCHANAN GRAY.

NAMES (Indo-European).—Although much attention has been devoted to the grammatical structure and connotation of the names of persons and places in all the Indo-European languages, their religious value has remained almost unconsidered. No treatise exists on the subject, and of some dialects, notably Icelandic and Old Irish, a *corpus nominum propriorum* is still to be made. The present article must, therefore, be regarded merely as a general outline of some of the leading phenomena connected with proper names in Indo-European; it cannot claim to be exhaustive. If the greater part of it is given to Indo-Iranian names, this is only because the other dialects, later in date, present few features not found in Sanskrit and the older languages of Iran. Restriction to the religious evidence to be gleaned from names leads, moreover, to the exclusion of any consideration of patronymics, occupational names, and personal names derived from place-names.

1. Grammatical structure.—While some of the

¹ See G. B. Gray, 'Nebo as an Element in Hebrew Proper Names,' in *ExpT* x. [1899] 232-234.

personal names in Indo-European are simple, the majority are compound. These fall, for the present purpose, into 'descriptive' (corresponding to the Skr. technical term *karmadhāraya*, 'office-bearing'), 'dependent' (Skr. *tatpuruṣa*, 'his-man'), 'possessive' (Skr. *bahuvrīhi*, 'having-much-rice'), and 'appositional' (not recognized by the Skr. grammarians, but a class whose importance has been much underrated). Besides these there is the very important class of hypocoristics ('pet names'). These are commonly either diminutives or abbreviations (or both together); and, when the abbreviation consists in dropping one of the components of the compound name, the resultant form may appear to be a simple name, so that in some cases it is difficult, if not impossible, to say whether a certain name is simple or hypocoristic. Here the meaning usually serves as the criterion.

The word cognate with Eng. 'name' occurs in nearly all the Indo-European languages—Skr., Av. *nāman*, Armen. *anun* (from **anōmn*), Alb. *emēn* (from **enmen*), Gr. *ὄνομα*, Lat. *nomen*, Ir. *ainm*, Goth. *namō*, O. Church Slav. *ime*, Old Pruss. *emmens*. On the other hand, in view of the very primitive character of Lithuanian civilization, it should be noted that that language employs for 'name' *vardas* (cognate with Eng. 'word').

The etymology of 'name' is quite uncertain. It has been connected with the group of Gr. *ὄνομα*, 'upbraid, insult, blame,' Lat. *nota*, 'mark,' etc. (cf., e.g., A. Fick, *Vergl. Wörterbuch der indogerm. Sprachen*⁴, Göttingen, 1890-1909, I. 99, 505; F. Justi, *Iran. Namenbuch*, p. iv); but this etymology is very unsatisfactory, both phonologically and semantically (cf. E. Boisacq, *Dict. étymol. de la langue grecque*, Brussels, 1907 ff., p. 704 f.).

2. Importance of the name.—One is, in primitive belief, not really a human being until one is named. The name is, as the Mīmāṃsā (*q.v.*) expresses it, the essence, as contrasted with the accident, or *guṇa* (O. Böhtlingk and R. Roth, *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch*, Petrograd, 1855-75, iv. 113), and in later Persian *nām* occasionally means 'person' (Justi, p. vi). This, however, properly belongs to the theory of nominalism.

3. Ceremonial of name-giving.—The early Hindu rite is described as follows by Gobhila (II. viii. 9-14, 17):

'Then he who is to do this [the name-giving] takes his seat, facing east, to the west of the fire [and] on *darbha* grass whose ends point north. Then the mother, having covered the child with a clean garment, gives it from the south to the officiant with its face upward and its head to the north. Going round behind [the officiant's] back, she seats herself to the north on *darbha* whose ends point north. Then he [the officiant] sacrifices to Prajāpati, the lunar day, the lunar mansion, and its divinity. . . . He mutters this mantra: "Who art thou? Who [of many] art thou? Enter into the month of the lord of the day"; and at the end he gives the name . . . and tells to the mother first.'

There was, however, according to Śāṅkhāyana (I. xxiv. 1-6), a preliminary rite, the *jātakarman*.

'Breathing thrice upon the new-born child, he [the father] breathes after: "Breathe in with the Rg, breathe with the Yajur, breathe out with the Sāman." Having mingled butter and honey, curds and water, or having rubbed together rice and barley, he should make [the child] taste gold thrice, saying, "To thee I offer honey for the rite, wealth produced by Savitr the bounteous. Long-lived, protected by the divinities, live thou a hundred autumns in this world." So saying, he gives his name. . . . That the father and the mother know; on the 10th day [is given] an appellation (*vyādhārika*) pleasing to the Brāhmins.'

If Śāṅkhāyana states that a child should have two names, Hiranyakeśin (II. i. 4. 11-15) declares that he must have three, one being secret and one astrological (cf. below, §§ 10, 18).

'Father and mother should name him first. Two names one should give him. . . . The second should be the name of a lunar mansion; one of the two should be secret; with the other they should address him; the soma-sacrificer should give him a third.' Gobhila says (II. x. 24 f.) that the second name may also refer to a divinity or a *gotra* (*q.v.*).

Instead of the secret name *Āśvalāyana* (I. xv. 8) speaks of an 'appellative' (*abhivādāniya*) to be given by the father and to be used by the pupil (cf. Manu, ii. 122), while other early Hindu texts

say that the teacher is to bestow this name. It is clear from these irreconcilable accounts that the ancient Indian system of name-giving was not rigidly fixed. The name should, naturally, be of good omen, but the minute refinements as to length, etc., laid down by the Hindu treatises were not observed in actual practice (Hilka, *Altind. Personennamen*, pp. 14-18).

4. When the name is given.—According to Manu (ii. 30), the child should be named on the 10th or 12th day, on an auspicious lunar day or *muhūrta* (hour of 48 minutes), or under a lucky lunar mansion (*nakṣatra*). Gobhila (ii. viii. 8), however, sets this ceremony for the 10th or 100th day after birth, or after the lapse of a year. According to Pāraskara (i. xvii. 1), Āpastamba (vi. xv. 8), and Baudhāyana (i. xi. 1), the name is given on the 10th (or 12th) day, when the mother is able to leave her bed. This was the general rule for the Brāhman caste. According to later texts (collected by Hilka, p. 11 f.), Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas, and Śūdras were to receive their names on the 16th, 20th (or 19th), and 22nd (or 32nd) day respectively.

In Iran Farīdūn does not name his sons until they have reached an age at which their characters have become manifest (*Šāh-nāmah*, tr. A. G. and E. Warner, London, 1905 ff., i. 177, 187 f.). In Greece also the name was given on the 7th or 10th day after birth (Harporocration, p. 92), usually by the father, who might change it later (Demosthenes, c. *Baot*. 1002, 1006, c. *Macart*. 1075); and the Roman *prænomen* was bestowed on a boy on the 9th day, and on a girl on the 10th (H. Blümner, *Röm. Privataltertümer*³, Munich, 1911, p. 304).

5. Deity and name.—If it is important to call a man by his right name, it is still more requisite to do so with a divinity. Thus, in the Avesta the *yasna* to Sraoša, Atar, Tištrya, Mithra, Vanant, and other *yazatas* must be *aoxtō-nāman*, 'with name expressed' (*Yt.* viii. 11, x. 30, xx. 1; *Ys.* iii. 20 f., xxii. 27; *Vīsp.* ix. 5, etc.; cf. also *Yt.* xiii. 79).

6. Religious cult and piety.—Personal names referring to religious cult and personal piety are, as we should expect, very common. Here belong such names as Skr. Agnidhira ('Kindling the [sacred] Fire'), Aghamarṣaṇa ('Sin-effacing'), Āsvamedhadatta ('Given by the Āsvamedha' [*q.v.*]), Idhmavāha ('Fuel-bringing'), Karmaśreṣṭha ('Best in *karma*' [*q.v.*]), Taponitya ('Constant in Asceticism'), Pavitrāpāni ('Pure-handed'), Uttānarbarhis ('With [sacred] Grass spread'), Yajñasvāmin ('Sacrifice-master'), Yūpaketu ('With the [sacificial] Post for a Banner'), Yogeśvara ('Yoga-lord'), Dṛḍhāvratā ('Firm-vowed'), Sutasoma ('With pressed soma'), Satyahavis ('With true Oblation'); Iran. Anūsarvan (and variants; Av. *Anaša-sarvan, 'Immortal-souled'), Ἀραφέρνης (O. P. *Artā-farnah, 'Having righteous Glory' [or 'Righteousness [is] Glory' ?]), Artaxsathra (Artaxerxes, 'Having righteous governance'), Ἀράμνης ('Righteous-minded'), Daēvōtbis ('Demon-hating'), Dārayavahu ('Darius, upholding the Good'), Dēnmaṛt ('Man of Religion'), Farnbag ('God-light'); Gr. Διεύχνης ('Zeus-praying'); Gall. Litugenos ('Feast-son'), O. Ir. Aidan ('Aid(u)agnos, 'Fire-lamb').

Religious phrases are rare as personal names. We find them, however, in the Avesta (*Yt.* xiii. 120): Ašem-yahmāi-ušta, Ašem-yenghē-raočaō, and Ašem-yenghē-verēza (cf. *Ys.* xiii. 1; *Yt.* xiii. 5; *Vīsp.* xi. 28).

7. Power of the name.—This concept is not particularly to the fore in Indo-European, unless the theophoric name (see § 8) be regarded as coming under it, as it undoubtedly does in a sense. According to the Avesta (*Yt.* i. 1-19; cf. xv. 43-52), the revelation of the greatest of the names of Ahura Mazda is besought by Zarathuštra that

he may conquer—and not be conquered by—'all demons and men, all wizards and witches.' In late Hinduism we find the belief, among Kṛṣṇaites, Rāmaites, and Śaivites, that 'the mere repetition of their god's name is a means of salvation,' so that 'sinner or heretic, if one die at last with Krishna's name upon the lips he will be saved' (E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India*, Boston, 1895, p. 508). With the same motive names of Rāma, etc., are often written on the margin of page after page in Sanskrit MSS, and they regularly begin with some such phrase as 'homage to Hayagrīva' (an epithet of Viṣṇu) or 'to Gaṇeśa' (the remover of obstacles). The present writer is not certain, however, that this is purely Indo-European.

Only rarely does 'name' itself form a component of personal appellatives. Yet we may cite Iran. Nāmfarux ('Name-lucky'), Vahūnām (and variants, 'Good-name'; cf. also Justi, p. 504), Old Osset. Nāmghenos ('Famous'); Gr. Ὀνομακλής ('Name-famed'), Ἀγαθώνυμος, Εὐδώνυμος ('Good-named'), Ἱερώνυμος ('Sacred-named'), Μεγαλόνυμος ('Great-named').

8. Theophoric names.—From the point of view of religion, theophoric names are by far the most important. To bear the name of a deity is to sustain a special and very real connexion with that deity, and to be peculiarly under his protection. It is the same concept which leads to the naming of children after famous men. The name being part of the hero, its application to a child is felt to give him an actual share in the valour or other admirable attribute of the original bearer. In modern times one may try to live up to the model set him in the person after whom he is thus named; primitively, *mana* would be given him by bestowing on him the name of a distinguished man.

The number of theophoric names is so great that only a few characteristic specimens can be cited, sufficient to show the main principles involved.

To this class belong Skr. Devārāja ('the God [is] King'), Devānika ('God-faced'), Devadatta ('God-given'), Devadāsa ('Servant of the God'), Devaprasāda ('Delight of the God'), Devadhara ('Upholding the God'), Devahu ('Sacrificing to the God'), Agnidatta ('Given by Agni'), Indrapālita ('Protected by Indra'), Indrapāla ('Indra [is] Protection'),¹ Brahmahali ('Oblation to Brahman'), Mitradatta ('Given by Mitra'), Kubervallabha ('Dear to Kubera'), Mukundarāma ('Joy of Rāma'), Rāmaja ('Born of Rāma'), Viṣṇusakti ('Might of Viṣṇu'), Viṣṇuputra ('Son of Viṣṇu'), Hariśiṅha ('Lion of Hari'); Iran. Hōrmizāfrid ('Benediction of Ahura Mazda'), Ormizduxt ('Daughter of Ahura Mazda'), Yazdānduxt ('Daughter of God'), Ἀραφάρης ('Protected by Righteousness'; cf. Av. *asapāta*), Ataredāta ('Given by the [sacred] Fire'), Atarecithra ('Seed of the [sacred] Fire'), Μεγάβας (Av. *Baghabāz, 'the God [is] the Arm'), Bagabuxša and Yazdānhuxt ('God-released'), Bagadāta, Yazdāndādh, Xudāidādh ('God-given'), Yazdkart ('God-made'), Cāhāruxt ('Four have released'; cf. Justi, p. 151; similarly Sēhuxt, 'Three have released', Pānchuxt, 'Five have released'), Māhdāt ('Moon-given'), Mafārtēs ('Moon-protected'), Mīhrdān ('Knowing Mithra'; cf. *ERE* viii. 752b), Spentōdāta ('Given by the Holy One'), Σπενδοδάτης ('Heaven-given'), Srōspāt ('Protected by Sraoša'); Old Osset. Ἰζόραδος ('Gift of the God'); Gr. Ἀπολλογενής ('Apollo-horn'), Ἀρητιάς ('Dear to Ares'), Ἀρτεμίδωρος ('Gift of Artemis'), Μηνόδωρος ('Moon-gift'); Gall. Camulogenus ('Son of Camulos [a war-god]), Divicus ('Divine'), Esugenus ('Son of Esus').

Often personal names are simply the appellatives of the gods, as Skr. Māhendra, Kubera, Prajāpati, Kṛṣṇa, Skanda, Chandra, Soma, Buddha, Tathāgata, Dipamkara; Iran. Hōrmizd, Xūrsid ('Sun'), Bahram ('Verethraghna'), Bahman ('Vohu Manah'); Serb. Božo ('God'). Many of these are shown by parallel forms to be possibly hypocoristic abbreviations; but in other cases it is very possible that they are full names, the name of the god being given, without addition, to the child.

Occasionally it is expressly stated that a deity
¹ Owing to the ambiguity of Skr. compounds a name of this type might also be construed as a *bahuvrīhi*, 'possessing the protection of Indra.' Absolute decision seems impossible, but it may be well thus to direct attention to the possibility that some Indo-European names are appositional rather than possessive or descriptive (cf. also § 1).

has named a place, natural object, animal, etc. Thus Ahura Mazda gave names to the good waters when he created them (Ys. xxxviii. 4), but men named mountains 'from visiting and observing them' (Yt. xix. 6).

9. Names from natural objects.—Among all the Indo-European peoples children are very frequently named after some animal, flower, or other object of nature. Names of animals whose qualities appeal to men are especially given to the male sex, such as 'Lion,' 'Tiger,' 'Wolf'; names of flowers and gems are naturally more appropriate to the gentler sex, as 'Pearl,' 'Ruby,' 'Rose,' 'Lily.' The underlying motive of these names is not absolutely certain, but it seems probable, on the whole, that the principle of sympathetic magic was originally involved. A boy named 'Wolf' would, like the animal whose name he bore, be a valiant marauder and a terror to his enemies; 'Pearl' should be as fair and softly rounded as the precious object which her name connotes.

(a) *Animal names*.—These are the most common. Omitting those which denote merely possession of horses, kine, etc., we may mention such names as Skr. Ajarāja ('Goat-king'), Ūrnanābha ('Spider'), Rśyaśrṅga ('Antelope-horn'), Ēnajaṅgha ('Antelope-leg'), Gajasiṅha ('Elephant-lion' [i.e. 'Mighty lion']), Baka ('Crane'), Vṛkājina ('Wolf-skin'), Vṛkodara ('Wolf-belly'), Vṛṣan ('Bull'), Vyāghradatta ('Tiger-given'), Śākuna ('Bird'), Śārdūlakarna ('Tiger-ear'), Sunahpuchha, Sunolāṅgula, Sunahśepa ('Dog-tail'), Mūṣikā ('Mousie'), Sakuntalā ('Birdie'); Iran. 'Opōdvns' ('Turtle-dove'; cf. New Pers. *varš*), Sag ('Dog'), Sāhēn ('Falcon'), Varāza ('Boar,' the sacred animal of Verethraghna), Gurgēn (and variants; Av. **vehrkaēna*, 'Wolfish'); Gr. Λεοντόπυον ('Lion-minded'), Λυκώγης ('Wolf-family'); Gall. Alauda ('Lark'), Lovernios ('Fox's son'), Matugenos ('Bear's son'); O. High Ger. Heidulf, Wolfheidis ('Wolf-form'), Hludulf ('Famous Wolf'), Wolfgang ('Wolf's Course'), Frifulf ('Dear Wolf'), Wacarolf ('Watchful Wolf'), Wolfarn, Arnulf ('Wolf-eagle, Eagle-wolf'), Mārulf, Wolfmār ('Famed Wolf, Wolf-famed'); Serb. Vukdrag ('Wolf-dear'), Dobrovuk ('Good Wolf').

(b) *Plant names*.—These occur not infrequently, as Skr. Aśoka (q.v.), Utpalārāja ('Lotus-king'), Chandanapāla ('Protector of the Sandal-wood' [or 'Sandal-wood [is] Protector' ?]), Padmagupta ('Lotus-protected'), Padmasundara ('Lotus-lovely'), Mallibhūṣaṇa ('Jasmine-adornment'); Iran. Barmak ('Water-ress'); Pol. Wirbosław ('Willow-fame'). It is only rarely, however, that any religious concept can be clearly seen in them, although we may mention Iran. 'Aṣṭārdavos' ('Rue,' used to protect against the evil eye [A. V. W. Jackson, *From Constantinople to the Home of Omar Khayyam*, New York, 1911, p. 119]).

(c) *Mineral names*.—These are very rare, instances being Skr. Kanakaprabha ('Gold-radiance'), Manidatta ('Pearl-given'), Mānikyamukta ('Ruby-diademed'), Rukmakāśa ('Gold-hair'), Hiranyadatta ('Gold-given').

How far such names were totemistic in origin is hard to say. As individual appellatives they scarcely had a totemistic basis, unless we assume an 'individual totem,' as when, e.g., Ikṣvāku means 'Gourd,' or in such cases as when Saṁharaṇa's father was Rkṣa ('Bear'). Even in such instances, however, the general impression gained from a survey of Indo-European personal names is strongly against a totemistic explanation. With regard to tribal names (for which cf. below, § 19) the problem is somewhat more obscure. It has been suggested (H. Oldenberg, *Rel. des Veda*, Berlin, 1894, p. 85 f.; A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, Strassburg, 1897, p. 153) that the Matsyas ('Fish'), Ajas ('Goats'), and Sighrus ('Horse-radishes') men-

tioned in the Rigveda (VII. xviii. 6, 19) are totem-names (but see A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, London, 1912, i. 12, ii. 111, 378), and the same may possibly be true of the Pārāvatas ('Turtle-doves'),¹ as well as of such Vedic priestly families as the Gautamas ('Oxen'), Vatsas ('Calves'), Sunakas ('Doggies'), Kauśikas ('Owls'), and Māndukyās ('Frog-sons'), and the Avesta Saēnas ('Eagles'). On the other hand, we must not forget that such names may be hypocoristic—Vatsa, e.g., for *Vatsavant ('Possessing calves')—while the name Matsya may, like the Iranian Massagetæ mentioned below (§ 19), imply that the tribe were fish-eaters, not that they possessed a fish-totem. Doubts are cast on the totemic explanation by Hopkins (*PAOS*, 1894, p. cliv), and in the present stage of our knowledge he would appear to be right.

10. *Astrological names*.—We have already seen (§ 3) that Hiranyakeśin urges that one of a child's names be taken from the lunar mansion (*nakṣatra*) under which he is born. In India, accordingly, a full scheme has been formulated for astrological names. The importance of such an appellative is obvious—just as a theophoric name brings its bearer into close connexion with a deity, so the astrological name gives one the protection of the 'house' of his nativity. One may be named not only from the month of birth, but also from the deity (masculine or feminine, according to the sex of the child) presiding over the month (for a list cf. Hilka, p. 31 f.); and in more modern times a name may likewise be given according to the zodiacal sign of nativity.

11. *Opprobrious names*.—The use of such names, almost invariably connected with belief in the evil eye, is too obvious to require discussion. It may, however, be suggested that one Iranian name for which no satisfactory explanation has yet been advanced may possibly belong to this category—the rather frequent name Pešōtann, which literally means 'Possessing a condemned Body' ('Damned' in the theological sense). If it does, it finds a close parallel in the Romance name Perdita (at all events Justi's explanation of Pešōtann, p. 251, is incorrect).

It is readily intelligible that evil things have evil names. A disease is 'ill-named' (*durnāman* [Rigveda, x. clxii. 10]), as are other evil things (Atharvaveda, II. xxv. 2, IV. xvii. 5, VIII. vi. 1, XVI. vi. 7, XIX. xxxvi. 4, 6), and it is well known that the Avesta has a whole vocabulary of derogatory words for evil creatures, parallel to the terms applied to the good creation (L. J. Frachtenberg, in *Spiegel Memorial Vol.*, Bombay, 1908, pp. 269-289).

12. *Tabu of names*.—With a certain analogy to the secret name (§ 3), names are often regarded as tabu, lest some possible ill-wisher may through them gain control over their owners. This is particularly frequent in the case of husband and wife.

A Hindoo wife is never, under any circumstances, to mention the name of her husband. "He," "the master," "Swamy," etc., are titles she uses when speaking of, or to, her husband. In no way can one of the sex annoy another more intensely and bitterly than by charging her with having mentioned her husband's name. It is a crime not easily forgiven' (F. de W. Ward, *India and the Hindoos*, New York, 1850, p. 189).

This usage still survives in such phrases as 'my man,' 'my woman,' current in humbler circles. It seems probable, moreover, that this principle of tabu underlies the reluctance which is felt regarding the use of one's personal name, except by close friends. We brand familiar use of our given names by casual acquaintances as 'impertinence'; primitive man would see an actual menace in such employment of the only part of our names that has any individual value.

¹ This suggestion has not previously been advanced, so far as the present writer knows. For a summary of previous explanations of the name ('mountaineers,' or 'people from afar') see Macdonell-Keith, i. 518 f.

Sometimes, as in Scandinavia, the name of the dead is avoided, an epithet being preferred if the deceased bore one during his lifetime (V. Guðmundsson and K. Kälund, in *Grundr. der germ. Philologie*, iii.² [1900] 415).

13. Epithets.—The name originally given to a person is very frequently augmented by an epithet derived from some good or bad quality, personal peculiarity, or the like; and sometimes such an epithet completely usurps the personal name. To cite only a single example, the epic Indian Arjuna has the following epithets in the *Mahābhārata* (S. Sörensen, *Index to the Names in the Mahabharata*, London, 1904 ff., pp. 86–89):

Aindri, Śakraja, Śakranandana, Śakrasūnu, Śakrasuta,

(‘younger brother of Bhīma[śena]’), Bibhatsu (‘joins’), Brhannala (‘great reed’), Śākhāṃgadhva, Kapidhva, Kapiketana, Kapivaradhva, Vānaradhva, Vānaraketana, Vānaraketu, Vānaravaryaketana (all ‘monkey-bannered’), Svetaśva, Svetaśva, Svetaśva, Svetaśva (all ‘white-bosomed’), Dhanabhaya (‘booty-conqueror’), Gaṇḍivabhṛt (‘bearing the *gaṇḍīva*’), Gaṇḍivadhanvan (‘with the *gaṇḍīva* for a bow’), Gaṇḍivadhārīn (‘holding the *gaṇḍīva*’), Gaṇḍivīn (‘possessing the *gaṇḍīva*’), Guḍākeśa (‘club-haired’), Indrarūpa (‘having the form of Indra’), Indrāvraja (‘Indra’s junior’), Jaya (‘victory’), Jispu (‘victorious’), Kapiravara (‘having the excellent monkey’), Kaunteya and Kuntiputra (‘son of Kuntī’), Kaurava (‘srestha’ (‘best of the Kururace’)), Kiritaabhṛt (‘diadem-bearing’), Kiritamālīn (‘diadem-garlanded’), Kiritavat, Kiritīn (‘diademed’), Kṛṣṇasātrathi (‘with Kṛṣṇa for a charioteer’), Nara (‘hero’), Pārtha (‘son of Prthu’), Paurava (‘descendant of Pura’), Phālguna (the lunar mansion of his nativity), Prabhājanasutānuja (‘younger brother of the son of the wind’), Savyāsacin (‘ambidextrous’), Surasūnu (‘son of a god’), Tāpatya (‘descendant of Tapati’), Vijaya (‘victory’).

Such usage is especially frequent with names of deities. Indra is ‘many-named’ (*Rigveda*, VIII. lxxxiii. 17; *Atharvaveda*, VI. xcix. 1); twenty names of Ahura Mazda are enumerated in *Yt.* i. 7 f.; Dionysos, Demeter, etc., are πολυώνυμοι (*Soph. Ant.* 1115; *Hom. Hymn. in Dem.* 18). Here, however, we must reckon with the possibility that some of these epithets were originally names of distinct deities who were later amalgamated with the greater gods (cf. H. Usener, *Götternamen*, Bonn, 1896, *passim*; C. F. H. Bruchmann, *Epitheta deorum quae apud poetas graecos leguntur*, Leipzig, 1893).

14. Multiple names.—We have already noted (§ 4) that a name once given might later be changed. This was no less true in India than in Greece, for the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* states that a name might be adopted in later life either to secure success or for the sake of distinction (III. vi. 2. 24, v. iii. 3. 14, IX. iv. 3. 13, II. iv. 4. 4, VI. i. 3. 9). Occasionally, particularly in India, synonymy is found—i.e. the same individual may vary his own name by substituting a synonym for one of its components. Thus we may have either Dhanurgraha (‘Bow-grasping’) or Dhanurdhara (‘Bow-holding’), Śilāditya or Dharmāditya, Śreṣṭhasena or Pravarasena, Pratāpāsila or Śilāditya; while the philosopher named (or, rather, nicknamed) Kanāda (‘Atom-eater’) is also known as Kanābhakṣa and Kanābhuj.

15. Sect- and caste-names.—It is very natural for adherents of sects to prefer certain personal names, especially those connected with the founders or heroes of the sect followed by the father of the child who is to be named. Thus in India Vaiṣṇava-vites very frequently have as a component of their appellations the name of Viṣṇu or one of his epithets (e.g., Keśava, Nārāyaṇa, Mādhava, Hari) or of his *avatāras* (Varāha, ‘Boar,’ Vāmana, ‘Dwarf’)—especially Rāma (and its synonyms, as Raghunātha) and Kṛṣṇa (with its synonyms, Gopāla, Govinda, Rādhavallabha)—or of his *śakti*, or female energy (Lakṣmī, Śrī), or of his attributes (Kāmalā [‘Lotus’], Chakra [‘Disk’]). In like manner Śaivites affect the various names of Śiva (Śiva, Dhruva, Nandin, Rudra, Saṃhara, Sarva, Haṛṣa, etc.) or of his *śakti*

(Durgā, Gaurī, Himā, etc.). Minor Indian cults are also represented. Serpent-worship is implied by a number of words for ‘snake’ (Nāga, Ajagara, Ahi, Bhujāṅga, Sarpa; as a matter of fact, these names are usually borne by Buddhists), the cult of the ‘mothers’ (see *ERE* v. 6 f.) by Matr (‘Mother’), of worship of the sun, moon, and planets by words for ‘sun’ (Aditya, Divākara, Prabhākara, Bhānu, Bhāskara, Ravi, Savitr, Sūrya, etc.), ‘moon’ (Indu, Chandra, Mṛgāṅka, Soma, etc.), and planet-names (Āṅgāra, Graha, Budha, etc.) respectively (for examples see Hilka, pp. 84 f., 89–103). So Buddhists and Jains often choose names connected with the founders of their religions (Buddha, Arhant, Jina, Tathāgata, Pārśva, Sugata, etc.), or even sacred abstracts (Jñāna, ‘Knowledge,’ Dharma, ‘Law,’ Bodhi, ‘Enlightenment,’ Saṅgha, ‘Assembly,’ etc.; cf. Hilka, pp. 104–107).

Caste-names are also regular in India. According to Pāraskara (I. xvii. 4) and Baudhāyana (I. xi. 9), a Brāhmaṇa’s name should contain the component *-śarman*, a Kṣatriya’s *-varman*, a Vaiśya’s *-gupta*, and a Śūdra’s *-(bhṛtya)dāsa*. As a matter of fact, the final elements of Brāhmaṇas’ names are often *-śarman*, *-deva*; Kṣatriyas’ *-varman*, *-rāja*, *-trāta*; Vaiśyas’ *-gupta*, *-bhūti*, *-datta*.

In later Hindu usage special titles are also given to scholars, authors, etc. In this category we must reckon such components as *-svāmīn* (‘lord’—especially common about the 7th cent. A.D.), *-soma*, *-āchārya* (‘teacher’), *-ānanda* (‘bliss’), *-kaviṇdra* (‘mighty poet’), *-tarkālaṃkāra* (‘adornment of logic’), *-tīrtha* (‘ford’), *-paṇḍita* (‘scholar’), *-bhaṭṭa* (‘master’), *-muni* (‘sage’), and *-sāgara* (‘ocean’). No strict rule can, however, be formulated by which a man’s sect can be determined exclusively from his name.

In Iran a partial approach to a class-name seems to be found in *Vend.* xviii. 45–52. This declares that at the eschatological restoration of all things a man is to arise from the seed which one has involuntarily lost during his life, and that such a man must be named ‘Ātaredāta’ [‘Fire-given’], or Āterēcithra [‘Fire-sced’], or Āteredahya [‘Fire-land’], or some other name connected with Ātar.

Here, in a sense, belong names denoting belief in beings banned by orthodoxy, such as Pers. Parīcīhrah (‘Fairy-face’), Pariduxt (‘Fairy’s Daughter’), a phenomenon which is also found in place-names (see below, § 20).

Even philosophical concepts occasionally appear in personal names, as in Skr. Ātmasukha (‘ātman-bliss’), Anandajñāna (‘Bliss-knowledge’), Mokṣa-śarman (‘Happy through *mokṣa*’), Vedanidhi (‘Repository of Veda’).

16. Names from ancestors.—In view of the widespread belief in transmigration, it is not strange that the concept that a forefather may be reincarnated in his descendant should find one of its manifestations in the naming of a child after one of his ancestors, especially his grandfather. This was a common practice in Greece (Demosth. c. *Macart.* 1075), and in India Patañjali and the *Saṃskāraratnamālā* (quoted by Hilka, p. 9) state that a child should be named after his grandfather, great-grandfather, or great-great-grandfather. In the lists of Indian kings we find a number of instances where a grandson is thus named: Chandrarāja I. and II. of Ajmīr, Someśvara II., III., IV. of Kalvāna (Someśvara II. was named after his father), Viṣṇuvardhana III., IV., V., and Vijayāditya I., II., III., IV., V. of the Eastern Chālukyas, Kārtavīrya II., III., IV. and Lakṣmīdeva I., II. of Saundatti, Rudrasena I., II., III. of the Vākātaka dynasty (C. M. Duff, *Chronol. of India*, Westminster, 1899, pp. 277, 279, 301, 307 f.). We likewise find this in Iran, though much less frequently—a fact which may be significant since transmigra-

tion is not an Iranian tenet. We may, however, note Cyrus I. and II., Cambyzes I. and II., Xerxes I. and II. In the Scandinavian lands the custom was widely spread, after the 8th cent., of not naming a child after a living person, but after ancestors or recently deceased kinsmen; if a father died before his son was born, the latter unconditionally received the name of the former (Guðmundsson and Kålund, *loc. cit.*).

17. Royal names.—Just as the *Brāhmaṇas* say that the private citizen may change his name to increase his fortune (above, § 14), so kings frequently bear—especially in their official capacity—a name which is entirely different from their personal appellation. Thus the famous Indian king Chandragupta is equally well known as Vikrama or Vikramāditya, Aśoka as Piyadassi, Jayadeva II. as Parachakrakāma, Śilāditya VII. as Dhruvabhṭṭa, etc. In Iran the original name of Darius II. was Ochus, of Darius III. Codomanus, of Artaxerxes II. Arsaces, and of Artaxerxes IV. Bessos.

The meaning of this is clear, just as it is in the case of the private individual who assumes a new name. The name being a real part of a man, he changes himself if he changes his name. When one passes through a state of grave crisis, as when he becomes king, he is changed just as he is, e.g., at initiation (*g.v.*), of which, indeed, the ceremony of *abhiṣeka* (*g.v.*) may be considered a form. The man himself thus being changed with this *rite de passage*, he may very properly assume a new name.

In similar fashion a new name might be taken on entering the religious life; Māni, e.g., assumed this appellative when he began the foundation of Manichæism (*g.v.*), although his original name was Kubrika (or some variant; cf. Justi, p. 190).

18. Secret names.—Since, as we have seen, knowledge of one's name gives actual power over its owner, just as the possession of the clippings of one's hair, nails, etc., renders it possible for one's enemies to work him harm, the value of a secret name is obvious. We have noted above (§ 3) that Hiranyakeśin expressly says that one of the names of an Indian should be secret (*guhya*). The secret name is mentioned in the *Rigveda* (X. lv. 2, lxxi. 1); such a name is given the child at birth (*Sat. Brāh.* vi. i. 3, 9, *Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, vi. iv. 25); Arjuna is a secret name of Indra (*Sat. Brāh.* ii. i. 2, 11, v. iv. 3, 7; cf. Macdonell and Keith, i. 443); and the gods had secret names (*Rigveda*, v. 10, ix. xcv. 2, xvi. 16, x. xlv. 2). Hiranyakeśin seems to leave it doubtful which of the two names should be the secret one, but Āpastamba (vi. xv. 3) makes this the *nakṣatra* name (see, further, A. Hillebrandt, *Ritualliteratur* [= *GIAP* iii. 2], Strassburg, 1897, p. 170f.).

We also find secret names in Iran; Kavādh, e.g., was originally the secret name of Kavādh II., whose mother called him Šērōē in public.

19. Tribal names.—The names of tribes present peculiar difficulties. Like many of the older personal names, they often defy analysis, and—as in the case of place-names—they seem frequently to be non-Indo-European in origin. When they can be satisfactorily interpreted, they seldom present any features of religious interest. Some which may possibly suggest totemism have been noted above (§ 9), and to these Skr. Mahāvṛṣa ('Great Bull') and Viṣānin ('Horned' [?]; cf. Macdonell and Keith, ii. 313) may perhaps be added. Religious cult is distinctly implied in the Italic tribal names Marsi ('Martians'), Hirpini ('Wolf-men', the wolf being sacred to Mars), and Picentes ('Wood-pecker-men', this bird also being sacred to Mars). The danger of falsely attributing religious connotation to tribal names is exemplified by the Iranian *Μασάγεται* (Av. *Mas(s)ya-ka; cf. Skr.

matsya, 'fish'), who were called 'Fishies' not because they had a fish-totem, but because they lived on fish (Herod. i. 201; cf. J. Marquart, *Untersuchungen zur Gesch. von Eran*, Göttingen and Leipzig, 1896–1905, ii. 77f.). Sometimes tribal names are contemptuous epithets bestowed by unfriendly neighbours, as Iran. *Δεσφίκες* (**dr̥gviṣka*, 'Beggars' [Marquart, ii. 139, note 1]), and Scyth. *Ἀριμασπῶτες* ('One-eyes' [Marquart, ii. 90–92]); but occasionally the names have a value as implying a former grade of civilization—e.g., Iran. Asagarta ('Sagartia', 'Dwelling in stone Caves' [C. Bartholomae, *Zum altiran. Wörterbuch*, Strassburg, 1906, p. 119 f.]).

20. Place-names.—The names of places suffer from the same obscurity—and for the same reason—as tribal names. In Greece and Armenia many date from pre-Indo-European times (A. Fick, *Vorgriech. Ortsnamen*, Göttingen, 1905; H. Hübschmann, *Indogerm. Forschungen*, xvi. 233, 366–368). Yet place-names possess a historic value which can hardly be over-estimated, especially as showing the ethnological strata which have existed in a country, and as revealing the sites of ancient sacred places. The same is true, in minor degree, of street-names, etc., in our older cities, since they still indicate, in many instances, the sites of vanished city-gates, monasteries, and the like.

This aspect may be studied with special clearness in the place-names of Scotland. Two distinct Celtic peoples are evidently responsible for such names as Aber-deen and Inver-ness; Pit-lochry is shown by its *p* to be neither Brythonic nor Goidelic; Ler-wick is Norse; Beaully is French.

This subject is discussed at length in the introduction to J. B. Johnston's *Place-names of Scotland*², Edinburgh, 1903, and has also been discussed by J. Jacobsen of Copenhagen in a course of lectures at King's College, Aberdeen, in June 1914. On the basis of place-names in Britain Jacobsen has shown that the infiltrations in Shetland, the Orkneys, the Hebrides, Caithness, Sutherland, and W. Scotland were from S.W. Norway, whereas they were Danish in N. and E. England, and in Normandy, the two streams meeting in Cumberland. Thus -*way* (Stornoway) and -*ster* (Lybster) point to Norwegian colonization, -*by* (Grimsby), -*thorp* (Ullesthorp), -*toft* (Lowestoft), -*thwait(e)* (Brathwaite) indicate Danish settlement, while -*ham* (Shoreham), -*stead* (Grimstead), -*ford* (Oxford) are Anglo-Saxon. Roman settlements are shown by the numerous English place-names in -*chester*, and former Celtic occupation where no Celts have been dominant for centuries is evident from such names as London and Carlisle.

Numerous examples of Indian place-names of religious significance are given in the present work (e.g., GARHMUKTESAR, HARDWAR, JAGANNATH). For Iranian names of this type we may cite Adhar-baijān (Pahlavi *Āturpātākān*, 'Fire-protected'), Bagavan ('God-district'); Old Osset. *Zovydāia* (Sudak in the Crimea; 'Holy City');¹ Armenian *At'oR Anahay* ('Mountain of Anāhita' [Hübschmann, pp. 286, 398]), *Astvaçaṣēn* ('God-built'), *Diçmairi* ('God-grove'); Italic Mantua ('City of [the Etruscan death-god] Mantus'); Gall. Camulodunum (Lexden Heath, 'Fort of Camulus' [a war-god]), Deobriga (Miranda de Ebro in Asturia; 'God-hill'), Divodnron (Metz; 'God-fort'), Lugudunon (Lyons; 'Fort of Lug' [the god of war]); Irish Caherepheepa ('Stone Fort of the [Fairy] Pipe'), Carrigleena ('Rock of [the Fairy Queen] Clodna'), Cushinsheean ('Little Foot of the Fairy Fort'), Knockshigowna ('Hill of Una's Fairy Palace'), Tobernashee ('Fairy Well'). Sometimes even rivers have divine names—e.g., Gall. Deva (Dee, 'Divine'), Taranis ('Thunder-god').

LITERATURE.—A. Fick, *Griech. Personennamen*, Göttingen, 1874 (the most general survey of the subject; the 2nd ed., do. 1894, omits the introduction and is, therefore, of less value for the present purpose); O. Schrader, *Reallex. der indogerm. Altertumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, pp. 673–678; A. Hilka, *Altind. Personennamen*, Breslau, 1910 (with good bibliography); F. Justi, *Iranisches Namenbuch*, Marburg, 1895; H. Hübschmann, *Altarmen. Personennamen*, in *Festgruss an R. von Roth*,

¹ Possibly identical in meaning with O. Pers. Suguda ('Sogdiana').

Stuttgart, 1893, pp. 99-108; W. Tomasehek, 'Die alten Thraker, II,' *SWAW* cxxxi. [1894], Abhand. 1; W. Schulze, *Zur Gesch. latein. Eigennamen*, Berlin, 1904; A. Holder, *Altkeil. Sprachschatz*, Leipzig, 1896 ff.; G. Storm, 'Sjælevandring og Opkaldessystem,' *Arkiv f. nord. Filologi*, ix. [1893] 109-222; E. Förstemann, *Altdeutsches Namenbuch*², Bonn, 1900 ff.; C. G. Andresen, *Altdeut. Personennamen*², Mainz, 1876; A. Socin, *Mittelhochdeutsches Namenbuch*, Basel, 1903; E. Lewy, *Altpruss. Personennamen*, Breslau, 1904; A. Leskien, 'Litauische Personennamen,' *Indogerm. Forschungen*, xxvi. [1909] 325-352; F. Miklosich, 'Bildung der slav. Personennamen,' *DWAIV* x. [1895] 215-330; G. Krek, *Einleit. in die slav. Literaturgesch.*², Graz, 1887, pp. 485-508. For place-names, H. Hübschmann, 'Altarmen. Ortsnamen,' *Indogerm. Forschungen*, xvi. [1904] 197-490; P. W. Joyce, *Origin and Hist. of Irish Names of Places*, Dublin, 1869-1913 (the list might be much extended, but these works, with the book of Johnston's mentioned in the text, will give an excellent idea of the method to be pursued in the study of place-names). The investigation of names seems to have been of scant interest to earlier ages; practically the only treatises known are in Irish: for personal (nick-)names see the *Góir Anamann* ('Fitness of Names'), ed. and tr. W. Stokes, *Irish Texts*, iii., Leipzig, 1891-97, pp. 285-444; and for place-names the *Dindenchas*, ed. and tr. (prose portions) Stokes, *RCel* xv. [1894] 272-336, 418-484, xvi. [1895] 31-83, 135-167, 269-312, and (verse portions) E. Gwynn, *Todd Lect. Series* (Royal Irish Acad.), vii. ff. [Dublin, 1900 ff.].

LOUIS H. GRAY.

NAMES (Japanese).—I. Family-names.—In ancient times there were two kinds of family-names recognized in Japan: *kabane*, or *sei*, and *uji*, or *shi*. Both were granted by the sovereign to only a limited number; and the mass of the people had no patronymic.

(a) *Kabane*.—*Kabane* are said to have existed since the 'divine age.' In the reign of Emperor Temmu (673-686) eight distinct *kabane* were recognized. They were as follows: Ason, Inagi, Imiki, Mabito, Michinoshi, Muraji, Omi, and Sukuna. Later the number of *kabane* was increased to twenty-three. Such family-names designated the profession or rank of those bearing them, and may be considered of the nature of class or caste distinctions.

(b) *Uji*.—*Uji* were for the most part granted by the sovereign to certain members of one or another of the *kabane* families in recognition of some special merit or to designate some special profession. Among the most ancient of these are: Mononobe, Odomo, Imbé, Nakatomi, and Soga; but the most famous in all the history of Japan are Minamoto, Taira, Fujiwara, and Tachibana. The last four are at once thought of as in particular 'the *uji*.' So prominent were they that they have by some been erroneously considered *kabane*. Sugawara, Kiyohara, Kamo, Urabe, and Abe are also among the more prominent *uji* names.

2. Local names.—As the descendants of these *uji* families increased, certain branches took a local or territorial name in addition to the *uji* name. Thus the number of apparently distinct families increased. In A.D. 815 a 'Record of *Kabane* and *Uji*' was published. This contained 1182 *uji* names, many of the local or territorial names having taken the place of the true family-name, or *uji*. Most of these branch families, bearing distinct names, were in reality members of some one of the large *uji*.

Until the beginning of the Meiji era the bearers of *kabane* or *uji* names were of high rank; and the common people, except for some special and extraordinary service, were allowed merely personal names. At the beginning of the Meiji era the government ordered all to take family-names; and, upon registration, the free changing of personal names was no longer allowed. At that time many millions of new families adopted names for the first time; but these were mostly of the local type, such as had in the earlier period been taken in addition to *kabane* or *uji* names. A large number adopted some popular name; and it was not unusual for whole villages to take the same name, often the name of the locality or of the village itself; and thus the use of the same family-name

did not of necessity signify any near relationship. The number of distinct family-names now recorded in the Tokyo Directory is 4146; and the Postal Cheque List of the whole country gives 4942. Probably the number of family-names in present use in Japan is no less than 10,000.

In writing Japanese family-names Chinese characters are used. The larger number of names consist of two characters which may be pronounced arbitrarily according to the taste of the family in one of two ways: the Japanese or the Chinese. Some names are of only one character, and rarely three or more are used. Of the Chinese characters used, certain ones are very common; and the majority have some connexion with nature or natural objects: Yama, 'Mountain'; Kawa, 'River'; Ta, or Da, 'Rice-field'; Mura, 'Village'; No, 'Field'; Hara, 'Plain'; Ike, 'Pond'; Hayashi, 'Forest'; Oka, 'Hill'; Shima, 'Island'; Mori, 'Grove'; Tani, 'Valley'; Ama, or Amé, 'The Heaven'; Hoshi, 'Star'; Hi, 'Sun'; Tsuki, 'Moon,' etc. These are all individually written in one Chinese character, though most are dissyllabic in pronunciation. Second to characters of this class are those signifying plant life: Ki, 'Tree'; Matsn, 'Pine'; Sugi, 'Cedar'; Ume, 'Plum'; Sakura, 'Cherry'; Fuji, 'Wisteria,' etc.

To these nominal forms all kinds of descriptive characters were added such as: great, small, middle, upper, lower, broad, high, black, white, red, blue, east, west, north, south, and many more.

3. Korean names.—Among the older family-names a considerable number came from Korea when the more or less extensive immigration from that country took place. In the 'Record of *Kabane* and *Uji*' a number of such names are given. For the most part, however, the Koreans, when naturalized, were given Japanese names or else their Korean names soon became so modified as to lose any distinctively Korean peculiarities which they had.

4. Personal names.—Personal names in ancient times, especially of men of rank, were of great length, as is seen in the *Kojiki* and *Nihongi*. The following may serve as fair examples: Amenigishi-kuninigishi-amatsuhidaka-hikohononiniginomikoto, and Ameshirushikuni-oshihiraki toyos-kurahikono-sumeramikoto.

5. Royal names.—As time went on, such royal family-names had a tendency to shorten. The real name of royalty was Imina, meaning 'the name to be avoided,' for it was usually avoided in conversation or writing. Imina ending with *hito* was adopted as distinctive of royalty, being limited to emperors and princes of the blood. The character read *hito* means 'benevolence,' and was first adopted by the Emperor Seiwa (859-876) in the name Tadahito. The name of Emperor Daigo (898-930) was Atsuhito; and since his time the special ending has been used with every imperial name. The name of Meiji Tenno, the late emperor, was Mutsuhito.

6. Nanori.—*Nanori* of two Chinese characters were from the Middle Ages adopted by members of the official and *samurai* class. It was also the *imina* for them. Within the same family many would adopt one of these two characters as a *tōrijī*, or character-in-common; e.g., among the descendants of Minamoto Yoriyoshi, either *yori* or *yoshi* was used in common for several generations: Yoriyoshi, Yoshiye, Yoshitsuna, Yoshimitsu, Tameyoshi, Yoshichika, Yoshikuni, Yoshitomo, Yoritomo. In the Tokugawa family Iye was the *tōrijī*: Iyeyasu, Iyemitsu, Iyetsuna, Iyenobu, Iyetsugu. It is to be noticed that the name employed in addition to the family-name was placed after the family-name.

7. *Tōrina*.—*Tōrina*, or *zokumyo*, popular or secular names, were used in everyday intercourse. With the passing of the old distinctions between the upper and the lower classes, all are now free to use these or other *nanori* together with their family-names.

In selecting the personal names for their children, certain families have the custom of using a single character as a common element for all, as in the case of *nanori*; but there is no general habit in the matter. The naming of a child after an ancestor or relative is rare. The adoption of the same name in succession by the head of the family is practised to a certain extent, especially in the case of trade or professional names.

8. Names for male children.—In the personal names of male children certain distinctive terminations are popular: *ro*, *suke*, *kichi*, *zo*, *bei*, *emon*, *hiko*, *maro*, etc. Of these some are remnants of old official titles, now unused, while others simply signify a son or male child. *Ro*, 'male child,' together with a number designating the order of his birth, is a very common personal name: *Taro*, or *Ichiro*, 'The First Male'; *Jiro*, 'The Second Male'; *Saburo*, 'The Third Male,' etc. To these combinations certain Chinese characters of noble meaning are often prefixed: *Tokutaro*, 'Virtue First Male'; *Tokujiro*, 'Virtue Second Male'; *Tokusaburo*, 'Virtue Third Male,' etc. Some of the most common of these prefixed characters are read: *masa*, 'good'; *zen*, 'just'; *michi*, 'righteous way'; *yu*, 'courage'; *shin*, 'faithful,' etc. Names of plants and animals are also of frequent use; and regard to what would produce harmonious combination with the family-name is not neglected.

9. Names for female children.—In the personal names of female children in ancient times the termination *mikoto* or *hime* was distinctive. During the Middle Ages, in families of rank, the name often terminated in *ko*. The names have all been gradually shortened and simplified; and at present the greater number contain only two syllables. In the case of such short names, however, a certain lack is felt, a certain undefined brusqueness, which is obviated by the supplementary prefix *O*. Of late the termination *ko* is increasingly taking the place of the prefix *O*, both forms serving alike to give a pleasing fullness to the name. Female names are often those of plants, trees, or animals: *Matsu* (Omatsu or Matsuko), 'Pine'; *Take* (Otake or Takeko), 'Bamboo'; *Ume* (Oume or Umeko), 'Plum'; *Tsuru* (Otsuru or Tsuruko), 'Stork'; *Kamé* (Okame or Kameko), 'Tortoise,' etc. These are popular from their omen, which promises long life. Classical names or those selected for their honourable meaning are not uncommon: *Michi*, 'Righteous Way'; *Yoshi*, 'Justice'; *Toku*, 'Virtue'; *Ai*, 'Charity,' etc.

In ancient times it appears to have been the custom that the mother should name the children; but after the Middle Ages, without any definite point of change, the right of naming devolved upon the father. In *samurai* families, as late as the opening of the present era, infant names were given; and then, at the age of fifteen, these temporary names were usually changed for permanent personal names.

10. Foreign names.—As relations with Western nations became more intimate, and especially as the influence of Christianity deepened, Western and Christian names were adopted to a slight extent. These names were for the most part so expressed in Chinese characters as to appear perfectly natural to the Japanese eye and ear. The following may be taken as examples: *Jo* for Joseph, *Paul*, *Ben*, *Samuru* for Samuel, *Joji* for George, and *Yugo* for Hugo.

11. *Azana*.—*Azana*, or alternate names, were occasionally taken by officers and scholars, after a Chinese custom, in addition to *nanori* and regular family-names; but of these little practical use was made.

12. *Noms de plume*.—*Go*, literary *noms de plume*, were not uncommon with scholars, writers, and artists; and in many cases these names became more popularly known than the real and legal cognomens. Of these the best known examples are: *Nakaye Toju* (Yoyemon), *Kumazawa Banzan* (Sukeyemon), *Rai Sanyo* (Kiutaro), *Yoshida Shoin* (Torajiro), *Yokoi Shonan* (Heishiro), *Nakamura Keiu* (Masanao). These *go*, generally taken from the name of some locality, mountain, or river, were ordinarily written in two Chinese characters, seldom in three or more. Occasionally scholars of the Japanese Classics adopted *go* expressed in Japanese characters; but these were not at all popular.

Thus it will be seen that a man of rank or scholarship might possess at the same time a large number of family and personal names: *kabane*, *uji*, a local family name, a *nanori* or *imina*, a *tōrina*, an *azana*, a *go*, and, after death, a *hōmyō*, or religious name.

13. Expressions of respect.—Following the name, not preceding it, certain expressions of respect are used. The most common in conversation, whether after the family or the personal name, regardless of sex or rank, is *San*. *Sama* may be used instead to express special distinction, as by a maid to her mistress. In writing, *San* is never used except in most familiar communications. *Sama* or *Dono* takes its place among all classes. *Kun* is a common form in addressing men, and may be thought of as taking the place of the English *Mr*.

14. Professional names.—Among actors certain family and personal names are taken by generations of pupils. *Ichikawa Danjuro* is the professional name now held in the ninth generation; *Ichikawa Yazo* in the eighth generation; and *Nakamura Kanzaburo* in the thirteenth. The same custom may be found among musicians and artists. In certain crafts specific characters are often used in common by successive generations, being recognized as distinctive. The names of Buddhist priests, usually of two characters, are ordinarily taken from the Buddhist scriptures and are pronounced in special Chinese fashion.

15. Posthumous names.—*Okurina*, or posthumous names, have been common with royalty and among the nobility. In the reign of *Kotoku* (645-654) the posthumous name *Jimmu* was given to the first sovereign, and since that time the custom has continued until the present time, when the late emperor is known by the posthumous name of *Meiji Tenno*. These names have for the most part been characteristic of the individual or his reign or some locality associated with him.

16. Religious names.—After the introduction of Buddhism the custom of giving *kaimyo*, or *hōmyō*, 'religious names,' to the dead became common. These were inscribed on the ancestral tablets and on the grave-stones, so that rarely were actual personal names to be found in such connexions. In recent years this custom has somewhat weakened; and more and more the ordinary personal and family name, acquired and used as in the West, is becoming the only name that marks the grave of the dead.

LITERATURE.—*Shinsen Shōshi Roku* (the revised 'Record of *Kabane* and *Uji*'), ed. Prince Manta and others, revised *Minamoto-Inabiko*, Yedo (Tōkyō), 1469; H. Knrita, *Studies in Shōshi Roku*, 2 vols., Tōkyō, 1897; L. Hearn, *Shadowings*, London, 1900; B. H. Chamberlain, *The Language, Mythology, and Geographical Nomenclature of Japan, viewed in the Light of Aino Studies*, Tōkyō, 1887.

T. HARADA.

NAMES (Jewish).—The post-Biblical period shows much the same general phenomena as are discernible in the Biblical age (see NAMES [Hebrew]; *HDB* iii. 478 ff.; and G. B. Gray, *Hebrew Proper Names*, London, 1896). The most significant modification concerns the marking of family sequence by the application to descendants of names borne by ancestors. In Palestine the naming of children after their grandfathers can be traced only to the Greek period, about the 3rd cent. B.C. But the Elephantine papyri carry the custom back some two centuries for the Egyptian Jews (Gray, in *Studien zur semitischen Philologie*, Giessen, 1914, p. 161 ff.). In the Rabbinic period the custom was well established, and it was recognized that a change had occurred from the older Israelite practice of naming a child after some circumstance at his birth. The change was justified by Rabbis of the 2nd cent. A.D. on two grounds: (1) the need of aiding the preservation of family genealogies, and (2) the loss of the guidance of the Holy Spirit in selecting the incident which was to be enshrined in the child's name (*Midr. Gen. Rabbāh*, xxxvii.). It has never become customary for Jewish children to bear their parents' names; there are exceptions, but in most cases the child seems to have been posthumous. More usual is the choice of the grandfather's name, though the tendency has been, since the 13th cent., not to name a child after a living relative (L. Löw, *Die Lebensalter in der jüdischen Literatur*, Szegedin, 1875, p. 95).

A full study of the history of Jewish personal names throughout the ages was published by L. Zunz in 1836 (reprinted in Zunz's *Gesammelte Schriften*, Berlin, 1876, ii. 1-82). At that time the Prussian Government, following a Bohemian precedent of 1787, was proposing to introduce legislation restricting the Jews to Biblical personal names (cf. J. Jacobs, in *JE* ix. 156 f.). Zunz had no difficulty in demonstrating that Jews had freely used non-Biblical names, adopting in succession Babylonian, Persian, Aramaic, Greek, Latin, Arabic, and later European designations. Many Hebrew names were translated into the vernaculars of Europe and Asia. Zunz's work contains long lists of the Jewish names of various periods; and there are some similar lists in Jacobs' article. In these lists Biblical names by no means predominate. The variety of Jewish names revealed in the English records of the 12th and 13th centuries is very remarkable.

With regard to surnames, there are indications that descriptive epithets were becoming common in the Rabbinic period, and that these were developed chiefly in lands where Arabic influence prevailed. Family-names were turned into surnames; so were place-names. The many wanderings of the Jews in the Middle Ages and more recent times induced the custom of naming a new settler after the town or country from which he had migrated. Then, again, such terms as Cohen and Levi, originally descriptive of descent, became surnames. Such names as Maimuni (or Maimonides), i.e. 'son of Maimon,' in the 12th cent., and Mendelssohn, 'son of Mendel,' in the 18th, are illustrations of the practice of converting the father's personal name into a surname. Animal-names are probably more common among Jews than among the general population. In the mediæval period occupations suggested many names, and in the centuries approaching the modern age names were derived, especially in Germany, from the business signs (such as the red shield which gave the Rothschilds their name). The intercourse between Jews and their fellow-citizens after the emancipation period rendered it necessary for the former to bear distinctive civic names. This had

been the case long before in Spain, and was growing common throughout Europe when, in 1787, the custom became regular in Central and Northern Europe. In the year named the Jews of the Austrian empire were ordered by law to adopt surnames; if any refused, the registration commissioners were empowered to enforce names of their own selection (cf. Jacobs, *loc. cit.*).

The naming of the child has at various times been a ceremony of considerable moment. The period covered by Scripture is fully dealt with in the Bible Dictionaries and in art. NAMES (Hebrew). From the 12th cent., according to Löw (p. 97), not earlier, Jewish boys were named on their eighth day, during the circumcision rite. The formulae vary; the now common form may be found in the *Authorised Daily Prayer Book* (ed. S. Singer, London, 1914, p. 305; cf. Löw, p. 101). A formula for the naming of girls is given in some rites (see *Book of Prayer . . . according to the Custom of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews*, ed. M. Gaster, London, 1901, i. 180); it is becoming customary to name girls at the first visit paid by the mother to the Synagogue after the birth of the child (Singer, p. 312). The names thus given are mostly in Hebrew, though sometimes the vernacular names are merely transliterated into Hebrew letters—a custom which goes back to Talmudic times. Such names as Alexander and Julian were thus treated in the Rabbinic age. Often the Hebrew and common names corresponded either exactly or in meaning, but in modern times there is frequently no exact correspondence between the Hebrew and ordinary names; thus the chief Rabbi Hermann Adler had the Hebrew name Naphtali. There is, however, some remote connexion in meaning between the two names. It is still customary to find a Hebrew name beginning with the same letter as the vernacular name. Most Jews still bear two names (though the two are often identical), the one Hebrew (termed 'sacred name' and used in Hebrew documents, in the Synagogue, in epitaphs, and so forth), the other vernacular (termed 'common name,' used for ordinary purposes). The Hebrew names thus conferred are borne throughout life, except that, under Kabbalistic influence, some rites direct the change of name in case of illness, in a prayer for the patient's recovery (for a formula see Gaster, p. 195). This custom is now more honoured in the breach than in the observance, though it has some Talmudic authority, for in *T. B. Rōsh Hashānāh*, 16b, mention is made of the efficacy of a change of name. Names are still changed on conversion; thus a Jewish convert to Christianity is given a new name, such as Paul, while a convert to Judaism receives a patriarchal name (Abraham, Sarah, or the like). On the other hand, it was held by the Rabbis a meritorious trait in the sons of Jacob that in their Egyptian environment 'they did not change their names' (*Lev. Rabbāh*, xxxii. 5). A pleasant custom with regard to Hebrew names is the selection of a Scriptural text, beginning and ending with the same letters as the Hebrew name; the text is then a kind of motto for the bearer of the name. A long list of such texts may be found in S. Baer, *Abodat Yisrael*, Rödelheim, 1868, p. 106. Some have sought the source of this custom in the Talmudic references to an older school usage. 'Repeat to me thy verse,' says a visitor to the school (cf. the incidents recorded in *Hagigah*, 15a). But the verse in these passages was some recently-learned text, and apparently had no connexion with the pupil's name.

LITERATURE.—To the works referred to in the course of the art. add: J. Jacobs, *Jews of Angevin England*, London, 1893, esp. pp. 345-369; H. Gross, *Gallia judaica*, Paris, 1897; and, for the ancient period, S. Daiches, *Publication no. 2 of Jews' College*, London, 1910.

I. ABRAHAMS.

NAMES (Lapp).—1. Saivo and saivo names.—Among the primitive beliefs of the Lapps was the worship of dead relatives. They thought that the souls of dead kinsmen helped their descendants and were reborn in them. But they regarded the name as a kind of soul, and therefore the transmission of names was of great importance. In order that a man might possess the character of a dead kinsman he must have his name, and dead men would help only those of the living who bore their names.

The burying-places of the Lapps on sacred mountains were called *saivos*, or *saivo* homes. Immediately after death souls passed into that *saivo* a tenant of which had been their familiar spirit while they lived. There, close under the ground, dwelt all souls of the dead, both men and beasts, passing a life like their earthly life, except that they were more prosperous and more powerful. They protected and helped those who survived them. The *saivo* men and women were the familiar spirits of those who bore their names, and the *saivo* beasts were also helpful spirits, especially to the shaman, whose retinue of familiars comprised not only his *saivo* men but also his *saivo* animals, viz. *saivo* birds, *saivo* fish or serpents, and *saivo* reindeer. Every adult Laplander had one or more of these familiar spirits represented by *saivo* names. The more *saivo* spirits a Laplander possessed, the higher was his reputation. *Saivo* spirits were obtained by skill in magic, by inheritance, or by gift or purchase. Parents while still living often divided their familiar spirits among their children; if they did not, their heirs took them. Marriages were esteemed in proportion to the number of familiar spirits, represented by *saivo* names, that were brought into the marriage bond.

2. Transmission of saivo names.—When a woman was pregnant, she was informed in a dream by a dead man what name the child should be given and also what dead man should rise to life again in the child. If she did not learn this in a dream, the father or other relatives had to find out by divination or by consulting the shaman. Missionaries living among the Norwegian Lapps (1716-34) stated that in their time babies were christened with common Norwegian names, but, as soon as the christening party returned from church, a *laugo*, or washing, of their own religion was held. This *laugo* was called *same-namma-kastates*, 'Lapp-name baptism.' The child was thereby consecrated to Sarakka, the birth-wife, and received a Lappish name which had been borne generally by some ancestor and communicated to the relatives in the manner mentioned above. This name was always used, the Christian name being ignored and forgotten.

'When afterwards the child falls ill, or cries more than it should, it is imputed to no other cause than because a just and genuine name was not given it. . . . A new washing was undertaken, when a new name was acquired, taken from one of his ancestors; and this is the reason why you meet with Laplanders frequently that have two or three names' (Leem, *De Laponibus Finmarckie*, p. 496, Eng. tr. in J. Pinkerton's *Voyages*, London, 1803-14, i. 483).

This new name was called *adda-namma*. Scheffer (*Laponia*, p. 301) reports similar changes of name among the Swedish Lapps, and Högström (*Beskrifning*, p. 138), who also wrote of the Swedish Lapps, says that, when a child was ill or troublesome, or sometimes for other reasons—e.g., to avert a suspected misfortune—the Lapps changed its name, washing away the old name with water coloured red by a decoction of alder-bark. Leem also mentions the use of alder-bark juice for this purpose (p. 496). C. Ganander (*Mythologia Fennica*, Åbo, 1789, p. 61) quotes the MS of Lenart Sidenius, a Danish missionary working in Norway

about 1716, who speaks of the magic baptism of the Lapps, by which they acquire a magic name and with it a *namma-guelle*, or 'name-fish,' one of their underground deities, which becomes their familiar spirit. 'They feign,' says Leem (p. 417; Eng. tr., p. 460), 'that very few can have this, unless on the second baptism.' The name-fish seems identical with the *saivo* fish which helped the shaman to hurt his enemies and carried him on his journey to the realm of the dead. The statement of Sidenius may perhaps mean that, when a man was re-baptized as a shaman in the name of a dead kinsman who had possessed a *saivo* fish, such fish thereupon became the name-fish and familiar spirit of the new shaman.

The baptismal rites of *same-namma* and *adda-namma* were never administered by the Christian godmother, but by another woman, generally the mother. She used warm water into which, Jessen says (*De Finnorum*, p. 38), two twigs of birch were thrown, one in its natural shape, the other twisted into the form of a ring. The *laugo-edne*, or washing wife, then addressed the baby, saying, 'Be thou as fruitful and strong as the birch-tree from which these twigs were taken.' Leem and Högström, however, state that alder-bark was decocted in the water. After throwing into the water some brass or silver object called *namma-skiello*, she then baptized the child, saying, 'I baptize thee with a new name, N.N. Thou shalt thrive better with this water than with that in which the priest dipped thee. By this washing I call thee up, O dead man, N.N. Thou shalt now rise up again, be healthy and receive a new body. And thou, child, shalt have the same fortune as the dead man N.N. had in his lifetime.' After the child has been baptized, she adds, 'Now thou art baptized with the *same-namma* (or *adda-namma*) baptism, with the dead man's name: see how well thou wilt thrive therewith!' The *skiello* was then taken from the water and tied to the child. It was highly prized as an amulet, and boys, when they grew up, tied it to their magic drums. Before the rite of *same-namma* baptism offerings were made to Sarakka, and both the water and the child were consecrated to her; but in the *adda-namma* baptism offerings were made to the dead man who was then reborn. When any one was to enter the ranks of the *noades*, or shamans, he was baptized, and, whenever any one received a *saivo* spirit, he was baptized in the name of the dead man who was reborn in him. Even old men over seventy were sometimes rechristened when ill. One old Lapp mentioned by Jessen (p. 40) had an *adda-namma* and thirteen *saivo* names, three of which he had received from his mother in her lifetime, and the rest he had inherited from various relatives. A Lapp youth had no *adda-namma*, properly so called, because he had never been ill, but he had two *saivo* names, one of which he had received as a present from his father, and the other he had obtained for himself by the practice of magic.

These ceremonies are a curious blend of Christian, Scandinavian, and Finno-Ugrian influences. It seems probable that the water-baptism itself is of Christian origin; but the Lappish custom as a whole is evidently of a more ancient descent, and may have been, as V. M. Mikhailovskii asserts, 'one of the most sacred rites' of the pagan Lapps (*JAI* xxiv. [1894] 148). Fjellner, the well-informed Lapp who supplied O. Donner with much of the material for his *Lieder der Lappen* (Helsingfors, 1876), told G. von Düben, the Swedish writer, that Lappish baptism was very old and mentioned in their most ancient songs. We may gather from the evidence of Högström, Leem, and Jessen that during the first half of the 18th cent., when the influence of Christian missionaries was making most progress, twigs of birch were placed in the baptismal water, but that, where pagan influences remained strong, alder-bark was used by both Norwegian and Swedish Lapps. It might perhaps be inferred that in the pre-Christian rite the patient was daubed with alder-bark juice, a substitute for, or equivalent to, blood, which had deep religious significance for the Lapps, and was used by them to a large extent in the very curious survivals of old ritual which followed the killing of bears.¹ Otherwise the name-giving customs are

¹ See P. Fjellström, *Om Lapparnes Björnsfänge*, Stockholm, 1755. It may be noticed that with the Chukcheis, before name-giving ceremonies similar to those of the Lapps, the faces of mother, child, and relatives were smeared with blood (W. Bogoras, 'The Chukchee,' in *Mem. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.: The Jesuit North Pacific Expedition*, vol. vii. pt. ii. [1907] p. 61).

of a general character, and occur with variations all over the north. The belief that ancestors come to life again in descendants named after them, which seems the root-idea of these Lappish customs, is of course not peculiar to the Lapps, who indeed borrowed much of their religion, like their language, from neighbours of alien blood. Such beliefs and customs are prevalent not only in Siberia but also among N. American Indians, and among the Eskimos, both American and Asiatic.¹

LITERATURE.—For Swedish Lapps: J. Scheffer, *Laponia*, Frankfurt, 1873, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1874; P. Högström, *Beskrifning öfver de till Sveriges krona lydande Lappmarker*, Stockholm, n.d. (1746-47). For Norwegian Lapps: E. J. Jessen, *De Finnorum Laponumque Norvegorum Religione*, Copenhagen, 1767; K. Leem, *De Laponibus Finmarchiae eorumque lingua, vita et religione*, do. 1767.

CHARLES J. BILLSON.

NAMES (Sumerian).—The oldest inscriptions of the Sumerians are contracts and business records, and these invariably contain names of persons in private life. These sources probably begin before 4000 B.C., so that we possess sources for the study of the personal names of this the oldest civilized people from the beginning of history until they were finally absorbed into the Semitic Babylonian race about 2000 B.C. The most remarkable fact about the personal names of this agglutinating language is that even the rude archaic inscriptions of almost pre-historic times contain no names reflecting the lower stages of culture. They have already freed themselves from names referring to bodily deformities, so frequent in the later Babylonian names.² Animal names have also disappeared, except in the names of the gods, most of whom preserved animal attributes, and were frequently referred to by animal titles. In two classes of personal names the words for 'dog' (*ur*) and 'maturing young animal' (*amar*) constantly recur, but they are no longer used in their original senses. A very large group of names begin with *ur*, followed by the name of a deity, or some sacred place or object, as *Ur-Bau*, literally 'Dog of the goddess Bau'; *Ur-Ninā*, 'Dog of the goddess Ninā'; *Ur-gir-gid-da*, 'Dog of the long wagon,' etc. In all these cases *ur* really means 'menial,' 'servant,' one who is attached to the worship of these deities, sacred relics, or objects employed in the cults. We cannot even say that we have here a remnant of pre-historic animal names. The Semitic names, which are often mere translations of Sumerian forms, never have the word for 'dog' in this class of names, but only *warad*, 'servant'; *Warad-Bau*, *Warad-Ninā*, would be their rendering, not *Kalab*.³ *Bau*, etc. As to *amar*, which for the sake of brevity we shall translate by 'calf,' the meaning is not so clear. It forms a small group of names in the sources of all periods and was rendered into Semitic by *bāru*, 'maturing young of animals.' Thus we have *Amar-Enzu*, 'Calf of Enzu (the moon-god),' Semitic *Bār-Sin*; *Amar-é-bil*, 'Calf of the new temple,' etc. The Sumerians, and after them the Semites, 'probably employed this word in the sense of 'sturdy offspring,' certainly not in the original animal sense. The element *subar*⁴ originally means 'pig,' Semitic *šahū*, and, like *ur* and *amar*, forms a small group of names of the type *Subar-Bau*, *Subar-Utu*, literally, 'Pig of the goddess Bau,' 'Pig of the sun-god,' etc., but the Sumerians clearly attached no such meaning to

these names, but understood 'Servant of Bau,' 'Servant of Utu,' etc., for the syllabars render *subar* by *ardu*, 'servant,' and in ancient texts *subar* and *nitaḥ* (the ordinary word for *wardu*, 'servant') occur side by side as class names.⁵ One of the most common personal names in Sumerian is *Subar*, which probably stands for the divine name *Ninsubar*, 'Lord of pigs.' With these groups of names thus disposed of, there remains not the slightest trace of connecting human beings with animals in assigning names.⁶ In those names which contain literal animal references we have to do with epithets of the gods which form part of the personal names; e.g., the names *Dun-tur*, 'Little zebu,' *Mas-tur*, 'Little kid,' *Mas-gula*, 'Great kid,' *Mas-du*, 'Kid,' *Subar-tur*, 'The little pig,' *Enzu*.⁷ 'The she-goat,' are apocopated forms in which the full name is reduced to the divine animal epithet.

Sumerian has no so-called pet names, or hypocoristica, and the language has in fact no proper diminutive endings. A considerable number of names end with the suffix *mu*, 'my,' as *Šes-a-mu*, 'The brother 'is my father,' *Dungi-zi-mu*, 'Dungi is my breath of life,' *Dim-zi-mu*, 'The creating one is my breath of life,' *Enlil-bad-mu*, 'Enlil is my wall (of defence),' and hypocoristica like *Zi-mu*, 'My breath of life.' The suffix *mu* is not to be regarded as having the force of endearment, but it forms a grammatical part of the original name and can be omitted in apocopated forms. Thus we have *Enlil-bad-mu* and *Enlil-bad*.

It appears that the complicated and theological names given to Sumerians great and humble were not assigned to their owners at birth, but at a later period, perhaps not until the age of their majority. This statement is deduced from two facts: (a) in the temple records infants, boys and girls, and orphans do not have names, but are entered in the lists simply as 'an infant,' 'a boy,' 'a girl,' etc.; (b) the names never refer to circumstances of birth.

Sumerian names are almost invariably of a theological character, and may be divided into two great groups: (i.) names which represent a complete grammatical sentence; and (ii.) names composed of construct and genitive. In the early period names of the former group preponderate, but the tendency to use names of the second group grew, and in the periods of the Ur and Isin dynasties the second group represents nearly half of the personal names. A name of the chief group originally consisted of a complete sentence, and generally has no reference to the life of the individual, but is taken from some well-known religious, historical, or magic text. A very large number are taken from hymns of the Tammuz and Innini cult. Thus we have *Nin-šes-ra-ki-ag*, 'The queen loves the brother'—an idea frequently expressed in the liturgies of the wailing of the mother-goddess for her brother Tammuz; *Šes-azag-gi-sú-mu-gin*, 'Unto the holy brother she has gone'—an apocopated form, in which the subject (*Ama*, the mother, or *Nin*, the queen, etc.) is omitted at the beginning of the name. A large number of names are really citations from liturgical texts; e.g., we find the following name in its various distorted forms, *Me-sig-gan-e*, *Me-sig-nu-di*, *Bara-sig-nu-di*, which are

¹ See, e.g., J. G. Frazer, *GB*, pt. ii., *Taboo*, London, 1911, pp. 368, 370, 371, *Totemism and Exogamy*, do. 1910, li. 344-346, lii. 297; K. Rasmussen, *People of the Polar North*, do. 1908, p. 116; M. A. Czaplicka, *Aboriginal Siberia*, Oxford, 1914, pp. 132, 135, 136, 144.

² See on these Semitic names H. Holma, *Die assyrisch-babylonischen Personennamen*, Helsingfors, 1914.

³ Semitic word for 'dog.'

⁴ Semitic Babylonian names beginning with *Bār* are not genuine Semitic names and gradually disappeared.

⁵ Falsely read *šah* in all previous lists of Sumerian names.

¹ Allotte de la Fuÿe, *Documents préargoniques*, Paris, 1908-1913, no. 119 VI.

² A small group of names begin with *dun*, which denotes a bovine animal, but this word also means 'strong,' 'heroic,' 'sturdy,' and has probably no reference to an animal in these names. It occurs in names of the type *Dun-a-Enlilikenag*, 'The sturdy Enlil loves,' *Dun-sag-kuš*, 'The pensive sturdy one,' *Dun-šes*, 'The sturdy brother' (referring to Tammuz).

³ Thureau-Dangin, *Recueil de tablettes chaldéennes*, Paris, 1903, no. 11 V.

⁴ 'Brother' is an epithet of the god Tammuz and always refers to him in Sumerian names.

really taken from a line of a liturgy, *Lugal-mu me bara sig-gan nu-di*,¹ 'My king whose decrees in the sanctuary cease not.' The name *Lugal-me-gal-gal* and its apocopated form, *Lugal-me*, rest upon a line like *Lugal-me-gal-gal sag-an-si mi-ni-ib-il*, 'The king² exalted the great decrees unto heaven.'³ Names taken from historical inscriptions are numerous; e.g., we have in various distorted forms the name *Nig-ud-ul-sig-e*,⁴ *Nig-ul-sig-e*,⁵ probably taken from the end of a building inscription which, after describing the construction of a temple, says, *nig-ud-ul-du-a sig-e*, 'that which unto future days has been raised gloriously.'⁶ The name *Sig-bi-gi*, 'Its brick he restored,'⁷ is for *Sig-bi-ki-bi-mu-gi*, 'Its brick to its place he restored'—a phrase which is found in many building inscriptions. Names taken from incantation-texts are easily detected; *Nin-su-el*,⁸ 'The queen-clean hands,' probably stands for *Nin-su-el-gi-gi*, 'Into the clean hands of the queen restore him,' or some other phrase of magical texts like *Nin-su-el-a-ni-ta mu-un-ku-e*, 'The queen with pure hands has eaten.' Names of purely ethical import are rare. The only one known to the present writer, *Nam-ku-li-ni-dug*, 'Friendship is good,'⁹ is probably extracted from some religious text.

We have, therefore, the remarkable example of a people who were known to each other by abstract religious phrases, usually shortened to convenient length, and often in such a way as to show that they had quite forgotten or at any rate neglected the original phrase; e.g., note the apocopation *Me-sig-gan-e* above, in which the negative *nu* and the helping verb *di* are omitted, thus completely destroying the sense. Often names are so reduced as to mean the opposite of the sense intended. Thus *Lugal-nig-a-zi-nu-ag*, 'The king does no cruel thing,'¹⁰ becomes *Lugal-nig-a-zi-ag*, 'The king does that which is cruel.'¹¹ In reducing this class of names the phrase may be apocopated at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end. Already in the early period this process has so distorted the names that many are a complete mystery, and in the later periods the names are almost wholly apocopations.¹² In the early period at least half of the names are unintelligible. As an example of the ruthless manner in which names were shortened compare *Nin-su-gal-lam*, 'The queen of Shugallam,' which is itself apocopated for 'The queen loves the chapel Shugallam,' or some similar phrase. This name appears as *Nin-su-lam* and *Nin-gal-lam*. *Nin-gu-bi* stands for *Nin-sag-gu-bi-mu-gi*, 'The queen's heart returns to its level,' i.e. she ceases to be angry, a poetical phrase taken from the return of the raging river to its banks. In the late period we have *Azag-ga-ni*, which would be unintelligible if we did not possess the early form *Ka-azag-ga-ni-mu-ba*, 'He has opened his pure mouth.'

Rarely do names have any relation to occupa-

tion. A priest who managed the religious rites connected with a canal has the name *Lugal-idig-na*, 'The king of the Tigris,' a short form containing simply the title of the river-god. It is perhaps no accident that the name of a part of Eridu, a city on the Persian Gulf, occurs in the name of a fisherman, *Amar-šubaru-(ki)*, 'The sturdy one of the city Shubaru.'¹

1. Names which represent a complete grammatical sentence.—Names of this great group may be analyzed into the following classes, which do not pretend to be exhaustive, since so many apocopated forms are obscure.²

(1) Names referring to the cult of Mother Earth and her brother Tammuz:

Dingir-sib, 'The divine shepherd'; *Dingir-seš-mu*, 'My divine brother'; *Ama-ra-[ki-ag]*, 'He [loves] the mother'; *Dam-zid-mu*, 'My faithful husband'; *Dim-tur*, 'The little wailer';³ *Ki-šū-a-be-ti-li*, *Nin-ki-šū-a*, 'The queen in a dark place dwells'; *Edin-ba-a-gub-nad*, 'In his plain . . . he sleeps'; *Dumu-mu-an-ni-dug*, 'My son maketh glad Anu'; *Dumu-nir-gal*, 'The glorious son'; *Dun-seš*, 'The sturdy brother'; *Nin-erib-ba-ni-gim-sal-zid*, 'The queen as her sister-in-law is a faithful woman';⁴ *Nin-edin-ni*, 'The queen unto the plains (has gone forth)';⁵ *Nin-mu-da-kuš*, 'My queen for (the brother) sighs'; *Nin-seš-da-kuš*, 'The queen for the brother sighs';⁶ *Nin-seš-ra-ki-ag*, 'The queen loves the brother'; *Nin-zid-dam-ki-ag*, 'The queen loves the faithful husband'; *Nin-ni-kuš*, 'The queen laments'; *Seš-da-gal-sa*, 'The brother of the merciful mother . . .'; *Seš-an-edin-na*, 'The brother from the plains (has been taken)';⁷ *Seš-kur-ra*, 'The brother in the earth (sleeps)'; *Seš-ki-na*, *Seš-ki*, 'The brother in the earth sleeps'; *Seš-ki-erim-ma*, 'The brother in the evil earth (sleeps)'; *Seš-lu-dug*, 'The brother, the good man';⁸ *Seš-ama-ra-ki-ag*, *Ama-ra*, *Seš-ki-ag*, 'The brother loves the mother'; *Seš-kal-la*, 'The precious brother.'

(2) Names referring to the goddess of begetting and the weeping mother:

Ama-en-tud, 'The mother an high priest has begotten'; *Ama-nun-un-zid*, 'The mother legitimate seed (has given)'; *Nu-mu-na-sum-ma*, 'Seed she gave'; *Nin-ū-numun-e-ki-ag*, 'The queen loves the seed'; *Ama-ka-ga*, 'The gracious mother'; *Ama-da-nu-di*, 'With the mother none rival'; *Nin-da-nu-me-a*, 'With the queen none compare'; *Ni-a-a-ma-da-ra*, 'Ninā is an everlasting mother'; *Nin-nam-tag-nu-tu*, 'The queen has no sin'; *aBau-ama-mu*, 'Bau is my mother'; *aBau-ama-da-ra*, 'Bau is an everlasting mother'; *aBau-gim-a-ba-ka-g*, 'Who is gracious like Bau?'; *aBau-zi-mu*, 'Bau is my soul of life'; *aBau-ni-kuš*, 'Bau laments'; *Nin-uru-da-kuš*, 'The queen laments for her city'; *Dim-a-Ninā-mu-tud*, 'The creating Ninā has begotten'; *aNin-dun-ama-mu*, *Dun-nin-ama-mu*, 'The queen of life is my mother';⁹ *Nin-iskim-ti*, 'The queen a helper is'; *Nin-mu-ma-da-aga*, 'My queen loves the land'; *aNinmar-ama-dim*, 'Ninmar is a creating mother.'

(3) Names referring to the word of the gods:

Enim-ma-ni-zid 'His word is trustworthy';¹⁰ *Enim-ašur-ruppak-zi-da*, 'The word of the god of Shuruppak is trustworthy'; *Enim-aEnlil-an-tub*, 'The word of Enlil shakes the heavens';¹¹ *Enim-enim-dug-ga-ni an-tub*, 'The words which he spoke shake the heavens';¹² *Enin-ud-zi-g*, 'The word is an on-rushing storm';¹³ *Enim-bi-dug*, 'His word is good.'¹⁴

(4) Names taken from historical inscriptions:

Apsu-sig-e, 'The *apsu* has been made glorious'; *Alam-kur-ta*, 'A statue from the mountain (he caused to be made)';¹⁵ *Ama-id-bil*, 'The mother the new canal . . .';¹⁶ *Bara-ir-nun*, 'The chapel with . . . oil he . . .'; *Ur-ir-nun*, 'The roof with . . . oil he . . .'; *Lugal-ir-nun*, 'The king with . . . oil has

¹ See Radau, *Sumerian Hymns and Prayers to Nin-ib*, Philadelphia, 1911, no. 1, rev. III. 17.

² 'King' in Sumerian names refers to some deity. Reference to the temporal king is doubtful in the few names which can be deduced for that purpose.

³ Cf. Gudea, Cylinder AI 2.

⁴ Nikolski, *Documents de la plus ancienne époque chaldéenne*, Petrograd, 1908, no. 18 IV.

⁵ Usually transcribed *Nig-du-pa-e*.

⁶ Cf. Kurigalzu's inscription in *Cuneiform Texts of the British Museum*, vol. ix. pl. 8.

⁷ Allotte de la Fuÿe, 69 II.

⁸ Ib. 126 III.

⁹ Ib. 120 VI.

¹⁰ Ib. 230, 12.

¹¹ Nikolski, 3, rev. III.

¹² The names of the later period, such as were known up to the date of publication, have been collected by Engelbert Huber in his *Die Personennamen in den Keilschrifturkunden aus der Zeit der Könige von Ur und Isin* (Leipzig, 1907). This list contains about 3500 names, and at least 2000 more, chiefly from Drehem and Umma, have since been published. Unfortunately the author did not realize the apocopated nature of the names of that period, and his interpretations are almost wholly erroneous. Nevertheless this book represents the first great effort to systematize Sumerian names, and is most useful.

¹ Wrongly transcribed *Amar-ba-a-ki*, by Genouillac and Hussey.

² The examples given under each number are only a selection from several hundreds which are known in the more important classes.

³ Allotte de la Fuÿe, 57, rev. 13.

⁴ This name refers to the relation of Innin and Geštinanna, sister of Tammuz; see Nikolski, 19 IV.

⁵ Cf. Langdon, *Sumerian and Babylonian Psalms*, Paris, 1909, p. 328, 22.

⁶ Genouillac, *Tablettes sumériennes archaïques*, Paris, 1909, no. 10, obv. VI.

⁷ Cf. Langdon, 336, 20.

⁸ Cf. Nikolski, 6 IX. and 6 VII.

⁹ Allotte de la Fuÿe, 87 II.

¹⁰ This name occurs frequently as a line in liturgies (see Langdon, 38, 11, etc.).

¹¹ This is one of the favourite descriptions of the Word in the liturgies.

¹² It is possible that the first two and last of these examples do not refer to the theological doctrine of the Word, which the liturgies describe as a messenger of wrath.

¹³ Thureau-Dangin, 4.

¹⁴ Allotte de la Fuÿe, 133 V.

been . . .'; *Lugal-gešten Lugal-kür-gešten*, 'The king with wine of the mountain . . .'; *Nig-du-sig-è, Nig-ud-ul-sig-è*, 'That which unto future days has been done fittingly'; *E-ki-bi-ba-gub*, 'The temple in its place has been fixed'; *Nin-pa-ki-bi*, 'Ninpa unto his place (has been restored)'; *Nin-sug-il-il*,² 'The queen on her foundation has been raised'; *Nin-ur-ni*, 'The queen upon her pedestal (has been placed)'; *Sib-kagina, Lugal-kagina, Uru-kagina*, 'The shepherd (or king) in the city has instituted justice'; *Sig-bi-gi*, 'Its brick (to its place) he restored'; *Sag-uru-ni-si*, 'Unto the heart of his city be . . .'; *Kur-gir-ni-ki, Gir-ni-ba-KU*, 'The foreign land unto his foot be reduced'; *Sa-ukkin*, 'The judgment of the assembly'; *Kingal-sa*, 'The chief of the assembly has decided.'

(5) Names taken from incantation-texts:

Nigerim-bar-ra-[au-teg], 'May the evil not approach';³ *Lugal-nin-hul*, 'May the king evil (put away)'; *Ad-da-su-el, Nín-su-el* (see above); *En-su-lab-lab*, 'The lord with clean bands (broke the spell).'

(6) Names referring to legends:

Sa-dingir-ra-ne, 'The net of the gods . . .'; *Lugal-sa-sù-gal*, 'The king with a great net . . .';⁴ *Tir-azag-gi-si*, 'The clean forest . . .';⁵ *En-abzu-a-gub-nad*, 'The lord in the ocean . . . sleeps'; *Lugal-tir-a-gub-nad*, 'The lord in the forest . . . sleeps'; *En-kür-ra-a-gub-nad*, 'The lord in the mountain . . . sleeps'; *En-du-azag-a-gub-nad, En-azag-a-gub-nad, En-azag*, 'The lord in the holy chamber . . . sleeps'; *Eara-uru-a-gub-naq*, ' . . . in the chapel of the city . . . sleeps'; *dEn-ki-sil-dagal*, 'Enki in the wide street (of the lower world walks)'; *Lugal-erida-sù*, 'The king unto Eridu . . .'; *Lugal-id-da-tud*, 'The king in the month . . . begat';⁷ *Lugal-ku-mab*, 'The king with a mighty arm . . .'; *Lugal-ma-ab-è*, 'My king arose from the ocean'; *Nam-nin-an-na-gam-gam*, 'The queenship of heaven she has subdued'; *Nam-nin-e-an-ki-gam-gam*, 'The queenship of heaven and earth she has subdued'; *Nin-si-gar-ab-ba*, 'The queen the holt of the sea . . .'; *dDungi-u-nam-til*, 'The divine Dungi the plant of life (has eaten).'

(7) Names referring to sacred places, cities, temples, shrines, and cult objects:

Azag-gi-pad-da, 'The holy reed hut'; *Amar-Kis-(ki)*, 'The sturdy one of Kish';⁹ *Amar-Subaru-(ki)*, 'The sturdy one of Shuharu';⁹ *Subaru-ki-dug*, 'Shuharu is a good place'; *Bara-ud-sud-sù*, 'In the chapel unto distant days . . .'; *Bara-nam-tar-ra*, 'In the chapel fate has been decreed (?)'; *Bara-[me]-sig-[gan]-nu-di*, ' . . . whose decrees in the chapel are not restrained';¹⁰ *Bara-zi-kür-ra*, 'The faithful chapel in the world . . .';¹¹ *Nin-bara-da-ri*, 'The queen in the everlasting chapel . . .'; *Nin-è-balag-ni-dug*, 'The queen whose temple lyre is sweet'; *Gal-balag*, 'The great lyre, apoc. *E-gis-gig-bi-dug*, 'The temple whose shadow is good, apoc. *E-gis-bi-dug*; *E-ud-gim-è*, 'The temple like the sun has risen';¹² *E-ur-bi-dug*, 'The temple whose foundation is good, apoc. *E-ur*; *Eul-ki*, 'The temple unto distant days . . .';¹³ *Gigir-ta-pad-da-an*, apoc. *Gigir-ta*, 'By the wagon . . .'; *Gir-nun-ki-dug*, 'The Gírun is a good place'; *Gir-nun-zi-sig-gal*, 'The Gírun the breath of life'; *Lugal-apin-ni*, 'The king the water wheel . . .'; *Gan-gigir-sag*, 'Abundance of the chief wagon'; *Nin-mu-nanga-ranad*, 'My queen sleeps in the enclosure'; *Nangara-sag*, 'In the propitious enclosure'; *Nin-ku-gal-lam*, 'The queen in Shugallam . . .'; *Nin-ki-dug*, 'Ninā the good place.'

(8) Names referring to personal interests of the individual, his birth, age, etc. :¹⁴

A-bad-mu, 'The father¹⁵ is my defence';¹⁶ *Enlil-bad-mu*, 'Enlil is my defence'; *Nin-bad-ni-dug*, 'The queen has made good the defence'; *Nin-ama-mu*, 'The queen is my mother'; *dInnini-ama-mu*, 'Innini is my mother'; *dBabbar-ama-mu*, 'The sun-god is my mother' (sic); *A-dingir-mu*, 'The father is my god'; *Lugal-ab-ba-mu*, 'The king is my father, apoc. *Lugal-a-mu*; *Nir-an-da-gal*, 'He has been brought into being by the mighty Anu'; *Lugal-an-da-[gal]*, 'He has been brought into being by the king Anu'; *Zi-mu-an-da-gil*, 'My

soul has been brought into being by Anu'; *Amar-dEzinu-l-ud-sud-sù*, 'The sturdy one of the grain goddess unto far-away days (may live)'; *Dim-dInnini-da-gal-sa*, 'The creation of the merciful Innini fares well'; *E-an-ni-mud*, 'Begotten in the house of heaven'; *Nigin-mud*, 'Begotten in the secret chamber'; *Lugal-nig-ga-ni*, 'The king loves his property';² *dInnini-ur-dim*, 'Innini has created a servant'; *Ur-mu-3-ab-tuk*, 'My servant I⁴ have obtained, var. *Ur-ma-tuk-a*; *dNingirsu-ur-mu*, 'I Ningirsu (have obtained) my servant'; *Ses-ur-mu*, 'I the brother (have obtained) my servant'; *Nin-ur-mu*, 'I the queen (have obtained) my servant'; *A-ur-mu*, 'I the father (have obtained) my servant'; *Nin-igi-mal-ur-bi*, 'Ninigimal (has obtained) my servant'; *Ningirsu-lu-mu*, 'I Ningirsu (have obtained) my man'; *Nin-lu-mu*, 'I the queen (have obtained) my man'; *dBabbar-lu-mu*, 'I the sun-god (have obtained) my man.'

(9) Names referring to the temporal kings:

dBabbar-igi-gub-Lugal-anda, 'Shamash is the defender of Lugalanda';⁵ *dNinā-ama-Lugal-anda*, 'Ninā is the mother of Lugalanda'; *Urukagina-dEnlil(hi)-zu*,⁶ 'Urukagina knoweth Enlil'; *Urukagina-dNinā-zu*,⁶ 'Urukagina knoweth Ninā'; *Gudea-a-ab-ba-uru*, 'Gudea is father of the city'; *dDungi-a-amu*, 'The divine Dungi is my father';⁷ [8]; *dDungi-ud-sud-sù*, 'The divine Dungi (lives) unto distant days (may give)'; [8]; *dBur-Sin-an-ni-ki-ag*, 'The divine Bur-Sin loves Anu'; *dGudea-[?]*, apoc.

(10) Names asserting attributes of the gods, adoration of their power, etc. :⁸

A-ba-mu-na-du, 'Who can walk with him?' apoc. *A-ba-mu-na*; ⁹ *A-sag*, 'The kind father'; *An-al-sag*, 'Anu is kind';¹⁰ *An-lu-sag*, 'Anu is he who shows kindness';¹¹ *Enlil-lu-sag*, 'Enlil is he who shows . . .'; . . . is he who shows kindness'; . . . god is the Zū-bird'; *dŠuruppak-im-gig-(bu)*, 'The god of Šuruppak is the Zū-bird'; *Dunnu-nir-gal*, 'The son¹² is counsellor'; *Dun-ig-gal*, 'The hero is a great gato'; *En-ig-gal*, 'The lord is a great gate'; *Lugal-d-sun-ma*, 'The king is endowed with strength'; *Lugal-aga-zid*, 'The king a sure tiara (has put on)';¹³ *dNingirsu-men-zid*, 'Ningirsu a sure crown (has put on)'; *dInnini-men-zid-dim*,¹⁴ 'Innini a sure crown has put on'; *Ses-me-na-tum*, 'The brother¹⁵ is made fit for a crown'; *Sil-tur*, 'The little lamb'; *Lugal-ug-banda*, 'The king a panther, apoc. *Utu-us-zid*, 'The sun-god is a faithful adviser.'

2. Names composed of construct and genitive.—

The large group of names composed of a construct and genitive arose from the desire, common to all peoples, of appealing more strongly to the personality of the individual. They belong logically to the names under class (8) above, for this more human sentiment found expression even among the forms designed to be wholly abstract and theological.

¹ This name is usually written *Amar-zen* and is confined to the early period, where it is very common.

² *Nig-ga*=*makkuru*, 'property', refers to the owner of the name. In the early period we have also *Nin-nig-ga-ni* (Allotte de la Fuyé, 230 VII.), and in the late period *Nin-nig-ga-ma*, which is difficult; *ma* probably represents a verb dropped at the end. More common in the late period is the form *Nig-ga-Innini*, 'The property of Innini (am I)'. This form is rendered into Semitic by *Makur-dInnini*, *Nemeli-dInnini*.

³ Names containing *ur-mu* are still obscure to the present writer, as also those with *lu-mu*; *lu* can also mean 'slave'. The renderings are tentative. These names disappear before the Ur dynasty and obviously point to some peculiarity of ancient life.

⁴ Refers to some deity.

⁵ Nikolski, § III.

⁶ The texts have *su*.

⁷ From Dungi, second king of the Ur dynasty, onward to the end of all the Sumerian city dynasties the kings were regarded as gods, and hence their names enter into personal names with the same force as that of a real deity. A selection of such names is placed here only for convenience. Each name belongs to the class indicated in the brackets. [Also Gudea, the patesi of Lagash in the middle period, appears in proper names as a god, but his own inscriptions neither recognize him as a deity nor do they mention his cult.]

⁸ This class is designed to cover a large miscellaneous group of names which cannot be reduced to more special analysis. Naturally many names assigned to the first nine classes could be grouped here.

⁹ Names of this type passed into Semitic in such forms as *Mannu-mahir-ku*, 'Who is his rival?', *Mannu-kima-Samas*, 'Who is like Shamash?', and were popular to the end of Babylonian history. Both Babylonian and Hebrew names of this type appear to depend on the Sumerian prototype.

¹⁰ Rendered into Semitic by *Anu-damik*, 'Anu shows kindness, Anu-damik', 'Anu is kind.'

¹¹ This seems to be the most probable interpretation of *lu-sag*, on analogy of *Nin-lu-ti-ti*, 'The queen is she that giveth life.'

¹² Taminuz.

¹³ This may have a lunar reference.

¹⁴ *Sanaku*=*dim*.

¹⁵ Taminuz. Or perhaps read *Ses-me-[an]-na-tum*, 'The brother bears the decrees of Anu.' So the present writer would explain also *En-an-na-tum*, *Nin-an-na-tum*, *Lugal-an-na-tum*, and *An-na-tum*, all with apocopea *me*.

¹ The meaning of the last four names is uncertain, and they may not belong under this heading. They are here referred to dedications or sacrifices.

² Read *Nin-rim-il-il*, by Genouillac and Hussey.

³ Nikolski, 16 III.; Genouillac, 10, rev. II.

⁴ Nikolski, 160 I.

⁵ Allotte de la Fuyé, 126 III., 135 VI.

⁶ The reading of *A-DU* in these names is uncertain.

⁷ Nikolski, 19 II.

⁸ This seems to be the correct interpretation with Huber, 118, but the name is rare and the legend of the plant of life is late, if it occurs at all in Sumerian.

⁹ Belongs also to the second group of names (II.).

¹⁰ Allotte de la Fuyé, 132 VII.; cf. Thureau-Dangin, *Die sumerischen und akkadischen Königinschriften*, Leipzig, 1907, p. 8 n.

¹¹ Allotte de la Fuyé, 230, 9. *Bara*, 'chapel,' does not occur in names after the Ur dynasty, with the exception of the obscure hypocoristic *Bara-si-ga*.

¹² Ib. 135 I.

¹³ Nikolski, 19 IV.

¹⁴ See also above class (2).

¹⁵ Refers to Enlil.

¹⁶ Literally 'wall.'

cal. In analyzing this group of names, we aim at distinguishing them on the basis of the philological meaning of the first element which characterizes the individual's relation to the gods, sacred places, and cult objects. It was natural that the profound sense of humility and sorrow which characterized the Sumerians' religion from the beginning, and gradually deepened in their religious life, found expression in their onomatology. And, as the austere view of life grew upon them, forcing every note of joy and exuberance from their liturgies, so also the tendency to employ names expressing dependence upon the gods increased. Since this aspect of religion was common to both Sumerian and Semite (although in a lesser degree to the latter), we cannot say that Semitic names of this type are mere translations from the Sumerian. Early Semitic names in the Sargonic era¹ have no forms like *Amel-Ishtar*, 'Man of Ishtar,' *Warad-Ishtar*, 'Servant of Ishtar,' *Amat-Ishtar*, 'Handmaid of Ishtar.' Not until the Ur and Isin periods do we meet with Semitic names of this kind and Semitic names of group i. also. These are translations of Sumerian types, and it is probable that all Semitic Babylonian names which reproduce pure Sumerian types are due to borrowing. Genuine Semitic Babylonian names express family relationship or peculiar bodily defects or traits, and, where they do express attributes of deity, they lack that theological and liturgical nature which characterizes the Sumerian names. The Semitic names of the construct and genitive type, which begin to abound in the documents of Ur and Isin, are in all probability mostly formations borrowed from one of the classes of group ii. which here follow:

(1) *Amar-dSin*, 'The sturdy one of Sin,' Semitic *Bur-dSin*; *Amar-ub*, 'The sturdy one of the shepherd';² *Amar-dPA*, 'The sturdy one of the god PA'; *Amar-sun*, 'The sturdy one of [Nin]-sun';³ *Amar-tar-an*, 'The sturdy one of the Taran';⁴ *Amar-Mama*, 'The sturdy one of the goddess Mama'; (2) *Bd-ša-dSin*, 'The mercy of Sin,' Semitic *Gimil-Sin*; *Bd-ša-Ma-ma*, 'The mercy of Mama'; *Baša-bū-a*, 'The mercy of the caretaker'; *Bd-ša-dEnlil*, 'The mercy of Enlil'; *Baša-I šub*, 'The mercy of the pure one'; *Baša-baš-dar*, 'The mercy of Ishtar'; (3) *Gim-ama*, 'Handmaid of the mother goddess,' Semitic, *Amat-ummi*; *Gim-dBau*, 'Handmaid of Bau'; *Gim-Sul-siy-ē*, 'Handmaid of the god Shulsige,' apoc. *Gim-sul*; *Gim-E-anna*, 'Handmaid of the temple Eanna'; *Gim-kun-sag*, 'Handmaid of the chief reservoir'; *Gim-ib*, 'Handmaid of the Ib';⁵ *Gim-id-edin-na*,

'Handmaid of the river of the plain'; *Gim-šugallam*, 'Handmaid of the Šugallam';¹ (4) *Lū-dBau*, 'Man of Bau,' Semitic *Amel-dBau*; *Lū-dAb-ir-nun*, 'Man of Abirun';² *Lū-db-tāg-azag*, 'Man of the holy Abtag';³ *Lū-dBabbar*, 'Man of the sun-god'; *Lū-dNinā*, 'Man of the goddess Ninā'; *Lū-Šubaru*, 'Man of Šubaru';⁴ *Lū-Ninā-ki*, 'Man of Ninā';⁵ *Lū-mid-gur-ra*, 'Man of the crescent-shaped boat';⁶ *Lū-giš-gar-ra*, 'Man of the carriage'.⁷

These are the only names of this kind known in the pre-Sargonic period. The expression 'man of' is clearly of later origin than the other classes, and becomes more frequent in the Sargonic and post-Sargonic texts. In the late period names with *Lū* become prolific and vie in popularity with those beginning with *Ur*.

(5) *Ur-dBau*, 'Servant of Bau,' Semitic *Warad-Bau*; *Ur-dDumu-zi*, 'Servant of Tammuz'; *Ur-dNingirsu*, 'Servant of Ningirsu'; *Ur-dNinsun*, 'Servant of Ninsun'; *Ur-gigir-sag*, 'Servant of the chief wagon';⁸ *Ur-šugallam*, 'Servant of the Šugallam';⁹ *Ur-ti-ra-aš*, 'Servant of the Tirash';¹⁰ *Ur-nigin*, 'Servant of the secret chamber';¹¹ *Ur-ig-gal*, 'Servant of the great gate'; *Ur-engur*, 'Servant of the sea';¹² *Ur-kun*, 'Servant of the reservoir'.¹³

In the texts from the Sargonic period onward it is not always easy to decide whether a name is to be read in Sumerian or translated into Semitic. As in all departments of literature the Semites often represented their own words by the equivalent Sumerian ideogram, so also, in writing their own names, especially those borrowed from the Sumerian nomenclature, they frequently turn part of it, or all of it, into Sumerian—a practice continued to the end of Assyrian and Babylonian history. When the Semites first came into contact with the Sumerians (which took place as early as the era of Ur-Ninā, c. 3500 B.C.), they, of course, employed their own Semitic methods in assigning names. Most of the deities employed in these names are Sumerian, but the grammatical constructions are Semitic; e.g., the name *Ik-ru-ub-E-a*, 'The god Ea has shown favour,' found on the stele of Manišusu, has the verb before the subject—which is impossible in Sumerian. These early Semites spell out their names phonetically, as *Sar-ru-ki-in*, 'The king is faithful,' *Sar-ga-li-sar-ri*, 'The king of all is my king,' names of the first and fifth kings of the first Semitic dynasty. But they soon learned to turn these names into Sumerian, and in the same period we have *Sar-ru-GI-i-li*, 'Šarrukīn is my god,' in which *ki-in* is represented by the Sumerian *gi*, which means *kinu*, 'faithful.' Naturally this name was pronounced throughout in Semitic. But, when the entire name was turned into Sumerian, the problem arises as to whether the Semites really pronounced it in Sumerian as it was written or translated it into Semitic. Occasionally the scribe adds a Semitic phonetic complement to the Sumerian sign to indicate that the sign is to be rendered into Semitic. The best Assyriologists agree in translating all names clearly Semitic by nature, whether written wholly or partially in Sumerian, into Semitic. This statement applies to the Sumerian period and in centres where the population was mixed. In a name clearly Sumerian in form, like *Šu-ma-ma*, 'The mercy of Mama,' it is highly improbable that the reading was *Gimil-Mama* even when given to a Semite. Towards the end of Sumerian influence and from the period of complete Semitic supremacy all names, whether Semitic or Sumerian in form, were rendered into Semitic. But difficulties on this point during the transition period of the Ur

¹ No adequate collection of names, either Sumerian or Semitic, has yet been made from the Sumerian and Semitic texts of the Sargonic and post-Sargonic periods. The names in the stele of Manišusu have been arranged by Scheil, *Délégation en Perse*, Paris, 1900, II. 41–52, and partly studied by Hoeschander, *ZA* xx. 246–302. A collection of names from the Sargonic period is given by Dhorme in *BASS* vi. 63 ff., but the author did not understand the apocopated nature of the names written in Sumerian, and translated most of them into misleading Semitic forms. Names of that period written in Sumerian were probably pronounced as such even when they are names of Semites. In this period there are names *Lū-dNinā*, 'Man of Ninā,' but not *A-še-il-dNinā*; *Ur-dEnki*, but not *Warad-dEnki*.

² Allotte de la Fuÿe, 59 III. ³ Ib. 92 II. ⁴ A sacred place (?); cf. *Ur-tar*, *Ur-tar-mā-a*; Nikolski, 19 IV. The above form occurs in Allotte de la Fuÿe, 96, rev. III. Note the *Amar-ma-a-an* (Huber, 86).

⁵ Transcription uncertain. The first element of this group is one sign, originally = *KA* + *ŠU* + *ŠA*, and later seems to be reduced to *ŠU* simply. But the old form persists even in the late period; cf. *KA* + *ŠA* + *dNintud* (CT 4, 18A 17) with *ŠU* + *dNinsun* (CT 8, 20, 24). The original *KA* + *ŠU* was confused with another sign *KA* + *KAR*; cf. *KA* + *KAR* + *ŠA* + *dUtu* (CT 8, 47A 24); *KA* + *KAR* + *ŠA* + *dSin* (CT 10, 46, 21256, R. 5), and finally we have *KA* + *KAR* in the texts of Ur and Isin. All these corrupt forms we shall designate by *ŠU* (A), *KA* + *KAR* + *ŠA* (B), *KA* + *KAR* (C). The Semitic rendering was most probably *gimilū*. The Semitic names of the Sargonic period have *ŠU* invariably, as well as the Sumerian names of that period.

⁶ Written C. ⁷ Written B in Legrain, *Le Temps des rois d'Ur*, Paris, 1912, no. 314, 6.

⁸ Written B in Huber, 153, and Legrain, 342, 6, but A in most cases (Huber, 154), and in Semitic names of the Hammurabi period *ŠU* is almost the only form employed.

⁹ A sacred place.

¹ A sacred place.

² A cult object.

³ Sumerian avoids the ordinary word for 'slave,' *nitaš*, in the formation of its proper names, probably because of the association suggested by this word. In the sum-total of Sumerian names this formation with *Ur* far surpasses in popularity all other classes. The element was popular in names of the early period and continued so to the end.

⁴ A cult object.

⁵ A sacred place.

⁶ In the Nippur Collection of the University Museum of Philadelphia the writer copied a fragment of a large tablet containing a list of at least 300 names beginning with *Ur*.

and Isin dynasties will never be settled. Here we have Semites bearing pure Sumerian names and written in Sumerian. In all such cases it is safer to render the name as it is written.

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ii. *SARGONIC AND POST-SARGONIC PERIOD UNTIL THE UR DYNASTY*.—List of names both Sumerian and Semitic by P. Dhorme, *BASS* vi. pt. 3, pp. 63-83 (includes only names of the Sargonic period taken from volume I [see above]). Names in V. Scheil's ed. of this text: 1900; F. Thureau-Dangin, do. 1910 (texts and summaries in translation). For the middle period the only texts are in Thureau-Dangin, 180-260. A few texts of historical and religious character from the period of Gutium are listed in S. Langdon, *Historical and Religious Texts*, Munich, 1914, p. 8.

iii. *PERIOD OF UR AND ISIN*.—List of names and a study of Sumerian nomenclature by E. Huber, *Die Personennamen in den Keilschrifturkunden*, Leipzig, 1907; Thureau-Dangin, 261-429 (texts); H. Radau, *Early Babylonian History*, London, 1900 (texts and partial list of names); G. A. Reisner, *Templeurkunden aus Tellah*, Berlin, 1901 (texts and list of names); G. A. Barton, *Haverford Library Collection of Cuneiform Tablets*, Philadelphia, 1905-14 (texts and list of names [in pt. iii.]); *Cuneiform Texts in the British Museum*, vols. I. [1896], iii. [1898], v. [1899], vii. [1899], ix. [1900], x. [1900], xxiii. [1912]; H. de Genouillac, *Inventaire des tablettes de Tello*, Paris, 1911 (texts and summaries in translation); L. Delaporte, *Inventaires des tablettes de Tello*, do. 1912 (texts and summaries in translation); R. J. Lau, *Old Babylonian Temple Records*, New York, 1906; H. de Genouillac, *Tablettes de Drehem*, Paris, 1911 (texts and list of names), *La Trouvaille de Drehem*, do. 1911; S. Langdon, *Tablets from the Archives of Drehem*, do. 1911 (names included in Genouillac, *Trouvaille*); W. M. Neshit, *Sumerian Records from Drehem*, New York, 1914; A. Poebel, *Babylonian Legal and Business Documents*, Philadelphia, 1909 (texts and list); L. Legrain, *Le Temps des rois d'Ur*, Paris, 1912 (texts and list of names); G. A. Barton, 'Religious Conceptions underlying Sumerian Names,' *J.A.O.S.*, 1914, pp. 316-320).

iv. On the reading of Semitic names with Sumerian elements, A. Poebel, *Die sumerischen Personennamen zur Zeit der Dynastie von Larsam und der ersten Dynastie von Babylon*, Breslau, 1910. S. LANGDON.

NAMES (Syriac).¹—As the language which we now know as Syriac is only the Christian literary form of Aramaic, and does not in its essential characteristics differ from the language spoken in Palestine in the time of Christ, any investigation of the system of personal nomenclature in Syriac naturally begins with the NT. The Semitic names borne by the Jews of the 1st cent. A.D. were as a rule either old Hebrew names or Aramaized forms of such, and the names of purely Aramaic origin existing in the NT are few in number. We have, however, clear instances in the two female names Mārthā ('Mistress') and Tabithā ('Gazelle'), and another is almost certainly to be recognized in Silas (Shilā = 'Asked'), which, though exactly equivalent to the Hebrew Saul (Shā'ul), can hardly be a mere Aramaization of it.² Aramaic also are the three quasi-patronymics Barabbas (Bar Abbā = 'Son of Father'), Barsabas, and Barnabas (see *HDB* and *DCG*, s.vv.), and the name Cephas (Khiphā = 'Stone') bestowed by Christ upon Simon. The last three, however, were not names in the ordinary sense of the word, but appellatives given late in life, and would therefore naturally be in the popular language. For the earliest Syriac Christian names we must look to Edessa, the home of the Syrian Church and the birthplace of the literary language; but the first which meet us—those of the legendary bishops Addai and Aggi—are of uncertain derivation, and

those of their more historical successors, P.L.W.T. (the vocalization is uncertain) and Kunā, are not much clearer.¹ Another name borne by an early Syrian Christian is that of the celebrated Gnostic writer of the 3rd cent., Bar Daisān (= 'son of the Daisān,' the river on which Edessa stood); but, as he was the son of heathen parents, this cannot properly be described as a Christian name. Of the names borne by Syriac-speaking Christians, especially those who lived within the empire, a large proportion are of Greek, Latin, or Biblical origin; and, since the true Syriac names are of similar character to Hebrew names, it is not necessary here to discuss the system of nomenclature in detail. The majority of them, as in Hebrew, have a definite religious origin; and, as in Hebrew, the religious names are divided into two main classes: (1) those which have some relation to the person bearing the name or his parents, and express gratitude for his birth or dependence upon God, and (2) those which merely express a general religious sentiment. The former class are by no means peculiar to the Semitic languages, but are to be found also in Greek (Theodore, Theodotus, Diodorus, Athenodorus, and many others), and in such late Latin names as Deusdedit and Adeodatus; but for the latter, unless the name Deogratias is assigned to this class, it would be hard to find parallels among Aryan peoples except the strange names adopted by the English Puritans of the 17th cent., though names of virtues such as Irene, Sophia, Grace, Mercy, etc., have some resemblance to them. The exact meaning being often obscure, however, it is not always easy to assign a name definitely to one class or the other.

(1) Of those which belong to what may be called the personal class the most obvious are Yaballāhā = 'God gave' (cf. Elnathan, Deusdedit), Yabyeshu² = 'Jesus gave,' Māryab³ = 'The Lord gave,' and Māran'amēh⁴ = 'Our Lord is with him.' The names Dādyeshu⁵ and Yeshu'dād = 'Jesus is friend' (cf. Jedidiah) seem to be a commendation of the child to the divine protection, and the names Shubbālmāran⁶ = 'Glory to our Lord,' and Shubbālyeshu⁷ = 'Glory to Jesus' (cf. Deogratias) probably express special rather than general thanksgiving. The name Aphnimāran⁸ = 'Our Lord has restored me' (cf. Restitutus) is apparently intended to describe the spiritual state of the person bearing the name; and on this analogy⁹ nānyeshu¹⁰ should probably be rendered 'Jesus has answered me,' but in this case the object of the verb seems to be the parent, not the child; though, even if we render it 'Jesus is a cloud,' it would seem, like Yeshu'dād, to be a commendation of the child to the protection of Christ, and should therefore be included in this class. The name of the bishop of Edessa at Nicæa appears as ܐܕܝܐ and ܐܕܝܐ, and may be transcribed as Itballāhā ('God is') and placed in the general class, or as Aithillāhā ('God brought') and placed in the personal class. To the personal class also belong Brikhā¹¹ = 'Blessed' (cf. Benedictus, Eulogius, Macarius); Hibā = 'Given' (cf. Donatus); Shilā = 'Asked' (cf. Rogatus), to which reference has been made above; Z'abīnā¹²

¹ To the names of the legendary bishops Bar Sh'āmā and Bar Samyā and others in the *Doctrine of Addai*, ed. G. Phillips, London, 1876, reference is made later.

² In Nestorian Syr., 'Yeshu' is vocalized Isho'. In this art. it is always written Yeshu'.

³ *Doct. Add.*, p. 1; Ass. I. 192, 193.

⁴ Ass. III. 1. 159, 450, 482.

⁵ *Ib.* III. 1. 189, 225, 479, 2. 546.

⁶ *Ib.* III. 1. 498, 490, 2. 16.

⁷ *Ib.* I. 14, III. 1. 139, 144.

⁸ *Ib.* I. 359. This name might be placed in another category; see below.

⁹ Ass. I. 15, II. 30. Cf. Ζεβίδος, Ζεβιδᾶς (Eus. *HE* vi. 13, *Mart. Pol.* ix. 5). See also *Ezr* 10⁴³, where the name is Aram., not Heb.

¹ In this art. Ass. = J. S. Assemani, *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, 3 vols., Rome, 1719-23; Wright = W. Wright, *Catalogue of the Syriac MSS in the British Museum*, 3 pts., London, 1870-72. For well-known names references are omitted.

² Tabithā is also equivalent to Ziblah (2 K 12¹).

⁷ *Ib.* III. 1. 187, 217.

= 'Bought'; and the odd name Barlāhā¹ = 'Son of God,' to which such names as Theogenes and Diogenes are not really parallels. Names beginning with 'bed or 'Abd² ('slave'), which are very common in Arabic, and of which we have instances in the OT in Obadiah, Obededom, and Abednego, seem in pre-Christian times to have been in use among the Syrians, for in the *Doctrine of Addai* and the *Ancient Syriac Documents* edited by W. Cureton (London, 1864) several names of this kind occur—e.g., 'bed Nābu³ = 'Slave of Nebo,' 'bed Shemsh⁴ = 'Slave of the Sun,' 'bed Shaddai⁵ = 'Slave of Shaddai,' and 'besh'āmā⁶, i.e. 'bed Sh'āmā⁶ = 'Slave of peace' (where the authenticity of the names, or at least the evidence for the existence of names of this type, does not depend on the historical character of the persons mentioned); a martyr named 'bed Haiklā⁷ ('Slave of the temple') suffered in Sapor's persecution; in a 6th cent. MS we have a name 'bed El⁸ ('Slave of El'); in the same century we find an author named 'bed M'shih⁹ ('Slave of Christ'), and a 'bed Yeshu¹⁰ ('Slave of Jesus') was nearly contemporary with the Arab invasion. Up to this period Christian names of this kind were apparently very rare, but, perhaps through Arab influence, the name 'bed Yeshu' is from this time forward of not uncommon occurrence. With the exceptions, however, of this name and 'bed M'shih it would be hard to find a name of this type, for 'bed Allāhā¹¹ ('Slave of God') is a mere translation of the Arab. 'Abd Allah.

(2) Of the second class of religious names the clearest instances are Kāmyeshu¹² = 'Jesus has risen (from the dead),' Yeshu' d'nah¹³ = 'Jesus has risen (as a star),' Kāmyeshu¹³ = 'Jesus is exalted' (cf. Jehoram), Yeshu' bakhar¹⁴ = 'Jesus is the first-born,' Yeshu' z'khā¹⁵ = 'Jesus has conquered,' Māran-z'khā¹⁶ = 'Our Lord has conquered,' S'libāz'khā¹⁷ = 'The Cross has conquered,' Th'riyeshu¹⁸ = 'Jesus is upright,' and Yeshu' sabran¹⁹ = 'Jesus is our hope.' From the last it is clear that Sabaryeshu¹⁹ means 'Jesus is hope,' not 'Hope of' (or 'in') 'Jesus'; and on the analogy of these words we must infer that H'nānyeshu²⁰ (cf. Hananiah, Hannibal) means 'Jesus is grace,' not 'Grace of Jesus,' and should therefore be placed in this category. On the same analogy also it appears that Brikhyeshu²⁰ should be rendered 'Jesus is blessed,' not 'Blessed of Jesus'; and the existence of a name Brikhshēbyāneh²¹ ('Blessed is his will') places this beyond doubt. The last, however, is perhaps an expression of resignation referring to some event in the life of the parents, and in that case should be assigned to the first class of names. The name Abhai²² ('The father is living'), if the father is God, belongs to the general class, but, if it refers to some event in the life of the natural father, to the personal class.

Besides these two main categories we find also a class of semi-religious names which express moral or spiritual qualities or conditions—e.g.,

Hanānā¹ = 'Gracious' (cf. Hanan, Hanno, Chariton), Zakhai² = 'Innocent' (cf. Heb. Zaccai = Ζαχαρις, and Innocentius), Nāsihā³ = 'Illustrious' (cf. Cleon, Eucles), and Ḥabib⁴ = 'Loved' (cf. Agapetus), and names derived from the day on which the child was born, such day always having some religious significance (cf. Noel, Paschalis)—e.g., Barhaddshabbā⁵ = 'Son of Sunday,' Bar 'Arubthā⁶ = 'Son of Friday,' Yaldā⁷ and Bar Yaldā⁸ = 'Nativity,' and 'Son of the Nativity,' and Denhā = 'Epiphany.' Bar Ṣaumā = 'Son of the fast' also perhaps denotes birth during Lent. Denhā is indeed too common to allow us to think that all bearers of the name were born on the Epiphany; but neither were all Noels born on Christmas Day, and a name, when once established, is perpetuated by tradition. Finally, we may add names of humility such as Ze'urā⁹ = 'Small,' and Maklikhā¹⁰ = 'Lowly.' In strange contrast to these are Mārā¹¹ = 'Lord,' Māri = 'My lord,' Mārthā = 'Mistress' (see above), Māruthā = 'Lordship,' Shalitā¹² = 'Ruler,' Rabbulā, a corruption of Rabbunā = 'Teacher,' and Kāyumā = 'President.' Such names can hardly be said to have any religious significance; and, if there is any such significance in the numerous names which express relationship, it is lost to us. These names are Abbā = 'Father,' Abbi¹³ = 'My father,' Aha¹⁴ = 'Brother,' Hāthi¹⁵ = 'My sister,' Dādā = 'Uncle,' and the two strange names Ahādabu¹⁶ = 'His father's brother,' and Ahudemeh = 'His mother's brother.' Of the last two the former can be paralleled by the Heb. Ahab and the latter by the Babylonian Ahummissu; and it has been suggested that they point to an ancient practice of incest, or that they express a wish that the child may grow up the brother, i.e. the helper, of his father or his mother;¹⁷ but neither explanation is quite satisfactory. Curious also are the names which express age. In the case of Bābusā¹⁸ we might suppose that the bearer had no younger brothers or sisters and the name 'Baby' stuck to him through life, and we can also imagine that two brothers might be known as Kashiish¹⁹ ('Old') and Talyā²⁰ ('Young'); but why any child should have been named Sābā ('Old man') is a more difficult matter. The word was used, however, like the Greek γέρων, for a hermit, and, as we also find a name H'bishā²¹ ('Recluse'), it may be a name of dignity of the same kind as those mentioned above. The names Sāhdā ('Martyr'), Bar Sāhde ('Son of martyrs'), and Sāhdnnā²² ('Little martyr') were probably originally given to children born during a time of persecution, possibly to posthumous sons of martyrs, and Bar Shebyā²³ ('Son of a captive') and Bar Samyā²⁴ ('Son of a blind man') must have referred to the child's parentage. Shemshi²⁵ ('My sun') sounds like a term of endearment, but may be a relic of sun-worship (cf. Samson). Of names derived from animals (cf. Leo, Ursula), of which several are found in Heb. (see *HDB*, s.v. 'Names, Proper'), the

¹ Ass. i. 83, 401, 413, 436.
² 'hed in W. Syr., 'Abd in Nestorian. The form 'hed is used in this article.

³ *Doct. Add.*, p. 84.
⁴ *Id.* p. 17.
⁵ Cureton, p. 23; but see J. Marquart, *Osteurop. und ostasiat. Streifzüge*, Leipzig, 1903, p. 296.

⁶ *Doct. Add.*, p. 35 (Cureton, 'Bar Sh'āmā').
⁷ Ass. i. 185.
⁸ Wright, p. 1043.

⁹ Ass. iii. 1. 193.
¹⁰ *Id.* iii. 1. 141.
¹¹ Wright, p. 713.

¹² Ass. ii. 342, iii. 1. 193.
¹³ *Id.* ii. 412.
¹⁴ Barhebraeus, *Chronicon Ecclesiasticum*, ed. J. B. Abbeloos and T. J. Lamy, Louvain, 1872-77, i. 313.

¹⁵ Ass. ii. 216, 415, 476, 478, iii. 1. 441.
¹⁶ *Id.* iii. 1. 481, 483, 2. 350.
¹⁷ *Id.* ii. 388, iii. 1. 111, 178. S'libā is probably only a shortening of this. The name might also be rendered 'The Crucified has conquered.'

¹⁸ *Id.* iii. 1. 142.
¹⁹ *Id.* iii. 1. 141.
²⁰ *Id.* iii. 1. 275.
²¹ *Id.* ii. 431, iii. 1. 157.

²² *Id.* ii. 505, iii. 1. 630.

¹ *Id.* iii. 1. 81.
² *Id.* iii. 1. 231.
³ *Id.* iii. 1. 199, 2. 440.

⁴ The name Brikhā, given above under the first class, perhaps really belongs to this category.

⁵ Wright, p. 1063. The shortened form Hahshab is also found (*Id.* p. 707).

⁶ J. P. N. Land, *Anecdota Syriaca*, Leyden, 1862-75, ii. 282.

⁷ Wright, p. 1069.

⁸ S. E. and J. S. Assemani, *Bibl. Apost. Vat. Codd. MSS Catalogus*, Rome, 1758-59, ii. 369.

⁹ Ass. i. 117, 425, ii. 58, 226.

¹⁰ *Id.* ii. 250, 388, iii. 2. 102; Wright, p. 16.

¹¹ Māran and Māryun are perhaps diminutives of this. It is unlikely that Māran has anything to do with the Gr. Maron.

¹² Ass. iii. 1. 176, 294; Wright, p. 1068.

¹³ Ass. ii. 227.
¹⁴ *Id.* iii. 1. 479, 497, 2. 146.

¹⁵ *Id.* i. 190.
¹⁶ *Id.* i. 633, ii. 387, 396.

¹⁷ F. O. Ulmer, *Die semit. Eigennamen im AT*, Leipzig, 1901, p. 14; H. Ranke, *Die Personennamen der Hammurabidynastie*, Munich, 1902, p. 37; *EBI*, s.v. 'Names.'

¹⁸ Ass. iii. 1. 142.
¹⁹ Wright, p. 1093.
²⁰ *Id.* p. 648, 1136.
²¹ Ass. iii. 1. 469, 495.
²² *Id.* ii. 403, 410, 416, 417, iii. 1. 82, 106, 119, 142, 229.
²³ *Id.* i. 188.
²⁴ *Doct. Add.*, p. 35.
²⁵ Ass. i. 240.

present writer knows, besides Tabithā mentioned above, only two doubtful examples in Syriac. Of these one is that of the early Edessene martyr Gurya ('Lion's whelp'); but this word is stated in the lexicon of Bar 'Ali to have been used by a curious transition of meaning for one who has subdued his passions,¹ and it is possible that this is the meaning of the name. The other is the name Nunā, which may, like the Heb. Nun, be rendered 'Fish'; but there was a Greek word *νῦνος*, perhaps of Egyptian origin, which, at first a title of honour, afterwards denoted 'ascetic' (whence our word 'nun'), and a not uncommon name Nonnus, and Nunā may be only a Syriacized form of this name. Of names denoting products of the earth it would also be hard to find an example in Syriac, for Pher'ā² merely means 'sprout' and might be a metaphorical term for 'child.'

LITERATURE.—The authorities are cited in the footnotes.

E. W. BROOKS.

NAME OF GOD (Jewish).—1. The Tetragrammaton.—The substitution in pronunciation of *Adōnāi* ('Lord') for the Tetragrammaton (the *shem ha-mephorash* of the Mishn. *Yōmā*, vi. 2) of which indications are to be found in the later Biblical books, and which is clearly recorded in the Mishnāh (*Sōṭah*, vii. 6), became the general usage of the Synagogue, even when reading from the Scroll of the Pentateuch. The Tetragrammaton had been retained, while the Temple stood, in the regular priestly benediction (Nn 6^{22a}), with special ceremoniousness on the Day of Atonement (Mishn. *Yōmā*, vi. 2). The true pronunciation of the Tetragrammaton was not freely transmitted, but was esoteric, and communicated by the teacher only to qualified disciples (*T. B. Qiddushin*, 71a; cf. the interesting sections on this whole subject in Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed*, ed. M. Friedländer, London, 1881-85, pt. i. ch. lxi. ff.). The Mishnāh so severely prohibits the utterance of the Tetragrammaton that the pronouncer of it was threatened with exclusion from a portion in the world to come (Mishn. *Sanhedrin*, xi. 1). Other paraphrastic substitutes for the name of God became common—e.g., *Māqōm*, lit. 'place,' from God's omnipresence, a phrase that is cited by Philo (*de Somniis*, i. 11), or 'Our father in heaven' (cf. *Annotated Edition of the Authorised Daily Prayer Book*, London, 1914, p. xxiii), and frequently in Rabbinic texts 'the Merciful' (as in the famous phrase 'the Merciful desires the heart' [*T. B. Sanh.* 106b]), 'the Holy One, blessed be he.' In the Kabbalistic literature there are many combinations of letters which are treated as substitutes for the name of God (*JE* ix. 164).

2. The Name in magic.—The reverence in which the Divine Name was held did not remain without consequence to dabblers in magic. Among many primitive peoples names were freely used for magical purposes. Naturally the Divine Name would be particularly potent, and we often find references to the use of the Hebrew Name in the Talmud (*T. B. Sanh.* 65b), but more particularly in mediæval legends of marvel and mystery (see CHARMS AND AMULETS [Jewish]; and *JE* ix. 164). Maimonides, referring to this subject (ch. lxxii.), denounces the folly of those who believed that by means of any arbitrary combination of letters they could construct a name which would operate miraculously. Yet, despite this, there were throughout the Middle Ages, and even more recently, those who claimed to be 'master of the Name' (*ba'al Shem*), and possessed of miraculous powers.

3. The Name as motive.—The close association between the Name of God and the being of God

led to certain developments. God Himself is, in Rabbinic and later Jewish literature, often referred to as 'The Name' (*T. B. Sanh.* 56a). Possibly this explains a frequent Rabbinic idiom. To do an act for the 'sake of the Name' was to be moved by desire to serve without any ulterior thought of self-profit. A similar metaphor was used in which the reference to God was omitted. To do a thing for its own sake was expressed by the term to do it 'for its name.' This is shown in such passages as the following:

'Let a man ever engage in the study of the Tōrah and in good deeds, even though not for its name [for its own sake], for through acts performed from a purpose not for its name [i.e. for selfish motives], he will reach the stage of doing good for its name [i.e. for its own sake]' (*T. B. P'sāḥim*, 50b).

Then, again, a convert to Judaism would be baptized 'in the name of *gēruth*' (i.e. of becoming a *gēr*, or convert), a slave would be manumitted 'in the name of freedom.' But most important of all was the phrase 'the name of heaven,' i.e. of God, for this belongs to the remarkable conception now to be described.

4. Sanctification of the Name.—(a) The idea of the imitation of God was based on the text *Lv* 19²: 'Ye shall be holy: for I the Lord your God am holy.' Abba Saul (1st cent. A.D.) comments on this injunction in these terms: 'Seek to be like God. As he is gracious and merciful, so be thou' (*Mekhilta* on *Ex* 15², ed. M. Friedmann, Vienna, 1870, p. 7). Man's self-sanctification was a sanctification of God (*Sifra* on *Lv* 19², ed. I. H. Weiss, Vienna, 1862, p. 86c). The same idea is expressed in other Rabbinic utterances (cf. W. Bacher, *Agada der Tannaiten*, Strassburg, 1890, ii. 367; F. Perles, *Bousset's Religion des Judentums*, Berlin, 1903, p. 68; I. Abrahams, in *Jewish Addresses*, London, 1904, ch. iv.). Later in the mediæval period, to the idea of the imitation was attached also the sense of initiation; hence the sanctified man in the mediæval phraseology came to signify 'mystic' (cf. I. Abrahams, *Trans. of the Jewish Historical Society*, v. [1902-05] 190).

(b) Sanctification and profanation of the Name were applied also to the effect of the individual's conduct on the world's opinion. Israel is to God like the court to a king (*Sifra*, loc. cit.); it is the duty of Israel to make God's name honoured, to prevent it from being disgraced. Israel sanctified the Name when his conduct reflected credit on God.

Thus it is told of Simeon b. Sheṭah that he bought a mule from an Arab, and returned to the vendor a jewel which he found suspended round the animal's neck. Whereupon the Arab exclaimed: 'Blessed be the Lord, the God of Simeon son of Sheṭah.'

Of another anecdote Phinehas h. Jair is the hero. Two strangers stayed with him and left in his charge two sacks of grain. He sowed the corn, and reaped a prosperous harvest for six seasons. One day, when the seventh goodly harvest was ripening, he accidentally met the strangers again. 'Come and see your sacks,' he said. They hesitated, for they felt certain that their corn was mouldy. But Phinehas took them to the field, and said, 'Here are your sacks.' 'If man is thus true, what must God's truth be?' comment the Rabbis (*Lev. Rabbāh*, iii.).

Such acts sanctified God's name, as Ezekiel (20⁴) had said: 'I will be sanctified in you in the sight of the nations.' Any act, again, by which God's name was degraded in the eyes of the world was the most heinous sin; it was unforgivable except by the offender's death (*T. B. Yōmā*, 86a). 'Hypocrites must be exposed, because they profane the Name' (*ib.*, and *Tos. Yōmā*, ii. 12). There are numerous passages in which the ugliness of moral corruption in men of reputed piety is commented on. Men whose conduct belies their profession profane the Name; similarly with a gluttonous student of the Tōrah (*P'sāḥim*, 49a). The Rabbis strongly maintained the inwardness of morality.

'Inside must be clean as the outside' (*T. B. Yōmā*, 72b). 'Whenever the Rabbis have forbidden anything for the sake of

¹ R. Payne Smith, *Thesaurus Syriacus*, 2 vols., Oxford, 1868-1901, s.v.

² Ass. ii. 240.

appearance, that same thing is forbidden in the innermost recesses of one's own privacy' (*T. B. Beza*, 9a).

Yet they realized that there were two elements in virtue, the one personal, the other communal. The offender not only sinned against his own conscience; he profaned the Name in that the outer consequences of his act affected the public conscience (cf. I. Abrahams, 'The Sanctification of the Name,' *American Hebrew*, vol. xci. [New York, 1912] no. 25).

(c) The sanctification of the Name implied, from another side, the acme of heroism. Israel being God's witness, God, as it were, ceased to be God unless Israel witnessed to Him (*P'siqṭā de R. Kahana*, ed. S. Buber, Lyck, 1868, fol. 102b), though another passage (*Sifra*, loc. cit.) adds that, while it is Israel's paramount duty to sanctify God, God is sanctified even though Israel fail. But Israel's testimony to God must not stop even on the brink of the tomb (Maimonides, *Code*, i. 5). Sanctification of the Name becomes a synonym for martyrdom (Perles, loc. cit., points out the analogy with the Greek *μάρτυς*). The Synagogue liturgy enshrines this idea:

'Our Father, our King! do it [i.e. have compassion] for the sake of them that went through fire and water for the sanctification of thy name' (*Authorised Daily Prayer Book*, p. 67).

On the model of the joyous acceptance of a martyr's death by R. Aqiba (c. A.D. 135) pathetic prayers were composed for recitation by those who were called upon to die for Judaism. One such prayer terminates thus:

'Blessed art Thou O Lord our God, King of the Universe, who hast sanctified us by Thy commandments and commanded us to love the glorious and awful Name, that was, is, and shall be eternally, with all our heart and all our soul, and to sanctify Thy Name before the world' (Nordlingen, *Posif Omeg*, Frankfurt, 1723, p. 69).

For Biblical usage see art. GOD (Biblical and Christian), vol. vi. p. 253 f. See also GOD (Jewish), vol. vi. p. 296.

LITERATURE.—M. Lazarus, *Ethics of Judaism*, Eng. tr., Philadelphia, 1901, vol. ii. § 184 f.; L. Löw, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Szegedin, 1899, i. 223; B. Jacob, *Im Namen Gottes*, Berlin, 1903.

NAMELESS GODS.—I. Name and epithet.—A study of the names of divinities suggests that they were first called by epithets or adjectival words describing them or their functions before they were called by personal names. These epithets frequently became the personal names of the gods, as philology shows. For, as Jevons points out,

'A personal name is an epithet the meaning of which comes in course of time to be forgotten.'¹

It is probably innate among the folk to describe a man by some function or peculiarity or by his occupation rather than by his personal name. If this is the case even where personal names exist, much more would it be true of a time when personal names, whether of men or of gods, had not yet been evolved. At one time both men and gods were, strictly speaking, nameless. Again, where a god's epithet has now practically become a personal name, he is often called by other epithets, while the personal name tends to become sacred; it is used only on particular occasions, and is tabu at all other times and often to whole classes of people—e.g., the women and children of a tribe. Many savage divine names are still little more than epithets, and this is especially noticeable in the case of the high gods. The god Daramulun of S. Australian tribes has a name which means 'leg on one side,' or, as explained by others, 'a sacred staff.'² The god is 'the lame one' or 'the possessor of the sacred staff.' Baiame, another Australian high god, appears to mean 'the maker,' from *baiā*,

'to make', or possibly 'big man.'¹ Another epithet of these gods is Mungan-nganr, 'our father.'² Daramulun has become a personal name, as it is too sacred to be uttered except at the mysteries. Hence other epithets are used for him—Papang, 'father,' Biamban, 'master.' The Eskimo Torn-garsuk means 'great spirit' (*suk*, 'great,' *torngak*, 'spirit').³ Other names of such gods mean 'father,' 'grandfather,' and the like—the Zulu Unkulunkulu, 'old, old one,' or 'great great grandfather'; the Pawnee Ti-ra-wa, 'the spirit father'; the Huichol Tatevali, 'our grandfather'; the Bahar Bök Glaih, 'the grandfather who thunders'; the Guiana Wacinaci, 'our father,' or Ifilici Wacinaci, 'our great father'; the Blackfoot Nā-pi, 'old man'; the Dravidian river-goddess Būrhi Thakurāni, 'the old lady.'⁴ Other epithet-names are as simple as these—e.g., those which refer to the position of gods, viz. the Carib Tamosi Kabotano, 'the ancient one in the sky'; the Déné Yuttaere, 'that which is on high'; the New Britain Nara i tara dat, 'he or some one who made us'; the Japanese *kami* (the term for 'god' or for 'gods' generally), literally 'above'; the Chinese Shang-ti, 'sovereign above' (another example of an epithet becoming a name which is not to be lightly used).⁵ Other epithet-names concern the god as creator—the Arawak Wa murreta kwonci, 'our maker'; Zuni names meaning 'creator and master,' 'maker,' 'finisher'; the Buru Opo-geba-snulat, 'the lord moulder or creator of man.'⁶ Others are equally descriptive, like Oro, 'torment,' the Egba god of vengeance; the Dinka Dengdit, 'the great rain,' also known as Nyalich, literally 'in the above'; the Hottentot Tsuni-goab, 'wounded knee'; the gods of the Japanese *Kojiki*, Izanagi, 'the male who invites,' and Izanami, 'the female who invites,' or the three chief gods, 'the deity master of the august centre heaven,' 'the high august producing wondrous deity,' and 'the divine producing wondrous deity,' or the goddess of Yomi (Hades) 'the ugly female of Hades'; or Fiji gods who meet the soul as it passes into the other world and whose epithet-names describe their functions—'ghost-scatterer,' 'reed-spear,' 'the dismitter,' etc.⁷

Usener, studying mainly Greek and Roman religion and mythology, has drawn attention to what he calls *Sondergötter* and *Augenblicksgötter*. These are gods of one function only, and often merely of a momentary function. They had no personal names, but epithets or adjectival names, expressing that function. They were the basis of the later personal gods with personal names, in which the reference to the original function of the god had become obscure. The greater gods whose names now suggested no definite meaning were apt to absorb local divinities with epithet-names—names whose meaning was clear and pointed to their functions. These epithet-names now became titles by which a god was invoked.⁸ Examples of such *Sondergötter* were the twelve divinities invoked at the sacrifice to Tellus and Ceres—each of them associated with some single action from the first

¹ A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, London, 1906, II. 9; K. L. Parker, *More Australian Legendary Tales*, do. 1898, Glossary, s.v. 'Byamee.'

² *JAI* xvi. [1887] 64.

³ D. Crantz, *History of Greenland*, London, 1820, i. 207.

⁴ H. Callaway, *Religious System of the Amazulu*, Natal, 1870, *passim*; G. B. Grinnell, *Pawnee Hero Stories*, London, 1893, p. 352; *ERE* vi. 828^b (Huichols), vii. 230 (Bahar); E. F. Im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883, p. 305 f.; A. Lang, *The Making of Religion*, do. 1898, p. 259; M. Martin, *Eastern India*, do. 1838, III. 361.

⁵ Im Thurn, p. 365 f.; *ERE* iv. 639^b, vi. 294^a, vi. 272^b.

⁶ Im Thurn, p. 365 f.; Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*, II. 85; *ERE* vii. 248^b (Burn).

⁷ *JAI* xix. [1890] 160 (Egba); *ERE* iv. 707^a (Dinka); A. Lang, *Custom and Myth*, London, 1885, p. 204; *Kojiki*, tr. B. H. Chamberlain, Tokyo, 1906; B. Thomson, *The Fijians*, London, 1903, p. 117 ff.

⁸ H. Usener, *Götternamen*, p. 75, and *passim*.

¹ F. B. Jevons, *The Idea of God*, Cambridge, 1913, p. 82.

² *JAI* xxi. [1892] 294, ii. [1872] 270.

breaking of the ground to the storing of the harvest—Vervactor, Redarator, Imporcitor, Insitor, Obarator, Occator, Sarritor, Subrincinator, Messor, Convector, Conditor, Promitor. Like these were the deities associated with the chief events of man's life from his conception to his death—Levana, Edula, Potina, Statilinus, etc. Similar Greek *Sondergötter* are Kourotrophos, Pandrosos, Erechtheus, Brizo, Iatros, Hygieia, Muiaeros, and a host of others. Of all these it may be said that their names are on the border-land between personal names and mere adjectival epithets—the name fairly clearly expressing the function. This is seen too where such an epithet-name has been taken up by an outstanding god, while yet a class of gods described only by such an epithet was also the subject of a cult. 'Αλεξικακος and ἀπορρόπαιος were applied to Zeus, Apollo, Heracles, but there were also θεοὶ ἀλεξικακοί, θεοὶ ἀπορρόπαιοι. Sometimes a god more or less clearly defined was known merely as Μέγιστος, 'the greatest' (as at Boulis), or as θεὸς δάβιος, θεὸς ἀγαθός, θεὸς ὅσιος, or as παρθένος, or simply as 'the god,' 'the goddess.'

This resembles what appears to have been an early Semitic method of naming gods by a title—e.g., Ba'al, 'owner' or 'lord,' i.e. the lord of a sanctuary or of the land in which a community is settled. Hence there were innumerable Ba'als distinguished from each other by a local appellative—e.g., Ba'al Sidon. Ba'al, however, never became a proper name, except in Babylon as the name of the chief god Marduk. Strictly speaking, the *b'alm* were nameless gods or spirits, though to a *ba'al* might later be given a more personal name. Yet even the name of the *ba'al* of Tyre, Melkart, means no more than 'king of the city.' In Egypt, where the importance of the name was so great, some gods, those of the various nomes, were nameless. Alike in character and in functions they were distinguished from each other by the name of the community where each was worshipped, like the local Ba'als—e.g., 'he of Edfu,' 'she of Nekheh.' There were also many functional deities, Egyptian *Sondergötter* or *Augenblicksgötter*.¹

In some instances gods are actually nameless either because of the mystery which surrounds them or because they are called by some oblique epithet, or it may be because their names have been forgotten. It must be remembered that often, when a god has received a personal name, that name becomes too sacred to be used. It remains hidden and secret, unlike other titles by which the god is called. Instances might be cited from the lowest savagery up to the Hebrews, with whom the name Jahweh was forgotten for this reason (see GOD [Jewish]). Generally a god has some less sacred name, but it is obvious that in such a case he might become nameless or be mentioned only by a circumlocution or epithet. Among the Fuegians their god was known only as 'big man in the woods.'² With the Eskimos the wife or mother of Tornarsuk is a nameless being dwelling under the sea.³ To the native tribes of California their 'high god' was merely 'the one above,' or 'the old man above.'⁴ Similarly the Zulus know dimly of 'a king which is above' or 'the lord on high'—not heard of first from white men.⁵ The jungle tribes of Chotā Nāgpur worship indeterminate beings in sacred groves, 'not yet clothed with individual attributes,' 'of whose form and functions no one can give an intelligible account.'⁶ Herodotus says of the Pelasgians that they sacrificed to gods who had set in order all things, but they gave no title

or name to any of them. He also adds that the oracle at Dodona advised them to call their gods by the names of barbarian (Egyptian) gods of whom they had heard.¹ Similarly Strabo, citing Posidonius, says that the Kallaikoi were 'godless' (ἀθεοί), and that the Celtiberians sacrificed by night at the time of full moon to a nameless god (ἀνώνυμῳ τινὶ θεῷ).²

Of these tribes as well as of the tribes of Thrace described by Theophrastus and others as ἀθεοί, Usener points out that they had gods without personal names, but called by adjectives. Hence by those accustomed to clearly defined gods they were regarded as goddesses.³

The same phenomenon is perhaps to be seen in China, where the numerous *shen*, tutelary or departmental gods, have little individuality or mythology, and are defined only by their functions.⁴ In this they resemble the groups of nameless *kami* in Japan, or the gods mentioned in the older writings as worshipped at the greater temples yet not mentioned by any personal name.⁵ Some of the highest Etruscan divinities, the *dei involuti*, were nameless—perhaps an instance of a sacred name being forgotten.⁶

Here we may note the teaching of St. Clement of Alexandria about God. In his desire to eliminate all taint of anthropomorphism from God, he maintained that we could understand Him not so much by what He is as by what He is not. And, as a logical consequence of this negative conception of God, he added: 'Nor can we say that God has shape or name.' Such terms as 'the One,' 'Father,' 'God,' etc., are not strictly appropriate.

'Such high names we employ because of our incapacity to find the true name, so that the mind may have something to rest on and steady it. None of these names taken separately expresses God.'⁷

This abstract negative method of regarding the being of God is seen also in Philo and the Neo-Platonists. Philo taught that God was without qualities and incomprehensible in His essence. He cannot be described, and even the patriarchs did not know His name. He was the Nameless Existing. So to Plotinus God as the One could be described only negatively. The doctrine of the Divine Namelessness characterized all the Alexandrian schools of thought,⁸ and was really to some extent characteristic of Hebrew and Jewish thought (cf. Job 26¹⁴ and GOD [Jewish]). God has a name which 'has not been sent into this world.'⁹ It is also found more or less in all mystic thought¹⁰—e.g., the teaching of the Upaniṣads that God is known only to those who profess not to know Him; of Lao-tse that 'the Tao which can be expressed is not the eternal Tao'; of the Egyptian hymn to Amen-Ra, 'whose name is hidden from all his creatures'; of St. Augustine that God 'sciendo ignoratur et nesciendo cognoscitur';¹¹ and of Hooker that 'our safest eloquence concerning Him is our silence.'¹² From a different point of view agnosticism insists on the unknowableness, and therefore the namelessness, of God.

The tabu on divine names applies equally to the secret or sacred names of men. These are not to be used lightly or even uttered by others—e.g., that of a husband by a wife, of a mother-in-law by a son-in-law, etc.—so that a person is called by a circumlocution or the like, or the names are in some cases known only to a very few persons. An example of this is found among the Arunta and

¹ ii. 52.

² iii. iv. 16.

³ Usener, p. 277 f.; cf. ERE ii. 35^b.

⁴ J. J. M. de Groot, *Religion in China*, New York, 1912, pp. 14, 176; Moore, i. 22.

⁵ Moore, i. 101 f.; ERE vi. 294.

⁶ ERE v. 534^b.

⁷ Strom. v. 81 f.

⁸ J. Drummond, *Philo Judaeus*, London, 1888, ii. 20 f.

⁹ *Ascen.* Is. i. 7.

¹⁰ Cf. G. d'Alviella, *The Origin and Growth of the Conception of God (H.L.)*, London, 1892, p. 223 ff., with references.

¹¹ *De Ord.* II. xvi. 44, xviii. 47.

¹² *Ecclesiastical Polity*, i. ii. 2.

¹ G. F. Moore, *Hist. of Religions*, Edinburgh, 1914, i. 146.

² R. Fitzroy, *Narrative of Voyages of the 'Adventure' and the 'Beagle'*, London, 1839, ii. 180.

³ Grantz, i. 207.

⁴ NR iii. 158.

⁵ Callaway, p. 19 f.

⁶ H. H. Risley, *The People of India*, Calcutta, 1908, p. 215 f.

kindred tribes of Australia, where the *churinga* name, i.e. the name borne in the Alcheringa (q.v.) by tribal ancestors and now applied to descendants, is known only to the older men of the totem group. The women, till they become very old, do not even know of the existence of such names.¹ In other Australian tribes a man gives up his name for ever at the time of initiation to manhood, and thus has no name, but is called brother, nephew, etc.² In other cases a child is sometimes nameless for some years in infancy, because, as with the pagan tribes of Borneo, to give it a name while it is still feeble might direct the attention of malicious spirits to it. Hence a boy is called *Ukat*, a girl *Owing* (=Thingumybob).³

See also J. G. Frazer, *GB*³, pt. II., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, London, 1911, p. 318 ff.; A. E. Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, do. 1902, p. 434; artt. NAMES.

2. Unknown gods.—In some polytheistic systems caution suggested that, as there were many gods, it was possible that there were some not known by name or function to men, besides the number who were known. Hence it was safe to recognize, to pray, or offer sacrifice to gods who were unknown as well as to those who were known. In the Babylonian penitential psalms, while unknown sins are often confessed, many unknown gods are addressed lest any, being forgotten, should still visit the penitent with his anger. It is probable that such a cautious point of view explains the altar seen by St. Paul in Athens with its inscription *ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ*. That such altars were well known there is proved by several literary references. Pausanias twice refers to these, once to 'altars of gods called unknown and heroes' seen by him in Athens, and once to 'an altar of unknown gods' at Olympia.⁴ Philostratus and Tertullian both refer to altars of unknown gods in Athens.⁵ In the *Philopatris* ascribed to Lucian, but perhaps by another author, 'the unknown god of Athens' is mentioned. Elsewhere, however, there is a clear reference in Lucian to the purpose of such a cult of unknown deities. First several gods are invited by name to an assembly, and then the unknown gods whose altars men propitiate with sweet odours.⁶ The same cautious attitude is seen in a passage of Diogenes Laertius, who tells how at the time of plague in Athens Epimenides let loose sheep from the Areopagus, and advised that wherever one lay down sacrifice to the appropriate god should be made. Hence now there are nameless altars (*βωμῶν ἀνωμένων*) throughout the *δῆμοι* of Attica.⁷ Like the Babylonians, the Romans at sacrifices called upon all the gods after invoking the special deities in question, and on occasions when there was doubt regarding the divinity who had caused an earthquake or other prodigy sacrifice was offered to one under the formula 'whether a god or a goddess.'⁸ Occasional examples of this uncertainty regarding names are found on inscriptions, and with the Romans as with the Greeks there were altars to unknown gods.⁹ The same caution is found wherever there is a cult of ghosts. As time goes on, the names of the dead are forgotten, but they are still capable of doing harm if neglected. Hence all the dead are invited to a sacrifice in one general formula, as with the Zulus or the Hindus.¹⁰ Similarly many of the invocations of the Veddas to

the *yaku* ('ghosts') address these without name—'my departed one,' 'multitude of relatives,' or simply 'you.'¹

For other instances see *ERE* vi. 276^b (Egypt), 294^b (Japan), and cf. J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, London 1893, II. 33 f. Cf. the 'unknown father' of the Gnostic Saturninus.

3. Groups of nameless spirits.—Where crowds of spirits, ghosts, genii, or simply beings are supposed to exist, these are too numerous to have each a personal name. But, as they have a generic likeness, so they have a generic name. They are anonymous beings with a collective name, and their functions are often but vaguely defined. Examples are found in the *wunda* ('ghosts'), *mrarts*, or *iruntarinia* of Australian tribes; the *inue* ('invisible rulers') or *torngak* ('spirits') of the Eskimos; the *vui* ('spirits') and *tamate* ('ghosts') of the Melaneseans; the crowd of nameless *yaku* of the Veddas; the *amadhlozi* ('spirits') of the Zulus; the 'above persons,' 'ground persons,' and 'under-water persons' of the Blackfoot Indians; the *atua* ('spirits') of the Maoris; the *bhūtā* of Indian folk-belief; the *nats* of Burma; the *jok* (spirits of long-dead ancestors) of the Dinkas; the *aphangak* ('ghosts') and *kilyi-khama* (other spirits) of the Lengua; the *kenatma* of the tribes of Guiana; the *toh* of the pagan tribes of Borneo. Among higher races there are such collective groups as the *shen* (gods, spirits, and ghosts) and the *kwei* (demons) of the Chinese; the *daēvas* of Zoroastrianism; the anonymous groups of spirits possessing only a generic name in ancient Egypt; the sprites or bogeys of Greece with a generic rather than a personal name; or such a group as 'the Seven' demons of the Babylonians. Any individual spirit in these groups would simply be called by the generic name. But some of these may come to be more clearly defined, or may be summed up in one particular being. These would then stand out above the others, and a definite, personal name would be given them, or a more definite being with a personal name might be included in the collective group. Qat, the hero-god of the Melaneseans, is an outstanding *vui*. Among the 'above persons' of the Blackfeet are Thunder and Wind. The Dravidian tribes with, e.g., their hosts of nameless tree-spirits know also of special forest-gods, Barām or Sarnā Būrlī, evolved from these. Among the *bhūtā* there are individualized examples with personal names. In Burma some *nats* have attained to the dignity of a personal name—*nats* of prominent trees or of the whole forest. In China the *shen* include Heaven, Sun, Moon, Thunder, Earth, etc., which stand out more prominently than the great mass of the *shen*. Among the Veddas the *yaku* of rocks and hill-tops tend to become named, taking the name of the hill which they inhabit. The *yaku* of important men are occasionally remembered by name long after their death.

4. Name and personality.—That the name has come to be regarded as part if not the whole of the personality in universal folk-belief is undoubted. To know the proper name of a man, spirit, or god inevitably gave one enormous power over these. This, however, implies a certain amount of theorizing about the name, and it is probable that even personal names existed before they were regarded in this light. Usener, followed by Höfding,² has maintained that the transition from momentary and special gods to gods who can properly be called personal is signalized by the acquiring of proper names. If this means that a god or a man has no clearly marked and definite personality until he acquires a personal name as distinct from an ad-

¹ Spencer-Gillen^b, p. 531.

² E. M. Curr, *The Australian Race*, Melbourne, 1896-97, I. 46.

³ C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, I. 79, II. 24.

⁴ Paus. I. 1. 4, v. xiv. 8.

⁵ Philostr. *Vita Apollon.* vi. iii. 5; Tertullian, *ad Nationes*, II. 9.

⁶ Phil. 9, *Zeus Trag.* 6.

⁷ Diog. Laert. I. x. 110.

⁸ Servius on Virg. *Georg.* I. 21; Aul. Gell. II. 23.

⁹ *CIL* I. 630; *Ins. Urb. Rom.* 141; Minuc. Felix, *Octav.* vi. 2.

¹⁰ Callaway, p. 176; J. Muir, *Orig. Sanskrit Texts*, London, 1859-72, v. 310.

¹ C. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911, pp. 161, 275, 278.

² H. Höfding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 130 ff.

jectival name, it is certainly not true. There was a period when men as well as spirits or gods had no personal names, and perhaps only very vague adjectival names. Yet men had a real sense of their own and of each other's personality, and this must have been true also of their thought about spirits or gods or worshipful beings. No doubt the personal name crystallizes the functions, characteristics, and actions of a man, but the man is there even before he is named, and others have a clear idea of him as an acting and living personality. Even Höfding admits that 'the word serves to help and support, to retain and to develop the results won within the realm of ideas, but it cannot be their exclusive cause.'¹ And, in fact, if the name was first a descriptive epithet, referring to some function or action or to the position of a spirit or god or of a man, it is obvious that some definite idea of these beings as personalities already existed. Personality is doubtless a more or less fluid conception to the savage, as is seen by his belief in the possibility of metamorphosis, yet that belief exists where the personal name exists and where it is the subject of the most stringent tabus. The groups of spirits already referred to, with no individual names but only a generic title, have functions and characteristics which are clearly enough defined, and they are conceived as personalities. Where one of them has become pre-eminent and has received a distinctive name, that name in the first place would be descriptive of some characteristic in which he was supposed to differ from the others. But the characteristic no less than the name which defined it is that which marks this spirit off from all the others. That the conception of *mana*, *orenda*, *wakanda*, and the like—impersonal power called by a descriptive name—is primitive and preceded the belief in beings to whom personality was ascribed is unlikely. These are rather 'generalizations from many separate experiences.'² What man first believed in was a being or beings to whom personality, however man first conceived it, was given. That personality was not necessarily in human form. It was described by an epithet, which later became a personal name. Even thunder might be conceived as a being, a personality, before the idea of an anthropomorphic Thunderer arose. The nameless gods of the Pelasgians had some personality, for they were regarded as setting all things in order and distributing all things—actions of a clearly personal kind.

LITERATURE.—H. Höfding, *The Philosophy of Religion*, tr. B. E. Meyer, London, 1906; F. B. Jevons, *An Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion*, New York, 1903, ch. iv., *Comparative Religion*, Cambridge, 1913, ch. viii.; H. Usener, *Götternamen*, Bonn, 1896. J. A. MACCULLOCH.

NANAK.—Nānak, the founder of the Sikh sect, is variously known as Guru Nānak, Bābā Nānak, and Nānak Shāh, the word *guru* meaning 'spiritual preceptor,' *bābā* signifying 'father' or 'one worthy of reverence,' and *shāh* denoting 'king' or 'chief,' the first, moreover, being in origin Sanskrit and the last two Hindi and Persian respectively, while all three are commonly used to designate ascetics. Guru Nānak, as we prefer to call him, was the first of the ten *gurus* of the Sikh community. Wherever representations of him are found, he is invariably shown as an old man with flowing white beard, such an appearance being more in accordance with his character for great wisdom than a more youthful picture would have been.

1. Sources.—In writing an ordinary history the historian sets about collecting materials with which to form a connected narrative, and, generally speaking, it is not impossible, or even difficult,

¹ P. 147; cf. F. B. Jevons, *An Introduct. to the Study of Comparative Religion*, p. 1311.

² J. Estlin Carpenter, *Comparative Religion*, London, 1913, p. 82.

to ascertain and state matters of fact with tolerable accuracy. In the case of Nānak, however, or any other of the Indian leaders of thought whose life belongs to the dim past, it is a very different thing. A number of *janamsākhis*, or biographies, of the *guru* are available. These are for the most part MSS in the Panjābi language and in Gurmukhi characters, which are peculiar to Panjābi. The present writer has before him a copy which, according to a statement on the final page, was written in the city of Amritsar half a century ago. The name of the scribe and the amount charged for making the copy are also stated, and the volume closes with the pious wish that those who read and hear the sayings of Nānak may have the gift of discipleship. At the beginning of the MS there is a singular Introduction—a description of a visit paid by Rājā Janak, father of Sitā of ancient Hindu story, to the infernal regions under the escort of Rājā Dhārm, who corresponds to Pluto of the ancient Greeks. A graphic account is given of the wretched condition of the sinners in hell, and of the marvellous change produced in that condition by a portion of St. Rājā Janak's merit being put to their account; they are set free not for one age only but for the succeeding age as well, until the Kal Yuga, the iron age, the age of vice, which is the present. The same Rājā Janak came into the world in this age in the person of Guru Nānak, that men, entering his order, might be saved from the consequences of their actions. Rājā Janak is thus introduced to the world again, and the author of this *janamsākhī* has thought it his duty, in order to glorify Guru Nānak, to embellish his narrative with such astounding and childish fables as would make history impossible. This is disconcerting, but we are not confined to that particular narrative; earlier *janamsākhis* are available. E. Trumpp, who, at the instance of the Government of India, wrote a translation of the *Granth Sāhib*, as the Sikhs call their book, made also a translation of a *janamsākhī* which he judged to date from the end of the 16th or the beginning of the 17th century. It is written in the characters in which the oldest copy of the *Granth Sāhib* is written, and is signed by the fifth *guru*, Guru Arjun, himself. In comparison with other and more modern copies it is free from the miraculous element, and may, therefore, be considered more reliable than the rest.

M. A. Macauliffe (*The Sikh Religion*, Oxford, 1909, Introd. p. lxxxvi) tells us that he used a MS which bore the date A.D. 1588, just fifty years after Nānak's death. Which of these two *janamsākhis* is the older cannot, probably, be ascertained, but they are both highly flavoured with fable, and one or two sentences in which Macauliffe appraises them throw the necessary light on their intrinsic worth.

'We must premise that several of the details of this and of all the current *Janamsakhis* appear to us to be simply settings for the verses and sayings of 'Guru Nānak. His followers and admirers found dainty word-pictures in his compositions. They considered under what circumstances they could have been produced, and thus devised the framework of a biography in which to exhibit them to the populace' (p. lxxxvii).

Trumpp also indicates the direction in which historical research is likely to be profitable. He found, on comparing the old copy with current MSS, that everything that appeared to throw a dubious or unfavourable light on Nānak had been left out, whereas other things, which spoke of his deification, had been interpolated. Closer research soon convinced him that the usual Sikh tradition concerning Nānak could by no means be trusted; he had reason enough to assume that the formation of myths about their first *guru* had already progressed very far, notwithstanding that his life fell altogether within the period of historical light, as

among the rubbish of miraculous and often absurd stories he could detect very few historical facts that deserved credit. The man as he had him before him in his own words and sayings, as contained in the *Granth*, would by no means agree with what the miraculous stories had made of him.

From this it is seen that the able translator of the *Granth Sāhib* had found the real man behind the fictitious veil of fable. With respect to the tales, he has only one opinion, and that is that they are rubbish, but there is more in the *janamsākhīs* than tales which serve only to supply a background for Nānak's sayings and to please the multitude—there are the verses themselves, regarding some of which Trumpp says :

'The meetings and verbal contests with other Faqirs and Shekhs, which are described at full length, are in themselves very probable, but in other respects of no importance, except that they give some hints to the mental development of Nānak' (*Ādi Granth*, Prefatory Remarks, p. v).

Let us emphasize the exception.

For the study of the mental power and mental growth of the Guru we have also the *Granth Sāhib*. *Granth* is simply the Sanskrit word for 'book,' and *Sāhib* is an Arabic word for 'lord,' and this title of the two combined is indicative of personality and greatness, wisdom and power; the Sikhs look on this book as their lord, whom they must obey. It is a collection in Panjābi, Hindi, and even Persian, of moral poems and apothegms composed and uttered by Guru Nānak and other religious and philosophical teachers. It was compiled in A.D. 1604. From its contents can be deduced a fair conception of the development of religious ideas from the 12th to the 16th cent., for the various compositions in the book are those of *bhagats* ('saints') scattered over that period, including, of course, Guru Nānak. It shows to what extent Nānak was indebted to his predecessors in the Indian field of thought within those limits of time, and how much their influence tended to bring about the remarkable reformation that took place. The Reformation had begun before his day. Nānak was fourteen years older than Luther and died eight years before him, and, when that great reformer took his stand for truth at the Diet of Worms, Nānak was in his humble way seeking to guide the Indian people to the recognition of a personal God. The Indian reformation was salvation from atheism, and we may see in Nānak the highest and best that it reached.

2. Life.—Bābā Nānak was born in the month of Vaisākh (April-May), A.D. 1469, in the village of Talwandi, now, owing to his fame, known as Nankāna, about 30 miles south-west of Lahore. He was born on a moonlight night when a watch of the night remained. Celestial, 'unbeaten' music was heard, which doubtless means that auspicious omens in sounds and sights greeted the arrival of the infant. He was named Nānak Nirākārī or Nirankārī, i.e. 'Nānak, servant of the formless one.'

His father, Kālū, Khatri by caste and Vēdi by clan, was a small farmer, who had also the duties of land-steward to perform to the owner of the village, at that time Rāe Bulār, a Musalmān Rajpūt of the Bhatti tribe of Rajpūts. It seems that Kālū was a petty merchant as well as farmer and land-steward. Nānak's early days were, therefore, spent in the freedom of farm and village life, and in close proximity to the boundless desert, which must have had endless charms and possibilities for him. As a boy he seems to have exhibited remarkable talents. There was a manifest difference between him and other lads, for, while they were intent on the games that boys usually delight in, he was immersed in meditation

on spiritual things. He was of a dreamy disposition, so that, to his discredit, it is recorded that he lost everything that he took out of the house. This caused his father great annoyance, which led him to upbraid the priest who had on the occasion of the bestowal of a name on the child declared that the fame of his son would be like a canopy over him. 'A fine canopy!' said Kālū.

At five he was able intelligently to talk about the Vedas and other Hindu *Sāstras*. His father took him to school and, the auspices being declared good by the priest, he gave the customary presents to the schoolmaster, and Nānak was admitted. Children have been known to read for their amusement at three, and, when the case of a boy of eight is cited as being able to recite a thousand lines of Virgil, we need not wonder that Nānak at seven astonished his master when the following incident occurred.

'Sir,' said Nānak to his teacher, 'what have you learned that you may teach me?' 'I have learned all the branches of knowledge,' replied the teacher; 'I have read the *Sāstras* and the Vedas,—I know arithmetic and book-keeping—I know everything.' 'All that kind of learning is utterly useless,' said Nānak. 'Listen, Sir :

Burn worldly love, rub the ashes and make ink of it; make of faith the best kind of paper;
Make the heart the pen, the intellect the writer; ask the Guru and write the judgment;
Write the Name and the praise thereof, write that which has no end or limit.

Sir, if you are able to teach me this manner of knowledge, then teach me.'

At the age of nine he learned Persian, and after a time he left school. Then he consorted with *sādhus* and *faqirs*, Hindu and Muhammadan mendicant ascetics who frequented the desert. Being in their company was much more to his mind than herding cows or doing any other sort of farm labour; indeed, he got into trouble over the herding of his father's buffaloes, for he fell asleep at the border of a wheat-field, which the herd entered and nearly ruined. Other instances of a like nature are recorded of him, and at twelve he was no better, as the following shows :

Broken-hearted, Kālū said to him, 'Nānak, you have been born in my house, and now that I am old my name is being ruined. I am hopeless and utterly undone. First your sister Nānaki was born and then you came, such as you are. I had hoped that my name would live after me, but you have disgraced it during my lifetime.' Nānak was silent, then Kālū said again, 'I am worn out and dying, and you say never a word.'

When he was seventeen years old, the crisis came. His father sent him to do a little trade, strictly enjoining him to spend the twenty rupees with which he entrusted him to advantage. Saying, 'Father, forgive me this once, and you will see what good purchases I shall make,' Nānak set out. But, meeting a company of devotees, he spent all the money on them, and, when he returned empty-handed, the exasperated Kālū 'struck him a blow on the left cheek with the right hand and a blow on the right cheek with the left so violently that Nānak's cheeks were instantly discoloured.'

It became evident to his relatives that he would not settle down to any regular work in Talwandi; therefore the plan was conceived of sending him to Sultānpur, in the district of Jalandhar, where his sister, Nānaki, the wife of Jairām, lived. By this time, however, he himself was married and had two sons, Srī Chand and Lakhmī Dās. Leaving his wife and children, he travelled to Sultānpur, where, by the recommendation of his brother-in-law, who was employed in the commissariat of Nawāb Daulat Khān, he obtained employment in Government service as storekeeper. His wife, Sulakhni, daughter of Mūlā, a Khatri of the same profession as Kālū, and residing in Batāla, a town of the present District of Gurdāspur, had been most unwilling that he should leave her, as is told pathetically in the *janamsākhī* :

The people of the house said that it would be good for him to go; perhaps his mind would become settled there. But his wife began to weep and said, 'Thou hast not shown thy love very much in the past, and now that thou art leaving me perhaps thou wilt not come back to me.' 'Silly one,' said Nānak, 'what were we doing here, and what shall we do there? I am of no use to thee.' She rose and pleaded with him, 'When thou didst sit in the house I thought myself queen of the whole world, and now I shall not care to live.' Then the Guru was touched and said, 'Do not grieve, every day thou shalt be queen.' She said, 'My husband, I shall not remain behind, take me with thee.' But the Bābā said, 'It is of the Lord that I go. If I make a livelihood there, I will send for thee. Obey my order.' Then she was silent.

At Sultānpur he devoted himself to his duties, and did so well that his faithfulness was everywhere recognized. Of his earnings he employed a part in supporting himself, and the rest he gave away in God's name. Mardānā, a village-musician of the Dūm class, professional players, came from Talwandī to see him and stayed with him. The duties of the day done, Nānak would make verses and sing them while Mardānā played the accompaniment. In the very early morning he bathed in the Bein river. This over, he began the labours of the day, and we can very well believe the truth of the statement that, when, in weighing out provisions, he came to the number 13, which in Panjābī is *terā*, he would pause and mutter, 'Terā,' which has the meaning also of 'Thine,' i.e. 'I am thine.' This is quite in accord with the Hindu mind and the ascetic manner.

He seems to have had a peculiar experience in Sultānpur. One day, while bathing, he remained longer in the water than was usual, and whether he had fallen into a state of semi-consciousness while he was carried down by the stream, or whether he had emerged and become absorbed in meditation, is not known, but it is believed that he saw a vision in which he was commanded to 'remain in the name, give alms, perform ablutions, worship, and remember' the Lord.

From this time we find him accompanying *faqirs*, except for an interval between two occasions when his enemies accused him of squandering the money of the Government. On both occasions the balance of his accounts proved his thorough honesty, but this annoying experience of suffering at the instance of detractors determined him to have done with the world altogether. Henceforth we know him only as the itinerant bard preacher accompanied by his musician Mardānā, who plays the *rabāb*, or *rebeek*, an instrument of the nature of the violin.

The itinerancy of the Guru is divided into four parts. He travelled east, south, north, and west, and at last, returning to the bosom of his family in Kartārpur, in the Jalandhar Duāb, he passed away in Oct. 1538.

It is not necessary to relate the incidents that Guru Nānak's ardent followers have collated in order to give the world a concrete narrative of his life subsequent to his retreat from the office of storekeeper, for their zeal has so far exceeded their common sense that the relation of the incidents alleged to have happened would detract from Nānak's reputation for wisdom rather than add to it. We prefer, therefore, to let these incidents alone, with the remark that the framing of the narrative (barring the miraculous element) and the course of the various discourses and discussions on religion are quite what one would expect among Hindu *sādhus* or Muhammadan *faqirs*.

3. Doctrines.—Reviewing Guru Nānak's distinctive position, we notice that his life as a preacher of righteousness began with the trumpet blast, 'There is no Hindu and no Musalmān.' He went on to show that they were both false, and thus incurred the odium of both. He fearlessly attacked idolatry, and, if he did not rise to a high degree of spiritual enlightenment, we can only say that Christian truth had not been conveyed to him.

He expressed himself in these selections from the *Granth*:

'The True One is, O Nanak, and the True One will be. True is the Lord, of a True Name, His love is infinitely inexpressible.

O Father, how shall I write of it?'

Nānak had a sense of sin which was wanting in the early teachers, and increased with the years.

'May on me, the sinner and vicious man, favour be bestowed. O Lord, be merciful to me that Nanak may cross.

I am not chaste, nor truthful, nor learned; foolish and ignorant am I.

Nanak says, "I have done mean actions."

Save the sinner! This is the prayer of Nanak, O my soul!

Covetousness is a dog, falsehood is a sweeper, living by cheating is carrion, To defame another is to touch filth, tale-hearing is fire, wrath is an evil spirit.

I am a sinner, Thou alone art pure.

As full as the ocean is of water so many are my vices.

Bestow mercy, have compassion, cause the sinking stones to cross.

The True, the Inapprehensible, the Infinite, Himself does all. I am a sinner; Thou art the Pardoner.'

The consequence of sin is not transmigration, but punishment in hell; the wicked at last 'sit outside weeping,' 'are marched off and struck in the face,' 'the sinner is beaten,' 'is marched with black face to Hell,' 'is banished from the presence of the Supreme Lord.'

The doctrine of the sinfulness of man and the danger into which sin has brought him coincides very much with what we regard as truth; and not only so, but in Nānak's portion of the *Granth*, as well as in the portion written by his Sikhs ('disciples') and successors, strong emphasis is also laid on the doctrine of the necessity for a mediator:

'The Dhau [white ox on which, according to the Hindus, the world rests] is

Dharm [duty or religion], the Son of Daya [mercy].

Thy Name is the Supreme Spirit; by taking Thy name a man is saved from going to Hell.

Brother, the dangerous ocean of existence terrifies me; if the True Guru be found, He who is friendly to man, He conveys him across by virtue of the Name of the Lord. O Nanak, that ocean is crossed by means of the True Name, the King above kings.

The palace of my Lord is beautiful, adorned with gems.

His palace of pearls, diamonds and gold, is enchanting.

Without a ladder how shall I ascend to His castle?

The Guru is the ladder.

In the future world no question will be asked of him whose companion the Guru, the Creator, is.

Without a boat there is no road on the sea.

The Guru is the boat.

Ik Aunkar. The True Name is the Creator, the Spirit without fear, without enmity, a Timeless Being, the Gracious Enlightener of Darkness.

(The Sikhs themselves derive the word *guru* from the Sanskrit root *grī*, 'to utter,' and they also give it a traditional signification, 'the darkness-enlightener'; we therefore translate the last expression in the opening invocation in the *Granth* as above.)

'If I abide within the Name, the Name comes and dwells in my heart. Without the Guru there is darkness; without the Word there is no understanding. Death comes not where the Infinite Word of the Guru is.'

Union with God is clothed in the language of human love:

'I have fallen asleep, my Beloved is awake. She who by the True Guru is united to the Lord abides in devotion; Love, O Nanak, is her companion.'

Finally, what is the attitude of the saint towards the world?

'In the house from which thou must at death depart kill thyself;

He that dies by the Word [of the Guru] is dead; he will not die again.'

It is true that Guru Nānak in a few solitary passages calls the world a play of the Creator:

'The play lasts to-day and to-morrow';

but he declares also that there is a higher arena beyond this passing show of earthly life:

'Whom thou unitest with Thyself he remains united; having gone he treads the true arena.'

If he says, as he does, that God is all in all ('Thou alone; Thou alone'), he also says, 'In the

true Lord are all virtues; in us are all vices.' If he says that 'duality sinks the boat's load,' he but seems to safeguard the truth of God's sovereignty, and, lest man should presume to ascribe evil to the nature of God, he insists on a virtuous life:

'Abandon vices and practise virtues, and thus acquire the truth—lest ye repent';

and he pathetically expresses his humility and longing when he says:

'O, my Lord, who knows Thy qualities? My vices cannot be numbered.'

Guru Nānak was a seeker after God, and, as we regard his thoughts concerning God and man and the true *guru* who mediates between them, and also his thoughts on deliverance from sin and misery and the attainment of happiness by union with God, we have no hesitation in declaring the conviction that, although he used the terms of the philosophy of his day to declare the oneness and greatness of God, yet the idea of God as a cold apathetic abstraction never satisfied him. Although it is now the fashion among the Sikhs to regard all their *gurus* as the 'true *guru*' (*sat gur*), yet, when pressed, they tell us that the true *guru* is God, and the true *guru* of the *Granth Sāhib* is not Nānak, but is the Supreme, the *gur-dev*, the incarnation of God, the sinless one, and it cannot fail to strike the least observant reader of the *Granth* that the only religion that can satisfy the aspirations of the Sikhs, and disclose the identity of the *sat gur*, and that claims to do so, is the Christian. Whether Nānak was acquainted with Christian truth is a debated question, but, whether he was or not, we must allow that, being in some degree conversant with the Muhammadan faith, he may have known something of the revelation of God in His Word, the true teacher, God-incarnate, the Lord Jesus Christ.

LITERATURE.—E. Trumpp, *The Ādi Granth*, 1877, published by the Government of India; M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, Oxford, 1909. J. W. YOUNGSON.

NĀRĀYANA.—*x.* Origin and meaning of the name.—Nārāyana is an ancient and dignified epithet which has been applied to various Hindu gods. It is not the name of any distinct Hindu divinity. The word is believed to be a patronymic, derived from *nara*, 'man,' so that it means 'son of man,' but it is not known of whom it was originally used.

One of the hymns of the *Rigveda*,¹ the subject of which is the origin of the universe, attributes the creation to the sacrifice of Puruṣa by the gods. Puruṣa is conceived as a gigantic being in human form, a primeval man. This poem, which is called the *Puruṣa-sūkta*, has exercised a great influence on Hindu thought. It was incorporated in each of the other three Vedas; and the word *puruṣa* and a number of the phrases of the hymn have formed part of the theological language of Hinduism ever since. It has been conjectured that the name Nārāyana was coined as an epithet for Puruṣa; and the derivation of the word fits well into the guess. In three passages in the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*² Puruṣa is definitely named Puruṣa Nārāyana, and there is a clear reference in each case to the *Puruṣa-sūkta*. In the *Kātyāyana Śrautasūtra*³ Nārāyana occurs as a patronymic of Puruṣa; and Kātyāyana's *Sarvānukramaṇi* gives Nārāyana as the name of the author of the *Puruṣa-sūkta*. The *Mahānārāyana Upaniṣad* contains a lyrical passage⁴ which is reminiscent of the *Puruṣa-sūkta*, and uses Nārāyana as an epithet of Puruṣa. It is noteworthy that all these works belong to the *Yajurveda*. Further, throughout Hindu history the word 'Nārāyana' seems to carry with it some association, strong or weak, with the origin of the

world, and frequently also with the hymn which celebrates Puruṣa. Thus far all the evidence would lead us to conclude that Nārāyana was coined to be an epithet of the gigantic being who is sacrificed in the *Puruṣa-sūkta*, and that, when it is used as a honorific title for some other god, the purpose is to identify him with Puruṣa.

But, when we turn to the earliest occurrence of the word in the literature, we meet a serious difficulty. The word first occurs in a litany of praise to eleven gods in the *Maitrāyaṇi Samhitā*¹ of the *Black Yajurveda*. In one stanza of this litany Puruṣa is used as a title of Śiva, and in another Nārāyana is used as a title of Viṣṇu. The *Black Yajurveda* is a much earlier work than the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* (the book in which Nārāyana occurs for the first time as an epithet of Puruṣa), and the facts just mentioned make it rather difficult to believe that, when it was compiled, Nārāyana was regarded as in any way attached to Puruṣa.

It would seem to be more consistent with all the evidence to suppose that Nārāyana was an independent conception, the origin of which has been lost, and that it was applied now to one now to another divine being even in very early times. The truth is, evidence does not exist to enable us to decide the question of origin. Yet at an early date it unquestionably became associated with Puruṣa.

At a much later date a new derivation was suggested for Nārāyana. In Hindu, as in Greek, thought one of the earliest theories was that the world had arisen from water. In the *Taittirīya Samhitā*² of the *Black Yajurveda* we read:

'This universe was formerly water, fluid. On it Prajāpati, becoming wind, moved';

and the idea is repeated in innumerable passages in the later literature. Then, somewhere about the beginning of the Christian era, some one suggested that it was Nārāyana who at the creation moved on the waters, and suggested also that the word was derived from *nārāḥ* ('the waters are called *nārāḥ*, for they are sprung from *Nara*') and *ayana* ('moving').³ Henceforward most Hindu writers prefer this secondary derivation of the word.

To sum up: at all periods the name Nārāyana suggests a personal spirit connected with creation. It is frequently used so as to recall the *Puruṣa-sūkta*; and in some cases it definitely stands for Puruṣa. The direct origin of the word, viz. *nara*, 'man,' is given less often than the fanciful etymology from *nārāḥ* + *ayana*, 'waters' + 'moving.'

2. History of the use of the term.—The earliest and most frequent use of the word is as an epithet of Viṣṇu; but it is also applied to other divinities.

(1) *As a title of Viṣṇu.*—(a) The very earliest occurrence of the word, as we have already seen, is in the *Maitrāyaṇi Samhitā*.⁴ It occurs in a litany in praise of eleven divinities, a litany for which the *Gāyatrī*, the most famous of Hindu prayers, has served as the model. Each stanza, devoted to a single god, copies the rhythm of the *Gāyatrī*, and repeats its leading words, while the name of the god and two of his epithets help to fill up the intervening spaces in the lines. We here reproduce the stanzas in which Śiva and Viṣṇu are praised. The italicized words are from the *Gāyatrī*:

'Tat Puruṣāya vidmahe; Mahādevāya dhīmahi:
Tan no Rudraḥ prachodayāt.

Tat Keśavāya vidmahe; Nārāyaṇāya dhīmahi:
Tan no Viṣṇuḥ prachodayāt.'

'We know about Puruṣa; let us think about Mahādeva:
May Rudra stimulate this in us.

We know about Keśava; let us think about Nārāyana:
May Viṣṇu stimulate this in us.'

¹ x. 90.

² xii. iii. 4. 1, xiii. vi. 1. 1, 2. 12.

³ xxv. vii. 86.

⁴ See § 2 (2) (b) below.

¹ ii. ix. 1. See § 2 (1) (a).

² vii. i. 5. 1; Muir, l. 52.

³ See, e.g., Mann, i. 8-10; Muir, l. 25.

⁴ ii. ix. 1.

It seems clear that this litany was a good deal used in the schools of the *Black Yajurveda*; for we find an echo of it in a later work belonging to that Veda. See below (c).

The title *Nārāyaṇa*, then, in this its very first occurrence, and at this very early date, is given to Viṣṇu.

(b) The title is also given to Viṣṇu several times in the earliest part of the *Rāmāyaṇa*; ¹ but, as this poem has been seriously interpolated, it is difficult to make certain that the lines are original. If they are, they show that about 500 B.C. the Vaiṣṇavite sect was already accustomed to use *Nārāyaṇa* as an equivalent of Viṣṇu.

(c) *Nārāyaṇa* does not appear in the early prose *Upaniṣads* at all; but it crops up in two passages in one of the second group, the verse *Upaniṣads*. In one of these it is an epithet of Viṣṇu. In the first chapter ² of the *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, which is ritualistic in character, the following modification of the verse quoted above from the *Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā* occurs (words from the *Gāyatrī* are again italicized):

'Nārāyaṇa vidmahe; Vāsudevāya dhīmahi:
Tan no Viṣṇuḥ prachodayāt.'

'We know about Nārāyaṇa; let us think about Vāsudeva:
May Viṣṇu stimulate this in us.'

One of our best scholars ³ gives the 3rd cent. B.C. as the lowest possible chronological limit for this *Upaniṣad*. The couplet is noticeable also as being the earliest passage in which Vāsudeva is used as an epithet of Viṣṇu.

(d) Scholars believe that those parts of the *Rāmāyaṇa* in which Rāma is represented as an incarnation of half the essence of Viṣṇu were composed and added to the original epic about the 2nd cent. B.C. It is noticeable that, in strict agreement with the passage just quoted from the *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, Viṣṇu receives in these additions ⁴ both *Nārāyaṇa* and *Vāsudeva* as titles.

(e) In the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, in which for the first time the claim is made that Viṣṇu is not one of the crowd of Hindu divinities but the mighty All-soul, the Brahman of the *Upaniṣads*, the word *Nārāyaṇa* does not appear at all. From this time forward, however, all Vaiṣṇavite literature claims that Viṣṇu alone is the Supreme, and uses *Nārāyaṇa* as one of his most honoured epithets. In this sense it occurs very frequently in the *Mahābhārata*. One section of the epic ⁵ is devoted to an exposition of the theology of the chief Vaiṣṇavite sect of the time, the Bhāgavatas. In it Viṣṇu is called *Nārāyaṇa* and *Puruṣa*, and the section is called the *Nārāyaṇīya*. So *Nārāyaṇa* and *Puruṣa* are used as titles of Viṣṇu in a late passage interpolated into the sixth book of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, ⁶ which may belong to the same time.

Thereafter these names are used as titles of Viṣṇu in countless passages in every type of Vaiṣṇava literature.

(f) The late sectarian *Upaniṣads* attached to the *Atharvaveda* ⁷ are in two groups: those which represent Viṣṇu as the All-god and those which give Śiva that place. In the former group the *Mahā Upaniṣad* is perhaps the most important. Here Viṣṇu as the All-god is called *Nārāyaṇa* and *Puruṣa*. The same is true of the Vaiṣṇavite *Purāṇas* and the *Pāñcharātra Samhitās*.

In the chief Vaiṣṇavite sect of S. India, the Śrī-Vaiṣṇavas, the sectarian mantra runs, *Oṃ namaḥ Nārāyaṇāya*, 'Oṃ! reverence to Nārāyaṇa.' Rāmāṇja, who belonged to this sect, in his famous commentary on the *Vedāntasūtras* called the *Śrī-bhāṣya*, constantly uses *Nārāyaṇa* as an

equivalent of Viṣṇu, and appeals frequently to the *Mahā Upaniṣad* and the *Subhala Upaniṣad* as *śruti* (i.e. revelation) in support of his claim that Viṣṇu is Brahman.¹

(2) *Other uses*.—Although the Vaiṣṇavite sect had in this way appropriated the old title *Nārāyaṇa* for their own divinity, and were prepared to hold it against all comers, other Hindus refused to acknowledge that it was a necessary appanage of Viṣṇu.

(a) It is used as a title of Brahman, the old god of creation, at the beginning of the *Law-book of Manu* ² and elsewhere.

(b) In the earliest *Upaniṣads*, which are in prose, the main stream of the teaching tends to represent Brahman, the Supreme, as impersonal; and it is only in occasional phrases that ideas which are consistent only with a personal theology occur; but in the later *Upaniṣads*, which are in verse, there is a considerable tendency to interpret Brahman as personal. In the majority of these theistic passages no divine name except Brahman is used; but in the *Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad* ³ the sectarian god Rudra is introduced to make the personal character of the Supreme more vivid. Then, in one of the latest of these verse treatises, the *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, the name and the concept of *Puruṣa* are used for the same purpose. The passage shows many traces of the *Puruṣa-sūkta*. The word '*Puruṣa*' is used once, but *Nārāyaṇa* is used eight times, clearly as an equivalent for *Puruṣa*. This striking lyrical passage ⁴ has given its name to the whole work, the *Great Nārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*.

(c) As we have seen above (§ 2 (1) (c)), *Nārāyaṇa* occurs in another passage of this work as an epithet of Viṣṇu. As the *Upaniṣad* is a composite work, the two sections are probably of distinct origin, so that the variant use of the word need cause no difficulty.

(d) Śaṅkarācārya, the great exponent of the monistic form of the Vedānta, uses *Nārāyaṇa* as an equivalent for Brahman, the Supreme God of the philosophy. Faced with Vaiṣṇavites who claimed that Viṣṇu was Brahman, and Śaivites who claimed that Śiva was Brahman, he declared that neither claim was acceptable, since Brahman was no sectarian god, but the impersonal Supreme behind all phenomena and all gods. He uses *Nārāyaṇa* as an epithet of Brahman, ⁵ and will not allow that it belongs to Viṣṇu.

3. Among the Jains *Nārāyaṇa* is the eighth of the nine black Vāsudevas, a group of mythical Tirthankaras said to have lived in the Duṣshamasunshamā period. ⁶ In the *Saddharma Puṇḍarīka*, a Mahāyāna Buddhist work, the body of a *bodhisattva* is compared with *Nārāyaṇa's* body. ⁷ Both are clearly reflexions from later Vaiṣṇavism.

4. In modern India *Nārāyaṇa* is universally regarded as a name of Viṣṇu.

LITERATURE.—This is cited throughout the article. See also O. Böhtlingk and R. Roth, *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch*, Petrograd, 1855-75; and M. Bloomfield, *Vedic Concordance*, Harvard, 1906.

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NARBADĀ.—The Narhādā, or Nerbudda (Skr. *Narmadā*, 'making happy'), one of the great rivers of India, is traditionally regarded as the boundary between Hindustān proper and the Deccan—the Namnādios of the Periplus (J. W. McCrindle, *Commerce and Navigation of the Erythraean Sea*, Calcutta, 1879, p. 116). It rises at Amarkantak (q.v.), and, after a westerly course of about 800 miles, falls into the Arabian Sea. It is specially associated with the cult of Śiva, his

¹ SBE xlviii. [1904] 229, 522, 537, etc.

² i. 8-10; Muir, i. 35.

³ iii. 4, iv. 12.

⁴ xi. 1-12.

⁵ In his *Bhāṣya* to the *Vedāntasūtras*, SBE xxxiv. [1890].

xxxviii. [1896].

⁶ Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson, *Heart of Jainism*, London, 1915,

p. 274.

⁷ SBE xxi. [1884] 397.

¹ n. vi. 1, iv. lxvii. 3.

² Verse 81.

³ A. B. Keith, in *JRAS*, 1903, p. 171.

⁴ *Rāmāyaṇa* i. xiv. 4, xli. 2.

⁵ In the *Mokṣadharmā Parvan*.

⁶ Canto 119.

⁷ See P. Deussen, *Sechzig Upaniṣad's des Veda*, Leipzig, 1897.

symbol (*bāna*, *vāna līnga*), made of white quartz, being found in its bed. The river is also known as Kewajī, 'the flowing lord,' and bathing in its waters is a potent mode of removing tabu or sin pollution. The river priests rank its sanctity above that of all other rivers. Freedom from sin, they say, is gained by bathing for three years in the Sarasvatī (*q.v.*), for seven days in the Jumnā (*q.v.*), one day is sufficient for the Ganges (*q.v.*), while the mere sight of the Narbadā cleanses the sinner. The local prophecy declared that the holiness of the Ganges would cease in A.D. 1895, while that of the Narbadā would continue through all the ages of the world; the first part of this prediction, in the opinion of the Ganges priests, has certainly not been fulfilled. It is the desire of many an orthodox Hindu that he may die on the Narbadā's banks, and the ashes of the dead are brought from long distances and consigned to its waters. Even the Ganges herself, it is said, comes once a year in the form of a black cow and bathes here. On this day, which is observed as a festival, the merit of bathing is double that of both the rivers combined. The most noted places of pilgrimage are Amarkantak, Omkār Māndhātā, and Chāndōd, which, if the Ganges gave way to the Narbadā, would become the southern Benares. Few Hindus would dare to swear falsely, standing in the river with a red flower garland round the neck, and holding in the right hand some of the holy water. Like all sacred rivers, the Narbadā resents being confined by a bridge, and more than once her floods have caused loss of life, which is said to have calmed her wrath.

LITERATURE.—*BG* ii. [1877] 347 ff., vi. [1890] 6, 169 f., vii. [1893] 553, 559 f.; *Central Provinces Gazetteer*, 1870, p. 346 ff.; *IGI* xviii. [1903] 375 ff.

W. CROOKE.

NĀSIK.—The town Nāsik (said to be derived from *Skr. nava-śikhā*, 'nine peaks,' as it is supposed to be built on nine hills), headquarters of the District of that name in the Bombay Presidency, is a famous place of pilgrimage, on the banks of the river Godāvari (*q.v.*), about 30 miles from its source; lat. 19° 48' N.; long. 73° 47' E. It is the Nasika of Ptolemy (*J. W. McCrindle, Ancient India as described by Ptolemy*, Calcutta, 1885, p. 156). It has been identified with the place visited by the Buddhist pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang, and capital of King Pulakesin II.

'Within and without the capital are five *stūpas* to mark the spots where the four past Buddhas walked and sat. . . . There are, besides these, other *stūpas* made of brick or stone, so many that it would be difficult to name them all. Not far to the south of the city is a *saṅghārāma* [monastery] in which is a stone image of Kwan-tsz'-tsai Bōdhisattva. Its spiritual powers extend (*far and wide*), so that many of those who have secretly prayed to it have obtained their wishes' (*S. Beal, Si-yu-ki*, London, 1884, ii. 257; *BG* i. pt. ii. [1896] 354 f.; cf. V. A. Smith, *Early Hist. of India*³, Oxford, 1914, p. 426).

The position of the group of Buddhist caves in the vicinity, known as Pāṇḍu Lenā, also points to the sanctity of the place in Buddhist times. They are situated in an isolated hill about 5 miles S.S.W. from the town. The caves are seventeen in number, and form a small but very interesting group. The great Chaitya cave is not so remarkable as others of the same series.

'But there are two Vihāras, which are very far in advance of any yet met with, and display in their façades a richness of decoration quite unlike the modest exteriors of those excavated before the Christian era. Notwithstanding this they all, except Nos. II. and xvii., belong to the Hinayāna or first great division of Buddhist caves, being devoid of images, or any representations of Buddha as an object of worship, or in fact of any of those characteristics which marked the introduction of the Mahāyāna theosophy' (*Fergusson and Burgess, Cave Temples of India*, p. 266).

The Chaitya cave contains an inscription of Kṛṣṇarājā, second king of the Andhra dynasty, which arose after the death of Aśoka (c. 220 B.C.; Smith, p. 206). The series extends from this period down to

about A.D. 600. The place appears in Hindu tradition in connexion with the story of Rāma, who is said to have spent part of his exile at Panchavati, a suburb north of the Godāvari river, and many places in the neighbourhood are associated with his adventures. About the 11th or 12th cent. A.D. Jainism seems to have prevailed here, and devotees of that faith excavated the Chāmbhār caves and made additions to the Pāṇḍu Lenā group. But, though it is a place of great sanctity, the Benares of W. India, as it has been called, the existing Hindu temples, most of which were built in the period of Marāthā rule, are not of much importance or dignity. That of Someśvara, a form of Śiva, attracts numerous pilgrims, and one group of buildings is the work of the famous princess of Indor, Ahalyā Bāī (A.D. 1750–1818), one of the great temple-builders of modern times. Other noteworthy shrines are those of Rāma, known as Gorā, 'white,' to distinguish it from the Kālā, or 'black' Rāma of Panchavati; a large temple dedicated to Bālājī, or the infant Kṛṣṇa; that of Śiva as Tilbhāndeśvar, so called because the *līnga* is believed to grow yearly to the length of a grain of sesamum (*tīl*); that of Viṭhobā, associated with Rādha and Kulkmini; that of Śiva Kapāleśvara, the 'skull-wearer'; and that of Kālā Rām or Śrī Rāmji, one of the finest modern temples in W. India. Śākta-worship is represented by the shrine of Bhadrā Kālī. In the bed of the Godāvari are numerous sacred bathing-places (*tīrtha*) and holy pools (*kuṇḍa*). The holiest of all is known as Rāmakuṇḍa, 'the pool of Rāma,' which is renowned for its purifying properties. As, for the people of N. India, a father's funeral rites are best performed at Gayā (*q.v.*), so those of a mother are never so perfect as when solemnized at Rāma's pool in the Godāvari. Crowds of pilgrims are constantly arriving at the place from all parts of W. India, Berār, the Nizām's Dominions, the Central Provinces, and at the greater feasts from even more distant places. Their names are carefully recorded by the local priests, known as *kṣetra upādhyāya*, 'teachers of the holy land.' The circuit of the temples and holy places occupies three days. It also attracts crowds of religious devotees, who in former times caused much trouble to the authorities by their turbulence. There is little evidence of Islām, except a Jāmi Masjid, or cathedral mosque, partly built from the ruins of Hindu temples.

LITERATURE.—For the Buddhist caves see J. Fergusson and J. Burgess, *The Cave Temples of India*, London, 1880, p. 263 ff. The place is described in *BG* xvi. [1893] 541 ff.; *IGI* xviii. [1903] 410 ff.

W. CROOKE.

NĀSIR IBN KHUSRAU.—Abū Mu'in al-dīn Nāṣir ibn Khusrāu (in Persian, Nāṣir-i Khusrāu) was born in A.D. 1004 at Qubādiyān, a town lying north-east of Balkh in the district of the upper Oxus. The first forty years of his life are practically a blank as regards biographical information, but it is clear that they were not wasted. Not only did he master the literary, scientific, and philosophical learning of the age in all its various branches, devoting particular attention to the study of religions, but he also thought deeply on the great questions which his ardent search after truth impelled him to attempt to solve. For a long time he could find no sure ground for belief, and he seems to have consoled himself by indulging in the pleasures of wine. When he was forty-two, he had a dream in consequence of which he determined to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. Having resigned his post—a secretaryship under the Seljūq government—he set out for Mecca, where he accomplished the immediate object of his journey, and then travelled by land to Egypt, arriving in Cairo in August, A.D. 1047. Here he

they made holes with their hands or with sticks and deposited the seeds in them. The work was done in common, the field of each man being taken in order. A number of dishes were made out of corn, one half drink and half food like the *sofki* of the Creek Indians, another of dry powdered corn which could be carried long distances without spoiling and in compact form. It was therefore usually taken by war parties and on distant hunts. The fruit or seeds of a certain kind of cane, bearing at irregular intervals, and that of two kinds of grains, one growing wild, the other being slightly cultivated, were also used. Marsh potatoes were used in seasons of want. Beans and pumpkins were among their cultivated plants. The principal native fruit was the persimmon, out of which a kind of bread, often spoken of by early travellers, was made. Peaches, figs, and water-melons were early introduced by the Whites. Walnuts and chestnuts were eaten to some extent, and probably, like other tribes of the southern United States, the Natchez expressed oil from hickory nuts and acorns, although notices of such usage seem to be wanting from the pages of our authorities. Salt was obtained from the salt lies in N. Louisiana. Tobacco was cultivated and was of great ceremonial importance. When they smoked, they usually mixed it with dried sumac leaves in about equal proportions.

4. Social customs.—It may be inferred from the information furnished by du Pratz that, when a woman was confined, she was forced to leave the house and give birth to her child in a small hut apart from other houses. The child was not put on its feet until it was more than a year old, and it was usually allowed to suckle as long as it chose. Training after the first few years of life was largely in the hands of certain old men, who were probably the oldest male members of the mother's clan or family. The work of the men was war, the ball-game, hunting, the performance of ceremonials, the cutting of firewood, fishing, cultivating the communal cornfields, at least part of the dressing of skins, felling trees, making bows and arrows, mattocks, and paddles, building houses, and taking care of the tribal lore and legends. The women carried in the wood which had been cut, brought in the game and cooked it, had entire charge of the house, made pots, baskets, garments of skin, mulberry-bark, and feathers, spun the bison and opossum hair, and made mats and numerous other things. Chastity before marriage was not valued, and, indeed, the reverse is said to have been inculcated, but after marriage strict fidelity was demanded of the wife. We do not hear of severe punishment being inflicted on adulterers such as was usual among the Creeks; divorce is said to have been extremely rare.

When a man died, his relatives came to mourn over him for an entire day. Then they arrayed him in his finest garments, painted his face, and ornamented him with feathers. Afterwards they laid him in a grave in the earth, placing by his side his arms, a kettle, and some provisions. For a month his relatives went to the grave morning and evening and wailed there, each mentioning the relationship which existed between himself and the dead man. The nearest relatives continued this for three or four months, and during the same period they had their hair cut or singed off, abstained from painting the body, and absented themselves from all festivities. The funeral rites observed on the death of a member of the ruling Sun caste were very elaborate and imposing (see below, § 7).

5. Games.—In ancient times the most popular game among them was one called by early travellers the 'chunky' game.

Two or more players participated. Each was provided with a pole 15 or 16 ft. long and shaped like a letter F. One of them then took a stone cylinder or roller about 3 ins. in diameter by an inch in thickness, which he rolled along on the ground, and at the same time he and the other players threw their sticks in the same direction, the object being to see whose stick lay nearest when the roller, or 'chunky' stone, came to rest. The 'chunky' game was the great gambling game, and while it was in progress quantities of property changed hands.

On festive, or rather ceremonial, occasions they played a game similar to lacrosse, but it was nearer the form of that game in vogue among the southern Indians generally, viz. the game in which two ball sticks were used. The women played a game with three pieces of cane which were treated like dice, the canes being allowed to fall on the ground and an account kept of those which fell convex side up. The children amused themselves by knocking to and fro a ball made of Spanish moss.

6. War.—War was an institution and was waged largely for social advancement. War parties varied in number from two or three to several hundreds, and participation in war expeditions was entirely voluntary. A war leader invited volunteers by setting up two red poles ornamented with red feathers and reddened arrows and tomahawks. When a sufficient number of warriors had presented themselves, a drink was brewed from the *Ilex cassine*, the 'black drink' of the traders, imbibed in quantities, and again ejected, though du Pratz says that this was preceded by a symbolic feast in which dog meat occupied a conspicuous place. After a speech by an old man and certain other ceremonies, the party marched off into the woods in single file. Some young men acted as scouts, but sentinels were not ordinarily set at night. A shaman accompanied each party, or at least each party of any consequence, and a war bundle was taken along and hung in their midst every night from a red pole pointing towards the land of the enemy. They attacked by stealth, killing the adult men and carrying off the women and children. Adult males were also captured, if possible, and reserved for torture by fire in a square frame made of poles, but not at a stake. If a Natchez woman who had lost her husband took a fancy to one of these devoted captives, however, she could claim him in the place of her former spouse. After striking a blow the Natchez warriors scattered about the place small tablets of wood marked with designs indicating their tribe, their war leader, and some other facts. The scalps of those who had been killed were carried home and preserved along with the scalps torn from those taken alive and devoted to death. Each war party was accompanied by a *berdache*, a man who dressed and acted like a woman. This individual cooked their meals for them, and performed other such duties about the camp. Sometimes, when war threatened with a very powerful tribe, the entire nation constructed, or resorted to, a stockade made of trunks of trees standing upright, interwoven with cross-pieces or reinforced by other posts between the first uprights, and having towers at intervals, besides two to protect the gateway made by the overlapping of the sides of the fort.

Peace-making was a formal ceremony, in which a pipe-stem ornamented with white feathers and provided at one end with a stone pipe played an important part. This stem was called a 'calumet' by the French, who were familiar with its use. The war calumet, hung up by a war leader when preparing for an expedition, was provided with red feathers from the flamingo. Treaties of peace sometimes resulted in alliances between small tribes much reduced in war and some large tribe whose effective force was thereby considerably increased.

7. The Sun family system.—When first clearly revealed to us the Natchez tribe consisted of nine

precipitated by the high-handed, overbearing conduct of the French governor of the post, F. Chopart. The uprising took place on 28th Nov. 1729, the post was completely destroyed, and about 250 Frenchmen killed. The next year the Natchez were attacked by the French and Choctaw, who recovered most of the captives, but did very little damage besides. Early in 1731 Governor Perrier of Louisiana attacked the Natchez again in a new fort which they had built on Black River to the west of the Mississippi, and induced about 400 to surrender, whom he sold as slaves in Santo Domingo. A bloody guerrilla war followed, in which one notable success was won by St. Denis, commander of the post of Natchitoches, though it was otherwise rather disastrous for the French. In a few years, however, the Natchez retired to the Chickasaw and Cherokee, and still later those among the Chickasaw went over to the Creeks, where they constituted a separate town for many years. The hands among both Creeks and Cherokee retained their identity and their language until after the southern Indians had been removed to the west of the Mississippi. Even there a nucleus remained for a long time, but to-day the Natchez among the Creeks have been absorbed entirely by the larger tribe. Practically the same fate has befallen those who had cast in their fortunes with the Cherokee, but fortunately three or four still have sufficient command of their language for purposes of record.

2. Mode of life.—In physical type the Natchez differed little apparently from the other southern Indians, though in their personal habits and general bearing they were—if we may trust early writers—at a decided advantage.

The only article of male attire never dispensed with was the breech-clout, made of a dressed deer-skin passed between the legs and tucked under a belt at either end. In colder weather or on dress occasions they added a shirt made of two dressed deer-skins, moccasins, and leggings, the last extending from the thighs, where they were fastened to the belt with thongs, to the moccasins, under the upper edges of which they were inserted. They were held in below the knee by means of garters of bison hair usually ornamented with beads or porcupine quills. Over all in the most severe weather was thrown a bison skin, dressed with the hair on and the hair side turned inwards. The summer dress of the women was a skirt which extended from the waist to the knees. This was originally of deer-hide, of a native fabric woven from the inner bark of the mulberry, or of feathers woven into a netting of bass-bark, an old fish net, or some similar article. In colder weather a kind of mantle of the same material was added, which passed over the left shoulder and under the right arm. Boys wore no clothing at all until they were twelve or thirteen. Girls went naked until eight or ten, when they assumed a garment made of a fringe of mulberry threads fastened to a cord about the waist and extending to the ankles. After contact with the Whites they first made their garments in the old way but out of European goods, and later adopted European clothing without essential modification. The hair of the head was cut or burned off above all the way round the crown, only a single tress being left, which hung over the left ear, and a few hairs for the attachment of feathers. The women allowed their hair to grow long and gathered it up in a netting of mulberry threads into a kind of queue behind with tassels at the end. Both sexes pulled out the hair on all other parts of their bodies. Both also wore necklaces of beads and pearls. The men wore feathers on their heads, deer-bone bracelets round their wrists, and iron, brass, or copper wire in their ears, besides using fans of turkey feathers on dress occasions. Spike-shaped ornaments of shell were worn in their ears by the women, and the men suspended shell plates about their necks. Red paint, made by burning ochre, was liberally employed by both sexes, and also blue, black, and white paints. These paintings were probably in part ceremonial and social as well as ornamental. The women blackened their teeth with tobacco and wood ashes. Men and women had their faces tatued, and the women of the upper classes were

also tatued upon the body, but body tatuing was indulged in most extensively by the warriors, the designs in their case representing noted feats accomplished by them. They were in both black and red. The foreheads of infants were artificially compressed in the cradle.

The houses were either square or round, made of a framework of hickory poles, interlaced with canes which formed a backing for mud walls. Over the latter were hung cane mats, then rows of grass in bundles overlapping, and over all other mats. Around the walls inside were platform beds raised on stakes and covered with cane mats and bison skins. They also had very low chairs or seats cut out of one piece of wood. Mats and baskets of all shapes and sizes, including large carrying baskets, sifters, winnowers, etc., for reducing corn to meal, were made out of cane, or rather out of its outer skin. Some were double-woven, and they had very good red, yellow, and black dyes with which excellent designs were worked, though few specimens have survived to the present time. Earthen vessels of as diverse kinds were also made, probably by the coil method, but they were not so successful in this art as in basketry. The weaving of mulberry-bark thread has been alluded to and also feather work and work with bison hair. Certain nettles, opossum hair, and other substitutes were resorted to. Skins were fastened in frames, the hair was removed, and then they were softened and whitened by rubbing with a flint and with deer brains. Permanence was given to the acquired softness by smoking them over fires of bison dung, rotted wood, and ears of corn. Many of these skins were beautifully painted in a variety of colours, and they were also ornamented with porcupine quills. Some of their knives were probably of flint, but the commonest kind was made by splitting a very hard cane into four pieces. Axes were of deep grey stones of fine grain. With these, in conjunction with fire, they felled trees, and shaped them into canoes, mortars for pounding corn, and other necessities. Rafts made of canes served as temporary ferries.

3. Hunting and agriculture.—The principal animals hunted were the bear, deer, and bison. The first-mentioned was generally sought out in a hollow tree, driven from it by means of fire, and then shot. Although his flesh was eaten to some extent, he was particularly sought on account of his fat, which was melted and poured into skin bags made out of the skins of deer taken off whole. Deer were usually stalked by single hunters, who provided themselves with stuffed deer heads, and are said to have imitated the actions of this animal very cleverly. Sometimes a hundred Indians would go together and secure the deer alive by means of a surround. In historic times bison were not found very near the Natchez country, but the Natchez periodically visited regions where they were plentiful. Usually they attacked them by stealth and in small parties. Turkeys were hunted with dogs. Fish were shot with arrows, lanced, or caught with hook and line. Certain kinds were caught in bass nets as they ascended the Mississippi. Part of the meat which they secured was kept for a certain time by smoking on a scaffold over the fire. The dog was the only domestic animal, and they were exceedingly fond of it, but it was of little practical use.

Meat was of far less economic importance to the Natchez than corn; of this they seem to have had several varieties, most conspicuous being the 'little corn,' a kind of popcorn, and the flour corn. Their sole agricultural implement was a bent hickory stick, or the shoulder-blade of a bison set in a wooden handle. With these primitive mattocks they cleared and weeded their fields, after which

is every reason to believe that it was here that the stone statue was preserved into which the Natchez culture-hero had had himself transformed. Thus it was only natural that the temple should be treated with much the same obeisances and cries as were bestowed upon the Suns. This was done by each person who passed it. The firstfruits of the year were brought to it, and likewise the seed before it was planted. Presents made to the nation were offered here, displayed by the guardians of the temple to the spirits, and then carried to the Great Chief and by him distributed to the nation.

Besides the offerings to the temple, sacrifices of small bits of food were made to the four cardinal points by every Natchez before he would eat. On certain days they painted their faces black and fasted, and fasting was one of the ways by which a man became a shaman, and brought on rain, or accomplished other supernatural feats.

9. **A theocratic State.**—The Natchez State was thus to all intents and purposes a theocracy. The sun or a being associated with the sun was the supreme deity. From it had come the culture-hero who had established the Natchez organization. Of immortal nature, this culture-hero had not actually died, but had transformed himself into a stone statue, and was still present with his people in that form in the innermost recess of the temple. Near him, symbolic of his solar character, burned a perpetual fire, the fire below representing that which burned eternally above. And, finally, the Natchez State was still in the hands of and under the direction of the descendants of this founder, and they, being of divine origin, received homage almost like that of the deity himself.

10. **Shamanism.**—Control over the weather was supposed to be in the possession of certain old men who attempted to affect it by sympathetic magic. Those who claimed to be able to drive away the clouds were distinct from those who professed that they could cause rain, and both again were in most cases distinct from the real doctors, or medicine-men. The latter sometimes prescribed medicines, many of which were also known to the laity, but more often they grappled with the disease by means of fasting, dancing and singing about the sick man, smoking constantly, and making various contortions of the body. The missionary Le Petit says:

'They have a little basket in which they keep what they call their spirits; this is to say, small roots of different kinds, heads of owls, small parcels of hair of fallow deer, some teeth of animals, some small stones or pebbles, and other similar trifles.' Like shamans among all the other southern tribes, they sometimes made cuts over the affected parts with a flint and pretended to suck out the disease, which then presented itself to the beholders as a piece of wood, a straw, a piece of leather, and the like.

11. **Mythology.**—Little of the ancient mythology of the Natchez is preserved, but we are told that they had a flood myth according to which all mankind were once destroyed by water except a very few who saved themselves by fleeing to the top of a mountain. All their fire had been extinguished, therefore the cardinal bird went to heaven and brought some new fire from there.

12. **Eschatology.**—Those Natchez who had lived well and in accordance with the tribal regulations looked forward to life after death in a beautiful country well stocked with game, while those who had not done so were supposed to be proportionally miserable. According to one writer, they believed in metempsychosis, but perhaps his statement was a result of the misunderstanding of some totemic idea.

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JOHN R. SWANTON.

NATIONALITY.—Nationality is that quality or complex of qualities in a group of persons which combines them in a nation. The persons thus combined may have the quality in different degrees. This is shown by the ease with which some, as compared with others, are detached from the national group by the operation of other motives, such as self-interest, common human friendliness, and countervailing attachments of various sorts. This tenacity of the quality as motive may also be distinguished from its liveliness as idea and its fervour as sentiment, and these two, moreover, from one another. Ideality and emotionality mark, and indeed constitute, the self-conscious stage of the development of nationality. The quality of tenacity is grounded rather in the strong personal instincts of attachment and affinity out of which all consciousness of unity between persons grows. Nationality is a fact long before there is any talk of national ideals or national sentiment. But, with the development of the society and the persons concerned in it, this consciousness of unity in the group emerges, as part of growing self-consciousness in the individuals. There dawns the conception of a national self, whose interests more or less are identified with those of the individual self, and more or less ought to be set above them. This national self thus appears from the first as a double object of affection—loved as we love ourselves naturally, and to be loved even more fervently as a matter of duty morally. Thus national sentiment grips human nature by both hands. By the left hand it allies itself to self-interest, personal pride, and all the egoistic train, rejoicing the poor man by the common wealth, exalting the mean man by contemplation of the national glory. By the right hand it swings to higher levels the individual will—to the levels of disinterested affection, self-devotion, cheerful acceptance of social duty as the chief aim of individual life. The sense of nationality differs from person to person, not only in the degree of its tenacity, its ideality, and its emotional fervour, but even more, and more importantly, in respect of the relative strength of the selfish and the moral impulses in it.

These distinctions do not, however, exhaust its variety; nor do they sufficiently explain the host of occasions when it is with fair reason either praised or blamed. Every complex sentiment—or, to speak more precisely, every psychosis involving ideas, instincts, and sentiments—has as many variants as there are possible combinations of its factors in all their varieties and degrees. Variety especially attends the out-put of ideas and their preservation in the development of the psychosis. As the experiences of different national groups, and of different persons in each group, differ, so the type of nationality in the group, and the particular manifestation of it in the person, will differ correspondingly.

towns, two of which had been adopted in the manner just indicated. The remarkable thing about their social organization was the power exercised by a certain family called Suns. This family does not seem to have been large, one early writer stating that there were eleven, another that there were seventeen Suns, but perhaps they referred only to adult males. This family might be called a caste, except that, unlike castes as we know them elsewhere, marriage between the Suns and the common people, instead of being prohibited, was obligatory. The family was perpetuated in the female line, the children of female Suns always being Suns. The royal blood had sufficient power in the male line, however, to preserve a distinction between the children and grandchildren of Suns and the common people, two different grades of nobility having been created for these children and grandchildren. The exogamous nature of this Sun clan suggests that it was really a clan similar to those found among so many primitive peoples, but the French writers upon whom we are dependent mention no other clans as existing in their time, although the late descendants of the Natchez had them. Another reason for exogamy may be found in the fact that the wives and husbands of Suns, when these died, were strangled to accompany them into the future state of existence, while a Sun could on no account be put to death. From among these Suns the Great Sun, or head civil chief, and the Great War Leader were drawn. These men were treated with great respect even by other members of the Sun family, and by the common people they were approached with the most abject servility. They had a right to the property and labour of their subjects, could have as many wives as they chose, and add to or reduce the number at will. Their authority even seems to have extended to the power of life and death over their subjects, but it probably made a great difference who the individual happened to be. This paternalistic system seems to have been reflected also in the various households of the Natchez tribe, in which the oldest uncle had very great authority. Nevertheless the head chief was assisted by a council of old men who had considerable influence, and in the course of Natchez history we find the authority of certain village chiefs endangering that of the real national head. There were evidently many official positions of lesser consequence which we may surmise to have been filled by the other members of the Sun family, and by the two grades of nobles already mentioned. It is important to observe, however, that the last two grades were attainable not merely by birth but by individual prowess or virtue, thus furnishing the necessary medium for the utilization of such talent as strayed into plebeian frames. Such promotion was also bestowed upon parents who strangled a child to accompany one of the Suns to the world of spirits, and upon all those who assisted in strangling the adult victims sacrificed at that time.

The mortuary rites of a Sun, especially of one of the chiefs of the nation, were elaborate, impressive, and gruesome.

Thus on the death of the Tatued-serpent, the Great War Chief of the Natchez, in the year 1725, those in the house uttered loud cries, which were immediately taken up and re-echoed throughout the village, while guns were discharged to inform all the other villages in succession of the sad event. At a signal from the Great Sun water was dashed upon the fire in the house, and an officer, going outside, uttered a howl, which was repeated everywhere as a sign that all the fires were to be extinguished in the same manner. This was done, however, because the Great Sun had decided to die also, and he was persuaded by the Frenchmen present to abandon this resolution. Meanwhile the body of the deceased had been dressed in his finest clothing, and surrounded by his various war honours. Food was offered him at intervals. The wives of the deceased and all the others who were to accompany him into the spirit-world rehearsed

their parts twice a day until the date fixed for the funeral. When that day arrived, the body of the Tatued-serpent was carried outside on a litter, borne round the house several times, and then carried in spirals towards the temple. When this was reached, the victims, who had followed, placed themselves on mats and were immediately strangled to death with cords passed about their necks, the ends being held by one person at each side. The body of the Tatued-serpent was buried inside the temple, his nearest relatives with him or just outside, and those belonging to different villages in the temples there.

8. Religious ideas and practices.—The common religious ideas were like those current among American peoples, and indeed among primitive peoples, generally, such as have been denominated under the general term 'animism' but might perhaps equally well have been called 'anthropomorphism.' Nevertheless, among the Natchez, a peculiar cult had evolved in harmony with the unique social organization of the tribe. Naturally a great deal of this has been lost and much distorted by the chroniclers upon whom we have to depend, but the main outlines are plainly discernible. Above all other deities was one who was particularly present through the sun. According to du Pratz, the native name of this being was Coyocop-chill (*Koyokop shihl*), 'the great spirit,' and under him were a multitude of lesser spirits known as Coyocop-téchou (*koyokop teshu*), 'servant spirits.' The name 'great spirit' at once suggests a possibility of European influence in this conception, but, whether the name was truly aboriginal or not, the conception squares so perfectly with the Natchez social organization that there is little doubt that it is in the main genuine. The founder of the Sun family, according to native myth, had himself come from the sun with his wife, and had, like culture-heroes everywhere, brought civil order out of chaos and established the rites and usages of the Natchez nation as they were to be ever after. He also established the temple, and laid down regulations for its maintenance. From him were descended the family of the Suns, and hence it was that they enjoyed the privileges of the demi-gods which in theory they indeed were. This information is given us by du Pratz, but a letter of the missionary St. Cosme makes a most important addition to it. He writes:

'The chiefs were regarded as spirits descended from a kind of idol which they have in their temple and for which they have a great respect. It is a stone statue inclosed in a wooden box. They say that this is not properly the great spirit, but one of his relatives whom he formerly sent into this place to be the master of the earth; but this chief became so terrible that he made men die merely by his look; that in order to prevent it he had a cabin made for himself into which he entered and had himself changed into a stone statue for fear that his flesh would be corrupted in the earth.'

The temple was an oblong or square building in the head village of the Natchez, separated from the cabin of the Great Sun by an open plaza. The dimensions are given by Charlevoix as 40 by 20 ft., and by du Pratz as 30 ft. each way. The doorway faced east and upon the plaza, and on the roof were three wooden birds looking in the same direction. The southern third of the building was cut off from the rest by an inside partition and evidently contained the most sacred objects connected with Natchez worship. In the middle of the larger room burned a perpetual fire, which the guardians of the temple kept alive, on pain of death, by pushing three hickory logs progressively inwards as they were consumed. The fire smouldered rather than burned. Directly behind this fire was a raised platform about 4 ft. high, upon which the baskets carrying the bones of some of the Suns were laid. Elsewhere were other baskets used for the same purpose, and in addition there are said to have been baskets containing certain 'idols' or fetishes. A few carvings are noted by some travellers, among them one of a rattle-snake. In the inner sanctuary du Pratz could make out only two carved planks, but there

history of the nations. In the development of this ideal consists the second part of the higher patriotism—that part, indeed, which more particularly marks it as patriotism rather than as pure humanitarianism. Under this lead the public spirit of the good citizen—his nationality—makes efforts and sacrifices for a double end: (1) to promote the welfare and virtue of his State by reform of institutions and development of persons within its borders, and (2) to promote the development of the higher nationality by using his influence to make his State internationally beneficent as occasion occurs.

The latter, it should be noted, is an object for the achievement of which a vigilant intelligence is as necessary as a vigorous good-will. Otherwise evil is apt to be done under the pretext of good—a thing which other nations call hypocrisy; it is not the same as individual hypocrisy, since the men who achieve the evil are not generally the same as those who proclaim the good as the national aim. At this stage of prosperous national existence, indeed, when international beneficence emerges more distinctly as an end, a mingling of humility with sharp self-criticism is needed to keep patriotic virtue pure. In dealings with other nations, the haughtiness of professed virtue without sympathy is, of course, the most hateful of national vices. And this leads reflexion to the core of the matter of international morality. Good-fellowship between nations, as between persons, depends only in part on the *intention* to act beneficently. Sympathy and respect for others are of its prime essence. The strong nation intending beneficence, as well as good faith and honour, fails to achieve and perhaps finally ceases to desire that end, if it be deficient in national fellow-feeling.

There is no room for doubt that distinction of nationality is a present political fact of weighty significance to be reckoned with in problems of human intercourse. It is a first duty of the political philosopher, and of the politician as such, to understand this strong motive force in nations. Nor is it less the business of the moralist and teacher to understand its action in the development of personal character, the uses, and more especially the abuses, to which it can be put, according to the ideals under which it is stimulated. A prior question, however, may be raised, as to the ultimate reasonableness of the national sense and its morality in relation to the ideal of universal human brotherhood. Admitting that national sense is a reality to be reckoned with in politics and utilized in ethics, it may still be urged that it ought to be transcended as civilization progresses, and that the higher forces of reason and humanity ought to be enlisted against its further development.

The consideration of this point requires a careful analysis of the ideal which the national sense subserves. What is it in the commonwealth of the world that the nationality of nations makes for? This, whatever it may be, is the ultimate ideal of nationality, though between the national ideas of different nations distinctions appear, according to the development of the ideal in them and according to the idiosyncrasies of race and circumstance which colour its application. These idiosyncrasies pertain in truth to the national type, and so are to be viewed as associated with rather than as qualifying the national ideal.

Human society originates in a multiplicity of communities. Each community is a group of persons united by ties of blood, traditions of common interest, habits of common action, a common language, and, most of all, mutual intelligibility. The members of such a group instinctively hang together, connected by a many-

stranded bond of affections and affinities. The alien appears to them as alien because his interests and habits seem to be different, so that, even apart from difference of language, they feel incapable of imagining what he thinks or would be at. Hence we have the primitive suspicion and the civilized distaste for the typical alien as unintelligible. The persons most free from this bias are those of penetrating sympathetic insight; and, when this fraternizing tendency marks the racial type, aliens are easily absorbed into the group. Errant members, on the other hand, lend themselves to absorption elsewhere in so far as they are apt to make themselves intelligible in the universal human sense. For common human nature is in fact much the largest part of the human nature of the average member of every group.

With the inevitable conflicts that arise between the groups, these higher errant tendencies, as well as others less respectable, provoke a reaction. Desertion to other groups becomes a crime, and the idea of loyalty to the home group as a necessary virtue transforms the group of kindred into a tribe or infant nation. We need not dwell on the use of the chief or king and of the tribal deities in this development. In actual history it is associated for the most part with international struggles in some form. The sense of nationality thus developed is, therefore, at least in its primitive form, a compound of social and anti-social elements. That this primitive character is apt to survive in more settled circumstances when no longer called for we know from our every-day experience of the anti-French, anti-German, anti-Russian, and other destructive elements which intertwine themselves from time to time with British loyalty. That is what may be expected from the origin of the virtue. It has grown, as a matter of fact, from acts of hostility as well as from instincts of faithful affection; and it is only by the further development of its social side together with general humanitarian instinct that it can be purified and preserved. On its positive social side, however, it acts on the primitive as on every society to weld a group of kindred into a band of comrades, resolute to preserve their unity by loyalty to the band. This is political union and the beginning of conscious nationality.

As human life develops, the common consciousness of each nation grows in interest and complexity. Every event in national history, every achievement in national literature, every reform in the national institutions, the customs, traditions, ways of thought, manners, even mannerisms—all contribute to the sense of national unity. The citizen from his youth up learns to love all the dear familiar things that mark the common life, learns also to be proud of and rejoice in them as in some peculiar sense his own. Nor is it by the merit of his country only that he is possessed. The history, the literature, the glory of his nation, the suffering also, even the shame and the crime, affect him as of his inmost life. This is so less or more, no doubt, but his nationality has reached its developed consciousness in so far as it is so. Such a citizen has passed the instinctive stage in which men of common blood, habits, and interests hang together; he has passed also the merely political stage in which they band themselves together of deliberate intent and under pledge of mutual faith. He has reached a further stage, the national stage proper, in which he is conscious of the national type as his, to be guarded, cherished, and developed by him at all costs and as a precious privilege. This stage is marked by concentration of attention on the end which has been subserved indirectly in the earlier stages, i.e. on the development and

Varieties of history and circumstance supply one main clue to the varieties of nationality which characterize different nations. That the national type itself, whether based on racial or historical considerations, affects the variety of this element in it would also seem to admit of no doubt. Nationality can hardly feel quite the same in the lively atmosphere of an imaginative race as in quarters where wits move more slowly and ideas are more rare. Yet there is some risk of error in exaggerating these distinctions. The common characteristics of human nature, as shown by our mutual intelligibility, are great enough to overshadow the effect of these minor varieties in the composition of a property so universal as this.

One distinction stands out, however, as important for discussion here. This is the distinction already made between the moralizing and non-moralizing elements in the psychosis, and so between good, bad, and indifferent kinds of national sentiment. With the development of this distinction history and circumstance have much to do—so much, indeed, that it would almost be true to say that the character of the national sentiment can be inferred from consideration of the national circumstances, past and present. This is only an example of the general psychological truth that average human nature on the whole responds to the claims made upon it, adopts, or at least favours, the ideals set before it, and falls in with the sentiments prevailing in its company. Hence, when the nation is poor, oppressed, or in danger, the call upon the citizens for help, thrilling as it then is with evident reality, evokes a passion of self-sacrifice and devotion: we have nationality at its most picturesque and characteristic—almost at its best—concentrated upon the common resolve that the nation shall live. The elements here are all noble: the individual self of each citizen is strongly asserted, in disregard of the interest of self, for the preservation of the prime social good conceived as national existence. To the consideration of this end as a prime good we shall return presently. Assuming its goodness, we have in the total situation the supremely moral attitude of personal self-devotion for a good social end. Compare the case of a nation prosperous beyond all real need of more wealth, honour, or security. Nationality here has a part to play much less exacting, indeed, however it be played, but much more likely to be played ill. In the absence of any real claim on the citizens for the preservation of the State, national instinct may be dormant for the time. On the other hand, it may easily enough be roused, and, in the absence of high guiding ideals, it may naturally ally itself with its primitive associates, the military anti-foreign instincts. Sacrifices and efforts will then be demanded for the remedying of fancied ills, the strengthening of imaginary weak points, or the further increase of national honour, security, and wealth with their inevitable accompaniment, taken in this sense—the subjugation or humiliation of others. Instead of a defensive we have in the latter case an aggressive nationality; and simultaneously the spirit of self-devotion in the citizens is apt to be largely—not wholly—replaced by the desire of personal gain from the effect of the national operations. Thus the motives lose their purity of personal virtue at the same time that the national end becomes injurious internationally. History rings with the tale of nations to whom the beginning of the end came thus. The prosperous nation is not, however, bereft of good outlets for the national spirit of her citizens. No nation that the world has ever seen has been so prosperous as to need no labour of love within her boundaries for the improvement of the condition of her people. Prosperity has always been accompanied with abundance of

individual poverty; ignorance, ill-health, and vice are always with us; the sum of knowledge is never complete; the national possibilities in art and literature are always unsatisfied; the ideals of the perfect life remain ever unfulfilled. Public spirit is the prime incentive to the fulfilment of these ends. The national sense under good guidance flows easily into such channels. A little reflexion shows that attention to all matters of internal development in a nation's life is of a piece with the patriot's stern defence of her in arms; it is another kind of national self-preservation, the maintenance of the body politic in health, by action of the strong parts upon the weak so that these also may live and serve. This is at once the development of civic virtue in each and the establishment of profound organic unity in the whole.

The spectacle, however, of the prosperous nation spending all its national spirit on the development of its citizens, noble as it is, does not satisfy fully. There is an analogy between the personality of persons and the nationality of nations. A person living alone might live rightly for self, but a very imperfectly developed personality would be the result—a moral and intellectual being starved for lack of its proper sphere of action. Human persons, as we know them, could not have come into existence without human society. So also nations could not have come into existence without contact with each other; the passion of mutual adherence in the members of a nation, *e.g.*, is the counterpart of a capacity for rivalry with, or even passionate hostility to, an opposing group. The nations by their commerce in peace and war have brought each other into active existence. They stand side by side as units distinct, possible foes, possible friends, much as the primitive men do; and, just as the elements of interpersonal virtue are in the latter situation, so are the elements of international virtue in the former. The personality of the man is shown in his dealings with other persons, as courteous or morose, frank or suspicious, just or unjust, false or true. The character of the man is determined in the estimation of his neighbours by these signs. There is much that is analogous to this in the relation of nations. And what analogy suggests direct thinking confirms; for it is certainly the fact (1) that a nation becomes what it is, and thus defines the character of its nationality, partly by action and reaction between it and others, and (2) that it is an object of national desire, in the mind of the patriot who is the organ of such desire, to bear a good character among the nations of the world for justice, faith, and even courtesy.

If so much be admitted, the shallow pretence, sometimes advanced in thoughtless sceptical mood, that nations have no morals, no conscience, falls to the ground. That there is such a thing as national honour will not be denied, nor will any reader of these pages be likely to argue that military honour¹ is the only meaning of the word. National honour is the preservation of national character in the eyes of the nations, and this end can be achieved only by a national existence in accordance with the character to be ascribed. So far, therefore, as the desired character goes, nations have morals and certainly have consciences. How far it goes is, however, another question. The development certainly is not complete throughout the international community.

None the less the ideal of national virtue internationally manifested, as something more than a mere character for courage and treaty-faith, has always had a strong hold on patriotic minds; and sometimes it has played a prominent part in the

¹ This idea corresponds to the dueller's obsolete notion of personal honour, which, however, long co-existed with the true idea of honourable character that finally absorbed it.

NATURALISM.—1. Definition.—The words 'nature' and 'natural' are used in a bewildering variety of senses. Nearly every school of ethics might claim that in some sense it expounded and exalted the maxim, 'Live according to nature.' In particular, this maxim is a convenient enough summary of the ethical theories advanced by Sophists, Stoics, Butler, and Spencer respectively—to mention no others. But in each of those cases the same maxim is very differently understood. So with the adjective 'natural.' To know what it means in the phrase 'a natural law' is no help towards understanding its significance in either 'the natural son' or 'the natural consequence.' 'Be natural' is excellent advice, but by 'the natural man' we may mean with St. Paul the unregenerate. Similarly, 'naturalism' may be used in different senses. The particular meaning varies with what we oppose it to. Another complication is that the 'naturalist' is not necessarily an adherent of naturalism. The former term has now acquired a very specific meaning; it connotes one who pursues a certain branch of study, not one who holds a theory which can be called 'naturalism.' For one who holds by naturalism there is no one-word term in the English language. The word 'naturalism' was fairly often used in the 17th cent. as descriptive of a certain type of theory, but fell into disuse, and within the last quarter of a century has been revived (cf. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, p. 20). We need not mention all the vagaries in its usage. In its revived and modern acceptance it means a certain type of *Weltanschauung* which has had its upholders ever since the first rise of philosophy. It includes all types of theory which rule or try to rule out of consideration whatever is called 'supernatural' or 'spiritual' or transcendent of experience. It attempts to transcend materialism (*q.v.*). It is not easily distinguished from positivism (*q.v.*).

2. Historical survey.—To write the history of naturalism in any detail would be to transcribe many pages from the history of philosophy. Here we shall merely indicate its broad features. Naturalism has always appeared at times when the scientific spirit has awakened. It has always been the outcome of enthusiasm for science. It has always been due to an exaggerated appreciation of science and scientific method, which has been oblivious of the limitations of science and uncritical of its presuppositions.

In ancient Greece the scientific spirit arose in opposition to the popular, naive, mythological, or theological explanations of phenomena. It aimed at giving a reasonable view of the world of nature by discovering and setting forth certain simple and intelligible principles or laws from which the whole complex of phenomena might be deduced. Various philosophers—e.g., the Sophists, Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus—developed a naturalism which was either atheistic and materialistic or ignored all supernatural and spiritual elements. Nature in their view was self-contained and self-explanatory. Postulating only atoms in motion, the philosopher could explain all phenomena. The soul of man was only rarefied matter.

In mediæval times the reign of ecclesiastical authority was so absolute, and interest in natural phenomena so small—the scientific spirit, so far as it was awake, limiting itself almost exclusively to the defining and marshalling in logical order of dogmas—that it can scarcely be said that naturalism found any articulate expression.

Only with the revolt against authority and with the development of re-awakened interest in nature which led to the birth of modern science do we find once more a bold and thoroughgoing naturalism. In the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries naturalism

on the whole was frankly materialistic and in many cases atheistic, though in some instances enthusiasm for nature led to a poetical and emotional pantheism. The naturalistic position of this period may not unfitly be summarized in the words of the famous sentence with which Hume closes his *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*:

'If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.'

The Darwinian theory of evolution gave naturalism a powerful fresh impetus. In conjunction with the nebular hypothesis it seemed to explain fully man and the world in which he finds himself. All phenomena connected with them could be brought under the categories of natural science, tabulated and classified. Yet modern naturalism is in a sense not so intolerant of the 'supernatural' as the older was. The older was dogmatic in its denial of the spiritual and dogmatic in its affirmation of matter as the absolute reality. The modern is in alliance with agnosticism, and studiously calls attention to the fact that it neither affirms nor denies anything 'supernatural'; it is simply not concerned with it. Whether this is a consistent and reasonable attitude is, of course, a debatable point. Again, modern naturalism appears anxious to avoid the charge of materialism, which it professes to transcend. Matter and spirit, it points out, are only abstract conceptions, not substantial realities. We know, and are concerned with, only material phenomena and psychical phenomena.

'The fundamental doctrines of materialism, like those of spiritualism and most other "isms," lie outside the limits of philosophical enquiry. . . . In itself it is of little moment whether we express the phenomena of matter in terms of spirit, or the phenomena of spirit in terms of matter: matter may be regarded as a form of thought, thought may be regarded as a property of matter—each statement has a certain relative truth' (T. H. Huxley, *Collected Essays*, London, 1893-94, i. 162, 164).

The attempt is thus made to make naturalism a neutral monism neither materialistic nor spiritualistic. Whether it is really neutral we must consider below.

3. The doctrines of naturalism.—Naturalism is older than science, as we understand science, but it is not older than the scientific spirit. Throughout its long history its essential character has not varied. Only the rise of modern science made it surer of itself—more complete and imposing as a system. Its aim has always been the laudable one of explaining all phenomena in the simplest, most intelligible fashion, of reducing the complex to simple terms, and of exhibiting all things rising in accordance with some universal principle or law to whatever degree of complexity they may manifest. It sets out to explain everything on the lowest terms, with the fewest possible postulates of agencies required for their production. Its rule is 'Principia non sunt multiplicanda.' This, we may say, is the first characteristic of naturalism—its 'reduction' of the complex to the simple, its 'explanation' of the higher in terms of the lower. It has made an ambitious attempt to carry this out completely, and is persuaded that it has succeeded. Psychological phenomena may be explained in terms of physiology, physiological in terms of chemistry, chemical in terms of physics, the physical all in terms of matter and motion. That is the ultimate basis to which all things may be reduced; all phenomena, no matter what their complexity, are simply phenomena exhibited by matter in motion.

Next, naturalism holds that the complex arises from the simple by a process of evolution. At no stage has any outside, transcendent agency or power been involved. In the whirling atoms of

preservation of human types. These are types of persons and types of societies.

The loyal citizen of the developed kind, possessed by a full sense of nationality, conceives the national type as a kind of person and also as a kind of society of such persons. Many of the real persons and much of the real society he may perceive to be at present quite different. His ideal is likely, indeed, to surpass the reality, as otherwise there would be nothing to do or desire, no progress possible, development at an end, no action called for except that of defence in case of need. No nation has ever yet reached such a stage, although some have stagnated—and most of these have decayed—because they acted as if they had reached it. To our loyal citizen, however, we may ascribe more sense of fact. It will be natural, therefore, that he shall find much fault with persons and institutions as they are. This is inevitable if he is earnest about realizing the national type as the best, and is, at the same time, no blind idealist to substitute imagining of what ought to be for faithful perceiving of what is. The blind idealist is a danger to the national development second only to the contented realist who desires no improvement.

It may be instructive briefly to compare the nationalist and imperialist ideals, treating both as ideals with a view to the end which they imply. Merely nationalistic imperialism, the motives of which are territorial aggrandizement, political supremacy, and monopoly of the world's industrial resources, does not enter into this comparison. The latter is but an extreme development of the crude mediæval nationalism centred in the constant endeavour to get the better of others in the division of material advantage. From time to time the world suffers an outburst of this crude spirit in some strong nation not come sufficiently to consciousness of the higher nationality. To other nations it is a menace: they are thrown back on their instincts of material defence, internal progress everywhere being retarded for the time. The imperialist ideal is not, however, this tearing national selfishness, though it may be invoked to make the latter seem more humane.

A great nation, like Britain, France, or Germany, conscious of its own national type as good, may well give rise within its borders to the idea of benefiting the world by imposing that type on all whom it can reach. In a sense and up to a certain point, great nations do this in respect of alien immigrants who become naturalized within them, though, if these be numerous, homogeneous, and of marked racial type, it may become an anxious question whether the cherished national type may not itself be modified by them. The United States offer on the whole the most striking example of successful absorption of strangers on a large scale.

It is another matter when an attempt is made to impose the national ideal on other peoples from without. The Roman empire, with its genuine extension of Roman citizenship to the provincials, is an example of success in this attempt. Yet in the end it was a double failure. The Roman type was in the long run blurred, though an ample heritage, no doubt, of ideas and institutions remained. The native development of the nations that became provinces was arrested and their self-reliance for the time being destroyed. So they too went down before the fresh barbarian, and their type also suffered eclipse. Thus the world lost what it might have had—a Latin Italy and a Celtic Gaul.

Let us view the matter, however, from the modern standpoint. The attempt could not, of course, be made with respect to another nation

existing as such, except in the absence of any regard to the other nation's national sentiment as a political and moral force. It would not be possible for any of the great nations to absorb a small European nation on any credible pretext except that of national self-interest. The world as it is now, therefore, can only for the most part supply material so diverse racially from that of the great nations that subjugation in some form—not absorption by real development—is the only possible result. A few apparent exceptions, mostly rather far-fetched, suggest themselves, the most striking being that of the S. American Republics, all or any of which might conceivably be merged in the United States. But it is obvious that this result, whether achieved by consent or by force, could be maintained only by self-government on the plan of the United States; and under self-government the S. American would not become N. American at all: the difference of type would remain, whatever might be said in favour of such a powerful political alliance otherwise. The case of the British and the Boers is a real case, and of great real interest, though the scale is small. Will the Boers take on the British type and identify themselves in course of time with the British nation? Or will they, on the contrary, absorb the British colonial who really does settle, and develop an Afrikaner national ideal under the British flag? The nearness of race and fundamental identity of religion facilitate equally both results. The causes of divergence are historical, and self-government neutralizes their effect.

It should be noted that identity of flag by no means argues unity of nation. The most serviceable idea of an empire would seem to be that of a group of self-governing States under one central government for a small number of purposes, primarily that of defence and treaty-making. The degree of self-government may be greater or less, and, even without political independence, nationality in the higher sense remains unshaken so long as the members of the group feel that they are a separate nation and work to maintain and develop their own national type. The dual State of Austria-Hungary furnishes a striking historical instance. The four nations of Great Britain and Ireland also defy all attempts to ignore their individuality; each in its own way asserts its own distinctive traits, of language, history, literature, and personality; each claims more or less successfully some separateness of treatment relative to difference of ideals and needs; each demands its own birthright of being and becoming what it is and believes it is meant to be. But the greatest and most noted example is the British empire as a whole, constituted as a union of self-governing States scattered round the world.

The case of the Jews is unique and should be mentioned apart. It is that of a nation strong, capable, strictly cohesive, with no political aspirations, relying exclusively on the bonds of race, history, literature, and religious customs.

LITERATURE.—The theory of the subject is treated briefly in J. S. Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, London, 1861, ch. xvi.; H. S. Maine, *Lectures on the Early Hist. of Institutions*, do. 1875, ch. iii.; E. Renan, 'What is a Nation?', in *The Poetry of the Celtic Races and other Studies*, Eng. tr., do. 1896; W. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, do. 1887, chs. II. and III. For concrete illustration reference may be made to G. Mazzini, *Life and Writings*, new ed., London, 1890-91, esp. I. (see 'Unity of Italy,' pp. 267-309), III. (see pp. 1-40), v. (see 'Royalty and Republicanism in Italy,' and 'The Holy Alliances of the Peoples'), also *Essays*, Camelot Series, London, n.d. (essays I. and II. deserve notice). Still more immersed in the concrete is the interest which attaches to T. Davis, *Essays*, Dundalk, 1914, and to Mrs. J. R. Green, *Irish Nationality* (Home University Library), London, 1911. More recent books are R. B. Haldane, *Higher Nationality*, London, 1913; E. Zepallos, *La Nationalité*, do. 1914; A. J. Toynbee, *Nationality and the War*, London and Toronto, 1915, *The New Europe*, do. 1915.

SOPHIE BRYANT.

First let us ask, Is naturalism really the neutral monism that it professes to be? Does it in any real sense transcend materialism? In the essay 'On the Physical Basis of Life,' from which we quoted above, Huxley says (*Collected Essays*, i. 159, 164):

'Any one who is acquainted with the history of science will admit that its progress has, in all ages, meant, and now more than ever means, the extension of the province of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant banishment from all regions of human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity. . . . As surely as every future grows out of past and present, so will the physiology of the future gradually extend the realm of matter and law until it is co-extensive with knowledge, with feeling, and with action. . . . There can be little doubt, that the further science advances, the more extensively and consistently will all the phenomena of Nature be represented by materialistic formulæ and symbols.'

It is not obvious in what way a materialist would desire to modify this statement. He might conceivably say that that was exactly what he meant by materialism. The fact seems to be that, while the name 'materialism' is repudiated, and some theories of the older materialists are discarded, just as some old hypotheses of natural science have been discarded, naturalism as a *Weltanschauung* is in no essential way distinguishable from materialism.

The most important points, however, to which attention must be directed are: (1) the view which naturalism takes of consciousness and will; (2) its denial of, or refusal to consider, teleology; (3) the rejection of metaphysics.

(1) As we have seen, naturalism regards consciousness as epiphenomenal and the freedom of the will as a delusion. All our knowledge is of phenomena, and over the course of phenomena the spirit can exercise no control. It is not difficult to see that, if we carry this out strictly, we land in absurdity. If the theory is to be consistent or mean anything, it must hold that all the sequence of physical processes can be explained from itself. Everything is the necessary, inevitable result of the physical phenomena that preceded. Shakespeare's dramas, theories of naturalism, and their refutation are all simply the necessary outcome of the world-process, and as phenomena can be explained, with all the explanation about which we need to inquire, without assigning any real effective rôle to consciousness (cf. Otto, p. 346 f.).

'We know only phenomena'; but what is meant by a phenomenon? It is a question of the utmost importance, and it is safe to say that naturalism pays little, if any, heed to it. It takes for granted the uncritical 'realism' of 'the plain man,' according to which in sense-perception (which is the foundation of all knowledge of nature) we have mirrored in the mind an image exactly corresponding to a real object external to us. Naturalism takes an external world for granted, and the phenomena in which it is most interested are the objects and the happenings in this external world, of which knowledge is gained in sense-perception. It forgets the simple truth that, strictly speaking, we can know nothing but facts of consciousness; that an external world is an inference, the truth of which cannot be 'scientifically' proved; that sense-perception is not a simple ultimate thing, and that what we perceive is certainly not what science shows to be the physical phenomenon which results in perception, but an interpretation of, or an inference from, it. We perceive, e.g., a tree, but the physical phenomena which precede are (a) ether waves striking the retina, (b) nerve-vibrations. It turns out, then, that what we are really in immediate relationship with is not 'phenomena,' but what naturalism regards as secondary and almost negligible, 'epiphenomena.' After all, consciousness must be allowed a very real importance, for the only world of nature that we can

examine is the world as it exists in consciousness. That is the only world that we know, and the statement that all things would be what they are, were there no consciousness, is manifest nonsense.

Once again, let us consider science. Its greatest glory admittedly lies in its marvellous generalizations, its far-reaching inductions. If science is to confine itself strictly to the study of phenomena, what justification can be found for any of its laws and inductions? What right has it to make a statement about 'all bodies' until it has examined all? None, save what can be provided by 'epiphenomenal' reason.

Nor must it be forgotten that science deals in abstractions and ideals. Each particular science deals only with one aspect of phenomena; no one science nor all the sciences together can exhaust all the concrete fullness of any object that they investigate. Even the sciences that are almost purely descriptive describe an ideal which includes all that the members of the class have in common, but leaves out points in which particular individuals of the class may differ. It describes, e.g., the lion, but to the description no particular lion may in all respects conform, so that all that may be said of it is included in the description. The lion described by zoology is, in fact, an abstraction, an ideal. But abstractions and ideals belong to the 'epiphenomenal.' Hence from many points of view we perceive the vast and primary importance of the despised 'spiritual.'

With regard now to the autonomy of spirit, it may suffice to say, we have seen that facts of consciousness are the fundamental realities with which we have to deal, and every one will admit that it is a fact of his consciousness that at his will he can produce changes on phenomena—that he has a real power of self-determination, and that only so can moral distinctions have any meaning.

(2) Naturalism denies or at least ignores teleology. It limits itself to the search for causes; it takes no account of reasons. If it did not insinuate that there are no reasons and that to ask what is the purpose, the meaning, of phenomena is foolish and altogether unnecessary, we should have no quarrel with it on that account. But its view is that a phenomenon is completely explained when we have analyzed it into its component parts, reduced it to its simplest terms, and shown how it came to be what it is. Now, when we have analyzed a thing into its components and shown how they came together, we have not really 'explained' it at all. We have explained its make; we have not explained itself. We have described it—nothing more. Except in pure mathematics a whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and the wholeness of the whole is not explained by enumerating its parts. It is evident that there are many phenomena which are in any sense 'explained' only from a teleological point of view, and that in their case the question, What is it for? or, Why is it as it is? is of more interest and value for its explanation than the query, How was it produced? or, How did it come to be what we find it? The only satisfying explanation of a piece of machinery is an account of what it is for—what it is meant to do. In comparison with that, the question, What is it made of? or, How was it made? is of secondary importance. So with human actions generally. We may surely ask, Why did he do it? as legitimately as, How did he do it? That within a certain range final causes are operative is fact of consciousness. Naturalism has no right to forbid the inquiry as to whether they are operative everywhere, and must form an important part of the explanation of the world-process. We are not concerned here to show that nature exhibits purposiveness. Our business is only to vindicate the

the primal fire-mist lay all the promise and potency of the development that was to come, alike the light of setting suns and the thoughts that should find it glorious. The whole development and differentiation of the simple into the complex came 'of itself.' Any stage of world-development arises exclusively from, and is conditioned by nothing except, the stage that immediately precedes it. Any phenomenon is fully explained when what preceded it has been discovered. This scientific 'cause' is the only kind of cause with which naturalism will have anything to do. Everything comes necessarily out of what goes before it. Because of what precedes, it is what it is, and could not be anything else. There are no final causes. It is our sole concern to discover the causes of things, not their *reasons*. Thus naturalism takes a strictly mechanical view of the world of nature. But what of consciousness and self-consciousness? What of will, choice, and moral judgment? In the whole range of phenomena these occupy but a small part, but it is the most important part of all. In these questions we have the real storm-centre of the naturalistic position, and the point that calls for closest attention. Naturalism is usually willing to admit that it cannot bridge the gulf between the physical and the psychical, that in spite of its best efforts at explanation something of a riddle remains. But its faith in the primacy of the physical remains unshaken; it is inclined to hint that, if only our knowledge were more perfect than it is, we should see that no gulf existed, that the continuity of all phenomena whatsoever was unbroken. In the present imperfect state of our science, naturalism lays great weight on the theory of *psycho-physical parallelism*. Every psychosis has its neurosis. Every psychical phenomenon has its counterpart in some corporeal process. To maintain its view that every physical change is sufficiently accounted for by the physical state that preceded, naturalism concludes that the psychical is but an epiphenomenon with no real determining influence upon the physical. As the shadow reproduces the changes of the real object, so is the psychic process a shadow of the physical. The more psychology is 'associationist' and 'sensationalist,' the better can the strict correspondence of psychical and physical, and the dependence of the former on the latter, be exhibited. To identify the two classes of phenomena is not possible; hence naturalism must conclude that it is simplest to assume some unknown unity connecting the two. Both are aspects of one and the same fact. But vital and psychical are secondary. They are determined by cosmical mechanism; it is not affected by them.

'The spiritual becomes the "epiphenomenal," a merely incidental phosphorescence, so to say, that regularly accompanies physical processes of a certain type and complexity' (J. Ward, art. 'Naturalism,' *EBR* xxxv. 88).

It follows that there is no such thing as the autonomy of spirit, no freedom of the will, no spontaneity to be attributed to reason. Reason in some obscure way is the product of Nature. Nature has somehow come to self-consciousness in man. In the mind of man Nature has polished for herself a mirror in which her phenomena are reflected, and she is busy improving her mirror so that a clearer reflexion is gradually being attained (cf. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. 22). The adherent of naturalism, indeed, cannot deny some activity to reason, but its activity is narrowly circumscribed. Its great function is to receive sense-impressions; thereafter it may be as active as it can, in associating and comparing them, though even in associating them it is bound by laws which can be perceived to have the same rigour and constancy as any natural law.

According to naturalism, 'man is essentially a sensitive subject, though able to reason about his sensations—that is, to associate, compound, and compare them. He is supposed to be built up of sense-perceptions associated with feelings of pleasure and pain. Recipient of external impressions which persist in idea and are accompanied by pleasure or pain on his part, and thus followed by other ideas and impressions, man's mental constitution is explained without attributing to reason any spontaneous or productive function' (Sorley, *Ethics of Naturalism*, p. 161.).

Hence naturalism adopts with enthusiasm the positivist view. All our knowledge is of phenomena; we have no concern with anything but phenomena, and they are to be investigated according to the methods which science has perfected. Apart from the natural sciences we have no knowledge in the real sense. If they were only so advanced as to be able to give us a perfect view of all the phenomena of nature and all their interrelations at any moment, in their light we could forecast accurately the whole future world-development. To a being provided with a perfect science the hairs of all heads would be numbered, and not a sparrow could fall to the ground without his knowledge (see E. du Bois-Reymond, *Ueber die Grenzen des Naturerkennens*, Leipzig, 1884, p. 6, quoted with similar statements in Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. 41). Metaphysical inquiries as to entities such as 'matter,' 'spirit,' and 'God' are all needless and profitless. All that is usually known as philosophy is to be discarded.

'Philosophy itself, in all its highest speculations, is but a more or less ingenious playing upon words. From Thales to Hegel, verbal distinctions have always formed the ground of Philosophy, and must ever do so as long as we attempt to penetrate the essence of things' (G. H. Lewes, *Hist. of Philosophy*², London, 1867, ii. 547).

The true philosophy has at last been discovered. It is science.

'A new era has dawned. For the first time in history an Explanation of the world, society, and man, is presented which is thoroughly homogeneous, and at the same time thoroughly in accordance with accurate knowledge: having the reach of an all-embracing System, it condenses human knowledge into a Doctrine, and co-ordinates all the methods by which that knowledge has been reached, and will in future be extended. . . . Its basis is Science. . . . Its superstructure is the hierarchy of the sciences—i.e. that distribution and co-ordination of general truths which transform the scattered and independent sciences into an organic whole wherein each part depends on all that precede, and determines all that succeed' (*ib.* ii. 590).

4. Criticism.—The primary *motif* of naturalism is altogether praiseworthy. It vindicates the rights of reason to inquire into phenomena and search for an explanation of them. It reprobates a lazy 'supernaturalism' which lays fetters on the spirit of inquiry, and declines the drudgery of trying to understand the world in which man finds himself by saying, 'All things are as they are by the will of God, whose ways are past finding out.' Yet in its fully developed form naturalism results in the denial to reason of its rights, and imprisons man in a dreary enough fatalism. It is all the more difficult to criticize naturalism because many of its exponents, and these the most popular, do not adhere consistently to a scientific precision of language in setting forth their views. They often seem to bring back with one hand what they have put away with the other. In speaking of 'nature,' e.g., they sometimes represent it quite anthropomorphically (cf. Otto, *Naturalism and Religion*, p. 24 ff.). It is to be wished that they who would reduce all things to mechanics would adopt uniformly a machine-like precision of expression, avoiding poetical imagery which, if interpreted literally, would confute naturalism, and, whichever way taken, is apt to be misleading.

We cannot here criticize naturalism in the fullness of detail required to confute it. We must refer the reader to such books as Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Otto's *Naturalism and Religion*, and the numerous answers to Haeckel's works. We must be satisfied with indicating the main points in which naturalism is vulnerable.

than exactly determined, it is a question whether some deviations from the mean of precise measurements would not, on such a supposition, be wider than they actually are, so that Nature's lack of success in her attempts at exactitude would reveal itself.

It has been pointed out that the higher, i.e. the more general and abstract, and quantitative laws of science presuppose theories, and that the introduction of symbolic elements is essential for the application of mathematics to physics. It may be further remarked that laws and general theories are alike presupposed in all quantitative measurement—or at least whenever measurement of time (the conceptual absolute time of physics) is concerned.

2. The derivation of physical laws; the validity of the belief in universal law.—With respect to the way in which we come to know laws, it will be obvious that they are not among the data of science or on the same level as observed facts. This is not so plain in the case of the cruder, the purely empirical and approximate, laws, as in that of the higher, the quantitative, and more abstract. But in neither case is the law perceived like a phenomenon; what are observed are not laws but 'cases.' Laws do not state facts; they state relations, or at least standards or types to which facts have been found to approximate. On the other hand, scientific or physical laws, in that they always refer to the actual or sensible world, are not *a priori* or self-evident, like the laws of thought. Pure thought is characterized by logical necessity, and deals with universals; facts are particular and contingent. Yet in the ideal of science, as conceived, e.g., by Kant, we have the fusion of the actual and the necessary, the particular and the universal. If Kant's own theory of knowledge be rejected, this ideal is not attained; we have, in actual science, no fusion of the empirical and the rational, but only juxtaposition. If there be science of the ideal type, as Kant too hastily assumed there is, then it is true that there must be epistemologically necessary presuppositions of such science; in other words, if phenomena are wholly calculable, the processes of Nature and the course of thought must alike be conditioned by necessary connexion. Only the determined is completely knowable. Innumerable instances of particular and approximate uniformities naturally engender, or psychologically cause, the belief in a universal reign of law extending to the unknown as well as to the observed; but the psychological cause of a belief is one thing, its epistemological validity quite another. Law, in this wider sense, possesses, as we have seen, no demonstrability, no assured epistemological validity. Such a reign of law cannot be proved empirically, because experience can never furnish universal knowledge; nor deductively, because there is no self-evident or *a priori* general truth from which it can be deduced. It is therefore a postulate—a necessary presupposition, indeed—of ideal science; but in actual knowledge of Nature its validity is entirely dependent on, and co-extensive with, the observed applicability of law to the behaviour of phenomena. Similarly, every particular law, being neither a perceived entity nor a proposition deducible *a priori*, possesses necessarily no further validity than it has been actually observed to possess. In any more extended sense it is but a postulate. Indeed, every physical law of the higher type—such as Newton's law of gravitation—including conceptual symbolism as well as reference to concrete phenomena, originates as a hypothesis. Few laws of Nature would be discovered by Bacon's method of disinterestedly collecting all the facts and then eliciting their significant relations; and

none at all would be discovered if experience were wholly passive, or knowledge wholly the result of mechanical association. The fruitful symbol and the useful hypothesis are not found ready to hand, or given with the phenomena observed, but are invented—Newton's 'Hypotheses non fingo' notwithstanding—and such invention, like all work of creative genius, is intuitive rather than ratiocinative. The progress of science from empirical facts to laws, principles, and theories is by a struggle for existence between hypotheses, and survival of the fittest of them. Many perish for the one which survives, even though scientific hypotheses are perhaps never random guesses, and generally are shrewd conjectures based on clues, and, as such, are likely to emanate only from minds scientifically informed and trained. The law, then, is the successful hypothesis—the hypothesis, which, together with its deduced consequences, fits the facts or is 'verified.'

Laws, like the conception of universal law, will thus originate in the active selective mind of man. And so it is sometimes represented that laws of Nature are created, not discovered, and that there is more truth in saying that man gives laws to Nature than in saying that Nature prescribes laws to man (see K. Pearson, *The Grammar of Science*³, London, 1911, i. 86 f.). This would seem to be an exaggeration, for 'creation' implies too much. The particular form in which a law is expressed is certainly a human creation, and the creation or discovery—whichever it be—of a law is due to the inventive and selective activity of the human mind. But it is also true that, unless Nature were characterized by such and such constant relations, and her phenomena were connected in a certain way entirely independently of whether humanity is cognizant of her regularity or not, it would not be possible to fashion laws having scientific value. We cannot dictate any laws to Nature, with impunity, unless they already be her laws, i.e. unless Nature be *gesetzmässig*. Hence the laws of Nature are not adequately described as creations, though their verbal expression and their symbolical associativeness are such.

If the mind be the lawgiver, 'it gives nature no other laws than such as nature would follow under the conditions it fixes, and does actually follow, so far as these conditions are realised, or are established for the sake of experiment' (A. Rehl, *Intro. to the Theory of Science and Metaphysics*, Eng. tr., London, 1894, p. 236).

It would seem better, then, to speak of physical laws as 'discovered' rather than as 'created.'

Laws are nowadays regarded by men of science as formulæ merely expressing observed results, as characterized neither by universality (applicability to the unobserved) nor by necessity; they are often said to be descriptions, not prescriptions or enactments; they are not entities 'binding Nature fast in fate,' but provisional generalizations which may be modified or superseded (in many cases, at least) in the light of further knowledge. Of 'laws that never shall be broken' actual science knows nothing; a broken law would be but a false or incomplete description. Thus, J. Dewar, in an address to the British Association, 1902, said:

'It is only the poverty of language and the necessity for compendious expression that oblige the man of science to resort to metaphor and to speak of the laws of Nature. In reality he does not pretend to formulate any laws for Nature, since to do so would be to assume a knowledge of the inscrutable cause from which alone such laws could emanate.'

At the same time, few men of science would regard the significance of a physical law as exhausted in its capacity briefly to summarize past observations. Laws certainly imply also the belief that their application extends to unobserved cases—e.g., the future. They thus express probabilities, and have been compared to guide-posts, which tell us what to expect as a result of certain experiences.

legitimacy and importance of such an inquiry. Naturalism may confine itself to a mere description of the course of nature if it chooses. We insist that it shall be left open to others, if they choose, to try to satisfy the human craving for no mere description, but explanation. And for explanation the teleological point of view is indispensable.

(3) As to the rejection of metaphysics and the proposed shelving of philosophy in favour of science, we must refer the reader to the art. POSITIVISM. Suffice it here to say that science suggests questions of perennial interest and great importance which it itself has no means of answering, and that the idea that science is the true philosophy is entirely unscientific, inasmuch as, while there are many particular sciences, there is no such thing as a science which might co-ordinate them so as to produce that superstructure described by Lewes (see above).

LITERATURE. — J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, London, 1899; R. Otto, *Naturalism and Religion*, Eng. tr., do. 1907; W. R. Sorley, *On the Ethics of Naturalism*, Edinburgh, 1885; A. J. Balfour, *The Foundations of Belief*³, London, 1901, *Theism and Humanism*, do. 1916; R. Eucken, *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*², Eng. tr., do. 1912; H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Eng. tr., do. 1911. W. D. NIVEN.

NATURAL LAW.—I. Different kinds of scientific laws, and their nature.—The term 'law' is used in the natural sciences to denote propositions of very various degrees of generality and abstractness. The simplest, or crudest, type of law is the statement of approximate uniformities of co-existence or of sequence observed to obtain between phenomena of much the same degree of concreteness and of conceptual elaboration as those which form the objects of unscientific knowledge. Laws of this type which refer to uniformities of co-existence are but expressions of the elements common to a class of phenomena which are at the same time more or less similar and more or less various. 'A law is nothing more than a docket into which we collect phenomena which have something in common' (A. Hill, *Introd. to Science*, London, 1900, p. 15); it states that the character which such phenomena have in common belongs to them all. Such laws express the results of comparison and elementary classification. Those of the same type which refer to uniformities of sequence are also formulæ in which multitudinous phenomena are stripped of their variety, and are reduced to unity, or more or less to identity; but they originate from generalizations of facts among which succession and connexion in time are an important consideration. Observation establishes, for instance, that this and that metal plate, when beaten with this or that rod, grows warm; and, when these particular facts are generalized into 'Concussion produces heat,' we have a simple, approximate or inexact, empirical law, which is but a general concept embracing similarly recurring processes, comparable with the class-concept, such as that of 'mammal.' 'Laws of Nature are nothing but generic concepts for the changes of Nature' (H. von Helmholtz, *Physiol. Optik*, Leipzig, 1866-67, p. 454).

The establishment of such laws as these, however, which are all of the form 'So far as we have observed, A is related to B,' marks but the earliest stage of a science. As science develops, the directly observed phenomenon, or the 'brute fact,' is itself resolved into co-existences and successions; and so the relations expressed by the 'brute law' are transformed into more complex relations between simpler phenomena. If laws of the first

type are rough inductions, purely empirical and contingent, they are often afterwards shown to be deducible, as particular cases, from more general or higher laws. As science proceeds towards its goal, the 'Nature' with which it deals becomes more and more abstract, because it is further conceptually elaborated; and the results of this procedure are visible in the higher laws with which science, at its middle stage, is mostly concerned. Thus Boyle's or Mariotte's law, that the volume of a gas at constant temperature varies inversely as the pressure upon it, introduces the notions of pressure, temperature, and mass, which are not matters of direct sense-experience in any empirical observation of the behaviour of gases. These are rather symbols, and the application of them to concrete phenomena presupposes the adoption of scientific theories. Moreover, it cannot be said of symbols that they are 'true' or 'false'; they can only be more or less suitable or convenient for a given purpose. Symbolism, in fact, as well as induction, enters into the higher laws of science. Thus Newton's law of gravitation not only presupposes more elaborate classification and generalization than does any law of the simpler kind described above; it differs further in being more conceptual, in introducing the idea of mutual acceleration, which is of the nature of a symbol, and in inventively associating this idea with the concrete phenomena; instead of being a mere induction from Kepler's laws, it is rather a symbolization of them, involving the confident adoption of the laws and hypotheses of dynamics.

H. Poincaré (*La Valeur de la science*², Paris, 1909, p. 238 ff.) maintains that empirical laws can often be resolved into two components: (1) a definition or convention, neither true nor false, but convenient, which can never be verified or refuted by experience, and (2) an empirical law rendering the prediction of brute facts possible. The latter component is always capable of revision in the light of further discoveries, and the former is erected into a 'principle,' which is of merely economic value. The symbolic, or descriptive and conceptual, element thus introduced into the higher laws of science is generally too simple for the complete representation of actuality; hence it is frequently found that there are circumstances in which laws do not hold. Symbols used by science are, indeed, sometimes avowedly fictitious, and laws are in some cases rendered applicable to phenomena only when quite unverifiable assumptions are adopted. Laws of a very high degree of generality, such as the principle of the parallelogram of forces, are sometimes asserted by high authorities not to be geometrically derivable, but to be based on an appeal to experience; but, of course, verifiability in experience can never be more than approximate. To pass from such inevitable approximations to absolute exactness involves the invocation of a principle—the simplicity of Nature—which, again, cannot be derived experimentally, but must be assumed for convenience's sake.

The approximateness of every experimental law has, indeed, been pressed by some physicists, especially of the French school, into a proof of their provisional, arbitrary, and conventional nature. So far as experimental observation, with its limitations of accuracy, goes, we rather establish an indefinite number of quantitative laws, all slightly different; and it is urged that the selection of one among these—the simplest—is a mere artifice. But too much can easily be made of this approximateness of observation. Certainly it affords no proof of the inexactness, but only room for theoretic doubt, at best, of the exactness, of quantitative laws; and, on the other hand, if Nature herself were always 'tending towards accuracy' rather

¹ See also the short introduction under the title Law (Natural), with the special application to psychology, sociology, economics, and history.

law. As only that which conforms to law, or is characterized by uniformity and determination, can be completely known in the scientific sense, and predicted or calculated, law is a condition of the existence of science. Laws are sought, then, with a view to making Nature scientifically intelligible, and therefore are instruments for the satisfaction of human interests, and especially of the need to act. Intelligibility, from the point of view of science—though not necessarily from that of philosophy, which takes a wider outlook—involves calculability; and this in turn involves the elimination of quality, and its replacement by the quantitative. The world has to be mutilated and simplified, as we have seen, before science can deal quantitatively with it, and the formulation of laws is a means to this end.

Physicists of the positivist and nominalist schools are inclined to see the sole function of law in economical or brief summarizing of past experience:

'To save the labour of instruction and of acquisition, concise, abridged description is sought. This is really all that natural laws are' (Mach, p. 193).

According to this view, laws are conceptual descriptions of how things change, resums of the routine of perceptions; and the necessity which we associate with the conception of law is said to lie in the world of conceptions (*e.g.*, in the theory of mechanics), and to be illogically transferred to the world of perception. The theory of knowledge of which this view (maintained, *e.g.*, by Pearson in *The Grammar of Science*) is the outcome, is based upon a confounding of the two distinct senses borne by the term 'sensation,' viz. (1) the object apprehended by sense, and (2) the process or act of conscious apprehension; and it seems to many to be committed to idealism of the solipsistic type, through failing to recognize the important distinction between individual or private experience and

the universal experience due to intersubjective intercourse.

On the other hand, it is maintained in some quarters that laws are explanations of the world rather than merely symbolical descriptions of experience.

'Physico-mechanical laws are, as it were, the telescope of our spiritual eye, which can penetrate into the deepest night of time, past and to come' (von Helmholtz, *Pop. Lectures on Scientific Subjects*, Eng. tr., London, 1893, i. 168).

Laws analyze phenomena into their real elements, are universals (if hypothetical), and claim universal validity. As a quality is an irrational surd, and as change is deemed inexplicable save as change of motion, laws aim at the establishment of purely quantitative relations; and the causal law, as used in science, approximates inevitably towards a statement of identity, expressed in equations. This view seems to mistake the abstraction for the noumenal reality, and, in aiming at a realistic account of what goes on behind phenomenal appearance, to overreach itself and to leave us with a purely kinematic, and therefore a purely conceptual, world. Perhaps the failure of both these extreme types of doctrine as to the nature of law and of science in general indicates that 'law' is not an ultimate category, that the cosmos is not capable of being adequately or comprehensively described or explained in terms of law, and that law itself has a teleological implication as well as a teleological origin.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works referred to in the art. the following may be consulted: E. Meyerson, *Identité et réalité*, Paris, 1912; A. Rey, *La Théorie de la physique*, do. 1907; P. Duhem, *La Théorie physique: son objet et sa structure*, do. 1906; J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, London, 1903.

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NATURAL RELIGION.—See ENLIGHTENMENT, DEISM, CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS.

NATURAL SELECTION.—See EVOLUTION (Biological).

NATURE.

Primitive (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 201.

American (J. N. B. HEWITT), p. 207.

Babylonian.—See 'Semitic.'

Buddhist (L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN), p. 209.

Celtic.—See CELTS.

Chinese.—See COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY (Chinese).

Christian (T. REES), p. 210.

Egyptian (J. BAIKIE), p. 217.

Greek (L. R. FARNELL), p. 221.

Hebrew and Jewish.—See 'Semitic.'

Hindu (A. S. GEDEN), p. 227.

Japanese (M. REVON), p. 233.

Lettish, Lithuanian, and Old Prussian (E.

WELSFORD), p. 240.

Muhammadan (D. S. MARGOLIOUTH), p. 242.

Persian (E. LEHMANN), p. 244.

Roman (W. S. FOX), p. 244.

Semitic (A. S. CARRIER), p. 249.

Slavic (E. WELSFORD), p. 252.

Teutonic (E. WELSFORD), p. 253.

NATURE (Primitive and Savage).—Whatever opinions may be held regarding the relation of animals to external nature, there can be no doubt that it has been an object of interest to man since his earliest existence as man. This is seen in the existence of so many myths regarding the phenomena of nature. These are found not only among savages, but in the lore of more civilized men, as well as in the mythologies of the higher religions. Everywhere man sought to know the origin of things, and suggested explanations for all the things which he observed, from the daily course of the sun in the heavens to the markings or colours of beast or bird. Sometimes he personalized the parts or phenomena of nature, *i.e.* regarded them as living beings.¹ He also constantly tended to bring his divine or worshipful beings into relation with nature, whether as makers or creators of things, as the producers of, *e.g.*, rain or thunder,

or as the ultimate destroyers of the world. The whole phenomenon of nature-worship in all its aspects shows again that man felt a strong bond uniting him to nature, which he sought either to strengthen or to loosen, according as he considered nature or the powers behind it friendly or hostile to him. The conditions of modern life are so different from those of the savage or of early man that we can with difficulty imagine what nature meant to them. Yet it must be obvious that men living in the closest touch with nature, immediately exposed to its hazards or rigours, directly benefiting by its agencies, and depending upon it without any intermediate agent for shelter and food, must have been quickened by it and stirred by thoughts concerning it, such as are foreign to more sophisticated life. To some extent this is also true of the peasant, with whom much of the earlier attitude persists and much of the older lore remains in spite of other influences at work upon him. The mythologies and the poetry of poly-

¹ This is different from personification (*q.v.*), the idea of a personal being more or less separate from that which he personifies.

Laws state the relations of things, and these relations are generally believed to be constant. The validity of such belief cannot be demonstrated. It would require an *a priori* premiss, and none such is forthcoming. If the principle of uniformity or the principle of induction could be demonstrated, such a premiss would lie to hand; in the absence of demonstration for these principles, universal law remains a postulate to be applied tentatively and to be trusted with safety no further than it has been found to be verified, and every particular law expresses a probability. Some maintain that the greater the number of cases in which the principle of uniformity has been observed to hold, the greater is the probability that it is universally true, and that the probability (in the subjective sense) amounts now to practical certainty; others affirm that, unless uniformity be first presupposed, there is no basis for a theory of probability.

In any case, such necessity as would characterize scientific law in the event of the principle of uniformity being valid would remain contingent. For before law can be universal, or the world completely calculable from its past states, it must be presupposed that the world is a closed system, with no interference from without. Such a negative cannot be proved. Hence the necessity of law would remain hypothetical. A law can never tell us positively what was or will be; it can only tell us what will be, provided certain conditions are fulfilled, while we have no reason to assert that they will be fulfilled.

3. Reign of law in the actual world.—The assumption of universal law, on the strength of such uniformity as we can observe, is the more plausible so long as we agree to regard the actual, concrete, sensible world as identical with the highly abstract and conceptual world to which advanced science refers. This plausibility diminishes, however, when necessary distinctions begin to be drawn between the two worlds just mentioned. If mathematical or quantitative laws seem to 'apply' absolutely to the world of science, this may be due partly to the fact that the world of science has first been clipped to suit the laws. And this would seem to be the case. In the first place, the phenomena with which science deals are not the concrete objects of sense-experience as such, but conceptual constructions; the sun, *e.g.*, is replaced by a perfect sphere or by a point.

The law always contains less than the fact itself, because it does not reproduce the fact as a whole but only that aspect of it which is important for us, the rest being either intentionally or from necessity omitted' (E. Mach, *Popular Scientific Lectures*, Chicago, 1898, p. 193).

So, if actuality 'obeys' law, it is yet more than the law, and the law does not exhaust the truth about it. There is more in the world of experience than can be contained in concepts and laws, historical or irrational elements in knowledge and in being which cannot be expressed in symbolic science; the world is not rationalizable without remainder: 'reality is richer than thought,' as Lotze often remarks. Science is not an adaptation of thought to things, exclusively; it is at least as much an adaptation of things to a particular kind of thought. Science makes suitable assumptions at the beginning of its process of thought; it impoverishes reality in order to get under way at all; it can proceed only by means of highly artificial manipulation of the residue of experience which it retains. Laws are after all our account of Nature's doings or habits, not hers; and in interpreting her exclusively in the light of them we may very easily perpetrate 'the psychologist's fallacy.' If the world, as science has constructed it—and the world of science is undoubtedly a construction—were a realm of law, a closed system, or a 'block universe,' the important

question remains, What is the relation of this geometrical world, wherein all change is change only of configuration and motion, to the actual world of experience? That the scientific schematism applies to it is at least partially true, for experience has hitherto found it to be so. That the actual world is such a schematism, such a mechanism, and no more, is not thereby proved. The whole structure of science, and the means by which it has put together its law-governed, largely conceptual, and symbolic world, show that there is at least room for escape from any such view. And this brings us to the question of the metaphysical and theological interpretation of the fact that Nature seems to be more or less a realm of law.

4. Metaphysical and theological interpretation of the reign of law.—Various views on this question can here be but briefly indicated, without discussion.

Finality cannot be philosophically reached until the problem of our knowledge of the external world is solved. Much depends on whether the realistic or the idealistic theory of perception of physical reality is valid. The issue is also dependent on whether a pluralistic or a theistic view of the world can be established.

Thus, if the primary properties of matter be alone 'real,' and if they are perceived 'diaphanously,' if, further, mind, including logically ordered thought, can be regarded as caused or determined by matter in motion, then it would seem to follow that the world is a mechanism behaving according to necessary relations between its elements, a realm of rigid law, of complete calculability. If, on the other hand, there is no ultimate duality between the subject and object of experience, either apart from the other being a mere abstraction, and if real activity belongs to the subject, then it is easy to construct a spiritualistic world in which conformity of things to law implies the 'greeting of spirit by spirit,' in which possibly there is a God who 'geometrizes,' and which, if there be not such an Intelligence behind it, is intelligent itself. From this point of view, spiritualistic pluralism and theistic monism remain as alternatives. According to the former of these theories, the conformity of Nature to law would be the expression of habit, of behaviour consolidated into routine, on the part of the monads or spiritual units of which the world is composed, and would constitute Nature as *naturata*, in contrast with the new beginnings, or incalculable activities not as yet crystallized into consilient habits—*Natura naturans*. Theism is consistent with such pluralism, save that the plurality would be regarded as not absolute, but as embraced by one supreme Being giving a unity to the whole which the partly clashing interests of the many would not completely achieve. In this case Nature's uniformity would ultimately be the expression of what Leibniz called *coutume de Dieu*, a system of law capable of being altered by Him, a system by Him and for Him. The necessity in law would be rational necessity, not an exhibition of blind fate; laws of Nature would be, as Newton and Berkeley held, thoughts of God. As teleology denotes expression of purpose, a world characterized by such complete determination as is contemplated in ideal science (science as conceived by Kant) would be perfectly consistent with teleology, and a system of law merely a means to the attainment of a divine end.

5. The functions of 'laws' in science.—A few words remain to be said with regard to the purposes which the discovery and use of laws are said to fulfil in the natural sciences.

The conception of natural law is, of course, teleological, and is derived from that of juridical

volcano or earthquake, the scorching sun, the river drowning him, the lightning striking him, the storm destroying him. Others seemed to be watching him—trees must often have suggested this, or a jutting mass of rock, or the surrounding hills.¹ Some made strange noises as if of vague speech—the trees creaked and groaned, the wind sighed or roared in the forest or the mountain-gorge, the river and the waves made various audible sounds. These were more or less the things which man himself did; in these nature was like him. He moved, acted, spoke, and cried; he was sometimes kindly disposed; he could kill and destroy; some men had a strange aspect; some of them towered above their fellows. All this gave a more or less clear idea of the aliveness of nature or of many of its parts, not necessarily to all men directly, but to the more thoughtful of them, and it issued in a crude personalization. Man could regard nature only as in relation with himself, and those parts of it in which he was more immediately interested, or with which he was more directly in contact, would first be assumed to be alive. To the forest-dweller the trees by which he was surrounded would be all-important, or the river which swept through the forest. To the dweller in more open country other objects would be more immediately important—sun and moon, wind, lightning and thunder. Mountains or the sea would appeal more directly to those who dwelt among or near them. The priority of the greater or the lesser powers of nature in appealing to man would entirely depend upon his environment, so that it is impossible to say which of these came first in importance. This is not sufficiently taken into account by those who theorize upon this subject.²

The idea that man, animals, the objects or forces of nature, were alive, could do things, acted in this way or that, suggested that all had power or, perhaps, were powers.³ There might be, however, two kinds of power—that which is seen in ordinary actions and that seen in unusual or extraordinary actions beyond man's ordinary power or the common processes of nature. Both, but the latter especially—the supernatural, so to speak—might be conceived in time as potential in all things. It was not always being put forth, but it might flash out at any moment. This in turn gave rise to the conception of a universal impersonal power or storehouse of power pervading all nature, and of which all things, all persons, have less or more. It is the source of that power as existing in persons and things. To it, however, in turn certain anthropomorphic attributes may be ascribed, approximating to the personal. It is on the border-land between the impersonal and the personal. But we must not forget that these conceptions are things of long growth and have a long history behind. Though they are found among various savage peoples as a kind of metaphysical notions, they obviously involve long ages of reflexion. They could not have been evolved before men had had a long experience of innumerable concrete instances, and they cannot be adduced as explaining the origins of nature-worship, although they may have modified its history.

These conceptions are seen in various degrees in the *mana* of the Melanesians and Polynesians—an impersonal force manifesting itself in ghosts, spirits, some men, and certain things;⁴ the Annamese *tin*—the force existing in all persons and things,

without which they could not exist, of which some have more, some less, and which is nevertheless independent of them;¹ the Tlingit *yek*—the store of supernatural (not ordinary) power as it manifests itself in objects of nature or men, such manifestation being conceived personally as that of a spirit;² the Iroquois *orenda*—power existing potentially and universally in men, animals, things;³ the Omaha *wakanda*—invisible and continuous life permeating all things, causing motion and giving permanency of form, e.g., to mountains, rivers, animals, men, impersonal yet having in its entirety attributes of an almost personal kind;⁴ the Algonquin *manitu*—an omnipresent property manifesting itself variously and awaking everywhere a sense of mystery;⁵ the *mulungu* of the Yaos—a sort of supernatural power, a universal agency in all things, the agent in mysterious actions or beings, impersonal, yet sometimes regarded as a person or even as the equivalent of God.⁶ For a full discussion of these see R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*, London, 1909; E. S. Hartland, *Ritual and Belief*, p. 36 ff.; F. Bouvier, *Animisme, préanimisme, religion*, Paris, 1911; and, more briefly, J. E. Carpenter, *Comparative Religion*, London, n.d. [1913], p. 80 ff. See also artt. *MANA*, *MANITU*, *ORENDA*.

Though these conceptions are not 'primitive,' it is obvious that they point to an earlier stage when all objects in nature which came into man's purview were endowed, as he or the animals were, with life or the potencies of life and action. Another series of beliefs, the result of a long process of evolution, and probably proceeding in some cases alongside the growth of the *wakanda* group of conceptions, is that summed up comprehensively as animism. Man discovered that one main source of his 'aliveness,' his power of acting, was the fact that, besides a body which was alive, he possessed a spirit or soul which was now regarded as the animating cause of his being. Hence it was easy for him to suppose that animals and natural objects of all kinds were also animated by soul or spirit.⁷

This was already noticed by an observer of savages in the 17th century. Le Jeune says: 'Les sauvages se persuadent que non seulement les hommes et les autres animaux, mais aussi que toutes les autres choses sont animées' (*Relations de la Nouvelle France*, Paris, 1638, p. 109). Similarly E. im Thurn says that, according to the Indians of Guiana, men, animals, plants, rocks, stones, waterfalls, streams, etc., are all alike animated by a spirit (*Among the Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883, p. 350).

Some of the beliefs of the *mana* type are more or less parallel to animism, and now and then they seem almost to pass over to it. The Tlingit *yek* manifests itself in a multiplicity of objects at once as supernatural energy and as spirit, so that there are innumerable *yek*. The Battak think of *tondi* as a reservoir of life-power which pours down into men, animals, and plants in various degrees, as well as into inanimate objects. It gives to the body energy for thought, will, feeling; it can leave the body in dreams, and finally departs at death. It is thus not a little like the spirit or soul, yet it is differentiated from the shadow, double, or self, the *begu*. *Tondi* here resembles the Annamese *tin*, while *begu* is equivalent to the Annamese *khi*, a kind of soul present in all things and persons, and a second condition of existence. Thus some conceptions of the *mana* class tend to be the equivalent of the second soul as believed in by many savages.

Now, it is one aspect of the animistic belief as far as men's souls are concerned that they can leave their bodies temporarily, as in sleep, and finally at death. This temporary exit of the soul must also have been believed of the souls of natural objects, while, where any natural object ceased to exist—e.g., when a tree died or a well was dried up—its soul might become altogether detached. Hence the spirit animating the sun, mountain, river, or tree might be regarded apart from these—a sun-spirit, mountain-spirit, tree-spirit. Again, men's souls became ghosts, and ghosts were apt to become

¹ Cf. *ERE* viii. 863a.

² See F. Max Müller, *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion* (HL), London, 1878; E. von Hartmann, *System der Philosophie in Grundriss*, Sachs, 1907-09, vii. 'Religions-philosophie'; A. Réville, *Hist. des religions: Les Religions des peuples non-civilisés*, Paris, 1883, II. 225 ff.; cf. E. S. Hartland, *Ritual and Belief*, London, 1914, p. 231.

³ Cf. *ERE* ii. 365b.

⁴ R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 118 ff.

⁵ P. Giran, *Magie et religion annamites*, Paris, 1912, p. 21 f.

⁶ J. B. Swanton, 26 *RBEW* (1903), p. 452 ff.

⁷ J. N. B. Hewitt, *American Anthropologist*, new ser., iv. [1902] 88.

⁸ A. C. Fletcher and F. La Flesche, 27 *RBEW* [1911], pp. 134, 597 ff.

⁹ W. Jones, *JAF* xlviii. [1905] 183 ff.

¹⁰ A. Hetherwick, *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 94.

¹¹ See *ANIMISM*; *PC* i. 425 ff.

theistic races of a higher type are rich in evidence of the love, respect, or fear of man for nature. Poetry everywhere has found in nature some of the most valuable sources of its inspiration and subjects of its interpretation. It teems with descriptions of nature, or with analogies drawn from its workings or its scenes. Sometimes, with more mystical writers, it regards nature as a symbol of spiritual verities, 'a living garment of God.' So, too, philosophy and science have sought to pierce its secrets, or philosophy, joining hands with religion, has sometimes regarded it as divine or a mode of the divine existence. Theistic thought has always shown the keenest interest in nature, as even a superficial acquaintance with the OT or with modern Christian thought would show. Nature's attraction for men is, in fact, perennial, whether as a thing of beauty, a restful consoler of heart and mind, a suggestive symbol, or a baffling mystery. They will go to it directly or they will study it under the guidance of an Emerson or a Wordsworth—the greatest of all those who have entered reverently into its inmost sanctuary.

1. Theories of nature-worship.—The subject of this article is in the main that of nature and its phenomena as objects of worship to savage and to more civilized men. There is no doubt that nature-worship is a thing of very ancient date, and that it has entered largely into most forms of religion and continued to affect those which sought to shake themselves free of its influence. Some, indeed, have held that nature-worship, in some shape or form, was the earliest aspect of religion. But, quite apart from what may be said on the side of animism as one of the origins of religion—though this is now more and more set aside—it is hardly likely that the particular forms of nature-worship claimed as the beginnings of religion or the reasons alleged for regarding them as worshipful by such writers as Max Müller or von Hartmann are true to fact. It is impossible for any one to tell what was man's religion in the very beginning, but man may have had religious aspirations or may have worshipped gods before he turned to nature as the source of worshipful objects or as affording satisfaction to his deeper longings. The high gods of even the lowest savages do not appear to be dependent on nature or to have been evolved from a personification of any part of nature or from nature-spirits. They appear to be 'older than any beast-god or god of the natural elements.'¹ Puluga, the Andaman high god, invisible, immortal, and the cause of all things, lives in the sky, and thunder is his voice, yet there is nothing to show that he is a personification of one or the other.² This is also true of the Australian high gods, who also are sky-dwellers. Indeed, such races as these can hardly be said to worship nature at all.³ Certainly they do not worship the sky, and, though they have sun- and moon-myths in plenty, and though sun and moon are personified, they are not worshipped. The Fuegians know of a being described as 'a great black man . . . wandering about the woods and mountains,' who is aware of man's conduct and punishes certain wrong actions, but he does not appear to be a nature-spirit.⁴ Even the evil spirits of the woods and of the sea and their progeny known to the Andamanese seem to be dwellers in those regions, not personifications of them.⁵ They are not propitiated, and are self-created and immortal, and inde-

pendent of Puluga. Among the Veddas, another low race, there is nothing but a cult of ancestral ghosts, or *yaku*, sometimes vaguely attached to forest-glades, rocks, and hill-tops, but not derived from these. Sun, moon, and heavenly bodies are not worshipped, though the former are personalized.¹ Indeed, it is but rarely that among the lowest savages a direct worship of nature can be found, the reverence for the creative being or the cult of ghosts existing instead. There are exceptions, as with the Bushmen, who, besides knowing and praying to Cagn, the creator, addressed also the sun, moon, and stars,² and the Hottentots, who, besides a cult of divine beings, known as Tsi Goab and Heitsi Eibib, and of ancestors, have ceremonies at new and full moon and at the rising of the Pleiades, and offer 'religions honours and invocations' to the moon.³ Again, the cult of ghosts and ancestors may exist apart from nature-worship, and owes nothing to it, though it may influence it in various ways (§ 2); and, though tribal or tutelary gods may sometimes be nature-powers, this is by no means always the case. Nature-worship is, in fact, but one of several forms of religion, and it is not necessarily the earliest or antecedent form.

2. Origin of nature-worship.—In considering the origin of nature-worship, it may be well to dismiss from our minds theories of animism or of *mana*. The objects or powers of nature—rivers, mountains, thunder, wind—as first viewed by man were or possessed, in his view, exactly what he himself was or possessed, whether that was *mana*, soul, or neither. They were simply regarded as alive in the sense in which he regarded himself as being. This must be the answer to the question, How did man regard nature and natural objects and forces around him? He knew himself alive, a being or person, one who moved and acted, who did things, and he probably saw in the things around him, especially in those which moved or did things, or in those which in any way suggested life, a reflexion of his own personality, greater or less. The things around him had varying capabilities, varying spheres of action, where action was concerned. Some were in motion—the river, the clouds, the sun and moon, the trees swayed by the wind. Some were vast entities—a huge tree, a broad river, a high mountain. Some were of strange, abnormal aspect—certain trees or rocks may have an unusual form, and it is certain that such things have a great attraction for the savage mind.⁴ Some acted or did things—the clouds poured down rain, the trees shed their leaves, or brought forth these and fruits, the earth produced vegetation, the thunder rolled and crashed, the lightning darted and shone, the sun gave light and heat, the mountain seemed to cast down stones and rocks in the avalanche. Some seemed beneficial to man, for it was inevitable that man should regard what he obtained from nature in the light of gifts or benefits to himself—earth was the producer, the trees bore him fruit, the sun and the fire gave warmth, thunder and rain broke up drought, sun, rain, and earth caused growth, sun and wind dried up floods, sun and moon gave light, the sea, lake, and river were sources of food, the tree and the cave offered shelter. Others, again, seemed hostile to man; at least they often caused great injury to him—the avalanche, the falling tree, the

¹ O. G. and B. Z. Seligmann, *The Veddas*, Cambridge, 1911, pp. 140, 144.

² J. M. Orpen, *Cape Monthly Magazine*, July 1874, cited in Lang, ii. 26; W. H. I. Bleek, *A Brief Account of Bushman Folklore*, London, 1875, *passim*.

³ T. Hahn, *Tsuni-Goam*, London, 1881, pp. 62, 81, etc.; P. Kolben, *Present State of the Cape of Good Hope*, Eng. tr., da 1731, i. 96.

⁴ See MONSTERS; and cf. H. Spencer's remarks on 'teratism,' in *Principles of Sociology*, London, 1876, i. 313.

¹ A. Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*², London, 1906, ii. 210.

² E. H. Man, *JAI* xii. [1883] 158; cf. art. ANDAMANS, § 3, for Puluga as fundamentally a storm-god.

³ See GOD (Primitive and Savage).

⁴ R. Fitzroy, *Narrative of the Voyages of the Adventure and Beagle*, London, 1839, ii. 180.

⁵ Man, p. 159.

stars are the eyes of the dead (Hottentots), their souls (Eskimos, Persians, Vedic Indians), or human beings transformed, myth and belief show that they are often regarded as living beings with human characteristics (cf. Lang, *Custom and Myth*, London, 1884, p. 121 ff.). Trees, again, as most generally beneficent, their fruit a staple of life, themselves things which showed growth, dying down in winter and reviving in spring, would easily be regarded as alive and worshipped as such. The influence of animism, however, has generally obscured this, and we hear mainly of tree-spirits or deities of grove or forest. Magical rites connected with trees perhaps continue the older train of thought.

Where sun, moon, mountain, tree, etc., are thus personalized, regarded as living and acting, they can hardly be conceived as other than anthropomorphic personalities, because man knows no other personality than his own. They may, however, be conceived as animals, since these may be regarded by man as a kind of persons. Thunder was conceived by the American Indian tribes as a bird—the thunder-bird, with a human face and a nose like an eagle's bill, according to the Dakotas.¹ Rivers, perhaps because of their sinuous gliding motion, are sometimes conceived as snakes. But, when they are thus personalized, there arises the possibility of an inevitable if gradual separation of the sun, moon, or mountain person from the actual sun, moon, or mountain. He becomes a sun-, moon-, or mountain-god—a separate personification of these natural objects. This might happen quite apart from animism. The Marûts, Helios, or the earth-mother might be winds, the sun, or the earth regarded as persons, or personifications of the winds, the sun, and the earth, with these as their vehicles or symbols, their spheres of action. This process of separating a nature divinity from the object with which he was once identified or which was he, was one which might occur independently of animism, but which would be aided and hastened by it. We now consider animism in its relation to nature-worship.

When man came to realize that he had a soul or spirit, it was natural to attribute the possession of such a spirit to the objects around him, regarded already as living beings, and some of them already for him objects of worship. Now, when any object is thought to have a superabundance of *mana*—which is often itself regarded as 'supernatural'—or where it is possessed of a spirit, there is an added inducement to worship it, mainly because the range of its activities is increased. Hence both these conceptions, but especially the latter, have greatly developed certain forms of worship and have also given rise to other forms of worship or belief—ghost-worship and the worship of spirits or powers connected with nature, or the belief in these. As far as animism is concerned, it begins with attributing to all objects in nature—sun, moon, stars, rivers, lakes, the sea, trees, stones, clouds, winds—a soul or spirit, the animating power of these objects which have already been personalized.² This is a practically universal doctrine,³ and it has influenced all later forms of religion. But, as it was thought that souls could leave human bodies temporarily or permanently, it is obvious that this would also apply to all natural objects animated by souls. Souls could exist apart from bodies, either after death, as wandering spirits or ghosts, or in the other world, or, as was often thought, they had a separate existence before being incarnated in human bodies. What applied to human souls would also apply to souls animating objects of nature. They might come to be regarded as having a separate life of

their own, though still more or less connected with these objects. At the same time, the more purely animistic theory might still continue. What is certain is that in many quarters there is a belief in nature-spirits, spirits haunting trees, forests, mountains, rivers, etc., using these as a dwelling-place, but not animating them in the sense in which a soul animates a body. We can hardly doubt that the one belief is dependent on the other, and, in fact, it is often difficult to see where the dividing-line between the two lies, though many spirit groups associated with some part of nature tend to become independent of it. It is nevertheless the case that animism let loose the crowd of spirits with which man's world is haunted, whether these were ghosts of men or spirits of nature. The spirit, or *numen*, animating a tree, a river or any part of it, a mountain or its gorges and rocks, would tend to become a spirit more or less separable from the river, tree, etc. Since there are many trees, and since various parts of a river or mountain are apt to be personalized, the result would be a number of spirits connected with these objects or dwelling in them, but liable to appear apart from them and often to assume a distinct form. Examples of such spirits are the *nats*, which, according to the Burmese, dwell in trees, the *toh*, which the pagan tribes of Borneo believe to infest rivers, forests, mountains, the sea, the similar nature-haunting supernatural beings of the Haidas, the *vuks* of the Melanesians,¹ the immense variety of river, or wood, or mountain spirits, demons, or genii thought to exist at all levels of civilization. Some of these are envisaged in grotesque or horrible forms; some in graceful guise, like the nymphs or naiads of Greece. But they are generally malevolent, and man seeks to propitiate them by prayer, offerings, and other rites. In some cases such spirits may be derived from human ghosts or these may mingle with actual nature-spirits, but more often the latter are quite independent of any ghostly ancestry.

Sometimes these groups of vague spirits are assumed to have a chief or chiefs, on the analogy of human society, and these may in time become personal divinities of some department of nature; or the host of spirits may be concentrated in individual gods of the forest, the rivers, or the mountains, with definite personal names; or the vague *numen*, or spirit, of a great forest, river, or mountain may develop into a great god, whose province is the rule over all forests, rivers, and mountains—departmental gods and sometimes creators of the objects which they rule (e.g., the Vedic Indra, associated with thunder and storms, or Vayu with winds, the Polynesian Tane Mahuta, maker and lord of trees and forests, and a host of others); or, again, where there was but one object of the kind in nature—sky, sun, moon, earth, or sea—the *numen* of these would become a personified god, ruling them and more or less associated with them. This separation of a god from the personalized object has already been regarded as a possibility apart from animism. In any case such gods tend to become more and more separate from the objects which were their source, more and more anthropomorphic, yet lofty divine beings, ruling the sun, moon, sky, earth, or sea; hence the number of such gods separate from, yet connected in some way with, these natural objects, which are found in all polytheistic religions. Such are earth-divinities like the Greek Demeter, the great goddess of the Semitic and Mediterranean races, the Teutonic Hertha, Târi Pennu of the Khonds; the sky-gods like Zeus among the Greeks, the Babylonian Anu,

¹ H. R. Schoolcraft, *Indian Tribes*, Philadelphia, 1853-57, iii. 480; F. S. Dellenbaugh, *North Americans of Yesterday*, New York, 1901, p. 393.

² Proof of this need not be given. Reference may be made to PC⁴; Lang, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*²; and the artt. ANIMISM, AINUS, ANNAM, DÉSES, LAOS, etc.

³ An exception is found in Melanesia, according to Codrington, p. 123.

¹ ERE iii. 23^a, vi. 473^a; C. Hose and W. McDougall, *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, London, 1912, ii. 23; Codrington, p. 121.

demons and wandering malignant spirits. And, if spirits of natural objects were capable of finally leaving them, this might be the source of the belief in spirits haunting departments of nature, each group more or less attached to these—wandering spirits of the forests, of the streams, of the mountain-gorge—and generally evilly-disposed to men, in this resembling most wandering ghosts. Such spirits are often ghosts of the dead, or are connected with them, but not invariably so. The spirit of a man killed or drowned at a certain place might be supposed to haunt it, and would tend to be regarded as a local spirit. The forest- and water-spirits of the Finns are spirits of the dead, and the *idgins* of the Buriats—lords of localities and of the phenomena of nature—are deified human spirits.¹ These must be regarded, however, as occasional, not as general, instances.

But, before the phenomena or objects of nature were regarded either as possessing *mana* or as animated by souls, it is certain that they were worshipped. We have already seen how many human traits were ascribed to them by man, although they were obviously a different kind of beings from himself and his fellows, and this as well as the relation in which they stood to man—benefiting him or doing him harm—led man to try to come into personal relation with them and prepared the way for their worship. If man believed that a tree could give him food or a river could drown him, and that these were living beings whose actions expressed their attitude to him, it was easy for him to show his gratitude to the one or to deprecate the violence of the other by acts or words which were acts or words of worship, however crude and elementary. But, further, many of the phenomena or objects of nature were clearly greater, stronger, and stranger than man. They were also more crafty and possessed of mysterious force, which, generally quiescent, might dart forth at any moment to spread havoc. A tree suddenly crashed down, lightning flashed forth, the tornado whirled in its devastating course, the river rushed along in flood. All these incidents, which meant so much more to one dwelling in the midst of nature than to more sophisticated and protected men, must have had the effect of making man believe that nature was full of strange powers, which, while some of them seemed kindly disposed, might be erratic in their action or even consistently hostile. Now, man, surrounded by human beings, some of whom are friendly, others doubtful in their attitude, others hostile, will cultivate friendship with the first, and, if he is not strong enough to overcome the two last, will deprecate their anger or violence by a submissive attitude or by gifts, unless he tries to get the better of them by stealth. His friendly or deprecatory actions are not worship, though they might become so if the men in question were regarded as divine. This forms an analogy to man in his relation to the powers of nature. His actions with regard to these are friendly, deprecatory, or propitiatory, and, since they are actions towards beings like yet different from himself and more and more regarded as 'supernatural,' they tend to become acts of worship. And perhaps, where man tries to force the hand of such stronger powers by acts of a stealthy, cunning nature, we have the beginnings of magic. It should also be remembered that, if man had already conceived beings of the nature of the high gods of the lowest savages, and had bowed before them in crude religions respect, awe, or worship, this would be easily transferred to the personalized powers and objects of nature. Here, then, we have the beginnings of the worship of nature. But with the growth, on the one hand, of the idea that these

living beings in nature had *mana*, or supernatural powers, or, on the other hand, of the idea that they were animated by spirits, a great impulse was inevitably given to the development of nature-worship. For now the force possessed by these beings was raised to a more mysterious and awesome height, and, again, the way was open for a crowd of detached spirits to throng every part of nature or for greater divinities to emerge from nature, to take at once ever more anthropomorphic and more divine forms, while never losing touch with it. Moreover, quite apart from the satisfying of man's temporal needs, he quite probably wished to get into relation with these nature-beings because they seemed to offer satisfaction to his dim religious or moral sense or his vague intellectual needs. Man associated himself with these beings for these ends instinctively rather than by way of reasoned and conscious motives.¹ And doubtless in the end this was the most important reason of all.

3. Varieties of nature-gods and -spirits.—The influence of animism or of *mana* conceptions as well as the growth of the idea of natural objects or powers as personalities has largely obliterated the more primitive view of these as being simply alive; but traces of it are still to be noted, especially in mythology, which is so often conservative of older strata of belief and thought. This is seen especially in myths about the sun and moon. These are often regarded as husband and wife (Ainus), with the stars as their children (Dravidians, Andamanese); they are said to have descended to earth to rescue a persecuted step-daughter (Buriats); or the sun rises from his mother, the earth, in the morning and returns to her at night as her husband (Indonesians). Other examples may be seen in the art. EARTH, EARTH-GODS; MOUNTAINS, MOUNTAIN-GODS.² The cult of actual nature-powers or objects considered as personal beings is found sporadically not only in the lower culture, but also amidst the more developed religious ideas of higher races.

Examples of this are found in the Vedic hymns, where also a much higher view prevails. Rivers are addressed as 'mothers' and 'protectors,' and prayers are offered to the mountains, to the sun, to winds, and to the earth. Traces of such 'animatism' occur in Greek religion—the worship of rivers or of the sun as such. In Egypt Seb, the embodiment of the earth, bears evidence of having once been the earth *sans phrase*, while even the monotheistic worship of Aten was a worship of the energies of the sun, and the myth and cult of Ra show how the sun had once been personalized. A cult of the sun can also be seen behind the cult of sun-gods with the ancient Arabs, in modern Hindu rites, and among many Dravidian tribes; and, indeed, this is true wherever the sun is personified as a god (see artt. BENGAL, BERAR, BERBERS, BRAHMANISM, DRAVIDIANS, HURON, LAPPS). The moon was worshipped as such by Dravidians and Hottentots, personified by the Lapps, and regarded as an old man or a hunter by the Central Americans and the Eskimos. Earth as a fruitful mother is worshipped by many races, and the cult is often paid directly to the earth even when a personified earth-goddess is known. Rivers are often worshipped as such—e.g., by the Celts (*q.v.*), who regarded them as divine or as fertile mothers, while in Egypt the Nile was worshipped as a man. More usually, however, the cult developed into one paid to gods or spirits of rivers. Again, though mountain-gods or -spirits are often worshipped, mountains themselves are still regarded as divine and worshipful, as myth and cult show (see MOUNTAINS, MOUNTAIN-GODS, § 2). Especially among the American Indian tribes, where the winds are presided over by gods, they themselves or the quarters whence they blow are venerated as rain-bringers or controllers of the harvest (see *ERE* i. 253, 381^b), just as behind the personified winds of the Greeks (Boreas, Zephyrus, etc.) and the Vedic Vayu and the Maruts (the storm-winds or gods of these) lurk the winds themselves. Fire as a leaping, devouring thing, but also as giving heat, would easily be conceived as living and itself divinized. In many passages where the Vedic Agni is referred to it is difficult to say whether the actual fire or its personification as a god is intended. Like the earth, the sea has a double aspect. There are sea-gods, but the sea itself is a great being, feared by men yet also beneficent and worshipped, while even the personified sea-god is sometimes spoken of as the sea itself, as when the Celtic sea-god Manannan is identified with a great wave (*Bodleian Manuscripts*, § 46; cf. *RCel* xii. [1891] 105). Apart altogether from the belief that

¹ Cf. A. Menzies, *Hist. of Religions*, London, 1911, p. 47 f.

² Cf. also the chapter on 'Nature Myths,' in Lang, l. 122 ff.

¹ See *ERE* vi. 24*, iii. 7b.

regarded as the work of savage man's high gods (see GOD [Primitive and Savage]), beings like himself, only bigger, more powerful, more crafty, who 'made things,' as he himself did; or the work is sometimes assigned to any prominent object in nature regarded as a living being—e.g., the sun or moon; again, even while the personalization of things in nature is most active, they are sometimes connected with what seems to be their source, and derived from some being dwelling in that source. The sea or a divine old woman living in the sea (Eskimos) sends storms; rain comes from the sky or from a god or beings dwelling there (Dengdit in Dinka belief, Mura-Mura in Dieri belief); thunder, the avalanche, or the flood might be regarded as caused by some being or beings behind nature, acting freakishly, as man himself often did. Such a method of thought is seen clearly at work where the spirits or forces supposed to animate things or phenomena are coming to be separable from them, or where the separation is complete and they are personifications of these. Then they have complete control of them—the spirit or god of storms sends storms, that of the river drowns men, that of agriculture causes growth. These are so many manifestations of the power and presence of such gods and spirits. Similarly the diffused supernatural power believed in by the Tlingits (*yék*) manifests itself locally as spirit in natural objects, animals, etc.

'The sky spirit is the ocean of supernatural energy as it manifests itself in the sky, the sea spirit as it manifests itself in the sea, the bear spirit as it manifests itself in the bear, the rock spirit as it manifests itself in the rock.'¹

Nature, in fact, is very apt to suggest to man either its own activity or the presence of a god or spirit, just as caves, trees, springs, or mountains were regarded as manifestations of deity—the *b'ālim*—by the Canaanites, or as the rainbow is thought to be the bow and thunder the voice of Mulungu of the Yaos, or a violent wind or whirlwind is so often supposed to be the vehicle of malevolent deities or demons or supernatural beings of some kind. Nature is so personal to man that he easily fills it with personal presences—embodiments of its parts—of woods, streams, or hills.

'He who wanders in the woods perceives how natural it was to pagan imagination to find gods in every deep grove and by each fountain head. Nature seems to him not to be silent but to be eager and striving to break out into music. Each tree, flower, and stone, he invests with life and character; and it is impossible that the wind—which breathes so expressive a sound among the leaves—should mean nothing.'²

How much more is this true of those things which suggested vast, superhuman, mysterious power—thunder, lightning, tempest, the waterfall, the roaring flood. These were easily personalized, or regarded as evidences of divine working.³

4. Man and the processes of nature.—As man was so dependent on nature for food as well as for other things, it was inevitable that he should come to think that he could aid its processes, so that these should work smoothly and produce a superabundance of results, or assist the gods or spirits of nature in their working. The sun might be strengthened for its work, the rain made to fall, storms driven away, the fertility of the earth augmented, the life of plants or trees stimulated, or the powers or gods behind these aided. The rites by which these ends were supposed to be attained are of a vast variety, and in the main belong to the province of magic (*q.v.*), though they have also a constant religious reference, and such religious rites as sacrifice and prayer enter largely into these magical actions. But what man did first as a means of assisting processes which lay outside his power came in time to be regarded as necessary to them. The powers of nature, its gods

or spirits, came to be regarded as dependent upon the magical rites which men performed. This subject has already been considered in the art. MAGIC, but it shows how closely man considers himself to be related to the nature which everywhere surrounds him and to the powers which animate or control it.

See also the artt. ANIMALS; EARTH, EARTH-GODS; MOUNTAINS, MOUNTAIN-GODS; SUN; WATER, WATER-GODS.

LITERATURE.—See the sections on nature-worship in most manuals or works on the history of religion, also works on native tribes and races; D. G. Brinton, *The Religions of Primitive Peoples*, New York, 1897; J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*³, London, 1911-15; L. Frobenius, *Die Weltanschauung der Naturvölker*, Weimar, 1898; E. S. Hartland, *Ritual and Belief*, London, 1914; A. Lang, *The Making of Religion*, do. 1893, *Myth, Ritual, and Religion*², do. 1906; A. Lefèvre, *La Religion*, Paris, 1891; A. Le Roy, *La Religion des primitifs*, do. 1909; O. Pfeiderer, *Die Religion, ihr Wesen und ihre Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1869, *Religionsphilosophie auf geschichtliche Grundlage*, Berlin, 1878; E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*⁴, London, 1903. J. A. MACCULLOCH.

NATURE (American).—At the time of the discovery of the American continent there existed on it a system of thought which was old when Sumerian civilization in the valley of the Euphrates was at its zenith, between the tenth and the fifth millenniums before our time. In this system all objects of sense and feeling of the present are derived or evolved as expressions from primal myth-born beings of three, rarely five, great cosmic periods; beside and beyond these uncreated beings nothing else existed. These beings of the primal time were conceived of as man, or mankind; for the native name for 'man,' or 'human being,' was and is the generic appellation by which they are known in myth and epos; and they were, of course, real and constant in substance, while their form and their manner of existence were fictitious. They were real and constant because they were and are the bodies, the elements, and the processes of the world of sense and feeling; and so in myth and later in the epos they do or effect things which are impossible to man; and their form and mode of existence were fictitious because they were wrought and ascribed in terms of human physical and psychic expression and existence. In attempting to give an English name or appellation to these primal beings the American descendants of the myth-makers call them 'the first people,' 'the ancestral people,' 'the ancient people,' 'the man-beings,' and 'the ancients' or 'the old people' who lived in the youth of the world. They were later called the gods, because as universal forces or powers of the world they controlled the operations of what we are pleased to call 'nature.' In this manner it was conceived that these man-beings or gods controlled or shaped the welfare of men.

In the American system of thought every element, every manifestation, every phenomenon, every body of being, and every process of cosmic or psychic power was conceived of as one of the primal man-beings; even the faculties of mind and body were by some regarded as once some of the first people. It is clear that the American himself is absolutely excluded from the company of the primal 'first people.'

The pitiless, though constant, need of adaptation to the forces, bodies, and elements of the environment and the varying struggle to satisfy the prompting of the faculties of the bodily and the psychic self to meet this need are the starting-point of myths of genesis—myths of origin—or the poetic narratives of birth, death, and re-birth of all things. The man of the earlier time perceived around and within himself powers, potencies, and bodies which experience taught him were in a state of constant activity which in measurable degree

¹ Swanton, p. 451.


² *Journals of R. W. Emerson*, London, 1909, i. 146.

³ Cf. the Indo-Chinese lightning-god, *ERE* vii. 230^a.

the Zulu Lord of Heaven, Ukko of the Finns, Tien in China, the sky-god of the Hopi, whose symbol is the sun; sun-gods like Rā in Egypt, Surya of the Vedic Indians, the Canaanite Shamash; moon-gods like the Vedic Soma, or that of the Central Americans, regarded as father of gods and men. Such gods as these tend to become the principal deities of any polytheistic system, and one of them often becomes the supreme head of the pantheon—Zeus, Indra, Rā, Anu, Hirume (the sun-goddess of Shinto). Here, *mutatis mutandis*, they are akin to the 'high gods' of savages, independent alike of nature-worship, though controlling nature, and of animism. Much of the lore and mythology about these gods, some of the ritual of their cults, the powers which they still retain over the objects or forces of nature, show their earlier ancestry and connexion with nature, though in this there are varying degrees of such connexion. The native gods of Shinto—the sun-goddess, rain-, storm-, thunder-gods, sea-, river-, earth-, mountain-gods, and the like—are still closely dependent on nature. So, too, are the Vedic gods, though these, besides occurring in anthropomorphic forms, are often moral governors, and also some of the Egyptian gods. Greek divinities who were earlier nature-gods threw off much of their old dress, and in certain aspects some quite freed themselves from it,¹ yet traces of their origin could still here and there be seen. All such gods tend to retain those parts of nature from which they originated as their symbols or attributes—sun, storm, thunder, growth. Some of them, as they rise in dignity, tend to take over functions or govern departments which, strictly speaking, belonged to gods who lagged behind. Thunder, from being regarded as itself a divinity, is often regarded as merely the voice of a god; or it may be regarded as the god of agriculture, perhaps because rain accompanies it and makes the ground fertile. Zeus, besides his original function, assumed many others, or, rather, a number of gods associated with these were assimilated by him, so that he was at once a sky-god, god of rain, of thunder, of agriculture, of mountains, besides coming to be the representative for the Greeks of the highest conception of deity. So, if Apollo was once a sun-god, his functions later became far removed from causing sunshine, until he retains as few traces of the sun as Artemis does of the moon. Some gods, indeed, retain only the slenderest link with the department of nature from which they originated.²

¹ Cf. *ERE* vi. 395a.

² The relations of man's worshipful beings might be graphically expressed as follows:



In polytheistic systems there will be many more gods than those who are connected even remotely with nature—gods of war, of crafts, city or community gods, abstract gods, and so forth. Yet even then and also where great nature-gods predominate there will also be many lesser nature-spirits, either those of this or that part of nature—governing it, dwelling in it—or else hosts of indeterminate spirits haunting woods, rivers, or mountains. The Chinese worship not only Shang-ti, the anthropomorphic heaven-god, but spirits controlling departments of nature—mountains, the sea, rivers, fire, rain, etc. The same phenomenon is seen in Celtic religion (see *CELTS*), and indeed in all the greater polytheisms. Much more is it the case in barbaric or savage instances. The pagan tribes of Borneo reverence the vague hosts of *toh* as well as the higher gods, some of these being nature-deities—gods of fire, of harvest, of thunder, of lakes and rivers—and others not derived from nature. This is only one example out of several which might be adduced. The importance of nature-worship as a large though by no means the only factor in the evolution of religion is seen in its various manifestations over the whole field of religious evolution, but not least in this that even in the highest forms of polytheism many of the gods still bear traces of their nature origin, and even the greatest gods are still brought into relation with nature, as in Babylonian theogony, where Anu is placed in heaven, Bel on earth, and Ea in the great deep. The logical outcome of nature-polytheism is pantheism (*q.v.*), as in India, though many polytheistic religions escaped this. Yet even theistic religions cannot escape the necessity of bringing God into relation with nature. Aspects and phenomena of nature are His instruments, evidences of His presence, or His symbols, as in the OT—much of this being based on the earlier Semitic nature-worship; or all nature is regarded as the creation of God, the field of His working, upheld and sustained by Him; or, again, theists, without reverting to pantheism, may use pantheistic language and speak of nature as 'the garment thou seest Him by.' Pantheism can never be a final resting-place for the human soul, and it has grave moral defects, but, in the words of a wise thinker,

'The system is an emphatic admission, or rather proclamation, that there is a secret in the Universe that belongeth unto God, unfathomed and fathomless by men.'

No religion save deism has ever banished God from the universe which He created. Hence both savage high gods and some of the gods of polytheistic religions may have their abodes in some part of nature without necessarily being derived from it. This should always be kept in mind in examining the gods of any religion. A god dwelling in the sky, like the Andaman Puluga or the Australian Baiame, is not always a sky-god in origin, and a god whose symbol is the sun may not always have been a sun-god, nor is a god who controls rain, like Dengditi of the Dinkas, or one who sends storms always a personification of rain or storm. Where such parts or phenomena are not personalized, the question still remains, Who causes them? The answer will inevitably be that it is the god who looms largest on man's horizon or has most potential power. Such a question may even be asked where these personalizations exist, for savage and primitive thought is inconsequent and admits of many contradictions. Creation-myths show that man has always been interested in the origin of the world around him, and the fact that its parts were believed to be alive did not hinder him from speculating as to how they came into existence. Creation is often

¹ J. Duncan, *Colloquia Peripatetica*², Edinburgh, 1871, p. 23.

If, then, it be true that the deities of a people are psychologically faithful reflexes of the distinctive features of the social organization of which they are regarded as members, it follows that, where comparatively complex social and religious organizations are found, it is futile to expect to deal with them as if they were the products of a 'primitive' mind, for evidently they have not the aspect of primitiveness. Certain predilections and predispositions as to the reasoning power and logical rigour of the American mind must be held in abeyance in any serious study of the ideas and conceptions evolved from it. If the premisses of American thinking be granted, the conclusions drawn from them are found to be consistent with them.

Among some American tribes man, the creature, ranked very low in power and knowledge, because every object and phenomenon except man was divine, while in other and more highly organized tribes man shared *orenda* with the gods or first people. One of the most striking traits of all the American deities is their self-existence. To this extent, then, they are peculiar and above human estate, experience, and knowledge. And, though both gods and men are derived, in mythic narrative, from an original first mother or parent, yet it is easy to see that the first people are self-existent, while man—the first human being—remains the creature of a god.

It is to be noted that in this American system of thought there is no concept or implication of a primal chaos preceding the events which resulted in the present constitution of things. In the myths from certain areas of America the metamorphosis of the first people—in mythologic phrase, the gods or deities—was achieved coincidentally with the first hint of the coming of the American folk to each place of those areas; but in other areas the American is created or formed by one or more of the gods of the third cosmic period. With the establishment of the present order begins the story of the existent bodies and processes of earth and sky, described in terms of human form and mind, and of their inter-relations with the American race of people. By means of two well-marked yet inter-related classes of myths—the narrative poems of creation or metamorphosis and the narrative poems of the great recurrent processes and of the bodies and beings of 'nature'—the American philosophers have related what they thought of the universe of their experience. The invisible forces of which the objects of sense are the evident expression were conceived as emanating from living beings endowed with human life, mind, will, and purpose. But it has been seen that these personified forces were in fact poetic fictions of the mind, created in the image of man; but, as they actually represented universal principles of unmatched power, they came to be regarded as superior to man in resource and immunity from destruction. The story of the activities of these personages became myth—a more or less sacred narrative—legend, or saga. And thus the cosmic bodies and processes as expressed in the environment became duly dramatized in the rites and ceremonies of long and intricate rituals.

This universal principle of physical and psychic change or metamorphosis in American myth and poetry explains why so-called animals occupy so important a place in the religious thought and culture of the peoples. It is a dogma developed from these myths that some of the first people are represented in the various species of animals, birds, reptiles, plants, trees, vegetables, and striking topographical features, as their 'elders' or 'ancestors.' These 'elders' or 'ancestors,' then, were and are in mythic phrase merely transformed

man-beings or first people of the first great cosmic period. Such an ancestor or elder on the tongue of an American of the elder culture is a deity. The myths thus explain the phenomena in religious expression. Hence there are found in abundance so-called animal-gods—beast-gods, bird-gods, fish-gods, reptile-gods, plant-gods, tree-gods, and vegetable-gods and goddesses. And the fact must not be disregarded that these ancestral deities were not the ordinary animal, beast, bird, fish, plant, or insect, but rather an ideally humanized creature of inchoate mind. Hence in Sumeria, Babylonia, and Egypt, and also in the descriptive visions of the Hebrew prophets and the mythic and religious art and culture of other early and lowly peoples, human-bodied personages with animal heads, or animal-bodied figures with human heads and aspect—of heroic proportions and unmatched power, some with floral symbols and other masks indicative of the kind of divine expression intended—are abundantly in evidence.

It must be noted, however, that the best-known gods of these early Oriental peoples are those representing the recurrent processes or phenomena of nature, and that of the gods or deities answering exactly to the first people of the American system of thought concerning the cosmos there have been found none but vestigial remains or traces. The mythic narratives of the primal first people in these places were lost or, by being misunderstood, entirely neglected. Were those myths available, it would be possible to explain to-day why plants, vegetables, insects, birds, beasts, reptiles, and fish have such prominence in the religious culture and thought of these lands.

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J. N. B. HEWITT.

NATURE (Buddhist).—It has been recognized and often emphasized that Buddha is not an atheist; that he admits the existence of those supernatural beings who, although there are many kinds among them,¹ can in a general way be styled gods, *deva*. But the importance of these beings in the daily life and even in the spiritual life has been minimized by several writers, denied by some, and fully recognized only by very few scholars.²

The origin and the reason of this mistaken view on the 'godlike' side of Buddhism lie in the fact that gods seem to be of no use in the Path. It is a very plausible opinion that the candidate to *arhat*-ship has nothing to do with deities; very few texts dealing with the Path even refer to them; possibly not a single one points to the usefulness of god-worship. Nevertheless, it is evident that the Buddhist ought to entertain social relations with all beings, 'expanding' sentiments of compassion and benevolence in the ten cardinal directions. It is well known that gods—and especially the chief of the gods, Sakra—furnished the future Buddha with opportunities of self-denial. To deny the relations of the Buddhist saint with gods and his obligations towards them would be to deny his relations with his fellow-men, and to forget the altruistic features of the Good Law. Altruism, of course is not insisted upon in the Little Vehicle, but it is always *sous entendu*. That altruism is the principle on which depend the relations of the true Buddhist

¹ On the meaning of *deva*, 'god,' *devaputra*, 'god-son,' 'angel,' *devatā*, 'deity,' see T. W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, London, 1910, ii. 115.

² See E. J. Thomas, *Buddhist Scriptures* ('Wisdom of the East' series), London, 1913, p. 99; A. Foucher, *Étude sur l'iconographie bouddhique de l'Inde*, Paris, 1899-1905, ii. 105.

affected his welfare and that of his fellows. In attempting to understand or explain the reason or the source of such activity, whether constant or variable, and his relation to it, he correlated this expression of strange and irresistible forces with his own conscious life, with the impressive sub-conscious energies of his own being, and with the superconscious promptings of his mind.

Lack of knowledge of the things of the distant past prompted the early ancestors of the American to project their own life into that unknown past; and ignorance of the things of the future induced them to project this present life into the dimly inferred next life. So it comes that the unknown future and the equally unknown past are but more or less idealized reflexes of the present experiences of man; neither is, in any mysterious sense, a revelation of other beings or other worlds. The study of the conceptions of the man of lowly culture and attainment indicates that he employed almost exclusively one means of defining the unknown. He interpreted and defined the unknown in terms of the known. And here the known quantity was the man himself. To the early American the origin of the bodies and the elements and processes of the earth and sky and the causes of their activities, as matters of environmental experience, were unknown. But it is found that all the biotic and psychic properties, faculties, and attributes, real or fancied, believed to be manifest in man were imputed to the objects and bodies of the environment, and their operations were then defined in terms of human activity, and hence all such objects and processes became duly endowed with life and mind and with all that these imply. And so, primarily, there were in American thinking at least three classes of persons or man-beings: (1) a part of the first people, few in number, whose minds and character remained unchanged and who lived in harmony with their environment—those first people who escaped the toil and strife of the 'war in heaven' and its fateful consequences, and who now dwell serenely in homes above the sky; (2) all those things or man-beings in the present world, exclusive of the American himself, who owe their existence to the metamorphosis of the great majority of the first people; and (3) the deities, gods, or man-beings who came into their present form in the second cosmic period as a final result of the collisions and struggle which closed the first period, i.e. all those who were changed in the second period. Some of the second class, after due metamorphosis, at the close of the second period, rejoined the first people who had not been changed in the struggles which brought about the close of the first period; and these have largely become the gods of the American, for they are uncreated and so divine. The American himself belongs to the third period and is a creature of one or more of these deities.

In attempts to explain the origin of myth and religion among men of low culture students of the developments of opinions have devised and used the term 'animism,' defined as 'the belief in spiritual beings,' 'the deep-lying doctrine of spiritual beings,' and 'the groundwork of the philosophy of religion, from that of savages up to that of civilized men,' for the mental process which imputes the form, attributes, and qualities of man to the objects, elements, forces, and processes of the environing world. But it must be noted that it is not animal life in its broad sense, but only human life, mind, passions, and form that are imputed in this process. This is a distinction which it is important to keep in view. And along with the imputation of these things goes that of the arts, the culture, and the institutions of the people. Thus it is found that the social

organization of the first people—the deities—is merely a reflex of that of the people themselves. Each of the deities was believed to have greater power in his or her own *natural* sphere than man, although the American who was ritually cleansed and secure might be able to do more effectively than one of the deities the things that fell within his competency.

By assuming the reality of these fictitious first people the American explained to his own satisfaction the origin and development of the forces of life and nature and the reasons for them. It thus becomes evident that an idol, as popularly conceived by careless observers, had no place in the American system of thought. The symbols or figures in wood or stone, in painting or sculpture, of any one of the deities or first people were never the object of any kind of worship. The rite was performed in honour of the deity so represented.

American myths inform us that in that great primal cosmic period the man-beings became restive through constant attrition and the frequent collision of diverse and sometimes quite contrary activities, natures, and mental attitudes; for offence had been given, with intention or without, and injury suffered, and, because each individual character had become ripened, manifest, and fixed, conflict of desires and purposes and bitter strife supervened, and the struggle did not cease until nearly all the first people had become changed, by a complete metamorphosis, into the various elements, bodies, and kinds of living creatures, with the exception of man, that have existed or now exist on earth, in the sky, or in the waters; they became the fauna and the flora and the striking topographical features of the birth-land of these myths. The earth, the sky, the sun, moon, and all the bright stars represent some of the first people of the first cosmic period. The spirits, minds, or lives of these first people were unaffected as to duration by the forced metamorphosis. Hence myth has its river-gods, rock-gods, mountain-gods, plant-gods, vegetable-gods, anthropic animal-gods, bird-gods, and fish-gods, who lived before the metamorphosis in the assumed first great cosmic period of peace and harmony and unmanifest character.

The first people and their metamorphosed selves, the gods, American myths inform us, perform their most characteristic duties and functions by means of a distinctive impersonal magic power which the Iroquois of the Mohawk dialect call *orenda* (q.v.), a word which with slight dialectic variations exists in all Iroquoian tongues.

With the gradual increase in complexity and compass of social and other institutions among American peoples and therefore with the unification of rule among them, there also came to pass like changes in the organizations of the first people, who ruled over those elements, bodies, or processes which they embodied; e.g., among the Iroquoian peoples the Earth-Mother is the chief matron in the great lodge of the gods; the ancient corn-woman, one of the changed first people, is the goddess Corn-Mother; and so with the goddess Bean-Mother, the goddess Squash-Mother, and all the myriad other first people. For their bounties to man, woman, and child these goddesses receive due homage and worship, as do all the metamorphosed first people, whose activities in the present world bring welfare and contentment to the American peoples. In the activities of these gods—conceived, however, in terms of human character and achievement—moral considerations were not involved; but, at a later time, when some of them became part and parcel of the social fabric, their deeds, thoughts, desires, and counsel acquired a potent moral value and implication.

freedom, He is withdrawn from all direct contact with the world, and His action is mediated by angels and spirits, personifications of the forces of nature and of divine attributes.

God created at first, besides heaven, earth, and sea, 'all the spirits which serve before him, the angels of the presence, and the angels of sanctification, and the angels [of the spirit of the fire, and the angels] of the spirit of the winds, and the angels of the spirit of the clouds, and of darkness, and of snow and of hail and of hoar frost, and the angels of the voices and of the thunder and of the lightning, and the angels of the spirits of cold and of heat, and of winter and of spring and of autumn and of summer, and of all the spirits of his creatures which are in the heavens and on the earth' (*Jub.* ii. 2, Charles's tr.; cf. *Enoch* lx. 11 ff.).

Apart from the personifications, the conception is not unlike that of deism. God as First Cause created all things, but at the same time He created spirits and angels, to which as second causes He deputed the control of all the processes of nature. It is an amalgam of animism and deism.

In Alexandria Jewish thought was formulated under Greek influence, and the action of God upon the world is expressed in more abstract terms. The heathen practice of regarding objects of nature as 'gods that rule the world' is repudiated, and an 'argument from design' is urged as a reason why men should recognize God 'by giving heed to his works' (*Wis* 13¹⁻⁹). Nature is simply and directly obedient to God's will. The marvels of OT history were God's acts of new creation for the sake of His people (*Wis* 19⁶; cf. 16¹⁷⁻²⁴). Here Wisdom personified is the mediator of God's activity in creation and providence (*Pr* 8²⁷, *Wis* 7²² etc.).

In the more developed system of Philo God's Logos and His powers are at once the media of His action and the principles of being and order in the world. His fidelity to OT ideas guards Philo from merging God and His powers in nature as mere immanent principles. He follows the Mosaic teaching that God created the world, though whether out of nothing or out of pre-existing matter is not clear. He carries the doctrine of divine transcendence and of the metaphysical antithesis between God and the world to the extreme limit, though he does not accept moral dualism. The world in itself is not evil, but the most perfect work of God. Philo gives profuse descriptions and discussions of the world as it exists. He follows in the main the teaching of the Greek science of his time, but expresses it in allegories of OT language. He conceives nature in general as a system of uniformities as complete and regular as that of modern science.

'Equality, the mother of justice . . . has ordered all things well, things in heaven and things on earth, by immovable laws and ordinances' (*de Justitia*, 14).

Yet some relics of primitive animism survive, as in the idea that the planets were living beings which moved themselves in their uniform order (see James Drummond, *Philo Judæus*, London, 1888, i. 267-313).

2. Primitive Christian teaching.—(a) *Common elements*.—In the NT, as in the OT, there appears a sense of the order and beauty of the world, as the product of God's wisdom, power, and goodness. They were not scientific or philosophical principles of uniformity or necessity or of the reign of law, but a *sensus communis* of the customary and normal processes of nature. Extraordinary events which we call 'miracles' were therefore regarded as signs and wonders, but not as violations of a natural order or law. They presented no intellectual problem, for they were manifestations of the power of God working freely according to His inscrutable will. They were neither contrary to nature nor above nature, but a part of the totality of divine operation which constituted, sustained, and governed the whole world. This pure and arbitrary theism had, however, been modified by

influences of Persian dualism and Greek polydæmonism allied with survivals of Semitic animism.

Angels might intervene and direct the course of nature for man's benefit (*Mt* 28², *Jn* 5⁴ RVm; cf. *Rev* 14¹⁸ 16⁴), but they too were agents of God's will and ministers of His power. Demons and evil spirits could also work injury to man, and certain classes of diseases were traced to their agency. The devil and his angels were a semi-independent kingdom over against God, but they too were subject to the power of God.

(b) *Jesus Christ* adopted these ideas and terms of His time. But whatever of dualism or pluralism was involved in them He eliminated by bringing all the processes of nature into the most direct and intimate relation with the idea of the Fatherhood of God. This governed His fundamental attitude towards nature. God's love and care for man determined all His activity in the world, and nothing happened except by the Father's will. 'All things are possible with God' (*Mk* 10²⁷), and not even a sparrow falls to the ground without the Father's will (*Mt* 10²⁹). God gives 'good things' to them that ask Him (*Mt* 7¹¹), and those who seek first His Kingdom and His righteousness will find nature and providence gracious (*Mt* 6³³). The processes of nature were neither eudæmonistic nor retributive in detail. Pain and sorrow were terrible realities which the best could least avoid. On the other hand, a misfortune like blindness need not be the result of sin (*Jn* 9²), and calamities did not prove that the victims were greater sinners than others (*Lk* 13⁴). The lilies grew beautiful, although they neither toiled nor spun. God 'maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust' (*Mt* 5⁴⁵). The order of nature is the process of divine love and mercy. Christ's view of the world is teleological and optimistic. God directs all nature to fulfil His fatherly purpose, and nothing exists or happens which cannot be subordinated to that purpose.

The sayings of Jesus are unique in their time for their appreciation of nature's glory. His interest extended to birds and flowers, and His parables reveal that intimate communion with Nature which enabled Him to see in her face the symbols and the effulgence of divine truth. He loved all Nature. There might be evil spirits, alien enemies in Nature's realm, and in men sin and evil were manifest, but Jesus taught no doctrine of permanent and radical evil in the nature of things. He was no ascetic who held things to be evil in themselves. He condemned the pursuit of mammon and riches only because men made *things* their supreme good and put them in the place of God. But He appreciated *things* in their right place and use (*Mt* 11¹⁹ 15¹, *Lk* 7³⁴). And, even so far as the world had been subordinated to evil influences by men's sins, God's action in it would eliminate the evil and bring into existence a regenerate world (*Mt* 19²⁸, *Lk* 20³⁴⁻³⁶). This is no scientific or philosophic theory of the universe. It was not then, nor is it yet, demonstrably true. But it is the attitude of Christian faith towards the universe, because it is the Father's work.

(c) *Apostolic theories*.—Christ's ruling ideas appear in the writings of the apostles, but, as they addressed heathen as well as Jewish readers, they had occasion to develop in a more speculative way the conception of the relation of God to the world. Paul in several places expresses the principles that were subsequently developed into the cosmological and teleological proofs of the being of God. At Lystra he declared that the living God 'made the heaven and the earth and the sea, and all that in them is,' and that 'he left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave you from

with 'gods' is certain. Just as gifts, not to the *pretas* (dead), but to human beings in order to help the *preta*, are in the oldest and most orthodox Buddhism the substitute for offerings to the dead, so gods are not entitled to worship (*pūjā*) or to sacrifice (*homa*),¹ but they must take their part in the general benevolence of the saint. The saint must honour the deities 'who haunt the spot where he has taken his abode.'

'Revered, they will revere him; honoured, they will honour him again; they are gracious to him as a mother to her own, her only son; and the man who has the grace of gods, good fortune he beholds.'

And the best way of honouring the deities is 'to give them the merit of his gifts to the brethren, good men of good control.'²

Among all beings, Buddha has been the most honoured and beloved by the 'gods.' The joy of the 'angels' at the birth of Buddha is described in a well-known hymn of the *Suttanipāta*, which has been unduly compared with the gospel narrative of the Nativity. These deities are not 'angels,' but, from the moral point of view, poor creatures, unable to enter the way of salvation, very good nevertheless—at least many of them—and of a very gentle nature. They were happy at the birth of Śākyamuni and miserable at his death.

'For twelve leagues, Ananda, around the Fig-tree grove of the Mallas, the Upavatana of Kusinārā, there is not a spot in size even as the pricking of the point of the tip of a hair which is not pervaded by powerful spirits. And the spirits are murmuring . . . the death of a Tathāgata will take place. . . . They dishevel their hair and weep, stretch forth their arms and weep, fall prostrate on the ground, and roll to and fro in anguish at the thought: "Too soon will the Exalted One die."³

From the physical point of view, *devatās* are by no means contemptible. Some possess 'great might and power.'

'A Devatā by intense meditation on the idea of the minutest portion of earth and on the idea of the widest expanse of water, can make this earth move and tremble and be shaken violently.'⁴

And, if Buddha, and all the saints like Buddha endowed with the power of benevolence,⁵ command the love and obedience of all the deities, that is not the case with ordinary people; since the oldest days of India—in fact, since palæolithic times—deities have assumed two aspects: they are frightful (*rudra*) and propitious (*śiva*); they are fanciful, covetous, capricious; human beings have to 'tame' them, if they want to live happily. Hence the efforts of Buddha to 'convert' the deities, to teach them the elementary rules of morality, 'not to kill,' etc. We are told that he succeeded; he can at least boast of having converted and turned the chief of the spirits, 'Holder of the Thunderbolt' (Vajrapāni guhyesvara), into the protector of the faithful;⁶ the once formidable goddess of small-pox, Haritī, the child-devourer, into protector of mothers and of children;⁷ nevertheless, much remains to be done—as the race of malignant spirits is increased every day by the rebirth of malignant men—and accordingly Buddhists have been provided with protections, 'cuirasses' (*kavacha*), *paritrā* (*pirit*), or *rakṣas*, of every kind. We must not suppose that the Buddhist monks were, in old days, ignorant of the first principles of the faith, namely, that gods have nothing to do with salvation, that a good Buddhist has nothing to fear

from the demons, but sin and distraction (*pramāda*) are the real Fiend; but it may be safely surmised, from the texts themselves, that the ancient Buddhists were concerned with the *rākṣasas* and the *yakṣas* just as Burmese monks are nowadays concerned with *nats*, and just as Tibetan monks are concerned with *yi-dams*.

The stories of the conversion of Vajrapāni and of Haritī are among the good stories of Buddhist folklore; and the history of this conversion, i.e. the processes by which nature-gods of the most malignant forms have been developed into faithful and benevolent deities, is not to be forgotten by the student of the history of religion. Buddhism has deified its saints and 'sanctified' the Hindu gods—a movement in two parallel directions, the second of which has proved not the less important for the prosperity and the longevity of the Good Law; both may possibly have modified to some extent the primitive position of the Saṅgha. Rhys Davids remarks ('Buddhist Suttas,' *SBE* xi. [1900] 20) that the Mahāparinibbāna passage commented upon above (p. 210, n. 2) 'gives Buddhaghosa [the orthodox commentator of the Pāli canon] a good deal of difficulty, as it apparently inculcates offerings to the gods, which is contrary not only to both the letter and spirit of Buddhism, but also to the practice of Buddhists.' *Bhakti*-offerings, *pūjā*-offerings—that is to say, devotional and liturgic offerings—are indeed contrary to the letter and to the spirit of the oldest Buddhism, but it is an old Indian *dictum* that 'Each god is entitled to obtain his own offering' (*yādṛśo yakṣas tādṛśo balih*); and it may be confidently asserted that Buddhism has never—in practice—denied the right *balī* to the right *yakṣa*. These are mere trifles, small concessions to the needs of practical life, which cannot endanger the normal and energetic endeavour of the saint walking in the Path.

LITERATURE.—On the old Hindu pantheon in Buddhism much information can be found in the *Mahāsamayasutta* and in the *Āṭṇāṭṭiyasutta* (*Dighanikāya*, xx. and xxxii.).

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

NATURE (Christian).—I. Antecedent factors.—Christianity entered into a heritage of ideas about the world consisting of a background of Semitic mythology, the revelation of the OT with Jewish developments of it, certain elements from Persian thought, and ultimately the whole framework of Greek philosophy.

In its developed form the OT doctrine affirms that Jahweh, now the one, universal God, created all things out of original chaos, gives a mythical (Babylonian) account of the method and process of creation (Gn 1-2), and establishes God's providential rule over all things upon His creatorship (Is 40). The world therefore is a manifestation of God's power, glory, and goodness (Pss 19, 29, 104, etc.). All the processes of nature are His direct acts, the thunder is His voice (Ps 29), the light His garment, the winds His messengers, the lightning His ministers (Ps 104²). But Jahweh was no nature-god. He was in no way involved in nature, no system of natural laws or cosmic principles limited or qualified His action, nor was His being dependent on the world. The OT does not argue from the world to God in the manner of the cosmological and teleological arguments, but it descends from the idea of God into the world, and in its manifold beauty, power, and goodness it apprehends the free and sovereign activity of God (P. Thomson, 'God in Nature and in History,' *Exp* II. i. [1881] 161-179, 241-252).

In post-canonical Jewish literature the ideas of God's freedom, sovereignty, and transcendence were still more enhanced; and the idea of the world as an independent reality over against God is more emphasized. To secure God's holiness and

¹ On the contrary, Mahāyāna Buddhism is devotional, and Tantric Buddhism is liturgic. The *homa*-literature is pre-eminent in Tantrism.

² *Dighanikāya*, ii. 88 f.; Rhys Davids, ii. 93 f.

³ Rhys Davids, ii. 151 f.

⁴ *Ib.* 115.

⁵ On the power of benevolence see, e.g., *Mahāvagga*, vi. 38. 4; *Chullavagga*, v. 6. 1.

⁶ See E. Senart, 'Vajrapāni dans les sculptures du Gandhāra,' in *Actes du 11^e congrès international des orientalistes*, Paris, 1906-08, t. I. 121; C. M. Pleyte, 'Vajrapāni als Dharmapāla,' in *Bijdragen . . . van Nederlandsch Indië*, vi. x. [1902] 195; Foucher, ii. 105; L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme*, Paris, 1909, pp. 372-375.

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(c) *Apostolic theories*.—Christ's ruling ideas appear in the writings of the apostles, but, as they addressed heathen as well as Jewish readers, they had occasion to develop in a more speculative way the conception of the relation of God to the world. Paul in several places expresses the principles that were subsequently developed into the cosmological and teleological proofs of the being of God. At Lystra he declared that the living God 'made the heaven and the earth and the sea, and all that in them is,' and that 'he left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave you from

heaven rains and fruitful seasons, filling your hearts with food and gladness' (Ac 14¹⁵⁻¹⁷). He used similar arguments on Mars' Hill (Ac 17²⁴⁻²⁶) and in the Epistle to the Romans (1²⁰). The point of the argument in each case is, not the being of God, which is assumed, but His nature and operation. Creation, providence, and nature are manifestations and proofs of the unity, spirituality, power, and goodness of God. Conversely, the Apostle's conception of God becomes his interpretation of nature. Paul is acutely conscious of the presence of evil and sin in the world (Eph 2³). Sin has made its seat in the flesh, whose very nature has been therefore corrupted (Ro 7¹⁸). Yet Paul's view of the universe as a whole is optimistic. 'To them that love God all things work together for good' (Ro 8²⁸; cf. vv. 20, 21). The world as God's creation is essentially good. Man's sin has subjected it to vanity, but it has not turned nature from God's purpose of goodness, and His salvation will deliver it from corruption 'into the liberty of the glory of the children of God.'

Paul retains the OT idea of God's direct creatorship (2 Co 4⁶, 1 Co 12¹⁸ 15³⁸), but in his later writing as well as in Hebrews and the Fourth Gospel traces are found of the Philonic doctrine of the Logos as the mediator of creation and the principle of nature. The term is used only in the Fourth Gospel, where the Logos is identified with Christ, and represented as issuing from God to be the maker of all things and the principle of life and light immanent in the world (Jn 1¹⁻⁴, 10). Similarly, according to Paul and Hebrews, Christ emanates from God (Ph 2⁶, He 1³) and 'all things have been created through him, and unto him . . . and in him all things consist' (Col 1¹⁶, 17). God 'appointed him heir of all things, through whom also he made the worlds' (He 1²). This conception of the Logos, as it is the interpretation of nature, differs in some important respects from that of Philo. The Logos is more closely identified with God, and therefore expresses better God's creative activity and immanence in the world. Its identification with Christ gives it the moral significance of His person, and the world process derived from Him is likewise moral (W. Beyschlag, *NT Theology*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1895, ii. 98). The dualism which Philo had inherited from Plato is thus almost, if not entirely, eliminated. Perhaps something of it survives in Paul's doctrine of the flesh, in the belief in evil spirits, and particularly in the Johannine idea of the world as evil. This world is primarily the world of men in their opposition to God (Jn 1¹⁰ 17¹⁶, 1 Jn 3¹⁻¹³), but sin has vitiated the whole fabric of society, and even the objects of creation which form its environment (1 Jn 2¹⁵⁻¹⁷). Yet God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son to save it (Jn 3¹⁶), and in the final consummation of salvation He will make a new heaven and a new earth (Rev 21). Man may be sanctified in flesh and spirit (1 Th 4⁵, 5²³, Ro 6¹⁹). All rule and authority and power and dominion, all evil spirits, will be brought into final subjection to Jesus Christ (1 Co 15²⁴⁻²⁷, Eph 1²¹).

Judaism had over-emphasized the transcendence of God and His arbitrary rule over the world. Greek thought tended to merge God in the world, which then became a necessary manifestation of divine reason. Christ and the apostles qualified Jewish transcendence by the revelation of God in Christ and of His immanence in nature and man. Yet it was not the essential and necessary immanence of Greek thought, but the personal and moral immanence of love and grace. Christ interpreted nature through His own filial consciousness of the Father; and the apostles through Christ's moral and redemptive personality. Nature, therefore,

could not be a system of mechanical uniformity and necessity, but it was a moral order in which God's unchanging purpose of grace is realized in His free activity through Christ. In such a system the antithesis of natural and supernatural could not arise, for with God all things are possible and natural, and without Him nothing is possible.

3. Hellenistic-Christian theories.—(a) *Assimilation*.—When the Christian Church entered the heathen world, it came face to face with a long tradition of Greek cosmology and science. Plato had established a dualistic separation between the sensual and the supersensual, between the world and God. Aristotle had defined their relation theistically—God was the First Cause of the world—and he had greatly enlarged the scientific knowledge of the world. The Stoics had conceived the universe as a system of law and necessity, wherein the world-process was ordered and governed by the divine Logos, and, inconsistently, they interpreted the process teleologically as realizing the ends of divine reason. Eclecticism had gathered all these ideas together into a more or less coherent system. On the basis of Platonic dualism Aristotle's scientific theism and Stoic monism had so far coalesced that God as transcendent cause was conceived as creator of the world and as the author and sustainer of its order and law.

Both the natural tendency to assimilate prevalent ideas and the necessity to commend itself to contemporary intelligence compelled Christianity to assume a scientific and philosophic form, which it did by adopting the current ideas of Greek science without change, and by adapting to its use such philosophic principles as would best harmonize with its own principles.

(b) *The Gnostics*.—The Gnostics were the first Christian theologians who developed a theory of the universe on the basis of religion. On two points their theories diverged so widely from the Christian position as to involve a direct contradiction of it. They conceived the relation of God to the spiritual universe pantheistically rather than theistically, as a process of emanation rather than as an act of creation. On the other hand, they conceived the material universe in a thoroughly dualistic fashion. The formless matter out of which the world was made, by one of the lower æons or spirits, was evil and antagonistic to God, so that the cosmic process was a strife between good and evil, and nature was so predominantly evil that it was destined to perish in the process of the redemption and restoration of the world of spirits. A still more extreme dualism, moral and metaphysical, was embodied in Manichæism (*q.v.*; see also Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, iii. 316-336). Such dualism was not only inconsistent with the Divine Fatherhood, but incompatible with the more general principles of monotheism, and the Christian Church opposed Manichæism and repudiated Gnosticism.

(c) *The Greek Apologists and Fathers*.—The Greek Apologists and Fathers developed a new theory of the world, which, while it did not quite eliminate dualism, strove to comprehend under the category of the Logos the complete rule of God over the whole world-process.

'God, the Maker of this universe, has made all things by the Logos which is from him' (Athenag. *Leg.* iv.).

'The immediate Creator, and, as it were, very Maker of the world was the Logos, the Son of God, while the Father of the Logos, by commanding His own Son—the Logos—to create the world, is primarily its Creator' (Origen, *c. Celsum*, vi. 66).

'For God is good, or rather is essentially the source of goodness: nor could one that is good be niggardly of anything: whence, grudging existence to none, He has made all things out of nothing by His own Logos, Jesus Christ our Lord' (Athan. *de Incarn.* iii. 3).

As to the method of creation, the account given in Genesis was generally accepted, but with vary-

ing interpretations. Clement and Origen defended the Mosaic cosmogony, but, by allegorical interpretation, they read into it much of their Neo-Platonic philosophy.

'God of his goodness and love created the world of Ideas, the invisible heaven and earth, and in accordance with this divine model, the Word gave shape and substance to the material universe' (O. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, p. 107; cf. p. 240).

Creation was an eternal process issuing from the unchangeable essence of God, and therefore of the nature of a physical and necessary emanation, as distinguished from the Christian idea of a free creative act, which was the general view of the Greek Fathers in the 4th and 5th centuries (Origen, *de Prin.* i. ii. 10, iii. iv. 3; Harnack, iii. 249; cf. Windelband, *Hist. of Philosophy*, p. 250 f.).

From the Apologists to Athanasius, there was also considerable development of ideas on the two points of the *immediacy* and *completeness* of God's creative act. The mediating Logos, according to the Apologists, was an independent being of temporal origin; according to the Alexandrians, He was co-eternal with God, but *ἕτερος θεός*; according to Athanasius, He was co-eternal and consubstantial with God, so that God in Him stood in direct relation to the world. According to the Apologists, the world was created out of pre-existing matter (Justin, *Apol.* i. 10); according to the Alexandrians, God created out of nothing the matter with which He made the world (Clem. *Strom.* v. xiv. 89; Origen, *de Prin.* ii. i. 4 f.); and Athanasius argues that Almighty God could only create out of nothing (*de Incarn.* ii. 4 f.).

God of His goodness created the world for the sake of rational beings. From Plato downwards the world was conceived teleologically as the scene and process whereby God realized His purpose of goodness towards man. For man as a rational being was essentially superior to all creatures, and the whole of nature is arranged to supply his needs and to afford opportunity for the development of his rational capacity (Origen, *c. Celsum*, iv. 75-99). It might therefore be expected that the world in all its parts and operations would manifest the wisdom and goodness of God. And the Greeks, both pagan and Christian, were duly impressed with the unity, harmony, order, and beauty of the universe. Although the Greek theologians had but little scientific interest in nature, they make frequent references to its order and bounty as evidences of the being and nature of God (e.g., Origen, *c. Celsum*, i. 23).

Yet the harmony was manifestly marred by evil.

'The sure and universal conviction was that the present condition and course of the world is not of God, but is of the devil' (Harnack, i. 182).

All Christian doctrine involves the idea of a fall, whereby the processes of nature as well as the lives of men were turned aside from their original and proper course. Platonic and Gnostic theories which traced evil to matter, and which would therefore make evil inherent in nature, were indeed strenuously repudiated. The fall was moral, not natural, and due to the voluntary acts of rational creatures, among whom Origen reckoned the sun, moon, and stars, as well as men, angels, and evil spirits (*de Prin.* ii. ix. 6). But he regards even the diversity and plurality in the universe as a departure from the unity, from God—a metaphysical fall which seems to establish evil in the nature of things. And the practical dualism of asceticism and monasticism found much support in Origen's philosophy. But his belief in monotheism, in the almighty power and goodness of God, and in free will led Origen, like the other Greek Fathers, to deny vigorously that evil inhered in nature. He also rejected the idea of a mechanical uniformity,

either in the recurring cycles of the universe or in the order of nature, because it would exclude the free will from whose acts sin and evil had to be derived. Nor was evil permitted to mar ultimately the perfection of God's plan, for He so orders the whole that it fulfils one ideal of perfect harmony (*ib.* ii. i. 3). He has so ordained the cycles of the æons and the processes of nature that they serve to discipline rational beings, and to lead them back to the original unity. Thus will all evil and disorder disappear 'when all things shall be re-established in a state of unity and when God shall be all in all' (*ib.* iii. vi. 6). Apocalyptic hopes proved the way of escape from dualism and despair for the early Church. Because of sin the present world was evil and under the dominion of demons, but it was a temporary phase to pass away speedily, and a restored and renovated world after God's perfect plan would soon be ushered in with the new age. Though the world was bad, nature was good and able to cast off its evil condition.

4. The Latin Fathers.—The Latin Fathers adopt in the main the theory of the universe developed in Greek theology, though with some characteristic differences.

'The one God, by His commanding word, His arranging wisdom, His mighty power, brought forth from nothing this entire mass of our world, with all its array of elements, bodies, spirits, for the glory of His majesty' (Tert. *Apol.* 17; cf. 11, 21).

The Genesis story is accepted literally as the way in which God perfected all His works in due order (Tert. *adv. Herm.* 29).

(a) *Tertullian*.—Tertullian states with new emphasis and clearness that God made the world out of nothing and it will therefore return to nothing. This is the theme of several of his treatises against the Gnostics (e.g., *adv. Herm.*, *adv. Valent.*). One characteristic difference between Greek and Latin thought was that the former was never quite free from a pantheistic tendency to derive the world to some extent by way of emanation from God's essence, but in Latin thought God's creative activity is free and even arbitrary, for it is not conditioned by His essence. Conversely, the world thus made out of nothing by God's free act assumes a more independent existence over against God. Although Tertullian and Minucius Felix wrote against Stoicism and rejected its pantheism, their view of nature as a totality of substances, laws, principles, and order, once created complete in itself, was largely Stoic. To the Stoic conception of a self-subsistent world they added the Hebrew-Christian conception of God as its original Creator. They came nearer to the deistic view than the Greeks. Nature was a most holy and 'reverend' work of God, 'an object of reverence' (Tert. *adv. Marcion.* iii. 11, *de Anima*, 27). As it enshrines the wisdom and truth of God, man may learn from it the general principles of religion and morality apart from revelation (*de Res. Carn.* 12). There is a common law of God 'prevailing all over the world, engraven on the natural tables' (*de Corona*, 5 f.). Tertullian appeals to the Roman emperors for the fundamental human right to worship as a privilege of nature (*ad Scapulam*, 2). The knowledge of God is manifest, not only from the works of His hands, but from 'the noble testimony of the human soul by nature Christian' (*Apol.* 17; cf. *de Test. Animæ*, 1). Christian experience is the special realm of the supernatural revelation and operation of the Spirit of God, but all nature's processes also correspond with the mind of God. There are two divine operations, natural and supernatural, but one truth. Tertullian shows a deep interest in the detailed processes of nature, which he conceived in the manner of Heraclitus as continual change ending in a final conflagration. He realized the difficulty which

evil and sin presented to his view of nature as a perfect work of God. Some evils and calamities he explains as means to the fulfilment of God's purpose, but radical evil and sin he traces to the free action of men and evil spirits. Nature is originally and essentially good, but the devil is the corrupter of nature (*de Cult. Fem.* i. 8). Yet he cannot corrupt the substance created by God. Paul's censure of the flesh applies not to its substance but to its action (*de Res. Carn.* 10). Christ abolishes not *carnem peccati* but *peccatum carnis*, not the substance of flesh but its *culpa* (*de Carn. Christi*, 16). And in the human soul the rational element belongs to its nature, but the irrational elements and the sinful tendencies emanate from the devil and enter the soul by acts of sin (*de Anima*, 16). Yet sin entered into human nature, and so into the world, at so early a stage that in a secondary sense it has become part of nature.

'The corruption of our nature is another nature, having a god and father of its own, the author of corruption' (*de Anima*, 41; cf. 16, 27, 89).

Even death is not a condition of nature, but the result of sin—the product of a fault and defect which is not itself natural; but it is easy to apply the term 'natural' to faults and defects that are inseparable from us since our birth, or even earlier (Traducianism). Thus, while Tertullian vigorously contends against the metaphysical dualism of the Gnostics, and in the main adopts the optimistic theory of nature which he had derived from the Greeks, his deep sense of sin and evil led him to lay the foundations of that Western doctrine of radical evil which was more fully developed by Augustine. Tertullian's writings also abound in ascetic teachings which easily led to the pessimism and contempt of nature that became rife in later ages. The large place and powerful influence which he ascribes to the devil in human conduct and destiny were inconsistent with an optimistic conception of nature in the widest sense. He never really faced the problem of evil on the large scale. He could retain his conception of nature as a perfect work of God only by assuming a realm of evil outside nature balanced by a realm of grace above nature, neither of which he attempted to fit into a theory of reality as a whole.

(b) *Augustine*.—The doctrine of radical evil was further developed by Ambrose of Milan (see Harnack, v. 49), and was finally stated as part of a system of the universe by his disciple, Augustine. With Augustine Patristic thought for the first time attains to a thoroughly subjective point of view. God and the soul are the two poles on which his whole system revolves. His interest in external nature and his theories of it are therefore secondary to and dependent upon his view of the relation between God and the soul. His philosophy is fundamentally spiritualistic. He even approaches pantheism. Will is the sole efficient cause. The will of God is the original and supreme cause of all things. Created spirits, angels and men, both good and bad, are also efficient causes in a secondary sense, but they have no power except what God has bestowed upon them. Material or natural causes are not efficient causes at all, 'because they can only do what the wills of spirits do by them.' Nature as a system of law and order is 'an order of causes in which the highest efficiency is attributed to the will of God' (*de Civ. Dei*, v. 9). God, being supremely good, can will only that which is good, and therefore all nature or substance is essentially good. By His good will He has given existence, form, quality, life, reason, beauty, position, relation, and all other attributes to everything in its due order, not only to heaven and earth, men and angels, but to the smallest and most contemptible

animal, to the feather of a bird, the flower of a plant, the leaf of a tree—all have their harmony and mutual place as parts of the great whole. It is not a necessary uniformity in nature, but the harmony of God's will. Even miracles are miracles only in a relative sense, for all events, whether normal or abnormal, issue directly from the will of God. Even the evil which other wills do, God so overrules that it does not mar, but rather completes, the harmony of His good purpose (*ib.* v. 11, vii. 30, x. 12, xi. 22, *de Moribus Manich.* 7, c. *Faustum*, xxi. 5).

Yet Augustine was intensely conscious of the reality of evil both in himself and in the world around him. In their normal state both the individual soul and human society were given over to evil as kingdoms of the devil. But this too was not of nature, but of will. God was the author of all natures and substances, and He could make nothing evil (*de Moribus Manich.* 2).

'The origin of sin is in the will; therefore in the will also is the origin of evil, both in the sense of acting against a just precept and in the sense of suffering under a just sentence' (c. *Faustum*, xxii. 22; cf. *de Civ. Dei*, xii. 1).

Physical evil is the result of moral evil. Pelagius argued therefore that nature, in spite of sin, is essentially good, because sin is only a momentary act of will that cannot pervert or corrupt the nature or produce an evil nature (Harnack, v. 194). But Augustine held that nature and will are so intimately bound up together that the will perverted by sin perverts and vitiates the nature itself, so that it becomes impotent to resist sin ('*natura vitata, massa perditionis, non posse non peccare*'). But there was in Augustine's doctrine a deeper element of dualism, a relic of Manichæan or Platonic influence, for the nature that was vitiated by sin held the capacity of corruption because it was created out of nothing, and evil is the privation of being; Augustine seems to regard the privation of existence in created things as in some sense a positive evil (*de Moribus Manich.* vii. 10, c. *Epistolam Manichæi*, xxxvi. 41). On the other hand, nature thus vitiated by sin can be restored to goodness, not by the creative or providential act of God, but by a supernatural act of grace through Jesus Christ and the Church, which is therefore a new and higher order of existence over against the old order of the sinful world. External nature is involved in the calamity of sin as the instrument of its punishment. God has not withdrawn all His creative goodness, for He has filled this misery of the human race with the rich and countless blessings of nature, and of the arts and sciences of civilized life (*de Civ. Dei*, xxii. 22, 23, 24). Yet the whole framework of nature has been irretrievably disordered by sin:

'From this hell upon earth there is no escape, save through the grace of the Saviour' (*ib.* xxii. 22), and 'all to which the New Testament invites belongs to that future inheritance which awaits us in the world to come' (*ib.* xxi. 15).

Nature as it is, therefore, stands in a double antithesis: (1) to original nature as God created it, and (2) to the realm of grace into which the elect are delivered from the corruption and misery of the present world. Augustine's doctrine of the two realms, of nature and grace, or of the natural and supernatural, has held sway over Christian thought down to the present time.

5. *Mediæval supernaturalism*.—The living interest of mediæval thought was almost entirely metaphysical.

(a) *John Scotus Erigena*, the most powerful and original mind in the early Middle Ages, in his chief work, *de Divisione Naturæ*, defines nature as the *processus* of the divine being in four successive stages: (1) nature uncreated and creating, or God in Himself; (2) nature created and creating, or God as proleptical cause of all things; (3) nature

created but not creating, the world as the continuous evolution process of the one divine substance; (4) nature neither creating nor created, God all in all at the end of the process.

'Of fatal necessity God eventually withdraws again into Himself; this is the final cosmic absorption in the bosom of the Great All' (M. de Wulf, *Hist. of Medieval Philosophy*, pp. 167-170).

Erigena's identification of all reality with God was not generally accepted by the Church, but the predominance of the metaphysical standpoint is equally manifest in the chief problem that engaged the thought of the later Scholastics.

(b) *The controversy about universals.*—The problem was mainly epistemological. Realists and conceptualists were manifestly concerned about abstract ideas, and nominalism, in spite of its more empirical trend, confined its outlook to the abstract problem of knowledge, and developed no interest in things.

(c) *The mediæval metaphysics of nature*, apart from Erigena's pantheism, was in all essentials Augustine's. God created all things by an act of will after the exemplar that He had in His mind (Aquinas, *Summa Theol.* i. xix. 4). He created all nature's good, and evil is neither a being nor a good, but the absence of being (*ib.* xviii.). The causality of God extends to all beings, not only to species, but to individuals. All things are directed by God to one end. The order of the universe is also a good which God has created (*ib.* xxii. 1, 2). And this order involves a gradation of being which admits the possibility of evil, but all actual evil issues from evil wills (*ib.* xlix.). All the Scholastics regarded the world chiefly as an effect of which God is the cause. Anselm, indeed, not content to base the proof of God's existence on creation, devised the ontological argument, but his successors rejected it, and fell back on proofs of the cosmological type. These have been criticized as implying a deistic separation between God and the world which limits His being and negates His immanence, but it is equally true that they tend to empty the world of its reality, for its substance or nature which was good was only the activity of God, while the evil in it was the negation of divine activity.

(d) *Practical dualism.*—While the metaphysical theory of evil represented it as negation, for the practical thought of the time it was the most terrible and dominant reality. The dualistic trend in earlier thought ran riot in the Middle Ages under the two forms of asceticism and diabolism. (i.) From the 2nd cent. downwards ascetic ideas asserted themselves in the Church. In the 3rd cent. men began to flee from this evil world to find peace and salvation in the desert. During the 4th cent. monasticism established itself as a permanent institution in the East. Its rise in the West was later—the Benedictine order in the 6th cent., the Clunian reform in the 11th, the Mendicant orders in the 13th—but it dominated the life and thought of the Western Church in the Middle Ages. Its chief, though not its only, underlying principles were that the world of sense was evil and therefore to be avoided, and that the normal processes of nature were, if not essentially evil,¹ at least occasions of evil.

¹ To many, indeed, virginity was neither more nor less than the very essence of Christian morality' (Harnack, *Monasticism*, Eng. tr., London, 1901, pp. 65, 67).

(ii.) Above all, the present world was under the dominion of the devil and his host of evil demons. Primitive animism, belched forth from the abysses of Western paganism, allied itself with Manichaean, monastic, and chiliastic elements in the mind of the Church, and all but submerged Christian mono-

¹ St. Francis of Assisi was a notable exception, whose love of nature was equal to his asceticism, but he stood alone, except for some intimations of a revived appreciation of nature found in poetry.

theism and every idea of a world created, ordered, and ruled by divine wisdom and goodness. Evil spirits swarmed upon the earth, ubiquitous and nearly all-powerful. Nature and man were their playthings. Magic, sorcery, witchcraft, possession, *incubi*, *succubæ*, alchemy, heresy, even science and philosophy, were forms of their activity. God, Christ, the Virgin, angels, saints, and sacraments afforded but uncertain protection against their devices to destroy men's souls. For the popular mind, a metaphysical supernaturalism was a poor protection against a nature diabolism.

(e) *Symbolism.*—The remedy was sought neither in science nor in theology, but in a symbolic interpretation of nature. If actual nature had been reduced to vanity by evil spirits, it still retained the form and image of the true and good, and so could be the efficacious instrument of divine grace. The idea that things had a double meaning, one obvious and the other hidden, had prevailed in many forms, in animism, poetry, Christ's parables, Plato's idealism, Alexandrian allegorism. The Patristic age developed the doctrine that the water of baptism, and the bread and wine in the Supper, had a mysterious and miraculous significance and efficacy for salvation. But there was no logical reason for limiting symbolical significance to a few natural elements. Sacraments were multiplied, and Hugo of St. Victor (1096-1141), in his *de Sacramentis Christianæ Fidei*, propounded the theory that the whole visible creation was a symbol of the invisible world and a revelation of divine truth (H. O. Taylor, *The Mediæval Mind*², vol. ii. ch. xxix.). But the symbolical interpretation of nature did not really reconcile it to God nor present a Christian theory of it. It was but a magic bridge cast by illusion over the chasm of dualism, and it availed only so long as the illusion lasted. When men at last brushed away the cobwebs of animism, diabolism, and symbolism, and gazed upon Nature herself, they entered into a universe very different from the supernaturalism and symbolism of the Church.

6. *Physical science in the Middle Ages.*—The mediæval Church preserved the tradition of science, and in its later period one here and there who manifested a new interest in nature may be reckoned as a forerunner of the modern science of nature. The end of the Patristic age, from Ambrose and Augustine to Gregory, descended to the lowest level of ignorance and indifference about nature. A semi-mythical book called the *Physiologus* supplanted the place of natural history (Taylor, i. 76). Boethius (470-525), by his translation of Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *de Categoritis* and *de Interpretatione*, revived some study of logic. Martianus Capella (5th cent.), in his *Satyricon*, or *de Nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae*, gave a compendium of the seven liberal arts, grammar, rhetoric, dialectic (= *trivium*), arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music (= *quadrivium*), which became the standard text-book. Similar compendia were *de Artibus ac Disciplinis Liberalium Litterarum* of Cassiodorus (c. 470-570), *Originum seu Etymologiarum Libri XX* of Isidore of Seville (c. 560-636), *de Natura Rerum* of the Venerable Bede (c. 674-734), and *de Universo* of Rabanus Maurus (c. 776-856). Physics or natural science was included in all the traditional divisions of philosophy, but it only amounted to a collection of traditional lore.

From the 10th to the 12th cent. a new quickening influence emerged in the Arabian philosophy derived from Aristotle by Avicenna (980-1037) and Averroës (1126-98). Gerbert of Aurillac (c. 950-1003) handled the traditional material with a new sense of the importance of mathematics and natural science. The school of Chartres was a centre of great intellectual activity. Bernard (1090-1153) wrote on

Porphyry, and, under Platonic influence, conceived nature as a living organism. His brother, Theodoric (c. 1100–55), compiled numerous books of natural knowledge. Gilbert de la Porrée (1076–1154) wrote *de Sex Principiis*—an attempt to complete Aristotle's treatment of the categories. William of Conches (1080–1154), in his *Magna de Naturis Philosophia* and *de Philosophia Mundi*, propounded an atomic theory of the universe, and displayed the interest in the medical and physiological studies of Galen and Hippocrates which marked the school of Chartres. John of Salisbury (? 1115–80) and Alan de Lille (? 1128–1202) closed the period of mere compilers and disseminators of ancient knowledge.

The greater writings of Aristotle were rediscovered about the middle of the 12th century. The stages of their appropriation by the Christian Church are represented by the writings of Alexander of Hales († 1245), Albertus Magnus (c. 1200–80), and Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle's spirit of observation and research into nature affected Albert more than the others, but his scientific achievements were negligible. Vincent of Beauvais (c. 1190–1264), in his *Speculum Majus*, another encyclopædia, reveals a genuine interest in nature (Taylor, ii. 247 f.). But all these men, whatever they observed and admired of nature, looked out upon it from the prison-house of Scholastic metaphysics. Roger Bacon (? 1210–? 1294) was of a different type—the herald of a new day. He revolted against the *a priori* methods of Scholasticism, and laid down the experimental method of modern science as the only adequate way of investigating nature—'*Oportet ergo omnia certificari per viam experientiae*' (ib. ii. 536).

One important result of the new recognition of nature as a witness of truth, and of science and philosophy as media of knowledge, was a new emphasis upon the distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge, and the acceptance of the doctrine of twofold truth, one *secundum rationem* and the other *secundum fidem*. Albert and Thomas recognized the distinction between natural and revealed religion and tried to reconcile them. Duns Scotus allowed to philosophy and theology, the natural and the supernatural, each its separate realm. But very soon the divergence grew still wider.

7. Humanism and science.—In the 15th cent. the study of the classics led men back to a new appreciation of nature and a free investigation of it, which in the 16th cent. produced the beginnings of modern science.

(a) *The philosophy of the Renaissance* was not so much a new theory of nature as a new attitude towards it. But the scientific discoveries of Copernicus and others in the 16th cent., of Galileo, Kepler, and Newton, transformed the conception of nature, and came into conflict with much that had been embodied in Roman Catholic dogma. Since the Church would not reconstruct its dogmas, a deep cleavage was made between theology and science, and once more nature was abandoned, if not to the devil, to what was confessedly an un-Christian interpretation. From the standpoint of Roman Catholic dogma the modern conception of nature is essentially un-Christian and in most respects even anti-Christian.

(b) *Protestantism* as represented in theology was only partially and gradually liberated from mediæval metaphysics, but the new spirit of free inquiry into nature's secrets found more complete expression in philosophy, science, and literature. Hence arose the so-called 'conflict between religion and science,' which was really a conflict between the old and new systems of philosophy and science.

(c) *Rationalism.*—Preoccupation with external

nature exclusively in the 17th and 18th centuries produced materialism, sensationalism, and rationalism—systems which denied altogether any spiritual meaning to nature.

(d) *Pantheism* at the other extreme, by identifying God as *natura naturans* with the world as *natura naturata*, also made all reality an impersonal, non-moral system of necessity.

(e) *Deism.*—The deists, both heterodox and orthodox, accepted the current scientific view of nature as a uniform system of properties and laws which worked automatically, but in virtue of God's creative act, and they found in it therefore evidences of certain universal truths of religion—God, virtue, future rewards and punishments. The orthodox school affirmed in addition certain special revelations and acts of God by which He remedied the defects that had entered into nature's mechanism along with sin. These the rationalists denied. But both schools assumed a twofold dualism of God and the world, of the supernatural and natural, and both placed God normally outside the universe. Nature and the Christian revelation were two distinct operations of God, and the tendency was to regard nature independently of God as self-sufficient and self-explanatory.

(f) *Naturalism.*—In the 19th cent. naturalism (and positivism), allied with agnosticism, became the legitimate successor of deism. Physical science in itself need not be religious or irreligious, but, if it is put forward as a philosophy, as a complete and adequate account of the world as a whole, it involves the denial of any moral or spiritual significance in the world. Writers like Huxley and Spencer limited all knowledge 'in the proper sense of knowing' to phenomena; and religion, the spiritual, the supernatural, were relegated to the region of the 'unknown and unknowable'; but the knowledge of nature therefore could have no religious significance. A similar but less drastic dualism between scientific knowledge of nature and religious knowledge as it is given in Christian experience appears in the school of Ritschl and in writers like Mansel and Newman.

8. Idealism and theism.—But modern thought has not been content to rest in a view of nature which leaves the new knowledge unrelated to religion, or which makes nature a complete antithesis both to God and to the spiritual being of man. A long succession of philosophers—Descartes and Leibniz, Kant, Berkeley and Butler, Hegel, Lotze, the Cairds, Rudolf Eucken, James Ward, and many more—have striven to interpret nature in correlation with the conception of God as living and personal, free and immanent in the world, by His power, wisdom, and goodness continually forming and guiding it to fulfil His perfect purpose of holiness and love. This theistic philosophy has not solved all its problems. The relation of the infinite to the finite, of the eternal to time and to the process of evolution, of the One to the many, the existence of evil, both moral and physical, are yet no more than formulated questions without answers. Theism is more a faith than a science, and it is not altogether a Christian faith. Modern thought cannot accept the Patristic and Scholastic method of imposing a Christian interpretation upon nature by authority. The Christian view has found more confident expression in some modern poets, such as Wordsworth and Browning, than in philosophy. The speculative methods of theistic philosophy move but slowly and uncertainly towards Christ's idea of the world as the Father's home and workshop. All that can be said is that theism represents nature in a way more congenial to Christian experience and thought than any other system, and that its line of progress, if it can make any progress, is set in the direction of the Christ-

ian ideal of a world in which 'all things work together for good to them that love God.'

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T. REES.

NATURE (Egyptian).—Various attempts have been made in the direction of classifying and arranging the enormous multitude of Egyptian gods. There is one groping, however, which, while it cuts across many of the other arrangements that have been suggested—human gods, animal gods, composite gods, and so forth—seems to mark a fairly broad and manifest division of Egyptian religious thought. On the one hand, we have abstract gods, called into being by the Egyptian religious consciousness as the expression of certain qualities which they found more or less present in their own natures, and assumed therefore to be necessarily inherent in their divinities. On the other hand, we have nature-gods, created by the people as the expression of certain aspects of the world and the visible universe around them. It may be a question which of these two classes of divinities came first into being; but on the whole, looking to the character of the Egyptian as a religious thinker, it seems probable that the rise of the abstract gods was a later development, and that the earliest developments of Egyptian religion were in the direction of forming gods out of the aspects and powers of nature as seen around the earliest inhabitants of the Nile Valley.

'As among all other early peoples, it was in his natural surroundings that the Egyptian first saw his gods. The trees and springs, the stones and hill-tops, the birds and beasts, were creatures like himself, or possessed of strange and uncanny powers of which he was not master. Nature thus makes the earliest impression upon the religious faculty, this visible world is first explained in terms of religious forces, and the earliest gods are the controlling forces of this material world. A social or political realm, or a domain of the spirit where the gods shall be supreme, is not yet perceived. Such divinities as these were local, each known only to the dwellers in a given locality' (Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, p. 41.).

Later, as it would appear, the more abstract aspects of divinity came into view; abstractions such as Maat, the goddess of truth, make their appearance, and even the old nature-gods change their character to some extent, and are more philosophically conceived; but Egyptian religion never made any very great advances in the direction of philosophic abstraction, and the nature-gods occupy, from first to last, by far the most important position (cf. PERSONIFICATION [Egyptian]).

They fall into two great groups: (1) sky-gods and (2) earth-gods. It would perhaps be simpler to call the sky-gods by the title of sun-gods, for they are all more or less connected with the cycle of solar deities, while the main earth-gods belong to a perfectly distinct cycle. The two great currents of religious thought in Egypt are those which deal with the Rā, or solar, cycle of divinities, and those which deal with the Osiris, or earthly, cycle. The two are found, as was to be expected, already existing side by side at the earliest period

of which we have any record; the rivalry between the two schools of thought and worship continues throughout the course of Egyptian history, and the developments of doctrine which derive from these two different lines of thought give rise to a good deal of that extraordinary confusion and inconsistency which are the first things that strike the student of Egyptian religion. The Egyptian never finally discarded either the one group or the other in his mind, and he kept side by side all the developments that arose out of the two theories of God without worrying over the fact that they were often absolutely inconsistent with each other. So we have, e.g., heavens that belong to the solar cycle co-existing in the religious literature with heavens that belong just as manifestly to the Osiris cycle, and are totally inconsistent with the others. The story of Egyptian religion is practically the story of the parallel development and rivalry of two groups of nature-gods—a heavenly, or solar, and an earthly, or Osirian. The intervals when other gods seem to onst both groups are not really exceptions to this statement. Thus, to take the most notable instance, the rise of the Theban god Amen to supremacy in the land, coinciding with the rise of Thebes as the capital city, is accomplished only by the stock-in-trade of the solar cycle of gods being credited to the Theban deity, who thus loses or sinks his own original character in order to become adequate to his new glory; Amen becomes Amen-Rā.

1. Sky-gods.—It is not difficult to see why the cosmic gods were headed and ruled in the Egyptian theory by the sun-god.

'The all-enveloping glory and power of the Egyptian sun is the most insistent fact in the Nile valley' (Breasted, p. 9).

Among the many natural agencies that were of importance to him, the Egyptian saw none that could be compared with this, and probably the very earliest form that religious thought took was the establishment of some kind of conception of a sun-god. There are in Egyptian religious literature traces of a still earlier form of sun-worship than that which we find in existence in the earliest historical period—a form in which the god was a Horus, or a group of Horuses, out of the innumerable company of deities of the same name which existed in Egypt. The many forms in which the sun-god was represented are doubtless survivals of the multitude of local cults of the everywhere present deity. Roughly, however, the prevalent idea represented the sun-god under three aspects. He is Khepera, the god of coming into being or becoming, in the morning when he rises, his emblem being in this case the winged beetle. He is Rā when he sails across the heaven in his boat during the middle of the day, and is represented as either a hawk-headed or a ram-headed human being, with a solar disk upon his head. He is Tum or Atum, 'an aged man tottering down the west,' when he appears as the setting sun.

Rā, to take the most generally used of his titles, is at the head of the Egyptian pantheon, and has in his company a cycle of other divinities representing other aspects and forces of nature. The theories of how he came into being are various. At Memphis it was held that Ptah, the artificer-god, shaped an egg out of which came the sun-god. Elsewhere a lotus-flower appeared out of the primordial watery element, and held Rā concealed among its leaves; or, as at Heliopolis, the god had appeared originally as a phoenix upon the ancient pyramidal stone in the temple. Having come into existence in one or other of these ways, Rā (or Nebertcher, as he is called in the texts referring to this particular period of his being) then by his own masculine power produced a pair of gods—Shu, the space- or air-god, and Tefnut, his wife.

'I, even I, spat in the form of Shu, and I emitted Tefnut. I became from God one, Gods three, that is to say from myself two Gods came into being on this earth' (Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, i. 317).

Of Shu and Tefnut are born Seb or Geb, the earth-god, and Nut, the sky-goddess; and of them are born Osiris and Set, Isis and Nephthys. Osiris and the chief figures in the Osirian cycle here appear in the Rā group of gods, but in an entirely subordinate position, and with no very marked reason for their presence, as they have no particular function to perform. This would seem to point to the fact that, when the gods were thus grouped—which cannot have been at the very earliest period—the Osiris group was already in existence and had to be incorporated somehow or other, though in a form quite inconsistent with the importance attributed to Osiris and his retinue in his own legend.

Rā's function as sun-god is at first a purely material one. He is the source of life and increase, the driver away of storm, the expeller of rain, and the breaker up of cloud. He has enemies who fight against him, and in one legend he loses one of his eyes—an attempt, no doubt, to account for eclipses; another version of the losing of the eye seems to be associated with the waxing and waning of the moon, whose close connexion with the sun would speedily be detected. In this case the lost eye is restored by Thōth, the moon-god. Beginning with these purely natural functions, Rā at a very early period developed into a more ethical governor of the world, and we learn how men rebelled against his rule, and were destroyed in vengeance by the fierce goddess Hathor (Sekhmet), who may in this case, as also in some other instances, represent the destroying heat of the sun. Finally, Rā became the great beneficent ruler of the world, the giver of every good and perfect gift.

Of his cycle, Shu, the air-god, is practically confined to a single action. He is the separator, and it is his function to separate Nut, the sky-goddess, from the embrace of Seb, the earth-god, and to keep her continually arched over the world, while Tefnut, his wife, is a mere feminine adjunct to him. Nut was not worshipped, and had no local establishment, and Seb, at least in the developed form of the Rā legends, was purely passive, though there are signs in remnants of earlier legends of his greater activity as divider of the earth. The appearance of Set as well as Osiris in the cycle of the solar god suggests that he may have represented some natural phenomenon, like the rest of his group—probably the darkness. In this case the enmity between Set and Horus, which finds full development in the great Osiris legend, would be the transference to a later tradition of a much older enmity between the solar Horus, who stands for the sun-god of the earliest Egyptian belief, and the darkness. In one of the Pyramid Texts Seb, the earth-god, assigns their respective domains to Horus and Set in a fashion that suggests the entire equality of the two divinities of light and darkness in this early stage of Egyptian religious thought. While Rā is to be viewed as the typical and representative sun-god of Egypt, it must be remembered that he is only one of a great number of forms of the same divinity. Many of the nome-gods of the land were, as was natural, sun-gods also, and were identified, when occasion arose, with the great central deity.

The cosmogony attached to this solar cycle of gods was as manifold and as inconsistent as the company of gods with which it had to deal. In one version the sky appears as a great cow, whose feet rest upon the earth and form the four pillars of the universe, while the barque of the sun-god

passes along its belly. In another the sky is represented by the form of a woman, the sky-goddess Nut, who bends over the earth, touching it at the four cardinal points with her feet and the tips of her fingers, while the sun-god's barque sails over her back. But in the most generally received idea the heavens are represented as a great iron canopy stretched over the earth, and supported upon four pillars. From this canopy the stars hang like lamps; and round the margin of the earth below runs the great river, the celestial Nile, along whose surface the sun-god sails in his barque all day, appearing in the morning from behind the eastern mountains, and disappearing behind the western mountains in the evening. This, of course, raised the question of how the god got back from west to east in time for his morning re-appearance; and the result was the invention of the journey of Rā through the realms of the dark under world—a doctrine which received extraordinary and fantastic development during the period of the XIXth dynasty. In his journey across the heavens the sun-god met with many enemies, particularly the great serpent Apap; and the crew of his boat had to fight for him against the monsters which would have devoured him. Here, no doubt, we have survivals of some primitive theory of eclipses.

Along with the sun-god there goes a company of other gods and goddesses. Among these the first place must be given to the moon-god Thōth or Tahuti, though later he became more a god of learning, and was, indeed, the head of the Hermopolitan ogdoad, which consisted of abstract deities. The reason for this transference of Thōth from his original position as a nature-god to the position of a god of learning and letters is fairly obvious. Owing to its rapid motion among the stars, the moon has always been the most convenient regulator of all periods of time greater than the day, and from its motions reckonings have been made and dates fixed in all ages and among all nations. Therefore it was perfectly natural to attribute to the moon-god the invention of letters and figures, and the control and regulation of all forms of learning. Later, and especially in connexion with the rise of Thebes, another form of the moon-god came into prominence, though without affecting the prestige of Thōth, who by this time had fully taken his place as the god of learning. This was Khonsu, who formed the third member of the Theban triad, which consisted of Amen the father-god, Mut the mother-goddess, and Khonsu the son. In this development the moon-god is represented as of purely human form, while Thōth is always figured with a human body and the head of an ibis. A late romance tells us that the temple at Thebes possessed two images of Khonsu, of which the one was named 'Khonsu-of-Good-Counsel-in-Thebes,' and the other 'Khonsu-the-Expeller-of-Demons,' and that the latter image, which appears to have occupied a secondary rank, possessed magical powers.

The sky-goddess Nut, so long as she remains a sky-goddess, is merely a pictorial adjunct to the solar god, and appears to have received very little veneration in historical times. In another of her manifestations, however, she becomes the favourite goddess of the Egyptian pantheon, under the form of the goddess Hathor. This title, 'House of Horus,' distinctly indicates her nature as a sky-goddess, and her association with the oldest form of solar worship; but, for what reason is unknown, she became at an early date not only the chief of all the goddesses, but the special object of women's adoration, and the goddess of pleasure and of love, the Egyptian Aphrodite. While this is so, another and a more terrible aspect of her character is

revealed by the ancient legend which recounts the rebellion of mankind against Rā and pictures Hathor as the eager executrix of the sun-god's vengeance upon humanity. In this aspect she is identified with the lioness-headed goddess Sekhmet, and may perhaps be held, as Renouf suggests (*Origin and Growth of Religion*, p. 179), to represent the destroying heat of the sun. Another sky-goddess of great antiquity, and, at the beginning and near the end of Egyptian history, of great importance, is Neit of Sais, 'the mother who brought forth the sun.' As this epithet suggests, she is originally a creative goddess, and is sometimes represented as having woven the universe as a weaver weaves cloth—an early version of the 'roaring loom of Time.' To this cycle of the solar gods there belongs its own theory of heaven and of the destiny of the dead in the hereafter. It would be more correct to say theories; for there are two versions more or less inconsistent with one another, as is not uncommon in Egyptian religion. In the one the blessed dead are received into heaven, there to shine as the stars in the firmament; in the other they are privileged to enter the boat of the sun-god, and to voyage with him through the realms of day and night.

2. *Earth-gods.*—Over against the sky-gods and goddesses of the solar cycle, and, no doubt, in the earliest stages of Egyptian religious thought, more or less hostile to them, were set the earth-gods, of whom the foremost and most important by far are those of the Osiris cycle. The beginnings of the Osiris story lie very far back in Egyptian history; and the Osiris who is met with in the earliest stages of the Egyptian religion is a very different being from the beneficent king of Plutarch's legend, slain by his brother, and afterwards appointed king and judge in the realms of the dead.¹ The original Osiris of Egyptian religion is purely and simply a nature-god—and a nature-god who is not necessarily of a beneficent type at all. The earliest notion of the relation of Osiris to human beings discernible in the Pyramid Texts is that he is a power hostile to them, against whose malevolence protection has to be sought in magic utterances.

The reason for this apparently strange beginning of the gracious god of the resurrection is to be found in the original rôle played by Osiris as a nature-god. He appears, in the earliest thought, to have represented the Nile. Now it is easy to see the stages by which, as the Nile was gradually pressed into the service of the Egyptian residents, the Nile-god became a beneficent deity—in fact almost the most precious and beneficent of all deities, so that he grew to be a noteworthy rival of Rā himself in the esteem of men. But in the beginning of things, when the Nile was yet unbridled, and the idea of utilizing its overflow had not yet dawned upon the inhabitants of the valley, that very peculiarity of the annual inundation which made the river an inestimable boon in later years must have made it a terror. Lives would be threatened, homes destroyed, and labour lost. Until the movements of the river were understood, and to some extent regulated and taken advantage of, the Nile-god must have been regarded as a destroying deity. Particularly before the Egyptians had learned to bury their dead safely beyond reach of the waters of the inundation, the Nile and its deity must have been a terror to them. This is probably the reason why in the Pyramid Texts we find traces of an Osiris who is hostile to men, and against whom the dead need to be protected by words of power.

¹ Plutarch's legend, none the less, seems to represent with considerable accuracy the later developments of the Osiris myth.

The identification of Osiris with the Nile is rendered absolutely certain by a number of passages in the Pyramid Texts—e.g., in the passage of the finding of the dead god by his son Horus we are told:

'Horus comes, he recognizes his father in thee, youtful in thy name of *Fresh Water*.'

And again, in a passage where the inundation is directly ascribed to him:

'The lakes fill, the canals are inundated by the purification that came forth from Osiris'; while later King Ramses IV. addresses Osiris thus:

'Thou art indeed the Nile, great with fields at the beginning of the seasons; gods and men live by the moisture that is in thee.'

The identification of Osiris with water is carried still further by making him identical, not only with the Nile, but with the ocean also:

'Thou art great, thou art green, in thy name of *Great Green*; lo! thou art round as the Great Circle; lo! thou art turned about, thou art round as the circle that encircles the *Hanebu* (the *Egeans*).'

From the identification of Osiris with the life-giving river it is only a step to the identification of him with the life-giving function generally. Here, therefore, he enters into relationship with the soil over which the water of the inundation flows. Life is produced by the combination of the water and the soil, and so, by a natural process, Osiris at a very early stage has become a god of the fruitful soil, and is even identified with the earth itself. In a very remarkable passage quoted by A. Erman (*ZÄ* xxxviii. [1900] 30-33) Osiris is addressed as follows:

'When canals are dug, . . . houses and temples are built, when monuments are transported, and fields are cultivated, when tomb-chapels and tombs are excavated, they rest on thee, it is thou who makest them. They are on thy back, though they are more than can be put into writing. [Thy] back hath not an empty place, for they all lie on thy back; but [thou sayest] not: "I am weighed down." Thou art the father and mother of men, they live in thy breath, they eat of the flesh of thy body. The *Primeral* is thy name.'

The last sentences show the process by which Osiris is being gradually transformed. He is now an earth-god; the atmosphere is his also; further, he is beginning to become a god of sustenance—'they eat of the flesh of thy body.' The process takes another step, in which Osiris is identified, not only with the soil, but also with the grain and the fruitful plants produced by the soil, and becomes a god of corn and wine. He had already reached this stage by the date of the Pyramid Texts. He is addressed in these as 'Thou lord of green fields,' and as 'Lord of overflowing wine.' At a later stage, in the Coffin Texts, which occupy a position in time between the Pyramid Texts and the *Book of the Dead* properly so called, we find passages in which the deceased expresses himself thus:

'I am Osiris, . . . the gods live as I, I live as the gods, I live as grain, I grow as grain, . . . I am barley.'

The idea is further illustrated by the frequent representations which show grain sprouting out of the prostrate body of Osiris or a tree growing out of his tomb or coffin, and by the fact that an effigy of Osiris moulded out of bruised corn and earth was sometimes hurried along with the dead, or in the cornfield to ensure a good crop.

The whole process of the transformation of Osiris is thus perfectly manifest. The original god of the Nile—a being hostile to humanity in some aspects of his working—becomes, as the nation learns to avail itself of the inundation, a beneficent deity who blesses the soil, then the soil itself, then the fruits that grow out of the soil.

'The god was doubtless in Egyptian thought the imperishable principle of life wherever found, and this conception not infrequently appears in representations of him, showing him even in death as still possessed of generative power. The ever-waning and reviving life of the earth, sometimes associated with the life-giving waters, sometimes with the fertile soil, or again discerned in vegetation itself—that was Osiris' (Breasted, p. 23).

When we have got to this stage, we are obviously

not far from the possibility which is realized when Osiris is transformed from a mere beneficent harvest-god, dying and reviving with his crops, to the moral and spiritual being who is regarded as the representative of good, placed over against the representative of evil in his brother Set. Set, who in the solar cycle appears to stand for darkness, in the Osiris cycle seems to stand for the desert soil as opposed to the fertile land of Egypt. He is the Red Fiend from the colour of his sands as against the black soil of the alluvial plain—ever encroaching on the domain of his brother, and ever hostile to his interests. The death and rising again of Osiris are in the beginning the mere recognition of the facts of nature, seen year by year in the changing seasons; gradually they are moralized, and become the type of immortality and resurrection, and also of the final victory of good over evil. St. Paul's argument in 1 Co 15 develops in a Christian fashion the same idea which the Egyptian thinkers of at least 3000 years before had already wrought out in their own way, when they made this Nile-earth-harvest-god into the type of the resurrection and the earnest of everlasting life.

Isis, the wife of Osiris, is regarded as her husband's helper in the securing of fruitfulness. The inundation coincided with the rising of Sothis, the star of Isis, and therefore the fruitfulness consequent upon it was attributed to her as well as to her husband.

'The beloved daughter, Sothis, makes thy fruits in this her name of "Year"' (Pyramid Text, quoted in Breasted, p. 22).

Isis, however, is regarded by Maspero as originally an independent nature-goddess, the earth-goddess of Buto, who was only introduced at a later period into the Osiris cycle. It is more difficult to see the place of Horus in the harvest story, until he has to be brought in as the avenger of his father. In the solar cycle Horus, as himself the original sun-god and the personification of light, has a natural place as against Set, the darkness, and wages unceasing warfare with him. There is no obvious reason for his appearing in the Osiris cycle, when the struggle is one between fruitfulness and barrenness, till he is brought in to round out the story as the avenger of his father; and no doubt much of the detail of the warfare of Horus with Set really belongs to the original solar form of the strife, and has been adapted to the case of Horus the avenger. Nebhat, or Nephthys, the wife of Set, is merely a concession to the Egyptian love of symmetry in families, though Renouf (p. 112) regards her as the sunset, wedded to Set, the darkness. This, of course, would give her a place in the solar cycle, but none in the true Osiris group.

3. Other deities.—In addition to the two great groups of nature-gods, the solar and the Osirian, the Egyptians recognized a great number of local deities, who may be regarded as merely variants of the chief gods already mentioned, while, further, they recognized a number of quite subordinate divinities of nature, spirits of the wood and stream and hill, sacred trees, sacred serpents, and so forth. But besides all these there were certain other divinities, not always clearly distinguished from some of those mentioned above, and yet with a sufficiently independent existence to warrant separate notice of them. Chief among these is the Nile-god Hâpi, to be distinguished from the other Hâpi, son of Horus, who was one of the four divinities to whom the charge of the internal organs of the dead was committed, and whose heads appear as the so-called canopic jars. Hâpi, strictly speaking, ought only to be a variant of Osiris; but the development and moralizing of the Osiris legend led to the detachment of Osiris from his original functions as a Nile-god, and

Hâpi took his place in that aspect, with some claim to be regarded as an independent divinity. Hâpi was one of the most widely recognized and worshipped of Egyptian gods, which is not to be wondered at when the importance of the river to the land is considered. He was, of course, particularly the object of worship in respect of the annual inundation, and it was believed that, if his worship were neglected, the inundation would not be favourable. He had temples at Memphis, Heliopolis, and elsewhere; but his place was all over the land of Egypt, and there are few localities where the familiar figure of the Nile-god is not to be seen among the temple sculptures. He is generally represented as a fat and flabby man with female breasts, typifying fertility, and is bedecked with water-plants and flowers. Sometimes he is separated into two gods, the god of the Upper and the god of the Lower Nile, wearing in the former case the lotus, and in the latter the papyrus; and a very frequent representation of him shows a Nile-god for each of the forty-two nomes of Egypt—a procession of deities advancing in single file to present gifts to the king. Associated with Hâpi are various minor gods—Hôr, Zefa, and Resef, representing food and abundance; Neper and Nepera, the god and goddess of grain; and the snake-headed Rennut, goddess of the harvest.

The local god of the Fayyum province also deserves separate mention. This was Sebek, the crocodile-god. The reason for the adoption of such a god in the lake district, where no doubt the animal abounded in early days, is sufficiently obvious. In addition to his local sanctity, he was worshipped at Ombos, where he was identified with Set; but he was also regarded in other localities as a variant of Râ and as an associate of Osiris. Sebek is represented either as a crocodile or as a human being with a crocodile's head.

Min, the highway god of Koptos, is also to be regarded in some of his aspects as a nature-god. He was the nome-god of Panopolis; but, in addition, he was more or less universally worshipped throughout Egypt as the type of the generative power of nature. He is represented as an ithyphallic figure waving a scourge in his right hand above his head. The harvest festival was dedicated to him in acknowledgment of the abundance produced by the earth, and several of the gods were identified with him when they were referred to as begetters of their divine sons.

The extraordinary development of the worship of the solar god in the reign of Amenhotep IV. (Akhenaten) can scarcely be regarded as within the range of this subject. In so far as the Aten, the life-giving principle of the solar disk, is regarded as a mere aspect of the material vivifying function of the sun, the new god which Akhenaten attempted to introduce may be regarded as a nature-god; but Atenism represents an attempt to reach something much more spiritual than anything which can be associated with the old nature-worship of the Egyptians. It is solar worship in a sense, but solar worship reduced to its most spiritual elements.

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NATURE (Greek).—When Aristophanes declares in a striking passage in the *Peace*¹ that a main difference between the religion of the Hellenes and that of the barbarians was that the latter sacrificed to the sun and moon, the former to personal deities like Hermes, he was partly right, but did not tell the whole truth. The leading deities of the Hellenic stocks were concrete personal beings, vividly conceived and strikingly anthropomorphic; they were individuals of a certain moral, social, and spiritual character. None of them are merely thinly-disguised personifications of natural phenomena and forces, and many of them reveal no sign of having originated in nature-worship. Zeus himself appears to have been for the earliest Hellenes, and probably for other Aryan races, a personal sky-god who directed celestial phenomena; the earliest conception may have been of the sky as animate or as the abode of a vague spirit, and we have one or two examples in actual Hellenic cult or cult-legend of the identification of Zeus with some phenomenon of the sky, as in the Mantinean inscription recording the cult of Zeus *Κεραυνός* and in the Arcadian legend of Zeus *Καπνώτας* mentioned below. It may be also that we can discern a primitive direct nature-worship dimly revealed by the cult of Demeter *Χλόη* (Demeter Vegetation), and that there was once at Marathon a cult of the spring verdure, *Χλόη*, regarded as divine before the idea of the personal goddess had wholly penetrated and absorbed it.² But it is difficult to pronounce at what time the animistic and pre-anthropomorphic religious sense prevailed unblent with the anthropomorphic idea. Certainly, when the early Greek was worshipping Artemis or Apollo, he was not consciously worshipping the moon or the sun. Even a deity so markedly departmental as Poseidon was never identified in substance with the inland waters or the sea which were his province, nor was the element ever called by his name. Nor can we say that the people who worshipped Hephaistos were fire-worshippers, although some dim trace of a primitive conception of fire as something animate and divine survives in one or two phrases attaching to his name—as, when the fire crackled, it was said 'Hephaistos laughs'³—but, as far as we can trace it, the name Hephaistos in its original application never denoted the fire itself, but always the personal god. There is, then, much truth and reality in the pronouncement of Aristophanes; the term 'nature-god' applies to very few of the leading figures of Hellenic polytheism. Nevertheless, in the rich and many-sided popular religion of Greece we find direct worship often paid to certain of the forces and phenomena of the natural world.

Before we collect the evidence and consider its importance for the religious history and culture of the race, we should distinguish three stages in the religious perception of nature: (a) the worshipper may regard an object or a phenomenon of the material world as mysteriously divine and animate and pay direct worship to it as a conscious power that can benefit him or injure him; (b) he may regard the object or phenomenon as the abode, lurking-place, or manifestation of an immanent spirit, vaguely conceived but invested with some personality; (c) he may clothe this vague spirit with ever sharper traits of personality and individuality until it becomes a concrete god, who produces the object and controls the element or phenomenon; the god thus evolved may be confined to this function and is then a true nature-god, or he may enlarge his sphere and grow in freedom and become a moral, political, and spiritual power, no longer enmeshed in the material world at all. The

study of Greek religion presents us with all these phenomena and these religious stages.

The first we may designate—for want of a better name—as animatism;¹ the second as animism, implying a vaguely personal *δαίμων*, or *numen*; the third as theism, implying the worship and imagination of a clearly defined *θεός*.

1. Animatism.—Nature-magic, which existed in Greece as elsewhere by the side of nature-religion, belongs to the two earlier of these three stages; the Greek rarely, if ever, practised magic upon his *θεός*. Nor was his imagination, with its strong bias for concrete and anthropomorphic creation, usually content with the inchoate perception of the mere 'animatism.' Yet traces of what may be called the most primitive religious feeling in regard to nature survived in Greece. According to Pausanias, in Arcadia near Trapezous, 'sacrifices are offered to lightning and thunder and storms.'² We may, of course, suspect the presence of personal deities here; but the words of Pausanias, who is generally careful in such matters, ought to be regarded as valid evidence of a naive animatism. The feeling in the Arcadian worshipper may have been the same as Hesiod's when he advises the traveller not to 'pass through the fair-flowing water of streams, ere thou utterest a prayer gazing into the fair torrent, having washed thy hands in the white and lovely water.'³ It may be that no god or spirit to whom the prayer was directed is imagined here, but only the divine and animate water. Even Homer's rivers of the Trojan plain, Simoeis and Skamandros, are occasionally imagined as nothing more than the element itself, but conscious and passionate.⁴ On the same level was the earliest Hellenic impression of the holiness of the household hearth in itself, before they endeavoured to realize the personal goddess Hestia.⁵ At this early stage nature-magic, as distinct from religion, is likely to be practised. At Methana, near Troizen, the severed limbs of a cock were carried round the vineyards to preserve them from the baneful influence of the wind that was called Lips; the practice, which is purely magical and apotropaic, implying no personal god nor even a spirit, was still in vogue in the time of Pausanias.⁶ He tells us also that he saw them there averting hail with sacrifices and incantations, the one a religious, the other a magical device. The same union of magic with simple worship of the elements is suggested by the words of Clement of Alexandria concerning the Magi, or wise men, of Kleonai in Sikyon, who 'when the clouds are about to throw down hail avert the threat of their anger by incantations and sacrifices.'⁷ The gilds of 'Wind-soothers' or 'Wind-lullers,' called *Εὐδάεμοι* in Attica and *Ἀνεμολοῖται* at Corinth, may have worked directly on these elements⁸ by means of simple incantation-magic or may have employed some method of religious service. Concerning these few examples of the simplest and crudest religious feeling in regard to natural phenomena it is hard to speak with certainty, for the evidence supplied us may be defective, and we cannot interrogate it.

2. Animism.—In regard to the religious facts that belong to the second of the types distinguished above, our indications are fuller and clearer. In the earliest period of Hellenic history to which our record reaches back or to which our theory can penetrate, we find an animistic perception that imagines the more salient parts of nature as containing a *δαίμων*, or *numen*, that is personal

¹ See R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*, London, 1914, pp. 15-21.

² viii. xxix. 1.

³ See below.

⁴ ii. xxxiv. 2.

⁵ Arrian, *Anab. m. xvi. 8*; Hesych. s. v. *Εὐδάεμος*, *Ἀνεμολοῖται*.

⁶ *Works and Days*, 737 ff.

⁷ See *CGS v.* 345-365.

⁸ *Strom.*, p. 755 (Potter).

¹ 409 ff.

² See *CGS* iii. 231, 212, ref. 9.

³ Aristot., p. 809a.

enough to be able to receive sacrifice on the altar, to hearken to prayer, to punish offences, but not yet sufficiently defined to be invested with concrete and complex personality and anthropomorphic character; and a small part of the Greek religion remains at this inchoate daimonistic stage, halfway to the higher stage of theism, down to the close of paganism.

We discern this in the worship of certain meteoric and celestial phenomena. At Titane in Sikyon there was an altar erected to the winds,¹ on which the priest sacrificed on one night every year: 'and he does other secret rites into four sacrificial pits, and, as they say, he sings over them certain incantations of Medea, assuaging the fierceness of the winds.' Apart from the element of magic, these rites of altar and sacrifice imply the worship of personal spirits—winds pure and simple would not need an altar—and these spirits belong to the dark world of ghosts. This association of furious winds with ghosts is a wide-spread animistic belief. It is illustrated by the double character attaching to the 'Tritopatores' at Athens, ancestral spirits as their name and certain inscriptions reveal them, yet explained as wind-powers by Hesychius.²

Sacrifice in itself need not imply the idea of personal spirits; but certain peculiar fashions of sacrifice to the winds, such as the wineless offering and the cake in the stormy month of December at Athens,³ the Attic sacrifice of black lambs to the whirlwind,⁴ the Laconian sacrifice of horses on the mountain-top of Taygetos,⁵ the strange and almost unique sacrifice of asses at Tarentum,⁶ must have assisted the clearer emergence of this idea in the view taken of the elements thus worshipped.

Finally, when a personal and proper name became attached to some particular wind, such as *Zéφυρος*, the west-wind, *Βορέας*, the north-wind—the names to which dramatic and personal myths could be and were attached—we have the necessary condition for the evolution of the *δαίμων* into an individual god. Such certainly Boreas became, for instance at Athens, where the love-story of his capture of Oreithyia was associated with the banks of the Ilissos and an altar erected there,⁷ and still more manifestly at Thourioi in Magna Græcia—owing doubtless to its close association with Athens—where a yearly sacrifice was prescribed for him, a house and an allotment of land consecrated to him, and he was designated by the strange cult-title of 'Citizen.'⁸ It is interesting to see the *δαίμων* of a primitive animistic cult developing into a political deity. A stimulus to this cultivation of the worship of Boreas at Athens was the aid that he was supposed to have rendered in the sea-fight at Artemision; but the earlier Attic art, dealing with the love of Boreas for Oreithyia and her capture, shows that the imagination of the people had already anthropomorphized the wind-god before the Persian wars.

As regards other meteorological worships, the cult of Zeus *Κεραυνός* at Mantinea⁹ marks a higher stage than the simple Arcadian sacrifice to the thunder and lightning mentioned above. The cult-title, Zeus Thunder, identifies the god with the phenomenon; the spirit or essence of the god is in the thunder; we may call this animistic religion, that has not yet risen to the view of a free divine personality that controls the elements. Similarly, a fallen meteoric stone was worshipped in Arcadia under the name of 'Zeus the fallen'—*Ζεὺς Καπνώ-*

τας—the stone being the god or infused with the essence of the god.¹

3. Theism.—But these primitive forms of meteorologic religion were only sporadic in Greece; the aboriginal Hellene had certainly arrived at the theistic stage and had already evolved his personal Zeus who attracted to himself the religious feelings aroused by thunder, rain, and hail.

(a) *Sun-worship*.—Of more importance is the question concerning sun-worship in Hellas. Plato² tells us that both Hellenes and barbarians were accustomed to greet the rising and the setting of the sun and moon with prostrations and kissing of the hand, and his statement is corroborated by Lucian³ and Plutarch.⁴ And Plato's *Apology*⁵ attests the fact, which throws a striking light on the culture of the Athenian of the 4th cent., that to the average man of that period these great luminaries were still regarded as divine and animate, and that the new doctrine of physical science which treated them as mere material bodies was repulsive. But the reverential feeling attested by this evidence should not be interpreted as showing that all the Hellenes of every period had a vivid belief in a personal anthropomorphic sun-god or moon-goddess. We may interpret it as inspired by the animistic feeling that the salient phenomena of nature are infused with a spirit, or *δαίμων*; or by the cruder impression that these great luminaries are animate and sentient bodies. The same may be said of another ritual that was probably aboriginal for all the Hellenes—the invocation of the sun in the formula of the oath, in which he is most frequently joined with Mother Earth. The fashion of swearing by Helios and by Ge is attested by Homer, by much literature of a later period, and by many inscriptions—the manumission of slaves, e.g., was performed under the witness of the sun. But a power invoked in an oath-formula is by no means always a personal god; the oath belongs to animism at least as much as to theism, and is often taken over objects that perhaps are vaguely conceived as animate, like a sword or an iron ring, or as merely possessing some mysterious potency. There is, in fact, no reason to suppose that for the aboriginal Hellene the sun was ever a personal high god, such as was Apollo, Zeus, or Poseidon; and the deities and heroes, Apollo, Herakles, and others, who used to be regarded as only thin disguises of the sun, have resigned these pretensions in the light of modern criticism. With one great exception, which will be considered below, the record of the cult of Helios in Greek lands is scanty and unimpressive.⁶ We rarely hear of temples, still more rarely of statues, more frequently only of altars. His power was recognized in part of the vegetation-ritual, his oblations being wineless after the ancient fashion; one of his favourite offerings was honey.⁷ The average Greek would speak of him as *θεός*; and, helped probably by Homer, whose religious and mythopoetic trend is always towards anthropomorphism, would be inclined to regard him as a personal god who ruled the sun; but he entered little into the popular mythology, and in the main played no part in the progress of the people towards the higher civilized and political life. The altar raised at Troizen to *Ἡλίου Ἐλευθέριος*, 'the sun of freedom,' after the defeat of the Persians need not have expressed more than the religious sense of joy in a freed heaven and a freed earth.⁸ The important exception referred to above is the island of Rhodes. From the earliest times till the introduction of Christianity Helios was the

¹ Paus. ii. xii. 1.

² Hesych. s.v.; cf. Photius, s.v., and CIA ii. 1062.

³ CIA iii. 77. ⁴ Aristoph. Ran. 847.

⁵ Festus, p. 181.

⁶ El. Mag., s.v. *Ἀνεμώτας*.

⁷ Herod. vii. 189; Plato, *Phædr.* 229 C.

⁸ El. Var. Hist. xii. 61.

⁹ ECH, 1878, p. 515.

¹ Paus. iii. xxii. 1.

² de Saltat. 17.

³ P. 26 D-E.

⁴ See CGS v. 449-453.

⁵ Athen., p. 693 E-F: schol. Soph. *Œd. Col.* 100.

⁶ Paus. ii. xxxi. 5.

⁷ Laus, 887 E.

⁸ P. 1123 A.

great god of the island,¹ the fosterer and sustainer of the physical, cultured, and political life of the people and the State. The greatest and most illuminating monuments of his cult are the ode that is Pindar's masterpiece, the 7th *Olympian*, and the type on the early 4th century coinage of Rhodes; the artist is the equal of the poet in revealing the glow and intensity of feeling evoked by their ancestral god. No doubt the Rhodians' conception of him was entirely anthropomorphic; their offering of a four-horsed chariot which they flung into the sea suggests the radiant charioteer, such as the later Greek art depicted him.² It is only here in Greek lands that a purely elemental god is seen dominating the imagination of the people; and, as the comic poets came to remark, the smallest part of their life was penetrated by Helios. The explanation of this unique fact is to be sought in the strong persistence in the isle of Rhodes of an earlier 'Minoan-Cretan' culture and religion. We know that Rhodes was linked by many ties to pre-Hellenic Crete; the Heliadae, the sons of Helios, the earliest mythic settlers in Rhodes, are with the Telchines the representatives of the splendour of Minoan art-culture that was beginning to fade when the earliest Hellenes arrived. We have some evidence of the prominence of the sun-divinity in Minoan Crete; he entered into the legendary genealogies of Pasiphae and Idomenus; Gortyna even in late times claimed to be the pasture-ground of the herds of Helios, and we may believe that the Homeric myth in the *Odyssey* of the island that nourished the sacred cattle of the sun-god reflects a fact of pre-historic, anthropomorphic ritual;³ the curious Cretan phrase *Ἀδίου-ριος Ταύρος*,⁴ explained by the story that the sun-god led a Cretan colony in the form of a bull, probably preserves an Eteo-Cretan title of his, and suggests his association with the Minoan reverence of the bull and with the legend of the Minotaur. Finally, among the remains of the Minoan-Mycenaean art evidence has been noted pointing, though somewhat vaguely, to sun-worship or adoration of the lights of heaven.⁵

Therefore, if in other regions of the Greek world that had been once dominated by the Minoan-Mycenaean culture we discern traces of a once powerful Helios-cult, we may explain it as an abiding tradition from the early period; e.g., in the city and territory of Corinth the legends and local genealogies seem to point to an ancient prominence of the sun-god; he contended with Poseidon for the land,⁶ and he was the ancestor of personages aboriginally Corinthian, such as Aietes, Medea, Kirke; he even enters into the early Sikyonian genealogies. But Sikyon and Corinth belong to the old Mycenaean kingdom.

Again, on the slopes of Taygetos, on the promontory of Taletos, we have record of an ancient Helios ritual, and a Homeric hymn consecrates this mountain to Helios;⁷ but the name 'Taletos' and certain cult facts of the neighbourhood point back to Crete. In Elis also pre-historic Cretan influences were strong and abiding, and here we find Helios associated in cult with the Cretan god Kronos⁸ and with the moon-goddess Selene,⁹ whose Endymion may be a disguised form and a pre-Hellenic name of the sun-god.

But it is only in Rhodes that Helios enjoyed such a position as Shamash, the Babylonian sun-

god, enjoyed in Babylonia; and this is the unique example in Greek religion of an elemental cult evolving a high god of the moral and political order. In the later period of Graeco-Roman paganism there came a religious wave from the East, giving a powerful lift to sun-worship in the Roman empire; and this may account for a few of the cults in the late records of Greece, such as that of Helios *Σωτήρ*, 'the saviour,' at Megalopolis.¹

(b) *Moon-worship*.—Selene, the moon-goddess, was of no importance for the higher religious life of historic Greece, though, according to Plato, all the Greeks recognized the moon as divine. The ritual at Athens, where 'wineless' or 'sober' offerings, *νηφάλια*, were prescribed to Selene, must be regarded as ancient;² so also in all probability was her cult in Arcadia, where she was associated with Pan.³ But, generally, the record of her cult is far scantier than that of Helios, and the few inscriptions and coins that attest it are of a late period. The pre-Hellenic era of the Cretan-Mycenaean culture may have given more prominence to moon-worship; for there is some Hellenic testimony to this in the cult of the Cretan Pasiphaessa, who was worshipped with Helios in S. Laconia,⁴ a region full of Cretan influences; her name, 'the all-shining one,' her legendary association with King Minos, and her cult connexion with the sun-god seem to point clearly to a Cretan lunar goddess. On the other hand, we cannot regard the early adoption of Artemis by the Hellenes as any evidence of their devotion to moon-worship. For there is no proof or indication that aboriginally Artemis was at all closely associated with the moon.

(c) *Worship of dawn, night, etc.*—There are other figures, such as Eos, the dawn-goddess, Hemera, 'day,' Nyx, 'night,' Ouranos, 'sky,' whose names concern this sphere of nature. In Greek mythology and genealogy and to some extent in Greek art these personifications of light and darkness and the sky play a lively and prominent part; but the test of religious significance is cult; and of the actual worship of any of these evidence is almost lacking. Hemera shared a shrine with Helios at Kos, perhaps in Hellenistic times.⁵ The dawn-goddess, Eos, whose personality was lovingly treated by Greek poetry and art, had, according to Ovid, 'the fewest temples in the world';⁶ he might have correctly said that in the Graeco-Roman world she had none. Only at Athens is there some evidence of her worship, for she is mentioned among the deities to whom 'wineless' offerings were made.⁷ We have a doubtful reference in Pausanias to 'an oracle-shrine called after Nyx' on the Akropolis of Megara;⁸ but the name may only have indicated that the oracles were given in the night-time, perhaps by the earth-mother. Finally, the heaven-god, Ouranos, familiar to the readers of Hesiod, Pindar, and Aeschylus, whose counterpart, Varuna, was a high god for the Vedic Indians, had no shrine or cult in Hellenic lands, if we can trust the complete silence of literary record and inscriptions. As evidence of any ritual associated with him we have only a doubtful passage in Proclus's commentary,⁹ in which he seems to say that the ancient laws of Athens used to prescribe to those about to marry that they should celebrate in a preliminary ceremony the bridal of Heaven and Earth. It may be that this late writer has thus interpreted the ancient ritual of the *τεπὸς γάμος* of Zeus and Hera. At any rate, we may safely say

¹ For references see *CGS* v. 451, ref. 33.

² Festus, s.v. 'October equus.'

³ Sacred herds of Helios were also kept at Apollonia on the Ionic gulf (Herod. ix. 93).

⁴ I. Bekker, *Anecdota Graeca*, Berlin, 1814-21, i. 844.

⁵ See A. J. Evans, 'Mycenaean Tree and Pillar Cult,' in *JHS* xli. [1901] 108, 160, 172 f.

⁶ Paus. ii. i. 6.

⁷ Paus. vi. xx. 4; *Hymn. ad Apoll.* 411.

⁸ *Et. Mag.*, p. 426. 16.

⁹ Paus. vi. xxiv. 6.

¹ Paus. viii. xxxi. 7.

² See *CGS* v. 464 ff., ref. 152-160.

³ Paus. iii. xxvi. 1.

⁴ *Metam.* xiii. 589.

⁵ i. xl. 6.

⁶ Schol. Soph. *Œd. Col.* 100.

⁷ *Archäol. Anzeiger*, 1905, p. 12.

⁸ Schol. Soph. *Œd. Col.* 100.

⁹ in *Tim.* p. 293.

that at no known period in the history of Greek religion was Ouranos of any consideration in the popular worship. And, when Æschylus speaks of him as 'one who in old time was mighty, full of unconquerable boldness,'¹ he was probably misled by Hesiod's artificial stratification of periods, the periods of Ouranos, of Kronos, of Zens.

(d) *Star-worship*.—Another noticeable feature of Greek religion, as compared, for instance, with the Babylonian, is the almost complete absence of star-worship. The only exception hitherto noted is the sacrifice to the dog-star in Keos, described by Apollonius Rhodius and the scholiast on his verses.² It was evidently apotropaic, intended to avert the great heat of summer, and we may understand the curious statement of the scholiast, that the men of Keos sacrificed to Seirios with arms in their hands, as meaning that, while they approached him with a religious ritual, they adopted at the same time the opposite attitude of threatening him with weapons, as savages frequently threaten evil spirits or dangerous phenomena of nature. But even in Keos the cult of Seirios appears to have been too weak to stand by itself; it was linked with that of the personal god, Ζεὺς Ἰκμαῖος, the god of dew.³

It may well have been this indifference to star-worship that saved Greece, until the last days of its decline, from the superstition of astrology, which has been so many times fatal to the intellect of Europe.

(e) *Earth-worship*.—So far we may be struck with the paucity and the barrenness of pure nature-worship in the Greek communities. But our impression is modified when we study the cults of Ge, the earth-mother, and of the rivers.

The worship of the earth, imagined as a female power, is attested of nearly all the Aryan and of many non-Aryan communities.⁴ We should expect, then, that the Hellenes would bring it with them as a tradition, and there is also reason for thinking that they would have found it within the Minoan-Mycenean culture in the lands that they occupied. No part of the natural world is more likely to arouse animistic religious feeling; but it needs a comprehensive imagination to conceive of the whole earth as a single religious entity, a divine animate power. That this conception was in the average mind of Hellas in all periods of its history, and that it stimulated wide-spread worship, is proved by archaeological evidence and by the literature from Homer to Plutarch, the latter writer being still able to say in the last period of paganism: 'The name of Ge is dear and precious to every Hellene, and it is our tradition to honour her like any other god.'⁵ In the Homeric poems, besides the frequent use of the word for the common earth, the actual soil that we walk upon, we find numerous examples of the name of Ge for a divine personality. She is three times invoked in the formula of the oath,⁶ and a black lamb is sacrificed to her in the ritual of the truce arranged between the Achæans and the Trojans.⁷ Nevertheless, as we have seen, sacrifice and the oath-invocation do not always prove that the conception of the divine power is clear and anthropomorphic. And the personality of Gaia, as presented to us in the Homeric poems, remains vague and amorphous, animistic rather than theistic. She is not a figure in his mythology; she plays no part in his action or in the moral life of man. In the first part of the Hesiodic *Theogony* she is assigned a dramatic and prominent rôle in the cosmogonic account; and all the poet's myths of creation are to this

extent anthropomorphic, that the creative processes are described in terms of human love, as is usual in the similar myths of savages. Later poetry, and especially the Attic drama, often exalts the divinity of earth in glowing passages, but with an imagination that is more animistic than vividly personal. Nor does the literature as a whole convince us that the human impersonation of Gaia with which perfected Greek art presents us, as a beautiful woman with mature and tender form, ever possessed the popular mind and faith.

Cult is the surest evidence of the people's belief, if the cult-records are explicit. We have record of the public worship of Ge at the following places—Dodona, Delphi, Thebes, Athens, Phlye, and Marathon in Attica, Sparta, Tegea, Olympia, Aigai, and Patrai in Achaia, in the islands of Mykonos, Thera, Kos, Crete, at Byzantium, Kyzikos, Erythrai, Pergamon, Smyrna, Magnesia, Amasia in Pontos, and in the Tauric Chersonese.¹ But we have only scanty and vague evidence as to the question how far the religion in any one of these places was animistic only, how far theistic and anthropomorphic. No doubt, altars and temples are adjuncts of anthropomorphic religion and promote the belief in concrete individual deities; and we hear of altars on the slope of the Akropolis at Athens, at Phlye, Tegea, and Olympia, consecrated to Ge; very rarely do we hear of cult-statues, as at Aigai in Achaia; the image of the earth-goddess on the Athenian Akropolis, praying with uplifted hands to Zeus to send rain, was not primarily a monument of worship, though it could react on the religious imagination. It is likely that the ritual of Ge as a rule demanded only a *temenos*, a holy ground enclosed, without shrine or statue or even altar. The title 'Ge in the fields,' which she enjoyed at Marathon, where a pregnant cow was offered to her, suggests the vague earth-spirit rather than the humanized goddess; and other cult-titles, such as Εὐρύστερνος, 'the broad-bosomed,' at Delphi and near Aigai, Μάκαιρα Τελεσφόρος, 'the blessed harvest-ripeners,' at Thebes, Πανδώρα and Ἀνησιδώρα, 'the giver of all gifts,' at Athens and Pergamon, Κουροτρόφος, 'the nourisher of children,' doubtfully attested at Athens, are on the border-line of the animistic and the anthropomorphic imagination.

Again, we find two examples in her service of the quaint and crude ritual of throwing the offerings consecrate to her into a mere cleft of the earth; such worship is consonant with animistic feeling and it marks her off from the civilized *theoi* who gather or sit round the formal altar-table spread with offerings, and to whom a comfortable couch might be dedicated with soft carpet for their real, though invisible, feet. The broad earth needed no κλίνη, no τράπεζα. Finally, in that interesting distich of an old liturgy in vogue at Dodona—'Zeus was, Zeus is, Zeus will be, oh great Zeus! Earth sends up fruits, wherefore call on Mother Earth'—while Zeus seems presented as the everlasting God, concrete and individual, it may be that Ge was vaguely imagined as an animate potency immanent in or identified with her element.²

An ancient function in Greece of the earth-spirit was prophecy and the deliverance of oracles. This was connected with the superstition that dreams foretell the future, and that the dream enters through the ear of the sleeper from the nether realm. Hence arose in pre-historic times the habit of 'incubation,' or sleeping on the bare earth in order to obtain a mantic dream. We are not,

¹ *Agam.* 153-190.

² *CGS* i. 148, ref. 35.

³ See art. EARTH, EARTH-GODS.

⁴ *Il.* iii. 276 ff., xix. 259 ff., *Od.* v. 184.

⁵ *Il.* iii. 103 f.

⁶ *Il.* 500-527.

⁷ P. 935 B.

¹ See *CGS* iii. 303 ('Geographical Register of Cults of Ge').

² Paus. x. xii. 10.

therefore, surprised to find that the snake, the most usual 'familiar' and incarnation of the earth-spirit, was the prophetic animal *par excellence* for the Hellenes ('prophecy was the peculiar property of snakes,' says *Ælian*¹); and that Ge was worshipped and consulted as a giver of oracles at Aigai, possibly at Olympia and Marathon, and certainly at Delphi in the pre-Apolline days. Here, according to Euripides, the earth-goddess sent up oracles through dreams, in order to thwart Apollo's divination, until Apollo appealed to Zeus to prohibit her.² Another mantic process, but also 'chthonian,' was practised in the worship of Gaia at Aigai; her priestess drank a draught of hell's blood, to fill herself with the spirit of prophecy, before she descended into a cave, which was the primitive shrine of the earth-spirit.³ As the hell is an animal closely associated with the latter, we may regard this drinking as a form of sacramental communion. Neither the function of prophecy nor sacramental communion necessarily indicates a clear anthropomorphic conception of divinity. But probably from her oracular power Ge acquired—at Delphi and Athens and perhaps at Olympia—the title of Ge Themis, 'Earth Oracle'; and there are strong reasons for believing that this double title engendered an independent goddess Themis, who, detached from Ge, became associated with Zeus and a figure of anthropomorphic religion and mythology, embodying the ethical idea of righteousness, and playing a part in the higher spiritual religion. At this point, then, an animistic nature-worship shows itself capable of a transcendental development; only, it is significant to note, in this development the name Ge drops out.

There is one more important aspect of Gaia—her association with the spirits of the dead, who find their home in the bosom of the earth-mother. She claimed a share in the libations to the dead;⁴ and she was not forgotten in the Attic service of the Anthesteria and the Gensia, two All-Souls' festivals of spring and autumn.⁵ We may think that these funeral offerings to her were dictated or accompanied by a vague idea that the fortune of the souls depended on her favour. Yet we have no evidence that any vivid personal hopes of happy individual life after death were confirmed by the worship of Gaia. But from Gaia, the mother of the spiritual goddess Themis, arose also the two brightest and most human deities of Hellenic polytheism, Demeter and Kore; and it was to these, or to Dionysos, that any living Hellenic faith in posthumous happiness attached.

We may draw the conclusion that it was the unavoidable association of the name Ge with the solid earth around us and beneath us that prevented the Greek imagination from exalting the earth-spirit up to the higher plane of religion. It was only by shedding her elemental name and disguising herself as Pandora, Aglauros, Themis, Demeter, and Kore that she could attract to herself bright anthropomorphic myths or count in the world of ethical and spiritual ideals.

(f) *River-worship*.—There remains to be considered that nature-worship which appears to have attracted most powerfully the Hellenes of the country-side and even those of the cities—the worship of rivers and of the nymphs of the fountain, grove, and meadow. In the earliest days of the Hellenic race the rushing water was regarded as an animate power; and probably long before Homer the animistic sense had been at work upon this mysterious element and had conceived of the rolling river as the abode of an immanent personal

spirit, a *δαίμων*, or *numen*, which came more and more to be clothed with a concrete and definite form, human or animal or half-human half-animal; and at the end of this process a definite and individual *θεός* might emerge. The Homeric poems give us some evidence of the various stages of this religious evolution. In the conflict of Achilles with Skamandros and Simoeis, at times the river is nothing but the divine animate element, overpowering the hero with the material force of its waves. But more often the poetic presentation is more personal; there is a *δαίμων*, a vague personality, in the water, that can feel anger and pity and fear; then, in a dramatic moment of stress, this being can emerge from the water and even ascend to the council-chamber of Zeus, in the form of a man,¹ a product of the anthropomorphic fancy so regnant in the Greek mind. It is with this imagination that Odysseus prays to the unknown river-god under the title of 'king,' and speaks of the divinity's knees that he clasps as a suppliant.²

The ritual also, as recorded by Homer, shows us something of the same shifting imagination. Skamandros has a priest, but priesthood does not always demand a personal *θεός* for its service; the Trojans were in the habit of throwing live horses into the waters;³ and this simple form of sacrifice, which we may call elemental and which survived in the later period of Greece, belongs to animistic rather than to theistic cult. So also the dedication of Achilles' hair to the river Spercheios was the pledge of a simple communion with the river or the river-spirit; it does not necessarily imply an anthropomorphic god. But, when we hear of altars erected on the river-bank for the sacrifice, we may say that such ritual attests the belief in a personal *θεός* who is sufficiently independent of his element to be able at will to quit it and to come and partake of the victim on land. Both forms of sacrifice, the animistic and the theistic, were, according to Homer, in vogue on the banks of the Thessalian river,⁴ and both were generally maintained in historical times—e.g., at Mykonos,⁵ where an inscription prescribes that of the eleven victims, a ram and ten lambs, consecrated to Acheloos, three should be offered on the altar and the rest thrown into the river. Acheloos was 'the river' *par excellence* for all the Hellenic communities, not only because it was the largest of all Greek rivers, but probably also because the ancestors of the leading divisions of the people had at one time dwelt near or within its area. We are told by Ephoros that its worship was universal and that it was even prescribed by the Dodonæan oracle;⁶ and we have definite proof of it in Attica, Megara, and elsewhere.⁷ We may therefore regard Acheloos as more than an elemental *δαίμων*, as a fully formed individual god, whose power extended beyond his element, and who might be worshipped far away from the neighbourhood of any water. And thus he might become associated with the Olympians, as he was, e.g., with Demeter.⁸

But doubtless the heart of the individual Greek turned with more yearning and love to the local river that watered the glen or the meadows in which his city arose; and the records⁹ are ample enough to compel us to believe that every locality possessed this worship. That it was real and earnest and dearer to the souls of the people than any other mere nature-worship may also be believed; for the fertilizing water was closely asso-

¹ *Il.* xxi. 212 f., xx. 71.

² *Od.* v. 444-450.

³ *Il.* xxi. 132.

⁴ *Il.* xxiii. 144 ff.

⁵ W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Græcarum*, Leipzig 1833, no. 373. 85.

⁶ *Macrob. Sat.* v. xviii. 6.

⁷ *Plato, Phædr.* 230 B; *Eph. Arch.*, 1905, p. 113.

⁸ *Oxyrhynch. Papyr.* ii. 221, col. 9; *Paus.* i. xii. 2.

⁹ See *CGS* v. 453-457.

¹ *Nat. An.* xi. 16.

² *Iph. Taur.* 1259 ff.

³ *Paus.* vii. xxv. 13; *Pliny, HN* xxviii. 147.

⁴ *Æsch. Pers.* 219.

⁵ *CGS* iii. 231.

ciated with the life of children, as the river was *κοιτοτρόφος*, 'a nurturer of the young.' The charming communion ritual of the dedication of the hair at puberty, attested by Homer, survived till a late period in Arcadia and probably in many other places.¹ The pure and holy water of the river or font was used for the service of the high gods, as at Olympia, and for purification ceremonies—especially at marriage.² We have no hint of anything like infant-baptism in rivers; but an interesting ritual indirectly connected, we may believe, with the birth of infants is attested of New Ilion by one classical text: the maidens of the historic city of Troy were obliged on the eve of their marriage to wade into the river Skamandros, and by a solemn formula to offer their virginity to the river-god.³ The maiden at the most critical time of her life enters thus into corporeal communion with the tutelary spirit of the land; and it is reasonable to think that the ritual was inspired by the belief that the future child born of the real marriage would be instinct with that spirit. The desire to establish some ideal connexion between the new-born infant and the river, if not expressed elsewhere by this peculiar ritual, is attested by such names as Kephissodotos at Athens;⁴ and the many myths concerning princesses and heroines conceiving by river-gods might have arisen from just such a *λεπρὸς γάμος* as that which was in vogue in the Troad.

The family-ties, then, between the home and the river-god were intimately felt in Greece. And the Hellene was capable of believing that such an elemental deity could be deeply concerned with the welfare of the whole State. When the Spartan king, Kleomenes, tried to cross the river Erasinos to attack the Argives, Erasinos strove to prevent him, and the king expressed his admiration of the god for doing his best to save his citizens.⁵ When certain men were condemned as traitors at Amphipolis in 356 B.C., a part of their confiscated property was paid over to the river Strymon, whom they were held to have betrayed.

We recognize by the evidence of such facts that the cult of rivers was one of the vital forces in the domestic and even the national religion of Greece. But it is not easy to say at once and precisely how the average Hellene imagined these divinities; we have seen what is the evidence offered by the ritual; but ritualistic forms by no means bind the imagination of the worshipper. Many may have remained at the stage of inchoate religious feeling and have been conscious merely of the flowing water as animate and divine, or have believed vaguely in the presence there of an immanent spirit, or *δαίμων*, who could be angry or propitious. But there was a strong trend in the Greek religious imagination towards definite concrete forms so as to invest the once vague *numen* with the definite personality of the hero or the individual *θεός*, while Greek art and Greek mythology both express and strengthen this tendency. Therefore it is likely that the average Greek, believing in the divinity of rivers, believed in real and robust river-gods inhabiting them, as appears in the story about Skamandros quoted above, and in the popular myths concerning the combat of Herakles and Acheloos, and Alpheios's amorous attempt on Artemis.⁶ If we may trust Achilles Tatius, even the later Hellenes maintained at Olympia the simple form of sacrifice to Alpheios which may be called non-anthropomorphic, throwing their offerings directly into the water; but they attached to it a legend of a human lover-god.⁷

The form, however, in which the river-god was imagined was not wholly and always anthropomorphic; according to Aelian,¹ many of the Greek communities personified their local river under the form of a bull, suggested no doubt by the roaring of the floods, others under the form of man; but the art evidence shows that here as elsewhere the anthropomorphic fancy prevailed at last over the theriomorphic; the later coin-types present the river-god usually in beautiful human form, only with bulls' horns above the forehead.

(g) *Nymph-worship*.—The worship of nymphs possessed an equal hold on the faith and affections of the early Greek and of the Greek peasant of all ages. These are the feminine personifications of certain elemental life, the life in the fountain and stream, in the grove and the meadow. But, unlike the river-divinities, they appear to have been anthropomorphically imagined from the very beginning; for their name, which is our primary evidence concerning them, means simply 'brides' or 'young women,' and their forms in art and legend are purely human. Perhaps even more than the river-deities, the nymphs were intimately connected with the religion of the family and home. A striking passage in the *Odyssey*² shows how they were associated with the deep sentiment of yearning for one's native land; and throughout the ages of paganism they were beloved and revered as *κοιτοτρόφοι*,³ the kindly nurturers of children, the most tender title in the religious language of Greece. Though they belonged to the wild landscape of the country-side, their cult was taken over by the city-State; each division of the Doric tribes appears to have had its special worship of them;⁴ the magistrates at Kos supervise their sacrifice;⁵ and on the slopes of the Athenian Akropolis, where we have evidence of a temple consecrated to 'nymphs of the State'—*Νύμφαι Δημόδιοι*, *Νύμφη Πάνδημος*⁶—they came near to the rank of higher divinities. Though personal and human, these 'brides' of nature are usually nameless, and, in the centuries when the Olympian religion flourished, they tend to attach themselves as adjuncts to the higher divinities, such as Hermes, Apollo, Artemis, and Dionysos. And, when the higher gods were fading in the latter days of paganism, we have reason for believing that the simple faith of the peasant turned more clingingly to those tutelary half-divinities that fostered the life of his home and his soil; and their cult may have been the less easy to eradicate in proportion as they were more dimly conceived. In a degraded form, because of the ban of Christianity, the faith in them survives even to this day in Greece and Macedonia.⁷

Even in the records and products of the civilized European imagination these half-divine personalities of river, grove, and fountain are not to be ignored; for they have been a heritage of our poetic tradition, and even our great Puritan Milton could not shake off their spell. But for the just appreciation of the popular Greek mind their importance is primary; they illustrate as vividly as any part of the polytheism the plastic personifying faculty which peopled the world of nature with bright personalities, ideal but akin to our humanity; and thus Greek religion as well as Greek poetry was in its attitude towards nature anthropomorphic rather than animistic or pantheistic; thus also, by evolving these forms of beauty and grace, the

¹ Var. Hist. ii. 33.

² xiii. 256 ff.

³ Hes. Theog. 346 f.; Artemid. ii. 33.

⁴ See inscription of Thera, CIG (Ins. mar. Eg.), 378.

⁵ W. R. Paton and E. L. Hicks, *The Inscriptions of Cos*, Oxford, 1891, no. 44.

⁶ CIG i. 503, iii. 369.

⁷ See G. F. Abbott, *Macedonian Folklore*, Cambridge, 1903, p. 242; J. C. Lawson, *Modern Greek Folklore and Ancient Greek Religion*, do. 1910, p. 130.

¹ Artemid. ii. 33.

² Schol. Pind. Ol. xi. 63.

³ Eschin. Ep. 10.

⁴ Cf. Ἀσπιόδαρος, Ἀχελώιδας, Ἰσμηνοδαρος, Ἰστροδαρος, Ποταμοδαρος, Στρυμόδαρος.

⁵ Herod. vi. 78.

⁶ Paus. vi. xxii. 9.

⁷ L. 12.

the arctic regions the chief and most terrible of the gods will rule the cold blast, and 'hell' will be a realm of pitiless frost. Thus divinities of the mountains will everywhere have similar characteristics, and will be awe-inspiring and difficult of access; deities of the storms will be variable and fickle, swift to strike, and readily appeased. The former may be expected to be constant, unchangeable, and in a mountainous region will dominate the entire pantheon. The ferocity or comparative mildness of the latter will vary with the climatic conditions of the country; their disposition will always be more or less uncertain, and their action erratic. In Egypt, where the conditions are stable, and the character and succession of the weather and the seasons may be relied upon with all confidence, nature-deities are equable and mild, ruling in general in their several provinces with consideration and equity. In the cold and storm-driven north the corresponding divinities are harsh, reckless, and cruel, and may be expected relentlessly to punish every offence against their majesty and laws. An animistic cult, endowing with some at least of the attributes and functions of life the powers and phenomena of nature that encompass its votaries, of necessity reflects the quality and characteristics of their environment, and in many respects may be looked upon as an unwritten record of their experiences and history.

In this way the nature-gods of India are brought into relation with their surroundings, and betray their origin. Where development has taken place, the change has usually, not always, been so simple and gradual that the original character of the deity in question can be discerned without much difficulty. In particular the gods of the Vedic hymns are for the most part at only a short remove from the natural phenomena which they represent. Behind the loosely wrought and transparent veil of the personality the concrete fact or phenomenon, upon which the idealization has been based, was readily apparent; and the poets or worshippers never lost their hold, as it were, of the material world, the elements of which their own imagination had converted into gods with a claim upon their reverence and fear. Those forces of nature which were most apt to surprise, hurt, inflict injury, or cause loss, whether to themselves or to their possessions, would most command their respect and exact from them offerings of propitiation. Deities, on the other hand, even though they represented constant facts of experience, as, e.g., the Indian warmth and sunshine, if the outcome of their activity were usually the happiness and well-being of man, did not need to be urged to beneficence by gifts; and consequently their worship always tended to be neglected and their claims deferred in favour of the more imperious need of the worshipper to secure himself by submission and offering against the ill-will of those who might be prone to do harm. It is probable that considerations of this nature explain the comparatively subordinate position which the direct worship of the sun occupies in India. No natural phenomenon is more continually present and all-pervading than the sunlight and heat; reverence for the sun is and always has been a permanent element of Hindu worship, and of the daily ritual and prayer of the Brahman worshipper. The beneficent action of the sun, however, might be taken for granted. The more urgent need of the worshipper was to erect altars and present sacrifices to avert the wrongs and calamities which he might otherwise suffer at the hands of more capricious deities, whose action might easily be diverted to do him harm.

To enumerate and describe even a tithe of the nature-gods and goddesses who from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin do at the present time exact or

have in the past exacted a measure of adoration and fear from a greater or less proportion of the inhabitants of the peninsula is manifestly impossible within the limits of an article. Their number is legion. It would not be incorrect to assert that of the great multitude of deities who compose the vast Hindu pantheon the character and attributes of at least nine-tenths would justify a claim to the name and rank of 'nature' divinities; the remainder, with hardly an exception, would find a place in shrines or temples for ancestor-worship, or betray their origin in deification of notable men and women of the present or past ages. Deities that are the personifications of abstract qualities or sensations are rare; nor do they seem ever to have commanded any considerable measure of practical worship, important though their rôle may have been in theory and in the constructive mythology of the priests.

There is a further reason also in the character of the nature-gods themselves which seems to render a detailed description of each and every one unnecessary, even if it were possible. They all or most of them exhibit a strong family likeness. A description true to the qualities and attributes of one would serve for many others. Practically the same divinity also re-appears under different names in different parts of the country. When facilities of communication increase, these various deities are brought into contact with one another, and are readily identified. Thus the number of distinct and individual entities among the gods is not so great as might at first sight appear. Moreover, the character and functions of a nature-deity are rarely sharply defined. They tend at the edges to indistinctness and lack of firm outline. The more readily, therefore, they pass into one another, interchange offices and attributes, and end by becoming indistinguishable or distinguishable only by a name which has ceased to connote any marked individuality. It is usual to classify nature-gods as gods of the mountains, forests, streams, etc.; within these classes a similarity of function and characteristic is universally found to exist, which has its explanation in the natural phenomena which the deities represent. Finally, all nature-gods are strongly anthropomorphic. The worshippers, by whose imaginative power they are conceived, endow them with qualities and capacities like their own. In bodily appearance, in motives and passions, in prejudices and desires, they are like men. Inasmuch, however, as they have at their disposal forces incomparably greater than human—forces, moreover, whose purpose and direction appear to be incalculable—they are credited with efficient powers on a greatly enhanced scale. The worshipper reflects his own capacities for willing, feeling, acting upon the creations of his fancy, but in so doing magnifies them, and finds himself in presence of a god.

In the hymns of the Rigveda, the earliest literature of the Hindus, a simple nature-worship is presented, the naive wonder and reverence of man in presence of the mighty forces of the universe by which he is encompassed. The Vedic deities are described in anthropomorphic terms, but their relation to the natural phenomena which they represent is usually of a simple and straightforward character. In the hands of the poets they have undergone little transformation or idealization, and are still manifestly the forces of nature more or less distinctly personified and endowed with human characteristics. Perhaps in no other early religion is the 'natural' element so clearly revealed, or the material origin so little obscured by passing into the divine. Thus also the qualities and attributes of the various gods, being constructed, as it were, after one pattern, that of man, present little

quently adopted to render an original philosophic term that hardly admits of adequate translation into a foreign tongue.¹

Hindu thought, moreover, hardly advanced to the conception of nature as a whole, a totality inseparably bonded together and unified under the control of a common law to which in every part and portion it was submissive. Set over against himself, to the Indian observer or thinker the universe was and remained individualistic, a group or rather groups of individuals, often loosely and obscurely defined, but with distinct individualities, wills, functions, and tendencies. In all this the conditions of human life and society were reflected upon the assumed life of the other world, and seen more or less distorted as in a mirror. The several members of the groups, deities of the forests, the streams, the sky, etc., bore a family resemblance, as it were, to one another; but also the groups themselves were not strongly or clearly differentiated *inter se*, and individuals on the border-line might be assigned without much difficulty to another company, and were not careful to avoid trespassing upon the sphere or functions of divinities in the main distinct and charged with a special office and work. The tendency was uniformly in the direction of assimilation, not only the individual members of the groups drawing closer together in attributes and character, in all but name, but the several groups losing their hold upon the distinctive characteristics which betrayed their origin, and becoming mere embodiments of a few leading or commanding attributes which were appropriate to all. This feature is not, of course, peculiar to early Hindu thought or conception, but to a greater or less extent characterizes all 'nature' religions, whose deities are only in rare instances clearly differentiated, more often under different names are possessed of identical attributes and discharge the same offices.

These vaguely conceived forces or powers of nature were, in the first instance at least, not defined as persons, or clothed with personal form and attribute. This stage or attitude of belief is represented widely among the less advanced animistic tribes of India at the present time, and to a large extent forms the background of the religious faith and practice of the countryside.² The ghostly object of the villager's dread is localized in this or that patch of jungle, in a rock, a tree, or a rushing stream, but is hardly individualized, or in any way distinguished from many others of his kind, who do similar deeds of mischief and ill-will and are equally to be feared. In the earliest literature of the Vedic hymns, however, the personality of the chief gods and goddesses is distinctly conceived and asserted. The poets'

¹ Illustrations are readily to hand from Indian literature. Thus *Bhagavad-Gītā*, xii. 19, 'Know that both *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* are without beginning, and that products and qualities (*guṇa*) originate from *prakṛti*.' *Prakṛti* is said to be the ground of the activity of cause and effect, *puruṣa* of the capacity of experiencing pleasure and pain (*SBE* viii. 2 [1898] 104 f.; cf. the comments of Rāmānuja on *Ved.* i. 1. 1 and i. iv. 8, *SBE* xlviii. [1804] 139 f., 365); *ib.* iii. 27, 'Actions in every instance are done by the qualities of *prakṛti*'; 33, 'Even the wise man acts in harmony with his own nature (*prakṛti*). All beings follow nature' (*SBE* xlviii. 55 f.); ix. 10, 'By me, the overseer, *prakṛti* brings forth the animate and inanimate world, from this cause the universe revolves' (*SBE* xlviii. 82); cf. *ib.* xiv. 6, v. 14, etc.

² Cf. the words of H. H. Risley, than whom no closer or more exact student of primitive Indian life can be quoted. 'More especially in Chota Nagpur . . . my endeavours to find out what the jungle people really do believe have led me to the negative conclusion that in most cases the indefinite something which they fear and attempt to propitiate is not a person at all in any sense of the word. . . . I should say that the idea that lies at the root of their religion is that of power, or rather of many powers. What the Animist worships and seeks by all means to influence and conciliate is the shifting and shadowy company of unknown powers or influences making for evil rather than for good' (*Census of India, 1901, 'Report,'* vol. I. pt. I, Calcutta, 1903, p. 352).

thought and conception have advanced far beyond the stage at which the suppliant addresses himself to a vague impersonal force; and of the leading divinities at least it may be said that they possess a character of their own, and are apprehended in and by themselves. This would tend to show that the Aryan peoples of that age were by no means at a primitive or very early stage in the evolution of religious ideas, but had made considerable progress in the orderly development of constructive thought. The conception of personality, if it forces itself upon primitive man as a given fact of experience, is only with difficulty defined, or made to apply to the unknown external powers upon which his own well-being so largely depends. These he endows with various qualities and functions, derived from his own self-consciousness and experience, as of cunning, strength, will, but he makes no effort to combine them into the whole of an individual person, a substratum whose attributes these are.

Accordingly, it would be correct to define the Hindu conception of nature as consisting, at least fundamentally, of an aggregate of forces, not clearly interrelated or acting in unison, but for the most part independent, and not set in motion by any common motive or principle. It is partially misleading, therefore, to employ the term 'force' of the Indian conception. For the so-called force is not determined by any rule or law, save that of its own volition. It is active, and works according to its own will and caprice. The animating power of the spring or the grove is really animated, and is, so far as it is self-governing and irresponsible, urged to action by no necessity or the control of a higher power or will, but is arbitrary and apt to perform the most unexpected feats of mischief-making and malice. This is the lowest and most primitive stage of naturalism, represented widely in India at the present day. A hierarchy of nature-gods and goddesses, with a gradation of authority and power, reveals itself only in the further course of evolution. Nor in this is man doing other than ascribing to the external forces of nature the faculties of self-determination and free movement which he finds within himself. The powers of the world without reflect the power within, but are conceived as endowed with a greater capacity for hurt or harm or for doing good, inasmuch as the radius of their action is indefinitely wider and the destruction that they work more ruinous and complete. Nature is essentially relative to man. For the very reason, however, that these powers are self-determining and irresponsible, they may be moved by prayer or placated by offering. The grovelling attitude of fear, the muttered petition for mercy, the rags tied to the sacred tree, the oblation poured upon the ground, and the slaughtered bird or beast are so many recognitions of the dominion which the forces of nature exercise over the worshipper, and the perpetual interference which they inject into the otherwise equable course of his life. He is always in presence of natural powers of indefinite range and capability, and the mere instinct of self-preservation prompts him to seek to propitiate them and to ward off the incalculable consequences of their spite or caprice.

A determining element in the character of all nature-divinities is the climate and natural features of the district in which they are found. Environment plays as large a part in the formation and development of early religious conceptions as in the physical growth and evolution of the human body. The deities with which the imagination of the worshipper fills the universe around him are of necessity deities of the things which he sees, and the phenomenal forces which he experiences. In the tropics a god of fire will predominate, and the supreme punishment will be torture by heat. In

the arctic regions the chief and most terrible of the gods will rule the cold blast, and 'hell' will be a realm of pitiless frost. Thus divinities of the mountains will everywhere have similar characteristics, and will be awe-inspiring and difficult of access; deities of the storms will be variable and fickle, swift to strike, and readily appeased. The former may be expected to be constant, unchangeable, and in a mountainous region will dominate the entire pantheon. The ferocity or comparative mildness of the latter will vary with the climatic conditions of the country; their disposition will always be more or less uncertain, and their action erratic. In Egypt, where the conditions are stable, and the character and succession of the weather and the seasons may be relied upon with all confidence, nature-deities are equable and mild, ruling in general in their several provinces with consideration and equity. In the cold and storm-driven north the corresponding divinities are harsh, reckless, and cruel, and may be expected relentlessly to punish every offence against their majesty and laws. An animistic cult, endowing with some at least of the attributes and functions of life the powers and phenomena of nature that encompass its votaries, of necessity reflects the quality and characteristics of their environment, and in many respects may be looked upon as an unwritten record of their experiences and history.

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Hindu thought, moreover, hardly advanced to the conception of nature as a whole, a totality inseparably bonded together and unified under the control of a common law to which in every part and portion it was submissive. Set over against himself, to the Indian observer or thinker the universe was and remained individualistic, a group or rather groups of individuals, often loosely and obscurely defined, but with distinct individualities, wills, functions, and tendencies. In all this the conditions of human life and society were reflected upon the assumed life of the other world, and seen more or less distorted as in a mirror. The several members of the groups, deities of the forests, the streams, the sky, etc., bore a family resemblance, as it were, to one another; but also the groups themselves were not strongly or clearly differentiated *inter se*, and individuals on the border-line might be assigned without much difficulty to another company, and were not careful to avoid trespassing upon the sphere or functions of divinities in the main distinct and charged with a special office and work. The tendency was uniformly in the direction of assimilation, not only the individual members of the groups drawing closer together in attributes and character, in all but name, but the several groups losing their hold upon the distinctive characteristics which betrayed their origin, and becoming mere embodiments of a few leading or commanding attributes which were appropriate to all. This feature is not, of course, peculiar to early Hindu thought or conception, but to a greater or less extent characterizes all 'nature' religions, whose deities are only in rare instances clearly differentiated, more often under different names are possessed of identical attributes and discharge the same offices.

These vaguely conceived forces or powers of nature were, in the first instance at least, not defined as persons, or clothed with personal form and attribute. This stage or attitude of belief is represented widely among the less advanced animistic tribes of India at the present time, and to a large extent forms the background of the religious faith and practice of the countryside.² The ghostly object of the villager's dread is localized in this or that patch of jungle, in a rock, a tree, or a rushing stream, but is hardly individualized, or in any way distinguished from many others of his kind, who do similar deeds of mischief and ill-will and are equally to be feared. In the earliest literature of the Vedic hymns, however, the personality of the chief gods and goddesses is distinctly conceived and asserted. The poets'

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thought and conception have advanced far beyond the stage at which the suppliant addresses himself to a vague impersonal force; and of the leading divinities at least it may be said that they possess a character of their own, and are apprehended in and by themselves. This would tend to show that the Aryan peoples of that age were by no means at a primitive or very early stage in the evolution of religious ideas, but had made considerable progress in the orderly development of constructive thought. The conception of personality, if it forces itself upon primitive man as a given fact of experience, is only with difficulty defined, or made to apply to the unknown external powers upon which his own well-being so largely depends. These he endows with various qualities and functions, derived from his own self-consciousness and experience, as of cunning, strength, will, but he makes no effort to combine them into the whole of an individual person, a substratum whose attributes these are.

Accordingly, it would be correct to define the Hindu conception of nature as consisting, at least fundamentally, of an aggregate of forces, not clearly interrelated or acting in unison, but for the most part independent, and not set in motion by any common motive or principle. It is partially misleading, therefore, to employ the term 'force' of the Indian conception. For the so-called force is not determined by any rule or law, save that of its own volition. It is active, and works according to its own will and caprice. The animating power of the spring or the grove is really animated, and is, so far as it is self-governing and irresponsible, urged to action by no necessity or the control of a higher power or will, but is arbitrary and apt to perform the most unexpected feats of mischief-making and malice. This is the lowest and most primitive stage of naturalism, represented widely in India at the present day. A hierarchy of nature-gods and goddesses, with a gradation of authority and power, reveals itself only in the further course of evolution. Nor in this is man doing other than ascribing to the external forces of nature the faculties of self-determination and free movement which he finds within himself. The powers of the world without reflect the power within, but are conceived as endowed with a greater capacity for hurt or harm or for doing good, inasmuch as the radius of their action is indefinitely wider and the destruction that they work more ruinous and complete. Nature is essentially relative to man. For the very reason, however, that these powers are self-determining and irresponsible, they may be moved by prayer or placated by offering. The grovelling attitude of fear, the muttered petition for mercy, the rags tied to the sacred tree, the oblation poured upon the ground, and the slaughtered bird or beast are so many recognitions of the dominion which the forces of nature exercise over the worshipper, and the perpetual interference which they inject into the otherwise equable course of his life. He is always in presence of natural powers of indefinite range and capability, and the mere instinct of self-preservation prompts him to seek to propitiate them and to ward off the incalculable consequences of their spite or caprice.

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To enumerate and describe even a tithe of the nature-gods and goddesses who from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin do at the present time exact or

have in the past exacted a measure of adoration and fear from a greater or less proportion of the inhabitants of the peninsula is manifestly impossible within the limits of an article. Their number is legion. It would not be incorrect to assert that of the great multitude of deities who compose the vast Hindu pantheon the character and attributes of at least nine-tenths would justify a claim to the name and rank of 'nature' divinities; the remainder, with hardly an exception, would find a place in shrines or temples for ancestor-worship, or betray their origin in deification of notable men and women of the present or past ages. Deities that are the personifications of abstract qualities or sensations are rare; nor do they seem ever to have commanded any considerable measure of practical worship, important though their rôle may have been in theory and in the constructive mythology of the priests.

There is a further reason also in the character of the nature-gods themselves which seems to render a detailed description of each and every one unnecessary, even if it were possible. They all or most of them exhibit a strong family likeness. A description true to the qualities and attributes of one would serve for many others. Practically the same divinity also re-appears under different names in different parts of the country. When facilities of communication increase, these various deities are brought into contact with one another, and are readily identified. Thus the number of distinct and individual entities among the gods is not so great as might at first sight appear. Moreover, the character and functions of a nature-deity are rarely sharply defined. They tend at the edges to indistinctness and lack of firm outline. The more readily, therefore, they pass into one another, interchange offices and attributes, and end by becoming indistinguishable or distinguishable only by a name which has ceased to connote any marked individuality. It is usual to classify nature-gods as gods of the mountains, forests, streams, etc.; within these classes a similarity of function and characteristic is universally found to exist, which has its explanation in the natural phenomena which the deities represent. Finally, all nature-gods are strongly anthropomorphic. The worshippers, by whose imaginative power they are conceived, endow them with qualities and capacities like their own. In bodily appearance, in motives and passions, in prejudices and desires, they are like men. Inasmuch, however, as they have at their disposal forces incomparably greater than human—forces, moreover, whose purpose and direction appear to be incalculable—they are credited with efficient powers on a greatly enhanced scale. The worshipper reflects his own capacities for willing, feeling, acting upon the creations of his fancy, but in so doing magnifies them, and finds himself in presence of a god.

In the hymns of the R̥gveda, the earliest literature of the Hindus, a simple nature-worship is presented, the naive wonder and reverence of man in presence of the mighty forces of the universe by which he is encompassed. The Vedic deities are described in anthropomorphic terms, but their relation to the natural phenomena which they represent is usually of a simple and straightforward character. In the hands of the poets they have undergone little transformation or idealization, and are still manifestly the forces of nature more or less distinctly personified and endowed with human characteristics. Perhaps in no other early religion is the 'natural' element so clearly revealed, or the material origin so little obscured by passing into the divine. Thus also the qualities and attributes of the various gods, being constructed, as it were, after one pattern, that of man, present little

variety, and the same epithets may be and frequently are applied to each and all. As is natural, it is the element of strength, the force which they exercise and by which their influence is felt, upon which most stress is laid. Whatever else they may be to the mind of their worshippers, they are severally all-powerful, able to accomplish their aims and to do whatsoever they will. Moreover, with few exceptions they are conceived as gracious and kindly, prepared to listen to the petitions of those who approach them in sincerity with prayer and sacrifice; and they wage continual war with the powers of ill, the demons who work disaster, suffering, and wrong. In all this may be easily discerned the self-consciousness of the early Hindu worshipper, facing with courage the problems of the world around him, projecting his own thoughts and experiences into what seemed its infinitely manifold activities, and endeavouring to construe its movements in terms of his own self-knowledge and will. Few of the great gods of the Veda survived to later times.

Nature-deities form part of what appear to have been early or primitive groupings of divine powers in triads, or sets of three. These, again, were, in most instances at least, based upon and developed out of pairs of divinities, in whom was expressed the ancient cosmological conception of the creation of the universe by means of generation, the union of the male and female principles in the natural world. The oldest of these dyads, or pairs, was Dyaus-Pṛthivī, heaven and earth, Dyaus representing the wide-spreading vault of heaven, which surrounds and encompasses the earth (*pṛthivī*). Dyaus is invoked as father of gods and men, who alone apparently in the conception of the poets is without beginning and possesses the attribute of immortality. The other gods, however great and powerful they may be, are in themselves but mortal, and gain immortality only as they quaff the life-giving *soma* (see below) in the halls of the gods. Other ancient divinities linked together in nature and worship are Mitra-Varuṇa, the sun in the heavens, in his royal prerogatives of justice and power; Indra-Varuṇa, the open heaven and the cloud-storms that come forth from its womb; and others of less importance. The earliest triad that is clearly distinguished appears as Agni, Vāyu, and Sūrya, or fire, wind, and the sun; but it is possible that this is a development out of a more primitive grouping in which Varuṇa, the heavens, and Mitra, a more ancient name or form of the solar divinity, had a part.

In the nature-worship of the Veda the sun appears in many forms and under many names. His most ancient title is Mitra, joint-guardian with Varuṇa of the wide universe, with a name and cult that lie far back in Indo-Iranian times. Varuṇa is thus in origin and relation closely connected with the sun. He has come to represent the wide-spreading vault of heaven, and as 'all-seeing' embodies the ancient Indian conception of justice and right. Varuṇa is perhaps the most completely personalized of the early Vedic gods. In the later Indian mythology, under circumstances that are obscure, he seems to have lost his original character, and became reduced to comparative insignificance as a god of the sea,¹ his office and functions being transferred to Prajāpati, the sovereign 'lord of creatures,' an abstract conception of a more reflective and theistic type of thought.

¹ In a late hymn of the R̥gveda the rule of Varuṇa is already associated with the triple waters that feed the ocean:

'The waters of the sky, the waters of the rivers, the waters of the wells: the bright and cleansing waters, whose goal is the sea—may these divine waters protect me.'

In the midst of them goes Varuṇa the king, marking the truth and falsehood of men: they so pure and bright, dropping honey—may these divine waters protect me' (VII. xlix.).

In all the hymns addressed to Varuṇa there are an acknowledgment of wrong-doing, and prayer for forgiveness; the following is part of one of the most remarkable from the first book of the R̥gveda:

'However we break thy laws from day to day, men as we are,
O god, Varuṇa,
Do not deliver us unto death, nor to the blow of the furious;
nor to the anger of the spiteful!
To propitiate thee, O Varuṇa, we bind thy mind with songs,
as the charioteer a weary steed.
Away from us they flee dispirited, intent only on gaining
wealth; as birds to their nest.
When shall we bring hither the man who is victory to the
warriors, when shall we bring Varuṇa, the wide-seeing, to
be propitiated?

He who knows the place of the birds that fly through the
sky, who on the waters knows the ships.

He who knows the track of the wind, of this wide, this bright,
and mighty; and knows those who reside on high,—
He, the upholder of order, Varuṇa sits down among his
people; he, the wise, sits there to govern.

Thence perceiving all wondrous things, he sees what has
been and will be done.

May he, the wise son of time, make our paths straight all
our days; may he prolong our lives!

O hear this my calling, Varuṇa, be gracious now; longing
for help, I have called upon thee.

Thou, O wise god, art lord of all, of heaven and earth: listen
and answer on thy way.²

The most clearly conceived and defined of the solar deities is Sūrya, the bright orb of the sun, who in the mythology is the son of Dyaus. He surveys the universe in the consciousness of power, and puts to flight the evil spirits of darkness and disease. The worship of the bright sun has been in India the most persistent and universal of early cults; and under the name of Savitr, the divine vivifier, who brings life again to the world and to men after the sleep of the night, he is invoked in the daily morning prayer of every Brāhman.³ Viṣṇu, the all-pervader, is a solar deity who in the development of Indian religious thought became one of the most important and influential of India's gods. He traverses the three worlds in three strides, and is described as 'wide-stepping,' 'wide-going'—epithets that probably refer to the rapid course of the sun in the heavens through the three stages of rising, culmination, and setting. Pūṣan also, the friend and guide of travellers and especially of the departed souls who are beset by many perils on their dark journey to the lower world, seems to have been originally a form of the light-giving god. In the later literature the number of the sun-gods is multiplied to twelve, representing the twelve months of the year. These are the Ādityas, sons of Aditi, the boundless expanse or void. In the R̥gveda the name occurs once in the late tenth book, and their number is given as seven or eight, Varuṇa being sometimes reckoned with them. Aditi, in the dual, is the dual divinity of heaven and earth; and the name Āditya is also employed generally of Viṣṇu or any solar divinity.

Two deities, moreover, prominent in the R̥gveda, were directly associated with the heavens. The twin Āsvins represented probably the morning and evening stars, which were originally conceived as distinct and independent. Their functions, however, and course in the sky were so evidently similar that they were regarded as twins. The name signifies 'belonging to horses'; accordingly, the Āsvins are the two charioteers who harness the car of the dawn, and conduct it each successive day above the horizon. They are also the divine physicians, who by their skill avert sickness and

¹ I. xxv.: Max Müller, *Hist. of Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, London, 1860, p. 535 ff.; Peterson, *Hymns from the R̥gveda*, pp. 2 ff., 295 ff.

² The sacred *Gāyatri* or *Sāvitrī* (R̥gveda, III. lxii. 10; cf. Manu, II. 78-82, 148): *tat Savitir vareṇyam bhargo devasya dhīmahi, dhiyo yo nah prachodayāt*, 'On the most excellent glory of that divine vivifier let us meditate, and may he inspire our thoughts.'

³ *Urukrama, urugāya*.

disease from men. Undoubtedly the most beautiful personification of the Veda is Uṣas, the goddess of the dawn, who in her car opens the gates of the sky, and drives away the malignant spirits that love the night. She is described as bright and ever young, the daughter of heaven and sister of the Adityas. In the dual, *uṣasau*, the name is given to the morning and evening twilights.

Several of the Vedic deities have a double or even threefold form and nature, as gods of the heavens, the earth, and the waters. The chief of these is Indra, sometimes described as an atmospheric divinity. He is the storm-god, son of Dyaus, the most popular deity of Vedic times, to judge from the number of hymns dedicated to him. He rides upon his golden car, and bestows rich and bountiful gifts upon his worshippers; but he is also greatly to be feared, for the same rain that enriches and fertilizes the soil may become a flood, sweeping away the crops and destroying life. In his character as warrior-king he is thus perhaps more distinctly personalized than the majority of the Vedic gods. He is said greatly to delight in the offerings of those who pay him homage, and to indulge to excess in draughts of the intoxicating *soma*, whereby he is strengthened for the warfare with the powers of evil in which he is perpetually engaged. Prominent as is the position of Indra in the Veda, from the later mythology his figure and name almost entirely disappear.

From many texts that might be cited the following express briefly the thoughts of the poet towards the god :

'He who, immediately on his birth, the first, the wise, surpassed the gods in force; at whose might the two worlds shook, through the greatness of his strength, he, O men, is Indra.

He who fixed the quivering earth; who gave stability to the agitated mountains; who measured the vast atmosphere; who propped up the sky, he, O men, is Indra.

He who has been a counterpart of the Universe; who casts down the unshaken, he, O men, is Indra.

The sky and the earth bow down to him; at his might the mountains are afraid.¹

'O Indra, listen to our prayer; come, yoke thy steeds, and drive them towards us; all mortals call upon thee in every place, but hear our prayer, O life-giver.

Thy greatness, Indra, reached our cry, and thou protectest the song of the singer, O mighty one: when thou dost take the thunderbolt in thy hand, great and fierce god, none can resist thee.

On the days when evil men do penance for their sin, on these days he gracious to us, O Indra; the sins which Varuṇa, the wise god, sees in us—from their guilt may Indra deliver us.

Let us call on this mighty Indra, that he may give us great wealth and substance: who is the hearer of prayer—and do you gods protect us always with your blessing.²

Closely related to Indra are the Maruts, the storm-deities, sons of Rudra, himself a god of the destroying tempest, and the only one of the great Vedic deities whose temper and character are distinctly maleficent. Rudra is also the lord of the healing art, the 'greatest of physicians,' perhaps so regarded from the action of the storm-wind in clearing the valleys and swamps of fogs and noxious vapours. The constant association of the Maruts with Indra in the hymns seems to be decisive against the explanation of their original nature as spirits of plant-life and vegetation.³ The really maleficent forces of the Veda are the demons, of whom Vṛtra, the defeated opponent of Indra, is the chief. The other demoniacal powers for the most part make their appearance in classes, as *rākṣasas*, *piśāchas*, etc. Vṛtra

certainly, as a personification of the evil serpent, belongs to the sphere of nature-worship. The great majority, if not all, of the rest probably share the same character.

Vāyu or Vāta was the wind, another impersonation of the mighty tempest. He is associated with the earth (*prthivi*), of whom he is sometimes regarded as the husband.

Among the most ancient deities of the Veda was Soma, who also appears under a terrestrial as well as a celestial form. His cult may be traced back to the Indo-Iranian period, when the sacred *haoma* had a part in the Avestan rites of worship. The basis of the personification is to be found in the strange intoxicating properties of the plant, which were ascribed to divine afflatus. What specific plant, however, was originally intended is uncertain. The so-called 'moon-plant' (*Asclepias acida*), which the Indians themselves usually identify with the *soma*, possesses a bitter acrid juice, which would seem unlikely, unless tastes have greatly changed, to have been lauded as a divine drink. Others have supposed that the *soma* really denoted the grape, the knowledge of which had been communicated to the Indians in their early home. P. Regnaud, on the other hand, has argued that the name originally indicated the aromatic oil that was employed to feed the sacred fire;¹ but his arguments have failed to carry conviction to scholars. There is less ideal personification in the poets' conception of Soma than in the case with the other chief divinities of the Veda. In celebrating his virtues and influence they seem never to have lost sight of the fact that the deity whom they praised did actually represent a tangible and concrete plant. Moreover, the *soma*, though the choice libation to the gods upon earth, possessed also a mystical life in the third heaven. There, like the nectar of the Greeks, it was the drink of the gods, through partaking of which they became immortal; and men also will win immortality when they quaff the *soma* in the regions of the blest. In some sort, therefore, the *soma* was conceived as having a celestial as well as an earthly existence. It grew also in heaven, whence it had been brought down, a gift from the gods to men. In the later literature Soma changed his character, as did some other divinities, and the name was transferred to or identified with the moon, probably through some obscure idea of the influence of the moon upon vegetation and the growth and ripening of the sap. Of this identification there are hints and pre-intimations in the R̥gveda itself.² It is unlikely, however, that the conception of Soma as the moon was other than a late development of religious thought.

In the tenth *mandala* of the R̥gveda the praises of the *soma* and its irresistible power are chanted in an unmistakable drinking-song. Indra is the speaker:

'This, this is my thought, that I will get me cow and horse: have I not drunk the Soma?

Like rushing winds the draughts I have drunk carry me along: have I not drunk the Soma?

The draughts carry me along as swift horses the chariot: have I not drunk the Soma?

Prayer is drawing nigh me, like a lowing cow approaching her dear child: have I not drunk the Soma?

I, as a carpenter with a plank, turn the prayer round in my heart: have I not drunk the Soma?

The two worlds reach not the half of me: have I not drunk the Soma?

Over heaven in my might, over this mighty earth I stretch: have I not drunk the Soma?

Ha! I will put earth down this way or that way: have I not drunk the Soma?

¹ *Actes du premier Congrès international de l'histoire des religions*, 1900, Paris, 1904, II. I. 49 ff.

² R̥gveda, vi. xlv. 21, viii. lxxi. 8, x. lxxv. 2 ff., cxxviii. 8. The passages are all probably late. In x. lxxv. 5 the moon is the cup from which the gods drink the *soma*, and a similar representation is found in the *Upaniṣads*.

¹ R̥gveda, II. xii. 1; J. Muir, *Orig. Sanskrit Texts*³, London, 1890, iv. 87.

² R̥gveda, vii. xxviii., tr. Peterson³, I. 280 f.

³ As by L. von Schröder, *Mysterium und Mimus im R̥gveda*, Leipzig, 1903, p. 124.

I am great of the great; I have risen to the navel of the world: have I not drunk the Soma?

I have taken, and go away satisfied, to carry the offering to the gods: have I not drunk the Soma?'¹

Agni, the god of fire, takes his place among nature-gods equally with the gods of the winds and the waters; and the universal prevalence of fire-worship among primitive peoples is due to the large part which that element plays in their daily life. In the Veda Agni is the son of heaven and earth, the guardian and friend of mankind; and, like Soma, bears the character of a terrestrial as well as a celestial divinity. He is indeed credited with a threefold origin and life, as the sacred fire upon the hearth, the lightning in the sky, and in the atmospheric waters. As in the descriptions of the *soma*, the physical qualities and appearance of the fire also seem rarely if ever to be lost sight of by the Vedic poets. He strikes in the lightning, and with his fierce heat consumes those who oppose him and refuse to render him his due. He also waits upon men at the household hearth, bears their sacrifices and gifts to heaven, and with his kindly warmth promotes the growth of their crops. Agni is the eldest of the gods, high priest and seer both in heaven and upon earth, messenger and intermediary between man and god, uniting in himself the functions of all inferior and human priests, and presenting their gifts and service with acceptance in heaven. Thus Agni especially, in his offices and worship, forms the bond between the daily concrete life and labour of man and the unseen world of the gods.

'O holy and divine Agni, with thy pleasant tongue of flame bring the gods here and worship them.

We have fed thee with butter, O glorious one, that gazest up into heaven: bring the gods to our feast.

Thou dost call them to our feast; we have kindled thee and thou dost shine: dost shine mightily, O wise Agni, at our sacrifice.

Agni, come with all the gods and partake of our sacrifice: we have chosen thee for our priest.

See thy worshipper pours out the soma for thee, Agni, give him strength: with the gods sit down on the rushes.

Thou art kindled, O Agni, conqueror of thousands, and kindled dost further our sacrifice: a messenger to the gods, worthy to be praised.

Put Agni upon the altar, he to whom all creatures are known, who it is that carries our oblation: a god and priest ever young.'²

Of nature-deities that in origin were more exclusively terrestrial the chief was Prthivi, the earth, the primeval mother of all creatures, and the consort of Dyans, the sky. All natural objects, however, were deified, or conceived as animated by spirits consciously working on their own purposes, gratifying themselves in the execution of their own will, but amenable to prayer and the offerings and desires of their worshippers. All running water was regarded as especially sacred. The semi-mythical river Sarasvatī was personified as the wife of Brahmā, mother of rivers, goddess of eloquence and learning, who bestows inspiration on the seers, offspring and riches upon mankind. It is doubtful whether the Vedic Sarasvatī is to be identified with the river which later bore the name, and now as an insignificant stream flows south-westwards between the Jumna and the Sutlej to lose itself in the Indian Desert. There is evidence, however, that the modern river was formerly of much greater size and importance.³ The heir to the especial sacredness of the Sarasvatī was Mā Gaṅgā, or Mother Ganges, a river which evidently occupied an entirely subordinate position in Vedic times, being mentioned once only in the R̥gveda.⁴ In the later mythology the Ganges was the eldest daughter of Himavat (the mountain-range of the Himālayas) and Menā, the latter one

of the *apsarasas*; ¹ and descended from heaven from the feet of Viṣṇu, falling directly upon Śiva's head. Thus the sacred river has a celestial habitation and home, and is believed also to flow in a subterranean course. To bathe in its waters purifies from all sin. Death on its banks is a sure passport to heaven. And water from the Ganges is carried to the most distant parts of India for the benefit of those who cannot themselves visit the holy river. While the Ganges, however, is the most sacred river, and the chief places of pilgrimage and worship lie on its banks, other rivers approach it in sanctity. Of these the principal are the Indus, the Narbadā, and the Godāvari (*gg.v.*). According to a widely accepted tradition, the Ganges is destined at a future date to lose its pre-eminence, the place of honour being taken by the Narbadā. Every temple has its sacred tank, the water of which is more or less efficacious for spiritual as well as physical purification. The *maṅṅkarnikā* well at Benares is perhaps the most frequented and revered of countless sacred wells and pools throughout India, each with its legend or legends, which attract the Hindu worshipper, especially at the great periodical festivals.

The worship of animals and plants is universal. In part this cult is a survival of totemism, as in many parts of India among the aboriginal and backward tribes it is associated at the present day with totemistic practices. The members of the serpent and monkey tribes are almost universally held in regard; to the more common and dangerous snakes, especially the cobra, *pūṣā* (worship) is habitually rendered. The bull is sacred and inviolable throughout the length and breadth of India. The animal 'vehicles' of the great gods become themselves the objects of a special cult and fear. Thus the sacred goose of Brahmā, the *garuḍa*, the mythical eagle or vulture of Viṣṇu, the *nandin*, or bull, of Śiva, the tiger of his wife Durgā, the rat of Gaṇeśa, the parrot of Kāmadeva the god of love, share the reverence due to the gods with whom they are associated. Dangerous beasts are propitiated in order to secure their worshippers from harm; in the case of others their usefulness in the service of man has led to a measure of honour being paid to them, which in most instances, however, falls short of a real deification. More or less unconsciously behind all lies the motive power of the belief in transmigration, which presents to the mind of the worshipper the possibility that the living form may enshrine the spirit of a deceased father or other ancestor, who has chosen this as his temporary home. Nature- and ancestor-worship are so intimately conjoined that it is often impossible with certainty to assign to one or the other the priority.

The worship of the *soma* has been obsolete from Vedic times, but the cult of trees and other plants is very widely practised throughout India. The belief in transmigration has undoubtedly exercised an influence here also, inasmuch as the possibilities of rebirth extend to the vegetable and material worlds. The most sacred plant of modern India is the *tulasī*, or *tulsi*, the holy basil (*Ocimum sanctum*), a small shrub, a specimen of which may be found growing in the courtyard of most Hindu houses. It is believed to be animated by Lakṣmī the wife of Viṣṇu, or by Sītā, and the entire worship of many high-caste Indian women consists in daily circumambulation of the sacred plant, with offerings of rice and flowers. The sacred lotus, if not actually worshipped, is the symbol of unstained purity; and the *kusa* grass, from its association with the sacrifice, is pre-eminently holy. Of trees the *pīpal* (*Ficus religiosa*) is peculiarly sacred, being the abode of Brahmā, or

¹ x. cxix.; Peterson², pp. 45 f., 319 f.

² R̥gveda, v. xxvi.; Peterson³, pp. 17, 304.

³ The question is fully discussed in Macdonell and Keith, *s.v.*, li. 434 ff.

⁴ In the late tenth book (lxxv. 5).

¹ See below, p. 233, and art. GAṆOĀ, GAṆOĀS.

of the triad of Hindu gods, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Śiva. It is worshipped by pouring water at the roots, daubing the trunk with red ochre, or fastening rags or threads to the branches, and by circumambulation. Other trees of great sanctity are the *banyan* (*Ficus Indica*), which is especially sacred to Viṣṇu, and as the Bo-tree, under which Gautama Buddha gained perfect wisdom, is equally revered by Buddhists. The *mango*, the *bel*, or wood-apple, and the *nīm* tree, the leaves of which are prophylactic against disease and snake-bite, with many others, are holy, and receive worship generally or at stated times.

Moreover, practically all the prominent and striking features of the countryside have come to be regarded as sacred, and in a measure deified. In particular, prominent rocks or hills and stones remarkable for shape or situation become the objects of a ritual worship that in its general character is similar throughout the country. The *śālagrāma* stone, a variety of black ammonite, is sacred to Viṣṇu, and the markings on the stone bear a mystical significance in relation to his worship. Vaiṣṇavites keep a specimen of the *śālagrāma* in their houses, where it is reverently bathed, and drink-offerings with incense and flowers are presented. The massive mountain-ranges of N. and Central India, and to a less degree the hills and plateaux of the south, were all personified, and admitted to the rank and station of the great gods. The impressiveness and inaccessible character of the vast Himālaya range, the 'abode of snow,' naturally claimed for it the chief place. Himālaya in the mythology was the father of Gaṅgā, the river Ganges, and of Parvatī, the wife of Śiva; and in the distant ice-bound recesses of his mountain-home some of the most holy pilgrim resorts are to be found. Other mountain peaks, however, in other parts of the country are hardly less sacred. The nymphs of the springs and groves, the mythical deities of the air, the *apsarasas*, *gandharvas*, *kinnaras*, and others, belong ultimately to the same class of nature-gods; and the personified powers of evil and disease, lurking in secret places, *rākṣasas*, *piśāchas*, *kimidin*, etc., are innumerable.

Reference should be made also to the strange cult of the implements of trade or occupation—a practice which is observed more or less throughout India, but is most prevalent where commerce has been most highly developed and organized. Its origin is probably to be traced to the influence of the trade guilds, and the desire to provide for a distinct centre of gild interest and worship.

'The tools which a man uses in his trade, the fire that warms him, the books out of which the school-boy learns his lessons, the pots with which the wife cooks the dinner, all have a part in this strange and elaborate deification, and become the objects of a worship that is by no means confined to the lowest and most ignorant strata of the population.'¹

In Bengal this worship takes place especially at the Śrī Pañcāmī festival in the spring, when even the clerks in the Government offices will gather together their pens and paper and books, and with the help of Sanskrit recitations by the Brāhman priest go through a formal ceremonial of worship, which concludes with presents to the officiating priest and general feasting.²

LITERATURE.—*SBE* xxii. [1891], 'Vedic Hymns,' pt. i. 'Hymns to the Maruts, Rudra, Vāyu, and Vāta,' tr. F. Max Müller, xlv. [1897], 'Vedic Hymns,' pt. ii. 'Hymns to Agni,' tr. H. Oldenberg; P. Peterson, *Hymns from the R̥gveda* (ed. with Śāyana's commentary, notes, and a translation)³, Bombay, 1905, *Second Selection of Hymns from the R̥gveda*, do. 1899; A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, 2 vols., London, 1912; M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*⁴, do. 1891, and *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, new ed., Oxford, 1899; W. Crooke, *Popular Religion and Folklore of Northern India*, new ed., 2 vols., London, 1898

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A. S. GEDEN.

NATURE (Japanese).—I. APPRECIATION OF NATURE.—No race, ancient or modern, seems to have had a keener appreciation of nature than the Japanese, or to have been more inspired by it in the formation of its religious ideal. The Japanese were inclined towards this state of mind by the very character of their country—a land full of contrasts, at once tragic and smiling, terrifying and gentle, stern and mild; refusing man much and giving him more; shaken by volcanoes, devastated by floods, swept by tempests, and at the same time rich in hidden resources and dazzling splendours, fertile in crops and beauties. Such a land was bound to make the deepest impression on an intelligent, artistic people inclined by their innate goodness of heart to look on the benefits of nature rather than on its scourges, and to see in the beauty of their country a constant reason for gratefulness to the gods.

This feeling of admiration and love for nature is seen throughout the whole literature of the country.

In mythology, when the wife of the hero Yamato-dake throws herself into the waves to pacify the sea-gods, one of her last thoughts before disappearing is the recollection of a landscape; and Yamato-dake himself dies singing the praises of his beautiful country and expressing fraternal sentiments towards a tree which is near him, before being changed into a bird (see HEROES AND HERO-GODS [Japanese], vol. vi, p. 664).

These significant details show how close the communion was between the Japanese and the nature in the midst of which they lived. In the most ancient poetical collection, the *Manyōshū* ('Collection of a Myriad Leaves'), we find numerous lyrical poems devoted to the celebration of all the splendours of the Japanese landscapes, from the lofty summit of Fujiyama to the smallest herb of the plain (see M. Revon, *Anthologie de la littérature japonaise*, Paris, 1910, p. 90 ff.). Even in these poetical pieces, most of which were composed in the 8th cent., the Japanese show that particular sentiment which they express in the phrase *mono no aware*, and which consists in understanding the 'melancholy of things,' i.e. in sympathizing with all creatures, having a fellow-feeling with the sorrows of nature as well as with human sufferings. The next poetical collection, the *Kokinshū* ('Poems Ancient and Modern,' 10th cent.), has the same sentimental lyricism with less fullness and more delicacy. In cleverly constructed verses the poets vie with each other in lamenting the ephemeral duration of the cherry-blossom in spring or the sadness of the autumn evenings. The preface to this work, written by a great poet, Tsurayuki, explains how men became poets by listening to the voice of the nightingale singing among the flowers or to the cry of the frog which dwells in the water, by admiring the flower or envying the flight of the birds, by gazing at the bazes or the tear-drops of dew; he says that the collection is to include all the feelings experienced by a person of the court, from the time when the plum-tree blossom was placed in his hair to the time when he listened to the cuckoo, when he gathered the maple-branches reddened by the autumn, when at last he went to admire the snow; and he concludes by celebrating the immortality of Poetry, eternal as the evergreen pine-tree (see Revon, pp. 139, 141, 150 f.).

There is the same appreciation of nature in the prose works. The famous novel, *Genji Monogatari*, which appeared in the brilliant court of the year 1000, the masterpiece of a lady of honour, Murasaki no Shikibu, was composed on the terrace of a

¹ A. S. Geden, *Studies in the Religions of the East*, p. 406 L.

² *Census of India*, 1901, vol. i. pt. i. p. 357 I.

temple facing a lake, by moonlight, and from these circumstances it seems to have acquired a poetical illumination through and through; the most beautiful passages are perhaps those, often in verse, in which the writer introduces into the expression of human sentiments images drawn from nature (see, e.g., *ib.* pp. 184 f., 190). In the delightful book of impressions of another court lady of the same period, the *Makura no Sōshi* ('Pillow Notes') of Sei Shōnagon, we also find mingled with lively remarks and anecdotes on the artificial life of the court the most acute observation of nature and its changing aspects: the work opens with impressions of nature, in which the writer says that what charms her in spring is the dawn, when all becomes gradually lit up on the mountains; in summer the dark night, when the fire-flies cross each other's paths, and so on (*ib.* p. 200). Another well-known book of impressions is the *Hōyōki* ('Book of a Hut ten feet square'), by the hermit Kamo Chōmei (13th cent.); with this religious person the love of nature once more predominates: he also dreams of nothing better in his solitude than to have as his friends music and poetry, the harp and flutes, the moon and the flowers; the whole hope of his life, he says, rests in the beauties of the seasons; and he blames himself for being too fond of the mountains and forgetting Buddha in his contemplation of the moon when it appears on the horizon (see *ib.* pp. 259-262, 263-265, 259, note 2). This eternal theme of the four seasons reappears in a third book of impressions, the *Tsure-zure-gusa* ('Varieties of Moments of Ennui'), by the bonze Kenkō (14th cent.), who, comparing his love of nature with that of the preceding authors, connects it with all the festivals of the year (see *ib.* pp. 285-288). Thus in writings in which the inmost heart is laid bare we always find among the Japanese the same profound love of nature.

The same remark may be made concerning other kinds of literature at later periods—e.g., in the *nō*, or lyrical dramas, of the 15th cent. (see, e.g., *ib.* p. 305 f.), or in the light poetry (*haikai*) of the 17th and 18th centuries, in which we see a poet, a lover of flowers, surprised because a brutal sword-bearer dares to look upon these exquisite marvels; another, indignant because they are looked upon by aristocrats whose grand dresses cover the ridiculous skeletons of degenerates; and another expressing the horror of the flowers themselves when they see approaching them people who have just shown their lack of taste by being present at an artificial theatrical performance; while, on the other hand, those poets themselves, in their enthusiasm for nature, do not hesitate to go and ask water from their neighbor so that they may not disturb a convolvulus that has entwined itself round the bucket of their well, or to set fire to their thatched roof if it prevents them from seeing a moonlight effect (*ib.* pp. 383 ff., 391, note 3, 394, n. 3, 395, ns. 2, 4, 397, n. 2; and cf. pp. 388, 389, n. 1, 392, n. 5, 393, n. 1, etc.).

To complete our survey of this Japanese conception which sees in nature the supreme beauty and finds in its contemplation the most perfect human joy, we may refer to a native thinker who has analyzed it very carefully, viz. Kaihara Ekiken, the great philosopher of the 17th cent., whose writings have remained popular to the present day. In his *Rakkun* ('Philosophy of Pleasure') he expresses himself on the subject with great beauty and sympathy (see *ib.* p. 320).

Like their ancestors, the Japanese of to-day are dominated by the thought of the seasons—so much so that, in conversation, they do not begin by asking about one's health, but by mentioning the state of the weather; and similarly in letter-writing

they always start with a phrase indicating, in poetical terms, the point of evolution of the year with regard to the change of temperature and the blossoming of the flowers. Like the artistic people of the ancient days who had special pavilions built where they might gaze on the moonlight, which was regarded as the most exquisite spectacle that could be presented to a guest at a friendly evening party, to-day all the people of Tōkyō go and admire it for whole nights, on certain dates fixed by tradition, singing and improvising verses full of tenderness, and they desert the capital to go to various well-known places to see in turn the bloom of plum-trees, cherry-trees, peonies, azaleas, wisteria, irises, then convolvuli, lotuses, and chrysanthemums, and, last of all, the maple-leaves turning red, awaiting the arrival of the snow, the light winter-flower. In a garden famous for its plum-trees, on the banks of the river Sumida, the present writer one day saw an old statesman, Admiral Enomoto, one of the founders of modern Japan, rising from his seat in order to show his respect by hanging on a branch in blossom a little poem which he had just composed in praise of the admired tree. The Japanese, even of the poorest class, often undertake journeys to visit the most distant landscapes of the empire; for they are convinced that the most beautiful scenes are those which the gods themselves have prepared for the eyes of man. This state of mind at the present time explains and confirms what we have noticed in the past. Throughout the whole course of their history, from primitive times to our own days, the Japanese appear as essentially charmed with nature, wonderfully gifted to understand it as artists, and predestined to love and adore it.

II. *NATURE-GODS*.—The national religion of Japan is not, as was for a long time believed, a cult of ancestors, accompanied secondarily by a vague nature-worship; it is essentially a cult of nature, complete and precise, to which a much less important cult of ancestors only gradually came to be added (see *ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD* [Japanese], vol. i. p. 456). As a matter of fact, the nature-gods constitute almost the whole pantheon of the ancient Shintō; they swarm in all the departments of the physical universe, sometimes attached to an object, sometimes to a phenomenon, and sometimes to a group of phenomena or objects—to a complex region of which they become the soul and form the unity.

I. *Gods of the sky*.—The first thing that the ancient Japanese noticed when they raised their heads was what they called the 'Plain of the High Heavens' (*Takama no hara*). But for them this material heaven was only the dwelling-place of the gods; it was not itself a god. The idea of a personal Heaven did not enter their minds until under the influence of the Chinese. Meanwhile they regarded the sky simply as the abode of the supreme gods.

(a) *The sun-goddess*.—The gods of light are the first important gods revealed by the native mythology, and the most brilliant of them, the sun, shines throughout the whole sacred history in the vault of the Japanese pantheon. In art. *COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY* (Japanese), vol. iv. p. 164, will be found an account of the circumstances of the birth of this solar goddess, Amaterasu-oho-mi-kami, the 'great and august goddess who shines in the heavens,' at the same time as the moon-god and the storm-god, and of the way in which these three deities were made the rulers of the Plain of the High Heavens, the Kingdom of Night, and the Domain of the Ocean respectively. But Amaterasu is manifestly the highest of these deities. She receives the most glorious investiture, and holds the highest rank in the sacred legend. In fact,

she is hardly raised to the royalty of the heavens when she takes the most noble and outstanding part in the myths; and the long account of her quarrels with the storm-god only serves to show up the beauties of a truly divine character.

When that impetuous god, deserting his kingdom, darts into the sky to overthrow that of his sister, she endeavours to appease him with the most indulgent calmness; and the eclipse of the goddess at last takes place only when, disregarding her patient gentleness, he perpetrates the worst crimes: she hides in the cave from which the other celestial gods had so much difficulty in enticing her to come forth (*Kojiki*, tr. B. H. Chamberlain², Tokyo, 1906, pp. 63-65).

After this episode the wicked brother is driven from the sky, and the goddess, henceforward calm, can at last reign in peace in the Plain of the High Heavens. She soon reappears, and at the most important points of the national legend; for it is she who in her turn gives the investiture to the ancestors of the emperors. This mission accomplished, she intervenes only at rare intervals to indicate especially the cult which she desires and which the emperors hasten to render to her as the most powerful of the deities. But this anthropomorphic rôle does not change the essentially naturistic character of Amaterasu. This character appears clearly in the myths referring to her birth, her strife with the storm which darkened the sky, and her retreat which plunged the world into darkness, and also in the old myth explaining the alternation of the two celestial luminaries (see COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Japanese], vol. iv. p. 165⁴). Thus Amaterasu was originally conceived as the sun itself, soul and body, a living spirit united to its brilliant covering. But gradually the advances of reason led the Japanese to see in this planet with such a regular course a simple object of physical nature; by degrees the personal element became detached and transformed into an anthropomorphic deity, and, although the divine rôle of Amaterasu, presiding over the government of the heavens like the living emperor over that of the islands, might well be reconciled with the idea of an indivisible solar deity, this function of general direction, which was soon applied to terrestrial politics and to the superintendence of imperial advances, must have tended to develop the human character of the goddess. Even to-day the Japanese always worship the sun as a living deity, to whom they render a direct positive cult, from the artisan, who, from the depths of his dark shop, turns towards the brightness of the dawn, claps his hands, and piously recites his prayer to the goddess, to the pilgrim who on the summit of Fujiyama prostrates himself dazzled before the first golden rays of the sun and worships it leaning his forehead on the rocks.

(b) *The moon-god*.—After this triumphant goddess of day, Tsuki-yomi-no-mikoto, 'the august moon of the darkness,' seems pale; and, in fact, this god occupies only a very inferior place in the Japanese pantheon. His birth is hardly described when he disappears from the legend. According to the first texts (*Kojiki*, 50; *Nihongi*, tr. W. G. Aston, London, 1896, i. 19), he was to be the companion of the sun and to share her rule; but he has no further part in the account and his existence is hardly mentioned again. It is certain, therefore, that in the 8th cent., when the mythology was collected in those ancient books, Tsuki-yomi was a god who had long been neglected; but it is also very probable that at an earlier time he had held a different rank. The myth explaining the alternation of the two luminaries, as it appears in the *Nihongi* (i. 32), is sufficient to prove his former importance, and the texts which declare his mission, alongside of that of Amaterasu, remain like the ancient foundations of an abandoned and destroyed building, which prove its

historic existence. In the case of the moon also the advances of reason must gradually have attenuated the primitive worship; they damped it much more quickly than that of the sun, because it had not the same conquering brilliance. In the Japanese moon-worship, therefore, as we observe it at the present day, the æsthetic sentiment is more predominant than the religious. But the moon none the less receives, with the homage due to its beauty, the offerings reserved for the divine powers; the people who go to witness its superb rising at certain times and certain favourite places proceed from admiration to prayer; the enchantment of the eyes is completed by the adoration of the heart. Comparing these present-day sentiments with the primitive myths which ascribe to the moon the same birth as the sun, the same parallel government, and the same importance in a famous story, we are justified in classing it unhesitatingly in the category of the oldest nature-deities.

(c) *The star-gods*.—After the glorious blazing sun, and the bright but pale moon, the distant twinkling of the stars appears still more humble and obscure. While the sun-goddess is the queen of religion, and the moon-god is the king of poetry, the stars hardly appear at all either in the sacred texts or in the literary collections; and clearly the silence of the poets shows the state of mind of religious men. Although we can find no trace of a formal star-worship in the old documents, there are clear signs of a vague deification, undoubtedly long before the time when the legend was written. Various myths referring to secondary gods, 'the brilliant male,' 'the weaver-god,' 'the heavenly weaving-girl' (see *Nihongi*, i. 69 f.; *Kojiki*, 117), show that in the 8th cent. the Japanese still had star-gods, perhaps the last remnants of a deeper and broader worship, at all events sure proofs of an old original naturism, very attenuated but still alive.

2. *Gods of the air*.—(a) *The storm-god*.—Beneath those divine planets which move in the firmament the primitive Japanese perceived other animate powers which sport in the air; and among those great meteorological phenomena we find in the first rank Take-haya-susa-no-wo-no-mikoto, 'the august impetuous male, swift and brave.' The terrible male personifies the storm, the ocean rising to threaten the sky, i.e. the most violent of the physical forces which terrified the ancient inhabitants of the archipelago. He has hardly issued from the nose of Izanagi when he is in a fury. His father commissions him to rule the Plain of the Seas in peace; but, instead of obeying him, like the regular planets who were to preside over the harmonious alternation of day and night, he neglects his duty, and darts into nature to scatter trouble and death broadcast. He weeps, cries, and groans continually; he leaves his sea-dwelling, makes the green mountains wither, dries up the rivers, shakes the whole country, and, when Izanagi takes him to task for his behaviour, he replies that his only desire is to descend to the Kingdom of Night. Izanagi drives him from his presence; immediately he departs, ascends to the sky, attacks the sun, and commits all possible crimes; and, when he is again driven off and returns to the earth, it is, according to one version, to kill the beneficent goddess who gave nourishment to human beings (*Kojiki*, 70). These fits of anger are appeased, however, and soon the impetuous male, without changing his character, passes to other exploits. He puts to death the monstrous serpent which was about to devour a young princess (see HUMAN SACRIFICE [Japanese and Korean], vol. vi. p. 855); he afterwards appears as the god of the lower regions (*Kojiki*, 86 ff.); and lastly we read that one of his descendants received

the sovereignty of Idzumo from him (*ib.* 78 ff., 88). Thus the nature-god becomes a romantic hero, and even, in the end, a seemingly historical personage. This is the anthropomorphic evolution which we already noticed in the legend of Amaterasu, and which is often seen in the myths. But, through all these inconsistencies, the general idea remains: Susa-no-wo is the same wicked devastating god that he was originally, and, as in his first aspect he made men die in crowds (*Nihongi*, i. 20), so in his last incarnations he is sometimes a god of plague (see HOSPITALITY [Japanese], vol. vi. p. 814), sometimes a fierce guardian of the kingdom of the dead, always an enemy of light and peace, a god of darkness and confusion.

(b) *The wind-gods.*—In contrast with the storm-god stands Shina-tsu-hiko, 'the prince with the long breath,' i.e. the normal wind, with long slow breaths, whose beneficent gentleness is naturally opposed to the wicked furies of Susa-no-wo. The *Nihongi* (i. 22) relates the birth of this young god.

The creator-couple had just engendered the islands, when Izanagi noticed that all over the archipelago there was nothing but 'perfumed morning mists'; he therefore dispersed them with his breath, which immediately became a new deity: 'and that is the god of the wind.'

This origin of the wind, which came from the living breath of a god, is obviously quite logical; and the reason of its creation is admirably understood in a country of mountains, where morning mists are common. Another document emphasizes and completes this Japanese conception. In the ritual for the service of the gods of Tatsuta (see tr. by E. Satow in *TASJ* VII. iv. [1889] 442 f.) the same god reappears, transformed into a couple of distinct personages, 'the prince with the long breath' and 'the princess with the long breath.' This couple of wind-gods also form a pair of mysterious pillars on which the firmament is supported, and thus maintain the order of the world—a useful mission, which does not hinder them on occasion from disturbing it by ravaging the country. In fact, if light breezes purify the air by sweeping away the mists, autumn squalls ruin agricultural hopes; and, according to the ritual, this was exactly the origin of the worship which these gods were destined to receive, and which aimed at softening their hearts (see DIVINATION [Japanese], vol. iv. p. 806^b). The wind-gods thus appear in Shintō as pure nature-deities, elementary forces which chased the mists and contributed to the harmony of the world as long as men did not irritate them by neglect.

(c) *The rain-gods.*—In an archipelago whose climate was governed by the monsoons the functions of the winds explain the importance accorded them by the native mythology. On the other hand, other meteorological phenomena are rather neglected. There is nothing definite about clouds in the texts. As regards rain, which was so abundant in Japan, they are not quite so barren, and we find, issuing from the blood of the god of fire, a 'great god of dark valleys,' Kura-oho-kami, who doubles himself and becomes in turn the 'great producer of the rain in the valleys' and the 'great producer of rain on the heights.' This god of rain probably also plays the part of god of snow; for, in spite of its comparative frequency in the western region occupied by the primitive Japanese, the snow does not seem to have been deified by them in any special way. The rainbow appears only as the probable origin of the famous 'bridge of heaven' which in legend floats between heaven and earth (*Kojiki*, 19, 155, etc.).

(d) *The thunder-god.*—The thunder alone of secondary phenomena holds a certain rank among the gods. Thunder-storms are frequent and severe in some of the Japanese mountains, especially in the old provinces where the mythology was formed.

In this mythology, therefore, the thunder-god, Ikadzuchi-no-kami, is born from the body of the fire-god at the same time as the god of the mountains and the god of the rain on the hills (*Nihongi*, i. 29). He soon appears multiplied, in one of the more sombre myths: it is eight thunder-gods that pursue Izanagi in the lower regions (*Kojiki*, 35 f.). He again intervenes at different times in the ancient annals. It is probably he who, as in a lightning-flash, sends through the roof of a good man the sword destined for the first of the emperors (*Nihongi*, i. 115); in the form of a serpent, he frightens the terrible emperor Yuriaku himself (*ib.* i. 347); and, under the empress Suiko, he tries to strike with lightning the shipbuilders who have cut down a tree sacred to him (*ib.* ii. 147). In a more or less vague way, throughout the whole primitive period, people are conscious of his dreadful presence, and it is only by degrees that they become accustomed to his dangerous caprices. He is feared even to-day; the common people are afraid of thunder, and even the educated show some uneasiness when its voice rumbles like a mysterious warning from heaven.

(e) *The fire-god.*—The transition from the thunder-god to the fire-god is natural, since, in Japanese mythology, the thunder is born of the fire. In ancient Shintō, Kagu-tsuchi, 'the venerable who shines,' appears as the last-born of the creator-couple; and in this birth, in a human manner, of the most terrible of physical forces the mother is severely burned. At this moment new deities are born, which the *Kojiki* account makes rise from the very manifestations of her fever: metals, clay, water, gourd, river-plant, all the magical apparatus which Shintoism employs to subdue fire (see MAGIC [Japanese], vol. viii. p. 298^b). After Izanami's death Izanagi in his furious grief kills Kagu-tsuchi. Then from his scattered members arise new deities, while his blood, also deified, spurts up to the stars, or flows over the earth, where it infuses the fire-principle into plants and trees, stones and rocks (see COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Japanese], vol. iv. p. 165^b). The matricide disappears, and is not mentioned again in the sacred literature. But he leaves traces of his brief existence, viz. the terrible seeds which he has sown, the latent principles of the greatest plague that the inhabitants of the frail native houses could dread. In such a country fire was an enemy. Its former benefits, its daily uses, were forgotten; only its terrifying frolics were seen. If the fire-god was worshipped, it was not because he was admired or loved, as among other races, but because he was feared. The people tried to exorcize him (ritual xii.; cf. art. MAGIC [Japanese], vol. viii. p. 298). He is regarded in the same way to-day, especially as a force of nature against which one must make sure of safeguarding one's house by amulets, etc.; he is not so much a god of fire, in the broad sense of the word, as a god of conflagration.

3. Gods of the earth.—(a) *Sea-gods.*—This land being an archipelago, the sea which envelops it is the first thing that attracts attention, and it is very probable that it held this dominant place in the imagination of the primitive Japanese. Of the three famous gods whom Izanagi appoints to govern the universe, one is to rule the ocean, the vast 'blue plain' (*ao-una-bara*), while no one is yet selected to rule the islands; and, although Susa-no-wo, disdaining this sovereignty, immediately becomes the raging ocean which rises against the sky, and finishes in a storm, the sea none the less keeps its familiar gods, born before him (*Kojiki*, 28), its calm and faithful masters. There is first of all Oho-wata-tsu-mi, 'the great god of the ocean,' the supreme sea-god, with his wonderful

palace hidden in the depths, once visited by a mortal, who experienced there the love of a goddess (legend of Ho-deri and Ho-wori, in *Kojiki*, 145-158). Then, in accordance with the habit of doubling common in Japanese mythology, there are the 'masters of the sea' (*wata-tsu-mi*), secondary gods who, like their chief, have a general function. Lastly, there are the more special gods of the 'bottom of the sea,' of the 'middle of the sea,' and of the 'surface of the sea,' the gods of the 'gates of the waters,' i.e. of the river-mouths, with their children, the gods of foam, of froth, etc.—not to mention the local deities who here and there haunt a certain bay on the shores of the archipelago (see *Kojiki*, 28, 46; *Nihongi*, i. 220, etc.). The whole sea therefore lives, animated, spiritualized, deified, and becomes transformed into a crowd of gods.

(b) *Land-gods*.—It is from the vast sea that, according to a very oceanic conception, the lance of Izanagi, from the height of the celestial bridge, draws the first island of the archipelago (*Kojiki*, 19); then, when Izanagi and Izanami come down to this corner of the earth to live there and celebrate their union, they gradually engender the whole 'country of the eight islands,' from the humble island of Awaji to the great central one, which appears last of all, according to the law of evolution (ib. 22f.). These islands, begotten by a human couple, imagined as having bodies and faces, seem so alive that it is believed that they had been born quite small, and had grown like persons. Nevertheless they are not raised to the rank of gods; they are not worshipped individually in the temples. On the other hand, we find the Japanese earth deified under more general forms: one deity is called 'the august spirit of the great country,' another 'the god of the great earth,' and another 'the august ancestor of the earth'; and real worship is offered to them.

(c) *Mountain-gods*.—All these land-gods are very vague, and too abstract to make a clear impression on the mind; the religious imagination requires individual concrete visions. This explains why the mountain-gods appear in the first rank of the gods of the earth. Nothing could be more natural in a country dominated by its orographic system, a country whose general appearance recalls that of Switzerland, whose whole beauty depends on the continual play of mountains and valleys, dark gorges descending from the heights and graceful hillocks undulating towards the plains, stern summits and smiling landscapes. All these raised portions of the earth were reflected in the depths of the primitive soul, which made them objects of general deification. First of all there is Oho-yama-tsu-mi, 'the great lord of the mountains,' the supreme god, round whom are grouped accessory 'lords of the mountain'; although these are secondary gods, they are very broad personifications, who are worshipped like him in numerous temples, and are always adored with fear by the woodman when he fells a tree in their forests. Those are the primitive gods, whom the creator-couple engendered when they wished to fix the great lines of the country. But there are also more special gods, corresponding to the various parts of the mountain, who were born from the members of the fire-god when he was massacred by his father.

According to the most fluent version (*Kojiki*, 36), the head of Kagu-tachi became 'the lord of steepnesses,' his breast 'the lord of the descent,' his belly 'the lord of the innermost mountain,' his genital organs 'the lord of the black mountain,' his left arm 'the lord of the dense forests,' his right arm 'the lord of the first slopes,' his left leg 'the lord of the high meadows,' and his right leg 'the lord of the mountain-gates.'

In this myth the divine world was, as it were, moulded as faithfully as possible on existing natural objects. But, by super-addition, the ancient

Japanese conceived a marriage between 'the great lord of the mountains' and the goddess of the lower regions, 'the princess of the fields where grows the thatch for the roofs' (*Kaya-nu-hime*). This union of extremes gives the whole series of intermediary accidents, and there appear as children of the two deities the 'god of the passes,' the 'gods of the boundaries of the passes,' the 'gods of the dark gates,' and the 'princes of the valleys' (*Kojiki*, 29). The 'august slopes of the hills' are also deified, and the 'mountains of metal,' until at last, from a less general point of view, all mountains are deified in which a local deity can be imagined (*Kojiki*, 216, 63, 140).

(d) *River-gods*.—The importance of mountains in ancient Shintō forms a striking contrast to the scant attention paid to rivers. The reason is that the hydrographic system of the country is as modest as its orographic system is preponderating. Streams which are rather torrents, and rivers which on account of the shortness of their course cannot develop and are more like streams did not make on the mind the impression of grandeur which mountains and volcanoes did. We need not be surprised, therefore, to find that, if river-gods are mentioned in the texts (*Nihongi*, i. 281, ii. 174), they are not named; they get none of the personal titles which the myths ascribe to the other nature-gods; they are not classed in a logical hierarchy, like the sea-gods or the mountain-gods, who reproduced so minutely all the details of the structure of the country; and, lastly, if we come across water-gods provided with individual names, they are not real river-gods, but the 'gates of the waters,' the river-mouths, which border on the sea, and in some measure share in its majesty. As regards rivers proper, after the summary notice of their birth by the creator-couple (*Nihongi*, i. 18), they do not become peopled with anthropomorphic beings, princes and lords of their waves; they are ruled only by impersonal anonymous spirits, vague deities who sometimes have no visible form, and sometimes assume the appearance of an animal—a serpent (*Nihongi*, i. 209), as was natural in the savage regions of the primitive country. But they are not organized physical powers, and we do not find in connexion with them any of the famous myths that indicate the approach of great deities.

(e) *Gods of travel*.—The last group of earth-gods is that of the *michi no kami*, 'gods of routes' or of travel. There are three of them, well-known, popular, and familiar, viz. Ya-chimata-hiko, 'the prince of the cross-roads,' Ya-chimata-hime, 'the princess of the cross-roads,' and Funado, whose name means 'Halt there,' and who personifies the strong mountain-staff which saved Izanagi when pursued by the infernal deities (cf. DIVINATION [Japanese], vol. iv, p. 802^b). Faithful to this legend, they will always remain friendly, helpful gods, protectors of the living against evil spirits (ritual xiii.; art. MAGIC [Japanese], vol. viii, p. 298^b); and, just as they were piously worshipped in the ancient sanctuaries, so to-day the believer has recourse to them before setting out on a journey.

4. *Underground god*.—There is still another nature-god, a fierce god hidden in the entrails of the earth—the god of the earthquake (*Nihongi*, ii. 124). He receives very sincere worship through terror, because his dreadful convulsions, which are worse than flood, plague, or fire, are the only scourge against which man cannot fight. The ancient annals continually mention those frequent earthquakes, which sometimes made a very deep impression on the imagination (e.g., for the surprise caused by an earthquake in the 7th cent. see COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Japanese], vol. iv, p. 164^b). We can understand, therefore, why

the earthquake-god had temples in the seven provinces; why after such a great cataclysm the emperor ordered solemn sacrifices on all sides; and why among all the beliefs arising from this terror the most popular is that which beseeches Takemikadzu, the powerful and awful god, to keep the monster under his magic sword as under the crushing of a rock.

5. **Plant-gods.**—The richness of Japanese vegetation accounts for the worship of plants. In addition to the general causes which have everywhere made tree-worship one of the most ancient human beliefs, we have in Japan the existence of a flora which forced itself on the mind by its grandeur, while at the same time it supplied almost all the materials of the indigenous civilization. From the mighty mountain, with its black forests, to the fertile plain, where all varieties, wild and cultivated, swarmed, the ancient Japanese saw exuberant vegetation on every side; and, when they instinctively sought an idea for naming their archipelago, they immediately chose its two verdant aspects, wild lands and rice-fields, and summed them up in the typical name 'the luxuriant country of the plain of reeds and fresh young ears of corn.' It is not surprising, therefore, to find among the first deities engendered by the creator-couple, on the one hand, 'the princess of the fields where grows the thatch for the roofs' (already mentioned, above, p. 237^b), who is the goddess of all herbaceous plants, and, on the other, 'the father of the trees,' Kuku-no-chi, the patriarch of the forests. The latter multiplies into several beings similar to himself. He changes, too, and alongside of this fundamental god, who personifies especially the tree-trunks, there appear the god of the forked branches and the protector-god of the leaves, while such a variety as the oak becomes the object of a special cult, at least in certain parts of the country. A curious legend relates how Susa-no-wo, by pulling out the hairs of his body and scattering them, produced the trees useful for all kinds of buildings and the different kinds of fruits (see **HEROES AND HERO-GODS** [Japanese], vol. vi. p. 662^b). If we add to this the famous story which tells of the birth, from Uke-mochi's dead body, of millet, rice, corn, and the different kinds of beans (*Kojiki*, 70; and cf. the version of the *Nihongi*, in art. **COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY** [Japanese], vol. iv. p. 165^a), we have all the useful elements of primitive agriculture. The legends also show the real motives of Shintō phytolatry. The vegetable world, which was at first animated because the plant is a living being, which germinates, grows, and dies under the eyes of man, because the wood contains the spark of fire, because the wind and the echo give a mysterious voice to the forests, was worshipped above all because it represented the essential food of the people, being therefore the necessary basis of all social order, as well as the material of the houses, from the thatch of the cottages to the precious wood of the temples. The same reasons must have tended to develop the belief in the spirit of plants, not only in the spirit of trees (*ko-tama*) in general, but much more in the special spirits which performed useful functions, like the rice-spirit or the spirit of the wood for building. And in their turn these animistic conceptions, strengthened by a careful observation of the virtue of simples, introduced into magic its vegetable elements—wild garlic, the shining peach, or the plant of long life (*Nihongi*, i. 30, 127, ii. 186)—while the ancient and sacred cleyera, 'of awful spirit' (*ib.* i. 225), spread throughout Shintō its long evergreen branches eternally laden with offerings.

6. **Animal-gods.**—The deification of animals is still more natural in primitive Japan. The forest, the tall grasses, are full of those mysterious crea-

tures which add to the already marvellous life of the plant voluntary movement, with its miracles of gracefulness and suppleness, and, above all, the power and agility so much envied by savage man. In his eyes those fascinating existences are of the same essence as his own, with a degree more of energy; therefore he readily regards them as 'superior' beings—in Japan, the *kamis*. In Shintō mythology animals have the attributes of man—e.g., the gift of speech (*Kojiki*, 81, 86, 149, 170, etc.); but they also possess rarer qualities—e.g., the toad knows things which even the gods do not know (*ib.* 103). It is not surprising, then, that the most famous heroes of the legends often appear as inferior to the animals which they meet (*ib.* 164, 269, etc.). At least, there is a close familiarity, a community of interests, based on the identity of nature, between man and the animals as well as between the animals and the gods; these three groups make one, and the animals, not being enclosed within the hard barriers erected since then by man's arrogance, enter into legend, where they wander at liberty, take part in all the heroic adventures, and play their wicked or helpful part with the same right as the other sacred personages.

(a) **Reptiles.**—First comes the serpent, whose worship, so wide-spread in Shintoism, is explained both by the alarming appearance of that creeping, glazed, often dangerous animal and by its abundance in the thickets of the primitive country. In Japanese mythology it is surrounded with a timorous respect. Whether it appears as the spirit of a river (see **HUMAN SACRIFICE** [Japanese], vol. vi. p. 855 f.) or of a mountain (*Nihongi*, i. 203 f.), or whether it becomes a virgin-devouring monster (see **HUMAN SACRIFICE**, p. 855), the incarnation of an amorous god (*Nihongi*, i. 158), or the omen of threatening treason (see **DIVINATION** [Japanese], vol. iv. p. 806^a), it is always in a formidable and at least alarming shape. On the other hand, in the cult a serpent-bite is regarded as a divine punishment, which entails expiatory penance ('Ritual of the Great Purification,' in Revon, p. 29), and the serpent ordeal confirms this religious character (see **DIVINATION** [Japanese], vol. iv. p. 805^b).

(b) **Birds.**—Birds share in a way the superior nature of the sky; man envies their wings and is surprised at their mysterious language; he admires those creatures so swift of flight, at one moment mounting to the abode of the gods and the next settling down beside other creatures and chirping as if telling them strange secrets. Thus in the myths their essential function is that of divine messengers, and nearly always, when a person sees them appearing, he guesses that they are bringing news or a command from heaven.

When the first couple are in perplexity about the consummation of their marriage, the example of a wagtail instructs them (*Nihongi*, i. 17); when the celestial deities require to send an ambassador to earth, they choose the pheasant (*Kojiki*, 114-116); when the march of the first conqueror has to be led, a crow becomes his guide, goes in advance, and negotiates with the rebels (*ib.* 169-170); and, when the same Jimmu is kept back by superior powers, a golden kite, shining like lightning, alights on his bow, misleads his opponents, and gives the emperor the victory (*Nihongi*, i. 126 f.).

Birds thus fly from page to page through the whole legend, until the god of scarecrows (*Kojiki*, 103) puts the winged group to flight.

(c) **Quadrupeds.**—Though often more formidable, quadrupeds are, on the other hand, less mysterious. Yet a number of animals appear as gods and divine agents, at any rate as beings gifted with faculties which assure them a high place in the myths. Not to mention the bear or the wild boar, which terrify the primitive warriors (*ib.* 164, 393, etc.), the wolf is still a god, and even a 'great god' (*ohokami*), in the historical period (*Nihongi*, li. 36).

The monkey is also deified and receives sacrifices (*Kojiki*, 138, and cf. HUMAN SACRIFICE [Japanese], vol. vi. p. 856^a). Other animals are considered more or less sacred, without being regarded as gods—e.g., the deer, which appears as gifted with superior qualities (see DIVINATION [Japanese], vol. iv. p. 806^b), and whose shoulder-blade is the most ancient instrument in Shintō divination (*ib.* p. 802).

(d) *Fishes*.—Fishes are rather neglected in the mythology, but even to them is accorded the gift of speech (e.g., the story of the trepan in COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Japanese], vol. iv. p. 166^a); and, if they are not gods, they at least play the part of servants of the gods (*Kojiki*, 139, 237, etc.). Even the molluscs intervene in an active and divine way: there are two shell-fish, 'the princess Kisagai' and 'the princess Umugi,' who by magical processes bring the god Oho-kuni-nushi back to life (*Kojiki*, 83).

(e) *Insects*.—Even down to the insects, all have their part in the mythology (*ib.* 63, 86 f., 396 f., etc.); one story tells of a caterpillar which was worshipped like a real deity (*Nihongi*, ii. 188).

In a word, whether these animals are the object of great adoration or only of slight respect, it is always because of the same old naturism, the profound instinct which gives a spirit to each one, humanizes and deifies animals as well as plants, and with the same breath raises the humble lives of the organic universe and the phenomena of the material world to the higher regions.

7. *Phallic gods*.—There is a form of worship intermediary between the adoration of the animal world and that of the human world, to which we must refer, viz. phallus-worship. This aspect of Shintō is in harmony with all primitive religions, in which man thinks it right and noble to admire the phenomenon of reproduction, to deify it, and to worship it in the sincerity of his heart. Therefore, from the very beginning of the national cosmogony the idea of reproduction is shown in the names of the gods. The celestial trinity of the great beginning includes two generating deities: Taka-mi-musubi, 'the high august producer,' and Kami-musubi, 'the divine producer'; among the 'seven divine generations' which come afterwards, we may mention, among other obscure couples, Tsunoguhhi and Iku-guhhi, the god of germs and the goddess of life; and the last of these couples, in which appear the first ancestors of the human race, consists of two beings with the significant names Izanagi and Izanami, 'the male who invites' and 'the female who invites.' These two deities are commanded by the other gods to engender the archipelago, with the *nu-boko*, 'jewel-spear'; the spear is lowered from the height of the sky-bridge, stirred in the salt water of the sea until it is coagulated, then raised, and at that moment the drops which fall from its point thicken, and become the first island of Japan (see COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Japanese], vol. iv. pp. 162-164). The young deities soon descend into this island, where they discover love; and the sacred account relates their marriage with the chaste want of shame which is that of nature (*Kojiki*, 20 f.). Then several pages are taken up with the long enumeration of the islands and the gods to which they give birth; and, when at last Izanami disappears, after having given birth to fire, when Izanagi in despair goes to look for her in the subterranean region, his first cry is to beseech her to come and continue their great work of procreation (*ib.* 22 f., 38). A little later, in the legend of the eclipse, the blacksmith god, Ama-tsu-mara, who is the Cyclops of Japanese mythology, and whose name has a phallic meaning, is ordered to manufacture a *hi-boko*, 'spear,' which suggests the same kind of

ideas as that of Izanagi (*ib.* 55; *Nihongi*, i. 47). Other gods whose names contain the same element support this interpretation. We must, in the last place, mention the monkey-god Saruta, whom the shameless goddess Uzume approached in an indecent manner (*Nihongi*, i. 77), and whose phallic character was admitted in ancient Japan. Further, a material proof comes to the support of those inductions drawn from mythology, viz. the *rai-tsui*, the 'thunder-clubs' of the excavations, which seem to have been phallic images rather than objects of combat. Ancient Shintō therefore possesses a phallic cult which forms an integral part of its essential naturism; and, as it considers paternity the highest mission of the gods, it worships in all simplicity the instrument of this supreme function. This worship is difficult to trace in primitive times, but becomes much clearer afterwards. The phallus became a definite god, Konsei Myōjin, who had his temples, images, ex-votos, and phallophories; at the same time this religious current became complicated with a less respectable movement, which finally led the imperial government in 1872 to order the destruction of these emblems throughout the whole empire. Nevertheless, the investigator who deviates a little from the main roads can still find here and there, in some sacred wood, invaded by bamboos, a small ancient temple, the witness of the old beliefs; and in this virgin nature, before the ex-voto offered by some rustic worshipper, he understands how deep and pure was this particular belief of ancient Shintō.

III. *NATURE-SPIRITS*.—The nature-spirits were closely related to the real gods of nature. As a matter of fact, the physical world and the spiritual world are not in juxtaposition in the primitive imagination; they are intermingled and often confused. The nature-gods were sometimes spirits closely united to some object or phenomenon, like the soul of a man to his body; but in many cases there were also broader, freer spirits who presided over a whole department of the universe; and, if we have classed these among the nature-gods in order to define their functions more clearly by placing them in their material compartments, it is none the less true that these gods of transition lead us to the very boundary of animism. To go beyond this boundary only one more step is necessary, and immediately a new family of spirits appears before us, viz. those that are detached from things and independent even of regions, but yet have a definite function, an express mission, in the physical world. Such spirits are known by the common characteristic that it is impossible to fit them into any of the divisions of nature, although the things in charge of which they are placed class them as nature-spirits.

As a typical example of this class it will be sufficient to choose the goddess of food, who is not only a goddess of cereals, but also provides fish and game, who is not only a goddess of food but also sees to the clothing and housing of men, who therefore surpasses the flora and the fauna, and hovers over the whole of nature, but whose definite duty nevertheless keeps her among the spirits of material phenomena. This goddess, whose ordinary name is Toyo-uke-hime, 'the princess of abundant food,' has various other names, which one would at first be tempted to mistake for new deities, but which are undoubtedly only hypostases (see *Nihongi*, i. 21 f., 32, 122). On the contrary, there are different gods connected with the same kind of idea—e.g., the gods of the harvest, Oho-toshi no Kami, 'the god of the great harvest,' and Mi-toshi no Kami, 'the god of the august harvest' (cf. MAGIC [Japanese], vol. viii. p. 296^b). But it is especially Toyo-uke-hime who personifies the

fundamental nourishment by rice and other cultivated plants. The most interesting of the myths concerning her is the one describing her death, which also gives us the legendary origin of agriculture and the silk industry (*Kojiki*, 70). We can understand her importance in Shintō above all by the worship which she received. This went back to the most ancient times (*Nihongi*, i. 86), having no equal except that of the sun itself, and we may say that after the sun the goddess of food is the greatest figure in Shintō. Even to-day in the temples of Ise, i.e. in the very heart of the ancient Japanese religion, people worship the sun-goddess and the goddess of food. In one of the two great temples, the Gekū, it is the goddess of food who receives all the honours; the other deities who are worshipped there, viz. the grandson of the sun-goddess, the first ancestor of the emperors, and the two divine companions who were with him when he came down from the sky, receive only an accessory worship. In the other temple, the Naiku, the sun-goddess is paramount; and after her the god with the strong arm who made her come out of her cavern and the venerable mother of the father of the emperors are merely secondary deities. Lastly, surrounding these principal sanctuaries, the temples of the wind-gods, of the god of the soil, and of the god of purification appear simply as inferior buildings. It is therefore certain that in the mind of the worshippers as in the legendary stories the deities of light and food have remained what they were originally—the greatest gods of the Japanese—because this race loved its old traditions and never forgot either the glorious planets that had saved it from the ancient nocturnal terrors or the nourishing earth on whose bosom it had rested in the ancient days.

It is clear, therefore, that the real national religion of the Japanese is essentially a nature-religion, since it is nature-gods that compose its pantheon, people its mythology, and hold the first rank in its worship. What led the most learned Japanologists to believe for such a long time that Shintō was above all an ancestor-cult was a kind of artificial integration that took place later, when, in imitation of the imperial family, the legendary descendant of the sun-goddess, the great families endeavoured to appropriate those famous nature-gods as ancestors. For an explanation of this evolution see art. ANCESTOR-WORSHIP AND CULT OF THE DEAD (Japanese), vol. i. p. 455 ff.

LITERATURE.—This has been cited in the article.

M. REVON.

NATURE (Lettish, Lithuanian, and Old Prussian).—Nature-worship played an important part in the religious life of the Baltic peoples, the Old Prussians, Letts, and Lithuanians. Peter von Dusburg († c. 1326) makes the following statement: 'Errando omnem creaturam pro deo coluerunt, scilicet solem, lunam et stellas, tonitrua, volatilia, quadrupedia etiam . . . lucos, canipos et aquas sacras' (*Chronicon terre Prussice*, ann. 7. 1326, in *Scrip. Rer. Pruss.* i. 53).

This passage, fortunately, is supplemented and confirmed by authorities of the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries, who, owing to the late introduction of Christianity, can furnish us with very valuable information.

1. Heavenly bodies.—The Lithuanians worshipped sun, moon, and stars. 'Solem et Lunam deos omnium primos crediderunt' (Erasmus Stella, *de Boruss. Ant.*, ii., in *Scrip. Rer. Pruss.* iv. [Leipzig, 1870] 294). The Nadravians worshipped a star deity in both male and female form.

They more commonly called this godhead Swelgsdunka, a star-goddess, whom they consider the bride of the sky and through whose power the morning and evening stars are guided. Swelgsdukks is a god of fixed stars' (Praetorius, *Deliciae Prussicae*, p. 28).

The folk-poems of the Letts and Lithuanians abound in myths of the sky and the heavenly

bodies. They probably contain very ancient matter; pagan deities such as Zemyna, Layme, and Perkun are frequently mentioned, and there is only the very thinnest veneer of Christianity. The mysterious personage called God, who was at war with the sun for three days and nights, can hardly be the Christian deity. Mannhardt would identify him with an ancient sky-god, possibly Occopirmus.

'God Himself goes to the first door;
Through the second; Dear Maria
Through the third the sun doth journey
With her two proud, golden horses'
(cf. Mannhardt, 'Die lett. Sonnenmythen,' p. 91).

Dear Maria must also represent a pagan goddess. Her woollen veil is stained with the blood of the oak-tree that was shattered by Perkun. She figures in several Lettish songs:

'Behind the mountains smoke is rising.
Who is it hath kindled fire?
Dear Maria heats the bathroom
Where bathe the little orphan maidens.'

Dear Maria seems to correspond to the Lithuanian goddess mentioned by Lasicius:

'Perkuna tete is the mother of thunder and lightning; who receives into a bath the weary and dusty sun and sends her out again next day washed and shining' (*de Diis Sam.* p. 300; 'Perkuna tete' should be translated 'the aunt of Perkun').

Mannhardt believes that Perkuna tete represents the planet Venus, who, in the folk-songs, is sometimes spoken of as a single being and sometimes appears in dual form, as morning and evening stars. There is also a change of sex. In the Lithuanian songs Auszrine and Wakarine are the handmaids of the sun; in Lettish sources, on the other hand, the morning and evening stars seem to be the beings called the 'sons of god.' There are two passages which point to the identification of Dear Maria (= Perkuna tete) with the planet Venus. In a Lithuanian poem the sun remarks:

'The morning star has kindled my fire,
The evening star has spread my bed.'

In a Lettish poem occur these words:

'By the valley spring the sons of god heat the bath chamber.'
But why should the planet Venus be called the aunt of the thunder-god?

The 'sons of god' play an important part in the Lettish songs. They are the workmen of Perkun, they woo the daughter of the sun, they serve as horses for the moon.

'Folks say
The moon has no steeds of his own.
The morning star and the evening star
They are the steeds of the moon.'

Mannhardt compares them with the Greek Dioskouroi and the Ásvins of Indian mythology (p. 305 ff.). See, further, SUN (Lithu-Slavic).

2. Thunder.—The cult of Perkun was of the utmost importance. 'The Nadravians call Perkun Dievaitis (god) kar' *ἐξάρχης*' (Praetorius, p. 21). Though disputed by some scholars, the word 'Perkunas' is in all probability derived from the common European word for 'oak,' A.S. *firgen*, 'forest'; O.H.G. *virgun*, 'wood'; Scand. *Fjörgyn* (the name of Thor's mother); Lat. *quercus*, 'oak.' Perkun, however, is not a tree-spirit, but the god of thunder and lightning:

'Epulati diis suis falsis praecipue deo lingua eorum appellato Perkuno, id est tonitru' (Michov, *de Sarm. Europ.* li. ap. Grynaeus, *Notus orbis regionum . . . incognitarum*, p. 519). 'Perkunos deus tonitru illis est quem coelo tonante agricola capite detecto et succidiam humeris per fundum portans . . . alloquitur' (Lasicius, p. 300). 'During the night there came a terrible storm with thunder and lightning and all the people thought that their god Perkuno spoke with the Křivalt' (Grunau, *Preuss. Chronik*, tract. iii. c. i.).

On the banner of king Widuwoto, Perkun was represented as a middle-aged, black-bearded man, with a countenance like fire and crowned with flames (*ib.* ii. ch. v.). The Provincial Statutes of Riga (A.D. 1428) witness to thunder-worship among the Letts: 'A tonitruo quod deum suum appellant.' Perkun is frequently mentioned by name in Lettish folk-

songs. He occupied one of the three divisions of the famous oak-tree sanctuary at Romove, which is described in detail by Grunau (tract. ii. ch. v.). Before him burned the sacred fire, tended by a priest who would lose his life if it were snuffed to go out. The statement that the god was supposed to hold communication with the chief priest in this sanctuary, by means of thunder, is confirmed by Bretkins (cf. Praetorius, p. 39). Grunau is not a trustworthy authority, but in this case his description can be paralleled from so many different sources that there is no need to doubt its essential accuracy.

3. Groves and trees.—Sacred groves and trees figure very prominently in Lithuanian religion. We hear of various wood- and tree-gods. 'Modeina et Regaina silvestres sunt dii' (Lasicius, p. 301). Praetorius mentions Gyrstis, a wood-god, Birzulis, a god of birches, and others. Sometimes the tree itself is the object of worship. The Jesuit Rostowski (cf. Usener, *Götternamen*, p. 87) obtained information that for 'fruitfulness and domestic welfare a hen is offered by men to an oak, and by women to a linden-tree as gods.' A tree whose trunk was split and then joined together again was called *romove* and deemed particularly holy. A tree of this kind was still standing at Nibndzen in A.D. 1664, and Lithuanians from far and near came to visit it (cf. Praetorius, p. 16). More often, however, the tree or grove was revered as the dwelling-place of the deity. When Jerome of Prague cut down woods 'sacred to devils,' the women complained 'that the house of their god had been taken away' (Æneas Sylvius, *Hist. de Europa*, 26, in *Script. Rer. Pruss.* iv. 239). According to Erasmus Stella (*loc. cit.*), the Old Prussians 'said that the gods inhabited the finest trees such as oaks.' To the oak-tree a special sanctity adhered. Its connexion with Perkun has already been mentioned. In the folk-songs he frequently cleaves the oak in anger, and sheds its blood. An aged Nadraivian described to Praetorius how the holy fire was obtained from oak-wood, adding that there were still many people who thought it very lucky to come across such an oak (p. 20). He also mentions (p. 16) a holy oak at Ragnit which would bring bad luck to any one who injured it.

4. Springs.—The sacred spring is frequently associated with the sacred tree. This was probably so in the case of the Romove sanctuary (cf. Praetorius, p. 19).

'An oak-tree behind the mountain,
Behind the oak-tree a lake.
The son of god hangs his girdle there'
(Lettish folk-song).

'Under the maple-tree is the spring
Where the sons of god resort'
(Lithuanian folk-song).

Peter von Dusburg (*loc. cit.*) mentions 'agnas sacras' among the many objects of Old Prussian cult.

'Orthus lacus est piscosus quem colunt; quemadmodum et Ezernim lacum deum' (Lasicius, p. 301).

In spring-time water was worshipped by the sacrifice of a fish (Praetorius, p. 34). We hear of various water-beings and gods:

'Audros deo, maris caeterarumque aquarum cura incumbit (Lasicius, p. 300). 'Szullinnus who governs the wells' (Praetorius, p. 33). 'One god Upinnis has the rivers in his power' (M. Strykowski, *Pol. Chron.* 1582, quoted by W. Mannhardt, in *Mag. der lett. literar. Gesellsch.* xiv. i.).

In Church documents of A.D. 1530 Antrimpus is identified with Neptune.

'The priests (Waldeler) of the water-god were called Naruttes; they dived into the water and conversed with the water-nixes' (Praetorius, p. 34). 'Water was honoured as a male and fire as a female deity. The former was prayed to by the name of Bangputtis, the latter by the name of Ponyke (i.e. Lady)' (ib. p. 33).

Elsewhere Praetorius describes Bangputtis as a storm-god; but the two conceptions are not necessarily inconsistent.

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5. Weather.—Perkun was not the only weather-god of the Baltic peoples. Drebknllis was invoked in time of earthquake. Blizgnlis was a snow-god, Lituvaris a rain-god, Wejopatis lord of the wind. Praetorius was acquainted with a Prussian fisherman who had a wooden image of Wejopatis fixed on the mast of his ship. In stormy weather he was wont 'to lift up both his hands towards it' (cf. p. 27). The wind, like the water, had its priests or sorcerers.

Of these 'some were also able to charm the fire and knew how to address the Fire-Angel by name . . . and command him to do no harm' (ib. p. 44).

6. Fire.—There are a number of references to the Lithuanian fire-cult.

'Colebant autem ab origine Lithuanum numina ignem . . . qui per sacerdotem lingua eorum Zinc nuncupatum, subjectis lignis dolchatur . . . praecipuum numen Samagitticum erat ignis, quem sacrosanctum et perpetuum putebant' (Michov, *loc. cit.*).

Jerome of Prague preached to people who worshipped a sacred, perpetual fire in a temple. The priests practised clairvoyance by means of it, and were consulted as to the destiny of sick persons (cf. Æneas Sylvius, *loc. cit.*). Both Lasicius and Praetorius mention Tartois Kibirksztu, 'a charmer of sparks, a god who withstands fire' (Praetorius, p. 32). Jagaubis is a fire-god (cf. Usener, p. 92). Praetorius states that fire was a female deity invoked as Szwenta Ponyke (i.e. 'holy lady'). In his day the Nadraivian women addressed her as they raked together the fire in the evening. 'Thou Holy Lady, I will cover thee up well, that thou mayst not rage over me.' Lasicius (p. 304) mentions Polengabia, 'a goddess . . . who is believed to rule over the bright hearth.' Some editions of the *Kalevala* contain a prayer to Panu, the Finnish fire-god. The word 'Panu' is said to be a Lithuanian loan-word and is possibly related to the Gothic *fōn*, 'fire.' In the poem Panu is addressed as son of the sun, and begged to take fire up to heaven, to carry it, as a child to its mother, into the castle of the beloved aged lady (i.e. the sun), and to place it there to light up the day. The duties to be performed by Panu recall the services rendered to the sun by Dear Maria (= Perkuna tete). Is it possible that this goddess is identical with the fire-deity, the 'holy lady' mentioned by Praetorius? If so, the title Perkuna tete is intelligible, for, as we have seen, the sacred fire is an important part of the cult of the thunder-god. In Serbian folk-songs St. Elias the thunderer is often associated with the Virgin Mary, who is also known as 'Maria, veiled in fire' (cf. F. S. Krauss, *Volks Glaube und rel. Brauch der Süd-slaven*, Münster, 1890, p. 2 f.).

Some passages from the magic songs of the W. Finns are particularly interesting in this connexion.

'Ukko of the air [i.e. the Finnish thunder-god] struck fire . . . and gave it to a girl to rock, to be swung by a maiden of the air' (J. Abercromby, *The Pre- and Proto-historic Finns*, London, 1893, ii. 375). 'Kasi, the beautiful young girl, the fire-maiden of the sky, 'tis she that rocked the fire, swung to and fro the flame' (ib. p. 377). 'The origin of fire is known, the genesis of fire (panu) is guessed: dear fire was created by God. . . . The Virgin Mary, mother dear, the holy little serving-maid, 'tis she that rocked the fire, that nursed the flame' (ib. p. 378).

7. Stones.—Stone-worship is occasionally mentioned.

'Saxa pro diis culta' (S. Rostowski, quoted by A. Brückner, 'Beiträge zur litauischen Mythologie,' *Arch. für slav. Phil.* ix. [1896] 35; cf. Usener, p. 85). 'A few years ago, a somewhat high stone not far from Gumhinen or Bissersheim in a pinewood, was considered holy, and on it the neighbouring people offered money, clothes, wool' (Praetorius, p. 21 f.).

8. Mountains.—Kankarius was a mountain-god (cf. Usener, p. 93).

9. Animals.—Consecrated house-snakes were important Lithuanian deities corresponding to the Latin *penates*. 'Serpentes in singulis domibus

velut deos penates nntriebant' (Michov, p. 518). See, further, ARYAN RELIGION, vol. ii. p. 24^b, and SERPENT-WORSHIP (Lithu-Slavic). Einhorn, who was pastor at Mitau in the 17th cent., states that the Letts sacrificed a goat at cross-ways to propitiate the wolves, and to induce them to spare the flocks. Almost every kind of animal had its presiding deity. Austheia is goddess of bees, Ratainicz god of horses, Kiaulai-Krukis god of swine, Baubis god of cows and oxen, etc.

10. Agriculture.—The gods connected with agriculture form a large and important group.

The Nadravians, Zalovians, etc., believe that there is something divine about the earth, and call it Zempattys as male and Zemynle as female godhead. To this earth-deity—commonly called Zemynle—they ascribe all that which, according to the historians, was done by Pergubrius, Padrympus, Gurcho, Auszwaltis and Pilwittus' (Praetorius, p. 66).

Pergubrius was a god of field-work (*ib.* p. 25). Certain Church documents (A.D. 1530) identify Pilwittus with Ceres. Padrympus (=Potrimpo) was represented, according to Grunau (tract. ii. ch. v.), as a young man of joyful countenance, crowned with ears of corn. Gurcho was a god of food and drink honoured with offerings of milk and honey, etc. (Grunau, tract. i. ch. xvi.; cf. Usener, p. 94). He is mentioned in a document of A.D. 1249.

'Ydolo quem semet in anno collectis frugibus consuerunt confingere et pro deo colere, cui nomen Curche imposuerunt.' 'The Nadravians honour Gurcho or Padrymho under the name of Gahjauga' (Praetorius, p. 22).

Other gods of the same kind are Lankpatis, god of ploughing and sowing, Prokorimos, god of honey, etc. Waizganthos was a god of fruitfulness. At his festival in the beginning of November he was worshipped by virgins, who offered up prayers for the increase of the flax crop (cf. Lasicius, p. 306). From the passages quoted it appears that there was a tendency to confuse the various agricultural deities; possibly they were merely local forms of the earth-godhead; 'permultos Zemopacios, id est, terrestres, ii venerantur' (*ib.* p. 300). The name of this deity is connected with *zemé*, the Lithuanian word for 'earth.' It appears in various forms. 'Propter rem pecuariam Semepates colitur' (*Church Catechism*, 1547). Lasicius describes a festival of Zemiennik which took place three days before that of Waizganthos. Praetorius names the earth-god Zameluks, Zemeluksztis, Zempattys. There was also an earth-goddess: 'Zemynle was held to be the sister of Zemepattys' (Praetorius, p. 31). They received worship in common.

On the shortest day a festival was held in honour of Zempattys, 'the god of farms and farmhouses' (*ib.* p. 66). In the course of which 'each takes his bread, presses it to the ground and speaks: "O Zemypatie, thou givest us such good bread, we thank thee for it. Help us to cultivate our fields with thy blessing, and through the co-operation of Zemynle to receive more of thy good gifts."'

It is probable that the earth was originally thought of as female. 'Gahjauga' is a feminine word, although this deity was addressed at his festival as 'Lord God.' In the earliest reference to Gurcho his name appears in the feminine form 'Curche.' For this change of sex we have a parallel in the N. European deities, Nerthus, Njörör, Frey, Freyja. The subject is fully treated by H. M. Chadwick in *The Origin of the English Nation* (Cambridge, 1907), ch. x. 'The Cult of Nerthns.' Semmesmaat, the Lettish goddess, corresponding to Zemynle, is mentioned only in folk-songs. In lamentations for the dead she is referred to as the keeper of the grave (cf. Usener, p. 103). The form Semmesmäte is interesting (cf. Uggunsmäte, the fire-goddess). We have an exact parallel in Anglo-Saxon Eorðan moðr=mother of earth.

11. Conclusion.—The religion of the Letts was of the same character as that of the Lithuanians, and the two peoples had a certain number of

deities in common. The chief difference between them is that for Lithuanian gods we find corresponding Lettish goddesses—e.g., Lith. Laukpatis = Lett. Lankamaat, Lith. Wejopatis = Lett. Wejamaat, wind-mother. The most notable peculiarity of the religion of all the Baltic peoples was the large number of departmental deities worshipped by them. We hear of a god of grass-growing, of a god to be invoked for moss-gathering, and many others of the same kind.

LITERATURE.—Peter von Dusbarg, in *Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum*, i. [Leipzig, 1881]; Simon Grunau, *Preussische Chronik*, pt. i. [1517-21], do. 1876; Erasmus Stella, *de Borussiae Ant. II.*; Mathias Michov, *de Sarm. Europ. Lit.* II. (S. Gryneus, *Novus orbis regionum ac insularum veteribus incognitarum*, Basel, 1587, p. 518 ff.); J. Lasicius, *de Dis Samagitarum cæterorumque Sarmatarum et falsorum Christianarum (Respub. sive Stat. Regni, Polon. Lit. Pruss. Livon., Leyden, 1627, ch. viii.)*; Æneas Sylvius (Pope Pius II.), *Hist. de Europa*, Basel, 1551, ch. xxvi.; M. Praetorius, *Deliciae Prussicæ*, ed. W. Pierson, Berlin, 1871; W. Mannhardt, 'Die lettischen Sonnenmythen,' in *ZE* vii. [1875] 73-104, 209-244, 280-330; H. Usener, *Götternamen*, Bonn, 1896 (which gives further literature). ENID WELSFORD.

NATURE (Muhammadan).—I. Terms and definitions.—Nature is designated in Arabic by the word *ṭabī'ah*, literally 'stamping,' i.e. the impression of form on matter, which, according to Aristotle (*Met.* 1015^a 5), is only one among the senses of the Greek *φύσις*, yet clearly belongs to his philosophy. In the early translations of his works the Syriac *ḫiyān* was adopted for *physis*; the substitution of *ṭabī'ah* is not easily explained. The verb is used in the Qur'an in the phrase 'God has stamped upon their hearts,' which appears to mean 'has sealed up,' and therefore belongs to a different range of ideas. A somewhat similar use of the word *ṭaba* is found in the Midrāsh (*Numbers Rabbāh*, § 14, p. 124^b, ed. Wilna, 5645), where it stands for 'element' in the four elements, to which indeed the name *physis* may be applied, according to Aristotle (*Met.* 1014^b 33); and an even more similar employment of the verb in *B. Sanh.* 37a, where God is said to have 'stamped' (*ṭaba*) every human being with the seal of Adam, yet no two are quite alike; i.e., the (Platonic) idea 'man' is impressed on an infinite number of portions of matter. The Arabic word (for which other forms from the same root are employed) may well be the Hebrew verbal noun, which, however, is not quoted in this sense; and, though the date of the Hebrew texts quoted is uncertain, it is likely that they are pre-Islāmic. In what is probably the earliest account that we possess in Arabic of Aristotle's works, that in the history of Ya'qūbī (260 A.H.), the word already appears as an equivalent for *physis* (ed. M. T. Houtsma, Leyden, 1883, i. 148); and its introduction is likely to be as early as the 2nd cent. of Islām, since in the poems of Abū Tammām ([† 228 A.H.] Beyrut, 1889, p. 168) we find that there are already conventional equivalents for Aristotelian technicalities. Probably, then, it was coined by some Jewish Aristotelian employed as an interpreter of Greek philosophy.

The definitions of nature given by Arabic philosophers are all traceable, though not always directly, to Aristotle. Al-Fārābī (*Philosophische Abhandlungen*, ed. F. Dieterici, Leyden, 1890, p. 60) defines *ṭabī'ah* as 'the source of motion and rest when neither external nor voluntary.' This, of course, refers to the theory of the 'natural motion' of the four elements. Another Aristotelian theory appears in the definition of Jurjānī (*Definitiones*, ed. G. Flügel, Leipzig, 1845, p. 145): 'the force permeating bodies whereby the body reaches its perfection.' In the astrological philosophy of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā (Bombay, 1305, ii. 88) it is defined as 'the force of the universal astral soul, which permeates all bodies that are below the sphere of the Moon from the globe of the

Aether down to the centre of the Earth,' or 'the operation of the Great Man,' i.e. the world. More ordinarily the meaning of nature is inferred from the subjects discussed in the *Physics*, enumerated by Avicenna (*Kitāb al-Najāt*, Cairo, 1331, p. 78) as 'existing bodies in so far as they are subject to rest, motion, and change.' This is copied by al-Ghazālī (*Maqāsid al-Falāsifah*, Cairo, 1331, p. 78). At times the word *ṭabī'ah* is used like 'nature' in the modern languages for the sum total of phenomena (e.g., in *Hikmat al-Ain*, Kazan, 1904, i. 83).

2. Nature and deity.—In spite of the close attention given by the Islāmic philosophers to the problem of determinism, it does not appear that many thought of nature as a power independent of the Deity; their reasoning deals rather with 'natures,' i.e. the properties of kinds, or causes which produce effects either in the things themselves (as the dryness and heat of fire) or in other things (as combustion in what comes near fire; see 'Alā al-dīn Tusi, *Kitāb al-Dhakhirah*, Hyderābād, n.d., p. 220). Those who maintained the uniformity of nature in the sense that these properties were invariable and immutable denied the miracles; it was possible to reply that these properties were customary, but could not be known to be invariable, and therefore the miracles were credible. Hence the name for such events is *khawāriq*, 'violations,' not of natural order but of custom (*ādah*), as though nniformity went no farther. So al-Ghazālī (*Al-Maḍnūn bihi*, Cairo, n.d., p. 18) declares that violation of custom is not incredible, his illustration being the speed with which fire melts minerals as opposed to the length of time taken by sunshine to produce the same effect. The work of a prophet may compare in efficacy with the former, at any rate where the miracle can be described as an accelerated natural process. This illustration very clearly ignores what are called 'laws of nature,' for which, indeed, the language has no proper equivalent, and of which it is likely that the Muslim consciousness is very slight. Thus, numerous travellers tell us that there is a wide-spread belief in the possibility of four years' gestation, and quite serious writers make men live for periods of two or three hundred years.

The classical discussion of this subject is in the *Tahāfut al-Falāsifah* of al-Ghazālī, whom Averroes attempted to answer (Cairo, 1302, i. 98-102, ii. 68-73). Ghazālī admits the possibility that a book might turn into a man, or that vessels of common material in a house might turn into gold. He can scarcely avoid the assumption, however (which he endeavours to refute), of a constant relation between causes and effects, and Averroes, as usual, seems no match for him in reasoning power.

Probably nature has theological importance in the theory of *karāmāt*, or 'spontaneous miracles'—violations of order which are not the acts of prophets, but occur for the glorification of saints. The Mutazilites, indeed, attempted to get rid of these and make all recorded cases miracles performed by prophets, while the orthodox view, that they are seen only by saints like those for whose benefit they are wrought and that the latter ought to disown them (*Baḥr al-kalām*, Cairo, 1329, p. 61), evinces some desire to restrict or get rid of them. It is clear that in the stories told of clouds shading the Prophet and the like the fundamental idea is that of animism, i.e. that nature behaved to the Prophet as though it possessed intelligence, and the difference of these supposed occurrences from miracles lies in their spontaneity. On the other hand, the lives of the saints show no lack of miracles that were not spontaneous, but exhibitions of these persons' extraordinary powers. The

spontaneous occurrences are at times not in order to do honour to any one, but for the contrary purpose. When a paralytic girl was given some bread baked with a fire of Ibn 'Arabī's *Fuṣūṣ al-Hikam*, she recovered (*Al-Ilm al-Shāmikh*, Cairo, 1328, p. 381).

3. Nature and man.—As applied to man the word 'nature' and its equivalent may either signify involuntary activities (Jurjānī, ed. Flügel, p. 145) or any proclivities (Harīrī, *Maqāmāt*, ed. A. I. Silvestre de Sacy, Paris, 1822, p. 319); it may stand for 'all the qualities bad and good compounded in a man from which he can scarcely depart' (Ibn al-Athīr, *Nihāyah*, Cairo, 1311, iii. 31). Its use in the latter sense is illustrated by the tradition, 'a believer may be stamped with any quality except treason and mendacity' (*ib.*).

'Natural theology,' in the sense of arguing from nature to the existence of a Creator, is said (probably with justice) to be recommended in the Qur'ān, and Islāmic writers of different ages have endeavoured to carry out this injunction. The most famous essay in this line is the *Risālah* of Ibn Ṭufail (b. 494 A.H.), which has frequently been edited and translated. The same Qur'ānic passages are alleged in justification of scientific treatises of various sorts—e.g., the 'Wonders of Creation' of Qazwīnī (764 A.H.). Writers of our time similarly claim physical science as an essentially Islāmic study, and even extend the name 'Muslims' to all who are engaged in its pursuit.

4. Appreciation of nature.—Admiration of natural beauty is not unrepresented in Islāmic works, but is probably less common than in the literature of Europe or India. A combination of the expression of this sentiment with the physico-theological argument is to be found in the treatise of the Ikhwān al-Safā, published and translated by F. Dieterici with the title, *Der Streit zwischen Thier und Mensch* (Berlin, 1858). The sentiment is also expressed in the poetical and semi-poetical literature; the descriptions of the camel, the horse, the wild ass, etc., with which the early poetry abounds come under this category.

5. Nature-worship.—Worship of nature, in the sense of the ascription to natural objects of divine attributes, is so absolutely in contradiction to the spirit of Islām that it has properly no place therein. The only form which it can with any propriety take is pantheism, by so straining the doctrine of the divine unity as to make all nature God. And this form it took with the Sūfī thinkers, of whom none expresses the idea more boldly than Ibn 'Arabī (586 A.H.):

'The perfectly wise is he who sees in every object of worship a revelation of the Truth, wherein he can be worshipped; and for this reason they call all such objects *God*, together with their proper name, whether stone, tree, animal, man, star or angel; such latter names being that of the personality therein. Divinity is a *rank*, supposed by the worshipper to be the rank of his particular object of worship, whereas in reality it is the mode whereby the Truth is revealed to the vision of this particular worshipper, who reverences this object of worship in this particular revelation' (*Fuṣūṣ al-Hikam*, Cairo, 1309, p. 890).

Hence even the fetish-worshipper worships God. This extraordinary doctrine found comparatively few adherents, and could not be professed with safety; nor can Islām be charged with encouraging fetish-worship except in the kissing of the Black Stone, the retention of which is said to have given offence to some of the early champions of the system. The charge of moon-worship that has been brought against Muḥammad appears to be groundless. Planet-worship is found in certain magical incantations, but these are not properly Islāmic. Cases of veneration paid to trees occur in various Islāmic communities (see I. Goldziher, *Muḥammad-anische Studien*, Halle, 1889-90, ii. 349-352), yet it is doubtful whether this can with justice be called

worship; it would seem that the tree in many cases is brought into connexion with some saint, real or imaginary, who is the ostensible and probably the real object of veneration. Of the worship of springs or rivers it is hard to find any trace; Ibn Iyās, however, records in the year 866 A.H. (Cairo, 1311, ii. 74) that, after various services of intercession to Allāh had failed to produce a rise in the Nile, recourse was had to the expedient of making all existing members of the 'Abbāsīd family sip some water and then discharge it into a vessel which was emptied into the basin of the Nilometer, and this process had the desired effect.

LITERATURE.—See the sources cited throughout the article.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

NATURE (Persian).—The Avesta has no word directly corresponding to our 'nature,' but the idea of cosmos is expressed by the term *anhū*, 'the two worlds' (dual. of *anhū*), viz. 'the corporeal and the spiritual existence' (*Yasna*, xxviii. 2), the real and the ideal world. This universe, as created by Ahura Mazda, forms a system founded on the principle of purity, or righteousness (*asha*, personified in the archangel Asha Vahishta), which is identical with Mazda's will and in fact rules in the world as a moral and physical law of nature. Mazda himself cannot operate except according to Asha; on the other hand, he cannot realize his will immediately on account of the system of Amesha Spentas, a theological parallel to the political system of satraps. The Amesha Spentas work as practical functionaries executing the divine designs in the world. The terrestrial sphere is divided into several territories every one of which is presided over by an Amesha Spenta, this genius being in some way identical with the province of nature governed by him and designated with his name. Using a technical term, the Avesta, however, calls the Amesha Spenta 'inspector' (*rātu*) of his domain, which he governs, not on his own behalf, but exclusively in the name of Mazda. Thus Vohu Mano is the *rātu* of the cattle, Asha Vahishta of the fire, Armaiti of the earth, Kshathra Vairiya of metals, Haurvatat of the water, and Ameretāt of plants. Together the Amesha Spentas preside over the whole of nature, and take care that it 'may not decay or perish'; their task is the 'advancement of living beings' (*fradāt gaēthām*, a characteristic term in Avesta, indicating its high appreciation of nature and practical life).

So far the Zoroastrian theology as known from the *Gāthās*; but besides this system we find in the younger Avesta, especially in the *Yashts*, a great number of nature-gods, some of them still reigning as old Aryan divinities from pre-Zoroastrian times, others as popular deities of a later period. Mithra as a sun-god (*Yt.* x.) is also mentioned in the Vedic hymns; the water-god, Apām Napat (*Yt.* xix.), is likewise well known from Indian religion; but most of the nature-gods are introduced into the Persian pantheon later. The goddess of water and fertility, Ardvī Surā Anāhita (*Ys.* lxv.; *Yt.* v.), seems to be identical with the Semitic (originally Hittite?) Astarte; the star-god, Tishtriya (Sirius), to whom *Yasht* viii. is dedicated, is perhaps a divinity of Babylonian origin. The quite naturalistic hymn to the moon (*Yt.* vii.) seems to be very late. All these gods act in the drama of nature broadly described in the *Yashts* in a mythological manner which is quite different from the abstract theology of the *Gāthās*.

Peculiar to Iranian worship is the cult of the elements without any personification—earth, water, fire, etc.—as powers of purity and instruments for the purification of the world. The holy fire (Ātar) is the most important of them, working—or fighting—against demons and impurity not only as

altar-fire but also as hearth-fire and an element of nature. Ātar's battle with the demons, especially the dragon Dahaka, is described in *Yasht* xix. The practical task and the moral duty of man are to assist and advance the pure elements of nature in the great conflict between good and evil spirits in the world. The eschatological ideal of Zoroastrian religion is the restoration of pure nature, when Ahura Mazda has conquered Ahriman in the last battle. On the whole, the Avesta religion may be designated a practical nature-worship, realized not only in the form of cult and theology, but also by means of culture and moral activity.

LITERATURE.—See the general works on Avesta religion by J. Darmesteter, *Études sur l'Avesta*, Paris, 1883, *Essais orientaux*, do. 1883, 'The Zend Avesta,' in *SBB* iv.² [1895], xxiii. [1883]; F. Justi, 'Die älteste iran. Religion und ihr Stifter Zarathustra,' in *PJB* lxxviii. [1897]; A. V. W. Jackson, 'Die iran. Religion,' in *GfP* ii. [1904] 612 ff.; E. Lehmann, *Zarathushtra*, 2 vols., Copenhagen, 1899–1902; J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913. Darmesteter, Ormazd et Ahriman, Paris, 1877, treats the problem in a rather speculative way; his introductions to the single *Yashts* in *Le Zend-Avesta* (Paris, 1893), iii., and esp. to his tr. of the *Vendidad* (*SBB* iv. 3), are more cautious and instructive.

E. LEHMANN.

NATURE (Roman).—I. Introduction.—Before we can undertake the discussion of nature in the intellectual and religious experience of the Romans, we must get a clear idea of where the Romans drew the line dividing nature from that which was not nature. It would be more accurate to say the line between *natura* and *non-natura*, for, although we have borrowed 'nature' from *natura*, the two words do not carry exactly the same meanings. Fundamentally *natura* signified 'birth' (as in Terence, *Ad.*, 126, 902), i.e. the process by which living objects come into being. Since after a fashion things without life come into being, they can metaphorically be said to be born. That these processes are only individuals in their own special series, and that each series is itself one of a countless number, are matters of elementary observation. Realization of these facts on the part of the Romans so extended the meaning of *natura* that it came at length to stand for the grand aggregate of the processes of becoming. But this aggregate was interpreted in two ways.

(a) By the philosopher it was understood as the entire universe, itself an immeasurably large process which initiated and directed the individual processes composing it. So Marcus Aurelius exclaims: 'O Nature, from thee are all things, in thee are all things, to thee all things return.'¹ Such a conception as that involved here tends to obliterate the line between nature and man, and ultimately results in a pessimistic philosophy. To Lucretius man is only a particle in a universe of particles whose entire tendency is downward towards dissolution. Man is as helpless as a clod against the inevitable decree that

'No single thing abides; but all things flow.

Fragment to fragment clings—the things thus grow

Until we know and name them. By degrees

They melt, and are no more the things we know.'²

But, as the Lucretian philosophy was Roman only by naturalization, so to speak, it is not our chief concern here.

(b) To the average Roman, on the other hand, the grand aggregate, *natura*, was not so much a single objective reality as a term. As such, it conveniently summed up those innumerable processes of life, motion, and change which the senses of man could perceive. But it was not the one efficient cause of all these processes; rather, each process or group of cognate processes had its own specific cause, and all of these many causes were alike marked by a certain regularity and by an

¹ *Comm.* iv. 23.

² W. H. Mallock, *Lucretius on Life and Death*, London, 1900, p. 15.

essential independence of human initiative.¹ Of the three marks of the natural just noted the last stood out most prominently in the consciousness. The mere mention of *natura* implied a contradictory *homo*. Of course, the Roman would admit that man is one of nature's works, yet he habitually thought of him as an apparently free agent outside of and in more or less opposition to nature.

2. Sources of information. — As regards the sources of our information as to the attitude of the Roman masses towards nature, there is a real difficulty in the fact that they almost wholly consist of the works of the *litterati*, whose peculiar training and manner of life dissociated them in a large part from the daily experiences of the populace. Few of the vast number of extant sepulchral inscriptions are of service in this field, except perhaps negatively. Yet we are not absolutely in the dark. By taking account of casual remarks of authors and by making simple inferences from well-attested manners and customs, we can at least approximate to the popular point of view. Moreover, the success of such nature-literature as that of Tibullus, Vergil, and Horace is plain testimony that these authors did not have to create *ab ovo*, but had ready to hand a generally sympathetic public. Their writings are, therefore, at once reflexions and enlargements of the views of the masses.

3. Roman regard for phenomena apart from their religious significance. — (a) *The land*. — As the early Italian depended almost wholly on the land for his subsistence, one must expect to find here his most intimate touch with nature. The field cleared from the forest, tilled, sown, and reaped with his own hands, was the most precious thing that he possessed. What beauty it had for him at first was the beauty of utility and of ownership, but it was at once the source of his patriotism and of his ultimate love of landscape for its own sake.²

But the bond between man and nature could not endure unless it gave man a present profit and promises for its continuance. Here it was that the native Roman philosophy, elaborated in the fields, opposed the Grecian philosophy of Lucretius. As Vergil propounds it, it is a philosophy of hope. Jupiter himself ordained that tillage should be hard, so that the skill of man might be whetted.³ The course of nature might be downward, but man is free to contend against it. Mildew, thistles, cranes, weevil, and drought might come, yet to patient toil *iustissima tellus* was generous of her bounty. The man with the mattock was the mainstay of the Republic.⁴ This was the moral of the *Georgics*.

Horace's view of nature is substantially that of Vergil. For him, too, there is no pride comparable to the pride of the freehold. Ofellus, though 'rusticus abnormis sapiens crassaque Minerva,'⁵ was nevertheless the most contented and most desirable type of Roman citizen. Here Horace strikes the rather cold note of policy. Vergil, on the contrary, seems always to cry as with the accents of a Hebrew prophet: 'Return to the plough and to the reaping-hook, "for blessed is he who hath known the rural deities."'⁶

Tibullus, unlike the two former poets, was a son of the city, and, like so many of his kind, had grown tired of city life. On his estate near

Præneste he learned to feel nature's healing power and to see her as the real builder of the Roman strength. In his opinion, no people could exist aloof from her and truly live. The worst that he could say of Hades was 'there are no fields of harvest below, no cultivated vineyards.'⁷

The same Roman view may be observed also in prose-writers like Cato, Varro, and Cicero. In the *de Senectute* the descriptions of the charms of both wild and rustic nature often border closely on the poetical.

Thus far we have noted the utilitarian bond between the Italian and nature, and we have treated it at some length because an understanding of it is essential to an appreciation of the poets' occasional rhapsodies on this theme. Now and again they seem to strike that full note of modern romanticism, the poetic fallacy. But a deeper reading discloses the fact that they have not advanced beyond the juvenile stage of thought expressed in the opening lines of Bryant's *Thanatopsis*:

*To him who in the love of Nature holds
Communion with her visible forms, she speaks
A various language.*

The language which she speaks to them is departmental, and not universal. The trees speak, the fields speak, the water-courses speak, but they speak singly and in their own several tongues. Lucretius comes the nearest to hearing the choral voice of nature, but he hears it as the disciple of a Grecian doctrine, and not as a Roman. But no Roman poet, nor, indeed, any ancient, ever quite attained that point of view of nature and that power of seeing a world in detail which we observe in Shelley's dirge beginning 'Rough wind that moanest loud,' and in Tennyson's 'Flower in the crannied wall.'

Closely allied with 'tilth and vineyard' in the Roman economy were flowers, trees, and domestic animals. From the earliest times flowers were sought and grown for their beauty and fragrance and for the making of garlands to be used in decoration and in religious rites. Poets often alluded to the favourite varieties, but gave none of them a place in romance until the time of the *Elocutio Novella*. The true use of a flower was as a symbol of the fertility and beauty of nature. Of course, the fruit-bearing trees meant much to the Roman in both literature and life. But he admired other sorts of trees as well—the elm for its service to the vine, the pine for its timber, the oak, ilex, beech, poplar, and others for their shade. The Roman poets give us many touching pictures of the domestic animals, especially those that share the labours of life with man. Horace, in his lines 'Sol ubi montium mutaret nimbros, et iuga demeret bobus fatigatis,'⁸ exhibits for the ox the sympathy of a Troyon or Horatio Walker.

(b) *The sky*. — The sky, the celestial bodies, and all the phenomena of weather had much significance for the Italian peasant and shepherd. These were the mysterious powers which with varying directness controlled in large part the conditions of his crops and pastures. The sun, moon, and stars were considered only in their physical aspects. Most of the literary epithets of the sun refer to its light or its heat. The group relating to light is much the larger, no doubt for the reason that at its source it appears to be constant. The sun's perceptible heat, on the other hand, is variable, and there seems to be some ground for believing that the Romans did not regard the sun as the only source of atmospheric heat. In their ignorance of the causes of air-currents they held the winds to be independent phenomena, if not independent agents; hence their frequent personaliza-

¹ In the light of this belief are to be interpreted the famous words of Vergil: 'Happy is he who has been able to trace out the causes of things' (*Georg.* ii. 490).

² 'The old connection between the love of the land and the love of our land . . . was to Vergil an absolutely real fact' (Countess Evelyn Martinengo-Cesaresco, *The Outdoor Life in Greek and Roman Poets*, p. 140).

³ See *Georg.* i. 121-123.

⁵ *Sat.* ii. li. 21.

⁴ *Id.* i. 118 ff., ii. 458-474.

⁶ *Georg.* ii. 493.

⁷ *L.* xi. 35.

⁸ *Odes*, iii. vi. 41-43.

tion. Moreover, as the temperatures of the year shifted with the march of the constellations, the easy, though fallacious, deduction was made that the latter were the cause of the former. This explains the significance of the days when the dog-star is in the ascendant. The greater prominence of the stars over the moon in Latin poetry lies perhaps in their importance as the common calendar of the seasons. The phases of the moon mark but brief periods and have therefore much less bearing on agricultural pursuits.

Of the seasons spring and winter receive the most frequent mention. In fact, one might say that to the Italian they are the only seasons, summer and autumn being only continuations of spring. Over spring alone was any deep emotion shown.¹ Winter was the period of sterility and idleness, and was tolerated only as a necessary evil.

Clouds were always looked upon as potential evils, for, although they brought the helpful rain, they could also bring flood or even hail.

(c) *Springs and streams*.—Springs and small streams were very close to the life of the common people. The few large rivers, like the Po and the Tiber, were viewed with awe rather than with affection. Being turbid, they were useless for drinking, and they ran at too low a level to be of service in irrigation. Horace's love for the Fountain of Bandusia² is representative of that of the populace of Italy for the myriad other springs of the land.³

R. A. Lanciani has said that the Romans were not attracted by lakes.⁴ The statement is altogether too sweeping. That they received less attention than rivers is evident, but this may be explained by their inferiority as a means of sustaining the life of man. At all events, a sure proof that the Romans were at least not insensible to their charms is seen in the fact that their shores were often chosen as the sites of Roman villas.⁵

(d) *The sea*.—In order to understand the attitude of the Roman towards the sea all that we need to know is that he was incurably a landsman. What little of his living came from the sea was practically negligible. The sailor and the merchant-captain he regarded as grasping and unduly adventurous. The sea was not meant for man. Even in a calm it was treacherous. So capricious was it that the Roman endowed it with human moods and passions. It was the world's greatest symbol of destruction.⁶

(e) *Mountains*.—To the Roman the most striking feature of the higher mountains was their barrenness; they were useless for shepherd and farmer alike. They approximated the intolerable conditions of winter. They were the home of the wolf and the bear. If they had any appeal at all, it was 'as a graceful definition of the horizon, or framing of the landscape,'⁷ or through long association. In the *de Amicitia* Laelius concedes that on this condition one can actually come to love even mountains and forests.⁸ In Lucretius, on the contrary, we observe such a rich variety of allusions to the mountains that we cannot but think that for him they came very near to possessing what we sentimental moderns call moods.

(f) *Wild animals*.—To the fiercer animals of the

wilds the Roman gave short shrift as the enemies of man. The noble beauty of the lion and the rugged majesty of the wolf were lost in bitter antagonism. In one of his letters Cicero tells a friend that the spectators at the opening of Pompey's theatre seemed to entertain a feeling of kinship for the elephants mutilated and killed before their eyes.¹ This was, indeed, very unusual, but may be attributed to a general knowledge that the elephant was often a useful servant of man. Many a Roman would shed copious tears over the death of a pet who could look with no other emotion than that of joy on the butchery of scores of wild beasts. The pet was his own; the personal element was paramount.

(g) *Under world*.—For the Roman's regard for subterranean phenomena see 5 (d) below.

4. *Deities and cults*.—The chief sources of our knowledge of the Roman deities and cults are the so-called Calendar of Numa, writers like Varro and Verrius Flaccus, myths, scattered notices in the literary authors, the anti-pagan diatribes of the Church Fathers, archæology, and anthropology. To appraise these sources severally is impossible at present. Suffice it to say in reference to myths that, influenced as they are by Greek models, they must be treated with special caution, although Otto and Pais have demonstrated that they contain a much larger element purely Roman in origin than was formerly allowed.

The distinctively Roman religion belonged, at the earliest period to which we can trace it, to the pre-animistic stage of thought. Natural objects and phenomena, and objects of a natural origin reshaped by man for his uses, were worshipped in themselves. Their powers were gauged and classified as these objects served as helps or hindrances to human well-being. Although the powers were in the main constant and regular, there was a certain mysterious margin in which they were inconstant and irregular. At first they can have been no more than mere infections, so to speak, benign or malignant in their effects, but in time the infections were condensed into special forces regarded as resident in the objects but in a certain sense independent of them and of one another. These forces were the *numina*. The Roman was now in the animistic stage of religious thought.

The step from *numen* to deity was not immediate. At best the *numen* was still little more than a 'magic potency' and lacked much of being a real *numen*, an expression of will (cf. *nuere*, 'to express will'; *adnuere*, 'to signify assent'). It was in the above-mentioned margin of difference between the regular and irregular manifestations of 'magic potency' that the possibilities for the transition were found. The variations could be accounted for only on the hypothesis that they were due to the activities of powers analogous in their freedom of initiative to human wills. Many of the *numina* were therefore conceived as wills, but the majority remained simply 'functional spirits with will-power.'² To the Roman, however, they were all gods.

It is probable that to the masses the gods were long without names, so vaguely were they conceived. Yet the growth of local cults and the invention of cult-epithets by the priests soon gave them names as well as a 'local habitation.' But the Roman could never wholly emerge from his primitive indefiniteness in this respect, for he was always more or less fearful that in calling upon a god he might speak the wrong name and thus fail in his petition.³ Many of the names were origin-

¹ Fam. vii. 1.3.
² Cf. W. Warde Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, pp. 118-120.

³ Witness the uncertainty of the invocations 'sive deo sive deæ' (Henzen, *Acta Fratrum Arvalium*, pp. 144, 146) and

¹ Hor. *Odes*, i. iv. 1.

² *Ib.* iii. xiii.

³ Longinus (*de Subl.* xxxv.) argued against the narrow Roman view.

⁴ *Wanderings in the Roman Campagna*, London, 1909, p. 45.

⁵ Cf. Pliny, *Letters*, ix. 7. For the sentiments of Vergil see *Georg.* ii. 159; for those of Catullus see *Carm.* xxxi.

⁶ Cf. Allen, *The Treatment of Nature in the Poetry of the Roman Republic*, p. 203.

⁷ L. Friedländer, *Roman Life and Manners under the Early Empire*, i. 391.

⁸ *Ib.* 63.

ally adjectival, but in time they became genuine proper nouns, and as such tended to transfer to the gods whom they designated at least an adumbration of personality.

5. Individual gods.—In the following discussion of the individual gods we shall exclude those of other than Italic provenance and also those of this provenance that are representative of man singly or collectively, living or dead, and of his activities and creations. The order of treatment to be observed will be based as far as possible on the sequence of the Roman's interests in natural phenomena.

(a) *Gods of the sky, atmosphere, and time.*—Juppiter (Iovis, Diovis, Dius, Diespiter) was the chief god of all the Italic stocks. He was the sky-god, or, better, the sky itself together with its phenomena, especially that of light. This would explain the absence of cults of the sun, moon, and stars among the early Italians. His importance to the farmer is obvious when one considers that the conditions of the various crops depend directly upon weather and light. The god Liber was an independent development from Juppiter Liber, and had to do with the fertilization of the seed of plants and animals.

Juppiter showed his power in the thunder, lightning, and rain, and, in fact, was thought to descend in person in the lightning-bolt; hence his epithets Fulgur and Fulmen. The cult of Juppiter Feretrius was apparently a lightning-cult in origin, whatever it was later. The silex known as Juppiter Lapis is generally explained as a celt, i.e. a thunderbolt, but there now seems to be good reason for believing that it was a flint knife symbolizing the act of killing. The name of Juppiter was applied to it in order to give it moral authority.¹ As the rain-god, Juppiter was known as Pluvius, Pluvialis, and Elicius, and, as god of the night-heavens, as Summanus. He is one of the few nature-gods of the Romans who took on moral attributes. As the *numen* who has a universal survey over boundaries between properties, he acquired the title of Terminus—a title which was later detached and given an individual identity. As Dius Fidius, he was the ever-present witness of men's observance of their pledges. To the Roman mind he seemed to sum up the positive powers of all the other *numina*.

Janus, as Consuevis, the power which brings the young to the light of day, may be considered as a nature-god. Closely allied with him is the feminine divinity, Mater Matuta, who

*'Tempore . . . certo roseam . . . per oras
aetheris Auroram deferet, et lumina pandit.'*²

She was a divinity of birth as well as of light.

The gods of the seasons were relatively inconspicuous. For the name of Angerona the ancients had many bizarre explanations. Mommsen is probably right in inferring from the occurrence of her festival on December 21 that she represented the turning of the year. She was thus a duplicate of Anna Perenna. The god Vertumnus is known only vaguely. From his function of presiding progressively over blossoms and maturing fruit we conclude that he was a god of the changing year.

(b) *Gods of human life, earth, agriculture, and herding.*—The Genius of man and the Juno of woman may be classed as nature-gods because they represent functional powers non-human in origin. Genius is the procreative function of the individual man in its aspect as a *numen*, and Juno is that of the individual woman. From indi-

¹ Proserpina, selve Salviam deicere oportet' (Fox, 'John Hopkins *Tabellae Definitionum*,' *AJPh* xxxi. 1. [1912] Suppl. p. 16).

² H. J. Rose, *Journ. of Rom. Stud.*, iii. ii. [1913] 237.

³ Lucretius, *de Rer. Nat.* v. 655 f.

viduals the names were extended to the two sexes so as to include their collective lives and interests. But, owing to the great diversity of men's activities as compared with the few of women, Genius never stood out as a single independent figure like Juno. Juno presided over the successive stages of growth of the child from conception to birth. Her union with Juppiter was comparatively late.

Ceres belongs to the oldest stratum of Italic gods. She was the protectress of the crops from seeding till harvest. At her spring festival, the Cerialia, she was invoked to grant healthy growth. Her relation to the production of the chief staple foods of the populace clearly accounts for the fact that her cult was peculiarly plebeian.

Tellus, or Tellus Mater, was also of the oldest stratum of divinities. She was really Mother Earth, but in the narrow sphere of agriculture she was the seed-field which received and fostered the seed cast upon her bosom. The increasing prominence of the cults of Demeter and her circle thrust Tellus more and more into the background until finally she vanished as a name. But under the name of Terra Mater she reappeared later, and it is probable that the Dea Dia of the Arval ritual is no other than Tellus herself. In certain rites she was the representative of the under world.¹

Saturnus (earlier, Sæturnus, from *serere*, 'to sow') occupied so important a place among the oldest Italic divinities that Italy was sometimes called Saturnia. His primitive function was apparently to preside over the sowing of the grain, but gradually he acquired oversight over other agricultural operations. The central purpose of his festival, the Saturnalia, was to secure proper germination of the seed sown at the winter sowing. By a sort of contamination he acquired his chthonic characteristics from his consort Ops. Only in the legends which identify him with Kronos and make him the ruler of the Golden Age is he endowed with moral characteristics.

Another ancient god of agriculture was Consus. His name, connected with *condere*, 'to store,' plainly shows that he had to do with the garnering of the fruits of the field. The underground location of his altar at Rome symbolized the practice of storing corn in pits. Intimately connected with Consus was Ops, who, as Consiva, was the embodiment of an abundant harvest rather than a divinity of the earth. As Opifera, she guarded the granaries against fire.

Scholars are divided as to the primitive nature of Mars (Mavors, Marspiter, Maspiter, Etr. Maris), a god common to all the Italic peoples. Some hold that he was always and only a god of war; others that he was originally a god of vegetation and of the border-lands between the fields and the wild. Certainly his association with the wolf, the woodpecker, and the ox points to this double relation. Quirinus was at first a local epithet of Mars peculiar to the Quirinal Hill.

With the possible exception of Juppiter, no god is so representative of Roman nature-worship as Fannus (cf. *fauere*, 'to regard with favour'). His attributes and the position of his priesthood are marks of his being a conception of the earliest period. He is the kindly spirit of the woods and fields who brings fertility to the crops and herds, and to the latter protection from the wolves. In the hamlets he was the *deus agrestis* par excellence. As a wood-god he exhibited a twofold nature. He was the speaker of the mysterious voices of the forest. Late legends said that he cast his oracular utterances into verse and thus became the inventor of poetry. He was also, in the popular conception, a mischievous sprite who brought the nightmare

¹ Cf. *CIL* vi. 15493; cf. *ib.* xli. 1932; A. Dieterich, *Mutter Erde*, Leipzig, 1913, *passim*.

(*incubus*), and who, as Inuus, copulated with the beasts in the field. Fanna, as his wife or daughter or sister, shared his power of bestowing fertility.

Silvanus, as the adjectival form of his name indicates, was a scion of an older god, probably either Fannus Silvicola¹ or Mars.² At all events he embodied characteristics of both of these gods. He was chiefly a god of the woods, propitious to the hunter and shepherd and to the farmstead reclaimed from the forest. By an extension of his functions he became patron of the house, of gardens, and of parks. His cult was wholly private and consisted of a very simple open-air ritual.

Diana was a goddess common to central Italy, but especially prominent in Latium and its vicinity. Her cult on the Aventine was simply a transference of that of Aricia. From her association here with the spring-nymph Egeria, who aided women in child-birth, and with Virbins, a male divinity of apparently like function, and from the connexion of women with her cult on the Aventine we judge that she too was primitively a goddess of child-birth. This function was later obscured through her identification with the Greek Artemis, when she became the 'huntress-goddess chaste and fair.'

By nativity Venus was purely Italian. Her name seems first to have signified charm in general, then the charm and bloom of nature, and finally the goddess presiding in this sphere. She fostered the growth of the vine and of plants in market-gardens. Her native career was cut short by her contact and subsequent identification with Aphrodite, the goddess of love.

Fortuna, or better, Fors Fortuna, was a nature-goddess so far as she represented a force beyond the control of man. Perhaps the earliest conception of her is as the incalculable element which adjusts the conditions of the harvest. Her union with Mater Matuta and her cult at Præneste reveal her as a *numen* which determined the destiny of women in child-birth. In her highest development she appeared as the incorporate will of the gods, and therefore as an ethical force.

With the spring festival of the Parilia (from Palilia, by dissimilation) was connected a divinity called Pales (designated variously as male or female), who granted fecundity to the herds.

The worship of the trees belongs more properly to the study of pre-animism or fetishism than to that of nature-gods. There were, however, two trees in Rome to which the Romans accorded honours that were almost divine: these were the oak of Juppiter Feretrius on the Capitoline and the Ficus Ruminalis on the slopes of the Palatine.

The plebeian host of the *Sondergötter* is too large for us to discuss at length (see *ARYAN RELIGION*, vol. ii. p. 31 f.). Those that spiritualize human acts, like Messor, Convector, Saritor, and so forth, can be dismissed *en bloc*. But there is still a large group which spiritualize purely natural processes. A few of these will serve as illustrations. Seia, Segesta, Nodutus, Volutina, Patelana, Lactans, and Matura were *numina* watching over the successive stages of the field-crops from sowing to maturity. Bubona, Epona, and Pomona fostered the growth of cattle, horses, and trees respectively. Each stage of development of the child was also placed under the guardianship of a special spirit. In short, no natural process of import for man's continued well-being was left without its cherishing divinity.

(c) *Gods of the water*.—The *numina* of springs received much more attention than those of rivers. The former were generally thought of as kindly young goddesses possessed of the gifts of alleviating pain, healing, prophecy, song, and magic. The most prominent in Rome was Juturna (earlier

Diuturna), a divinity of healing. Next to her in popularity stood the Camenæ (cf. *carmen*, *casmen*, 'song'), who granted easy child-birth and were called the Roman Muses. Their leader, Carmentis, was known as a prophetic spirit who sang to the new-born child its destiny. Affiliated with them was the nymph Egeria. The prophetic Feronia was probably a *numen* of springs. The large number of extant dedications to Fons refer to him as the divinity of local springs rather than of all.

The *numina* of rivers were conceived as benevolent old men; hence the epithets Padus Pater and Pater Tiberinus. The Umbrian Clitumnus and the Campanian Voltumnus were of considerable importance in Italian religious thought.

Neptunus is to be counted among the oldest gods of Rome. His proverbial association with the sea is not original, but is due to his identification with Poseidon. He is to be interpreted as the *numen* of the element of moisture. His logical development was curtailed in Rome by the apparent remoteness of urban life from agricultural interests, but among the rustics of Italy and the provinces his divinity was long the object of worship. The nymph Salacia, who seems to have represented the ebullient nature of springs, was frequently his cult companion.

(d) *Gods of the under world and of fire*.—Independent Roman attributions of divinity to the under world and its phenomena lack sharpness of definition. And this was quite natural, for the Roman's first care was for the living and to ensure himself a posterity; moreover, he was disinclined to speculate on so uncertain a matter as the lot of man after death.

Apparently the chief divinity of the under world was Vediovis (Vedius, Veiovis), who seems to have been not so much the physical as the logical opposite of Juppiter.

The fire-god Volcanus was far from being as conspicuous as we should have expected him to be in the lands of Vesuvius. The explanation is doubtless to be found in the fact that for many centuries prior to A.D. 79 the volcano had been quiescent. The later significance of Volcanus came with his assumption of the personality and functions of Hephaistos. Originally he was of the circle of old Roman gods, being the god of destructive rather than useful fire.

(e) *Gods of disease*.—The disease that most constantly menaced the Romans was, of course, the malaria, and several phases of its attacks were so uniform in character as to impress the Romans that they were the work of divine powers. Thus they erected a shrine to Febris on the Palatine. Among extant provincial inscriptions there are dedications to the Dea Tertiana (*CIL* vii. 999) and the Dea Quartana (*ib.* xii. 3129).

6. Divination and portents.—See art. *DIVINATION* (Roman).

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¹ Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, p. 213.

² See Fowler, *Rel. Experience*, p. 132.

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iii. *DICTIONARIES AND ENCYCLOPEDIAS*.—Daremberg-Saglio; *ERE*, artt. DIVINATION (Roman) and FETTERISM; Pauly-Wissowa; Roscher. W. SHERWOOD FOX.

NATURE (Semitic).—All primitive races doubtless started with much the same spiritual capital. Environment modified and enlarged it as man developed. Natural forces and phenomena presented the same mysteries to all alike, and the imagination evolved strange, fantastic, mighty forms to account for them. In Babylonia and Asia Minor Semitic, Aryan, and other race-stocks met and mingled. They whispered their fears and their speculations to one another and left a heritage of myth and story out of which later generations framed religions, heresies, and philosophies. The Semite looked at things objectively. And yet he often spiritualized where the Greek materialized. Trees and rocks were to both connected with the unseen world, but, while the Greek might see a nymph or a maiden changing into a tree to escape the pursuit of the god, the Semite regarded the oak or the rock as the abode of deity, and the votary sleeping in its shadow would hear the divine voice through his dreams speaking from the object which was his dwelling.

The strange, mysterious power, working out through nature was, to the Semite, God in action—far different from the Greek, to whom the gods were apart from the world, laughing at mortals, fighting with or against them, toying with the thunderbolt, or leaping into life from the waves. Arabia, probably the Semite's home, with a landscape rugged and inhospitable, seemed little fitted to stimulate the imagination, but scanty springs and palm-trees, seen afar across the steppe, promising food and water, and the sterner phenomena of nature as well, aroused the elemental religious ideas—fear and hope and nascent faith.

The heavenly bodies must have profoundly affected primitive man, and the Semitic nomad would see in the moon a beneficent agency. Each new moon spoke of bright nights to come, so welcome to the shepherd and the desert wanderer. The moon-god, called Sin in Babylonia, became the father of the circling host of heaven. His influence was one of kindness, yet Ps 121⁶, 'The moon shall not smite thee by night,' reminds us that his beams were baleful as well. In Babylonia, Uru (Ur) and Harran were seats of his worship, while Sinai and perhaps Jericho in the west were among his shrines. Though his worship had been long extinct in Israel, the feast of trumpets, new moons, Sabbaths, and the lunar dating of the great feasts carry the memory of his cult down even to NT times.

Sun-worship may not have been so ancient; it is more easily associated with the agricultural stage of society, but it acquired a wide currency. Many aspects of the solar deity were undoubtedly derived

from the pre-Semitic inhabitants of Babylonia, but each division of the Semitic world developed its own conception of him according to its varying climatic and cultural environment.

It was Babylonia that developed the most varied forms of religion. The Semite coming from Arabia forced his way across the Euphrates, and, sword in hand, penetrated to the centres of the ancient Sumerian civilization. He must have stood amazed and awed at the temples and the religious system which had grown up through unknown ages, but, in various ways, this civilization possessed an attraction for him, which compelled him to search to their depths its innermost mysteries. We cannot determine when the conquerors from Arabia began their entry, but traces of undoubted Semitic worship existed early as far south as the shores of the Persian Gulf. In 2500 B.C. the Semites were in the ascendant, and under Hammurabi the conquest was nearly complete both in civil and in religious affairs, yet we must believe that the great triad of deities, Anu, En-lil, and Ea, was not originally Semitic in its origin, but an inheritance from the former lords of the land. The Semitic features of these deities were probably a later development. The nature element which pervades the triad comes out more strikingly in the second series of gods, where distinctively solar and lunar elements are personified.

In several of the old Babylonian centres of worship we find two gods standing in the relation of father and son. M. Jastrow (*Aspects of Religious Belief and Practice in Babylonia and Assyria*, New York, 1911) considers that the older deity was in some cases displaced by a later, and, while not removed from the pantheon, was regarded as the son of his successful rival. En-lil at Nippur was called the father of Ninib, who was the older deity, and Nabū (Nebo) of Borsippa was called the son of Marduk. The oldest gods, like Ea and Anu, remained as somewhat shadowy abstractions in the religion. As the Semitic power advanced, we hear the names of these old gods principally in spells and incantations. The younger Semitic deities were the ones invoked in the midst of the activities of life, and they were more definitely involved in the fortunes of the cities and the States. They were also directly associated with the active powers of nature—the sun, the moon, the vegetative processes and growing life. Here, as elsewhere, it is a little difficult to draw the line, and yet it seems quite clear that the powerful and violent elements of nature were deified by the Semite more definitely than by the Sumerian.

Tammūz was a deity of vegetation; although at times he is identified with the sun, the vegetation idea was probably the original one. He seems to be a connecting link between the mythologies of Babylonia and the rest of the Semitic world, and his relationship with Ishtar is a feature which shows the underlying thoughts and conceptions of the Semitic race.

The Babylonian priests reduced religion to a system and worked out a consistent and elaborate pantheon. Magic and divination were large elements in their scheme, and in the temple libraries was a vast mass of religious literature to be used for incantations, and for charms to avert evil. Above all, and in spite of this, there are surviving traces of the power of nature ideas; for the peculiarity of the Babylonian religion, by which it may be differentiated from that of other Semitic branches, was the idea of unfolding life in the vegetable, animal, and human world (see, further, Johannes Hehn, *Die biblische und die babylonische Gottesidee*, Leipzig, 1913, p. 72). Each of the great gods has associated with him a consort, who is, however, but a feeble reflexion of his own person-

ality and also of the social usages of the people, but along with the greater gods, in both the first and second triad, we find Ishtar, who is co-equal with them, sometimes represented as a consort, and sometimes as absolutely independent. In Assyria this deity is associated with the national god, Ashshur. As is well known, she is a prominent figure in the religion of the entire Semitic world outside of Babylonia, and with many of the same characteristics. We are justified in saying that the nature element in the Babylonian religion is associated pre-eminently with Ishtar. She is the mother-goddess, and her prominence throughout the entire Semitic world is an inheritance from a matriarchal state of society.

Among all the gods of the lands of the Tigris and Euphrates the most distinctly Semitic deity apart from Ishtar was Ashshur, who was the supreme god of the Assyrians, standing in a peculiar and unique relation to that people. He was on the nature side a solar deity, his symbol being the solar disk, and he possessed little or nothing of the material element that was so easily associated with other gods. No image of him seems to have been made. While the whole Babylonian pantheon was often associated with him in the royal inscriptions, he stood at the head, and every other god was a member of his court, whose presence and lower position but contributed to the glory of the supreme god. Ishtar is the outstanding exception, who, sometimes as the wife, and sometimes as an independent queen, appears by the side of Ashshur, the two united in the leadership of the people of Assyria, ensuring their victory and enhancing their glory. The nature element of Ashshur, however, is insignificant, because in him the Assyrians approached very close to monotheism. They fell short because he was so often the embodiment of the warlike spirit and of the overweening national pride.

When we leave the rich civilization of Mesopotamia, we find ourselves in more primitive and far cruder surroundings. The pantheons are smaller and simpler. Certain names are used for the deities which seem to be titles rather than proper names. There is in most systems a god who is called Ba'al, 'lord,' or Melech, 'king.' He often possesses a solar character, and the forces of growing life and fertility are closely associated with him. As stated above, the worship of the moon-god had its seat at several points in the west. Here, as in the lands farther east, the worship of Ishtar was a leading cult. In Phœnicia and in Syria, in Palestine, and even in Cyprus, we find this deity under the name of Astarte, of which the Biblical Ash-toreth is simply a form marked as abhorrent by the use of the vowels of *bōsheth*, 'shame.' In Arabia the equivalent of this name is 'Athtar, a male deity—a curious transformation of character, due probably to changing social conditions. From the OT we learn something of the domination of the Astarte worship. To the prophets it was abominable and to be rooted out. To the people it had a strong attraction, and with each succeeding generation one finds recurrent appearances of the cult and attempts at reform. Nevertheless, certain phases of her worship at first possessed remarkable features. It was inevitable that such a worship should have originated and persisted among the early peoples, and the fact that moon-worship was in some way connected with this deity is significant. Though this relation is obscure, it evidently existed: witness the place-name, Ash-taroath Karnaim. The perversions of the worship may have been inevitable, but they were recognized by the people themselves in their better moments as perversions. It is easy to identify this goddess with Mother Earth. The ceaseless circuit of the

seasons—life emerging as it does from the soil, bursting into bloom, drooping and perishing in the cold of winter, or parched by the drought of summer—must have impressed the primitive mind more powerfully than anything else, and we find these phenomena reflected in myths and epics, which come down to us from the earliest ages.

The descent of Ishtar into the lower world, 'the land whence none return,' in search of Tammūz, one of the most ancient of these epic fragments, is a striking illustration. As the goddess moves downward from one stage to another, change and decay take place in the upper world, vegetation languishes and dies, and all the gracious activities of life cease. With Ishtar's return—for she is a goddess—there is a revival of life and the emergence of the world from its death-like sleep. So varied and powerful were the aspects and representations of Ishtar that her cult permeated the religious thought of Syria and Asia Minor. In the Græco-Roman mythologies one goddess was not sufficient to represent all that Ishtar embodied. Demeter, the goddess of the grain fields, Aphrodite, the goddess of love, and Artemis, wearing so often the horned moon as an emblem and appearing in such remarkable form as the patron of Ephesus, are all reflexions of the Semitic Ishtar, and each one shows the intimate connexion with nature which her personality represented. This is one of the many features in which the Western world became a debtor to the Semite. The persistence of the idea of a mother-goddess is evident down to modern times.

Closely associated with Ishtar was Tammūz, who also represented the powers of nature, but whose personality is subsidiary to that of Ishtar. His cult, however, extended widely. We find it in S. Babylonia earlier than the Gilgamesh epic, and in Syria the myth of Ishtar and Tammūz has left indelible marks. The stream which to-day 'runs purple to the sea' was originally, according to the old myth, stained by the blood of the slain god, for whom, in times of religious decadence, women were seen weeping even in Jerusalem and in the Temple precincts (Ezk 8¹⁴). The name Adonis, 'lord,' through which the memory of his worship descends to us, is but the title of the god.

High-place worship belongs to the latest as well as to the oldest strata of the religion. Scattered over Syria and throughout Palestine are standing-stones and pillars. Some of these may be the survivals of stone circles, which probably were the work of an older and vanished race; but, if so, the seal of sacredness which they left has been respected by the Semite. But, in addition, jutting fragments of rock were often invested with sacredness, or a worshipper set up a pillar, anointed it with oil, and paid there his vows. The most sacred spot to-day in Mecca is the Ka'bah, a survival of heathenism, which Muhammad was unable or reluctant to supersede. The traveller in Palestine sees on many a hill-top the white dome of a *weli*, which under the name of a saint preserves the memory of an ancient god, or *jinn*. Image-worship probably finds its origin here, for the stone was conceived to be the habitation of deity; but, inert as the stone is, and materialistic as the form may be, some of the grandest conceptions of deity come to us from this source. 'Great mountain' the Assyrian sometimes called his god. 'My Rock and my salvation' (Ps 62) the Hebrew Psalmist sang, and 'as the mountains are round about Jerusalem, so Jahweh is round about his people' (Ps 125) became a watchword of faith. Indeed, in Syria and the Sinaitic peninsula the mountain itself was one of the most revered objects. Volcanic peaks seemed aflame with God; the loftiness of the mountain carried one's thoughts inevitably to the skies. The sacred-

ness of Mt. Sinai, Mt. Hor, and Mt. Hermon is attested by traditions and by shrines which surround their bases. Their tops could seldom be reached, but the worshipper could always offer his prayers and his sacrifices with the assurance that they ascended to the deity who dwelt within the mountain. On the top of Mt. Hermon were an altar and a temple. The peaks around Mt. Hermon are crowned with altars and temples, which were continued down even to the Greek period. Mt. Hor had its peculiar sacredness, attested by the tomb of Aaron on its summit, which is revered by the Arabs and guarded with the most superstitious care.

The cult of the sun-god was probably a feature of settled agricultural life. Several of the older gods have titular names which imply sun-worship. Perhaps these, however, were later additions to the original function of the god in question. But Ba'al Melkart of the Phoenicians was a sun-god. The Ba'als of Canaan were probably the same.

Moon-worship among the Hebrews seems to have died out before the entry into Canaan, although the prominence of lunar feasts is evidence that this deity occupied a high place at an earlier stage in the nation's history. The crude forms were eliminated and the survivals were re-consecrated and purified.

The three great agricultural feasts testify to the early dominance of vegetation-deities. The green tree, denounced by the prophets because associated so often with heathen worship, was a reminiscence of the desert, when the tree, a rare feature of the landscape, showed where the god chose to dwell. The streams and fountains so abundant in Palestine were revered there, much as they were upon the steppe, where they were often the gathering-places of the nomads for the decision of quarrels (cf. the name En Mishpat, 'fountain of judgment'), and where the truce of God stilled tribal antipathies.

We can see how strong the influence of climate was upon religion and religious expression. The theology became richer as it approached the lands of settled habitation, where there were not only pastures, hut gardens and forests. That which was occasional and remarkable in desert life became common and abundant.

A peculiar manifestation of nature-religion, common to many primitive peoples, was totemism (*q.v.*). The prevalence of this among the Semites has been disputed, but there are many evidences that totem tribes existed and that totem customs were observed. The number of animal-names found both among individuals and among clans testifies to the fact, and, while we must beware of assuming that every animal-name given to men was in some way an expression of totemism, yet there is a sufficient number of cases where we can be sure that a totem existed, and that the animal and the man were brothers in blood. The dog tribes and the leopard tribes considered their eponym as their kinsman, in some mysterious way connected with the clan or tribal deity. Sometimes this god was supposed to assume the form of a dog, panther, or other animal. The totem was seldom eaten—never as a common article of food, but only in rare cases as a sacrament, whereby the life of the clan was strengthened and renewed by partaking of this life of the beast from which it was named, and undoubtedly the god was a sharer in the feast, if he were not also conceived of as being consumed with the flesh of the victim. Vague and obscure as our knowledge of totemism is in its details and in its philosophy, through it we obtain a vision of the conception of life among the primitive Semites. The world around was palpitating with the life of deity, and in tree and

fountain, in the inert stone even, and in the animals familiar to their eyes God was seen. The conception was crude and materialistic, but it contained the germ and inner principle of that which was capable of unfolding into the highest spiritual expression.

When we consider the Hebrew people and their forms of religious life, we must look at them from two points of view: (1) the prophetic, which gives us an interpreted history together with profound ideals; (2) the historic, through which we are able to trace unfolding conceptions of God and the world. OT literature is full of beautiful and expressive poetical figures; underlying many of these are nature-myths, from which the base and crude elements have fallen away under the teachings of priests and prophets (cf. Ps 19 with its description of the sun). Many religions rites and customs retain traces of an older day. The combination of pastoral and agricultural feasts at Passover preserves the memory of the transition from nomadic to settled life. In the ritual are crystallized remainders of nature-worship. The calf-worship which was prevalent at times in the Northern Kingdom is evidence of the persistence of nature ideas. The fact that it was not always denounced shows what a hold it had upon the religion, but its final disappearance and the abhorrence which was felt for it as time went on show how drastic was the reformation and how completely it overmastered national life. We now know that the obscure allusions to Rahab in the poetry are the reminiscences of an ancient creation-myth, in which strange nature ideas are interwoven. This may have come down from the Sumerian religion through a Babylonian medium, but its presence in the OT shows how far the religion had travelled from the polytheistic forms and ideas once so prevalent. Psalms like the 29th, describing the sweeping of a storm across the land from Hermon to the wilderness, certain of the Psalms of the Ascents, where the mountains and the hills add glory to the description, the figures in the older poetry—all attest the power which nature had upon the Hebrew mind. Nature is not deified in the OT, but its power upon the imagination and its value in carrying most forcibly religious ideas are manifest on nearly every page. The description of God Himself in many of the poetic passages shows the dominance of early conceptions and early forms of speech. 'When he rode upon a cherub and did fly, when he flew upon the wings of the wind' (Ps 18¹⁰), when He manifested Himself in the lightning and the thunder, we are inevitably reminded of the materialistic representations of God by nations of different culture, and of different religious ideas among the Semites themselves.

To recapitulate: in the highly developed religion of the Babylonian the naturalistic element receded into the background, and, while interesting survivals are found in invocations, incantations, and epics, the old theology was conventionalized with the developing priesthood and ritual.

The Semite, who had reached an agricultural stage and had become interested in the phenomena of seed-time and harvest, worshipped the forces of nature, and these were gradually personalized. The sun-god was the lord, the Ba'al. It was he who bestowed the gifts of fruits and grain, and filled barns with abundant harvests. His worship was wide-spread over Syria and Palestine. The notions of leadership and fatherhood were associated with him, as the names 'king' and 'lord' testify, as well as the terms 'father,' 'brother,' 'kinsman.' We see here the growth towards the larger and more abstract notions of the theologies of Babylonia and Assyria, but it was nature and nature's luxuriant productiveness that seized upon

the imagination and the religious sense of the people.

As for the nomad, the mysterious power that dwelt behind the things that he saw was revered and feared. Nature in its unexpected manifestations awakened in him the vague notion of a deity. Yet, when we have reached this stage, we know that behind it lay an uncharted period when ideas were forming and personification had hardly reached the point of expression. Everything that we find in the Semitic religion points to animism as the basis and origin. Just where animism begins we perhaps may never know, but that it existed in primitive man and in the primitive Semite we may be sure. The strange things that happened without the intervention of man, the capricious actions of nature and of nature-forces, compelled the individual to believe that there was some mysterious agency with an intelligence or power superior to man's that wrought the changes and either blessed or cursed the helpless votary. Naïve expressions in the earlier portions of the OT itself show how prevalent such notions were and how difficult to eradicate.

The appreciation of natural beauty and the thirst for it were latent in the mind of the primitive Semite, and he possessed a remarkable ability to absorb and assimilate. At the outset the palm-tree, which satisfied so many of his needs, as a product of the great and abounding life of nature, might easily symbolize a god. The spring that flowed from some cavern or from beneath a rock in the midst of the desert, turning the sands into grass with reeds and rushes, was fed, not by human hands, nor by the clouds above, but by Deity Himself. Man might imitate the god and irrigate desert spots, but the human work was a feeble copy of the divine, and the fountain had a reverence all its own. But, when the Semite, wandering from his native deserts, came to lands where water-courses were numerous, vegetation varied, and trees, with many waving branches and fluttering leaves, abundant, he seemed to be in the very ante-chamber of Paradise. Like his own deserts when touched by fertilizing streams, his soul responded and its desert blossomed, whether in the arts of civilization or in the varied forms of religion. Taking colour from his surroundings, as he so often did, he was, nevertheless, not merely a reflector of that with which he came in contact, but a creator as well. Whatever he touched he enriched, and he left to posterity such new glories that the world outside has become his debtor for ever.

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A. S. CARRIER.

NATURE (Slavic).—Our knowledge of Slavic religion is very limited, but we have a number of vague allusions to nature-worship. 'They reverence rivers and nymphs and other "daemons"' (Procopius, *de Bell. Goth.* iii. 14). Bohemian sermons in the 12th cent. abound in exhortations against nominal Christians of whom 'some worship the sun, some the moon and stars, some rivers and fires, some mountains and trees.' Similar references are found in Helmold (*Chron. Slav.* i. 52, 83 [*MGH* xxi.]), Cosmas of Prague (*Font. Rer. Bohem.* 52, 83 [*ib.* ix.]), and elsewhere.

1. Heavenly bodies.—For sun-worship there is little evidence. A god Dazbogu, mentioned in various texts, is usually identified with the sun-god, because his name glosses Helios in a Slavic translation of a Greek fragment of George Hamartolos (cf. Leger, *La Mythologie slave*, pp. 118-121). The marriage of sun or moon with the morning-star is a common theme of the folk-songs of the southern Slavs. At weddings it was customary among the people to nickname bride and bridegroom as morning-star, sun, or moon. Krauss, however, does not see in these customs any evidence for former sun- or moon-worship (*Volks Glaube und rel. Brauch der Südslaven*, p. 1 ff.).

2. Mountains.—Thietmar (*Chron.* viii. 59) mentions a mountain in Silesia which was worshipped on account of its great size.

3. Groves and trees.—There are numerous references to holy groves, forests, and trees. In 1008 Wigbert destroyed Zutibur (Sventibor, 'holy forest'), a grove which was worshipped in all respects as a god. The oak was particularly holy. Constantine Porphyrogenetus (912-959) gives an account of a Russian voyage on the Dnieper:

'When they arrived . . . they made sacrifices . . . because they found there a very large oak, and they offered up living birds' (*de Administ. Imper.* ix.).

The oak-tree was associated with the sacred spring and perpetual fire.

Herbord tells us that near Stettin there was 'a large and leafy oak, with a most excellent fountain beneath it, which the simple people thought the habitation of some god' (*Vita Otton.* [*MGH* xii. 794]).

4. Thunder, etc.—In texts of the 14th, 15th, and 18th centuries a god Svaroziczu is mentioned. 'They invoke fire, calling it Svaroziczu' (Leger, however, believes that this deity is a god, not of fire, but of war [p. 235 f.]). According to A. Guagnini, the monastery of Perunu was built on the site of an idol of Perunu, which had been worshipped by the people of Novgorod.

'It represented a man holding . . . a stone, in form like a thunderbolt. In honour of the idol burned by day and night a fire of oak-wood' (*Sarm. Europ. Descrip.*, Spira, 1581, p. 83).

It is hard to know how Guagnini could have obtained this information. 'An oak of Perun' is mentioned in a Galician charter, A.D. 1302. The god Perun is mentioned by Nestor in his account of the treaties made between Greeks and Russians (*Chron.* 21, 31, etc.). He is, in all probability, referred to by Procopius:

'They considered one god, the creator of the lightning, to be the only lord of all things' (*ib.* 14).

The word 'Perun' is identical with the Czech word for 'thunderbolt'; it does not occur in Serbian or Bulgarian texts. Perun survives in folklore. In a Galician tale Pieron appears to a nobleman to the accompaniment of thunder and lightning (cf. Leger, p. 67 ff.). He is mentioned in the Slovak ballads collected by J. Kollar:

'The god Perom behind the clouds . . .
suddenly launched the thunderbolt'
(quoted by Leger, p. 60).

When the treaty with the Greeks was concluded (A.D. 945), Igor went up to the hill where there was an idol of Perun, but the Christians took their oath in the chapel of St. Elias. Among all Slavic people Elias appears as the saint of thunder and lightning, the master of wind and rain.

5. Agriculture, etc.—In the government of Kursku and of Voroneczu it is customary at the end of the harvest to leave a handful of twisted corn in the fields. This is known as 'twisting the beard of Elias,' sometimes as 'twisting the beard of Perun or Volos.' Volos, god of flocks, is mentioned, together with Perun, by Nestor in his account of the treaty of A.D. 971. In Russian folklore his place has been taken by St. Blaise, patron saint of herds. It has been maintained,

indeed, that the so-called god is derived from the Christian saint (cf. Leger, pp. 111-117; and G. Krek, in *Arch. für slav. Phil.* i. [1876] 134 ff.).

LITERATURE.—F. S. Krauss, *Volks Glaube und religiöse Brauch der Südslaven*, Münster, 1890; L. Leger, *La mythologie slave*, Paris, 1901; further literature is given in Leger, ch. i. 'Les Sources de la mythologie slave,' and *Intro.* pp. i-xix.

END WELSFORD.

NATURE (Tentonic).—From Cæsar we have the following statement:

'The Germans . . . acknowledge no gods but those which are objects of sight and by whose power they are apparently benefited, the sun, moon, fire. Of others they know nothing, even by report' (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 21).

This is so difficult to reconcile with the testimony of Tacitus and others that it has been thought (perhaps too hastily) that Cæsar entirely misunderstood the nature of Teutonic religion. Natural phenomena undoubtedly played some part in Teutonic cult.

'The inhabitants of Thule [i.e. Scandinavia] worship many gods and "daemons," in heaven and air, earth and sea, and other "daemons" who are said to be in the waters of wells and rivers' (Procopius, *de Bell. Goth.* ii. 15).

From Canute's Anglo-Saxon Laws we learn that 'heathenship is to honour heathen gods, and sun or moon, fire or floods, wells or stones or trees of any kind' (cf. B. Thorpe, *Ancient Laws and Institutes of England*, London, 1840, p. 162).

1. **Heavenly bodies.**—In Germany prohibitions of observance connected with the sun or moon are found in early Christian sermons or penitentiaries. The Decrees of Burchard of Worms († 1024) mention pagan traditions, 'id est nt elementa coleres, id est lunam aut solem aut stellarum cursum' (*PL* cxi. 960). In the Merseburg charm Sunna is mentioned along with Wodan and Frāa. Bede (*de Temporum Ratione*, 15) mentions two Anglo-Saxon goddesses, Hreda and Eostur, after whom the months of March and April were named. We know nothing further of these deities. The word Eostur is connected with Lat. Aurora, Gr. Ἡώς, Skr. Uṣās, Lith. Auszra, all of which denote personification of the dawn. Lith. Auszrine, morning-star, is derived from Auszra. Sun and moon, day and night, are personified in the O. Norse poems of the older Edda. Snorri counts Sol as one of the Asynjur (i.e. goddesses). See art. SUN, MOON, AND STARS (Teutonic).

2. **Fire.**—Our only evidence for actual fire-worship (besides the disputed passage from Cæsar) comes from the passage from Canute's Anglo-Saxon Laws which has already been given. Fire undoubtedly was of some importance in religious ritual. In Scandinavia there are some instances of a claim to property being established by carrying fire round it (cf. *Landnámabók*, v. 3; *Erbyggja Saga*, 1-7) or shooting the fire-arrow towards it (*Landn.* iii. 8). In the temple of the Iclander Thorgrim there 'was always to be fire, which should never go out; they called that consecrated fire' (*Islendinga Sögur*, i.). In *Gylfaginning* and the Edda poems a being called Surtr is spoken of as the watchman of MnsPELLHEIM, the world of fire. He has a flaming sword and will burn up everything at the end of the world. It has been suggested that Surtr is a volcano-god of Icelandic origin (cf. B. S. Phillpotts, in *Arkiv för nord. Filol.* xvii. [1905] 14 ff.).

3. **Thunder.**—Our knowledge of the cult and attributes of the Tentonic thunder-god is derived almost exclusively from Scandinavian sources. In England traces of his cult are probably preserved in place-names such as Thundersley, Thundersfield. 'Latona Jovis mater' is translated 'Thnnres moðr' in Anglo-Saxon (Grimm, *Teut. Mythology*, p. 189). In Germany there are a number of place-names compounded with 'Donner' (*ib.* p. 170). Thuner appears with Wodan and Saxnot in the O. Saxon renunciation formula. Latin 'Jovis

dies' is translated by O.E. Thunoresdaeg, O.H. Germ. Donarestag, O.N. Þórsdagr. The name of the Scandinavian god Thor is identical with the word for thunder employed by all Tentonic peoples, but in Iceland the word went out of use, and, consequently, in O. Norse and Icelandic literature Thor's connexion with the elements is almost forgotten—except perhaps in Snorri's account of the duel with Hrungnir:

'Afterwards he saw flashes of lightning and heard great thunder-claps; and then he saw Thor in his divine wrath' (*Skáldskaparmál*, p. 104).

In Denmark and Sweden, on the other hand, Thor was always remembered as a nature-god.

'Thor who is thunder and lightning presides in the air; he rules over winds and rain, fair weather, and fruitful seasons' (Adam of Bremen, *Gesta Hammaburg.* iv. 26).

He survives in Swedish folklore as the opponent of trolls and giants, waging war on them by means of thunder and lightning (cf. Craigie, *Scand. Folk-lore*, p. 17). In Gothland thunder is known as Thorsaka ('the driving of Thor'). Thor is represented as the son of Óðin. His mother is called sometimes Jorð (Earth) and sometimes Fjörgynn, which is probably a derivative from Idj *perkuns, 'an oak.' It is probable that the thunder-god of the Teutons, like that of other European peoples, was originally associated with the oak. St. Boniface cut down a large tree at Geismar in Hesse which the pagans called 'robnr Jovis.'

4. **Trees, groves, etc.**—We have numerous references to Teutonic 'groves grim with ancient rites, and oaks resembling a barbaric divinity' (Claudian, *de Laudib. Stilich.* i. 229-231). In most cases the grove was simply a sanctuary revered as the haunt of a deity, but sometimes it was in itself the object of devotion. The Iclander Thorir 'worshipped the grove.' Often the sacred spring is associated with the sacred tree.

Near the Swedish temple at Upsala there was 'a huge tree with wide-spreading branches, always green winter and summer . . . there was also a fountain, where the pagans were wont to make sacrifices and to throw in a living man' (Adam of Bremen, *lv.* 26, *schol.* 134).

This type of tree-sanctuary seems to have given rise to the conception of the universal, three-rooted tree, the Yggdrasil's ash, of Northern mythology. Under the root which belongs to the Æsir (i.e. the gods) is Urðarbrunnr. Every day the Norns sprinkle Yggdrasil's ash with water from this spring, so that the tree never withers or decays, but 'stands ever-green over the spring of fate' (*Völuspá*, 19). The link between the tree-sanctuary and the idea of the world-tree is perhaps to be found in the *Vördtröd*, the 'guardian-tree' which stands beside the homestead in many parts of Sweden, and was possibly regarded, at one time, as the abode of the guardian-spirit of the family. A marvellous tree called Lærnär stands beside Valhöll and may represent the guardian-tree of the divine community (cf. *Gylf.* p. 49; also Chadwick, in *JAI* xxx. 30).

5. **Water.**—Water-worship was very common among the Tentons. Procopius (ii. 25) states that the Franks who invaded Italy A.D. 539 threw the Gothic women and children into the Po as a sacrifice. The Anglo-Saxon penitentiary of Egbert imposes penance on those 'who bring alms to a fountain' (ii. 22, *ap.* Thorpe, p. 371). The canons of Edgar (16, *ap.* Thorpe, p. 396) also forbid well-worship. In *Landnámabók*, v. 5, we are told that Thorstein Redneb 'worshipped the waterfall.' Water was considered the abode of monstrous beings. Mimir inhabited the spring beneath one of the roots of Yggdrasil's ash. In Germany his memory survives in place-names (cf. Mogk, *Germanische Mythologie*, p. 305). In songs of Smaaland we hear of Mimesjö, and Mimesa, which flows from it, where a water-spirit has his

habitation. In *Völuspá* the waves are called 'sons of Mimir.' The waves are also called 'daughters of Ægir' (Mogk, p. 303). The latter appears to be a good-natured being associated with the sea. His name may be connected with Goth. *ahwa*, 'water.' His wife Ran, 'the unmannerly,' represents the sterner aspects of the ocean.

'Then the Æsir became aware that Ran possessed a net in which she caught all those men who came into the sea' (*Skaldsk.* p. 109). 'Then came a wave . . . and flung four men overboard . . . "Now is it likely," said Friðjof, "that some of our men will visit Ran . . . I think it right that every man should carry some gold with him . . . we will cut the red ring . . .

Before Ægir slays us
Gold shall he seen on the guests
In the middle of the hall of Ran
If we need night-quarters there'" (*Friðjof Saga*, vi.).

6. Mountains.—In the 6th cent. Agathias (*Hist.* i. 7) mentions 'hills' among various other objects of Alemannic worship. Thorolf Mostrarskegg, one of the first Icelandic settlers, had so great a reverence for the hill which he called Helgafell that 'he enjoined that no man should look upon it unwashed . . . and nothing was to be destroyed there' (*Landn.* ii. 12).

7. Earth.—For the Teutonic worship of the earth-deity our chief information comes from Tacitus (*Germ.* 40). From him we learn that certain maritime tribes had a common worship of Nerthus, 'id est, terra mater.' In Scandinavian mythology the name of the god Njörðr is identical with that of Nerthus, but there has been a change of sex and function. Njörðr rules over winds and calms the sea and fire (*Gylf.* p. 31 f.). The cult of Nerthus seems to have been inherited by Frey, the son of Njörðr, who was closely connected with Upsala, the famous Swedish sanctuary. We also hear of a goddess Freyja, who seems to be a female counterpart of Frey, who is represented as her brother, and of a corresponding Danish deity, Gefion, who created the island of Sjælland by her four-ox plough. In an Anglo-Saxon charm for fruitfulness invocation is made to 'Erce, erce, erce eorðan moðr.' For the phrase 'eorðan moðr' we have an exact parallel in Lettish 'Semmesmāte,' mother of earth (cf. Chadwick, *Orig. of Eng. Nation*, ch. x.). The Anglo-Saxon legend of Scyld Scefing is probably to be derived from agricultural ceremonies (*ib.* p. 274 ff.). The well-known Scandinavian story of the death of Balder probably originated from certain rites of the type made so familiar to us by J. G. Frazer in *The Golden Bough*.

The preamble to the Icelandic code of laws (A.D. 927) provided that seafarers were to take down the figure-heads from their ships before arriving in sight of Iceland, and not sail up to the land 'with gaping heads and yawning snouts lest the *land-vættir* should take fright thereat.' The belief in *land-vættir*, the spirits of the soil, seems to have been a development peculiar to Icelandic religion, and to have been a very real factor in the life of the people. The Icelandic Egil Skallagrímsson believed that Norway also had its *land-vættir*, and by means of threats he tried to turn them against his enemy King Eric Blood-axe.

'He turned the horse's head so that it pointed towards the land. "I turn this curse on the *land-vættir* who dwell in this country, so that they shall all go astray, and no one of them shall find his home'" (*Egilskallagrímsson Saga*, 60).

8. Animals.—According to Gregory of Tours (*Hist. Franc.* ii. 10), the Franks worshipped birds and beasts. In the Life of St. Barbatius († 683) there are references to the snake-worship of the Lombards. There are several allusions to animal-worship in the sagas.

'Freyfaxi [a horse] . . . was owned by a man named Brandr, who is said to have worshipped it' (Grimm, p. 656). 'Ográid was a king and a mighty warrior, who made great sacrifices to a certain cow, and had her with him wherever he went' (*Saga of Olaf Trygvason*, 71).

9. Winds and other natural phenomena.—'Whence comes wind?' asks Gangleri (*Gylf.* p. 26). Hárr replies,

'He is called Corpse-swallower
Who sits at the end of Heaven
A "Jotun" in eagle's form,
From his wings
Wind is said to come
Over all mankind.'

The storm-winds howling through the forest were often thought to be the souls of the dead riding out on the Wild Hunt. In parts of Scandinavia and Germany this host is attributed to the god Wodan-Oðin (cf. Mogk, p. 337 ff.). It is chiefly due to this fact that Oðin is so often described as a wind-god. We hear, however, of other leaders of the 'raging army,' Holda, Perchta, Dietrich von Bern, etc. Oðin's connexion with the Wild Hunt is probably quite secondary, and due to the fact that he was already worshipped as god of the dead.

Other mythological beings such as the god Heimdallr and his opponent Loki are sometimes (but with insufficient evidence) regarded as personifications of natural phenomena. In Scandinavian literature the earthquake is explained as the quivering of Loki when the poison drops fall on him (cf. *Gylf.* p. 80). The Jötunn (=A.S. *eotenas*) may be, in origin at least, nature-'daemons.' This is suggested by the occurrence in Scandinavian mythology of the great wolf Fenris, and Miðgarðsormr, the world-snake, and the *himpursar*, the frost-giants who had such good reason to fear Thor's hammer. The name of the Jötunn Thrymr (who was killed by Thor for stealing his hammer) is connected with *pruma*, the O. Norse word for 'thunder-clap.' In this case we seem to have rival personifications of the same element.

LITERATURE.—Cæsar, *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 21; Tacitus, *Germania*; Procopius, *de Bell. Goth.* ii. 15; Gregory of Tours, *Hist. Francorum* (MGH, 'Script. Meroving.' i. (1884)); Adam of Bremen, *Gesta Hammaburgensis Ecclesie pontificum* (MGH, 'Script.' vii. 267 ff.); Saxo Grammaticus, *Hist. Danica*, i.-ix., tr. O. Elton and F. Y. Powell, London, 1894; the poems of the older Edda, especially *Völuspá*, *Yafprudnismál*, *Grimnismál*, ed. K. Hildebrand and H. Gering, Paderborn, 1912; Snorri Sturluson, *Gylfaginning*, *Skáldskaparmál* (*Die prosaische Edda*, ed. E. Wilken, Paderborn, 1912); *Landnámabók* ('The Book of the Settlement of Iceland'), tr. T. Ellwood, Kendal, 1898; *Kyrbýggja Saga*; *Flateyjarbók*; J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. B. Stallybrass, Oxford, 1882-88; E. Mogk, *Germanische Mythologie* 2 (Paul's *Grundriss der germ. Phil.* iii. x.), Strassburg, 1907; A. Orlík, *Nordisches Geistesleben*, Heidelberg, 1908; W. A. Craigie, *Scandinavian Folk-lore*, London, 1896; H. M. Chadwick, *Origin of the English Nation*, Cambridge, 1907, ch. x. i., and 'The Oak and the Thunder-god,' in *JAI* xxx. [1900] 22 ff. For further literature see Mogk, and P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, *The Religion of the Teutons*, tr. B. J. Vos, Boston, 1902, pp. 418-463.

ENID WELSFORD.

NATURISM.—See ANIMISM.

NAVAHO. — 1. Introduction. — The Navaho belong linguistically to the Athapaskan stock, one of the largest and most widely distributed of the linguistic families of N. America. The great interior of the northern portion of the continent is occupied by this stock, where they are to be found in the valleys of the Mackenzie and Yukon Rivers and in the interior of British Columbia. This northern division has been discussed under the name Déné (*q.v.*). A second division occupies the coast and western portions of southern Oregon and northern California. These in part have been treated under the name Hupa (*q.v.*), one of the best known Athapaskan tribes of this region.

In the south, besides the Navaho, there are several tribes, generally called Apache (*q.v.*), which are closely connected with the Navaho in language and, in large measure, in religion also. These Apache tribes are: the Mescalero, who live in the more elevated region between the Rio Grande and Rio Pecos in eastern New Mexico; the

Jicarilla, consisting of two bands formerly living on either side of the Rio Grande in northern New Mexico; and, in western New Mexico and eastern Arizona south of the high plateau, several Apache tribes, similar in culture, which will be referred to in this article as the Western Apache. The Navaho themselves live in a vast high plateau between the Little Colorado and San Juan Rivers in northern Arizona and north-western New Mexico. There are 30,000 or more of these pastoral semi-agricultural people in this district, who have for the most part been little influenced by the religion of the Europeans.

Between these Athapascan-speaking peoples of the south, the Navaho and Apache, and their linguistic relatives of the north, represented by the Déné and the Hupa, there seems to be no more connexion in religious observance and mythology than exists between other linguistically unrelated N. American tribes. In a general way the Navaho religion is similar to that practised by their neighbours occupying the Pueblo villages of the Rio Grande valley and the Hopi *mesas*. It is true, however, that the Navaho and Apache have a well-developed cycle of myths and a belief in a number of gods with personal names not shared, as far as is known, by any other people.

2. *Mythology.*—The creation-myth recognizes a series of worlds imposed one above the other. A pre-existing race was driven from the lower world by floods. According to the Navaho version, they escaped to this world by means of hollow reeds which grew miraculously until they reached the sky of the lower world, the surface of this one. With these animal-like men came the gods who have human form. As a result of sexual misbehaviour there were born a number of man-eating monsters, who preyed upon the people until only one woman was left, *Estsanatlehi*. Lying exposed, she conceived by the rays of the rising sun, and gave birth to a daughter. This daughter, after falling to secure conception in this manner, succeeded when she lay under a waterfall. Her child, sired by the water, was a boy, the culture hero *Naiyenesgani*. In some versions *Naiyenesgani* is the son, not the grandson, of the sun and *Estsanatlehi*, and has a 'brother,' according to the native terms, his mother's sister's son, born of water. The boys (or the boy, according to the version), coming to manhood in a few days' time, go on a long and difficult journey to the home of the sun in the east. They are given directions for this journey by Spider Woman, whom they encounter on the way. Arrived at the house of the sun, they are subjected to certain tests and are then given a sweat-bath, during which they are moulded into finished human shape so that in form they are indistinguishable from the sun himself. Being supplied by the sun with weapons with which to slay the monsters, they return to earth on a streak of lightning and set about their mission. One by one the monsters are overcome, a trophy being taken in each case. Incidentally there occurs a discussion of the old problem of the presence of good and evil in the world, since certain semi-evils—old age, poverty, and cold—were allowed a continued existence on certain conditions. After the task of ridding the world of evil had been completed, the culture-hero went to live at the mouth of the San Juan river and *Estsanatlehi* to the western ocean, where she receives the sun as he sets.

Men themselves were created in various ways. According to the Navaho, the gods placed ears of corn of various colours between blankets, which, animated by the wind, became boys and girls. These, considered relatives, married other semi-divine couples. People were also produced by *Estsanatlehi* by rubbing cuticle from her side. The origins of agriculture, of the clan organizations, and of the various ceremonies are explained by separate myths, which frequently relate the experiences of certain individual men.

Agriculture was introduced by a young man so devoted to, and uniformly unfortunate in, gambling that his relatives were on the point of killing him. With the help of the gods he floated down a large river in a hollow log, escaping many dangers by the way. His pet turkey had followed, and, hearing a desire for something to plant, spread its wings and shook out seed-corn of the various colours. This corn, together with tobacco and melons, was planted on a flat by the river, where it matured with miraculous rapidity. The young man found and married the daughter of Deer Raiser, who gave his daughter as her marriage-portion the game animals which until this time had been kept in enclosures. Most of the ceremonies are believed to have been obtained from the anthropomorphic gods, who live in the cliff-ruins and the mountains. Some man in dire need is taken to the homes of the gods and taught the songs, prayers, and dances of the ceremony. Being relieved himself, he is hidden to return to his fellow-men and teach them what he has learned.

3. *Religious ceremonies.*—The Apache, and in all probability the Navaho, hold adolescent cere-

monies for maturing girls. The girl during the time is called *Estsanatlehi*. While she dances, songs are sung for her during four nights. The ceremony is concluded on the morning of the fourth night with a race by the girl and the painting of the girl and the spectators with white earth. The songs sung are those of *Naiyenesgani*, which he obtained of the sun when he was given the sweat-bath. During the nightly ceremonies for the girl masked men representing the anthropomorphic gods come in procession and dance. A special series of songs connected with their cult is sung for them.

There are healing ceremonies of various sorts which, among the Navaho, take place in a specially built house. Masked men representing the various gods participate in the ceremony. The songs of the two kinds mentioned above are sung and many prayers are recited. The final night, usually the tenth of the ceremony, is given over to a public spectacle during which much amusement is furnished by clowns.

One of the striking features of Navaho ceremonies is the use of dry paintings. Under the direction of the priest in charge, large and elaborate pictures are made on the floor of the lodges by sprinkling down dry pigments. These pictures usually represent scenes taken from the myths, which also furnish the themes of the songs. The use of pollen is also noteworthy. It is sprinkled as the accompaniment of prayer, and is used to mark out trails and indicate boundaries.

The religion of the Navaho and Apache, like that of the Hopi, is largely conditioned by æsthetic motives. The arrangement of the parts of the songs and of their sequence in groups is according to a numerical rhythm. The songs and prayers are filled with imagery and refer constantly to the four world-quarters with which are associated colours, certain semi-precious stones, and definitely named gods.

The major ceremonies of the Navaho and Apache are held under the direction of individual priests who by long study have acquired the ritual, which may include a hundred or more songs, many prayers, numerous and elaborate dry paintings, and various detailed items of knowledge. This information is most frequently, but not necessarily, obtained from an older relative. Many individuals have charms or fetishes which ward off evil or give good luck in hunting and the raising of their flocks and herds. The ceremonies connected with agriculture are but little known.

4. *Objects of worship.*—The religion of the south-west is of great interest, rivaling in its complexity that of the Plains and north-west coast of N. America. From the myths, songs, prayers, and other sources of information it appears that natural objects are of supreme importance in Navaho and Apache religion. The sun, the moon, dawn, sunbeams, rainbows, lightning, the four world-quarters; wind, and the all-pervading darkness are all mentioned and invoked as powerful agents concerned in human affairs. Besides these are the gods of human form, the *gan* of the Apache, the *yai* of the Navaho, immortals who live in hollow mountains or in the cliff-ruins. They join with men in their ceremonies, particularly those of healing, which they have themselves provided as a cure for human ills. These anthropomorphic gods are by some believed to be the ghosts of ancestors, although the Indians themselves look upon them as a separate race who preceded men upon the earth. Various animals are also objects of worship. The bear is generally associated with healing and the panther with hunting. Of the tabus that which prevents the eating of fish is the most important.

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P. E. GODDARD.

NAYARS.—1. Introduction.—The habitat of the Nāyars ('Narā' of Pliny) is the extreme south-western littoral of the Indian peninsula between Cape Comorin and Point Dely, 16 miles north of Cannanore, a strip of beautiful thickly wooded country from 20 to 60 miles in width, flat only near the sea—where is a chain of lagoons—and in the rice-fields. This portion of the Madras Presidency is known as Malabar, divided politically between the Malabar District of British India and the native States Cochin and Travancore—in all about 11,000 square miles.¹ The incidence of population is, in parts, higher than it is in Belgium. In its peoples, history, customs, land-tenures, and ordinary ways of life Malabar is unlike the rest of India. The architectural style of the mosques and temples is curiously like that of Nepāl; the forms of jewellery resemble those of Sind. The very origin of Malabar is the subject of myth. Parasurāma, wishing to create a new land for the re-establishment of *dharma*, is said to have raised it from the sea from where he stood, at Cape Comorin, to as far as he could fling his axe. The land which emerged from the sea was the ancient Kērala, its old and well-loved name. Protected by its physical barriers, the high western Ghāts, Malabar has survived apart from the turmoil which has changed the face of India, the home of rigid conservatism in customs, beliefs, and practices. It is a miniature world. Highest of the Hindus are the Nambūtiri Brāhmins, purest of the Vedic stock and faith, sacerdotal, aristocratic, rich; lowest are jungle folk having a nasal index of nearly 100², guided by the crudest animistic ideas.³ Below the Nambūtiris are the Nāyars, and in a descending scale is a variety of peoples in different conditions of culture.

The orthodox view of the Nambūtiri Brāhman is thus stated in an official document of Travancore:

'His person is holy; his directions are commands; his movements are a procession; his meal is nectar; he is the holiest of human beings; he is the representative of God on earth.'

2. Inheritance, marriage laws, etc.—Descent among the Nambūtiris is patrilineal. Eldest sons alone inary; their sons inherit the family property. Younger sons are authorized to mate organically with Nāyar women. In the cases of the royal houses of Travancore and Cochin and families of lesser chiefs and people of importance, the fathers are always Nambūtiris. The Nāyars are divided into clans which are mostly but not entirely exogamous. By a rule, infringement of which is never condoned, a Nāyar woman is allowed to associate intimately with a man of her own clan or of a superior clan, or with a Nambūtiri, but never with one of an inferior clan or caste. The former practice is known as *anulōman*, 'following the hair.' Its converse, *prātīlōman*, 'going against the hair' (or 'grain'), brings complete social degradation. The restrictions placed upon Nāyar men are well expressed in the *Lusiad*:

'The haughty nobles and the vulgar race
Never must join the conjugal embrace'
(tr. W. J. Mickle, London, 1793, bk. vii. p. 156).

Mother-right obtains. A man's sister's sons, not his own sons, are the heirs. As a rule, the woman remains in her own *tarawād* ('household'), where she is visited by her husband. She may visit him,

¹ Hills and forests where no Nāyars live excluded.

² On the fringe of Hinduism, but not, strictly speaking, Hindus by caste.

or he may visit her for a period, but she never joins her husband's *tarawād*; she brings up her children, who are members of her *tarawād*, in her household. The eldest male—the *karanavan*, as he is called—conducts the entire management of the *tarawād* property. Nāyar girls without exception observe certain formalities before entering upon the marriage state. Chief of these is the *tālī-kettukalayānam* ('marriage-token-tying-ceremony'), obligatory before attainment of puberty. A boy whose horoscope is in agreement with the girl's is usually the bridegroom for the occasion—which, however, confers upon him no prescriptive right to her person.

'A cloth is severed into two parts and each part is given to the *mana valen* (bridegroom) and the girl separately; symbollo of divorce (*Report of the Malabar Marriage Commission*, Madras, 1891, p. 15).

Subsequently, under formal family consent she forms an alliance which constitutes marriage. While the Nambūtiris' marital arrangements are governed exclusively by considerations of property, those of the Nāyars are not. Position, pride of family, and the like naturally exert influence, but the Nāyar marriage involves no transference of family property. It is never mercenary.

The Nāyars were the military element. Thus in the *Lusiad* we read:

'By the proud Nāyres the noble rank is claimed;
The toils of culture and of art they scorn,
The warrior's plumes their haughty brows adorn;
The shining faulchion brandished in the right,
Their left arm wields the target in the fight,
Of danger scornful, ever armed they stand
Around the King, a stern barbarian band'

(bk. vii. p. 156).

Now, while the Nāyar no longer knocks the hilt of his sword against his shield as he walks along his shaded lanes to warn low-caste people to wait at a distance until he passes by, lest their proximity should pollute him, he is almost as careful to prevent pollution from whatever source, for personal purity, cleanliness, is an essential of his religion. Pollution is conveyed by a person of inferior caste approaching a Nāyar within a prescribed number of paces as well as by the slightest contact, and the Nāyar is especially careful to permit no violation of this social rule when, having bathed and donned clean clothes, he returns home after his devotions in the temple. Bathing before eating is imperative.

3. Religion.—The Nāyars are Hindus; their religion is therefore Hinduism. But, as a Travancore Hindu observes,

'Hinduism is a very comprehensive term, and has many shades and degrees of varying hues in it, ranging from Brāhmanism, the highest and purest and most philosophical form of Theism, and the fetish worship of the aboriginal castes. . . . It has in its course of evolution from nature-worship to its present form passed through various phases, has come in contact with all the other religions of the world and has imbibed something from all. It is, in fact, "all tolerant, all compliant, all comprehensive, all absorbing." Hence it has been found difficult to exactly define what Hinduism means' (V. Nagam Aiyar, *Travancore State Manual*, II. 29, 42).

Undoubtedly the belief in the transmigration of souls as caused by the law of *karma* is its most distinguishing feature.

"As we sow, so shall we reap." So long as this doctrine is the basis of a Hindu's belief, it is a safe guide inciting him to do good and deterring him from evil. Every moment of his daily existence the pious Hindu is reminded of the law of Karma, that "every deed in his life . . . leads to its legitimate results in one's future life, whether it be in another world or in another existence in this world." Self-righteousness lies at the root of Hindu religious belief, and no man is counted righteous except through his works, acts and thoughts' (ib. p. 103).

Self-realization, self-mastery, control of the mind are the ideal.

'As all action, right or wrong, proceeds from desire, and as desire springs from the mind, the mastery of one's mind and habit to which uncontrolled mental activity makes a man a slave, constitutes true worship; and all rights and ceremonials

are either preparations for or applications of that mastery' (N. Subramanya Aiyar, *Census of India, 1911*, vol. xxiii. pt. i. p. 199).

The use and purpose of sacred images are well described by the same writer :

'Although in the anxiety to exonerate themselves from the charge of venerating what is in substance a piece of stone or metal, apologists have not been wanting to explain away these *Vigrahas* as mere symbolic representations to catch the popular mind or, at most, mechanical aids to concentration, the fact remains that according to Hindu Scriptural texts and to the belief of the great mass of worshippers, the image is a living Divine presence. The basic theory of image-worship as far as one is able to make out from enquiry and research, is that, in the image, a particular power among the various Powers or Gods provided in the scheme of cosmic order . . . is embodied, and placed . . . within reach of those who may not have the power to dive into the occult but none the less real world' (ib. p. 201).

Throughout S. India to the east of the Western Ghats, Hinduism in its varied aspects is conspicuously sectarian, followers of even the same sect often exhibiting active and bitter hatred of each other in their quarrels concerning unimportant details of ceremonial. Worship by a votary of Siva in a Viṣṇu temple would be unthinkable. But in 'the Land of charity,' a name by which Malabar is known, it is quite otherwise. Sectarianism is unknown. Viṣṇu and Siva are little more than mere names. Whether Bhagavati is male or female no one knows or cares. An *avatār* of Viṣṇu may be found in the list of evil spirits acting under control by a magician. This local non-sectarian character of Hinduism is, probably, largely due to the influence of the great philosophical religious teacher, Sankarāchārya, expounder of the Vedānta, who is held in special veneration by the Nambūtiris and by the Nāyars. Himself a Nambūtiri Brāhman, he was born, as most scholars now agree, in N. Travancore in A.D. 788.

'He preached the universal doctrine that all created things, animal, vegetable and mineral, are manifestations of a supreme, eternal, unchanging and impersonal Spirit, Brāhman, through Māya and openly proclaimed the absence of difference between Viṣṇu and Siva, laying down sectarian neutrality as an inviolable law for Kērala' (N. S. Aiyar, *Census of India, 1901*, xxvi. [Trivandrum, 1903], pt. i. p. 101).

Another name for Malabar was 'Karmabhūmi,' the significance of which is given as follows :

'The spiritual salvation of the inhabitants of this land depends on good actions, as contrasted with the East Coast . . . where a man obtains salvation by mere birth irrespective of his actions, as the land itself is consecrated ground' (V. N. Aiyar, i. 1).

But, while the lofty ideas of the Vedānta philosophy inspire, more or less, the Nambūtiri in almost every moment of his life, they do not in the same degree of completeness represent the religious ideas of the Nāyar, who is far more deeply imbued by the lower, the magico-religions, cult. In the case of the Nāyar the serpent is an object of regular worship.

'A serpent Kavu (shrine) or an abode of snakes is an indispensable adjunct to every Nāyar house' (ib. ii. 59).

A Nāyar house, even of the very poorest class, is always detached, in its own well-shaded garden. Around the shrine the trees and shrubs are untouched by the axe. Images are placed, and, in addition to periodical ceremonies, offerings are made 'there in propitiation of the serpent gods' (ib. ii. 61).

The myths and legends relating to serpents are innumerable. In addition to the serpent, Adīśṣha, who supports the earth and is the bed of Mahā Viṣṇu, the cow, giver of all things, the bull, a vehicle of Siva, and the Brāhmany kite, a vehicle of Viṣṇu, are held sacred. Sacred trees are: *asvatta* (*Ficus religiosa*), circumambulated by women desiring children, and by men to avert the evil influence of Saturn under which every man suffers during some period of his life; its twigs are indispensable in all sacrificial offerings to the gods; *bilva* (*Aegle marmelos*), sacred to Siva; *tulasī* (*Ocimum sanctum*), to Viṣṇu. 'The worship of animals and plants

is not outside the cult of the most Sāstric Hindu' (N. S. Aiyar, p. 99). There is 'no clear line . . . between the Animists and the Hindus' (V. N. Aiyar, ii. 39), and it is to the many minor deities, serpent and other, and the more notorious spirits of mischief and evil that the Nāyar offers most of his devotion. This may be called the land of magic; for magic in all its bearings—witchcraft, divination, oracular demonstrations, and so on—is an actuality of life. Every Nāyar wears on his person from childhood at least one amulet and more often several amulets, each one consisting of a magic formula or a figure enclosed in a golden case. Expression of religious feeling is seen in ceremonies, notably those concerned with birth and death, and during religious festivals. After the seventh month of pregnancy the Nāyar woman bathes and worships in the temple every morning, and before her morning meal she eats a small quantity of butter over which holy *mantras* ('charms') have been muttered by priests. Personal ceremonies, ante-natal, during childhood—such as naming a child, boring its ears, and so on—and throughout life, are numerous. When death is at hand, before the breath leaves the body each member of the household, one by one, pours into the mouth of the dying man a few drops of water from a little cup formed of leaves of the *tulasī*, holding in the hand a piece of gold over which the water runs. A light is kept burning day and night, and near it a large measure of unhusked rice and a small quantity of husked rice, while one member of the *taravād* holds the head of the dead in his lap, the body lying on plantain leaves, as relatives enter to bid farewell. As conducive to the happiness of the dead, cremation takes place without delay. The body is washed, anointed, and covered with new cloths, and, as it is being carried to the pyre—always to the south—the senior male present tears from one of the cloths upon the body a piece, which he fastens round his waist; and he holds in his hand, or sticks in his waist, a piece of iron. He is the chief mourner. The corpse is laid head to the south, and on the fuel, which, all or in part, must be wood of the mango tree, is placed a little camphor, sandal-wood, and *ghī* (clarified butter). No elder member of the *taravād* of either sex may be present. The deceased's younger brother or nephew lights the pyre at the head. The son may, at the same time, apply fire at the feet of the corpse. While it is being consumed, every member of the *taravād* bathes in the small pond which is in the garden of every Nāyar's house. The chief mourner carries a pot of water, pierced so that the water spills as he walks thrice round the pyre ere the corpse is consumed, and dashes the pot to the ground. A small image of the deceased is then made of raw rice, and rice and gingelly seeds are offered to it. Balls of food are offered daily during the following seven days, and at the end of this period all members of the *taravād* bathe together, the chief mourner having in his possession the strip of cloth and the piece of iron. During these seven days the deceased is represented by a piece of palm-leaf, knotted and placed upright in the ground. The essence of the food goes direct to the spirit of the deceased and appeases him. The piece of cloth and the piece of iron are tied to a pillar of the house nearest the palm-leaf. The food is scattered to crows or thrown into water. Death-pollution continues until the fourteenth day, when the calcined remains are carried in a pot to a river and thrown into it. Then follows more ceremonial bathing, and on the fifteenth day the purificatory ceremony takes place, releasing the members of the *taravād* from the ban of the death-pollution. Subsequently there are other ceremonies and the chief mourner remains un-

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P. E. GODDARD.

NAYARS.—1. Introduction.—The habitat of the Nāyars ('Narā' of Pliny) is the extreme south-western littoral of the Indian peninsula between Cape Comorin and Point Dely, 16 miles north of Cannanore, a strip of beautiful thickly-wooded country from 20 to 60 miles in width, flat only near the sea—where is a chain of lagoons—and in the rice-fields. This portion of the Madras Presidency is known as Malabar, divided politically between the Malabar District of British India and the native States Cochin and Travancore—in all about 11,000 square miles.¹ The incidence of population is, in parts, higher than it is in Belgium. In its peoples, history, customs, land-tenures, and ordinary ways of life Malabar is unlike the rest of India. The architectural style of the mosques and temples is curiously like that of Nēpāl; the forms of jewellery resemble those of Sind. The very origin of Malabar is the subject of myth. Parasurāma, wishing to create a new land for the re-establishment of *dharma*, is said to have raised it from the sea from where he stood, at Cape Comorin, to as far as he could fling his axe. The land which emerged from the sea was the ancient Kērala, its old and well-loved name. Protected by its physical barriers, the high western Ghāts, Malabar has survived apart from the turmoil which has changed the face of India, the home of rigid conservatism in customs, beliefs, and practices. It is a miniature world. Highest of the Hindus are the Nambūtiri Brāhmins, purest of the Vedic stock and faith, sacerdotal, aristocratic, rich; lowest are jungle folk having a nasal index of nearly 100°, guided by the crudest animistic ideas.² Below the Nambūtiris are the Nāyars, and in a descending scale is a variety of peoples in different conditions of culture.

The orthodox view of the Nambūtiri Brāhman is thus stated in an official document of Travancore:

'His person is holy; his directions are commands; his movements are a procession; his meal is nectar; he is the holiest of human beings; he is the representative of God on earth.'

2. Inheritance, marriage laws, etc.—Descent among the Nambūtiris is patrilineal. Eldest sons alone marry; their sons inherit the family property. Younger sons are authorized to mate organically with Nāyar women. In the cases of the royal houses of Travancore and Cochin and families of lesser chiefs and people of importance, the fathers are always Nambūtiris. The Nāyars are divided into clans which are mostly but not entirely exogamous. By a rule, infringement of which is never condoned, a Nāyar woman is allowed to associate intimately with a man of her own clan or of a superior clan, or with a Nambūtiri, but never with one of an inferior clan or caste. The former practice is known as *anulōman*, 'following the hair.' Its converse, *prātīlōman*, 'going against the hair' (or 'grain'), brings complete social degradation. The restrictions placed upon Nāyar men are well expressed in the *Lusiad*:

'The haughty nobles and the vulgar race
Never must join the conjugal embrace'
(tr. W. J. Mickle, London, 1793, bk. vii. p. 156).

Mother-right obtains. A man's sister's sons, not his own sons, are the heirs. As a rule, the woman remains in her own *tarawād* ('household'), where she is visited by her husband. She may visit him,

¹ Hills and forests where no Nāyars live excluded.

² On the fringe of Hinduism, but not, strictly speaking, Hindus by caste.

or he may visit her for a period, but she never joins her husband's *tarawād*; she brings up her children, who are members of her *tarawād*, in her household. The eldest male—the *karanavan*, as he is called—conducts the entire management of the *tarawād* property. Nāyar girls without exception observe certain formalities before entering upon the marriage state. Chief of these is the *tāli-kettu-kalayānam* ('marriage-token-tying-ceremony'), obligatory before attainment of puberty. A boy whose horoscope is in agreement with the girl's is usually the bridegroom for the occasion—which, however, confers upon him no prescriptive right to her person.

'A cloth is severed into two parts and each part is given to the *mana valen* (bridegroom) and the girl separately,' symbolic of divorce (*Report of the Malabar Marriage Commission*, Madras, 1891, p. 15).

Subsequently, under formal family consent she forms an alliance which constitutes marriage. While the Nambūtiris' marital arrangements are governed exclusively by considerations of property, those of the Nāyars are not. Position, pride of family, and the like naturally exert influence, but the Nāyar marriage involves no transference of family property. It is never mercenary.

The Nāyars were the military element. Thus in the *Lusiad* we read:

'By the proud Nāyres the noble rank is claimed;
The toils of culture and of art they scorn,
The warrior's plumes their haughty brows adorn;
The shining faulchion brandished in the right,
Their left arm wields the target in the fight,
Of danger scornful, ever armed they stand
Around the King, a stern barbarian band'
(bk. vii. p. 156).

Now, while the Nāyar no longer knocks the hilt of his sword against his shield as he walks along his shaded lanes to warn low-caste people to wait at a distance until he passes by, lest their proximity should pollute him, he is almost as careful to prevent pollution from whatever source, for personal purity, cleanliness, is an essential of his religion. Pollution is conveyed by a person of inferior caste approaching a Nāyar within a prescribed number of paces as well as by the slightest contact, and the Nāyar is especially careful to permit no violation of this social rule when, having bathed and donned clean clothes, he returns home after his devotions in the temple. Bathing before eating is imperative.

3. Religion.—The Nāyars are Hindus; their religion is therefore Hinduism. But, as a Travancore Hindu observes,

'Hinduism is a very comprehensive term, and has many shades and degrees of varying hues in it, ranging from Brāhmanism, the highest and purest and most philosophical form of Theism, and the fetish worship of the aboriginal castes. . . . It has in its course of evolution from nature-worship to its present form passed through various phases, has come in contact with all the other religions of the world and has imbibed something from all. It is, in fact, "all tolerant, all compliant, all comprehensive, all absorbing." Hence it has been found difficult to exactly define what Hinduism means' (V. Nagam Aiyar, *Travancore State Manual*, ii. 39, 42).

Undoubtedly the belief in the transmigration of souls as caused by the law of *karma* is its most distinguishing feature.

'"As we sow, so shall we reap." So long as this doctrine is the basis of a Hindu's belief, it is a safe guide inclining him to do good and deterring him from evil. Every moment of his daily existence the pious Hindu is reminded of the law of Karma, that "every deed in his life . . . leads to its legitimate results in one's future life, whether it be in another world or in another existence in this world." Self-righteousness lies at the root of Hindu religious belief, and no man is counted righteous except through his works, acts and thoughts' (ib. p. 103).

Self-realization, self-mastery, control of the mind are the ideal.

'As all action, right or wrong, proceeds from desire, and as desire springs from the mind, the mastery of one's mind and habit to which uncontrolled mental activity makes a man a slave, constitutes true worship; and all rights and ceremonials

are either preparations for or applications of that mastery' (N. Subramanya Aiyar, *Census of India, 1911*, vol. xxiii. pt. i. p. 199).

The use and purpose of sacred images are well described by the same writer:

'Although in the anxiety to exonerate themselves from the charge of venerating what is in substance a piece of stone or metal, apologists have not been wanting to explain away these *Vigrahas* as mere symbolic representations to catch the popular mind or, at most, mechanical aids to concentration, the fact remains that according to Hindu Scriptural texts and to the belief of the great mass of worshippers, the image is a living Divine presence. The basic theory of image-worship as far as one is able to make out from enquiry and research, is that, in the image, a particular power among the various Powers or Gods provided in the scheme of cosmic order . . . is embodied, and placed . . . within reach of those who may not have the power to dive into the occult hut none the less real world' (ib. p. 201).

Throughout S. India to the east of the Western Ghats, Hinduism in its varied aspects is conspicuously sectarian, followers of even the same sect often exhibiting active and bitter hatred of each other in their quarrels concerning unimportant details of ceremonial. Worship by a votary of Siva in a Viṣṇu temple would be unthinkable. But in 'the Land of charity,' a name by which Malabar is known, it is quite otherwise. Sectarianism is unknown. Viṣṇu and Siva are little more than mere names. Whether Bhagavatī is male or female no one knows or cares. An *avatār* of Viṣṇu may be found in the list of evil spirits acting under control by a magician. This local non-sectarian character of Hinduism is, probably, largely due to the influence of the great philosophical religious teacher, Śaṅkarācārya, expounder of the Vedānta, who is held in special veneration by the Nambūtiris and by the Nāyars. Himself a Nambūtiri Brāhman, he was born, as most scholars now agree, in N. Travancore in A.D. 788.

'He preached the universal doctrine that all created things, animal, vegetable and mineral, are manifestations of a supreme, eternal, unchanging and impersonal Spirit, Brāhman, through Māyā and openly proclaimed the absence of difference between Viṣṇu and Siva, laying down sectarian neutrality as an inviolable law for Kēraḷa' (N. S. Aiyar, *Census of India, 1901*, xxvi. [Trivandrum, 1903], pt. i. p. 101).

Another name for Malabar was 'Karmabhūmi,' the significance of which is given as follows:

'The spiritual salvation of the inhabitants of this land depends on good actions, as contrasted with the East Coast . . . where a man obtains salvation by mere birth irrespective of his actions, as the land itself is consecrated ground' (V. N. Aiyar, i. 1).

But, while the lofty ideas of the Vedānta philosophy inspire, more or less, the Nambūtiri in almost every moment of his life, they do not in the same degree of completeness represent the religious ideas of the Nāyar, who is far more deeply imbued by the lower, the magico-religious, cult. In the case of the Nāyar the serpent is an object of regular worship.

'A serpent Kavu (shrine) or an abode of snakes is an indispensable adjunct to every Nāyar house' (ib. ii. 59).

A Nāyar house, even of the very poorest class, is always detached, in its own well-shaded garden. Around the shrine the trees and shrubs are untouched by the axe. Images are placed, and, in addition to periodical ceremonies, offerings are made 'there in propitiation of the serpent gods' (ib. ii. 61).

The myths and legends relating to serpents are innumerable. In addition to the serpent, Adīśeṣha, who supports the earth and is the bed of Mahā Viṣṇu, the cow, giver of all things, the bull, a vehicle of Siva, and the Brāhmany kite, a vehicle of Viṣṇu, are held sacred. Sacred trees are: *asvatta* (*Ficus religiosa*), circumambulated by women desiring children, and by men to avert the evil influence of Saturn under which every man suffers during some period of his life; its twigs are indispensable in all sacrificial offerings to the gods; *bilva* (*Ægle marmelos*), sacred to Siva; *tulasī* (*Ocimum sanctum*), to Viṣṇu. 'The worship of animals and plants

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shaven either for forty-one days or for a year.¹ The people who practise these rites are good Hindus, and, according to the tenets of their religion, the spirit, which is emancipated from the body at death, at once inhabits another body, for suffering or enjoyment measured by the deserts of the bodily existence which has just ceased. This is the higher religion. Nevertheless they admit that the spirit is connected with the shadow, not with the breath, and feel in their hearts that it still lingers in the house and absorbs the essence of the food offered to it, and that it must be propitiated or it will cause harm to the living. This is the lower religion. The religion of the Nāyar is a mixture of both.

Sacrificial offerings consist usually of cereals, milk products, or flowers, but there are occasions when cocks are decapitated, and, rarer still, when black goats are smothered. Nāyar pilgrims, while on the way to one of the more important shrines during the annual festival, indulge in every kind of disorderly and even obscene conduct, which not only is permissible, but is, for this occasion only, the right conduct; while on the return journey they are in possession of that calmness which follows communication with unutterable mysteries.

Fulfilment of vows involving pilgrimage to places perhaps far beyond Malabar is common. Vows may be made for receipt of any favour from the hand of God, and, when the desire is obtained, the devotee awaits, perhaps for years, the divine injunction to proceed. He then undertakes his pilgrimage in the garb as well as in the spirit of humility. Votive offerings are usually such as may be seen at any Roman Catholic shrine.

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NAZARÆANS.—See MANDÆANS.

NAZIRITES.—There are certain assured facts in regard to the Nazirites, but there is much that has been thought to relate to them which is uncertain as applied to them exclusively, and in regard to which a careful balance of judgment must be exercised. They appear on the stage of Jewish history at widely different periods, from the period of the Judges down to early Christian times—roughly a thousand years. They show themselves for a time quite clearly, and then for a long period we hear nothing of them; afterwards they re-appear as if their life and organization had been continuous, active, and universally acknowledged. There are some well-known sources of information, such as in Judges, Numbers 6, the Mishnah, and sporadically elsewhere, and a few famous treatises, as Spencer, *de Legibus Hebræorum*, but the data are few and the information

somewhat intricate owing to the meteoric appearances of the Nazirites, and the partially similar relationship in which their forms of religious devotion stand to others.

1. Various types.—We shall see, as we proceed, that there existed two, if not three, types of Nazirite, viz. the life-long Nazirite, the 'Nazirite of days,' and the Samson Nazirite; and it is a matter of considerable dispute whether the types were co-existent or convergent. The dates of their appearances have also to be approximately fixed, and the relationship between the earlier and later Nazirites determined. It is generally acknowledged that the Nazirites were much more numerous than the scattered information concerning them would lead us to suppose, and there is a fairly general agreement as to the prevalence in most periods of their history of the principal restrictions imposed upon the Nazirites, viz. abstinence from wine, etc., letting the hair grow uncut, and the avoidance of pollution by contact with the dead. Indeed, it is mainly through these various regulations that we are enabled to piece together the history of the institution.

2. Life and purpose.—Making use of the facts which are admitted by scholars as practically assured, we may sketch the life and purpose of the Nazirites with some probability. It was a 'dedicated' or 'consecrated' life. It was marked by both negative and positive qualities. It was a life essentially lived under a solemn vow. Ordinarily, to show their adhesion to the deity, men made material offerings; in the case of the Nazirite, he offered himself. It recognized a divine 'call' from Jahweh in days when the primitive simplicity of devotion to Jahweh was being undermined and supplanted by various forms of self-indulgence. It aimed at setting up an ideal of consecrated life, not necessarily ascetic. It thus had definite purposes with practical issues in relation to God and man. Jewish writers have taken different views as to what those purposes were. Some, e.g., contend that the Nazirite vow was intended to signify the working out of the divine nature in man made in the image of God, and, as the growth of the hair was supposed to indicate the growth of the intellectual life, the wise man would not allow this part of his nature to be in any way diminished; for the same reason he would abstain from wine, lest the intellectual faculty should be blurred; and his care to avoid contact with the dead would indicate his witness to the eternity of God and his own nature.

Others see in it 'the principle of stoicism, and imagine that it was intended to cultivate, and bear witness for, the sovereignty of the will over the lower tendencies of human nature' (Smith's *DB*, London, 1893, ii. 474). It was for purposes of self-mastery: the Nazirite wore his hair long as a crown, 'quod ipse rex sit cupiditatis imperans præter morem reliquorum hominum, qui cupiditatem sunt servi' (J. G. Carpzov, *Apparatus Historico-Criticus*, Leipzig, 1748, p. 162; so similarly Aben Ezra (Darius, on Nu 6⁷).

Philo, who calls it ἡ εὐχὴ μεγάλη, regards it in the light of complete self-oblation to Jahweh (*de Animal. sacrificio idoneis* [Mangey, ii. 249]).

'According to him the Nazirite did not sacrifice merely his possessions but his person, and 'as no spiritual state or act can be signified by any single symbol, he was to identify himself with each one of the three victims which he had to offer as often as he broke his vow by accidental pollution, or when the period of his vow came to an end. He was to realise in himself the ideas of the whole burnt-offering, the sin-offering, and the peace-offering' (Smith's *DB*, loc. cit.).

Although these views of Naziriteship were later developments of a more philosophical age, they enable us to see some of the purposes of its life and service, which were doubtless of a manifold

¹ Nāyars shave the whole body excepting the crown of the head.

character. The Nazirites have been described as 'men of real moral worth, good gifts of God to His sinful but beloved people' (*HDB* iii. 500^a). Though not debarred from innocent social life, their consecration would afford them special opportunities for prayer and study. In a certain sense, the Nazirite's life partook of the nature of the priestly as well as of the prophetic office; it was a protest against the self-indulgent habits of the surrounding nations; and something of the warrior and the judge was also inherent in the service which the Nazirite rendered for God and His people, as in the case of Samson in his exploits against the Philistines.

3. Principal features.—We can now pass to consider the principal features of Naziriteship, and the periods during which the Nazirites make their appearances, and draw what inferences we can from them.

We go to the stories of Samson (c. 10th cent.) in Judges for the earliest accounts, and to Josephus in the 1st cent. A.D. for the latest, covering a period roughly of a thousand years, during which it seems (as might be expected) that the institution underwent considerable changes. The law in Nu 6 (P), which is obviously directed to the regulation of a known usage, and the post-Exilic references, such as that in 1 Maccabees, would naturally fall between these periods.

Taking the law in Numbers as a basis round which we can collect evidence of the institution, we can classify our subject under the following heads, and estimate its significance by the regulations in regard to it.

(1) *The vow*.—In Nu 6 it is clear that Naziriteship consisted partly in the assumption of a vow. Vows, of course, were common in all periods of Jewish history, and would take the form of a solemn promise in order to secure the divine aid, or of the expression of an act of piety, or of an act of self-discipline by means of certain abstinences. Contrasting these regulations with those of an earlier period, we should bear in mind that in cases like those of Samson or Samuel and the Nazirites referred to in Am 2^{11a} we have no evidence to assure us that the vow was actually taken, though Hannah herself makes a vow before the birth of Samuel, and this would seem to involve the offspring; so, similarly, a prophet (like Jeremiah) might be sanctified from the womb (cf. Jer 1⁵ with Jg 13⁵).

(2) *The duration of the Naziriteship*.—When we compare the data at our disposal, two clear facts emerge, viz. (a) the existence of the Nazirite for life, and, whether synchronously or otherwise, (b) that of the Nazirite for a limited period. It seems probable, on the whole, as we balance the evidence, that in the days before the Exile the Naziriteship was of a permanent, life-long character. Samson was a Nazirite for life (Jg 13⁵⁻⁷), and Samuel (though the case is not precisely parallel) remained unshorn all his days. In this connexion the passage in Amos (2^{11a}) is important and would appear to support this view, for the Nazirites are placed presumably on the same footing as the prophets who assume their office as the result not of a vow but of a divine call, and the character of the office is, therefore, of permanent obligation.

When we pass to post-Exilic days, the inference is that Naziriteship was of a temporary character. The evidence for this must be sought in Maccabees, in Josephus, and in the Mishnah (*Nazir*). We read in 1 Mac 3⁴⁹ of certain Nazirites who had 'accomplished their days' (ἐπλήρωσαν τὰς ἡμέρας), which clearly indicates a terminable period. Josephus (cf. *Ant.* iv. 4, XIX. vi. 1) speaks of an order of Agrippa requiring that many of the Nazirites were to have their heads shorn—passages

which indicate the numerical extent of the institution as well as the temporary character of the vow, and the fact that it was a customary practice of benevolence to defray the expenses of the offerings of persons who were under the obligation of the vow of Naziriteship. And with this we should compare the case alluded to in Ac 21^{23a}, when St. Paul was at charges for the four men who had a vow upon them; the character of the latter vow was analogous to that of the Nazirites, and may have been 'allowed to Jews of the Dispersion as a substitute for the strictly legal vow' (*HDB* iii. 500^a). From the treatise *Nazir* in the Mishnah, it is probable that temporary Naziriteship was common in later Jewish history.

In the later Jewish period and in Christian times we cannot be certain of any life-long Naziriteship. The case of St. John Baptist is not strictly to the point, as it lacks the principal characteristic mark of Naziriteship, viz. the growth of the hair. Eusebius (*HE* II. xxiii. 4-6) mentions Hegesippus's description of James the Lord's brother. Both these cases resembled the Nazirites, but represent merely a part of their ascetic life; they were probably both permanent ascetics; the early Nazirites were not, however, ascetics, as can be inferred from the case of Samson. It is doubtful, as Gray points out (*JThSt* i. [1900] 204, 202 f.), whether the regulations in later Judaism (as in *Nazir*) were called forth by the actualities of life or are to be attributed to the speculative legalism of the Rabbis. He inclines to the view that in early Jewish history Naziriteship was of a permanent character; after the Exile and down to the Fall of Jerusalem temporary Nazirites were numerous; the cases of the permanent Nazirite at this period were rare, if they existed at all.

(3) *The treatment of the hair*.—Robertson Smith (*Religion of the Semites*, p. 324) points out that the hair 'is regarded by primitive peoples as a living and important part of the body, and as such is the object of many taboos and superstitions'; he also shows that the principles underlying the offering of hair and the offering of blood are of a similar character; sometimes the hair is cut off in mourning, sometimes it is offered at the funeral pyre, sometimes it is made as an initiatory offering on the attainment of manhood or womanhood, when the offerer is admitted into full religious and social status, and sometimes on the occasion of pilgrimages for safe preservation, or in the assumption of a vow to secure the divine aid in times of sickness or other misfortune. As in the case of the offering of blood, so here a bond of union is established between the offerer and his god, or between the living and the dead.

The growth of the hair seems to be the most essential characteristic of the Nazirite vow, common to both forms of Naziriteship, but obviously there is a difference between the two: in the case of the temporary Nazirite, the hair becomes, at the close of the period of the vow, an offering; in the case of the life-long Nazirite, this would, of course, not apply. The important thing to bear in mind is that the hair, whether it is cut off or remains unpolled, is part of the personality of the individual. If this is so, then it follows that the hair, representing a man's personality, is (like the blood) a suitable sacrifice to the deity, and, as it represents the man's power and strength, it must be preserved inviolable and 'consecrated.'

(4) *Avoidance of pollution by contact with a dead body*.—The regulation in Nu 6 is, of course, applicable only to the temporary Nazirite, for in his case the period of the vow could be recommenced. It would be inapplicable to the permanent Nazirite. Samson's life, e.g., was inconsistent with this regulation. The Rabbis saw this difficulty, and solved

it by practically placing Samson in a class by himself: a Nazirite of the Samson type must never cut his hair, and, if he contracts defilement by contact with a corpse, he does not bring the usual offering in such cases (אִינוּ מִכֵּי קָרֵן מִכֵּסָה). Samuel, too, it should be observed, must have suffered pollution when he hewed Agag in pieces (1 S 15³³).

(5) *Abstinence from all products of the vine and from all intoxicants.*—There may have been a prejudice in favour of this from the nomadic tendencies of ancient Israel. There is no evidence to show that it was a permanent element in Naziriteship. The case of Samson shows that no such abstinence was practised by him, and in the case of Samuel it is clear that he was present on several festal and convivial occasions, when the fruit of the vine would ordinarily have been used. The general conclusions on the subject of Naziriteship are helpfully summarized by Gray (*JThSt* i. 210 f.) and are mainly as follows.

The practice of leaving the hair unshorn is based on primitive belief and practice. The devotees of Jahweh in the 10th cent. left their hair unshorn in token of their devotion. In the 8th cent. the Nazirites were a familiar class of sacred persons in some respects resembling the prophets. Later, the Nazirites took a vow upon themselves for a short period, and at the end made an offering of their hair and presented certain animal sacrifices as well. These changes may be accounted for by the fact that vows were commonly taken in early times, and certain abstinences were observed at the same time. In some cases the hair was suffered to grow uncut, and at the close of the period of the vow it was offered sacrificially. On account of this treatment of the hair the term 'Nazirite,' originally used of permanent religious devotees, was extended to persons under a vow. But at what period it is impossible to determine. It may have been when the secondary sense of the term 'Nazirite' (a person with unshorn hair) exceeded in prominence the primary sense (a devotee); and this had certainly taken place by the 6th cent. B.C., as is shown by the metaphorical use of the root in *Lv* 25^{5, 11}.

4. *Nazarene and Nazorean.*—Elucidation of this subject, requiring minute technical consideration, should be sought in two recent contributions of modern scholars, E. A. Abbott, *Miscellanea Evangelica* (I.), Cambridge, 1913, and F. C. Burkitt, 'Syriac Forms of New Testament Names' in *Proc. Brit. Acad.*, 1911-12, p. 392 ff. The latter seeks to show that the Gr. ζ is rarely the equivalent of the Sem. נ, and therefore Ναζωραῖος cannot mean a native of נֶזְרַת, but must be connected with נִזְרִי and the Nazirite vow. He also suggests, rather as a counsel of despair, owing to the 'ordinary view of Nazareth' being 'unproved and unsatisfactory,' that Nazareth has arisen by a literary error, and that the real name of our Lord's home was Χοραζην, not Ναζαρέθ. There is much more to be said in favour of his views as to the historical position of Χοραζην and Ναζαρέθ than for those referring to the relation of the Greek and Semitic letters, as it would appear that there are too many exceptions to the rule which he notices in respect of ζ and נ for it to be safe to base any definite conclusion upon it.

In Abbott's minute discussion of many technical difficulties in the words 'Nazarene' and 'Nazorean,' the opening paragraph will be sufficient to show his line of argument:

'In this Chapter it will be argued that (i.) "Nazarene," meaning a man of Nazareth, and (ii.) "Nazorean," meaning the Nétzer or Rod of Jesse mentioned by Isaiah, were probably interchanged by a play on the two words; so that the populace, acclaiming Jesus as the Lifegiver and Healer, altered "Jesus the Nazarene," into "Jesus the Nazorean." To state the theory more exactly, we should say that they called Him Jesus the

Nétzer, or the Na(t)zorean, partly because there was a pre-existing belief that the Messiah would be the Nétzer, and partly because they vaguely felt what Matthew ventured definitely to express, that His residence from childhood onward in Nazareth had been ordained to fulfil the prophecy "He shall be called Nazorean (i.e. Nétzer)."

LITERATURE.—J. von Grill, in *JPTA* vi. [1880] 645 ff.; G. B. Gray, *ICC*, 'Numbers,' Edinburgh, 1903, and specially in *JThSt* i. [1900] 201 ff. (best account in English); S. R. Driver, *Camb. Bible*, 'Joel and Amos,' Cambridge, 1897; G. F. Moore, *ICC*, 'Judges,' Edinburgh, 1895; G. A. Cooke, *Camb. Bible*, 'Judges,' Cambridge, 1913; E. A. Edghill, 'Amos,' in *Westminster Com.*, London, 1914; G. W. Wade, *OT History*, do. 1901; W. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, do. 1894; *GB*, pt. ii, *Toboo*, do. 1911, pp. 252-287; *Tractate Nazir* in *Mishnah: Philo, de Victimis*, xli.; J. Spencer, *de Legibus Hebraeorum*, Cambridge, 1635, bk. iii. ch. vi. sect. i. and ii. pp. 583-594; *HDB*, s.v. 'Nazirite' (full lit.); *EBI*, s.v. 'Nazirite.'

S. M. COOKE.

NECESSITARIANISM.—See **LIBERTARIANISM** AND **NECESSITARIANISM**.

NECESSITY.—See **FATE**, **LIBERTARIANISM** AND **NECESSITARIANISM**.

NECROMANCY.—See **DIVINATION**, **MAGIC**.

NEEDS.—The conception of needs is a recent one in theology and is not yet clearly defined. It arose in apologetical literature in the endeavour to justify religious beliefs and practices by their supposed satisfaction of needs. As no attempt has so far been made to elucidate the idea or to investigate what are rightly included in human needs, much superficial writing has confused the issues. Whatever the degree of validity of this form of argument, the nature of the needs ought to be established before individual beliefs are referred to them.

'Needs' is essentially a metaphysical conception, but, as such, it must have some relation to psychological facts. Psychology talks of 'conative tendencies' (G. F. Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, London, 1913, p. 121), which form the active factor in consciousness, in its endeavour to realize certain aims in relation to the objective world. Needs lie behind these conative tendencies, of which they are the source and in which they first become evident. All activity involves a relation of subject and object, and the nature of the activity will depend on that of the subject, and specifically on its needs. Subjective needs give rise to activity exerted upon the objective world. Metaphysically, it might also be urged that needs are what they are because of the ultimate nature of the objective side of reality, since only thus would there be a real unity of the subjective and objective aspects of existence.

Some of the errors in the use of the argument have arisen from a failure to distinguish between needs and desires. The former must be conceived as wants, without the satisfaction of which the subject of them is imperfect. A perfect being has no needs; human needs in their totality imply an ideal of human perfection. The presence of error and sin in human experience shows that some conative tendencies turn towards ends other than those involved in perfection. Desires, as distinct from impulses, are conative tendencies defined by the presence of an idea of the aim. Needs express themselves in desires, but not all desires are the expression of needs, for a person may desire what is in opposition to his needs. The distinction is most clear in reference to the physical: men may desire kinds and quantities of food, drink, rest, exercise, opposed to what is physically requisite. As with the physical, so with the spiritual. Some of the general characteristics differentiating needs from mere desires may be stated briefly. Desire is always conscious and may be good or bad, i.e. it may be for something not related to true well-

being, and may even be detrimental to it. The distinction of good and bad is not applicable to needs; and individuals or even a whole race may have needs of which they have no conscious knowledge. 'In even savage bosoms, there are longings, yearnings, strivings, for the good they comprehend not' (Longfellow, *Hiawatha*, Introd.). A desire may be modified or deliberately and entirely suppressed without satisfaction; it may be in the highest degree capricious and is often transient. Needs continue until completely satisfied or until the extinction of the subject of them; they can be modified only by partial satisfaction. Desires are based upon some actual previous experience, while needs exist prior to any specific experience. Mere desires, therefore, generally have an individual and temporary character, while needs express themselves rather as generic appetites or as definite tendencies to function, having an essential relation to the permanent nature of the subject experiencing them, so that their satisfaction is fundamental to the attainment of the ideal. A desire is often for what one thinks one needs; for consciousness of the nature of needs may come only with the success or failure of the activity that is rooted in them.

The absence of any consensus of opinion as to the nature of needs is chiefly due to the neglect of their study and to the necessity of distinguishing them from their form of expression, which depends not only on the stage to which thought and language have evolved, but also on the adequacy and accuracy of the analysis implied in their expression. Different races and individuals at the same time, and the same race and individuals at different times, have held diverse and even contradictory beliefs, and these appear to involve diverse and contradictory needs. The solution of the difficulty of apparent contradiction must be sought in the indication of faulty analysis and expression. Allowance must also be made for human development, for with the satisfaction of some needs others become clearer, and through the total or partial satisfaction of the latter further advance is made. Historical and comparative studies should seek for evidence of greater comprehensiveness and consistency in conative tendencies, beliefs, and practices. Consciousness of needs and what is offered to satisfy them should, in the language of Bergson (*L'Évolution créatrice*, Paris, 1907, p. 399), be 'in process of being adapted to each other and making towards final rest in a common form.'

Needs may be classified either as physical and spiritual or as physical, æsthetical, intellectual, moral, and religious; human perfection demands the satisfaction of all. The present discussion is limited to moral and religious needs. The reality and universality of the latter are now rarely denied, even though some may say with Spencer:

'Religious creeds, which in one way or other occupy the sphere [life and mind] that rational interpretation seeks to occupy and falls, and fails the more the more it seeks, I have come to regard with a sympathy based on community of need' (*Autobiography*, London, 1904, ii. 471).

'Men will not rest in peace until they have a Faith; they cannot consent to forego a religious sense of duty and reverence' (F. Harrison, *Philosophy of Common Sense*, London, 1907, p. 427).

Religious needs may be studied directly, by introspection and psychological analysis, or indirectly, in the historical and comparative study of religious beliefs and practices—i.e. by a consideration of the methods which men have taken to satisfy needs, and the degree in which such satisfaction has been real and enduring. Though religious rites and doctrines are of the most diverse character and in the course of history have undergone innumerable changes, it does not follow that the underlying needs are different. Evidence shows that the consciousness of religious needs

and the capacity for satisfying them are subject to development. Though some needs are revealed by the persistent elements in religious experience, the factors which differentiate religions are also of fundamental importance, for in them lie the results of evolution and the grounds of superiority. The attitudes of primitive races and times must be considered from the point of view of more advanced peoples; and the moral and religious needs of the latter must themselves be estimated with reference to those individuals who have been more or less generally recognized as the highest religious characters of the community or of humanity as a whole. For needs of a higher kind have been brought to light and partly or entirely satisfied by religious saints and moral teachers. Capricious and temporary desires have no real and abiding effect on the evolution of religion. Most sociological studies of religion (see, e.g., E. Durkheim, *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*, Paris, 1912) are vitiated by the assumption that it is to be best understood by the consideration of the common denominator of religions. Yet, where the influence of ideals is so great as in morality and religion, neglect of the higher forms seriously limits the trustworthiness and diminishes the value of conclusions respecting the lower and more primitive forms. The highest needs are present from the beginning; one might say of them what J. F. Ferrier says of principles:

'They have influence and indeed operate largely and powerfully long before they come to the surface of human thought and are articulately expounded' (*Institute of Metaphysics*, Edinburgh, 1854, p. 13).

But if, on the one hand, changes in the consciousness of needs lead to modifications of religious doctrines and practices, on the other hand, changes in the latter may bring about clearer consciousness of the former. The process of religious and moral evolution is made possible by man being at once an individual mind and a member of a social group. The influence of the social environment tends to make the individual conscious of his needs; but the effect of society does not always make for progress, since doctrines accepted by men through social pressure may lead them to fancy that they have real needs corresponding to these doctrines, which, if false, will thus hinder the religious life of the individual. What appear to be religious needs may only be temporarily acquired tendencies due to beliefs adopted as a result of traditional and ecclesiastical forces, as, e.g., the supposition of needs to which many have been led by unethical ideas of salvation. Up to a certain point, however, history and religious organizations aid the individual in understanding and appeasing his needs; and, if doctrines can be shown on independent grounds to be true, their acceptance will lead to development.

When we come to the actual nature of religious needs, the naturalistic theories that reduce religion and morality to mere means must be declared inadequate. H. R. Marshall (*Instinct and Reason*, New York, 1898, p. 247 ff.) regards religion as simply serving a valuable function in the biological evolution of the human race, leading to the suppression 'of the force of individualistic elemental impulse' in favour of something higher. B. Kidd (*Social Evolution*, London, 1894, p. 97 ff.) similarly thinks of it as having its essential value in restraining the individual for the biological future of society. E. Metchnikoff (*The Nature of Man*, Eng. tr., London, 1903, p. 151) interprets the desire for immortality merely as the physical impulse to go on living. In contrast with all such theories, one of the most important and constant factors in human history has been the answer which religion has given to men's undeniable metaphysical needs. Religion has also answered

needs other than those of the inquiring intellect, for religious experience is not simply a promise of satisfaction, but is itself a real satisfaction in which the soul finds actual and present peace and rest.

'If religion is a practical need, the response to it can only be a practical action. No theory would suffice. Religion is nothing if it is not the vital act by which the whole spirit seeks to save itself by attaching itself to its principle' (L. A. Sabatier, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. tr., London, 1897, p. 23).

Beliefs can, therefore, be fully understood only in relation to this wider complex attitude of the spirit. The social character of moral and religious needs is fundamental, the individual finding complete satisfaction only in an active life in a 'Kingdom of God.'

A short consideration of some prominent religions and ethical beliefs, in the light of the preceding principles, will indicate some human needs and the methods of investigation. The beliefs in God, immortality, and a way of salvation are the most important and best repay study. The most advanced conceptions must be the starting-point. All attempts to conceive of God as supra-personal end in representing Him as less than personal:

'The religious consciousness demands a personal God: no profound and enduring relation to the non-personal is practicable' (G. Wobbermin, quoted by G. Galloway, in *RThPh* iii. [1907-08] 199). 'If man is to be successful in the struggle, he must be persuaded that he is not alone, or in the language of religion, that God is with him, and that therefore nothing can be ultimately against him' (A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, *The Philosophical Radicals and other Essays*, Edinburgh and London, 1907, p. 270). R. Seeberg (*Fundamental Truths of the Christian Religion*, Eng. tr., London, 1903, lects. i., ii., xvi.) maintains that man needs a 'near firm Object' on whom to depend and a 'Goal far-off' at which to aim; and R. Wimmer (*My Struggle for Light*, London, 1903, p. 51.) thus expresses some of the needs which belief in God as personal satisfies: 'I must trust'; 'I must give thanks'; 'I must worship'; 'I must love . . . fully and entirely surrendering my whole heart.'

It is a sure ground for the authority of the moral conscience; it points to a source of consolation in trouble, of help towards righteousness and of hope for the future, and leads to communion in a fellowship which, unlike human relationships, gives perfect peace. The history of religion manifests a more or less consistent development of the consciousness of needs resulting finally in the belief in God as personal.

'I surveyed the history of men, and I found that all nations have felt the necessity of bringing their finite being into fellowship with the Infinite, and I found that this necessity is the basis of all phenomena of religion' (Wimmer, p. 6).

Prayer is essentially the outcome of practical need, and its evolution from a predominantly non-spiritual to an ethical and spiritual character indicates the course of development of the consciousness of needs and of the idea of God sought to satisfy them. L. R. Farnell (*Evolution of Religion*, London, 1905, p. 183) has not been able to find 'any example of a savage prayer for moral or spiritual blessings.' A higher stage is reached by the Psalmist: 'My soul thirsteth for God, the living God'; and in its latest form prayer is for conformity to the will of God. Deification in ancient times; mariolatry and saint-worship in the Middle Ages; the virtual deification of 'humanity' as a 'being immense and eternal' by the positivists; the religious attitude of Spencer towards 'the Unknowable'; the proposal of Haeckel to base a religion on the theory of neutral monism regarding the cosmic ether as a divinity; the attempt to supply an ideal for human effort and an object of worship in the conception of the Superman—are all evidence of man's need 'to enter into some vital relationship with an Other.' The question, therefore, concerns not the reality of the need, but its actual and full nature, and the character of the 'Other' and of the relationship to the 'Other' which will be a com-

plete and rational satisfaction. A merely immanent principle never has done justice to the requirement of mankind: God must be conceived as a real objective Being. The feeling of dependence (F. Schleiermacher, *Discourses on Religion*, Eng. tr., London, 1893) implies simply the need of a superior Power. The application of the term 'Father' to this Power suggests that man has felt the need of other qualities in God. The historical and comparative study of religion gives us as the common denominator the idea of a Power (or powers) at least partially friendly; but only the notion of God as personal is adequate to the needs of which mankind has now become conscious.

The desire for immortality is not universal, and the contradictory beliefs concerning the destiny of the human spirit necessitate a careful analysis to see whether any common need may possibly underlie beliefs and hopes so different as those of immortality and extinction. An appreciation of the good in life, together with a consciousness of the inadequacy of the present, the insufficiency of the actual, leads to a demand for and expectation of greater and complete good in the future. The majority of mankind have appeared indifferent to the question of immortality; their lives have been neither predominantly good nor bad. Underlying all desire for extinction is a dissatisfaction with life as experienced; the evil in these lives impresses more than the good or the prospect of good. It should be noticed that the desire for immortality could arise only with a more or less definite conception of time. In the earliest ages of mankind men were occupied solely with the present and the very proximate future; desires and beliefs concerning the future in general appeared much later. But even the earliest men needed 'everything' to be 'good.' The common need seems therefore to be for a state completely good—desire for continuance depends on the quality of life. In Buddhism the same need is implied, though it has acquired a definitely negative form of expression. Both the conceptions, immortality and extinction, are in actual life defective in relation to the need: the former tends to the neglect of the values of the present, the latter to the neglect of those of the future. There may be no precise and exact way of stating what will satisfy a specific need, and choice must be made between several more or less imperfect statements.

Sacrificial rites and doctrines of redemption and atonement have been persistent and almost universal elements in religion.

'There is an immense *a priori* argument for the truth of some atonement, past, present, or future—some way of realising and feeling that we are at one with God—from the need, all but universally felt, in human nature, of some way of approaching God' (J. M. Wilson, *The Gospel of the Atonement*, London, 1899, p. 26).

Salvation and atonement are thus related to the consciousness of sin, which is felt to be more than a falling short of an ideal of one's individual perfection, in that, through his place in the universe, by sin man violates the purpose of God. The solidarity of man with God and the need of reality is an indispensable condition of the rest of redemption. Salvation is in part dependent on the realization of goods (physical and spiritual) through a man's own effort, and from this point of view 'my essential personal need is simply for a chance to find out my rational purpose and to do my unique duty' (J. Royce, *HJ* v. [1906-07] 744). But the need of harmony is felt most keenly in the desire for forgiveness and reconciliation, as between man and man, and men and God. The conviction of forgiveness is a real want of the penitent mind, and without its satisfaction further effort is hindered. If sin is not merely a failure to realize the ideal of personal welfare, but also a

breaking away from the cosmic purpose, it is an alienation from God, and repentance and forgiveness are necessary before the relationship of love between man and God can be felt by man again. To satisfy the need of salvation in its fullness the belief must indicate a justifiable basis for the realization of individual perfection and also an assurance of divine pardon of sin.

The attempt to justify religious beliefs by the claim that they satisfy human needs has generally been associated with a sceptical attitude concerning the capacity of thought to establish religious conceptions. In modern times Kant is the source of both tendencies. In the *Critique of the Pure Reason* he limits thought to the phenomenal, and in the *Critique of the Practical Reason* he urges the acceptance of the beliefs in God, freedom, and immortality on the ground of practical needs. Lotze, who under the influence of the Hegelianism of Weisse certainly meant to acknowledge the importance of thought in matters of religion, ultimately adopts the same attitude, basing belief upon a resolution of character in the direction of personal needs. Ritschl, who was much nearer Kant than Lotze in his view of thought, founded his apologetics entirely upon the practical valuation of Jesus in relation to the needs of the individual. Sabatier, also starting out from a Kantian view of knowledge, interprets religious beliefs and conceptions as ever-changing symbols which are justified solely by the satisfaction that they give. But, like Kant and Lotze, he gives evidence of some slight recognition that man needs a unity and harmony of his intellect and his religious and moral feelings, and, also like them, suggests that 'the synthesis will be found in a teleological consideration of the universe' (p. 82; cf. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, tr. J. H. Bernard², London, 1914, and Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1894, and *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. tr.³, London, 1903). H. Höfding's critical monism varies little from the Kantian scepticism.

'If religious ideas are to have any significance at all, it can only be in serving as symbolical expressions for the feelings, the aspirations, and wishes of men in their struggle for existence' (*The Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. tr.³, London, 1903, p. 6). The 'core' of religion consists in the 'conviction that no value perishes out of the world.' 'The nature of a being determines its needs, and its needs determine what shall have value for it.' The belief in the axiom of the conservation of value is not justified by experience, for 'there are no definite empirical values in the conservation of which we may believe' (p. 257); the axiom is thus assumed purely on 'a practical personal need' (p. 248).

W. James (*The Will to Believe*, London, 1897, *Pragmatism*, do. 1907, and *Varieties of Religious Experience*, do. 1902) and the pragmatists, also sceptical as to the capacity of the intellect, adopted the satisfaction of needs as a general principle of justification. The need of an eternal moral order is one of the deepest needs of our breast, and the notion of God guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved, and consequently our belief in God is justified. Roman Catholic modernists like G. Tyrrell represent religious doctrines as symbolical 'truths of faith' satisfying personal needs (*Through Scylla and Charybdis*, London, 1907, ch. vi.).

The manner in which the argument is used by popular writers may be seen in J. N. Figgis's *The Gospel and Human Needs* (London, 1909); he urges the acceptance of certain doctrines on the ground that man has need of what they imply, and this even in cases of doctrine concerning which it is not clear what needs they do imply. To assume, e.g., that man 'needs mystery' and to base on that an argument for belief in certain doctrines is to adopt a form of apologetics as dangerous as it is simple, and, moreover, tends to obscurantism. Religious beliefs give satisfaction just in so far as they show

life to have a meaning and make it more intelligible than it is without them. The attempt to disregard thought or underestimate reason in the establishment of religious conceptions is frustrated by the fact that beliefs bring satisfaction only when they are accepted as true, so that their truth cannot itself rest on their religious or moral satisfaction. It is methodologically incorrect to treat the moral and religious aspects of experience as quite separate from the rest, as in the Kantian dualism, from which these systems mostly spring. Doctrines are the work of thought, and their validity can be judged only by consideration of all the data implicated. Among these data human needs are of fundamental importance and must not be omitted; but it is before all else necessary that the nature of human needs shall be rightly understood, and that they shall not be confused with mere desires. Expectations and desires in mundane affairs are continually being disappointed by the actual course of events, and similarly mere desires in religion may not be fulfilled. But, when the nature of human needs is known with accuracy, and they are not confused with transitory wishes and merely acquired tendencies, they will be an essential factor in the justification of religious beliefs. For, unless we are to assume a radical contradiction at the heart of things, the ultimate nature of man which determines his needs must be in harmony with and form a unity with the rest of reality, which is to satisfy those needs. If the world is rational, intellectual and religious needs must be fundamentally at one.

'It seems to be easier to believe that the interpreters of human experience have lost their way than to maintain that experience itself is rent in twain, and that the fundamental conditions of human welfare are inconsistent' (H. Jones, *HJ* I. [1902-03] 252).

LITERATURE.—This has been given throughout the article.

ALBAN G. WIDGERY.

NEED-FIRE.—It is not surprising that fire, the mysterious element which was one of the greatest benefactions to the human race and which was so dangerous under certain circumstances, should have created in the mind of man a feeling of reverence and awe and should find a prominent place in his conception of the supernatural. There has been some discussion as to whether any section of mankind has been ignorant of the means of producing fire, and it has been claimed that this was a condition of the Andaman Islanders. A. E. Crawley, in art. FIRE, has set out the main facts showing the universal practices in fire-production and fire-use at the different stages of human culture, and has pointed out that, as a consequence of these practices, fire is used with more or less sacred rites by every race whose life-history has been investigated by anthropologists. There is, however, this to add to Crawley's conclusions: fire-worship has been overcharged with survivals of rite and ceremony to such an extent that it has been found impossible for most inquirers to arrive at a scientific conclusion as to its origin and development, and this confusion is reflected in all its parts.

Need-fire is only a secondary element in fire-worship, and it seems to be possible to arrive at its origin without touching the confusion incidental to the wider question. It was a reversion to primitive methods of lighting a fire, if and when a fire which was to be kept ever burning was allowed to become extinct. Now there exists throughout Europe a series of fire customs, which have been exhaustively collected and examined by J. G. Frazer (*GB*³, Index vol., s.v. 'Fire'). These fire customs have a remarkable number of common features, which, equating with certain Hindu and Persian fire customs, make it fairly certain that they belong to the Aryan-speaking peoples in a

special sense. The meaning and significance of the Aryan fire customs both in origin and in survival can be ascertained only through their sociological aspect, and for this purpose it is necessary to work through the tribal organization of the Aryan peoples. This is, of course, not the place for the entire subject, but a portion of the evidence may be used for the investigation of need-fire.

The tribe, not the family, was the primary unit of the Aryan peoples, and its religious aspect was represented by the ever-burning fire. L. R. Farnell rightly considers the sanctity of the fire maintained by the tribal king as 'the source from which the public Hestia-cult of the historic period immediately descends' (*CGS* v. 351). But, except in Greece and Rome, the tribal-fire cult has in Europe given way to the house-fire cult. It followed the break-up of the tribe and led directly to the formation of the family; and this means that the break-up of the tribe was into family units.

It was at the stage when the break-up of the tribe took place that the secondary cult of need-fire became fully developed. It exists throughout Europe, and, when it is remembered that Celtic, Teutonic, Scandinavian, and even Slavic tribalism broke itself in the struggle against the Roman empire and its highly developed institutions, it seems very probable that the origin of such a custom as need-fire is sufficiently indicated. The explanation is that the destruction of the tribe meant the destruction of the tribal religion, but, just because religious ritual lasts longer in survival than social structure, we have survivals of the tribal-fire cult where no other survivals of the tribe exist.

Strange to say, the most perfect example in illustration of this point occurs in Scotland, and not in the Scandinavian north. This can be shown by two selected examples for purposes of analysis and comparison. The Scandinavian custom is as follows:

In ancient times on the 31st of Dec., a festival called *Eldbjargmess*, or 'feast of fire salvage,' was observed in the north, and the name is still given to 7th Jan. in Icelandic almanacs. 'The name signifies that on this day the Yule fires, which had been kept alive from Christmas day, were put out. On that day the festivities came to an end and the Christmas guests took their departure. From Telemarken in Norway a tradition is preserved illustrative of the customs which were observed on this particular day, in the olden time. The mistress of the house entered the room, where round the fire burning on the hearth the household were seated, and took her stand before the fire, and from a bowl of beer which she carried in her hand she drank the fire's toast with this formula—

"So high my fire

But neither higher nor yet hotter."

Then the company seated on the floor drank the fire's toast in the following manner: the beer bowl was placed between their legs on the floor, and each one had to take it up with his teeth and empty it and then throw it over his head so that it came down behind him. If the bowl came down bottom upmost, the thrower's was a forfeited life and he must die within the ensuing year' (E. Magnússon, 'On an early runic Calendar found in Lapland, 1806,' in *Camb. Antig. Soc.'s Communications*, iv. (1873) 42).

This custom gives us (a) the continuity of the fire during a specially religious period, (b) the extinction of the fire at the end of the period, (c) the anniversary character of the fire, (d) the offering to the fire by the mistress of the household, and (e) the divination derived from the hearth rite. All these elements are primitive in character, but do not extend beyond the stage of pure survival.

The Scottish example is the well-known Burghead custom of 'burning the clavic.'¹

The fire is made by the sons of the original inhabitants, and every stranger is rigidly excluded from the ceremony.² This

is a clear recognition of the blood-bond, because the early ties of relationship still hold their place against the later ties of locality. Secondly, the clavic must be lighted by a burning peat, the custom being that no form of modern lighting is allowed to approach the precincts.¹ The next point is that the smoking embers of the clavic were scattered among the assembled villagers, by whom they were eagerly caught at, and with them the fire on the cottage hearth was at once kindled.² The date fixed upon for the ceremony, viz. New Year's Eve (old style), is the next important element to note, it being obvious that a fire kindled on the last day of the old year, and allowed to burn into the first morning of the new year, has carried on its flame from one year to another, though actually only through one year's end into another year—a fiction which may very well stand for an original perpetual burning. And, finally, there are details of ritual in this custom. The object of the ceremony is the perambulation, with the sacred fire, of the bounds of the village and of the fishing-boats. At certain street corners a halt was made, and a brand whipped out of the clavic and hurled among the crowd. He who seized the brand was the favourite of fortune during the months of the coming new year. Afterwards the fire was carried to a small artificial promontory, where a circular heap of stones, called the 'durie,' was built up for the purpose, and the still burning clavic was placed in the hollow centre, from which it was distributed to the villagers.³ The whole community joined in the ceremony as an act necessary to its welfare and prosperity during the year. If the hearer stumbled, it was looked upon as a dire calamity foretelling disaster to the place and certain death to the hearer in the course of the next year;⁴ 'the first "lift" is an honour,' and was usually conferred upon some member of the community who had recently been married. As soon as one hearer gave signs of exhaustion, another took his place, and, should any of them meet with an accident during the journey, 'the misfortune excites no pity even among his near relatives.'⁵ In the construction of the fire-pile every action is regulated by 'unwritten but unvarying laws,' one of which is that every article is borrowed, nothing bought; and, finally, there is the remarkable fact that, although the long nail which fastens the staves of the clavic is iron, and is made specially for the purpose by the village smith, the hammer used for the purpose must be a round stone.⁶

Analysis of this ceremony reveals the following details: (a) the fire is made by a group of men connected by a common descent, i.e. a kindred; (b) the original inhabitants of a village form the unit from which common descent is traced; (c) the flame for the fire is obtained in a sacred manner; (d) continuous life of the fire is symbolized; (e) the house-fire is derived from the village-fire; (f) the possession of an ember is the means to good fortune; (g) the bounds of the village have the fire carried round them; (h) the welfare and prosperity of the community are dependent upon the performance of the ceremony; (i) the bearers of the fire are honoured; (j) stone-age implements are used.

The element of the need-fire is to be found in item (c) of this analysis, and by symbolism it takes the place of the older condition of ever-burning, item (d). This is the most perfect example of the fire ritual of Europe in survival, and, when we compare other examples with it, the several stages of decadence are revealed, beginning with the need-fire prepared by friction and ending in the bonfire constructed by modern methods, but still retaining here and there relics of ancient ritual (*Report of British Association, Liverpool Meeting, 1896*, p. 650). Altogether it seems that need-fire may be defined as the perpetuation by primitive methods of a rite which became important when the ever-burning fire of the tribe ceased to exist as the tribe ceased to exist, and which thus carries through survivals the sacred formalism of an earlier ritual.

LITERATURE.—This is quoted throughout the article.

LAURENCE GOMME.

NEGATION. — Negation is a relative term which gets a definite meaning only when one can name or define of what, in a given case, something is the negation. In other words, there can be negation purely in general or negation which has no definite corresponding object of which it is the negation. Any particular case of negation has its own determinate corresponding object.

¹ *Proc. Soc. Antig. Scot.* x. [1881] 649.

² *FLJ* vii. 12.

³ *Proc. Soc. Antig. Scot.* x. 649.

⁴ *FLJ* vii. 121.

⁵ *Ib.*

⁶ *Ib.* p. 13.

¹ The clavic is made of the lower half of an empty tar barrel nailed to a stout pole, and supported by staves taken from a herring cask. The remaining staves are used as fuel for the clavic.

² *FLJ* vii. [1880] 12.

1. Illustrations of various kinds of negation.—

(1) In the opening words of Hamlet's soliloquy, 'To be or not to be; that is the question,' 'not to be' involves a negation of 'to be'; both the expressions 'to be' and 'not to be' refer to possible modes of action. 'To be,' as Hamlet explains, includes in its meaning 'to bear the ills we have'; it names a mode of action which any man who chooses to continue his life decides to adopt; 'not to be' involves a course of action—namely, committing suicide—which is treated by Hamlet as the negation of continuing to live. The commandment, 'Thou shalt not steal,' commands a course of action which is the negation of that involved in stealing. Both in Hamlet's soliloquy and in the Ten Commandments, with their familiar 'Thou shalt not,' the negation of a possible course of action is considered or is commanded.

(2) Just as courses or plans of action may be the objects of negations, the negations being themselves possible courses of action which stand in the negative relation to their objects, i.e. to the courses of action of which they are the negation, so propositions, judgments, or assertions may be the objects of negations, the meaning of the negation in each case being relative to its object. 'Charity seeketh not her own' is the negation of the proposition or judgment that would be expressed by omitting the word 'not' from the sentence. 'Ten is not a prime number' is a proposition which is the negation of the proposition 'Ten is a prime number.' When the object of the negation is a proposition, the proposition and its corresponding negation stand in the logical relation of contradiction.

(3) Negations may also have as their objects kinds or classes of beings, real or ideal. In the classes 'believer' and 'not-believer,' and in the kinds of beings distinguished as 'rational' and 'not-rational,' the second term in each expression is a negative term whose object of negation is the first term.

(4) Lastly, the object of a negation may be a highly general type, grade, or state of being, to which definable characters belong or are attributed. Negations of this kind may, of course, be regarded as belonging to the previous class. But the importance of the problems or ideas involved in them may make it worth while to regard at least some of them as forming, for certain purposes, a type by themselves.

T. Harper, in *The Metaphysics of the School* (i. 322f.), maintains that 'evil is not a pure negation.' He expounds this thesis by saying that 'evil is a *privation*,' and by explaining what he means by privation. 'Privation,' in so far like 'negation,' is a relative term (see below, p. 267). But the use of the word 'negation' by Harper, and by many other theologians and metaphysicians in cases of analogous complexity, is distinct from the usage which the negation of propositions or classes brings to our minds, so that it will be convenient to speak of such negations as forming a type by themselves.

In a well-known passage of *The Imitation of Christ* of Thomas à Kempis the adoring subject begins by praying that he may adore God, and love God, 'above' all created objects. He then enumerates, in an eloquent series, glories and powers, both of this world and of the next, accompanying each mention of some wonder, or sweetness, or beauty of the created world by the prefixed phrase 'above all.' The passage culminates in the words, 'Above all that Thou art not, O my God.'

In this case God is explicitly regarded as in some sense the negation of the whole created world, and especially of all that is most wonderful and beautiful, and even good, in the noblest sense, about that world. Thus, to regard God as the negation of the finite world is a familiar and famous teaching of both practical and theoretical mystics.

A closely similar 'negative theology' is suggested by the legendary Hindu seer, Yājñavalkya, in his address to his wife, Maitreyi, when he says of the *ātman*, or self, the absolute: 'The only word concerning the self is "Neti, Neti," "It is not so, it is not so"' (*SBE* xv. [1900] 185).

Yājñavalkya here asserts that his absolute can be defined only by means of negations. The negations, in this case, as in the case of *The Imitation of Christ*, make the absolute itself a negation of 'all that Thou art not,' i.e. of everything finite and relative. There is, of course, a decided distinction between the actual doctrine for which Yājñavalkya and à Kempis are contending; but they are both emphasizing an aspect of their doctrine which constitutes a sort of 'negative theology.' When the absolute is thus defined as a negation, the object of the negation being the finite world or the empirical facts and significance of the finite world, the negation differs, historically at least, and in some important respects both logically and metaphysically, from the ordinary negation of the logical text-books, whose object is a class or a kind of being.

2. The negative relation as a purely logical relation; the meaning of 'not.'—Despite the variety of the foregoing instances, it is plain that, in every negation, a characteristic relation is concerned, viz. that which is naturally expressed in our ordinary language by the particles 'not' and 'no.' If a course of action is proposed or commanded, a dissenting voluntary agent may respond, 'I will not,' or simply 'No.' To respond in this way is to propose, threaten, or promise an alternative course of action which is the negation of the original proposal, and which may be said to stand in the not-relation to it. In the case of a defined class or other universal, such as the class man or the relation brother, the class not-man and the relation not-brother stand in a relation to the class man and the relation brother which furnishes a new instance of the meaning of the word 'not' and of the general meaning of the negative relation.

The not-relation is one of the simplest and most fundamental relations known to the human mind. For the study of logic no more important and fruitful relation is known. And none has a wider range of exemplifications in the whole realm of the experience of any rational being. Anybody who can act voluntarily is able to do so by virtue of the fact that he can also refuse to act in a case where his will is concerned; i.e., a conscious voluntary action is possible only to a being who understands the meaning of 'not,' when some mode of action is its object. The importance of this understanding of the meaning of 'not' for the development of the will is exemplified in the life of childhood.

In one of the psychological efforts to observe and record the vocabulary of a young child who had recently begun to speak fluently it was noted that the two words which he most frequently used in the course of a day's speech were, first, the name that he happened to employ in speaking of himself and, secondly, some word of the nature of 'no' or 'not,' used to express, not necessarily disobedient refusal, but objection, or unwillingness, or a preference and desire standing in some sort of negative contrast to the modes of action which the questions or the proposals of his elders or his playmates suggested. The vocabularies of individual children vary, of course, very widely, both in the words used and in the frequency with which they are used; but we cannot doubt how significant an advance is involved for the whole voluntary life of the child in his power to understand and use the expressions for 'no' and 'not.'

The nature of the not-relation may be most readily approached by considering the relation between a proposition and its contradictory. These are so related that, if either of them is true, the other is false, while, if either is false, the other is true; they are also so related that both of them are not true at the same time and in the same sense, while, with suitable definition of time and of sense, one of them must be true. The not-relation between two propositions is thus strictly mutual or symmetrical; i.e., if the proposition P is the

negation of the proposition Q, the proposition Q is the negation of the proposition P, and conversely. Further, the relation is what may be called, in a terminology favoured by a French logician, M. Couturat, 'bi-univocal'; i.e., a given proposition P cannot possess two negations, so that, if the proposition Q contradicts the proposition P, and the proposition X also contradicts the proposition P, Q and X are strictly and formally equivalent propositions. In the same way, a given proposition P is the negation of what is, essentially, one and the same proposition. Thus a proposition has only one negation, and is essentially the negation of only one proposition. Obviously connected with this fact is the familiar principle that the negation of the negation of a proposition is equivalent to the proposition itself; or, as is often said, a double negation is equivalent to a simple affirmation.

Closely bound up with the foregoing is a fact which has caused, in its relation to more complex problems, a good deal of difficulty, both for philosophers and for common sense—that, from the purely logical point of view, there is no distinct class of propositions that are essentially affirmative, and thereby opposed to or to be distinguished from a class of propositions that are essentially negative. There are excellent reasons for distinguishing between affirmative and negative propositions so soon as we lay stress upon well-known empirical complexities and philosophically important unions of ideas, which interest us when we are uniting the study of different propositions in some connected discourse. But, apart from such complications and from the purely logical point of view, every proposition is the negation of its own negation. So far as the judgments of human subjects are concerned, whoever affirms any proposition to be true thereby contradicts the opinion of whatever opponent may deny the original assertion. It is vain, therefore, to say, 'For my part, I prefer to avoid negations and to confine myself to such positive affirmations as I can make'; it is vain to attempt to confine oneself to 'merely affirmative' thinking; for to affirm is to deny the contradictory of whatever one affirms. It would be equally vain for one, in a sceptical mood, to declare that his favourite attitude is that of negation or of denial; for whoever denies any proposition affirms its contradictory, so that every denial is, in its logical meaning, an affirmation. In brief, it is essential to the whole business of thinking that propositions and the judgments which affirm or deny them go in pairs of contradictories—every proposition having its unique contradictory, of which, in turn, it is the unique contradictory. Hence, when Mephistopheles declares that he is 'der Geist, der stets verneint,' he asserts, from a logical point of view, precisely what is true of anybody who makes any assertions whatever.

In view of this indubitable logical fact, many very natural and important philosophical questions arise as to why affirmation and denial, as they occur in our actual thinking and discourse, appear to involve such strongly contrasted attitudes of mind, and why we regard those whose most noticeable or most usual attitude is that of affirmation as different in such important and practically potent ways from those whose habits and preferences emphasize or prefer negation. This is a problem which it is perfectly fair to consider on its merits. Despite the fact that every judgment is both positive and negative, we all actually do observe what makes us clearly distinguish, in some sense, affirming and denying as standing for decidedly different frames and attitudes of mind or states of knowledge. The attitude of Mephisto-

phes, that of denial, we all regard as different from the attitude which many of us prefer, that of affirmation.

This problem becomes still more important when we consider the philosophical types of negation exemplified in *The Imitation of Christ* and the assertions of Yājñavalkya. The worshipper in *The Imitation of Christ* adores a God whose divinity is defined in terms of a divine negation of the created world; the seer of the Hindu *Upaniṣad* tells of a self whose being consists in its negation of our finite distinctions. Such attitudes involve mainly negative types of thinking. Most of us, for comparatively good reasons, prefer a more positive or affirmative attitude in our assertions about both ethical and metaphysical matters. But, if every affirmation is *ipso facto*, from the logical point of view, a negation, since judgments, as well as propositions, essentially go in pairs of contradictories, how comes it that we so naturally and sharply oppose affirmative and negative thinking, regard Mephistopheles as engaged in some conceivable, although also diabolical, task, and find the Hindu mystic, as we often say, 'too negative'? For a suggestion as to the solution of this problem see below, p. 269 f.

We may sum up by saying that the relation to its object for which the term 'negation' stands is, from a purely logical point of view, and apart from various empirical and philosophically important complications, one which is 'bi-univocal,' or, as it is also called, a 'one-one relation,' and perfectly symmetrical. In the case of propositions the logical truth is that every proposition has its contradictory, while of two contradictories one must be true, the other false; and the contradictory of the contradictory of a given proposition P is precisely equivalent to the proposition P itself. For similar purely logical reasons negation, as applied to acts and modes of action, gives precisely analogous results: to every mode of action is opposed its contradictory mode of action. Of two contradictory modes of action, one who has the power to choose may put into execution the one mode; but he must choose one of the two, and he cannot choose both. One who has the opportunity and the power of choice may either steal or not steal. But one of the two he must choose. He cannot voluntarily refrain from both. Only the loss of his opportunity or of his power of voluntary choice can relieve him from being voluntarily in the position of one who steals or one who does not steal.

In the case of acts and modes of action the same complications arise as in the case of propositions and judgments. From the logical point of view, there are no modes of action which are essentially positive, and none which are essentially negative. If a man says, in answer to the request to work in the vineyard, 'I go not,' his act is, logically speaking, both affirmative and negative. He negates the request 'Go work'; he takes the contradictory, but for that very reason also distinctly affirmative, attitude of positively refusing to work. No one capable of voluntary choice and possessed of the opportunity for action can undertake to do anything without thereby refusing or negating the plan of not undertaking to do that same thing. For the same reason, no voluntary agent can refuse an act without positively expressing the will not to do that act.

Yet, for all of us, positive and negative commands seem, under ordinary circumstances, to involve a distinctly different attitude of will and of mind. The contrast between the negative mode of commands illustrated by the Ten Commandments and the positive attitudes of the will expressed in the Sayings which tradition attributes to Christ has

furnished a very frequent and important topic for both ethical and theological comment. 'Tell the children, in a persuasive way, what to do; but do not insist upon telling them what not to do, unless you are obliged to do so' is, at the present time, familiar pedagogical advice. It is fair to ask why the purely logical point of view, which inevitably regards negation as a symmetrical relation, seems to stand in such momentous contrast to what both common sense and experience, ethical as well as religious, so persistently exemplify.

In the case of logical classes the not-relation takes a form which we cannot here study in detail. In briefest summary, we may say that, when two terms are related as X and Not- X , the meaning of the terms is such that everything in the so-called universe of discourse to which one is confining his consideration is either X or Not- X , while nothing is both X and Not- X ; the relation of negation here preserves, from the point of view of pure logic, its character as a symmetrical and 'hi-univocal' relation. Any term X which has a determinate range of application has one, and one only, corresponding negative term, or negation of X . In turn, the negative of the negative of X is the term X itself. From this point of view, pure logic, so far as we yet see, has no reason to recognize the existence of any terms except those which are essentially and equally both positive and negative terms. If a term X has a determinate meaning, then, *ipso facto*, the term Not- X has a determinate meaning. The negative of the negative of X is once more X itself. Each of these terms is the negative of the other. Each is also a positive term in so far as it is the negation of its own negation. Yet common sense and ordinary experience sharply distinguish purely negative terms, or terms that are defined by negation, from terms that are positive. The reason for this difference between the logical point of view and that of common sense needs a little further explanation. We may close this elementary logical survey of the nature of the not-relation by mentioning the fact that, despite the baffling complications and abstractions with which this elementary study is beset, the not-relation remains one of the most momentous of all relations for the organization not only of all the exact sciences, but of all the systematic study of human experience and of all our knowledge concerning the order of the world and our own conduct (see, further, art. ORDER). If negation, considered in these formal aspects, seems barren and abstract we may assert—dogmatically enough at this stage of our inquiry—what more careful research would make clear in great detail: 'Without negation no order.' But order is not only 'heaven's first law'; it is that upon which science and righteousness, insight and ethics, equally depend.

3. Unsymmetrical relations associated with the not-relation: privation, affirmation, positive attitudes of will, and modes of knowledge.—In experience, in forming our plans of conduct and defining the topic of our discourse, the not-relation comes to appear, and in certain respects actually to be, unsymmetrical, so that there arises a significant distinction between positive, or constructive, and more purely negative modes of expression, of the description of objects, or of the formation of our plans of action. This is due to the fact that we very seldom consider the not-relation merely by itself. Both in experience and in action, both in our thoughts about things and in our observations of the real world, we find reasons for associating the not-relation with other relations, such, e.g., as are suggested by the manifold contrasts and differences which appear in our experience, and which interest both our thought and our will.

When the not-relation is associated with other relations, so that we are dealing with an object P which is in certain respects to be treated as the negation of Q , while, at the same time P and Q have certain interesting differences to which we also attend, or are conceived by us under the limitations which are imposed upon us by the facts of life or by the interests of our minds, we are often able to say that only in a certain respect is P the negation of Q , or that P and Q are each the negation of the other with respect to, or within, a certain field, under the limitations of a certain discourse, or from a certain point of view. At the same time P and Q may also be in other relations—which are not wholly symmetrical. It is under such conditions that we are led to make use of expressions such as that ' P is not the mere negation, but the privation, or the absence of Q ,' or that the meaning of P implies that P expresses a certain need or want directed towards the object Q , which is then, precisely as the object of this need or want, in an unsymmetrical relation to P .

Further, it is very often the case that, in considering P and Q , we are actually limiting ourselves, our discourse, our plans of action, or our definitions to considerations and distinctions that arise within some limited field, or from the point of view of some special interest of our life, thoughts, or modes of classifying objects. We may be conscious of this limitation, or it may be merely tacit or ill-defined, or even unconscious. Within the limited field in which we are considering the distinction between P and Q , the relation between them may be or may appear to be the not-relation. Any one of very numerous considerations associated with this limitation of our point of view, our field of discourse, or our plans of action may involve relations between P and Q which are unsymmetrical, so that, as in the case of the instances of privation mentioned above, the relation between P and Q may be regarded as not symmetrical, and sometimes as associated with relations that involve objects distinct from both P and Q , with which P and Q stand in still further interesting relations. In such cases the not-relation, symmetrical and dyadic as it is, may be or may appear to be not the only relation with which we are actually concerned. Therefore, side by side with the not-relation, we may be obliged to note the existence of certain other relations in which P and Q also stand, relations triadic, tetradic, and, in fact, polyadic, with various degrees of complexity. Thus, by association with other relations, what is, from a certain point of view or in certain respects, to be regarded as the not-relation between P and Q comes to appear in other respects no longer symmetrical, and frequently no longer dyadic.

So complex are the situations and relations which under such circumstances may arise that we do well here to help ourselves by means of examples, beginning with comparatively simple instances, in order to show that most of the philosophical and empirical problems about the nature and function of negation are principally due to the fact that the conditions for negation seldom arise either in life or in science without being associated with the conditions which involve other relations than the not-relation. To unravel the tangle which this union of negation with other relations frequently involves is one of the most delicate and difficult problems of logical analysis. We can here give only the most elementary and general indications of the way in which this unravelling is to be attempted.

In Lewis Carroll's *Hunting of the Snark* the Barrister dreams that the Snark is 'defending the pig on the charge of deserting his sty.' In one of his pleas the Snark says: 'The charge of

Insolvency fails, it is clear, if you grant the plea, "Never indebted." The point of view from which 'insolvency' can very naturally be regarded as the negation of solvency involves what constitutes—to borrow the well-known phrase used by de Morgan—a 'limited universe of discourse.' In this universe of discourse the distinction between solvency and insolvency arises; the classes 'solvent' and 'insolvent' appear as classes standing each in the not-relation to the other, and one who belongs to this universe is either solvent or insolvent, while he cannot be both. The relation between solvent and insolvent is, so far, a symmetrical one; each of the terms is the negative of the other; there is no reason to call either the essentially positive term, while the other is to be viewed as essentially negative.

The plea of the Snark is founded upon bringing to our consciousness, in a somewhat confused way, the fact that the universe of discourse whose beings are classified as solvent and insolvent is a universe of discourse of beings who are, or at some time have been, debtors, when these beings are considered with reference to the question whether they are, were, or will be able or unable to pay their debts when these debts are, were, or will be due. One who has never belonged to this universe of discourse, simply because he has never contracted a debt, certainly does not belong, so the Snark asserts, to the class of insolvent debtors, whatever else may be said about him, or whatever else is the class in which he ought to be placed. Of this limitation, whereby the universe of discourse of solvent and insolvent beings is characterized, we may be unconscious, and therefore each of the classes 'solvent' and 'insolvent' appears to us as the negation of the other. That is why the relation is, in so far, treated as merely a not-relation.

If we become, as the Snark apparently wishes his listeners in the 'Shadowy Court' of the Barrister's dream to become, aware of what this limitation is, the classes 'solvent' and 'insolvent' appear in a somewhat different light. For, as even the Barrister becomes at least dimly aware, if the classes 'solvent' and 'insolvent' are classes of debtors, considered with reference to their power to pay their debts at maturity, they differ in a respect which involves other relations than the not-relation. A solvent differs from an insolvent debtor in that he possesses a power to pay at maturity. This power, if he is an honest man, he intends and probably expects to possess in due time. If he discovers that he no longer possesses it, he fails from inability to accomplish what he presumably wants to accomplish. His need is to be, if possible, solvent. An insolvent debtor is thus deprived of something that he needs or wants. His insolvency is therefore an instance of what has been called 'privation.' On the contrary, the solvent debtor has what, as an honest man, he intends or desires to have—the power to pay his debts. The relation between the solvent and the insolvent debtor is now no longer symmetrical. It is the relation between one who has and one who has not the object of a need or a desire.

For closely associated reasons, insolvency may conceivably be the object of what the Snark calls a 'charge.' The insolvent debtor may be haled into court, declared a bankrupt, or imprisoned as if for crime. From such perils and obligations the solvent debtor may be free. Here, again, the contrast between needs and privileges or possessions, between legal, social, or other empirical restrictions and freedom from such limitations, becomes important. The not-relation, in a universe of discourse thus limited, is no longer symmetrical. We need some other term than those of mere negation to express the relation involved. The insolvent and the solvent debtor classes are no longer each the mere negation of the other. Solvency appears as something positive, while insolvency involves want of something desirable, privation of something whose possession would constitute success.

Trivial as it is, this instance illustrates a type of relation which has its importance throughout the whole range of conduct, opinion, classification, conception, and so throughout the whole range of science, art, and human interests. Side by side with pure negation there now appears the distinction between two objects, each of which is in certain respects the negation of the other, while, at the same time, the negation arises within some limited universe of discourse. Secondly, there appears the frequent, though the not universally present, fact that such limitations of the universe of discourse are or may be associated with empirical, conventional, legal, or ethical contrasts which lead us to regard one of the two negatively related objects as the positive, the required, the superior member of the two negations. In such cases, where, within a limited universe of discourse, the relation of negation is associated with a definable or empirically obvious distinction in value, dignity, or desirableness between the two objects, we speak of one of the two negatively related objects as involving, or as constituted by, the privation of the other; one of the two appears as the positive term, the other as what the elementary text-books of

logic sometimes call 'the privative term' of the negation. Sometimes this privative term is called the 'merely negative term,'—an expression more familiar than enlightening, which has helped to confuse both the popular and the technical discussions of negation.

In the case of the debtor relation we obviously have, in the universe of discourse which the Snark defines in the Barrister's dream, a limited universe. This is not the only reason why the condition of insolvency seems to involve privation. It is because the debtor wants to pay his share, or because the law may put him in peril if he does not do so, that the universe of discourse of the solvent and insolvent debtors comes to be not merely a world which is classified, but a world in which solvency, as something positive, is contrasted with insolvency, as something which involves privation. Cases where other relations than those which necessarily involve contrast and classification interesting to the will, or having different value according as X or Not-X is the term emphasized, lead to unsymmetrical relations between terms, each of which is the negation of the other, are easily to be found in the exact sciences.

The whole numbers are classified into those which are prime and those which are not prime. In the universe of discourse of number, to say that ten is not a prime number is to assert the contradictory of the proposition that ten is a prime number. The limitation of the universe of discourse makes it possible to regard the prime numbers and the numbers which are not prime as in some respects unsymmetrically related. For the numbers which are not prime have factors, such that, in each case, the factors of a prime number are distinct both from the number and from unity. But the prime numbers have no such factors. Here, in so far as we are considering the purely logical character of the classification, the two classes 'prime numbers' and 'numbers not prime' are, within the universe of the numbers, negatively and symmetrically related. But the possession of factors is associated with so many other characters used in the theory of numbers, while the prime numbers (each of which initiates a new series of numbers, namely, its multiples, which from that prime number outward extend without end in order, and in their due places, throughout the series of whole numbers) have so many of their properties due to this fact, that, from what one may call a purely ordinal point of view, the distinction between the prime numbers and those which are not prime is in many respects unsymmetrical. Nobody would speak of the character of being a prime number as a privation of the character of having factors. Yet the two classes, prime and not-prime, are not merely negations of each other, within their own universe of discourse. The limitation of the universe is associated with many ordinal characters, which the prime numbers possess, and which the numbers that have factors do not possess. From the point of view of these ordinal characters, the distinction in question thus becomes unsymmetrical.

Other interesting instances of unsymmetrical relations associated with and modifying the relation of negation are furnished by the distinction between 'continuous' and 'discontinuous' lines, aggregates of points, sets or series of numbers, 'rational' and 'irrational' numbers, 'chemical elements' and 'material substances' which are not chemical elements. In all these cases, within some limited universe of discourse, a classification involving a negation appears. At the same time some more or less important unsymmetrical relations are so bound up with the not-relation that we are certainly not dealing with mere negation.

The foregoing illustrations and considerations show how, in general, affirmation and positive and constructive attitudes of will and modes of knowledge are defined. In life we always deal with limited universes of discourse. Within these limited universes distinctions arise like those between solvency and insolvency, success and failure, acceptance and refusal, winning and losing. In all such cases the contrasts become unsymmetrical, and may be associated with extremely complicated situations, such as involve triadic or polyadic relations. Under these conditions, for reasons which may be mainly practical, and which may also be of great theoretical importance in more or less exact sciences, and may be bound up with the most various enterprises and incidents of life, conduct,

and knowledge, we accept as an 'affirmative' attitude or assertion, or as a 'positive' deed or state of mind, one of two contrasted objects each of which is the negation of the other. Our reasons are of various sorts, some of which have had to serve in the foregoing as illustrations. In consequence, 'pure negation' can play no part in our concrete thinking and life, simply because it involves a merely symmetrical and logical relation between objects each of which is the negation of the other, and therefore is in a wholly symmetrical relation with the other, while there is no reason to declare one of the two negations to be the 'positive' and 'affirmative' member of the pair. It is in association with the other relations which life and experience most significantly present that negation becomes of concrete importance. When a man refuses to steal, society and the moral law are interested, not merely in the purely logical distinction between stealing and not-stealing, but also in what else the man does who does not steal.

4. The function of negation in thought and life. —In view of the distinctions which have now been illustrated, the main purpose of this article can best be accomplished by indicating the practical function which negation has in the business and conduct of life and in the work of science and philosophy.

This function is frequently defined by pointing out that what are generally called positive attitudes of mind, affirmative assertions, positive commands and exhortations, constructive thinking, and equally constructive conduct and decision are inseparable from negative attitudes, expressions, and opinions, and are implied in the latter, so that 'pure negation' is indeed impossible, while a positive attitude of mind is, in general, more fruitful and more advanced in its attainment of reasonableness than a prevaillingly negative attitude.

What this article has attempted to add to the familiar philosophical lore which is thus summarized is (1) a somewhat clearer view of the general logical nature of the process of negation, and (2) an enumeration of some of the ways in which we have good reason for contrasting a prevaillingly affirmative or positive way of thinking and conduct with a prevaillingly negative way, and for preferring affirmation to negation in certain regions and from certain points of view, as well as for certain specific purposes.

Usually, in giving the traditional preference to affirmation over negation, those who discuss the subject have failed to recognize that, in their purely logical character, both affirmation and negation, both positive and negative modes of definition, conception, and counsel, illustrate the same fundamental logical function. This, as a purely logical function, involves what is illustrated by the not-relation in general, by pairs of terms each of which is the negation of the other, and by pairs of contradictories, whether of propositions or modes of conduct. Since the not-relation, as purely logical, is symmetrical, it seems to involve, in its essential nature, no particular reason why one of two contradictory propositions should possess a form which is superior in its fruitfulness to the other, or why, of two terms each of which is the negation of the other, one should help us to conceptions essentially more fruitful than those which the other involves.

We have now seen that the reason why the logically symmetrical not-relation becomes nonsymmetrical, and furnishes a pair of terms or propositions of which one is more fruitful, more instructive, or in general more valuable than the other, lies in the fact that, in a limited universe of discourse, one of two terms each of which is the negation of the other may have a value superior to that possessed by the other, and may, in any case, call to

our attention matters which have an interest not possessed by the matters brought to our attention by the negation in question. We have also seen how both the experience which lies at the basis of our classification, or which warrants our proposition, and the interest which guides our will may lead us to emphasize these distinctions between the values of two terms, modes of action, or propositions which stand to each other in the not-relation. The result of our study is therefore that, when we are considering the general value which negation is to possess for us, either in the guidance of our conduct or in the clarifying and organizing of our information, we should explicitly take account (1) of the limitations of our universe of discourse, (2) of the values and interests which guide us when we consider or set in order our knowledge of this universe or direct our conduct in dealing with it, and (3) of the sort of experience which guides us as we take account of the various not-relations in question. Once more we may be aided in this summary by a reference to some of the illustrations which we have already used.

Some one advises us to prefer a positive or affirmative mode of guiding our conduct to a prevaillingly negative mode, to consider what to do rather than what not to do, to give to the children positive rather than negative counsel, not to take Mephistopheles for our model, to prefer constructive to prevaillingly destructive modes of behaviour. What does such counsel practically mean? Whoever says, 'Do this,' logically speaking, counsels us not to refuse to do this, not to do the contradictory act. Thus, then, all counsel, in order to be positive, is also, in a strictly logical sense, negative; and, as we have seen, there is no such thing as purely negative counsel, as always denying, as the supposed purely Mephistophelian attitude. Nobody is purely constructive. Whoever builds the edifice destroys the original structure which existed before in the material out of which he constructs the edifice. Civilization implies a destruction of vast numbers of natural objects and processes. Whoever rears and trains the mature man destroys many of the natural tendencies and habits which, apart from training, nature would produce in the untrained child. Why, then, does one conceive of construction as something not negative? Why does one regard the affirmative attitude as something absolutely distinct from the negative attitude? Why does one prefer the positive in life, thought, and training?

The answer is, as we have seen, that we live in a limited universe of discourse, and that we wish to do so. The very conception of an absolutely unlimited universe of discourse would involve manifold logical contradictions, which are now well-known to logicians. Moreover, all that is valuable to us takes place in, and is subject to the limitation of, the universe of discourse of our present human life. Not only is this the case, but all the preciousness of life depends upon it. As experience shows us some of the limitations of this universe of discourse, it also reveals some of its values. Our ethical conceptions and distinctions give to many of these values a more rational character, but all the more reveal to us the importance of the asymmetries which our conduct both finds and prefers. We desire to live in houses. The desire has its well-known empirical foundation, and also its rational ethical justification. Constructing houses is an activity which stands in contrast with the activity of destroying them, and which has a corresponding value. In a duly limited universe of discourse we can at pleasure so define the activities of building houses and of destroying them that the two modes of action stand in a symmetrical not-relation to each other. But in this limited universe

Insolvency fails, it is clear, if you grant the plea, "Never indebted." The point of view from which 'insolvency' can very naturally be regarded as the negation of solvency involves what constitutes—to borrow the well-known phrase used by de Morgan—a 'limited universe of discourse.' In this universe of discourse the distinction between solvency and insolvency arises; the classes 'solvent' and 'insolvent' appear as classes standing each in the not-relation to the other, and one who belongs to this universe is either solvent or insolvent, while he cannot be both. The relation between solvent and insolvent is, so far, a symmetrical one; each of the terms is the negative of the other; there is no reason to call either the essentially positive term, while the other is to be viewed as essentially negative.

The plea of the Snark is founded upon bringing to our consciousness, in a somewhat confused way, the fact that the universe of discourse whose beings are classified as solvent and insolvent is a universe of discourse of beings who are, or at some time have been, debtors, when these beings are considered with reference to the question whether they are, were, or will be able or unable to pay their debts when these debts are, were, or will be due. One who has never belonged to this universe of discourse, simply because he has never contracted a debt, certainly does not belong, so the Snark asserts, to the class of insolvent debtors, whatever else may he said about him, or whatever else is the class in which he ought to be placed. Of this limitation, whereby the universe of discourse of solvent and insolvent beings is characterized, we may be unconscious, and therefore each of the classes 'solvent' and 'insolvent' appears to us as the negation of the other. That is why the relation is, in so far, treated as merely a not-relation.

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Trivial as it is, this instance illustrates a type of relation which has its importance throughout the whole range of conduct, opinion, classification, conception, and so throughout the whole range of science, art, and human interests. Side by side with pure negation there now appears the distinction between two objects, each of which is in certain respects the negation of the other, while, at the same time, the negation arises within some limited universe of discourse. Secondly, there appears the frequent, though the not universally present, fact that such limitations of the universe of discourse are or may be associated with empirical, conventional, legal, or ethical contrasts which lead us to regard one of the two negatively related objects as the positive, the required, the superior member of the two negations. In such cases, where, within a limited universe of discourse, the relation of negation is associated with a definable or empirically obvious distinction in value, dignity, or desirableness between the two objects, we speak of one of the two negatively related objects as involving, or as constituted by, the privation of the other; one of the two appears as the positive term, the other as what the elementary text-books of

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This function is frequently defined by pointing out that what are generally called positive attitudes of mind, affirmative assertions, positive commands and exhortations, constructive thinking, and equally constructive conduct and decision are inseparable from negative attitudes, expressions, and opinions, and are implied in the latter, so that 'pure negation' is indeed impossible, while a positive attitude of mind is, in general, more fruitful and more advanced in its attainment of reasonableness than a prevaillingly negative attitude.

What this article has attempted to add to the familiar philosophical lore which is thus summarized is (1) a somewhat clearer view of the general logical nature of the process of negation, and (2) an enumeration of some of the ways in which we have good reason for contrasting a prevaillingly affirmative or positive way of thinking and conduct with a prevaillingly negative way, and for preferring affirmation to negation in certain regions and from certain points of view, as well as for certain specific purposes.

Usually, in giving the traditional preference to affirmation over negation, those who discuss the subject have failed to recognize that, in their purely logical character, both affirmation and negation, both positive and negative modes of definition, conception, and counsel, illustrate the same fundamental logical function. This, as a purely logical function, involves what is illustrated by the not-relation in general, by pairs of terms each of which is the negation of the other, and by pairs of contradictories, whether of propositions or modes of conduct. Since the not-relation, as purely logical, is symmetrical, it seems to involve, in its essential nature, no particular reason why one of two contradictory propositions should possess a form which is superior in its fruitfulness to the other, or why, of two terms each of which is the negation of the other, one should help us to conceptions essentially more fruitful than those which the other involves.

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our attention matters which have an interest not possessed by the matters brought to our attention by the negation in question. We have also seen how both the experience which lies at the basis of our classification, or which warrants our proposition, and the interest which guides our will may lead us to emphasize these distinctions between the values of two terms, modes of action, or propositions which stand to each other in the not-relation. The result of our study is therefore that, when we are considering the general value which negation is to possess for us, either in the guidance of our conduct or in the clarifying and organizing of our information, we should explicitly take account (1) of the limitations of our universe of discourse, (2) of the values and interests which guide us when we consider or set in order our knowledge of this universe or direct our conduct in dealing with it, and (3) of the sort of experience which guides us as we take account of the various not-relations in question. Once more we may be aided in this summary by a reference to some of the illustrations which we have already used.

Some one advises us to prefer a positive or affirmative mode of guiding our conduct to a prevaillingly negative mode, to consider what to do rather than what not to do, to give to the children positive rather than negative counsel, not to take Mephistopheles for our model, to prefer constructive to prevaillingly destructive modes of behaviour. What does such counsel practically mean? Whoever says, 'Do this,' logically speaking, counsels us not to refuse to do this, not to do the contradictory act. Thus, then, all counsel, in order to be positive, is also, in a strictly logical sense, negative; and, as we have seen, there is no such thing as purely negative counsel, as always denying, as the supposed purely Mephistophelian attitude. Nobody is purely constructive. Whoever builds the edifice destroys the original structure which existed before in the material out of which he constructs the edifice. Civilization implies a destruction of vast numbers of natural objects and processes. Whoever rears and trains the mature man destroys many of the natural tendencies and habits which, apart from training, nature would produce in the untrained child. Why, then, does one conceive of construction as something not negative? Why does one regard the affirmative attitude as something absolutely distinct from the negative attitude? Why does one prefer the positive in life, thought, and training?

The answer is, as we have seen, that we live in a limited universe of discourse, and that we wish to do so. The very conception of an absolutely unlimited universe of discourse would involve manifold logical contradictions, which are now well-known to logicians. Moreover, all that is valuable to us takes place in, and is subject to the limitation of, the universe of discourse of our present human life. Not only is this the case, but all the preciousness of life depends upon it. As experience shows us some of the limitations of this universe of discourse, it also reveals some of its values. Our ethical conceptions and distinctions give to many of these values a more rational character, but all the more reveal to us the importance of the asymmetries which our conduct both finds and prefers. We desire to live in houses. The desire has its well-known empirical foundation, and also its rational ethical justification. Constructing houses is an activity which stands in contrast with the activity of destroying them, and which has a corresponding value. In a duly limited universe of discourse we can at pleasure so define the activities of building houses and of destroying them that the two modes of action stand in a symmetrical not-relation to each other. But in this limited universe

of discourse the distinction in value between the two processes remains both empirically manifest and rationally justifiable. Of the resulting mutually negative modes of action one is called the 'positive' mode, the other involves that destructive treatment of houses which leaves people homeless, and which robs the world of its value. Therefore the counsel, 'Build rather than destroy,' has a perfectly definite warrant, which at once depends upon the logical symmetry of the not-relation in its own limited universe of discourse and makes clear why the one mode of action appears as a privation, a wiping out of values, while the other appears as both empirically and rationally preferable.

If Mephistopheles always denies, his denials, which are practical as well as theoretical, are modes of action which have their place and value in a definitely limited universe of discourse, both social and ethical. In their simplest forms and instances they appear as a 'snubbing' of the proposals which others made, a sarcastic and cynical showing of contempt for human hopes and aspirations; they leave hearts desolate, ruin lives, and add to the sum of human horror. Under these circumstances, we can understand how every mode of action does indeed involve a destruction of something as well as a construction of something else, and how the not-relations involved are perfectly symmetrical, while we equally well understand why we prefer that hearts should not be made desolate, that lives should not be ruined, that the noblest in man should not be destroyed. The world in which we condemn Mephistopheles for his negation is indeed a limited universe of discourse, but the relation between heaven and hell in that world is not merely a symmetrical not-relation, but an asymmetrical relation—a relation of lower and higher, of the noblest to the basest, of the heights of justice and holiness to the depths of diabolism. It is important to see that the logical symmetry of the not-relation is needed as the basis of such unsymmetrical relations between good and evil, heaven and hell, salvation and perdition. Without negation none of these contrasts could be defined, none of these distinctions between the lower and the higher could come to clear consciousness at all; hence negation is an absolutely essential function of our thought and will. Without negation there would be no clearness with regard to values, no knowledge of heaven or hell, of good or evil; hence Mephistopheles is indeed the inseparable companion of the one who is to learn what these distinctions are, and is even thereby to come into contact with what constitutes their value.

We turn for a moment to the case of the types of pedagogical advice which we have already mentioned. It is true that, if we give positive counsels to the children, we, logically speaking, inevitably give them advice which is also negative. For we cannot tell them what to do without counselling them not to do the contradictories of what we counsel. And, as the children are also more or less crudely logical, while some of them are more or less quaintly or crudely Mephistophelian, they will frequently find their own way of planning and performing the contradictory of what we counsel. But it is one thing to give them encouraging advice which awakens them by winning suggestions; it is another to play in our own way the part of Mephistopheles, by first finding out what their desires are and then explicitly snubbing them, and thus condemning them to the depths of discouragement, or inflaming their already existing disposition to rebel against our counsel. The Ten Commandments appear to make their appeal to an already more or less evil-minded, rebellious, or wayward people, whom the thunders of the law

are to terrify into submission. The use of the word 'not' gives to the Commandments this outward seeming, not because the relation of negation is logically unsymmetrical, and not because we can ever command without also forbidding the contradictory of our command, but because the limitations of the universe of discourse about Mt. Sinai, as well as the unsymmetrical distinctions between the thunders on the top of the mountain and the way downward to the plain where the people listen to the thunders, strongly suggest the overcoming by terror of an already-existing stubborn will.

On the other hand, the Sayings and the Sermon on the Mount give their counsels in a universe of discourse where the unsymmetrical relations between the Father and His children, between the Shepherd and the lost sheep, already inspire confidence, a tendency to harmony with one's counsellor, and a disposition to regard him as one who speaks with a peculiar and winning 'authority.' In such a world the not-relation is as definitely present as in any other logically definite world of counsel. On occasion the Sayings, the Parables, and the Sermon on the Mount make explicit both the not-relation and the limitations of the universe of discourse. But, on the whole, while the not-relation is logically just as prominent in the universe of discourse of the Parables and of the Sayings as it is in any other sharply defined universe of discourse, the particle 'not' does not play so large a part as in the Commandments, or as would be the case in negative appeals to the unwise or to the erring. The logic of the situation is identical. What one emphasizes in the mode of expression used is distinct; privation is in the background. What ought to be is made attractive; what ought not to be is more frequently left to be discovered by the enlightened doer of the will, who is expected 'to know of the doctrine' all the better, the more he has been won over 'to do the will.'

The practical moral of all such instances is that, both in our definition of the not-relations which interest us and in our whole use of negations, we should carefully consider the universe of discourse which we propose to employ as the field within which to make our logical distinctions, and also the asymmetrical distinctions of value which arise within that universe. The problem of the relation between these limitations and values and our use of negation is partly a psychological one, and partly one of limiting one's field of operations, for the sake of accomplishing to the full one's enterprise.

'In limitation alone can mastery be displayed.' Thus the problem of negation is one of limiting the field of attention and following the guide of the asymmetrical relations which appear within that field.

The case mentioned above, of the so-called 'negative theology' of the mystics, of *The Imitation of Christ*, and of the Hindu seer, still calls for a word. A 'purely negative' metaphysical doctrine is logically quite as impossible as any other 'purely negative' doctrine. For a metaphysical doctrine must consist of propositions; and a system of propositions essentially consists of a series of pairs of mutually contradictory propositions. If we call either of these propositions 'positive,' its contradictory 'negative' is its inseparable companion; if we call either 'negative,' its own contradiction, which then appears as an 'affirmative' proposition, is equally inseparable from it. But the Hindu seer, or the author of *The Imitation of Christ*, or any other teacher who uses expressions which illustrate a 'negative theology,' is actually thinking or speaking in a more or less deliberately

limited universe of discourse. This universe of discourse is supposed to contain every thing possible, because it contains two beings, God and the world, the absolute and the finite. But an absolutely complete universe of discourse is logically impossible; and the mystic's universe of discourse is, in general, a very limited one—consisting of the objects of our more ordinary experience and the apparent object of the mystic experience itself. These two objects stand in a relation which is certainly not merely the not-relation, although Yājñavalkya and a Kempis are unnecessarily fond of speaking as if this were so. The relation is unsymmetrical in this sense that, for the mystic, one of these objects, viz. God, the absolute, or the 'self,' is ineffably precious, and is defined in terms of the decidedly unsymmetrical relation 'above' or 'beyond,' and the other is defined as 'beneath' or sometimes as 'without.' The relation between this precious or perfect absolute object of the so-called 'negative theology' and the objects of ordinary experience is sometimes defined in terms of a contrast between 'created being' and 'uncreated being.' Now, whatever the relation of creation is, it is obviously viewed by those in question as unsymmetrical. The world 'emanates from,' or 'descends from,' or is 'produced by' its conceived Creator. The mystic God is therefore not merely and negatively uncreated, but He is that from which created being emanates or through whose will it is produced. The Hindu seers, pantheistic as they were, had still their own doctrine of 'emanation' and their various unsymmetrical relations.

It follows that the so-called 'negative theology' never tells us anything in terms of 'pure negation.' On the contrary, it very volubly characterizes a set of unsymmetrical distinctions of value, of preciousness, of grades of being, and of processes of emanation, which include numerous not-relations, but which depend for all their interest upon the fact that the mystic presents to us something of which he can say that it is best known 'when most I feel there is a lower and a higher.'

Perhaps this final illustration, when added to the foregoing, may serve to indicate the function of negation. In brief, the function of negation is, by means of the indispensable and fundamental not-relation, to lay a basis for an understanding of the complexities and asymmetries of the world of experience which may serve to clarify our ideas and systematize our conduct.

LITERATURE.—Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and Hegel's *Logic* both contain very extended discussions of various aspects of negation. To Kant belongs the doubtful credit of having deliberately attempted, in his discussion of the Table of Categories, to treat negation as involving an essentially triadic rather than a dyadic relation. This doctrine has, since Kant, been justly neglected. Hegel's logical discussions of the topic are manifold, and have been historically very influential. See also the *Logics* of R. H. Lotze (2nd Leipzig, 1880-84), C. von Sigwart (3rd Tübingen, 1904), F. H. Bradley (London, 1883), B. Bosanquet (2nd Oxford, 1911), and W. Wundt (2nd Stuttgart, 1893-95), as well as A. N. Whitehead and B. A. W. Russell's treatment of various aspects of this not-relation in their *Principia Mathematica*, Cambridge, 1910-13, and elsewhere. See also T. Harper, *The Metaphysics of the School*, London, 1870-84. The term 'negative theology' is used by Dionysius Areopag., *de Myst. Theol.* 1st ff., *de Div. Nom.* i. 4. See also Scotus Erigena, *de Div. Nat.* ii. 30.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

NEGRILLOS AND NEGRITOS.—The existence of living Pygmy peoples in Africa (Negrillos) and in Indonesia and Melanesia (Negritos), and the discovery of their skeletal remains in Europe, have given rise to much theorizing as to the position of such dwarf peoples in the genealogical tree of the human race. According to J. Kollmann (*Korrespondenzblatt der deutsch. anthropol. Gesellschaft*, xxxvi. [1905] 9, and *Globus*, lxxxvii. [1905] 140), the oldest forms of man were of small stature; from them the modern races gradually developed,

each tall race being preceded by a correlated small one. W. H. Flower says:

'We may, therefore, regard them [Pygmies] as little-modified descendants of an extremely ancient race, the ancestors of all the Negro tribes [African and Indo-Pacific]' (*JAL* ix. [1880] 132). W. Schmidt (*Die Stellung der Pygmäenvölker*, Stuttgart, 1910, p. 298) describes them as humanity in its childhood. Other authorities regard the Pygmy tribes as degenerate forms; G. Schwalbe (*Studien zur Vorgesch. des Menschen*, Stuttgart, 1906) states that they are due to selection under poor and isolated conditions; indeed, their position is still an open question (cf. art. DWARFS AND PYGMIES).

As regards the ethnology of the Pygmies, we find them to be uniformly at a very backward stage of culture. They are collectors and hunters, whose weapon is the bow and arrow; some Negritos, however, have learned from neighbouring peoples to till the soil. They are typically monogamous.

1. Negrillos of Central Africa.—In the work named above Schmidt summarizes our knowledge of the Pygmy peoples. He there quotes A. Le Roy (*Les Pygmées*, Tours, 1905, p. 176 f.), who emphasizes the great difference between the religious ideas of the Negrillos and those of the Negroes among whom they live. The Negrillos have hardly any cult of the dead, and no fetish huts or images dedicated to them, no amulets, no professional sorcerers or priests. They have certain charms for ensuring success in hunting, but it has not yet been ascertained whence these derive their power. A marked contrast to the polytheism and nature- and ancestor-cults of the Negroes is afforded by the notions of certain Pygmies as to the supreme being. The chief of the Boni Pygmies of E. Africa gave Le Roy the following account of Waka, their god:

'He is lord of all. He gave the Boni these lands, forests, rivers, and all by which they live. He cannot be seen, but he sees men very well. Sometimes he descends into the Boni camp and kills one of them. Then they bury that one deep in the earth and move away from there; for it is dangerous to remain under the eyes of Waka. He is strict and must have his share of everything. Therefore when they kill a buffalo the best piece is taken and laid on the fire; part is burnt on the fire, the rest the man and his children eat. If any one finds honey, he does not take any till he has thrown a little into the forest and up to the sky. If he wants to drink palm-wine, he first pours a little on the ground. The following words are said: "Waka, thou hast given me this buffalo, this honey, this wine. See there thy share. Give me henceforward strength and life, and let nothing evil befall my children!"' (quoted by Schmidt, p. 232).

It should be noted, however, that the Hamitic Galla of E. Africa have a supreme being, Wāq, who is conceived as the omniscient and all-powerful creator of everything earthly and represents the principle of good; he possesses all the sublime qualities of godhead and is prayed to for preservation of life and property and for all worldly prosperity (P. Paulitschke, *Beiträge zur Ethnographie und Anthropologie der Somäl, Galla und Harar*, Leipzig, 1886, ii. 19). Le Roy also gives an account obtained from a member of the Ajongo tribe of Gabun, which has mixed with the Negroes but retains distinct and 'higher' religious ideas. The supreme being is called Nzambi—a name which also occurs among some W. Bantu, though with vaguer significance. He lives up above, and speaks through thunder to tell men that rain will fall. He is lord over all and has made and disposed all things, and before him we are very small. He causes life and death; after death the shade sinks into the earth and then gradually mounts up to him, and receives reward or is cast into the fire according to his merits (quoted by Schmidt, p. 232 f.). The Nkula Pygmies offer the firstfruits of the nkula-nut to their god with a short ceremony. The Bekü mixed Pygmies honour a supreme being, Nzame, maker of the sky, the stars, light, and the

eyes, the pupils of which reflect his image and are the seat of life. Beasts and men arose from his union with a lesser maternal deity. The Bekü also have a spirit-cult 'which is evidence of Negro influence.' J. M. M. van der Burgt states (*Un grand Peuple de l'Afrique équatoriale*, Bois-le-Duc, 1904, pp. 46, 74, 82, 119-121, 137, quoted in Schmidt, p. 234) that the Wa-Twa of Urundi have a supreme spirit Indagarra, who created a man and woman, and judges people after death according to their deserts. Below him is Ryangombe, a spirit who is associated with the ancestral pair, of whom, however, there seems to be little or no cult. The Wa-Twa wear few amulets themselves, though they are said to make all those of the Wa-Rundi.

P. H. G. Powell-Cotton ('Notes on a Journey through the Great Ituri Forest,' *Journ. Afr. Soc.*, 1907, pp. 5, 6) found among the Pygmies of Mawambe the belief that thunderstorms were controlled by a higher power, and an offering of food to the supreme spirit at a ceremonial feast to give them luck on moving to a new hunting-ground. H. H. Johnston writes:

'Even these dwarf hunting nomads [in the Congo basin], leading a life equivalent to one of the earliest stages of human culture, believe—so far as their impressions have been recorded—in some vague superhuman power of the sky (*Nzambi*, if they speak in Bantu dialects), and think that chiefs or village elders live again after death in the form of bush-pigs or snakes' (George Grenfell and the Congo, London, 1903, ii. 632).

Among some, at any rate, this power seems to be regarded as bad, for it occasionally slays men with its fire (Johnston, *The Uganda Protectorate*, London, 1902, ii. 539).

2. Negritos of the east. —(a) *Andamanese*.—The Andamanese, according to A. R. Brown (*The Andaman Islands*, Cambridge, 1916, ch. iii.), believe in two different kinds of supernatural being: (1) the spirits inhabiting the forest and sea respectively, which are the ghosts of dead men and women; and (2) other beings connected with the sun and moon, lightning and thunder, and the monsoons (Biliku and Tarai); these are all associated with the phenomena of nature. The only being outside these categories about whom Brown could discover anything was Nila, who lives in hollow *Pterocarpus* trees and comes out to slay human beings who approach his trees. The most important beliefs are those relating to the weather and seasons, which are under the control of Biliku (Puluga) and Tarai (Deria). The connexion between Biliku and the north-east monsoon is fundamental; throughout the Great Andaman wind, rain, and storm are associated with Biliku, or with Biliku and Tarai, who is identified with the south-west monsoon. As to other points accounts differ in various parts: in the north Tarai is often said to be Biliku's husband; elsewhere they are said to be two friends (male) who have quarrelled, or again Biliku is a pair whose children are the winds. In all the groups bad weather is regarded as the result of Biliku's anger; lightning is a fire-brand flung by her (him). There is complete unanimity also as to the three things which are punished in this way: (1) the melting or burning of bees-wax; (2) cutting or interfering with a certain number of plants, especially at a certain period of the year; and (3) killing a cicada or making a noise during the time cicadas are singing at morning or evening. The idea that Biliku dislikes the smell of burning wax may be due, Brown suggests, to the fact that honey is collected and wax melted every year just before the rains begin, and so the breaking of the monsoon has come to be regarded as resulting from the offence caused to Biliku in this way. Similarly, the season for digging up yams is in October, and November is the month for the worst storms and cyclones.

There are numerous legends about the 'ances-

tors' who first inhabited the Andamanese world, in which Biliku figures.

In one Lumatut (the kingfisher) stole fire from Biliku, who lived on a separate island from the ancestors; Biliku woke up and flung a fire-brand at him, after which in wrath Biliku went to live in the sky. Another tale from the south tells how Puluga was sent away out of the world by the ancestors whose huts and property he used to destroy. In another version it was a ba shell that Biliku flung at the thief, which is used by women for slicing yams and seeds. One informant said that Biliku (who had a husband Porokul) made the earth, sky, and sea, discovered the use of all the edible roots known to the Andamanese, and is very angry if these are gathered in the rainy season. The points to note in these tales are that Biliku lived on earth but apart from the ancestors, that fire was stolen from her, and that she flung a fire-brand or shell-slicer. The belief in Biliku as the first being is sporadic and undeveloped, and, in Brown's opinion, an accretion (*FL* xx. [1909] 257-271).

It has been stated that the Andamanese tend to personify natural phenomena, and, just as the sun and moon are regarded as two persons, the sun being the wife of the moon, so the two monsoons were personified as Biliku and Tarai and made wife and husband. In the five northern linguistic groups of Great Andaman Biliku is female; so also is her counterpart Oluga in Little Andaman; in two other groups she is male, and in the remaining three predominantly so. Two facts indicate that Biliku was originally feminine: (1) that at the two extremities of the islands Biliku and Oluga are female, while three of the five central groups seem to reveal an intermediate stage; (2) that she hurls fire-brands or shell-slicers instead of shooting arrows, as a man would do. There seem to be no legends about Tarai; in the south he is generally ignored, even storms from the south-west being attributed to Puluga.

The account of Andamanese beliefs by E. H. Man (*On the Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands*, London, 1883, pp. 84 ff., 88 ff.), differing from Brown's more in interpretation than in actual data, forms the basis of Schmidt's version, in which Puluga is made to figure as a high god, creator and supreme judge, 'who has forbidden deceit, theft, raids, murder, adultery, and the burning of wax (for magical purposes)' (p. 195). The prohibition on yams and other edible fruits during the first half of the rainy season is interpreted by Schmidt as a sort of offering of firstfruits; according to Brown, they are not available for food until the end of the rainy season. When Man denies to the Andamanese any form of cult or religious rites (p. 88), and M. V. Portman confirms this as regards prayer and sacrifice, adding that no love is felt for Puluga (*A Hist. of our Relations with the Andamanese*, Calcutta, 1899, i. 44), then Schmidt questions whether our knowledge of the Andamanese justifies such categorical negatives (pp. 197-200), and adopts the rôle of counsel for the defence of Puluga as high god, revered and beloved by man, preferring to ascribe certain anthropomorphic tendencies in the deity to a later mythological stratum (p. 203). He is convinced that a moon-mythology similar to the Austronesian must formerly have dominated the Andamans; according to this, the waxing moon is male, the waning moon male or female. Thus the male waxing moon which appears first in the south-west is Tarai, the male, and so the sex of Biliku when regarded as female is satisfactorily accounted for. To sustain his theory Schmidt is obliged to assume that S. Andaman, where Man's observations were made, is in a more primitive condition than the north, for which assumption he offers no adequate proof. The conflicting views of Brown and Schmidt found expression in a short controversy in *Man* (x. [1910] 2, 33, 66, 82).

Ceremonial observances of the Andamanese are social rather than religious in character (cf. chs. ii. and v. of Brown's *Andaman Islands*). Certain periods in the life of the individual are regarded as

critical, and at such times food-tabus are strictly observed. Thus on attaining puberty both boys and girls have to abstain from honey, turtle, dugong, etc., and a number of vegetable foods for two or three years, on the expiration of which the turtle-eating ceremony takes place, when a new name is conferred. After some months the pig-eating ceremony follows, and then by degrees the youth or girl reverts to normal diet. During pregnancy and for one month after the child is born a mother observes certain food-tabus, in which her husband shares.

Disease and death are attributed to the ghosts of jungle and sea. The body is decorated, flexed, and enveloped in the sleeping mat, and a shell-knife is placed in the hand. It is either buried in the ground or exposed on a platform, with the face to the east; platform disposal is regarded as more honourable. A fire is lighted and a vessel of water is placed beside the grave; sometimes the dead man's bow and an arrow or two or a harpoon and line are left on it. After the funeral the camp is abandoned, and a period of mourning ensues, at the end of which the bones are exhumed, broken up, and strung together into ornaments to be worn by the near relatives. The bodies of enemies are burned, so that blood and fat ascend in smoke and the ghost does not trouble the slayers. After killing turtle, pig, etc., certain precautions are taken to avoid trouble with the animal's ghost.

The Andamanese think that a man can die and come to life again. It is the man's double, reflexion, or shadow that leaves his body at death, and may visit people in dreams while he is alive.

'In every tribe there are alternative and inconsistent beliefs as to the place where spirits go, which by different accounts is in the sky, beneath the earth, out to the east where the sun and moon take their rise, or in the jungle and sea of their own country' (Brown, p. 170).

These ghosts haunting jungle and sea can be kept at a distance by wearing strings of human bones or certain leaves, by fire, bees-wax, an arrow, or red paint; but whistling attracts them. Medicine-men (or, less often, medicine-women) acquire their power by contact with the ghosts; a man can come into contact with them by dying and then coming back to life, or by meeting them in the jungle, or in a less degree power may be obtained through dreams. Medicine-men are able to cause or cure disease, and to control the weather by simple rites directed either against Biliku or Tarai or against the ghosts of the sea. Among all supernatural forces it is Biliku, controller of the weather, who is of paramount importance, for on fine weather depend the hunting, fishing, and dancing which make up the work and pleasure of the Andaman Islander's life.

(b) *Semang of the Malay Peninsula*.—A full account of the religious beliefs of the Semang, based largely on the observations of Vaughan-Stevens, is given by W. W. Skeat and C. O. Blagden (*Pagan Races of the Malay Peninsula*, London, 1906, ii. ch. vi.).

'The Semang religion,' they observe, 'in spite of its recognition of a "Thunder-god" (Kari) and certain minor "deities," has very little indeed in the way of ceremonial, and appears to consist mainly of mythology and legends. It shows remarkably few traces of demon-worship, very little fear of ghosts of the deceased, and still less of any sort of animistic beliefs' (ii. 174.).

Kari is of supernatural size, but is now invisible. He created everything except the earth and mankind, but when Plé had made men Kari gave them souls. He is omnipotent and knows whenever men do wrong; certain acts anger him, but sometimes he pleads with Plé on man's behalf. Kari is the giver of life, the causer of death, and the supreme judge of souls. He requires a blood-sacrifice; during a thunderstorm a few drops of blood are drawn from the shin, mixed with a little water in a bamboo receptacle, and thrown up to the sky.

accompanied among the E. Semang by a form of invocation. As a rule, however, invocations, which are requests for material advantage, have not advanced to the stage of a fixed form, but are simply a wish expressed in conversational phrase addressed to the great spirits or deities. Plé also receives blood-sacrifices. R. Martin (*Die Inland-stämme der malayischen Halbinsel*, Jena, 1905, p. 956) regards this proceeding during a storm as simply a weather-charm and in no sense an act of worship or cult. Besides Plé and his sister Simei there are other deities subordinate to Kari who act as his messengers.

The E. Semang believe that each man has a soul shaped like himself, blood-red, and the size of a grain of maize. New souls sit in a tree behind Kari's seat till he sends them forth; they are conveyed by a bird which is killed and eaten by the expectant mother. Each species of animal has a corresponding soul-plant; 'fish-souls come from grasses, bird-souls from their eating certain fruits' (Skeat-Blagden, ii. 215 f.). When Kari desires to punish a person, he sends a disease borne by the wind-demon, who deposits it upon the culprit's forehead. The god Plé pacifies Kari and permits the Semang to avert the punishments by giving them a talisman: a woman is protected by the special designs engraved on the combs worn in her hair; according to Vaughan-Stevens, the patterns used by her sex to avert the special ills affecting them were the invention of Simei, the sister (or daughter?) of Plé (*Veröffentl. aus dem. königl. Mus. für Völkerkunde*, iii. [Berlin, 1894] 110). Definite patterns ward off specific diseases; as many as eight different combs may be worn at once. These combs are buried with a woman to afford protection to her soul. Men avert diseases by means of patterns invented by Plé on quivers, blow-pipes, and bamboo staves. Similar combs are worn by the Pangan Sakai of Perak, and most of the mixed tribes. Martin says (p. 703) that he found them mainly confined to the Sakai, being much rarer among the woolly-haired Semang; he notes various amulets in use among the Semang (p. 954; cf. Skeat-Blagden, i. 396 ff., 149).

When a man dies, his burial bamboo is inserted in his girdle. On this tube, which is larger for men than for women, patterns are incised by the tribal chief. If a man has been very wicked, his chief will refuse to cut the patterns on it, and the soul will have to appear before Kari without it and will certainly be condemned.

'The soul was believed to cross over into Paradise by means of a tree-bridge, from which the souls of the wicked fell into a boiling lake beneath, through fright of a monstrous figure that mounted guard over the bridge' (Skeat-Blagden, ii. 217).

After swimming about there desperately for three years, they may be rescued by the chief of the heaven of fruit-trees, who lets down his great toe, to which they cling and are drawn out. The old and wise (chiefs and medicine-men) are buried in trees, so that their souls may be able to fly over the head of the monster at the bridge. The Kedah Semang believe that the heavens consist of three stages: the highest, filled with fruit-trees yielding luxuriantly all the year, is inhabited by the greater persons of mythology; the second also contains wild fruit-trees; the third has nothing but low brooding clouds which bring sickness to mankind (ib. i. 460, ii. 207 f., 217).

The medicine-man is usually the most important member of the tribe; chiefs nearly always seem to be medicine-men of more or less repute. They obey prohibitions on the flesh of goats, buffalo, and fowls which are not incumbent on other tribesmen. They are able to enter the fruit paradise in a trance, to turn themselves into tigers, to slay men at a distance, and to supply infallible love-charms

(ib. ii. 225-227). There are a good many myths and beliefs about animals—elephants and tigers in particular are occupied by the souls of dead chiefs; and there are vague ideas of a big conflagration replacing the wide-spread flood-myth (ib. ii. 221 ff., 219). Martin regards animal tales as of Malay origin (p. 950).

As regards the supreme position of Kari, Martin considers (p. 986 f.) that Vaughan-Stevens' data upon which mainly Skeat and Blagden base their statement require confirmation before a primitive theistic system can be ascribed to the inland tribes. 'From the primitive spirits . . . a single almighty, wrathful and rewarding god has developed under foreign influence,' undergoing a new connexion with a much more primitive animism and demonism, though of these only traces appear among the Semang. There are thus two views: (1) a wholesale substitution of religious beliefs for which there is no evidence as yet available; and (2) that of Schmidt (pp. 219-229), who states that the Semang afford a striking contradiction to most modern evolutionary theories as applied to religion. For of the three main groups of backward peoples, we find among the Pygmy Semang, who are culturally at the lowest stage, 'recognition and reverence of a Supreme Being with practically no manism and animism . . . but retrogression of reverence for the Supreme Being and growth of manism and animism the more cultural development advances among the Senoi and Jakun' (Schmidt, p. 228). As to the foreign influence assumed by Martin, it should be noted that the Semang live farthest from and the Jakun nearest to the zone from which such influence could emanate. See, further, art. MALAY PENINSULA.

(c) *Philippine Islanders*.—Not much is known about the religion of these tribes, and some accounts are contradictory. The best is that of W. Allan Reed ('Negritos of Zambales,' *Phil. Is. Ethnol. Survey Publications*, vol. ii. pt. i. [Manila, 1904]), who says:

'The basis of all the superstitious beliefs of the Negritos . . . is the constant presence of the spirits of the dead near where they lived when alive' (p. 65).

All places are inhabited by them, and all adversity—sickness, ill-luck in hunting, failure of crops—is attributed to them; as long as things go well, they are not much considered. In one place there is a huge black boulder which is believed to be the home of one powerful spirit; it seems that the spirits of all who die enter this one spirit, or *anito*, dwelling in the rock. No Negrito passes without leaving a banana or some article of food there. Disease is usually regarded as a punishment, the more serious maladies being sent by the supreme *anito*. Lesser diseases are inflicted by minor spirits, but these have to invoke the aid of the supreme spirit when a more severe punishment is to be meted out. A sickly child's name may be changed so as to avoid the attentions of some spirit. A medicine-man or medicine-woman (*mañga-anito*) can exorcize a spirit causing trouble. Charms are also used to remedy diseases. A certain yellow parasitic plant imparts great powers, and can attract a woman.

After a hunt the game is divided. The chief man present takes a small part of the entrails or heart, cuts it into little pieces, and scatters them, chanting a few words of thanks to the spirits; this is never omitted. F. Blumentritt (*Globus*, xlv. [1884] 75), referring to the Negritos of N. Luzon, states on the evidence of Father Villaverde that a single piece is thrown into the air with an invocation to one spirit only (cited by Schmidt, p. 230).

According to A. de Quatrefages (*The Pygmies*, Eng. tr., London, 1895, p. 159 f.), all Negritos believe that the spirit survives the body and has

the same requirements as in life; a dead man's bow and arrows are therefore hung above his grave and gifts of tobacco and betel are placed on it. A. Schadenberg (*ZE* xii. [1880] 144) states that there is a kind of moon cult (cf. also D. G. Brinton, in *The American Anthropologist*, 1898, pp. 293-307). Dances are held at the full moon, though it may be that they are held then merely for the convenience of light (cf. F. H. Sawyer, *The Inhabitants of the Philippines*, London, 1900, p. 204). Their mimetic dances are described by Reed (pp. 52-54), but he does not say whether there is any underlying religious significance. Combs analogous to those of the Semang, but apparently non-magical in character, are worn by both sexes (Reed, p. 38, pl. xxxvi.).

The only true Pygmy peoples as yet discovered in New Guinea are the Tapiro and Pesechem, who are too slightly known for anything to be said about their religion. The peoples of mixed Pygmy descent are dealt with in art. NEW GUINEA.

Though there exists among certain Pygmy peoples, both African and Indonesian, a more or less definite belief in a supreme spirit, any suggestion that this is a general characteristic of Negrillos and Negritos is to be regarded as highly speculative and premature in view of the fragmentary evidence as yet available.

LITERATURE.—This is sufficiently indicated in the course of the article.
A. C. HADDON.

NEGROES AND W. AFRICA.—1. Introduction; fetishism.—The pure pagan Negro is represented by numberless tribes inhabiting the coast-line from Cape Verd to Calabar, and extending here and there even to the borders of the Sahara. Within this vast area, much of which is still only partially explored, are to be found several dominant Negro races, many large tribes, more or less independent, with numerous branch tribes, and smaller tribes having distinct characteristics. On the outskirts of this Negroland, where the Muhammadan wave has swept forward from the north and north-east, and where the Negro is gradually merging into the Negroid, the religious beliefs of the people are losing much of their originality and becoming impregnated with Muslim ideas, though, on the other hand, the Muhammadans of this border-land show themselves willing to accept freely many so-called superstitious pagan beliefs. South of Calabar, and inland to the eastward, i.e. in the Cameroons, Gabun country, and Loango, the people belong to the great Bantu family.

With the scant knowledge that we possess, it is difficult to reduce the religion of the aboriginal Negroes to any really systematic form; for there is little intercourse between one great tribe and another, little exchange of religious ideas, and no one supreme religious head to whom all the Negro peoples look for guidance. Again, the Negroes have no written language; except by word of mouth, they have no means of communicating with each other; and therefore there are no sacred books or other writings handing down the history or tenets of their religion from one generation to another. What has been discovered about their religion has come to light principally during the last two centuries; before that little was known of the country for more than a few miles from the coast-line. The slaves conveyed to the W. Indies and America came from all parts of the interior; but, since they shared a common misfortune, it may be assumed that the men of one tribe would be prone to assimilate the beliefs of their fellow-slaves of other tribes, so that the religion of the old W. Indian and American slaves cannot be held to represent that of any individual Negro tribe. There is always the possibility, also, that the

natives' beliefs have been warped and confused by the statements of the Christian preacher.

Theories as to the process by which the W. African natives have arrived at their present state of religion are of two kinds: (1) that, in the beginning, Jahweh revealed Himself to all men on earth, and that He alone was worshipped; that subsequently this monotheism gave place to polytheism, out of which in the course of time grew idolatry, superstition, demonism, etc. (this theory is upheld by some Christian missionaries who have lived long among the people, and who have been careful students of their religious ideas); and (2) that the Negroes (and the Bantu) are gradually working upwards to monotheism. But we might equally well theorize that the natives began with monotheism, fell away, and are now drifting back to monotheism. It matters little how the people reached their present stage of religion; it is with the actual state of religion as now found to exist among the various tribes that we have to deal.

Modern students of the Negro religion who have conducted their researches on the spot are few in number, and the two to whom the world is indebted for a great part of its knowledge unfortunately died before the completion of their work. A. B. Ellis left behind him a storehouse of valuable information, to which Mary H. Kingsley added in no small degree, the former dealing more especially with the true Negroes of the Gold Coast and of the Slave Coast, and the latter with those of the Oil Rivers and with the Bantu further south. Of these Bantu in the neighbourhood of the Gabun R. H. Nassau has written fully, as has R. E. Dennett of the Fjort (or Bavili) Bantu. But, in the districts beyond those named above, there remains a virgin field, where the student of W. African religion may find a sufficiency of work. Now and again notes are made by careful observers travelling through, or residing in, those districts, and such scraps of information increase our knowledge; but the gaps are still wide.

M. H. Kingsley¹ divides W. Africa into four main 'schools' of religion, which may be said to extend geographically along the coast: (1) from Sierra Leone to the Niger mouth, (2) thence eastwards to the Cameroons, (3) the Mpongwe country, about the Gabun River, (4) the Loango country (north of the Congo), peopled by the Fjort (Fjât, Fiote, or Bavili). In each division, she considers, the religious aim, or guiding motive, is distinct and clear; and, though the various peoples of the tribes thus grouped have not all arrived at the same stage, yet the fundamental aim of each 'school' appears to exist in every case. Thus, the one aim of the religious practices of the Negroes westward of the lower Niger basin is to preserve human life; of the Oil River natives to enable the soul to pass successfully through death; of the Mpongwe Bantu to attain material prosperity; while the religion of the Fjort Bantu (Nkicism) is concerned chiefly with the cult of the mystery of the power of earth (*nkici*=mysterious power; *nkici-ci*=mysterious power of the earth; *nkici-kici*=mysterious power in personal protective charms, etc.). Such religious ends are not easy for the Christian mind to grasp, and to understand them at all it is necessary to realize that a Negro thinks in quite a different manner from a European.

With the exception, perhaps, of some of the Bantu, the peoples of W. Africa do not appear to speculate on such far-off things as the creation of the world, but almost every Negro tribe possesses some legend connected with the origin of man. Sometimes the legend is unmistakably of Phœnician introduction (for the Phœnicians are known to have penetrated as far as the Gold Coast); at

other times it shows signs of having come from the Christian missionaries on the coast or from the Muhammadans of the interior; while, again, there are legends so local and narrow in their notions as to be clearly marked as of tribal evolution.

The Yorubas maintain that, before the earth was peopled by men, there was always Olorun, the great god of the firmament, and that by him another god, Obatala, was created and placed in charge of all things connected with the firmament and the earth. For Obatala was created also a goddess-wife named Oduduwa, who bore a boy and a girl named Aganju and Yemaja. The brother and sister married, and had a son (Orungan), whose evil doings brought about the violent death of his mother, at which event there sprang from her body fifteen gods and goddesses. On the spot where Yemaja died, runs the legend, the town of Ifé was built, and was for many centuries considered a sacred city. In this manner the Yorubas account for the creation of their gods, by whom alone, they believe, the world was at one time inhabited. As to the period of man's creation Yoruba opinions differ, some holding that the first couple were made out of mud by Obatala, others that they came from Yemaja's body with the gods, and that they were named Obalofun ('Lord of Speech') and Iya ('Mother')—names which strike one as having been inspired by Christian missionaries.

Among many tribes there seems to be a more or less general belief that, for a long time before the creation of man, there was a god epoch, followed by a giant epoch; and that the advent of man caused the giants, if not also the gods, to become invisible, but to remain on the earth to harass man.

In some parts of W. Africa the Negroes have a legend that, in the long-ago, a ladder was placed between the earth and the abode of the gods in the skies, and that, when a person was old and infirm, he was called by the gods to ascend the ladder; one day a cripple boy began to ascend the ladder, and was pursued by his mother, whereupon the gods, infuriated at women and children attempting to intrude, flung down the ladder for ever. But legends of this kind are regarded as mere fairy-tales by the mass of the people, and their religion does not in any way hinge on them.

There are also myths about the sun, the moon, the stars, and the rainbow. These are found principally in Dahomey and the adjoining countries, and, judging from their similarity to myths existing in other parts of the world, are probably not of Negro origin.

Lissa, the spirit of the sun, is worshipped by the Dahomans, as is Gleti, the spirit of the moon, who is the wife of Lissa. The stars are held to be the children of Lissa and Gleti; and eclipses are accounted for as domestic wrangles between the spirit of the sun and that of the moon. Anyi-Ewo, the spirit of the rainbow, is worshipped by the Ewe tribes, who have the myth that the rainbow is a huge serpent which, when thirsty, comes forth from the sea, stands on its tail at one side of the earth, and bends its head over to drink at the other side.

Those students who maintain that the Negro tribes are working up, or working back, to monotheism have noticed that, in many instances, peoples that have undoubtedly sprung from a common stock have not advanced towards monotheism equally rapidly, although they may show little difference in other respects, i.e. in the European idea of civilization. This is, perhaps, attributable to environment—to the nature of the country in which the respective tribes dwell. In an open country, where means of communication are easy, the people are enabled to discuss matters and exchange ideas more freely, whereas, in heavy forest-land, where little intercourse exists between one village and another, things remain at a standstill. The result of this condition of affairs is shown principally in the number of the gods worshipped. The peoples held to be most advanced in the religious scale have cast aside many of their old gods, retaining only a few; and these are common to the whole tribe, so that the inhabitants of one village worship the same gods, under the same names and with the same rites, as the inhabitants of another village of the tribe. On the other hand, peoples held to be low in the religious scale have gods without number, but for the most part purely local—very often known to and worshipped by one person only. In short, it is con-

¹ *W. African Studies*, p. 116.

sidered by these students that religious advance among the Negroes carries with it a reduction in the number of gods worshipped, which may imply that, as the Negro's mind develops, he realizes that, since the greater gods control the lesser ones, it is a waste of time to endeavour to propitiate the latter. All this may be true of the Negroes, but, as will be seen below, it does not appear to hold good with the semi-Bantu and Bantu tribes who dwell immediately east and south of the true Negroes.

The word generally used by Europeans to describe the religion of W. Africa is 'fetishism' (*q.v.*); from the Portuguese *feitiço*, 'a charm,' or 'magic.' Synonymous with 'fetish' (implying charm) are the words *gri-gri*, used by the natives about Sierra Leone and Liberia, *ju-ju*, used by Europeans in the neighbourhood of the Oil Rivers and the Niger Districts (said to be derived from French *jou-jou*), *nkici-kici* of the Fjort, and so on. Now, this word 'fetishism' is unknown to the natives themselves, and its use in its original sense conveys a totally erroneous impression of the nature of the W. African's religion, implying, as it does, a system of idolatry or worship of tangible images, combined with a great amount of magic. As we shall see, the religion of the Negro and Bantu is something quite different, and the error arose from the superficial observations of early travellers, who noticed only what may be called the lower form of the religion of the people. The word has been so long in use, however, that it is unlikely to be abolished, though its original meaning may, in the course of time, be forgotten. Pure fetishism does exist to a certain extent in many parts, but it does not often hold the ruling place in the religion of the people. Among most of the tribes there is a higher and a lower form of religion, both thoroughly believed in and practised, as often as not, by the same people at the same time. With the Fjort, *e.g.*, there is the worship, or reverence, of the goddess Nzambi, with all the strange mystery appertaining to the earth-spirit, which is in a sense a perfectly good religion; but there is also fetishism of the lowest form—superstitious dread of evil spirits, a belief in charms, witchcraft, and every abomination of what may be termed the 'black art.'

To fathom the depths of W. African religious thought we must start with a knowledge of certain matters on which the Negro bases his beliefs. (1) His religion has no connexion whatever with morality; no Negro imagines that he is 'living in a state of sin'; nor, as far as morality is concerned, does he see any harm in murder, theft, or any other crime. If, therefore, he commits an offence for which he is punished by a European court of law, by his king, by a secret society, or by the community, he considers, not that he has sinned, but that, by some omission or some act of stupidity (apart from the commission of the actual crime), he has unwittingly brought down on himself the wrath of some god or evil spirit. (2) All Negroes, however low they stand in the religious scale, have a firm belief in the existence of an indwelling spirit in almost everything animate and inanimate (except such things as are made by human hands). Holding these convictions, and believing that nearly every non-human indwelling spirit is capable of utilizing at will the material wherein it dwells as a powerful agent for influencing or controlling the actions of man and of all living things, the Negro argues that everything that occurs—every accident, every natural phenomenon, in fact every event—is caused by the workings of an indwelling spirit, by some human spirit which has temporarily lost its abiding-place, or by some other spirit of the spirit-world. It was originally believed that the in-

dwelling spirits of all things in nature were hostile to man; it was their aim to thwart man in every possible way, and even to destroy life.

With a knowledge of the above beliefs, it is not difficult to trace the evolution of Negro worship. Every object in nature was believed to possess an invisible spirit, ever on the look-out to work destruction on man. The spirit of the sea caused shipwrecks; that of the river upset canoes; trees and rocks, impelled by their spirits, fell and crushed those passing by. In order to ward off the anger of these spirits, the Negro sought to appease them by offering them something which he imagined would be acceptable to them and at the same time be a deprivation to himself. The nature of the sacrifice or offering would depend on the importance of the god or spirit, *i.e.* on the degree of misfortune which the god or spirit would be able to produce. It might take the form of merely a little food, or might require to be something greater—a blood-offering of a goat or even of a human being; for it is thought that the spiritual essence or indwelling spirit of anything offered to a god is enjoyed by, or enters the service of, that god. By constant propitiation of a particular god or god-spirit it was imagined that, in the course of time, the worshipper became not only immune from harm, but also more or less under the protection of the god. Consequently, it became every man's object to devote his attention to one particular god, and he usually selected for his special worship the god whose actions he most dreaded. It is easy to understand from this that several individuals of the same family, following similar vocations, feared the malignancy of the same god, so that the god was worshipped by the family and became a family-god. For similar reasons, a whole tribe or a whole nation would worship the same gods. They shared a common fear of a common enemy, and, on the principle of co-operation, agreed to appease him by combined worship and sacrifice, or by the same means to obtain his goodwill. In order further to save trouble in guarding the abiding-places of the gods or spirits and looking after the sacrifices made to them, certain individuals were appointed by the tribes and maintained at the expense of the people. This was, at any rate in the Gold Coast and Slave Coast regions, the foundation of the priesthood, which henceforward increased, and in many districts became paramount. It was imagined that the priests, by close association with the surroundings of the god for whom they cared, became his confidential agents, and so mediators between man and the god.

2. Gods and idols.—The use of English equivalents for W. African conceptions is unsatisfactory, since it is almost impossible thus to define clearly the native's ideas. Still, when writing of many tribes, speaking many different languages, it is impossible to employ Negro or Bantu words always. It is, therefore, necessary to explain at the outset what is implied by certain words which have been adopted in the following pages as the nearest equivalents to W. African notions. The words most likely to be misunderstood are 'god,' 'spirit,' 'soul,' and 'ghost'; for very frequently they appear to overlap one another. Negroes and Bantu of W. Africa believe that their gods are material and tangible beings, generally of human form, residing in the skies, in the world, or under the world, and invisible to man, but making themselves visible on occasion to their special priests. These gods possess invisible indwelling spirits, which have permanent or temporary abodes, and which have the power of passing themselves into any article they choose—even, for a period and for some particular purpose, into the body of a priest. The word 'spirit' is used to denote (1) the indwelling spirit of a god;

(2) the indwelling spirit conceived to have its residence in all things animate and inanimate; and (3) that spirit, good or evil, which belongs to the great world of invisible spirits, and which will ever remain in it. 'Soul' is the indwelling spirit of a human being, as long as he is alive, or, where re-incarnation is believed in, until re-birth takes place. 'Ghost' (as distinct from 'spirit' and 'soul') is the filmy individuality supposed by some people to leave the man's body at death, and occasionally to make itself visible in a shadowy form.

With regard to the gods of the people, it is maintained by some observers—chiefly by Christian missionaries—that all W. African tribes, whether god-worshippers or not, believe in the existence of a supreme being, manlike in form, and dwelling in the skies, but no longer taking any interest in the affairs of man, and therefore not worshipped. Such are Nyankupon of the Tshis, Nyommo of the Gas, Mawu of the Eves, Olorun of the Yorubas, Abassi of the Efiks, Osovo of the Indems, Anyambi of the Mpongwe, etc. In preaching of the Christian God the missionaries use the name of the supreme god of the people, and, consequently, it is probable that the Negro's ideas of his chief god are not the same to-day as they were before the advent of the missionaries. But even now the natives regard him not as an omnipotent creator, but as merely one of many gods, having no influence or control over the other gods, and neither feared nor loved. To this there is, perhaps, one exception, viz. Nzambi-Mpungu, whom some of the Fjort people believe to have been the creator of the world, though they no longer worship him.

Ellis and others have collected much information concerning the gods worshipped by some of the peoples dwelling between Sierra Leone and the Niger mouths, and the information is of great value, more particularly as showing the condition of the Negro mind. The gods that have been best studied are those of the Negroes of the Gold Coast and of the Slave Coast, and a knowledge of their characteristics and functions will assist in understanding the extent to which a W. African's life is bound up in his religion. It must be recognized, however, that, although a Negro may be able to describe exactly what he thinks each particular god is like, he does not pretend to have ever seen the god, and he does not for a moment imagine that the image or representation of the god is the actual god. But he does believe that the gods are material beings, each possessing an indwelling spirit; that they reveal themselves in a material form to their priests, into whom on occasions they pass their spirits; but that to ordinary people they are spirits, and, like other spirits, invisible. These gods or their spirits have their abodes (permanent or temporary) in objects of nature, in images, in the elements, in the surf, the tornado, the lightning, the pestilence, fire, etc.

Taking the Gold Coast and Slave Coast tribes from west to east, we find that the further east one travels, the fewer are the gods of the people. The Tshi-speaking and the Ga-speaking tribes of the Gold Coast have innumerable gods, while the Yorubas of the Slave Coast have few. All these gods may be classified according to grade or importance; thus, among the Gold Coast peoples there are: (1) national gods universally worshipped; (2) local deities universally worshipped under the same names; (3) local deities; (4) town, village, and family deities; and (5) private gods. East of the Gold Coast tribes dwell the Ewe-speaking peoples of the Slave Coast, whose gods can be reduced to three classes, while eastward again we find among the Yorubas only two distinct classes of deities. It would be quite possible to classify the deities according to their origin; for

some evidently belong to the old mythology, while others—the greater number—are of more modern creation. East of the Yoruba country, and inland along the banks of the Niger, the gods worshipped appear to be again numerous; then in the Oil Rivers, although certain gods are acknowledged, little attention is paid to their worship, for reasons which appear below. Further down the coast, where the true Bantu succeeds the Negro, no active gods are even acknowledged by the Mpongwe and other tribes of the Gabun region. But among the Fjort, to the north of the Congo, there is the great goddess Nzambi.

The following is a description of the more important gods recognized or worshipped by the better-known tribes.

i. GOLD COAST TRIBES.—(a) *National gods universally acknowledged or worshipped.*—Bobowissi is supposed to dwell at Winnebah Hill, and was originally the principal god of the tribes along the coast between Appollonia and Barracu (near Accra), as well as of the Wassaw, Arbra, and Assin tribes inland. He appointed all local deities and had control over the elements—thunder, lightning, storms, etc.; he has a day of annual sacrifice (Kohbor) at the end of August. Formerly it was usual to sacrifice human beings to him. He is represented in human form, though twice the size of man, and black. In his right hand he carries a sword, and his left hand is held behind his back. His wife is Abu-mehsu (spirit of the river of the same name), who is worshipped as a goddess by some of the coast tribes.

Tando is the principal god of the Ashantis and other northern tribes of the Tshi group, and is represented as similar in appearance to Bobowissi. Driver ants are sacred to him, and his wife is Katarwiri (spirit of that river). She is represented as of human shape, black, and of enormous size, and crocodiles are her special care. As the southern tribes were for several centuries at war with the Ashantis and northern tribes, Bobowissi was held to be hostile to Tando, and tribes throwing off their allegiance from Ashanti exchanged the worship of Tando for that of Bobowissi.

Nyankupon, or Nana-Nyankupon (i.e. 'Lord of the Sky'), is acknowledged by some of the southern tribes to have supplanted Bobowissi as chief god. His origin appears doubtful, and by some he is supposed to have been introduced by Christian missionaries. He has no priesthood, and little account is taken of him. The Negroes seem to have gradually come to the conclusion that Nyankupon dwelt at too great a distance from the earth to take any interest in its inhabitants, except occasionally to show his displeasure by means of some great calamity. They feared his wrath, but were unable to propitiate him except through his deputy Bobowissi; and they still regard Bobowissi as obtaining his power solely from Nyankupon. Nyankupon is represented as a man-like god, possessing the faculties and passions of man, and essentially a material being.

(b) *Local deities universally worshipped under the same names.*—Sasabonsum is a monster of human form, of red colour, and with long hair. His abode is either below or above the ground wherever the earth is red, i.e. stained with the blood of his victims. He is also said to dwell in bombax (silk-cotton) trees. He is a most malignant and death-dealing god, and cannot be appeased. When dwelling in a tree, he crushes his victims by causing it to fall; when living underground, he produces earthquakes; and in all cases he devours those on whom his wrath descends.

Srahmantin is a hideous female monster, dwelling only in certain bombax trees. She terrifies those who pass by her abode, seizes them, and keeps

and is represented as an old man with a withered leg. Flies and mosquitoes are his messengers, and the badge of his followers is a stick with red and white marks. Dada (Eda, or Ida), the god of newborn children and vegetables, is represented by a calabash studded with cowries and containing a lump of indigo. Oya, the principal wife of Shango, and goddess of the Niger, is sometimes represented by an image with nine heads (mouths of the Niger). Afeke, the wind, is her messenger. Oshnn and Oba have been already mentioned as being wives of Shango and goddesses of the rivers bearing their respective names. Aje Shaluga is the god of wealth, and his badge is a large cowry-shell. Orisha-Okò, the god of the farm and of crops in general, is worshipped far and wide, and has many priests and priestesses. He corresponds to the yam-god of other tribes, but, besides looking after the fruits of the earth, he is also concerned with human fertility. Bees are his messengers, and his emblem is an iron rod. Oke is the god of mountains, and is worshipped by people dwelling in hilly or rocky country. Oshosi is the god of hunters, and helps them to kill game, while Orun (the sun) and Oshu (the moon) are nowadays worshipped by only very few of the people, and no sacrifices are offered to them.

Other minor deities worshipped by the Yorubas are: Shigidi, Olarosa, Osanhin, Aroni, Aja, Oye, Ibeji, Oshumare, and Olori-merin.

Shigidi, the god of nightmare, is a malevolent god, whose evil actions can be invoked by one man against another during sleep. He is represented by a short, stout cone of clay, embellished with cowries. Olarosa is the house-god, and is represented by an image, in the form of a man with a stick, set up at the door of the house. Osanhin, the god of medicine, is much worshipped; his emblem is a bird upon an iron bar. Aroni, god of medicine as well as of the forests, is represented as a one-legged man, with the head and tail of a dog; and Aja, goddess of the forests, is said to resemble a woman in miniature, being only 18 inches in height. Oye is the god of the Harmattan wind, and gigantic in stature. Ibeji, the protector of twins, corresponds to Ho-ho of the Ewes; and Oshumare, the rainbow-god, is identical with Anyi-Ewo, worshipped by those people. Olori-merin was a four-headed god, with the legs and feet of a goat, who protected towns; but his worship appears to have now ceased.

iv. NEGROES OF THE LOWER NIGER.—About the gods of the tribes dwelling on the banks of the Niger and in the districts of the Oil Rivers little reliable information is forthcoming. Gunu, the chief god of the tribes in the neighbourhood of the confluence of the Niger and Benué, is believed to be a deified ancestor of the Igaras, and is of a beneficent disposition. Provider of children and crops and controller of the elements, he dwells in certain groves and has an actual festival (Jan.-Feb.), when offerings of food are made, principally by childless women praying for offspring, and cultivators anxious about their crops. Sebo is a tribal god of the Igbiras; Okenga is a tribal god of the Igbiras and Igaras; Ebo and Ode are local gods of the Igaras; Ikenga, Offo, Isu-Chuku, Isi are tribal gods of the Ibos; Eki, Aroh, Onisseh, Anni-Asaba, local gods of Asaba (Ibo); Orinse, Anni-Onitcha, Okikeba, Ojedi, Utoh, Azeh, local gods of Onitcha (Ibo); Anni-Mogoro, Adjeh, local gods of Oko (Ibo); Igi-Oji, local god of Odekwe (Ibo); Fejokoo, local god of Abo (Ibo), is represented in clay at the celebration of the yam-festival, and regarded as the supplier of yams; Ogbooka, local god of Abo (Ibo), is represented in wood and carried in this form at the yearly festival, being the Abo god of mirth.

Incomplete as the above list is, it shows that among the Ibo people on the banks of the Lower Niger the gods are innumerable, and doubtless, were the list complete, it would be found that the religion of this great tribe is in much the same stage of development as that of the peoples of the Gold Coast.

v. NATIVES OF THE CROSS RIVER.—These tribes, according to C. Partridge, have many gods besides the greater one or overlord whom the Efik people call Abassi, and the Indem people Osowo, and in addition to the lesser god Nfam, who is worshipped by most of the tribes. There are deities common to a tribe, town, village, club, or belonging to a private household. Among the local gods and goddesses may be mentioned: Akwoainsi and Ekissi (a deified ancestor), worshipped at Ingkimm (Atam); Majo (a deified ancestor), represented by a wooden post carved in human form, and worshipped by the people of Akerita and Abia. At Obubura (Eshupnm) the most important local god is Binokkpabi, whose wife is Awtoha; their son, Agadiden, and daughter, Ebu, are also worshipped. Other gods of Obubura are Ibrambri, Emanna, Binokkpabi (in female form), Obumuku, and Nchuku, while each household in the town possesses gods of its own. At Oburukpon (Eshupnm) the people worship the yam-god Osibi Keiwurra, who is concerned with marriages, and Ibillekpari, protector of women. At Awakande the yam-god is called Abanna, his wife Ekpaga, and his daughter Oka. The most important tribal god of the Aruns is Okeiworo, who is represented by a clay figure of a man, having goat's horns stuck on his head, cowries for eyes, and a white cloth round his loins. 'His right arm is covered with sheep's wool, and in each hand he grasps a wooden weapon.'

vi. FJORT (OR BAVILI) BANTU.—Mpungu, or Nzambi-Mpungu, i.e. 'Father,' or 'Father of the Fearful First-born,' is regarded by the Fjort as the overlord, and there is a legend (possibly introduced by missionaries 400 years ago) which says that he created the universe, as well as Princess Nzambi, whom he then married, with a view to populating the world. After that he handed over the control of everything to Nzambi, and retired to his far-off palace. He has no priests and no worshippers.

Nzambi is the great goddess whose cult is the foundation of the higher form of Fjort religion. At the present day she is represented by an immense wooden image of a woman, though it is generally thought that prior to some 250 years ago she had no such image. Her name means Mother Earth (lit. 'Terrible Earth First Created'), and she is considered to have been the mother of man and of the lower animals. She is served by priests, who are held to be able to obtain from her such benefits as the people desire, for Nzambi is well-disposed towards mankind and all animals. Her place of abode is in the sky, but her spirit is everywhere in the earth, in mountains, rocks, etc. Failing to distinguish between Nzambi and Nzambi-Mpungu, the early Christian missionaries assumed that Nzambi was the creator, and therefore adopted her name as a translation of the word 'God.' And, later on, Jesuit missionaries, in the endeavour to assimilate Christianity with the religion of the people, led the natives to believe that their goddess Nzambi was identical with the Virgin Mary—the result being to produce complete confusion in the Fjort mind.

The effect of the belief in an all-powerful goddess has been to raise the position of women among the Fjort to a much higher level than elsewhere in W. Africa.

Certain things, such as sacred groves, trees,

plants, rivers, and even animals, are believed to be filled with the sacred spirit of earth, i.e. the *nkici-ci* is held to be inherent in them by nature. Such things are holy, and possess mysterious powers, received originally from Nzambi. But, so far as the actual worship of the goddess is concerned, everything is left to the priest (the *nganga-nzambi*, or *nganga nkici-ci*), who dwells in a hut on the edge of a small plot of sacred ground, which is kept scrupulously clean. To these places the people repair when they have any simple benefit to ask of the goddess, such as rain, children, good crops, etc. The priest is paid handsomely for his advice or divination, and the matter is left in his hands. At certain times the chiefs assemble their people to clean up these sacred plots of ground, when sacrifices of white fowls are offered, and much dancing takes place. This may, perhaps, be considered an act of worship. Otherwise there is no popular worship of Nzambi. It seems almost established that the cult of Nzambi was imported several centuries ago from outside. For, according to local history, or tradition, when Fumu Kongo, king of Congo, occupied the province of Loango, he sent priests of Nzambi with the princes who took over the country. Wherever these princes stayed, there a priest remained, and established a plot of ground sacred to the spirit of earth (*nkici-ci*).

Besides the above-mentioned naturally sacred things, there are other objects which the priests, by the performance of certain ceremonies, can make sacred. These, then, are bound up with the higher form of Fjort religion; e.g., each village and each family has its holy ground, on or near which there is a hut containing the family gods, or images, as well as a tree with holes made in it. 'Medicines' are placed in the holes, which are then closed with pieces of looking-glass. These family or household gods are said to be connected with the spirits of the winds, and Dennett¹ mentions the following different kinds:

(1) Mpumbu (supposed to be brought by the east wind); two little wooden figures of a man and a woman, about 18 ins. high, which are made sacred by the priest, with particular ceremonies. A man of the family has first to be sanctified, i.e. the mysterious spirit (*nkici-ci*) is passed into his head, and henceforward he becomes the spokesman of the figures, which, after having been filled with 'medicines,' are handed over to his care. His method of invoking their aid, to kill or protect, is to throw palm-kernels or dust at them. (2) Mabil (also brought by the east wind) is a kind of boundary gateway, consisting of two upright poles and a cross-pole or string, decked with grass and feathers. (3) Tshimbuka (brought by the west wind) is a round basket made of certain leaves, and holding the family remedies. It is invoked by rattling a gourd containing a few hard seeds at it. Two guardians, a man and a woman, properly spiritualized (as in the case of the guardian of the Mpumbu), look after it and speak for it. (4) Nzaci (brought by the west wind) is also a basket, somewhat similar to the last-named, though the ceremonies of spiritualizing its guardians are different. (5) Ngoto (brought by the south-west wind) is another kind of basket, flat and open. In this case the guardians go through a marriage ceremony, and each wears an iron bracelet. (6) Lembe (brought by the south-west wind) also takes the form of a basket containing medicines, the guardians being bound by the most sacred marriage ties, and wearing bracelets.

It seems hardly accurate to apply the term 'god' to such things as these, yet there is no very great difference between them and the family and private gods of the Gold Coast tribes—the *boksum* and the *suhman*. The *boksum* is held to have been appointed by some higher god, and to have received, through a priest, the spirit of that god; the *suhman* is also inspired, but without the assistance of a priest. Similarly, it might be maintained that the east wind appointed the *mpumbu*; but apparently the Fjort priest does not pass the mysterious spirit (*nkici-ci*) into the figures, baskets, and bracelets, but rather into their guardians. In the articles themselves he places 'medicines,' i.e. the spirits of herbs (*nkici*, not *nkici-ci*).

¹ At the Back of the Black Man's Mind, p. 87 ff.

All the above belong to the higher form of Fjort religion in that they are, in one way or another, connected with the spirit of the earth, emanating from the goddess Nzambi. The lower form of religion, which deals with the 'black art,' may be said to be the religion of the common people. It has no connexion with the *nkici-ci*, the sacred spirit, and is worked by a distinct class of fetishmen, who are believed to have the power of passing into images and other articles every description of evil spirit. This is true fetishism; it is discussed below, § 4.

3. Human souls and futurity.—Connected with the conception of the indwelling spirit previously referred to is the Negro's belief concerning what may be termed his 'soul' or 'souls,' i.e. the spirit or spirits which he believes to dwell in him. Probably the whole theory of the indwelling spirit had its origin in the man's belief in his own indwelling spirit. Be that as it may, it is maintained by many W. Africans that a human being possesses four souls—the surviving, or immortal, soul, the bush-soul, the shadow-soul, and the dream-soul. The immortal soul is held to be the most important, and the others are dependent on or subservient to it. The Tshis and some others believe that this soul has a definite earth-dwelling period allotted to it; and that, if the body of an individual passes away before that period has elapsed, the soul remains in the world to complete its earthly existence as a homeless wanderer. Being without an abode, this wander-soul endeavours to find a resting-place in the body of some human being—a new-born child, if possible. The bush-soul dwells in the body of a wild animal in some part of the bush; the man himself possibly does not know the animal or the part of the country; the animal and the human owner of the bush-soul die simultaneously. The shadow-soul exists in the man's shadow, and the Negro is careful to keep in the shade at noon-tide, so as not to lose his shadow-soul. When the sun sets, the shadow-soul takes its rest, and at sunrise awakes in great strength and length; but it can be destroyed by an enemy thrusting a weapon through it; and the death of the shadow-soul brings death to its human possessor. Of the dream-soul there is much to be said. When the Negro is awake, his dream-soul is practically dormant; but, as soon as the man goes to sleep, it endeavours to escape from its human prison and enjoy itself with other dream-souls. A dream, therefore, results from the escape of the dream-soul, which, wandering forth, encounters the dream-souls of other men and the souls or indwelling spirits of inanimate things. When the man awakes, the dream-soul returns, the mouth being the means of egress and ingress. But, should the chain of the dream be broken by the sleeper being suddenly awakened, there is the danger of the dream-soul being shut out. Such a catastrophe produces immediate illness, the other three souls being affected at once; and, unless the dream-soul can be conjured back into the body forthwith, the case must prove fatal. The dream-soul can be brought back only by a fetishman, or witch-doctor, who is possessed of the power of catching it and returning it to its proper place, by way of the patient's mouth. With regard to the wander-soul, i.e. the immortal soul with a period of mundane existence remaining after the death of the body to which it belonged, its first object is to find a body from which the dream-soul is temporarily absent, and to take its place. This introduction of a strange soul, of course, deranges the body, and the witch-doctor, having been summoned and having discovered the presence of the wander-soul in the body, proceeds to draw it out, and insert the dream-soul in its stead. But the witch-doctor does not

and is represented as an old man with a withered leg. Flies and mosquitoes are his messengers, and the badge of his followers is a stick with red and white marks. Dada (Eda, or Ida), the god of newborn children and vegetables, is represented by a calabash studded with cowries and containing a lump of indigo. Oya, the principal wife of Shango, and goddess of the Niger, is sometimes represented by an image with nine heads (mouths of the Niger). Afefe, the wind, is her messenger. Oshun and Oba have been already mentioned as being wives of Shango and goddesses of the rivers bearing their respective names. Aje Shaluga is the god of wealth, and his badge is a large cowry-shell. Orisha-Oko, the god of the farm and of crops in general, is worshipped far and wide, and has many priests and priestesses. He corresponds to the yam-god of other tribes, but, besides looking after the fruits of the earth, he is also concerned with human fertility. Bees are his messengers, and his emblem is an iron rod. Oke is the god of mountains, and is worshipped by people dwelling in hilly or rocky country. Oshosi is the god of hunters, and helps them to kill game, while Orun (the sun) and Oshu (the moon) are nowadays worshipped by only very few of the people, and no sacrifices are offered to them.

Other minor deities worshipped by the Yorubas are: Shigidi, Olarosa, Osanhin, Aroni, Aja, Oye, Ibeji, Oshumare, and Olori-merin.

Shigidi, the god of nightmare, is a malevolent god, whose evil actions can be invoked by one man against another during sleep. He is represented by a short, stout cone of clay, embellished with cowries. Olarosa is the house-god, and is represented by an image, in the form of a man with a stick, set up at the door of the house. Osanhin, the god of medicine, is much worshipped; his emblem is a bird upon an iron bar. Aroni, god of medicine as well as of the forests, is represented as a one-legged man, with the head and tail of a dog; and Aja, goddess of the forests, is said to resemble a woman in miniature, being only 18 inches in height. Oye is the god of the Harmattan wind, and gigantic in stature. Ibeji, the protector of twins, corresponds to Ho-ho of the Ewes; and Oshumare, the rainbow-god, is identical with Anyi-Ewo, worshipped by those people. Olori-merin was a four-headed god, with the legs and feet of a goat, who protected towns; but his worship appears to have now ceased.

iv. NEGROES OF THE LOWER NIGER.—About the gods of the tribes dwelling on the banks of the Niger and in the districts of the Oil Rivers little reliable information is forthcoming. Gunu, the chief god of the tribes in the neighbourhood of the confluence of the Niger and Benué, is believed to be a deified ancestor of the Igaras, and is of a beneficent disposition. Provider of children and crops and controller of the elements, he dwells in certain groves and has an actual festival (Jan.-Feb.), when offerings of food are made, principally by childless women praying for offspring, and cultivators anxious about their crops. Sebo is a tribal god of the Igbiras; Okenga is a tribal god of the Igbiras and Igaras; Ebo and Ode are local gods of the Igaras; Ikenga, Ofio, Isu-Chukn, Isi are tribal gods of the Ibos; Eki, Aroh, Onisese, Anni-Asaba, local gods of Asaba (Ibo); Orinse, Anni-Onitcha, Okikeba, Ojedi, Utoh, Azeh, local gods of Onitcha (Ibo); Anni-Mogoro, Adjeh, local gods of Oko (Ibo); Igi-Oji, local god of Odekwe (Ibo); Fejokoo, local god of Abo (Ibo), is represented in clay at the celebration of the yam-festival, and regarded as the supplier of yams; Ogbooka, local god of Abo (Ibo), is represented in wood and carried in this form at the yearly festival, being the Abo god of mirth.

Incomplete as the above list is, it shows that among the Ibo people on the banks of the Lower Niger the gods are innumerable, and doubtless, were the list complete, it would be found that the religion of this great tribe is in much the same stage of development as that of the peoples of the Gold Coast.

v. NATIVES OF THE CROSS RIVER.—These tribes, according to C. Partridge, have many gods besides the greater one or overlord whom the Efik people call Abassi, and the Indem people Osowo, and in addition to the lesser god Nfam, who is worshipped by most of the tribes. There are deities common to a tribe, town, village, club, or belonging to a private household. Among the local gods and goddesses may be mentioned: Akwoainsi and Ekiissi (a deified ancestor), worshipped at Ingkimm (Atam); Majo (a deified ancestor), represented by a wooden post carved in human form, and worshipped by the people of Akerita and Abia. At Obubura (Eshupum) the most important local god is Binokkpabi, whose wife is Awtoba; their son, Agadiden, and daughter, Ebu, are also worshipped. Other gods of Obubura are Ibrambri, Emanna, Binokkpabi (in female form), Obumuku, and Nchuku, while each household in the town possesses gods of its own. At Oburukpon (Eshupum) the people worship the yam-god Osibi Keiwurra, who is concerned with marriages, and Ibillekpari, protector of women. At Awakande the yam-god is called Abanna, his wife Ekpaga, and his daughter Oka. The most important tribal god of the Aruns is Okeiworo, who is represented by a clay figure of a man, having goat's horns stuck on his head, cowries for eyes, and a white cloth round his loins. 'His right arm is covered with sheep's wool, and in each hand he grasps a wooden weapon.'

vi. FJORT (OR BAVILI) BANTU.—Mpungu, or Nzambi-Mpungu, i.e. 'Father,' or 'Father of the Fearful First-born,' is regarded by the Fjort as the overlord, and there is a legend (possibly introduced by missionaries 400 years ago) which says that he created the universe, as well as Princess Nzambi, whom he then married, with a view to populating the world. After that he handed over the control of everything to Nzambi, and retired to his far-off palace. He has no priests and no worshippers.

Nzambi is the great goddess whose cult is the foundation of the higher form of Fjort religion. At the present day she is represented by an immense wooden image of a woman, though it is generally thought that prior to some 250 years ago she had no such image. Her name means Mother Earth (lit. 'Terrible Earth First Created'), and she is considered to have been the mother of man and of the lower animals. She is served by priests, who are held to be able to obtain from her such benefits as the people desire, for Nzambi is well-disposed towards mankind and all animals. Her place of abode is in the sky, but her spirit is everywhere in the earth, in mountains, rocks, etc. Failing to distinguish between Nzambi and Nzambi-Mpungu, the early Christian missionaries assumed that Nzambi was the creator, and therefore adopted her name as a translation of the word 'God.' And, later on, Jesuit missionaries, in the endeavour to assimilate Christianity with the religion of the people, led the natives to believe that their goddess Nzambi was identical with the Virgin Mary—the result being to produce complete confusion in the Fjort mind.

The effect of the belief in an all-powerful goddess has been to raise the position of women among the Fjort to a much higher level than elsewhere in W. Africa.

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plants, rivers, and even animals, are believed to be filled with the sacred spirit of earth, *i.e.* the *nkici-ci* is held to be inherent in them by nature. Such things are holy, and possess mysterious powers, received originally from Nzambi. But, so far as the actual worship of the goddess is concerned, everything is left to the priest (the *nganganzambi*, or *nganga nkici-ci*), who dwells in a hut on the edge of a small plot of sacred ground, which is kept scrupulously clean. To these places the people repair when they have any simple benefit to ask of the goddess, such as rain, children, good crops, etc. The priest is paid handsomely for his advice or divination, and the matter is left in his hands. At certain times the chiefs assemble their people to clean up these sacred plots of ground, when sacrifices of white fowls are offered, and much dancing takes place. This may, perhaps, be considered an act of worship. Otherwise there is no popular worship of Nzambi. It seems almost established that the cult of Nzambi was imported several centuries ago from outside. For, according to local history, or tradition, when Fumu Kongo, king of Congo, occupied the province of Loango, he sent priests of Nzambi with the princes who took over the country. Wherever these princes stayed, there a priest remained, and established a plot of ground sacred to the spirit of earth (*nkici-ci*).

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3. Human souls and futurity.—Connected with the conception of the indwelling spirit previously referred to is the Negro's belief concerning what may be termed his 'soul' or 'souls,' *i.e.* the spirit or spirits which he believes to dwell in him. Probably the whole theory of the indwelling spirit had its origin in the man's belief in his own indwelling spirit. Be that as it may, it is maintained by many W. Africans that a human being possesses four souls—the surviving, or immortal, soul, the bush-soul, the shadow-soul, and the dream-soul. The immortal soul is held to be the most important, and the others are dependent on or subservient to it. The Tshis and some others believe that this soul has a definite earth-dwelling period allotted to it; and that, if the body of an individual passes away before that period has elapsed, the soul remains in the world to complete its earthly existence as a homeless wanderer. Being without an abode, this wander-soul endeavours to find a resting-place in the body of some human being—a new-born child, if possible. The bush-soul dwells in the body of a wild animal in some part of the bush; the man himself possibly does not know the animal or the part of the country; the animal and the human owner of the bush-soul die simultaneously. The shadow-soul exists in the man's shadow, and the Negro is careful to keep in the shade at noon-tide, so as not to lose his shadow-soul. When the sun sets, the shadow-soul takes its rest, and at sunrise awakes in great strength and length; but it can be destroyed by an enemy thrusting a weapon through it; and the death of the shadow-soul brings death to its human possessor. Of the dream-soul there is much to be said. When the Negro is awake, his dream-soul is practically dormant; but, as soon as the man goes to sleep, it endeavours to escape from its human prison and enjoy itself with other dream-souls. A dream, therefore, results from the escape of the dream-soul, which, wandering forth, encounters the dream-souls of other men and the souls or indwelling spirits of inanimate things. When the man awakes, the dream-soul returns, the mouth being the means of egress and ingress. But, should the chain of the dream be broken by the sleeper being suddenly awakened, there is the danger of the dream-soul being shut out. Such a catastrophe produces immediate illness, the other three souls being affected at once; and, unless the dream-soul can be conjured back into the body forthwith, the case must prove fatal. The dream-soul can be brought back only by a fetishman, or witch-doctor, who is possessed of the power of catching it and returning it to its proper place, by way of the patient's mouth. With regard to the wander-soul, *i.e.* the immortal soul with a period of mundane existence remaining after the death of the body to which it belonged, its first object is to find a body from which the dream-soul is temporarily absent, and to take its place. This introduction of a strange soul, of course, deranges the body, and the witch-doctor, having been summoned and having discovered the presence of the wander-soul in the body, proceeds to draw it out, and insert the dream-soul in its stead. But the witch-doctor does not

allow the wander-soul to go free, for, as a rule, a subscription is got up, and the witch-doctor takes the spirit home, with a promise to educate it, so that it may be able to find its way straight to soul-land, though, as often as not, he lets it slip into the body of a new-born child, who soon dies of convulsions.

The belief in the four souls is not universal throughout Negroland. The Tshis hold that in every man there dwells a *kra*, or guardian-spirit, which leaves the man at his death and becomes a *sisa*, but can, within a given time, revert to the position of a *kra* by being re-born in a new body. Should such re-birth not take place, the *sisa* must quit the world for *sisa*-land (somewhere beyond the river Volta). But even thence it is able to return to the world as an evil spirit, and enter a body from which the *kra* is for the time absent. Thus the *kra* of the Tshis is somewhat similar to the immortal soul of some of the other tribes, and it performs also the functions of the dream-soul; but the shadow-soul and the *bmsh*-soul are not acknowledged.

The Gas divide the *kra* (or *kla*) into two distinct souls, or guardian-spirits, the one male and the other female, the former being well-disposed, and the latter evilly-disposed. The *nian* acts according to their advice; in other words, they represent his conscience.

The Ewes hold views similar to those of the Tshis, but they have no equivalent for *sisa*-land, the wander-soul continuing as such, or being re-born either in a human body or in the body of some animal. In the latter case it shows its disposition towards mankind by its choice of an animal; if malignant, it enters the body of a beast of prey; if well-disposed, the body of a harmless animal.

The Yorubas have three souls, dwelling respectively in the stomach, the head, and the great toe. Of these the stomach-soul is of greatest importance, and shares all the food that the man eats; the head-soul guides the man in all his actions, and has special offerings (usually the blood of fowls) made to it; the toe-soul receives attention only when the man is about to undertake a long journey.

But, whatever the number of souls that the Negro or Bantu believes to dwell in his body, the general idea is always the same, viz. that, as long as life remains, the body, like everything else, contains an indwelling spirit or several indwelling spirits; that, if the belief is in more than one such indwelling spirit, then one—the immortal soul—has higher functions than the others and has a future existence. Concerning the nature of this future existence beliefs differ, but the *kra* of the Tshi, the *kla* of the Ga, the *luwo* of the Ewe, the *iwini* of the Yoruba, the *inina* of the Mpongwe, the *ilina* of the Benga, the *nsisim* of the Fang, the *nkulu* of the Fjort, and the immortal soul of other tribes, by whatever name it is known, continue to exist in one form or another after the death of the body with which they had previously been connected.

No Tshi doubts the fact that the material corpse remains in the grave where it has been placed, but he holds that at death the indwelling spirit, and at the same time the man's individuality, in a shadowy form, quit the body. Thus from the latter there emanate the man's immortal soul (*kra*) and his ghost (*srahman*)—a shadowy representation of the living man. The ghost goes to the 'land of ghosts' (*srahmanadzi*), but not necessarily at once. If the deceased completed his proper term of life, the ghost proceeds to the other world forthwith; but, if the man was killed, or died before his time, the ghost remains on the earth to haunt people, until taken in hand by the

priests and forced to depart. Ghost-land is believed to be beneath the earth, but is similar in every respect to the world, and the ghost retains the same status as the man held when alive. For the latter reason funeral customs are of supreme importance; the ghost of a chief must have its retinue of ghost-slaves, or their equivalent in ghost-wealth, and the ghosts of the man's clothes, property, food, etc., must accompany the ghost-chief; otherwise he will not be received with due respect by his fellow-ghosts.

The Ewes believe also in ghost-land, and in the fitting of the indwelling spirit at death, but the actions of their *luwo* are not quite the same as those of the *kra* of the Tshis. It becomes a *noli* (corresponding to *sisa*), but there is no *noli*-land for its eventual disposal; it may be re-born as a *luwo* in a new-born infant or transmigrate into the body of an animal; failing either of these, it becomes a wandering *noli*, with powers of doing good or evil.

The Yorubas have made further developments in the conception of what takes place at death. They have the ghost and the ghost-land like the Tshis and the Ewes, but they believe that, unless the funeral-rites are properly performed, the ghost cannot go to ghost-land, and, therefore, wanders as a ghost on the earth, until hunted down by evil spirits and dispatched to an uncomfortable place set apart for stray ghosts, from which there is no return. They also say that it is possible for a ghost to return from ghost-land and commence life apart in a new-born infant. This is not a little confusing, for apparently here the ghost is regarded as the man's soul.

But none of these tribes dwelling westward of the Niger believe that metempsychosis always takes place. They occasionally observe in a child a marked resemblance to some deceased relative, whose individuality, ghost, or spirit they imagine must have been re-born in the infant. It is probably due, therefore, to the fact that metempsychosis is not universally believed in that the aim of this 'school,' as was pointed out above, is to preserve human life. With this object all sacrifices are made to the gods and spirits. Death must be averted at all costs, for the after-life is an unknown quantity.

In the region lying between the Niger and the Cameroons the belief in re-incarnation is practically universal, though, where the true Negro merges into the Bantu (e.g., Cross River), the people have various opinions as to what happens to the soul or human indwelling spirit at death. According to Partridge, the majority of the Cross River natives have no definite ideas on the subject; there are some (possibly from intercourse with Christian missionaries) who believe that the spirit goes up to live with the 'big god' in the sky; others that it passes into the sacred tree which every village possesses, and which the people call their 'life'; others that it is re-born in an infant or in a wild animal; and others that it wanders about, as a species of evil apparition, to haunt the world. Yet these Cross River people do think that they can, to a certain extent, control the destiny of the soul, and help it to attain one or other of the above resting-places. In the Oil Rivers, however, where it is held that re-incarnation is the natural and only fate of the human soul, the Negro's one concern is to guide and control the actions of the soul from the moment when it leaves the body until its re-birth in an infant, in order that it may be re-born into the same status as it previously had. A soul of a dead chief, e.g., must be re-born in an infant who will some day become a chief. This guidance and control of the soul is undertaken by the fetishmen—not only the head

of the house, who is *ipso facto* the family fetishman, but also by the fraternity of fetishmen, corresponding to the priesthood in other parts. As soon as the breath leaves the body, the fetishmen take the soul in hand, and the elaborate funeral-rites connected with the burial of a chief, with the gifts, sacrifices, etc., are for the purpose of proclaiming the rank of the dead man when the soul reaches soul-land. Human sacrifices are much more important here than among the Tshis and other western tribes. There wealth in any form can take the place of slaves, for, as long as the ghost-chief arrives in ghost-land with sufficient wealth, his position is established. The soul, however, with re-birth in prospect, must be accompanied by a retinue befitting its rank, to keep up its dignity until the time arrives for re-incarnation. The length of time that this takes varies, for it depends on the birth of a suitable infant. But during this interval the fetishmen believe that they are able to hold intercourse with the soul, and to guide it in the way that it should go.

Although the Oil River natives concern themselves so much with the destiny of the soul after death, they are not callous of life. On the contrary, they desire long life for themselves and their friends, because, unless the soul lives its allotted time in the body, it cannot have acquired all the knowledge necessary for its re-incarnation. Hence witches, who, by means of evil spirits, cause premature death, are here, as elsewhere in W. Africa, regarded with intense hatred, and ruthlessly destroyed, it being one of the duties of the fetishman to hunt them down, and counteract their evil deeds. The Mpongwe native believes that at death his indwelling spirit, or immortal soul (*inina*), leaves the body and passes into the spirit-world, which he vaguely imagines to be everywhere around him, including the air that he breathes. The spirit (in an invisible form, of course) then continues its existence as a spirit in a spirit-world, much resembling the world in which the man had lived, the spirits of his wives and other property being with him, and his hunger being satisfied with the spiritual essence of earthly food. The majority of these spirits have no fixed place of abode, but wander about; some take up their residence temporarily in natural objects—mountains, rocks, trees, etc.—while others enter the bodies of wild beasts. Not one would willingly become a wanderer were it left to itself, but, at the death of the body which it tenanted, would settle down in the village and house where the body had spent its life. This, however, would be inconvenient to the family of the deceased, as no son wishes to be perpetually interfered with by the spirit of his father, and consequently every endeavour is made, by firing guns and beating drums, to frighten away the spirit whenever it becomes disembodied.

Since, in the opinion of a Mpongwe native, a disembodied human soul possesses in its new existence the good and bad qualities of the dead man in whom it dwelt during life, it is capable of good or bad actions towards mankind. But by the medium of the fetishmen man is able to avert evil, and, indeed, to induce good, at the hands of the spirits (see below, § 4). One point, however, must be borne in mind, viz. that any influence which a man may obtain over a spirit can be but temporary, for the spirit never ceases to exist, and can never be destroyed.

Lastly, the Fjort people do not differ very widely from the Mpongwe people in their ideas concerning the human soul. At death the *nkulu* of a good man may remain about the house of the deceased for twenty days, after which it passes into the

spirit-world, which is everywhere, though most of the spirits dwell in the woods and forests. The *chimbindi*, as it is now called, is hostile to mankind in general, and is, in fact, an evil spirit of the worst description. The soul of the Fjort, however, does not always join the spirit-world quietly and at once; e.g., in the case of a corpse whose eyes are not closed special precautions have to be taken as to the disposal of the body, or the family of the deceased will die. Moreover, if the *chimbindi* of such an individual is seen by a member of the family, that member may die; if the *chimbindi* beats him, he will certainly die. Again, sometimes the soul refuses to become a *chimbindi*, and then it is necessary for a priest or fetishman to pass it into the head of some member of the deceased's family. The spirit of the dead man (*nkulu qianzi*) is then able to hold intercourse with his family.

What happens to the souls of bad people (e.g., witches) seems to be doubtful. It is possible, however, to imagine that, since the bodies of witches are hurled from the summits of the highest precipices, to be broken to pieces on the rocks below or thrown into rivers to be washed away to the sea, the people believe that, in thus dealing with them, they destroy their souls also. Otherwise there would be no object in these drastic methods, and, it must be remembered, the Negro thinks deeply, and does nothing without a purpose. Still, there is a belief that the *nkulu* of a dead witch may be passed into the head of a living witch, and thus continue its existence, while some say that the *chimbindi* of a witch remains for ever to haunt the place where the witch died.

4. Priests, fetishmen, and witchcraft. — The origin of the priesthood in the greater part of W. Africa was undoubtedly the inability or unwillingness of the people to manage their own religious affairs, and in all probability the first priests were men—either more intellectual or more cunning than their fellows—who gained a local reputation as soothsayers, and on whose prognostications the community placed great reliance. When they had once acquired a hold over the people, it was a simple matter to increase their power by the invention of mysterious rites and ceremonies, and, aware that they were not immune from the effects of old age or from death, they trained a younger generation in their art. Thus a special class grew up, whose members, in the course of time, may perhaps have imagined that their practices were real, that they themselves possessed attributes not given to ordinary human beings, and that they were able, by incantations and similar methods, to avert or bring down the wrath of the god who was their special care. Believing this, the Negro consults the priest on all occasions, paying him what he asks. Should he wish to compass the death of an enemy, he goes to his priest, who, inspired by his god, prepares a 'medicine' to bring about the desired end, or instructs the applicant how by some other means the enemy can be secretly destroyed. Should he wish for a charm or amulet as a preventive of misfortune, his priest will sell him one. Moreover, it is the priest who conducts the proceedings when trial by ordeal is resorted to, in order to discover the perpetrator of a crime. The power of the priests is without limit, though the natives maintain that it is the god that strikes or assists, and that the priest is merely the agent or mouthpiece of the god.

Among the Gold Coast tribes the priesthood, although certainly a fraternity, has no real organization. Each deity worshipped by the people has its priests or priestesses, but all are equal, work together for the common cause, and owe no allegiance to any one. The people themselves, however,

recognize a difference in the individual abilities of their priests, and credit some with possessing superior powers. Among the Ewes of the Slave Coast the priesthood had developed into an organization, the priests of each of the more important gods forming themselves into a separate brotherhood, or sect, with proper rules and a distinct ritual, the king of a country usually being their head. Priestesses also are more numerous here than on the Gold Coast. The Yoruba priesthood is more highly organized still, and is in intimate connexion with the Ogboni secret society (see below, § 7). In most cases the chief of a kingdom or State is chief of the society, and as such is, *ex officio*, head of the priesthood, which is divided into three orders, each being subdivided into classes. In the first order there are three classes: (1) the priests of Ifa (the god of divination), who are superior to all other priests, and have two high priests at their head; (2) those of Osanlin and Aroni (gods of medicine), who practise medicine; and (3) those of Obatala and Odudua. In the second order there are two classes: (1) priests of Shango; and (2) priests of all other gods, except Orisha-Oko. The third order is also divided into two classes: (1) priests of Orisha-Oko (god of agriculture); and (2) priests of such gods as are supposed to be deified men. In addition to these orders and classes, there are also grades among the priests of a class; e.g., the priests of Shango are presided over by a chief priest (the *magba*) and twelve senior priests, each with a title and a place in order of precedence. Priests of the respective orders are distinguishable one from the other, and some of the classes have distinctive marks or badges. Thus, the priests of the first order all wear white; those of the second order wear red and white, and shave the crown of the head; and those of the third have a small white paint-mark on the forehead. Again, the priests of Ifa wear armlets of palm-fibre and carry a cow-tail whisk; those of Obatala wear necklaces of white beads; and those of Shango necklaces of black, red, and white beads; those of Ogun have an iron bracelet on the left arm, and those of Oshun brass armlets and anklets.

As a rule, a Yoruba priest's sons follow in their father's footsteps, though the priesthood is also recruited from outside. There are regular institutions where boys and girls are trained for the offices of priest and priestess, the novitiate occupying two or three years, during which many strange and mysterious ceremonies take place.

It will be observed, therefore, that a true priest is one who concerns himself with the worship of one particular god. This does not, however, preclude him from believing in the existence of other gods; he does believe in their existence and in the sincerity of the priests who serve them, but his attentions are all devoted to the service of his own god, from whom he is convinced, or pretends, that he can obtain for the followers of the god whatever they require. But, besides the ceremonial worship which he performs for his god, the priest has other functions: he is a diviner, a maker and seller of 'medicines' and charms, and, at times, even a judge and executioner. In fact, he is not only a true priest, but also a fetishman (sometimes termed 'witch-doctor,' or 'medicine-man').

Eastwards of the Niger, in the Oil Rivers, and thence southwards, in the Mpongwe country, true priests are rare, for the worship of gods is hardly recognized; but fetishmen are numerous. The difference between a true priest and a fetishman is that the former devotes himself to some particular god, maintaining certain forms and ceremonies of worship, whereas the latter deals with all gods and all spirits of every degree, dispensing charms and 'medicines,' conducting trials, etc. The true

priest is a fetishman, but the fetishman is not a true priest.

In the Oil Rivers, as has been pointed out, the one great guiding motive of the religion of the people is to deal with the human soul after death. This is the principal concern of the fetishmen (*ngujumen*), of whom there is a large fraternity, i.e. men who have no other profession, and who, doubtless, came into existence much in the same way as the priests. But here the head of each house considers himself the fetishman of the house, although at times he may deem it necessary to call in some outside fetishman more skilled than himself in the ways of the spirit-world—and the spirit-world rules the unfortunate Negro with a rod of iron. Besides the guidance of the recently-disembodied human soul, fetishmen have many other duties to perform—all the duties (unconnected with worship) mentioned above as being performed by the priesthood elsewhere.

Among the Mpongwe-speaking tribes the fetishman wields far more power than even in the Oil Rivers; for the Mpongwe native, although he cares nothing for gods, is overwhelmed with the vast concourse of the spirits of the spirit-world, who are ever striving to thwart him. He desires prosperity in this world, and this prosperity he can obtain only by gaining a mastery over the evil spirits which stand in his way. He himself, as an ordinary man, is unable to battle with such spirits, but from the fetishmen he can buy 'medicines' and charms wherewith to overcome all difficulties; for the fetishmen possess the power of controlling all spirits, by means of one great and strong spirit with whom they are on intimate terms.

South of these godless and priestless regions we find among the Fjort people both priests and fetishmen; for here, perhaps more than anywhere else in W. Africa, there is a well-defined dividing line between the higher and the lower forms of religion. In the former, as has been said, there is the cult of Nzambi and the mysteries connected with the *nkici-ci*, concerned with which are the king, chief, or head of the family, and the true priest (*nganga-nzambi*, or *nganga-nkici-ci*). But this priesthood differs from that of the Slave Coast and Gold Coast in that it is not a fraternity, for each priest is independent and works for himself on lines of his own, though always through that power which is considered to fill the earth and everything yielded by the earth, and which comes from Nzambi, i.e. Mother Earth. To the lower form of religion belong the fetishmen who work by 'black art,' such as the *nganga-nkawci* and the *nganga-nkici-mbowu* ('keeper of a nail-fetish'). The descriptions given below of spirits and charms will make clear the methods of these fetishmen. Besides the true priests and fetishmen, there is a third class of *nganga*, the *nganga-bilongo*, who is regarded by the people almost as a fetishman, but who, in reality, is merely a medical practitioner, with a knowledge of herbs. This knowledge he keeps in his family, but his methods of using it are quite rational.

Priests and fetishmen are frequently described by Europeans as 'witch-doctors' or 'medicine-men'—terms which leave the impression that these individuals practise witchcraft, or, to use an old term, are 'in league with the devil.' In a sense this is true; at any rate, the fetishmen profess to be able to hold communion with all kinds of evil spirits, and to be able to dispense 'medicines' in order to bring about any desired results. On the other hand, no small part of the duties of the priests or fetishmen is the detection of witches, the frustration of their evil designs on human beings, and their condemnation to death. The fetishman

is therefore not a friend of witches. As a matter of fact, there appears to be very little difference between the methods ascribed to the witch and those of the fetishman; but the native has an abhorrence of a witch, because he believes that she possesses powers not possessed by priests and fetishmen, that she strikes secretly (by poison, etc.), and that she has at her beck and call a host of evil spirits about which the fetishman knows nothing. Of this witch-power the priests and fetishmen are undoubtedly jealous; the witch is infringing their rights, so, for the most part, they uphold the native in his hatred of witches, and do all in their power to get rid of them. Since to be suspected of being a witch means immediate trial by ordeal and certain death, or even death without trial, no one proclaims that she practises witchcraft; and in all probability the idea of the existence of witches is kept alive solely by the fetishmen, in order to explain away their own failures. Witches, they say, can produce sickness and death, can kill swiftly or slowly, by passing evil spirits into the human body, and are ever endeavouring to undo all the good done by the priests and fetishmen. Among the many cruel acts with which they are credited may be mentioned the charge that they catch wandering dream-souls in traps and on baited fish-hooks, and prevent them from returning to the bodies from which they have absented themselves, until purchased by a fetishman. At the same time, although the priests hate witches as rivals and as enemies to what they consider an elevating religion, and although fetishmen hate them for somewhat similar reasons, and because a witch-belief has a bad effect on the community, the fact remains that in some parts this hatred is not instilled into the people by the priests or fetishmen, yet it is as intense as elsewhere. Moreover, the belief in witches is strengthened by the strange fact that not infrequently a woman accused of witchcraft confesses that she is a witch. Wizards are not unknown in W. Africa, but they are far less numerous than witches; in fact they are rare.

Whether the methods of the priest and fetishman be called witchcraft, fetishism, or anything else is a matter of small importance. The distinction between their methods and those of the wizard or witch is said to be that the latter secretly causes sickness or death (usually by poison), and denies that he or she does so, whereas the priest or fetishman practises openly, is acknowledged by the people as following a legitimate calling, and maintains that all his actions are for the welfare of the people. It is a distinction without a difference; for the priest or fetishman can be procured to assist in the making-away with an enemy, using for the purpose the identical means said to be employed by witches—such as ‘medicines’ and the calling-in of evil spirits.

5. Spirits and charms.—The whole difficulty of the Negro's life arises from his firm belief in the existence all around him of countless evil spirits. The air, the earth, the under-earth, are all filled with spirits of the spirit-world. The mere matter of his gods and their worship does not cause him much uneasiness; he supports a priest to look after them, he propitiates them with the necessary offerings, and he feels convinced that he has done his duty. He has no love for any of his gods, but he fears their ability to do him harm. He has the utmost faith in his priest, and he knows that he himself cannot wrestle with a god—a superhuman being. With the host of minor spirits, i.e. supernatural beings, however, things are different; for, by cunning and other methods, they can be successfully kept under, prevented from working destruction, and even made benevolent. It is no

longer a matter of propitiation, but one of hard fighting—pitting one spirit against another, and leaving them to fight it out. The arrangements for these trials of strength entail a vast amount of trouble.

Superhuman god-spirits, including the indwelling spirits of natural objects and the indwelling spirits, or embodied ‘souls,’ of human beings, have already been discussed. What remains to be dealt with is that great army of spirits of the spirit-world, pervading the universe, hemming in the Negro and Bantu on all sides, and influencing every action of man.

In the Bantu (Gabun and Loango) mind spirits are graded according to rank, and it seems to be the general idea that the spirits of gods that are worshipped are superior to all others (of course, among god-worshipping people), and that human embodied souls are superior to the spirits of things non-human. But these two main classes are subdivided into several grades, and the lower spirits are also subdivided into grades. Miss Kingsley maintains¹ that there are two classes higher than human souls, several classes equal to human souls, and at least eleven classes lower than the latter; and she further maintains that spirits which are human disembodied souls remain in that class for all time, never passing into a higher or a lower class. She, therefore, denies the deification of human beings in W. Africa. The most reliable authority on the subject, so far as the Mpongwe-speaking tribes of the Gabun are concerned, Nassan,² names six classes which affect human affairs:

(1) *Inina* is the human embodied soul, which, on becoming disembodied and passing into the world of spirits, continues to take an interest in human affairs, more especially in the affairs of the family with which it was connected when embodied. (2) *Ibambo* is the name applied to a class of spirits with the power of appearing in ghost-like form and frightening human beings. *Abambo* (plur.) have no fixed abodes, can appear anywhere and at any time, and are thought to be the spirits of dead ancestors. They are much dreaded and are worshipped; whether they are universally malevolent is not certain, but, when a man is ‘possessed of a devil,’ it is generally an *ibambo* that has entered into him and has to be cast out. (3) *Ombwiri*, *nkinda*, and *olaga* are the disembodied souls of men, which have taken up a temporary residence in natural objects, such as rocks, trees, etc. They are revered and offerings are made to them by passers-by, who fear to incur their displeasure. The *ombwiri* is the soul of a chief, the *nkinda* that of an ordinary native of the country, and the *olaga* that of a stranger. In many respects they resemble the local deities and the private gods of the Gold Coast tribes, but they have no priesthood and communicate with man direct. They also have the power of causing sickness by entering into human beings. (4) The *mondi* is an evil spirit greatly feared, which brings disease and all kinds of trouble to humanity by taking possession of the body, from which it has to be expelled by exorcizing some stronger spirit to fight it. (5) *Yaka* is a family fetish supposed to contain the spirits of ancestors; and for its edification portions of the bones, eyes, skull, etc., of generations of deceased members of the family are carefully preserved. The greatest reverence is paid to the *yaka*, offerings of food and drink are made to it, and it is consulted on all occasions; for the people believe that the spirits of their ancestors continue to take the deepest interest in the affairs of the family. (6) The last kind is the spirit that enters into a wild animal for the purpose of doing some evil act. This may be any ordinary spirit of the spirit-world, or it may even be the indwelling spirit of a living human being temporarily absent from the body. But such possession of a wild beast is not permanent, i.e., it is not the same thing as transmigration of souls.

All these Mpongwe spirits are in one way or another derived from or connected with the human soul, and they are for the most part distinctly malevolent. They are not unlike some of the spirits believed in by the Gold Coast and Slave Coast tribes. It will be remembered that the *kra* (of the Gold Coast tribes), when disembodied, becomes a *sisá*, that it can be re-born as a *kra* in a human body, but its proper destination is *sisá*-land. Occasionally the *sisá* leaves *sisá*-land and returns to dwell in the world as an evil spirit, sometimes passing itself into the body of a wild beast. The *kurwo* of the Ewe people (Slave Coast) becomes a

¹ *West African Studies*, p. 170.

² *Fetichism in W. Africa*, p. 64 ff.

noli, and, failing re-birth in a human body or in that of a wild animal, it remains on the earth as a good or an evil spirit. Among the Yorubas there is the belief in evil spirits known as *abiku*, dwelling everywhere in uninhabited tracts of country, and apparently similar in origin to the *sisa*. The *abiku*, it is thought, suffers from hunger, thirst, and other privations, and his particular object is to enter the body of a child, and share the child's food, comforts, etc. Since, however, the *abikus* are more numerous than children, they form a compact among themselves that any *abiku* fortunate enough to take up its residence in the body of a child shall support, with food, etc., a certain number of its fellow evil spirits. The consequence is that the child possessed of an *abiku*, having to share its food with many other *abikus*, soon sickens and frequently dies. There are, of course, methods of ridding the child of the evil spirits—e.g., enticing the *abiku* and its fellows to quit the child to partake of savoury food placed somewhere close by, and then, while the spirits are eating, tying rings and bells round the child's ankles, in order to scare the evil beings away altogether; or rubbing pepper into small cuts made on the child's body, which is supposed to be an effective method. The heavy infant mortality in this part of W. Africa is ascribed to the evil operations of *abikus*, with whom witches are held to be in league.

Not unlike the *ombwiri* of the Mpongwe people are certain tree-spirits believed in by the Yorubas, such as the spirit that dwells in the *ashorin* tree, that which dwells in the *apa* tree, and that of the silk-cotton tree. Before cutting down any of these trees, the woodman makes offerings to their spirits. But these are not regarded as the spirits of local deities, though very possibly they were at one time; and they differ from the *ombwiri*, which is a human disembodied soul. It is said that witches assemble at night round these trees, whose spirits they invoke to assist them in their malpractices.

The dislike which a native has to discussing with Europeans matters which he feels will be ridiculed is accountable for the lack of detailed information concerning the spirit-beliefs of the people; yet enough information is at hand to enable us to form some idea of the W. African's conception of the inmates of the spirit-world. It is certain that both Negroes and Bantu think that there are spirits without number everywhere; that, as a spirit's existence never ends, the spirit-world grows more congested every day and every hour; that the majority of the spirits of the more active kind are disembodied souls of men; and that they are nearly always maliciously inclined towards mankind. Questioned as to what he thinks a spirit is like, the native will reply that, though it is usually invisible, it is similar in form to a human being, or to something with whose form he is familiar. He believes that the spirit is material; his mind is not capable of conceiving anything else; and, if he has not himself seen a spirit, he knows many people who have. Moreover, there are few natives who have not experienced, on a dark night in the bush, the clammy touch of some spirit, and fled from it for dear life.

As to what may be termed the lower order of spirits, some are good and some evil, and an idea of their number can be formed by recalling what has been said of the midwelling spirit theory. Everything not made by human hands has an indwelling spirit—the lower animals, the earth, the grass, flowers, herbs, etc. Knowing this, one can understand the notions of 'medicines' entertained by the people. The spirits of certain things, when properly dealt with by trained fetishmen, can be made subservient to the will of the fetishmen, and their powers thus utilized for certain

purposes. The fetishmen are well aware of the medicinal properties of various herbs, but whether they believe in the spirit theory is probably open to doubt. Still, by upholding the belief, they are able, while effecting a cure for some simple illness by the administration of a simple drug, to increase their reputation as fetishmen; for the administration of the drug is always accompanied by mysterious ceremonies and incantations; and the invocation of the spirits of the various ingredients of the drug is kept well to the front.

In this manner arises the charm, or fetish, certainly of the Bantu, if not also of the Negro. In one respect at least there is no difference between the amulets, or charms, of the Negroes and those of the Bantu, viz. their use, which is to protect the wearer or possessor from evil spirits, and to guide and assist him in all undertakings. The Gold Coast Negro creates a certain class of charm for himself through the medium of his *suhman* (see above, § 2. i. (c)), but besides these there are the numerous charms made and sold by the priests of all the god-worshipping Negro tribes, and such charms are always consecrated to a god, the priest maintaining that the ingredients in the charms are derived from a god and are consecrated to the god. The priest, therefore, keeps up the fiction of the religious nature of these charms, because he thereby strengthens the people's faith in their gods, and at the same time adds to his own importance as sole intermediary between man and the god whom he serves.

A brief description of some of the charms and 'medicines' sold by the priests of the Gold Coast and Slave Coast may be of interest, as showing the faith of the Negroes. The following may be taken as typical of those found to exist among all the god-worshipping tribes dwelling westward of the Niger.

As a protection from wild beasts, an amulet made of teeth and claws of animals is used; to ward off sickness, a human tooth and a Popo bead strung together and worn round the neck, or a lump of clay adorned with cowries and pieces of broken pottery. To protect a family from various injuries, a scarecrow resembling a man is planted in front of the house. To prevent bullets and other missiles from taking effect, the tail of a horse, cow, or goat is waved in front of the body during battle. To protect a house from fire, a charm is made of hare's fur. Anklets, bracelets, and necklaces of sacred beads are worn by women prior to childbirth in order to keep away evil spirits; and for a similar purpose such things are fastened to the child as soon as it comes into the world. Amulets containing various preparations are worn to keep away particular ailments, such as headache; and similar things are hung up in the fields to protect the crops. Strings of leaves or of feathers are suspended over a doorway or across a path to stay the inroads of evil spirits. Then there are the 'medicines' prepared by the priests and sold to the people for special purposes, viz. magic powders and unguents which, when used as directed, will produce certain results. The amulets and charms are used as preventives, but these 'medicines' are used otherwise; and, in many cases, those using them, as well as the priest who supplied them, would, if detected, be dealt with as witches. There are powders which, if blown against a door or window, will cause it to open forthwith; others scattered on an enemy's footprints will drive him mad, or blown after an enemy will cause his death; while there are unguents which will produce love or will even cause a man to lend money to another. In fact, the priests are prepared to sell 'medicines' to meet all the requirements of their customers, who, firmly believing in the efficacy of the 'medicines', are ever in dread of their being used against them. Consequently, the priest does a double trade; for, if a man thinks that his enemy has purchased a 'medicine' to be used against him, he will obtain from his own priest a counteracting powder.

In reality there is very little difference between the charms and 'medicines' of the priest and those of the fetishman; the former are connected with a god or gods, while the latter are spirit-born. In the creation of both, secrecy, mystery, incantations, and weird ceremonies are ever present. Yet charms are certainly not regarded by the Negroes of the Slave Coast, etc., as of such vital importance to their welfare as they are by the Bantu of the Gabon and Loango districts. These Bantu stake everything on the possession of charms, and

to the Mpongwe-speaking people they are the essence of religion. Possibly this is the earliest form of, and the nearest approach to, true fetishism in W. Africa. It is, therefore, of considerable interest. The Mpongwe native has only one idea in life: he desires to secure material prosperity for himself and his family, i.e. to live in comfortable circumstances to a good old age; for, although he may have some hazy idea of a future life, the general belief is that beyond the grave there is only the world of spirits and constant wrangling. Now, these spirits of the dead swarm round the living, and are always trying to annoy them; but by taking due precautions (getting possession of the proper charms) the Mpongwe imagines that he is able to frustrate the evil designs of the spirits. Each man, therefore, works for himself, and shapes his own destiny by means of charms (or fetishes, for the term is here permissible). But man himself cannot create his own charms, and thus the fraternity of trained fetishmen holds the people in an iron grasp, dispensing charms at varying prices.

Before the Mpongwe is old enough to be the owner of charms and to understand their value, his parents or the fetishmen perform certain ceremonies for him, as a protection against evil spirits. On reaching years of discretion, he begins to battle with the spirits, and procures from the fetishmen the necessary weapons of defence and offence, in the shape of charms and 'medicines.' The amulets or charms used by the people of the Mpongwe country, and supplied by the fetishmen, take almost any form, but usually consist of some small article capable of holding the ingredients necessary for the special purpose for which the charm is required. It may be a shell, a horn, or, in fact, anything, but the preparation placed in it by the fetishman varies. His assortment of materials is extensive, and includes such things as the ashes of herbs, plants, and bones, portions selected from human bodies or from the bodies of wild beasts, etc., which, with incantations and mystic rites, he prepares and mixes in strictest privacy. In making his compounds, he works on methodical lines, each ingredient being supposed to have its proper use; and, although the effect may be imaginary, the fetishman is careful to have what he considers the right materials in his concoctions.

E.g., a man has a grudge against another; he goes to the fetishman to procure a charm which will bring misfortune to his enemy; in the compound the fetishman will place (if he can obtain them) nail-parings, hair-clippings, or a drop of blood, of the person against whom the spell is to work. But the shell, or horn, with the mixture which it contains, has no efficacy of itself; a spirit—good or evil, strong or otherwise—must be passed into it; and, in selecting the ingredients for his mixture, the fetishman includes spices and other things likely to attract the particular class of spirit which he desires to take up its abode in the charm. For all this working by means of charms is nothing more than warfare among the spirits, and the man whose charm contains the more powerful spirit wins the day.

Besides innumerable charms to secure prosperity in this world, the well-to-do Mpongwe native has other means for bringing good or causing evil. These include certain cabalistic expressions, supposed to influence the spirits, and used by individuals, as well as incantations by the fetishmen in the nature of curses or blessings.

In the lower form of Fjort religion charms are everything, if we include in the term not only the personal protective charm (*nkici-kici*), but also the nail-fetish (*nkici-mbowu*). These things have no connexion whatever with objects having sacred powers inherent in them by nature (*nkici-ci*), nor is the nature of the charm quite the same as that of the Mpongwe charm.

The nail-fetish is an extraordinary institution, which without doubt is the curse of the country. It consists of a wooden image, in the form of a man, made under the following circumstances. The

party, beaded by a special fetishman, proceeds to the grove where the tree for the image is to be cut down. The spirit of a man has to be passed into the tree, in order that human passions may dwell in the image, and for this purpose the man must die—though not necessarily at once. When the grove is entered, should a man's name be called, even accidentally, that man will die and his spirit will enter the tree. But, as a rule, the man whose spirit is to preside over the image is specially selected for his great courage or some other manly attribute, and his name is solemnly called in the grove. The fetishman then fells the tree, and the sap that flows from it is thought to be its blood; with this is mingled the blood of a fowl sacrificed for the purpose. The man whose spirit is to enter the image dies within ten days—by what means is not known, though the natives deny that he is killed by any human agency. The image is carved, and stuffed by the fetishman with the proper 'medicines,' long and mysterious ceremonies being performed; it is then set up among the other images in the fetishman's hut. The nail-fetish is now ready for use, the people supposing that the *nkulu*, or spirit, within it is able to kill whom it pleases. The process of invoking its aid is simple: if a man thinks that another has done him an injury, or is likely to harm him, he goes to the fetishman of a nail-fetish, tells him his trouble, pays him handsomely, and persuades him to drive a nail, knife, or spear-point into the image. This having been done with proper ceremonies, his enemy will surely die. If this were all superstition or imagination, there could be no great harm in nail-fetishes, but the fact is clearly established that the man to compass whose death the nail has been driven does actually die—at the hands of the *nkulu* within the image, the natives say. It is not unnatural to suppose that the fetishman, who has been paid for the murder, sees to it. But there are ways of avoiding this death. If a man has reason to suppose that his enemy has had a nail hammered for his death, he seeks out a priest or diviner, whom he pays to tell him the name of the particular nail-fetish which has had the nail driven into it. He then proceeds to the fetishman and, having discovered his own nail, pays to have it extracted. Endeavours have been made by European officials to suppress these images; several have been seized, and are now to be seen in museums in England; but doubtless new ones are created to take their places.

The *nkici-kici*, or personal protective charms, are also imbued with power by ceremonies performed by the fetishmen, but the respective sources from which the fetishmen derive the power by which the *nkici-kici* and the nail-fetishes are made efficacious are totally different. There are differences also in the ceremonies performed when passing the power into the objects, in the manner of invoking or consulting them, and in the purposes for which they are used. Of these *nkici-kici* of the Fjort the following are examples:

Bracelets of iron and of plaited palm-leaves and cloth, to protect from various misfortunes; a bracelet made of *baobab* fibre, to preserve health; a piece of the skin of a sloth, attached to a string, and worn round the head, to keep away pain and other ills; a charm made of elephant's skin, to give a man virility; a piece of skin of the sloth (different from the above), worn by a woman to protect her unborn child; a gazelle's horn filled with 'medicines,' worn by a woman to guard her in childbirth; and various similar things. There are also iron and copper marriage-bracelets, worn by both men and women as protective charms.

All such *nkici-kici* are obtained from different *zinganga* (plur. of *nganga*), or fetishmen, and, of course, are supposed to contain a *nkici*, or spirit, like the charms of other tribes.

6. Tabu, totemism, ancestor-worship, cannibalism, and sacrifices.—Among all W. African

tribes there appears to exist, in one form or another, prohibition or abstention from eating some particular articles of food. In the majority of cases the nature of the abstention is a family affair; and its origin is supposed to be connected with the family name—a species of totemism. On the Gold Coast and in many other parts there are families bearing the names of animals and plants. How they came by such names is not known; some have traditions that their ancestors sprang from the animal or plant; some believe that at one time an animal befriended a member of the family and was thenceforward revered, if not worshipped; and others maintain that the name was given to an ancestor because he was thought to resemble the animal in appearance or in habits—that it was, in fact, originally a 'nickname.' Whatever may have been the origin of the name, at the present time the members of a family abstain from eating the flesh of the animal whose name they bear. Thus a member of the Buffalo family does not eat the flesh of the buffalo, nor a member of the Corn-stalk family the corn-stalk, and so on. This form of prohibition or abstinence may be called ancestral prohibition, and it is found almost everywhere in W. Africa, among both Negroes and Bantu, even when the family bears no animal name. In addition to this, there are tabus laid on individuals by the priests and fetishmen, for some particular reason—e.g., for the protection of the individual.

The Fjort word used to express anything forbidden is *kazila*, or *xina*; and Dennett's names nine classes of things that are *xina*. Eagles, owls, crows, bats, snakes, etc., are universally prohibited as food, probably because they are considered, from their nature and habits, unclean, or possessed of some evil spirit, and no person, except witches, would think of eating them. Then each tribe and family has its distinct *xina*, and each member of a family his own special *xina*, to knowingly eat which results in the direst consequences—trouble, sickness, and even death—produced, the people believe, by unseen and malignant spirits. To certain tribes (about the Congo, Loango, etc.) the leopard is *xina*; and each province has also its separate forbidden animal. Moreover, a member of the family has to respect what he knows to have been the *xina* of his father, as well as those of his mother, his grandfathers, and his grandmothers. It will thus be observed that every native, in all probability, is forbidden to eat the flesh of several different animals; if he is a chief, or other high official, his list of prohibited animals will be still longer. To mention all the animals that are *xina* would be impossible, for to one person or another nearly every known beast and bird is *xina*. Then there are special tabus—e.g., certain priests may not eat food cooked by unmarried women; members of a royal household may not even touch a pig; doctors may prohibit a patient from eating certain foods. Finally, all animals parts of which (skins, horns, claws, shells, etc.) are found to be stored up by the fetishmen in the sacred groves are *xina*.

The *orunda* of the Mpongwe is not so widely applied as the *kazila* (or *xina*) of the Fjort, though the idea is similar. As a rule *orunda* is laid on a child when quite young by the parents and fetishmen. Lengthy ceremonies are performed, and the child is prohibited for the remainder of his life from eating some particular animal, or some particular part of an animal. The *orunda* may take other forms; thus an individual may be forbidden to eat in the presence of a woman, to drink except at certain times of the day, etc. How the *orunda* is selected in each case, or for what reason, does not appear to be known. But the object of

the ceremony is a dedication of the article selected to the indwelling or guardian spirit of the child, in order to obtain the spirit's goodwill and assistance through life. Consequently, should a man at any time break his *orunda*, his insulted spirit will turn against him, and call in evil spirits to cause trouble. The underlying idea in *orunda*, *xina*, *ibet* (of the Efiks, Old Calabar), and the abstinence of other W. African tribes is always the same; but the peculiarity about it is that, though it is voluntarily assumed, and though the priests and fetishmen do not interfere to see that it is carried out, no native would dare to face the consequences of breaking his prohibition—so great is his dread of the unseen spirits which rule the universe.

From the ancestral prohibition of families with animal names, it seems probable that animal-worship was at one time more prevalent in W. Africa than it is now. At the present time the actual worship of animals is by no means common, though several animals (snakes, monitor lizards, etc.) are protected by the priests. Still, as has already been mentioned, certain of the Ewe-speaking people worship the crocodile, and the Dahomans worship the leopard, but apparently only because of the belief that the homeless *kra* of some human being takes possession of the animal for evil purposes. In some parts of Dahomey the python is worshipped as a chief god, and any disrespect shown to one of these snakes is severely punished. Beyond this animal-worship in W. Africa does not go, and, as a matter of fact, it is no more the animal that is worshipped than the wooden image representative of a god; what is worshipped is the spirit residing in the animal, whether that spirit is regarded as a *kra*, a bush-soul, or some malevolent spirit which the native dreads. It may be that, in some cases, the animal is emblematic of an ancestor, and is thus regarded as in a measure sacred. This opens up the whole question of ancestor-worship, if true ancestor-worship may be said to exist in W. Africa. A respect for ancestors is found among all the tribes, and ancestor-esteem is part and parcel of the religion of the Negroes and Bantu, but that a W. African habitually regards any one of his ancestors as a god is not true. Nor, as a rule, does he, in the true sense, make sacrifices to an ancestor; what he offers to the spirit of the departed is merely a gift, the spiritual essence of which, he thinks, will be acceptable. His conception of the spirit-world leads him to believe that its inmates require spiritual food and drink, and before eating and drinking, therefore, he lays aside a portion for the spirit of his dead father or other relative. This gift of food is not made from fear, nor for the purpose of warding off threatened wrath; for the spirits of ancestors are deemed to be guardians of the living members of the family, and not hostile to them. The gift is evidently made out of pure kindness of heart, in return for the protection which the ancestral spirits are thought to afford their living offspring.

On occasions, more especially in times of national calamity, a king and his people will invoke the aid of the spirits of departed kings, and in Ashanti, Dahomey, and elsewhere there are annual festivals for honouring deceased rulers. The skeletons of the kings are carefully preserved, and offerings of food are made to each one. Moreover, until recently, sacrifices of human beings were made to the spirits of the dead chiefs out of gratitude for past protection. In Benin and the various kingdoms of the Oil Rivers the chiefs celebrate what is termed 'making father' on the anniversary of the late chief's death. Formerly this ceremony was accompanied by human sacrifices, but now it is more a public festival attended with

dancing and rioting, the religious part being performed by the chief at his father's grave, where offerings of food are made. So also among the lower classes of all these Negro tribes the greatest respect is shown for dead relatives. The skulls of the family ancestors are kept in earthen pots, in rows on a shelf, or in some small temple built for the purpose, food is placed before them, and they are consulted whenever assistance is required. This, however, can hardly be called true ancestor-worship, if by worship is implied adoration of a god through a priest. Yet some of these tribes do occasionally worship gods whom they believe to be deified ancestors—*e.g.*, Adanlosan, Ajahuto, Kpati, and Kpasi, worshipped by the eastern Ewes, and Gunu, the chief god of the Nupés, Igaras, and other tribes in the neighbourhood of the Niger-Bennué confluence. Again, the Mpongwe are without doubt ancestor-worshippers, proof of which is to be found in the *yaka* hundle previously referred to. Lastly, connected with ancestor-worship—carried perhaps to extremes—is the custom of certain tribes of the Upper Cross River, where, it is said, in order to assimilate the good qualities of their ancestors, the people eat their relatives as soon as they die. In contradistinction to this relative-eating is the case of the Fang and other remote tribes of the interior, whose members eat all corpses except those of their own family. But these are not wasted, for they are sold to another family or exchanged for other corpses. This form of cannibalism, however, is not common in W. Africa, and there is no proof that cannibalism of any kind prevails to a great extent among Negroes or Bantus of the coast regions. There are known cannibal tribes even on the coast, but their cannibalism is not of the lower order; human flesh is eaten not because it is enjoyed, or to stay the pangs of hunger, but rather from a religious motive. They believe that in warfare their gods are ever present, aiding them in the fight, and they are led by their priests to believe that the gods demand that a proportion of the captives of war shall be slaughtered and eaten by the conquerors, so that the fighting qualities of the victims may pass into the system of the victors, and thus strengthen them for future battles. But, besides eating the flesh of captives of war, no great human sacrifice offered for the purpose of appeasing the gods and averting sickness or misfortune is considered complete unless either the priests or the people eat the bodies of the victims. Such practices, however, are fast disappearing, and have, of course, been stamped out wherever European administration has been established.

With regard to sacrifices and offerings, it is necessary to recall two points: (1) there are two distinct purposes for which sacrifices and offerings are made, or, rather, two distinct classes of recipients, viz. the gods of the people, and the spirits of the departed; and (2) the Negro's conception of a sacrifice or offering, for whatever purpose it is made, is that its spirit or spiritual essence passes into the use of the spirit to whom it is offered—whether it be the spirit of a god or the spirit of a dead person. Human sacrifices are made to a god, because it is thought that he requires numerous attendants to do his bidding, and the ghosts or spirits of slaughtered slaves are supposed to pass immediately into his service. To obtain the goodwill of a god, therefore, especially in times of great trouble, it is necessary to offer up human beings. On occasions of victory a wholesale slaughter of prisoners of war is carried out for the reason that all warfare is held to be as much the affair of the gods as of men, that the gods fight on the side of their devotees, and consequently the gods of the

victors are particularly pleased at receiving into their service the spirits of worshippers of the vanquished gods.

The sacrifice of human beings at funerals has already been discussed. It may be remarked, however, that such sacrifice is not made to a god, but to the spirit or ghost of the dead man. The motive of the sacrifice is the same, viz. that the spirits of the victims shall pass into the service of the spirit of the departed; for the ghost of a dead chief must be accompanied to ghost-land by a retinue of ghost-wives and ghost-slaves befitting his rank. All other sacrifices and offerings are made with similar intentions—to appease or please a god or to furnish the supposed requirements of the dead. A blood-offering of any kind is deemed of greater value than anything else, and, where before the advent of European administration a human being would have been offered to a god, now a goat, sheep, or fowl is sacrificed. Of minor offerings food and drink are the most usual, but almost anything may be offered; for, even if the offering be of no value to the god or spirit, it is thought that the mere act of offering will induce goodwill and aid.

7. Secret societies, oaths, trial by ordeal.—Since the ordinary Negro or Bantu is not morally restrained from wrong-doing, and sees no harm in cheating his neighbour or causing him even greater annoyance, fear of punishment alone keeps him within bounds. In those parts of W. Africa now administered by European governments law and order are, of course, maintained by regular courts of law, but, prior to the establishment of this European control, and in such parts as are still outside European influence, the welfare of the community was, and is, watched over by village or tribal councils. But these councils of themselves, although they may find a person guilty of an offence, do not possess the power of enforcing punishment or even of seeing that a wrong is made right. They have, however, at their back what may be termed a 'court of final appeal,' viz. the secret society, whose operations, under the cloak of religion, terrorize the people. The original purpose for which the majority of secret societies were formed was to prevent the chiefs from unduly oppressing their people; but no sooner were these socialistic ideas discovered than the chiefs themselves joined the societies, and used them for their own purposes. Thus, to-day, the head of a secret society will generally be found to be the king of the country or the chief of the tribe; but this is not always the case, for there are still some powerful societies which virtually rule the country, and to whose decrees the king himself is forced to submit. The best example of this is the Oghoni society of the Yorubas, with which is connected the whole priesthood, and which is therefore doubly powerful. The organization of the society is complete, each town and village having its 'lodge,' with a code of signs, passwords, etc., while the members are solemnly sworn to assist each other and to do the bidding of the society. The supreme head of the Ogboni is the Alafin of Yoruba, but in the various minor States the chief priest is the local head of the society. The heads assemble in council when any important matter (religious, judicial, or civil) has to be discussed, and they have powers of life and death (*i.e.*, of course, beyond the limits of British jurisdiction). No matter of public interest appears to be too trivial to occupy their attention, and they are at once judges and executioners. The society is under the protection of the goddess Odudua, but beyond what has been said, little is known about it; its organization and methods are secret, and the penalty for betraying its secrets is death.

Secret societies are found in all parts of W. Africa, and the work that they do is, up to a certain point, beneficial to the communities. They uphold the moral and social laws and preserve the ancient religious customs and institutions. On the other hand, as was perhaps only natural, they have overstepped the bounds of justice, and in many instances have become nothing more than an organized band of murderers or executioners, with the result that, wherever they have come into contact with European administration, they have had to be rigorously suppressed. Of such societies the better known are the Porroh of the Mendis (Sierra Leone), the Bondo of the Sherbro country, the Igwomori of Benin, the Otrada of the Sobos, the Ekemeku of the Asabas, the Aro ('Long Juju') of the Oil Rivers, the Egbo of the Efiks (Old Calabar, etc.), and the Ukuku and Yasi of the Bantu tribes to the south-east, though the last two have now been completely broken up. Their organization is always much the same: new members are initiated, with peculiar ceremonies and mystic rites, on reaching man's estate; and they bind themselves by the most sacred oaths, and on pain of death, not to reveal the secrets of the society, as well as to carry out the orders of the spirit which is considered to preside over its affairs. The mouthpiece of the spirit is, of course, one of the head officials of the society, selected by his fellows to act as chief priest; and consequently this official is in reality the judge of the people. His word (purporting to be the word of the spirit) is law, and the members of the society are bound to do his bidding—even to killing offenders, should this be ordered. As a rule, however, killing is seldom necessary; for so great is the dread of the guardian-spirit of the society that any idea of resisting its authority usually dies out the moment it becomes known that a meeting of members has been called to discuss a case.

From all accounts, the Porroh was the most bloodthirsty of these societies, and its members (known as 'human leopards' and 'human crocodiles'), dressed in the skins of wild beasts, lay in wait for unsuspecting travellers, tearing them to pieces and carrying them off to be eaten by the priests of the society. Its power has been crushed by the Sierra Leone authorities. The Egbo of the Efiks is the most prominent secret society of W. Africa now in existence; and, though it has been robbed of its higher functions by the British administrators who now rule the country, it still carries considerable weight with the people. Beyond the limits of British influence, its power is as strong as ever. Its secret has been well kept, for little is known of the rites and ceremonies connected with Egbo, or of its organization, except that it has numerous branches, subdivided into various grades. The *jujumen* (trained fetishmen) are generally the heads of the branches, and through them the Egbo spirit makes known its decisions. It rules by fear, and its members maintain their reputation by periodically assembling and passing in procession to their council-house. Disguised in hideous wooden masks and strange dresses, they lead the people to believe that they are evil spirits, and so great is the terror inspired by their appearance that the sound of the Egbo horn or bell is the signal for a general stampede; for any one found abroad by the Egbo is severely beaten, if not torn to pieces.

Secret societies are not restricted to the male population; there are women's societies also, and their secrets are guarded from men. Originally they were intended for the protection of young women from the tyranny of their husbands, but nowadays it is impossible to say what purpose such great secret societies as the Njembe of the

Mpongwe women serve. What goes on at their meetings in the bush is not known, and their power to do harm to the outside world appears to take the form of curses and poisoned food.

It is absolutely impossible to probe the secrets of any of these societies. Many attempts have been made by Europeans to acquire information from friendly natives, and bribery has been resorted to. But no man or woman, even after conversion to Christianity, can be induced to break his or her oath. It is not perhaps strange that a people, brought up in the belief that their gods, evil spirits, secret societies, kings, priests, and fetishmen each and all are ready to deal death on the slightest pretext, should hesitate before revealing a secret which they have been sworn to keep. Dread of the consequences is sufficient to make the oath absolutely binding.

The actual form in which the secret society oath is taken has never been divulged, and it is probably different in every tribe; but the nature of the oaths taken, on other solemn occasions, by the members of the various tribes may be considered as typical. This oath of allegiance or friendship is not merely the swearing of a simple oath, but rather an impressive religious ceremony performed in the presence of numerous witnesses.

The Gold Coast tribes are sworn by a god in the following way. Some article (a portion of earth, leaves, berries, sea-water, etc.) taken from the spot where the spirit of the god is said to reside is mixed up and eaten or drunk by the person or persons to be sworn, while the priest administering the oath calls on the god to punish any violation of the oath. Europeans sometimes term this 'eating fetish,' 'chopping ju-ju,' or 'swapping ju-ju.' Another method of taking an oath is by a *bohsum*, or even by a *suhman*, charm, over which water is poured and then drunk. Blood mixed with chips of wood from a chief's stool of office is sometimes eaten. But the actual eating or drinking of a certain article is not always necessary, and among some of the tribes the person taking the oath lays a portion of his hair or nail-parings at the shrine of his god, the priest at the same time invoking the god to vent his wrath on the man if he should ever break his oath.

In some districts the oath of friendship takes the form of the interested parties washing one another's feet. Among the tribes inland from Opobo (Oli Rivers) a goat is brought into the circle, its head is struck off at one blow, and the blood is smeared with the fingers over the foreheads and breasts of all present, after which pieces of raw flesh are crammed by one party into the mouths of the other. The blood-brotherhood ceremony of the Upper Cross River, known as 'chopping *imbiam*,' is somewhat lengthy. The fingers of the right hands of the two parties are interlocked, after which each man's wrist is lanced until the blood flows freely; a grain of Indian corn, one of Guinea corn, and a piece of kola-nut are then rubbed in the blood, and eaten by each man off the other's wrist. They now consider themselves brothers, and repeat an oath to the effect that, if either attempts to harm the other in any way, may he himself be killed in that same way. The brothers embrace and seat themselves back to back, when they are separated by dropping some earth between them. Lastly, they drink palm-wine out of the same vessel.

Every native uses some short form of oath or imprecation to impress on his fellows that he is speaking the truth. The methods of swearing witnesses in courts of law differ in different parts of W. Africa. The general nature of the oath is much the same, the native calling on a god or a spirit to make his food disagree with him or to cause him to die some manner of violent death, if he fails to speak the truth. But the most ancient, and perhaps the most reliable, way of testing a man's veracity is by ordeal.

Trial by ordeal has from time immemorial been resorted to by the natives of W. Africa, and is still employed where the people are left to their own devices. The original idea was a simple one; e.g., A accuses B of stealing his goods; B denies the charge; the matter is brought before the council or the chief; a decoction, supposed to be poisonous, is prepared in a bowl, and is offered to B to drink; if he refuses to drink, or if he drinks and becomes ill, his guilt is proved; but if he drinks and suffers no ill effects, he is deemed innocent. This method of trial had the advantage of doing away with the

tedious evidence of many witnesses; and, relying on the Negro's superstitious dread of the consequences, it was doubtless a deterrent of crime as well as of litigation in general. Had trial by ordeal gone no farther, no great outcry could have been raised against it; but those in power—the chiefs, priests, fetishmen, etc.—found the poison-bowl an easy instrument for getting rid of their enemies and for extorting large sums of money. The priest or fetishman who administers the test mixes the contents of the bowl, and, for a price, will regulate the amount of odum, sass-wood, casca, Calabar bean, or other poison, which he employs. The guilt or innocence of the party, therefore, rests with the priest or fetishman.

In private life ordeals are often employed to detect crime, though in most cases a confession of guilt is made as soon as the ordeal begins. Few natives are willing to submit to the test, unless their consciences are quite clear—not that they fear the actual bodily pain resulting from the hot iron, the boiling oil, or the needle, feather, or thorn thrust through the tongue, but because they are convinced that, by voluntarily undergoing the ordeal when guilty, they are defying the gods and spirits, and are sure to suffer the consequences.

8. Birth, marriage, and death.—In most parts of W. Africa births are made the occasion for a good deal of religious ceremony. On the Gold Coast, Slave Coast, and elsewhere where gods are worshipped, as soon as a woman discovers that she is about to become a mother, she takes special precautions, offers sacrifices to the family-god, and is bound with charms of beads by a priestess in order that all may go well with her. Among the Mpongwe Bantu, on such occasions, almost as much interest is attached to the husband as to the prospective mother, and he, as well as his wife, has to observe certain rules; he may not follow certain avocations, and must abstain from eating certain food. No sooner is the infant born than it is loaded with charms as a protection against evil spirits, and among such priest-ridden people as the Ewes and Yorubas it is at once taken charge of by a priestess. About a week later the birth ceremonies begin, and among the various tribes the differences in these are clearly marked, resulting from the degree of religion at which the tribe has arrived. The Tshis (somewhat low down in the religious scale) do not call in the aid of priests or priestesses, the father performing the necessary ceremonies. The child, as a matter of custom, is given as a first name that of the day of the week on which it was born, and on the eighth day after birth the father, attended by his male friends, proceeds to the house where the birth has taken place, where, seated outside, he receives the infant in his arms. He then returns thanks to his particular god, after which he gives the child its second name, which may be that of an ancestor or a friend; and he completes the ceremony by spitting some rum into the infant's face. Then follows the thanksgiving service; rum is poured freely on the ground for the benefit of the ancestral spirits, sacrifices are offered to the family-god, and feasting and dancing are carried on into the night.

The Ewes have almost identical customs, though the mother and infant are placed under the protection of a priestess for forty days after the birth, and the naming ceremony is different. Here the priest takes the place of the father in the naming of the child, which is accompanied by a good deal of religious ceremony, including the bathing of the child's forehead with water of purification. Since the Ewes have no names for the days of the week, the name given at birth is either that of a god or that of an ancestor. The eastern Ewes, dwelling in proximity with the Yorubas, have acquired the

belief in metempsychosis, and, when a child is born, it is the duty of the priest to discover what ancestor it represents, and its first name becomes that of the ancestor. Later in life the man takes a 'strong name,' and drops his birth name.

The power of the priesthood being greater among the Yorubas than among the Ewes, the religious ceremonies at birth are correspondingly more important in Yoruba-land than in the countries to the west. The belief in metempsychosis is universal, and the diviner or priest proclaims what ancestor has received re-birth in the new infant, who has to be trained to grow up like the ancestor. At the naming ceremony a hen is sacrificed to Ifa and a cock to the *olori* (indwelling spirit of the head), after which there follows the purification by water. The priest throws consecrated water on to the thatch of the house, and the mother and infant walk three times through the drips. Water is placed on the child's forehead, while his name is repeated three times; and the priest then holds him so that his feet touch the ground. Finally, there is the purification by fire. The fire burning in the house is put out and cleared away, the house is swept and cleaned, and a fresh fire is lighted, a sacrifice of fowls to Ifa concluding the whole ceremony.

Such ceremonies as the above prevail where the people have gods and a priesthood, but elsewhere, where the belief in evil spirits is strong, all energies are devoted to the preservation of the mother and infant from their malicious designs, and guns are repeatedly fired to frighten them away.

In former times, if a Tshi woman died in childbirth, her infant was buried with her; and it was the custom of the Ahanta people (Gold Coast) to destroy the tenth child borne by a woman. Everywhere in W. Africa, even nowadays, the birth of twins is regarded as a remarkable event—by some tribes as a sign of bad luck, by others as the reverse. It is probable that originally twins were considered unnatural, and the woman who bore them was regarded as possessed of an evil spirit; hence it was customary, as it still is in the Niger Delta, to proclaim her an outcast and to destroy her offspring. By some tribes, however, only one of the twins was destroyed. In the countries westward of the Niger, as well as in Gabun, Loango, etc., the advent of twins is hailed with joy, and religious ceremonies for their protection take place. Special names are given to them; thus, the Ewes call the first-born of twin brothers Atsu, the second Tse, while the first male child born after twins has to receive the name Dosu. Some of the Yoruba tribes reverence twins, who are deemed to bring the best of luck to the household and tribe, and the death of one of them is considered a grave misfortune. Should such an event happen, a wooden figure is carved to take the place of the dead infant, and laid by the side of the living one, the image then becoming a family-fetish. A mother who loses both of her twin infants has two images made to represent them, and these she worships continuously. Through life twin brothers do everything alike—eat similar food, wear similar dress, marry on the same day, etc. To do otherwise would break the spell, and result in the death of one of them.

Like twins, albino babies are destroyed as monstrosities by some tribes, by others welcomed as bringers of good luck. Then, again, there is the custom, still prevalent in remote districts, of making away with children who cut the upper teeth first.

Polygamy is universal among both Negroes and Bantu, the number of wives that a man possesses depending on his wealth, i.e. his ability to pay the necessary dowry. Except among the Fjort, marriage in W. Africa is a purely social institution, and not connected in any way with religion, though

the Yoruba priests, in the endeavour to strengthen their position, sometimes persuade the newly married couple to make sacrifices together to a god. Doubtless, in the course of time, religious ceremonies will be introduced, but at present there exist only certain social customs. Children may be betrothed, when quite young, or even before birth. When a girl who has not been betrothed arrives at a marriageable age, she is dressed, painted, decked with ornaments, and paraded through the streets by her companions, until a suitor comes forward. The suitor then has to come to terms with the girl's family, for in all cases he has to pay a sum for his bride. After this has been settled, a day is fixed for the marriage-feast, when the bridegroom takes charge of the bride, and dancing and wild orgies are indulged in.

The Fjort people hold marriage in much higher esteem than do the other natives of W. Africa—a fact doubtless due to the cult of the goddess Nzambi, and the superior status held by women. Betrothal and payment to the bride's father are much the same here as in other parts, but a curious custom takes place when a girl becomes marriageable. She is locked up in what is called the 'paint-house,' where she is painted red, and carefully attended to until those in charge of her think she is fit to marry. If she has been betrothed, she is washed, and the marriage-ceremony then takes place; but, if no husband is waiting for her, she is dressed up and paraded round the town in search of a suitor. The actual marriage-ceremony is more or less of a religious nature, and is accompanied by rites, such as those of *boomba, lembe, funzi, ngofo* (the family-fetishes brought by the winds [above, § 2. vi.]). In each case a metal bracelet is given by the bridegroom to the bride, who swears to be faithful to her husband, never to leave him, and to be buried with him when he dies.

Burial customs in W. Africa are very similar among all the tribes; the only real difference results from the conception of the particular tribe as to what happens to the soul after death. In all cases death is the occasion for wailing and lamentations, more especially by the women of the household; and the Gold Coast, Slave Coast, and neighbouring people dress the corpse in the dead man's best clothes, and deck it with jewellery and ornaments. The relatives and friends then visit the corpse, offer it presents, fire guns, and call on the dead man to return to life. The mourners abstain from food until after the burial, though intoxicating liquor is freely partaken of. The burial of property with the corpse, the slaughter of slaves, and other matters connected with funeral ceremonies have been mentioned above, and it will be remembered that such things are prevalent among those people who believe in the requirements of the ghosts dwelling in ghost-land, or in the requirements of the spirit awaiting re-birth. In other parts, particularly among the Bantu, where it is thought that at death a man's spirit quits the body, joins the world of spirits, and continues to have an influence over the living, the ceremonies that take place have for their principal object the ingratiating of the spirit of the deceased. It is necessary to keep the spirit in good humour, so that it may work for the welfare of the family.

The mode of actual burial and the place selected for interment vary considerably. Coffins are nearly always used, and the body is usually wrapped in cloths or grass mats. Some tribes (e.g., the Limbas of Sierra Leone) bury their dead upright, others place the corpse in a sitting position, while the majority place it on its side, with the face towards the east. Again, the place of interment may be under the floor of the deceased's house, the grave being so arranged that the head

of the corpse will lie just outside the outer wall of the house; or the body may be buried in the compound, or even outside the village, in which case a small hut is built over the grave. Some tribes—e.g., the Mpongwe—prefer the spirits of the dead to dwell at a distance from human habitations, and therefore bury their dead in the forest.

With a belief in witchcraft so strong as it is among the people of W. Africa, it is only natural that death should be regarded as due to the machinations of witches or evil spirits. By many death is held to be unnatural, and, when it overtakes a member of a family, his relatives summon the fetishman, who is called upon to state the cause of death and seek out the witch who brought it about. The witch proclaimed, she is required to undergo the poison ordeal in front of the corpse. If the fetishman considers that death resulted from the actions of evil spirits, the friends of the dead man have to take special precautions to prevent the same evil spirits from working destruction on the other members of the family.

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NEGROES (United States).—I. Origin, numbers, and distribution.—Records are found of Negroes occasionally with the Spanish colonists in Florida and other southern sections of the country, and Negroes take pride in the presence of some of their race with Cortez de Narvaez, de Soto, and other explorers. The Spanish Government expressly permitted the settlers who owned slaves to bring them with them to America, and they were among the first in Florida (St. Augustine), Alabama, and New Mexico. Negro pride in adventure is illustrated just now in the case of Matthew A. Henson, who had accompanied Peary on several explorations and was with him on his successful dash for the North Pole. He is a greatly popular hero among his own race. He has had successful lecture tours and has written an autobiography, and half a page in the *Negro Year Book* for 1914-15 is devoted to him. The history of Africans in America has its beginning, properly, in the introduction of slaves into the English colonies in 1619, when, in the quaint record of Master John Rolfe, 'About the last of August came in a Dutch man-of-War that sold us twenty negars.' From that time for more than 150 years Negroes were imported from Africa, chiefly by British exploiters, who early secured a monopoly of this traffic. There is no way of knowing the total number brought into the United States, but it cannot have been less than 2,000,000. They were taken mainly from the west coast of Africa, although many were procured from the interior by methods well known (see SLAVERY). Many different tribes were represented among the captives, and they have preserved many physical marks of their different origins. Few of the Negrito Bushmen were included, but one occasionally observes their characteristics even yet. The splendidly-built Bantu is also sometimes seen in almost native purity. But chiefly the Hamitic Negroes constitute the main body of the African stock in America.

By the time of their emancipation (1861) the numbers had come to about 4,500,000, of whom nearly 500,000 were free—census 1860: total,

4,441,830; free, 487,970. At present there are 10,000,000—census 1910: 9,827,763—which is 10·7 per cent of the total (continental) population of the country. The percentage is gradually and rather rapidly decreasing owing to the great immigration, which is practically all white. In 1860 the percentage was 14·1. With only two exceptions the percentage has shown decrease at every census since the first, 1790, when it was 19·3.

From the start it was evident that slavery could be made profitable only in the cotton- and tobacco-growing States, and so it was in the south that the numbers of Negroes multiplied; they were never relatively numerous in the north. The warmer south was far better adapted to their habits of life, brought over from Africa, and to their inherited constitution. Contrary to what might have been expected, they have remained in the south during the period of their freedom. In seventeen southern States, including Delaware, District of Columbia, and W. Virginia, not distinctively southern, there are 8,749,970; while in all the rest of the country there are only a few thousand above 1,000,000, and of these fewer than half (450,000) were born in the south, whereas a few more than 40,000 now in the south were born in other parts of the country. In two of the southern States they constitute a majority of the total population—56·2 per cent in Mississippi, 55·2 in S. Carolina. In the whole south they are 29·8 per cent of the total. Only in the populous States of New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois has the north as many as 100,000 in any one State. In the country as a whole 27·4 per cent live in the cities, while in the south the percentage is 21·2. Of the large cities Washington, the capital, has the largest proportion of Negroes—94,446 in a total of 331,069. In the western part of the country there are very few, less than one per cent in Seattle, and only about one-third per cent in San Francisco.

2. Social condition.—We have seen that from the beginning Negroes came to the country as slaves. In Virginia they were not legally and technically so designated until 1661. All the earlier States provided for slavery. There was division on the subject after the rise of the anti-slavery agitation which culminated in the Civil War. In some of the States they were theoretically allowed to hold property, while in others they could neither hold property nor borrow money. The conditions varied in degree with different economic conditions and varying sentiment. In general, the type of slavery was that of the household chattel slave. On the great plantations they were grouped in 'settlements,' controlled by 'overseers,' and dealt with largely on the group plan. The nature of the care and kindly attention received by them from the owners and their representatives was determined by the principles of humanity and the material interests at stake. It was generally recognized to be commercially advantageous to give the slaves a large degree of physical care, and as a rule their humanity was so far recognized as to lead to providing many humane and helpful conditions. On the whole, it should be set down as established that physically, as well as spiritually, the Negro in the United States was far more advantageously situated than in Africa in his native condition. Slavery is always in some of its features, and in its basal idea, inhuman; and it is beyond question that there was much relative neglect and not a little gross brutality in the treatment of the Negroes. It has been estimated (*Negro Year Book*, p. 111) that 6200 free Negroes in the country owned Negro slaves to the number of 18,000, but the estimate may not be well founded.

It was evident from the beginning that the

American conscience did not wholly approve of the practice of slavery. Active agitation against it began early. In legislation Rhode Island led the way as early as 1652 with a law prohibiting the holding in slavery for more than ten years of any person, white or black, after he was twenty-four years old. Legislation mostly took the form at first of prohibiting the importation of slaves into the States or of limiting it by an import duty. By 1776 the sentiment had sufficiently grown for the Continental Congress to resolve that 'no slave he imported into any of the thirteen colonies.' The Constitution of the United States left within the authority of the several States the control of slavery and of the importation from one State to another; and the Government accepted from several of the States territory ceded on condition 'that no regulations made or to be made by Congress shall tend to emancipate slaves.' Conflict of views and interests involved in the rights and policies with reference to slavery, beginning even before the founding of the Union, grew in severity and acuteness. Numerous measures of compromise and temporizing could only delay the culmination in the Civil War (1861-65), in the midst of which by proclamation of President Lincoln all slaves were emancipated (1st Jan. 1863). In 1865 the abolition of slavery was confirmed by an amendment of the Constitution, and under the regime of 'Reconstruction' all the State constitutions were made to conform to this principle, which was also made binding in the 'territories' by proclamation of the governors.

Later amendments to the national Constitution sought to remove all disabilities of the freed men and to guarantee to them full and equal rights of citizenship. This course, prompted by lofty sentimental idealism, nevertheless proved to have outrun sound statesmanship and practical possibility. The effort to confer immediate and full citizenship, with suffrage and possible official position included, upon 1,000,000 men just out of slavery was a political and social blunder, working grievous wrongs to whites and blacks alike, and the more so that the federal government had no plan or power at the time to provide for the education of the freed men in the meaning and responsibilities of that citizenship. Within a quarter of a century this came to be very widely recognized, so that the southern States that had by various illegal devices prevented, hindered, and nullified the franchise of Negroes now began to accomplish the result by constitutional amendment, and were supported by the federal courts in this course. This was possible in popular sentiment, because in the better understanding of the different sections of the country it was getting to be generally agreed that the problems of race adjustment could best be worked out in the regions where they existed and not by doctrinaire measures depending for adoption and execution upon men with little personal knowledge of the actual difficulties. Legally the course was made possible by avoiding in form all distinctions based on colour or race, the chief device being the 'grandfather clause.' Standards of literacy were adopted, with the proviso that the prohibition would not apply to those whose grandfathers had exercised that right, or had served in the armies of defence of their State. Thus nearly all whites were exempt from the operation of the limiting laws. So the matter was in process of solution, while the gradual and rapid extension of education among the Negroes brought them into the rights of full citizenship with hope for its worthy exercise. Now, however (1916), the final court of appeal has voided these laws and the situation is somewhat chaotic. It seems to be generally agreed that some legal means will be found for continuing

the method of solution indicated. Two Negroes have sat in the U.S. Senate, both for Mississippi, and twenty have been representatives in Congress for a total of thirty-five terms. They were from eight southern States. Several hold consular, subordinate diplomatic, and administrative office under appointment. In all branches of government service there were, in 1914, 22,440, including some 6500 in the army and navy (*Negro Year Book*, p. 153 f.).

It was inevitable that caste custom and race prejudice should make and maintain sharp barriers against 'social equality' for the Negroes. This has failed in no community where the Negroes were present in large numbers. While many Negroes have cherished hopes of such 'equality,' the majority have either never taken much thought about it or have recognized the impossibility of it, and not a few of them have urged its undesirability. Once a much-discussed question, it is relatively ignored to-day. Beginning about 1880, laws have been enacted in many States compelling the separation of the races in public conveyances, especially railway-trains, hotels, theatres, and other public buildings, and in schools. In Florida it is even illegal for a white to teach in a Negro school, and *vice versa*. Latterly a movement is spreading to segregate the two races in their residences. This has long been done by community agreement and by regulation of real estate companies in property deeds; and, as a rule, normal tendencies and race affinities procured general grouping according to colour, but not infrequently the purchase of property in white districts by Negroes was embarrassing, and encroachments of one race on the other frequently made readjustments necessary. Now the matter has become the subject of city legislation, the very simple, if unscientific, basis usually being the prohibition of a member of one race from acquiring property, by purchase or rental, within a city block wherein more than half the property is already occupied by the other race. In certain northern States there are towns in which public sentiment, with mob enforcement, does not permit a Negro to live at all.

Miscegenation is prohibited by law in twenty-nine of the States, and social custom renders intermarriage between the races rare even where there is no legal barrier. In some States the penalty is to 'void' the marriage, in others to punish the violators but not to 'void' the marriage, while in several the marriage is 'voided' and a penalty imposed—imprisonment, or fine, or both. In some States the official issuing the licence is also punished, and in some the minister or magistrate celebrating the marriage. Lustful and illicit miscegenation is, however, lamentably prevalent. There is no national definition of a Negro, and the local and State definitions are not uniform. In some provisions any Negro blood constitutes one a Negro, in others one-sixteenth, one-eighth, and one-fourth are the degrees specified. The estimate that one-fifth of all the Negroes have more or less of Negro blood cannot be far wrong, and it has the support of the 1910 censuses, which showed 20.9 per cent. This is an apparent increase in twenty years from 15.2; but in 1890 the enumerators were instructed to include as mulattoes only those having one-fourth or more of Negro blood, whereas in 1910 all were reported as mulattoes who had any trace of Negro blood, and, on the other hand, were 'not evidently full-blood Negroes.' Enumerators were usually ignorant of ethnological distinctions and judged merely by superficial appearance or report. Thus the apparently rapid rise in the last decade is not trustworthy. Except for the decade 1860 to 1870, when there is a drop from 13.2 per cent to

12 per cent, the percentage has risen slowly. In comparison with the total number of Negroes the proportion of mulattoes is lowest in the S. Atlantic States (10.4); in New England it is 28.6, and reaches its highest in the Pacific States (37.3). Miscegenation is nearly exclusively of white men with Negro women, and this must be one of the influences that account for the distressing number of attempted assaults of Negro men on white women.

Negroes have not often sought social relations with the white people on the basis of equality, although very many of them have entertained the hope that this might ultimately come to them. Aggressive efforts in this direction have, in the rare instances, been inspired by the vicious or misguided sentimental influence of white people. In the main there is a growing sense of race pride and an increasing determination to develop within racial lines. Not a few of their own leaders are directing the thought and ambition of the Negroes along this line. A growing respect for the Negro and appreciation of his potentialities and achievements on the part of the white race help forward this propaganda, and its progress is its guaranty of success. It is many years since there was any serious discussion of the proposition, once much agitated, of deportation or emigration of the Negroes. It may be taken as definitely settled that the present race of Africans in America will work out their destiny in that land, and with progressively satisfactory adjustment of the difficulties growing out of the occupation of the same territory by two races held apart by social and racial antipathies.

3. Education and culture.—Prior to emancipation no systematic provision for the general enlightenment of the Negro was made, and no public policy adopted. Various enterprises and movements for educating Negroes were undertaken by missionary and philanthropic organizations, and in some northern States the public schools were accessible to the few Negroes resident there. So far as progress was made, it was mainly by the efforts of the slave-owners, members of whose families in many cases taught the rudiments of learning to the slaves, especially to those to whom were assigned the household duties and personal service. Special provision was frequently made for the instruction of the slaves during the seasons when there was little work to be done. Those who were taught by white people were able to extend that knowledge in part to others. At emancipation not fewer than five per cent of the Negroes were able to read, and about 10,000 were in public schools; there were four schools for higher education and normal training; 150 Negro teachers; \$50,000 invested in property for education; an annual expenditure the first year for education of \$200,000, of which the *Negro Year Book* (p. 2) claims that \$10,000 was given by the Negroes.

The history of education of Negroes since 1863 reveals progressive concern on the part of all parties. Large activities are included on the part of missionary and benevolent organizations through which many millions have been expended and some great 'Funds' made permanently available, as the Peabody Fund, Slater Fund, Jaynes Fund, and part of the Rockefeller Fund dispensed by the General Education Board (New York). Negroes have contributed in a way that often manifests heroism, insight, and wide vision, and their gifts include some very considerable endowments. The extensive destruction of material resources by the Civil War and the demoralization of all social organizations, and the conflict of interests and opinion during the period of 'Reconstruction' (to 1876), left educational facilities for all, in the south, prostrate and

to be built up anew and on lines radically different from those that had existed before the War, and under circumstances of extreme difficulty. Personal property was nearly all destroyed and realty was in dilapidation, while business was either destroyed or utterly demoralized. Of the 4,000,000 Negroes only a negligible number had either property or business, and they had lost the right of immediate dependence upon white people for support and direction. They had neither the resources nor the training for independent development. It was fifteen years before systems of free public schools were generally established with any measure of completeness. While in some of the States the effort was made to keep separate the income from school taxation from the two races and to expend on each the funds so procured, in most States there was no such legal discrimination, and schools were established for all. In practical administration it was inevitable that the Negro should receive far fewer of the all too inadequate facilities so meagrely provided. The equipment of his schools and the length of his school term were both far below those of the whites, and the disparity has not yet been overcome, but by degrees it is being removed, notwithstanding the fact that far the larger part of the revenue for the schools comes from the white people. This public school system provided in the various States has been the greatest of all factors in the education of the Negro. Fifty years after emancipation (1913) Negro illiteracy had fallen to 30 per cent; there were 1,800,000 pupils in free schools; 3500 Negroes were engaged in teaching; there were 500 colleges and schools for normal training; there had been in all 3856 college graduates, of whom more than 1600 belong to the first decade of this century; \$200,000,000 are now invested in Negro education; the annual expenditure for this purpose amounts to about \$13,500,000, of which the Negroes themselves are estimated to contribute \$1,600,000 (*Negro Year Book*, p. 4). The best thought of the nation is now given to the task of removing illiteracy and providing adequate training to all. In this work account is taken of race and colour only as these affect the character and efficiency of methods to be employed in reaching the goal of well-trained citizenship. The Freedman's Bureau, which so signally promoted the facilities for Negro education, soon ceased to be needed. In the large sums expended and in the extensive work accomplished by this organization, and by the philanthropic societies of the white friends of the Negro, many mistaken aims and methods were employed in an experimental period. Not yet has universal agreement been reached, but more and more expert opinion suggests, and practical experience approves, vocational training for the majority of Negroes, involving a large element of industrial and domestic instruction and training. The demonstration of the value of this method has been signally wrought out at the government school for Indians and Negroes, Hampton (Va.) Institute, and the Tuskegee (Ala.) Normal and Industrial Institute. The former of these is generously supported by the National Government and the State of Virginia, while the latter has attracted the widest interest and support on account of the striking personality and sound wisdom of its President, Booker T. Washington († 1916), so that it now has property and endowment of some \$3,000,000 and an annual income of \$300,000, ministering to a student body of about 2000. Generally in schools for Negroes the inspirational element now plays a large part, cultivating ideals for the person and the home, racial and national consciousness, and respect. The purely academic training that once played so large a part in the tentative efforts to educate Negroes is

increasingly held to be secondary, while there is no loss of the aim after a sound culture. Professional training has its place. There are reported 3 schools of law, 4 of medicine, 5 of pharmacy, 17 agricultural and mechanical schools under government control and support, and 350 private (largely Church) schools with normal and industrial features; but most of these are small and poorly supported, often representing more of ambition and pride than of solid realization. The efforts of Negroes to build up institutions of learning have often been pathetic in their pretentiousness and pitiable in their poverty, but always inspiring in their heroism and idealism. A 'university' is sometimes hardly a good high school, and a 'college' not infrequently begins with the primary classes and does not reach beyond the grammar-school grades.

In spite of all limitations the present is full of encouragement. The points now emphasized in the policy with reference to public schools are: (1) to have the teaching vitally connected with the activities of the people; (2) to improve facilities; (3) to provide more helpful and efficient supervision; (4) to make the school largely assist in the general welfare of the community. With reference to secondary and high schools the policy includes also: (5) by concentration to limit the number of schools undertaking the highest grades of work and to extend the quantity and quality of such work; (6) to increase the financial resources, which is being done by State appropriations, by special endowments for specific schools, and by the use of the income from the various Funds referred to above; (7) stricter and more helpful supervision. Five agencies co-operate in this supervision—the Federal Government, State governments, religious societies, managers of educational funds, and voluntary associations of Negro educators.

In the fine arts the Negroes have made no great advance, nor as yet demonstrated any striking capacity. In music they have a native capacity for a peculiar type of melody, and they are almost universally lovers of music, especially of simple stringed instruments and of wind instruments. They have become famous for singing what are called 'plantation melodies.' A few have won distinction with popular songs, and many are proficient in the execution of music. They have done some creditable work in art and sculpture. They are producing many books and publish many newspapers, generally not of a high order. In literature they have thus far shown best in didactic work and essays dealing with social, political, and religious subjects. Some of the best works dealing with Negro questions have been written by them. Their most extensive efforts in publication work are in Sunday school and other religious literature.

4. Economic condition.—The 1910 census showed 71 per cent of Negroes over ten years of age engaged in useful occupations, including 3,178,554 males and 2,013,981 females—a larger percentage of the whole than is found in any other class of the population; 2,893,674 were employed in agricultural pursuits, 1,099,715 in domestic and personal service, 704,174 in manufacturing and mechanical labour, 425,043 in trade and transportation, 69,929 in professional service. The large falling off in the decade of the number in domestic service (224,445) is a significant feature in the economic and social life, inasmuch as in the south this service has been rendered almost entirely by Negroes. Increased efficiency of the men as bread-winners, increase of domesticity and home-life among the Negroes, acquisition of homes by them, and the instruction in home arts given in the schools are reducing the numbers of those who go out in service. To how great an extent the native African idea of the function of the female has been imported into America and

has persisted is indicated by the 1,051,137 females reported as in agricultural pursuits and the 68,440 in manufacturing and mechanical labour. Labour unions have been slow to recognize the Negro, and in northern States particularly, where the union has had its most extensive power, they have greatly hindered the development of the Negro in the trades of skilled labour. In the south, where immigrants are few and unionism less developed, far more friendliness and encouragement have been found. Some of the trades—*e.g.*, brick-laying—have been almost wholly in their hands; and others—*e.g.*, carpentry—have been largely open to them. In 1910, however, the National Council of the American Federation of Labor unanimously invited Negroes and all other races to enter the Federation. Nine of the sixty most important unions still bar Negroes from membership. In 1863 9000 Negroes owned their homes, 15,000 worked farms as owners or as managers, and 2000 businesses were conducted by them. In 1913 they owned 550,000 homes, worked 937,000 farms, conducted 43,000 business houses, and owned property estimated as high as \$700,000,000. From 1900 to 1910 the value of farms, live-stock, tools, etc., increased from less than \$200,000,000 to nearly \$500,000,000. There were 57 Negro banks with more than \$1,500,000 of capital and with an annual business amounting to about \$20,000,000—in spite of the fact that banking among Negroes has been marked by not a few disasters, due sometimes to dishonesty, more frequently to incompetency, and sometimes to the unfriendly action of other bankers and business men. The kinds of business most popular, in order of numbers of businesses, are restaurants and other forms of catering, groceries, vending, building and contracting, and butchers' and coal-dealers' businesses. The great majority of Negro labourers are unskilled and of a low average efficiency. Still they constitute, because of their numbers and docility, a very important factor in the economic life of the country.

For the most part the homes of the Negroes are of a very low quality, with few comforts and poor facilities for hygienic and moral conditions. In the country districts they live largely in small board or log houses that are usually untidy and unsanitary, except that they are very open. In cities thousands of them live in rooms over stables, in cheap houses built along alleys, and in tenement houses, where crowding and filth are very common. The results of these conditions are seen in diminished efficiency in labour, in extensive disease and a high death-rate, and in gross immorality. The average death-rate among Negroes is about 50 per cent higher than among whites. One authority (W. F. Willeox, *EB*¹¹ xix. 348) places the Negro death-rate at twice that of whites. The diseases most disastrous among them are consumption, pneumonia, nervous diseases, heart diseases, diseases of the bowels, and urinary troubles. Aggressive and intelligently directed campaigns of improvement in these conditions are now being made, but the situation will require much time and energy to recover from the long neglect.

5. Religion and morality.—If by religion one means the form of worship, organization, and dogmatic statement, and by morals the rules and range of conduct included under the religious direction of the life, then there is no necessary connexion between the two. In principle, however, religion always includes ethics. It stimulates and educates the conscience, but it does not directly inform the ethical judgment. Religion itself is subject to, and demands, education, interpretation, extension. The earlier movements of religion have reference only to the soul's relation to the spiritual environment (God), and include the personal relations of

man to man in the social group only as the group is conceived to be related to the spiritual environment as a whole. It is a later development that recognizes that the worship of God consists in doing His will in a personal society. Later still men come to recognize that their relation to God places them in ethical relation to all personal beings. Many, failing to recognize these principles, have severely criticized the Negro's religion as being non-moral, and think of it with contempt. As a rule the Negro has not yet gone very far in discovering that the religious emotion is to find expression in the rational direction of the life in human relationships, so as to realize the will of God in a righteous and loving personal order. Hence his morality represents a crude and undeveloped stage of religious ethics. The civil and criminal laws of the United States are designed for the stage of civilization reached by the white race, or for the restraint of the Negro race within limits approved by the white race from their own, and not from the Negroes' standpoint. For most Negroes, therefore, very many of these laws have no ethical significance and seem to them, when they know them at all, to be conventions of the dominant race to interfere with the Negroes' normal activities. And the administration of these laws, almost wholly by the white race, manifests a rigidity and a severity, often an injustice, by no means calculated to inspire respect and ready obedience in the weaker people. Laws are sometimes called for in a community only by reason of the prevalence of the Negro, and are enforced only with reference to him. Then there are white men who exploit the weakness and animism of the Negro for the sake of base gain and thus augment some of his easiest vices, bringing him under the condemnation of the law. The social sin of white men with black women, the lewd influences of much theatrical and other advertising, the corrupting suggestiveness of many of the amusements provided for them all serve to arouse the viler passions of the Negroes, who, wanting the restraints of enlightened judgment and established self-control, are led on to criminal practices. The multiplication of laws in a society of growing complexity adds to the violations, among whites as well as blacks. All these things must be taken into account in judging the records of crime and vice in a people as yet at a backward stage of the road from savagery to Christian civilization. Of prisoners to each 100,000 of population in 1904 there were among whites 77, among Negroes 278. In the north the figures were 83 and 743, in the south 40 and 221. All the figures show decrease as compared with 1890. Negroes had a lower rate than any immigrants except Poles. In major offences the Negroes were surpassed by all foreigners except Irish and Germans. It is gratifying to note that lynchings, of whites and Negroes, declined from 1908 (7 white and 93 black) to 1913 (1 white and 51 black), the lowest number since records have been kept (twenty-nine years). Petty crimes of Negroes against members of their own race, unless they disturb the community, do not usually result in arrests, and even gross evils often escape official notice. This is especially true of social sins.

Evils most prevalent among the race and most harmful are indolence, theft, drunkenness, gambling, and sexual sins. Much is to be said in mitigation of the Negro's guilt in these vices, but the fact remains that they are widely prevalent. Theft is violation of ownership, but in a tribal régime and under the conditions in Africa, where there is relatively little of exclusive ownership, the rights of property cannot be distinctly in consciousness; and a keen consciousness of individual personality is a condition of high regard for personal property and personal rights of all sorts. This

consciousness is not yet highly developed in the Negro. After his emancipation there were those who definitely taught the Negro that the wealth in the south was his creation, and that he had an essential right to as much of it as he could safely appropriate. The large measure of inequality which the Negro suffers in the social and economic life gives him some ground for reasoning that he may seek by all means to equalize the 'goods' of life. And poverty gives a strong impulse to theft.

Drunkenness is augmented by the greed of whites who exploit the weakness of the Negro for base profit. Negroes are not often allowed to own drink saloons, and in 1910 only 652 were in their hands. The necessity for protection from drunkenness among Negroes has been a strong factor in the prohibition of the sale of intoxicants in the south, now practically universal in rural sections and rapidly becoming so in the cities, State prohibition having been adopted by ten of the States. The bad conditions of living must also be chargeable with much of the vice found among Negroes.

Influences of the primitive animism of Africa are abundant in the superstitions and religious notions of the American Negro. The *voodoo*, usually called *hoodoo* in the United States, in its grosser forms has nearly disappeared, but there are milder forms of fear of subtle influences by spiritual powers, and of persons supposed to be *en rapport* with those powers, to be found on all hands. A modified form of witchcraft is met with, and a mild type of the medicine-man with his occult powers, presumably connected with some herb or concoction, has great influence with many. Ghosts are very real to most Negroes. Charms are trusted or feared, and dreams are often significant of divine communications or of messages from departed friends or enemies. The 'evil eye' can sometimes arouse the utmost terror. Unusual natural phenomena arouse an awesome sense of the supernatural and sometimes create great consternation. The behaviour of animals suggests to the Negroes superior and subtle intelligence, and awakens a feeling of uncanniness that almost approaches a belief in spirit-possession. Certain aspects of death are especially terrible, and the Negro is usually very fearful of cemeteries at night. Idolatry is practically unknown. Forms of spiritism prevalent among white people in America and Europe are little known by the Negroes. Their superstitions have affected the folklore of the whites, many of whom share some aspects of them.

Prior to emancipation the religious life of the Negro was cared for largely in the patriarchal way, the masters taking such interest in it and making such provision for it as their own religious sense prompted. Along with this were the white ministers, who often took the deepest interest in the religious welfare of the slaves; local religious workers; missionary organizations with such efforts as the conditions permitted; and especially preachers and pious women among the Negroes themselves, usually illiterate but often with imposing personality and genuine goodness, giving them unlimited power for comfort and instruction in righteousness. For the most part their church-membership was in the same organizations with the white Christians, a special part of the buildings for worship, usually galleries, being set apart for their use; but in the cities some very large and powerful Negro churches were built up, over which in some cases white pastors presided with love and ability.

It is at once an evidence of the essentially religious disposition of the Negro and a testimony to the religious interest of the whites that in 1863 there were more than 500,000 communicant church members, and that with 550 separate local church

organizations they owned property to the extent of \$1,000,000. Far the larger part of the Christians among them have been identified with the Baptist and Methodist denominations. These were the most numerous in the south, and were the most aggressive bodies, giving much energy to missionary evangelism, and demanding less of education and culture in their converts, and especially in candidates for the ministry. Since the Civil War Congregationalists and the other leading denominations from the north have laboured extensively among them, but have not much modified the popular hold of the Baptists and Methodists. Roman Catholicism would be expected to have found in the emotionalism and superstition of the Negro, his love of display and ceremony, and his rich imagination, to which symbolism so readily appeals, a most fruitful field; but only in the States, Maryland and Louisiana chiefly, where Roman Catholics were numerous and powerful have any considerable numbers of Negroes been identified with that Church, and then by no means in proportion to the opportunities. Notwithstanding exhortations of bishops and resolutions of councils, Roman Catholics have not until quite recently seemed greatly concerned to win the Negroes. Several societies are now interested, and 'a special "Catholic Board of Mission Work among Colored People"' since 1907 has sought to cultivate interest and provide funds for this purpose. A Roman Catholic authority (*CE* xii. 629) claims 200,000 to 225,000 Catholic Negroes, but the claim is not supported by the government census. The latest available religious statistics of the census are for 1906, when there were reported 5375 churches, and 477,720 communicants affiliated with white denominations. This inclusion with white organization refers to their general connexion, and not to local organization, in which they are nearly all in separate congregations. The great bulk of these (308,551) are in the Methodist Episcopal Church. All are Protestants except 36 congregations of Roman Catholics with 38,235 communicants. Of independent Negro denominations, all Protestant, the census enumerates 17 with 32,985 congregations, 3,779,681 communicants; 2,261,607 were Baptists, organized in the 'National Convention,' and 1,400,000 belong to one or another of several Methodist bodies. The rest are distributed among Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and others. In 1913 it was computed that the Negroes had altogether 40,000 congregations with 4,300,000 communicants, 41,000 Sunday schools with 2,200,000 pupils, and church property valued at \$70,000,000. They have 27 schools teaching theology, extensive publishing plants for Sunday school and other religious literature, a large number of Young Men's Christian Associations and a growing number of Young Women's Christian Associations, and almost innumerable semi-religious social and benevolent organizations and brotherhoods and sisterhoods, for which they have a great fondness. The larger denominations among them have organized foreign mission work, conducting missions in Africa. In proportion to their numbers, and taking account only of outward attachment to organized Christianity, the Negroes constitute decidedly the most religious element in the population of the United States.

The worship of the Negro is characterized by a high degree of emotionalism, which diminishes with education and the restraints of culture. Music plays a large part in the worship, where the singing is remarkable for its persuasive melody and subtle, almost hypnotic, influence over the congregations. Their bodies move with the rhythm, and it is easy for a skilful leader to sway them in mass. The preaching is dramatic, imaginative,

and powerful in emotional appeal. They have developed some of the greatest pulpit orators in American history, and the more enlightened of these have frequently been heard with enthusiasm and appreciation at white conferences and conventions, where they are often present to make appeals for sympathy and funds for worthy enterprises. There is growing co-operation between the missionary and benevolent organizations of the two races for the religious and moral elevation of the Negroes, and solid advances are being made in the sobriety, dignity, and intelligence of their worship. Several of their leaders are already men of splendid education, a high degree of culture, and sound moral life and influence.

6. Summary and appraisal. — (1) In the United States there is found the only large group of Negroes yet rescued from heathenism and set forward on the road to civilization, now living under conditions that contain the promise of continued and accelerating advance. G. Warneck (*Outline of a Hist. of Prot. Missions*, Eng. tr.³, Edinburgh and London, 1906, p. 194) calls attention to the fact that in the American Negroes there is much the largest group anywhere in modern times rescued from heathenism and brought into the Christian Church. The experience of success and failure here affords important material for the study of the methods of missionary work elsewhere, especially of work in Africa, where there is so much of basal similarity in the subjects to be won and developed. All who would work at the problem of the Negro in Africa should take account of the history of the Negro in America.

(2) There are many sympathetic friends of the Negro who share the thought that his capacity for development has not yet been fully determined. It is not true that the enlightened leadership among Negroes has been almost wholly by men with admixture of white blood (*EBR*¹¹, *loc. cit.*), but too many of the leaders have been men of mixed race for us to be able yet to affirm that the Negro has shown capacity for sufficient education, initiative, and resource to be capable of a native and independent realization of the ideals of Christian culture.

(3) There yet remain in the United States many problems of social, economic, and religious organization and adjustment, but the Negro is definitely established as an element in the life of the country, and his destiny lies along the lines of separate race development, with the cultivation of a worthy race consciousness, respect, and ideal. On purely theoretical grounds many argue that amalgamation must be the final solution of race problems, especially in a purely democratic social organism to which all caste distinctions are essentially repugnant (cf. Mecklin, *Democracy and Race Friction*); but history, the present tendencies in the United States, in S. America, and in S. Africa, and the deeper instincts of race division all oppose the amalgamation theory.

(4) Mutual understanding and sympathy between whites and blacks in the United States are making rapid progress. There is no intelligent sympathy with a brutal book that had a wide circulation by means of glaring advertisement and agency promotion and for a while exerted a pernicious influence, contending that the Negro is not a member of the human family at all but a soulless brute, nor with other unfriendly but less despicable works. It is coming to be recognized and appreciated that the two races are to live together and that neither can without the other gain the goal of civilization and national ideals.

LITERATURE. — There are numerous works dealing with various phases of this subject and the number is growing. Besides in works of general reference the facts are to be sought mainly in

the volumes of the United States Census Reports, in the 17 vols. of the Atlanta University Publications, and in the *Negro Year Book*, Tuskegee, 1914-15; facts and discussions will be found well covered by the following selected list: H. K. Carroll, *Religious Statistics of the United States*, New York, 1915; H. P. Douglass, *Christian Reconstruction in the South*, Boston, 1909; W. E. B. Du Bois, *Study of the Negro Problems* (= *Atlanta Univ. Pub.* 3 [1898]), *The Negro Church* (= *ib.* 8 [1903]), *Social and Physical Conditions of Negroes in Cities* (= *ib.* 2 [1897]), and *The Souls of Black Folk*, Chicago, 1903; D. Fraser, *The Future of Africa*, London, 1911; M. Helm, *The Upward Path*, New York, 1909; F. L. Hoffman, *Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro*, New York, 1906; G. B. Jackson and D. W. Davis, *The Industrial History of the Negro Race in the U.S.*, Richmond, 1911; H. H. Johnston, *The Negro in the New World*, New York, 1907; J. M. Mecklin, *Democracy and Race Friction*, New York, 1914; G. S. Merriam, *The Negro and the Nation*, do. 1908; E. G. Murphy, *Problems of the Present South*, do. 1904; F. P. Noble, *The Redemption of Africa*, do. 1899; H. W. Odum, *Social and Mental Traits of the Negro*, do. 1910; R. Patterson, *The Negro and his Needs*, do. 1911; W. H. Thomas, *The American Negro*, do. 1901; B. T. Washington, *Story of the Negro*, do. 1909, *The Future of the American Negro*, Boston, 1899, *The Negro in Business*, do. 1907, *Up from Slavery*, New York, 1900, *Working with the Hands*, do. 1904; W. D. Weatherford, *Negro Life in the South*, do. 1910, *Present Forces in Negro Progress*, do. 1912; G. W. Williams, *List of the Negro Race*, do. 1883.

W. O. CARVER.

NEMESIS.—See FATE (Greek and Roman).

NEO-CYNICISM.—We know that the Cynicism of Antisthenes and his immediate followers was gradually absorbed in Stoicism (see CYNICS STOICS), and that, after Chrysippus († 208 B.C.), unimportant, sporadic manifestations aside, it disappeared from history till the 1st cent. A.D. Meanwhile profound changes had overtaken the Mediterranean peoples, who, as a result, evinced a new attitude towards fundamental questions of religion and conduct. In particular, traditional restraints of civic or racial institutions, beliefs, and customs were weakening, thanks to the association of men 'out of every nation under heaven' (cf. Ac 2) in populous cosmopolitan centres like Rome, Alexandria, Corinth, and even Jerusalem. Bereft of ancient supports by denationalization, many approached the problems of conduct and destiny as individuals, no longer as citizens. Thus, the conception of life as a warfare—possibly the germ of the 'Church militant'—began to assert itself.

'The bond that formerly kept devotion centered upon the city or the tribe, upon the gens or the family, was broken. In place of the ancient social groups communities of Initiates came into existence' (F. Cumont, *Les Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*², Paris, 1909, p. 42, Eng. tr., Chicago, 1911, p. 27).

Piety, a personal aspiration, replaced loyalty, a socio-political virtue. Hellenic intellectualism, brave and curious towards theory, waned as practical issues gained urgency. Morals ousted metaphysics; belief, often in the form of superstition, eclipsed logic. The masses desired assurance of immortality; the *élite* sought an 'inner' life wherein they could escape this present evil world. In both cases the state of the 'soul' became the question of the day. Accordingly, from Seneca (c. 4 B.C.—A.D. 65), Musonius Rufus (il. A.D. 53–81), and Dio of Pruso (c. A.D. 40–117), when Stoics aspired more and more to be 'physicians of the soul,' the Cynic element in their teaching re-asserted itself. The Neo-Cynics, at once products and evidences of this condition, embodied a special phase of general tendencies which were sweeping over the Roman world as a whole. Thus they form an aspect of a social and spiritual movement rather than a philosophical school of the Hellenic type.

1. History. — When Stoicism reached Rome (Crates, 159 B.C.; Diogenes of Seleucia, 155 B.C.; Panætius, client of Scipio Africanus, c. 142 B.C.), it was a complete system theoretically, and therefore ready to accommodate itself to Roman needs. The version taught by Panætius emphasized *officia*, or the duties of station to be rendered as proper service by every good citizen (cf. Cicero, *de Off.* ii.).

The harshness of the original was thus softened by adjustment to the calls of active citizenship, and the Cynic element of rigoristic individualism fell into the background. Nevertheless the moral 'inwardness' of the system, Cynic in origin, remained, as Marcellus Aurelius saw long after (viii. 49, 56, ix. 133):

'Remember that your Inner Self is inexpugnable, when once it rallies to itself and consistently declines to act against its will, even though the defiance may be irrational. How much more then, when its judgment is rational and made with circumspection? Therefore the mind free from passions is a citadel: man has no stronger fortress to which he can fly for refuge and remain impregnable. . . . To my moral will my neighbour's will is as completely unrelated as his breath is to his flesh. Be we ever so much made for one another, our Inner Selves have each their own sovereign rights; otherwise my neighbour's evil might become my evil, which is not God's good pleasure, lest another have power to undo us.'

'You are part of a social whole, a factor necessary to complete the sum: therefore your every action should help to complete this social life. Any action of yours that does not tend, directly or remotely, to this social end, dislocates life and infringes its unity. It is an act of sedition, and like some separatist doing what he can to break away from civic accord' (G. H. Rendall, *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus to Himself*, London, 1898, pp. 120, 123, 133).

The history of Roman Stoicism is a record of the conflict between these two authoritative calls. In the time of Caligula, and again after A.D. 96, the former prevailed with the Neo-Cynics, whose gospel had been foreshadowed, in turn, by Q. Sextius, the teacher of Seneca, in the last years of the Principate of Augustus. This development was gradual. Even during republican times Q. Aelius Tubero (c. 118 B.C.), Q. Mucius Scaevola (c. 95 B.C.), P. Rutilius Rufus (c. 92 B.C.), and especially M. Porcius Cato (95-48 B.C.), followed the Cynic ideal in public as well as in personal affairs. In the next generation Horace (fl. 41-8 B.C.) adverts not merely to the civic dutifulness of the Stoics (*Ep.* i. i. 16 f.), but also to their Cynic 'inwardness' (*Carm.* iii. iii. 1 f.). This rigorism steered the saints and martyrs of the 'opposition' under the Cæsars (cf. H. Schiller, *Gesch. des röm. Kaiserreichs unter der Regierung des Nero*, Berlin, 1872, p. 666 f.; G. Boissier, *L'Opposition sous les Césars*, Paris, 1905); its drift towards abandonment of a theory that placed nature above man, and towards exclusive emphasis upon consistency of conduct, is made plain by Persius (*Sat.* iii. 66 f.). Extant literary references suffice to show the extraordinary persistence of the 'Cynic sect'—from Caligula (A.D. 41) till Justinian (A.D. 530). The main body of information is furnished by Seneca (fl. 55), Epictetus (fl. 120), Lucian (fl. 180), and Eusebius (fl. 330). Further references, among others less important, are found in Plutarch (fl. 100), Dio Chrysostom (fl. 110), Justin Martyr (fl. 150), Tatian (fl. 166), Aulus Gellius, Athenagoras and Galen (fl. 175), Dio Cassius (fl. 220), Tertullian and Philostratus (fl. 230), Julian 'the Apostate' and Ammianus Marcellinus (fl. 361), John Chrysostom (fl. 400), Augustine (fl. 420), Damascius (fl. 520), Simplicius (fl. 533), and Suidas. But, to all intents and purposes, the movement attained its crests immediately after the death of Nero and, again, under the Antonines. Thereafter, it appears to have been absorbed gradually into Christian monachism (cf. E. Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church* (HL, 1888), London, 1890, lect. v. f.; St. Paulinus of Nola, *Ep.* xxv.). The first onset is represented by Demetrius, associate of Seneca (fl. 71). Between him and the Antonine group we have Epictetus, who, although a Stoic in theory, was deeply affected by Cynicism in practice; and Dio Chrysostom, who seems to have adopted Cynic ways in life, although he was an eclectic in philosophy; while, in the reign of Hadrian, Cénomaus of Gadara flourished. But, thanks to Lucian, the representatives of the sect whom we know best are its saint,

Demonax (fl. 145-160), and its part-prophet, part-charlatan, Peregrinus Proteus (self-immolated, 165), both in the Antonine period. In addition, it is evident from the frequent references in contemporary literature that numerous Cynic missionaries traversed the empire, preaching to the masses, and standing much in the same relation to them as did the Stoic 'private chaplains' or 'house philosophers' to the educated minority. The very names of the great majority of these peripatetic exhorters have been lost—possibly two score, capable of historical proof, have been transmitted to us. It is evident, however, that, like votaries of similar movements always (cf., e.g., W. Benett, *Religion and Free Will*, Oxford, 1913, p. 204 f.), they ran the entire gamut of human nature, from authentic culture and sincere devotion to insolent sham or arrant rascality.

2. Teaching.—The Cynic disciples of Socrates were overshadowed by the original constructive philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Hence their pragmatic sterility was at odds with an age interested vitally in positive thought. In short, the intellectual genius of the time surmounted their sectarianism. Similarly, civil autonomy in Greece did not pass away till the school had been active for two generations, and, even then, fresh memories of a glorious past, rooted in pride of citizenship, gave the lie to anti-social *παρρησία*. Moreover, the claims of citizenship acquired a new lease of life at Rome. So the gospel of revolt, unsupported by actual aspiration, faded away. Nevertheless, the ideal of the 'wise man'—one sufficient to himself, and this defensibly—had been set forth, and was destined to resurrection in due time. Immense social displacements occurred during the four centuries between the battle of Cheronea and the invasion of Britain by Claudius. Nowhere were they more conspicuous than in philosophy and civic patriotism. The one had sunk to the level of antiquarian exegesis or, worse, of profitable trade; the other had ceased to furnish an absorbing career, so that men grew importunate for a 'way of life.' Thus the ideal of the 'wise man' regained vitality, because it rebuked the conventional trifling of the schools, and promised norms for personal conduct. Philosophically, *conatus in suo esse perseverandi* appearing the sole recourse, *in magnis voluisse sat est* came to be the core of teaching. Briefly, philosophy ceased to be systematic or scientific, and assumed a purely disciplinary aspect. Man must turn to correction of the soul, in order that he may secure release from the ills of nature and society. Hence a class of professional (and therefore narrow) moralists appeared, preaching counsel and reproof. They desecrated a divine element in the human spirit, whereby the 'wise man' becomes the 'messenger of God' upon earth. As exemplars, they even professed to fulfil a mediatorial office. For, the conditions of the moral life being entirely internal, the end is quite *ἑαυτῷ*—to become one's true self, it is necessary to discover this self in self. Accordingly, an incommunicable indifference to all that is distinctively human in common life constitutes ethical perfection or, at least, attainment. The exercise of reason is futile—*facere docet philosophia non dicere*. The great wisdom is to develop self to the point where nothing remains to be willed. Renunciation affords the means. A man must therefore examine himself, experience remorse, and exhibit penitence, to the end that he may achieve the perfect peace of independent isolation. As a rule, then, the necessary activities of the average citizen must be eschewed, and this is as true of national religion and current esteems in good conduct as of the most disreputable vices or meaningless foibles.

The condition of a society where spiritual apathy and gross materialism were prevalent gave point and power to exaggerated preaching of obvious moral truths, with its trick of painting two pictures, one all black, the other all white, and setting them in melodramatic contrast.

'Their criticism of the society to which they belong and of all its institutions and modes of action and thought, attracts attention by the very violence and extravagance of the form in which they present it. And the neglected truth or half-truth, which they thrust into exclusive prominence, gradually begins by their means to gain a hold of the minds of others, forces them to reconsider their cherished prejudices, and so leads to a real advance' (E. Caird, *The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers*, Glasgow, 1904, ii. 56 f.).

Here the Neo-Cynics were strong, like their predecessors; they did not spend their 'genius in trying to regenerate a form of social and political life which mankind had outgrown' (*ib.* p. 68). Nevertheless, even at its best, in Epictetus, the doctrine corroded all particular ties, and deserved to be called a parasite upon the society which it repudiated. In fundamental principle it was intensely anti-social. Hence what has been said of the early Cynics holds of the latest representatives of the sect:

'They appealed largely to the poor, and most men were probably revolted by their roughness and their neglect of the ordinary decorum and courtesies of life, rather than attracted by the nobility and manliness inherent in their teaching' (W. W. Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas*, Oxford, 1913, p. 30; cf. ch. viii.).

Finally, it may be said that the alleged influence of the Neo-Cynics upon the development of Christian doctrine is not proven, although the presence of some of the forces destined to produce Christian rigorism is apparent enough.

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NEO-HEGELIANISM.—Neo-Hegelianism is a title which has been given to that current of thought inspired by Hegel and the idealists of Germany which began to make itself felt in British and American philosophy in the third quarter of the 19th century.

1. Chief thinkers.—Before attempting to elucidate the sources and general significance of the movement, we may refer briefly to some of the individual thinkers more immediately connected with it. As regards its origination three names have a claim to be regarded as outstanding: James Hutchison Stirling (1820-1909); Thomas Hill Green (1836-82), Fellow of Balliol College and Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy, Oxford; and Edward Caird (1835-1908), Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, and Master of Balliol College, Oxford. Stirling's work, *The Secret of Hegel*, published in 1865, may be said to have revealed for the first time to the English public the significance and import of Hegel's idealistic philosophy. Green in 1874 published *Introductions to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature*, in the course of which he subjected the whole English tradition in philosophy to criticism; and he left at his death an almost completed work entitled *Prolegomena to Ethics*, in which is contained a groundwork of idealistic metaphysics, the positive basis for his earlier criticism. Caird published two successive critical studies of Kant in 1878 and 1889, in which he derived from Kant's 'Ideas of Reason' the outline of a metaphysic which is essentially Hegelian and which furnished a basis for contributions to other departments of thought, especially the philosophy of religion and the history of Greek philosophy. Other men of importance at the beginning of the movement were John Caird (1820-98), brother of the above, who belongs to the first generation of the school and whose *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion* was published in 1880 and his *Fundamental Ideas of Christianity* posthumously in 1899; then a little later Richard Lewis Nettleship (1846-92), Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford, a pupil of Green, whose small output of published work bore no relation to the magnitude of his influence; and William Wallace (1844-97), a scholar of great attainments and an unusually luminous and imaginative philosophical writer, who succeeded Green at Oxford and published expositions of Hegel's thought and translations from his works. Among living writers and teachers the number of those whose bent of thought follows the tendency in greater or less degree is very large. Perhaps the most representative of them are F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, and, in America, W. T. Harris.

These are a few of the exponents. But, to be just to the compass of the movement, it is necessary to remember two further sets of names: on the one hand, leaders of thought belonging to the period before it took its rise, who played a part in the eventual turning of English-speaking philosophers in the direction of Continental idealism, such men, e.g., as Jowett and Ferrier and William Hamilton, Coleridge, Emerson, and Carlyle; on the other hand, among contemporary teachers and writers, besides the large number who acknowledge their affinity with the Neo-Hegelian tendency, we must remember the very many more who make their departure from the school the beginning of their own teaching, and are so far within its sphere of influence that they are under constant necessity of criticizing its ideas. If we take the positive and the negative influence of the movement together into account, we shall probably find that no other way of thinking sends its roots so deep or extends its ramifications so far in the philosophy of the English-speaking world at the present time.

2. Rise of Neo-Hegelianism.—No mere chronicle of adherents with an enumeration of their works and a statement of their external philosophical affinities ever explains a philosophical movement. We must see it in its inception. In order to see Neo-Hegelianism in its inception we have to consider (a) the general state of culture in England from the beginning of the century till the time when it appeared, roughly, during the sixties and early seventies, for the movement was the outcome of that culture; (b) the Continental development in philosophy, for the movement springing from this English source found stimulus and guidance in German idealism. It was, in fact, an effort of the English philosophical mind to use the results of that idealism upon problems which English thought, art, and life had created during the first decades of the century.

(a) *English culture before its inception.*—English culture in the time of Green, Caird, Stirling, and the others referred to was fitted to lead any reflective mind in the direction which these minds took. A little earlier—in the period of the rise of our English romantic poetry and of romantic literature in Europe generally—a great development had been undergone by English and Continental culture alike. We of the present time are still too near to that great age to know all that it meant in European life and thought. It was a seed-time which must be judged by its harvest, and its harvest has probably not yet come. Yet the romantic movement as a whole was not without certain distinguishable features of great importance for the later English culture out of which Neo-Hegelianism arose, features which we are indebted to one distinguished scholar and student of the century—A. C. Bradley—for enabling us, for the first time, to discern distinctly.

The first of these is the obvious relation of the leading minds of the time to orthodoxy. If we take the romantic movement as a whole, the Continental and the English sides of it together, it is almost a commonplace to say that most of its great representatives were in disagreement with the accepted religious ideas of their age. Many of them may have tried to soften the opposition. They may have held in one way or another that their teaching and the orthodox believer's faith were rooted in the same facts and sprang ultimately from a common conviction. Some of them may even have felt sympathy with the details of the concrete scheme of the universe which figured before the ordinary believer's imagination. But no amount of such sympathy, where it existed, could obliterate the gulf between the two; and it is certain that in many cases it did not exist. These great men are separated by all degrees of alienation from the theological ideas around them. They stand in no such relation to the religion of their time as Dante, *e.g.*, stood to mediæval Christianity or Milton to Puritanism.

The fact is important in connexion with the influence of the movement upon educated minds during the period when Neo-Hegelianism appeared. It means that for them there had ceased to be any vital relationship between the bearers of the highest contemporary culture and the official religion of the time. Not that there was open schism between them, so much as simple indifference. Individual great writers might accept the ordinary religious formulae, but the acceptance was external. They might even be interested, but their interest in these things was not central and convincing. It was not supreme. It did not, *e.g.*, furnish them with a theme for a long poem.¹ There grew up in the cultured

mind a vague sense of a hiatus between what theology dealt in and what really mattered most to man. The fact might not be preached or proclaimed, but it was none the less a fact that, once Goethe and Shelley and Heine had spoken, orthodoxy began to suffer from the irrelevance of its ideas.

But, if the pioneers of 19th cent. culture were not orthodox, the next striking feature of their work is that it was not secular.

'Take a list of nineteenth century creators,' says Bradley,¹ 'and strike out the names of purely scientific men; which we must do, because science, as science, is not concerned with an interpretation of the whole. Consider, then, philosophy and the serious literature and art of the nineteenth century, and ask, is it on the whole irreligious or even non-religious? No one would answer "Yes." On the contrary it may be asserted with truth that no secular products of the higher kind since the Renaissance have been so religious as those of the nineteenth century. I am not thinking solely of men like Coleridge or Tennyson, unorthodox but obviously "Christians"; nor solely of Mendelssohn's oratorios, or Holman Hunt's pictures; but equally of writers like Schopenhauer or Shelley, George Eliot or Carlyle, or painters like Watts or Millet. By almost all the greater men, life is portrayed not only with a seriousness or even a passion which reminds us of religion, but in some kind of scheme which embraces the whole of things and indicates man's place in it. That surely means in some sense religion. This can be realised by thinking on the other hand of Shakespeare. He had so marvellous a mind that he could give to a secular theme the import of a divine tragedy. But compare his work with that of the nineteenth century poets and we see that the former is secular as the latter is not. He refuses to portray his subject in the light of its relation to the whole of things; and so, placed side by side with Milton, he is secular. But the typical nineteenth century poet is like neither. He is like Shakespeare in taking usually a theme which is not religious; but like Milton inasmuch as his atmosphere vibrates with pulsations from worlds beyond the sun.'

Now, to see the kind of mental atmosphere in which Neo-Hegelianism sprang up, we only need to place alongside these two features of the whole romantic movement—its doctrinal heterodoxy and its religious spirit—a further feature especially characteristic of the English part of it. This is the lack in the great English writers of a theoretical grasp of what the poetry and romance and even the great moral teaching of their time were revealing. Giants in art, and even in art and moral criticism, they could exhibit an astonishing amount of childishness in intellectual outlook. There were some exceptions. Carlyle, *e.g.*, had been through the wilderness, and out of his narrow Scottish Calvinism had wrought a philosophy somewhat commensurate with the universe with which he had to deal, before he began to deal with it. But, steeped as he was in Continental studies, he is an exception which rather proves the rule. How different, *e.g.*, was Ruskin. The spectacle of Ruskin's going forth with the ardour of a knight-errant to re-mould the deepest formative ideas of his generation, with no better metaphysical equipment than that of a crude evangelical Protestantism, strikingly illustrates the gulf that was possible, in the mind of a man of genius, between the vision of the world actually breaking in upon him and his theoretical notions about how the world was built. What was true of him was true in other walks of English culture, and was felt, if not understood, by critics of a slightly later time. Matthew Arnold was aware of it. And Bradley, corroborating Arnold's view that the opening of the century was intellectually limited although poetically great, points out the superiority of the imaginative and the comparative inferiority of the theoretic literature of the romantic period. Its poetry ranks higher among poetry, he says, than does its history, philosophy, theology, politics, or economics among the work of other epochs in the same fields. The theoretical crudities which startle us in the prose writings, the letters, and the recorded conversation of the poets themselves in Wordsworth's England are probably a further evidence of the same thing.

¹ See in this connexion Bradley's essay on 'The Long Poem in the Age of Wordsworth,' in his *Oxford Lectures on Poetry*, London, 1909.

² In an unprinted lecture.

'Assuredly,' says Bradley,¹ speaking of this prose, 'we read with admiration, and the signs of native genius we meet with in abundance—in greater abundance, I think, than in the poetry and criticism of Germany, if Goethe is excepted. But the freedom of spirit, the knowledge, the superiority to prejudice and caprice and fanaticism, the openness to ideas, the atmosphere that is all about us when we read Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, Heine, we do not find. Can we imagine any one of those four either inspired or imprisoned as Shelley was by the doctrines of Godwin? Could any of them have seen in the French Revolution no more than Scott appears to have detected? How cramped are the attitudes, sympathetic or antipathetic, of nearly all our poets towards the Christian religion! Could anything be more *borné* than Coleridge's professed reason for not translating *Faust*?² Is it possible that a German poet with the genius of Byron or Wordsworth could have inhabited a mental world so small and so tainted with vulgarity as is opened to us by the brilliant letters of the former, or could have sunk, like the latter, to suggesting that the cholera was a divine condemnation of Catholic Emancipation and the Reform Bill?'

There may have been reasons for this theoretic backwardness in English romantic culture, reasons connected with the previous history of English philosophy and science. But, however it may be accounted for, a certain incapacity for speculation, a certain preponderance of the intuitive over the theoretical mind, appears to have been there.

If we hold these results firmly together, we can easily conceive the mental atmosphere around any English youth of generous character and speculative mind, at a centre of English culture like Oxford, about the beginning of the third quarter of the century. The new spirit in literature and science had had its full effect upon religious life at Oxford by 1850. The University had got beyond the long controversy over the teaching of the Church in which it had been entangled. The old Oriel College school of 'Noetics,' with its noisy heterodoxy, and the 'Tractarian' reaction against it had alike exhausted themselves. The youth of the fifties and sixties were left free enough of sectarian controversy to breathe the ampler air into which the culture of the romantic period had really brought them. In view of the character of that new culture, the indifference to religious formulæ and yet the deep religious impulse which were all through it, it was not surprising that the need should be felt by serious minds for some scheme of metaphysical belief which should be at once religiously satisfying and scientifically defensible. There was as little hope of meeting such a need by an appeal to the current philosophy of the time as by an appeal to the orthodox theology. Hamilton and Mill were as un-religious as Newman was unscientific. It was whilst in this situation, whilst feeling the mystery of the romantic spirit on the one side and the incapacity of the English philosophical tradition on the other, that some young British thinkers stumbled on the interpretation which the romantic spirit had already given of itself on the Continent, applied it to their own problems, and gave it an English form. This was the rise of Neo-Hegelianism.

(b) *The Continental development.*—The salient matter, then, is the philosophy of the romantic movement. What interpretation had it given of itself? And with what general modifications did its interpretation reappear in the work of these English and Scottish thinkers?

In the first place, where lay the difficulty which made the romantic movement a problem to itself? It lay, more than in anything else, in a feature inseparable from its whole course—the tremendous invasion of the realm of the sacred by what had been called secular things. We have seen how the 19th cent. poets could elevate secular themes and make them pulse with religious significance. This meant a serious challenge to a long-established dualism, the dualism within which the whole preceding age of the so-called 'enlightenment' had

lived and moved. It meant, not exactly that religious ideas were being questioned—they had been so already—but rather that, damaged by scepticism as they were, they were now being passed over; their place was being usurped. That part of the mind which had been reserved for current religion was being addressed by thoughts from elsewhere. The result, with the best minds, was a solicitude lest the rising tide of interest in mere history, or natural beauty, or secular human affairs should interfere with the respect due to the very highest objects of human aspiration and hope. These extraneous things were caught up, it is true, by a poetry which could disclose real spiritual value in them. But that is not a fact calculated to allay such misgivings in any circumstances. 'Secular' things with an unsuspected spiritual value in them are all the abler to displace religious tradition. But this unexpected spirituality, if it intensifies anxiety, also defines the issue. It points people beyond the dualism—accustoms them to the thought, What if it did not exist? It forces forward the question whether the barrier here felt to be breaking is really a religious necessity. The situation is that the secular movement—on the surface a mere supplanting of religion by temporal things and a paganizing of Christianity—appears to have definitely come. But the question whether it may not be regarded as exactly the reverse of what it seems, whether it may not be a true permeation of what was secular by the religious principle, is not thereby settled. And this is the question which now comes uppermost. Things once frankly 'secular' have been discovered to have a profound human value. As a result the familiar landmarks have become confused. The one sphere appears scattered all through the other. The difficulty is simply to believe that things which have sufficient value in them are sacred for that reason, and to see convincingly what is sacred about them.

But there was help available in such a difficulty. This dualistic partition which broke at the push of 19th cent. civilization was a thing which philosophy on the Continent had faced. Speculation in Germany at the opening of the century built upon the foundations laid by Kant. Now, the dualism upon which Kant bent his critical strength was not exactly of this shape, but it was the same in principle. Kant was not confronted by the spectacle of an art which was religious in its inmost nature passing over to the world of experience and finding this more important than the religious world itself. He was confronted with a habit of thought for which the world of sense-experience was coming to be the only one that counted, so far as knowledge went. He felt with many minds of the 18th cent. the growing irrelevance of theology and all its lore of another world to anything that science and observation could tell us about this one. And he succeeded in reducing the issue between the two to clear terms, with the result that, if he did not leave a solution, he left the suggestion of one. His idealistic successors, advancing upon their master's position, seemed to arrive from it at exactly the relation between secular and sacred which the romantic spirit had been forcing into view.

Where could the distinction really lie—so ran the difficulty—between that higher world which calls forth religious veneration and gives morality a meaning and, on the other hand, the common world of sense-experience and positive knowledge? Or are they just the same? The whole question, to Kant's mind, has been prejudiced by an error which he would noproof. The one world is not a simple extension of the other. The world in which religion is interested is not one about which we have special *a priori* knowledge, and which we

¹ *Oxford Lectures on Poetry*, p. 180.

² *Table Talk*, 10th Feb. 1833.

know to lie simply beyond the confines of this one. The higher world, according to Kant, is not an object of knowledge at all. It is a world of whose reality we are convinced by our actually entering into it. And we enter into it in the act of being practical or moral. We do not prove the reality of God, freedom, and immortality by argument. Religious convictions do not rest on argument. The true proof of them is, rather, that in the moment of duty, in the consciousness of something absolutely worthy which I ought to do and he, I enact my freedom, my immortality, and my place in a Kingdom of God. This freedom which the moral consciousness confers, science cannot comprehend. But science cannot cavil at it; because it is the utterance of a world about which science, confined as it is to the world of experience, can neither assert nor deny anything.

Here we have the possibility of a clue to that confusion which was the perplexity of romantic culture and even its reproach—that taking of mere things of sense and investing them with a sanctity which did not seem to belong to them, thus leaving nothing holy. Kant's reading of the distinction between the secular and the sacred world suggests that in the last resort it is one between knowledge and practice. And, if it is so, then these two, it would seem, are sufficiently capable of being intermixed without ceasing to be different. Knowing and doing are functions never far from each other—combined, indeed, in all intelligent practice and in all courageous theory. Yet knowing what the world is remains a different thing from changing it into something else.

Personally, Kant would have repudiated the idea of taking anything out of his theory to justify a view so directly opposed to all his own sympathies as the view that the higher world permeated all the ordinary world of nature and experience. But he held that the moral imperative carried the higher world with it. And his great follower Fichte simply asks where, in all the wide range of human function, this moral imperative is *not* operative. In effect he answers, 'Nowhere.' Kant himself, he held, had taught him this. It had been the core of Kant's argument against Hume that no part of the world of nature and experience was merely passively received; all was actively constructed. Had the knowledge process been a mere matter of an external nature imprinting itself on a non-resisting mind, leaving the mind to read off the impression, it simply could not have existed. There would then have been no world to know, or only a world bereft of all form or order, a world in which there was neither space, time, unity, substance, nor causal connexion. All these constitutive features of the world had been shown by Kant to be the active syntheses of the knowing mind, whereby it works up the given sense-data into that objectivity with which man's senses deal. But this synthesis to Fichte is a deed of the spirit, entirely parallel to a moral deed. In fact, it is a moral deed. It is an expression of the free self-assertion of the rational mind. It is a further carrying out of that essentially moral activity which receives its first and most concentrated expression when a man is able intelligently to say 'I.' The synthesizing function whereby man wins his world is nothing else than a particular form of his consciousness of the moral imperative and of his springing up in obedience thereto. Now, since every part of the world of man's experience is a field for this spiritual construction, since it only arises, in the last resort, as such construction proceeds, every region of the world provides an opportunity for man to enter that higher realm of which religion speaks. To him who has eyes to see, the sacred is everywhere.

This reading of the situation is just what the romantic spirit had been waiting to hear. It had been deeply conscious of it. Engaged upon secular themes, it had yet felt itself constantly heating against ultimate things. Abandoning itself to the natural world, throwing its soul open to all that had been neglected in it, to 'the great, the obvious, the habitual, the common earth, the universal sky, the waters rolling evermore,'¹ it found such natural facts laden everywhere with spiritual treasure. And in neglected regions of secular human life, amid the drab and the dull, the sin and the wrong of the world, it found the same spirituality. This new art felt that, whether 'secular' or not, it was engaged on another mission than providing cultivated idleness with amusement. It was revealing the ultimate and the divine. But, if Fichte's theory is true, the ultimate is everywhere. Wherever a man opens his eyes upon the world, he interprets what is before him, he actively construes it into what shape it has. That, to Fichte, is a doing of his duty; and it carries with it all that Kant thought duty implied. It is therefore but a matter of a man's realizing what he is doing and doing it fully; and the divine is there—nigh him, in his mouth and in his heart. This mere having of a world before our intelligent eyes is to Fichte the very process of believing in God.

¹You do not believe in God because you believe in the world; rather you see a world at all, solely on this account, that you have to believe in God.²

3. General significance of the English movement.—The philosophy of Fichte contained the suggestion in the light of which both his own immediate successors and some English thinkers of a later date essayed a systematic interpretation of life. Its central doctrine is that of a free, creative, synthetic activity on the part of the soul of man, whereby to a limited degree he participates in or re-enacts that ultimate creative synthesis through which the universe as a whole is sustained. Fichte himself had expanded this view into what he thought a complete and satisfactory philosophy, embracing the entire round of man's experiences, sensuous, intellectual, moral, religious, æsthetic, political, etc. But two successors, Schelling and Hegel, sought in turn to expand it further, and render it more systematic and complete. And the Neo-Hegelian thinkers, seeing in the whole development what appeared to be a way of meeting the difficulties of English culture, also worked it over again in a manner which was perhaps all the more English for their having the example of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel before them.

We cannot attempt in this article to treat all these thinkers individually and show how each modified the system which he found. But it is possible to characterize the group without damaging the individuality of its members by our generalization. We can say that to all of them idealism meant at least what we have just taken to be the essence of its original meaning, viz. the discovery of a principle of distinction between natural and spiritual which could fill the place of the arbitrary traditional distinction, which the experience of romanticism had broken down. Moreover, to the English thinkers as to their forerunners the spirituality was such that the whole universe could be spiritually discerned. And we can almost characterize the whole English way of working out a spiritual view of the universe by referring to the traditional empiricism of the English mind.

A certain esoteric character is inseparable from idealism in Germany. By the time it had received

¹T. H. Green, 'Popular Philosophy in its Relation to Life,' *Works*, iii. 120.

²J. G. Fichte, *Sämmtl. Werke*, Berlin, 1845-46, v. 212.

Hegel's treatment, the idealistic position had acquired, not by accident or design, but simply by the nature of the case, a certain impenetrability. In principle Fichte had got the romantic spirit out of its characteristic perplexity. He found the whole world of experience potentially the conscious product of free spiritual activity, and so potentially sacred. Such a discovery changes the character of the philosopher's task inherently. If knowledge is thus a deed, and not a mere static object of further knowledge, then to do this deed is the ultimate task of philosophy, all mere theorizing about how it is done being external and beside the point. It was but in the nature of the case, then, that Hegel, instead of telling us how he is going to explain the world, should proceed to explain it; instead of speaking about the point of view which he is going to adopt, should proceed to take it up, assuming that that is the only definition possible of an ultimate point of view. But it was inevitable that such literal idealism, such endeavour to enact before us, and along with us, the very synthesis which the world of knowledge is, should make his theory in a sense impenetrable, a thing not spoken about but simply begun, a system without approaches, a sort of enchanted ground into which the reader must simply insert himself and in which it may be long enough before he find his bearings.

The English thinkers have endeavoured to avoid all such suggestion of the esoteric as is contained in the classical form of the idealistic system. They have had to force their way into this system, by direct attack or through Kant. But none of them has been content simply to be in it, or simply to 'initiate' others. They may not all have been equally successfully exoteric. And in some of those who stood nearest to Hegel there is even a trace of complacency with this state of affairs. Harris has still an 'atmosphere' which the reader has somehow to learn to breathe. Stirling has a 'secret' whereby he will initiate us into all the hidden chambers of Hegel's thought. But of none of the English idealists can it be said that he valued the Hegelian system solely as a system. Its results must be translated into terms of concrete human values. Sometimes one set of values is dominant, sometimes another. The pioneers, e.g., are distinctly religious. Green centres his theory in an 'eternal consciousness.' Caird speaks constantly of a unity beyond all differences, to which the thinking consideration of the world always leads us back; and he names it God. Stirling's writing almost riots in the very picture-language of the ordinary religious consciousness, proclaiming the content of that consciousness as the very truth which Hegel came to teach. In the thinkers a very little later in date there is an appreciable change of emphasis. A sense of the importance of the ultimate or religious outcome of the system of course remains. But in many of them—in Nettleship, particularly, but also in Wallace, Bosanquet, and Bradley—there is a perceptible easing off from the religious note. Nettleship appears to have left Green to deal with the religious implications of philosophy, while he used it for its educational value. All that is recorded of him by contemporaries and by his biographer indicates a man whose way of studying the idealistic point of view was to throw its light on other things, and study them. And his mantle has descended on others. Bosanquet's *History of Aesthetic* and those literary studies of A. C. Bradley from which we have already quoted are conspicuous examples of the effort to study things other than idealistic philosophy without leaving out of account what idealism has suggested to be the ultimate nature of the universe. The work of William Wallace is practi-

cally all of this character. His writings are memorable for the brilliant sidelights thrown on questions of ethnology, philosophy, history, and all manner of current controversial topics. His systematic idealism is buried in the mass of this concrete reference. To all these idealists idealism means, in the first place, power in definite fields of concrete human interest. It is not to them primarily what it primarily was to their forerunners—a technically perfect metaphysical system.

Behind all their interest in the concrete there lay, of course, for the English thinkers, the point of view from which they regarded it, and the considerations which seemed to them to make their general point of view a metaphysical necessity. And they have done their part in giving these considerations point. They have contributed to the science of metaphysics. But the same concrete interest which makes them sometimes prefer being metaphysical students of other things to being metaphysicians operates in their metaphysical work itself and makes it distinct from the great system-building of the past. They are not in search of a system so much as the possibility of it. The classical idealism enveloped the universe in its system. In an age of spiritual world-conquest it had been its pride to be able to discern progressive manifestations of its principle in the great epochs of history, in the successive systems of philosophy, in the development of political institutions, in the periods of art, in the system of the natural sciences. To give to every matter of fundamental human interest its place in the evolution of one ultimate, dialectically moving principle had been the object, e.g., of Hegel's *Phenomenology*. As compared with this the later idealists are not greatly impatient to see the ultimate, divine order of the world. They are content to know that some such order exists and is the ultimate truth of things, so that there is substantiation for the ultimate hypothesis of religion. For the rest, they are interested in the particular departments of human experience as objects of a study which treats them for their own sakes although without forgetting that there is an ultimate principle in the nature of things and that they are connected with it. The Neo-Hegelian writers, one might say, are interested in the incidents of the dialectical process and they are interested in its ultimate outcome, but they are not specially interested in its cohesion. That this process invades their metaphysic is clear from the most notable metaphysical production of the school, Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. There is something in the procession of the topics in that work which reminds us of the procession of 'categories' in the *Phenomenology*. But the difference is shown by the absence of the attempt in the English work to give each 'category' its place in an articulated system. The thought treats them *seriatim*. It does not make a feature of their ascending order. It is confined to showing about them all equally that they are not adequate to the spiritual whole which idealism takes the universe to be, but that, on the other hand, none of them can endanger the spiritual whole, while it is shown that, for indisputable reasons, the spiritual whole must be. This taking of what were but the incidents of the dialectical process for the classical idealists to be each a field for independent study and criticism, together with the interest taken in discussing what 'must be' the outcome of the whole process, is characteristic of the school. Despite the great advance towards a more positive presentation of the same main considerations in the latest great product of Neo-Hegelianism, Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures, the lightness of its touch on the question of the internal arrangement of the categories is entirely in the manner of the school, and effectually dis-

tinguishes even this, perhaps the most comprehensive and systematic Neo-Hegelian work, from any work of the classical German period.

LITERATURE.—It has been impossible to deal with the movement in its entirety. We have not named all or even the central writers. And, until some adequate history of the movement appears, the only way to get a grasp of what it had to teach is to read a few works of typical representatives of it. The following list taken in the order given will, it is believed, form an effective introduction to the standpoint: John Caird, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion*, Glasgow, 1880; Henry Jones, *Idealism as a practical Creed*, do. 1909; T. H. Green, 'Popular Philosophy in its Relation to Life,' in *Works*, ed. Nettleship, London, 1885-88, iii., *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Oxford, 1883; R. L. Nettleship, *Philosophical Lectures and Remains*, London, 1897; F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*², do. 1902; B. Bosanquet, *Principle of Individuality and Value*, do. 1912, and *Value and Destiny of the Individual*, do. 1913.

J. W. SCOTT.

NEO-KANTISM.—1. Meaning and explanation of the term.—Neo-Kantism is the philosophic endeavour to expound and justify Kant's theory of the world, so that it shall satisfy the demands, and solve the problems, of modern culture. It embraces also the thought performances of those thinkers who, deviating from Kant's methods and principles, find it first of all necessary to defend and justify any such deviation from him. Hence the term 'Neo-Kantists,' or 'Neo-Kantians,' is applicable in a collective sense to investigators like H. Vaihinger, A. Riehl, J. Volkelt, F. Paulsen, H. Cohen, P. Natorp, and many others of varying shades of opinion. Cohen, Natorp, W. Kinkel, and E. Cassirer are the chief representatives of the Marburg school, whose methods are idealistic. Very diverse points of departure mark this revival of Kantism. At one extreme we have the positive or immanent unconscious school of W. Schuppe, J. Rehmke, R. von Schubert-Soldern, and A. von Leclair. These noetical thinkers reject all extramental elements, and treat all being as only conscious content. Hence their advocacy of the monism of consciousness. Schuppe is a more significant thinker in this connexion than is often supposed, but his views cannot be expounded here. At the other extreme stands the metaphysical school of W. Wundt, E. von Hartmann, and Volkelt, of whom the last-named has actually tracked the inconsistencies and contradictions of Kant to their ultimate hiding-places in Kant's in-harmonious thinking.

In its inception, as seen in F. A. Lange, it was really a bifurcated movement. Founding on Kant's limitation of knowledge to the objects of experience, Lange would have philosophy, as science, confined to the task of yielding a more securely grounded and limited theory of knowledge. Again, availing himself of Kant's critical idealism, he would resolve the whole corporeal world into mere appearance for the apprehending consciousness, conditioned and fixed by *a priori* forms of knowledge. The antipathy to speculative philosophy in these positions is very marked, and Lange's theoretic materialism simply presented a regulative principle for scientific investigation. It is easy to see in Neo-Kantism the natural rebound from extreme idealism, in the lengths to which the Neo-Kantian doctrine of object-subject has been carried. But it is obviously unsatisfactory that Neo-Kantism should have attached itself to the empirical and sceptical sides of Kant's philosophy, leaving in abeyance the rationalistic element so characteristic of Kant as we find him in the whole presented to us by history. The modifications in the positions of Cohen, E. Laas, Paulsen, and Natorp are, in this connexion, interesting and suggestive. But Lange was the real head of the movement, in which, allied to the limitation of knowledge, experimentally, to the world of sense, was an aversion to inquiries of a metaphysical or transcendental character. Everything bore the

stamp of relativity, and absolute truth was de-spaiied of. Cohen's criticisms had a modifying effect, in certain well-defined respects, upon Lange's position, but what concerns us here is that he simply took his stand on knowledge as we find it in the natural sciences, whose methods he would apply to psychology. His is critical materialism, aware, as the older materialism was not, of the purely phenomenal character of matter. This, then, carries him back upon idealism, and between these two Lange's thought, which is a kind of idealistic naturalism, oscillates in no very satisfactory manner. In its later developments Neo-Kantism has really become a philosophy of culture. Its logic is a logic of development, whose aim is to get at the foundation of the culture-consciousness of humanity, as expressed in science, art, and morality. It is psychology—the critico-idealistic psychology of Cohen—that, according to Kinkel, makes possible the unity of these three directions in the consciousness of humanity. But it must be said that, though a philosophy of development, Neo-Kantism, like that of Cohen, is yet not a philosophy of history.

2. Historic development of Neo-Kantism.—Although Neo-Kantism may be taken as having its rise about the year 1865, yet the cry for a return to the epoch-making Kant had been raised long before. In that year the feeling of the time found strong expression in Otto Liebmann's *Kant und die Epigonen*. Weisse had, two decades earlier, declared that return should be made to Kant's point of view, and Liebmann, going much further, affirmed the idealistic tendencies of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, the realistic positions of Herbart, the empirical viewpoint of Fries, and the transcendental trends in Schopenhauer to be one and all rooted in the teaching of Kant, to whom, he insists, return must be made. He holds, however, Kant's 'thing-in-itself' to be an absurdity, responsible for the four erroneous tendencies just pointed out. In his next book, *On the Individual Proof for the Freedom of the Will* (1866), Liebmann demurs to Kant's way of reconciling freedom and necessity. In two later works (*Objective Vision*, 1869, and *The Analysis of Reality*, 1876) he adopts the standpoint of the criticism founded by Kant—the Newton of speculation—who discovered the laws of intellect. Lange's great work on the *History of Materialism* first appeared in 1866. He holds, in the main, with Kant, and regards the essential reality of things as unknowable by us, since our every act of knowledge is a result of what is outside us and of what is within us. He views with disfavour Kant's wish to find out *a priori* what exists *a priori* within us. He holds that other things besides space, time, etc., exist *a priori* within us, as development advances. With Lange, after Kant, knowledge is restricted to the sphere of sense, and truth is known only in the realm of experience. The cry for return to Kant had been made as early as 1832 by K. Fortlage, and later by E. Zeller and Kuno Fischer—to say nothing of E. Reinhold and others. Indeed, the real beginnings of the return to Kant lay with the appearance of Kuno Fischer's great exposition of Kant's philosophy, with its fine exhibition of the development in Kant's thought (1860). Co-operant with such influence was the treatment by H. von Helmholtz of physiological optics and acoustics as accordant in result with the critical philosophy of Kant—a line of inquiry then significantly new.

In the transcendental group high places are occupied by H. Cohen and P. Natorp. Cohen's logic of pure knowledge is neither a pure theory of knowledge nor a psychological logic, but a system of building up a thought-world, in pursuance of Neo-Kantian desire to be rid of anti-metaphysical psychologism. His abjuration of psychologism

runs through his whole logic. But, without entering on the discussion of the whole matter, it must be said that psychologic reflexion asserts itself for Cohen, in the concept-producing activity of thought, in spite of himself. His positions are at times paradoxical, as the result of his unreasonable attitude towards the 'given.' For him the weakness of Kant lies in his firm prejudice for the 'given'—the error that man need, or can, give anything to thought. Cohen's new treatment of psychology would reconstruct the mental out of its own factual productions. Natorp may be classed with Cohen, inasmuch as they both stand—though not without differences—for the Marburg principle that, instead of the dogmatic view of subject and object as ultimately given, subject and object are to be held as constituted only by fiat of thought itself. In these thinkers we see Neo-Kantism trying to pass from the objective to the functional, and from rigid substance, as it appears to abstract thought, to the vital activity of concrete mind itself. Thus Natorp erects his system of fundamental logical functions, not as existing, but as deduced from the fundamental act of knowledge. His work is subtle, and marked by logical precision, but he tends to depart from his own strictly logical positions, and to break through into the psychological sphere. His idealistic contention that thought first generates the object stands in obvious need of modifying sense, if we are to be saved from scepticism. Besides Cohen and Natorp, the transcendental group includes E. König, A. Stadler, K. Lasswitz, W. Koppelman, and F. Staudinger. König's view is a really phenomenist one, and, from attachment to the experiential side of Kant, he made studies of the causal problems of an extremely valuable character. Koppelman treats, with clearness and power, of Kant's relations to ethics and to Christianity.

Paulsen proved a powerful exponent of Neo-Kantism, setting forth historically the development of Kant's theory of knowledge. Later, he blamed speculative idealism for thinking that it could evolve a system of absolute knowledge of reality by rational thought, in independence of experience. He held that thought without experience leads to the knowledge of reality just as little as experience without thought. The efforts of B. Erdmann and H. Vaihinger at Kantian interpretation must be here noted, that of J. Volkelt having been already mentioned. It should be observed, further, that it was in critical connexion with Kant that such German positivists as E. Laas and A. Riehl developed their theory of knowledge. The work of both of these thinkers is acute and interesting, and the same may be said of that of R. Avenarius, who may be classed with them. Laas occupies a position approximating that of Mill. His positivism is one which founds alone on positive facts, that is to say, perceptions, and which demands that all judgments shall show the experiential bases on which they rest. Laas is viewed by Riehl as holding in effect the position of universal idealism or universal relativism—an unstable position. Riehl himself has affinities with the intellectualistic basis of the Kantian theory of knowledge, but is in many respects nearer of kin to Spencer. A critical realist, he holds to a transcendental ground of appearances, but, with Kant, grounds objectivity in the synthetic unity of appearance. Riehl is an incisive critic of idealism, and holds it no prejudice of Kant, but only of his expositors, that the critical philosophy is grounded in psychology. On this it may be remarked that the question how representations arise is quite different from the other inquiry whether these representations contain objective knowledge, or agree with the object, and that the latter question is not one to be decided by a psychology. Aven-

arius termed his system 'empirio-criticism,' and dealt with the theory of experience in such a way as to give us at the same time a theory of knowledge. He claims that his 'empirio-criticism' combines and transcends Hume and Kant. Professing an absolute realism, he lands himself in subjective idealism, even while appearing as its critic.

G. Thiele, in his important work on the philosophy of self-consciousness, held that to be true which corresponds with reality, and laid the usual Neo-Kantian stress on fact and experience. Quite recently W. Kinkel has shown affinities with the Marburg school, especially with Cohen. In this connexion it may be remarked that the movement back to Kant has meant a limitation of the field of psychology, at the hands of polemical logical idealism. The works of B. Bauch and E. Cassirer, within very recent years, are not without thought-relations to Neo-Kantism.

Neo-Kantism has proved a powerful impulse in the sphere of religion, as witness A. Ritschl, W. Herrmann, and J. Kaftan. It holds the religious instincts to be not less authoritative than the other instincts; it lays stress upon ethics; it emphasizes history; it puts in the foreground of its thought the idea of the Kingdom of God, as a sphere of right living. Among more recent developments we can merely note that of Neo-Kantist thought in socialism, as by K. Vorländer and others, who treat socialism in this connexion after a Kantian moral theory of the world.

In France neo-criticism, with C. Renouvier as leader, was essentially Neo-Kantist in character. Renouvier was almost more Kantian than Kant himself. He modified and supplemented Kantian criticism by subsuming all the categories under the principle of the relativity of knowledge, and by making them all modes of the category of relation. Though Renouvier thought the Kantian philosophy 'practically bent upon the ruin of the person,' yet, for him, 'no objective representation' could be 'more than *subjectively* objective'; and we have merely ideas aroused in us by the presence of objects or bodies, but no real perception of bodies in themselves. Renouvier allowed his system to become rather fanciful and composite, and somewhat heterogeneous in its answers. Critical and suggestive though his theory was in parts, its mixed character keeps it from being satisfactory.

3. Further criticism of Neo-Kantism.—In addition to the critical references in the course of this article, some further explicit criticism of Neo-Kantism may now be made. One thing that must be put to its credit is that, in severe comparisons with extreme idealistic systems, it has wonderfully maintained its inner force and its external efficacy. It is the abiding merit of Neo-Kantism to have re-discovered, amid the growing heaps of system, the most valuable ideas of the critical philosophy, and to have elaborated them in new and fruitful ways. But it was obviously wrong in thinking to derive all from Kant, and to ignore influences that came from Lessing, Herder, Goethe, Schiller, and others. As we have seen, one result, in Germany, of the Neo-Kantist movement has been a plethora of epistemological theories of the most divergent character, as exemplified in Cohen's criticism of knowledge, the philosophic criticism of Riehl, the immanent philosophy of Schuppe, and so forth. Naturally, the right of epistemological theory to build up a system of knowledge in its own strength, and without metaphysical presuppositions, has been keenly disputed. The bankruptcy of epistemological theory has at times been proclaimed by those who have fallen back upon metaphysics. As might be expected, the results are as diverse as the methods, and range from extreme phenomenalism to extreme realism. It cannot be said that

attempts at harmonization have proved more than vain. The root-trouble of Neo-Kantism lies in its point of departure. That consists of an unhistorical mode of thinking, which, rejoicing in its isolation and its alleged freedom from dogmatic dependence, corrects Kant, in spite of itself, in all the diversified forms of Neo-Kantist thinking. It is thus manifest that its isolated critical mode does not come near objective and universal validity. Neo-Kantism has been styled 'Half-Kantism,' on the ground that Lange rejected the whole practical philosophy of Kant, while Paulsen held to the very half which Lange spurned. Certainly the Neo-Kantists have shown a somewhat irrational leaning to the negative side of Kant, with the unspiritual and mechanical world-view attaching thereto. Wundt has opposed Neo-Kantist separation of science and metaphysics. Cohen and some others do not seem sufficiently to realize that Kant, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, sought for experience a basis that should include physics and psychology. It seems clear that, in Neo-Kantism, the meaning of inner experience has not been at all sufficiently determined. Not less certain does it appear that the critical materialism, or idealistic naturalism, of much Neo-Kantism is too uncritical of the mind's part in relation to the knowledge given in science. If philosophy is to be critical, it must recognize the reality of matter to lie, for us, not apart from consciousness—this, without impairing the epistemological fact that the object, when given, wakes a conviction of extra-mental reality. Our knowledge implicates existence or reality beyond knowledge. The cognitive subject cannot fail to recognize that that of which he has knowledge exists without him, and cannot possibly be one with his own mental state. But, although the object is so important to many characteristic Neo-Kantists, it seems that, when subject and object come together, the Neo-Kantists fail to do justice to the part played in knowledge by the combining self-active subject. For the object exists but for this conscious subject—its necessary correlate, so far as knowledge is concerned. It must be said that the facts of the relation subsisting between psychology and transcendentalism have still been too little explicated by Neo-Kantism. The transcendental categories, it should be observed, are not deduced from psychological concepts. Rather is it the case that psychological ideas are here viewed from a transcendental standpoint. When Neo-Kantists have turned from the empirical to the rational—Cohen and Volkelt are examples—the influence of Hegel, rather than of Kant, has been apparent, in spite of Cohen's express repudiation of Hegel. Both Hegel and Cohen build up all-spanning thought-worlds, and they can be compared through the range of categories employed by them. In keeping with this, Kinkel insists that thought must have no source or origin outside itself, and Natorp proclaims facts to be not given, or attainable, by empiric knowledge in any absolute sense; so that we are brought at length to a doctrine of absolute relativity. In fine, Neo-Kantism lands itself in an unfortunate dilemma. For it says, practically, that we know that there is infinite knowledge, and that there are ideas, but that we, with our finite, discursive thought, can never reach them—the serious practical result of which would seem to be that object and knowledge, form and content, being-in-itself and culture-consciousness, never do, in Neo-Kantism, come together in their proper mode or relation of hanging all together, at least never in such a way as to meet the demands of philosophical requirement. What Neo-Kantism has increasingly evidenced itself, as a system, to be is a *Kulturphilosophie*, having its acme in the idea of humanity.

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JAMES LINDSAY.

NEO-PLATONISM.—I. Precursors of Neo-Platonism.—The philosophy of Plato, and even that of his independent disciple Aristotle, was a kind of splendid digression from the main current of Greek speculation. Plato's was a many-sided nature. He is by turns sceptical and mystical, constructive and analytical, a socialist and a conservative. But at bottom he is a pessimistic aristocrat, who can find little to admire or hope for in the spirit of his age. Many of his ideas could be realized only under a theocracy such as the Roman Catholic Church attempted to establish in the Middle Ages, so that Nietzsche was not wholly wrong in calling him a Christian before Christ. The evolution of thought in his own mind was a curious foreshadowing of what happened at last to his school. His growing sympathy with Orphic and Pythagorean teachings, the devoutness and solemnity of his later attitude towards religion, the ethical rigorism of his old age, with its strongly marked ascetic tendency, his interest in oracles and demons, and the momentary appearance of an 'evil soul' in the *Timæus*, all pointed the way which Platonism was much later to follow. Loyalty to their master was always a tradition of the Platonic school; but his disciples were not content with mere commentatorship, like many of the Peripatetics, and they often diverged from their founder more widely than they knew. The members of the older Academy Pythagoreanized still further than Plato had done, laying stress on the lore of numbers, and dropping the 'doctrine of ideas,' which they could not understand. After a time they grew tired of number-mysticism, and concentrated their attention upon religion and ethics. Plato's idealism now fell into the background, and a speculation, at once arid and timorous, on epistemology led the school, under Arcesilaus and Carneades, to deny the possibility of knowledge, asserting that probability is enough for practical purposes. The 'New Academy' followed, given up to quibbling disputations about the grounds of probable belief. A period of frank eclecticism ensued. Greek thought was now entering upon a long period of comparative barrenness, which lasted from the early part of the 3rd cent. B.C. to the rise of Neo-Platonism. Such movement as there was in the Platonic school was away from scepticism and towards mysticism. The New Academy, in despair of metaphysics, had referred men to practical utility as a test of truth; and it became again necessary to ask what is the end to which action should be directed in order to be useful. Since dialectic was discredited, the only source of illumina-

tion could be the inner light. The school now taught that truth is given intuitively to the mind. Thus Platonism tended to become a philosophy of revelation, and scepticism (in spite of an attempt to revive it by Aenesidemus) passed out of the Platonic tradition. By teaching that the supersensual alone is real, and divine illumination alone blessed, the school returned, though with a difference, to the position of Plato himself. The whole influence of the school was now on the side of belief and piety.

But the cradle of Neo-Platonism was not the quiet university town of Athens, but the great manufacturing city of Alexandria. From the time when the Alexandrian school rose into prominence, the official Academy, with its professor—the Diadochus, as he was called—at Athens, fell into insignificance, until, near the beginning of the 5th cent., the Academy was captured by the school of Plotinus, or rather of Iamblichus, and remained Neo-Platonic till the edict of Justinian in 529 closed the series of Platonic professors who had taught at Athens for 800 years. It is to be noted that Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus wished to be called Platonists, not Academicians. It is well known that Alexandria was at this time not only a great intellectual centre, but the place where, above all others, East and West rubbed shoulders. The wisdom of Asia was undoubtedly in high repute about this time. Philostratus expresses the highest veneration for the learning of the Indians; Apollonius of Tyana went to India to consult the Brahmins; Plotinus himself accompanied the Roman army to Persia in the hope of gathering wisdom while his comrades searched for booty; and the Christian Clement has heard of Buddha (*Βουττα*). It is, therefore, natural that many modern scholars have looked for Oriental influence in Neo-Platonism, and have even represented it as a fusion of European and Asiatic philosophy. But, though the influence of the East upon the West was undoubtedly great during the decline of the Western Empire, it is not necessary to derive any Neo-Platonic doctrines from a non-European source. Neo-Platonism is a legitimate development of Greek thought, and of Plato's own speculations. In some ways it might even be said that Plato is more Oriental than Plotinus. It is another question whether Neo-Platonism was influenced in any way by the Jewish Alexandrian school, which is known to us through the writings of Philo. The resemblances between the Essenes and the Neo-Pythagoreans, and between Philo and Plotinus, are so striking that many have thought it impossible to deny a direct dependence. But it is more probable that the Greek and the Jewish Alexandrian schools developed side by side under parallel influences. Philo does not seem to have been much read by the educated pagans, who had strong prejudices against the Jews.

The Pythagorean school, as a philosophy, disappears from view in the 4th cent. B.C. But as a religious society, in connexion with the so-called Orphic rule, it was full of life. The Pythagoreans practised the simple life on a diet of vegetables and water. About 100 B.C. they produced a number of pseudonymous treatises, among them the metrical maxims called the 'Golden Verses of Pythagoras.' They taught that the Monad is the beginning of all things. From the Monad came the 'Indefinite Dyad,' and from the Dyad the other numbers, and geometrical quantities. The soul is divided into three parts (*νοῦς, θυμός, σπέρμα*), of which the first alone is immortal. The space between earth and heaven is filled by invisible spirits, who may be induced to foretell the future and give advice. The world is a living rational being, of which the animating principle is heat. As centres of heat the sun and stars are gods. For a time the

school or sect languished, at least in Rome, where, Seneca says, they could not find a professor to teach them (*Nat. Quest.* VII. xxxii. 2). But at Alexandria there was a strong revival. Neo-Pythagoreanism was consciously eclectic; it tried to fuse together the systems of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoa, consecrating the whole under the name of Pythagoras, whose doctrines, they maintained, had come down to them by oral tradition. They did not discard the number-mysticism of the older school, but gave it a deeper metaphysical meaning. The Monad became the ultimate ground of all good and of all the order of the universe. The Dyad, on the contrary, was the ground of all imperfection and disorder. The Monad was the sign of the Godhead, of spirit and form; the Dyad of 'matter.' They acknowledged a plurality of subordinate gods, and deified the heavenly bodies. They taught that God is both immanent and transcendent, thus attempting to reconcile Stoicism with Platonism. The rift between God and the world was partly closed by the idea of a World-Soul, which vaguely embraced Stoic, Aristotelian, and Platonic conceptions. The phenomenal world is unsubstantial and constantly changing. It derives all the reality which it possesses from the Divine Ideas. But here came in the fantastic lore of numbers. Arithmetical symbols were converted into creative types of objects, and certain numbers, especially 3, 4, and 10, had a special sanctity. In their theory of knowledge they followed Plato. There are four kinds of knowledge, with corresponding faculties: (1) *νόσ* (*νόσις*), spiritual perception, (2) *διάνοια*, discursive reason, which produces *ἐπιστήμη*, science, (3) *δόξα*, opinion, which draws inferences from sensuous perception, (4) *αἴσθησις*, sensuous perception. As regards the fate of the world, they taught that the universe is eternal, and the human soul imperishable. The soul is a microcosm, with affinities to every grade of existence. They believed in transmigration. The Neo-Pythagoreans were strict vegetarians, and celibates, at least as a counsel of perfection. The 'Pythagorean life' was a recognized and standardized discipline. The Life of Apollonius, the typical Neo-Pythagorean saint, represents him as an ascetic, a model of piety and devotion. He wore only linen clothes, abhorred bloody sacrifices, and kept holy silence for five years. He had miraculous powers; he cast out devils and raised the dead.

The syncretizing tendency of the age is strongly marked in Plutarch and Maximus of Tyre. The former accepts the notion of an evil World-Soul, developing the suggestion in Plato's *Timæus*. But he is no Manichæan; evil, for him, needs only supplementing and redistributing to make it good. More important than either of these, as a precursor of Neo-Platonism, is Numenius of Apamea, who so far anticipated Plotinus that Amelius had to vindicate the originality of his master. Numenius wished to go back to Plato and Pythagoras, but also to sweep into his net the wisdom of the East, including even Judaism. He gathered together the crowd of inferior gods to whom Plato had entrusted the creation of the world, into a single Demiurge, with attributes like those of the Christian-Alexandrian Logos. The Godhead above the Demiurge he calls in so many words a *roi faînéant* (*βασιλεὺς ἀργός*, Eus. *Præp. Evang.* XI. xviii. 4). The world is 'a third God'; so that Numenius gives us a Trinity of unequal Persons. The immediate teacher of Plotinus was Ammonius Saccas, who is said to have been at one time a Christian. Next to nothing is known of his doctrines, which were not committed to writing; but Plotinus, on first hearing him, exclaimed, 'This is the man I was looking for' (*τοῦτον ἐζητούην*), and remained his disciple and friend as long as he lived in Egypt.

2. Plotinus.—Plotinus was not by intention an eclectic. It was no part of his scheme to combine the systems of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. He considered himself a Platonist, and indeed a conservative Platonist. His reverence for antiquity, which was part of the spirit of the 3rd cent., when creative genius was at a low ebb, made him chary of finding errors in any of 'the ancient philosophers of blessed memory' (*οἱ ἀρχαῖοι καὶ μακάριοι φιλόσοφοι*, *Enn.* III. vii. 1), and he tried to represent their divergent views as no more than superficial differences. But to Plato alone he allows plenary inspiration. He will not admit that he ever deserts his master's teaching. Again and again we find such protestations as these:

'This doctrine is not new; it was professed from the most ancient times, though without being developed explicitly; we wish only to be interpreters of the ancient sages, and to show by the evidence of Plato himself that they had the same opinions as ourselves' (*ib.* v. i. 8).

He even maintains that his three hypostases, the One, spirit, and soul, are to be found, not merely in Plato, but in Parmenides, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles (*ib.*). Pythagoras, next to Plato, is treated with most reverence, though Plotinus does not really owe very much to this school, except through the Platonic tradition. Aristotle is treated with more freedom; he frankly criticizes the Aristotelian categories. In reality, however, he borrows a great deal from him—especially the fundamental conceptions of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, which are of vital importance in Neo-Platonism. The world of Ideas is really alive for Plotinus; each Idea is an *ἐνέργεια*. It is an original type of a definite individual: thus the Ideas have an independence which they have not in Plato. In psychology too there are important unacknowledged debts to Aristotle. It might even be maintained that Plotinus knew and understood Aristotle better than Plato, though he names him only four times. To his successors Plotinus seemed to have achieved in principle the unification of these two great philosophies, a task which was avowedly set before themselves by Porphyry, Iamblichus, and other Neo-Platonists down to and including Boëthius. To Stoicism the attitude of Plotinus is in the main hostile, since it is one of his main objects to combat materialism in all its forms. Yet he owes to the Stoics, in part, his dynamic pantheism—the doctrine that the living forces of the Deity permeate all nature; and the somewhat enigmatic part played in his system by *λόγοι* and *πνεῦμα* shows Stoical influence. He sums up his quarrel with Stoicism in *Enn.* IV. vii., where he says that it is a radical mistake to explain the higher by the lower, and to suppose that the merely potential can of itself develop activity.

The life of Plotinus extended from about 205 to 270, the exact dates being uncertain. He is said by Eunapius and Suidas to have been born at Lycopolis in Egypt. At the age of 27 he became a student of philosophy at Alexandria, and attached himself to Ammonius, whose lectures he attended for eleven years. At the end of this time he left Alexandria, and accompanied the emperor Gordian on his ill-starred expedition against Persia, his object being to gain a personal acquaintance with the philosophers of the East. Gordian was murdered during the campaign, and Plotinus with difficulty made his way back to Antioch. Soon after, he took up his abode in Rome, where he lived for the rest of his life. His mode of living is described by his disciple Porphyry as the ideal of the philosophic character. He had numerous pupils, of both sexes and all ages, to whom he

p. 187), his school room. It was not write. His confer-

ences were attended by several prominent men, such as the senator Rogatianus, whom he persuaded to renounce his worldly possessions and retire from public life. The emperor Gallienus and his wife Salonina had a great admiration for him, and even promised to help in a wild scheme to found a city on a deserted and probably malarious site in Campania, to be constituted on the model of Plato's Republic. Fortunately the idea was abandoned. In spite of this aberration, Plotinus was a good man of business, and was in request as a guardian and trustee of young orphans of the upper class. He also came forward as a peace-maker, and had no enemies, except among rival philosophers,

one of whom, Porphyry says, tried in vain to bewitch him by sorcery. He lived an ascetic life, eating no meat and sleeping but little. He died at the age of 66, after a long illness, at a country house near Minturnæ. His friend, the physician Eustochius, heard his last words: 'I was waiting for you, before the divine principle in me departs to unite itself with the divine in the universe.' In such a busy life, we might suppose that prayer and meditation could find but little place. But it was not so. Plotinus would often spend whole nights in 'the prayer of quiet.' In the words of Proclus, the greatest of his successors, his soul, which he had always kept pure, took flight towards the divine principle, prayed to it, and adored it. He had always endeavoured to raise himself above the stormy waves of this brutal life, which is nourished on flesh and blood. It is thus that this divine man, whose thoughts were always turned to the supreme God and the unseen world, merited the privilege of beholding several times the immediate presence of the Godhead, who has neither sensible nor intelligible form, since He is exalted above intelligence and being itself. (This is the beatific vision of all the mystics. Plotinus enjoyed it four times during the six years when Porphyry lived with him.)

The *Enneads*, edited by Porphyry, are mere lecture-notes, which Porphyry found as an unsorted heap of almost illegible MS; for Plotinus had weak eyes, and never cared to work up his lectures in literary form. Porphyry did his best to arrange his material according to subject, disregarding the date of composition. He was less wise in dividing it into six books, each containing nine chapters—a fanciful arrangement dictated only by respect for the 'sacred numbers.' Even the younger members of the Neo-Platonic school, who almost worshipped the memory of Plotinus, groaned over the obscurity of his style and the chaotic condition of his writings. 'Enigmatic,' 'harsh and unintelligible,' 'scattered and disorderly,' such are the criticisms of men who regarded his wisdom as almost superhuman. The modern reader will not differ from them. There is no harder Greek than the *Enneads*, because it is bad Greek. The author, writing notes to refresh his memory in lecturing, has no mercy on his readers. There are passages of noble sublimity, of tender charm, of lofty devotion, in the *Enneads*, which delight as well as instruct the reader; but on the whole it is probable that no great teacher has placed so many obstacles in the way of his own popularity as this devotee of the ever-charming Plato. Modern historians of philosophy have generally shirked the trouble of reading him—with the result that more blunders are current about this philosophy than about any other system, ancient or modern. Critics have merely copied each other's remarks about him.

Plotinus sets himself to overthrow three enemies of the true philosophy—materialism, scepticism, and dualism. These are the three errors which, in his opinion, it is most necessary to confute. Those critics who have found in Plotinus himself a philosophy of dualism have misunderstood him from top to bottom. Popularized Platonism often takes a dualistic form; but neither in Plato nor in Plotinus is there any justification for the notion that there are two world-principles and two worlds. In the case of Plato, this error has been exposed satisfactorily by Bernard Bosanquet (*The Principle of Individuality and Value*, London, 1912, p. 8).

Plotinus, then, in opposition to these heresies, maintains that reality is spiritual, knowable, and single. There are two fundamental trinities in his system. One is the trinity of divine principles, consisting of the Absolute or Godhead, which he calls indifferently the One and the Good, spirit (this is by far the best English word for *νοῦς*, which is commonly rendered 'intellect' or 'intelligence'), and soul. The other is the tripartite division of man into spirit, soul, and body. This triadic schematism was almost obligatory on a Greek philosopher. Three is the perfect number; its continual recurrence in all mental processes, particularly in the syllogism, led to an almost superstitious reverence for this symbol. But there is nothing forced or arbitrary in either of these triplets in Plotinus;

the dominance of the triad is much more marked in Proclus, as it is in Hegel. Besides (and this is a most important point), Plotinus wishes to draw no hard boundary-lines across the field of experience, whether physical, psychical, or spiritual. His map of the world is covered with contour-lines, which, as in the designs of modern cartographers, are understood to indicate not chasms but gradual slopes. He draws a ladder and gives names to the rungs; but the reality, he wishes us to understand, is much more like an inclined plane. This is eminently true of the three divine principles; it is not less the key to his anthropology.

In their objective aspects body, soul, and spirit are respectively the world as perceived by the senses (*κόσμος αἰσθητός*), the world interpreted by the soul as a spatial and temporal order, and the spiritual world (*κόσμος νοητός*). The organs which perceive the world under these three aspects are the bodily senses, the discursive reason (*διδόνα*), and spiritual perception or intuitive knowledge (*νόησις*). It is only when we exercise the last—the highest faculty of our nature, a power 'which all possess but few use'—that we are ourselves completely real and in contact with reality. This reality is neither an independently existing external universe nor a subjective construction thrown off by the mind. It is constituted by the unity in duality of the spiritual faculty and the spiritual world which it beholds in exercising its self-consciousness. Spirit and the spiritual world imply and involve each other; neither has any existence apart from its correlative. If the spiritual world may be called the self-externalization of spirit, spirit may with equal propriety be called the self-consciousness of the spiritual world. Plotinus is not an idealist in the modern, post-Kantian sense, though he argued against Longinus that 'the spiritual world is not outside spirit' (*οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ τὰ νοητά*). In saying this, he did not mean that all reality is mental, or that apparently external objects are created by the mind which perceives them; he only meant to deny one interpretation of Plato's Ideas—that which made them independently existing entities, which the mind contemplates as something other than itself. The *νοητά* are not outside *νοῦς*; but they are certainly not created by *νοῦς*.

Reality was conceived by Stoics and Epicureans alike as body itself, or as a quality or relation of body. As against these schools, Plotinus sees the issue more clearly than any previous thinker. Neither Cicero nor Plutarch ever calls the Stoics and Epicureans materialists. It is to Plotinus more than to any other philosopher that we owe the first clear doctrine of spiritual existence. His refutation of materialism is still valuable. The Stoics, he says, ascribe to matter (*ὄλη*) properties which cannot belong to it. Matter is really a mere abstraction; it is the bare receptacle of forms, the subject of energy, viewed by abstraction as subsisting apart from the energy which alone gives it meaning and existence. Plotinus's 'matter' is not material; it is not to be confounded with the ponderable stuff to which science gives the same name, and which it is now engaged in subdividing till it seems on the point of being sublimated into the subject of electrical energy—a strange approximation to Plotinus's own view. Matter is that intangible, impalpable all-but-nothing which remains when we subtract from an object of thought all that makes it a possible object of thought. This is quite clearly the Neo-Platonic doctrine about matter. It is immaterial; it is a mere abstraction; we arrive at it only by thinking away all that makes consciousness of an object possible. And yet it is commonly said, and not without some excuse, that 'matter' is in this philosophy the principle of evil. The difficulty is

a real one. It raises the question of the interrelation of the two hierarchies—that of existence and that of value. Plotinus has disposed of the claim of matter to possess substantial reality (*ὁλβία*). But the word 'evil' at once introduces another scale—that of value. The existential problem has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with values. An 'appearance,' as opposed to 'reality' (*ὁλβία*), is a partial presentation of reality which needs to be enlarged or harmonized in order to make it a true presentation. It is false if it claims to be a presentation of fact in all its relations, whereas in truth it ignores some of those relations. It is an error to mistake appearance for reality; e.g., it is an error to regard the world of sense as an objective, self-existing cosmos. This error may be the cause of moral fault; but there is nothing evil about the appearance itself. A shadow has its place in the order of the world, as well as the substance which casts it. It is, however, impossible to confine ourselves to the purely existential aspect of things. It is impossible for the biologist, e.g., to avoid using such words as 'degeneration,' 'survival of the fittest,' which imply an ethical or qualitative measurement. Only in pure mathematics are value-judgments excluded. Qualitative estimates are based on fact not less than quantitative, but they give us a different standard and different results, so that we are threatened with an intractable dualism. For Plotinus it is an article of faith that the hierarchies of existence and of value must ultimately be found to correspond, so that the class which has the lowest degree of reality in the existential scale must have the lowest degree of value in the ethical scale. But there is one important difference between the two series. In the scale of existence there are no minus signs; the all-but-non-existent occupies the lowest rung of the ladder. But in the scale of values we have to register temperatures below zero. There are many facts, and some persons, of whom we may say that it would have been better if they had not come into existence. The moral standard, therefore, is essentially dualistic, the existential monistic. We may either force the two schemes into harmony by investing 'matter' or 'flesh' with evil characteristics, in which case we have accepted metaphysical dualism, or retain monistic views by holding that the opposition between good and evil is only relative. The minus signs disappear, from the standpoint of the Absolute. The latter is the solution towards which Plotinus inclines; but he is too conscious of the positive obstacles which impede morality to be satisfied with a theory which makes evil a mere defect in the penetration of matter by spirit or soul. His utterances on the problem of evil cannot all be reconciled. But his deepest view is that matter is the absence of order which when isolated by abstract thought becomes the foe of order. In arguing against Stoical materialism, he sometimes uses 'matter' in the Stoical sense instead of his own, meeting his opponents on their own ground. But Zeller is quite wrong in saying that Plotinus makes matter the evil principle. Matter is 'potentially all things'; 'it is what it may become'; it is the necessary condition of all good. There is such a thing as 'divine matter' (*θελα ὄλη*), which is enriched and glorified by the spirit poured into it, so that it has a place in the eternal world. Here below, matter remains 'a decked out corpse,' because form and substratum are to some extent held apart; 'yonder,' matter too is delivered from the bondage of corruption. In heaven form and matter are 'one illuminated reality' (*μία ὁλβία πεφωτισμένη*). Evil, for Plotinus, is not a negation posited in the Absolute; the necessary tension belongs only to the world of becoming. Friction

and conflict belong to the world of soul, which is also the world of will; they are a condition of the actualizing of reality on that plane, but not in the realms above. When he is asked why strife and friction exist, even in this imperfect world, he can only say, 'It had to be.' Necessity is to Plotinus a part of the ontological argument. It belongs to the inner nature of goodness that it should create in the fullest and freest manner; and this creation is not a reduplication of a perfection which cannot be measured quantitatively, but the production of a hierarchy exemplifying every possible grade of existence and value. These hierarchies are also immediate data of experience, so that they cannot be explained from outside. They are the foundations on which philosophy has to build.

But now arises an epistemological difficulty. Reality is constituted by the trinity in unity of the perceiving spirit (*vous*), the spiritual world (*τὰ νοητά*), and the spiritual perception (*νόησις*) which unites subject and object in one. Reality is thought, thing, and the relation of identity between them. This correspondence and mutual dependence of subject and object holds good all down the scale. Like alone sees like. How then do we come by the 'false opinions' which invest matter with a spurious substantiality? There is, Plotinus says, an element of indeterminateness in the soul, which apprehends the indeterminate, matter. This half-blinded spiritual faculty, this clouded perception, this shapeless object, all 'desire' to rise together into a clearer light where they will be transformed. Our average life is lived on the middle level of the soul's activities, the organ of which is discursive reason (*διάνοια*). But, when the soul gives itself humbly as 'matter' for spirit, it is raised up to the higher sphere of life 'yonder,' in the spiritual world. The world of appearance may be described either as the real world seen through a glass darkly or as an actual but imperfect copy of a perfect original. The real-idealism of Plotinus holds these two views together. 'A feeble contemplation makes a feeble object of contemplation.' The world of appearance shows us a diversity which exists by the side of unity, instead of the concrete unity of spirit; mutual exclusion as the mark of differentiation, instead of the mutual inclusion or compenetration which exists in the spiritual world; strife and opposition in the place of harmony; time in the place of eternity; perpetual flux and change in the place of the unchanging activity of spirit. 'Sensible reality' (*ἡ ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἀνύπνοος οὐσία*) is but a shadow of true reality. The sensible world is a reflexion of the eternal world in the mirror of matter.

The sensible world is the creation of the universal soul, through the medium of nature, which is its moving power. Nature is the active faculty of the universal soul, its outer life, the expansion and expression of its being, that without which it would be shut up in itself. Nature is sleeping spirit. All its activity comes from soul; it casts upon matter a reflexion of the forms which it has received from above. On nature's methods Plotinus says:

'If anyone were to demand of nature why it produces, it would answer, if it were willing to listen and speak: You should not ask questions, but understand, keeping silence as I keep silence; for I am not in the habit of talking. What ought you to understand? In the first place, that which is produced is the work of my silent contemplation, a contemplation produced by my nature; for being born myself of contemplation I am naturally contemplative, and that which contemplates in me
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but
the forms of bodies. I preserve the disposition of my mother the universal soul, and of the principles which produced me (the creative Logos). They too were born of contemplation, and I was born in the same way' (*Enn.* iii. viii.).

By contemplation Plotinus means attention directed to that which is above ourselves in the scale of reality and value. All creative activity is the (in a sense) unconscious result of this steady devotion to what is higher than ourselves. We always create after some pattern in a higher sphere; and the whole world, thus produced, is an image of the mind and thought of God. Foot-prints (*ἑρμῆ*) of the universal soul, and of spirit itself, are to be found everywhere.

Extension (*τόπος*) is the necessary form which results from the inability of matter to receive all forms without dividing and separating them. The purely indeterminate is spaceless; extension is given to it by the soul. Leibniz was only partially right in calling space the form of co-existence; for co-existence can be conceived, though not pictured, non-spatially. It is also the form of the whole and part relation; of the inclusion of one thing by another. Again, it is the form under which we recognize near and far, and so infer the reality of the unseen and unexperienced. The external world can teach us much about ultimate truth. Plotinus mentions especially order and limit (*τάξις* and *πέρας*) as the chief lessons of natural science. But he insists strongly on the reflexions of the divine beauty which we find in the visible world. His quarrel with the half-Christian Gnostics—the most vigorous polemic in the *Enneads*—is mainly on the ground that they despise this beautiful world and regard it as evil. 'All things that are in heaven (*ἐκεῖ*) are also on earth,' he says in a passage which should have saved some of his critics from many blunders (*Enn.* v. ix. 13).

Plotinus is well aware that time is one of the hardest problems in metaphysics. He does not claim to throw any new light upon it. Time, the moving image of eternity, arose through the desire of the soul of the world to exert its powers. Time is the form which the soul creates for itself when it desires to reproduce the eternal ideas as living activities. In the vulgar sense, time is as everlasting as eternity; it never began and will never end. It is 'the activity of an eternal soul not turned towards itself nor within itself, but exercised in generation and creation' (*Enn.* iii. vii. 12). This view of time implies teleology. Time is essentially the interval between the inception and completion of creative purpose. Causation is a teleological category, and belongs exclusively to psychical life, or to physical life as determined once for all by a first cause. If the world were merely a mechanism, there would be no causation, but only invariable sequence. Causation, in fact, is what Bergson calls creative evolution, and it requires *la durée*, as he says. But Bergson does not succeed in proving that psychical evolution, in 'real time,' is irreversible or unpredictable. He only makes it discontinuous, whether we read it forwards or backwards. It is unpredictable, not absolutely, but only by the laws which govern inorganic matter. Creative evolution may be the orderly development of psychical or spiritual laws. If so, his argument for contingency falls to the ground. For Plotinus, every distinct idea 'yonder' becomes a finite purpose 'here.' Every attribute of God's essence becomes an activity of His existence. The time-process is not the necessary form of the self-evolution of God; it is the product of His free but necessary creative activity. Nor is there any radical difference between the laws which regulate organic and inorganic objects. The same spirit which slumbers in the stone and dreams in the flower awakes in the human soul. Time then is not merely the measure of the impermanence of the imperfect. It is, in his careful definition, the measure of definite finite activity directed to some end from which it is quite distinct

(*Enn.* vi. i. 16). What is real in time is the potentiality of qualitative change. 'Movement of itself does not need time.' From the point of view of practical religion it makes a great difference whether we regard the phenomenal world as a polarization of changeless reality, or whether we hold that its being is radically teleological. The former view, when developed logically and held exclusively, leads to the vacuous existence of the Indian contemplative, the latter to the vulgar conception of eternal life as survival in time, and to the brutal activity of the western man, with whom, as Bosanquet says (*The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, London, 1913, p. 295), reliance on the future has become a disease. Plotinus tries to combine the truth in both; but he shows no interest in the larger life of nations, which may justly be regarded as representing unitary thoughts and purposes in the mind of God. His view of the fate of the world is nevertheless vastly superior to those dreams of perpetual progress which, in spite of their scientific absurdity, are so popular among ourselves. The world-order, according to Plotinus, evolves regularly till the end of an astronomical cycle, when the whole process is repeated. Thus the history of the universe consists of a number of vast but not infinite schemes, each of which has a beginning and an end. An infinite purpose is, as he sees, a contradiction in terms. We must find consolation for the inevitable disappearance of our species by remembering that in the eternal world all values are preserved intact.

The relation of the world 'here below' to the world 'yonder' has been completely misunderstood by most critics of Neo-Platonism. There is only one real world, the *κόσμος νοητός*. The kingdom of *οὐρα* includes soul, but nothing lower than soul. The half-real phenomenal world is a necessary product of soul, and without it the divine principles would not be what they are; for

'It is necessary that each principle should give of itself to another. The Good would not be the Good, nor Spirit Spirit, nor Soul Soul, if nothing lived dependent on the first life' (*Enn.* ii. ix. 3).

Thus every grade of being is bound in 'a golden chain about the feet of God.' All divine creativeness is what philosophers call transeunt or transitive activity. The higher does not need the lower; God does not need the world. The necessity of the world lies in the inner nature of all which derives its being from the One who is also the Good. Proclus (who, of course, must be used with caution as an interpreter of Plotinus) says that God created the world by His goodness, His will, and His providence, a trinity in unity (*ἐνοειδὴς τριάς*) of motives. The soul descends into the phenomenal world because it wishes 'to imitate the providence of the gods.' It is, in a word, the character, not the essence, of God that calls the world into being. There are some thinkers who deny the possibility of transitive activity. But this is to destroy, not merely Platonism, but all theism. If God is transcendent at all, part of His activity must be transitive. The analogy of mechanical laws need not frighten us. As soon as we reach the domain of *οὐρα*, we deal with values which are increased by sharing, with forces which 'operate unspent.'

The world of sense, then, is created by soul after the pattern of spirit. It is a construction of superficial experience, a rough-and-ready synthesis based on imperfect data. It is not identical with the world as known to natural science. The latter is an attempt to interpret the universe by the exclusive use of quantitative categories. The world of common experience is quite different from this. It is a blurred and confused picture of the spiritual world, distorted by defects in the organ of perception, and split up by the very conditions of soul-

life. For all that, it is a great and glorious thing, a vision of the eternal verities. Plotinus replies indignantly to the Gnostic theory that the world was created through a lapse of the universal soul:

'We affirm that the soul created the world not because it looked downward but because it looked upward. In order to look downward, the soul must have forgotten the spiritual world. But if it had forgotten it, how could it create the world? Where could it find its pattern, except from what it saw yonder? But if it thought of the spiritual world while creating, it did not look downward at all. . . . We must not allow that the world is ill made because it contains much that is disagreeable. It is only an image of the spiritual world, but could there be a more beautiful image? . . . Do you think that the world as we see it is the world as it is? When we love a person, we love an image that belongs to him; if we love the father, we love the children for his sake. But every soul is a child of our Father in heaven. How can this world, with the divine powers which it contains, be separated from the spiritual world? Those who despise what is so nearly akin to the spiritual world, prove that they know nothing about the latter except in name' (*Enn.* ii. ix. 4).

The flaws which we justly observe in the world as we know it are themselves evidence that the soul has her true home in a higher sphere, above the discordance, change, and strife which are the conditions of spatial and temporal existence. What is most real in this world is that which most reflects the mind and purpose of that which called it into being. The only way to understand anything is to view it in relation to its source and goal in the sphere next above it. The 'nature' of anything is to be sought in its completed development.

The Third Person in the Neo-Platonic Trinity is not the aggregate of individual souls, but 'the soul of the all.' To this Plotinus assigns attributes which hardly distinguish it from spirit. It is exalted above space and time. It remains itself at rest while it illuminates the world and gives it life. It is not in the world; rather the world is in it, embraced by it and moulded by it. The individual soul can understand itself only by contemplating the universal soul. The passage in which Plotinus urges us to this holy quest is one of the finest in the *Enneads*, and it is familiar to thousands who have never read Plotinus, because it is closely imitated by Augustine in the most famous chapter of the *Confessions*:

'The soul ought first to examine its own nature to know whether it has the faculty of contemplating spiritual things, and whether it has indeed an eye wherewith to see them, and if it ought to embark on the quest. If the spiritual world is foreign to it, what is the use of trying? But if there is a kinship between us and it, we both can and ought to find it. First then let us consider that it is the universal soul which created all things, breathing into them the breath of life. . . . The soul sets them in their order and directs their motions, keeping itself apart from the things which it orders and moves and causes to live. The soul must be more honourable than they, since they are born and perish, as the soul grants them life and leaves them; but the soul lives for ever and never ceases to be itself. This great soul must be contemplated by another soul, itself no small thing, but one that makes itself worthy to contemplate the great soul by ridding itself of deceit and of all that bequiles common souls, through quiet recollection. For it let all be quiet; not only the body that encompasses it, and the tumult of the senses, but let all its environment be at peace. Let the earth be quiet, and the sea and air, and the heaven itself calm. Let it observe how the soul flows in from all sides into the resting world, pours into it, penetrates and illumines it. Even as the bright beams of the sun enlighten a dark cloud and give it a golden border, so the soul when it enters into the body of the heaven gives it life and immortality and awakens it from sleep. . . . The soul gives itself to every point in this vast body. . . . But itself is not divided; it does not split itself up in order to give life to each individual. All things live by the soul in its entirety; it is all present everywhere, like the Father which begat it, both in its unity and in its universality. The heaven, vast and various as it is, is one by the power of the soul, and by it is this universe of ours divine' (v. i. 2).

Individuality is always a difficult problem in systems like that of Plotinus. Individual souls are not parts of the universal soul. They are rather *λόγοι* (active principles) of spirits, corresponding to distinct Ideas 'yonder.' But in the spiritual world there is distinction without separation. The separateness and mutual externality of

souls in this world is a *πρόημα* of bodies, not of soul itself. In this world we find separation without disparity, and resemblance without unity; 'yonder' it is not so. And even here the soul never loses its correspondence with the universal soul, through which 'all souls are one.' Sympathy is as much a fact of experience as individuality, and bears witness to a real unity behind apparent separateness. Plotinus is anxious to preserve human individuality. 'Each individual must be himself' (*δεῖ ἕκαστον ἑκαστον εἶναι*); and each individual soul is 'an original cause' (*πρωτοπυρρὸς αἰτία*, *Enn.* III. i. 8). The soul 'is present' with the body, but not within it; it remains pure of all admixture, and is always itself.

Psychology of Plotinus.—Sensation (*αἰσθησις*) is not a passive impression made by external objects on the perceiving faculty. It is an activity—an *ἐνέργεια*, not a *πάθος*. The difference between sensations and spiritual perceptions (*νοήσεις*) is one of degree; sensations are dim *νοήσεις*. The mind is never dormant in perception; what we call perception is largely the work of imagination. The fact that we can perceive external objects at all is a proof of the 'faint sympathy' (*ἀμυδρὰ συμπάθεια*, IV. iv. 40) which pervades all nature, for we can be aware only of what is akin to ourselves.

Pleasure and pain are not pure sensations, since they are states of consciousness; and, on the other hand, they are not affections (*πάθη*) of the soul. They belong to 'the compound' (*τὸ σύνθετον*), i.e. to soul present to body, or body present to soul.

Memory and imagination, which in Plotinus are closely connected, belong to the discursive reason (*διάνοια*). Recollection (*ἀνάμνησις*) demands a higher kind of volitional and rational activity than memory (*μνήμη*), and is confined to man, while the lower animals possess some memory. Plotinus transforms Plato's *ἀνάμνησις* into a doctrine of innate ideas potentially present. The higher soul is by choice forgetful of all that is foreign to its true nature, but it *recovers* ideas which belong to an earlier and nobler state of existence, which have been forgotten here below. Memory is of images only; spiritual perception is first transformed into an image reflected in the mirror of the imagination, and memory is the faculty which grasps this image. We do not 'remember' *νοητά*, because we contemplate them as permanent activities of our higher self. There is no memory 'yonder'; for all spiritual perception is timeless (*ἄχροτος πάντα νόησις*, *Enn.* IV. iv. 1). Imagination (*φαντασία*), opinion (*δόξα*), and discursive thought all float between the spiritual and sensible worlds. Perception seizes the forms (*εἶδη*) of sensible objects. At the summit of this faculty, when the *αἰσθημα* becomes a purely mental representation, the faculty takes the name of *τὸ φανταστικόν* in presence of the object, of memory in its absence. Imagination is mid-way between sensation and reason; its higher state is the same as opinion. Porphyry makes the three faculties of knowledge to be sensation, imagination, and *νοῦς*, and says that neither sensation nor *νόησις* is possible without imagination. *Φαντασία*, it will be seen, is nearer *Vorstellung* than 'imagination,' and *φάντασμα* is what modern philosophy incorrectly (to a Platonist) calls an 'idea.' Some modern writers, notably Wordsworth, have given imagination a far more exalted place. The 'imagination,' which 'is reason in her most exalted mood,' is Plotinus's *νοεῖα φαντασία*. Even 'intellectual love,' which ushers spirit into the presence of the One, is for Wordsworth inseparable from imagination—a profound truth which is the key to the understanding of religious symbols generally. In the discursive

reason (*διάνοια*) the proper function of the soul is achieved. Self-consciousness belongs to it; the yet higher activities of the soul are not self-conscious. Plotinus does not regard self-consciousness as the highest of human powers. He has observed that we do things best when we are not thinking of ourselves as doing them; our organs remind us of their existence only when they are out of order. What we call consciousness of self is in truth consciousness of a contrasted not-self. There is a kind of unconsciousness in the highest experiences of the soul; our senses 'protest that they have seen nothing' (*Enn.* v. viii. 11); but we can no more doubt them than we can doubt our own existence. But discursive thought is only the polarized copy of *νόησις*. The soul, in knowing itself, 'knows that there is something better than itself'; it knows itself as another's (v. iii. 4 and 6). Plotinus purposely makes *νοῦς* and *διάνοια* overlap; discursive reason is never separated from *νόησις* at the one end, and creativeness (*ποίησις*) at the other. The realm of soul is 'the world of life' (*κόσμος ζωτικός*, identified with *ψυχὴ* by Proclus). Soul has *οὐσία*, but the soul-world is fully real only when it is taken as a whole, not as split up among individual *foci* of consciousness, and in time. There are three planes on which a man may live, and his rank in the scale of existence depends on the choice which he makes: he may live a purely external life, obeying his natural instincts, or he may live in obedience to his discursive reason, the life of an intelligent but unspiritual man, or he may, in rare instances, attain to 'the life of gods and godlike men,' the life of the spirit. The soul, as a microcosm, has affinities with every rung of the ladder which reaches from earth to heaven. These stages shade off into each other; Neo-Platonism knows of no rigid barrier-lines.

Before our birth, says Plotinus, we existed as pure souls and spirits, attached to the universal soul. Why do souls ever leave this happy state, and 'come down' to earth? This is a real crux of Neo-Platonism, and Plotinus, who always seems to be thinking aloud, does not conceal his perplexity about it. He throws out several suggestions which do not pretend to be consistent with each other. He has consulted Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Pythagoras without finding any clear answer to the question. Even the divine Plato does not always use the same language. How shall we reconcile his well-known words about the body being the cave, the prison, the tomb of the soul, and about the moulting of the soul's wings through contact with matter, with the doctrine of the *Timæus*, that the Creator sent soul into the world to make it the abode of spirit or intelligence, and with a view to its perfection? If we follow the *Timæus*, the soul is not to blame; 'we may care for that which is below us without ceasing to abide in the highest and best.' Plotinus shows us that he would like to follow the *Timæus*, not the *Phædrus*. But he characteristically tries to prove that both may be true. It is permissible to say that God sent the souls down to earth, for 'the operation of the highest principle, even though there are many stages between, can be traced down to the end of the process.' And yet the soul commits two faults, one in coming down, and the other in entering into bodies. It does so by choice, and because it desires to bring order into what is below. If it returns quickly, it has suffered no hurt; indeed it has put forth powers which would otherwise have remained latent. The soul *must* communicate its gifts, for all grades of reality and value must exist, down to the lowest degree possible. The soul learns its own good by the experience of contraries, though the strongest souls may understand evil without experience of it (IV. viii.). The

soul descends into the body prepared for it, as if summoned by a herald (IV. iii. 13). The soul has a desire to go forth and create according to what she has seen in the spiritual world (IV. vii.). The ascents and descents of the soul are necessary parts of the universal harmony (IV. iii. 12). Yet there is a danger lest the soul be 'deceived and bewitched' by the charm of sensuous being (IV. vi. 3). It beholds itself in the mirror of matter, and like Narcissus falls in love with the image and plunges in after it (IV. iii. 12). These last passages represent the real view of Plotinus. The local metaphors of ascent and descent must not mislead us. The soul does not sin by desiring to create after the eternal pattern in a lower sphere; it is entirely right and necessary that our world should exist; but, as soon as we forget that we are strangers and pilgrims here, sin begins. There is a want of firmness and consistency in the teaching of Plotinus on this subject; he is hampered partly by reverence for Plato, and partly by the very natural tendency to *Weltflucht* in a dismal and hopeless age; but his deeper thought is unquestionably that which most decisively excludes the Gnostic errors which he combats so strenuously.

Plotinus also asks, Can the soul itself sin? Does it 'descend entire,' or is there a divine nucleus at the heart of humanity, which can take no stain? Plotinus holds that there is, and he expresses this in spatial imagery by saying that 'part of the soul remains above.' This is his own theory, though he tries to father it on Plato. And it is most interesting to find that the later Neo-Platonists, in spite of their almost superstitious reverence for the 'most divine Plotinus,' frankly desert him here. Iamblichus, Proclus, Simplicius, and Priscian all maintain that the soul comes down entire; only Theodorus and Damascius follow Plotinus. Proclus, who is quite emancipated from the Platonic doctrine of *πτεροφόρησις*, makes the creation of the world an essential movement of spirit. The soul descends 'because it desires to imitate the providence of the gods. What nobler enterprise could it set itself than to hand on to other created beings the gifts which God has given to itself?' (Proclus, in *Timæum*, 338). It is plain that later Neo-Platonism is more willing to receive a true incarnational doctrine than Plotinus was. The soul may still be at home in heaven while it energizes with all its powers on earth. The more deeply it penetrates into the darkest recesses of nature, the more fully is it fulfilling its divine task. Heroic action and real struggle are proper to the divine life.

The soul, which exists in its own right, neither comes into being nor perishes. When separated from the body it no longer exercises its lower faculties, which are not extinguished by death, but remain *δυνάμει* only (*Enn.* III. iv. 6). Such faculties as opinion, reasoning, and memory are superfluous under the conditions of eternal life. Resurrection, he says pointedly, is an awakening from the body, not with the body (III. vi. 6). Discarnate souls help the universal soul to govern the world; their separate individuality is not lost, but latent (*οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνεργεῖα οὐδ' αὖ ἀπόλωλεν*, VI. iv. 16). And yet beatified spirits enjoy a happy communion with each other. Unrighteous souls are sent into other bodies, even the bodies of ignoble beasts, as a punishment. Chastisements are proportioned to offences by divine law (IV. iii. 24). A man's guardian angel (*δαίμων*) may also inflict chastisement on the disembodied soul (III. iv. 6). There is a higher and a lower soul. The higher soul cannot be lost, but we may, so to speak, lose it by identifying ourselves with lower interests. The soul of the bad man may be lost, but not the soul

which would have been his if he had not been a bad man. We are what we love and care about.

We now come to what for Neo-Platonism is the centre of the whole system—the spiritual world. It is here that we are to find the fully real and the completely true. This reality is neither thought nor thing, but the unity in duality of spirit (*νοῦς*) and the spiritual world (*νοητόν*). Plotinus is no idealist in the modern sense. 'Spirit, the whole of reality, and truth, are one nature' (III. ix. 3). 'Being, by being perceived, gives to Spirit perception and existence' (*τὸ δὲ ὅν τῷ νοεῖσθαι τῷ νῦν διδόν τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ εἶναι*, V. i. 4). 'Spirit in beholding reality beheld itself, and in beholding entered into its proper activity, and this activity is itself' (V. iii. 5). Nor does reality consist in a relation: 'reality is that which is seen, not the act of seeing' (VI. ii. 8). *Νόησις* is the relation between *νοῦς* and *νοητόν*, but the two are identical, though not absolutely fused. 'Where Spirit energizes in itself, the objects of its activity are other spirits; but where it energizes outside itself, the soul' (VI. ii. 21). 'The *νοητόν* are many in one and one in many and all together' (VI. v. 5). Spirit 'wanders among realities' (*ἐν οὐσίαις πλανᾷται*) on 'the field of truth,' remaining always itself. Though it does not change, it is constantly active.

Plotinus has much to say about the categories of the spiritual world; but he is again hampered by Plato, who gives one set of categories in the *Philæbus* and another in the *Sophist*. In the spiritual world there are certain antinomies which cannot be reconciled in our ordinary experience, but which in a higher sphere are fully harmonized. These are—thought and its object; identity and difference; change and permanence. The discussion of these categories, which occupies a great deal of space in the *Enneads* (for he takes the opportunity of criticizing Aristotle at great length), has been very differently estimated by modern critics. To the present writer it seems disappointing. The subject-object relation is not on the same footing as change and permanence. The real attributes of the spiritual world are truth, beauty, and goodness, as Plotinus is well aware. In the spiritual world these are both fully realized and fully operative. He insists repeatedly that it is a *life* which he is describing, a state of intense activity which, as being unimpeded, may also be called rest. Some of the finest passages in the *Enneads* (e.g., V. i. 3, V. iii. 3, V. viii. 4, VI. vii. 31) describe with enthusiasm the glory of life in the eternal world.

The individual spirit is the same being as the individual soul, only transformed into the divine image and liberated from all baser elements. There is 'something unique' in every spirit; but it is no longer any bar to the most complete communion with all that is good, true, and beautiful in others. Spirits pass their existence in 'living contemplation' (*θεωρία ζῶσα*, III. viii. 8). In this state 'soul is the matter of Spirit' (III. ix. 3), which means that the self-transcendence of the soul is achieved by making itself the passive instrument of spirit. In knowing God, the spirit knows also itself; and the soul can have direct access to God—'there is nothing between.'

The whole philosophy of Plotinus is an ontology of moral, intellectual, and æsthetic values. The highest form in which reality can be known by spirits, who are themselves the roof and crown of things, is the general ideas of truth, beauty, and goodness, manifesting themselves in the myriad products of creative activity. These attributes of reality, which, so far as we know, constitute its entire substance, are spiritual; i.e. they belong to a sphere of unified existence which is neither subjective nor objective but constituted by the indis-

soluble unity in duality of subject and object. These three attributes are ultimates, in our experience. They cannot be fused, or even wholly harmonized. There is a kind of noetic parallelism between them.

We have now reached in our survey the last stage of the soul's upward journey, the absolute Godhead above existence, whom Plotinus calls the One or the Good. The spiritual world is the Neo-Platonic heaven, and the undivided spirit who is completely expressed in that world is the normal object of religious worship. But philosophy must distinguish between God and the Godhead. The God whom we worship is the revelation rather than the revealer, just as the personality that we know is the 'Me' rather than the 'I' who knows the Me. The source and goal of revelation cannot be revealed; the source and goal of knowledge cannot be known. The goal of the intellect is the One; the goal of the will is the Good; the goal of love and admiration is the Beautiful. Plotinus follows all three lines of ascent. The Absolute *must be*—this is the conclusion of the dialectic; it *ought to be*—this is the conclusion of ethics; it *is*—this is the discovery of the 'Spirit in love' (νοῦς ἐρῶν). The dialectical proof is that the idea of plurality implies that of unity, that of relativity an Absolute. The moral aspiration for the Good is assumed throughout the *Enneads*; it is regarded as too fundamental to need argument. Of the Beautiful he says that he who has not yet seen God desires Him as the Good; he who has seen Him adores Him as the Beautiful (I. vi. 7). It is true that he does not add τὸ καλόν as a third name of the Absolute. But he does not really subordinate Beauty to Truth and Goodness. Ultimately, they are one and the same. Since the One has no form, it is better, Plotinus says, to call Him Beauty than the Beautiful; he is 'the source and principle of all beauty, the power that is the flower of all the beautiful, the creator of beauty' (VI. vii. 8).

The Absolute is called by Plotinus the One. The Monad in Pythagorean arithmetic was not itself a number, but the source in which the whole nature of all numbers was gathered up and implicit. There is a sense in which unity and plurality are correlatives, so that we cannot have one without the other. In this sense the Absolute One is a contradiction. But for Plotinus the One is the transcendence of separability rather than of plurality. The One is 'beyond existence.' For Plato the Good had been within the circle of the Ideas; for Plotinus it is above them. He uses in speaking of the One the negative language familiar to all students of mysticism. The One is beyond existence, beyond spirit and life; he is in truth ineffable (ἄρρητον); whatever we deny of him we deny rightly; or rather we may speak of him if we add, 'yet not this but something higher.' Thus the Absolute does not think, and is not conscious; but he knows himself by a direct self-intuition (ἀπλῆ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτόν) and abides in a state of wakefulness (ἐγρήγορος) beyond being (V. iii. 13). In the Absolute knower and known coalesce so perfectly that no relation exists between them. The Absolute's knowledge of Himself is an ἀληθινὴ νόησις, though different from that of νοῦς. We must not attribute will to the One, but we may say 'he is what he willed to be, for he posited himself.'

If the One did not generate the spiritual world, its activity, says Plotinus, would have been dormant and hidden. The objection, 'How can multiplicity emanate from absolute unity?' is answered by boldly carrying the war into the enemy's country. 'Can you show any reason why the First Good should remain stationary in itself? Is it envious? Or is it impotent, though it is the source

and potentiality of all things?' (V. vi. 1). As a mere metaphor, he bids us think of the effluence of light from the sun, which loses nothing by shining. This is, as we now know, an unfortunate illustration; but it does not affect the argument, since, as has been urged, the law of the expenditure of energy does not hold good for spiritual existence. The One does not lose anything by creating spirit, but its power penetrates not only all the spiritual world, but the soul-world likewise, down to the lower confines of being. We must remember that there is no sharp division between the Absolute and spirit, nor between spirit and soul. Just as there is no obstacle to prevent soul from becoming spirit—'only then we call it no longer soul, but *our* Spirit'—so there is no barrier between spirit and the One. The chain is unbroken throughout. Indeed, he says once, quite clearly, that spirit is the self-consciousness of the Absolute. 'The One turned towards himself and looked, and this seeing is Spirit' (V. i. 7). Reciprocally, 'Spirit, while thinking itself, thinks the One, for it thinks of itself as active, and the activity of all things turns towards the Good.' All activity directed to spiritual ends is an unconscious contemplation of God.

When Plotinus calls the Absolute the Good, he may seem to fall under the censure of Bradley, who proves that morality, as such, must be transcended in the Absolute. He explains, however, that it is only in relation to ourselves that this name can be given to the One. Moreover, he does not use 'the Good' in a moralistic sense. Virtue, he says truly, is not the Good, but a good (I. viii. 6). 'The Good' is rather the *Perfect*—harmonious unity as the goal of desire. The Good is the fulfilment of the natural desire (ὁρμησις) for self-completion and self-transcendence, to which we are impelled by our nature. 'All things strive after life, immortality, and activity' (VI. vii. 20).

We can know the unknowable, because we ourselves in our deepest ground are the unknowable. This is the foundation of the Plotinian mysticism, which comes in as the crown of an all-embracing metaphysical system. The soul, when it has become spirit, has in a sense reached its goal; but even then it counts not itself to have apprehended. Even in heaven there is the mystery of love for something beyond; even the beatified spirit may still love and aspire. Even in this life moments are not denied us, though they are few, when the soul is swept entirely out of itself and carried up into the ineffable region 'beyond existence,' where the One manifests himself in his majesty.

'What is better,' he asks, 'than the life of Spirit, most wise and sinless and faultless as it is? . . . If we find nothing better than Spirit, we will stop there. But no! we must mount still higher, to find the absolutely One and self-sufficing, on which all these things depend. It must be something above and beyond being. Is it enough to say this and then leave the subject? No, the soul is in travail and longing. Can we find a charm for this pain? It cannot come through the discursive reason, but by some spiritual contact, about which we may reason afterwards, but not at the time. We must believe that the soul has truly seen, when it suddenly perceives a light. We must believe that God is present, when he comes into the house of him who invites him, and gives him life. . . . This is the soul's true goal, to touch that light, and to behold it by means of that light itself, and not by any other light; even as we see not the sun by any light except its own' (V. iii. 17).

There are many other fine passages in the *Enneads* in which the beatific vision is described. In the last chapter he imagines a worshipper at the mysteries led through the forecourts adorned with statues of the gods, and at the last admitted into the Holy of Holies itself.

'And when the vision is over, the man will once more awake the virtue that is in him. . . . This is the life of the gods, and of godlike and blessed men, a release from all else here below, a life that takes no pleasure in earthly things, a flight of the alone to the Alone' (VI. ix. 11).

The system of Plotinus has the appearance of mysticism superimposed upon rationalism, not unlike the philosophy of Spinoza. But it is not legitimate to limit mysticism to rapture or ecstasy. The central doctrine of mysticism is not that we can see God only in a state of swoon, but that we can see only what we are. This principle is applied consistently by Plotinus at every stage of experience. He uses it to confute in turn materialism, naturalism, and intellectualism, each of which is shown to be a synthesis from imperfect data, composed by an imperfect instrument. At the final stage spirit itself is led to define itself against the background of a deeper mystery. In this sense mysticism is present and active throughout the whole scheme. Another fundamental doctrine of mysticism is that love is the key to all mysteries, the guide and revealer of all higher truth. Here also Plotinus applies a great principle to the whole of life. There is a half-unconscious upward striving (*ἐρσις*) in all creation, which groans and travails to be delivered from the bondage of corruption. At the top of the ladder the *νοῦς ἐρῶν* throbs with the *amor intellectualis Dei*, and at rare intervals feels that its passion is satisfied. The main difference between the mysticism of Plotinus and traditional Christian mysticism, as standardized in Roman Catholic manuals of ascetical theology, is that the ecstatic state is with Plotinus an exceedingly rare phenomenon, encountered only at the summit of spiritual development; and it is noteworthy that his successors in the school do not cheapen it at all. Christian mysticism, on the other hand, speaks of such visitations as common in the early stages of the life of holiness, and warns beginners not to think too much of them. Some female mystics are recorded to have spent a considerable fraction of their lives in a state of trance. This difference is in no way to be traced to the teachings of Christianity, which gives no encouragement to the indulgence of violent religious emotion. It is the result of the discipline of the cloister, and of the peculiar mental conditions induced by that kind of life. The Hellenic mind was averse from this kind of asceticism, and Plotinus at any rate would not have approved of deliberate self-hypnotization such as was practised by many mediæval mystics. The sanity and calm of Neo-Platonic discipline preserved its votaries from the terrible reactions which fill so large a place in the biographies of Christian mystics. There is not a trace in Plotinus of 'the dark night of the soul,' or the experience of 'dereliction.' Even if we grant that the Greeks made too little of sin and repentance, the balance of good seems to be decidedly on the side of Plotinus and his disciples. And it must be remembered that no religious teacher appealed less to religious excitement than the Founder of Christianity.

The mystical state is always the result of intense mental concentration, which Plotinus calls *ἀπλῶσις*. The mind must be resolutely shut against all impressions from outside; hence the language used by all mystics about the blankness or darkness of the mind at the moment of vision. Plotinus experienced this vision several times—Porphyry says four times during his own association with him. But the importance of ecstasy in Neo-Platonism has been as much exaggerated as that of Nirvāna in western books about Buddhism. What the doctrine of the One as the supreme object of love really secures is that human spirits in their most exalted mood may share not only a common life and a common happiness, but a common hope and a common prayer.

The connexion of ethics with philosophy was becoming closer throughout the whole history of Greek thought. In Plotinus the two blend very

completely. But there is not much—perhaps too little—about social and political morality in Plotinus. He tells us that the 'political virtues' must be acquired first, but touches very lightly upon them. They are a preparatory stage; next comes 'purification' (*καθάρσις*). The soul must cleanse itself from external stains, and strip off its own lower nature:

'Chisel away from thy soul what is superfluous, straighten that which is crooked, purify and enlighten that which is dark, and do not cease working at thy statue until virtue shines before thine eyes with its divine splendour, and thou seest temperance seated in thy bosom in its holy purity' (i. vi. 9).

Discipline of the thoughts is the most important part of this training; if the heart be kept pure, right action will follow almost necessarily. The simple life, rather than mortification of the flesh, is in harmony with Neo-Platonic ethics. But in the matter of love and marriage he is not much superior to his contemporaries. He sees that sensuous indulgence rivets the chains which bind the soul to earth; he does not see that the love of man and woman, consecrated by marriage, may be the best initiation into heavenly love. The conflict with evil is a process of emancipation rather than a struggle with a hostile spiritual power. Human wickedness is never absolute. 'Vice is still human, being mixed with something contrary to itself.' Most sin is caused by 'false opinions' (*ψευδείς δόξαι*), untrue valuations, and ignorance of all kinds. Goodness must be sought for its own sake. 'If any man seeks anything else in the good life, it is not the good life that he is seeking' (i. iv. 12). The only true motive is the desire 'to become like to God.' The ultimate good is to be something, not to do something. Thus all virtues are in a sense a preparation for contemplation (*θεωρία*); and the three main roads which lead us upward are the arts, philosophy, and love. The cult of beauty is thus, as for Plato himself, an indispensable part of the moral life. But 'beauty' is an attribute not only of visible forms, but still more of noble actions and noble thoughts. Plotinus would have us admire truly, think truly, and love truly—these three, in his view, 'lead life to sovereign power.' The great sin is selfishness or self-will, which makes us 'forget our Father.' The separate self is a figment; we are members one of another, and may be compared to a choir which sings out of time when it ceases to look at the conductor. The Plotinian ethic is theocentric, but not unsocial.

Plotinus himself felt no need of the popular mythology and worship. He surprised his disciples by his indifference to the externals of religion; and, when they ventured to question him on the subject, he replied, 'It is for the gods to come to me, not for me to go to them.' In this attitude he differed greatly from his most famous successor, Proclus, who spent much of his time at the temples, engaged in devotional exercises. Plotinus uses the names of the gods to serve as an allegorical presentment of his system. They have no reality for him. But he leaves room for them by his doctrine that the universe contains many beings more divine than man—demons, and gods, who are demons of a superior order. He believes in magic, like all his contemporaries, and to some extent in astrology; but he reduces these beliefs as much as is possible without abandoning them. He attaches importance to prayer, but prefers 'the prayer of quiet,' which does not offer petitions. He does not encourage us to pray for deliverance from earthly calamities. Some of these are necessary in a universe constituted like ours; others have their appropriate remedy (e.g., if a nation wishes to avoid servitude, it must learn to fight); and all of them are of small account to an immortal being, who knows that he is only a temporary sojourner in a world where such things happen. The soul is not in

jured by such occurrences, and we should bear public and private calamities philosophically. Death only means that 'the actor changes his mask.' We may trust that Providence orders all for the best.

3. Neo-Platonism after Plotinus.—The appearance of a great speculative genius like Plotinus in a period so barren of originality as the 3rd cent. of our era had an immediate and decisive influence on the future of Greek philosophy. The school of Plotinus swallowed up and absorbed all other systems. A hundred years after his death Eunapius could say that he was more read than Plato himself, and adds quite justly that his fame is very largely due to his disciple Porphyry.

(a) *Porphyry*.—Porphyry (he took this name as the Greek equivalent of his Syrian name Malehus = Melek, a king) was born in 233 and died soon after 300. He is best known as a formidable opponent of Christianity; but our present subject is his influence upon the development of Neo-Platonism. He was mainly an expositor and commentator, his writings being afterwards much used for educational purposes; and it is to him that we owe the preservation of Plotinus's own writings. So far as we can judge from the rather scanty remains of his numerous books, he attempted to schematize the progress of the soul from the lower to the higher virtues more thoroughly than his master had done, and laid much more stress on asceticism, especially on abstinence from a flesh-diet. The philosopher, he held, ought not to live like the rest of mankind, but to follow rules like those which priests, who have accepted the obligation to lead a holier life than other men, lay down for themselves (*de Abstinencia*, 4, 18). He denied the transmigration of human souls into animal bodies, which Plotinus had accepted, though perhaps not quite seriously. Porphyry was a devout and highly moral man, of a somewhat sombre and fanatical temperament; on one occasion Plotinus had to dissuade him from taking his own life. He was dutifully credulous of his own mythology, though his rationalist attacks upon the NT miracles showed much acuteness. Augustine, writing, of course, after his death, pointed out that some of his beliefs were derived 'not from Plato, but from his Chaldean masters,' and that the Chaldean superstitions which he favoured were as criminal by Roman law as Christianity itself.

(b) *Iamblichus and others*.—Iamblichus, another Syrian, had been a pupil of Porphyry. He was a more considerable philosopher than his teacher. He showed his independence by teaching that every soul must descend and ascend periodically; there is no permanent abode in heaven for any one. The soul also descends entire, and is not impeachable. 'If the will sins,' he asks, 'how can the soul be sinless?' (*ἐἴ ἡ προαίρεσις ἀμαρτάνει, πῶς ἀμαρτάνητος ἡ ψυχή*; Proclus, in *Tim.* 341). He also developed the triadic arrangement of the stages of emanation. The scheme of Iamblichus is nevertheless a religion, of the Gnostic type, rather than a philosophy. He turns the ideas and hypostases of Plotinus into gods and demons, and leaves the door wide open for magic and theurgy, though he does not seem to have encouraged these superstitions deliberately. At any rate he laughed (a rare event with him) when asked whether it was true that he sometimes floated in the air while saying his prayers. He is throughout more in sympathy with the Pythagoreans than with the Platonic tradition. Iamblichus died about 330.

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had definitely committed its fortunes to the sinking ship of paganism; and, as the abler minds transferred their allegiance to Christianity, carrying with them most of what was vital and permanently valuable in the philosophy of the later paganism, the Hellenists were driven more and more to rely, not upon the independent speculations of the great Greek thinkers, but upon the inertia of religious conservatism. The dividing-line between Christians and pagans was mainly the question of loyalty to the Hellenic tradition. The battle was not so much between Plato and St. Paul as between Homer and Moses. The real objection felt against Christianity was that it was the religion of 'barbarians.' One of the 4th cent. Neo-Platonists, Antoninus, predicted plaintively that 'a fabulous and formless darkness is about to tyrannize over all that is beautiful on earth.' Philosophically, this Syrian school is of very little interest after Iamblichus.

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(c) *Proclus*.—Proclus was born in 410, at Constantinople, of a Lycian family. He studied first in Alexandria, and came to Athens at the age of nineteen, where both Plutarch (in spite of his great age) and Syrianus taught him. In 438 he became head of the school, and held the office till his death in 485. He was a man of great amiability and attractiveness, in spite of a slightly hasty temper. His life was that of a busy college tutor. He lectured five times a day, and wrote voluminously, but still found time to give his evenings to his pupils, and to take an active part in municipal business. This is the more remarkable as he was zealous in his religious exercises, worshipping the sun three times a day, observing all the holy days of the Egyptian calendar, and spending part of the night in prayer, praise, and sacrifice. His religion was an amalgamation of various cults, and has been compared to Comte's 'religion of humanity.' Legends gathered round him in his life-time. He was frequently visited by the gods in person, and was a great miracle-worker. It may be doubted whether Proclus himself ever encouraged these stories. He was too much in earnest about philosophy to wish it to be submerged by theurgy and magic.

Proclus carries much further the method of finding triads in every stage of emanation. There are traces of this in Plotinus, and from Porphyry downwards this schematism becomes more popular and more arbitrary. Every creative energy produces things like itself, but less perfect. These strive to return to their source. There is therefore a universal circular movement away from and back to the creative source. The three stages are called *μονή*, *πρόοδος*, *ἐπιστροφή*, and we find these circles everywhere in nature. But the energy of the One extends down to the lowest of created things—a direct energy, in which the intermediate causes have no share. Plotinus (*Enn.* iv. viii. 6) had taught that the activity of the One extends as far as matter, and, in spite of some critics, there does not seem to be any real difference between the two philosophers on this point. The One is *ἀμέθεκτον*, which means that *all* its activity is 'transitive.' The creatures are informed by it, but they in no way share it among them. This doctrine of detached causes extends to other grades of being, and is rather obscure. It is connected with the interpolation of new intermediate terms, such as the 'independent henads' (*αὐτορρεαί*

The system of Plotinus has the appearance of mysticism superimposed upon rationalism, not unlike the philosophy of Spinoza. But it is not legitimate to limit mysticism to rapture or ecstasy. The central doctrine of mysticism is not that we can see God only in a state of swoon, but that we can see only what we are. This principle is applied consistently by Plotinus at every stage of experience. He uses it to confute in turn materialism, naturalism, and intellectualism, each of which is shown to be a synthesis from imperfect data, composed by an imperfect instrument. At the final stage spirit itself is led to define itself against the background of a deeper mystery. In this sense mysticism is present and active throughout the whole scheme. Another fundamental doctrine of mysticism is that love is the key to all mysteries, the guide and revealer of all higher truth. Here also Plotinus applies a great principle to the whole of life. There is a half-unconscious upward striving (*ἐφεύς*) in all creation, which groans and travails to be delivered from the bondage of corruption. At the top of the ladder the *νοῦς ἐπ' αὐτῷ* throbs with the *amor intellectualis Dei*, and at rare intervals feels that its passion is satisfied. The main difference between the mysticism of Plotinus and traditional Christian mysticism, as standardized in Roman Catholic manuals of ascetical theology, is that the ecstatic state is with Plotinus an exceedingly rare phenomenon, encountered only at the summit of spiritual development; and it is noteworthy that his successors in the school do not cheapen it at all. Christian mysticism, on the other hand, speaks of such visitations as common in the early stages of the life of holiness, and warns beginners not to think too much of them. Some female mystics are recorded to have spent a considerable fraction of their lives in a state of trance. This difference is in no way to be traced to the teachings of Christianity, which gives no encouragement to the indulgence of violent religious emotion. It is the result of the discipline of the cloister, and of the peculiar mental conditions induced by that kind of life. The Hellenic mind was averse from this kind of asceticism, and Plotinus at any rate would not have approved of deliberate self-hypnotization such as was practised by many mediæval mystics. The sanity and calm of Neo-Platonic discipline preserved its votaries from the terrible reactions which fill so large a place in the biographies of Christian mystics. There is not a trace in Plotinus of 'the dark night of the soul,' or the experience of 'dereliction.' Even if we grant that the Greeks made too little of sin and repentance, the balance of good seems to be decidedly on the side of Plotinus and his disciples. And it must be remembered that no religious teacher appealed less to religious excitement than the Founder of Christianity.

The mystical state is always the result of intense mental concentration, which Plotinus calls *ἐκλογισμός*. The mind must be resolutely shut against all impressions from outside; hence the language used by all mystics about the blankness or darkness of the mind at the moment of vision. Plotinus experienced this vision several times—Porphyry says four times during his own association with him. But the importance of ecstasy in Neo-Platonism has been as much exaggerated as that of Nirvāṇa in western books about Buddhism. What the doctrine of the One as the supreme object of love really secures is that human spirits in their most exalted mood may share not only a common life and a common happiness, but a common hope and a common prayer.

The connexion of ethics with philosophy was becoming closer throughout the whole history of Greek thought. In Plotinus the two blend very

completely. But there is not much—perhaps too little—about social and political morality in Plotinus. He tells us that the 'political virtues' must be acquired first, but touches very lightly upon them. They are a preparatory stage; next comes 'purification' (*κάθαρσις*). The soul must cleanse itself from external stains, and strip off its own lower nature:

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éndes), which are the gods, and are above being and life and spirit. This difficult doctrine is at any rate intended to carry the source of plurality above the world of *voûs*. It might be made the basis of a metaphysical pluralism.

Critics have rightly discerned 'scholasticism' in Proclus. He relies almost exclusively on deduction, which assumes that philosophy is a system of known truths, and that the mission of the philosopher is to place them in logical order and perfect clearness (Chaignet, *Psychol. des Grecs*, v. 297). This apparent rigour of method more often obscures than illuminates the great and simple ideas of Plotinus. It is, however, not strange that Hegel admired him; for not only do the triads of Proclus anticipate to some extent the thesis, antithesis, and reconciliation of Hegelianism, but the doctrine that God arrives at self-consciousness in and by the world is not far off in the speculation of this Neo-Platonist. Bigg thinks that it would be as easy to drop Platonism out of Proclus as polytheism out of Plotinus (*Neoplatonism*, p. 325). This is going rather too far; but Proclus sometimes comes very near to the Gnostics, whom Plotinus, in the name of Plato, combated so strongly.

Proclus abounds in excellent philosophical aphorisms, such as:

'Three things make the perfection of divine beings and supreme principles—the good, science, beauty; there are three things inferior to these, but which penetrate all the divine orders—faith, truth, and love' (*Theol. Plat.* i. 1). (Porphyry had already adopted the Christian theological virtues, only adding 'truth' as a fourth, and changing *ἀγάπη* into *ἐρως*.) 'Discovery is a silence of the soul' (i.e. we only learn to know God when the soul is passive). 'The soul is the world of life' (*κόσμος ζωικός*, in *Tim.* 172). 'The movement of life is towards the Good, of thought towards Being' (ib. 229). 'Do nothing in vain, for God and nature do nothing in vain' (in *Alcib.* 3. 94). 'All things pray except him to whom all things pray' (in *Tim.* 65). 'Evil is not a disease or a poverty but a wickedness of the soul' (ib. 335).

(d) *Successors of Proclus.*—The succession of the Diadochi ran on after Proclus for over forty years, through Marinus, Isidorus, Zenodotus, Hegias, and Damascius. Simplicius, a member of the school, was writing his valuable commentary on Aristotle. Damascius seems to have been the ablest of Proclus's successors; his work on *Problems connected with First Principles* is extant. He emphasizes the impossibility of making any assertions about the unknowable Absolute. Then the blow fell which brought to an end the teaching of philosophy in Athens, after 800 years. Justinian, anxious to win a reputation for orthodoxy, closed the lecture-rooms and confiscated the endowments. Damascius and his friends determined to go outside the Roman Empire altogether, and repaired to the court of Chosroes in Persia. They were woefully disappointed in the East as a home for philosophers, and returned to Europe, Chosroes generously securing for them a promise from Justinian that they should be unmolested. They continued to write commentaries for several years longer.

4. Influence of Neo-Platonism on Christianity.

—There was in the 3rd and 4th centuries so much friendly interchange of ideas between Christians and pagans, especially at Alexandria, that, as Harnack has recently shown (*HJ* x. [1911–12] 65 ff.), there is very little difference between Porphyry and his Christian contemporaries in their general view of life and duty. The great lesson which Christianity had to learn from the Platonists was the meaning of 'God is Spirit.' The idea of timeless and incorporeal existence was accepted by the Church, but not without much difficulty. Tertullian is still materialistic, and even Augustine believed, before his conversion, that Christianity was committed to the doctrine that God has a body. The acceptance of Greek idealism necessarily modified the beliefs about the future life,

though here there was hardly an attempt to gain consistency. Eschatology everywhere is a congeries of incompatible hopes and contradictory symbols. Origen was an elder contemporary of Plotinus, and we can hardly speak of Neo-Platonic influence in his case, though he was doubtless acquainted with Ammonius Saccas. The Cappadocian Fathers, Basil and the two Gregories, are full of Plotinian ideas (see art. CAPPADOCIAN THEOLOGY). But it is with Augustine that the stream of Neo-Platonic influence flows strongly into Christian theology. Augustine was converted first to Platonism, and came through Platonism to Christianity. His early writings are steeped in Plotinus, whom he knew in a Latin translation, and some of the most famous passages in the *Confessions* show reminiscences of the *Enneads*. Even in later life, when the philosopher in Augustine was almost extinguished by the bishop and Church Father, the influence of Neo-Platonism upon his theology remained great. Passing over the hymn-writer, Synesius, who apostrophizes the Deity as *ἐνοτήτων ἐνὰς ἀγνή, μοράδων μοράς τε πρώτη*, we strike another channel of Neo-Platonic influence in 'Dionysius the Areopagite,' whose works were treated with reverence in the Church as the work of St. Paul's Athenian convert. 'Dionysius' may have been a pupil of Proclus, and was certainly influenced by him. Boëthius (put to death in 524) represents an eclectic Neo-Platonism mainly concerned with ethics. He and Macrobius, who also quotes the Neo-Platonists, were widely read in the Middle Ages. In the 9th cent. John Scotus Erigena bridges the gulf between Neo-Platonism and Catholic scholasticism. The Arabian philosophers were about equally indebted to Aristotle and to the Neo-Platonists, whose writings they were unable to distinguish from each other. Thomas Aquinas often quotes Dionysius; and the influence of Neo-Platonic doctrines upon Dante (in the *Paradiso*) is well known. Duns Scotus was a student of the *Fons Vitæ* of Ibn Gabirol (Avicbron), which is a Neo-Platonic treatise. Some of the heretical mystics of the 12th and 13th centuries held doctrines akin to those of Plotinus and Proclus. Such were David of Dinant, Amalric, and Joachim of Fiore. At the Renaissance there was a violent anti-Aristotelian reaction, which rested on Plotinus as much as on Plato. Marsilio Ficino published a Latin version of the *Enneads* in 1492. Bruno and Campanella seized the nature-loving and half-panteistic side of Plotinus, and preached a nature-mysticism not unlike that of Wordsworth. In England the little school of Cambridge Platonists (q.v.), in the 17th cent., tried to revive the diligent study of Plotinus. Berkeley's *Siris* is a Neo-Platonic essay. More important is the influence of Plotinus on German philosophy. Eckhart, however he arrived at his position, was purely and simply a Christian Neo-Platonist; and Boehme was a kindred spirit. From these pioneers, as may be traced in any German history of philosophy, was handed down and developed the great edifice of modern idealism. Platonism has also had a very marked influence upon English poetry, notably upon Spenser, Wordsworth, and Shelley. As Eunapius says, 'The fire still burns on the altars of Plotinus.'

5. *Permanent value of Neo-Platonism.*—Whitaker reminds us that Neo-Platonism is, metaphysically, the maturest thought that the European world has seen:

'The modern time has nothing to show comparable to a continuous quest of truth about reality during a period of intellectual liberty that lasted for a thousand years' (*The Neoplatonists*, p. 210).

Our educational method of treating Greek philosophy as if it came to an end with Aristotle, or with the Stoics and Epicureans, is most unfortun-

ate. It directly encourages the sheer ignorance or superficial knowledge which has interfered with any really intelligent and respectful study of the latest stage in the great debate. The Neo-Platonists are dismissed as pagans who, if they had had more sense, would have been Christians, as examples of 'extreme dualism' in philosophy, or as dreamy mystics whose ambition was to 'swoon into the Absolute.' Such views could hardly survive a diligent study of the *Enneads*. In the opinion of the present writer, Plotinus is one of the great thinkers of the world, whose philosophy is still of the utmost value to humanity. We shall not go to him for sound physical science, nor for instruction how to discharge the duties of a good citizen under a democracy. But even here we cannot help thinking that his theory of recurrent cycles, during which worlds are made, unmade, and remade, is far more scientific than the views which are popularly held; and that the scale of values which he gives us would, if adopted, promote a far more satisfactory social order than that under which we live. His idealistic ontology, which finally disposes of materialism without making the phenomenal world unreal and meaningless, comes near to solving one of our deepest problems. That his philosophy is throughout religious and ethical means that he has not left out the highest of human interests. The one defect in a grand constructive effort seems to be that on which Augustine laid his finger. 'The word made flesh—that found I not among them.' In other words, it is an error to make the highest Principle exempt from suffering. It is, as Plotinus knew, no necessity of the divine nature to plunge in the river of becoming; but it is part of the divine character to pity and redeem by a costing effort. An incarnational philosophy of religion, which teaches that the Son of God comes to seek and save the lost, has a profound effect upon the character of him who accepts it. For it becomes our duty and privilege to 'imitate the providence of God' by making sacrifices ourselves in order to help our brethren. This great truth, which Christianity can supply, does not seem to be incompatible with the ground-principles of Neo-Platonism. Rather it was assumed too lightly by Plotinus that spirit and higher soul must be inaccessible to pain and conflict, as also to sin. But, if the soul 'comes down,' it accepts the conditions of the world into which it comes: an invulnerable soul would not have truly 'come down' at all. With this exception, which is easily made good, the modern truth-seeker may well say of Plotinus what Plotinus said of *Aimmonius*—*τοῦτον ἐξήκουον*.

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The writer of this article has long been engaged on a detailed study of Plotinus, which is now nearing completion.

For the later Neo-Platonists, the bibliography in Ueberweg-Heinze may be consulted.

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NEO-PYTHAGOREANISM. — Neo-Pythagoreanism was one among many kindred phenomena resultant upon the spiritual commotion which marked the gradual decline of classical culture and, at length, ended in the triumph of the Christian Church. It may be dated after the 'death of the oracles' in the time of Nero and his immediate successors (cf. Tacitus, *Hist.* i. 2), although presages of it occurred long before (e.g., the Bacchanalian affair; cf. Livy, xxxix. 8f.). Thus, despite his acquaintance with its ascetic discipline from youth (*Ep.* 108, 17), Seneca asserts towards the close of his life (c. A.D. 62) that the Pythagorean school had ceased to have an organization (*Nat. Quæst.* vii. 32). Possibly this was because he associated it with the school of the Sextii which, as he says in the same place, disappeared rapidly. But, although he was unconscious of it (failing to recognize his own defection from the 'old' Stoa), another reason probably had greater weight. Alexander and Aristotle dead, an era of change overtook the Hellenic spirit. Greek religion, having crystallized at the point where the mythological deposit was greatest, fell behind the intellectual consciousness of the race. The deeper insight suffered as a consequence. 'First philosophy' came to be confounded with impossible superstition. For the mysticism associated traditionally with Pythagoras, the sublime intuition of Polygnotus (cf. Aristotle, *Poet.* ii. 2), and the immaterialism of Plato as seen in the *Philebus*, *Parmenides*, *Phædrus*, and especially *Timæus*, failed to retain a hold upon a people forced by its critical genius into rationalistic natural religion and pragmatic ethics. Seneca lived at a time when this phase had nearly passed, when profound yearning for a positive, personal faith was beginning to manifest itself in reversion to Platonizing immaterialism and to venerable theosophy, but when the intellectual sobriety of the schools still retained much of its authority (cf. W. W. Fowler, *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, Oxford, 1911, lects. xv., xvii.). And, as he missed the significance of men like Posidonius and Alexander Polyhistor, he could hardly be expected to note the import of the revival of movements akin to 'Orphic-Pythagorean' esoterism (cf. H. W. J. Thiersch, *Politik und Philosophie in ihrem Verhältniss zur Religion unter Trajanus, Hadrianus und die beiden Antoninen*, Marburg, 1853). It is important to recall that animism (*q.v.*) was still universal in the Roman world (cf. Ovid, *Fasti*, v. 429 f.; Propertius, v. 7. 1 f.; Lucan, *Phar.* ix. 1 f.). Inevitably, it favoured those 'private' as opposed to State religious observances against which the government felt compelled to take repressive measures, and 'Pythagorean' occultism seems to have been associated with such illicit oracles (cf. Livy, xl. 29, xxv. 1; Tac. *Ann.* vi. 12).

Astrology figured in these practices, so much so that, in 139 B.C., Qn. Cornelius Hispanus, the Prætor Peregrinus, ordered all 'Chaldeans' to quit Rome and Italy within ten days. Now, thanks to its cosmology, Stoicism (*q.v.*) had affinities with astrology, and when, in the person of Posidonius of Apamea (fl. 86-62 B.C.), Cicero's teacher (cf. R. Hirzel, *Untersuch. zu Ciceros philos. Schriften*, Leipzig, 1873-83, i. 191 f., ii. 257 f., 477 f., 756 f., iii. 342 f.; F. Cumont, *The Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism*, Eng. tr., Chicago, 1911, ch. vii., *Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans*, New York, 1912; W. W. Jaeger, *Nemesis von Emesa*, etc., Berlin, 1914), Oriental ideas invaded the West under authoritative intellectual auspices, this pseudo-science gained most influential adherents (cf. Suetonius, *Aug.* 1), and was soon expounded by P. Nigidius Figulus (prætor, 58 B.C.). This, together with the blunting of the Greek critical habit, which found its last successful exponent in Carneades († 129 B.C.), the prominence of encyclopædic or antiquarian knowledge, and the growing thirst for mystical revelations, placed astrology in an incontestable position by the time of Tiberius (cf. Tac. *Hist.* i. 22, *Ann.* vi. 21), and marked the moment favourable for a revival of 'Pythagoreanism' (see DIVINATION [Roman]).

1. History.—Where so much remains obscure, detailed historical sequence is unattainable. In fact, we have an aspect of an elusive movement, in which man asserts his personal need for assurance of right relation with the divine, adopts doctrines of very diverse origin when they seem to lend him support, seeking all the while hoary authority to justify his beliefs, and, in an attempt to systematize, appeals at the moment to current traditions respecting one type of speculation. Seneca was right so far—Neo-Pythagoreanism never became more than a transitional phase. In itself, it left no permanent mark upon philosophy, and it influenced religion only to the extent to which it was absorbed into a larger whole (cf. J. Simon, *Hist. de l'école d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1844-45, vol. i. bk. ii. ch. iv.). Thus when, in 181 B.C., the Pythagoreanizing forged 'Books of Numa' were unearthed on the Janiculum, the fraud testified to tendencies that had acquired momentum already. Repression by government served only to drive them underground, and, beginning with Alexander Polyhistor, the freedman of P. Cornelius Lentulus (c. 50 B.C.), to whom Diogenes Laertius and Clement of Alexandria assign a Life of Pythagoras and commentaries upon his teaching, many pseudonymous 'Pythagorean' works—those attributed to Archytas being most important—were produced during the period when the Roman Principate was developing. Like that of the 'Books of Numa,' their intent was obvious—to acquire the authority (cf. F. Beckmann, *Dissertatio de Pythagoræorum Reliquiis*, Berlin, 1844) of an august name for doctrines which, as yet, were anathema to the State religion. Possibly, too, they may have been designed to effect for 'Pythagoreans' what the Septuagint had done for the Hellenistic Jews, for Philo especially—in this regard the association of many of the Neo-Pythagoreans with Alexandria is significant; and when, early in the 3rd cent., Philostratus cast a halo about the career of Apollonius of Tyana (*q.v.*), he may have been trying, like Hierocles eighty years later, to parallel the authority derived by Christians from the Founder of their faith. In any case, from the outset, only one interpretation can be placed upon the appeal to antiquity. Philosophy was being transformed into a mystical creed. After Alexander Polyhistor the movement was sustained by P. Nigidius Figulus (a friend of Cicero), Endorus

of Alexandria (c. 20 B.C.), Arius Didymus of Alexandria (an intimate of Augustus), Sotion of Alexandria (the teacher of Seneca), Apollonius of Tyana (c. A.D. 65-85), Moderatus of Gades (c. A.D. 65), Secundus of Athens (c. A.D. 120), Numenius of Apamea and Niconaeus of Gerasa (c. A.D. 170), and Philostratus (c. A.D. 220). Doubtless there were many others; for even of those mentioned we know little, Apollonius excepted—and he became a subject of romance—and, ere the time of Secundus, Neo-Pythagoreanism was being absorbed rapidly, by a process of syncretism (*q.v.*), in the eclectic Pythagoreanizing Platonism represented by Plutarch of Chærenea (*q.v.*), who, in turn, was the harbinger of Neo-Platonism (*q.v.*).

2. Teaching.—Neo-Pythagorean teaching cannot be recovered in detail. The movement was very complex; records are largely lost; the stress laid upon the incidental doctrines wavers from representative to representative at different times; and, on the whole, there is little philosophical relation to Pythagoras. Further, the teaching was highly syncretist, drawing impartially upon previous systems, even upon Epicureanism, which it opposed vehemently, and making large drafts upon Stoicism, against which it was a reaction. The reasons are tolerably plain. The spiritual currents of the age set away from scientific, logical thought and flowed towards religious persuasion, which, perforce, sought support in popular fables and superstitions (cf. Cicero, *de Div.*). Philosophy had lost constructive power, and, the theoretical motive gone, all schools had grown fundamentally sceptical. Moreover, social unrest and dissatisfaction with life, consequences of ethical staleness and civic atrophy, had engendered a consciousness of failure or defeat that came nigh a sense of sin. This, in turn, bred an appetite for portents, dreams, horoscopes, and other marvels—the lower aspect of the movement. On a higher level, it produced a desire for immortality, for a perfection impracticable under corporeal conditions, and accordant eschatological speculation (see COMMUNION WITH DEITY [Greek and Roman]). Out of this arose attachment to a peculiar species of immaterialism, leading to a henotheistic (see MONOLATRY AND HENOtheISM) conception of an overruling Power, and to a yearning for assurance of personal relationship with a Supreme Being. But the emphasis upon the transcendence of deity—itsself a result of the opposition between matter and spirit—rendered intermediate beings necessary, and so the higher level of the movement returned upon the lower, in the doctrine of dæmons (see DEMONS AND SPIRITS [Greek and Roman]). Neo-Pythagorean teaching exhibits an attempt to satisfy these aspirations by appeal to Greek resources, just as Philo and his school (see ALEXANDRIAN THEOLOGY) revert to the Hebrew Scriptures and Jewish theology. They agree in availing themselves—somewhat unconsciously, it is true—of Oriental theosophizing notions. Thus, the teaching gleaned its materials from the past—there was no dominating or transitive contemporary leader—and ancient tendencies of Hellenic thought aided its syncretism.

While, then, it is impossible to outline a system, or even to detect a series of co-ordinate doctrines, the following factors may be noted. (1) The ideal of the 'wise man' was a consequence of the indigenous Greek contention that philosophy is a 'way' of life. And, when the 'wise man,' inculcating virtue as its own reward, remained aloof from the people and their demands, it was easy to transfer allegiance to God, and to envisage the 'blessed life' in terms of practices which assimilated themselves to the ceremonial purification (see ESSENCES) of the mysteries (*q.v.*) or could be linked with the reputed habits of the 'Pythagorean

band' (Sextius). It was no accident, accordingly, that the philosopher should become the hierophant (the Pythagoras or Apollonius of romance); because his extraordinary insight attested the incalculable abnormally, he stood midway between the gods and men (Apollonius). Again, this agreed with the tradition (cf. Plato, *Rep.* x. 600 A) that Pythagoras introduced a secret *δδός τις βίον*, designed to supersede or supplement the religion of the State—the essence of Orientalizing tendencies after Domitian. (2) Plato's doctrine of an incorporeal world which, thanks to its conceptual character, is superior to the realm of sense, could be developed readily in relation to the Pythagorean theory of numbers, thus affording a hierarchy of realities mediating between the 'Highest' (One) and the appearances of the phenomenal world (Alexander Polyhistor, on the *Pythagorean Commentaries*). This, again, following the Later Stoa, could be accommodated to a sharp dualism (see DUALISM [Greek]) between matter and spirit, or body and soul (see BODY [Greek and Roman]), by the simple expedient of depriving the ideas (numbers, forms) of ontological independence, and making them existences in the divine mind, i.e. teleological subordinates (Eudorus—the view of the Neo-Pythagoreans on the whole). If, as some held, the ideas had no existence outside of the divine mind, an ontological dualism necessarily resulted (Plutarch); on the other hand, if, as the stricter Neo-Pythagoreans seem to have contended, they possess such an existence, a theory of three, or many, principles was evolved (Moderatus, Nicomachus), and, in the end, by personification of the Supreme Idea, a trinity (Numenius). (3) In reaction against the implicit materialism of the Stoics, Aristotle's doctrine of the eternity of the world (cf. *de Caelo*, i. 10 f.) and of time (cf. *Phys.* iii. 6) was adopted; but the stress was shifted from its cosmological to its anthropological significance, i.e. to man's eternity (cf. *Pol.* ii. 8, 1269^a 4). Not that the cosmological aspect was dismissed summarily; it commended itself in the theory of the divinity of the stars (cf. *de Caelo*, ii. 1), which could be accommodated to astrological prediction, to the notion of cosmical harmony according to number, time, and, possibly, 'mixture' in space, where, as the Neo-Pythagoreans, misunderstanding Plato, did not observe, myth ousts philosophy; it was convenient also in connexion with speculations about the changeless medium that fills interstellar space (see COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY [Greek] and [Roman]). More important, however, was the doctrine of man's divinity. If creative force be eternal in the world, it is eternal in man; hence an open road to belief in divine 'participation'; as God is to the world, so is the soul to man. Therefore, if a man is to be selected as an object of divine grace, he must worship by 'the most beautiful faculty we possess,' i.e. reason (Apollonius, ap. Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* iv. 13). This is the warrant for the asceticism (see ASCETICISM [Greek] and [Roman]) that delivers man from the snares of the body, for the helpful communion of the mysteries, and for belief in rebirth—a process which enables the soul to rise or fall in the scale of existence. Thus, the teleological relation of deity to the celestial and the terrestrial worlds, obvious in the motions of the stars, in the succession of the seasons, and so on, was adjusted to man also. Stoic self-sufficiency broke down utterly; deliverance from matter became the consummation. So the old gods, viewed now as daemons, could play the part of special providence to man (cf. Plutarch, *de Def. Or.* 13); touched in all things like as he is, they could come nigh him as the 'First, who is One above all,' could not. Thus, immanence of the divine in the human was

provided for indirectly under 'symbols,' directly by revelation through hierophants, who acquire illumination through holiness, which, in turn, they achieve by asceticism (Philostratus). Plainly, we are on the verge of special revelation here, and the introduction of the concept of authority is imminent (see Gnosticism). In general, then, it may be said that the substance of the teaching is Greek (see GREEK RELIGION), the mood Oriental; and, till Numenius, who had come under the spell of Philo, the material served, all things considered, as a defence against the more insidious, not to say degrading, issues of the mood (see ISIS); hence the transitional character of Neo-Pythagoreanism. But the ancient self-governing State was passing into a quasi-Oriental despotism; and this change found a parallel in the transformation of independent philosophy into a mystical theosophy with a theocratic trend. We therefore find no consistent system, but merely a group of ideas, strung together loosely, in which the sane intellectual curiosity of the Greeks is surcharged with a hybrid, if fervent, supranaturalism. For, the ancient aristocratic religion having failed to assuage popular imagination, men were seeking the purification and, at the same time, the immortality of the soul. Philosophy could not but be diverted to religious aims. The elevation of spirit over matter which it taught was taken to imply that matter could be directed by spirit, the limits of space and time notwithstanding. The eclipse of Hellenic rational science had begun.

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NEPĀL, NIPĀL. — 1. Physical characteristics.—The kingdom of Nepāl, on the northern frontier of India, is a native State extending along the southern slopes of the Himālaya for about 500 miles, with an area estimated at 54,000 sq. miles, and a population of 4,000,000.

It falls into four zones: the Tarāi (probably Skr. *talā*, 'the tract below the hills'), the water-soaked malarious region along the British frontier; the hill range continuous with that of the Siwāliks; the hilly country extending to the Himālaya; and the Himālaya itself, culminating in Mount Everest (29,000 ft. high), and within Nepāl in Kinchinjunga (28,146 ft.). But for purposes of religion and ethnography the country may be divided into three regions: the Tarāi; the valley of Nepāl, with its capital Kātmāndū (*q.v.*); and the mountainous country bordering on Tibet. Owing to the jealously exclusive policy of the Gurkhā rulers we possess less knowledge of Nepāl than of any region on the borders of India, except perhaps the upper course

of the river Brahmaputra, barred by hostile savage tribes.

2. History.—The meaning of the name Nepāl is uncertain, the Brāhman derivation from a saint Niyamapāla, 'observer of vows,' being perhaps an afterthought. The name is identical with that of the Newārs, the oldest known inhabitants of the valley. There is a long series of native chronicles which, like those of Kashmir, embody information of value, but need to be checked by epigraphic and other independent evidence. These have been analyzed by D. Wright (*Hist. of Nepāl*, Cambridge, 1877). In the 4th cent. A.D. a Licchavi dynasty ruled the country, and it was apparently by their aid that Chaudragupta Maurya raised himself to power; it continued autonomous, but under Gupta suzerainty under Samudragupta (V. A. Smith, *Early Hist. of India*³, Oxford, 1914, pp. 279 f., 285, 365).

'Local tradition affirms that long before the time of Samudragupta, in the days of Aśoka, in the 3rd cent. B.C., the valley was under his control, and this tradition is confirmed by the existence at the town of Pātan of monuments attributed to him and his daughter, and by inscriptions which prove that the lowlands at the foot of the hills were an integral part of his empire' (ib. p. 366, and the same writer's *Aśoka*², Oxford, 1900, pp. 77, 81).

The Buddhist pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang (A.D. 629-645) may not have visited the country in person, but he speaks of a king Amsuvarman (Anehu-famo), founder of the Thākuri dynasty, who died about A.D. 642 (S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, London, 1884, i. 80 f.; T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, London, 1904-05, ii. 84). It is not certain whether Harsha (A.D. 612-647) exercised control over the country (Smith, *Early Hist.*³, p. 366). But about the 8th cent. A.D. the period of dependence on Tibet began, and the country had little connexion with India until the Muhammadan conquests led to the emigration of bodies of Hindus, the Gurkhās claiming to be descended from fugitives from Rājputāna after the capture of Chithor by Alā-ud-din Khilji, A.D. 1303 (*ERE* vi. 456). For the blood-stained later history see *IGI* xix. 30 ff.

3. Religion.—Nepāl thus forms the meeting-ground of at least three cultures: the Mongolian stock, including the Newārs, and tribes of Tibetan origin, such as the Kirāntīs of E. Nepāl, more purely Mongoloid and less civilized than the Newārs, the Mirmīs, Lepchās, and Limbūs of the hills adjoining Sikkim and Dārjiling; in the Tarāi are the Thārus and Boksās, akin to the aboriginal population of the Indian plains, probably of the Mon-Khmer races, all now ruled by the Gurkhās or Gurkhās, a mixed race including Mongoloid and Indo-Aryan strains (A. Baines, *Ethnography* [= *GIAP* ii. 5], Strassburg, 1912, p. 136 ff.). The Mongoloid element in the population appears in the temple architecture of the valley, which is of the primitive Chinese type, in which the roof is the main element, the walls being mere screens set between pillars.

'Certain temples and tombs of Jain priests in the South Kanara District on the western coast of the Madras Presidency, built in a style obviously derived from wooden originals, possess a surprising and unexplained resemblance to the buildings of distant Nepāl' (V. A. Smith, *Hist. of Fine Art in India and Ceylon*, Oxford, 1911, p. 45).

The beliefs of the Newārs are animistic with a veneer of Buddhism. The Gurkhā aristocracy, like all recent converts, are devoted followers of Brāhmanical Hinduism, stringently repress cow-killing, and employ Brāhmins as their priests.

(a) *Animism*.—The animistic beliefs current in Nepāl resemble those of the entire Himalayan region. The *deotās*, or hill-spirits, are special objects of worship. The Tibetans worship Mount Everest as the abode of the five celestial nymphs who confer immortality, and the Gosāinthān peak,

which stands due north of the valley, is distinguished for its sanctity; the sacred tusk of Nārāyaṇa, buried amidst its snows, is an object of special worship to pilgrims (L. A. Waddell, *Among the Himalayas*, p. 351 f.; H. A. Oldfield, *Sketches from Nipal*, i. 4). Mountain-passes, probably on account of the rarity of the air, are scenes of spirit-possession, and the spirits are propitiated by the erection of cairns on which offerings are placed (*GB*³, pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, p. 8 ff.).

At a pass in Sikkim Waddell (p. 115) tells how his men laid down their loads at such a cairn, tore a few rags from their dress, tied them to a twig or stone which they placed on the cairn as an offering, crying out, 'Pray accept our offering! The spirits are victorious! The devils are defeated!' (for this kind of offering see Hartland, *LP*, London, 1894-96, ii. 214 f.).

Springs, and particularly hot springs, are regarded as the work of spirits which cause disease if not conciliated (Waddell, pp. 203, 216). Worship of snakes and cows is common, and we find in Nepāl the curious tabu against the use of milk which prevails widely in E. Asia (*FL* xxiii. [1912] 285 ff.). In connexion with serpent-worship that of the frog may be noted. Waddell (*JA* xxii. [1890] 293 f.) states that among the Newārs of Nepāl the frog is regarded as an amphibious water-deity, subordinate to the *nāga* demigods. The Newārs worship the *nāga*, or dragon, at the festival of the *Nāgpanchamī*, 'Dragon's Fifth,' so called because it is held on the fifth day of the month Bhādon (August-September).

The priest ceremonially washes his face and hands, and makes an offering of food, milk, and water to the *nāga*, with the invocation: 'Hail Paramēśvara (Supreme Lord), Nāga-rāja, and Ye Nine Nāgas! I pray you to receive these offerings and to bless us and our crops!'

With this rite is combined the propitiation of the frog, which is performed in the month of Kārttik (October) at a pool frequented by frogs.

A dole of food is placed in five brazen bowls, and a pile of butter and incense is set alight. Then the priest invokes the frog-spirit: 'Hail Paramēśvara, Bhūmīnātha (Lord of the Earth), I pray thee to receive these our offerings, to send timely rain and bless our crops!'

The rite seems to be a form of magical rain-making.

(b) *Buddhism*.—Buddha was closely connected with Nepāl, having been born in the Sākya territory, at the foot of the Nepāl hills. Aśoka introduced the faith into Nepāl, and by about A.D. 640 it reached Tibet (Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, p. 9). An inscription of the 3rd cent. B.C., discovered at the *stūpa* of Sānehi, gives the legend: 'Of the good man Kassapa-gotta, the teacher of all the Himālaya region' (T. W. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist India*, London, 1903, p. 299 f.). The local traditions in Nepāl indicate that Sankara Aelārya, the prophet of the Neo-Hinduism, who lived about the beginning of the 8th cent., persecuted the Buddhists, and by his magical powers dismissed Sarasvatī, the goddess of eloquence, whom the Buddhists had installed in a jar of water to assist them in the controversy with the Hindu missionary (Wright, p. 118 f.). Buddhism in Nepāl is at present in a degraded condition.

'Buddhism has sadly degenerated from the high standard of doctrine and of discipline which was established by the primitive Buddhist Church in the early ages of its history. Theoretically the religion is unchanged. The Buddhist scriptures now extant in Nipal, and which are still looked on as the only inspired authority on all matters of faith, propound the same orthodox doctrines which were preached by Sakya between two thousand and three thousand years ago; but the Church itself has become corrupt, its discipline is totally destroyed, and its social practices at the present day are in direct defiance both of the letter and spirit of Buddhist law. Its monastic institutions, with their fraternities of learned and pious monks, have long since disappeared; the priesthood has become hereditary in certain families, and the system of caste, which was denounced by Sakya and the early Church as utterly repugnant to their ideas of social equality, has been borrowed from the Hindus, and is now recognized as binding on all classes of Buddhists in the country' (Oldfield, II. 72).

Nepālese Buddhism has absorbed much from the

local animism and Tāntrik Hinduism; prayer has become mechanical, offered by means of praying-wheels and flags inscribed with petitions erected near the temples. Nepāl, both in the valley and in the Tarāi, possesses a great series of Buddhist antiquities, the Lumbinī (q.v.) garden and the remains connected with it, and some of the few extant *stūpas* like those of Sāmbhunāth and Budnāth within a few miles of Kātmāndū. It is much to be desired that the Government should be induced to afford facilities for their examination.

(c) *Hinduism*.—The cult of Śiva is of special importance in Nepāl. Even Buddhists have adopted the symbols of the *liṅga* and the *yonī*, the former being regarded as the lotus in which the spirit of Adibuddha, in the form of flame, was made known to Mañjuśrī and the early Buddhas, the latter representing the sacred spring in which the root of that divine lotus was enshrined (Oldfield, ii. 203). The cult of Śiva in the form of Paśupati, 'lord of animals,' is as popular as in other parts of the Himālaya (E. T. Atkinson, *Gazetteer Himalayan Districts*, Allahābād, 1882-84, ii. 771 ff.). The *Śivarātri*, or night-feast of the god, occurs on the first day of the month Phālguna, in the early spring, when, according to Oldfield (ii. 321 f.), all the Hindu population of the valley, both Gurkhā and Newār, from the Mahārājā and his highest chiefs down to the poorest classes, throng to the shrine of Paśupati within the twenty-four hours during which the festival lasts.

The chief object of worship is the four-faced *liṅga* of Śiva which stands in the principal temple. Prayers and offerings are made to it, and the usual fees are paid to Brāhmins and to the officiating priests. These priests pour water over the *liṅga* as a rain-charm, wash it, and cover it with flowers, after which the officiant, reciting certain incantations, reads out of the scripture the names and qualities of the deity, while the worshippers fling leaves of the *bel*-tree, sacred to this god, over the head of the *liṅga* (ib. ii. 321 f.).

The god is also specially worshipped with his consort in the form of Bhairava and Bhairavi, old gods of the earth. According to the local legend, the four Bhairavis, finding that they could not get blood to drink, as there were no Rājās, resolved to create the Nepāl monarchy (Wright, p. 105). The festival of Śiva in this form is the *Bhairava-jātra*, which is followed by a procession of the *liṅga* accompanied by masked dancers. At the festival in honour of the consort of Śiva, Bhairavi Devī, the image of the goddess is brought to her original home, Devī Ghāt, where buffaloes are sacrificed and their life-blood drunk by the Newār worshippers. The account of the rite, as given by Oldfield (ii. 293 f.), is disgusting. Here the goddess has no regular temple. As a purely local aboriginal deity imported into Hinduism, she is represented only by a pile of stones, walled in temporarily every year to protect the deity from being seen or disturbed by the profane. Śiva at Kirtipur is worshipped in his tiger form as Bāgh Bhairava, a survival of the primitive theriolatry. Brutal animal-sacrifices are also made at the *Dasahra* festival as a method of expelling evil spirits (*FL* xxvi. [1915] 42 ff., 57). Durgā in her more awful form, Chāndesvari, was imported into Nepāl by one of the early Rājās, and placed in the centre of the country as its tutelary deity (Wright, p. 154). On the whole, the Hinduism of Nepāl has assumed a degraded form, and nowhere else in India, except at a few shrines like those of Kālī at Calcutta, Vindhyaśini Devī at Bindhāchal, Devī at Devī Pātan, and in the worship of the village-deities in Madras, does the custom of animal-sacrifice survive in such a brutal form.

LITERATURE.—There is a considerable literature connected with Nepāl, but most of the writers were not permitted to visit any part of the country beyond the capital and its neighbourhood. The most useful books are H. A. Oldfield, *Sketches from Nipal*, London, 1880; D. Wright, *Hist. of Nepāl*, Cambridge, 1877; L. A. Waddell, *Among the Himalayas*, London,

1899, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, do. 1895; B. H. Hodgson, *Essays on the Languages, Literature, and Religion of Nepāl and Tibet*, do. 1874. The following are other authorities: C. Bendall, *A Journey of Literary and Archaeological Research in Nepāl and N. India, 1884-85*, London, 1886; P. Brown, *Picturesque Nepāl*, do. 1912; F. Egerton, *A Winter's Tour in India, with a Visit to the Court of Nepāl*, do. 1852; F. Hamilton (formerly Buchanan), *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepāl*, Edinburgh, 1819; W. Kirkpatrick, *An Account of the Kingdom of Nepāl in 1798*, do. 1811; S. Lévi, *Le Népal: Etude historique d'un royaume hindou*, Paris, 1905; L. Oliphant, *A Journey to Katmandu*, London, 1852; T. Smith, *Five Years' Residence at Nepāl, 1841-45*, do. 1852; R. Temple, *Journals in Hyderabad, Kashmir, Sikim, and Nepāl*, do. 1887.

W. CROOKE.

NEREIDS.—See NATURE (Greek), above, p. 227^a.

NESTORIANISM.—This is the name given to a heresy which divided Christ into two Persons, closely and inseparably joined together, and yet distinct. It became acute in the 5th cent., and is named after Nestorius, bishop of Constantinople A.D. 428-431. Whether Nestorius himself held this view of the Incarnation is a matter of dispute, and we shall have to consider the question in the course of this article.

i. Pre-Nestorian Christology.—After the settlement at Nicea (A.D. 325) of the Arian question with reference to the relation of the Son to the Father, and even while the kindred question of the personality and Godhead of the Holy Ghost was still being discussed, men were groping after true ideas of the Incarnation, and after the true meaning of the words (Jn 1¹⁴): 'The Word became flesh and tabernacled among us' (ἐν ἡμῖν). In other words, after the settlement of questions relating to the Holy Trinity, Christology became the subject that chiefly occupied the minds of Christian theologians. The problem to be solved was, How can Christ be truly God and also truly man?

(a) *Apollinarianism*.—The first detailed solution of the problem was offered by Apollinarius, or (as most Latin writers call him) Apollinaris, the younger, bishop of Laodicea in Syria, who began his theological life as a decided and orthodox opponent of Arianism, but in later years developed the heresy named after him (see art. APOLLINARIANISM). He answered the question by affirming that our Lord's humanity was not perfect. Adopting the Platonic trichotomy of man into body, soul (ψυχή), and spirit (πνεῦμα or νοῦς), as in 1 Th 5²³, he asserted that, while our Lord had a true human body and a true human soul (i.e. that part of man which is common to him and the animals), the Logos or Word occupied in Him the place of the πνεῦμα, which is the highest part of man. This idea is due to a reaction from Arianism (q.v.), and a desire to affirm at once the real divinity of our Lord and His real unity. But an imperfect humanity means an unreal Incarnation; and Apollinarius's teaching was emphatically condemned at the Second General Council, that of Constantinople, A.D. 381 (can. 1; see also Hefele, *Hist. of the Councils*, ii. 348).

(b) *The school of Antioch* in the 4th cent. had a special relation to the teaching of Nestorius. Its tendency was the opposite of that which has just been considered. It was also quite different from that of Alexandria. The Alexandrian teaching dwelt most on the divine side of our Lord, the Antiochene on the human. In the interpretation of the Scriptures, while the Alexandrians revelled in allegory and mystical exegesis, the Antiochenes confined themselves to external facts; they studied the Scriptures from a purely historical point of view, and examined them word by word for the grammatical meaning. Such a method, so much akin to the methods of the present day, has both advantages and disadvantages. The advantages (if we may take as a good example of the school

Theodore, bishop of Mopsuestia, in Cilicia, known by the Nestorians as 'the Interpreter' (on account of his exegetical work) are sound common sense and a rational presentment of the historical position of the author commented on. The disadvantages of Theodore's method, as summed up by H. B. Swete, are:

'Want of insight into the deeper movements of Scriptural thought; a tendency to read his own theology into the words of his author; a lack of spiritual force, an almost entire absence of devotional fervour' (*Patristic Study*, London, 1902, p. 100).

In their Christology the Antiochene writers emphasized our Lord's real humanity, in opposition to Apollinarius. The two authors of this school in the pre-Nestorian period who are most important for our present investigation are Diodorus, bishop of Tarsus, and his pupil, Theodore of Mopsuestia, already mentioned. Both dwell especially on the real humanity of our Lord, but in both there is a tendency, which in Diodorus (to judge by the scanty fragments that remain of his works) was scarcely more than latent, unduly to separate the natures of Christ, and to make of Him two Persons. Theodore goes much farther than his master, and in him has been seen both by ancient and by modern writers the real founder of Nestorianism. This is the view of the contemporary layman, Marius Mercator, to whose curiosity and diligence, when he was staying for the purposes of his business in Constantinople, we owe the preservation, in a Latin version, of several sermons and other writings of Nestorius. Marius emphatically fathers the error on Theodore (*PL* xlviii. 110).

A very brief summary of Theodore's teaching must here suffice (for further particulars see Swete's art. 'Theodorus of Mopsuestia,' in *DCB* iv., esp. p. 944 f.). Theodore affirmed the true humanity of our Lord and its perfect sinlessness; this was due, he said, to His union with the Person of the Divine Word which He had received as a reward for His foreseen sinlessness. The Word dwelt in the man Christ. 'He united the assumed man entirely to Himself and fitted Him to be a partaker with Him of all the honour of which the indwelling Person who is Son by nature partakes.' Theodore rejected the word *ἐνωσις* for the union of God and man in Christ, and used rather *συνάφεια* ('connexion'); he disliked the term *θεοτόκος* (below, §§ 2, 4), but allowed that it might be used in a certain sense. Mary was both *ἀνθρωποτόκος* ('man-bearer') and *θεοτόκος* ('God-bearer'). She was mother of the man, but in that man, when she gave Him birth, there was already the indwelling of God.

Theodore was 'felix opportunitate mortis.' He died in 428, a few months after Nestorius went to Constantinople (below, § 2). Had he lived longer, there can be little doubt that he would have been condemned for the teaching which was in reality his own, though it was popularized by Nestorius and therefore named after him. Theodore's doctrines were formally condemned at the Fifth General Council, held at Constantinople in 553.

It was against such teaching that the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon (431 and 451) affirmed that our Lord was one Person only; and the approved doctrine may be summed up in the admirable and careful words of Hooker:

'The Son of God did not assume a man's person unto his own, but a man's nature to his own person' (*Ecclesiastical Polity*, v. 52).

2. Nestorius and the Council of Ephesus.—The present generation has had the opportunity of learning something more of the history and a great deal more of the teaching of Nestorius than its predecessors, owing to recent discoveries and investigations. Before we go farther we may try to estimate the value of our most important, though by no means our most voluminous, authority, the historian Socrates; for from the accounts of the avowed

enemies of Nestorius we shall be inclined to make considerable deductions.

Socrates was a layman of Constantinople, orthodox (for there is no good reason for calling him a Novatian), but not violently opposed to Nestorius, willing to put the best construction on his words, and evidently not at all predisposed to favour Cyril or Alexandrian teaching (*HE* vii. 15, 34). He was specially interested in the affairs of his native city, and a searcher after truth, so that he dwells most on what he himself saw (v. 23). He was disliked good in . . .

On the vation 1 his comparatively brief record of the Nestorian controversy. He wrote in 439. For his conclusions on the subject see below, § 6. It may be added here that Theodoret, bishop of Cyrrhus or Cyrus in Syria, does not bring his *Ecclesiastical History* down to the outbreak of the controversy, but ends it with the death of Theodore of Mopsuestia, although he seems to have written it a good many years later. Probably this omission was made with a purpose, as he was one of those Antiochenes who afterwards took an undecided line, though eventually he agreed to the union. We must also notice that Sozomen, whose *Ecclesiastical History* covers the same period as that of Socrates, does not mention Nestorius except in a very indirect allusion (ix. 1). His silence is instructive, and probably shows that the controversy did not excite quite such a universal interest as one might have supposed. Much of what follows is taken from Socrates.

Nestorius was, as Socrates expressly says (*HE* vii. 29), a native of Germanicia, a city in the east of Cilicia. A Syrian tradition describes him as of Persian origin; but it appears to be due to a desire to connect him with the later 'Nestorians' of the Persian empire; and the historical references of the later Syrian writers are so full of fable and ridiculous statements that it is impossible to put any trust in their unsupported averments. Nestorius became a monk of the monastery of Euprepus, near Antioch, and was famous for his eloquence as a preacher, and, according to some, for the austerity of his life (Socrates, *loc. cit.*; Gennadius, *de Vir. illustr.* 54). The see of Constantinople becoming vacant in December 427, and the ecclesiastics of the city having displayed ambitious rivalry, a bishop was sought for from outside its limits; and, by the influence of the emperor Theodosius II., Nestorius was appointed, and was consecrated on 10th April 428. Theodosius hoped to bring from Antioch a second Chrysostom, whose eloquence would greatly further the cause of religion.

Nestorius's first act, a few days after his consecration, was to make a fierce attack on heresy; he promised the emperor heaven as a recompense, and also assistance in conquering the Persians, if he would purge the earth of heretics. Nestorius immediately proceeded to the destruction of the chapel of the Arians in the city, and persecuted the Novatians, whose bishop Paul was everywhere respected for his piety' (Soc. *loc. cit.*), and the Quartodecimans in Asia, Lydia, and Caria; also the Macedonians or 'Pneumatomachi' (who denied the Godhead of the Holy Ghost), and others. He is with some reason blamed by Socrates as a furious persecutor.

The first outbreak of the Nestorian controversy was due to a presbyter named Anastasius, brought by Nestorius from Antioch (Soc. *HE* vii. 32). He preached in Constantinople against the popular name Theotokos (see below, § 4). The presbyter exclaimed: 'Let no one call Mary Theotokos, for Mary was but a woman, and it is impossible that God should be born of a woman'; and his sermon gave great offence. Thereupon Nestorius delivered a course of sermons supporting Anastasius. Several of these have been preserved by Marius Mercator (above, § 1).

Socrates passes over the events which happened during the next three years. But before the Council of Ephesus (the Third Ecumenical) was held, in 431, Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, entered into controversy with Nestorius because of his teaching. Celestine, bishop of Rome, held a

synod in that city in 430, and the synod declared Nestorius a heretic. Shortly afterwards a synod at Alexandria under Cyril did the same thing. Cyril drew up twelve 'anathematisms' (below, § 5), and Nestorius replied with twelve counter-anathematisms. Finally, the emperor summoned a General Council, to meet at Ephesus on Whitsunday (June 7) 431. In the meantime the bishops of the province of Antioch, whose metropolitan was John, examined Cyril's anathematisms, and found them unsatisfactory. The Antiochenes were by the traditions of their school inclined to favour Nestorius and to oppose Alexandrian teaching. And, whatever was the reason, whether from a desire to oppose Cyril, or from a wish that Nestorius should not be condemned in their presence (for they were a small minority), or, as some say, from accidental causes, they delayed their arrival at Ephesus till 26th or 27th June.

The first to arrive was Nestorius, who came soon after Easter with 'a great crowd of his adherents' (Soc. vii. 34). Cyril arrived just before Pentecost, others a few days later. After waiting more than a fortnight after the day fixed for the Council, and after receiving a friendly letter from John of Antioch and then (as he himself declares) a message requesting him to proceed without him, Cyril held the first meeting of the Council on 22nd June, 198 bishops being present. The letter of the Council to the emperors Theodosius and Valentinian (Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum Collectio*, iv. 1235 ff.) expressly says that John sent before him two bishops, Alexander of Apamea and Alexander of Hierapolis, to tell the Council to go on without him. Nestorius declined to be present at this meeting, or to send any explanations of his teaching. The bishops, after investigating his sermons and writings, on the same day condemned him to deposition. In these proceedings no one appears to any great advantage. Cyril showed himself more of a prosecutor than of a president or judge; and, late as the Antiochenes were, he ought to have waited for them a little longer. Nestorius put himself out of court by his absence and by his unconciliatory and provocative language during the time of waiting; and the excuses offered in his lately-discovered 'Apology' (see below) do not exonerate him. The emperor comes out of the affair very badly, for he openly favoured the accused, just as later he openly favoured Eutyches, whose doctrines were the exact opposite of those of Nestorius; and the imperial commissioner, Candidian, outstepped all propriety in endeavouring to support Nestorius. Equally unsatisfactory was the part played by the Antiochenes, whose tardiness in arriving can with difficulty be believed to have been accidental. When they did arrive, they held a rival Council, attended by a small minority of 43 bishops, and deposed both Cyril and his supporter Memnon, bishop of Ephesus. They did not refer to the case of Nestorius on its merits at all, but only said that Cyril's Council had no right to depose Nestorius before their arrival.

The emperor thereupon showed much vacillation. He ordered the arrest of Nestorius, Cyril, and Memnon alike. But eventually public opinion forced him to release Cyril and Memnon and to banish Nestorius, first to his old monastery, then (at John of Antioch's own request) to Arabia, and finally (perhaps before the last arrangement was carried into effect) to the Oasis (of Ptolemais) in Egypt, where he still remained when Socrates wrote (A.D. 439). The emperor also summoned several bishops of the Ephesine majority to Constantinople to arrange for the filling of the vacant see there, and Maximian succeeded Nestorius. Socrates calls Maximian 'rude in speech' but 'inclined to live a quiet life' (vii. 35). He was

soon after succeeded by Proclus, and under these two peaceful bishops quiet reigned in the capital.

Till a few years ago little of Nestorius's later life was known. But the newly-discovered *Book of Heraclides*, the 'Apology' of Nestorius, shows us his life in exile. It was written in Greek, under the pseudonym of 'Heraclides of Damascus,' by Nestorius after his deposition. There is little doubt that Heraclides is a fictitious personage; and, once we get to the book itself, there is no veiling of the fact that Nestorius is the author; a pseudonym was necessary to prevent the book from being burned unread by those who hated the very name of the writer; for he retained very few friends, even among the Antiochenes, in his later life. The book has been preserved to our own day in a Syriac version, in the library of the E. Syrian (Nestorian) Catholicos, at Qochanes in the mountains of Kurdistan. Only one MS has survived, and that was unknown to European scholars; but it has lately been several times copied, and the book was published in 1910 by P. Bedjan in Syriac and by F. Nau in a French translation of the Syriac. Already, however, J. F. Bethune-Baker, in *Nestorius and his Teaching*, had given copious extracts from it in English. The 'Apology' (which will be cited in this art. as *Heraclides*) begins with a lengthy introduction, in 93 chapters, on heresies, proceeds to a history of the Council of Ephesus, following the order of the acts of that Council, and quotes numerous documents. A valuable appendix deals with events which followed the Council; it mentions the Robber Synod ('Latrocinium') of Ephesus (A.D. 449), and also the 'Tome' of Leo the Great (the *Dogmatic Epistle* to Flavian, bishop of Constantinople, Ep. xxviii., A.D. 449), which Nestorius praises greatly, and looks upon as supporting his own position. Nestorius died probably just before the Fourth Ecumenical Council, which was held at Chalcedon (opposite Constantinople) in 451. The later Monophysite and Nestorian accounts of his death, as one might expect, differ considerably in detail. They are both quite untrustworthy. For the Monophysite account and for authorities for Nestorius's later life see Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ch. xlvii. n. 55; but the discovery of *Heraclides* has corrected our previous knowledge on the subject. Cyril had died in 444, some seven years before his antagonist.

The 'Apology' is called in the Syriac the '*Tegurta*' of *Heraclides*, and Bethune-Baker translates this 'The Bazaar of Heraclides,' suggesting that the original Greek had ἐμπορίον. But Nau (p. xviii), with much more probability, urges that the original was *πραγματεία*, which may mean either 'trade' or 'a treatise.' It seems that the Syriac translator blundered, and gave the word the former meaning when he should have given it the latter. That *πραγματεία* meant 'a treatise' in Nestorius's own day is clear from the account in Socrates, who uses this word when he says that Nestorius had very little acquaintance with the 'treatises' (*πραγματείας*) of the ancients. Audishu (Ebedjesus, f. A.D. 1318), the learned Nestorian writer, mentions among Nestorius's writings 'the book of Nestorius.' This favours Nau's argument. For a further confirmation see E. W. Brooks, in *JThSt* xvi. [1915] 263.

After the Council of Ephesus there remained for some time a schism between the Antiochenes and the rest of Christendom. This was less on account of Nestorius—for even Theodoret later on, in his book on heresies (*DCB* iv. 917^b), speaks strongly against him—than because of Cyril's anathematisms, which the Antiochenes greatly resented. Socrates merely mentions the schism (vii. 34), but we have many documents bearing on the subject, and these are collected in Mansi's great work on the councils (vol. v.). Eventually, however, union was restored, largely through the efforts of Paul of Emesa, who acted as intermediary between Antioch and Alexandria. The Antiochenes propounded a perfectly orthodox creed, containing the expression 'Theotokos,' and this was fully accepted by Cyril (for the text see below, § 5); they also agreed to the

condemnation of Nestorius. Cyril, on the other hand, explained (in a letter to Acacius, bishop of Bercea and one of the Antiochene party) the language of his anathematisms in a manner satisfactory to John of Antioch and to most of the bishops of that party (below, § 5). This was in 433. There were, indeed, opponents on both sides. Of Cyril's adherents some, the progenitors of the Monophysites of the next generation, blamed Cyril severely. Of John's adherents some were definitely Nestorian, some (like Theodoret) were still doubtful about Cyril's orthodoxy, even after his explanations; and these all blamed John. But at last all the Antiochenes except fifteen (for whose names see Hefele, iii. 152 f.) agreed to the union, and the dissentients were deprived of their sees. For the after history of Nestorianism see § 8 below.

3. Change of meaning of certain technical words. — In order to understand the doctrines taught by or imputed to Nestorius, it is necessary that we should investigate the meaning of the expressions *substantia*, *οὐσία*, *ὑπόστασις*, *persona*, *πρόσωπον*, and *φύσις*, as used by Christian writers of the pre-Nestorian period. These words, except the last, were during that period chiefly discussed with reference to the Holy Trinity, in consequence of the Arian controversy. But some of them were used in more than one sense, and, as is usually the case in similar circumstances, violent disputes arose, owing to a lack of proper definition, between theologians who meant the same thing, but expressed it in different words. It is the duty of the conscientious historical student to endeavour to get behind words, and to discriminate between the two cases of essential difference between writers who use similar phraseology, and of essential identity between those who use different expressions.

(a) *Substantia* and *οὐσία*. — We need not here consider the pre-Christian use of *οὐσία* (for this see A. Robertson, *Select Writings and Letters of Athanasius* [‘Nicene and post-Nicene Fathers’], Oxford, 1892, p. xxxi f., and T. B. Strong, as below). The word was used by Greek Christian writers, though not quite exclusively (see below), to express that which is common to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the divine ‘essence’; and the Latin equivalent was *substantia*. Thus the divine *οὐσία* is spoken of by Justin Martyr (*Dial.* 128) and Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* ii. 2); and Tertullian (*adv. Prax.* 2) says that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are ‘*unius substantia*.’ Hence the Nicene Creed affirms that the Son is ‘*homousios*’ (‘of one substance’ or ‘consubstantial’) with the Father; and very shortly afterwards the same expression is used of the Holy Ghost, as in the *Testament of our Lord* (i. 41, c. A.D. 350); and Athanasius’s Council held at Alexandria in 361 (Soe. *HE* iii. 7; Soz. *HE* v. 12), and some versions of the baptismal creed in the *Egyptian Church Order*, in the middle of or early in the 4th cent., speak of ‘the consubstantial Trinity’ (Macleay, *Ancient Church Orders*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 115; another version and the *Ethiopic Church Order* have ‘Trinity equal in Godhead’). It is rather remarkable that the word ‘*homousios*’ is not applied to the Holy Ghost in the enlarged Nicene Creed which we use at the present day (known as the ‘Constantinople Creed’); but it is so applied in the confession of Charisius read at the Council of Ephesus in 431 (Mansi, iv. 1347). The word is an instance of a technical phrase changing its meaning, for in another sense it is said to have been repudiated by the orthodox at Antioch in the 3rd cent., when used by Paul of Samosata (Hefele, i. 123; T. B. Strong, in *JThSt* iii. 292). For a detailed examination of the word ‘substance’ see Strong in *JThSt* ii. 224, iii. 22.

(b) *ὑπόστασις*, *persona*, *πρόσωπον*. — The Church

had some difficulty in fixing on a proper phrase for expressing the distinctions in the Holy Trinity; and all these three words show at different periods considerable variation in meaning. The word *ὑπόστασις* (lit. ‘foundation’ or ‘support’), which, as Socrates tells us (*HE* iii. 7), was not a term approved by Greek grammarians and philosophers, was first used by the Christians in the sense of ‘substance,’ *οὐσία*; this, Socrates says, was the usage of many ‘moderns.’ And this sense of the word is frequent; it is found in He I³ (see Westcott’s note, *Com.*³, London, 1906), also in Gregory Thaumaturgus (quoted by Basil, *Ep.* cex. 5), usually, but not always, in Athanasius (see Robertson, pp. 90, 482), and in the anathema attached to the Nicene Creed: ‘Those who say . . . that [Jesus] is of another hypostasis (ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως) or ousia [than the Father] . . . the Catholic Church anathematizes.’ On this anathema see J. H. Newman’s excursus revised by Robertson (p. 77 ff.); it is disputed whether *ὑπόστασις* and *οὐσία* are here meant to be identical; Newman and Robertson assert the affirmative, the well-known theologian Bishop Bull (1634–1710), following St. Basil, the negative. If, as is probable, the books against Apollinarius contained in the works of Athanasius were written by that Father, he denies the propriety of the expression ‘hypostatic union,’ which became in the 5th cent. the approved method of expressing the union of our Lord’s two natures (see below, § 5). But Athanasius here understands the phrase to mean ‘union of substance’ (see Hefele, iii. 3, and below (c)).

This sense of *ὑπόστασις* gradually died out except among the Nestorians, and the word came to be used to express the distinctions in the Godhead. It would be pure Arianism to speak of ‘three hypostases’ in the Godhead, in the earlier sense of the word; but the sense changed and men came (not without much hesitation) to speak of ‘one ousia, three hypostases’ as denoting the Unity in Trinity. In the 3rd cent. Origen already uses *ὑπόστασις* in this sense, keeping *οὐσία* for ‘substance’ (*c. Cels.* viii. 12, etc.). In the 4th cent. Gregory of Nazianzus (*Orat.* xxi. 35, ‘On the great Athanasius’) says that *οὐσία* denotes the nature (*φύσις*) of the Godhead, *ὑποστάσεις* the ‘properties’ (*ἰδιότητες*) of the Three.

Some of the Greeks, however, used *πρόσωπον*, as the Latins used *persona*, to denote the distinctions in the Godhead. *Persona* properly means ‘an actor’s mask,’ hence ‘a character’ on the stage, and so it is often used of ‘a feigned character.’ But it came to mean ‘an individual,’ ‘a person,’ ‘a personage.’ Similarly *πρόσωπον*, which properly means ‘a face,’ came in classical Greek to mean ‘an actor’s mask,’ and in later Greek ‘a person.’ In a theological sense Tertullian already uses *persona* of the Holy Trinity (*adv. Prax.* 7, 12); and he has been followed by Western theologians to the present day, who have with one consent spoken of ‘*una substantia, tres personae*.’ Some of the Greek writers followed suit and used *πρόσωπα* to denote the ‘persons’ of the Holy Trinity, as Hippolytus early in the 3rd cent. (*c. Har. Nocti.* 7, 14), Basil in the 4th (*loc. cit.*), and others. Thus, in later days *ὑπόστασις* and *πρόσωπον* were used in the same sense, only that the latter was sometimes looked upon with suspicion as being capable of a Sabellian meaning, as if it meant ‘appearance,’ ‘aspect’ only; Sabellius had said that there were three *πρόσωπα* in the Godhead, but he meant that the Son and the Holy Ghost were the Father under different aspects (*c. A.D.* 200). Gregory of Nazianzus, in the 4th cent. (*Orat.* xxxix. 11, ‘On the holy lights’), allows both terms, *ὑπόστασις* and *πρόσωπον*, though he prefers the former.

The use of *ὑπόστασις* in this later sense met with some opposition. It had already caused some discussion between Dionysius of Rome and Dionysius of Alexandria, in the 3rd century (see Westcott, in *DCB* i. 851). At the Council of Sardica (Sofia, the present Bulgarian capital) in 343 (for the date see Hefele, ii. 86) the Western bishops condemned the expression 'three hypostases' as Arian, taking the word as equivalent to 'substance' (Theodoret, *HE* ii. 6). And, still later, Damasus of Rome (c. 370) takes it in the same sense (*ib.* ii. 17). Jerome says (*Ep.* xv. 4, 'ad Damasum') that in Syriac they spoke of three hypostases, but he himself refused to use the expression, as 'hypostasis never means anything but essence.' Gregory of Nazianzus (*Orat.* xxi. 35) says that 'the Italians' introduced the word 'persons' because of the poverty of their language (which prevented them distinguishing *ὑπόστασις* from *οὐσία*) so as to avoid being understood to assert three essences. The Council of Alexandria, held in 361 (see above), determined with much good sense that the word may have either meaning (Hefele, ii. 277); and so Athanasius asserts (*Tom. ad Antioch.* 6).

We are so accustomed to speak of three 'persons' in the Holy Trinity that we are apt to overlook the difficulties presented by the term in the earlier ages. It must not be taken, on the one hand, to mean three separate individuals, as if the Holy Trinity was like three men; nor yet, on the other hand, must it be understood to denote merely three different aspects of the Godhead, as Sabellius taught.

(c) *φύσις* ('nature').—Until the Council of Chalcedon, in 451, the sense of this word was not absolutely fixed. It is used as a somewhat vague equivalent for *οὐσία* in Athanasius, *de Synodis*, 52 (see Robertson, p. 478, note). But two traditional, though somewhat ambiguous, phrases were used by Cyril of Alexandria as from Athanasius. One was *ἑνωσις φύσικῇ* (see Cyril's third anathematism [Hefele, iii. 32]), which, if it meant 'a fusion of the natures,' would be heretical; and the other was 'one incarnate nature of God' or 'of the Word': *μία φύσις τοῦ θεοῦ (λόγου) σαρκαρωμένη* (*ib.* 3, 31, 141 f.). The former phrase, however, says only that the two natures were united, which all allow, and nothing of their being fused (see Cyril's explanation, below, § 5). In the latter phrase *φύσις* is used with an approach to the idea of 'personality'; but the words were at least ambiguous, for they were quoted by Dioscurus at Chalcedon as proving Eutychianism. This sense of *φύσις* happily passed away, or we might have had endless confusion. The phrase was believed by Cyril to have been used by Athanasius ('not two natures, but one incarnate nature of God the Word'); but the book in which it occurs, *de Incarnatione Verbi Dei* (not to be confused with the famous treatise of that name by Athanasius), is really a forgery of the Apollinarian school (Robertson, p. lxxv). From the middle of the 5th cent. *φύσις* was used of the divinity or the humanity of the Lord. He has two natures, divine and human, united but not commingled. The Monophysites and Eutychians in different ways affirmed the fusion of the two, so that they were, or became, one.

For the later Syriac equivalents of some of the above terms see below, § 8.

4. The doctrine of Nestorius examined.—We may now proceed to consider what the doctrine known as 'Nestorianism' is, and whether, as a matter of fact, Nestorius himself taught it. Since the discovery of *Heracleides*, his doctrine has been re-examined by several writers, with the result that, while Bethune-Baker thinks that he ought to have been acquitted, Nan and Bedjan consider that even after his 'Apology' he would have been

rightly condemned. The question is a personal one, concerning Nestorius himself only, but is not of supreme importance. It does not affect the question, which is the really vital one, whether Nestorianism is erroneous.

(a) *What Nestorianism is.*—In order to emphasize the reality of our Lord's manhood, in opposition to Apollinarianism, this doctrine conceives of the Incarnate as uniting in Himself two persons, the Logos and a man, although these two persons were so inseparably united that they might in a sense be deemed one. But, putting aside all technicalities, it fails to affirm, as Pearson admirably puts it (*Expos. of the Creed*, art. iii., p. 293, n. 92), that 'the Son of God, begotten of His Father before all worlds, was incarnate and made man, and . . . that the same only-begotten Son was conceived by the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary.' Nestorianism in reality denies a true Incarnation just as much as Apollinarianism does.

(b) *What Nestorius did not teach.*—We may clear the way by dismissing a popular charge against him, namely, that he denied that our Lord was God. It was commonly thought that he was in agreement with Paul of Samosata and Photinus. The former, a bishop of Antioch in the middle of the 3rd cent., taught that our Lord was merely man, and 'was not before Mary, but received from her the origin of His being'; and that He pre-existed only in the foreknowledge of God (Athanasius, *de Synodis*, iii. [45]). Photinus, the pupil of Marcellus of Ancyra in the 4th cent., taught much the same doctrine. But this was not Nestorius's teaching, and the idea that it was so is largely due to his unfortunate saying about God and an infant, for which see below (f). Socrates (*HE* vii. 32) says that he had examined Nestorius's writings, and found that he did not hold these opinions; and the extant sermons and fragments, as well as *Heracleides*, fully bear out this verdict.

(c) *The title 'Theotokos' and the communicatio idiomatum.*—There can be little doubt that, though Nestorius did not deny that our Lord was God, yet much confusion was produced by his not being able to distinguish the abstract from the concrete. This inability is shared by most of the Syriac-speaking Christians of the present day, and is found among the Greeks of old time, though in a lesser degree (for *ἄνθρωπος* = 'manhood' see below, (d)). To them the words 'God' and 'Godhead' were often interchangeable; and so 'man,' 'manhood.' This is probably due to a defective sense of personality. A modern E. Syrian, e.g., will often say that 'there is much manhood' in a room when he means that there are many men present. Hence to Nestorius phrases like 'God died' or 'God was born,' which meant that 'He who is God died,' or 'He who is God was born,' implied that the Godhead died and was born. In fact, he often imputed to his opponents the very doctrine which many of them imputed to him, that our Lord owed His origin to His mother. Nestorius had a horror of the method of speech which goes back to the earliest Christian ages (for instances see below), and is called by the Latins *communicatio idiomatum* and by the Greeks *ἀντίθεσις*; by which, because of the unity of our Lord's person, the properties of one of His natures are referred to when a title appropriate to the other nature is being used. When, e.g., Ignatius talks of the 'blood of God,' he means that He who is God shed His blood in His manhood. And so the phrases 'God died,' 'God was born,' however harsh they may sound to a modern ear, were common before Nestorius, as expressing the fact that He who was born of the Virgin Mary and died upon the Cross was truly God. But it would be false to substitute the abstract for the concrete in these phrases, and

say that 'the Godhead died' or 'was born.' The fact that Apollinarius delighted in expressions such as the above was doubtless one element in setting Nestorius against them.

The watchword of the Nestorian controversy was 'Theotokos' (θεοτόκος, 'God-bearer,' Lat. *deipara*). It had been long in use, and was the popular name of the Blessed Mother; and, as we have seen (above, § 2), the prohibition of its use by Nestorius roused the fiercest opposition. It can only mean 'bearer of Him who is God,' and not, as Nestorius supposed, 'bearer of the Godhead.' It enshrined the vitally important doctrine that the same He who was born of Mary was from all eternity God the Son, and not only one who was inseparably connected with Him. It ought to be added that *θεοτόκος* is not designed to honour Mary, but rather to explain the position of her Child. It is perhaps unfortunate that it frequently gave place to the expression 'mother of God' (μήτηρ θεοῦ, 'Dei genetrix'), which has not quite the same connotation, and may be liable to suggest Monophysite ideas, which the original *θεοτόκος* does not do. Cyril himself uses, but very rarely, *μήτηρ θεοῦ* for *θεοτόκος*. It must also be observed that the question is not whether 'Theotokos' is a suitable name to use (on that matter opinion may legitimately vary), but whether the doctrine underlying the title, that He whom the Virgin bore is the same person as the Word of God, is true. The title was approved at the Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon in 451 (Hefele, iii. 347).

Some instances of the *communicatio idiomatum* in very early times may be mentioned. In Ac 31⁶ ('ye killed the Prince of life') we have such an instance: 'the Prince of life' is a title of our Lord's Godhead, but St. Luke is speaking of His death. A striking instance would be Ac 20²⁸ ('the church of God which he purchased with his own blood'), but we are not quite certain of the text; 'God' is a better supported reading than 'the Lord,' but it has been suggested by Hort that originally the text ran 'with the blood of his own Son.' Other early examples are: *Barnabas*, 7 ('the Son of God . . . suffered'); Clement of Rome, *Cor. 2* ('His sufferings'); 'God' having preceded, according to Tertullian, *ad Uxor.* ii. 3 ('blood of God').

The word 'Theotokos' had been used in the 3rd cent. by Origen, who in his commentary on Romans gave an 'ample exposition' of the term (Soc. *HE* vii. 32); by Gregory Thaumaturgus, *Hom.* 1, 'On the Annunciation' (Eng. tr. in 'Ante-Nicene Chr. Lib.' xx. 134 ff.); and by Archelaus of Kashkar, *Disputation with Manes*, 34 (ib. p. 348); in the 4th cent. by Alexander, bishop of Alexandria at the time of the Nleene Council (quoted by Theodore, *HE* i. 3); Eusebius, *Vit. Const.* iii. 43; Athanasius, *Orat. c. Arian.* iv. 32; Basil, *Ep. cecelx.*, 'Of the Holy Trinity'; Gregory of Nazianzus, *Ep. ci.*, 'ad Cleodionum'; and by others.

The title was no real difficulty to the Antiochenes, who recognized its antiquity and its meaning; and it did not stand in the way of union. Even Nestorius, when all went against him (for, as we have seen, the Antiochenes were much less for him than against Cyril) exclaimed: 'Let Mary be called Theotokos if you will, and let all disputing cease' (Soc. *HE* vii. 34). In a Greek fragment quoted by Loofs (*Nestoriana*, p. 353) he is willing to tolerate the term 'as long as the Virgin is not made a goddess'; in a sermon (Loofs, p. 276) he suggests *θεοδόχος* ('one who receives God') rather than *θεοτόκος*. He wished, like Theodore (see above, § 1), to introduce the term *ἀνθρωποτόκος* ('man-bearer') as a complement to *θεοτόκος*, but he preferred *χριστοτόκος* ('Christ-bearer'). Yet up to the end of his life, as we see again and again in *Heraclicides*, he attacked the term *θεοτόκος*. (For two elaborate notes on this term see Pearson, *Expos. of the Creed*, art. iii., p. 318, notes 36, 37.)

(d) *Favourite expressions of Nestorius.* — He always speaks of 'two hypostases' in Christ. It seems fairly clear that he uses the word *ὑπόστασις* in its earlier sense of 'substance,' and that he means by 'two hypostases' our Lord's two natures.

But he causes some confusion by talking of the two hypostases and their two 'characteristics' or 'natures' (*φύσεις*). His persistent refusal to see any other possible sense of *ὑπόστασις*, though another sense had become common long before his day (above, § 3), is a justification of Socrates' opinion (*HE* vii. 32) that he was ignorant (see below, § 6). A little later the Council of Chalcedon fixed the terminology by affirming that in our Lord there was one *ὑπόστασις*, one *πρόσωπον*, two natures, 'without confusion, without change, without rending, without separation' (*ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαίρετως, ἀχωρίστως* [Hefele, iii. 350]).

In many passages of Nestorius 'a man' is used where it is charitable to suppose that 'manhood' is meant (see above (c)). The use of this particular concrete for this particular abstract is found in older writers, such as Athanasius, who uses the phrase 'the Man from Mary' when he is speaking of our Lord's humanity (*Orat. c. Arian.* iv. 35; so i. 45, etc.). Also in the *Exposition of Faith* (*Ἐκθεσις*) Athanasius three times uses the expression *ὁ Κυριακὸς ἄνθρωπος* for 'the Lord's humanity' (also elsewhere); and subsequent writers followed him, Latins translating it by *Homo Dominicus*. But Augustine, who had used this phrase, later disapproved of it (*Retract.* i. xix. 8). Robertson remarks (p. 83) that Athanasius did not employ 'man' for 'manhood' carelessly, nor in an ambiguous context, and that there is no doubt of his meaning. But, had he lived a century later, Athanasius would probably have used different language. In this connexion it should be added that certain NT expressions like 1 Ti 2⁵ ('one mediator . . . [himself] man, Christ Jesus') and 1 Co 15⁴⁷ ('the second man is of heaven') are not relevant to the present subject. In these 'man' is not used for 'mankind.' But it is quite Biblical to speak of our Lord as 'a man' (cf. Jn 8⁴⁰, Ac 2² 17³¹).

The metaphors 'temple,' 'veil,' 'vesture,' and 'instrument' (*ὄργανον*) are very common in Nestorius, as they had been in Theodore of Mopsuestia. In themselves they are unobjectionable; their context must determine whether they are suitable. If it is the 'manhood' that is the temple, or vesture, etc., the phrases are perfectly orthodox. But, if 'a man' is the temple, etc., they may reasonably be objected to as erroneous. A few examples out of a great number are the following: 'Mary did not bear the Godhead but a man (*ἄνθρωπον*) the inseparable instrument of the Divinity' (Loofs, p. 205). 'The manhood (*ἀνθρωπότητα*), the instrument of the Godhead of God the Word' (p. 247). 'The Creature did not bear the Creator, but bore a man (*ἄνθρωπον*), the instrument of [the] Godhead' (p. 252). 'The Lord was clothed with our nature . . . the vesture of [the] Godhead, the inseparable clothing of the divine substance' (p. 293). 'I said that the temple was passible, and not God who quickens the temple which has suffered' (*Heraclicides* [Bedjan, p. 318; Nau, p. 202]).

It is much more difficult to find an orthodox sense for the expression *συνάφεια* ('connexion'), by which the union effected by the Incarnation is expressed by Nestorius and Theodore. This is symptomatic of the whole trend of their teaching, towards the conception of two distinct beings joined together, though joined inseparably. They objected to the expression *ἐνωσις* ('union'), holding that it conveyed the idea of a confusion of the human and divine natures. But the main objection to *συνάφεια* was that it spoke of a conjunction of the Word with a man, not of human nature with the Word.

Nestorius also frequently uses the word *πρόσωπον*. But he uses it very ambiguously. Thus he several times speaks in *Heraclicides* of the *πρόσωπον* of the Godhead and the *πρόσωπον* of the manhood (Bedjan, p. 289; Nau, p. 183, etc.); and so he says in a passage of a sermon which we have only in Latin (Loofs, p. 255): 'Christ took the person

(*personam*) of the nature that was in debt and through it paid the debt as a son of Adam.' He affirms, indeed, one *πρόσωπον* in our Lord, but he frequently appears to conceive of two persons (*πρόσωπα*) united so as to make one person (*Heraclides* [Bedjan, pp. 94, 305, etc.; Nau, pp. 61, 193, etc.]).

It is, however, not so much by his technical terms (even though they show much confusion) that Nestorius must be judged as by the general character of his teaching. Theological terminology was in the process of construction; as we have seen, technical words changed their meaning, and it was an indirect benefit of the early heresies that they forced men to think more clearly and to define their terms. In the matter of technical phraseology we shall do well even to stretch a point in giving Nestorius the benefit of the doubt whenever we are able to do so with a clear conscience. And it must also be remembered that most Christian thinkers of the first few centuries of our era were somewhat vague in their ideas of 'personality.' Even when we have fixed on proper words to express the 'persons' of the Holy Trinity, we still have to find suitable terminology for 'personality' in man, for the word 'person' cannot mean exactly the same thing when we are speaking of the distinctions in the Holy Trinity as when we are speaking of the 'personality' of ourselves or of the Incarnate Lord. We may, therefore, now pass over Nestorius's technical terms and endeavour to estimate the general meaning of his teaching.

(c) *Examples of Nestorius's teaching.*—The counter-anathematisms were directed against those of Cyril, and ascribe to him Apollinarianism pure and simple. But, in doing so, they run to the opposite extreme. The seventh, *e.g.*, when literally translated, runs as follows:

'If any one says that the man who was created of the Virgin and in the Virgin is the Only-begotten who was born from the bosom of the Father before the morning-star (*luciferum*), and does not rather confess that he became partaker of the designation of Only-begotten because of connexion (*unitiōnem*) with him who is naturally the Only-begotten of the Father, and also says that any other than Emmanuel is Jesus, let him be anathema' (see Loofs, p. 214, for the Latin of Marius Mercator, and Hefele, iii. 36, for a rather free English translation).

Some of the other counter-anathematisms are scarcely less 'Nestorian.' Some are ambiguous; others charge Cyril with affirming what he never did affirm. On the other hand, Nestorius rejects an exaggeration of Nestorianism in his 6th anathematism:

'If any one after the Incarnation calls another than Christ the Logos . . . let him be anathema'; but from the rest of this 6th anathematism it is not easy to draw any good sense.

From other writings of Nestorius may be cited a few examples, in addition to those already given. In some Nestorius approaches a position which it is difficult to distinguish from true Nestorianism; in others he approaches orthodox doctrine. Cassian quotes him as saying: 'No one bears one who was before herself' ('*nemo anteriorem se parit*'), and almost the same words (with '*antiquiorem*') occur in his first letter to Pope Celestine (Loofs, pp. 168, 351). On one occasion (*ib.* p. 352), with reference to the name 'Theotokos,' he asks if, because the babe John was filled with the Holy Ghost from his mother's womb, one ought to call Elisabeth 'Pneumatotokos' ('Spirit-bearer')—a question which shows him to have been either a hopelessly confused thinker, or else (if the relation of the Son of Mary to the Logos is to be compared with that of John to the Holy Spirit) a confirmed 'Nestorian.' Another saying (Loofs, p. 292) which is decidedly ambiguous is:

'The same (*ὁ αὐτός*) was both babe and Lord of the babe . . . the same was babe and inhabitant (*οἰκίστης*) of the babe.' The phrases 'Lord of the babe' and 'inhabitant

of the babe' seem to point to two persons, namely 'the Lord' ('the inhabitant') and 'the babe,' even though they be united with 'the same.' In one of his sermons (Loofs, p. 327 f.) Nestorius says:

'The babe that is seen . . . is Son eternal in respect of that which is hidden, Son, Creator (*δημιουργός*) of all . . . For the babe is God in his own right (*αὐτεξούσιος*).'

Here we have a much closer approach to the conception of the single personality of our Lord.

Nestorius repeated Theodore's language about the Logos dwelling in Christ, and about the indwelling being due to God's good pleasure (*εὐδοκία*). He said that he was willing to worship 'him that is borne on account of him that bears' (Bethune-Baker, pp. 44, 93, 153).

In *Heraclides* the language is very diffuse and the arguments often difficult to follow; they are on the whole better balanced than those of his earlier works, though they include much that is ambiguous. The following is a specimen (Bethune-Baker, p. 86):

'He passed through blessed Mary. . . I said that God the Word "passed" and not "was born," because He did not receive a beginning from her. But the two natures being united are one Christ. And He who "was born of the Father as to the divinity," and "from the holy Virgin as to the humanity," is, and is styled, one; for of the two natures there was a union. . . The two natures unconfused I confess to be one Christ.' [He goes on to argue against the name 'Theotokos.']

It must be added that his summary of his own position in *Heraclides* is hopelessly confused (Bedjan, p. 128 f.; Nau, p. 83). It contains a statement of Christ's sinlessness; but it shows all the old inability to see the difference between the abstract and the concrete.

(f) *The saying about God and an infant.*—This saying is so important historically that it must be considered separately. Socrates (*HE* vii. 34) reports Nestorius as saying at Ephesus during the time of waiting for the Antiochenes: 'I would not name him who is two or three months old God' (*ἐγὼ τὸν γενόμενον διμηνῆτον καὶ τριμηνῆτον οὐκ ἂν θεὸν ὀνομάσαιμι*). This saying embittered the people against Nestorius more than any other, and was doubtless one great reason for attributing to him the heresy of Paul of Samosata (see above (b)). Nestorius deals with this saying in *Heraclides*, and either he or his Syriac translator gives another turn to the sentence (Bedjan, p. 202; Nau, p. 121). Here it is made to run: 'I do not say that God is aged two or three months.' In the Acts of the Council of Ephesus we read (Mansi, iv. 1181) that Nestorius was reported to the Council as saying that it is not right concerning God to speak of suckling or birth from the Virgin. 'So also then' (continued the witness Theodotus, who had been his friend) 'he frequently said *διμηνῆτον ἢ τριμηνῆτον μὴ δεῖν λέγεσθαι θεόν*.' The last words, Bethune-Baker remarks (p. 79 n.), would be read by no Greek scholar in any other way than as they are explained in *Heraclides*, *i.e.* 'that God ought not to be called two or three months old.' But he perhaps forgets that, as a matter of fact, Nestorius was not understood in this sense; for there is not the slightest ground for supposing that Socrates wilfully distorted his speech. The Greek-speaking people of the 5th cent. were not 'Greek scholars'—nor was Nestorius. And therefore it is by no means certain that (supposing that the words were exactly as given in the Acts of the Council) Nestorius, when he spoke them, meant what *Heraclides* suggests. For what is the meaning of the phrase in *Heraclides*? The proposition that 'a two or three months' old child is not God' is perfectly intelligible, however erroneous it may be. But there is no satisfactory sense in the phrase 'God is not two or three months old.' No one would dream of affirming that He was. And, if Nestorius

really did mean such a foolish thing by words uttered on the spur of the moment, we cannot conceive why he should have repeated it 'often' (πολλάκις). If 'no Greek scholar' could understand it otherwise, why did it make such a sensation in the Council of Ephesus? The letter of the Council to the emperors (Mansi, iv. 1235 ff.) has the saying thus: ἐγὼ τὸν διμνηραὶον καὶ τριμνηραὶον θεὸν οὐ λέγω, which shows that the Council understood the saying as Socrates did; in this form it can only mean 'I do not call one who is two or three months old God.' Assuredly no one present would have affirmed that 'God was two or three months old.' And, if that were the meaning of the saying, why did not Nestorius explain it at once, when he found what a sensation it caused? Under these circumstances the suspicion arises that in the heat of the moment, and very probably without meaning quite all that he said, Nestorius made the statement attributed to him by Socrates, whether it was in the exact words given in the *History*, or in those given in the Acts of the Council, or in the letter to the emperors; and that on reflexion he made the explanation which is found in *Heraclides*. The explanation has all the appearance of being an after-thought.

5. The solution of the question of the personality of our Lord.—Before we come to a conclusion as to Nestorius's own teaching, let us consider how the question was solved by Cyril and by the Antiochenes, whose united efforts prepared the way for the definitions of the Council of Chalcedon. The creed composed by the Antiochenes, and accepted by Cyril as true, and incorporated by him in his celebrated letter to John of Antioch, written on the conclusion of the union, and known as *Lactentur coeli* (Mansi, v. 301 ff.; for the Greek of the creed see Hefele, iii. 131 n.), is of the greatest importance. It ran as follows:

'We confess therefore our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the Only-begotten, perfect God and perfect man, of a reasonable soul (ψυχῆς) and body; before the ages begotten of the Father as to the Godhead, but in the last days (born), the same one (ὁ αὐτός), for us and for our salvation, of Mary the Virgin as to the manhood; the same one of one substance with the Father as to the Godhead and of one substance with us as to the manhood. For there has become a union (ἐνωσις) of two natures (φύσεων); wherefore we confess one Christ, one Son, one Lord. According to this thought (ἐνωσις) of the union without mingling (ἀνυγχύτου), we confess the holy Virgin [to be] Theotokos, because God the Word was made flesh (σὰρκωθῆναι) and became incarnate (ἐνανθρωπήσας), and from the very conception united to Himself the temple which He took of her. But we know that the theologians make some of the evangelical and apostolical utterances about the Lord refer in common to the one person (πρόσωπον), and separate others as [referring] to the two natures, and apply those which are divine (θεοπερεῖς) to the Godhead of Christ, but those which are humble [deal with the humiliation] to His manhood.'

Here we have a perfectly orthodox statement of doctrine from the school that was supposed to favour Nestorius. Nothing could be more explicit than its positive affirmation that our Lord is one person, and nothing better than the statement of the distinction of the two natures. If the suspected word 'temple' occurs, the context makes it quite clear that it means 'manhood' and not 'a man.' With the last sentence, which is an addition to the creed as originally compiled, but is included in Cyril's letter to John of Antioch, compare Cyril's fourth anathematism.

Side by side with this confession of faith we may set Cyril's teaching, both as first put out in his anathematism (Hefele, iii. 31 f.) and then as explained by him (*ib.* p. 122). In the second anathematism Cyril speaks of the Word 'hypostatically uniting' Himself with the flesh, i.e. with human nature. In the third he repudiates the word 'conjunction' (συνάφεια) and speaks of a 'conjunction in physical union' (συνδύω τῇ κατ' ἑνὸς φύσεως). It was these last words that especially aroused opposition, though it was a traditional phrase (see

above, § 3 (c)). And Cyril therefore in his explanation asserted that

'Christ had a reasonable human spirit (πνεῦμα), and that no mixing and mingling and no confusion of the natures in Christ had taken place; but, on the contrary, that the Word of God is in His own nature unchangeable and incapable of suffering. But in the flesh one and the same Christ and only-begotten Son of God suffered for us' (translation revised from Hefele, iii. 122).

It is the bright spot in the rather sordid history of the controversy that Cyril and the Antiochenes showed such a spirit of mutual forbearance, and that each endeavoured to understand the real meaning of the other. Yet even modern writers have sarcastically spoken of both John of Antioch and Cyril 'eating their words' and unworthily giving up their opinions. The present writer believes this to be an erroneous view of history; and that John and Cyril had in reality agreed all along in their theology, though they had expressed themselves differently. No historical character has been so variously judged as Cyril.¹ But, with all his faults of impetuosity and temper, he has the merit of having seized the real point of the controversy. When this was once done, it was possible, by explanation of the words used on either side, to arrive at a satisfactory agreement. The crucial point was that it was essential for a true Incarnation that He who was with the Father from all eternity, very God of very God, should be the self-same He who was born of the Virgin, and should not merely have been joined, however inseparably, to the child of the Virgin. It was equally essential that His Godhead and His manhood should not be fused into something else, or confusedly commingled. On these points Cyril and the Antiochenes agreed.

Two methods of expression which affirm that our Lord is a single Person must here be mentioned.

(a) *Impersonality of our Lord's manhood*.—This has been the usual way of expressing the single personality. The personality is said to reside in our Lord's Godhead as pre-existent, and therefore the humanity is said to be impersonal in itself, but personal in Him only (Bethune-Baker, p. 98). This does not mean that the human nature of Christ is in any way imperfect. It is perhaps more accurate to put it, as Bethune-Baker suggests, that our Lord's human nature 'is never impersonal, because it has His personality from the first'; which is another way of stating the same truth. But it would be pure Nestorianism to say that our Lord's manhood had a personality other than that of His Godhead.

(b) *The 'hypostatic union'*.—This phrase has been generally approved as expressing that in our Lord there are two natures united in one hypostasis or person. As we have seen, Cyril uses the expression, and it was used at a synod held under him at Alexandria (Hefele, iii. 29). It is this 'hypostatic union' that is the justification of the mode of expression called *communicatio idiomatum* (above, § 4). But, though the phrase 'hypostatic union' is a valuable one when properly understood, it is doubtless capable of a wrong meaning. It has already been mentioned (above, § 3) that Athanasius (or another writer of his school) repudiated it in the sense of 'union of substance'; and so Nestorius understood it to mean a union which resulted in one nature (Nau, p. xv). Even taking ὑπόστασις in its later sense of 'person,' the phrase might mean 'the uniting of two persons so as to make them one person.' In fact, this is a good instance of a technical term being a good servant but a bad master. We have here also to 'get behind words.'

6. Conclusion from the evidence as to Nestorius

¹ For opposite views of Cyril's character Gibbon and Hefele should be read. But, while both take a decided line, Hefele is impartiality itself as compared with Gibbon.

and Nestorianism.—Very different verdicts have been given, since the discovery of *Heracides*, on the question whether Nestorius was a Nestorian. On the one hand, Bedjan and Nau, the editor and translator of the book, think that, even after the explanations offered in it, Nestorius would have been condemned as heretical.

'We must not forget that the two natures involve with him two distinct hypostases and two persons (prosôpons) united together by simple loan and exchange' (Nau, p. xxviii).

On the other hand, Bethune-Baker, on an examination not only of *Heracides*, but also of the other writings, considers Nestorius orthodox; and, what is rather surprising, seems to think him an able man (pp. 122, 175 ff.):

'The ideas for which Nestorius in common with the whole school of Antioch contended, really won the day'; 'Nestorius himself was sacrificed "to save the face" of the Alexandrines' (p. 207).

The present writer cannot take so rosy a view of the matter as this, and especially dissents from the last three statements. It seems much more in accordance with the evidence to hold that Nestorius sometimes used heretical and sometimes orthodox language. If we may suppose that we have *Heracides* as it left Nestorius's pen, unaltered by the Syriac translator, we have, indeed, a better presentment of doctrine than in some of his other writings, though even in *Heracides* the tendency is heretical, and the expressions, e.g., about two *πρόσωπα* are hard to reconcile with true teaching. On the other hand, we can scarcely, with Nau, adduce the expressions about two hypostases as heretical, as 'hypostasis' is here used in the older sense of 'substance.' And we may hope that, when freed from the temptation that besets an eloquent and popular preacher of saying rather more than on calm reflexion he would have written, and when in seclusion he had more time for thinking out the problem and for writing on it at leisure, Nestorius to a great extent rid himself of his errors. For his heresy, if he was a Nestorian, was due to confusion of thought. We probably cannot come to a better conclusion than that of the contemporary historian, Socrates, who, though he mentioned Nestorius's faults, especially as a persecutor, candidly endeavoured to 'be unbiassed by the criminations of his adversaries' (*HE* vii. 32). Socrates, having perused his writings, 'found him to be an ignorant man'; he 'found that he did not deny Christ's Godhead,' but that he was 'scared at the term Theotokos as though it were a bugbear' (or 'hobgoblin'). This was due, Socrates says, to the fact that, though eloquent, he was not well educated, and did not know the 'ancient expositors.' The conclusion, then, which seems most suitable to the evidence is that, while Nestorius was not a systematic and consistent upholder of what we call 'Nestorianism,' yet he sometimes spoke erroneously; and, even if we give him the benefit of the doubt with regard to technical terms, it is difficult to acquit him altogether of a certain amount of heresy, and of a heresy which is particularly dangerous.

He fully saw the danger of the opposite error, even though it was not as openly expressed as in the immediately succeeding age. But errors are usually the result of reaction from another error; Apollinarianism was a reaction from Arianism, Nestorianism from Apollinarianism, as afterwards Eutychianism was a reaction from Nestorianism. It is not always easy to hit the golden mean between two doctrinal extremes. Nestorius could see no mean between his teaching and that of Apollinarius, and, as a consequence, he also, like Apollinarius, tended to destroy the Incarnation, though in an opposite manner. But he was a foolish and obstinate man, who did not see the outcome of his own teaching. Had he explained it as Cyril and the

Antiochenes explained theirs, his future would have been a happier one. As it was, he who began by persecuting heretics was himself persecuted as a heretic till the day of his death.

7. Writings of Nestorius.—(a) The following works of Nestorius are now extant: *The Book of Heracides*, preserved in Syriac (see § 2 above); the *Counter-anathematisms*, in reply to Cyril, preserved in a Lat. tr. by Marius Mercator (Loofs, p. 211); a Greek homily, *On the High-Priesthood of our Lord*, preserved among the sermons of Chrysostom (Loofs, p. 230); three Greek homilies, *On the Temptation* (Nau, p. 335), also preserved in a Syr. tr. (Marius Mercator translated portions of these into Lat., and the fragments are extant; parts of these homilies have been made up into a single homily attributed to Chrysostom); *Letters* (some in Greek) to Cyril, Celestine, Celestius the Pelagian, John of Antioch, the emperor Theodosius, and others (Loofs, p. 165 ff.); Nau also gives (p. 370) two versions of a letter to the people of Constantinople, which Loofs (p. 202) looks upon as 'doubtless unauthentic'; *Sermons*, chiefly in a Lat. tr. by Marius Mercator, but also in fragments quoted by Cyril of Alexandria and in the Acts of the Council of Ephesus, or elsewhere (Loofs, p. 225 ff.); fragments of the *Theopaschites* (Loofs, p. 208) and the *Tragedy* (Loofs, p. 208), for which see below (c).

(b) *Probably unauthentic works.*—The *Liturgy of Nestorius*, still used by the E. Syrian or Nestorian Christians, is almost certainly not the work of that writer. It is not a complete liturgy, but an Anaphora only, borrowing the first part of the service, and also the conclusion, from the older *Liturgy of the Apostles Addai and Mari*, which is the principal liturgy used by the E. Syrians. It is not of the type of liturgy with which Nestorius was familiar either at Antioch or at Constantinople, but is of the E. Syrian family, though it is influenced to some extent by the Byzantine rite. It was probably composed by an E. Syrian who had a Constantinople liturgy before him, and may be dated, in its original form, some time before Narsai, i.e. before the end of the 5th century.

Besides the sermons mentioned above, P. Batiffol has suggested that 62 homilies preserved among the works of various orthodox writers are in reality the work of Nestorius (*RB* ix. [1900] 329). They are thought to show the style and manner of thought of that writer. But, as Bethune-Baker remarks (p. 102 f.), theological language was more fluid in the East than in the West in the earlier ages; and therefore it does not follow that, because in a sermon we find a somewhat unusual phrase which was used by Nestorius, the sermon must be attributed to him. Batiffol's suggestion has not been very favourably received. On the general question of assigning the authorship of sermons, it may be remarked that there is nothing strange if one of Nestorius's own sermons has been attributed to a preacher like Chrysostom, and preserved among his works. They were both of the Antiochene school of thought, and all Antiochenes had much in common in the way of literary style and line of reasoning; besides, the worst heretic (and we need not think worse of Nestorius than that he was a very confused thinker) does not always preach heresy.

In addition to the above works there are extant *Twelve Syriac Anathematisms*, given in Syr. and Lat. by Aesemani (*Bibl. Orient.* iii. ii. 199-202) and in Lat. by Loofs (p. 220). But these are of very doubtful authenticity.

(c) *Old lists of Nestorius's works.*—Gennadius, who continued Jerome's *Lives of Illustrious Men* after his death, says that Nestorius wrote many treatises on various questions while still in Antioch, and that these were already tainted with his error. After he went to Constantinople, he wrote a *Work on the Incarnation*, on 62 passages of the Scriptures (Gennadius, *de Vir. illustr.* 64). These works of Nestorius are not now extant.

The Syriac translator of *Heracides* says that both *Teôpaschîgôs* (= *Theopaschites*) and the *Tragedy* were written as an apology against those who blamed Nestorius for having demanded a council. 'Theopaschites' is a name which had already been used, if by Gregory of Nazianzus (R. F. Oxford, 1879-1901, ii. 4367); in the 6th cent. it was applied to the Monophysites in connexion with the addition to the Trisagion of the words 'One of the Trinity was crucified' (Hefele, iii. 457 f.). It was somewhat like the older nickname 'Patripassiane,' which denoted those who were said to hold that the Father suffered.

In Audishu's list of Nestorius's writings are given: the *Tragedy*, *Heracides*, a *Letter to Cosmas* (not extant), the *Liturgy of Nestorius* (see above), a book of *Letters*, and a book of *Homilies and Sermons* (Bethune-Baker, p. 20).

8. The later Nestorians.—(a) *Within the Roman empire.*—It has already been stated (above, § 2) that the Antiochenes were doctrinally divided among themselves. After the general acceptance of the union arranged by John and Cyril some of the bishops finally refused to assent to it, and, openly siding with Nestorius, were deprived of their sees. Several of them seem to have travelled eastwards, no doubt taking with them those of their priests and deacons who supported them, and reinforced the E. Syrian Church (see below). Whatever view we take of Nestorius's own teach-

ing, some of these Antiochene extremists were thoroughgoing 'Nestorians,' and it is to them that the E. Syrian Church owed its knowledge of the controversy. Yet for a considerable time Nestorianism retained some footing in the Roman empire itself; e.g., Cosmas Indicopleustes, the well-known traveller and geographical writer, who lived in Egypt, and published his books in 547, is said to have been one of its adherents (Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ch. xlvii. n. 116; *DCB* iv. 32^b).

(b) *In the Persian empire.*—The 'East Syrian' Church, or, as it proudly calls itself, 'the Church of the East,' had existed, in all probability, from the Apostolic Age; but, it being the Church of the Persian empire, its members were a good deal cut off from their brethren who were subject to the Roman emperor, and the separation ever tended to increase. It was fostered by the civil authorities for political purposes. Yet it is somewhat surprising to learn that the E. Syrians knew nothing officially of the Council of Nicea till 410. Similarly, they did not hear of the Christological controversies of the Roman empire until they were practically decided there. The dissentient Antiochenes would not give them a favourable account of Cyril and of the proceedings at the First Council of Ephesus, and to this day they hold that Nestorius was unjustly condemned, and reckon him, with Diodorus and Theodore, among the 'Greek doctors' whom they commemorate on the fifth Friday after Epiphany. They bear witness to the absence of personal connexion between Nestorius and their Church by not including him among the 'Syrian doctors,' i.e. those of the 'Church of the East.' They accepted the 'Tome' of Leo and the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon as part of their *Sunhaddhus*, or book of canon law; and their final separation from the Orthodox did not take place till about the time of the conquest of the Persian empire by the Muhammadans in the 7th century.

Their missions in the whole continent of Asia were extensive; the foundation of the old Church in India, that of the 'Christians of St. Thomas' in Malabar, was due to them, and is attested by Cosmas Indicopleustes in the 6th cent. (*DCB* i. 693^a); a monument at Si-ngan-fu in China still bears witness to their activity in that country; and their evangelistic zeal gave rise to the story of Prester John. But this Church which spread all over Asia is now reduced to the 'shadow of a shade,' and finds its home, to the number of 100,000 souls or more, in the mountains of Kurdistan, and in the neighbouring plains of Adharbaijan in Persia and of N. Mesopotamia in Asiatic Turkey.

The great school of the Nestorians was at Edessa, or Ur-hai. After the death of Rabbulas, Cyril's great supporter, Ibas succeeded as bishop of that city, and fostered Nestorian teaching. But they were finally driven out of Edessa in 489 by the emperor Zeno, and they then established their school at Nisibis.

(c) *Do the E. Syrians hold Nestorian doctrine?*—This is not an easy question to answer fully; there is, however, no necessary connexion between it and that already considered, whether Nestorians was a Nestorian. There can be no doubt that some of the E. Syrian writers have used decidedly Nestorian language. Yet on the whole it is remarkable how free their liturgical and synodical language, in particular, is from it. There is, however, a phrase to which they cling tenaciously, and which must be considered. They affirm that in Christ there are two *kyānē*, two *qnūmē*, one *paršūpā* (the Syriac words are given as pronounced by them, though the plural termination is often -i rather than -ē). The first of these terms, *kyānā*, is φύσις, 'nature'; the second, *qnūmā*, is ὑπόστασις; the third is πρῶτον transcribed. It seems

clear that, like Nestorius, the E. Syrian Christians take ὑπόστασις in its oldest sense of 'substance,' and so they talk of the *qnūmā* of the Godhead and the *qnūmā* of the manhood. If we may acquit Nestorius, when he spoke of 'two hypostases,' of meaning by that term two persons, we may certainly also acquit the E. Syrians of doing so. They try to make a distinction between *kyānā* and *qnūmā*, when speaking of our Lord, but really they mean much the same thing by both words. We may notice that both they and their neighbours, the Monophysites or W. Syrians (known as 'Jacobites'), speak of the three *qnūmē* in the Holy Trinity, not of three *paršūpē*. We see, therefore, here some inconsistency. For a very careful discussion of these and other Syriac technical terms see the appendix (by another pen) to Bethune-Baker's *Nestorius and his Teaching* (p. 212 ff.). It is very generally agreed that, whatever vitality 'Nestorianism' may have had in the past in the E. Syrian writers, it is now entirely dead among these Christians. It is an example of their confusion of thought that in the oath taken by their bishops they affirm that Christ has one will, one power, and is confessed in two *kyānē*, two *qnūmē*, and one 'paršūpā of filiation' (the last is a very common phrase in their writers). But Monothelism was the very opposite error to Nestorianism (Nau, p. xii).

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NĒTHĪNĪM (NĒTHŪNĪM).—According to the theory of the Priestly Code (P), Nu 33^a 813-19 (cf. also 18^b), the Levites were given (*nĕthūnīm*) unto Aaron and his sons in behalf of the children of Israel, 'to do the service of the tabernacle.' They were a wave-offering given to Jahweh in place of the first-born, a gift to Aaron and his sons from among the children of Israel 'to do the service of the tent of meeting.' So, in the Greek Ezra (1 Es 12) they are called *hierodouloi* (q.v.), or temple servants, which is elsewhere in this book, as in Josephus, the translation of *nĕthūnīm*. This theory does not, however, conform with the earlier

¹ As our present Hebrew text reads, they were *nĕthūnīm*, which the translators render 'wholly given,' or 'utterly given.' Probably (see Batten, *ICC*, 'Ezra and Nehemiah,' p. 83) we should read *nĕthūnīm* *nĕthūnīm*, i.e. they were *Nethinim* given unto Aaron and his sons. *Nĕthūnīm* and *nĕthūnīm* are, in fact, merely differentiations of one and the same word and are confused with one another (cf. Ezr 8:17). It is worthy of note how large a number of the Levitical names, especially in the later books, are compounds or derivatives of *nāthan*, 'give.'

practice. As late as the Exile the Levites are priests. In the reform of Josiah (623 B.C.) every Levite was recognized as a priest, having potentially the right to serve as such in the Jerusalem Temple (so the book of Deuteronomy). At this time and earlier the *hierodouloi*, who performed the menial or non-priestly service of the Temple, were frequently, if not generally, foreign slaves, given for this purpose (*nēthānim*), or the descendants of such slaves—precisely the same use which we find in the temples of other countries, both earlier and later, as in Babylonia and Greece, and even in the Muhammadan shrine at Mecca. From analogy we should suppose that this would have been the case; that it was so up to and including the time of Nehemiah is clear from the testimony of the Bible.

According to Nu 31³⁰, out of all booty of war, including slaves, a certain proportion was to be given to the priests and Levites—which is really a record in legislative form of an ancient fact and right. A case of this in actual practice, referred to in the story of the conquest of Canaan under Joshua, is that of the Gibeonites, made 'hewers of wood and drawers of water for the house of God' (Jos 9²⁷⁻²⁷; cf. also 1 K 9²⁰). According to the book of Ezra, this practice, for the Jerusalem Temple, dated back to David, the Nethinim of his day being descendants of the slaves 'whom David and the princes had given for the service of the Levites' (8²⁰). Among the Nethinim of that period are noted specifically, also, descendants of slaves given by Solomon (Ezr 2²⁵). These Temple slaves were, as a rule, foreigners, captives taken in war, and in the first generation presumably uncircumcised heathen. Hence Ezekiel's protest: 'No foreigner, uncircumcised in heart and uncircumcised in flesh, shall enter into my sanctuary' (44⁹).¹ He proposes that instead of these foreign slaves the Levitical priests of the high places shall be made *nēthānim*, ministers of the sanctuary. This rule, however, was not adopted, at least in this form, at that date, and, after the return from the Exile we still find the non-Levitical Nethinim, descendants of former Temple slaves, servants of the sanctuary. It is from the post-Exilic writings that we obtain our fullest notices of these Nethinim, and in the books of Ezra and Nehemiah we first find, in fact, the word *nēthānim* used as a *terminus technicus*.² Here, also, we have the first distinct and clear mention of the method and organization of the Temple service, and of the titles of the Temple servants and officials. Of these there are five distinct classes mentioned: priests, Levites, singers,³ porters, and Nethinim. In the list of those returning from the Exile (Ezr 2⁴³⁻⁷⁰, 1 Es 5²⁹⁻⁴¹, Neh 7⁴¹⁻⁶⁰) 35 to 41 families of Nethinim are mentioned, with an additional 10 families of 'sons of the slaves of Solomon.' The whole number of Nethinim, according to all these lists, was 392 individuals. The inclusion of the 'sons of the slaves of Solomon' in this total is an evidence, it may be said in passing, of their constituting part of the Nethinim, in connexion with whom they are mentioned in all places where the name occurs. The names in these lists

¹ Zec 14² There shall be no more a Canaanite in the house of Jahweh. This is commonly understood, however, not to refer to Canaanites in a racial or religious sense, Canaan meaning 'merchant' or 'pedlar.'

² The word occurs sixteen times in these two books (once as *nēthūnim*); elsewhere in the Bible only in 1 Ch 9², and perhaps in the two passages in Numbers already cited.

³ Among the singers there were included, apparently, women as well as men (cf. Ex 15²⁰, Ps 68²⁵). In the salary lists from the temple of En-il at Nippur we have also both men and women among what are evidently the Nethinim of that temple. Among those included in the lists of temple employees there are singers, gatekeepers, shepherds, grinders, weavers, temple servants, etc. Incidental evidence of forced labour is furnished by the note against some names, indicating that at that time those persons were not on hand, having run away (A. T. Clay, *Bab. Ex. of Univ. of Penn.* xiv.).

are very largely foreign, including Edomite, Assyrian, and especially Aramæan elements, and many of them do not occur elsewhere—incidental evidence of the non-Israelite origin of the Nethinim.

In the account of Ezra's return (Ezr 8¹⁷⁻²⁵) we are told that from Ahava on the Euphrates he sends to Iddo, the head-man of Casiphia, to obtain Levites and Nethinim, of whom there was a lack in the returning caravan, and receives in return 38 Levites and 220 Nethinim. In Neh 3²⁶,³¹ we are told that the Nethinim lived in the Ophel, and that the house of the Nethinim was 'opposite the gate of the muster.' In 11²¹ we are again informed that the Nethinim dwell in the Ophel, and that Ziha and Gishpa (Hasupha?) are their chiefs. In Neh 11⁸ we learn that they have possessions among the cities of Judah, like the priests and Levites, and in 10³⁸ they, with the Levites, porters, and singers, are among the covenanters, who 'entered into a curse, and into an oath, to walk in God's law.' Like the priests and Levites, they were free from taxes (Ezr 7²⁴).

From all this it would appear that before the Exile the Nethinim had ceased to be foreigners and had become a part of the Jewish people, so firmly attached to the Temple that the Exile could not break that attachment, so that a goodly number of them, when the opportunity was given, returned to their ancestral occupation of the service of the Temple. Evidently they were by this time regarded as an integral part of Israel, and as such they had their inheritance like the rest among the cities of Judah. It is clear that they must have been well organized for the fulfilment of their functions before the Exile, and that organization was handed down and became the basis for the later organization in 'families,' with two head-men, those in service quartered in a house especially assigned for that purpose in the Ophel, the rest living in their possessions among the cities of Judah. It also appears that they considerably outnumbered the Levites.

In the book of Chronicles the Nethinim are mentioned only once—1 Ch 9²,* a passage which is really taken from the list in Neh 11³⁻¹⁹ and should be regarded as a citation of an earlier source. With this exception there are no Nethinim¹ in Chronicles. They disappear entirely, as do also the singers and the porters, all of them being now included in the Levites, to whom are assigned all the functions heretofore performed by them. So far as the functions of the Nethinim are concerned, this is explicitly stated at a later date, about the commencement of the Christian era, by Philo in his *de Præmiis Sacerdotum*, 6, where he says that the sweeping and cleaning of the Temple were done by the Levites.

The protest of Ezekiel, to which attention has already been called, was the basis of the theory of the Priestly Code, as expressed in Numbers, which was finally put in practice at the time of the Chronicler, not by the elimination from the Temple of the descendants of the slaves, but by their amalgamation with the Levites, with the prohibition presumably for the future of the admission of any foreign slaves.

We may then sum up the history of the origin and development of the Nethinim as follows. From the outset there were attached to Israelite temples, to perform various services, slaves, either bought with money, or foreigners, captives of war; and indeed, in the case of captives taken in war, a certain portion was always assigned to the service

* The Peshitto Syriac here renders Nethinim by 'sojourners,' in Neh 10 and 11 by 'slaves,' in Ezr 8²⁰ by 'men.'

¹ 1 Ch 6 seems to show this amalgamation. Here the Levites are divided into three tribes, among whom are included specifically the singers; and the Levites are described as Nethinim, given for all 'services of the tabernacle.'

recognizes that certain reciprocal rights and duties exist between warring Powers and States which elect to remain at peace. In the first case the rules laid down owe their existence to the gradually increasing power of commerce; in the second instance we find that modern reform is due not to the self-interest of nations and individuals, but to purely humanitarian and ethical considerations, which themselves are the fruit of a higher civilization and the slow growth of moral sentiment.

The whole law of neutrality is based upon the principle that peace is the normal state of civilized mankind, that war is an interruption of this condition. In early times this was far from being the case; indeed, it was war that was the rule and peace the exception. And until the end of the 18th cent. belligerent States were so much more powerful than neutrals that their right to violate territory, to interfere with commerce, to do, in fact, as they pleased, was practically unquestioned. The ethics of war consisted for them in considerations simply of military advantage. How was victory to be attained most speedily and cheaply? How was defeat to be made crushing and permanent? These principles operated with peculiar severity upon neutral countries. But the military power of neutrals cannot now be disregarded, and belligerents must respect their rights at the risk of increasing the number of their enemies. To this extent the power to dictate terms on matters affecting neutrals has changed hands.

The position of a neutral during war is held to be the same as it was before hostilities began—free, that is, from all restraint—except with regard to the observance of certain rules which are regarded as binding upon all civilized nations. Two clear principles underlie those rules: (1) neutrals must be absolutely impartial; (2) belligerents must show absolute respect for the sovereignty of neutrals. This impartiality on the part of neutrals had to be secured at one time by special treaty. But the feeling gained ground that neutrality ought to mean one thing or another, and that on the outbreak of war every nation ought to make a clear choice between openly engaging in war and standing out of it altogether—the decision taken being, of course, subject to future re-consideration. Even after this new point of view prevailed, however, there was for a long time an exception in favour of defensive alliances. A State could preserve its so-called neutrality, while giving assistance previously promised to one of the belligerents, without, as would now be the case, being held a party to the war.

The rights and obligations which are set forth in the law of neutrality are (1) those between belligerent States and neutral States, and (2) those between belligerent States and neutral individuals. The duties of neutral States are to act towards belligerents with impartiality and to acquiesce in the exercise on the part of either belligerent of his right to punish neutral merchantmen for breach of blockade and carriage of contraband. The duties of a belligerent are to respect the sanctity of neutral territory, to act towards neutrals with impartiality, and to refrain from suppressing their intercourse and especially their commerce with the enemy. A neutral State must not assist either belligerent with men, money, or the necessities of warfare. It may not allow forces of either belligerent to pass through its territory or the agent of either to levy troops or fit out warlike expeditions thereon. When by any fault or accident it has failed to preserve an honest neutrality, it is obligatory on a neutral Government to make suitable reparation at the risk of being involved in the hostilities. A neutral Power incurs no responsibility if it allows its nationals to leave neutral

territory to enlist in the services of a belligerent. Nor is it bound to prevent its nationals from trading in contraband with a belligerent, but such trade is subject to the belligerent's rights of capture.

The obligation on a belligerent to respect the sanctity of neutral territory implies that his land forces may not enter the country of a neutral, and that he may not carry on hostilities in its waters. In technical language, he may not use its land and waters as a base of operations. When he has failed to obey regulations of a fair and legitimate kind which a State has made for the preservation of its neutrality, he must offer all reparation in his power. It is the modern practice of nations to allow the ordinary commerce of neutral individuals to proceed unmolested, subject to certain restrictions and under rules which may be regarded as having been fixed by the Declaration of Paris in 1856. These rules are: 'A neutral flag covers enemy's goods with the exception of contraband of war' and 'Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under an enemy's flag.' It is the desire of the neutral to continue his trade as far as possible uninterrupted by the war; it is the aim of the belligerent to prevent commodities of all kinds from reaching the enemy, and any settlement of the question of what trade may be legitimately conducted by neutrals is in effect a compromise between their interests and those of the belligerents. Certain goods may be carried by a neutral to a belligerent only at the risk of capture, these being known as contraband of trade, and it is the practice of a belligerent at the beginning of a war to publish a list of what he intends to treat as contraband. All other goods, in the absence of a blockade, may be freely carried between neutrals and belligerents. Articles of contraband are primarily and ordinarily those used for military purposes in time of war. Articles which may be and are used for purposes of war or peace, according to circumstances, are classed as conditional contraband. It is obviously in the interest of neutrals to restrict the list of contraband within the narrowest limits, whereas a belligerent seeks to widen the scope of the term to his own advantage, so that disputes as to what should or should not be considered contraband are of frequent occurrence. Absolute contraband can be captured by a belligerent on its way to enemy territory and confiscated. But, if consigned by one neutral to another, it is not liable to capture, unless it can be shown that it is intended ultimately to reach a belligerent country. This is known as the doctrine of continuous voyage. Conditional contraband may only be captured if it is consigned to a belligerent Government, or its agent, or to the armed forces of the belligerent. This rule, however, has recently been held inapplicable to modern conditions, and the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband has been practically obliterated.

If a neutral intends to run a blockade, he does so at the risk of the loss of his ship. If he performs what is called unneutral service—i.e. if he carries officials in the service of one of the belligerents or important dispatches belonging to a belligerent, or if he conveys signals for the benefit of either party, or aids with auxiliary coal, repair, supply, or similar ships—he is liable to be treated as a belligerent.

There are certain States, persons, places, and even things which have been made permanently neutral, or, in technical phrase, have been neutralized. The ordinary State may be neutral, and remain neutral or not, as it pleases. But States like Belgium and Switzerland have not this freedom of choice. By international agreement they

of the priests of the sanctuaries. As in the case of other sanctuaries, so also in Jerusalem, from David's time onwards, slaves were assigned from among the captives taken in war for the service of the sanctuary, and in post-Exilic times there still existed a special subdivision of these Nethinim, or slaves of the sanctuary, claiming to be descendants of those given at the organization of the Temple services under Solomon.

The priests of the Jerusalem Temple, as of the other sanctuaries, were Levites, and all Levites were priests performing the priestly functions. The other functions of the sanctuary were performed by the slaves given for this purpose. These functions were divided, so far as our information goes, into three main parts; singing, guarding the gates and performing the service of porters, and the more menial functions, such as cleaning. It was to those performing the latter functions that the title Nethinim was given. Originally the slaves assigned to these various functions, being presumably largely foreign captives, were heathen and sometimes uncircumcised. They themselves, however, or their descendants, continuing in the service of the Temple, became in time circumcised Israelites. At the same time, their ranks would seem to have been recruited from time to time by foreign captives; hence the protest of Ezekiel, referred to above, against uncircumcised foreigners serving in the Temple.

With the overthrow of the high places and the concentration of worship at Jerusalem, in 623 B.C., it became necessary to provide for all Levitical priests at that Temple. Had they become priests there, its priestly sacrificial staff would have been inordinately increased; hence the priests of that Temple resisted this reform for the sake of their own prerogatives and perquisites. The Reformation, however, marks a very distinct step in exclusivism—the separation of the Jewish people from the outside world, and of their sacred worship and its service from all outside contact.

The protest of Ezekiel, himself a priest of the Temple, and his proposition to have all Temple service performed by Levites, are evidence of the existence among the priests of the intent to preserve priestly functions and prerogatives exclusively for the descendants of the priests of the Jerusalem Temple. Hence the rejection of the claims of Levites from other sanctuaries to act as priests in their Temple. It is also evidence of a spirit of religious exclusivism, which would shut out foreigners from the nation, and particularly from the sacred religion of the nation, as represented in the Temple functions. 'Let us get rid of the foreigners and utilize these Levites for the service of the Temple heretofore performed by them. The Levites deserve to be so treated as a punishment for their idolatry in the past.'

In principle this point of view was made effective in the Priestly Code, which did not, however, become the law of the Jews or of the Temple until long after the return from the Exile. To this extent, however, Ezekiel's point of view seems to have become at once effective, that, with the return from the Exile, only those counted as Jews were allowed to serve in the Temple, circumcised men of the Jewish religion. Such the porters, the singers, and the Nethinim had become, and with the restoration of the Temple after the Exile they resumed their old functions. The number of so-called Levites who returned was very small in relation to the number of these three classes of Temple servants.

Precisely what the function of the Levites now was it is difficult to determine. Theoretically they seem to be distinguished from the priests on the one hand and from the porters, singers, and Nethinim

on the other. The tendency was, on the one side, to push down the Levites, by making them inferior to the priests, and, on the other, to exalt the Temple servants by bringing them to an equality with the Levites. The distinction of priests, Levites, porters, singers, and Nethinim is established for the time of Nehemiah (c. 440 B.C.) and of Ezra (c. 380 B.C.). The Priestly Code, promulgated at the latter period, abolishes the distinction between those rendering any service below that of the priesthood in the Temple. They are all alike to be regarded as Nethinim, given to God for the Temple service, and, accordingly, in the records of the Chronicler (c. 300 B.C.) we find the old distinctions done away with. There are now only priests and Levites. This process seems to have been a gradual one, and affected first the singers. So in certain remodelled portions of Nehemiah (11¹⁶⁻¹⁹, 22¹, 12⁸¹, 24¹, 27-29) the musicians are already regarded as Levites. This is true throughout Chronicles, and here indeed they not only no longer rank below Levites, but they are the highest class of Levites. By the time of Agrippa II. (A.D. 50) this attitude of exaltation of the singers at the expense of the Levites in general reached a climax, so that at that time the singers became a separate class, entitled to wear linen robes like the priests (Jos. Ant. xx. ix. 6).

Door-keepers were the next to be included as Levites, as shown by 1 Ch 9²⁶ 15¹⁸, 23¹, 23³⁻⁵, and Nethinim the last. With the admission of the latter, all are alike; Levites are Nethinim, and Nethinim are Levites.

There is no mention in the NT of singers, porters, or Nethinim, as distinct from Levites. At that time, apparently, all Temple functions, outside of the sacrificial ones, were performed by those who were called Levites, i.e. the descendants of the ancient Levitical priests of the high places, and of the slaves attached at various times to the Temple by purchase or by capture for the performance of the various other functions, as Philo also testifies.

The Talmud, by its references, shows that Nethinim did not exist in the Talmudic period, but it also shows that the Talmudic interpreters were conscious of the foreign origin of the Nethinim, mentioned in the Biblical books. Accordingly in the Talmud Nethinim are classed with, or even placed below, bastards, and their descendants for all time forbidden to marry with Israelites (Yeb. ii. 4, viii. 3, Kid. viii. 8, Yer. Hor. iii. 5, and Yer. Yeb. viii. 5).

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JOHN P. PETERS.

NEUTRALITY.—The term *neutrales*, or 'neutral,' as technically applied to States and persons, is not older than the 15th cent., its equivalent in classical Latin being *medii* or *medii amici*. The subject of neutrality is one of the most important in the code of rules which regulate the intercourse of nations, and it includes not only principles and practices which are as old as international law, but also elements of the most recent date. The law of neutrality is new in so far as it deals with the relations between belligerent States and the individual citizens of neutral States, whose interest it is to continue their commercial pursuits unhindered by the war. It is new in so far as it

recognizes that certain reciprocal rights and duties exist between warring Powers and States which elect to remain at peace. In the first case the rules laid down owe their existence to the gradually increasing power of commerce; in the second instance we find that modern reform is due not to the self-interest of nations and individuals, but to purely humanitarian and ethical considerations, which themselves are the fruit of a higher civilization and the slow growth of moral sentiment.

The whole law of neutrality is based upon the principle that peace is the normal state of civilized mankind, that war is an interruption of this condition. In early times this was far from being the case; indeed, it was war that was the rule and peace the exception. And until the end of the 18th cent. belligerent States were so much more powerful than neutrals that their right to violate territory, to interfere with commerce, to do, in fact, as they pleased, was practically unquestioned. The ethics of war consisted for them in considerations simply of military advantage. How was victory to be attained most speedily and cheaply? How was defeat to be made crushing and permanent? These principles operated with peculiar severity upon neutral countries. But the military power of neutrals cannot now be disregarded, and belligerents must respect their rights at the risk of increasing the number of their enemies. To this extent the power to dictate terms on matters affecting neutrals has changed hands.

The position of a neutral during war is held to be the same as it was before hostilities began—free, that is, from all restraint—except with regard to the observance of certain rules which are regarded as binding upon all civilized nations. Two clear principles underlie those rules: (1) neutrals must be absolutely impartial; (2) belligerents must show absolute respect for the sovereignty of neutrals. This impartiality on the part of neutrals had to be secured at one time by special treaty. But the feeling gained ground that neutrality ought to mean one thing or another, and that on the outbreak of war every nation ought to make a clear choice between openly engaging in war and standing out of it altogether—the decision taken being, of course, subject to future re-consideration. Even after this new point of view prevailed, however, there was for a long time an exception in favour of defensive alliances. A State could preserve its so-called neutrality, while giving assistance previously promised to one of the belligerents, without, as would now be the case, being held a party to the war.

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The obligation on a belligerent to respect the sanctity of neutral territory implies that his land forces may not enter the country of a neutral, and that he may not carry on hostilities in its waters. In technical language, he may not use its land and waters as a base of operations. When he has failed to obey regulations of a fair and legitimate kind which a State has made for the preservation of its neutrality, he must offer all reparation in his power. It is the modern practice of nations to allow the ordinary commerce of neutral individuals to proceed unmolested, subject to certain restrictions and under rules which may be regarded as having been fixed by the Declaration of Paris in 1856. These rules are: 'A neutral flag covers enemy's goods with the exception of contraband of war' and 'Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under an enemy's flag.' It is the desire of the neutral to continue his trade as far as possible uninterrupted by the war; it is the aim of the belligerent to prevent commodities of all kinds from reaching the enemy, and any settlement of the question of what trade may be legitimately conducted by neutrals is in effect a compromise between their interests and those of the belligerents. Certain goods may be carried by a neutral to a belligerent only at the risk of capture, these being known as contraband of trade, and it is the practice of a belligerent at the beginning of a war to publish a list of what he intends to treat as contraband. All other goods, in the absence of a blockade, may be freely carried between neutrals and belligerents. Articles of contraband are primarily and ordinarily those used for military purposes in time of war. Articles which may be and are used for purposes of war or peace, according to circumstances, are classed as conditional contraband. It is obviously in the interest of neutrals to restrict the list of contraband within the narrowest limits, whereas a belligerent seeks to widen the scope of the term to his own advantage, so that disputes as to what should or should not be considered contraband are of frequent occurrence. Absolute contraband can be captured by a belligerent on its way to enemy territory and confiscated. But, if consigned by one neutral to another, it is not liable to capture, unless it can be shown that it is intended ultimately to reach a belligerent country. This is known as the doctrine of continuous voyage. Conditional contraband may only be captured if it is consigned to a belligerent Government, or its agent, or to the armed forces of the belligerent. This rule, however, has recently been held inapplicable to modern conditions, and the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband has been practically obliterated.

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There are certain States, persons, places, and even things which have been made permanently neutral, or, in technical phrase, have been neutralized. The ordinary State may be neutral, and remain neutral or not, as it pleases. But States like Belgium and Switzerland have not this freedom of choice. By international agreement they

have bound themselves to refrain from engaging in war unless in strict self-defence, and, so long as they observe this agreement, the guaranteeing Powers undertake to protect them from attack. Thus the invasion of Belgium in 1914 by Germany, one of the guaranteeing Powers, was the immediate cause of the participation of Britain in the European War. The province of Savoy, the grand duchy of Luxemburg, and the Suez Canal occupy a position similar to that of Switzerland. The persons of nurses, doctors, and chaplains attending to the sick during war have also by convention acquired a neutral character.

LITERATURE.—A fuller discussion of the principles outlined above will be found in T. J. Lawrence, *Principles of International Law*, London, 1910, and similar text-books. The reader should also consult T. E. Holland, *Studies in International Law*, Oxford, 1893, ch. xiv.; L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, London, 1906, deals exhaustively with the subject.

M. CAMPBELL SMITH.

NEW BIRTH.—See REGENERATION, TRANS-MIGRATION.

NEW BRITAIN AND NEW IRELAND.—

These are the two largest islands of an archipelago, lying north-east of New Guinea, which also includes New Hanover, the Duke of York group, Vuatom, and many other islands. The group is mainly of volcanic origin, and has several active volcanoes. Large regions are still wholly unexplored, especially in the interior and on the south coast of New Britain. The regions about which most is known are the Gazelle Peninsula at the north-eastern extremity of New Britain, the Duke of York group, and the southern half of New Ireland.

1. Population.—The islands are inhabited by a population bearing a general resemblance to other Melanesians, but probably showing less variation than in most other parts of Melanesia, the more negroid characters of this people predominating especially in the Gazelle Peninsula.

2. Language.—Most of the languages spoken in the archipelago belong to the Melanesian family, but several peoples are known to speak languages resembling the Papuan languages of New Guinea, and more will probably be found in the unexplored parts of New Britain. The best known of the peoples who speak these non-Melanesian languages are the Baining, who occupy the hills in the interior of the Gazelle Peninsula, and the Sulka, living to the south of the isthmus of this peninsula. Neither people differs physically from its neighbors who speak Melanesian languages, though striking differences of culture accompany the difference of language.

3. Social organization and secret societies.—Two chief forms of social organization are known: the dual organization with matrilineal descent, and the totemic clan-organization, probably with matrilineal descent also. The dual organization occurs in the Gazelle Peninsula, the north coast of New Britain, the Duke of York group, and the greater part of the southern half of New Ireland, while the totemic organization is found in the northern half of New Ireland and New Hanover, and in a somewhat different form on the south-eastern coast of New Ireland. These two regions will be spoken of in this article as the dual and totemic regions respectively.

The moieties of the dual region are in most parts named after birds, and the attitude of the people towards the object connected with their moiety resembles that usually associated with totemism. In the Duke of York Islands the animals connected with the moieties are insects, and the respect shown to these animals is even greater than is usual in Melanesian totemism; if one is found dead, it is buried with the same honours as a human being.

The moieties have a number of subdivisions, which are probably local groups. In the totemic region the totems are usually birds.

Hereditary chieftainship with patrilineal succession is probably present in the totemic region, at the southern end of New Ireland, and in the north-western part of New Britain. In some parts of the Gazelle Peninsula two kinds of chief are distinguished—one whose business it is to look after the shell-money, while the other or others lead in war—but both offices may be combined in the same person. When these dignities are hereditary, they pass to the brother or sister's son.

In other parts of the Gazelle Peninsula, and probably elsewhere, authority depends chiefly on wealth and position in the organizations known as the *Dukduk* and *Ingiel*, especially the former. These resemble the secret societies of other parts of Melanesia. The *Dukduk* is the more recent, at any rate in the Duke of York Islands and New Britain. It is said to have come to them from the southern part of New Ireland, where it has now almost disappeared. It has two sections called *Dukduk* and *Tubuan*, represented in the rites by men wearing different forms of conical head-dress. The *Tubuan* is always in existence and is called the mother of the *Dukduk*, which 'comes to life' annually and dies again later in the year. The cult of the dead, which is the motive of similar societies in other parts of Melanesia, is not obvious in the ritual of the *Dukduk*, and there is reason to suppose that this ritual may have been derived in part from a cult of the sun. The *Dukduk* is an organization whose members exert great powers over the rest of the community, from whom they are able to extort money and other goods by a process of terrorization and blackmail. Rank within the organization probably depends chiefly on wealth.

The other secret organization, the *Ingiel*, is more clearly connected with a cult of the dead. Stone images, which represent dead ancestors in human or animal form, are prominent in its ritual. Within the *Ingiel* is another organization, entered by a special process of initiation, which is devoted to practices of the kind usually called magical. Their special feature is that members learn how to project some part of themselves, called *magit*, into the form of an animal or of some other human being. The *magit* brings about the effect which the worker of the spell desires—usually the injury of some other person. In another branch of the *Ingiel* men learn how to protect themselves from the harmful action of the *magit* of others.

Another feature of the *Ingiel* is the practice of a rite in which new members are initiated on the top of a high canoe-shaped platform erected on a tree set in the ground with its roots upwards. The initiates are submitted to certain ordeals, and those who fail to retain a proper instructor who tells them how to behave run the risk of becoming transformed into beings, called *tutana vurakit*, who live for ever as wild men of the woods.

Dances in which enormous masks are worn or carried take place among the Baining, but there do not appear to be any definite organizations corresponding to the *Dukduk* and *Ingiel*.

4. Disposal of the dead.—There is much variety in the disposal of the dead. In the dual region interment is the most general mode. In the Duke of York Islands the bodies of influential men are either thrown into the sea or exposed on platforms, usually in canoes. One feature of this region is the use of the upright position of the dead body. Bodies thrown into the sea are weighted so that they will take this attitude, and occasionally the body of a chief may be interred in this position. In the totemic region the most usual method is cremation, but the dead may be placed

on platforms or may be either interred or burned in the sitting position. In one region of New Ireland the dead are packed in chalk in the sitting position and preserved under the roof of the house in which the survivors live.

The people of New Britain who speak non-Melanesian languages dispose of their dead in distinctive ways. The Sulka bury them in the sitting position, but with the upper part of the body above the ground and covered with a tower-like structure. The Baining inter the dead body, but take no special precautions to prevent its being devoured by pigs or dogs; and, associated with this absence of care for the body, there is said to be no belief in a life after death. The other people of the Gazelle Peninsula believe in homes of the dead in the east. One of these, called Tingenatabaran, reserved for those who have acquired large quantities of shell-money, has an abundance of all that the Melanesian desires, while those who have not acquired sufficient wealth pass to a comfortless existence in a place called Yakupia.

Though the skulls of the dead are sometimes preserved and are the object of ceremonial, there is no regular cult of dead ancestors apart from the *Inqiet* and *Dukduk*. The ghosts of the dead, called *tabaran*, are greatly feared, being supposed to have a harmful influence on the living, but we do not know of offerings and prayers to these beings such as form a prominent part of the religious ceremonial of many other parts of Melanesia.

5. Supernatural beings.—There are beliefs in several kinds of spiritual beings, some of whom are beneficent and others injurious to man. We do not know of any being who can be regarded as a supreme deity except in New Ireland, in the central part of which there is a belief in a good being who made the sky, the earth, and its people. This being is called *hintubuhet*, a word which means 'female ancestor,' and is also used for the birds and other sacred objects connected with the moieties of the dual organization. The *hintubuhet*, who is believed to have created the world, is not, however, supposed to take any special interest in her handiwork. Men have no duties towards her; they neither propitiate nor pray to her, and she neither punishes nor rewards.

A class of beings in whose beneficence towards mankind the people of New Britain believe is called *inal* or *pepe*. These beings live in banyan trees; they are not birds, though they resemble them in having wings. They send men into conditions of trance, in which they acquire new knowledge, or into states of ecstasy so that they are able to perform acts of which they are quite incapable in their ordinary condition. In the trances men learn new songs, dances, and love-charms, are taught how to make certain ornaments, and attain other desirable knowledge, but they are never taught any measures by which they can harm their fellows. Initiation into the cult of the *inal* also assists in the attainment of happiness in the life after death. The knowledge how to become possessed by the *inal* is obtained through a process of initiation by, and payment to, those who already possess the knowledge. If in his trance a man learns a new dance or song which appeals to others, he can sell it, the cult thus becoming a source of profit. It is a question, however, whether this economical aspect of the belief is not relatively recent.

Another class of supernatural beings, called *kaia* in the Gazelle Peninsula and *tadar* in the central part of New Ireland, occupies a more prominent place in the minds of the people. These beings have a local character and are greatly feared by all except the people of the districts which they inhabit, to whom they act as protectors, thus

forming a kind of guardian-spirit. It is believed that any intrusion on the domain of a *kaia* or the taking of fruits or other objects by strangers is resented by this being, who thus protects property and preserves the produce of the district for its inhabitants. The most important of the *kaia* are gigantic creatures with the bodies or tails of snakes and the bearded faces of men. They have companions who are believed to be harmful to those who offend the *kaia*. The most important of these companions are dogs with hanging ears and other characters which distinguish them from the Melanesian dog of the present time. Other companions of the *kaia* are pigs, fowls, lizards, snakes, ants, and other animals, many of which are naturally harmful to mankind. The *kaia* not only is able to bring disease upon individual persons, but also may punish a whole community by causing earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, thunder-storms, floods, pestilence, or famine.

There are beliefs in several other supernatural beings which take a less important place in the lives of the people than that of the *tabaran* and *kaia*, or *tadar*. Female beings are believed to inhabit hollows in rocks or trees, from which they come forth in the dusk and entice men, who suffer in consequence from painful diseases of the sexual organs. Dwarfs with long beards and of enormous strength are said to uproot trees from the ground and bear them to their dwellings. Wild men, who have only two teeth and long tufts of hair growing from forehead, neck, and sides, are believed to be derived from the unborn children of women who die during pregnancy.

The people of the west coast of New Ireland believe in men with long hair, in others with a face at the back as well as in front of the head, in others with enormous ears, and in another with one arm of the ordinary length and the other 50 to 80 yards long, with which he seizes canoes which venture within its reach. Still another being belongs to a river which disappears under ground to reappear again at the spot where the spirit is believed to dwell.

All these beings are thought to be still alive, though some of them are never seen by mortal eye. Stories are also told of men of old time who no longer exist. Prominent among these are two men connected with the moieties of the dual system of whom numerous stories are told, all of which illustrate the superior ability and wisdom of one and the stupidity and ignorance of the other.

6. Sun-worship.—In one district of the island of Vuatom there is a definite cult of the sun, the rites of which take place at the southern solstice, and there is some reason to suppose that a cult of the sun may underlie certain features of the ceremonial of the *Dukduk*. The sun is sacred to one of the moieties in the central part of New Ireland, and in the northern part of New Ireland an object representing the sun is burned after it has been the subject of rites.

7. Circumcision.—Circumcision is practised by the Sulka and in Rook Island, lying between New Britain and New Guinea, while the operation of incision occurs at the north-east end of New Britain. In Rook Island the operation takes place in a club-house and is followed by a long period of seclusion.

8. Money.—The sacred character of money, of which there are definite signs elsewhere in Melanesia, comes out very strongly in New Britain, in one part of which the shell-money is called *tambu*—a word which has the general meaning of 'sacred.' This money takes a very prominent place in the ritual both of the *Dukduk* and of the ceremonies following death.

9. Drums.—Two kinds of 'drum' are used—the form more properly called a gong and the drum proper, the sound of which is produced by striking a membrane. It is the gong that is used especially in sacred rites, while the drum proper is used in connexion with dances of a more secular character. The instrument used to make the mysterious sound of the secret rites is the bull-roarer, and the shell-conch is also prominent in these rites.

10. Betel.—Betel-chewing, in which a mixture of areca-nut, betel-leaf, and lime is used, is a general custom, and some or all of the constituents of the mixture are used in magical and religious rites.

11. Art.—The decorative art of the dual region is characterized by the presence of spirals, while that of the totemic region takes the form of highly-complicated carvings, the general motive of which is the representation of a struggle between birds who act as the guardians of mankind and evil beings represented by snakes. In this region bisexual images are made about the meaning of which we have at present no information.

LITERATURE.—R. H. Rickard, *Proc. Roy. Soc. Victoria*, iii, [1901] 46, 70; A. Willey, *Zoological Results based on Material from New Britain, New Guinea, Loyalty Islands*, etc., pt. 6, Cambridge, 1902; P. Rascher, *AA* xxix, [1904] 209; P. A. Kleintitschen, *Die Küstenbewohner der Gazellehalbinsel, Hilt-rup bei Münster*, 1908; R. Parkinson, *Dreißig Jahre in der Sildsee*, Stuttgart, 1907; E. Stephan and F. Graebner, *Neu-Mecklenburg*, Berlin, 1907; P. J. Meier, *Mythen und Erzähl-ungen der Küstenbewohner der Gazelle-Halbinsel*, Münster, 1909; *Anthropos*, iii, [1903] 1005, v, [1910] 95, vi, [1911] 837, vii, [1912] 706, viii, [1913] 1, 286, 688; P. G. Peekel, *Religion und Zauberei auf dem mittleren Neu-Mecklenburg*, Münster, 1910; G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, London, 1910; G. Friederich, *Beiträge zur Völker- und Sprachkunde von Deutsch-Neu-guinea*, Berlin, 1912; W. H. R. Rivers, *The Hist. of Melanesian Society*, Cambridge, 1914.

W. H. R. RIVERS.

NEW CALEDONIA.—This island, which forms the south-western extremity of Melanesia, is inhabited by a people who resemble other Melanesians in showing a mixture of two main types, one Negro and the other resembling the Polynesian. There is much linguistic diversity, but little is known about the character of the languages. All those recorded belong to the Melanesian family, though of an aberrant kind.

1. Social organization.—The social organization varies in different parts of the island. An exogamous clan-organization, in some cases on a local basis, appears to be general, but there is no evidence of any dual system. In some parts the clans are named after ancestors, and elsewhere they appear to be totemic, each clan being associated with an animal which may not be eaten and is regarded as a father. The members of certain social groups are believed to be able to promote the growth of plants, and this power is associated with a tabu on the use of the plants as food, but we do not know whether these social groups have other totemic characters. Wherever we learn its nature, descent is patrilineal, and inheritance also follows this mode of transmission. The cross-cousin marriage is practised, and there is definite avoidance between brother and sister. The relation between a man and his sister's son, so frequent in Melanesia, takes in this island the special form that a man who sees the blood of his nephew thereby obtains extensive rights over his property.

Hereditary chieftainship with succession in the male line is found, and there is some evidence for the presence of the distinction between sacred and secular chiefs. The sacred chief is highly honoured and is said to be regarded as a divinity.

2. Religious beliefs.—There is no evidence of any belief in a supreme deity, but there is a belief in several sacred beings with special names who preside over the home of the dead or are believed to live on mountains. There is little doubt, how-

ever, that, as in other parts of Melanesia, the essential element in the religion of the people is the cult of dead ancestors. Offerings are made to the skulls of dead relatives, and certain men are believed to be able to summon the ghosts of dead chiefs and obtain from them information about the future.

Masks are worn on certain occasions, as in the rites which follow death and after the operation of incision, but we have no evidence that they are connected with such definite organizations as are present in other parts of Melanesia.

There is a definite cult of the sun in which the tombs of ancestors are visited and fires are lighted on 'altars' on the tops of mountains. Rites are performed both at sunrise and at sunset. There is evidence that chiefs are especially associated with the sun, for, when a chief is dead, the people say, 'The sun has set.'

There is a belief in a snake-like being inhabiting a cave, and there seem to be other signs of a cult of serpents, although there are no snakes on the island.

3. Disposal of the dead.—There is much variety in the modes of disposal of the bodies of the dead. In one method of frequent occurrence the body is buried in the squatting position with the head above the ground so that the skull can be removed and preserved, this taking place six months after death in the case of a chief. The teeth may be extracted as relics, and the teeth of women may be sown in order to promote the growth of crops. The dead are sometimes interred in the extended position, as a special mark of honour. They are also mummified, especially among the chiefs of the northern part of the island. In some cases in which the body is preserved caves are used as funerary chambers, but more frequently the body, with the legs folded on the trunk, is placed on a platform in a banyan or other kind of tree. This method, which is said to be ancient, is now in vogue chiefly in the interior of the island. The dead are believed to go to a place at the bottom of the sea, whose chief is represented with rocks in the place of the lower part of the body and with trees growing from the upper part.

4. Culture.—The people are agricultural and practise terrace-cultivation and irrigation on a large scale. There are rites connected with first-fruits, the first yams being eaten by the chiefs. We know little of the nature of the rites performed to promote the growth of vegetation, but, as in other parts of Melanesia, stones are used in them.

A special feature of the material culture is the presence of the round house, often with an image in human form at the summit of the conical roof. The rectangular house also occurs, but the circular form is the more frequent and is used for the club-houses and for the houses of chiefs, as well as for those of the general population.

The people practise incision, the use of the pudendal sheath, tattooing, deformation of the head, piercing and distension of the ear-lobe, and use shell-money and wooden gongs. The human motive is prominent in the decorative art, and the human figure is sometimes represented with a protruding tongue.

A feature of the culture of New Caledonia which distinguishes it from other parts of S. Melanesia is the prominence of the cult of the sun, and this cult is associated with many customs which accompany it in other parts of the world.¹ A few features of culture, such as the use of nephrite and the protruded tongue in the decorative art, suggest a relation with New Zealand.

¹ Cf. Elliot Smith, *The Migrations of Early Culture*. Manchester, 1915.

LITERATURE.—M. Glaumont, *Reth* vii. [1889] 73; Lambert, *Mœurs et superstitions des Néo-Calédoniens*, Nouméa, 1900; J. J. Atkinson, 'The Natives of New Caledonia,' *PL* xiv. [1903] 248 ff. W. H. R. RIVERS.

NEW CHURCH.—See SWEDENBORG.

NEW DISPENSATION.—The Church of the New Dispensation was the name given by Keshab Chandra Sen to the section of the Brāhma Samāj which remained faithful to him after the schism of 1878. The publication of Sāstri's *History of the Brahmo Samāj* and other fresh material makes it desirable to give here a rather fuller account of the New Dispensation than that which appears in art. BRĀHMA SAMĀJ (vol. ii. p. 820). For the historical connexion readers will refer to that article.

The subject is one of considerable interest; for what Keshab attempted to do was to create a religion which should be the final religion for all men, and should stand in living relations with all foregoing religions. Madame Blavatsky attempted something of the same kind but on other lines in India about the same time.

The great secession took place in 1878, and it left Keshab with a very seriously diminished following. The New Dispensation was not announced, however, until Jan. 1880, and its significance was not clearly and fully unfolded until Jan. 1881, only three years before his death. At the anniversary meetings held then Keshab appeared on the platform under a bright red banner, on which were inscribed the title Naba Bidhān (i.e. Nava Vidhāna, 'New Dispensation') and an extraordinary symbol, made up of the Śaiva trident, the Vaiṣṇava *khuntī*, the Christian cross, and the Muhammadan crescent. On the table beside him lay the Scriptures of the four great religions, Hinduism, Buddhism, Muhammadanism, and Christianity. In a sermon he expounded the New Dispensation, declaring that it was a revelation from God, that in it all religions were harmonized, and that he and his missionaries were the apostles of this new divine message. At the evening service the Hindu ceremony named *ārati*, the waving of lights before an image, was introduced in a modified form as a significant feature of the system.

The chief conceptions of the new position are that in the New Dispensation all religions are harmonized, and are so set forth as to become available as spiritual food for the members. The new system is a revelation from God; and it is therefore the duty of all men, of whatever race or religion, to accept it, and to find within its organization their spiritual home. It was spoken of as a far larger and more serious thing than the old Brāhmaism; and all Brāhmas who refused to accept it were condemned as unbelievers and enemies of God. The revelation had been sent by God, the Divine Mother, to Keshab; and, though he disclaimed the title of prophet, he frankly claimed authority in the New Dispensation. He frequently issued in the name of God proclamations in which he denounced in vehement terms the men who had left him. In full confidence in these new ideas he went on to introduce into the thought and ritual of the New Dispensation fragments of Hindu and Christian belief and practice.

The central conception of the New Dispensation has three sources—Keshab's belief in his own perpetual inspiration, the Christian doctrine of dispensations, and Rāmākṛṣṇa Paramahansa's doctrine, that all religions are true.

It is abundantly clear that Rāmākṛṣṇa exercised a very powerful influence over Keshab's mind. For many years he was a strict theist; but he made the acquaintance of Rāmākṛṣṇa about 1875, and from 1878 onwards one can trace a new attitude

to Hinduism in his teaching; finally there emerged in the year 1881 the definite statement, 'All the established religions of the world are true.' A friend of Rāmākṛṣṇa had a symbolical picture painted which represents Rāmākṛṣṇa teaching Keshab this doctrine. A Christian church, a Muhammadan mosque, and a Hindu temple occupy the background. In front of the church stand Keshab and Rāmākṛṣṇa, the former carrying the banner of the New Dispensation, the latter calling Keshab's attention to a group of figures which fill the rest of the foreground. They are men of many religions, each carrying a symbol of his faith, and in the centre of the group are Christ and Chaitanya dancing a religious dance together.

While Keshab's teaching and religious practice were undergoing this very remarkable change, another most interesting revolution was taking place in his mind. From the beginning of his theistic life he had been much more under Christian influence than any earlier Brāhma had been. He not only recognized the value of Christ's ethical and social principles, but lived in the inspiration of His character and followed Him with tender love and adoring enthusiasm. He was a strict theist, yet his religious life was rooted in Christ. But during the period when he developed his New Dispensation theory he was driven onward by his personal experience to give a more adequate account of the person of Christ, and finally reached the position that He was the Logos, the Son of God. He also accepted the doctrine of the Trinity. Yet he continued to teach the New Dispensation theory to the end. He was not a systematic thinker.

Keshab's personal power, the extreme brilliance of his teaching, and the faithful toil of a large number of missionaries combined to secure considerable success for a few years; but the leader died in Jan. 1884, and the final outcome of the undigested eclecticism of his new system was precisely what one would expect it would be: the Church of the New Dispensation broke up into sections, and even into fragments, which have never been again united.

LITERATURE.—Sāstri, *Hist. of the Brahmo Samāj*, Calcutta, 1911-12; J. N. Farquhar, *Modern Religious Movements in India*, New York, 1915. J. N. FARQUHAR.

NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY.—See EDWARDS AND THE NEW ENGLAND THEOLOGY.

NEWFOUNDLAND.—See BEOTHUKS.

NEW GUINEA.—It is impossible in a short article to deal adequately with the religions of the various peoples of so large an island as New Guinea, and it is difficult to make satisfactory generalizations, as very few groups of people have been carefully studied, and even about these our information is rarely complete. The inhabitants of New Guinea are of mixed origin and have been subject to various cultural influences coming in from the east, north, and west. The main racial elements are Negrito, Papuan, and Melanesian, with intermixture in places with peoples from the E. Indian archipelago. It is quite possible that there are or were more than one variety of Negrito in New Guinea. The only true Pygmies are the Tapiro, whose appearance and material culture have been described by A. F. R. Wollaston (*Pygmies and Papuans*, London, 1912) and C. G. Rawling (*The Land of the New Guinea Pygmies*, do. 1913), and the Pēsēchēm (*Nova Guinea*, vii. [1915] 145, 233); of their social and religious life we know nothing. With a perceptible Negrito strain are the Kama-weka mountain tribes behind Mekco, British New Guinea (*JRAI* xxxix. [1909] 329), the Mafulu (R.

W. Williamson, *The Mafulu Mountain People of British New Guinea*, London, 1912), the people of the Goliath mountains, Netherlands New Guinea, and of the Torricelli mountains, German New Guinea, and the Kai, German New Guinea; traces of the Pygmy stock also occur elsewhere (cf. Haddon, in Wollaston, p. 303 ff.; O. Schlaginhaufen, 'Über die Pygmäenfrage in Neu-Guinea,' in *Festschr. der Dozenten der Univ. Zürich*, Zürich, 1914). Of these the Mafulu and Kai alone have been studied; the Mafulu are mixed with Papuan and Melanesian elements, and their customs and beliefs betray this mixture, there being no socio-religious customs which we can refer with probability to the Negrito element. Owing to the spread of various cultures it is difficult at the present stage of our knowledge to determine what elements belong to the different strata, and lack of space prevents a discussion of these problems. A few indications will, however, be attempted. A geographical arrangement has been adopted as being the most satisfactory, beginning with the south-west and continuing along the southern, eastern, northern, and north-western areas, for the reason that the presumably purest Papuan peoples will be treated first, then the predominating Papuo-Melanesians, and finally those peoples who have been directly affected by influences from the E. Indian archipelago.

The Kaia-kaia, or Tugeri, at Merauke (about 140° 23' E., 8° 28' S.) are inveterate head-hunters. All the men sleep in a few men's houses at each end of a village, and there is a bachelors' club-house outside the village; no one may enter the house of the opposite sex. There is a complicated patrilineal exogamous totemic system, in which plants are combined with animals into main and subsidiary groups. Several villages assemble at initiation, bull-roarers are employed, and there are many dances in which masks are worn and animals represented. The bull-roarer is anthropomorphized as Sosom, a mythical monster in the bush, who at the annual festival at the beginning of the south-east monsoon devours the novices but brings them back to life; it is not known to be used anywhere else in Netherlands New Guinea. The youths receive a new name but are not circumcised (R. Pösch, *SWAW* exv. [1906] i. 899 ff.; *ZE* xxxix. [1907] 392; *Geog. Journ.* xxx. [1907] 616; the system of age-grades is described by H. Nollen, *Anthropos*, iv. [1909] 553).

The Toro, who live up the Bensbach River, have totems which descend in the male line; probably they, like the natives of the Morehead River, use their bull-roarers in initiation ceremonies (C. G. Seligmann and W. M. Strong, *Geog. Journ.* xxvii. [1906] 229).

The Dungenwab of the Wäsi Küsa believe that ghosts of men, dogs, and pigs, but not of cassowaries, go into the sky. Grave-offerings are made (*Ann. Rep. Brit. New Guinea*, 1895-96, p. 44).

Chalmers says that the Bugilai (near the coast about 142° 20' E.) practise totemism, have an initiation ceremony, believe in a great spirit, Kaka, and that ghosts (spirits?) are everywhere. The ghost (*yedö*) goes right away to Bëmor in the west (*JAI* xxxiii. [1903] 109).

The Masingara, behind Mawata, have a crocodile-cult. At large hunting ceremonies men dance round two effigies of crocodiles, one of which represents Nugu, whom B. A. Hely describes as their deity (he is also represented in human form), libations of kava are made to them, and they are greased with pig's fat (*Ann. Rep. Brit. New Guinea*, 1894-95, p. 45).

The bush people up the Binaturi River employ carved wooden figures (*udo*) in the ceremonies connected with the planting of bananas. The

figures are anointed with oil, food is heaped in front of them, and there is dancing (MS).

The islanders of Torres Straits are Papuans, but the western islanders speak an Australoid language, while the eastern islanders speak a Papuan language. There was a large variety of natural and worked stones and carved wooden figures which were supposed to ensure good crops and influence animals and the elements. In Mabuiag wooden human effigies (*madub*) were said to become animated and go round the gardens swinging bull-roarers to make plants grow. Perhaps in all cases sacred words were employed. Many belonged to definite families or to the heirs of definite localities, but certain stones, shrines, or rituals belonged to larger groups. Offerings were made to some of them. Masked dances to increase the food-supply were common. Typical totemism occurred in the west, but had disappeared in the east. Omens were obtained from birds and other sources, and in Mer the ghost of a recently deceased man usually appeared in the form of some animal, that of a woman as a flying animal. Skull-divination was common. A distinction was made at all events by the western islanders between a ghost, *mari*, of a recently deceased person and its later stage, *markai*; the former was feared, but the latter was friendly. The dead were buried in an extended position. There were numerous funeral ceremonies, the most elaborate being that at which several ghosts were dispatched finally to their island home in the west. Certain men in Mabuiag were friends of the ghosts and possessed the gift of ghost-divination. There are slight traces of a former manes- or ancestor-cult, but ancestors were not apotheosized. A high code of morals was inculcated at very important initiation ceremonies, at which seclusion was practised and the lads were terrorized. Ghosts resented wrong done to their children; otherwise morality derived neither sanction nor support from non-human influences. Tales were told of heroes who introduced new foods or a new technique, or instructed people in new ceremonies; some of these came from New Guinea. Kwoiam, the warrior-hero of Mabuiag, was of Australian origin; two emblems made by him were called *augud* (the name for a totem), and were associated with the dual organization. In Muralug Kwoiam was regarded as an *augud*. A family of mythical brothers came from New Guinea first to certain western islands, and then two went to Mer. At Yam two of the brothers became identified with totems, and were prayed to as *augud*; they were represented by turtle-shell images of a crocodile and a hammer-headed shark, under each of which was a stone in which the spirit of the *augud* resided; the cult at these complicated shrines was essentially a war-cult. In Mer the hero-cult took the form of a secret society or religious fraternity of the usual W. Pacific type, which did not develop into a war-cult, but took upon itself disciplinary functions. The sacred men connected with it attained considerable power, which they frequently used for their private ends, and were on the way to become priests. The hero-cults were not an evolution from totemism. A transformation of totemism had certainly occurred, but by a grafting of a new cult upon an old. Nor is there any suspicion that the heroes of the cults were locally developed ancestors, though they may have arisen in this way in their original country. Unless the heroes of the cults be regarded as gods, it can be stated definitely that the Torres Straits islanders had no deities, and certainly they had no conception of a supreme god (A. C. Haddon, 'The Religion of the Torres Straits Islanders,' *Anthrop. Essays presented to E. B. Tylor*, Oxford, 1907, p. 175 ff.; *Rep. Camb. Exped. Torres Straits*, v., vi.).

The natives of Kiwai island and Mawata on the coast to the west are practically the same people. Patrilineal totemism was first noted among the western Papuans by the present writer in 1888 and by E. Beardmore in 1889 (*JAI* xix. [1890] 297 ff., 459 ff.). B. A. Hely (*Ann. Rep. Brit. New Guinea*, 1898, p. 134) gives an account of totemism at Kiwai and Mawata, which is reprinted in the *Rep. Camb. Exped. Torres Straits*, v. 187 ff. (cf. A. C. Haddon, *Head-hunters, Black, White, and Brown*, London, 1901, p. 101 ff.). On Kiwai initiation (*moguru*) takes place at the beginning of the yam season. On hearing the bull-roarer, all the uninitiated have to leave the village, in order to see the wooden effigies Kurumi, Uruparu, and Paroniti. Large feasts have to be prepared, and, when they are shown, fire is showered on the lads. Various immoral practices are indulged in. Only those who have passed through all the stages of initiation may drink kava (*gumada*).¹ The effigies are used when they are going to fight or when there is sickness; smaller ones are employed as charms (J. Chalmers, *JAI* xxxiii. [1903] 119). The young men are hardened by fighting among themselves with burning torches, which they place previously for a moment on wooden human figures (*mimia*) which are arranged down the sides of the men's house (G. Landtman, MS). Bull-roarers are swung to ensure good garden crops, and wooden images of nude women make sago abundant. Both of these enter into the initiation ceremonies; the latter were described as 'God belong *moguru*,' and one name for a bull-roarer is 'mother of yams.' A wooden image of a man (*uvio moguru* or *oraoradubu*) is used at initiation; he makes everything grow, and presents of food are made to him when the planting season arrives. He is always consulted before fighting, and presents are given him to secure success in getting heads. In cases of sickness offerings are made, and he is prayed to as follows: 'Oh, Uvio, finish the sickness of our dear one, and give life' (Chalmers, MS, quoted in Haddon, p. 107). For further information on totemism, etc., at Mawata see Seligmann, quoted by Frazer, *Totemism and Exogamy*, ii. 29-34. Landtman (*Festschrift tillegnad Edward Westermarck*, Helsingfors, 1912, p. 59 ff.) has given a good account of the wanderings of the dead in the folk-lore of the Kiwai-speaking Papuans.

The legendary Sido of Kiwai opened the road to Adiri, or Woibu, the land of the dead, a country in the western sea. His was the first death, which was also a murder. His ghost was mischievous during his wanderings, and after various adventures reached the barren Adiri. Here he married the daughter of a man also called Adiri, and, as there were no houses, gardens, fires, or proper food, he introduced them. All mortals follow Sido's road, but may do so in the guise of animals. Some people who have died a violent death remain on the spot for a long time, and their ghosts are much feared. Some ghosts go underground. Ghosts can return to earth; some are malevolent, others are quite friendly and helpful; presents of food are often deposited at places which they frequent and a request is made, but there is no regular or continuous cult. In building a man's house various objects, such as thorny bushes, parts of spiders, bats, etc., are placed in the holes for the piles and in various parts of the structure for the purpose of closing the road to Adiri and preventing men from becoming ill or being killed. They have reference to similar objects which barred the road that Sido took.

Magico-religious ideas enter into all their practical life.

The Kabiri, or Girara, who live north of the estuary of the Fly, are head-hunters, chew kava, and have five patrilineal totems. They pay great attention to human heads, and probably have a manes-cult. At their principal ceremony, *moi-inta*, three large named wooden effigies of croco-

diles are exhibited, masks are worn, marriages are celebrated, and youths are initiated. The boy to be initiated is previously hidden and at the ceremony is placed in the jaws of one of the crocodiles (W. N. Beaver, *Ann. Rep. Papua*, 1911-12, p. 11; A. P. Lyons, *ib.* 1913-14, p. 100).

The tribes in the deltas of the Turama, Omati, and Kikori are allied, but very little is known about them. Each village has at least one *dubu-daimu*, or house for the married men, with a number of shrines which consist of a perforated board (*agibi*) on which is carved a human face, and to the hooks of which numerous skulls are suspended; in front of the carving is a shelf supporting the skulls. The skulls are those of enemies or of victims who have been sacrificed when a war canoe is made or a *dubu-daimu* erected, their bodies having been boiled and eaten. There are similar but much smaller carvings (*marubu*), from which birds' heads are suspended. An *agibi* probably belongs to a family or clan. Male and female effigies are carved to represent dead people, and are connected with some form of ancestor-cult, as also are probably boards or tablets carved with human designs (MS). One ceremony is described by H. J. Ryan (*Ann. Rep. Papua*, 1913, p. 76).

Namau is the coastal district from Era Bay to the Alele mouth of the Purari River. The people are lusty head-hunters and cannibals. The club-houses (*ravi*) are especially fine, and formerly contained large numbers of skulls of enemies and victims; in a screened-off portion at the end are eight to ten basket-work monsters with four legs and great gaping jaws; these *kopiravi*, or *kai-ia-imunu* ('sky *imunu*'), have names. Before going out to kill any one, the men consult the spirit of the *kopiravi*; it comes out of the *ravi* and causes the canoe to rock if the expedition is to be successful. The present writer was informed that the dead bodies of victims were thrust inside the *kopiravi* and left there all night while the men danced in the front part of the *ravi*. Next morning the bodies were cut up with bull-roarers (of which numbers are kept under the *kopiravi*), and then cooked and eaten. A human victim, a cassowary, and a pig have to be sacrificed when a canoe is completed. The skulls of their own dead are kept in the houses. Totemism existed, but is now breaking up. According to Holmes, the conception of *imunu*, 'the life principle,' runs through all their religion; masks are *imunu*. The carved tablets (*koe*) which occur in such numbers in the shrines in the *ravi* seem to be personal *imunu*; it would seem that they are ancestral tablets, and, if the bull-roarers represent ancestral ghosts, the tablets may be hypertrophied bull-roarers; one name for the bull-roarer is *imunu viki*, 'crying *imunu*.' Holmes is now studying these people, who seem to be remotely related to the Elema tribes, but the *kopiravi*-cult is peculiar to them, and their religion seems to be a combination of head-hunting, cannibalism, and a manes- or ancestor-cult; the *kopiravi* may prove, however, to be effigies of spirits who may be regarded as gods. Chalmers first described the *kanibus*, as he calls them (*Pioneering in New Guinea*, London, 1887, pp. 63-66; cf. J. H. P. Murray, *Papua, or British New Guinea*, do. 1912, p. 178, pl. on 219).

Elema is the coastal district between the Alele mouth of the Purari in the west and Cape Possession in the east. Apparently all the tribes have migrated towards the coast, the original home of the 'Ipi' tribes being on the south side of the mountain range near the east bank of the upper Purari. The initiation of a youth is all-important, since it is on the performance of the instructions which he received as an initiate that the social and moral welfare of the tribe depends, and great

¹ The distribution of kava-drinking has an important cultural significance. It occurs in New Guinea at Astrolabe Bay, Fischhafen district, Fly estuary district, inland from Mawata, at Merauke, and perhaps on the upper reaches of the Fly (cf. Haddon, 'Kava-drinking in New Guinea,' *Man*, Oct. 1916).

reticence is observed about the proceedings. The various stages are marked by feasts, at which pigs always figure.

The first stage is when the boy is about eight years of age, two or three years prior to his entering the *eravo* (cluh-houso) for seclusion; he is then formally taken into the *eravo* and greeted with the noise of bull-roarers (*tiparu*), which he sees for the first time; one is placed on his chest, and he is severely beaten. Bull-roarers are swung day and night till the feast is over. After the lad has entered the *eravo* for his period of seclusion, the clan feast of Kovave is held. Ten days previously a large number of young men wearing Kovave masks announce that Kovave is about to visit the village; they are the sacred messengers of the mountain-god, as is proved by the fact that they do not walk on the soles of their feet. Every night bull-roarers are swung, and all women and children keep indoors. On the great day large quantities of food and pigs are taken to a tabued spot in the bush for Kovave to the accompaniment of the beating of drums and blowing of conchs, and at nightfall the novices are marched there. In the dark a feigned gruff voice assures them that Kovave is speaking to them. He promises to be their friend as long as they observe all tribal and clan duties, obligations, and secrets; otherwise they will be punished with disease and death. Unexpectedly a Kovave mask is placed on each boy's head amid a loud buzzing of bull-roarers; he is then beaten, and all are marched back to the *eravo*. The feast is partaken of by the initiated members of a given clan, not by the tribe. The lads remain in well-guarded seclusion in the *eravo*; they must not be exposed to the rays of the sun lest they suffer thereby, nor do any heavy manual work lest their physical development be hindered, and they must have no dealings with females. When allowed to go outside they are encased in plaited palm-leaves and must maintain silence. There are food-tabus, and during seclusion they are instructed in all matters pertaining to tabu. They are taught that the tribe must take the first place in all their actions, and whatever serves the highest interest of the tribe is justifiable; everything that is, or can be, must be subordinated to the pursuit of obtaining the fittest; this idea is dominant till death. The next stage of initiation is one of greater liberty, but still subject to strict surveillance. The final stage is the *semese*, or warrior festival, which is of tribal significance, and in which large masks are employed. First of all, numerous pigs are killed, accompanied with great noise. Four men wearing Kovave masks arrive from a hill village and receive presents of pigs. In the evening there is a procession of symbolic masked figures from the *eravo*, followed by most of the villagers. The novices and recent initiates man a scaffolding in front of the *eravo* and welcome the effigies with song; armed men in front of the effigies fire arrows at the *eravo*, and dancing is kept up all night. At daybreak there is another procession of human-face masks and totem effigies. The festivities last as long as the food holds out. Only the initiated may eat pig-flesh; others must eat dog-flesh. At the last procession there is no dancing, and all the masks are then burned. The festival has a religious significance to the native mind more profound than it can express to an alien mind; at it friend and foe meet in peace on common ground, all anxious to do honour to their ancestors, from whom come all temporal blessings. The period of seclusion is now terminated, and the initiate can marry and take his place in the social life of his community. The final degree of initiation is the *makaikara*, 'sea' ceremony, which may be clan or tribal; totemic decoration is employed, but no masks. The chief addresses the people, and then shouts to Kalapo, the god of the sea, acknowledging the indebtedness of his tribe to him, invokes him to continue his protection of their crops and to give them a plentiful supply of fish, and reminds him that the present festivities are in his honour. The clan *makaikara*, though impressive, is less elaborate.

The religious ideas resolve themselves into reverence for certain objects, a belief in the existence of ghosts, and the worship of gods. The name for ancestors is practically the same term (*ualare*) by which all sacred objects are designated. Certain animals are *ualare*, and, as these were never injured or eaten by the ancestors, so their descendants hold them sacred; or they may be natural objects or phenomena. (1) All tribal *ualare* are regarded as deities who in the long ago temporarily assumed human form when they became the ancestors of the respective tribes and at the same time appropriated certain areas for their posterity, which they furnished with vegetable food. Some of the immediate descendants of the original ancestor are credited with his supernatural attributes. These *ualare*-deities are kind and beneficent, and are angered only after much provocation from the tribes, not by individual wrong-doing. There are two of them; the one associated with the sea is occasionally malevolent. It is strange that the inland tribes also have the same ideas. (2) Clan *ualare*-deities are ancestors who acquired their

powers from the father (or from the mother—in the latter case descent is matrilineal), who created himself from a natural object or is a nature-deity. (3) Individual *ualare*, unlike the others, are not inherited. A personal *ualare* may be that of either parent or of the person after whom a man is named, or the result of a dream. Every man of legitimate birth has two *ualare*, such as a bird, a dog, a pig, a wallaby, or a tree, and a fish; rarely a man may have two trees or only one *ualare*, as women have. A man should not injure or eat his *ualare*; he fasts and mourns as for a relative when one is killed, and he wears parts of it as personal adornment—which no others may do. It is quite evident that the *ualare* was originally a totem, but the totemic idea has been greatly extended through ancient contact with another cult. Holmes believes that the Naman of the Purari delta and the Elema tribes used to be closely allied, and that the former have a purer and more elaborate totemic cult.

The future of ghosts (*ove*) depends upon the death which the individuals have died. Ghosts of warriors go to the residence in the sky of Hiovaki, the god of war, but can roam about their old surroundings. Those that have died a natural death go to their respective places when assured that all mourning ceremonies have been duly observed. Those that have died a violent death roam about constantly and are malicious. Spirits (*harisu*) are classified as good or bad, and have their respective spheres of action, and thus may be termed gods. The great good god is Harisu; Harohoha is his messenger, and he communicates through sorcerers. The pageant of the warriors' festival represents all the totems (*ualare*), ghosts (*ove*), and gods (*harisu*), but effigies are not made of Harisu and Harohoha. *Ualare* created the visible world and nearly all the animals and foods. Kivovia created sago, areca palms, and other good things, his son created dogs, and Ruapu the pig. As Harisu is the supreme god of all the minor gods who work for the welfare of mankind, so Karisu is the supreme god of the minor malignant deities. Kovave, the mountain-god, holds the fate of travellers; Hiovaki, the war-god, dwells in the sky; Oalea, a malignant god resident on Yule island, is the god of *tiparu*, the bull-roarer. Saukoro is an evilly-disposed god who dwells in hollow trees. The kindly minor deities seem concerned only with the protection of foods and receive propitiatory worship; thus the gods of bananas are besought to protect bananas from the ravages of birds, and the gods of winds and the sea are invoked before a voyage. Every family of living things from man downwards has its special god or guardian spirit for whom awe is felt (Holmes, *JAI* xxxii. [1902] 418, xxxiii. 125, *Man*, 1905, pp. 2, 17, and MS). Chalmers says that the only guardian spirits of the Toaripi are those of father and mother, and to them they appeal in distress or want by land or sea (probably this statement requires modification), and that in times of great sickness they expel the evil spirits of sickness from the village with great noise and the throwing of firebrands (*JAI* xxvii. [1897] 334). He says elsewhere that the Toaripi ('Motumotu') believe in a great spirit called Saukoni, who is vindictive, steals native food, and kills people. Semese, his two sons, the sun, moon, stones, rocks, and mountains are worshipped; in a small degree they worship dead warriors long after they have gone. Hiovaki Semese, a spirit in the heavens, made the land and sea; to him they pray for goodness and strength in fighting; his sons are Hiovaki and Mial. Ghosts are like men; they live in Lavau in the west. All animals and objects have a spiritual part for the use of ghosts. At Perau, Vailala River, Chalmers saw two wooden idols.

Epe and Kivava, and a large stone 'Ravai' to which offerings are made, and they are appealed to in cases of sickness, 'seeing that Kanitu, the Great Spirit, is represented in them. . . . At Elema the Great Spirit is "Kanitu," at Namau, "Kanibu"' (*Pioneering*, pp. 168-174, 84). Tabu on garden produce is enforced by masked men, *harihu* ('spirits'), whose office is hereditary. Chalmers calls the mask *oioi* (*JAI* xxvii. 329); this custom has spread to certain Roro-speaking tribes, where it is known as *kaivakuku* (C. G. Seligmann, *The Melanesians*, Cambridge, 1910, pp. 299, 300); it also occurs at Hisiu, Redscar Bay (*Ann. Rep. Brit. New Guinea*, 1901, p. 2).

The Mambule (Mafulu) are an admittedly mixed people of Pygmy (Negrito) -Papuan descent and probably influenced by Melanesian culture. They inhabit the upper waters of the Angabunga (St. Joseph River), but they have affinities with the inhabitants of the Chirima affluent of the Mambare on the north-eastern side of the Main range, and it is possible that they have trading relations with the natives of the Waria River. There is no totemism, but there are clans and clan villages which are grouped into communities, each community being for many purposes a composite whole. The villages of one clan have a common chief and club-house (*emone*). Descent is definitely patrilineal. There is a ceremony at the assumption of the perineal band by boys and girls at which the decorated child stands on a dead pig bought from the family by an outsider. Only people from other communities take part in the dance. This ceremony is frequently performed at the 'big feast.' Later there is a purification ceremony. There is no seclusion of boys or girls at any time, no initiation ceremony, wearing of masks, or use of bull-roarers. A similar ceremony takes place before boys and girls may enter the *emone* (but after a girl has received the perineal band she may not enter the *emone*), and also to confer the right to beat a drum and to dance. When a person is dying, a woman gives a heavy blow on the side of the head, and pronounces the patient dead, and all the people shout to drive away the ghost. The body is wrapped in leaves and bark, doubled up in a crouching position, and placed on its back, in a grave in the open village enclosure. Every one shouts to frighten the ghost away, the grave is filled up, and the funeral is over. A mother often amputates the end of a finger for a child. Two or three days later a feast is held, all bring spears, and a ceremony something like the 'big feast' takes place. The killing of the pigs finally propitiates or drives away the ghost. Then wild pigs are caught, killed, and eaten, and the village is swept by way of purification. A chief's funeral is attended with more ceremonial; the wrapped-up body is placed in an open rude wooden box either supported on poles or placed in the fork of a *gabi* fig-tree. In the case of a chief all except two men watchers leave the village for two or three weeks; then they return, kill wild pigs, and sweep the village.

The 'big feast' is held in a particular village at intervals of about fifteen or twenty years, and requires a very long preparation.

Usually a new *emone* is built, and also new houses, view platforms, and sheds for guests. Composite high posts are erected, on which food and skulls are placed, and round the central space slender poles connected by a cord are put up, on which food is displayed. If one does not already exist, they build a box-shaped wooden burial platform on high poles containing the skull and bones of a chief, and others are added to it. Three trees are erected in the centre of the village. The ceremony is very impressive. Two women guests with pigs' tusks in their mouths rush round the enclosure brandishing spears, and strike at the chief's *emone*. Male guests brandish spears, also in silence, and knock down the trees. Other guests perambulate the enclosure. The chief of the clan cuts down the burial platform, which is not rebuilt. Food is distri-

buted to the most important men, and the real dance is performed only by some of the guest men, who wear skulls and bones in addition to feather head-dresses and carry drums and weapons. Various smaller ceremonies then take place. There is next a general distribution of food among guests. It may take a week before the village pigs are collected. These are killed by a professional on the spot where the burial platform stood, and placed in a line. Bones are dipped in the bleeding mouths of the pigs, and the skulls and other bones anointed with them and then hung up. When the feast is over, all bones are removed from the posts and are never used again ceremonially. Some may be hung up in the *emone*, or put in a box in a tree, or otherwise disposed of. After the guests have gone, wild pigs are killed on the site of the burial platform and eaten by the villagers. The bulk of the villagers then leave the village for about six months to make new gardens.

There is no belief in a universal god, but a general belief in a mysterious personage, Tsidibe, who has immense power and once passed through the country from east to west, traces of his passage being seen in strange rocks and stones. He taught the people all their customs, dances, and manufactures, and finally reached the land of the white man; hence his superior culture. He is essentially a beneficent being, but he has no cult. At death the ghost leaves the body and goes to the tops of the mountains, where it exists for ever; it becomes the sunlight on the ground in the forests, or, if that of an elderly person, it becomes a fungus. The food of all ghosts is the ghostly elements of native food. There is no reincarnation. A few special trees and creepers (the *gabi* is one) imply the presence of a spirit. All ghosts and spirits that never had a bodily form are evilly-disposed, and are associated with those who practise magic (Williamson, *The Mafulu*).

The Kuni are a Melanesian-speaking people living between the Mafulu and the Roro, south of the middle waters of the Angabunga. The soul is a spiritual being reproducing the shape of the body and is manifested in the breath; there are no moral ideas connected with it; the object of ritual practices is to avoid earthly evil or, more rarely, to secure some advantage. The ghost stays near the village to see that all ceremonies are performed and terrify neglectful relatives, or to communicate with the living. After some time it leaves the village and goes into a lonely part of the mountains. There is no judgment after death; all ghosts are in a state of discomfort and cold. The dead are buried, and sometimes the village is abandoned. A small feast is held when the bones are exhumed; the skull is usually hung in the club-house (*kufu*) or in the dwelling-house, generally with the tibiae and radii, which at great dances are painted red and held in the hand; the mandible is detached and decorated, but is taken out only on great occasions. Other bones are worn by the widow. At great dances the skull and bones of some great ancestor may be worn, though the feast is not given in his honour. At the great feast in honour of the dead, 'objects of abstinence' are washed in the blood of a pig reared by the family concerned. The dead are invoked to send good hunting and fishing, and for this reason ancestors' names are remembered. There is no trace of a supreme spirit or creator, but there are various spirits which produce earthquakes, cause mists to rise, frighten people in the bush, and so forth; these are not ghosts but true spirits. They have definite abodes, generally under great stones; certain women have converse with them. Besides these there are the *ivikála*, who are known to the Mkeo and Roro and to two other (Papuan-speaking) peoples. They are merged with the animal, tree, stone, etc., which they occupy. Their only cult is in the avoidance of uttering their name, though this rule is readily broken if things go wrong. When the *ivikála* is a tribal one, it must not be killed or injured. Every group of villages, or even a single village, has its special *ivikála*. Sometimes an

ivikala is attached to any spot like a rock or hole, and people must be silent in its proximity; some are wild dogs or reptiles inhabiting villages. Their origin is ascribed to Oveloa, who also caused men to arise from the bowels of the earth. Allied to these are the spirits of stone dishes of unknown origin. Finally, there are *káfu*, any object which a given sub-tribe, village, family, or even individual, has chosen as a witness of the truth of a statement. That of the sub-tribes is inherited; sometimes the family or individual one is chosen, but the personal *káfu* does not affect that of the village or sub-tribe. *Káfu* demands silence on its name; it is insulted by being named in its presence or outside its territory. *Káfu* may be a relic of totemism, since certain sub-tribes are often called by its name. The use of *káfu* to affirm the truth of a statement seems Papuan in origin, like that of *ivikala*, and has not yet been traced to the coast (V. M. Egidí, *Anthropos*, viii. [1913] 202).

Very little can be said about the religion of the western Papuo-Melanesians, who extend from Cape Possession to Mullins Harbour. In the most westerly tribes, the Roro and Mekeo, traces of totemism seem to persist in the badges (*oava*) of the exogamous patrilineal clans; there are club-houses analogous to those of the Elema but without ritual objects, and there are no initiation ceremonies.

A different cultural element is marked by the open ceremonial platforms (*dubu*) which are found among the Motu and allied tribes who extend from Redscar Bay to Kapakapa, being best developed among the Sinaugolo, etc., some distance inland from Kapakapa. These people state that they came with a *dubu* post from Mt. Tabogoro, a spur of the main range. The *tabu* is a very important feast in which the whole countryside participates; generally a new *dubu* is built for it; unmarried girls dance on a special platform. The *dubu* has a close association with ghosts, who visit it at feasts to eat the shadow of the food. There were no skull trophies in this area.

The district from Hood Peninsula to Aroma is characterized by steeple-houses (*koge*), on which or on platforms skulls were hung, and probably ghosts were connected with them. The house may decay, and then its platform serves as a *dubu*, on which at the *kapa* feast recently tattooed nubile girls mount, doff their petticoats, and are anointed with oil. The girls cut up yams and pelt the crowd with areca nuts, and drums are beaten by women on the *dubu*. It is solely a women's ceremony, one object of which is to bring good luck to the gardens (R. E. Guise, *JAI* xxviii. [1899] 214; Haddon, *Head-hunters*, p. 217).

There is a general uniformity in the religious beliefs of all these people. The Roro dead are buried with the head towards the rising sun, but on Yule Island with the feet towards Mt. Yule. The ghosts frequent the villages; if they desert them, there will be no luck, but they may send bad luck in hunting or fishing if annoyed, and they are then conjured out of the village. They reside in the bush behind Cape Possession; on their way they are intercepted by an evil spirit like fire, who asks if their ears and nose have been pierced and how death occurred (Seligmann, pp. 275, 303, 310). Koita ghosts (*sua*) go to a mountain, Idu, their legendary home, whence they quickly return with other ghosts to carry away the *sua* of objects which the dead man cared for in this life. They live for a long time, but gradually weaken and cease to exist as they are forgotten on earth. They frequently return to the village, showing little benevolence, but punishing any neglect of funeral rites or infringement of tribal custom. Only the Sinaugolo invoke their ancestors. Every-

where there are malicious spirits, most of whom inhabit definite areas. All the heavenly bodies are more or less venerated; people 'yell' only for the new moon at Port Moresby (*ib.* pp. 183-193).

The Northern Massim of the Trobriands, Woodlarks, etc., have been strongly influenced from the east; they are not cannibals, and have a royal family in each district or island. The following account of the Trobriands may be taken as typical. There is a system of linked totems for each of the four clans: a bird is of supreme importance, with which are linked a four-footed vertebrate, a fish, and a plant, and various less important birds. There is no snake-totem. There is no physical or psychical resemblance to the totem, nor is it omen-giving. The usual tabus are more or less in force, but a man may fight another with the same totem. The clans are matrilineal, but the father's totem is regarded, and marriage is not permitted into the father's clan. The dead are buried; after some time the skeleton is exhumed, and a chief's skull is made into a lime-pot by his children, which they and the widows may use. When certain relatives of a dead chief die, an arm bone is removed and made into a lime-spatula; other bones may be worn. The ghosts of the Trobriand islanders go to Tuma, a small island to the north-west, where they descend to the under world presided over by Topileta, a gigantic tattooed man; he causes earthquakes, and, when he becomes old, makes medicine which restores to youth himself, his wife, and his children. Opinion is divided as to whether pigs, dogs, and all birds have a soul as well as men. The breath accompanies the ghost to Tuma, and possibly the shadow. The soul can leave the body without death ensuing. Ghosts visit a feast held ten months after death, and food is sometimes specially cooked for them at this feast, but they are not summoned to it. The four clans were sent to the upper world at Tuma by Topileta, as people increased too rapidly; each ancestor came with his totem-animals. The earlier people built houses and made gardens, but had no yams and apparently no pottery; Topileta told the clans to bring these (*ib.* pp. 7, 677-691, 719, 733-735).

The conditions at Milne Bay somewhat resemble those of Bartle Bay, but there are no initiation ceremonies for boys or girls. The corpse is placed in a squatting position in a grave, which is roofed over with planks and earth; it faces east, otherwise the ghost would not be able to reach the other world. Funeral feasts take place monthly for about a year; at the last great feast all the man's pigs must be killed and his coco-nut trees knocked down, and all tabus end. Before this feast (which may serve for several deaths) new houses must be built, a number of pigs are killed, and food is piled on a special platform. The assembled friends have a sham fight, and food is distributed; there is a good deal of dancing, but not on the platform. The coiffure of the dead man, which was cut off and retained by his brother, is presented to the maternal uncle of the dead man along with a pig; the coiffure is burned and the pig singed, and the dead man is now completely finished with. The ghost (*arugo*) goes to Hiyooya, the other world under the sea at the head of Milne Bay, which is presided over by Tumudurere, who, like his wife and children, is white-skinned and smooth-haired; he never existed on earth as a man. Many people assert that they can go to and return from Hiyooya, but, if they ate food there, they would never return. Cannibalism was largely due to revenge; the victim was dragged to the stone circle of the clan, burned to death, and eaten partly inside partly outside the circle. No one eats his own killing; a killer or captor is under food and other restrictions for a month (*ib.* pp. 404, 609, 620, 632, 655).

Thanks to Newton, Seligmann, Stone-Wigg, and others, we have good ethnological data concerning the natives of Bartle Bay on the south shore of Goodenough Bay. The people are included by Seligmann among the Southern Massim group of the Papuo-Melanesians; they have exogamous clans which take their names from real or hypothetical bush settlements or stocks. Each clan has one or more totems, *bariawa*—a term used for anything that is out of the ordinary run of experience, such as supernatural beings or white men. The totem is regarded as the ancestor of the family, and is not eaten. They are matrilineal, but youths may elect to join the father's clan; they do not marry into the father's clan, and as a rule children may not eat their father's totem. Certain clans have a stone totem which gives strength in war, and near it skulls of enemies are placed. Totems are sometimes regarded as omen-giving. Totemism has a wide sociological effect. Thus the Boianai and tribes farther west know nothing of the *walaga* feast and take no part in it, while the shore people from Wedau eastwards do; yet totemism brings all these peoples into close relationship (H. Newton, *In Far New Guinea*, London, 1914, p. 163). Chiefs possess considerable influence and power; in addition there are departmental experts in beneficent magic; both offices are hereditary and are often combined in the same person. Of equal extension with totemism is the *kimta* bond, which includes all individuals of the same sex and of approximately the same age. Initiation, which is said to have been instituted by a superhuman being, formerly took place about every three or four years; it is now held at longer intervals.

The boys live in a special hut apart from the village for four to six months; they work in the gardens or on the seashore, and are instructed by the old men; there are food and sexual tabus; the food is cooked by their mothers in special small pots, but no one eats the food prepared by his own mother. The day before the end of their seclusion they hunt with the men. Next day they wear a new belt, and a comb for the first time.

Formerly girls were secluded at puberty in a house for one to three months, and abstained from all flesh food. A dead man is buried by his clan on his side with his head (Wedau) or feet (Wamira) in the direction from which his ancestors originally came when led by the totem; upright stones are sometimes placed at the head of the grave. Each clan, group, or settlement has its own grave, so that graves are frequently reopened; bones are not kept in the houses. At Gelaria the corpse is carried to the grave with flexed limbs so as to form a compact bundle; a chief is buried in a squatting position, but a commoner is laid on his side; in either case he faces the direction whence his clan came. Most frequently disease and death are caused by a 'sending' projected from the body of a sorcerer or witch. It is thought of as leading a separate life after the death of the persons in whom it is normally immanent. After a woman's death the 'sending' (called *labuni* at Gelaria) may pass to her daughter or go with her ghost (*aru*) to the other world (it is evidently analogous to the 'soul-stuff' of the Kai). Any woman who has had children may command a *labuni*, and she is employed by any one. Disease is produced by various objects, human bones being most potent, but only the spiritual portion enters the victim. Knots are tied by specialists in the hair as a preventive against charms, and things are tied round ankles, knees, and wrists so as to block the entrance of spirits into the body. The ghost after death 'goes to Maraiya in the south-east, "where is the Lord of the dead Tannrari (for Wedau) who prepares the place for each and assigns to each his place"' (Newton, in Seligmann, p. 657); but Newton also says that the ghost wanders around the familiar

places for some time after death; but about Wedau and Wamira, when the death-feasts are finished, it goes to a valley east of Cape Frere, the entrance to the other world being through a hole in the ground (*In Far New Guinea*, p. 219f.). The skin of ghosts is white; the life there resembles that here; those who are wealthy here are so there; they may fight among themselves, and whoever is killed is dead for ever. Spirits wander about at will, but usually favour certain places, as a rule dark uncanny spots. The only good that spirits do is to make strangers fear to intrude, as they are jealous of them. Some spirits do not injure men, others are ghouls; none are good. Incantations are a very prominent feature of native life. Every person, food, animal, occupation, and amusement has its *pari*; these must be used or results cannot be looked for. They are not addressed to any person or spirit; some can be bought from their owners, but not those which are hereditary, and bestowed on the possessor a distinct office (M. J. Stone-Wigg, *The Papuans*, Melbourne, 1912, p. 26). In Goodenough Bay a child's spirit does not enter him until he gains intelligence, and the right sort of spirit has to be got into the child and the wrong one kept out by means of special charms and exorcisms. Some say that he has an uninstructed vaporous soul which is in danger of being lost; therefore, when a baby is carried along a path for the first time, the father walks behind and throws down bundles of leaves so that the child's spirit may not lose the path or the child would never be able to speak (*ib.* p. 28). The ghost, *konaga*, dies after an ill-defined period, becomes a spirit, goes into the sea, and feeds on the foam. There it remains for ever (*ib.* p. 27).

The *walaga* feast is the cult of the mango, and is the most important ceremony in the Bartle Bay district, bringing together from a great distance even hostile communities. The name is derived from the great dancing platform built for the occasion.

The headman of the clan giving the feast selects a young wild mango-tree, and he and the men who help him to clear the ground round it are holy; they may not drink or touch water nor eat boiled food or mangoes; these fasting men live in a special house (*potuma*). A temporary village is built round the platform in the bush. The platform is prepared and erected by the fasting men with the aid of the charms of all the medicine-men from the neighbouring mountains, who also extract the *aru* (ghost) of any dead man that may happen to be present in the post (from one a human bone was said to have been extracted). They carry the ghost away and release it in the bush.¹ The tree is carefully cut down by the fasting men with a special stone adze (iron should never be used), and all chips, etc., are caught on new mats. With great ceremony and care the tree is wrapped in the mats with the chips and fallen leaves, carried to the *potuma*, and later tied to the central pole of the platform; no part of it may ever touch the ground. Things belonging to a dead man may be hung on the pole above the tree. Guests arrive bringing pigs. If one brings five pigs, this is called a mango, and a small mango-tree is cut down. Dancing and singing continue all night. At daylight the pigs are killed, being speared as slowly as possible so that the maximum amount of squealing takes place. The mango-tree must hear their cries, smell the burning fat, and know that blood has been poured out. Otherwise the crops will fail, the fruit-trees be barren, the pigs will not be productive, and even women will fail to bear children (Stone-Wigg, p. 32). After the distribution of food the guests disperse. The following day the mango-sapling is taken down, wrapped up in mats, and hung in the roof of the *potuma*. After an interval of many months it is removed and carried with great ceremony to the centre of the temporary village. A certain man cuts green mangoes in pieces and puts them in the mouths of the fasting men, who chew and spit the fragments in the direction of the setting sun so that 'the sun should carry the mango bits over the whole country and every one should know.' A piece of the tree is cut off and burned with the chips, etc. The mango-tree is again wrapped up and carried to the house of the head man. It is brought out and exhibited at intervals, and a piece broken off and burned on each occasion till it is totally destroyed. Then this community may have a new *walaga*, but another community may have a *walaga* in the meantime.

The significance of this ceremony is not yet fully

¹ To the east of Bartle Bay bull-roarers, used at no other time, are said to be swung by the fasting men all the time the posts are being stepped.

understood; in some ill-defined way it is associated with the ghosts of the dead.

'It seems that in some way the *walaga* is specially the finale for all death feasts, and the idea is that the spirits of the dead should be gratified by knowing that all duties have been performed. If not, they would take revenge . . . yet the spirits of the dead do not seem to be present' (Newton, in Seligmann, p. 651).

Stone-Wigg relates that a long time ago, when human victims were offered, Dabedabe was born; all his brothers and sisters were pigs; he persuaded people to substitute pigs for human victims. Since his death his spirit can be passed by ceremonies and incantations into a mango-tree selected for the purpose. It is by no means evident why a mango-tree should be sacred, for, though mangoes are a common food and much liked, they are not sacred in any way or connected with garden magic. There may have been some connexion between this ceremony and the *barlum* and allied feasts, but, if so, the *walaga* has been subject to other cultural influences; that this is probable is indicated by the frequent occurrence of stone monuments in this part of Goodenough Bay. These consist of stone circles and lines of stones; the former were mainly the meeting-place of the old men, which no woman might approach. Some at Wamira were certainly used during cannibal feasts. The body was cut up in the circle, washed at the shore, and cooked and eaten in the circle. At Wedau the stone circles do not seem to have had much significance, and cannibal feasts were not held in them. In all the villages are stones which are revered and may not be moved. In the Boianai villages many are carved; their presence ensures success to all garden work, a plentiful supply of food, and happiness to the people. No one knows their origin. Stones in and near houses have an influence on life, health, and prosperity (Seligmann, pp. 451, 465 ff.).

There is an overlapping of Papuan and Melanesian peoples at Cape Nelson. The Kworafi, or Korapi, have patrilineal totemism (Pösch, *ZE* xxxix. 389); they are the southernmost representatives of the Papuan-speaking Binandeli ('Orokaiva'), who extend thence to the Mamba River and some 20 to 30 miles inland (Murray, *Papua, or British New Guinea*, pp. 98, 108). The Kubiri are also totemic, but a departure from typical totemism is shown by W. M. Strong's statement, 'The crocodile is a totem and its intercession is sought by placing food in the rivers for it to eat' (*ap.* Seligmann, p. 744).

The cult of a mythical snake, Baigona, which is supposed to live on Keroro (Mt. Victory), has recently spread to the coast, mainly to the west and especially up the rivers of the Kumusi and Mambare Divisions. The authorized practitioners, *baigona*, claim to have control of rain, practise massage, employ two drugs, and regulate the affairs of the natives; snakes and certain reptiles may not be killed (*Ann. Rep. Papua*, 1911, p. 139, 1912, pp. 14, 129, 134, 1913, p. 152; Murray, p. 38). Sir William Macgregor says:

'In many places no native will kill a snake. Evidently snake cult is an ancient form of veneration and worship connected with ancestors over a large area of British New Guinea' (*Ann. Rep. Brit. New Guinea*, 1893, p. 47).

The *thaw* ceremony is common to the Koko of the Yodda valley of the head waters of the Mamba River and neighbouring tribes of the Kumusi watershed, Orokaiva mountains, and almost to the coast.

The ceremony takes place at considerable intervals, and boys and girls are initiated at the same time, having been previously secluded in houses built for them in the bush. During the preparations trees are pulled down by the hunters of wild pigs, and bull-roarers are swung, and the children are told that this is the work of ghosts. Visitors attend from far and near. On the night of the ceremony all lights are put out, and the men, wearing huge head-dresses of feathers and frames of pigs' teeth over their faces, enter the village square and kneel in front of the large central scaffolding. The candidates are brought in from the bush with yells and shrieks, men seize the lads, run up and down the village with them, and throw them on the scaffolding,

the women following with waving spears, and all uttering cries and yells. The boys try to climb up the scaffolding, but are repeatedly hauled down. Sometimes a man will rush at the boys, swinging his clubs and shouting, 'I am the ghost.' Among other tortures the boys are drenched with cold water. Towards the end of the night the girls are put through a similar performance, though they are treated much less roughly. Immediately after daybreak boys and girls are completely covered with hoods of bark-cloth. The boys are told to turn their backs, and the men pull down trees with lianas, which is said to have been done by the ghosts. After this bull-roarers are brought out for the first time, and the lads are told that the ghosts are present. The men shout, 'Do not kill my child!' and utter the names of the ghosts, who apparently are dead ancestors. The hoods are next drawn off and the bull-roarers are shown and explained to the initiates. The bull-roarers are taken into the bush, and pigs and other food brought into the village; after the feast the guests disperse. The initiates return to the initiation houses in the bush, where they must remain in close confinement for a month; large smoky fires are kept burning under the floor to make them sweat profusely; they are not permitted to talk much, and then only in a low voice. Should a boy happen to drop taro through the floor, he would be killed (the mother would know of the death only when the lads returned home, and she would not be permitted to make any comment). Instruction is given of a moral nature and relating to the ordinary occupations of life.

It is stated that one-holed flutes are played by the girls (?) in the bush after their initiation. They are blown in pairs, a long one about 5 ft. in length and a shorter one.¹ Extreme care is taken of the bull-roarers; should one break and a chip strike any one, that person, when next he goes hunting or fighting, will be wounded in the spot where he was struck by the bull-roarer; among the tribes on the lower Kumusi, if a bull-roarer strikes any one, he will die. It is strongly impressed on all the uninitiated that the noise made by the bull-roarers is really emitted by a ghost (E. W. P. Chinnery and W. N. Beaver, *JRAI* xlv. [1915] 69 ff.). According to Murray (p. 105), the Koko and allied tribes are cannibals and physically of the mountain type; they differ in appearance and language from the Binandeli-speaking natives of the plain. Chinnery and Beaver say that they differ very little from the rest of the 'Orokaiva' tribes of the Kumusi Division.

The *balum*-cult has been described by Lehner for the Bukaua, who live on the north coast of Huon Gulf, and by Schellong and Zahn for the Jabim about Finschhafen, whose area adjoins that of the Bukaua. They are closely allied Melanesian-speaking tribes. Among the Bukaua the term *balum* includes: (1) the secret cult of an uncanny being to whom are attributed geographical catastrophes, and who personified is regarded as the ancestor of a village kin called after it, women being told that it is a greedy monster and must be bought off by fat pigs; (2) the bull-roarer, which produces the voice of the spirit; and (3) the ghosts of those who have been long dead.

(1) The *balum* circumcision feast is held at intervals of ten to eighteen years in the country of the Bukaua and Jabim, and between times among the hinterland Kai and the Tami islanders. The preparations are lengthy, as great numbers of people come from far and near to the feast.

The special house (*lum*) for the candidates is erected in the village, which the women have to leave (the Jabim build it in the bush); dogs' and pigs' blood and chips of various woods are placed in the holes for the posts. Boys in the *lum* have to abstain from certain food for three to five months and spend their time making mats and flutes. On the day of circumcision with great noise and swinging of bull-roarers the boys are conducted to the *balum* hut; this is a long gradually decreasing hut, the roof-pole of which is a complete areca-palm, the roots representing the head and hair of the *balum* monster and the crown of leaves its tail; the jaws are closed with mats on which a grotesque face is painted. Each boy is struck on the crown and under the chin with a bull-roarer to make him keep silence before the uninitiated, talk sense, show hospitality, act properly, etc. As the boys are dragged into the hut, men squatting on each side emit growls, and in this way the boys are swallowed

¹ Similar flutes have been seen at Sangara, near Mt. Lamington, and on the Upper Waria, where they are regarded as intensely sacred and on no account to be seen by women and children.

by a roaring monster. The circumcision is accompanied by the booming of bull-roarers and the noise of bamboo flutes. Here the boys remain for two or three months in total seclusion from women; they amuse themselves by playing flutes, and are instructed in tribal and personal conduct by the old men. Among the Jabim, when the women return to the village, the boys go to large huts in the bush for about three months, play flutes, and do plait-work and carving; they must not be seen by women, who sound bamboo slit gongs to warn the boys of their approach (O. Schellong, *AE* ii. [1889] 158).

(2) There are various kinds of bull-roarers (*balum*), some being wonderfully decorated. Some at least of the designs are symbolic and convey warnings or illustrate certain aspects of the cult. They are divided into 'ruling' and 'serving'; each village clan has one of the former and several of the latter. Ruling bull-roarers bear the names of prominent dead men whose characteristics they recall; they are carefully handed down through generations; the name is often used as a war-cry, in pig-catching, in the girls' ceremony, etc. Less respected but also guarded from women's sight are the serving bull-roarers, which also are named after the dead but concern only their descendants. A third class are those bull-roarers with a high tone; they are the wives of the first class. Very small bull-roarers are worn as ornaments by the chief men at the *balum* feast.

(3) There is a belief in a soul (*katu*), which is a sort of independent spiritual principle that can leave the body, as in sleep, and to which clairvoyance is attributed. At death the *katu* become ghosts (*ngalau*), which at any time may assume any form and behave as if alive; finally, they become *balum*, which mostly have hostile relations with the living, but may be pacified by offerings. These natives feel beset by the *balum*, and their whole life is dominated by the fear of them. The *balum* cult thus combines the initiation of the youth into the society of the adult men with the recognition of his kinship with the dead, his death to the old order and new birth into a higher social status being symbolized by his being swallowed by a monster who is the ancestor of the village kin. The prominence and symbolism of the bull-roarer are very noticeable features in the cult, and the playing of flutes by the initiates is also noteworthy. These are of two kinds, which are spoken of as husband and wife, and must not be seen and should not be heard by women. The dead are buried, but respected persons may be mummified, and the skull and some bones may be kept for some time. Every dead Jabim man of repute has a bull-roarer buried with him. Ghosts are not always harmful but may help the living, especially in gardening and hunting, and for this purpose offerings of food are made to them. There are traces of totemism among the Jabim and Bukaua. Certain families believe that some animal was formerly among their kindred, and they reverence it on that account; if it was a pig, e.g., they avoid pork; or they may spare the crocodile because their tribal ancestress gave birth to one together with their ancestors. The Jabim and Bubui folk believe that any one having an animal relative on the mother's side is changed into that animal after death; if another man kills such an animal, its human relatives must avenge it by fighting him in pretence, and must give a funeral feast in its honour. Closely akin to totemism is the watchword of each village clan, which, if an animal, is generally the same as the totem; protest is made if it is killed, and compensation may even be demanded (*ib.* p. 145; K. Vetter, quoted by Krieger, *Neu-Guinea*, p. 183; H. Zahn, in Neuhauss, *Deutsch Neu-Guinea*, iii. 287; S. Lechner, *ib.* p. 395).

The Tami islanders to the north of Huon Gulf are much purer Melanesians than their neighbours on the mainland, and in their ceremonies they employ masks which elsewhere are met with only

west of Cape König Wilhelm. Men have two souls, both resident in the abdomen. The 'long soul' wanders when a man sleeps, and is tantamount to our consciousness. At death it immediately leaves the body, appears to relatives, and goes to Magilep in N.W. New Britain (whence a migration probably took place to Tami). The 'short soul' at first remains near the body, and then goes underground to Lamboam, but returns to frighten the sorcerer who caused the death. After two or three years there is a great feast and dance, at which numerous ghosts enjoy the 'soul' of the good things. They recognize two kinds of supernatural beings—*buwin* and *kani*. The *buwin* are spirits who live on an uninhabited island; they have a fish body and human head, but are invisible. Epidemics and earthquakes are ascribed to them. They are not worshipped except in the event of a great epidemic, when a miserable pig or dog is sacrificed. One of these spirits is Anuto, a good being, who created the sky, earth, and mankind. He sits on the earth and holds up the sky with his head. Apparently no regard is paid to him except that at feasts or markets the first portion is offered to him and put in a basket to the east. Anuto eats the soul of the offering; the people eat the rest. Bamler compares him with the Jabim 'Anuto,' Siassi 'Anutnat,' and the South Sea 'Atua,' god. The sun and moon were formerly addressed as 'lord.' The *kani* is the *balum* of the mainland, and comprises the spirit invoked at circumcision (under this head belong the mask-spirits called *tago* on Tami and Siassi and at Magilep, and the wooden masks [*ngaboyo*] of Rook Island). The *kani*, which is represented by the bull-roarer, is described as a dragon invisible to women and is spoken of as 'lord.' This cult is the only public religious ceremony, and the Tami say that it was forced on them by the mainlanders, apparently about 150 years ago, before which time circumcision was not practised. They say that it spread to Siassi and Rook Island and to Magilep. Details of the *kani* festival are essentially similar to those of the *balum* festival. The oldest religious stratum appears to be that of the *tago*, who were created with their respective families or clans, those of the oldest families being most respected. Some of the *tago*, who are addressed as 'lord,' are said to live in holes in the island, but others come from other islands. *Tago* are represented by masks which are kept in a hut in the bush where women and children may not go. When men dressed in the *tago* masks appear, a tabu is placed on all coconuts for one year, during which time there must be peace; this happens about every ten or twelve years (G. Bamler, in Neuhauss, iii. 489).

The Kai are a people of mixed Pygmy and Papuan descent, who speak a Papuan language and inhabit the Rawlinson and Sattelberg ranges north of Huon Gulf. They may be regarded as very primitive, and, as they have been carefully investigated by Keysser, they form a good basis for comparison with other peoples. A long hut, which tapers away behind, is built for the circumcision festival in the jungle, and no woman may go near it. It represents Ngosa ('grandfather'), a monster who swallows the novice. In it are kept bull-roarers (*ngosa*), which are employed in the ceremony; only the old men have access to them. The Kai are very religious, their whole thought and conduct being influenced by animism. Everything has a soul-stuff completely permeating it; a shaving of wood has the soul-stuff of the tree, a stone that of the parent rock; so also a man's nails, hair, etc., that of the man. A man's glance, voice, and even his name also contain his soul-stuff; thus the names of people long dead are still potent in charms. The powers or qualities of a person or thing belong

also to his soul-stuff, and may be transmitted by contact with or without the agency of words of charming—e.g., yam or taro stones with which shoots are touched before planting out, or the bone of the forearm of a dead hunter. The soul-stuff can be isolated or withdrawn. There is a mutual attraction between allied soul-stuffs; thus a white leaf of the size and form of the egg of a megapod will guide the Kai in his search for eggs in the bush. Whatever befalls the soul-stuff is undergone by its owner as well. These animistic ideas affect their whole life; thus certain foods must be avoided by parents. They are further exemplified in love-charms and in the agricultural charms which are employed at every stage from the clearing of the ground to the harvest. Certain games assist the growth of crops: swinging and playing cat's cradle help yams to grow; top-spinning helps taro; and stories of the earliest times are generally told by a few of the older men, but the narration ceases when sowing is over and the plants begin to shoot. The soul-stuff and the body thrive or perish together, but the soul persists after death and is just like the original man. This ghost has in its turn soul-stuff, for ghost sorcerers of the other world can bewitch other ghosts through their soul-stuff, and the death of the ghost follows. A further degradation results; the ghost sinks to an animal, and finally to an insect; with the death of the insect the soul-metamorphosis ends. The death sorcerers, who form a sort of small caste, work by means of something connected with the victim which contains his soul-stuff, but wounds and sickness may be caused by ghosts and spirits—indeed, the first suspicion falls on them. There is great dread of the ghost which has left the body when the man is dead, those of fierce warlike men being most feared, since the character of the man is perpetuated in his ghost (the ghost of a thief will go on thieving). Property, trees, etc., are destroyed at a death in order that the ghost may have these things in the spirit land. A bamboo is placed in the grave to connect the corpse with the upper world, so that the ghost may have easy access to the body. In return for benefits received in the form of little offerings of cooked taro or crabs, the ghost furthers crops and is expected to send good luck in hunting, especially if he was a good hunter when on earth. The ghost takes only the soul-stuff of the offering; the material part may be eaten by the people. If things go very wrong, the ghost is blamed, his grave is knocked about, or he may even be driven away by pouring a pungent juice down the tube at the head end of the grave. The ghost of a slain person is particularly feared, and pursues those carrying weapons smeared with his blood so as to recover his soul-stuff; thus gory weapons are left outside the village for some time till the ghosts have regained their soul-stuff and are then carefully washed before being brought into the village. After the decomposition of the body, the ghost journeys to the world beyond, the entrance to which is the ghost cavern west of the Sattelberg. Ghosts are received by Tulumeng, the stern ruler, who accords a place to each according to whether he was slain or bewitched; every one must have the lobes of the ears and the septum of the nose bored. The life beyond is much the same as on earth. Ghosts have powers beyond those of men, which become accessible to men by means of the names of ghosts or by fetishes which act as vehicles of their soul-stuff; those of the newly departed are helpful to agriculture and hunting. There are various male and female spirits who are invoked to make plants grow or guard the crops, when catching birds, eels, pigs, etc., before fighting, or for other reasons. There is a creator Malengfung who has no practical effect on life; after making

the world he put in it the demi-gods, or *nemu*; he also made a giant, 'old Panggu,' who, like himself, is partly flesh and blood and partly rock. The *nemu* made men, discovered edible fruits, first planted gardens and made houses, and death came through them. Finally they turned into animals or blocks of stone, being destroyed by a great flood. Calling the *nemu*, to whom field produce is traced, to memory helps its growth. The forces of nature are personified and are placated or even defied. There is no idea of relationship with animals and no totemism (C. Keysser, in Neuhauss, iii. 3 ff.).

At the Papuan villages of Sialum and Kwamkwam in the neighbourhood of Cape König Wilhelm (6° 8' S. lat.) there is no deity who must be worshipped. Offerings are made to ghosts at burial to keep away from the village and bring no misfortune on it, and when beginning tillage to keep away harmful influences and protect from pigs and grasshoppers. Offerings are made to the ghosts of dogs and pigs whose death cannot be accounted for. The *nai*, or ghosts of men who have died far from home, are the only friendly spirits; they warn people of danger and foretell events. The only spirit-cult is *mate*, but the people will tell nothing about it for fear of the inlanders who are the real owners of *mate*. The cult seems to be much the same as the *balum*-cult, but the associated circumcision is falling into disuse. A number of spirits are included under *mate*, chiefly the ghosts of ancestors and of the recently dead; of the rest nothing is known. There are various spirits who are mainly malevolent. Nemunemu created the sky and earth (this is now the name for white men). The creators of the world were two brothers; the elder made the mainland and gave his people the bow and stone club, the younger made the islands and the sea, and instructed his people in making spears and burning lime for betel-chewing; the differences in language are also due to them (Stolz, in Neuhauss, iii. 245).

Most of the information from Astrolabe Bay has been obtained at the Papuan village of Bogadjim; all the other coast villages except Bongo are Melanesian-speaking. The corpse is exposed on a framework on which food is hung; that of a man is painted white and red and crowned with red hibiscus flowers by members of the *asa* society. After a few hours burial takes place with grave-gifts; if not buried, the ghost wanders about seeking its old home. The village of ghosts is not located; its inhabitants are still interested in earthly affairs. The ghosts of those slain in battle go to another place and are still more terrifying; they prowl about the village as long as they are unavenged. The song of the *kiru* bird is thought to be the voices of the dead, and it is a good omen if it is heard when making magic in the gardens to get a good crop. The dead help their relatives and are invoked on all sorts of occasions. Great wooden images, apparently of especially honoured dead, are made in Bongu and widely exported. Every few years a feast is held in their honour, which women may not share; if the image fails to help suppliants, it may be set aside. Other spirits are the embodiment of hostile forces of nature, smallpox, spring tides, bad Europeans, etc. There is no idea of a creator. The whole world—mountains, valleys, water, trees—is animated. The existence of totemism is doubtful. The *asa*- or *ai*-cult centres in a poor sort of house in the jungle which contains wooden masks and the ritual musical instruments, *asa*-flutes, etc. Nothing is known about the initiation ceremonies, which take place about every ten or fifteen years, but Biro (*Eth. Sam. Ung. Nat. Mus.* iii. 183) says that they are just the same as the *balum* at Finschhafen;

circumcision then takes place and bull-roarers are used. Bull-roarers, which differ from those of Huon Gulf, are of varied form and decoration; unperforated ones are in common use as love-charms, and are given by the girls to young men. These and other ritual objects are figured by Semayer. Biro states that the *asa*-house was formerly the only place for practising ancestor-cult, initiation ceremonies of youths, and the sacred dances, but that latterly, though not from European influence, *asa*-houses are neglected, being replaced by the men's house (B. Hagen, *Unter den Papuas*, Wiesbaden, 1899; W. Semayer, 'Beschr. Cat. L. Biro,' *Eth. Sam. Ung. Nat. Mus.* iii. [1901] 181-196).

The Monumbo are a Papuan-speaking people living about Potsdamhafen (145° E. long.). They do not believe in a supreme being, or moral good and evil, or recompense hereafter. Ghosts are supposed to live like mortals, and are invoked and prayed to. Images (*dva*) are made of every dead tribesman, as any ghost may do harm if left loose; they are not merely memorials of the dead, but residences of the ghost. Offerings of food are made to them to secure their help, but they are scolded if it is withheld; in time they pass into oblivion. When ghosts have grown old, they die and are changed into animals and plants (white ants, a kind of pig, the *barimbar*-tree, etc.). There is great fear of magic, and many ceremonial tabus are observed. There is a myth of a creator Ombéraman, who was killed by a woman and her parthenogenetic sons; she told her two sons to kill her, and from her and from her blood mankind appeared, but previously she instructed them in making houses, pottery, masks, etc. There are two kinds of dances, 'mask-dances' and 'people-dances.' In the former there is great diversity in the masks; the masked figures represent *murup* who inhabit the primeval forests of the Ramu and Augusta River valleys; women and children may not approach or the *murup* will kill them. Not only are the masks called *murup*, but the name is also given to the long bamboo flutes, women being told that their noise is the cry of the *murup* monster; the flutes are kept in the men's houses carefully concealed from the uninitiated; they are blown on the completion of a chief's house, at initiation of youths, and after burial of the male dead. The dancing lasts for one week, but very few men join in it though crowds of both sexes attend. There are six kinds of mask: three are imitations of the dog, kangaroo, and cassowary, three imitate higher beings who may be connected with the flute *murup*; both groups are treated as mysteries and are all called *murup*, but have proper names besides. The second group was borrowed a long time ago from the Koranduku to the west. Masks, flutes, and small mask-like amulets are provided with a soul by special consecration by fumigation. As having a soul, they are revered, sacrificed and prayed to, and treated as patron spirits. They are expected to give fine weather or a safe journey, and to reveal in dreams if fish are in the net or an enemy is lurking. Special masks and flutes belong to each patrilineal clan. The head of the clan that provides a feast arranges matters, but works in a friendly way with other chiefs; his wife may enter the men's enclosure and see the flutes, and all the men present have intercourse with her. From a rite that takes place it would seem that the flute has some connexion with procreation (F. Vormann, *Anthropos*, v. [1910] 407, vi. [1911] 411). Pösch says that totemism does not occur, but there appear to be survivals; he also states that the songs, dances, and ceremonies of the Monumbo came from the low country between the Ramu and the Sëpik (*Mitt. der anth. Gesellsch. in Wien*, xxv. [1895] 235; *ZE* xxxix. 334).

Up the Sëpik (Kaiserin-Augusta River) are wonderful houses containing slit gongs, ceremonial flutes, numerous skulls, carved figures, dance-masks, etc., but we have no information as to the cult. On the lower river flutes (*murup*) are kept in men's houses with bull-roarers. Head-hunting prevails on the river and in the neighbourhood; at Watam on the coast, Pösch says, skulls must 'take part' in pig feasts (*Globus*, xciii. [1908] 171). Enemies' heads are kept in the men's house. Reche considers that head-hunting is connected with manism, especially a skull-cult; one tries to get the skull (the seat of the soul) of an enemy into one's power so as to secure its help for oneself and withdraw it from the enemy (Neuhauss, i. 58, 235; O. Reche, *Der Kaiserin-Augusta-Fluss*, Hamburg, 1913, pp. 356-398). Von Luschan describes several wooden images which he calls 'ancestor figures' from the mouth of the Ramu, about 4° S. lat. (in Krieger, p. 498). They are of an entirely different type from the Geelvink Bay *korwar*, but nothing was then known about them. Vormann was told that the images from the mouths of the Ramu and Sëpik have the same significance as among the Monumbo. They are, as P. W. Schmidt points out, images of the dead and not ancestor figures (*Globus*, lxxxiv. [1903] 111); food is offered and appeals for help are made to them (Reche, p. 358). Reche suggests that the faces and heads on weapons, shields, canoes, etc., up the Sëpik have a similar meaning, and are, in fact, representations of dead persons or of their ghosts (p. 360 f.).

Neuhauss (i. 412) records the only clear case of totemism in 'German New Guinea.' Around Dallmannhafen and on the neighbouring islands exogamous tree-totemism is wide-spread; there are the usual tabus. If danger is averted or a special piece of good fortune happens, a man utters the name of his totem tree. The tree is that man's good spirit. There are also animal totems. Neuhauss refers to an ancient totem tree on Seleu, Berlinhafen; all the people would die if it were destroyed.

Among the littoral Melanesian-speaking peoples in the neighbourhood of Berlinhafen, and on the neighbouring islands, the dead are buried in a coffin made of areca-palm wood, but the bones are exhumed in December after two or three years with great ceremony for men, the grave being opened when the sun is at the zenith, and the skull and a thigh-bone of a man are kept in the club-house (*alot*) of that division of the village; in the case of other people they are kept in the house or thrown away in a charnel spot, but various bones are kept to be worn. There is a dim idea of reward and punishment for ghosts, and a sort of metamorphosis into fish or pigs. The memory of the dead is often celebrated, and by means of their bones they are invoked to calm a wind, etc. On certain days at the beginning of spring graves are tidied up to bring good luck on sea and in trade, as neglect would bring great misfortune. Sickness is produced by ghosts, who are exorcised. On Tumleo Island a ghost goes underground and has to pay a spirit in order to cross a ladder over a great piece of water; then it goes by canoe to a great river on the mainland, where there are three subterranean cities of the dead. There are good female spirits (*tapum*) who bring good luck and protection to those who honour them and good fortune in hunting; they are so numerous that in Tumleo each village has several, and in Sapi each family has one. The cult consists of keeping the spirit-house (*parak*) clean, and in it are held special feasts with drum-beating and the playing of water-flutes. Women and children may not enter or listen to the music, as the spirit is unfriendly to women, who have to provide it with abundant food. The *tapum*

are the parthenogenetic progeny of a spirit, Mok-rakun, who, owing to a flood on the mainland, drifted to Tumleo; she was discovered by the women, but the men appropriated her and built a *parak* for her. The *parak* is a highly ornamented two-storeyed house which contains the slit drums and water-flutes. The *parak* is where spirits, and the *alol* where ghosts, are revered. The spirit- and club-houses are repaired and a festival held before the south-east monsoon begins, this being the trading season. Festivals are held in these houses after successful hunting or fishing. There are various evil spirits that infest many places (M. J. Erdweg, *Mitt. der anth. Gesellsch. in Wien*, xxxii. [1902] 274 ff.; and cf. R. Parkinson, *AE* xiii. [1900] 35, 41 ff.). Biro calls the *parak* 'karowara,' and states that in one at Tarawaj against the wall were red human and animal images of various sizes and also little images leaning against coco-nut shells; before some of them food was placed. Several of these images are figured; he terms them 'Ahnenfigürchen' (J. Janko, 'Beschr. Cat. L. Biro, *Eth. Sam. Ung. Nat. Mus.* i. [1899] 45 ff.). On Ali Island curious bored stones are used in sorcery, and on Meta Island, Dallmannshafen, a bored stone is kept which is believed to ensure an abundant catch of fish (Parkinson, p. 44).

As regards Humboldt Bay, which is the western limit of the occurrence of the slit gong, Van der Sande states that the people are entirely impregnated with religion. He received the impression that they believe the universe to be ruled by supernatural powers which are feared, and that all feasts have a religious character in so far as they take the place of prayers and ward off evil. Feasts in commemoration of the dead take place in the 'temple' (*kärëwäri*, which seems also to be the name of the spirit associated with it). This building contains the sacred drums and flutes; these are always blown two at a time; it is a religious act and indicates that the spirit is hungry and the women have to prepare food for the inhabitants of the temple (*Nova Guinea*, iii. 287 f., 294-297).

De Clercq and Schmeltz state that east of Cape D'Urville the greatest festivals take place in large buildings, *ruma* (*roemah*) *kärëwäri*, in which men call upon the ghosts of their forefathers to ward off harm from those going on a journey, and feasts are celebrated on starting for or returning from a fight. Especially are they connected with shark-fishing, with which the whole life of the men is bound up; these ceremonies take place only during the west monsoon or fishing season (*Ethnographische Beschrijving*, p. 180).

The coastal people of the Mamberamo (137° 50' E. long.) mostly migrated from the northern islands of Geelvink Bay. They are very intelligent and energetic, and are head-hunters; they speak a Melanesian language. Totemism of a kind is practised. Representations of the totem animals are tattooed on both sexes; these animals were in early times brothers of the men. The good principle is the full moon; they pray when she rises for good things; the dead go to her husband and sit with him in a squatting posture as a sign of most blessed repose. Ghosts trouble themselves little about the living, but blood-revenge must not be neglected. The dead are placed in little boats on a decorated high framework, the skull being eventually kept in a little hut in the forest. Squatting wooden figures (*korwar*) are made, into which the ghost enters at times and announces its will to descendants and foretells the future. The July full moon is the time of the moon's wedding; she is then very gracious; at the great festival then held amulets are consecrated. The principle of evil is a spirit, Sinompi (Suangir in the west), who sits under the roots of pandanus-trees and

howls; if any one is ill, a picture of Sinompi is tattooed on the chest, or in some places he is sacrificed to. There was an old culture-hero who gave laws and founded the men's houses; his laws were disobeyed and he vanished, but he will return some day and everything will be renewed; therefore he is called Manseren koreri, i.e. the god at whose return everything will cast its skin (Moszkowski, *ZE* xliii. 322-329). The inland tribes of the Mamberamo are of a different stock and apparently speak a Papuan language. A flood myth is current among them. They have a great initiation festival.

On the day before it is held women and children leave the village, the novices are taken into the men's house and are said to be blind, and the sacred bamboo flute is sounded (no woman may see or hear it or the Mamberamo would again overflow the land and kill all living beings). The novices' eyes are opened when they hear the flute and they now recognize the sanctity of the men's house.

A similar festival is held by all the tribes up to the Central mountains. The dead are exposed on high platforms in the forest; the people fear the ghosts, and a village is abandoned after a death. They believe all nature to be animate: if it thunders, the mountain is angry; when a man is drowned, the river is angry (*ib.* pp. 340-342).

In the Geelvink Bay district a manes-cult based mainly on fear of the ghosts is very evident. Dead infants are placed in baskets and slung on a tree so that Narwur and Imgiar—male and female spirits who live in the evening mist of the forest and kill babies because they love them and wish to have them near—may take them and spare the other children. The other dead are buried. In some parts, as in S. Japen (Jobi), corpses are mummified, kept in the house, and later removed to hollow trees. Some believe that the soul has its seat in the blood and that the ghost goes to the bottom of the sea. After death the ghost abides by the corpse and is buried with it. A small wooden image is made and taken to the grave; the ghost passes into it, and is supposed to remain there so long as satisfactory answers can be obtained from it; should the answers be unsatisfactory, it is believed that the ghost has deserted the image, and it is thrown away as useless. These *korwar*, or *karwar*, are kept in the houses or taken on sea voyages, and are consulted on all important occasions. An offering is placed before the *korwar*, which is either held in the hands or placed on the ground. The ghost is supposed to pass from the image to the suppliant, who thus becomes inspired. The mere presence of such images benefits the sick, though they may not be the ancestors of the patient (various authors quoted by Frazer, *Belief in Immortality*, i. 307-313). *Korwar* are generally made of persons who have died at home, but can be made for others, in which case the ghost is called to the village by setting fire to a great tree. The skulls of very important men or warriors sometimes form the head of the *korwar* that represents them; but on Ron Island such images are made of all first-born children who are about twelve years of age or more; they are consulted as oracles (de Clercq, p. 632). Van der Sande (p. 302) says that the *korwar* are found only in coastal villages and as far east as Liki (Kumamba Islands), but he is evidently referring to the characteristic squatting Geelvink Bay images, since analogous images spoken of as ancestor images are found about the mouths of the Sepik and Ramu Rivers (4° S. lat.), and in the Arfak mountains and elsewhere in the north-west. The distribution of the various kinds of *korwar* is given by Serurier (*Tijdschr. voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, xl. [Batavia, 1898] 287). The men's house or 'temple' (*rum sëräm*) is adorned with carvings of human beings and crocodiles; little more is known about them than that the young men sleep there. Van der

Sande equates them with the *kārēvāri* of Humboldt Bay district and the *parak* of Berlinhafen, but points out that the cult has diminished (p. 302). At Doré and Mansinam women holding *korwar* dance to drum-beating until they fall into a trance. Other 'Malay' customs occur there, such as the use of the soul-house, with a bird brooding over it, whither a woman's soul can repair when she goes on a journey for the first time (Moszkowski, p. 326). In Geelvink Bay the moon is believed to be inhabited by a woman who weaves; she is invoked before going on trading journeys. There is excitement over the new moon. Thunder and lightning are stated at Doré to be due to evil spirits; men swear by the sky. A sort of dualism occurs in Manuval, the evil spirit of night, and Narvoje, a good spirit living in the mist; there are also a creator and numerous bad spirits who cause thunder and lightning, storms, and all kinds of harm (J. L. van Hasselt, quoted by Krieger, p. 405).

The Windessi of the west coast of Geelvink Bay generally place their dead on a platform, often on an islet, and omens are taken. After a year the feast of the dead takes place, at which *korwar* are made, into the head of which the real skull may be inserted. The feast lasts for two days, accompanied by dancing and singing, but not by drum- or gong-beating. If in the meantime they kill some one who is reputed to be an incarnate evil spirit (who presumably caused the death of their relative), they do not carve a *korwar*, but make marks on the skull of the murdered man, and have instrumental music. The living have two souls; when a woman dies, both of them go down into the nether world, but, when a man dies, one of his souls goes below, the other passing into a living man (rarely a woman), who thereby becomes a medicine-man and has powers to heal the sick (J. L. D. van der Roest, quoted by Frazer, *Belief in Immortality*, i. 318). In Windessi, Biak, and other islands the bodies of enemies are thrown into the forest; later their skulls are preserved. Fellow-tribesmen are exposed on coral islets (Moszkowski, p. 325).

In the Arfak mountains the dead are mummified by being smoked in a hut. On the highest mountains dried mummies are placed in hollow trees (Moszkowski, p. 325). De Clercq could find no trace of a worship of gods among the coastal tribes of the islands of Waigiu, Salwatti, Misol, etc., but they keep in their houses *karwar* and miniature houses of the dead, at which men only may make the daily offering of sago. In the chief's house are shrines for the ghosts of all the persons who have died in the village. The mountain tribes, however, believe that the ghosts dwell in branches of trees, to which they attach food and strips of white and red cotton. The people of the 'Negeu Negorijen' make male and female *karwar*, in which the ghosts of their ancestors are supposed to reside. These afford protection to the households, and food is set beside them at festivals (de Clercq, p. 205). The Seget Sélé at the extreme westerly point of New Guinea bury their dead in the islet of Lago and erect little houses for their ghosts in the jungle, which are never entered (*ib.* p. 211). Wooden images of the distinguished dead are made in MacCluer Gulf; at Sekar similar *korwar* protect property, and one ancestor figure, Aerfanas, makes girls pregnant (H. Külin, quoted by Krieger, p. 402 f.); in the same place small bowls (called *kararasa* after the ghosts of ancestors who are believed to lodge in them) are hung up in the houses, and on special occasions food is placed in them (de Clercq, p. 462). In the islets of the Angunung district in the south of MacCluer Gulf corpses are placed in hollows in the rocks, which are adorned with pictographs (*ib.* fig. p. 459).

The Papuans of the Mimika River either bury their dead in a shallow grave or place the body in a coffin supported on trestles; occasionally the corpse is just placed on a platform. Only the skull is eventually retained and kept in the house. There is a belief in ghosts. The first peal of thunder in the day is greeted with a long tremulous shout, as is the rare whistle of a certain bird; in a bad thunderstorm the ground is beaten and sticks waved with shouting. The first sight of the new moon is greeted with a sort of bark (Wollaston, pp. 131, 132, 136-140). A 'form of prayer' by wailing is practised during the performance of any risky deed, at the ceremonial slaughter of a pig, and even at the setting of the sun. There are carved figures of men in some villages, for which, however, no respect is shown (Rawling, pp. 135-139, 224).

Wollaston refers to a pig festival, attended by visitors from distant parts, in which women draped in leaves drove two boars into the jungle. The men formed a hollow square in the village; the women driving the boars returned to the village, and, as the boars were being bound, the women set up a great wailing and plastered themselves with mud. The boars were clubbed to death on a large sloping platform, and, when they were dead, the women threw themselves on the dead bodies, wailing loudly. The men also wailed. After the mud had been washed off, playing took place; the women and girls chased the men into the river and beat them without retaliation. A child had its ears pierced on this occasion (pp. 134-136).

No explanation of the ceremony was obtained but it appears to be a variant of the great periodic festivals of the eastern coastal districts.

General observations.—A few generalizations on the religions of New Guinea may now be made. Everywhere man is believed to possess a soul which leaves the body at death, and may then be termed a ghost. The ghost remains for some time in the neighbourhood of the corpse, and, although it may go to an underground world or to some island, it frequently revisits its former home, partly to be revenged on the sorcerer who compassed the death of its body, partly to be assured that the funeral rites are duly performed. If this is the case, it is pleased and may be helpful; otherwise it is malicious, and it may show displeasure if its children are molested or tribal customs neglected. After a long interval an elaborate festival is held, and the ghost is finally dismissed to the other world. During all this time offerings are made to the ghost and it may be prayed to for help; for this purpose the skull is frequently kept and often other bones as well, as the ghost retains connexion with them. The final ceremony is all-important, though the period which elapses before it is variable. It is often the occasion of initiation ceremonies, the idea seeming to be that, as the ghosts, at all events of the recently dead, are present, it is a convenient opportunity to socialize them with those who are being admitted into tribal life. The bull-roarer seems in many tribes to be associated with ghosts, often indeed to be their representative, which may explain its very constant use in initiation ceremonies. The carved tablets or boards which are so constantly found in the 'club-houses' are connected with a manes- or ancestor-cult, as are also masks; but these in some instances may represent spirits that never were men and whom it is permissible to speak of as gods. The employment of masks, however, is limited, and evidently belongs to a distinct culture.

As the ghosts are often invoked to make the gardens or plantations fruitful, so the occasion of the final funeral feast may be taken as a special opportunity for securing their aid. The initiation ceremonies are not merely the promotion of status of the novitiates, but also their introduction to sexual life. Usually the puberty ceremonies of both sexes are distinct, but they may be combined. The relation between human reproduction and the

fruitfulness of the soil is frequently recognized. Thus we find that the 'great festival' is of complex origin and import, and it is not surprising that one or other aspect is predominant in different localities. It is probable that its components were perfectly distinct rites connected severally with puberty, death, and horticulture. That such syncretism does take place is proved by the fact that the occasion of the great feast is taken by the Mafulu to perform minor social rites, such as nose-boring, etc. The various developments that may occur will depend upon the social organization of the people, the different cultural influences that have come in from outside, and other circumstances, among which must be reckoned migration. If the migration has been gradual, a connexion may be retained with the parent stock, or at all events the differentiation may not be great, as among the Elema tribes, but, if the migration has been from afar, as among the Motu, a great obliteration may be expected.

Totemism has a discontinuous distribution, but there is no evidence as to whether it was at one time universal; in some places there are what appear to be vestiges, and in others totemism has been modified by later influences. For more detailed information Frazer's *Totemism and Exogamy* (ii. 1-62, iv. 276-286) may be consulted.

Head-hunting is wide-spread, though not universal; it, too, is the criterion of a cultural drift. Often a victim must be offered at the consecration of a new club-house or for 'bleeding' a war canoe. The *kopiravi*-cult of the Purari delta and the *agibi*-cult farther west are special developments of head-hunting, which at present cannot be linked with other phases of the custom. Cannibalism is frequently associated with head-hunting; sometimes it is of a very mild order, being a form of contagious magic; often it is a solemn act of revenge; in some cases human flesh is eaten for pleasure.

The rich religious life of many of the tribes of the Papuan Gulf seems to find a parallel among the peoples up the Sëpik, judging from their paraphernalia, although we do not know anything about their religion. It seems probable that there has been a migration southward from the Sëpik, which introduced among other things men's houses and the use of masks eventually as far south as Torres Straits, thus complicating the more aboriginal culture which, we may assume, the less influenced Papuans possessed. The Papuan substratum probably extended all over New Guinea, and in some cases has remained relatively pure even at points along the coast. There is abundant linguistic, cultural, and other evidence of several migrations from Melanesia in the south-east and east. The total absence of masks south of 9° S. lat. and the almost co-extensive absence of the bull-roarer are significant. Noteworthy, too, are the apparently weak religious sentiment of the W. Papuo-Melanesians and the stone erections of many of the S. Massim. The employment of sacred flutes among the inland tribes of the Mamba and Waria, from Huon Gulf to Humboldt Bay, and on the Sëpik and Mamberamo Rivers, indicates a definite cultural influence with which may be associated the distribution of slit gongs and spirit-houses from Humboldt Bay to Berlinhafen and up the Sëpik. The prevalence of various kinds of *korwar* from the Mamberamo to MacCluer Gulf is significant; their distribution indicates more than one cultural drift from Indonesia.

A manes-cult is practically universal, though in places it seems to be feebly developed. Frequently the bull-roarer is definitely associated with this cult, as are also masks and ceremonial tablets on which human faces are carved. In the Papuan

Gulf, according to Holmes, ancestors seem to have been promoted into distinct gods. Culture heroes are frequently recognized, and there is a tendency to apotheosize them when they come from elsewhere. The absence of a priesthood has prevented the systemization of religion.

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NEW HEBRIDES.—This archipelago in the western Pacific Ocean consists of a fairly compact mass of islands in its northern and central parts, tailing off to the south into the more widely separated islands of Eromanga, Tanna, Anaiteum, Aniwa, and Futuna. The term 'New Hebrides' is often used to include the Banks and Torres Islands lying to the north.

With the exception of the Torres group, all the islands are volcanic and are very fertile and not specially unhealthy. The chief foods are the yam, taro, bread-fruit, banana, and coco-nut, together with fish, and on festive occasions pork and fowls. The population has decreased very greatly, partly owing to the introduction of European diseases, alcohol, and firearms, but probably in still greater measure owing to artificial restriction of the birth-rate. In some parts the decrease has now been stayed and families have become larger, especially where missionary influence is strong.

1. *Somatology*.—The inhabitants of the New Hebrides are examples of the Oceanic variety of the Negro, but there is very great variety of physical type. In some places, such as parts of Lepers' Island (Oba) and Ambrini, the people are much lighter than the average in colour, and nowhere are they so dark as in some of the northern islands of Melanesia. There is also great variety in stature. The people of the interior of Espiritu Santo (commonly called Santo) are so small (3 ft. 6 in. to 4 ft. in height) that they may properly be called Pygmies, and there are indications of a similar population elsewhere. There is more constancy in the nature of the hair, which is nearly always frizzly and black, but examples of curly or wavy hair are occasionally to be observed. The great variety of population has probably arisen through the fusion of several light-coloured and wavy- or straight-haired immigrant peoples with an indigenous Negro or Nigritic population. In some places the physical characters of the people may have been influenced by later settlements of Polynesians, but the cultural resemblance to Polynesia has probably arisen more through the settlements of the wanderers who originally peopled Polynesia than through the later arrival of Polynesian castaways and migrants.

2. *Language*.—Two families of language are spoken in the New Hebrides—Melanesian and Polynesian. The Polynesian languages are spoken only in certain small islands in the southern and central parts of the group, viz. Aniwa, Futuna, Vila (or Fila), Meli, and the western part of Mac. The presence of Polynesian languages in these islands is probably due to the relatively recent

settlement of small bodies of Polynesians who perhaps reached the islands as castaways, and, blending with the earlier Melanesian population, succeeded in introducing their language. The Melanesian languages which are spoken in every other part of the group show very great variety in vocabulary and phonetic character, the differences in grammatical structure being smaller or at any rate less obvious. In vocabulary and phonetics the differences may be very great, especially aberrant examples being found at Hog Harbour in the north-eastern part of Santo, at South-west Bay in Malekula, and in Ambrim and Epi. The languages of the southern islands differ considerably from the rest, the language of Anaiteum departing more widely than the others from the usual Melanesian character. Variations may be found quite close to one another, and an island less than a mile in length may show two or three dialectical variations.

There is no close correlation between language and physical character. The people of the islands where Polynesian languages are spoken differ little from their Melanesian-speaking neighbours, and the speakers of anomalous Melanesian languages may conform closely to the prevailing physical type. Thus, in Santo the people of Hog Harbour who are anomalous in language are not so in physical appearance, while their Pygmy neighbours speak a language conforming closely to the general Melanesian type.

3. Social organization. — Four chief types of organization can be distinguished: (a) the dual organization with matrilineal descent; (b) the totemic clan-organization; (c) a clan system dependent on locality with local exogamy; and (d) a system in which there is no clan-organization, in which marriage is regulated by kinship.

(a) The dual organization with matrilineal descent is found in the purest form at Hog Harbour at the north-eastern part of Santo. Immediately north of this the moieties are subdivided into sections, and this is also the case in the northern part of Pentecost, the eastern side of Oba, the north-western part of Santo, and the Banks Islands. In parts of Santo the dual organization is fused with a totemic system to produce a highly complex organization.

(b) The totemic system is found in its purest form in Sandwich Island (Fate) and the adjacent islands, such as Nguna, Vila, and Meli. The people of these islands are organized in a number of matrilineal clans, each associated with a plant or animal, the former being the more numerous. The condition would be one of typical totemism if there were not an almost complete absence of the tabus on the use of animal or plant which are usually associated with totemism. The totemism of Santo is still more anomalous. The sub-groups of the moieties of the dual organization are associated with plants or animals, and a person belongs to the clan of his mother, but every person includes in his or her personal name the name of the totem of his or her father. Thus, a man whose father belongs to the kava (*ae*) clan and his mother to the coco-nut (*olo*) clan will belong to the *olo*, but will have the word *ae* as a prefix to his personal name.

(c) The organization with local exogamy is found in Ambrim, in some parts of Malekula, and in the small islands (Vao, Atelin, Wala, etc.) on the north-eastern shores of that island. Since a man belongs to the locality of his father, the condition is patrilineal.

(d) The fourth kind of organization, in which marriage is regulated by kinship, is found in Tangoa and Eraki, small islands at the southern end of Santo, and in several villages on Santo. It is also present in Malo and Tituba, and in the

western part of Lepers' Island (Oba). It may also be present in the group of small islands lying between Sandwich Island and Epi, often called the Shepherd Islands. At present we have no definite knowledge concerning the social organization of the islands from Eromanga southwards.

Some of the islands, such as Ambrim, are highly communistic, and the whole group seems to present various intermediate stages between communistic and individual ownership of property. In most parts chieftainship in the strict sense cannot be said to exist, but is replaced by the status which accompanies high rank in the organizations known as the *Mangge*, *Sukwe*, etc. (see below). Chieftainship, however, is present in the southern islands and probably in the group of islands lying between Sandwich Island and Epi. Wife purchase is general throughout the islands, but in some parts is accompanied by a condition in which the young women are monopolized by the old men, the young men having to be content with widows. Probably as the result of this social condition, there are a number of peculiar forms of marriage, such as marriage with the daughter's daughter of the brother, with the daughter of the sister's son, the wife of the father's father and of the mother's brother. These marriages occur especially in the northern part of the group, while the region south of Epi, with the exception of the Fate group and the small islands between Sandwich Island and Epi, is characterized by the presence of the cross-cousin marriage (*ERE* viii. 425 f.). A limited form of this marriage occurs also at Hog Harbour and on the east coast of Malekula.

The chief objects used in the purchase of wives are pigs, and these animals also form the chief medium of exchange and payment in other transactions. In the New Hebrides mats form a kind of money. In the Banks Islands shell-money is the chief currency, and in the Torres Islands arrows and pigs' jaw-bones.

The organizations to be described in the next section take a very important place in social life, and there is hardly a branch of social organization upon which they do not exercise a profound effect.

4. Religion. — In most of the islands there is a belief in a being who is usually supposed to have created man and to take an interest in his welfare. In Ambrim this being is called Taktak, in the northern part of Malekula Tagar, in Atchin Tahar, in Oba Tagaro, in Malo Tokotitai, in Tangoa Soketatai, in different parts of Santo Totetara and Yetar, while in the southern islands he is known by some form of the Polynesian Maui-tikitiki, viz. Moitikitiki in Anaiteum and Tanna and Amoshikishiki in Futuna. Though these beings correspond in many ways with our idea of 'god,' they are not the object of any special cult, and the people seem to attach little, if any, importance to the possibility of their intervention in human affairs. In some places they are connected with the sun and moon. In Atchin Tahar represents both sun and moon. At Nogugu, in Santo, Totetara is believed to dwell beyond the setting sun, and the people of Tangoa occasionally throw food towards Mata ni alo, 'the eye of the sun,' asking it to take the offering to Soketatai. The worship of sun and moon is said to have been present in the southern islands, and representations of sun and moon have been found carved on rocks in Anaiteum.

Beliefs and practices connected with such beings as Soketatai are, however, of very little importance beside the cult of the dead, and especially of dead ancestors, which is the central feature of the religion of the New Hebrides. The belief in the influence of the dead upon the living inspires much of the religious ceremonial, and in some if not all, of the islands the cult of dead ancestors forms part

of an elaborate organization called the *Mangge* in Ambrim, *Mangki*, *Mengge*, or *Maki* in Malekula and the adjacent islands, and *Mwele* or some form of the word *Supwe* (*Supkwe* or *Sukwe*) in Santo and the Banks Islands. This cult certainly extended as far south as Sandwich Island (Fate), and was probably present in the southern islands. The practice of the cult is closely associated with the representative of the Melanesian club-house called *gamal*, *khamali*, etc. Though we have as yet no definite evidence of the presence of the whole cult in the southern islands, the club-house which accompanies it elsewhere is certainly present, and the people use kava, which is associated throughout this part of Melanesia with the cult practised in the club-house.

In the Banks Islands the organization has two distinct sections—the *Supkwe* proper and the *Tamate*, or 'ghost' secret societies. In the New Hebrides these two sections are combined in one cult, which has little of the secret character of the 'ghost' societies of the Banks. All the organizations consist of a number of grades, and men rise in rank and social estimation by passing from grade to grade, making payments on each occasion to those who are already members; the payments consist of pigs in the New Hebrides and of shell money in the Banks Islands. A member of the organization may eat only food cooked at his own fire or at the fire of a member of his own rank; this makes the institution resemble the caste of India, which has led European settlers in the New Hebrides to speak of the whole organization as 'caste.'

The chief features of the ceremonial of the *Mangge* of Ambrim are the killing of pigs, the assumption of a new name by the initiate, and the making of a new fire. The leading feature of the higher ranks is the setting up of an image in human form, in which it is believed that the ghost of the father's father comes to reside and care for the welfare of his descendant who is taking the new rank. The image is covered by a house or some structure representing a house.

In other islands—Santo, Malo, and Malekula—an important feature of the ritual is the erection of dolmen-like structures consisting of a table-stone resting on stone supports, upon which a new member stands when he is killing a pig. Nearly everywhere the banyan tree forms a striking object in the places where the ceremonies are held.

Wooden gongs, often called drums, are used in all forms of the organization to give special signals so that all shall know the nature of any ceremony which is about to be performed. In Ambrim and Malekula and in many of the islands to the south as far as Fate the gongs are set upright in the ground and are adorned with representations of the human form. In Santo they are little ornamented and lie on the ground. The shell-conch is also prominent in the ritual, being blown in some islands whenever a boar passes from one person to another. Only the flesh of male pigs may be eaten by those who belong to the organization, and in many islands especial importance is attached to pigs believed to be hermaphrodite.

A prominent difference between the organizations of Santo on the one hand and Malekula and Ambrim on the other is that in Santo more importance is attached to the number of pigs killed. In some parts of Santo a man may have to kill more than a thousand pigs, the number accumulating from the time when he took his first step. In Malekula and Ambrim, on the other hand, more importance is attached to the kind of pig, especially to the degree of curvature of its tusks. In Ambrim only a few pigs are killed, though many pass from the new to an old member in payment for the various objects used in the ritual.

The connexion of the organization with ancestor-cult is especially obvious in Ambrim. Elsewhere the religious character of the institution has often fallen into the background, while the economical aspect has become especially important. This importance has arisen out of two factors: (1) the payments made by new members to old have produced a complicated system of vested interests, a man in a grade receiving from new members a return for the payments that he had himself made in order to reach his present rank; (2) the other mode is by the connexion of the organizations with the practice of tabu. In some islands, such as Ambrim, membership of the organization is the chief means by which a man can reserve property for his own use, and in Ambrim the power of tabu is definitely associated with the ancestor-cult, any infraction being punished by the ghostly ancestors of the tabuer, who inflict some form of illness on the offender.

In Ambrim the rites following death are almost an exact replica of the proceedings when the dead man took his last step in the *Mangge*, and this connexion between the ancestor-cult and the death-rites is probably present in Malekula. The chief mode of treatment of the body of the dead which is associated with the *Mangge* and allied cults is interment in the extended position, often in the house or club-house. In some places only the head is interred, while the body is kept on a platform, and this practice appears to be the representative of an older mode of disposal in which the bodies of the dead were placed on platforms, sometimes in the branches of a banyan tree. This mode of disposal is still practised in some parts of Santo. In one district of South-west Bay in Malekula the bodies of important men are dried over a fire on a frame-work inside the house. After a time the bones are thrown away except the skull, which is taken to the club-house. It is covered with plaster and made to resemble the dead man as much as possible. It is then fixed to an artificial body, which is decorated with all the insignia proper to his rank in the *Mengge*. Under certain conditions in Ambrim the dead may be interred in the upright or sitting position, and the sitting position is the rule in the interment of old men in Vao and Atchin, and appears to have been habitual among the now extinct Bushmen of Fate. In some of the southern islands, such as Anaiteum, dead commoners were thrown into the sea, while chiefs were interred.

Everywhere in the New Hebrides the dead are believed to pass to some place at a distance from their home in life. The people of Ambrim and of some parts of Malekula are believed to go to the great volcano in Ambrim, and those of the southern part of Malekula to South-west Bay. The people of Malo and Tangoa go to a place in Santo, those of Nogugu on the west coast of Santo to a cave at the northern point (Cape Cumberland) of the western side of Big Bay, and those of Hog Harbour to two mountains on the eastern shore of Big Bay. The people of Fate and other central islands usually pass to some small island, reef, or point of land in the vicinity. The dead of Atchin are said by the old men to go to Tahar (see p. 353^b), this belief co-existing with that in the passage to Ambrim.

The journey of the dead to their future home may be accompanied by various trials, and success in reaching it does not depend on the possession of moral qualities as we understand them, but rather on such features as membership of the *Mangge* and similar organizations, the knowledge of certain songs, tattooing, and the boring of ears or nose. The dead of the small islands lying north-east of Malekula succeed in reaching their home in Ambrim only by the gift of the pigs killed in their funeral rites to a being called Lesausan in Atchin.

and Lehettheth in Vao, whom they meet on the way. At Hog Harbour those who are killed in war go to one mountain and those who have died from disease to another.

The *Mangge* and similar organizations are very far from exhausting the ceremonial of the New Hebrides. In Ambrim the bull-roarer is swung after the death of a man who has learned with special ceremonial how to use it in life. This ceremony and one called *rom*, in which masks are worn, are probably survivals of an older cult allied to that of the *Tamate* societies of the Banks Islands, which existed in the island before the introduction of the *Mangge*. The bull-roarer is said to have passed to Ambrim and Malekula from Epi; it is used as a toy in parts of Santo.

The operation of incision, a variety of cirencision (*ERE* iii. 660), is practised in Malekula, Ambrim, the southern part of Pentecost, Epi, Eromanga, Tanna, and probably Anaiteum, and true circumcision occurs in the northern part of Malekula. In each case the operation is accompanied by prolonged ceremonial, in which boys undergo a period of seclusion, with features suggesting the representation of death which are also present in the proceedings of the *Tamate* societies of the Banks Islands. In Ambrim incision certainly belongs to a stratum of culture older than the *Mangge*. The practice is associated with a special form of dress, the pudendal sheath, either in a simple form in Ambrim and parts of Malekula, or greatly exaggerated in size in other parts of Malekula and in the southern islands. The operation and mode of dress are very closely associated; where one occurs, the other is always found. Though the customs of boring the ears and nose have an influence upon the fate of a man after his death, the boring does not seem to be accompanied by any special ceremonial.

Another mutilation—knocking out the upper incisor teeth of women—is practised at Hog Harbour, in South-west Bay, and in a district in the middle of the east coast of Malekula. At South-west Bay the operation is performed with ceremonies resembling those accompanying incision. Deformation of the head is performed in the southern part of Malekula and in the adjacent Maskelyne Islands.

Prolonged and important ceremonies are performed in connexion with the making of new canoes and gongs. In some islands the ceremony of making the wooden gongs forms part of the ceremonial of the *Mangki* or *Maki*, but in Ambrim it is wholly distinct, though the gongs when made are used in the ritual of the *Mangge*. The canoe ceremonies were performed only in the case of the large canoes used for going to other islands, and are now performed when the people have bought large boats of the European pattern. In Ambrim the ceremonial has much in common with that performed when making a new gong.

We do not know of any special ceremonial accompanying other manufactures. Pottery is made by women on the west coast of Santo and was formerly made in many other parts of the group, but the manufacture does not seem to have had a ceremonial character, and, beyond the killing of pigs, we have at present no knowledge of religious ceremonial accompanying house-building or the making of weapons or other objects.

5. Magic.—Various kinds of magic are practised in the New Hebrides, but apparently play a less prominent part in the lives of the people than in the Banks and Torres Islands. In these islands the people chiefly fear the magical powers of members of their own community, and in the Banks Islands associations have come into existence for mutual protection in this respect. In the New

Hebrides magic is also practised within the community, but in some islands the people fear chiefly the magic of their neighbours, and especially do the people of the coast fear those who dwell in the bush. Magical powers are widely ascribed to the people of Ambrim, who in their turn dread the magic of the inhabitants of certain parts of Malekula.

In the Banks Islands magical powers are believed to be derived from spirits (*vui*) whose efficacy depends on an attribute called *mana* (*ERE* viii. 375 f.). We have no evidence at present that similar spirits are supposed to produce magical effects in the New Hebrides, and, though the word *mana* exists with other meanings, we do not know of the presence of the beliefs which this term connotes in the Banks Islands.

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NEWMAN.—John Henry Newman was born in London on 21st Feb. 1801. His father's family has been said to be of partly Jewish descent, but there is no evidence for the assertion. His mother's family, Fourdrinier by name, was descended from French Huguenots who left France on the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Her influence, her fervent if somewhat narrow piety, was largely responsible in his childhood for the formation of that intense conviction of the reality of the spiritual world which is his distinguishing characteristic. As a boy he was already a mystic, and at fifteen he underwent the experience known in Evangelical circles as conversion. In 1808 he was sent to a private school at Ealing, where he remained until he went up to Trinity College, Oxford, in June 1817. A year later he was elected to a scholarship, and took his B.A. degree in 1821, although, owing to nervous exhaustion from overwork, with a less brilliant place in the class-list than was expected. His real powers were known, however, and recognized in 1822 by his election to a fellowship at Oriel. This college, although a small one, had taken the lead in the intellectual revival of the early 19th cent. at Oxford, and to be chosen a member of that brilliant society was to win the blue ribbon of Oxford scholarship.

At first the influence of his new associates, with Whately as the dominant force among them, seemed likely to lead him in quite a different direction from that which he afterwards took. They 'called everything into question; they appealed to first principles, and disallowed authority as a judge in matters intellectual' (Ward, *Life of Newman*, i. 37). The abiding result of this intercourse was his liberation from the narrow, almost Calvinistic, theology of his youth, and that breadth of sympathy which marked his later writings. In 1824 he took orders in the Church of England, and was appointed to the curacy of St. Clement's Oxford, a parish almost entirely inhabited by the poor. On his appointment in 1826 to a tutorship at Oriel, which, unlike the preceding generation of tutors, he regarded as involving a definite responsibility for the souls of his pupils, he resigned his curacy; and in 1828 he was named vicar of St. Mary's, the university church. In the latter year his friendship with Hurrell Froude brought him into relation with Keble; and little by little he began to value more highly the ancient traditional element in religion, and to study with avidity the writings of the early Christian Fathers. He began to think that he had overvalued the function of the mere intellect in matters of religion, and to

dread the liberalism which characterized the keenest thinkers of the day both at Oxford and at Cambridge. It is curious to find that his first notable stand on public questions was his opposition in 1829 to Sir Robert Peel's re-election as member of parliament for the university because of his proposing Catholic emancipation—an opposition based, however, not upon Newman's prejudices (at that time very real) against the Roman Catholic system, but on his conviction that the measure was an outgrowth of the indifference of the day. This does not mean that he ever became, or could have become, a blind reactionary—he had much sympathy, for instance, with Roman Catholics of the type of Montalembert in France; but this whole aspect of his life is best summed up in the words which he spoke fifty years later on his reception into the College of Cardinals.

'And, I rejoice to say to one great mischief I have from the first opposed myself. For thirty, forty, fifty years I have resisted to the best of my powers the spirit of Liberalism in religion . . . the doctrine that there is no positive truth in religion, but that one creed is as good as another. . . . It is inconsistent with any recognition of any religion, as true. It teaches that all are to be tolerated, for all are matters of opinion. Revealed religion is not a truth, but a sentiment and a taste; not an objective fact, not miraculous; and it is the right of each individual to make it say just what strikes his fancy' (Ward, ii. 460).

After finishing his first serious piece of historical study, *The Ariens of the Fourth Century*, in 1832, he set out for rest and refreshment, in company with Hurrell Froude, on his memorable Mediterranean journey, during which he came in contact for the first time with the Roman Catholic system in actual operation, and was nearly dying of a fever in Sicily. He told his servant that he did not think he should die, for he believed that God had a work for him to do. The same sense of a divine guidance is expressed in the hymn, 'Lead, kindly Light,' which he wrote while becalmed in an orange-boat off the coast of Sicily on his homeward way from Naples to Marseilles.

He reached England at a time critical for the Established Church. Ten Irish bishoprics had been suppressed, and disestablishment seemed among the possibilities. Froude, Keble, and Palmer had already resolved to 'write and associate in defence of the Church,' and on 14th July 1833 Keble preached in St. Mary's his famous sermon on 'National Apostasy,' from which the formal beginning of the Oxford Movement was dated. Newman threw himself heartily into their plans, and in December the *Tracts for the Times* (1833-41) began—pamphlets of varying size, but of uniformly academic rather than popular tone, intended to vindicate the continuity of the Church of England and the integrity of the Prayer Book. Presently he reached the height of his influence; in the Oxford of 1838 he was the central figure, and every one bears witness to the marvellous effect of his sermons in St. Mary's. One testimony may be quoted from a Scottish Presbyterian:

'To call these sermons eloquent would be no word for them; high poems they rather were, as of an inspired singer, or the outpourings of a prophet, rapt yet self-possessed. And the tone of voice in which they were spoken, once you grew accustomed to it, sounded like a fine strain of unearthly music. Through the silence of that high Gothic building the words fell on the ear like the measured drippings of water in some vast dim cave. After hearing these sermons you might come away still not believing the tenets peculiar to the High Church system; but you would be harder than most men, if you did not feel more than ever ashamed of coarseness, selfishness, worldliness, if you did not feel the things of faith brought closer to the soul' (J. O. Shairp, essay on 'John Keble,' in *Studies in Poetry and Philosophy*, Edinburgh, 1863, p. 278).

But presently arose the doubts as to his position which were to make the next five years a time of torture to him. His studies (1839) in the history of the Monophysite controversy, followed by the impression of the other parallel in the Donatist schism and St. Augustine's classic words, 'Securus judicat orbis terrarum,' set him thinking whether

a local, a national, Church cut off from antiquity on the one side and on the other from the majority of Christians in the present day could indeed be the body of Christ. He managed to put the doubts away from him; but, in his own phrase, 'he who has seen a ghost can never be as though he had not seen it,' and they were bound to recur. In 1841 he published the famous Tract xc., 'On Reserve in Communicating Religious Knowledge,' in which he tried to prove that the XXXIX. Articles need not bear the anti-Roman sense popularly attributed to them. It caused intense excitement and was condemned by a number of bishops, in order to emphasize the Protestant character of the Church of England. In April 1842 Newman took up his abode in the row of simple cottages at Littlemore, a few miles out of Oxford, which he had prepared with a view to the foundation of a quasi-monastic community. He resigned the vicarage of St. Mary's in September 1843. 'From the end of 1844,' he writes, 'I was on my deathbed as regarded my membership in the Anglican Church.' Yet, until he was sure, he felt bound not to unsettle others, and withdrew himself more and more into solitude, giving himself to uninterrupted prayer and study. In March 1845 he resigned his fellowship, and on 9th October he was received into the Roman Catholic communion by Father Dominic, an Italian Passionist who was travelling in England.

In the following year he went to Rome and made some studies there, and was ordained priest on 30th May 1847. After considerable weighing of what his future work should be, he joined the Congregation of the Oratory, founded by St. Philip Neri in the 16th cent., and more loosely organized than the old monastic orders. The plan of a new Oratorian house in England, the first there, was approved by the pope. It was established at Edgbaston, a suburb of Birmingham, in January 1848, with Newman as superior; and this was his home for the rest of his life, except for the Irish interlude. In 1850 he gave some notable lectures in London on 'Certain Difficulties felt by Anglicans,' and a few months later another series on 'The Present Position of Catholics in England,' the best written, in his own opinion, of all his works. In one of these, delivered in the Corn Exchange, Birmingham, he exposed in very plain language the abominable vices of an apostate Italian friar named Achilli, who had been lecturing against the Church (the passage is given in full in Ward, i. 279). Following closely an article by Cardinal Wiseman in the *Dublin Review* of July 1850, he detailed the scandalous career of Achilli, who brought an action for libel against him. It proved very difficult to get from Italy the necessary witnesses; the jury was prejudiced by the violent anti-Roman feeling of the days of the 'Papal Aggression'; and Newman was found guilty and sentenced to a fine of £100, which, as well as the enormous expenses of the trial, was at once paid by popular subscription. In a leading article the *Times*, which then spoke the sober mind of England, called the proceedings 'indecorous in their nature, unsatisfactory in their result, and little calculated to increase the respect of the people for the administration of justice or the estimation by foreign nations of the English name and character.'

In 1852, at the first synod of the restored hierarchy, he preached the magnificent sermon on 'The Second Spring' which Macaulay is said to have known by heart. Before this he had been asked to take the rectorship of a Roman Catholic university to be established in Dublin, but he was not actually installed until February 1854. The story is too long to tell in detail of how misunderstandings and apparent lack of support from some of the Irish bishops made his position anything

but comfortable (see his own account published after his death under the title of *My Campaign in Ireland*, and Ward, i. chs. xi., xii.); but he was never at home in his new surroundings, and at the end of 1858 he resigned his office and went back with relief to the quiet life of the Oratory.

The next five years were years of discouragement and apparent failure. Singularly enough, it was a bitter and unscrupulous attack upon him that led to his restoration to a wide popularity not only among the members of his own Church, but in the English world at large. In a review of Froude's *History of England* (*Macmillan's Magazine*, Jan. 1864) Charles Kingsley wrote:

'Truth for its own sake has never been a virtue with the Roman clergy. Father Newman informs us that it need not be, and on the whole ought not to be;—that cunning is the weapon which Heaven has given to the Saints wherewith to withstand the brute male force of the wicked world which marries and is given in marriage. Whether his notion he doctrinally correct or not, it is at least historically so.'

Newman might possibly have let the thing pass, 'grave and gratuitous slander' as he called it in his initial demand on the publishers for reparation, if it had touched himself alone. But he felt that the honour of the whole Roman Catholic priesthood was at stake; and when, in answer to his request for substantiation, Kingsley was able to give but one reference, and that from a sermon preached in St. Mary's while Newman was still an Anglican, the matter could not be allowed to rest. Yet the only apology that he offered, printed in the following number of the magazine, was merely conventional and did not touch the real point at issue; and in a pamphlet entitled *What, then, does Dr. Newman mean?* he actually deepened the offensiveness of his original charge. Newman came to the conclusion that the only way to vindicate himself completely was to do what was extremely distasteful to his sensitive and retiring disposition—to give a minute history of all the mental processes which had led him to his change of allegiance. In seven parts, at intervals of a week, he published the *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, which, written as it was at high speed and under the pressure of conflict, has been often called the greatest piece of autobiographical writing in the English language.

'Not the letters of Pascal, nor those of Junius, won more instant success. The *Apologia*, as it was given to the world Thursday after Thursday, appeared in all hands, was read in clubs, in drawing-rooms, by clerks on the top of omnibuses, in railway trains, and one had almost said, in pulpits, for everywhere its author was discussed, his pathetic or striking sentences quoted, his English more than ever admired' (Barry, *Cardinal Newman*, p. 123).

Abundant testimony to the convincing effect of Newman's defence might be collected from many people absolutely at variance with his religious beliefs. Richard Holt Hutton, editor of the *Spectator*, a Liberal in politics and, until late in life, a Unitarian in religion, a known admirer of Kingsley, put forth strongly in more than one article that 'the whole justice of the matter seems to us on Dr. Newman's side'; and Frederic Harrison, in a sketch of Kingsley's whole work and influence (*Studies in Early Victorian Literature*, London, 1895, p. 180), declines even to speak of 'his miserable duel with Cardinal Newman, wherein he was so shamefully worsted.'

Apart from the *Apologia*, the most interesting activity of the sixties in Newman's life was the attempt to establish a centre of Roman Catholic life and teaching in his still-loved Oxford. The scheme was opposed by Manning and others, and ultimately abandoned—though since Newman's death the principle for which he contended has been fully recognized. The details of this controversy may be seen at length in Ward's *Life*, chs. xxi., xxiv. f., and in Purcell, *Life of Cardinal Manning*, ii. ch. xiii. f. In 1866 he began to make

notes for the work which he regarded as one of his most important, the *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*. The next four years were largely occupied with serious thought and correspondence touching the apparently approaching definition of papal infallibility at the Vatican Council of 1870. He found in the utterances of the *Dublin Review* and the *Univers*—strongly Ultramontane—exaggeration and party spirit which seemed to him unhappy in tendency and likely to lead to portentous evils.

'Newman's great fear, in the years 1866-70, during which the proposed definition was canvassed, seems to have been that by its terms it might appear to the world at large to sanction such excesses as those of M. Louis Veuillot [editor of the *Univers*], novelties which were at variance with traditional Catholic theology' (Ward, ii. 239 f.).

In 1868 the pope, after having his works examined and approved by official theologians, directed that he should be asked to help in preparing the material for the Council, which not only was a testimony to his orthodoxy, but gave him a definite standing when he was impelled to discuss the important question at issue. He declined to attend in person the theological conferences in Rome, but did his best to assist by correspondence such bishops as wished his advice. His fears were not allayed until the definition was actually made. His objection was not so much to the making of a definition as to the sort of definition which he felt was likely to be passed, in haste and under partisan pressure. When he saw the actual text of the decree, he was satisfied with its moderation.

'So far, indeed, as doctrine was concerned, no more was defined than he himself had always held. The old Ultramontanism of which Archbishop Sibour and Montalembert had been staunch defenders became a doctrine of faith. The Ultramontanism of the *Univers* received no countenance in the text of the definition. . . . The tendency towards excessive centralisation which he deplored was not a matter of doctrine but of policy' (Ward, ii. 307 f.).

He had said of the *Grammar of Assent*, which appeared early in 1870, that he expected it to be his last work; and in a memorandum of 14th Oct. 1874 spoke of 'my habit, or even nature, of not writing and publishing without a call' (Ward, ii. 400). Only a month later such a call came to him in a bitter attack, first in a magazine article and then in a pamphlet, by Gladstone, upon *The Vatican Decrees in their Bearing on Civil Allegiance*. It was thought by not a few that the statesman was irritated by the defeat, through the influence of the Irish bishops, of his Irish University Bill of 1873; at any rate, he came out with the statement that 'Rome had substituted for the proud boast of *semper eadem* a policy of violence and change in faith,' and that since the events of 1870 'no one can become her convert without renouncing his mental and moral freedom, and placing his civil loyalty and duty at the mercy of another.' In a brilliant pamphlet, entitled *A Letter to the Duke of Norfolk* (the leading Roman Catholic layman in England), Newman refuted Gladstone's charge, taking occasion at the same time to disown some of those exaggerated conceptions of the pope's position which he had deprecated before the Council.

In 1877 his old college at Oxford, Trinity, made him an honorary fellow, and in the following February invited him to pay a visit, of which Lord Bryce records:

'... to see younger people so many eventful years, sit as a youth, the voice so often heard in St. Mary's retaining, faint though it had grown, the sweet modulations Oxford knew so well, and the aged face worn deep with the lines of thought, struggle, and sorrow' (Ward, ii. 430).

But a greater honour was in store for him. Leo XIII., who had become pope in April 1878, signified in the following March his intention of conferring a cardinal's hat upon the venerable English

Oratorian; the actual creation took place in the consistory of 12th May, and was made more welcome by the permission, not granted to a cardinal who was only a priest since the time of de Bérulle, superior of the French Oratory, in the 17th cent., to continue his residence in England. His health grew increasingly feeble with advancing years, though to the last he endeavoured to be always working for the cause to which he had given his life. He died on 11th August 1890, and was buried at Rednal, under a stone engraved at his own desire with the words 'Ex umbris et imaginibus in veritatem'—words recalling the spirit of his best-known utterance, the appeal of the hymn written nearly sixty years before to the 'kindly Light' to lead him through all darkness and danger safely home.

During the years since his moving voice fell silent his influence has been perpetuated by the manifold appeal of his writings. Testimony to the unsurpassed excellence of his prose style—'common English made perfect,' as Barry calls it; 'not so much the expression of a thought as the thought taking shape in a perfectly pure medium of language' (A. C. Benson, *The Upton Letters*², London, 1906, p. 26)—might be collected from many good judges who have again no sympathy with his theology, as widely divergent from it, in fact, as R. H. Hutton and W. E. Henley, who says of Thackeray (*Views and Reviews*, London, 1908, i. 18), 'Setting aside Cardinal Newman's, the style he wrote is certainly less open to criticism than that of any other modern Englishman.' One of the most penetrating judgments is that of William Vaughan Moody:

'Newman's prose style at its best is characterized by an obtrusive distinction, and by a kind of aerial transparency in comparison with which even Arnold's prose appears slightly dense. Although Arnold's meaning is always perfectly clear, it reaches us, so to speak, through a resisting medium; we are conscious of his manner. Newman, it may almost be said, has no manner, or at least his manner is so completely one with his matter that it passes unobserved; his words convey his meaning as ether conveys light. If Arnold is as clear as crystal, Newman is as clear as mountain air. This quality of style, by virtue of which it incorporates itself in meaning and becomes, as it were, invisible, is the highest attainable quality; and Newman, in certain passages especially of his *Apologia* and his *Idea of a University*, has perhaps come nearer than any prose writer of his century to the type of perfect prose' (*Hist. of English Literature*, New York, 1902, p. 342).

Of all his thirty-six volumes, that in which these qualities are best exemplified on a subject of general interest is probably *The Idea of a University Defined and Illustrated* (1873), in which—again side by side with Matthew Arnold—he pleads for a broad general culture against the aggressive utilitarianism of the day, and exhibits the serene Oxford suavity in its most charming form. But greatest in substantive importance (unless the *Essay on Development* may be thought to rival it), although, because of the concentrated attention which it requires, never likely to be popular, is the *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*. Again and again he had justified in his *University Sermons*, preached before his conversion, as Hutton points out,

'the potent implicit reason of man against the fruitless and formal explicit reason,' shown 'how much more powerful was the combination of humility, trust, imagination, feeling, perception in apprehending the revealed mind and will of God, than the didactic and formal proofs to which the popular religious appeals of our day usually have recourse' (*Criticisms on Contemporary Thought and Thinkers*, London, 1894, ii. 276).

For years he had wished to write something which should deal with the relations of faith and reason in such a way as to answer the difficulties of modern sceptics, of which he had naturally a more vivid realization than most of his fellow-Catholics. Twenty years earlier he had complained that the Italian theologians 'know nothing at all of heretics as realities' (Ward, i. 247); and he had been seeking a key to their situation, which,

as mentioned above, he thought he had discovered in 1866 in the idea 'that certitude is a form of assent, and that to treat of the psychology of assent as distinguished from inference' was the way to reach his aim. The book is too long and too closely reasoned to be analyzed here; its value is its keen insight into certain mental processes which are deeply rooted in the experience of mankind, though their importance is not as a rule fully realized, which account for and justify beliefs not to be adequately proved by explicit logical arguments. It was a bold experiment; where scientific theology had tended to use the deductive method exclusively, the *Grammar*, with its minute psychological observation, was a step in the direction of employing the Baconian method.

'How man ought to arrive at certitude has been the subject of many an ambitious treatise. How, in concrete matters, he does arrive at it, was Newman's concern' (Barry, p. 148).

The *Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine*, most of which he had written before his conversion as an intellectual exercise for himself, evidences his growing conviction that the Roman Catholic belief of the 19th cent. was substantially the same as that of the apostles, only more explicitly defined and amplified. Its main contention may be most simply understood by recalling the use of the word 'development' in photography, where the chemical process is unable to bring out anything that was not originally imprinted on the plate by the sun's rays, yet the outline only at last becomes clearly visible. To some thinkers of the present day the enforcement of this idea, which anticipated so curiously in the ecclesiastical field much that Darwin was to suggest in the realm of biology, seems Newman's most important contribution to religious thought; and certain Modernists, especially in France, have attempted to claim him as in sympathy with their position. He was, indeed, one with them in his anxiety to show the reasonableness of his faith to the modern non-Catholic world, whose peculiar difficulties he understood so well; and they might gladly quote such phrases as these, detached from their context:

'Old principles reappear under new forms. [The living idea] changes in order to remain the same. In a higher world it is otherwise, but here below to live is to change and to be perfect is to have changed often' (*The Development of Christian Doctrine*, pt. i. ch. i. sect. i. [ed. 1878, p. 40]).

But the context and the attitude of humble submission to authority which characterized Newman's forty-five years as a Roman Catholic tell a different story; and the lecture entitled 'A Form of Infidelity of the Day,' delivered in 1854 (*Idea of a University*⁴, London, 1875, pp. 381-404), distinctly condemns, in an almost prophetic manner, the special temper of mind which was to be known half a century later by the name of Modernism (*q.v.*).

His genius did not find full development in the realm of fiction, although his two attempts in this field—*Callista* (1856), a tale showing the influence of Christianity on the educated world of the first Christian centuries, and *Loss and Gain* (1847), a novel full of interest for its vivid picture of the Oxford of the Movement—have many exquisite passages. The greater part of his poetry belongs to the early days, and is marked by the austere sobriety of *The Christian Year*. What was written later shows the same progress as is apparent from his Anglican to his Roman Catholic sermons—a greater intensity and fervour, life and colour. One poem stands out as unique in beauty and force. *The Dream of Gerontius* (1865), describing in dramatic form the death of a Christian and what follows it, written at a time when he was often meditating upon the expected approach of his own death, has a soaring splendour of imagination which induces a modern non-Catholic critic (W. J. Dawson, *Makers of English Prose*, p. 296) to

reckon it 'one of the great poems of the world, in spirit and substance akin to Goethe's *Faust* and Dante's trilogy, in depth of spiritual insight and emotion superior to the former and the equal of the latter.'

The same writer goes on to call it 'the most characteristic fruit of Newman's genius. For by birth and training, by temperament and life, Newman was essentially a religious genius, a prophet to whom doors of vision stood wide where other men saw only impenetrable darkness; yet so sensitively sympathetic, that he knew the weight of darkness which crushed others, although he never once succumbed to it. And it is by virtue of this temperament and genius that he will always be reckoned the greatest religious writer whom England has produced—perhaps also the greatest since Augustine and Aquinas.'

LITERATURE.—Newman's *Works* are published in 36 vols., London, 1868-81. The final authority on his biography is the *Life* by Wilfrid Ward, 2 vols., do. 1912. There is a valuable monograph by William Barry², do. 1904, and other brief *Lives* by W. Lockhart, do. 1891; R. H. Hutton, do. 1891; Wilfrid Meynell, do., n.d. [1887]. Inestimable in their wealth of detail on the Anglican period are his *Letters and Correspondence*, ed. Anne Mozley, 2 vols., do. 1891; see also *Contributions chiefly to the Early History of Cardinal Newman*, by his brother F. W. Newman, do. 1891. Other works which may be consulted are E. S. Purcell, *Life of Cardinal Manning*, 2 vols., do. 1895; H. P. Liddon, *Life of Edward Bouverie Pusey*, 4 vols., do. 1893-97; T. Mozley, *Reminiscences, chiefly of Oriel College and the Oxford Movement*, 2 vols., do. 1882; *Letters of the Rev. J. B. Mozley*, ed. Anne Mozley, do. 1885; J. T. Coleridge, *Memoir of John Keble*, do. 1869; Walter Lock, *John Keble*, do. 1893; R. W. Church, *The Oxford Movement*, do. 1891; *Occasional Papers*, do. 1897; C. Kegan Paul, *Biographical Sketches*, do. 1883; E. A. Abbott, *The Anglican Career of Cardinal Newman*, 2 vols., do. 1892; R. H. Hutton, *Essays on some Modern Guides of English Thought in Matters of Faith*, do. 1887; J. A. Froude, *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, iv., do. 1883; John Morley, *Miscellanies*, 4th ser., do. 1903; Aldan Gasquet, *Lord Acton and his Circle*, do. 1906; Percy Fitzgerald, *Fifty Years of Catholic Life and Social Progress*, 2 vols., do. 1901; *Letters of Archbishop Ullathorne*, do. 1892; W. Sanday, *England's Debt to Newman*, do. 1892; C. Sarolea, *Cardinal Newman and his Influence on Religious Life and Thought*, do. 1908; P. Thureau-Dangin, *La Renaissance catholique: Newman et le mouvement d'Oxford*, Paris, 1899; Henri Brémond, *Newman: Le Développement du dogme chrétien, Psychologie de la Foi, Essai de biographie psychologique*, 3 vols., do. 1905-06, Eng. tr., *The Mystery of Newman*, London, 1907; W. J. Williams, *Newman, Pascal, Loisy, and the Catholic Church*, do. 1906; L. E. Gates, *Three Studies in Literature*, New York, 1899; W. J. Dawson, *Makers of English Prose*, do. 1906. Joseph Rickaby has published an *Index to the Works of John Henry Cardinal Newman*, London, 1914.

A. I. DU P. COLEMAN.

NEW MOON.—See CALENDAR.

NEW TESTAMENT.—See BIBLE.

NEW TESTAMENT IN MUHAMMADANISM.—See OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS IN MUHAMMADANISM.

NEW THOUGHT.—New Thought, sometimes known as 'progressive philosophy,' has been defined as 'the latest product of growing mind' (C. D. Larson, *Eternal Progress Magazine*, Feb. 1912, p. 13), and as 'an attitude of mind and not a cult' (W. W. Atkinson, in the *New Thought Magazine*). Neither definition is complete.

1. Principles.—Some of the underlying principles of New Thought are the following: the existence of an omnipresent God—a God immanent in nature; universal life, intelligence, and energy, underlying and pervading the universe, finding expression in every created entity, colouring the rose, moulding the leaf, painting the sunset, clothing the grass with beauty, teaching the bird its song, reaching its culmination in man and revealing to him his own individuality and the consciousness of his own divine soul; the reign of universal law—the law of cause and effect; and that this law is as inexorable in the mental and spiritual world as in the physical universe; that thoughts are forces, and under this law every thought planted in the subconscious is expressed in the life and personality of the individual; 'whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap' (Gal 6); the identity of the individual

or human soul with the universal or divine Soul, and hence the continuity of the soul after the change which we call death; the brotherhood of man as the true foundation of every human relationship; that truth is the only foundation for religion and for ethical or moral growth; that evolution is God's method of creation, and that man is the result of evolutionary processes.

2. Religion or philosophy.—A religion or philosophy founded on these principles cannot harmonize with many of the Christian dogmas. New Thought excludes such doctrines as the duality of man and God, miracles in the accepted sense, the vicarious atonement, the forgiveness of sins, and priestly mediation. It seeks to interpret the world and nature as science has recorded them, but also to convey their finer and esoteric meanings to the human understanding. The fundamental purpose of religion and science is the same—namely, the discovery of truth. No conflict ever existed between true religion and real science; the only conflict was between contending dogmatists. Truth does not produce conflict.

New Thought holds that mind is the dominant power in man, and that his life and personality are the sum total of his thoughts. It would employ the laws of modern psychology in the mental development of man and the creation of proper mental states for bodily health, intellectual and moral efficiency. It lays emphasis on the value of constructive thinking. Thought is the helmsman that every man obeys. Thought determines character; thought is character. The conscious mind supplies ideals; the subconscious brings them into expression. Every thought sent forth attracts like thoughts, whether good or bad; this law is as certain as the law of gravitation.

It sees every man as a divine soul, hence it recognizes limitless possibilities within him. The purpose of true religion is to call the divine qualities of man into expression. It advocates a religion for to-day, and recognizes character as the only asset that man can carry into another state of existence. It sees in God and man the same attributes; otherwise man could form no comprehension of God. 'Man is a microcosm of God.' Accepting the fundamental unity of creation, it recognizes a kinship between man and every created entity, and that unity as the only foundation for the brotherhood of man. When the conception of this unity embraces our whole being, then and then only are we free.

Realizing God as omnipresent, indwelling in man, it finds no place for intermediaries. If God is indwelling in man, there is no occasion for a vicarious atonement to restore His lost relationship. Man's only separation was in thought, only an illusion of theology, an invention of the Church to make a place for intermediaries. Man having his origin in the lowest forms of animal life, his course has been steadily upward, until he now stands at the summit of creation, capable of abstract thought, conscious of his own divine qualities. His only fall was upward.

'If the sole Divinity of Jesus is denied, the Divinity of all men is affirmed' (S. D. Kirkham, *Ministry of Beauty*). While the Christian religion would bring God down to man, New Thought would lift man up to God, i.e. to the consciousness of his own divinity.

As the Christian creeds—Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and all the Protestant branches—rest on the allegory of Eden related in Genesis, they must either stand or fall by the construction which their theology has placed thereon. It is inconceivable that God would condemn the race for one act of their common ancestor, when that act was a step upward in the evolution of man—an effort to rise

above the animal and become man. According to Gn 3^d, the serpent said to Eve: 'God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil.' Was it wrong for man to become wise? According to theology, God put a ban on knowledge and wisdom, and manifested intense jealousy over man becoming like Himself. To-day we would not seriously regard a religion that did not urge man to become like God.

Adam and Eve ate and they became wise; they knew good and evil. Was there a penalty? Yes; every progressive step has its penalty. Adam and Eve as animals were happy only as the animal is happy. They had only physical desires; no worries fretted their lives; they could not sin; they were strangers to remorse. As man and woman, knowing good and evil, they could sin; they could feel the sting of remorse, and must thereafter pay the penalties of sin.

New Thought is not a system of thought, for, when thought is moulded into a system, it ceases to grow, and is not therefore new. The term can be employed only to convey the idea of growing thought. Man applies thought to the truths that enter into his consciousness, he gains new and enlarged conceptions, his mind expands, and his resultant thought is new. Every religion or philosophy is the product of human thought. When mind develops and expands, religions and philosophies must likewise expand. Unless a religion or philosophy is based on universal principles, when mind expands beyond its circle, it must fall. When so based, mind cannot pass its boundaries, however far it may soar, for thought cannot transcend infinity. Here is the test between temporal and enduring religions. Until the world worships a universal God, we can never have a universal religion; we can never have a universal religion so long as we worship a distant God. Until we have a universal religion, we can never have universal peace or the brotherhood of man.

The greatest gift from God to man is a growing mind. Were our ideas fixed and changeless, life would become intolerable. It is the new conception that thrills the soul and broadens the understanding. In the search for truth each discovery becomes a cause, a starting-point for the discovery of more truth. The discovery of every law of nature is a forerunner of a more universal law. Each step towards the infinite reveals new light. Our last thought may be our best, but not our ultimate, thought.

Science in its broadest aspect is a search for the knowledge of God. Because its fundamental idea is a search for truth success has rewarded its efforts. To gain higher conceptions of the basic laws of the universe is the real work of man. As man grows into a closer intimacy with nature, he enters a richer field of experience, he gains a wider spiritual vision, he realizes his oneness with universal life. New Thought means spiritual and mental growth, constant and eternal progress. Recognizing divine qualities in man, it sets no bounds to the soul's progress.

New Thought does not teach the moral depravity of man. Such thoughts demoralize and weaken the individual. What we sow in the subconscious is reproduced in the life expression and personality. Modern psychology is believed to be rapidly undermining many theological fallacies. Miracles in the accepted sense New Thought does not conceive as possible in a universe of law. The only miracles are phenomena not understood, but nevertheless the result of law. It applies the pragmatic test to every religion and philosophy. Are you true? What do you give to man to carry to his daily tasks?

New Thought is not favourably impressed with the idea of a special revelation through a book or certain favoured individuals. Men of this age, becoming more and more intellectual and discriminating, will not accept a revealed religion from a book whose authorship and date of production are unknown, according to the voice of modern scholarship. God never spake to man, but through man, for man is a part of God. Through man He finds expression as He does in the rose and bird, only in the rose and bird He manifests in lower octaves. The essence of the soul, as of the universe, is unity. The book of Nature is always an open volume, and from its pages we may read God's thoughts and secrets. He whose ear is attuned to Nature constantly hears her divine and peaceful melodies. The rocks and trees and running brooks teach profounder lessons than were ever read in books or taught by man to man. In the book of Nature we catch glimpses of eternal beauty, harmony, infinite power, universal order, abiding and constant love.

New Thought is a progressive idealism, viewing the visible universe as the expression of cosmic mind and all created entities as the result of divine ideals. The starting-point of all things is in thought-images; mind expresses itself in matter. Absolute idealism or Christian Science denies the existence of matter, holding that nothing exists but the ideal. Here is the line of divergence between the two philosophies. The idealism of New Thought is progressive, because all healthful ideals change as man gains new visions of the truth.

New Thought proclaims a robust individualism. The individual is the unit from which all greatness springs. Man is great only as he is individualistic, only as he follows his own path. The individual ranks above all institutions. All masters of thought have taught this truth. Human thought created every institution, and no institution is greater than its creator. Jesus spoke to individuals and not to institutions; neither did He found an institution.

New Thought recognizes no authority save the voice of the soul speaking to each individual. Every soul can interpret aright the oracles of truth. The assumption of authority, it is held, marks the decline of religion and stifles every spiritual impulse. When man has found the light within, he consults no authority how he shall worship God. As the adherents of New Thought conceive of God as omnipresent and hence indwelling in man, their idea of prayer differs from that of those who hold the dualistic conception. The dualist prays to an absentee God, the others to the God within. True prayer is not debasing the soul in the presence of divinity; it is lifting the soul up; it is bringing the conscious mind into touch with the universal mind; it is lifting the soul into an atmosphere where one feels the glow, the beauty, and harmony of the divine presence, and the play of vibrations from the source of eternal truth.

New Thought presents two ideas as supremely fundamental and important in man's development: (1) that he is a divine soul, and hence has within himself unlimited potentialities, slumbering perhaps and waiting to be called into expression; and (2) that he is under the dominion of universal law—the law of cause and effect; that he is punished by every wrong and rewarded by every virtue. Until we grasp the true significance of these truths, we shall never find a true religion or the pathway of spiritual progress. This philosophy conceives of evil as only a misdirected energy. All forces are good; only as they are misdirected do they produce harm. Evil has been unduly exalted and good unreasonably minimized. The Church

created an imaginary Satan, and at the same time emphasized man's weakness and inability to resist him. True teaching exalts the good and replaces negative with constructive thoughts. To teach man to come into the conscious realization of the divinity within, the unity of God and man, so that out of the sublimity of his own soul he can say with the Gentle Seer of Galilee, 'The Father and I are One,' is the supreme voice and meaning of New Thought.

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NEW YEAR.—See FESTIVALS AND FASTS.

NEW ZEALAND.—See AUSTRALASIA, POLYNESIA.

NICARAGUANS.—See CENTRAL AMERICA, MEXICANS.

NICOBARS.—I. The country and the people. —The Nicobars are a group of nineteen islands in the Bay of Bengal, twelve of which are inhabited, at the southern extremity of the long string of islands, stretching between Burma and Sumatra, usually called the Andamans and Nicobars (see ANDAMANS). The name implies 'the land of the naked,' by which the islands have been known to travel and commerce for many centuries, as they lie in the direct sea route from west to east. The people are not, however, really naked, though they wear very little clothing owing to the heat of the climate.

The Nicobarese are not divisible into tribes, and what differences are observable among the inhabitants of the several islands may be safely referred to habitat and the physical difficulties of communication between the islands.

By language, physique, and tradition they belong, no doubt, to the general Indo-Chinese race of the Farthest East, and came into their present home long ago from the south-east corner of Asia. Throughout the ages, from the days of the geographer Ptolemy onwards, they have been known for the same characteristics—want of clothing in the men, short petticoats for the women, possession of coco-nuts, betel, and ambergris, manufactures in cane and bamboo, eagerness to trade for iron with passing vessels, communication with strangers by canoes, isolation from the world except for passing ships—that is, as having the same civilization and the same habits as distinguish them at the present day. In this view a study of them is of great ethnological value, as, owing to their consistent isolation from the earliest times, it must be to their habits that we should look for an explanation of those of the great general group of mankind to which they belong. The same observation is true of their speech, which clearly belongs to that group of tongues now represented by the Mon language of Pegu and Annam and the Khmer language of Cambodia among civilized peoples and by the dialects of a number of uncivilized tribes in the Malay Peninsula and Indo-China. The isolation of the speakers of the Nicobarese dialects, and the small admixture of foreign tongues to be found in them, render them a probably true basis for the philology of the Indo-Chinese family of languages.

The Nicobarese are not savages, and apparently have not been so at any time in the long period during which they have been reported on by Indian, Greek, Arab, and Chinese traders. They are a fine, strong race with idle habits, as they live in what is to them a land of plenty with a hot enervating climate. Their great standby is the coco-nut, which supplies food and drink and many other wants both of themselves and of their domestic animals, and, by means of trade and barter, every

foreign luxury that they desire, including rice, cotton clothing, and metal ornaments. Though they will not cultivate rice because they can import it, they are capable fruit gardeners. They are well housed, and their villages are carefully arranged and often kept extraordinarily clean. They can manufacture, in wood, iron, cane, and pottery, most of the articles which they require for domestic use, importing the rest, and they are good canoe-builders. They have a definite system of trade, both internal and external, though they do not use money, but employ coco-nuts as their currency, in the use of which they have created for themselves a ready and quick-witted method of valuation. Everything is estimated in pairs of coco-nuts, even foreign money, and, with the aid of an ingenious and intelligent system of reckoning by scores, they can count and tally accurately up to very large numbers. They reckon time by the moon (lunar months) and by the monsoon or half-yearly season, never by the year, with considerable accuracy by means of intercalary nights and rough calendars notched on wood. The distances between the islands have made them study the stars and winds to a limited extent, and turned them into experts in the feeling of direction, and, as among other Far Eastern peoples, the points of the compass are thoroughly understood and constantly in mind. They are natural linguists, and pick up readily, in 'pigeon' fashion, any tongue that they come across in business or trade. In this way they got on formerly in Portuguese, Danish, German, and English, and in early times in Malay and Chinese. Nowadays English, Burmese, Hindustani, and some Tamil are their chief foreign acquirements. Their own language, though unwritten, is a remarkable product of the human mind. It is a highly developed analytical language with a strong resemblance in grammatical structure to English. It bears every sign of a very long continuous growth both of syntax and of etymology, and is clearly the outcome of a strong intelligence constantly applied in its development. The last observation sums up the mental powers of the Nicobarese. Though arrested as to development in the stage of half-civilization, they are up to that point a clearly intelligent people.

Taken as a whole, the Nicobarese, though for a long time they were callous wreckers and pirates and then very cruel, and though they show great want of feeling in their 'devil murders'—a form of public execution of undesirables—are a quiet, good-natured, inoffensive people, honest, truthful, friendly, helpful, polite, extremely hospitable towards each other, and not quarrelsome. By inclination they are friendly and hospitable towards and not dangerous to foreigners, though in places suspicious of them, and then surly. They are kindly to children, the aged, and those in trouble, even when foreigners, respectful and kindly to women, the wife being a help, not a slave, and deferential towards elders. They are conservative and bound down by custom in all things, though capable of change of habits on occasion.

The Nicobarese are given to drink from home-made coco-nut toddy and any foreign liquor that they can get. Their great pastime is feasting, not only on every 'religious' pretext that presents itself, but also by way of family conviviality. They are musical, and sing clearly and well in unison. The social emotions are highly developed, and domestic trouble will on occasion lead to suicide. The family system is patriarchal, and what government exists is extremely democratic in character. They are kept perpetually poor by the custom of destroying all personally acquired property at death and dividing equally all real property among sons, daughters getting a share on marriage. Girls are

free to marry whom they wish, subject to such pressure as the possession of means on the part of suitors naturally produces.

2. Religion.—(a) *Historical aspect.*—It will be observed that the study of the religion of such a people as this, small though their numbers may be—only some 6500—is something more than merely interesting, as it may lead to an explanation of much that is to be found in the customs and ideas of their congeners on the neighbouring continent, and of the more numerous and civilized islanders of the Malay Archipelago, who have long been subjected to a close contact with the outer world.

Especially will the study be found informing, because, unlike the case of the Andamans, there is as long a history of European occupation, chiefly by missionaries, as exists of any other land in the Eastern seas. In the 16th cent. came the Portuguese. French Jesuits were there in the 17th and early 18th centuries. In the latter half of the 18th cent. Protestant Danes from Tranquebar tried their influence on the people by means of a Moravian (Herrnhuter) mission, which lasted after a fashion till 1834. Then French Jesuits succeeded again, only to disappear in 1846. These missionary efforts were accompanied by attempts, all more or less feeble, to colonize the islands by Frenchmen, Danes, and Austrians, until the advent of English power in the islands for political reasons in 1869. The climate is a fatal one for Europeans, and every one of the pre-British efforts, missionary or political, failed miserably. Indeed, the long story of the European attempts to colonize and evangelize such a land as the Nicobars is a record of the extreme of useless suffering that merely well-intentioned enthusiasm and heroism can inflict if they be not combined with practical knowledge and a proper equipment. Beyond leaving behind it a valuable and continuous series of records of all kinds about the country and the people, a few religious terms of European origin, such as *pater* for sorcerer, and *Deos* (also *Reos*) for God, already degraded, as *Deuse*, into a plainly anthropomorphic chief of the spirits to be feared, a few personal names of Christian origin, and a folk-tale here and there saturated with European ideas, all the missionary effort of 300 years has had no effect whatever on the religion of this old and most conservative people. One of the most noteworthy facts about them is that, in spite of everything, their religion has remained the same throughout the ages.

(b) *Animistic form.*—The indigenous religion of this semi-civilized people is an undisguised animism, and all their very frequent and elaborate ceremonies and festivals are aimed at exorcizing and scaring spirits—'devils,' as they have learned to call them from the missionaries, the term 'devil' being often quaintly transferred from the spirit itself to the spirit-scarer. Fear of spirits and ghosts (*iwi*) is the guide to all ceremonies, and the life of the people is very largely taken up with spirit-scaring and spirit-controlling ceremonies and feasts of all kinds. They are usually held at night, and, whether directly religious or merely convivial, seem all to have an origin in the overmastering fear of spirits that possesses the Nicobarese. It has so far proved ineradicable, and all the Christian missionary effort so long applied has had no appreciable effect on it. The one outcome of the religion of political import is the ceremonial murder of one of themselves for grave offences against the community—e.g., for murder, habitual theft, or public annoyance. Such an offender is regarded as 'possessed,' and is by a sort of lynch law formally put to death with great cruelty. This, the 'devil murder' of the Nicobars, is now being gradually put down.

Witches and, of course, witch-finders abound. It follows that the mind of the Nicobarese is largely occupied with superstitions, which extend to the ancestors, the sun, and the moon. The funeral ceremonies show that human shadows are the visible signs of the spirits of the living, and on Car Nicobar there is a special ceremony for 'feeding shadows.' Every one's fortune and sickness are spirit-caused or witch-caused, and the remedy in every case is special exorcism by means of the *menlūana* (shaman, or doctor-priest), or by general exorcism performed privately. Of the latter class of remedy is a libation poured out always before

drinking and at spirit-feasts. Lucky and unlucky actions and conditions abound, of which a quaint instance may be quoted: it is lucky to get a pregnant woman and her husband to plant seed in a garden. Uneven numbers are unlucky, and no others are allowed at funerals.

3. Religious influence.—(a) *On art.*—The superstitions and animistic beliefs of the Nicobarese explain a good many articles to be seen prominently in their houses and villages. Such are the *henta*, which consist of paintings, sketches punctured on areca-nut spathe screens, or carvings on boards. They represent all sorts of objects, such as huts, trees, birds, domestic animals, men and women, ships and canoes, crocodiles and fish, including the merman and mermaid, sun, moon, and so on. *Deuse*, i.e. God, in the degraded form of a chief of the spirits, is frequently represented in some of the islands as a man in quaint European garb, with a wine-glass in his hand, surrounded by various weapons, implements, or articles in daily use, including a mat, a table, chairs, decanters, watch, telescope, and boatswain's whistle. All this shows that the people regard him as a European spirit embodied in a ship's captain, the most powerful human being of their acquaintance. The object of the *henta* is to gratify the good spirits (*iwi-kā*) and frighten away the bad spirits ('devils,' *iwi-pot*).

A development of the *henta* is the *kareau*, the most prominent object in many Nicobarese houses. This is a human figure in a threatening attitude, often of life size and armed with a spear, which is made in times of sickness under the orders of a *menlūana*, with the object of discovering or frightening away the bad spirits that have caused the sickness. If the patient recovers, the image is regarded with favour, and retained for future services: if he dies, it is thrown into the jungle. Other common carvings are a ladder (*halak*) for the use of the *menlūana*'s spirit, to climb up and discover whether the spirit of sickness is in the air, and a canoe or ship to enable his spirit to search for the evil one among neighbouring villages or islands. Similarly fish, birds, animals, sometimes with human faces, are carved in order to invoke the assistance and good will of their spirits in helping the *menlūana* to discover the whereabouts of offending spirits, and so to alarm them that they will not repeat their visits.

(b) *On festivals.*—The spirit-feast is a family (including the friends) general exorcism with the aid of the *menlūana*, rubbed over with oil, his face painted red, and worked up to an ecstasy by drink and his mysteries. His business is to catch the *iwi*, or spirit of harm, after a struggle, and put it into a small decorated model of a boat, which is towed far out to sea. In cases where spirits have caused sickness, or where they might damage a new hut, they are caught and put out to sea in special cages placed on special rafts. This apparently harmless ceremony leads, however, to the most serious, and in some cases comic, quarrels of the people. Should the raft land at a coast village, the spirit of evil is transferred thereto, and at once a sudden attack is organized on the offending and unsuspecting village that has let it loose. This attack is ceremonial in its nature, though severe, and must be conducted with special quarter-staves until some heads and limbs are broken, when both sides fraternize and wind up with a joint jollification.

(c) *On customs.*—In fact, the main-spring of all the religious ceremonies of the Nicobarese is the controlling or scaring of spirits. They pass their lives in dread of the spirits, chiefly of the dead, and the effort to overcome them is seen most clearly in the various ceremonies connected with death. The customs in the northern and southern islands are distinct, but everywhere extravagant grief is displayed at all deaths for fear of angering the ghosts. Everywhere funeral ceremonies are prolonged and elaborate, but all are for the one end of rendering the ghosts harmless, and preventing them from leaving the grave. In the south after

some time the *lanēatla* feast is held, when the skeleton is exhumed, thoroughly cleaned, and re-interred. In the north this feast is represented by the ceremony of disinterment of all the recently dead at the same time, and the disposal of their bones in a communal ossuary. Both these ceremonies have the object of making the ghosts harmless—in the one case by depriving the bodies of all their flesh, and in the other by mixing them all up together. As with the primitive Andamanese, it is the recently dead who can do most harm to the living. For the disposal of the bodies of highly revered personages there are special ceremonies everywhere. This is interesting as a distinctly Indo-Chinese custom.

(d) *Tabu*.—Connected with the death ceremonies especially there is a wide custom of tabu, which may be light or serious in its consequences, as it is a sort of privately imposed self-denying ordinance as to what shall be tabued from use in the way of food or drink. In the case of those entitled *saōkkua* ('dainty', 'fastidious') it amounts to an embryonic asceticism. There is, of course, a great deal of pretence about observing self-imposed but highly inconvenient funeral tabus, and many amusing stories are told of the ways and means adopted of avoiding them. Once the idea was started, however, tabu has been extended in all directions, until it has affected the form of huts in villages, and confined certain industries to localities, such as the making of pottery to Chowra Island, shell-lime to certain other islands, and fish traps to Nancowry Harbour in the rainy season. It has greatly affected the nomenclature of the people, as the names of the dead may not be used again by relatives and friends for a whole generation, and, since personal names are always words in common use in the language, these words are also avoided—so much so, indeed, as to affect the dialects of villages from time to time.

(e) *Priests and novices*.—The *menlūana* is a shaman or doctor-priest of the sort that is common to many half-civilized peoples, but there is an interesting variety of him at Car Nicobar in the *māfai*, or novice, the name actually meaning one undergoing sacerdotal instruction. Any one who feels himself inspired may become a *māfai*, but he does not necessarily pass on to the stage of *menlūana*. The ordinary cause of becoming a *māfai* is recovery from severe illness, and the life is that of comfortable, well-fed idleness—a condition which has caused imposture in some cases. The use of the *māfai* to the public is to cure the sick by touch. It need hardly be said that in the circumstances the medicine of the Nicobarese is almost wholly exorcism and belongs to the domain of superstition. The Nicobarese 'doctor' cures by a spiritual fight with the spirit which has possessed the sick man, and includes conjuring tricks in his practice, in order to press damaging articles, like pigs' teeth, stones, etc., out of the patient's body. There is no idea of surgery.

4. Folk-tales.—Tales of origin—in this case from a man and a dog—and the like, told in a jerky, disjointed fashion, the Nicobarese share with many parts of the civilized and semi-civilized world. Chowra Island is their holy land, the cradle of the race where the men are all wizards—a belief that the inhabitants thereof have turned to good account for keeping the control of the internal trade chiefly in their own hands. But one must be careful with Nicobarese folk-tales, as the people have proved themselves to be receptive of foreign stories and to be fond of repeating them in a purely native dress (see *Census of India, 1901, iii., Report, 'The Andaman and Nicobar Islands,' p. 230*). Hence the presence in some of their tales of creatures which are not indigenous in the

islands, and hence also the practically certain missionary origin of the tale of the Creation prevalent in Great Nicobar, in which Deuse (God) appears with Eve and her birth, the forbidden fruit, and the temptation.

LITERATURE.—This is largely mixed up with that of the Andamans (see ANDAMANS), but the following works may be separately consulted with profit, especially as many of them contain valuable bibliographical notices in several languages: R. C. Temple, *Census of India, 1901, iii.*, 'The Andaman and Nicobar Islands,' Calcutta, 1903, 191 xix. 59 ff., republished, 1909, in *Provincial Series*, 'Andaman and Nicobar Islands,' *Gazetteer* 1908, 'Andaman and Nicobar Islands'; *Selections from the Records of the Government of India*, no. lxxvii. Calcutta, 1870 (valuable bibliography); F. A. de Roepstorff, *Vocabulary of the Dialects spoken in the Nicobar and Andaman Islands*, do. 1875 (references French, Danish, German), *Dict. of the Nancowry Dialect*, do. 1884 (references to Danish works).

All the above are Government of India publications. See also W. Dampier, *New Voyage round the World*, London, 1697; E. Renaudot, *Ancient Accounts of India and China by two Mohammedan Travellers*, do. 1733; *Lettres Édiifiantes*, xi., Toulouse, 1810; F. Maurer, *Die Nikobaren*, Berlin, 1867 (valuable bibliography, English, Danish, German, from 1799 to 1863); E. H. Man, *Nicobar Voc.*, London, 1888, *Dict. of the Central Nicobarese Language*, do. 1889.

There are also references in H. Yule, *The Book of Marco Polo*, London, 1871, and in I-Tsing, *Travels*, ed. E. Chavannes, Paris, 1894, and J. Takakusu, Oxford, 1896. Articles will be found in *JRAI*, those by E. H. Man being very valuable; in *Asiatic Researches*, by N. Fontana, iii. [1802], G. Hamilton, ii. [1801]; in *JASE*, 1870, by de Roepstorff; in *JA*, many by E. H. Man and R. C. Temple; in *Journ. Ind. Archipelago*, by Chopard, iii. [1844]; in *Journ Philol. S.*, by A. J. Ellis, 1882; in *JRAS*, Straits Branch, by C. O. Blagden. There is a valuable article by W. Svoboda, in *AE* v. [1893] 186 ff., 'Bewohner des Nikobaren-Archipels,' with coloured plates and a good Continental bibliography.

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NICOLAITANS.—This is the name given to a sect mentioned in Scripture only in Rev 2¹⁵; but the Jezebel of Thyatira was probably a woman of influence within the party, and the paragraph 2¹⁵⁻²⁹ throws light upon their tenets and practices. Outside of Scripture are several allusions, lacking in definiteness and leaving many questions unanswered. Irenæus (*adv. Hær.* i. 26) reproduces the description of the Apocalypse, and seems to have had no other source of information, but in iii. 11 he adds that the Nicolaitans anticipated Cerinthus and were therefore to be classed as a 'vulsio (ἀπομαρμα) ejus quae falso eognominatur scientia.' Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* ii. 20, iii. 4) refers to the sect as immoral, and quotes a tradition as to its origin, which is adopted by Eusebius (*HE* iii. 29) without any suggestion of the existence of other accounts. Tertullian (*adv. Marc.* i. 29) makes similar charges of self-indulgence and lustfulness; but his language elsewhere (*de Præse. Hær.* 33) suggests that the Nicolaitans had ceased to exist as a separate sect, while the name served as a convenient description of the morals of some of the Gnostics (cf. 'sunt et nunc alii Nicolaitae; Caiana haeresis dicitur'). Such other early evidence as is extant is obviously, or even confessedly, based upon what has already been cited; and the most likely explanation is the existence of two entirely independent sects or groups—the Nicolaitans of the Apocalypse, struggling unsuccessfully for a hold in the important centre of Ephesus (Rev 2¹⁵), but flourishing in the comparative security of Pergamum, the ancient official capital of the province, and Thyatira (Rev 2^{15, 20, 21}), and a later libertine Gnostic sect, which at the beginning of the 3rd cent. either justified some of its practices by an appeal to the teaching ascribed to Nicolaus or because of those practices attracted the condemnation associated with his name.

1. Origin of the name.—There are several theories as to the origin of the title, but not one of them is free from difficulty.

(1) The earliest and earliest derives the name from that of the deacon 'Nicolas a proselyte of Antioch' (Ac 6⁵), about whom nothing is certainly known, the numerous legends having arisen in the endeavour to explain his assumed relation to the sect.

Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* iii. 41.) preserves a story to the effect that the deacon was reproved by the apostles for the jealousy with which he watched over his beautiful wife, whereupon he offered to give her over (*ἐνέπεφεν*) to any one of them who wished to marry her, and himself lived afterwards blamelessly. The deacon is further quoted as using the phrase *δὲν παραχρησθαι τῇ ἀρσῇ*, and the ambiguity of *παραχρησθαι* was the cause of misunderstanding. Nicolas used the word in the sense of despising or ill-using (Herod. i. 108, viii. 20, though with a different construction; cf. J. Ast. *Apol.* i. 49); but the sense of misusing by indulgence (Arist. *ap. Plut.* ii. 527 A; Philo, ii. 61) was assumed by an Antinomian party in the Church, who proceeded to claim the deacon's sanction and to shelter themselves under his name. Epiphanius (*adv. Hæc.* i. 25) gives the story another turn, and represents Nicolas as separating from his wife in obedience to the counsels of perfection, but afterwards as breaking down his purpose and returning to her again. This conduct he is implied to have justified by easy principles, and thus he 'occasioned the foundation of the sect of the Nicolaitans.' But not only is Epiphanius a rather late witness; his account is discredited by his evident disposition to disparage marriage. He reads the sentiments of his own day into the practice of a much earlier age. On the whole, whatever testimony there is is distinctly in favour of the deacon. Eusebius and Hippolytus are not independent, and have no original information on the subject, and Theodoret (*Hæc. Fab.* iii. 1) professedly follows Clement, who defends Nicolas from the charges to which his assumed followers were open, thereby discrediting his own theory of the origin of their name. Twice in the 'long' recension of the Ignatian *Epistles* the Nicolaitan is qualified as *ψευδώνυμος* (*Trall.* 11, and *Philad.* 6), and the term may have been borrowed from *Apost. Const.* vi. 8. Thus in all probability the assumed connexion of the sect with the deacon is but another instance of the tendency to fasten upon an 'apostolic man' as the originator of every early movement and even as the founder of any important heresy; but, whilst that tendency may throw some light upon the views put forth by Clement and Epiphanius, it does not explain the occurrence of the word in the Apocalypse.

(2) Even less can be said in support of the theory that Nicolas is a translation or transliteration of Balaam. It is true that the Apocalypse is allegorical; but the appetite of its author for symbol was not without limit, and he is not likely to have tried to bewilder his readers with a hopeless puzzle in etymology. The name of Balaam was already current as typical of certain false views and immoral practices (2 P 2⁵, Jude 11, *Pirge Abboth*, v. 28 f.); and in Rev 21⁴ a comparison is instituted between the effects of his teaching and that of the Nicolaitans, but there is no suggestion that the two words are themselves identical in meaning. Every attempt to show that *Νικόλαος* is a real equivalent to *בַּלְאָם* has failed, and the phrasing of the verses does not warrant the supposition that etymological identity was imagined.

(3) Another Nicolas than the deacon must in consequence be sought as the founder of the immoral party at Pergamum. The name was not uncommon, and exact identification is not at present possible. According to pseudo-Dorotheus, there was a Nicolas, bishop of Samaria, who fell into heresy and evil ways under the influence of Simon Magus, and he may have given his name to the sect; but pseudo-Dorotheus is not only a late witness, but for other reasons somewhat untrustworthy. The same may be said of pseudo-Abdias, who in his *Acta Apost.* introduces us to another Nicolas, who is alleged to have been converted in his old age, after a life of indulgence, through the persuasion of the apostle Andrew. Had this man professed Christianity before his conversion, the circumstances would have been in fair agreement with the conditions as set forth in the Apocalypse. The rise of a noxious party in a district within reach of the scene of the traditional labours of Andrew would be explained, together with the speedy disappearance of that party as a separate Antinomian sect. But in the absence of better or confirmatory evidence all that can be said with confidence is that this Nicolas is the sort of man required, and that to him or to a namesake of similar character may be ascribed the mischief wrought in the northern and neighbouring cities of Pergamum and Thyatira, and suppressed with difficulty but with success in the church of Ephesus.

2. Tenets and practices.—Concerning the beliefs and usages of these original Nicolaitans there is no other direct evidence than is contained in the letters to Pergamum and Thyatira. That resolves itself practically into two statements, as to the meaning of which the context is more significant than are parallel phrases in different connexions.

(1) The one is the explicit comparison with the teaching of Balaam (Rev 21⁴) in the two particulars of sanctioning and even recommending fornication and compromise with idolatry, with a view 'to cast a stumbling-block before the children of Israel,' to frustrate their right endeavours, and by guile to bring about their fall. Certain means, in themselves bad, were deliberately selected for the accomplishment of an inhuman and entirely immoral purpose. The specific references are to such verses as Nu 31¹⁶ 25¹⁻²; and, though the story of Balaam,

as we now have it, has been compiled from several sources, and extracts from JE and from P are woven into it without complete success in unifying the tradition, the writer of the Apocalypse would not be perplexed by any such complications, and his thought is sufficiently clear. Balaam, a recognized prophet or soothsayer, a man not without some knowledge of and reverence for Jahweh, counsels Balak to seduce Israel from its allegiance to Jahweh, and thereby from the enjoyment of His protection, by alluring the people into the immoralities associated with the Moabitic or Midianitish nature-worship. Similarly the Nicolaitans must be considered as loosely connected with Christian organizations of their day, and as seeking to undermine the godliness of the people by beguiling them into complicity with idolatry and into a practical disregard of the sinfulness of sins of the flesh. Self-deceived like Balaam, they glossed over obvious wickedness and so dressed it up as to make it pass off more easily with their consciences (cf. J. Butler, *Works*, ed. W. E. Gladstone, Oxford, 1896, ii., *Sermons*, p. 131, § 12); and hence the allusion involves the charge of a deliberate attempt to impose upon themselves and others in moral matters that were confessedly of the first importance. That such was their leading characteristic appears also from the changed imagery of the message to the neighbouring church.

(2) The second statement is implied in this message to Thyatira, where it is evident that the difficulty was the same, though the OT parallel was found in the case of Jezebel (Rev 2², 1 K 21²⁵), possibly because some female in the church had joined the movement and become the head and front of the offence. The evil that was violently opposed at Ephesus (Rev 2²) was tolerated with inadequate opposition at Pergamum (21⁴), but at Thyatira does not seem even to have been interfered with (2²). The district was and continued to be notorious for its prophetesses, Oriental and Montanist; and it is easy to imagine that some Christian woman of influence became affected by the spirit of the place, claimed for herself the gift of prophecy, and proceeded to use it in the promulgation of views elsewhere known as Nicolaitan. The new feature in the description of those views is the claim to superior knowledge, a natural adjunct to the faith of a party led by a professed prophetess—a claim to know 'the deep things of Satan' (2²). It is very unlikely that any traces of incipient Gnosticism in a technical sense are to be found in that phrase, or anything beyond the pretension to esoteric and privileged knowledge characteristic of every exclusive group. 'Deep things' is an easy expression for any pretender to special intuition to use, and entirely neutral in regard to the implication of Gnostic attachments. St. Paul uses it (1 Co 2¹⁰) of the inscrutable regions where God's plans for mankind are framed, and in the singular for the central riches of the wisdom and love of God (Ro 11²⁵, Eph 3^{1st}). Man's heart also has a depth (Jth 8¹⁴) that cannot easily be sounded, and in nature are recesses into which none but divine thought can penetrate. The figure is early and common, confined to no class or sect, but the heritage of every tongue, and from its use alone there is no need to infer any leaning towards Gnosticism. The qualifying phrase 'of Satan' is not without perplexity. It can hardly be taken literally as implying that the Nicolaitans themselves claimed a special knowledge of the things of Satan. Accordingly Hort (cf. *Com. in loc.*) is disposed to alter the generally accepted punctuation, and to connect 'as they say' with the words that follow, as though the Nicolaitan teachers professed to impose no superfluous burden, a contemptuous reference to the Jerusalem decree (Ac 15²⁸) being implied by the

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In reality St. Paul, though more given than St. John to compromise on non-essentials, would have opposed the Nicolaitans with equal or greater vehemence. His own principle, indicated in Gal 5⁶ and illustrated in detail elsewhere in his letters (cf. 1 Co 8¹³), was to contend for whatever was central in belief or fundamental in practice, and to allow considerable latitude in regard to whatever did not really matter; but, as soon as anything indifferent was exalted to the rank of the indispensable, it met with stern opposition. Christian liberty was to be maintained against both legal bondage and moral laxity; and yet the Christian 'under law to Christ' (1 Co 9²¹) must be guilty of no offence against Him or His disciples, while admitting no rival. In the conflict with Græco-Roman civilization a practical difficulty continually arose in deciding how far professed Christians could or should comply with the social usages of their neighbourhood. The public festivals in the Ionian cities were the joy and pride of the citizens, and the private clubs or guilds met often in sacred buildings and interspersed sacrificial rites in their formal meals. The question was as to what concessions were legitimate or in the interest of the spread of the Christian religion and the protection of its professors from national suspicion. The Nicolaitans were the extreme party who disregarded all the safeguards with which St. Paul had invested the law of compromise, and pleaded for a suicidal blending of Christian beliefs with idolatrous worship, of theoretical Christian morals with sexual practice of the most immoral kind. St. Paul had seen the possibility of these developments in his day, and would not have considered St. John's denunciation of them as unnecessary or too strong.

4. Later sects of Nicolaitans.—The original sect of the Nicolaitans was not long-lived (Ens. HE iii. 29), though, as has been seen, it attracted the attention of several of the Fathers, who speculated as to its origin and the personality of its founder. But the name, sometimes merely as a term of abuse, has been attached to several later groups without implying any dependence upon one another or upon the sectaries in Asia Minor. There is evidence at the beginning of the 3rd cent. of the existence of a Gnostic sect of immoral habits, called therefore Nicolaitans (Epiph. Her. xxv.; see also pseudo-Tert. *adv. om.* Her. I, and Hipp. Her. vii. 24). They shared in the worship of the great Mother-goddess, the goddess of heaven, and in the unbridled prostitution associated therewith; and, though their special object appears to have been to prevent the sexual propagation of mankind and the consequent perpetuation of evil, their cult might fitly be described as a mixture of idolatry and fornication. In the disputes as to the celibacy of the clergy again the term was applied to the married priests by the opponents of clerical marriage. It appears to have been first used in this connexion by Cardinal Humbert (*Cont. Nicetam*, 25), who described the 'Nicolaitan heresy' as consisting in the justification of clerical marriage; and in that sense it obtained official recognition in the canons of the Council of Piacenza (March 1095). Again, among some of the tendencies that preceded the organization of the Friends, the word occurs curiously to denote those who upheld creeds and outward ordinances, and exalted the authority of the written word above that of personal intuition (see C. Burrage, *The Early English Dissenters*,

Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* iii. 41.) preserves a story to the effect that the deacon was reproved by the apostles for the jealousy with which he watched over his beautiful wife, whereupon he offered to give her over (*ἐνέριπεν*) to any one of them who wished to marry her, and himself lived afterwards blamelessly. The deacon is further quoted as using the phrase *δὲν παραχρησθαι τῇ σαρκί*, and the ambiguity of *παραχρησθαι* was the cause of misunderstanding. Nicolas used the word in the sense of despising or ill-using (*Herod.* i. 108, viii. 20, though with a different construction; cf. *Just. Apol.* i. 49); but the sense of misusing by indulgence (*Arist. ap. Plut.* ii. 527 A; *Philo.* ii. 61) was assumed by an Antinomian party in the Church, who proceeded to claim the deacon's sanction and to shelter themselves under his name. Epiphanius (*adv. Hæc.* i. 25) gives the story another turn, and represents Nicolas as separating from his wife in obedience to the counsels of perfection, but afterwards as breaking down his purpose and returning to her again. This conduct he is implied to have justified by easy principles, and thus he 'occasioned the foundation of the sect of the Nicolaitans.' But not only is Epiphanius a rather late witness; his account is discredited by his evident disposition to disparage marriage. He reads the sentiments of his own day into the practice of a much earlier age. On the whole, whatever testimony there is is distinctly in favour of the deacon. Eusebius and Hippolytus are not independent, and have no original information on the subject, and Theodoret (*Hæc. Fab.* iii. 1) professedly follows Clement, who defends Nicolas from the charges to which his assumed followers were open, thereby discrediting his own theory of the origin of their name. Twice in the 'long' recension of the Ignatian *Epistles* the Nicolaitan is qualified as *ψευδώνυμος* (*Trall.* 11, and *Philad.* 8), and the term may have been borrowed from *Apost. Const.* vi. 8. Thus in all probability the assumed connexion of the sect with the deacon is but another instance of the tendency to fasten upon an 'apostolic man' as the originator of every early movement and even as the founder of any important heresy; but, whilst that tendency may throw some light upon the views put forth by Clement and Epiphanius, it does not explain the occurrence of the word in the Apocalypse.

(2) Even less can be said in support of the theory that Nicolas is a translation or transliteration of Balaam. It is true that the Apocalypse is allegorical; but the appetite of its author for symbol was not without limit, and he is not likely to have tried to bewilder his readers with a hopeless puzzle in etymology. The name of Balaam was already current as typical of certain false views and immoral practices (2 P 21⁶, Jude 11, *Pirge Abôth*, v. 28 f.); and in Rev 21^{4c} a comparison is instituted between the effects of his teaching and that of the Nicolaitans, but there is no suggestion that the two words are themselves identical in meaning. Every attempt to show that *Νικόλαος* is a real equivalent to *בְּאַלְמַלְכָּא* has failed, and the phrasing of the verses does not warrant the supposition that etymological identity was imagined.

(3) Another Nicolas than the deacon must in consequence be sought as the founder of the immoral party at Pergamum. The name was not uncommon, and exact identification is not at present possible. According to pseudo-Dorotheus, there was a Nicolas, bishop of Samaria, who fell into heresy and evil ways under the influence of Simon Magus, and he may have given his name to the sect; but pseudo-Dorotheus is not only a late witness, but for other reasons somewhat untrustworthy. The same may be said of pseudo-Abdias, who in his *Acta Apost. Apoc.* introduces us to another Nicolas, who is alleged to have been converted in his old age, after a life of indulgence, through the persuasion of the apostle Andrew. Had this man professed Christianity before his conversion, the circumstances would have been in fair agreement with the conditions as set forth in the Apocalypse. The rise of a noxious party in a district within reach of the scene of the traditional labours of Andrew would be explained, together with the speedy disappearance of that party as a separate Antinomian sect. But in the absence of better or confirmatory evidence all that can be said with confidence is that this Nicolas is the sort of man required, and that to him or to a namesake of similar character may be ascribed the mischief wrought in the northern and neighbouring cities of Pergamum and Thyatira, and suppressed with difficulty but with success in the church of Ephesus.

2. Tenets and practices.—Concerning the beliefs and usages of these original Nicolaitans there is no other direct evidence than is contained in the letters to Pergamum and Thyatira. That resolves itself practically into two statements, as to the meaning of which the context is more significant than are parallel phrases in different connexions.

(1) The one is the explicit comparison with the teaching of Balaam (Rev 21^{4c}) in the two particulars of sanctioning and even recommending fornication and compromise with idolatry, with a view 'to cast a stumbling-block before the children of Israel,' to frustrate their right endeavours, and by guile to bring about their fall. Certain means, in themselves bad, were deliberately selected for the accomplishment of an inhuman and entirely immoral purpose. The specific references are to such verses as Nu 31¹⁶ 25¹⁻²; and, though the story of Balaam,

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Cambridge, 1912, i. 217 ff.). It was a usage begotten of the desire for a word of reproach rather than in the workings of the instinct for historical continuity; and in this case, as in the others, the passage in the Apocalypse may have suggested the term but has no real light cast upon it.

LITERATURE.—The Patristic references, which are really the only original authorities, are given in the text. Among the commentaries on Revelation, H. B. Swete (*The Apocalypse of St. John*, London, 1906, esp. p. lxxiff.) and F. J. A. Hort (*The Apocalypse of St. John*, 1-3, do. 1908) may be consulted with advantage. See also W. M. Ramsay, *The Letters to the Seven Churches*, do. 1904, esp. p. 299 ff., and A. V. Green, *The Ephesian Canonical Writings*, do. 1910, esp. p. 180 ff.

R. W. MOSS.

NIETZSCHE.—I. Life.—Friedrich Nietzsche, philosopher, poet, mystic, and prophet, was born on 15th Oct. 1844, at Röcken, near Lützen, in the Prussian province of Saxony. There is some reason to believe that he was of remote Polish descent; this always gave him much satisfaction, and he was pleased when living in Italy to be mistaken for a Pole. On the paternal side he came, like Emerson, of a line of ministers, and his mother was a minister's daughter; it was a significant origin for one who remained throughout life a preacher, though not of the gospel that he had been taught. He came on both sides of healthy and long-lived families. His father, however, a man of sensitive temperament and poetic mind, died at the age of thirty-five as a result, apparently, of injury to the head from a fall; his mother, a woman of much beauty and vitality, with a rebelliously high spirit, resembled Goethe's mother in temperament, and was of the same age of eighteen at her distinguished son's birth. After the father's death the family removed to Naumburg. Here the child, who grew tall and strong, though only beginning to talk at the age of two and a half years, was surrounded by exclusively feminine influences. He was a quiet, refined, and well-behaved boy, with fair hair and grave dark eyes, very truthful and very polite, though possessing a passionate temper which he early learned to control, with no liking for rough games or coarse amusements, and a taste for poetry and music. At school young Nietzsche was one of the best pupils—serious, reserved, pious, and fond of the Bible, called by his schoolfellows, over whom he exerted much influence, 'the little minister'; he excelled in all subjects except mathematics and athletics, and was especially devoted to the classics; at the same time he became a brilliant extemporizer on the piano. At the age of sixteen he obtained a scholarship which enabled him to enter the Pforta School, not far from Naumburg; this is a kind of Public School, of exclusive character, and with a very high level of discipline and scholarship.

In 1861 young Nietzsche received his first Communion, and, when he left Pforta to proceed to Bonn University, he obtained a certificate of good conduct and industry and special excellence in the subjects of Religion, German, and Latin. At Bonn he entered the faculties of Theology and Philology, but, led by his Hellenic tastes, he more and more concentrated on philology, which, also, he felt to be a needed discipline to his own temperament. Ritschl and Jahn were his teachers. When a quarrel arose between these two philologists, and the former went to Leipzig University, Nietzsche followed his beloved teacher, who had a high regard for the young student's qualities and scholarship. At Leipzig he took the chief part in founding and carrying on a Philologists' Club, occupied himself with important investigations into the history and sources of the writings of Theognis, Suidas, and Diogenes Laertius, and formed many valuable friendships, especially with

Rohde and Gersdorff. His friends were always men of noble character and tastes akin to his own; throughout life he cherished high ideals of friendship, but his few attractions towards women were superficial and fleeting. While a student, he by chance became acquainted with the works of Schopenhauer; he had long felt intense admiration for the works of Wagner (to whom he was not personally introduced until 1868); Schopenhauer and Wagner became the two chief influences on his life and thought, and he began to lose his Christian faith, although then, and long after, he displayed no aggressive opposition to Christianity, remaining, in his own words, 'a reverent animal.' At the same time he endeavoured to take part in the beer-drinking and duel-fighting life of the students' clubs, but these attempts speedily ended in failure; he took the unusual step of severing himself from his club, and throughout life experienced nothing but loathing for the 'beer-materialism' and related accompaniments of the ordinary German's intellectual life. Goethe's *Conversations with Eckermann*—'the best German book there is,' he declared—became and always remained with him a profound influence, and the same may be said of Emerson; he looked upon Emerson as a kind of elder brother, and throughout the whole of his active life some volume of Emerson's *Essays* always accompanied his wanderings. His chief early interests and influences were, however, Hellenism, Schopenhauer, and Wagner. Later the last two influences were left behind, though he always recognized the great importance of both, and Rome became more to him than Greece; but the early attraction of Hellenism, and the sound philological training of Pforta, made him a philologist.

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Cambridge, 1912, i. 217 ff.). It was a usage begotten of the desire for a word of reproach rather than in the workings of the instinct for historical continuity; and in this case, as in the others, the passage in the Apocalypse may have suggested the term but has no real light cast upon it.

LITERATURE.—The Patristic references, which are really the only original authorities, are given in the text. Among the commentaries on Revelation, H. B. Swete (*The Apocalypse of St. John*, London, 1908, esp. p. lxxii ff.) and F. J. A. Hort (*The Apocalypse of St. John*, 1-3, do. 1903) may be consulted with advantage. See also W. M. Ramsay, *The Letters to the Seven Churches*, do. 1904, esp. p. 299 ff., and A. V. Green, *The Ephesian Canonical Writings*, do. 1910, esp. p. 180 ff.

R. W. Moss.

NIETZSCHE.—**r. Life.**—Friedrich Nietzsche, philosopher, poet, mystic, and prophet, was born on 15th Oct. 1844, at Röcken, near Lützen, in the Prussian province of Saxony. There is some reason to believe that he was of remote Polish descent; this always gave him much satisfaction, and he was pleased when living in Italy to be mistaken for a Pole. On the paternal side he came, like Emerson, of a line of ministers, and his mother was a minister's daughter; it was a significant origin for one who remained throughout life a preacher, though not of the gospel that he had been taught. He came on both sides of healthy and long-lived families. His father, however, a man of sensitive temperament and poetic mind, died at the age of thirty-five as a result, apparently, of injury to the head from a fall; his mother, a woman of much beauty and vitality, with a rebelliously high spirit, resembled Goethe's mother in temperament, and was of the same age of eighteen at her distinguished son's birth. After the father's death the family removed to Naumburg. Here the child, who grew tall and strong, though only beginning to talk at the age of two and a half years, was surrounded by exclusively feminine influences. He was a quiet, refined, and well-behaved boy, with fair hair and grave dark eyes, very truthful and very polite, though possessing a passionate temper which he early learned to control, with no liking for rough games or coarse amusements, and a taste for poetry and music. At school young Nietzsche was one of the best pupils—serious, reserved, pious, and fond of the Bible, called by his schoolfellows, over whom he exerted much influence, 'the little minister'; he excelled in all subjects except mathematics and athletics, and was especially devoted to the classics; at the same time he became a brilliant extemporizer on the piano. At the age of sixteen he obtained a scholarship which enabled him to enter the Pforta School, not far from Naumburg; this is a kind of Public School, of exclusive character, and with a very high level of discipline and scholarship.

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ing Strauss, he was attacking, and not for the last time, German 'culture,' and setting forth his own ideal of culture as 'unity of artistic style in every expression of a people's life'; at this time, and always, he regarded the French as the supreme representatives of true culture.

Human, all-too-Human (*Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*), which is transitional in character, was published in 1878. In this 'Book for Free Spirits' Nietzsche finally abandoned the method of essays carefully elaborated with a due regard to literary conventions, and adopted the more free, aphoristic, and fragmentary method which afterwards he always preferred; it suited his direct and personal way of approaching problems, and it doubtless suited also the limited energies which bad health placed at his disposal. *The Dawn of Day* (*Morgenröthe*), which completely reveals Nietzsche's characteristics, was published in 1881, and was followed by *The Gay Science* (*Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*), published in 1882, and *Beyond Good and Evil* (*Jenseits von Gut und Böse*), published in 1886; these books all belong to the same class and possess considerable resemblance in substance and method. For many readers they include most that is precious in Nietzsche's work. They represent him in his central and most mature period; they range freely over a vast field; they are full of the most penetrating criticism and insight into the deepest questions of life and thought and art; they are for the most part free from the unbalanced extravagances and the reckless over-emphasis which we so often find in his later work. Before this series of works came to an end, Nietzsche had already begun the most famous of his books, *Thus spake Zarathustra* (*Also sprach Zarathustra*, 1883-91). Its first origin was at Sils Maria in 1881. It consists of four parts, each part written with great rapidity, usually in about ten days, although the parts were separated by long intervals. Zoroaster had always been a favourite figure of Nietzsche's, embodying some of the ideas to which he was most attracted, and it was therefore natural that he should give this traditionally imposing name to his typical Superman. It is easy to understand the position which *Zarathustra* has attained; it has a certain kind of unity since it is written around a single figure and throughout in the lofty rhythmic style which we commonly regard as Biblical; it is moreover, all are agreed, magnificently written; it contains pictures and passages of a highly impressive character. Many, however, will agree with so competent a critic as Brandes that it has been over-rated, being too monotonous and lacking in imaginative invention. When we read it carefully, we are made to feel that its imposing surface frequently covers no great depth of thought or truth of insight; it sometimes seems simply a marvellous *tour de force*. Nietzsche was not, however, entirely wrong in attaching so much importance to his *Zarathustra*. Apart from its rare beauty, it possesses a certain coherence as a narrative of the passage of the Superman, Nietzsche's perfected human being, through life, and a record in brilliant imagery of his attitude towards the difficulties of life. We may regard it as Nietzsche's *Pilgrim's Progress*. *The Genealogy of Morals* (*Zur Genealogie der Moral*, 1887), largely dealing with Christian and traditional morality, the ascetic ideal, and the analysis of the conscience, may be said to form the transition to the last group of Nietzsche's writings. This group includes *The Case of Wagner* (*Der Fall Wagner*, 1888), attacking Wagner's music which he had in early life so enthusiastically admired, *The Twilight of the Idols* (*Götzendämmerung*, 1889), *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, and *Antichrist* (both first published in the collected edition of his works), while *Ecce Homo*,

also written at the end of this period, was not published until 1908; it is the most egoistic, it might be said, arrogant, of all Nietzsche's writings, but of much biographical value. *The Will to Power* (*Der Will zur Macht*), remarkable but often imperfect and obscure fragments of what was meant to be an extensive and important work, was also published posthumously. All these later writings after *Zarathustra*, and to some extent including *Zarathustra*, show a frequent tendency to self-assertion, unrestraint, over-emphasis, and extravagance—all of which are absent from the earlier writings—and they are chiefly responsible for the various common misunderstandings of Nietzsche's attitude and opinions. In these last writings, brilliant as they may be, he too often forgot his own wise saying that 'a spirit who is sure of himself speaks softly.' It may be added that Nietzsche wrote some notable poems (*Gedichte und Sprüche*) published in 1898, and also composed music, which has been variously judged.

3. Place and influence.—(a) *Nietzsche's ideas and originality*.—Nietzsche is frequently termed a philosopher, but, in the proper sense of that term, he was something less and something more than a philosopher. He may have recognized this himself in his tendency to avoid the term 'philosophy' and to speak, in preference, of the 're-valuation of values.' Philosophy to him was simply a perpetual criticism of thought and life. Of coherent and consistent system he had almost nothing, much less even than Schopenhauer, from whom his own thinking started, so far as it was in any sense philosophic, and one feels that the attraction of Schopenhauer for him lay in the earlier master's constant appeal to the concrete and practical problems of living, in the beauty of his style, and in the fact that (as Nietzsche has expressed it) the value of the stones he builded with is so much greater than that of the edifice itself. Nietzsche never completed any systematic statement of his philosophical system, the book in which he proposed to do this, *The Will to Power*, remaining merely a series of fragments, comparable to his other books of the same period. Nor is it possible to arrange Nietzsche's leading ideas into any harmonious whole. A. Fouillée, an accomplished philosophic thinker not altogether hostile to Nietzsche, has analyzed his conceptions at length with much care, and finds that they finally fall into a 'dust of antinomies'; he denied authority and yet the Superman constituted an authority; he denied absolute truth and yet proclaimed the transvaluation of truth; he affirmed egoism and yet presented a self-abnegating law of life; he glorified the passions and yet declared the supreme necessity of austere self-discipline. Moreover, when we coldly investigate Nietzsche's favourite and persistent conceptions, we can scarcely attribute to them any great fruitfulness, originality, or even precision. Let us, for instance, examine the conception of the Superman with which in popular opinion Nietzsche's name is especially associated. He used the word *Uebermensch* first at the age of seventeen, applying it to Byron's heroes, and later to Shakespeare's; as a more abstracted conception, it is probably due, as Brandes has suggested, to Renan (a writer with whom he was not in sympathy), who, in 1871, in the discouragement caused by the Franco-Prussian War, tentatively put forward the view (in a dialogue called 'Rêves' of his *Dialogues philosophiques*) that 'the goal of humanity is the production of great men for the domination of mankind; Renan had specially referred to Germany as offering the most favourable soil for this, as he regarded it, deplorable consummation. When Nietzsche began to use the term seriously, it was rarely or never biologically, as denoting a higher

species developed in the Darwinian way, for he regarded Darwinism as an unproved hypothesis, though he accepted evolution and esteemed Darwin. He was acquainted with Galton's work, and it is possible to use many of his sayings concerning the Superman in the eugenic sense, but it is difficult to say how far he so intended them and impossible to regard him as a pioneer of eugenics. More and more, as he spoke of Supermen and declared that 'the goal of mankind is in its great Exemplars,' he simply had in mind men of genius of the type of Cæsar, Napoleon, and Goethe. However vaguely suggestive in the mouth of the artist and the poet, the term 'Superman' was of no precise philosophic or scientific significance. Much the same may be said of another favourite conception of Nietzsche, that of 'eternal recurrence.' It came to him in 1881, when he was planning *Zarathustra*, and he regarded it as the fundamental underlying doctrine of that work, 'the highest formula of affirmation that can possibly be achieved.' It seems to have been a revivification of the old Pythagorean idea, stimulated by reading Helmholtz, Riemann, and the earlier writings of Wundt. It can scarcely be said, however, that Nietzsche made any fruitful use of this ancient and outworn formula, however suggestive he may personally have found it; it is, indeed, an idea which, it has been said, seems to place man in the position of a squirrel in a cage, endlessly turning round himself. We may note that all Nietzsche's persistently iterated formulas belong to the last ten years of his active life, when we may find reason to believe that his mental grip was no longer so close as before nor his insight so penetrating. It is not in such formulas that his originality lies, but rather in the personality of the man, in his direct and sincere attitude towards life and thought, his acutely sensitive receptivity to the influences of his time, and his intense energy in reacting to them vitally.

(b) *His ethical attitude.*—It was inevitable that a man of this temper should sooner or later become profoundly interested in moral problems. In Nietzsche's case this interest was rather late. His instinctive moral seriousness, that of the unspoilt 'child of the Manse,' only gradually became self-conscious and aggressive under the influence of his intellectual development. *The Dawn of Day* is the first of his thoroughly unconventional ethical writings, and it was only about this time that he began to call himself an 'immoralist.' 'I like not those coquettish bugs,' Nietzsche once wrote, 'with an insatiable ambition to smell of the Infinite, until eventually the Infinite smells of them.' It is an illuminating remark, and enables us to understand why it is that many readers of Nietzsche have failed to realize that it was not the Infinite that he was assailing but merely the bugs. Nietzsche himself sometimes opened the path to misapprehension. He is not to be classed with the adepts of paradox, but the epithet 'immoralist' was merely a paradoxical way of declaring his growing alienation from the traditional morality of his time; we must bear in mind the point on which he so often insisted, that every innovator in morals, like Jesus and like Socrates, is regarded as 'immoral.' The 'immoralist' was intensely absorbed in questions of morality, and, not only so, but in actual practice, he was, from first to last, himself strictly moral, even in a rare degree, from the standpoint of the very morality, that of traditional Christianity, which in theory he condemned. He fully accepted the foundations of morality, the binding nature of duty, the supremacy of the will. Yet he was entirely opposed to what he considered the 'Christian-democratic' ideals of selflessness, humility, renunciation, and the sacrifice of the strong to the weak. The clue

to the development of his moral conceptions lay in his own intensely sensitive and sympathetic nature, rendered hyperæsthetic by the strain of his physical disorders. The 'hardness' which he preached was the shield that he himself needed against the arrows of the world. It was on this personal basis that Nietzsche's restless intellect wrought concordant ethical conceptions and images.

'My brother,' wrote Frau Förster-Nietzsche, 'was not at all suited to the role of a warrior "whose paradise is in the shadow of his sword." He could fight an impersonal type, but when the type appeared embodied in a sensitive human form, he suffered from his own blows even more than the enemy he assailed. "I was not made to hate," he would say.'

When we come upon passages glorifying war in *Zarathustra* and the later writings (they are never found in the earlier books), we must read them in the light of what we otherwise know concerning Nietzsche's attitude towards war. He had had actual experience of only one war (in 1870), and that had not only left in him an impression of horror, but had convinced him that the effects of war are disastrous even on the victors. He never advocated any particular war, least of all for the aggrandizement of Germany (he scoffed at the cry 'Deutschland über Alles!') and wished to be a 'good European' rather than a good German; he disapproved of militarism and standing armies, and loathed the conception of the State which it is the object of militarism to magnify. The idea of combat and war has, however, always been idealized in Germany, even by philosophers and moralists, and it is not unnatural that Nietzsche should have adopted it. The apostle of the most peaceable of religions exhorts the disciple to 'fight the good fight,' and Nietzsche, not unreasonably, believed that struggle, self-discipline, and suffering are necessary for moral development, in accordance with his favourite motto, 'Virescit volnere virtus.'

These are the considerations that we must bear in mind when reading some of Nietzsche's utterances on sympathy and pity. It must be added that those utterances, especially when detached from his later and more extravagant writings, often present an altogether misleading view of their writer's attitude. To reach a saner view a wide and impartial collation of passages is necessary; this has been carefully made by W. M. Salter ('The Philosopher of "The Will to Power,"' i. Nietzsche on Love and Pity, *HJ* xiii. [1914] 102 ff.), and shows that Nietzsche, far from condemning pity *per se*, merely desires a revision of the things deserving pity, and is prepared to expend pity on that pity which fails to see the need of suffering and sacrifice in life.

At the same time, while setting in a clear light the source and the nature of Nietzsche's attitude towards current morals, we must not disguise the radical opposition presented in many respects by his own moral ideas. Our morality, as Nietzsche saw it, has been largely moulded by Christianity reinforced by modern democratic social developments, and these influences have been predominantly altruistic, subordinating the duties which regard self to the duties which regard others, and placing the interests of the whole unconditionally over the interests of the individual. Now Nietzsche, as witnessed by his ever growing admiration for the Romans, to whose temperament Stoicism was so well adapted, was by his classical training a pagan, by his intellectual distinction an aristocrat, and by his fundamental genius an individualist, for whom morality was always an individual matter to be achieved by combat, self-discipline, and pain. St. Bernard, it is true, used the same moral methods; but, while Bernard used them to impress on men that they are but sacks of dung and the food of worms, Nietzsche would use them to train men in

At the Council of Tonrs (May 1163) the point was debated at length; but it would appear that no formal decision was taken. It is of interest to note that the pontiff presiding at this Council was none other than Alexander III., who, as we have mentioned, had some twenty years before, as a private doctor, maintained this very opinion. In the following year (1164) a great assembly of theologians was held at Sens, at which the pope was again present. Here he issued a prohibition against 'omnes tropes et indisciplinatas quaestiones in theologia'; and he ordered the bishop of Paris to see that these discussions should cease. Again in 1170 (2nd June) he wrote to the bishops of Bourges, Rheims, Tours, and Rouen, commanding them not to permit the error 'quod Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid' (Jaffé, *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum*, Leipzig, 1888, 11809). Another letter of the same year (18th May 1170), to the bishop of Paris, bids him convoke his suffragans in order that a final stop should be put to the propagation of the opinion (Jaffé, 11806). A still more important step was taken in 1177. On 18th Feb. of that year the pope wrote a letter to William, archbishop of Rheims, in which the doctrine is condemned under pain of anathema (*Corpus iuris canonici: Dccr. Greg.* v. 7. 7; Denzinger-Bannwart, *Enchiridion*¹, no. 393). There can be no doubt that the *Eulogium* of John of Cornwall contributed to bring about this result. That work, as J. de Ghellinck shows, appeared between 1175 and 1177; and it is a direct appeal to the pope to pronounce a definite condemnation. Among the controversial writings of the period it takes a high place, alike for the moderation of its tone and for its clear and ample demonstration that the doctrine which it attacks is altogether inconsistent with orthodox belief. It is, however, noteworthy that the author himself falls into error in supposing that the first and not the second of the views as to the Incarnation mentioned by Peter Lombard is that which expresses the revealed doctrine.

The pope was now so convinced of the need of strong measures that at the Lateran Council of 1179 he proposed to procure the condemnation of Nihilianism by a formal conciliar decree. He was, however, deterred by the opposition of several of the cardinals and by the vigorous protests of Adam, bishop of St. Asaph (*D.V.B.* i. 75). After this date the doctrine seems to have ceased to exercise any noticeable influence.

LITERATURE.—Petrus Lombardus, *Sent.* iii. 6, 10 (*PL* xcii.); Rolandus Bandinelli, in A. M. Gietl, *Die Sentenzen Rolands*, Freiburg, 1891; Petrus Pictaviensis, *Sent.* iv. 10 (*PL* cxli.); Thomas Aquinas, *Comment. in Lib. Sent.*, Parma, 1857, iii. vi., x.; Johannes Cornubiensis, *Eulogium ad Alex.* III. (*PL* cxclx.); anon. *Apologia de Verbo Incarnato* (attributed by some to John of Cornwall) (*PL* clxxvii.); Gualterus de S. Victore, *Contra Quatuor Labyrinthos Francie* (*PL* cxci.); in C. D. d'Argentré, *Collectio Judiciorum de Novis Erroribus*, Paris, 1728, i. 112; J. Bach, *Die Dogmengesch. des Mittelalters*, 2 vols., Vienna, 1873-76; C. J. von Schubarth, *Die Sentenzen Rolands*, 1873-90, ed. H. Leclercq, 2) 874; E. Portalié, art. *Sentences*, in M. A. Vacant, *Dictionnaire de Théologie*, i. (Paris, 1903) 418; J. de Ghellinck, *Le Mouvement théologique du XIII. siècle*, Paris, 1914.

G. H. JOYCE.

NIHILISM.—See **ANARCHY**, **SOCIALISM**.

NIHILISM (Buddhist).—Buddhism, as known to the Brāhman authors, *i.e.* Buddhism of the Great Vehicle, has been strongly criticized by them as nihilistic (*cf. vaināśika*). The extreme Vedāntist (Sāṅkara's school), who held the doctrine of illusion (*māyāvāda*), was charged with the same crime and styled a pseudo-Buddhist.¹ Both indictments are justified, and there is no doubt

¹ See T. Aufrecht, *Cat. of Sanskrit MSS Bibl. Bodleiana*, Oxford, 1884, p. 14.

that the 'absolute truth' (*paramārthasatya*) of the extreme Buddhist and of the extreme Vedāntist is an unqualified negation of the world of appearances, a negation of existence (*samsāra*). The two nihilisms—nihilistic nihilism of the Buddhists; there is nothing; and monistic nihilism of the Vedānta: there is being alone—differ so little that a book could be written illustrating the position of the Vedānta with phrases and stanzas borrowed from Buddhist works (*Gauḍapāḍakārikā*).¹ The only difference between the two systems is that the Vedānta recognizes an unqualified being—in fact, its denial of existence has its source in its belief in being—whereas Buddhism, from the very beginning, had denied being and then went so far as to deny existence. It was very easy to make a place in Buddhism for the Vedāntic affirmation, and some Buddhists did not fail to proclaim that voidness is the very nature and essence of things.² Voidness hitherto has been understood as their character, as it is said: 'Form (*rūpa*) is void, because it is void or without any reality, not owing to Voidness.'³ Thus was evolved a curious aspect of the pantheistic theory, very like Vedānta and probably largely indebted to it.

But, to be fair, one must consider the problem from another point of view, and it will appear that neither Vedānta nor Buddhism is nihilistic. Like Sāṅkara and Māyāvādin philosophers, the neo-Buddhist doctors of nihilism loudly claim to be firm supporters, and the only firm supporters, of morality, religion, realistic philosophy. While they are proud of being Śūnyatāvādin, they fiercely disclaim to be Nāstika (see art. MATERIALISM [Indian]) or Vaināśika.

They are very good when they criticize the position of their opponents, believers in reality. There is no life or existence if there is no change; and there cannot be change if there is being. What exists (*sat*) must be instantaneous (*kṣaṇika*).⁴ And the generation of instantaneous things in succession is incomprehensible and impossible.

But they were also well aware of the conspicuous target that their absolute (*pāramārthika*) dogmas offered to their adversaries. Nāgārjuna, their chief, if not first, exponent, has put the objection in the plainest possible language.⁵ The old Buddhist (Little Vehicle) is introduced to point out that, if everything is void, nothing will remain of the old Buddhist fabric. The stone on which Buddhism is strongly built is the truth of suffering: Buddha taught a path leading to the deliverance from suffering, and the neo-Buddhist denies the existence, not only of the sufferer, as Buddha himself did, but of suffering too. Buddha contrasted existence (*samsāra*) and liberation from existence (*nirvāṇa*), desire (*kṛśa*) and absence of desire (*vyavadāna*), while Nāgārjuna maintains that beings are 'in Nirvāṇa' (*nirvṛta*) from the beginning. Buddha did not believe that there is an ego who practises the rules and follows the Path, but he was an indefatigable preacher of 'act and fruit,' while his modern disciple, Nāgārjuna, the so-called 'Buddha without marks' (*alakṣana*), endeavours to show that act is void.

The answer of Nāgārjuna is to the point. To begin with, the cardinal principle of Buddha is that one must rely on truth—on reasoning. That is the refuge, not the authority of any one. Where there is disagreement between the Buddha's sayings and the dicta of reason, we have to look

¹ See *JRAS*, 1910, p. 123 ff.

² See D. T. Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, London, 1907.

³ *Prajñāpāramitā*, *passim* (see *Aṣṭasāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā*, *Bibl. Indica*, Calcutta, 1898).

⁴ See *Sartadarianasangraha*, tr. E. B. Cowell and A. F. Gough, London, 1882.

⁵ *Mūlamadhyama*, p. 475 ff.

on these sayings as provisional—expressions for the convenience of hearers, not true expressions of Buddha's mind.¹ So much for the charge of heresy. And it is evident that the old philosophy—negation of an ego, belief in the existence of *dharma*s (see PHILOSOPHY [Buddhist])—does not bear criticism (*vichāra-asāha*). All the common notions—cause, act, fruit, etc.—which Buddha admitted so far, because his disciples were not ripe for the truth ('I do not disagree with the world' [*lokena sārādhā na vivādāmi*]), are contradictory. Nāgārjuna is subtle—more subtle than solid—in finding 'antinomies.' The doctrine of voidness, therefore, is the true word of Buddha.

It remains only to make sure that this unqualified nihilism of the 'pure reason' does not weaken the old positions of Buddhism, does not 'destroy' the common notions of everyday and of religious life. Buddhists and Indians do not object to any metaphysical theory, and one is often astonished at the marvellous freedom of their most orthodox writers. They have often been praised by Europeans for their so-called free thinking. But this freedom has its limits, and sometimes very narrow ones. In the present case it is all-important for a Buddhist that the holy Path should remain safe. It is safe in the town of Voidness, and, to tell the truth, the Path can be followed only by a believer in voidness.

The aim of the Path is deliverance from suffering; i.e. deliverance from existence. The Path, therefore, is the suppression of desire. And, although the old Buddhists failed to realize this psychological fact, there cannot be cessation of desire as long as there remains in the mind any idea of pleasure, pain, or existence. The Buddhist of the Little Vehicle strives for liberation, without knowing that this very endeavour is framed with desire; therefore the saint of the old pattern, the *arhat*, when he dies, has not really done what is to be done, has not practised the true *brahmacharya*, and he will live again. To be qualified for liberation, one must know that there is neither *samsāra* nor *nirvāṇa*, neither Buddha, liberated, nor candidate for liberation.

We should rejoice that, if things are void of any real existence and like a dream, mirage, or magical creation, there cannot be any order and consequence in the coming and going on of these things; that, therefore, the means leading to liberation from desire are of no avail. There is no reason why these dream-like illusions should not continue to deceive us. They are without cause; therefore there is no means of stopping them. But Nāgārjuna does not believe that void things are going on without order and consequences: the various magical contrivances depend, as a matter of fact, on various formulæ. It is true that causation, motion, and knowledge do not support criticism; but criticism does not destroy the indisputable fact that everything is happening as if there were causation, motion, knowledge. Everything is absurd in the nightmare which we are dreaming; but, while we have first to know that this is an absurd nightmare, in order to obtain a reasonable sleep, we have also to understand the rules that govern its *processus*. It is an absurd nightmare; that is the absolute truth. It is going on because we cling to it, because we find pleasure in it, because we are feeding it—absurd and unreal as it is—by absurd and unreal affections or dislikes; such is the experimental truth. Nāgārjuna does not 'destroy' the experimental truth; he emphasizes, on the contrary, this fundamental point that, unless we manage void and illusory things according to the rules that govern their *processus*, it will be

impossible to reach the other side of illusion. This system may not bear criticism; but it is nevertheless an honest and able attempt to cook the last fruit of nihilism—negation of suffering and of liberation—evolved from the old nihilistic seed sown by Buddha himself, in the most orthodox juice (*rasa*) of the Good Law, the juice of suffering and liberation.

LITERATURE.—The chief authorities are Nāgārjuna, *Mūla-madhyamaka* (Bibl. Buddhica, iv.), Petrograd, 1913, and Chandrakīrti, *Madhyamakāvatāra* (ib. ix.), do. 1912, and tr. in *Museon*, viii. (1907), 249, xi. (1910) 272, xii. (1911) 285. See, further, PHILOSOPHY (Buddhist), MADHYAMAKA, and MAHAYĀNA.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

NIMĀVATS.—The Nimāvats are a Vaiṣṇavite sect of considerable influence in the north of India. They are especially numerous in Bengal, in and around the home of their founder Nimbārka at Vyṇḍavana, near Mathurā, in the Moughyr district in the north of the province. His father's name is given as Jagannātha; and, according to some authorities, he spent a considerable part of his life in Bellary, in the province of Madras. Nimbārka is said to have derived his name from a miracle which he performed on the occasion of the unexpected appearance of a Bairāgin ascetic at his house late in the evening, demanding food. His visitor was under a vow not to eat after sundown. Nimbārka, therefore, not to fail in hospitality, caught the sun in a *nīm*-tree, and delayed its setting until his guest had satisfied his hunger. The founder is believed to have been an incarnation of the sun-god, or of Sudarśana, the discus of Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa, itself a solar symbol; and the *nīm*-tree is universally associated with solar worship. His date has not been certainly determined; probably he lived and taught in the early part of the 12th cent.; and by some he has been identified with Bhāskaraśāhārya, who at that time studied and wrote on mathematics and astronomy.¹

The community or sect founded by Nimbārka is known as the Sanaka or Sanakādi-saṃpradāya, the latter term denoting the organized system or 'church' of Sanaka and his successors. Sanaka is described as the predecessor of Nimbārka in the second generation of teachers, and the inspired source of the knowledge which had been communicated to him immediately by the 'divine lord' (Bhagavat). The members of the community direct their chief worship to Kṛṣṇa and his spouse Rādhā. They wear on the forehead as a caste-mark two perpendicular lines of white clay (*gopī-chandana*) with a central black spot, and carry a rosary and necklace of the sacred *tulasī* wood. Many of them are wandering *sannyāsins*; others marry and fulfil the duties of ordinary citizens and householders.

Nimbārka wrote a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*, which in its turn formed the text of commentaries by his followers and successors. A knowledge of the doctrines which he taught, however, is obtained chiefly from a brief dogmatic treatise of which he was the author, known as the *Siddhāntaratna*, or *Daśaśloki*, consisting of ten stanzas, whence the latter name is derived. His teaching was based upon that of Rāmānuja, from whom he was not far removed in time, which he extended and developed in the direction of assigning a quasi-independent position to the individual soul (*jīva*) and to the inanimate universe. This qualified individualism, however, is not to be understood as though these two can or do maintain an existence distinct or separate from Brahma. They are essentially and permanently one with that which is all and in all. The system of Nimbārka, therefore, secures in form at least the monistic position.

¹ C. M. Duff, *The Chronology of India*, London, 1899, p. 139, with references; Monier-Williams, *Brahmanism and Hindūism*, p. 146 f.

¹ L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme*, Paris, 1909, p. 130 ff.

Jiva and the world are distinct from Brabma only in the sense that they are developed or evolved from his qualities, force, or *śakti*, so as to constitute the universe of animate and inanimate forms. They exist in him in a subtle (*sūkṣma*) guise, which in the world of phenomena takes on a gross (*sthūla*) body, yet remaining essentially united to him, with no detached being or life. Nimbārka's teaching, therefore, combines a modified pluralism with the Vedāntic monism. Equally also with Rāmānuja he emphasized the importance and need of *bhakti*. The grace of Brahma is for all who are in need and who seek him with devotion and faith. This is the only way of salvation by submission to the will of Kṛṣṇa, and trust in his mercy; at the feet of the one god all should offer worship and devotion, and thus alone can they obtain deliverance from distress and the darkness of ignorance and sin.

Like other Indian teachers, Nimbārka distinguished two classes of souls: those already emancipated and those yet in bondage. For the devotee who sought emancipation it was essential to obtain a knowledge of five things: (1) the nature of the object of worship, defined as *sacchidānanda*, 'reality,' 'thought,' 'bliss'; (2) the nature of the worshipper; (3) the results to be anticipated of the divine grace, explained as devotion, self-surrender, supreme affection, etc.; (4) the bliss produced by true *bhakti*; (5) hindrances to union with God. Instances of the last are idolatrous worship, disregard of the divine commands, etc. Inanimate objects also are of three kinds: (1) those that owe their origin to *prakṛti*; (2) those that do not originate from *prakṛti*; (3) time. The *jīva* finds its true nature and destiny when by the grace of God the hold of *prakṛti* is relaxed, and final and complete separation achieved.

Thus the followers of Nimbārka have inherited and maintain theoretically a doctrine of compromise, to satisfy, on the one hand, the evidence or apparent evidence of the reality of the visible universe and of the individual soul, and, on the other, not entirely to break with the Vedāntic doctrine of absolute unity (*advaita*). Of the history of the sect since its foundation little or nothing is known. Its members are said to have suffered much persecution at the hands of the Jains and others, and at one time the sect almost ceased to exist. No effort seems to be made to propagate their distinctive teaching, nor are they actively hostile to other forms of belief.

LITERATURE. — M. Monier-Williams, *Brāhmanism and Hinduism*, London, 1891, p. 1461; W. Crooke, *PR* i. 61; R. H. Bhattacharya, *Vaiṣṇavism, Saivism and minor religious Systems* (= *GIAP* iii. 6), Strassburg, 1913, pp. 82-86., 1601; A. S. Geden, *Studies in the Religions of the East*, London, 1913, p. 333f. See also art. BHAKTI-MĀRGA, vol. ii. p. 545.

A. S. GEDEN.

NINOMIYA SONTOKU. — I. Life. — Ninomiya Sontoku, the peasant sage of Japan, was born near Odawara in 1787, and died in 1856. When he was twelve years of age, his father died, leaving him to support the family. He had little opportunity for study, but so intense was his thirst for knowledge that he carried his Confucian Classics wherever he went, and would read as he walked, or would keep his book open near him as he worked, that he might catch frequent glimpses of its pages. When he was sixteen years of age, his mother died, and the family was broken up. Ninomiya went to live with his uncle Mampai, a sordid old man, who grudged him the oil he used when poring over his books at night. So the boy found a tract of deserted land, and planted it with rice-plants which the farmers had discarded. Thus he was able to supply his own oil for study. Even this did not appease his uncle, who considered study a shameful waste of time and oil, so he strictly forbade him to study at night. Then Ninomiya rose

as soon as the day began to dawn, and pursued his studies before his uncle was awake. For lack of paper and ink he practised writing in the sand. He continued to cultivate his tract of waste land, saving the money each year until he was able to redeem his father's estate. These early experiences proved to be stepping-stones to his great life-work.

A man named Hattori, a clansman of the lord of Odawara, hearing how Ninomiya had redeemed his father's estate, and being himself in great financial difficulties, urged Ninomiya again and again to come and help him to save his estate. Finally Ninomiya yielded, on condition that Hattori should strictly follow directions. The family were not allowed to wear silk or to indulge in any needless luxury. He made them live so well within their means that each year there was a surplus. The result was that in five years prosperity was restored to the estate of Hattori. Not only were all debts paid, but there was money in hand, which Hattori offered to Ninomiya. Ninomiya refused any reward for himself, but divided a portion among the servants who had been his loyal helpers.

The next appeal for help came from the lord of Odawara, who had heard of the great good accomplished on his clansman Hattori's estate. Sakuramachi, in Shimotsuke province, was once very prosperous, producing 20,000 bushels of rice annually and supporting over 400 homes. It had gradually declined until it produced less than 4000 bushels of rice, and the people were correspondingly degraded.

Ninomiya first made a thorough examination of existing conditions. Then, to the lord of Odawara's surprise, he refused all offers of money to carry on the work. His plan was to make the people work out their own redemption. He himself sold out all that he had, and went with his family to reside in Sakuramachi. The first few years brought little but discouragement. All his efforts seemed unavailing. Indolence, gambling, drunkenness, and vice continued to flourish. Suddenly Ninomiya disappeared, and the people, alarmed lest he had deserted their cause, made a search for him, and found him at the Narita temple, where he had spent twenty-one days in fasting and prayers for his people. They were so impressed by his devotion and self-sacrifice that they promised him their diligent support if he would but return to their village. During the next five years unprecedented prosperity crowned their efforts. At the end of that time, when the famine of the seventh year of the Tempō era (1836) occurred, the people of Sakuramachi were able to assist the neighbouring districts with food and money. The storehouses were opened, and from March to May they fed over 40,000 persons. In addition Ninomiya loaned about \$3000 to the people without interest.

After the death of the lord of Odawara he was employed by the Tokugawa government in A.D. 1842. It was his custom to begin his work in the most promising village or district and gradually to work out from there. He praised and encouraged the industrious ones, and patiently taught the unworthy. Wherever he went, he preached the duty of man, emphasizing filial piety, honesty, righteousness, and brotherly love. He gave homes to the homeless, loaned money without interest to those who were in debt, advising them to write the amount of their indebtedness above their god-shelf, that they might be reminded of it daily as they performed their devotions. He supplied farm implements until the people were able to buy for themselves, and taught by example and precept the importance and dignity of honest toil and mutual helpfulness. Thus he spent his life, until

he was over seventy years of age, bringing hope and cheer to the people of Japan.

2. Teaching.—Ninomiya's teaching centred in the idea of gratitude to heaven, earth, and man for blessings received—to heaven for the light of the sun and moon, for growth and decay; to earth for the trees, grain, birds, animals, and fish; to man for his various offices and labours. Hence the first principle of conduct is to make suitable return for these blessings. The manner in which such return can be made is set forth in Ninomiya's teaching known as 'Hotoku.'

The society of 'Hotoku' was organized by his disciples. The members of the society are expected to conduct their lives in such a way as to bring prosperity to themselves and to their country. By their conduct they must show their gratitude for all the blessings that they have received from the gods, the emperor, and their ancestors. They must be industrious, and live so within their income that they will have a surplus, which may be used to develop waste places or new industries. 'Hotoku' is not a religion, but it tries to put the best elements in Shintoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism into practice, laying great stress on national spirit.

The society has two funds: one is made up of voluntary offerings from the members, known as 'foundation money,' and may be used for current expenses, public works, encouraging new industries, relieving distress, or rewarding good deeds; the second is made up of the surplus funds of the members, known as 'good seed money.' This fund may be loaned to the members or to other worthy persons without interest, on a vote of the society. Ninomiya condemned the taking of interest, because heaven does not demand interest on her blessings. The borrower is expected to return the loan in ten annual payments, and then in the eleventh year to bring an extra payment as a thank-offering for the benefits which he has received from the society.

The central idea of Ninomiya's method was to have a yearly surplus. He said that it was in that way that the earliest ancestors of Japan opened up the country and redeemed waste places. The same method would reclaim any number of deserted plains, and rescue any number of people from poverty. He urged this method upon the feudal lords of the Tokugawa age when they became financially embarrassed, and, even when they enjoyed prosperity, he still urged them to lay by something either to help the poor or against a time of famine.

He regarded self-sacrifice as a fundamental virtue, without which peace and prosperity were impossible. He used to say to young men:

'If you wish to succeed you must unselfishly serve men. I have learned from experience that self-sacrifice is essential to success. When I was a poor boy, I owned but one spade. One day it broke and I was greatly embarrassed. I tried to borrow a spade from an old man who lived next door, but, as he had need for it in his own garden, I offered to do his work for him. When I had finished digging and planting his garden, he gladly gave me the spade and said I was very welcome to use anything he had. You young men do not need to spend your mornings in bed; rise early and find something, however small, to do for some one else. Some may not appreciate your act of kindness, others may thank you profusely, while others may offer you some slight reward. It matters not how they receive it; your responsibility is to give yourselves to others.'

Ninomiya condemned the spirit of revenge. He said that Iyeyasu, the first of the Tokugawa Shoguns, being born in a warlike time, admired the spirit of revenge, but a great Buddhist priest taught him a better way, by emphasizing the beauties of benevolence. From that time the great Iyeyasu discountenanced revenge. Ninomiya thought that all Japanese should learn to love benevolence. Revenge leads to revenge without

limit. If it were encouraged, the world would become a scene of bloodshed and murder. It is the duty of the government to administer justice, and punish the guilty.

He taught that good and evil are relative terms, like far and near. The difference between far and near depends entirely upon your standpoint. So with good and evil; nothing is absolutely good or absolutely evil. Man deplores waste places; the bear and the deer rejoice in them. The thief thinks it good to steal; the government condemns it. Happiness and misery always go hand in hand. Water under control is a blessing; uncontrolled, it brings floods and misery. The hunters' joy is the sorrow of the birds and animals.

3. Religion.—Ninomiya favoured no one religious sect, but was liberal towards all. He thought that, just as one may reach the summit of Mt. Fuji by many different paths, so men may reach truth through any of the various sects of religion. Shintoism is useful for opening up the country, Confucianism for governing the country, Buddhism for giving peace of mind. He described his own teaching as a medicine tablet in which he had thoroughly mixed two parts Shintoism, one part Confucianism, and one part Buddhism. They need to be well mixed to be effective. His sacred book was the unwritten book of nature. He disliked priests because they were consumers rather than producers. Yet he was very religious. He used to say: 'Without sound, without odour, heaven and earth repeat over and over the unwritten sacred book.' To read this book you must close the physical eye and open the spiritual eye. There may be errors in the written sacred books, but never in nature's book. If the written book did not agree with nature's book, he rejected it.

4. Conclusion.—Ninomiya was not merely an economist, although his work was largely connected with the accumulation of wealth. In his report concerning the district round lake Imba he advocated a reformation of the ethical and moral conditions of the people as of more importance than the mere improvement of their material environment. He reported that it was impossible to employ them on any government enterprise unless their spiritual natures were reformed. Even if their district became wealthy, the moral ideals of the people were such that wealth would only increase their vice and sensuality. If their moral natures were reformed, wealth would be a blessing and not a curse to them. Again, when he was appointed to his last great work, he sighed and said: 'My intention is to refine human kind rather than to restore deserted places, but now I am again ordered to do the latter.' These references are sufficient to show that Ninomiya placed moral teaching first, and the development of wealth second. He used to say: 'If we could only develop the deserted places in human minds, we could then let the deserted fields look out for themselves.'

LITERATURE.—Tadasu Yoshimoto, *A Peasant Sage of Japan*, tr. from *Hotoku-Ki*, London, 1912; R. C. Armstrong, *Just Before the Dawn (The Life and Work of Ninomiya Sontoku)*, New York, 1912; Kanzo Uchimura, art. in *Representative Men of Japan*, Tokyo, 1908; R. C. Armstrong, art. in *TASU*, vol. xxxviii. [1910] pt. ii.; Takayoshi Tomida, *Hotoku-Ki* (Jap.), Tokyo, 1905; Masaya Fukuzumi, *Yawa* (Ninomiya's evening addresses) (Jap.), Shizuoka, 1887; *A Study of Ninomiya* (Jap.), published by The Sapporo Agricultural College, Tokyo, 1909. R. C. ARMSTRONG.

NIRMALAS.—The Nirmalā Sādhus, or 'pure saints,' are a Sikh order which was bitterly opposed to that of the Akālīs. They are said not to undergo any rite of purification, but merely to receive the *amrit* like other Sikhs when they become Singhs. They originated, like the Akālīs, in the time of Gurū Govind Singh, but the history of their foundation is obscure.

According to one story, a water-carrier was seized by the Gurū's soldiers for supplying their enemies with water during a battle, but the Gurū declared him 'stainless' (*nirmalā*). This account, however, undoubtedly arose out of a confusion between this order and the Sewāpanthis. According to the *Panth Prakash* (Amritsar, 1892, p. 855), the Nirmalās originated thus: Gurū Govind Singh invited a Brāhman to come from Benares to teach the Sikhs, his disciples, Sanskrit, but he declined the invitation, saying that none but Brāhmins were entitled to learn Sanskrit or the Vedas, and pointing out that many of the Sikhs were artisans or even menials by caste. To this the Gurū rejoined that the Sikhs would become more erudite than the Brāhmins, and that the latter would one day be glad to learn from the Sikhs. He also sent many of his disciples to learn Sanskrit. They wore the saffron garment of the *sādhu*, and translated many Sanskrit works into the vulgar tongue. These people were styled Nirmalās by the Gurū. Another story is that once the Gurū asked his Sikhs to cook *karā parshād* (sweet-meat eaten in communion), and they all obeyed him except thirteen, who kept their seats. These were called Nirmalās, as they had discarded the things of this world (from *nivṛt*, 'renunciation'). A third tradition is that once after a hard-fought fight the Gurū and his companions went to rest, but at midnight he arose to see if any were awake in meditation. Those whom he found keeping vigil in spite of their fatigue he called Nirmalās.

The precise derivation of the name is obscure. The Yogis practise a rite called *nivali*, or *niuli* (physical purification by purging) as a preliminary to the rite of *yoga* (drawing in the breath) properly so called, and the term Nirmalā may be derived from this practice.

At first the Nirmalās took the *pahul* and wore white raiment, but they have adhered to the study of the orthodox Hindu scriptures and thereby lost touch with Sikhism. They now wear the ordinary saffron robes of the Indian *fagīr*, possibly to facilitate begging, which they profess to avoid, as they claim to subsist on offerings voluntarily made. All Nirmalās are *kesh-dhārī*, i.e., they wear the *kes* of the true Sikh or Singh.

The Nirmalās form a well-disciplined and highly respected organization. Each monastery is under a *gurū*, while a council or committee periodically visits their societies throughout the Province. Almost always celibate, they bear a far higher reputation for morality than most of the other religious orders in the Panjāb. Their principal *akhāra* is at Hardwār, but they also have foundations at Amritsar and elsewhere in the Panjāb.

H. A. ROSE.

NIRVĀNA.—*Nirvāna*, etymologically 'blowing out,' 'cooling,'¹ or *mokṣa* (q.v.), 'deliverance,' is the central idea of the teaching of Śākyamuni and the *raison d'être* of Buddhism.

'As the vast ocean, O disciples, is impregnated with one flavour, the flavour of salt, so also, my disciples, this law and discipline is impregnated with one flavour, with the taste of deliverance' (*Chullavagga*, ix. 1. 4).

It was in order to lead his fellow-creatures to *nirvāna* that Śākyamuni preached the True Law; it is in order to reach *nirvāna* that monks and nuns forsake the duties of secular life, become strangers to the society of the family, both the dead and the living, which assembles around the domestic fire, and devote themselves to the practices of an asceticism which has one 'flavour,' the flavour of *nirvāna*.

It seems, therefore, that we should be amply provided with definitions of *nirvāna*, and that there should be no doubt as to the actual meaning of the word. As a matter of fact, the present writer believes that we know what *nirvāna* is as well as the Buddhists themselves did, and it is not our fault if we are not able to give an unambiguous statement. The Buddhist felt satisfied with a description which does not satisfy us, because, whereas we have been for centuries trained to make our ideas clear, this was not the case with the Indians; and also because we look at the Buddhist doctrines from the outside, without in the least believing in them: whereas *nirvāna* is

for us a mere object of archaeological interest, it is for Buddhists of paramount practical importance. Our business is to study what *nirvāna* may be; the business of a Buddhist is to reach *nirvāna*—a very different thing.

1. *Nirvāna* as a negative conception.—The idea of *nirvāna* cherished by the Buddhists is chiefly a negative one. They know what existence is. They know that existence is suffering—every existence, even the happy life of the gods, because the gods are to die and to be reborn; every existence, even the almost endless dreamy meditation of the beings living in the 'realm of neither notion nor no notion' (see art. COSMOGONY [Buddhist]). And they think that there is an exit, an end to the ever-recurring birth and death; there is an 'extinction' of the everywhere and always miserable consciousness; there is a *nirvāna*, deliverance from existence; and that is, indeed, enough. We must admit that the prospect of an endless migration from world to world, from hell and animal birth to hell and animal birth, is an appalling one, although we fail to realize fully its appalling character because we are not disposed to share it. But it is fairly evident that, at the time of Śākyamuni, many men were tired of existence.¹ They had learned to despise the trivial and unstable joys of life, and taken so gloomy a view of the universe that deliverance—unqualified deliverance—seemed to them a goal for which it is worth while to strive. This negative definition does not appeal to the most innate needs of our mind and heart—and that is the reason why *nirvāna* has been so often misunderstood; but the first duty of a historian of religion is to admit that some 'states of mind' may be human although they are not European or modern.

2. *Nirvāna* as a happy state.—While we believe that we are right on this point—namely, that some Indians were deeply pessimistic and that this pessimism culminated in the Buddhist ideal of an unqualified deliverance—it is not difficult to understand how this wan and cold ideal received the tinge of the warmest colours of confidence and hope. There is an enormous mass of texts which represent *nirvāna* as a happy state.² Every phrase that the Brāhmins use to describe the fortunate merging of the individual self into the absolute and universal self is or may be used by the Buddhists to describe the deliverance. *Nirvāna* is the farther shore (*para*), the island (*dvīpa*), the endless (*atyanta*), the immortal (*amṛta*), the immortal state (*amṛta pada*), the *summum bonum* (*naiḥsreyasa*). It is better than any existence, however pleasant. Śākyamuni, who discovered the path to it, felt obliged, out of love for mankind, to preach his discovery. Nothing can surpass the joy of the monk when he realizes that he will reach *nirvāna*; the *Dhammapada* and the 'Psalms of the Elders and the Nuns' (*Theragāthā*, *Therīgāthā*)³ give eloquent evidence of the deep joy and thrilling hope with which *nirvāna* was looked upon. It is difficult to find in the Brāhmanic literature, or

¹ E. J. Thomas, *Buddhist Scriptures* ('Wisdom of the East' ser.), London, 1913, p. 20, strongly remarks that 'it is sometimes unintelligently said that continued rebirth is a dreary doctrine. But it does not necessarily mean rebirth upon earth.' To read certain books it seems that India was, as it were, hallucinated by the idea of rebirth and death, whereas the Indian literature gives us a quite different image of Indian life. So far right. But we are concerned with the Buddhists, i.e. with the monks, with 'spiritual' men, who did really despise the paradisiac as well as human pleasures. Common religious people dreamed of paradises as they do to-day. Many more live, given to pleasure

² 'earthly *nirvāna*' (see below, § 4). But are such terms as *amṛta* compatible with this opinion?

³ See the tr. of C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Psalms of the Early Buddhists*, London, 1900-12, i. and ii., esp. introd. to vol. i. p. xxxvii.

¹ On the various meanings of *nirvāṇi*, *nirvāna*, see Senart, *Nirvāṇa*, in *Album Kern*, p. 101 ('extinction,' 'disappearance,' 'becoming cool,' 'refreshment,' 'comfort' [*nirvṛti*], 'repose,' 'serenity' [*ānti*]).

even in the *Upaniṣads*, feelings so fervid and enthusiastic.

It may be said that such feelings draw their strength and their import from mysticism and religious exaltation; and we must agree that there is little doctrinal speculation in them. Nevertheless the fact remains that Buddhists spoke of *nirvāṇa* as a firm believer in happiness after death would speak of paradise; and this fact is an important point in the description of what the Buddhist thought of *nirvāṇa*.

3. Doctrinal statements.—When we turn to doctrinal statements, we are confronted with two or possibly three opinions: (1) deliverance is pure and simple annihilation; (2)—which will not prove tenable—*nirvāṇa* is some inconceivable existence; (3) Śākyamuni has refused, in so many words, to state whether deliverance is annihilation or not.

(1) There are texts which suggest that deliverance is annihilation—e.g., the narrative of the death of Śākyamuni:

'As the extinction of a flame
Even so was his mind's release';¹

but similes are, as a rule, misleading, and the simile of fire that perishes when the fuel is consumed is used in the *Mahābhārata*, where annihilation is out of the question.²

We have here in view the whole fabric of the speculative texts, the texts which force upon us the identification of deliverance with annihilation, because they do not leave room for any other surmise. These texts are very numerous and free from any loophole for doubt. They provide us with a scientific description of man, and teach that there is nothing permanent in him. As a matter of fact, there is no 'man' or 'being' (*puruṣa*, *sattva*), 'soul' (*ātman*), or 'person' (*pudgala*); such expressions are mere names for a complex of elements (*skandhas*), some corporeal, some spiritual, which are dissolved at death.³ If the causes—actions to be rewarded in some other life (see art. KARMA)—remain that give to the dying consciousness the power of creating, in some embryo, a new consciousness that continues the first one and enjoys the fruits of previous lives, there is no cessation of existence, there is no annihilation. If, however, these causes are wanting—and they are wanting in the case of a saint, who has destroyed desire and burned act—the consciousness is blown out as the flame of a lamp, and that is *nirvāṇa*, i.e. the end of life, of consciousness, and of suffering. All the mystic or psychological data—all idea of a transcendent self, of an immanent absolute—that could give any support to a conception of survival of whatever kind, personal or impersonal, have been sedulously destroyed by Buddhist philosophy.

Here we must confess, however, that this identification, '*nirvāṇa*=annihilation,' is not one of the 'primordial' doctrines of Buddhism. The doctrine of annihilation was not an 'original purpose'; it was a result. That is to say, Śākyamuni (or the Church) did not start with such an idea of deliverance; this idea has been forced upon him (or upon them) because he has been rash enough to deny the existence of a soul.

¹ *Digha*, II. 151. (cf. *Suttanipāṭa*, 235), tr. E. J. Thomas, *Buddhist Scriptures*, p. 116; cf. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Oxford, 1899-1910, II. 176; the Sanskrit version, *Mahāyānakavyūṭi* (Bibl. Buddhica, IV., Petrograd, 1913), p. 524, with an interesting discussion on *nirvāṇa* conceived as something real (*bhāva*).

² xii. 543; *SBE* viii. 2 [1895] 247.

³ Thomas, p. 9: 'The self is compound and hence impermanent. When the individual is analysed into body and mind with its qualities and functions, what is there remaining behind? The soul, *ātman*, said the Vedāntin, that permanent entity which is in reality identical with the absolute and eternal Brahma. But the Buddhist answer was that there is nothing remaining. The elements of the self are the self, just as the parts of the chariot are the chariot.'

We shall see that, according to some evidences, Śākyamuni did his best to avoid this 'result,' and even objected to a definite statement of it. But, when certain premisses are accepted, conclusions follow with the fatality of destiny. *Tarka* ('logic') is indeed a most dangerous auxiliary of religious thought.

(2) There is a text, dressed in scholastic garb and therefore the more authoritative, which would lead us to suggest that *nirvāṇa* is, in the words of H. Oldenberg, 'an existence that is beyond reason and conception.'¹

'At this time, a monk called Yamaka has adopted the following wicked bereavement: "I understand the doctrine taught by Bhagavat to be this, that a monk who is free from the depravities (*āsava*) when his body dissolves, is annihilated; that he perishes; that he does not exist beyond death."

If it is a wicked heresy (*pāpakā dīṭṭhi*) to hold that the dead saint has perished, the obvious inference is that he continues to exist. But let us see the sequel.

Śāriputra, the disciple full of wisdom, endeavours to save Yamaka from this wrong view. Yamaka feels obliged to admit that a saint, a living saint, is neither identical with the bodily form, with the sensations—in a word, with the *skandhas* that are the constituents of what the common people style an individual or a person—nor, on the other hand, is he different from them. And Śāriputra concludes, in the words of Oldenberg:

'Thus then, friend Yamaka, even here in this world the saint is not to be apprehended by thee in truth. Hast thou, therefore, a right to speak, saying: "I understand the doctrine taught by Bhagavat to be this, that a saint . . . does not exist beyond death"?'

Hence the conclusion:

'One who clearly and indefinitely renounced an everlasting future would speak in another strain: behind the veil of mystery there lies the longing for escape from opposing reason, which declines to admit the conceivableness of everlasting existence, the hope for an existence which is beyond reason and conception.'

But, if it is heresy to maintain that a saint (an *arhat* or a *tathāgata*) perishes at death and does not exist beyond death, the obvious reason, stated by Śāriputra, is that an 'individual' or a 'person' is a mere *être de raison* which does not perish because it does not exist. As Śāriputra tells Yamaka, the living saint is neither identical with the *skandhas* nor different from them. If he were the body, etc., he would of course exist and would also be subject to annihilation when the body dissolves. If he were different from the body, etc., he would be eternal; but he is not different from them, because, when we speak of somebody as being a man or a saint, the only reality of which we are speaking is the group of *skandhas*. All Buddha's teaching is to make clear that the body, etc., are the only things that exist and that may be spoken of.²

The Yamaka-Śāriputra dialogue, therefore, cannot be understood as a veiled positive answer to the question of survival. It means that such questions are devoid of any actual meaning, and can be dreamt of only by foolish people who have not learned the first lesson of Buddha, that there is no soul.³

But what about the phrase which we have italicized above: 'apprehended in truth'?⁴ The present writer is of opinion that the passage must

¹ *Saṃyutta*, III. 109; cf. H. O. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1900, p. 133; Oldenberg, *Buddha*, 2, tr. Hoey, p. 233, tr. Foucher, p. 279.

² Cf., e.g., *Saṃyutta*, IV. 374: 'Yena rūpeṇa tathāgatam paññāpāyāmaṇo paññāpeyya taṃ rūpam paññam.' For another exegesis of the phrases, 'neither identical . . . nor different,' see below, p. 378.

³ See the end of the dialogue, and the concluding words of Yamaka: 'Henceforth, when I shall be asked whether a saint perishes at death or not, I shall answer: body is perishable (*rūpam añīcheṇam* . . .)'

⁴ *ditthe va dhamme saccheṇato tathāto anupalabbhiyamaṇo*, Fr. tr., p. 279: 'le Parfait ne peut être compris en vérité et en essence par toi.'

be translated: 'the saint is not found by thee to be something real,' or, in the words of Warren, 'considering now that you fail to make out and establish the existence of the saint in the present life.' The use of the expression *na upalabhyate* in later Buddhism (Mādhyamika school) has been known for a long time; also the logical use of the *anupalabdhī* to establish the non-existence of something somewhere; and we have now the evidence of the *Mahāniddesa*, the oldest of the commentaries, which has even been admitted in the *Suttapīṭaka*, where *natthi*, 'is not,' is commented *na samvījati*, 'does not exist,' *n'upalabhati*, 'is not perceived.'

Grammar is a conjectural science, and no matter of importance can be decided upon these philological grounds. But Oldenberg's version would be admissible only if supported by some clearer references to a state 'that is beyond conception and reason.' These references are scarce, and wear a garb of metaphor that diminishes their importance. Two may be mentioned. The first one, in the dialogue of the nun Khemā and the king Pasenadi (*Samyutta*, iv. 374), is specious. The comparison of the saint with the unmeasurable ocean must not lead us astray, as the text concludes with the common lesson on the *skandhas*. It gives only evidence of an ill-advised tendency to mystery. The second one is a celebrated fragment which occurs in two of our oldest books:¹

'There is, O disciples, a something that is not born, not produced, not created, not compounded.² Were there not, O disciples, this something not born . . . , there would be no possible exit for what is born.'

The present writer has often quoted this statement as favouring the opinion that '*nirvāṇa* is existence.' But Oldenberg has rightly remarked:

'These words seem to sound as if we heard Brāhmanical philosophers talking of the Brahma, that has neither beginning nor end. . . . Yet these expressions, when viewed in the connection of Buddhist thought, convey something wholly different. . . . For the Buddhists, the words: "there is something uncreated," merely signify that the created can free himself from the curse of being created.'

To sum up: there is little doubt that the nihilistic interpretation of Buddhism—negation of a soul, negation of the survival of the saint—is the leading doctrine of the *Pīṭakas* (old Scriptures), as it is of the mediæval northern scholastic (Mādhyamaka). But there have been in the ancient Church as well as in historical times many 'heretics,' and among them the 'believers in personality' (*pudgalavādīn*), these 'maintainers of Sāṅkhya' (*sāṅkhyavādīn*) in disguise. The *Pudgalavādīn*s stated that the *pudgala*, the self, is neither identical with the *skandhas* nor different from them; nothing can be predicated of it (*anabhilāpya*); it nevertheless exists. They probably admitted some transcendent form of eternal existence.

(3) There is a third set of texts which we may style 'agnostic' (see art. AGNOSTICISM [Buddhist]). Strong and clear as was the teaching of the Master, many of his disciples felt dissatisfied with his utterly nihilistic doctrines, and hoped, in the depth of their hearts, that they misunderstood him. Let us not forget that the disciples of Śākyamuni came to him as to the discoverer of the Path of Immortality (*amṛta*), and were not previously informed concerning the only immortality possible, namely eternal silence and destruction. If we are not mistaken, it is therefore easy to

¹ *Uddāna*, viii. 3; *Itivuttaka*, 43.

² It is worth while to look at the list of the 'not compounded' (*asamskṛta*), which seems to be old: (1) space (*ākāśa*), which is simply a name, being the mere absence of a thing 'making obstacle' (*anātarapamātra*); (2) the destruction of the things which perish without premeditation (*apratissanḥkhyānirodha*), as the wood perishes in the flame, as the flame perishes when the fuel is wanting; (3) the destruction brought about by premeditation (*pratisanḥkhyānirodha*), i.e. the extinction of the thought of the saint, more exactly, the cessation of the production of new thoughts—i.e. *nirāpāna*. See L. de la Vallée Poussin, 'Les trois Asamskṛtas,' in *Album Kern*, pp. 111-113.

understand that many monks were anxious to be made sure about *nirvāṇa*, not by logical conclusions drawn from metaphysical tenets, not by metaphorical and conflicting phrases, but by a definite and authentic statement from the lips of the Master. The texts give sundry evidences of this state of mind.³ But the Master refused to give any answer, and he added the reason of his silence:⁴

'Why has Buddha not taught his disciples . . . whether the saint lives on beyond death or not? Because the knowledge of these things does not conduce to progress in holiness. . . . What contributes to peace and enlightenment, Buddha has taught his own: the truth of suffering. . . . Therefore, Mālūkyāputta, whatsoever has not been revealed by me, let that remain unrevealed; and what has been revealed, let it be revealed.'

This passage seems to us to express the feelings of the Buddha's disciples who did not care for metaphysics; they did not seem to have realized that the first truth, 'Everything is unsubstantial,' contains at least an authoritative expression of nihilism.

A large number of the Buddhists, and by far the larger number of the Buddhists who wrote—to say nothing of Śākyamuni himself, whose personality remains an unfathomable riddle—were bold enough to face the problem of the 'non-existence of a soul' (*nairātmya*) with its inevitable consequence, namely annihilation at death. But the monks who have recorded and introduced in the Scripture this 'positivist' statement, 'I have taught what is useful; what I have not stated, let that remain unstated,' are the exponents of the commonest attitude concerning *nirvāṇa*.

The Buddhists have discussed the question of the nature of *nirvāṇa* much less than we have done.⁵ They know that *nirvāṇa* is deliverance and that deliverance is the highest good, the only good to be hoped for. That is enough. What is interesting and worth search is the path to *nirvāṇa*; discussing *nirvāṇa* is far from being the best path to it; and Buddha rightly discouraged such discussion.

4. An earthly *nirvāṇa*.—Childers⁶ was the first to point out that, in a number of texts, *nirvāṇa* does not mean deliverance from existence, the state beyond death of the dead saint, but the 'brief period of bliss' enjoyed by the man who has liberated himself from desire and become a saint, before he obtains final *nirvāṇa* at death—in other words, the state of the *arhat* or the *jīvanmukta* (qq.v.).⁷ Much stress has been laid on this conception of an earthly *nirvāṇa* by several writers, among whom is Rhys Davids; and rightly so. On the one hand, deliverance from desire is the cause and the token of deliverance from existence. On the other hand, India has always been full of reverence for the saints who have reached a thorough *āraṇyaka* and become insensible to pleasure, suffering, and hope: 'I do not wish for death; I do not wish for life.'⁸ Neophytes longed for that 'professional' perfection, a sublime pattern of which was given by Śākyamuni; and it can be maintained that many monks dreamed only of the earthly *nirvāṇa*, without taking trouble about final *nirvāṇa*. They thought only of attaining the happiness and detachment of *nirvāṇa* in this life.⁹ There is much 'professionalism' in Buddhism, more than is generally admitted. Childers' hints and Rhys Davids' discussions must not be neglected if we want to get a complete idea of what *nirvāṇa* was for the Buddhists.

¹ See, e.g., *Majjhima*, I. 426; *Samyutta*, iv. 374.

² Oldenberg, *Buddha*?, tr. Hoey, p. 276.

³ See, however, Burnouf's *Introduction* and *Mādhyamaka-ṭīkā*, ch. xxv. pp. 519-541.

⁴ *Dict. of the Pali Language*, p. 263.

⁵ The term *sa-upadhiṣṣa nirvāṇa* is often understood as referring to the state of the *arhat*.

⁶ *Theragāthā*, 1062.

⁷ See *Samyutta*, I. 251.

'The present treatment of the subject is not very clear, for it is difficult in dealing with such a problem to be both fair and coherent. Incoherence is one of the chief features of Indian thought. We believe that orthodox Buddhism (i.e. the Buddhism of the books) maintains that *nirvāṇa* is a mere concept, the state of a thing that does not exist and of which nothing can be predicated. A saint, after death, a *nirvṛta* or a liberated one (*mukta*), is 'void' (*śūnya*); therefore he can be said to be annihilated. The conclusion, in Europe, would be evident. But Mātṛcheṭa tells us:

'Others than Buddha may have won liberation; but in Buddha the superiority is altogether great: all the liberated are void; but the void of a hair cavity compares but poorly with the large void of the sky.'¹

We shall conclude with the words of Barth:

'The imagination even of an Asiatic has some difficulty in settling down to the idea of annihilation. Thus the Chinese pilgrims Fa-Hian and Hiouen-Thsang, who . . . were orthodox believers in the complete Nirvāṇa of Buddha, nevertheless speak of miracles, and even of apparitions of his, as if he had not ceased to exist; and it is beyond a doubt that with many of the Buddhists of former days Nirvāṇa was only what it is with the majority of them to-day, a sort of eternal repose or a negative state of blessedness. This does not hinder Buddhism from being doctrinally the confession of the absolute vanity of all things, and, as regards the individual, an aspiration after non-existence.'²

5. Origins of the notion of *nirvāṇa*.—This problem is very obscure. The present writer would merely state that Oldenberg's opinion that 'the idea of *nirvāṇa* originates from the idea of Brahman'³ cannot be received with absolute confidence. The Buddhist idea of *nirvāṇa*—unqualified deliverance or qualified annihilation—arose from the same causes that produced the Brāhmanic idea of *nirvāṇa*, *brahmanirvāṇa*, merging in the absolute. The same attitude towards life, towards 'contingent existence', produced two conflicting views on the end of man, two conflicting eschatologies, in harmony with two conflicting metaphysics—the nihilism of the Buddhists and the monism of the Brāhmins. But our texts never mention *brahman*, the absolute of the Vedānta; and they never consider the *ātman*, which is the absolute of the *Upaniṣads*, as the universal principle, but always as the individual soul—the existence of which they firmly deny. They discuss the possibility of reaching by the Brāhmanic means the world of the god Brahmā, and they show the right means to reach it; but they have not a word on the *brahmanirvāṇa*, the merging in *brahman*. It seems, therefore, that the Buddhists were, at the beginning, quite ignorant of the eschatology of the *Upaniṣads*. This ignorance may be explained in many ways; until the chronology of the Brāhmanic and Buddhist literatures has been settled, a sure explanation is impossible.

LITERATURE.—The literature of *nirvāṇa* is very large, and a complete bibliography would have hundreds of headings. We may mention: E. Burnouf, *Introd. à l'hist. du bouddhisme indien*, Paris, 1844, pp. 18, 516, 594; F. Max Müller, *Chips from a German Workshop*, London, 1867-75, I, 279 ff., 'The Meaning of Nirvāṇa' (1867); T. Rogers, *Buddhaghosa's Parables*, do. 1870, *Introd.* p. xxxix; *Dhammapāda*, SBE x. [1881], *Introd.* p. xlv; J. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire, *Le Bouddha et sa religion*, Paris, 1862, tr. Laura Enssor, London, 1896; R. Spence Hardy, *Eastern Monachism*, London, 1866, pp. 5, 20, 291; P. E. Foucaux, *Doctrine des Bouddhistes sur le Nirvana*, Paris, 1864, and *Revue bibliographique*, 15th June 1874; R. C. Childers, *Dict. of the Pali Language*, London, 1875, pp. 265-274; A. Barth, *Les Religions de l'Inde*, Paris, 1879, tr. J. Wood, London, 1882, p. 113 ff.; V. Trenckner, *Mitinda-pañiḥ*, London, 1880, p. 424; H. Oldenberg, *Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, und seine Gemeinde*, Berlin, 1881, 1912, 2tr. W. Hoey, London, 1882, 2tr. A. Foucher, Paris, 1903; T. W. Rhys Davids, *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as illustrated by . . . Indian Buddhism (H.L.)*, London, 1881, *Buddhism* (Ameri-

can Lectures), New York, 1896; E. W. Hopkins, *The Religions of India*, London, 1896, p. 321 ff.; J. Dahlmann, *Nirvāṇa, eine Studie zur Vorgesch. des Buddhismus*, Berlin, 1897; J. A. Eklund, *Nirvāṇa: en religionshistorisk undersökning*, Upsala, 1899; E. Senart, 'Nirvāṇa,' in *Album Kern*, Leyden, 1903, pp. 101-104; F. O. Schrader, 'On the Problem of Nirvāṇa,' *JPTS*, 1904-05, p. 167; L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme: Opinions sur l'hist. de la dogmatique*, Paris, 1909, p. 84. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

NOACHIAN PRECEPTS.—The attitude of the Hebrews towards foreigners or 'Gentiles,' especially those who lived in their midst, underwent definite changes. It was in this connexion that there grew up the conception of the 'Noachian precepts'—the duties that could be required of the Gentiles in accordance with Biblical commands prior to the Mosaic legislation, which was regarded as peculiar to the Hebrews.

The exclusive temper of the Hebrew nation was a gradual growth. In the time of David (c. 1000 B.C.) a Hittite held high office and even the Philistines could be hosts. While P carefully notes that Isaac and Jacob avoid exogamy, the earlier sources, E and J, represent Joseph and Moses as marrying foreign wives. By the time of Deut., however, Israel's religion had become self-conscious, aware of its difference from other religions, devoted to the one spiritual God; accordingly, pagan customs were denounced, Canaanite peoples were banned, and an alien could not reside without restrictions among the children of Israel (cf. Dt 23³). This exclusive tendency is explicitly formulated in the Priests' Code with its regulations regarding alien immigrants, marriage, descent, diet, and the like. Within a short time after the return from the Exile P's account of man's early history had become axiomatic in Judaism, and the devout Jew found in the commands of the Creator as communicated by the Mosaic writings the sole sanction for human duty. P represents legitimate sacrifice, the Divine Name, the distinction between clean and unclean, as things unknown before the time of Moses. Yet, though he was ignorant of the Mosaic Law, Noah was a just man according to the standards of his age (P); and, as all the descendants of Noah could claim God as their creator and preserver, his standards might be expected from all; hence the term 'Noachian precepts.'

Post-Exilic writings vary in their attitude towards Gentiles. Ruth, Jonah, and some of the Psalms (100, 67, etc.) indicate a charitable disposition; the Wisdom literature favours tolerance; and the Greek influence created a party with wider sympathies. On the other hand, Joel, Zec 9-14, and Esther are definitely hostile. The forcible conversion attempted by Antiochus stimulated feeling in the same direction, and the Maccabean wars created the stern uncompromising piety of the future Pharisees. In the Apocrypha, while there is evidence of the more generous disposition (e.g., To 14⁶, Wis 1-11), the glorification of the Jews is equally conspicuous (e.g., Wis 12-19). The use of the names of Adam, Enoch, Noah, and Abraham in Apocalyptic literature was designed to avoid the risk of collision with the Torah, which was regarded as valid for all time. Among the disciples of Jesus the charitable attitude towards Gentiles had a new birth, but this tended to intensify the exclusive elements in Pharisaism; and it is to the discussions of Rabbis in this connexion during the first three centuries A.D. that precise definitions of the precepts of Noah are due.

The Noachian laws did not include all pre-Mosaic injunctions, but only those which coincided with the laws enunciated at Sinai (*Sanh.* 59a); e.g., circumcision was not required of Gentiles. It was only after this general principle was established that the number and scope of the Noachian precepts could be defined. According to the

¹ *Varnaṇāraḥavarnaṇa*, 101, ed. and tr. F. W. Thomas, *IA* xxxiv. [1905] 145 ff.; see A. F. R. Hoernle, *Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature*, Oxford, 1916, p. 78.

² *Religions of India*, p. 114.

³ *Buddha*, tr. Foucher, p. 281: 'L'idée du nirvāṇa est sortie de celle du Brahman.'

tractate *Sanhedrin* (56a), they were seven in number: (1) obedience to authority (יָרָא), (2) reverence for the Divine Name, (3) abstinence from idolatry, (4) from incest (Gn 12¹⁸ 20³), (5) from murder (4³⁴ 9⁵), (6) from robbery (21²⁵), (7) from eating flesh of living animal (9¹). The list grew, and in the 3rd cent. Ulla could speak of 30 commandments to which Noahide owed obedience, though he declares that they fulfilled only three (Cholin, α and β). The original seven, however, were the most important, and by observing these as a minimum a Gentile settling among Jews might be advanced to the privileges and responsibilities of the proselyte.

The Rabbis taught: Naaman's proselytism was only to perform the seven commandments given to the descendants of Noah. Nehusaradan, however, was a true proselyte; from the descendants of Sisera were such as taught the Torah among a majority of Israelites. From the descendants of Haman were such as learned the Torah in the city Bne-Berak' (*Sanhedrin*, tr. M. L. Rodkinson, New York, 1902, viii. 299).

The temper of the Rabbis appears in the following pronouncement:

'A Gentile who employs himself in the Law is guilty of death. He is not to employ himself except in the seven commandments that belong to the Gentiles. And thus a Gentile who keeps a Sabbath, though it be on one of the week days—if he make it to himself as a Sabbath, he is guilty of death; it is not necessary to add, if he appoint for himself a festival. The general rule is, that they are not permitted to innovate in religion, or to make commandments for themselves out of their own heads. Either let a Gentile become a proselyte of righteousness, and take upon him the whole Law; or let him remain in his own law, and neither add nor diminish. But if he employs himself in the Law, or keeps a Sabbath, or makes any innovation, he is to be beaten and punished, and informed that he is for this guilty of death—but he is not to be killed' (*Tilhoth Melaḥm*, x. 9, tr. A. McCaul, *The Old Paths*, London, 1837, p. 12).

The question was raised whether the Gentile should consider the seven precepts so inviolable as to claim his obedience even to the extent of suffering martyrdom for them. The school of Rabb (3rd cent. A.D.) decided in the negative, because Naaman had been allowed by Elisha to bow in the house of Rimmon (2 K 5¹⁸).

The fate of non-Jews in the Messianic kingdom was also discussed, the dominant view being that they would never adopt the whole Jewish Law.

Rabbi Jose (2nd cent. A.D.) declared that, though they would betake themselves to the Law and wear phylacteries, 'when they see the war of Gog and Magog breaking in upon the Messianic kingdom, they will throw away the Law and cry, "Let us break their bonds asunder and hrow their fetters away from us."'

The best that can be promised to a good Gentile has the authority of Maimonides:

'Whosoever confesses himself liable to observe the seven precepts of Noah and is diligent in fulfilling them, belongs to the pious among the nations and has a portion in the world to come' (*Melaḥm*, viii. 11).

The decrees of the Council of the Apostles in Jerusalem (c. A.D. 50), Ac 15²⁹ (cf. art. JUDAIZING), are independent of the later Rabbinical definitions. Among the Rabbis the postulates of the Priests' Code in Genesis are studied as the sole authoritative voice on man's origin and duty; but in the Apostolic Council custom and conduct are freely reviewed by the living Christian spirit.

LITERATURE.—Hamburger, s.v. 'Noachiden,' and cognate articles, 'Nichtisraelit,' 'Heiden,' 'Fremden,' etc.; W. Bacher, *Die Agada der Tannaiten*, Strassburg, 1883.

D. M. KAY.

NOETIANISM.—See MONARCHIANISM.

NOMINALISM.—See REALISM.

NOMISM.—'Nomism' or 'legalism' is the name given to the view that moral conduct consists in the observance of a law or body of laws. It stands opposed to those conceptions of morality which postulate an end to be pursued or an ideal to be realized rather than a law to be fulfilled. Legalism is not necessarily to be identified with what Kant, in contrast to morality, calls 'legality.' By 'legality' Kant means the moral practice of

one for whom moral law is no more than a rule, while he applies the term 'morality' to the conduct of one who finds in the law likewise the determining ground of his actions (cf. *Metaphysik der Sitten*, ed. J. H. von Kirchmann, Berlin, 1870, pp. 252, 226 f.; T. K. Abbott, *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason*³, London, 1883, pp. 269, 282), it being understood, of course, that the law is for Kant a rational and in essence a purely formal principle. Legalism may even take the form of a willing obedience which exalts reverence for the law above every other motive, whether such law be of a purely rational or of a positive and historical character. In this sense it may be, and indeed ought to be, an element in all moral life, even in its highest phase, and is then at bottom identical with what Kant calls 'morality,' though it need not bear the abstract character that Kant assigns to virtue nor imply any indifference to the practical results of observing the moral law. Whatever name we give to the supreme principle of morality, that principle must always be of the nature of a law. The moral ideal or end towards which our action is directed not only exercises an attractive power over us, but manifests itself also as an authority which makes demands upon us. Christian ethics, alike in its Protestant and in its Catholic form, has always upheld the conception of law, and rejected antinomianism, i.e. the doctrine that the moral agent who has attained to maturity has no need of external ordinances. It maintains that law cannot be dispensed with by the Christian, in so far at least as he is still subject to the power of sin; and it was from this point of view that the Formula of Concord decided the question of antinomianism. On the other hand, it is necessary to guard against what may be called positive legalism, which forgets that law and obedience are merely the form of the moral life, and not its substance. Positive legalism is exposed to danger on two sides: (1) it tends to regard the law as a multiplicity of commandments without inward coherence, and (2) it tends to confound a merely outward observance of those commandments with an allegiance of the will to the spirit of the law—to foster obedience from motives of fear or interest, and thus to become an unintelligent and Pharisaical conventionalism. Wherever we find these two defects, we have a spurious legalism, and it is to this false legalism, or else to the positive legalism as just defined, that the term is most frequently applied.

The idea of legalism, both in the good and in the bad sense of the word, was not unknown among the ancients. If we except the Stoics, Greek thinkers always identified the moral law with the law of the State. We nevertheless find Socrates, or at least Plato speaking as the interpreter of Socrates, insisting upon a willing and resolute obedience to the laws, and condemning the attitude of those who obey them only from the fear of punishment. Respect for and love of the law were quite familiar sentiments among the Greeks and Romans. The Stoics advanced to the conception of a universal law of nature, which they regarded as the foundation of all the duties and rights of human beings. This conception gave rise to a casuistry which could not fail to make a cleavage between a genuine and an unintelligent or insincere legalism. Spurious legalism is in a peculiar degree characteristic of the ethics of Judaism and Roman Catholicism. Judaism reduced all moral life to the observance of a historically revealed law, whose various constituents cannot be brought under the unity of one pervading spirit. Nevertheless, the obedience of the Jews issued in many cases from pure respect for and inward acquiescence in the law. Thus the love of the law plays a great part in the Psalms, although that love frequently

manifests itself in the form of sheer legalistic bigotry. Among the mass of the Jewish people, however, an unintelligent mechanical, self-interested, and even hypocritical observance of the law was the rule. In proportion as the casuistry of the scribes made obedience to the law ever more difficult and exacted an ever more scrupulous precision on the part of the conscientious observer, it gave rise to a deplorable practice of religious trafficking, and was itself compelled to find means of evading certain commandments under the show of fulfilling them. It would seem, nevertheless, that a reaction against this debased legalism made itself felt within the confines of Judaism itself, as is indicated by the fact that certain circles were intensely concerned to discover the 'great commandment' of the law, *i.e.* a commandment that would comprise all the rest.

It was felt necessary to appeal from the letter of the law to its spirit. Jesus made this appeal in the most emphatic way, and pursued the spurious legalism with denunciation and scorn. He even brought upon Himself the charge of being a despiser of the law, while, as a matter of fact, His great object was to secure its fulfilment by showing that its observance demanded, above all, love to its Author, and devotion to its supreme end—the transformation of mankind into a society of mutual love. St. Paul, too, incurred the imputation of antinomianism (Ro 7¹⁻²³), but he denied that he was *ἀνομος*: he was in truth *ἐννομος Χριστοῦ* (1 Co 9²¹), *i.e.* he upholds the idea of a law to which even the Christian is subject. As a matter of fact, he endorses the Law of Moses by bringing it under the unity of a supreme principle (Ro 13^{8ff.}), and sometimes he actually seems to maintain the letter by availing himself of an allegorical interpretation (1 Co 9⁸, Gal 4^{21ff.}). St. Paul's doctrine that the natural man is incapable of fulfilling the law, and that the law is unable to effect his salvation, was designed, above all, to sever the root of that spurious legalism which was the source of fatal delusion in some and of perpetual misgiving in others.

The legalistic tendencies reprobated by Jesus and St. Paul were not long in manifesting themselves in the Christian Church. The gospel came to be regarded as a new law; positive and even spurious legalism gained the upper hand in the sphere of practice and often also in that of doctrine. One of the main results of this triumph was the distinction between an obligatory morality and an optional morality, a distinction which had been made by the Stoics, and which re-appears in the Christian literature of the 2nd cent., developing later into the distinction between evangelical precepts and counsels. This tendency is closely allied to the false legalism to which the law is simply a mass of statutory ordinances without organic unity. Roman Catholic theology distinguishes various categories of laws, *viz.* natural divine law, positive divine law, positive human law, and prescriptions of the Church, of all which it proclaims the complete harmony, but which, in reality, form a collocation altogether heterogeneous, and are as such but little calculated to produce singleness and concentration of moral volition. In theory, no doubt, Roman Catholicism demands that the law shall be obeyed willingly and of conviction, but, as it does not insist upon the transformation of the heart, it is forced to place human liberty—regarded as the liberty of the natural propensities—in perpetual opposition to the law, which forms an obstacle to the growth of that liberty. Hence the law cannot be considered as anything but a yoke and a curb, nor can its observance rest upon any other motive than desire to evade penalty or acquire merit. Legalism in this sense was bound to adopt

the distinction between precepts and counsels, and to create the theory of probabilism (*q.v.*), which is hardly more than a device for eluding the law by rendering it vague. Such a legalism, however, can have no ground to stand upon where the law is regarded simply as the expression of an ideal which we have made our own and of an end which we strive to realize.

The Reformers, in reviving the Pauline doctrine of justification through faith, and in substituting for the distinction between precepts and counsels the idea of a vocation which, while individualizing the law, rescued it from the atomism of the casuists, struck at the very foundations of spurious legalism. It ought to be said, however, that, while the Reformers fought against false legalism with success, they were less fortunate in the manner in which they formulated the moral law, and in enunciating the claims of a properly defined legalism. While Protestantism may know nothing of the spurious legalism, it has not always been wholly free from legalism in the positive sense. The Reformed Church, in particular, has laid great emphasis upon the idea of law; it has frequently regarded the Scriptures as a legal code, and has not always succeeded in adequately distinguishing between the letter and the spirit of the Biblical precepts. Pietism likewise has sometimes lapsed into an ignoble and punctilious legalism. The Anabaptists thought of the Bible as being primarily the revelation of a law, and of the Christian life as consisting in obedience to it; yet, while their legalism made them narrow, it has not in the slightest degree undermined their earnest morality, as holds good likewise of the Reformed Church and Pietism.

If the spurious legalism that takes cognizance, not of a single all-pervading law, but only of particular laws, and deals with these in a commercial spirit, and the positive legalism, to which moral life consists wholly in fulfilling a law, play a large part in the history of the Christian Church and the history of humanity, it is none the less true that there is a just and proper legalism which is required as a counteractive to a morality purely æsthetic and sentimental. Legalism, narrow though it be, may have a considerable educational value in habituating human beings to resist their natural impulses, and to bow before an absolute authority. Rightly understood, indeed, legalism is a necessary condition of true moral liberty, as it reminds us that we are free only in proportion as we detach ourselves from our egoistic nature and rise above the claims of self.

LITERATURE.—The subject is usually dealt with in general histories of ethics and in histories of Christian ethics; *cf.* in particular: J. Denis, *Hist. des théories et des idées morales dans l'antiquité*, Paris, 1879; C. E. Luthardt, *Gesch. der christlichen Ethik*, Leipzig, 1888. See further works on Biblical theology, *esp.* B. Stade and A. Bertholet, *Biblische Theologie des alten Testaments*, 2 vols., Tübingen, 1905-11; H. Holtzmann, *Lehrbuch der neutestamentlichen Theologie*², 2 vols., do. 1911; H. Weinel, *Biblische Theologie des neuen Testaments*, do. 1912; W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*², Berlin, 1905; E. Schürer, *GVJ*^{3,4}, Leipzig, 1898-1902, II.; O. Holtzmann, *Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte*², Tübingen, 1906; *cf.* also the systematic expositions of Christian ethics, and *esp.* J. Gottschick, *Ethik*, Tübingen, 1907; V. Cathrein, *Moralphilosophie*, Freiburg i. B., 1890; W. Herrmann, *Römische und evangelische Sittlichkeit*³, Marburg, 1903; J. Mausbach, *Die katholische Moral und ihre Gegner*, Cologne 1911.

EUGÈNE EHRHARDT.

NONCONFORMITY.—1. Meaning and application of the term.—Although anybody who declined to fall in with the religious usages of his people might be called a 'nonconformist,' the name has come to have a more definite, specific meaning in English national life and history, so that we can speak of 'the Nonconformists,' the article indicating a particular section of the community with its own characteristic views and policy. The negative form of the word points to

an antithesis. There can be no nonconformity where there is not some rule or set of regulations compliance with which is refused. Further, the word has a political connotation. While 'heresy' stands for opposition to ecclesiastically settled orthodoxy, 'schism' for separation from the communion of the society claiming to be the one true Church, and 'dissent' for divergence from the beliefs and doctrines maintained by the national settlement, Nonconformity consists in not carrying out the requirements of an 'Act of Uniformity,' which is a law of the State. Accordingly, in America, in the British colonies, and in India there are no Nonconformists, because the English Acts of Uniformity did not extend beyond England and Wales. The disestablishment of the Welsh Church involves an end to Nonconformity in Wales. On the other hand, in Scotland, while Presbyterianism is the established form of Christianity, the Anglican Church, though outside the Establishment, is not, strictly speaking, Nonconformist, because since the suppression both of the Prelatists and of the Covenanters, Scotland has enjoyed religious liberty unhampered by any Act of Uniformity. Next, it should be observed that all the Acts of Uniformity have aimed at enforcing the use of the successive forms of the Book of Common Prayer that Parliament has sanctioned from time to time. They are not concerned with differences of religious belief except in so far as loyalty to the contents of this book and an honest use of it are concerned. It is possible to be a heretic inside the Established Church—with regard to doctrines not defined by the Prayer Book—and commit no offence against an Act of Uniformity; and it is also possible to agree with the Church standards of doctrine and yet be a Nonconformist, because not accepting everything in the Prayer Book. For some time there were Nonconformists within the pale of the Church, even Nonconformist ministers and bishops; Hooper was such. But their position was illegal, and, though the earlier Acts of Uniformity were not always pressed, the rigorous application of the latest of these Acts (that of 1662) drove all Nonconformists out of the Church. Thus, strictly speaking, a present-day Nonconformist is a person who is kept out of the Established Church of England on account of his refusal to accept the Book of Common Prayer in its entirety. But practically any one who stands outside the Established Church and associates himself with some other Christian Church is regarded as a Nonconformist, whatever his views about the Prayer Book may be. There are even Nonconformist churches that use this book in their regular services. Here we have the exceptions that prove the rule.

Historically regarded, the Nonconformists have been further characterized by their adherence to Puritanism in opposition to any approach towards Roman Catholicism on the one hand and towards Erastianism on the other. The early Nonconformists rejected certain ancient mediæval beliefs and usages that had been retained in the Elizabethan Church, in particular two—Episcopacy and the use of vestments. They claimed to represent primitive Christian beliefs and practices, and denied the right of the State either to alter or to add to them. In this way most of the early Nonconformists became Presbyterians and the remainder Congregationalists and Baptists.

It has been maintained that beneath these specialities of opinion and practice there lies a vital principle inspiring them and so essentially separating the Nonconformist from the Roman Catholic conception of religion. This is that, while the Catholic system begins with the Church as an institution and seeks to work inwards towards

spiritual religion by the influence of its rites and ordinances, the Nonconformist process is the reverse, commencing with the individual, with personal spiritual life, from which the Church and its activities are evolved as its fruits and products. Although these two ideals appear to be more or less clearly represented in the two types respectively, yet it cannot be shown that the divergence began with them or that they were always recognized as the most fundamental factors.

Lastly, it should be observed that, while modern Nonconformists are opposed to any interference with religion by the State, and stand for complete religious liberty—Cavour's 'free Church in a free State'—this was by no means the case among the early Nonconformists, with the solitary exception of the Baptists. The Presbyterians, while holding to the Puritan principle of keeping to the Word of God pure and simple as the standard, would have had their interpretation of the Bible enforced by the government, and there are even some statements of the Congregationalists Browne, Barrow, and Greenwood that recognize the authority of the civil magistrate for maintaining religious orthodoxy. If Cartwright had obtained the support of the government in his controversy with Archbishop Whitgift, he would have put down Episcopacy by force in favour of Presbyterianism. There was nothing to choose between the two with reference either to religious liberty or to the idea of a State establishment of religion. It was only in course of time that the Nonconformists came to agree on an entire repudiation of State interference with religious beliefs and practices and a demand for the disestablishment of the Church and the maintenance of complete religious liberty—the present Nonconformist position.

2. Tudor period.—Previous to the Tudor period there were divergences from the standard beliefs and practices of the Church, most conspicuously in John Wyclif and his followers, the Lollards. But, while Wyclif repudiated the authority of the pope over the Church in England, he asserted that of the king. The Lollards were persecuted by the civil authorities for heresy and dreaded on account of their socialistic tendencies. Although when they met in secret doubtless they would have conducted their services in a manner agreeable to their convictions, since there was no Act of Uniformity under which they could be arraigned, yet their separation from the Church was not effected in this way, and therefore, strictly speaking, they should not be described as Nonconformists.

Under Henry VIII. the Act of Supremacy, substituting the king for the pope as head of the Church, and the legal enforcement of the Six Articles were two fruitful causes of dissidence—the one repudiated by stanch Roman Catholics and leading to the martyrdom of Bishop Fisher and Sir Thomas More as well as less notable champions of the papacy, the other making martyrs of thorough-going Protestants who denied the doctrine of the Mass, so that supporters of the Roman discipline were beheaded and rejectors of the Roman doctrine hanged. But Henry and his parliament did not interfere with the ceremonies of the Church, although in the year 1540 a commission was appointed to inquire into them. Meanwhile varieties of usages that had come down from time immemorial in the different dioceses continued undisturbed, and no attempt was made to enforce any particular form of service. As yet there was no one Book of Common Prayer to which conformity could be required.

The establishment of the reformed religion in the reign of Edward VI. was accompanied by an important innovation with regard to uniformity of worship. In the reign of Henry VIII., as early as

the year 1544, the litany was ordered to be used in English; but as yet there was no complete English Prayer Book. In the year 1549 there was issued the first Book of Common Prayer, compiled in the main out of ancient missals. This was revised by Cranmer with the assistance of Martin Bucer, then Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, and Peter Martyr, who held a similar post at Oxford; and their labours resulted in Edward VI.'s Second Prayer Book—a work which showed considerable advance in the direction of Protestantism. Transubstantiation was now distinctly repudiated, prayers for the dead, anointing at baptism, and extreme unction were omitted, and the use of all vestments except the rochet and the surplice was forbidden. Neither of these Prayer Books had been submitted to Convocation when it was enforced by Act of Parliament. The first Act of Uniformity—that requiring the use of Edward VI.'s First Prayer Book—proclaims itself such. Its preamble contains the following declaration:

'Of long time there hath been had in this realm divers forms of common prayer, commonly called the Service of the Church; that is to say, the use of Sarum, of York, of Bangor, and of Lincoln; and besides the same, now of late, much more diverse and sundry forms and fashions have been used in the Cathedral and parish churches—with divers and sundry rites and ceremonies concerning matins and even song, and in the administration of the Sacraments of the Church.' It goes on to assert that the king has 'diverse times assayed to stay innovations or new rites,' adding: 'Yet the same hath not had such good success as his highness required—therefore he hath been pleased with the interest to secure a uniform, quiet, and godly order, to appoint commissioners, to make one convenient and meet order of common prayer, the which, by the aid of the Holy Ghost, is by them concluded.'

It is enacted that the services in the churches are to be conducted in such 'form as is contained in the said book, and none other, or otherwise' (*Statutes*, 2 and 3 Edward VI., cap. 1). The act is enforced by severe penalties, including deprivation, fines, and imprisonment, which after a third offence is to be for life. The origin of Nonconformity may be traced back to this first Act of Uniformity in English history. There were two parties to whom it was not acceptable. Designed expressly to effect a repudiation of Roman Catholic practices and doctrines, it could not but be obnoxious to adherents of the mediæval faith. It was against their position that its guns were directed. But there was another party in the line of fire whose antagonism had not been contemplated—the party of the Puritans. Aiming at the English method of compromise and moving slowly, the Reformation in the southern portion of our island was less drastic than in Scotland, where the Calvinistic model was adopted. This was not at all satisfactory to those English Protestants who desired to go as far as the more advanced Continental reformers. Foremost among them was John Hooper, afterwards bishop of Gloucester, who refused to use the vestments, openly objected to much in the Act of Uniformity, and even declined to take the oath of the royal supremacy. He has been called 'the first Nonconformist' (Skeats, *Hist. of Free Churches of England*, p. 6). He was also the first minister in the Church to pronounce clearly for the freedom of the Church from State control—a position which the main body of the Nonconformists did not take up till more than a hundred years later.

'Touching the superior powers of the earth,' he writes, 'it is not unknown to all of them that have read and marked the Scripture that it appertaineth nothing unto their office to make any law to govern the conscience of their subjects in religion'; and, again, 'Christ's Kingdom is a spiritual one. In this neither Pope nor King may govern. Christ alone is the governor of his Church, and the only law-giver'; and, again, 'The laws of the civil magistrate are not to be admitted in the Church' (quoted in Skeats, p. 7).

This is quite the Free Church position. Hooper was imprisoned at the Fleet, but was liberated by the king after some small concessions had secured

his submission, and then under the persuasion of leading Continental reformers he accepted the bishopric of Gloucester in the hope of helping to carry the Reformation further in England. Edward VI.'s Second Prayer Book (A.D. 1552) registered a considerable advance in this direction. The second Act of Uniformity (5 and 6 Edward VI., cap. 1), enforcing the use of the revised Prayer Book, forbade attendance at any other form of service under penalties amounting—for the third offence—to imprisonment for life.

During Mary's reign, while all types of Protestantism were banned, there was no longer any occasion for specific Nonconformity. Her brother's Acts of Uniformity were nullified by the restoration of Roman Catholicism. But the return of Protestantism with the commencement of the reign of Elizabeth brought back the Prayer Book and was confirmed by a new Act of Uniformity (Elizabeth, cap. 2, A.D. 1559) with penalties amounting to imprisonment for life in case of a third conviction, also fining parishioners twelve pence for every offence of non-attendance at church. The Book of Common Prayer was revised by a commission of divines and members of the Council, who combined the two forms of it issued in the reign of Edward VI. The result was a ritual less advanced in Protestantism than King Edward's Second Prayer Book. In particular, the description of the adoration of the elements as 'idolatry' and the assertion that 'the sacramental bread and wine . . . remain still in their very natural substances,' with other statements to the same effect, were removed. In the beginning of her reign Elizabeth desired to be conciliatory. It may be said that the *via media* of the Church of England is very largely due to the great Tudor queen's policy. She repudiated the papacy, and, while reluctant to be called 'supreme head' of the Church, accepted the title 'supreme governor.' But, quite apart from her desire to gather in as many of her subjects as possible, Elizabeth was personally enamoured of ceremony, and she found the bareness of the extreme Protestant type of worship repulsive to her taste. Accordingly she had no sympathy with Puritanism. This movement now came into prominence under the leadership of a great scholar and masterly controversialist, Thomas Cartwright of Cambridge, who exerted wide-spread influence, not only in the University, but also throughout the country. Cartwright went beyond the position of Hooper in the reign of Edward VI., and distinctly rejected the Episcopal form of government, pronouncing for Presbyterianism on grounds of Scripture. He was opposed by Whitgift, then Vice-Chancellor of the University. But even Whitgift, while defending Episcopacy, did not accept the Catholic doctrine of apostolical succession or even the divinely appointed authority of bishops as a distinct order of the ministry. This High Church view of the episcopate appears to have been first advocated by Bancroft in the year 1588. We wait for Laud in the reign of James I. for the full assertion of the doctrine of apostolical succession. While Cartwright held that the Presbyterian order, with the right of the people to elect their ministers, was authoritatively required by Scripture, Whitgift maintained that the external polity of the Church was left an open question which the Christian State could settle for itself. It may be said, therefore, that Whitgift took a more liberal view of the situation than Cartwright. But then the Erastianism that accompanied it limited this liberty to the crown and a subservient parliament. In point of fact, it was only the queen who enjoyed freedom in the matter; her subjects, including the Church and its ministry, were tied down by the Act of Uniformity to the system of government on

which she had decided. In the year 1574 Travers published his *Disciplina Ecclesiæ ex verbo Dei descripta* at Geneva, and twelve years later Cartwright translated it into English with additions. He and some 500 ministers signed their agreement with it. This book was pronouncedly Protestant, and it advocated the form of church government adopted by the French Presbyterians. Efforts were made to further the Puritan cause by the introduction into Parliament of bills limiting the stringency of subscription and the powers of bishops. But they were all stopped by the queen and the court party which stood for the Episcopal settlement. In spite of this fact most of the Puritans remained in the Church. These were Presbyterians who hoped for the ultimate triumph of their own views in the Establishment, and who, cherishing that hope, submitted for the time being to ordinances of which they did not approve. A minority could not agree to this policy. A Presbyterian conventicle was founded at Wandsworth in 1572. This was suppressed and its members were scattered—the first instance of the breaking up of a Nonconformist church. But it was by the Congregationalists that the idea of separation was developed. Their view was first expounded by Robert Browne, whose *Treatise of Reformation without tarying for aie* was published in 1582. He blames those preachers who will not reform themselves or their charges, but wait till the magistrate commands or compels them. In taking up this position, he plainly advocates positive and open Nonconformity. It may be regarded as an accident that this was first identified with Independency; but, while Presbyterianism could be established by the State or left free as the case might be, Independency logically involved separation, because it recognized Christ as the only Head of the Church and the body of the Church members as the one authority competent to interpret His will. Browne's fundamental principle also requires the same freedom. He states it thus:

'The Kingdom of God was not to be begun by whole parishes, but rather of the worthiest, were they never so few' (*A True and Short Declaration*, etc., p. 6).

The Presbyterians were willing to retain the parochial system, which assumed the Church membership of the whole nation. In rejecting this and arguing for a separated Church of genuine Christians, Browne necessarily broke not only with the existing Anglican and Episcopal Act of Uniformity, but with the very idea of such an act. He would have had to stand out from an established Presbyterian Church. It is true that he did not always see the legitimate inferences to be drawn from his contentions; for, while in one place he says, 'They [the magistrates] may do nothing concerning the church, but only evile, and as evile Magistrates' (*Treatise of Reformation*, p. 12), he is not always clear on the point or consistent with it. But this personal vacillation does not affect the inherent requirements of his principles. See, further, art. BROWNEISM.

Thus the early Independents became pronounced Nonconformists and were persecuted as such. Robert Browne was reconciled to the Established Church in his later days. But the Independents or Congregationalists—the names are synonymous—Barrow, Green, and Penry were hanged as Nonconformists, the grounds of their condemnation being publishing seditious books, denying the royal supremacy (which was treated as constructively implying treason against the queen), and attacking the existing ecclesiastical order. The statute of the royal supremacy was originally directed against the Roman Catholics and their adhesion to a foreign prince, in the pope, and Protestant Nonconformity was then scarcely con-

sidered. It does not appear that Queen Elizabeth knew or cared anything about the obscure Separatists. Their obstinate recalcitrance came as an unpleasant surprise to her. It was Whitgift who drew them out to the light, and he must bear the chief responsibility for the treatment that they received. For fuller particulars concerning these Elizabethan Nonconformists see artt. CONGREGATIONALISM and PRESBYTERIANISM.

In 1593 there was enacted a rigorous law against Nonconformity (35 Elizabeth, cap. 1), threatening imprisonment, which was to continue till open submission and declaration of conformity were made. Obstinate offenders were to abjure the realm.

3. Early Stuart period.—During the reigns of James I. and Charles I. the Elizabethan requirements remained in force and with them the prohibition of Nonconformity. Nor was this all. Fresh disabilities were introduced and additional power was given to the engines of repression, so that the plight of the Nonconformists was worse now than it had been during the later years of Queen Elizabeth. They were harried out of the land. The irresponsible courts of the Star Chamber and the High Commission destroyed both liberty and justice. The first flight of the Separatists to Holland took place under Elizabeth; a second followed under James I., when life in England had become intolerable for them. Unlike the Presbyterians, Puritans within the Church, who numbered in their ranks some of the ablest, most scholarly, and cultured men of their day, the earlier Congregationalists were for the most part persons of humble origin and meagre attainments, although the martyrs Barrow and Greenwood were both educated at Cambridge University. A man of wider culture and larger intelligence, as well as higher tone, was John Robinson, who went from Scrooby in Nottinghamshire to Amsterdam, where he was followed by his congregation, and thence to Leyden. Here Congregationalism was first established on a firm basis by a capable and large-minded exponent of its principles, and from this place it crossed over to America with the Pilgrim Fathers (*q.v.*). The Independents from Leyden were followed by others from England and also by Puritans who had not voluntarily separated from the Established Church, but who could not submit to its legally enforced requirements. They too, on joining the exiles at Plymouth, came to be fused with the Independents, whose principles they ultimately adopted. On the other hand, the Puritan Nonconformists, who made a new settlement in Massachusetts, carried with them their Presbyterian tenets and established a rigorous Calvinistic government in the New World. It has been urged against the Nonconformists that after claiming liberty in England they practised tyranny in America. But to say this is to fail in discrimination. We should distinguish between the two classes of exiles. John Robinson's people, who had claimed Church freedom in the Old World, did concede it to a very large extent in New England; but the Puritans, who denied it and enforced a State-governed Presbyterianism in Massachusetts, had never objected to the State establishment of religion, and, if they had obtained the upper hand at home, they would have enforced their form of Church government, as was the case with their successors in the days of the Long Parliament when the Covenant was adopted. Thus each party remained consistent with its principles.

Meanwhile efforts were being made to secure an ecclesiastical settlement in England. In the year 1604 the Hampton Court Conference was summoned—ostensibly in order to bring the opposing parties together. Dr. Reynolds, representing the Presby-

terians, desired to secure permission for assemblies of the clergy every three weeks, 'prophesying,' and diocesan synods, each composed of the bishop and his presbyters. This proposal aimed at a compromise combining the essential elements of Episcopacy and Presbyterianism. In all probability, if it had been adopted, we should have heard little more of Nonconformity except among the detached sects—Congregationalists, Baptists, Quakers, etc.; for the majority of the Puritans were anxious to remain in the Church and to arrive at a common settlement. But this was not to be. The tone of the conference was anti-Puritan, and all that it effected was a more pronounced opposition to the Presbyterians and other Nonconformists.

The same year James I., who thought his own consummate wisdom equal to a task at which theologians and statesmen had failed, made an attempt to determine the dispute by issuing his *Book of Canons*, which required every clergyman to subscribe 'willingly and *ex animo*' to the royal supremacy, the Book of Common Prayer, and the Thirty-nine Articles. The king did not explain how any compulsion could be needed for what was to be done willingly. Although the book was passed under the Great Seal, it was never adopted and authorized by Parliament. But it sufficed to aggravate the persecutions of a royal and episcopal tyranny. The hard case of the Puritans was still further embittered by the position taken up by Laud—and that on two accounts. First, Laud followed Bancroft in adopting the doctrine of the apostolical succession of bishops. This implied that Presbyterian ordination was invalid, and it repudiated the Churchmanship of all but Episcopalians. Inferentially it cut off the Church of England from communion with all the great Protestant Churches on the Continent, Lutheran, Calvinistic, and Zwinglian—a complete reversal of the policy of Elizabeth, who had championed the Continental Protestants. It also indicated some undoing of the work of the Reformation—a move back in the direction of Roman Catholicism. Laud himself had no leanings towards the papacy. On the contrary, his aim seems to have been to strengthen the Church of England by giving it a sound basis. Under the strong Tudors the royal supremacy was an adequate substitute for the papal; but that was not the case with the Stuarts. Hooker had tried to justify the Episcopal position on grounds of Scripture and antiquity. But some one clear principle seemed needed to strengthen it against the Presbyterian position and at the same time justify it in view of Roman Catholic claims. This Laud thought he had found in the divine appointment of the Anglican episcopate and its mystical powers. Such a contention was especially offensive to the Puritans, and it aggravated their objections to the conduct of Church affairs by the authorities. The Prayer Book as interpreted by Laud was far worse than the Prayer Book as interpreted by Parker. In the second place, Laud was an Arminian, and the 17th cent. saw the Church of England invaded by Arminianism. Archbishop Whitgift had been as Calvinistic as Cartwright. Those two controversialists agreed in doctrine, while they differed as to the discipline and government of the Church. Elizabeth herself was Calvinistically inclined, and the Elizabethan Church was mainly Calvinistic. The Lambeth Articles, which went beyond the Thirty-nine Articles in the direction of extreme Calvinism, represented the dominant spirit of Anglicanism at the end of the 16th century. But the 17th cent. saw a great change in this respect. The Puritans, however, remained true, in the main, to the Genevan theology. There were exceptions, as in

the case of John Smyth, who broke off from the Independent Church at Leyden on Baptist principles and founded the General Baptist body, and later in the Independent John Goodwin. The Calvinism of the bulk of the Puritans was directly opposed to the Arminian tendencies of the Stuart Church, and thus a second ground of divergence appeared, still further widening the breach and intensifying the antagonism between the Established Church and Nonconformity. The vigorous activity of Laud made this antagonism acute.

4. The Parliamentary and Cromwellian periods. —Then came the reaction, and Laud was sacrificed to the Presbyterian opposition. But the execution of the great Churchman did not save the ill-advised king and his incompetent courtiers. The Civil War indicated the uprising of Protestant England and Scotland against prelatical tyranny as much as against royal despotism. It was a fight for religious liberty. But with the Presbyterians this proved to be only liberty for themselves and their own views. Two stages in the subsequent triumph over the court and Episcopal side must be kept distinctly apart if the parties concerned are to be justly judged. The first is in the period of the Westminster Assembly and the Long Parliament, when Presbyterianism was made the religion of the nation by Act of Parliament, and the Solemn League and Covenant adopted by Parliament in England as well as north of the Tweed. The execution of this Erastian requirement was never complete. Presbyteries were established in London and in Lancashire; but little was done to set them up in other parts of England. Many Episcopalians were then ejected from their livings, with a reduced maintenance at least allowed them by law (though they did not all get it), but not so many as Walker's *Sufferings of the Clergy*, London, 1714, might lead us to suppose. In his exhaustive study of *The Ejected of 1662 in Cumberland and Westmorland*, 2 vols., Manchester, 1911, B. Nightingale has gone carefully through Walker's names for those counties, and finds (1) some incumbents removed for inefficiency or moral faults, (2) some for malignancy, on political grounds, and (3) some only deprived as pluralists of all livings but one, which they were allowed to retain. There is no reason to believe that the case was different in other counties, the records of which have not been so thoroughly searched. Still, no doubt there was much suffering under this parliamentary despotism, as well as real heroism and the true martyr spirit among loyal lovers of the suppressed Prayer Book.

The second period is that of the Commonwealth, when Oliver Cromwell held the power of the State in his own hands. Cromwell had called the Westminster divines 'persecutors.' The five Independents who had left the Westminster Assembly when they had found all protests against the forcing of Presbyterianism on the nation ineffectual had stood out for a freer course. But even they had not anticipated the breadth of the great Protector's policy. This was to leave all godly men and gospel preachers, whether Congregationalist, Presbyterian, or Episcopalian, in possession of their parishes so long as they discharged their duty faithfully. His triers were not all of one party, and they were expressly ordered not to molest worthy ministers of any of these persuasions. It was the widest, most comprehensive Church order ever established. Even some Baptists as well as many of the three denominations mentioned above now entered the ministry of the Established Church, notably Henry Jesse, rector of St. George's, Southwark, John Tombes, vicar of Leominster, and Paul Hobbson, chaplain to Eton College. We must regard this as a large-minded statesman's

practical expedient devised to meet a peculiarly awkward situation. It was not wholly consistent with the requirements of any of the parties concerned, for the Episcopalians had no bishops, the Presbyterians had no synods except in London and Lancashire, and the Independents were in charge of whole parishes, while also gathering and meeting their separated churches in those parishes. In reality it was an established Congregationalism unfettered by any formal creeds or canons of Church order. This secured personal liberty for the ministers and churches that it included within its ample boundaries. No Episcopalian was to be ejected except for inefficiency, immorality, or plotting against the government. Roman Catholics, Unitarians, and Quakers were not included in Cromwell's otherwise comprehensive Church. But none of these people are known to have been holding livings when he assumed the reins of government. The Protector removed the disabilities of Baptists and Congregationalists who had remained outside the Establishment all along—quite the majority in those denominations; and, although the Quakers were still obnoxious to the law, he endeavoured, being favourably impressed in an interview with George Fox, to soften its rigour against them. Oliver Cromwell did not live long enough to test the efficacy of his efforts to secure religious amity; and his arrangement fell to pieces in the chaos that followed his death and the succession of his incompetent and negligent son Richard, who was more at home in a country gentleman's life among horses and dogs than in great affairs of State.

5. Period of the Restoration.—A national revulsion against the gloom and sternness of Puritanism and despair of the establishment of settled order by the government of the day led to a joyous welcome of Charles II. when he landed at Dover on 25th May 1660. Many have expressed surprise that the Presbyterians took the lead in bringing about the restoration of the Stuart dynasty. It should be observed, however, that at the time of the Westminster Assembly this party, in its antagonism to the Independents, who had leanings towards Republicanism, was turning towards the monarchy. Besides, could its leaders have gauged the depths of Charles's perfidy? Ten years before this, when in Scotland, he had sworn to support both the National Covenant of 1581 and the Solemn League and Covenant of 1643, and he had renewed his oath when crowned at Scone. Honourable men would find it hard to expect that a king would so forswear himself as to repudiate such an oath and sanction the persecution of those who remained faithful to its principles. Then they had the king's letter to the House of Commons, in which he promised to respect tender consciences and maintain religious liberty. Was it to be supposed that within two years he would break his word and repudiate the promise on condition of which he had been called to ascend the throne? Many had grave misgivings; but the tide was too strong for them. The worst that we can say of the Presbyterians who invited Charles is that they were deceived as to the character of the prince with whom they were dealing, having no conception of its incredible baseness. Not that we are to accuse Charles of any Machiavellian policy of duplicity. Probably in his easy, careless way he intended to keep his word when he gave it. He was no lover of persecution; he would have liked all things to go pleasantly so long as he could revel in his own pleasures. But, when these were threatened—being the only serious objects of his life—oaths and vows might be scattered to the winds.

So it came about that the restoration of the monarchy brought with it almost as a matter of

course the restoration of the Anglican Episcopal Church. The popular revulsion against Puritanism made this inevitable. Charles could not have prevented it. What his pledged word should have opposed was the concurrent ecclesiastical tyranny which immediately began to oppress every other kind of Church life. Many Presbyterians and others were at once expelled from their livings in the Church. In most cases this was in order to restore the rectors and vicars who had been cast out by the previous government. As far as that was the case, there could be little just ground of complaint. It was hard on the ejected; so had the previous ejection been hard on the Episcopalians, who could also claim priority of right. But these cases do not cover all the ground. Apart from the restoration of livings to survivors from previous ejection, a dead set was made against the Puritans, and many suffered in consequence. For two years, however, no new law was passed in order to bring about a sweeping clearance. But the storm was brewing, and in the year 1662 it burst with wide-spreading results. During the intermediate period the Puritan party was gradually experiencing more and more disfavour. This was seen in Parliament, where the expressions of vindictiveness against the opponents of the late king became more pronounced as time went on. It was also manifested by the actions of the government. Ten Presbyterian ministers were appointed among Charles II.'s first chaplains, of whom, however, only four actually preached before the king. These were Reynolds, Spurstow, Calamy, and Baxter.

'I suppose,' writes Baxter, 'never a Man of them all ever received or expected a Penny for the Salary of their Places' (*Life and Times*, pt. ii. p. 229).

The Worcester House Conference was then called together at the house of the Lord Chamberlain. It consisted of a meeting of Presbyterian chaplains with leading statesmen in the presence of the king, who professed to be glad at any approach to agreement—no doubt, in spite of his deep duplicity, with some sincerity, for he was not ill-natured, and he always desired to see things going pleasantly. Baxter had previously conferred with Archbishop Usher, and the two had come to an agreement as to the terms to be proposed for a settlement. These were the appointment of a suffragan bishop in each rural deanery, annual diocesan synods, and a national synod every three years. It was to be a combination of Episcopacy and Presbyterianism. This suggestion, together with a recommendation for revision of the liturgy, was now adopted and proposed by the Presbyterian chaplains. They do not seem to have made any clear pronouncement on the vital question of Episcopal ordination. When the scheme was submitted to the bishops, they drew up a reply, which was presented to the Presbyterian chaplains in writing. On 4th Sept. Clarendon sent a draft declaration for indulgences to the Presbyterian divines, to which Baxter wrote an elaborate answer; and on 22nd Oct. he effected a meeting of representatives of both ecclesiastical parties together with the Dukes of Ormond and Albemarle, the Earls of Manchester and Anglesey, and Lord Hollis, the king himself being present. There were six bishops and six Presbyterians. This was at Worcester House in the Strand, where Clarendon was living at the time. Unhappily, the conference broke down on a proposal of the king, introduced by the Lord Chancellor, granting liberty of meetings for religious worship provided they did not disturb the public peace. This was in response to a petition for toleration that the king had received from 'Independents and Anabaptists.'

'The Presbyterians,' says Baxter, 'all perceived . . . that it would secure the Liberty of the Papists' (pt. II. p. 277).

Baxter, himself the champion of liberty, who was labouring for peace and comprehension, protested against the inclusion of papists and Socinians. Thereupon the king broke up the meeting. Two or three days later Charles issued a manifesto embodying some of Baxter's proposals, including the appointment of suffragan bishops, the requirement that censures should not be issued without the co-operation of presbyters, and a revision of the Prayer Book. The king also gratuitously renewed the declaration from Breda that no one should be disquieted for differences of religious opinion. Baxter, Calamy, and Reynolds were offered bishoprics. Baxter declined; Calamy would wait till the new royal declaration became law—which never was the case; Reynolds, on Baxter's advice, and hoping to help the Puritan cause, accepted the see of Norwich. When the proposals of Charles's manifesto came before Parliament, they were rejected.

In the winter of the same year an excuse was found for oppressive measures in Venner's insurrection—a petty disturbance raised by a small party of fanatical Fifth Monarchy men. But this was not the real cause of the new severity, for, although a declaration curtailing religious liberty was not issued till 10th Jan.—four days after the riot—the Council Book shows that its provisions had been decided on in the Council on 2nd Jan., i.e. four days before that outbreak (see J. Stoughton, *Church and State Two Hundred Years Ago*, London, 1862, p. 131). This order in council forbade the meetings of Anabaptists, Quakers, and other sectaries in large numbers, and restricted them to their own counties. Apart from its specific requirements, there were plenty of old laws that had slumbered neglected under more liberal administrations which could be revived and utilized for the persecution of Nonconformists, and there were many victims of this persecution before the famous ejection. Among others John Bunyan had been sent to Bedford jail for his Nonconformist activity on 12th Nov. 1660—eighteen months before the new Act of Uniformity was passed.

6. The Savoy Conference.—The Savoy Conference was summoned by royal authority on 25th March 1661, as a commission to attempt a settlement by a revision of the Prayer Book. It consisted of Church dignitaries and Presbyterians. The Congregationalists, Baptists, and other denominations were not represented in it. The bishops showed from the first no inclination to come to terms, and they repudiated the objections urged by the Presbyterians to any of the contents of the book as it stood. Baxter, who had undertaken to draw up a scheme of suggestions for amending it, made the amazing mistake of writing an entirely new book of prayers and offering it to the bishops as a substitute for their old Prayer Book. Utterly unpractical and altogether lacking in diplomatic policy as the great and good man showed himself to be in this matter, he was throughout labouring for peace, and the supreme object of his endeavours was to secure a united Church. It was not Baxter's unpracticalness, however, but the obvious determination of the bishops to make no concessions, that led to the failure of the conference. The Savoy Conference met at the time when preparations were being made for the king's coronation—a great and gorgeous function in which none but Episcopalians of the Established Church took any part. Thus the very object of a conference called together by royal authority was negated in the eyes of all men while its discussions were being carried on.

7. Reactionary measures.—Meanwhile a new

House of Commons was elected, and no sooner did it meet than it began to show its character. Young squires whose fathers had suffered for the royalist cause were in no mood to welcome projects of conciliation and compromise. In particular, three measures passed in the first year of this parliament (1661) marked the reaction against the Puritan régime very distinctly, viz. acts for the return of the bishops to the House of Lords, the restoration of some ancient ecclesiastical customs, and the exclusion of Nonconformists from municipal offices by requiring the test of the sacrament in an Anglican church. These measures were brought in so closely together and pressed through so quickly that it is manifest that they were in a pre-concerted plan for the effective re-establishment of a dominant Episcopacy. Charles's promise at Breda of respect for tender consciences and religious liberty was flung to the winds in the royal assent to these Acts of Parliament.

8. Act of Uniformity.—A fourth measure, of greater historical importance and far-reaching consequences, was the now famous Act of Uniformity (14 Charles II., cap. 4), which split the Church in two, and thereby created Nonconformity as a powerful factor in the national life. The bill was introduced into the House of Commons by Serjeant Keeling, a man whose disposition may be seen in the fact that on one occasion, when he was a judge, he fined each member of a jury 100 marks for acquitting some people who had assembled for worship one Sunday with Bibles but without Prayer Books. It was read a first time on 29th June, and it had passed through all its stages and was sent up to the House of Lords by 10th August. As it then stood, this bill required all clergymen, on pain of ejection from their livings for disobedience, to declare publicly 'their unfeigned assent and consent to the use of all things' contained in the Book of Common Prayer. This was legislating in the dark; for the revision of the Prayer Book in Convocation by order of council was not begun till November, and was completed only on 20th Dec.—more than four months after the requirement to give conscientious consent to the use of all that it was to contain had been voted by the Commons. Any clergy who after their ejection conducted public services were to be punished with imprisonment—three months for each offence.

It was not till the next year, 1662, that the House of Lords took the measure into consideration, and then several amendments were introduced, most of which rendered it more drastic. The date for ejection in case of non-compliance was brought back from Michaelmas to St. Bartholomew's day, thereby depriving the incumbents of the tithes which they had earned by nearly a year's work. Worse than this, the subscription was altered from assent and consent to the 'use' of the Prayer Book to assent and consent to 'all its contents,' so as to run thus: 'I, A. B., doe declare my unfeigned assent and consent to all and everything contained and prescribed in and by the book intituled The Book of Common Prayer,' etc. Here we come to the crux of the matter. The acceptance of this amendment by the Commons and the assent given to the bill by the king constituted the essential cause of subsequent Nonconformity. The clergyman who could not declare that he conscientiously believed every sentence printed between the two covers of that book was to be deprived of his living in the Church of England. When an attempt was made in the House of Lords to explain this clause as meaning only a promise to use the book in its entirety, that explanation was negated. There can be no doubt that the clause was made as exacting as possible for the express purpose of expelling the Puritans from the Church of England. Addi-

tional amendments required of all cathedral dignitaries, schoolmasters, and private tutors a declaration of non-resistance and a repudiation of the Solemn League and Covenant—*i.e.* a condemnation of the action of the parliamentary party in the late war. The clause referring to the Covenant was to be in force only for twenty years, after the expiration of which period it might be expected to be no longer necessary. On the other hand, two amendments were introduced by the Lords mitigating the severity of the bill. One was assenting to the king's suggestion that he should be allowed some dispensing power, the other giving to the ejected ministers a grant of one-fifth out of their forfeited livings, similar to the grant that had been made to ejected Episcopalians by the Long Parliament. When the bill thus amended was sent up to the Commons, the House accepted all the changes which added to its severity and rejected the two changes of the opposite character. No doubt Charles's motive in claiming dispensing power was suspected as intended to prepare for leniency towards Roman Catholics. The rejection of the amendment proposing a small pension for the ejected clergy shows the animus of the House.

9. The ejection.—On 19th May the bill in its final form received the royal assent. Baxter at once resigned his two London lectureships. This he did lest his attitude should be misunderstood as implying compliance with the measure. It is commonly supposed that, when the act came into force, it resulted in the ejection of 2000 clergymen.¹ In point of fact, the number of those who were deprived of their livings on 24th Aug. 1662 was somewhat less; but, if we add to the list the names of those who had been expelled after the king's accession, during the intermediate two years, probably it will mount up to more than 2000. This then may be said in round numbers to be about the total of the ejected Nonconformists in the reign of Charles II.² Among them were some of the most learned, earnest, and effective ministers. The ejection of these men inflicted a tremendous blow on the Church. At the same time the impoverishment of the Establishment carried with it a corresponding enrichment of Nonconformity. To the few Congregationalist and Baptist churches that had dared to maintain their independence was now added a large number of ministers and their disciples who were henceforth to maintain their religious life and teaching outside the pale of the Church of England. Most of these people went out with no faith in Free Church principles. The majority were Presbyterians who had stood for the establishment of Presbyterianism. There were also some Episcopalians, who, while believing in the three orders and the authority of bishops, could not give their conscientious assent to certain things in the Prayer Book, chiefly because it seemed to contain remnants of Romanism; and there were the Independents and the few Baptists who never would have been in an Established Church if they

had realized the logical issues of their principles. Together these four classes of ejected ministers with their faithful disciples all became Nonconformists. Many of them proceeded to found new churches in accordance with their distinctive tenets. The result of their activity is to be seen in the number of 1662 churches that were celebrating their 250th anniversary in the year 1912. The ministry of the ejected ministers was liable to punishment, and in many cases was punished, the penalty imposed for preaching or conducting services after ejection being three months' imprisonment.

There can be no doubt that this act entailed a vast amount of suffering among the ejected and impoverished clergy and their families. It is clear also that there were real heroism and a fine fidelity of conscience on the part of men who left their homes and their flocks and went out as wanderers, in most cases with no prospect of a livelihood or opportunity for continuing their life-work. On the other hand, the following facts should also be remembered. (1) The persecutors had in many cases been persecuted themselves under the parliamentary régime. Revenge is un-Christian; but it is human, and its added severity when the tables are turned is also in accordance with human nature. (2) Most of the victims would have enforced a uniformity of their own on their persecutors if only they could again have got the upper hand, for they were in sympathy with the Covenant. This is not true of all. (3) The position of the Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and Baptists within the Established Church, if they had been permitted to remain, could not have been happy, and they would have been wise to come out of their own accord in order to share the freedom and independence of their ecclesiastical fellows who were already maintaining their separate churches. Hard as was their fate personally, the ejected were able to advance their principles much better outside the Church than would have been possible within its bounds, however wide these might have been.

10. Conventicle Act.—The Act of Uniformity was directed against nonconforming clergymen and teachers. It did not directly affect the congregations. There were old laws that could be brought to bear on the attendants at Nonconformist services. In particular, by an act of the reign of Elizabeth (35 Elizabeth, cap. 1) all persons attending any other services than those of the Church of England as by law established incurred a penalty of imprisonment, and, if they failed to make their submission in three months, were liable to banishment from the kingdom. But doubts were raised whether this law was still operative. Accordingly, in the year 1664 the Conventicle Act (16 Car. II., cap. 4) was passed, declaring it to be 'very clear and evident' that the Elizabethan statute was still in force and 'ought to be put in due execution,' and providing further and more speedy remedies against the practices of 'seditious sectaries and other disloyal persons.' It was now enacted that every person over sixteen years of age attending any Nonconformist service, at which five or more persons—in addition to the household—were present, was liable to a fine of £5 for the first offence, and in default of payment to imprisonment for three months; for the second, £10 or six months; for the third, £100 or seven years' transportation to one of his Majesty's foreign plantations. The exile was to pay his own passage money, and, if he did not provide this, his goods were to be distrained for the purpose. If that did not bring in enough money, the shipper might detain him as a labourer till he had worked the amount off for any period up to five years. The

¹ Calamy reckons 2188; Palmer, 2196.

² It has been pointed out that, since the Revised Prayer Book was not published till about three weeks before the act was to come into operation, some clergymen in remote parts could not even have seen it when they were required to give their solemn assent and consent to all its contents. It would have been only reasonable to have allowed everybody a sufficient time for studying it. And indeed it should be noted that the act expressly provides for those who are prevented from complying with its requirements at the assigned date by any 'lawful impediment.' But it was left to the bishop to determine what constituted a 'lawful impediment.' Inability to see the book in time might well be reckoned such. And there is extant a document in which the bishop of Peterborough excuses delay in signing on the part of his cathedral prebends for this very reason. On the other hand, a bishop might override this excuse or hold that a delaying clergyman whose ejection he desired could have obtained a copy of the book in time. It was left entirely to the bishop's decision.

act was to be in force for three years and till the close of the first session of Parliament held after the expiration of this period. Now began the romance of Nonconformity, fascinating to read about, but tragic to experience. Meetings were held in lonely houses, in cellars, in hay-lofts, in all sorts of out-of-the-way places. Secret passages were provided and watchers were set to give notice of the danger of arrest. In spite of every precaution, many conventicles were surprised and their attendants carried off to jail.

11. Five Mile Act.—The next year occurred the Plague of London, and then, some of the newly-appointed city clergy having fled to the green fields to escape the infection, some of their predecessors—the ejected ministers—returned to their old flocks and ministered to them in their distress (see Baxter, pt. iii. p. 2; Burnet, *History*, i. 411). The same year, 1665, there was passed the Five Mile Act (16 Car. II., cap. 2), to still further restrict the activity of Nonconformist ministers. It required all persons in holy orders or pretending to be in holy orders who had not made the declarations required by the Act of Uniformity to take an oath that ‘it is not lawful upon any pretence to take up arms against the king,’ and to add, ‘I will not at any time endeavour any alteration of government, either in church or state.’ The ejected minister who refused to take this oath was forbidden, under penalty of £40, to come except on a journey within five miles of any city or corporate town, or of any parliamentary borough, or of any parish, town, or place in which he had formerly been the parson, vicar, curate, stipendiary, or lecturer, or had conducted any Nonconformist service. He was also forbidden to keep any school.

12. New Conventicle Act.—A scheme of comprehension agreed upon between Wilkins, bishop of Chester, and the Presbyterian leaders, and favoured by Stillington, Tillotson, and Reynolds, which would have allowed Presbyterian ordination with the addition of the laying on of the bishop’s hands to confer legal authority and also permit assemblies in orthodox meeting-houses, never got the length of a bill in Parliament. On the other hand, in the year 1670, after the expiration of the Conventicle Act, Sheldon, bishop of London, who had taken a foremost part in shaping and pushing forward the measures against the Nonconformists, persuaded the king to issue a proclamation commanding the old (Elizabethan) laws against Nonconformity and also the Five Mile Act to be put in force. The House of Commons thanked the king and proceeded to pass a new and milder Conventicle Bill (22 Charles II., cap. 1), fining only five shillings for the first offence and ten shillings for the second, with no imprisonment. If some could not afford to pay the fines, others who were in the congregation could be required to make them up to the amount of £10 for each person thus mulcted. Preachers were to be fined £10 and £20. This measure, though much less severe than the earlier law, proved to be more effective. It was followed in 1673 by the Test Act, which practically excluded consistent Nonconformists from all government employment—civil, military, or naval.

13. Indulgences.—In the year 1672 Charles attempted to put in force the dispensing power which he said was ‘not only inherent in him, but hath been declared and recognized to be so by several statutes and Acts of Parliament.’ He gave as his reason for doing so that there was ‘very little fruit of all those forcible courses,’ so strong and stubborn was Nonconformity in spite of all attempts to suppress it. This was while the king was enjoying some freedom during a parliamentary recess; but the next year, within a week of re-assembling, the Commons resolved ‘that the Penal Statutes in

matters ecclesiastical cannot be suspended but by Act of Parliament.’ When the king held out, they refused him supplies. This drove him to yield, and he broke the seal of his declaration with his own hands and recalled the licences issued under it.

James II. went further with the obvious intention of securing privileges for the Roman Catholics by enlarging the bounds of religious liberty, perhaps also because he was really opposed to persecution. On 4th April 1687 he issued a Declaration of Indulgence suspending all laws inflicting penalties for Nonconformity. There were victims of those laws who gravely disapproved of this unconstitutional action and refused to avail themselves of the advantages that it offered them. John Howe denounced the dispensing power. Daniel Williams said that he would rather suffer injustice than sanction violation of the fundamental principles of the constitution. But great difference of opinion on the question existed, as may be seen in the war of pamphlets that followed, and many Nonconformists availed themselves of these indulgences—as many as 3500 in five months (for specimens of the licences see G. L. Turner, *Original Records of early Nonconformity under Persecution and Indulgence*, 2 vols., London, 1911). On 27th April 1688 James issued his second Declaration of Indulgence with a command that it should be read in all the churches. When the seven bishops who refused to obey the illegal order were tried and acquitted, the Nonconformists joined with the people generally in acclaiming this vindication of law in opposition to Stuart despotism.

14. Toleration.—The flight of James followed by the accession of William and Mary brought the Nonconformists relief from the persecuting laws. The king himself recommended the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts; but, although efforts were made in Parliament to bring about these ends, they were not successful. On the other hand, all holders of office in State and Church were required to take the oaths of supremacy and allegiance to the new sovereign. Four hundred of the clergy, including six bishops, refused, considering themselves still bound by their oaths of allegiance to James. These ‘Non-jurors’ (*q.v.*) were really Nonconformists in their separation from the Church, although not as regards the Act of Uniformity, to which they still adhered. On 24th May 1689 the Toleration Act (1 William and Mary, cap. 18) was passed. It granted exemption from all the penalties to which Nonconformists were liable under the Acts of Elizabeth and Charles II. Thus, while it did not repeal any of those acts, it drew their teeth. Nonconformity was still illegal. The Act of Uniformity not only still kept those who did not accept the Prayer Book in its entirety out of the Church; it still forbade ejected ministers to conduct services elsewhere, and conventicles were still prohibited. But there was no punishment for disobeying these laws. This anomalous position involved toleration, but not full liberty of conscience, much less religious equality. It was only granted subject to the following conditions: (1) the oath of allegiance, (2) subscription to a declaration against popery, (3) subscription by ministers of Nonconformist congregations to the Thirty-nine Articles, with the exception of Article 3 and part of Article 4. Baptists were also exempt with regard to the Article on Baptism, and Quakers were altogether free from this condition. Previous legislation making attendance at public worship compulsory was confirmed and extended to include Nonconformist places of worship. These were to be licensed and protected from molestation under penalties.

Limited as the toleration was, it gave at once release from legal persecution, and it was followed by a great extension of the building of Nonconformist meeting-houses. Before the end of the century as many as 2418 licences for Nonconformist places of worship were taken out.

15. Comprehension Bill.—Meanwhile Burnet, Tillotson, Tenison, and other men of liberal sentiments were for going further, and they favoured a Comprehension Bill, which was introduced into the House of Lords by the Earl of Nottingham and passed in that chamber, but relegated by the Commons to Convocation, where, after it had been carefully examined by a commission, the Upper House favoured it, but the Lower condemned it. The Presbyterians and Congregationalists were largely in favour of it, especially Baxter and Calamy. But the House of Commons did not proceed with it in face of the adverse attitude of the bulk of the clergy. Calamy thought that, if the bill had passed, it would have brought two-thirds of the Dissenters into the Church. The Baptists, the Quakers, and the Unitarians would still have stood out in nonconformity. This measure had required a modified subscription giving general approval of the doctrine of the Church of England and a promise to conform to its worship and government. The more rigorous Nonconformists could not have agreed to that; but it was the Church party that actively opposed the measure and stopped its progress.

16. Queen Anne and reaction.—The reign of Anne was marked by a reaction against the tolerant policy of William and Mary, the queen's main object being to strengthen the Church of England. Dissenters were now subjected to many kinds of petty persecution and insult in spite of the Toleration Act. In the first year of the new reign De Foe's *Short Way with Dissenters* appeared as an anonymous tract. It recommended their extermination. The High Church party was completely deceived by it, and, reading it as a grave recommendation of the sternest measures, exulted in the daring of its proposals. When they discovered that it was written by a Dissenter as a satire on their attitude to Nonconformity, they were furious. Its author was discovered, prosecuted for using seditious language, fined £200, and put into the pillory—an outrage which the London populace turned into a glorification by decking the pillory with flowers.

17. Occasional Conformity Act.—During this reign two measures were enacted for increasing the disabilities of Nonconformists. One was the Occasional Conformity Act, which was passed by the Commons in 1702 and again in 1703, but on each occasion thrown out by the Lords. At last, in 1711, it was pushed through Parliament by a bargain with the Whigs, who preponderated in the Upper House, they being then intent on defeating the negotiations that led to the Peace of Utrecht. It had become customary for Nonconformist municipal and other officials to evade the Test and Corporation Acts by taking the sacrament in their parish churches once or twice a year, though attending their own meeting-houses on other occasions. De Foe had vehemently denounced the practice. This new law enacted that any persons in public offices who, after taking the sacrament test, attended any religious meeting where five persons were present besides the family should be disabled from their employments and fined £100, with the addition of £5 for every day they acted in such employments, and further incapacitated till after a year's conformity. A reward of £40 was offered to informers, encouraging spies in the meeting-houses. This act was designed to exclude Nonconformists from all public service. It was to

a considerable extent evaded by the practice of keeping a private chaplain in the occasional conformist official's house.

18. Schism Act.—The Occasional Conformity Act had allowed Nonconformist teachers and preachers to exercise their callings on certain conditions elsewhere than in the counties where they had been originally qualified, and many of them obtained a living by keeping schools. Academics were now springing up for the education of the ministry. The 17th cent. Nonconformist ministers had been among the most cultured alumni of the universities, but the Act of Uniformity excluded their successors from those ancient national seats of learning. Accordingly, valiant attempts to compensate for this deprivation were made by the Nonconformist scholars, who prized an educated ministry. The Schism Act (1714) was designed to destroy Nonconformist scholarship; like a similar ordinance of the emperor Julian directed against the higher education of the Christians in the Roman empire, it aimed at accomplishing its purpose by a process of intellectual starvation. To recover favour with the queen, the free-thinker Bolingbroke prompted the measure. It was introduced in the Commons by Sir W. Windham, and, though opposed by the Whigs, carried there by 237 votes to 126. Bolingbroke obtained only 77 votes to 72 in the Lords. To their credit five bishops and 28 lay peers signed their protest against this peculiarly mean and cruel bill. It enacted that teachers must (1) be licensed by their bishop, (2) promise to conform to the liturgy, (3) take the sacrament at least annually in the Church of England way. Certain mitigating qualifications introduced by the Lords were accepted by the Commons and incorporated in the bill, viz. (1) teachers of elementary subjects were exempt, and (2) also tutors in noblemen's families; (3) only the higher courts could inflict the penalties. A gratuitous injustice was the extension of the act to Ireland. So strongly was the government set against the Dissenters that in all probability before long the Act of Toleration would have been repealed if Queen Anne had not died the same year.

19. Nonconformity under the House of Hanover.—While many in the Anglican Church sympathized with the cause of the two Pretenders, the Nonconformists welcomed the House of Hanover and were among its staunchest supporters. George I. came pledged both to Protestantism and to the maintenance of religious liberty. But, although overt acts of persecution ceased with his accession, the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts were not repealed till the year 1719, when Stanhope carried through the measures of liberation. He attempted to destroy a third act of religious intolerance, the Test Act; but with that he failed. In the year 1722 an act was passed to relieve the Quakers from a form of words in making their affirmation of loyalty which they deemed contrary to their principles, with the result that even now some of them were in prison. It was vehemently opposed by Atterbury and other bishops and clergy; but their opposition was ultimately borne down.

20. Period of decline.—The removal of the worst legal disabilities was not followed by prosperity to the Nonconformists, who shared in the general decline of religious life during the period preceding the Methodist revival. The anonymous author of *An Enquiry into the Causes of the Decay of the Dissenting Interest*, published in 1714, attributed this to two causes—lack of thought and defective organization resulting in the inadequate payment of ministers. But the subsequent growth of Arianism, issuing at length in Unitarianism among

the Presbyterians and General Baptists, did not suggest a creed-bound orthodoxy. The causes were deeper in the life of the nation and the spirit of the times, and Anglicans as well as Dissenters shared in the depression of religious life. There was a further cause of weakness that affected only a minority of the ministers. This was the *Regium Donum*, a secret annual gift from the king for the benefit of ministers' widows that had been engineered by Walpole. When it became known, many Nonconformists opposed the receiving of it as contrary to their principles. But it was kept up amid much heart-burning for more than a century.

21. 'The Church in danger.'—The invasion by the Pretender in 1715 was made the occasion for the cry of 'The Church in danger,' when riots occurred in which a number of Dissenting meeting-houses were destroyed. Two years later a sermon preached before the king by Hoadly, the bishop of Bangor, on 'The Nature of the Kingdom or Church of Christ' raised a storm and revived this party cry. Hoadly advocated 'the union and mutual charity of all Protestants,' and declared that the time had come when all the disabilities of the Dissenters might be removed. For this he was charged in the Lower House of Convocation with undermining the constitution of the Church and impeaching the authority of the king. Convocation was prorogued before the Upper House had time to face the question, and for long after effectually silenced.

22. The 'Dissenting Deputies.'—Just before the general election of 1734 a body known as the 'Dissenting Deputies' was formed in order to take political action for the rights of Nonconformity. It exists to-day and consists of delegates of the Presbyterian, Congregational, and Baptist Churches within ten miles of London. Sir Robert Walpole promised it his support, and the Dissenters in return worked for his side in the election. But when, after he had secured a majority, the deputies asked him to use the government influence for relieving them from the oppression of the Corporation and Test Acts, he procrastinated on the plea that the attempt would revive the cry of 'The Church in danger,' and finally declined altogether to help them. In the House of Commons he declared that the proposal was ill-timed, and thereupon it was lost by 251 to 123 votes. Nevertheless the Dissenting Deputies succeeded in stopping many local acts of illegal tyranny and oppression and also in securing some parliamentary relief.

For instance, there was a peculiarly cruel form of tyranny practised in the city of London when Nonconformists were elected to the office of sheriff. A heavy fine was inflicted on a person who declined to serve in this office after being elected to it. The Corporation Act prevented honest Nonconformists from serving. But some Nonconformists were elected in view of that fact for the express purpose of getting them fined. This iniquitous procedure was now stopped.

An attempt to widen the Church by the abolition of subscription to the Articles, which was begun in the year 1771 by Archdeacon Blackburne in his *Proposals*, was defeated by protests in the interests of orthodoxy which cut across the old lines of division. It was thought to be promoted in the interests of the Unitarians—people who at this time were taking the most prominent place in efforts for religious liberty under the able leadership of Priestley and Price. Towards the end of the century renewed attempts to abolish the Corporation and Test Acts secured the powerful support of Fox; but they were opposed by Pitt, partly on account of the sympathy of the Dissenters with the French Revolution in its earlier stages. In the riots that took place at Birmingham the mob burned down Priestley's house.

23. Methodism. — Although both of John

Wesley's grandfathers had been ejected ministers, he as well as George Whitefield was a Churchman, Wesley in particular clinging to Anglicanism to the last, even after he had been denied access to the churches and had himself ordained Methodist ministers. Nevertheless the Methodist revival gave a great impulse to Nonconformity in two ways: (1) by its revival of religion; unlike the parish clergy, the Dissenters welcomed the movement for which their most earnest ministers, Isaac Watts and Philip Doddridge, had prepared; (2) by the breach between Methodism and the Church; while the Methodists did not reckon themselves Nonconformists, their compulsory separation from the Establishment and independent action could not but weaken the Church-and-State position and correspondingly strengthen that of Nonconformity.

24. Repeal of penal enactments.—A 'Protestant Society for the Protection of Religious Liberty' was founded in the year 1811. Its object was to 'obtain the repeal of every penal law which prevented the complete enjoyment of religious liberty. The chief leader in this movement was John Wilks, a son of Matthew Wilks, the minister at Moorfields. Acting in conjunction with the Dissenting Deputies, within a twelvemonth it secured the repeal of the Quakers' oaths, the Conventicle Act, and the Five Mile Act. The statutes of William III. and George III. which excluded Unitarians from the benefit of the Toleration Act and punished a denial of the doctrine of the Trinity as blasphemy were repealed the next year (1813). In 1820 Lord John Russell, who had become the champion of religious liberty and obtained the enthusiastic support of the Nonconformists, carried through the long-delayed repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts. The earliest of all the acts against Nonconformity, its very parent, the Act of Uniformity, still remains on the statute-book, and it is still in force as regards the ministry of the Anglican Church, although its penal clauses with regard to Nonconformists were neutralized by the Act of Toleration. The Registration Act of 1836 (6 and 7 William IV., cap. 85) ordered a State registration of births, deaths, and marriages, which is specially beneficial to Nonconformists, because previously the only registers were those of the parish clergy. The Dissenter Marriage Act of the same year (6 and 7 William IV., cap. 83) allowed of marriages in Nonconformist places of worship licensed for the purpose on condition of the presence of the registrar. The starting of the *Nonconformist* newspaper in the year 1841, under the masterly editorship of Edward Miall, gave a fresh impulse to movements for religious equality as well as liberty. Three years later 'The British Anti-State Church Association' was formed for the disestablishment of the Church. Its title was changed in 1853 to that of 'The Society for the Liberation of Religion from State Patronage and Control'—known popularly as 'The Liberation Society'—of which J. Carvell Williams was long the secretary. Compulsory Church rates were abolished in 1868 (31 and 33 Victoria, cap. 109). After many earlier attempts had failed, W. E. Gladstone, who had defended them while he represented Oxford University, now supported the abolition of compulsion, so that Church rates were made purely voluntary and to be demanded only of those willing to pay them. The disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Ireland (32 and 33 Victoria, cap. 102) under Gladstone's leadership in 1868 put an end to Nonconformity in Ireland by establishing complete religious equality in the island.

The year 1871 saw the University Tests Abolition Bill passed into law (34 and 35 Victoria, cap. 26). This threw open degrees and appointments in

the universities to Nonconformists. The emancipation, however, was not so complete as C. S. Miall represents it in his continuation of Skeats's *History of the Free Churches* (p. 624). Theological degrees and theological professorships are still confined to members of the Church of England. In 1882 the headships of colleges and fellowships were freed from ecclesiastical restrictions.

25. Education.—The Education Act of 1870 (33 and 34 Victoria, cap. 75), though the work of a Liberal government, conceded privileges to the Established Church to which the Nonconformists strongly objected, since they put the denominational schools on the rates. The Education Acts of 1902 (2 Edward VII., cap. 24) and 1903 (2 Edward VII., cap. 42) still further extended those privileges by placing the entire maintenance of such schools on public funds, leaving only the providing of the buildings to the denominational supporters. This is objected to by Nonconformists as an unfair privilege, especially as most of the expense of the building had previously been met by grants of State funds. But two other objections are felt to be more serious: (1) the compulsory attendance of the children of Nonconformists at Church schools in single school areas, the 'conscience clause' which provides an escape from the denominational teaching proving to be practically ineffective; (2) tests for teachers, involving the exclusion of Nonconformists from the head teacherships of thousands of State-supported schools.

26. Free Church councils.—Until near the close of the 19th cent. the Nonconformists had acted together only for specific objects and as occasion required. In the year 1892, mainly owing to the instigation of Rev. Hugh Price Hughes and Dr. Guinness Rogers, the first Free Church Congress met in Manchester with some 370 delegates representing all the leading Free Churches. Dr. Mackennal was then appointed honorary secretary of a movement which developed into 'The National Council of Evangelical Free Churches.' Local councils affiliated to the National Council and nominating its members have been formed all over the country. These councils carry on united missions, organize common parochial visitation, take action with regard to morals in civic and public life, and generally give effect to the united action of the Churches which they represent. The National Council deals with such questions as religious liberty, temperance, peace and war, social and trade ethics, slavery, gambling, and immorality, in the State and the nation.

27. Present condition of Nonconformity.—According to the statistics of the *Free Church Year Book* for 1916, in the previous year there were 1,995,278 Free Church members reported by the denominations of the Federation; 10,863 ministers in charge; 54,449 lay preachers; 399,624 Sunday-school teachers; and 3,161,791 Sunday-school scholars. These figures do not include the nearly 750,000 attendants at Brotherhood meetings, except in the case of those who are also Church members, nor the 100,000 members of adult schools, most of which are organized by Free Churchmen, nor the members of Churches that send in no report—some few in the Federation, others of small denominations not in it. Then we must add those Nonconformists who are not registered members of Churches, though attendants at Free Church services, if we would form any estimate of the present number of Nonconformists in the country.

28. Nonconformity in Wales.—The first conspicuous Welsh Nonconformist was John Penry, who had done much to evangelize his native country when he was hanged at Southwark on a charge of

issuing seditious publications. This was in the reign of Elizabeth. The several Acts of Uniformity applied to Wales as well as to England, and resulted there also in Nonconformity with its consequent sufferings. At the instigation of Laud the bishops of St. David's and Llandaff commenced a systematic prosecution of clergy who did not conform. In his annual addresses to the king the archbishop reports many instances.

In 1633 he states that the bishop of St. David's certifies that he had suspended a lecturer for 'inconformity'; in 1635 that the bishop of Llandaff had carefully prepared articles for the High Commission Court against 'two noted schismatics, Wroth and Erbery—where, when the case is ready for hearing, they shall receive according to the merits of it'; in 1636 that 'there is one Matthews, the vicar of Penmain, that preaches against the keeping of all holy days, with divers others, as fond or profane opinions. The bishop hath inhibited him, and if that doth not serve I shall call him into your High Commission Court.' Many more instances might be given (see Lambeth MSS Vol., 943, cited in Rees, *Nonconformity in Wales*, pp. 38–40).

The founding of regularly organized Nonconformist churches in Wales began with William Wroth, known as the 'Apostle of Wales.' Born in 1570 at or near Abergavenny, he was educated at Jesus College and Christ Church, Oxford, where he appears to have lived for nine years. As rector of Llanvaches in Monmouthshire, he attracted multitudes of people from the surrounding districts and carried on a great religious work among them. Like John Wesley in England at a later time, he gave offence to the ecclesiastical authorities by preaching in various places all over the principality. In 1638, soon after Laud became archbishop of Canterbury, Wroth was summoned to the Court of High Commission and there deprived of his living on the ground of his ecclesiastical irregularities. The next year he founded an Independent church at Llanvaches, where he died three years later. This is reckoned to have been the first Nonconformist church in Wales. The outbreak of the Civil War scattered the Welsh Nonconformists, who found themselves a small minority in the midst of a population of royalists. For the time being the churches were broken up and the fugitives took refuge from persecution in Bristol. Those who dared to remain in Wales were harried by Prince Rupert, their cattle driven off, their houses robbed, and some of them killed. After the defeat of the royalists there was an ordinance of Parliament for sending itinerant ministers into S. Wales supported by the revenues of St. David's and Llandaff. In the year 1649–50 Parliament passed an ordinance entitled 'An Act for the better Propagation of the Gospel in Wales and Redress of some Grievances,' appointing commissioners with authority to try to remove clergymen and schoolmasters found guilty of 'any delinquency, scandal, malignancy, or non-residence,' to grant certificates for approved ministers and schoolmasters, and pay them out of the sequestered revenues of the parishes from which the persons objected to had been ejected. Most of these commissioners had been Royalists and Churchmen previous to 1646, and only a minority appeared as Nonconformists after the Restoration. In his *Sufferings of the Clergy* Walker states that between 500 and 600 were ejected by the commission; but he is able to name only some 330, and of these, as in his lists of the ejected in England, some were pluralists who were only deprived of all benefices but one, but allowed to retain that.

The earliest Nonconformists in Wales were Congregationalists. The first Baptist church in the principality was founded at Ilston, Glamorganshire, in 1649 by John Myles. The Society of Friends appeared in Wales a little later than the Baptists. The first known Quaker in the principality is Thomas Holmes, who was very active in promulgating his principles. The leaders of the

early Welsh Quakers were educated men of some social position, but the majority of their followers were drawn from the lower classes.

Immediately after the Restoration persecution of the Welsh Nonconformists began, and in a month every prison in the principality was filled with them. This was before the passing of the Act of Uniformity in 1662. That act issued in over 100 ejections in Wales and, consequently, a considerable increase of Welsh Nonconformity. Previously there were no Presbyterians among the Welsh Nonconformists, who were all Independents, Baptists, or Quakers. But now the expulsion of the Puritans, the majority of whom were Presbyterians, developed a Presbyterian type of Welsh Nonconformity, but not as yet with any formal distinction between Presbyterian and Congregational Churches. The impossibility of organizing presbyteries and synods in times of persecution compelled the Nonconformist Churches to work independently, so that the practice was Congregational even among people who cherished the Presbyterian ideal, although the ordination of a number of ministers together in one place for the charge of different places and some other innovations showed tendencies towards Presbyterianism. In point of fact, the words 'Independent' and 'Presbyterian' came to be used as synonymous terms throughout the principality and to be applied to the same churches. Following the Act of Uniformity, the Conventicle, Five Mile, Test, and Corporation Acts affected Wales as well as England and added to the disabilities and sufferings of the Welsh Nonconformists. As usual, the Society of Friends came in for the most cruel treatment, but some of the ministers of the various dissenting churches were rudely handled and compelled to suffer great hardships.

The early Nonconformists were foremost in printing and publishing books for the religious instruction of the Welsh. Of the ten editions of Scripture in Welsh—five of the whole Bible and five of the NT—which were issued between 1641 and 1690 nine were produced by Nonconformists. The *Assembly's Catechism* and the *Whole Duty of Man* were published in Welsh during this period, as also were several original works composed by Nonconformists. All these books had to be printed in London or Oxford.

The Act of Toleration set the Welsh Nonconformists free in common with their co-religionists in England. Unhappily a hot controversy between the Baptists and their opponents occurred about this time and seriously impeded the positive religious work of the Welsh Nonconformists. A more serious trouble appeared about 1729 in the 'Great Arminian Controversy.' Hitherto, with the exception of the Quakers, the Welsh Nonconformists had been Calvinists and their young people and converts had been required to learn the *Assembly's Catechism*. But now Arminian ideas began to take hold of the students at Caermarthen and to spread through their influence as they came to be settled in pastorates.

Depressed during the reign of Queen Anne, Nonconformity in Wales made considerable progress in the middle of the 18th cent. throughout the south part of the principality; but as yet it scarcely took hold of the Welsh population in the north, where it was then almost confined to the English churches. The Methodist revival was anticipated in Wales by Griffith Jones, an Anglican clergyman, who carried on a preaching mission throughout the principality and established 'itinerant schools' for the education of children by travelling teachers, for the most part Nonconformists. But the actual founder of Methodism in Wales was Howell Harris, who was born at Trevecca, Breconshire, in 1714. He and his associates, like the early English

Methodists, did not contemplate severance from the Anglican Church or the founding of a new denomination. Though treated as Dissenters by rigorous Churchmen, they did not regard themselves as Nonconformists. But one result of their activity was to quicken and enlarge the religious life of the Nonconformist Churches. They met with violent opposition from Churchmen as well as from the mob. Worse than this was the division that arose between Harris and Rowlands and their followers. About the year 1769 a division occurred between the Calvinists and the Arminians in the Churches then known indifferently as Independent and Presbyterian, and after this the Calvinistic section came to be called simply 'Independent,' and the Arminian, which had its headquarters at Caermarthen, and had drifted towards Unitarianism, was denominated 'Presbyterian.'

The Wesleyan Methodist movement was slow in making progress in Wales at first, because its preachers could preach only in English; and later, when Welsh preachers were sent out by this Church, their Arminianism was dreaded by the Calvinistic Methodists. These people considered themselves to be members of the Church of England down to the year 1811, when they had ministers formally ordained. There were then some 300 or 400 congregations with a few clergymen travelling about among them to administer the communion; and the necessity of the case drove the society to the new step in spite of the vehement protest of most of the clerical leaders. After that this Church began to grow rapidly, and it is now the most powerful denomination in the principality. One consequence of the religious awakening in the 18th cent. was that Nonconformity spread rapidly in Wales. The disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Wales, an action for which almost all the Welsh members of parliament were pledged, but which hitherto had been prevented by the House of Lords, in spite of being repeatedly voted by the House of Commons, was passed into law under the Parliament Act in the year 1914. Subsequently it was hung up by the suspensory legislation agreed upon because of the Great War. This would put an end to Nonconformity in Wales by liberating the principality from Charles II.'s Act of Uniformity and establishing religious equality among the Churches. Wales, like England, is still left to bear the grievance of the 1903 Education Act in its patronage of denominational schools with tests for teachers, against which the Free Church Council still protests.

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NONJURORS.—The Nonjurors were clergy and laymen who, though no Romanists, scrupled to take the oaths of allegiance and abjuration imposed, particularly on office holders, under William III. and George I. The term, strictly including some Scottish Covenanters, is commonly restricted to Episcopalians, but extended to persons who, though exempted from the oaths as unofficial, attached themselves to the Nonjurors proper. Those rejecting only the oaths of 1701 and 1714 are sometimes distinguished as Non-Abjurors.

The English and Scottish Nonjurors may be most conveniently treated separately; their Irish brethren, including but one bishop, William Sheridan of Kilmore, hardly demand separate notice.

1. **England.**—The English Nonjurors—originally over 400 clergy, with an unknown number of laymen—were often important individually as men of the highest character and of great learning. Corporately, they stood on the one hand for the doctrines of passive obedience and non-resistance, on the other for the right of the Church to independence in spiritual matters. They maintained a 'State point'—that William's title was 'pretended'; and a 'Church point'—that even a legitimate sovereign could not deprive bishops without ecclesiastical sanction.

Their reputation for piety and learning requires no laboured proof. The Dr. Wolf of *The Nonjuror* (Colley Cibber's adaptation of *Tartuffe*, London, 1718) at best misrepresents as typical the servility and intrigue which poverty and dependence perhaps fostered in exceptional cases. Inspired by an antipathy political and possibly personal, it flattered and fomented popular prejudice. But, in spite of Johnson and Macaulay, it has long been recognized as a libellous caricature, well matched by Whiggish abuse of the Nonjurors as 'British Hottentots, as blind and bigoted as their brethren about the Cape, but more savage in their manners' (cited by Overton, *Nonjurors*, p. 310). The Nonjurors in general, sacrificing everything to conscience, showed at least a noble courage. Nor could any small community easily outmatch a group of saints like T. Ken, J. Kettlewell, W. Law, R. Nelson, and N. Spinckes. Again, the mere names of G. Hickeys, H. Dodwell, T. Baker, R. Rawlinson, and T. Hearne sufficiently attest the learning of a class in which, at both universities, 'the intellectual interests of the time were almost entirely centred' (W. H. Hutton, *The English Church, 1625-1714*, London, 1903, p. 243).

The Nonjurors were no whole-hearted enemies of William, little as they might approve of his birth, his character, or his creed. They included five bishops of the famous Seven—W. Sancroft, T. Ken, J. Lake, F. Turner, and T. White—with two others, R. Frampton of Gloucester and W. Lloyd of Norwich, who had lacked only opportunity to join them. They accepted William's interposition, stoutly refusing to proclaim their abhorrence of it. They even joined in urging him to safeguard the welfare of the Church and nation. But they denied (Ken with one hesitating reservation) that the crown could be forfeited. Sancroft would neither visit William nor attend the Convention. The other bishops insisted on a Protestant regency for a titular Romanist king. And none joined in the offer of the crown to William and Mary. It was indeed a commission from Sancroft to his suffragans that made the coronation possible; yet neither he nor his party would swear allegiance, or even use the State (henceforward the 'immoral') prayers. Hence, under 1 William and Mary, cap. 8, six prelates with their beneficed supporters were *ipso facto* suspended on 1st Aug. 1689 and deprived on 1st Feb. 1690. Lake, W. Thomas of Worcester (a like-minded bishop), and T. Cartwright of

Chester (distinguished from the rest by his devotion to James, whom he followed abroad) died between the passing of the act and the deprivation. Kilmore—Sheridan having withdrawn—was adjudged, like the throne, vacant by desertion.

The sees thus emptied remained unfilled for over a year. William, desiring compromise, offered to waive the oaths if the bishops agreed to discharge their spiritual functions. And great Churchmen like South, though recognizing William, declined preferment gained through the scruples of others. But Nonjurors could not accept conditions involving at least implicit recognition of William's royal supremacy; they could only promise to live quietly. And hence in May 1691 new bishops were consecrated, headed by the reluctant J. Tillotson as primate.

Meanwhile many lay Nonjurors—notably Dodwell, Roger North, and the second Earl of Clarendon—had sacrificed their prospects to their consciences.

James II.'s death, apparently inviting reconciliation, merely added Non-Abjurors to Nonjurors, for the oath of 1701 not only abjured the Pretender, but expressly recognized William's legitimacy—a point hitherto discreetly evaded. And the oath of 1714, to George I., increased their number.

But Nonjurors, however Jacobite in sympathy, were seldom actively disloyal. Turner, indeed, earned exile by complicity in Preston's and Fenwick's plots (1690 and 1696). And the Non-Abjuror historian T. Carte, apparently a '15 rebel, had a price of £1000 on his head as a conspirator with Atterbury. But Turner's implication of his fellow-thinkers in his treasons was unjustified. They waged, indeed, a paper warfare. They ministered spiritual comfort to dying plotters. But they seldom plotted themselves. One Jacobite scheme was actually revealed by a Nonjuror. And, as the Jacobite menace weakened, Nonjuring politics—the 'State point'—lost all importance.

The 'Church point,' however, to some extent remained. The conception of the Church as an autonomous society—the lasting contribution of the movement to English theological thought—had an immediate practical significance. It produced a certain alienation of the Nonjurors from the Establishment. They repudiated deprivation by mere Act of Parliament. They therefore considered Tillotson and his fellows intruders, thrust into sees not canonically vacated, without title to recognition, at least while the lawful incumbents survived and claimed their rights. And hence some of them condemned the National Church as now schismatic.

'Some'—for all along they suffered from those distracted counsels which especially beset seceders from a great communion who lack alike a supreme constituted authority and the sobering influence of corporate wealth and temporal responsibilities. Even their bishops adopted different attitudes towards William's proceedings: Thomas of Worcester, who died before suspension, was yet already preparing to welcome Stillingfleet as his successor; Ken remained at Wells as late as possible, publicly protested, like Turner, against his deprivation, and long retained his diocesan style; and Sancroft yielded only to the imminent threat of forcible eviction. Again, Kettlewell justified resistance by the mere injustice of the expulsions, Dodwell only by their invalidity.

There was equal disagreement as to future relations with the Established Church. Sancroft, unlike Ken, declared her schismatic. Hickeys denied to her 'usurping' bishops and their adherents not only sacerdotal powers, but even the benefits of the Incarnation (it was the posthumous publication of his attack on all Jurors that pro-

voked Benjamin Hoadly to reply, and so led to the 'Bangorian Controversy' and the long suspension of Convocation). But Kettlewell professed himself still a member, and many clergy, though never officiating, remained in lay communion.

Practice as to public worship therefore inevitably varied. Some, like Law and Nelson, attended their parish churches, without protest against the 'immoral prayers.' Others went, but protested: Frampton, retaining a small living, read the service and preached, but omitted the names of the sovereigns. Others, again, attended only failing some convenient Nonjuring assembly. And others refused attendance altogether, holding, with Sancroft, that it would necessitate a second absolution after the service. Yet in the country, generally, opportunities for special corporate worship were few. Even in London, though Nonjuring 'churches' were reckoned in 1716 at over fifty, the prologue to *The Nonjuror* mocked their furtive character:

'Each lurking pastor seeks the dark,
And fears the Justices' inquiring clerk.
In close back rooms his routed flock he rallies,
And reigns the patriarch of blind lanes and alleys.'

The number is possibly a gross exaggeration. The Nonjurors had now not only lost their great protagonist Hickes, but, even before his death, suffered a secession revealing once more their inveterate disunity.

Dodwell's *Case in View Consider'd* (London, 1705) had limited the separation to the lifetime of the deprived bishops. Hence in 1710, when Ken, the sole survivor, renounced his claims, Dodwell and many others rejoined the Established Church, though still maintaining the 'State point.' But Hickes insisted that only official repudiation of the deprivations could heal the schism, and the distinct Nonjuring episcopal succession which his view required had been secured in 1694, when he and Thomas Wagstaffe became suffragan bishops of Thetford and Ipswich. Here again difference of opinion had appeared. The consecration, authorized by James and Sancroft, was performed by Lloyd (to whom Sancroft had delegated his metropolitan authority in 1692), Turner, and White. But Frampton held aloof, and Ken only reluctantly consented. The proceeding involved continued schism, and its claim to legality—based on Henry VIII's Act for Suffragan Bishops—was not undisputed. Yet the 'Hickesites,' between 1713 and 1741, carried out further consecrations, continuing the episcopal line till the death of Robert Gordon in 1779. The new prelates, however, were bishops 'at large,' without territorial title, though Jeremy Collier, after Hickes's death, styled himself 'Primus Anglo-Britannice Episcopus.'

Meanwhile yet another controversy had arisen. The Prayer Book of 1662, with Kettlewell's form of recantation for converts, satisfied the early liturgical demands of most Nonjurors. But Hickes used the Communion Office of 1549, and after his death (1715) a reform movement began, culminating in the compilation, by Collier, T. Brett, and others, of a new Service Book (1718) based on the 1549 Prayer Book, but enriched from primitive liturgies. Four 'Usages'—the mixed chalice, prayers for the faithful departed, prayer for the descent of the Holy Ghost on the consecrated elements, and prayer of oblation on the consecrated elements—were thus adopted, sometimes even declared necessary to salvation, by 'Usagers.' 'Non-Usagers' rejected them, or at least condemned a view branding as schismatics Romanists, Anglicans, and even most Nonjurors. The Scottish bishops, invited to decide, named a mediator whose attempted compromise failed. Both parties consecrated bishops to maintain their views, and only in 1732 was ritual unanimity attained through the

'Instrument of Union,' restoring the 1662 book on condition that it should be so used and interpreted as to satisfy the Usagers on the four crucial points. No important event marked the later history of the English Nonjurors, but meantime they had long negotiated for union with the Orthodox Church, failing, however, completely—mainly through the demand of the Eastern patriarchs for unconditional submission.

EPISCOPAL SUCCESSION AMONG THE ENGLISH NONJURORS.—

I. THE REGULAR SUCCESSION.—

1694—George Hickes († 1715); Thomas Wagstaffe (|| 1712).

1713—Jeremy Collier († 1720); Samuel Hawes († 1722); Nathaniel Spinckes († 1727).

1716—Thomas Brett, sen. († 1743); Henry Gandy († 1734).

1721—Hiliah Bedford († 1724); Ralph Taylor († 1722).

1722—John Griffin († 1731).

1725—March: Henry Doughty († 1730); May: John Blackbourne († 1741); June: Henry Hall († 1731).

1727—Thomas Brett, jun. († before 1743?).

1728—March: Richard Rawlinson († 1755); December: George Smith († 1756).

1731—Timothy Mawman (†?).

1741—Robert Gordon († 1779).

II. THE IRREGULAR SUCCESSIONS.—(a) For America.—

1722—Richard Welton († 1726); John (?) Talbot († 1727).

(b) To carry on the Usager party.—

1733—Roger Laurence († 1736); Thomas Deacon († 1753).

1752—Kenrick Price († 1790).

[?]—P. J. Browne (said to = Lord John Johnstone, son of the Marquis of Annandale, † 1779).

1780—William Cartwright († 1799).

1795—Thomas Garnett (†?).

?—Charles Boothe († 1805).

2. Scotland.—In Scotland the almost universal rejection of the oaths by the clergy, including every bishop, on the one hand, and the re-establishment of Presbyterianism, on the other, created conditions unparalleled in England. No 'Church point' of the English type was possible. Yet almost the whole Episcopal Communion was involved in the 'State point.' Anne, indeed, allowed a tacit toleration, though the Toleration Act of 1712 nominally enforced the oaths and prayers. But her death, the '15, and (after a peaceful period) the '45 brought ever more harshness to bear on the Church, culminating in an attempt to destroy it altogether. The share of Churchmen in Jacobite risings—though far slighter in 1745 than in 1715—was both a cause and a consequence of this severity. Hence the decline of Jacobitism and the accession of George III.—resolute for toleration—were epoch-making in Scottish Church as in English political history. And the recognition of George by the Scottish bishops when the Young Pretender died ended the northern Nonjuring movement.

Meantime Scottish Nonjurors had both influenced and been influenced by their English brethren. Archibald Campbell and James Gadderar, Scottish bishops 'at large' living in London—Campbell for life, Gadderar for many years—had supported both the Usages and the negotiations with the Eastern Church, and with others had helped to consecrate English bishops. Conversely, the Usages problem—complicated by the question whether bishops should again become diocesan (though no regular royal nomination or *congé d'élire* was available) or, as a college, should jointly rule the whole Church—divided the Scottish Nonjurors. They too produced two sets of bishops—Usagers and diocesans v. Non-Usagers and collegers. But here again a compromise, favouring the diocesans, established final peace in 1732. To the Scottish Church Gordon, the last regular English Nonjuring bishop, commended his dwindling flock. To the single-handed action of the Scottish Campbell—an irreconcilable Usager—the English Nonjurors owed an irregular episcopal succession lasting from 1733 to 1805. And from the Scottish Church the American Colonies finally secured a renewal—in canonical fashion—of the short-lived line of bishops irregu-

larly founded by the English Nonjuror R. Taylor in 1722.

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NON-RESISTANCE.—See RESISTANCE.

NORTH AMERICAN PHALANX.—See COMMUNISTIC SOCIETIES OF AMERICA.

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE.—See PANJAB.

NORWAY.—See TEUTONS.

NOSAIRIS.—See NUSAIRIS.

NOSE.—The nose is important from an anthropological point of view, since the variations of its form afford an index of race. In the skull the shape of the nasal bones and the nasal opening are expressed in figures as the nasal index—in other words, the relation between the height from the root of the nose to the anterior nasal spine, and the breadth of the bony mass. The skull may be platyrrhinian (flat-nosed), leptorhinian (long-nosed), or mesorhinian (medium-nosed), according as the breadth of the bones and opening is greater or less, this forming an invariable criterion of race. Negroes, Australians, and Bushmen are platyrrhinian (61.7 to 53.7), Mongolians are mesorhinian (52.1 to 50.1), and Caucasians are leptorhinian (47.9 to 42.2). In Hindu literature the nose is described as one of the nine (or eleven) portals of the body, or one of the apertures of the head.¹ These portals or cavities are divided into those above and those below the navel, pure and impure respectively.² The nose, being above, is one of the pure apertures. The *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* says:

'That part of the vital air which is immortal is above the navel, and streams out by upward breathings,'³ i.e. from nose or mouth.

In the OT strength is expressed by forcible breathing from the nostrils (Job 39²⁰, Ps 18¹⁵). The importance of breathing through the nose, not through the mouth, was already recognized by the American Indians, as noted by G. Catlin, who wrote a small book on the subject. In accordance with the belief in monstrous races current in antiquity (see MONSTERS [Ethnic]), we find an occasional assertion of the existence of noseless tribes who 'draw breath through two holes,' as Benjamin of Tudela alleges of the Turks of the steppes, a people with mesorhinian skull, naturally regarded as noseless by an observer accustomed to more shapely noses (cf. § 3 for noseless ghosts).⁴ On the other hand, extravagantly long noses are sometimes attributed to mythical beings—e.g., the nose of the Norse Huldre folk is very long, reaching to the saddle-pommel.⁵

1. The odour of the sacrifice.—Whatever later notions may have attached to burnt sacrifices, it is probable that the early idea was that the smell rising upwards with the smoke was pleasing to the gods.

In the Babylonian flood-story Utnapishtim offers sacrifice and 'the gods smelt the sweet savour; the gods gathered like flies

over the sacrificer.' In the corresponding Hebrew narrative, when Noah offers burnt-offerings, 'the Lord smelled the sweet savour' (Gn 8²¹). Generally it is said of burnt-offerings and of incense that they are 'a sweet savour before the Lord,'¹ just as offerings on high places were 'sweet savour' to Idols (Ezk 6¹³). When God is displeased with Israel, He is represented as saying, 'I will not smell the savour of your sweet odours' (Lv 26³¹), 'I will smell no sweet savours in your solemn assemblies' (Am 5²¹). Similarly, Homer describes the savour of the sacrifice involved in smoke ascending to heaven,² and the Zulus burn incense with the caul of the sacrificial beast to give to the spirits a sweet savour.³ Both Origen and Porphyry maintained that the demons were nourished with the fumes and smoke of sacrifice and incense, and waited in the region of the air for these, presumably inhaling them with nose and mouth.⁴ The idea is finely spiritualized in Ezekiel (20⁴¹), where God says of Judah, 'As a sweet savour will I accept you,' and by St. Paul, who says of Christ's sacrifice that it was 'to God for an odour of a sweet smell' (Eph 5²), of the faithful that they are 'a sweet savour of Christ unto God' (2 Co 2¹⁵), and of the gifts sent by the Philippians that they are 'an odour of a sweet smell, a sacrifice acceptable, well-pleasing to God' (Ph 4¹⁸).

Gods and spirits, like mortals, loved sweet-smelling odours and disliked evil odours. Hence they were pleased with incense, and malodorous fumigations were commonly used to drive off demons, though pleasant odours sometimes have this effect (see INCENSE, § 2).

2. Salutations with the nose.—One curious form of salutation found among several peoples is that of smelling each other or of rubbing noses. The custom is found in N. Asia and America, in Polynesia and parts of Melanesia, in the Malay Archipelago, in New Guinea, among aborigines of India, in Madagascar, and sporadically elsewhere.

The Eskimos rub noses and draw the palms of their hands over their faces.⁵ With the Laplanders each man lays his right hand on the shoulder of the other, and places the point of his nose on that of the other, rubbing them, with the words, 'Well, Well!'⁶ The custom is found among the Samoyeds,⁷ and E. Petitot reports it of the Dénés and Dindjé of the north-west of Canada,⁸ and it is alleged of the Blackfoot Indians.⁹ In New Zealand and in the Friendly Islands the noses are joined (*hongi*) and the one rubs the other's hand on his nose and mouth.¹⁰ Similar customs are found in many others of the Pacific groups.¹¹ The Samoans join noses, at the same time giving each other a hearty smell.¹² In Astrolabe Bay, New Guinea, the natives squeezed the nostrils with the forefinger and thumb of the right hand, pointing to the navel with the index finger, and grunting at intervals.¹³ Joining noses without rubbing is also mentioned of the Sandwich Islanders in former days.¹⁴ In Fiji smelling the hand is described as the parting or greeting ceremony, along with strong inhalation. A person of lower station smells the foot of a chief.¹⁵ Rubbing noses is met with in New Guinea, as well as in the Aru Islands and Buru (among women).¹⁶ Among the Malays smelling is the usual form of greeting, the words 'smell' and 'greet' being interchangeable. The head and neck are embraced and the snell inhaled.¹⁷ In Celebes at the departure of friends there is a general nose-rubbing—the Malay kiss—and the Burnese phrase, 'Give me a snell,' is the equivalent of 'Kiss me.'¹⁸

¹ Cf. Ex 29^{18, 25}, Lv 10^{13, 17} 23¹³, Nu 15³ etc. Cf. 1 S 26¹⁰ 'Let him accept (=smell) an offering.'

² Il. i. 317; cf. Lucian, *de Sacrif.* 0.

³ H. Callaway, *The Religious System of the Amazulu*, Natal, 1870, pp. 11, 141, 177.

⁴ Origen, *Ezhort. ad Mart.* 45; Porphy. *de Abst.* II. 42.

⁵ F. W. Beechey, *Narrative of a Voyage to the Pacific and Behring's Strait*, new ed., London, 1831, p. 242, 351; H. R. Rink, *Danish Greenland*, do. 1877, p. 223; E. Petitot, *Les grands Esquimaux*, Paris, 1887, p. 69.

⁶ J. Scheffer, *Hist. of Lapland*, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1674, p. 317; *Globus*, xii. [1867] 62.

⁷ M. A. Castrén, *Reisen im Norden*, Leipzig, 1853, p. 258.

⁸ Petitot, p. 68.

⁹ T. Waltz and G. Gerland, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1859-72, iii. 136.

¹⁰ E. Tregear, *JAI* xix. [1890] 113; H. Ling Roth, *ib.*, p. 166.

¹¹ W. Wilson, *Missionary Voyage to S. Pacific*, London, 1799 p. 363 (Society Islands); E. H. Lamont, *Wild Life among the Pacific Islands*, do. 1807, pp. 18, 296 (Marquesas, Penrhyn Island); cf. W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, do. 1820, II. 11.

¹² G. Turner, *Nineteen Years in Polynesia*, London, 1861, p. 346, *Samoa a Hundred Years Ago*, do. 1884, p. 170.

¹³ *JAI* vi. [1877] 103.

¹⁴ *Annales de l'Institut de France*, 1820-31, IV. 233.

¹⁵ T. Williams, *London*, 1858, I. 152; A. St. Johnston, *do.* 1883, p. 302.

¹⁶ J. Chalmers, *Adventure in New Guinea*, London, 1855, p. 151; R. Andree, *Ethnographische Parallelen und Vergleiche*, Leipzig, 1893, p. 226.

¹⁷ J. Crawford, *Hist. of the Indian Archipelago*, London, 1820, I. 100.

¹⁸ A. R. Wallace, *Malay Archipelago*, London, 1867, II. 152; Andree, p. 221.

¹ *Bhagavad-Gītā*, v. 19 (SBE VIII. [1882] 65); *Katha Upaniṣad*, v. 1 (SBE xv. [1884] 18).

² *Mannu*, v. 122 (SBE xxv. [1880] 192).

³ *SBE* xii. [1894] 267.

⁴ *Itinerarium*, tr. A. Asher, London, 1810, p. 83; cf. *PC* I. 328.

⁵ *LX* xx. [1009] 327.

With them, as with the Chittagong Hill people, the mouth and nose are placed on the cheek of the other person and a strong inhalation takes place.¹ The Khyongtha adopt the same method of greeting.² Among the Mongol tribes and with the Chinese (only as an act of love) the nose is placed on the cheek and inhalation follows.

Though these methods of salutation vary, it is probable that all are connected with the act of smelling each other on meeting or parting. The sense of smell is much stronger with savages than with more civilized men. The smell of the human body, or of various parts of it, different with different races, is agreeable to many, whether on normal or abnormal grounds.³ Whether or not the smelling of a person in greeting is associated with a recognition of him through the sense of smell, as H. Spencer maintained,⁴ it is certain that it must have some agreeable sensations for those who practise it.

There are numerous instances of this: a Mongol father smells from time to time the head of his youngest son as a mark of affection;⁵ a father in Timorlaut smells and fondles his child;⁶ Isaac smelled the smell of Esau's raiment on Jacob, and compared it to 'the smell of a field which the Lord hath blessed.'⁷

The salutation by smelling might easily become conventional—a mere rubbing or touching of noses, or laying the head on the shoulder of a friend, as with the Ainus of Saghalien.⁸

3. Nose-ornaments.—The piercing of the septum of the nose, less usually one of the alae, is found very generally in some regions, but only sporadically in others, and with some peoples not at all—e.g., Fuegians, Andamans, Polynesians, nearly all N. American tribes, and most of the higher races. The piercing, which is often of a ritual character, has for its purpose the wearing of some ornament in the hole thus formed—a piece of wood or bone, feathers, or metal (e.g., a ring). The peoples among whom this custom is found are the Austrorians (almost universally), peoples of Papuaia (Solomon Islands to New Guinea), wild tribes in Malaysia, some African tribes (Bushmen, some western Negro and Bantu tribes), tribes of N.W. America, tribes in the interior of S. America, Hindus, and formerly the Jews and some other Semitic peoples.

In Australia a piece of wood or bone, or on ceremonial occasions, feathers or pieces of twig, are worn.⁹ Women in the Lower Murray River tribes wear a little ring of bone.¹⁰ The piercing is usually ceremonial. In New S. Wales the medicine-man goes through a series of contortions on the ground, pretending to suffer pain, and is then delivered of bones—those which the boys are to wear. The boys are told that the more the medicine-man suffers, the less will they suffer.¹¹ Among the Kurnai the piercing occurs before initiation. With the Wurundjerri old men do it for boys, old women for girls.¹² With the Arunta and other tribes the piercing of a girl's nose is done by her husband, with the Kaitish by the wife's father.¹³ Among some of the tribes the nose-peg is merely ornamental, but, as special objects are sometimes inserted at ceremonies, this may not have been its only purpose. A medicine-man in the Warra-munga tribe wears through the nose a *kupitja*, 'the emblem of his profession and very closely associated, in some mysterious way, with his powers as a medicine-man.' It is made of fur-string, coated with grease and red ochre, and is held in great reverence.¹⁴ The natives of Gippsland believe that those who have no nose-peg will suffer in the other world. In some of the tribes the mother flattens the nose of the child; the insertion of the nose-peg also aids this.¹⁵

Among the Papuans from the Solomon Islands to New Guinea a pin is usually worn in the septum. Among the Motu

(British New Guinea) the piercing occurs at the age of six.¹ Should a child die before then, the operation is performed on the corpse. Here the reason is that those whose noses are not pierced cannot enter into bliss, where, curiously enough, spirits are noseless. The unpierced must go with ghosts possessing noses to a place where there is little food.² So, among the Koita, corpses with unpierced noses have the operation performed on them; otherwise in the other world creatures like slow-worms would be attached to their nostrils.³ In the Fly River district children of both sexes have their noses pierced, for scandal would otherwise arise, and an unpierced person could not marry. At the piercing, which is done by the mother's father or uncle, a feast is given. The nose-ornament is a piece of wood three-quarters of an inch in diameter with pieces of shell at each end.⁴ In Mabuiag and Muralug, Torres Straits, the septum is pierced when the child is a fortnight old. Long nose-ornaments are worn on festival occasions.⁵ In Torres Island a ring is worn. In the Solomon Islands the tip of the nose is pierced and a pin inserted; in New Britain the side of the nose is pierced.⁶ In Torres Straits Islands, where the skull is preserved, it is sometimes given an artificial nose of wood and beeswax, or, as in New Guinea, a very large ornament is fixed to the nasal cavity.⁷

The custom is found among the wild tribes of the Malay Peninsula (Semang, Sakai), a quill of porcupine or a piece of bone or stick being worn.⁸

Passing to Africa, among the central tribes (Machinga, Yao, and Nyasa groups) women pierce the left side of the nose at the age of eight and wear in it later a metal or ivory ring. They are laughed at if the right side is pierced.⁹ Among the western tribes, Bantu and Negro, nose-ornaments are common, but sometimes, though the septum is pierced, no ornament is worn, as in the Congo Free State.¹⁰ Nose-piercing is also found among the Bushmen.¹¹

Among some of the north-western tribes of America—Aleuts, Kutchin, etc.—the piercing of the septum was general, and the wearing of a quill-like shell.¹² The interior tribes of the Amazonian region perforate the septum to receive straws, feathers, and other ornaments. Among the Nambiquiras this is confined to the men.¹³

It is in India among women that the most elaborate nose-ornaments are worn, their form varying according to caste and position. Here the piercing is found on the right wing of the nose, or with Muhammadans in the Panjāh on the left wing. The piercing is performed in infancy. Special respect is paid to a woman's nose-ring. A stranger may not mention it, and it is a sign of wedded happiness. Shīh women remove it in Muharram as a sign of mourning.¹⁴

The Hebrews probably derived the custom of wearing nose-rings from their Semitic kindred. Whether, among the latter, they were generally worn by men is uncertain. In Jg 8²⁴ Ishmaelite men seem to wear them, and Pliny also refers to the custom among men. In the OT the practice among the Hebrews is confined to women.¹⁵ Such a ring, often of large size, was a valuable present from a lover (Gn 24⁴⁷), and sometimes more than one were worn, hanging from the alae, not from the septum. This ornament was much valued, perhaps as an amulet as well as an ornament.¹⁶ The Talmud forbids nose-rings to be worn on the Sabbath. The Mishnah describes them as one of the ornaments liable to become unclean.¹⁷ In modern Egypt nose-rings are worn by women of the lower classes, usually through the right alae. The ring is of brass or gold, sometimes with pendent heads.¹⁸ They are also worn by Bedawi women.

While ornaments are liable to be attached to any part of the body, and while it has been thought that the idea of wearing nose-rings may have been suggested by the fact that they were put through the nose of cattle (this does not account for nose-sticks and the like), it is possible

¹ Howitt, p. 742 f.; Thomas, p. 20.

² J. Chalmers, *Pioneering in New Guinea*, London, 1887, p. 163 f.; *JAI* vii. [1878] 484 f.

³ O. G. Seligmann, *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 192.

⁴ J. Chalmers, *JAI* xxxviii. [1903] 121 f.

⁵ A. O. Haddon, *JAI* xix. [1890] 370, 406, 431.

⁶ *Handbook to the Ethnographical Collections, British Museum*, London, 1910, p. 120.

⁷ *Cambridge Anthropol. Exped. to Torres Straits, Reports*, v. [1907] 258; *Handbook*, p. 144.

⁸ W. W. Skeat, *JAI* xxxiii. [1902] 132; cf. *ib.* xxxix. [1909] 145 (women of the tribes of Ulu Plus, Perak).

⁹ H. S. Stannus, *JAI* xi. [1910] 310.

¹⁰ *Handbook*, pp. 231, 240; E. Torday and T. Joyce, *JAI* xxxvii. [1907] 147.

¹¹ *Handbook*, p. 212.

¹² Stoll, p. 108; *Handbook*, p. 257.

¹³ *Handbook*, p. 279; T. Roosevelt, *Through the Brazilian Wilderness*, London, 1914, p. 208.

¹⁴ Stoll, p. 111; H. A. Rose, *JAI* xxxvii. [1907] 256; *PRi* 43.

¹⁵ Gn 24⁴⁷, Ex 35²², Pr 11²² 25¹², Is 3²¹, Ezk 16¹². In some of these passages there is ambiguity, as the same word may mean 'ear-ring.'

¹⁶ W. R. Smith², p. 453.

¹⁷ Cf. T. De Quincey, 'Toilette of the Hebrew Lady,' *Works*, xi. [1862] 121 f.; *JE* ix. 339.

¹⁸ E. W. Lane, *Modern Egyptians*, London, 1846, iii. 224.

¹ T. H. Lewin, *Wild Races of S.E. India*, London, 1870, p. 46.

² *ib.* p. 118.

³ O. Stoll, *Das Geschlechtsleben in der Völkerpsychologie*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 302 ff.

⁴ *Principles of Sociology*, London, 1893-90, ii. [1893] 15.

⁵ G. Timkowski, *Travels through Mongolia*, Eng. tr., London, 1827, i. 106.

⁶ *JAI* xiii. [1883] 20.

⁷ Gn 27²⁷.

⁸ *JAI* lii. [1874] 237.

⁹ R. Brough Smyth, *The Aborigines of Victoria*, London, 1878, i. 278; N. W. Thomas, *Natives of Australia*, do. 1906, p. 68; Spencer-Gillen^b, p. 615; E. Palmer, *JAI* xiii. [1884] 285.

¹⁰ Brough Smyth, i. 277.

¹¹ D. Collins, *Account of the English Colony of New S. Wales*, London, 1804, p. 380.

¹² Howitt, p. 740 f.

¹³ Spencer-Gillen^b, p. 615.

¹⁴ *ib.* p. 464.

¹⁵ Brough Smyth, i. 274.

that, like labial ornaments, nose-ornaments and piercing the nose had a magical origin. The nose is one of the spirit-entries of the body; hence, like mouth-ornaments, those of the nose may have served the purpose of amulets to prevent spirits entering by the nose when breathing (see MOUTH). The purposes alleged of the nose-ornament with some Australians and Papuans (see above) are perhaps secondary. Yrjö Hirn points out that savage face-ornaments, wood or bone, in nose, mouth, ears, etc., give an appearance of strangeness to the face and hence attract eyes which might otherwise regard it with indifference. They have the effect of charming.¹ Nose-ornaments are of wood, shell, pearls, feathers, bones, teeth, and metal. Sometimes they serve as distinctive tribal marks, or are worn by one sex, or only after marriage.²

The nose is sometimes ornamented by painting or tatuing, or by cicatrices. It may also be further deformed by flattening or by slits. The Miranhas of Brazil incise the alæ and turn them over.³ Some castes in India slit the alæ in connexion with religious usages.⁴ If the passage in Lv 21¹⁸ means 'slit nose' rather than flat nose, such a mutilation prevented a man from being a priest.

4. Sneezing.—Superstitions about sneezing are found in ancient and modern times, and also among the lower races.

The Greeks regarded sneezing as a favourable omen, or as divine.⁵ 'For Simichidas the Loves have sneezed,' and of a bridegroom it is said 'Some good spirit sneezed out on thee a blessing.'⁶ Penelope says, 'My son has sneezed a blessing on all my words.'⁷ Generally the sneezer was saluted with *ζῆθε, Ζεὺς σάουε!* So the Romans saluted the sneezer with *Salve!*, or wished him health.⁸ With the Hindus sneezing is connected with demoniacal influence—a spirit entering or leaving the nose, or being expelled from it. The formula on sneezing are 'Lavs!', answered by 'With you!', or 'God bless you!', or 'God be praised!' The last is Muhammadan, and with Muhammadans it is customary to wash the nose out with water because the devil visits it at night.⁹ In Egypt, when a man sneezes, he says, 'Praise be to God!' Each one present says, 'God have mercy on you!', and he replies, 'God guide us and guide you!'¹⁰ In certain cases in Hindu belief sneezing is ominous; e.g., if one is beginning work and bears another sneeze, it is necessary to begin over again. Sneezing at a threshold is unlucky.¹¹ In ancient Persia it was necessary when sneezing to recite one *Yatha ahū vairyo* and one *Ashem vahū*, because there is a fiend in the body as well as a fire or disposition or instinct of sneezing. This wages war with the fiend, and sneezing means that the fiend is coming out. When another bears the sneeze, he also utters the same prayers.¹² The Jewish formula towards one sneezing is called *Asusa*, or 'Health.' The wish is, 'Your health!', 'God bless you!', 'For life!', or 'For a happy life!' The sneezer usually cites Gn 49¹⁸, and, when the bystanders bless him, replies, 'Be thou blessed!'¹³

A legend in *Pirqe Eliezer* says that until Jacob's time man sneezed at the end of his life and then died. Jacob was, however, granted time to make his will, and now illness always precedes death. Hence, when one sneezes, the wish is uttered 'For life!', so that this sign of death may be changed to that of life.

In mediæval and later folk-custom in different parts of Europe similar formulae have been in use—'Helfu Got!', 'Christ ih helfe!', 'Got helfe dir!', 'Deus te adjuvet!', 'Gesundheit!', 'God bless you!', 'Bless you!', 'Felleite!', etc.¹⁴ Sneezing was sometimes regarded as a momentary palsy.¹⁵ In early Christian times the sign of the cross was made, but later ecclesiastical advice was not to regard sneezings.¹⁶

With the Zulus sneezing is a good omen, as it is a sign that the *idhlozi* (*manes*) are with the sneezer, and he returns thanks. If a child sneezes, the people say, 'Grow!', as it is a sign of health. Christian Zulus say, 'Preserve, look upon me!', or 'Creator of Heaven and Earth!'¹ In Guinea, when a chief sneezes, all wish him happiness and prosperity.² In Samoa a sneezing tbs bystander said 'Life to you!'³ (for Indonesian beliefs see ERE vii. 236). The Kolita of British New Guinea regard sneezing in sleep as a sign that the soul has come back to the body. If one does not sneeze for some weeks, this is a bad sign—the soul must be far away.⁴ So, with the Zulus, if a man is ill and does not sneeze, it is thought that the disease is great. Sometimes sneezing is of bad omen. In Tonga, if one sneezes while starting on an expedition, it forebodes evil.⁵ In Old Calabar people say, 'Far from you!', with gestures as if warding off evil, when children sneeze, and in New Zealand on similar occasions charms are said to prevent evil.⁶

Thus the rationale of the practice varies, though in its origin it is connected with the presence of spirits, their entrance or egress from the body. According as the spirits are good or bad, sneezing will be regarded as wholesome or the reverse. Where it is thought that the soul is itself returning, the omen will be good (cf. the sneezing of the child restored to life by Elisha [2 K 4²⁵]); but, if the soul is leaving the body, it will be bad (cf. the Jewish tradition above). Perhaps a sneeze was regarded as dangerous because it might expel the breath or soul, man's breath (i.e. life-breath) being in his nostrils (Is 22²; see MOUTH, § 3), just as yawning is dangerous for this and other reasons.⁷

Omens are drawn from sneezing.

The Negroes of Jamaica think that, if your nostrils itch so that you sneeze, some one is backbiting you.⁸ In N. Carolina, if you sneeze when eating, you will bear of a death.⁹ Other German omens are that sneezing while putting your shoes on is a sign of ill-luck, or, if you are telling something and you sneeze, your assertion is true, or (Estonian), if two pregnant women sneeze together, they will have daughters, but sons if their husbands sneeze.¹⁰ Many othersuch omens exist. Omens, usually of a trivial character,¹¹ are also drawn from an itching nose.

In connexion with the idea that the soul is entering or leaving the body at sneezing, it is noticeable that some savages believe that it may find an exit by the nose just as it does by the mouth. Hence the nostrils of a dead or dying man are sometimes held or closed (along with the mouth) to keep his soul in, either to benefit the man or to prevent its issuing forth and carrying off the souls of others.¹² In Celebes fish-hooks are attached to a sick man's nose to catch the issuing soul.¹³ Eskimo mourners or those who prepare the body for burial plug the nostrils, lest the soul should find an exit and follow the dead.¹⁴ Instances of a savage sleeping with nose and mouth covered to prevent the soul leaving are known. Again, as the breath from the mouth may contaminate sacred objects, so also may breath from the nose. Hence both are covered in certain rites.¹⁵

5. For nose-bleeding many medico-magical cures are current among the folk—holding a living spider twisted up in a linen cloth to the nose (Roumania); the use of the Bible and key (England); the use of a bloodstone, allowing the blood to fall on it, then placing it down the back; as the blood dries, so does

¹ Callaway, p. 222 ff.

² W. Bosman, in J. Pinkerton, *General Collection of . . . Voyages*, London, 1803-14, xvi. 478.

³ Turner, *Nineteen Years in Polynesia*, p. 348.

⁴ Seligmann, p. 189 f.

⁵ W. Mariner, *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*, London, 1817, i. 456.

⁶ R. F. Burton, *Wit and Wisdom from W. Africa*, London, 1865, p. 373; E. Shortland, *Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders*, do. 1856, p. 131.

⁷ Cf. PR I. 241; PC³ i. 102; Lane, ii. 16.

⁸ FL xv. [1904] 76.

⁹ FLR iv. [1831] 94.

¹⁰ Grimm, iv. 1785, 1788, 1843.

¹¹ See FLR iv. [1831] 94; FL xlii. [1902] 60, xv. [1904] 94, xvi. [1905] 76, xxiii. [1912] 402, xxiv. [1913] 90, 227.

¹² E. Modigliani, *Un viaggio a Nias*, Milan, 1890, p. 233; M. Radriguet, *Les derniers Sauvages*, Paris, 1852, p. 245 (Marseillais); *Annales de la Prop. de la Foi*, xxxii. [1860] 420 (New Caledonians); A. d'Orbigny, *L'Homme américain*, Strassburg, 1840, ii. 241, 257 (Tonamas, Cayuvavas).

¹³ GB², pl. II, *Taboo*, London, 1911, p. 20.

¹⁴ *Bulletin of American Museum of Nat. Hist.* xv. [1901] pt. 1 144; 6 RBEW [1858], p. 613 f.; 2 RBEW [1892], p. 425.

¹⁵ See MOCRU, § 3; ERE iv. 602^a.

¹ Y. Hirn, *The Origins of Art*, London, 1900, p. 208.

² O. Hovorka von Zderas, *Mitteilungen der anth. Gesellschaft in Wien*, xxv. [1895] fasc. 4 and 5; see also *L'Anthropologie*, vii. [1896] 234.

³ *L'Anthropologie*, vii. 234.

⁴ Xenophon, *Anab.* iii. ii. 9; Arist. *Prob.* xxxiii. 7.

⁵ Theophr. vii. 96, xviii. 16.

⁶ HN xxviii. 2; Apul. *Metam.* ii. 211.

⁷ PR I. 240 f.; W. Ward, *A View of the Hist., Literature, and Religion of the Hindoos*, London, 1817, i. 142. In one of Somadava's tales the spirit of the air says, 'When he enters into his private apartment, he shall sneeze a hundred times; and if some one there does not say to him a hundred times, "God bless you," he shall fall into the grasp of death.'

⁸ Lane, ii. 16.

⁹ Sad Dar, vii. 1 ff. (SBE xxiv. [1855] 265).

¹⁰ JE ii. 255.

¹¹ J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1882-83, iii. 1116, iv. 1637; PC³ i. 102.

¹² Grimm, iii. 1116.

¹³ Sermo S. Elgii, in Grimm, iv. 1737.

the bleeding (Cambridgeshire); writing the name on one side of a piece of lime-wood and the letters O R on the other, then burning it (17th century).¹

6. The phrase in Ezk 8¹⁷ in connexion with sun-worship—'they put the branch to their nose'—has been explained with reference to the Zoroastrian use of the *barsom* (*q.v.*), or to an earlier Magian rite identical with it.²

For nose-flutes see MUSIC (Primitive and Savage), § 5 (3).

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III. *SNEEZING*.—R. G. Haliburton, *New Materials for the Hist. of Man*, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1883; *PC*³ i. 97 ff.

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NOVATIANISTS.—This is the name given to the adherents of Novatian, a distinguished Roman theologian and presbyter of the 3rd century. His case is remarkable in that his secession had nothing to do with his teaching, but was the result of disputes, personal and disciplinary, within the orthodox Churches of Rome and Carthage; it is remarkable also as an instance of a characteristic doctrine being developed to justify a separation which had already been carried out. To understand the schism, it is necessary to consider the events in Rome and Carthage of the years 250 and 251. One of the first victims of the Decian persecution was Fabian, bishop of Rome, who suffered on 20th Jan. 250. During the crisis his place could not be filled, and there is evidence of a struggle among the leading presbyters for the direction of the policy of the Church and the ultimate succession to the bishopric. The first to take the lead was a grossly illiterate person, the author of *Ep. viii.* in the collection of St. Cyprian's letters. That letter was the beginning of Cyprian's troubles. It was addressed by the presbyters of Rome to the presbyters of Carthage, and advised them to act as if both sees were equally vacant. Cyprian had (in obedience to a vision, as he believed) secreted himself at a distance from Carthage, and the spokesman of Rome regarded this as an abdication which was as effectual as the martyrdom of Fabian to make his see headless. It is needless to enter into the dispute in Carthage, where the bishop and the majority of the presbyters were soon at strife over the terms on which Christians who had lapsed into paganism through fear of death should be restored to communion. Cyprian took a sterner line than the clergy. The confusion at Carthage became intolerable, and it was largely due to the encouragement which Rome had given to the clergy against their bishop. There was a change in Roman policy, and therefore also a change in its spokesman. Novatian became the leader. He had strong claims to the position, and therefore also to succession, when an election should be possible, to the see. He was a distinguished theologian, and the only one of the Roman clergy, so far as is known, who could speak with authority on the topic. His orthodoxy was above suspicion; his doctrine was derived from that of Tertullian, on which he had made a certain advance. It is true that his Christology, like that of all theologians before Chalcedon, was in some measure tentative and contained hints which might be developed into conclusions that were, in the future, to be regarded as heretical; but it would be an anachronism to suppose that he

or any of his contemporaries dreamed that anything was wrong with it. His life was as far above suspicion as his doctrine; the charges that were to be brought against him in the struggle for the bishopric of Rome are disproved by the fact that they had never been advanced against him as a presbyter. He was regarded as a grave, learned, and consistent minister and teacher. Especially it must be noted that his doctrine on the point where he was, as a schismatic, to vary from the normal teaching of the Church was as yet precisely that of St. Cyprian. The bishop of Carthage insisted that the penitence of the lapsed must be tested before they were restored to communion. So taught Novatian also, who gave his full approval, when writing as representative of the Roman Church, to the measures which Cyprian was taking. As yet he had not discovered that the Church was powerless to pardon such sin. He was, in fact, no rigorist. We learn from Cyprian (*Ep. lv.*) that he took the more lenient view, and that generally held, concerning the restoration of penitent adulterers to communion.

It was thus as a normal Churchman that he stood as a candidate for the see of Rome. His rival was Cornelius, an equally respected presbyter of Rome, apparently of longer standing. The election was held, after the slackening of persecution, in March 251. We know nothing of the proceedings, save that both candidates claimed to have been duly elected, and that both were consecrated by bishops who were their supporters. Those who thus sanctioned the election of Cornelius were much more numerous than those who upheld Novatian; but the rights of the latter, if he were duly elected, were not diminished by the fact that the bishops who consecrated him were few in number. There was no recognized court to which the rivals could appeal; the validity of the successful candidate would in due time be demonstrated by the adhesion of the Roman community. At first it seemed that Novatian's chance was good. The majority of the confessors, those who had suffered in the late persecution, were on his side, and they were the most respected members of the Church. But local opinion was guided in great measure by the decision of the leading churches elsewhere. Both rivals at once sent clerical messengers to the great sees to announce their election, and the holders of those sees had at once to make up their minds. Not only the emissaries but other Christians from Rome would certainly visit their cities, claiming communion on the ground of commendatory letters from either Novatian or Cornelius; and the letters of one or the other must be repudiated. The two great Eastern sees decided differently. Fabius of Antioch took the part of Novatian. His character and motives are above suspicion, and, since he had evidence before him which is now lost, we must assume that there was a good deal to be said on behalf of Novatian's claim that he had been duly elected. Dionysius of Alexandria took the opposite course and supported Cornelius. But he bore himself with Christian courtesy in a strife which engendered much bitterness. He suggested to Novatian that he should retire in the interests of peace from a position which he had unwillingly assumed. But Novatian's 'nolo episcopari' may have only been an expression of conventional propriety; and in any case Novatian might reply that he could not desert his supporters or sanction, by withdrawing his claim, Cornelius's assumption of an office to which he had not been lawfully elected. But Dionysius had not suggested that the affair should be compromised by a resignation of both competitors, and can hardly have expected that his kindly effort should succeed. Its tone, however, proves that he disregarded the

¹ *FLJ* ii. [1884] 219; *FL* xvi. [1905] 160, xxiii. [1912] 233, 349; many other instances in W. G. Black, *Folk-Medicine*, London, 1883.

² See J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913, p. 189 f. He rejects C. H. Toy's correction of the text (*EBJ* ii. 1463), 'they are a stench in my nostrils.'

attacks on Novatian's character that were being made by his rival. There remained one Church whose importance and whose nearness to Rome rendered it necessary for each candidate to gain its adherence. It was that of Carthage. We have seen that Cyprian, its bishop, had been involved in grave difficulties with his clergy, in which Rome, led by Novatian, had taken his side. But Cyprian was still engaged in warfare with the majority of his clergy, he ignoring their existence and they professing (as Rome had once done) that he had vacated his see. The leader of the clergy was Novatus, whose name has been confused by Eusebius and others, to the darkening of the story, with that of Novatian. The two men were known to each other, for Novatus had visited Rome during the vacancy and had been courteously received by Novatian. The latter had approved Cyprian's policy in regard to the lapsed and disapproved the laxity of Novatus and his colleagues. He had also recognized Cyprian as bishop; but there was nothing strange in his welcome to Novatus, for he may well have thought that Cyprian was acting unconstitutionally, or at least harshly, towards the clergy of his Church, and that, in the interests of future peace in Carthage, it was well to keep on good terms with both parties in the conflict. This relation of Novatian with the clergy of Carthage won him their support as soon as Cyprian had adhered to Cornelius. There, as at Antioch and Alexandria, the messengers of both rivals had appeared, and claimed recognition. For a while Cyprian withheld his decision. Cornelius, we know, was made anxious by the delay; probably Novatian was hopeful. But, when Cyprian had made up his mind, he expressed himself with as much vigour as Cornelius could have wished. And it must be said that both Cyprian and Cornelius used to the full the licence of the age. Vituperation was a department of the art of rhetoric as taught in the schools, and need be taken no more seriously when employed by a Christian writer than when Demosthenes or Cicero used it to discredit an opponent. It was the ordinary missile of controversy. The charges against Novatian either related in the main to circumstances of his baptism which had been condoned by the bishop who admitted him to orders, and therefore could no longer be pleaded against him, or were reflexions upon his courage in the persecution, and are refuted by the fact that his chief supporters were the confessors, who must have known how he had borne himself and were the last of men to tolerate in their bishop a lower standard of loyalty than their own. But the breach between Novatian and Cyprian was now impassable, and, in obedience to a principle common to both, each henceforth asserted that the other was outside the Christian Church. Their test of membership was that of communion. Cyprian was in communion with Cornelius, who, according to Novatian, was not bishop of Rome; therefore, according to Novatian, Cyprian was not a bishop of the Catholic Church. According to Cyprian, Novatian, being out of communion with his own Church as represented by Cornelius, its bishop, was out of communion with the whole of Christendom. It was common ground that a local church must have a bishop, and therefore Novatian procured the consecration of one of the party of his ally, Novatus. This party provided the new bishop with an organization in working order, and including a majority of the presbyters of Carthage, who had already, and on independent grounds, reached the conclusion that Cyprian had vacated his see and was no longer bishop.

This consecration of the new bishop, Maximus, in Carthage, took place in 252, and from that time

the schism, represented by bishops in Rome and in Carthage who claimed to be the true bishops of those sees, was incurable. At first it seemed that the chances of the two Churches were about equal. But in this year, 252, Fabius of Antioch died, and his successor reversed his policy. And very quickly, actuated by motives of which we are uninformed, the Roman confessors, or at least the great majority of them, transferred their allegiance to Cornelius. There is no reason whatever to think that they were wrong in doing so. But Novatian could not see the matter in that light. He held that he had been validly elected and therefore that communion with himself was a necessity for Christians. Numbers were not the test, and those who deserted him unchurched themselves. He still had considerable support. In 254 we find Marcian, bishop of Arles, the most important see of Gaul, in communion with him, and Cyprian writing (*Ep. lxviii.*) to Stephen, who had lately become bishop of Rome, urging him to initiate a movement at Arles for the consecration of a new bishop there who should be in communion with themselves. We do not know the sequel, but there can be no doubt that there, and universally, the Novatianists were excluded, but still claimed to be the true Church and provided for their continuity by consecrating for themselves bishops. That their numbers were considerable and their extension wide is evident, but we have no means of estimating the size of their Church. It is only by accident that we hear of their existence in various regions; e.g., their presence in Spain is proved by the controversial writings against them of Pacian of Barcelona in the second half of the 4th century. They were strongest in Asia Minor, where the Montanists, attracted by their claim to purity, seem to have fused with them; and the nearness of that region to Constantinople gave them weight in the great doctrinal controversies.

With the claim to purity we come to what grew into the *raison d'être* of Novatianism, though, in fact, so far as Novatian was concerned, it was an afterthought, and not the occasion of his action. We have seen that he began by agreeing with Cyprian, and with the general opinion of Christendom, that, though lapse into paganism was a sin of the greatest gravity, it was not unpardonable. But, when his schism was final, though his breach with the Catholic Church was due to a dispute upon a historical fact, whether he or Cornelius had been duly elected, it was inevitable that differences should arise, and that he should detect fresh errors in the society which had rejected him. He found one in this very matter of the lapsed. The Church, he came to teach, was defiled by restoring those who had been guilty of such a sin. It did not cleanse them; it shared their guilt. The unpardonable character and the contaminating nature of the sin became for the followers of Novatian a cardinal doctrine; not that they denied God's power to forgive, but they denied His gift to the Church of that power. This contamination was unending; it passed from generation to generation of those who received communion or orders from the persons who had contracted the original defilement. There was thus a second barrier between Novatianists and the Church; the latter had not only erred in rejecting the lawful ministry, and so cut itself off from Christ, but it was also involved in a guilt from which no power on earth could relieve it. As the original, the historical, question lost its interest through the lapse of time, the latter doctrine became the conspicuous differentia of the Novatianist Church.

In all other respects its development followed the same lines as its rival. Novatian's own theology, borrowed from Tertullian, started his Church

on a course of thought which led to full agreement with that which prevailed at Nicæa in 325. It may be that, conscious of rivalry, the smaller body made it a point of honour not to fall behind in doctrine; in any case, the Church of Novatian had its day of triumph when Constantine called in Acesius, its bishop of Constantinople, to advise him as an impartial expert in his dealings with the bishops of the greater Church who were at strife. Acesius's verdict was for the doctrine of Athanasius, and, though he gave no satisfactory answer to Constantine's natural inquiry why, seeing that they believed alike, the two Churches did not coalesce, and had to endure the emperor's taunt, 'Set up your ladder and climb to heaven alone,' he and his followers had earned the gratitude of the orthodox. Therefore, during the dominance of Arianism, from the reign of Constantius to that of Valens, they suffered from persecution equally with the orthodox, and, when the victory of Athanasianism came with Theodosius, they were tolerated and even favoured. They seem, at least in Constantinople and Rome, to have been an educated and influential body, with weight beyond their numbers, though in each city they had several churches. Monasticism grew up among them as early as among the Catholics. Of distinctive practices we hear as little as of distinctive doctrines, apart from the great barriers between them and the rest of orthodox Christendom. There is some evidence that they dispensed with unction at baptism, and some of those who represented the former Montanists retained certain Montanist peculiarities. But the Novatianist community was singularly free from internal differences, and nothing unworthy of its claim to purity is recorded. To a body so respectable and so orthodox in doctrine it was natural that advances should be made, and the Council of Nicæa, in its 8th canon, even offered to recognize the orders of Novatianist clergy.

This was the consistent temper of the Catholics till, with the death of the generation that had known the Arian strife, the Novatianist services to orthodoxy were forgotten. In 412 the Western emperor Honorius issued a severe edict against them, and the popes of the 5th cent. consistently aimed at their suppression. In the East they were suffered to remain in peace a little longer, and the interest in their concerns taken by the historian Socrates has raised the suspicion that he may have been one of their number, and certainly shows that it was safe for a literary man to sound their praise. The storm came in the middle of the century when Cyril in Alexandria and Nestorius in Constantinople, agreeing in intolerance, denied them the opportunity of public worship and strove to force them into conformity. But they maintained their corporate life in many places. There is evidence of Novatianists in the 6th cent., and perhaps in the 7th, and probably it was rather to the general collapse of the ancient society than to the efforts of their adversaries that their final disappearance was due.

LITERATURE.—Eusebius, *HE* (letters of Cornelius and Dionysius); Cyprian, *Epp.*; Pseudo-Cyprian, *ad Novatianum* (printed in Cyprian's works); Socrates, *HE*; Sozomen, *HE*; Pacian, *Opuscula*; numerous references in all the ecclesiastical writers of the 4th and 5th centuries. Modern Church histories and histories of doctrine deal fully with the subject; the best recent treatment is by A. Harnack, in *PRE*³.

E. W. WATSON.

NOVEL.—See FICTION.

NUBA. — 1. Geographical distribution and organization.—The Nuba may be regarded as the Negro or Negroid aborigines of Kordofan, although at the present day the northern half of this area is inhabited by Arabic-speaking tribes professing

Islām, so that Dar Nuba, the country of the Nnba, occupies only the southern half of the administrative province, extending over 2½° of latitude from about 12½° to 10° N. Even so it includes some 50,000 sq. miles, being bounded on the east by the Shilluk territory fringing the west bank of the White Nile, on the south by Lake No and the Bahr el-Ghazal, and on the west by Dar Homr and Darfur. But, since southern Kordofan is a great plain dotted with isolated hills and ranges, and the Nuba are essentially hill people, they actually inhabit only a small part of this area. Although it would be out of place to discuss the mixed Muslim population of the flat country, it may be said that, except in the case of some of the smaller and weaker Nuba hills where intermarriage has taken place, they have not exerted any great influence on the hill-men. Indeed, it is surprising to find that even in northern Kordofan, where the country has come thoroughly under Arab influence, traces of the older religious and social systems persist, while on some hills many inhabitants show Nuba physical characters. On the other hand, there do not seem to be any northern hills on which non-Arabic languages are spoken, even where the remains of the old religious beliefs exist, as, e.g., on Jebel Kaja (about 14° 30' N.). It is far otherwise in the south, where the Nuba, though raided for cattle and slaves, have retained their independence, for even under Dervish rule the Emirs sent against the Nuba did little more than reduce the more exposed hills, in some cases carrying off almost the whole population.

North of the twelfth parallel foreign influence is pronounced; even in Bruce's time¹ Jebel Tegele and Jebel Daier had been overrun from Darfur and Sennar alternately, and had furnished a garrison to the latter province—or kingdom, as it then was. The inhabitants of the hills lying between the eleventh and twelfth parallels, though less sophisticated than their northern neighbours, are by no means as unaffected as the hill-men further south.

It does not appear that any recent physical, cultural, or linguistic influence has been exerted on the southern Nuba by the Shilluk, whose villages form a line along the White Nile to the south-east of Dar Nuba, nor by the Dinka and Nner to the south.

As customs vary from hill to hill, and even in different communities on the same hill, it may be as well to state that the present writer has visited the following hills, Amira, Korindi, Eliri, and Talodi, all in the extreme south of Dar Nuba, and has had opportunities of obtaining information from natives of Kanderima, Kawarna, Tiramandi, and Dilling, the last lying just north of 12° N. lat.

One of the most remarkable features of Dar Nuba is the multiplicity of languages spoken within its bounds. The inhabitants of hills only a few miles apart may speak languages mutually unintelligible, and even on the same *massif*—when this is of moderate size—there may be two or three communities speaking different languages and coming little in contact with one another, though their habits, customs, and beliefs are fundamentally the same.

A good example of the prevailing condition is offered by Jebel Eliri. The Eliri, said to be the original inhabitants of the *jebel*, have been forced to cede the best part of it to the Lafota, who came from the neighbouring Jebel Tekeim. The Eliri have mixed with the 'Arabs' below to some extent, and now inhabit a small village high up on the *jebel*, a few houses close to the Lafota village, and a settlement at the base of the hill. A few Eliri men speak the Lafota dialect, though none of the Lafota profess to understand the Eliri dialect, and only two or three mixed marriages are recorded. On the same *jebel*, about 6 miles to the west, is Talassa, where the Korongo dialect is spoken, the founders of this community being natives of Jebel Korongo who were joined by refugees from various northern hills which had been attacked by the Derrishes.

At least sixteen languages are already known in

1 J. Bruce, *Travels to discover the Source of the Nile, 1768-73*, Edinburgh, 1790.

southern Kordofan, and, if a few of these should prove to be only dialects, this can hardly be the case with the majority.

This brings us to one of the outstanding difficulties connected with the Nuba, viz. their widespread confusion with the Barabra or Berberines, the inhabitants of Nubia north of the fourth cataract—a difficulty which makes it necessary to define the position of the Nuba at some length and as precisely as possible. Apart from the fact that Dar Nuba is even now one of the least known parts of Africa, the confusion is due, at least in part, to writers who have insisted on applying linguistic criteria to determine the ethnological position of the Berberines and the tribes of northern Kordofan. Frederick Müller formed a Nuba-Fulah group of languages to include the Barabra dialects and Fulah. Keane rejected this view almost with scorn, but, on account of similarities in the language, or some of the languages, spoken in northern and central Kordofan to those spoken by the Barabra, did not hesitate to proclaim the essential unity of the Barabra and the tall black Negro hill-men of Kordofan. The confusion may have been increased by the similarity of the names Nuba and Nubia, for German scholars actually speak of the Barabra dialects as 'Nuba Sprache.' In any case it is not difficult, in the light of fuller knowledge of the Nuba themselves and of the history of Kordofan, to explain the similarity of language which misled Keane. This will be referred to later; meanwhile it may be pointed out that the difference between the present-day Barabra and the Nuba of Kordofan, as shown by physical measurements, is confirmed by a whole series of characters not susceptible to expression by measurement. The Nuba is stoutly-built, muscular, and so dark-skinned that he may be called black; the Berberine is of slight, or more commonly medium, build, not particularly muscular, and in skin-colour varies from a yellowish to a chocolate brown. The hair of the Nuba is invariably woolly; that of the Barabra, though approaching the Negro in individual instances, is commonly curly or wavy, and may be almost straight, while the features of the Barabra are not uncommonly absolutely non-Negroid.

Thus there can be no doubt that the two peoples are essentially different in physical characters, and the same holds good on the cultural side. The Barabra scar their faces in the manner common to the Beja and riverain tribes of so-called 'Arabs'; they circumcise their youths and mutilate their girls, but they do not cover the bodies of their women with cicatrices or remove their incisor teeth, nor do their women perforate the lower lip in order to wear a lip-ornament. The Nuba do not circumcise their boys or mutilate their girls, but practise the remaining deformations mentioned.

To return to the language: If the speech of the southern Nuba be compared with dialects (Mahass, Sukkhot, etc.) spoken by the Barabra, it will be found that the inhabitants of the hills of southern Kordofan situated but little north of the Bahr el-Ghazal have a language, or rather a series of languages, with grammatical structure and vocabularies which do not resemble the Berberine dialects. The communities of some of the hills are as yet unaffected by northern influence, as is shown by the fact that the men still go absolutely naked and uncircumcised—the very first result of Arab (Muhammadan) influence being the assumption of at least a minimum of clothing and the adoption of circumcision. The resemblances found between the languages of the Barabra and the Nuba of northern Kordofan are, in fact, due to foreign influence, to which the more northern hill-men have been subjected for a considerable period. It has long been known that the southern Barabra of Dongola Province are keen traders; indeed, the traveller in Kordofan soon comes to recognize that these folk have exerted a sustained and increasing influence for a considerable time. As might be expected, this influence is most marked in the north, where important settlements of Barabra have long existed, but there is no doubt that it has penetrated deep into the heart of Kordofan to a degree not commonly realized, and it is this pacific and mercantile penetration that must be held

responsible for the similarities which have been discovered in the Berberine and Nuba languages. So much evidence in support of this opinion, which apparently has not previously been put forward, will be found in Macbichael's recent work, *The Tribes of Northern and Central Kordofan*, that it will be sufficient to note that passages confirming this view occur in the writings of El Tounsi (referring to about 1784-85), Rüppell (1829), and Pallme (1839).¹ But, although some of the languages of northern Kordofan and even of northern Dar Nuba may show resemblances to the Barabra dialects, the languages of southern Dar Nuba are quite unlike these both in structure and in vocabulary. In the Berberine dialects grammatical changes in both nouns and verbs are produced by suffixes; in the Nuba this is done by initial change. Moreover, in the latter, alliterative assonance prevails to a considerable extent; e.g., the plural of *talanga jôte* (Elkri), 'a good club,' is *malanga môte*.² Turning to the vocabularies of seven languages published by B. Z. Seligman—and for the moment neglecting the most northerly—the most that can be said from the point of view of affinity with Barabra is that there are a few words scattered in the lists which might be connected with Nubian or Arabic. Kawarma, the most northern of the languages investigated, shows a decided Berberine influence.

The position may perhaps best be made clear by a consideration of the numerals. The most southern hills have special words for the first numerals, but form 6 by $x+1$, 7 by $x+2$, etc. This is not a Berberine characteristic, though Kawarma shows a decided Berberine influence especially in the agreement of the initial sounds of the words, while the numerals given by Munzinger for Jebel Daier (about 12½° N.) show merely dialectical differences from the Berberine.

It is then obvious that there is the greatest difference between the languages spoken by the Nuba in the far south of Kordofan and those used further north, the latter closely resembling the Berberine. Moreover, in physical characters and culture the Nuba stand absolutely apart from the Barabra, so that it is perfectly reasonable to conclude that the Berberine characteristics in the languages of the more northern Nuba are due to the gradual penetration of Berberine influence, and are not due to the common origin of Nuba and Berberine.

Each Nuba community is autonomous; there is no division into clans and no restrictions upon marriage other than those imposed by blood-relationship; indeed, nearly all unions take place within the community. Women and children are well treated, property passes in the female line, and girls choose their mates and are allowed the greatest freedom; no bride-price is paid, and either party can break the marriage at pleasure, separations and the formation of new attachments occasioning little or no trouble so long as they are openly declared. This applies to the most southern communities; further north, where a bride-price is paid, matters are less simple.

There is no definite evidence of the existence of totemism, but on Tira el-Akhdar and also on Jebel Lumun there are people who claim descent from leopards, and who will not kill leopards as other folk do. These man-leopards can make themselves invisible at pleasure, and, even if speared, cannot be seen or tracked. No difficulty is made about marrying into the leopard families. Although no man turns into a leopard without good cause, no one will go into a man-leopard's house without an invitation lest he should come upon the owner while skin-changing. On Tira el-Akhdar there are also people descended from a species of snake called *erunga*, which is the family-name of the snake people. These folk can turn into snakes, and, if any one is injured by an *erunga*, one of them spits upon and massages the injured part and the patient gets well. Probably exogamy does not prevail in either leopard or snake families.

The regulation of public life is ultimately in the hands of the rain-maker and certain subordinates who are in fact his executive officers,³ though, in some instances at least, they seem to partake of his spiritual authority and to be his assistants in the rites of his office.

¹ W. P. E. S. Rüppell, *Reisen in Nubien, Kordofan, und den petrischen Arabien*, Frankfurt, 1829; I. Pallme, *Travels in Kordofan*, Eng. tr., London, 1844.

² S. H. Ray considers that certain forms of grammar seem to connect the Nuba languages with those spoken far away to the west and to the south, i.e. the Jolof (Wolof) and somewhat more indefinitely the Bantu.

³ The men usually called *mek* and considered as chiefs in the intercourse between the government and the Nuba are, as a rule, executive officers of the kind indicated.

The Nuba are skilled and energetic cultivators, and possess only a comparatively small number of cattle, so that their herds do not take the great place in their life which cattle occupy in the thoughts and conversation of the Dinka and Shilluk. Nevertheless, only men herd the cattle and milk the cows, and, since on certain hills the initiation-ceremonies of the lads are connected with the cattle and take place in specially prepared cattle-kraals, it seems possible that at one time cattle may have played a larger part in the lives of the Nuba than they do at present.

During recent years, and even now when peace has been established and the fear of Arab raids has been removed, the Nuba cultivate their grain upon the plateaux of their hills, or, if these are insufficient, construct terraces on which to grow *dura*. But there is reason to believe that at one time, before the Baggara pushed their way into central Kordofan and began to raid the south, considerable areas of the plain in the neighbourhood of the hills were cultivated.

At his best, i.e. on those hills which have been strong enough to resist Arab influence, the Nuba is plucky and generous, and, when once his innate suspicion of strangers has been overcome, he is a cheerful companion and makes an excellent host. Both sexes are cleanly, and the condition of their settlements compares most favourably with that prevailing in the villages of the Nilotes. To a certain extent this may be due to the presence of the domestic pig which is found in their hills, but it is, in part at least, due to their being more particular to keep themselves and their huts clean. No rubbish or dirt is allowed to accumulate in the interior of their houses, and the women always wash their hands before grinding *dura* or preparing food.

2. High gods.—Although it is probable that all Nuba believe in an otiose high god, in practice he is overshadowed by the spirits of the dead, except perhaps in connexion with rain-making, while in some instances a powerful ancestral spirit seems to be confused with the high god, or has perhaps usurped his name. Thus, on Jebel Kawarma, Jebel Kanderma, and Jebel Tira el-Akhdar the highest spiritual power is called Elo, but, while some at least of the Kawarma people recognize him as their ancestor who came out of the rock Eldu, and know the site of his grave, the inhabitants of the other two hills do not believe that he was human, and say that he lives in the sky with the rain which he sends. Nevertheless the Kawarma folk invoke Elo at a ceremony held at the beginning of the rains, which has as its purpose the increase of the cattle. A bullock is killed and a bowl of native beer is passed round and over the body, while Elo is invoked, 'Elo, we are hungry, give us cattle, give us sheep.' So, at Dilling, while some appeared to regard Belet as an ancestral spirit, some at least of his attributes are those of a god. He sends rain when the rain-maker asks it, and causes the corn to grow; he also gives increase of cattle and men. He inhabits (perhaps only at times) a holy cave called Kulignala which would appear to be regarded as Tvala, 'the other world,' or at least as its entrance. It should be noted that religion appears to be more developed in the northern hills of Dar Nuba than in the extreme south, though there is no reason for attributing this to Arab influence.

On some hills the high god is invoked in oaths, as among the Lafafa, who swear by a sacred fire and by Kalo, who created all things and in whose house (the sky) are the sun and moon.

3. Eschatology and the cult of the dead.—The eschatological ideas of the Nuba, though fairly uniform in principle, vary somewhat from hill to hill.

Generally speaking, the spirit or shade of the deceased is considered to remain in the grave with the body, yet the spirit can and does emerge to visit the village, and is seen by relatives and friends in dreams, but not otherwise. In spite of this it was sometimes said that nothing was known concerning a life after death, and that man was literally 'as the beasts.' It was especially on Jebel Eliri that this view was proclaimed; but, even if some folk of the Lafafa and Eliri communities hold no formal beliefs as to the survival of any spiritual part after the death of the body, the funeral rites of these people would alone suggest that the general opinion is that something persists after death. As a matter of fact, the agnostics were relatively few in number.

The animals killed at and after the funeral are for the benefit of the dead; one informant went so far as to say that, if a bullock, or at least a goat, was not killed, the dead in the family grave would hold the new-comer to be a wretched fellow of no account. The near blood-relations of the deceased alone eat the flesh of these animals, and husband and wife do not partake of the flesh of animals killed for a spouse. If a bullock is killed, it is provided by a son of one of the sisters of the deceased. It appears that the relatives should stay in the house of mourning where the feast is to be held for the whole of the first night after the funeral.

The southern Nuba bury in family-graves shaped like an inverted funnel, the shaft, corresponding to the stem of the funnel, being so narrow that a living man can only squeeze down with his hands above his head. The shaft is 6 to 8 ft. long, and expands below into a circular chamber with sloping sides some 3 ft. high in the centre and perhaps 8 ft. across. In the middle of the floor, i.e. under the opening of the shaft, there is usually a mound of earth about a foot high. Any one lowered down the shaft naturally lands on this. When a burial takes place, a couple of men are lowered into the grave and they receive the body, which is laid (whether on side or back is uncertain) at the periphery of the chamber. It is said that such family-graves occurred at least as far north as Dilling; nevertheless, there is great variety in the mode of burial. Thus, on Jebel Nyema and Jebel Katla Kurun the grave is a short narrow-necked cell in which a single body is interred in the squatting position, while at Beraeis, in the far north of Kordofan, the Nuba ancestors of the present half-breed population buried in the lateral posture with limbs flexed. The body is commonly rubbed with oil before burial, but it is generally buried naked except for bead-ornaments. Various objects may be placed in the grave, including a hoe; those which are not of iron are broken, while iron ones (perhaps these, too, are destroyed) are removed the next time the grave is opened, and the iron is worked up into new implements, which become the property of the sons of the sisters of the deceased. The more important the man, the greater the number of things buried with him, and at Talodi it is said that, when a really notable man is buried, his *angareb* and shield are placed on his grave. Most of the graves actually seen had one or more gourds or pots upon them; often these had been purposely holed. The whole matter of death ceremonial was summed up by a native of Jebel Tamtam who said, 'The stronger the man, the more important he is both in life and after death.' Hence, in most communities, when an ordinary man dies, there is only one big feast, which is held soon after his death, but for important men two or three feasts are held at intervals of about a year. These feasts appear to be made in or near the house of the deceased.

At Dilling the spirits of the dead are thought to

visit the living, especially at the time of the *dura* harvest. When the *dura* is cut, every widow believes that the spirit of her husband will come to her that night, so she sends her children away and prepares food and drink. She puts a clean mat upon the floor and sleeps naked upon it as if with her husband. A woman does this only for her first husband, and, although there is no idea of any congress with the spirit, her husband (if she has married again) would not remain in the hut. Mothers prepare food and a bed for a dead child in much the same way.

On Jebel Kawarma live sheep, often as many as ten, are said to be put in the grave with the body as well as a hoe and other objects. The sheep are not tied up. The bead-ornaments commonly worn are left upon the body, which is wrapped in the skin of a pig killed for the purpose. The spirit remains in the grave and delights to look after the sheep, yet it comes out at times and may then be seen in dreams. If a 'big' man is seen in a dream, his relatives may pour a pot of *merissa* on the grave and sacrifice an animal at the door of his house, the latter custom possibly being due to Arab influence.

The matrilineal habits of the Nuba are specially well marked in their burial rites. Both men and women are buried with their mother's relatives. The men of Jebel Eliri were at first reluctant to show their burial-places. This was the more remarkable because no difficulty was made in talking about death and burial customs. It was explained later that it was not customary to show the graves to strangers, and that the people themselves did not visit them.

On Jebel Korindi it was thought that death might be due to the dead calling the living to join them, and in one case an *angareb* with the dead body upon it was taken round to the houses of certain deceased who were supposed to have called the dead person to them.

4. Rain-makers and rain-making.—The rain-maker is the most important man in each community, and the regulation of public life is ultimately in his hands, though he will scarcely be heard of by strangers until they have gained a considerable measure of the confidence of the people. In the old days the rain-maker was not allowed to go to war, and every effort was made to protect his person against accident, the reason for this being that each succeeding rain-maker incarnates the spirit of a great and long-dead predecessor. The rain-maker is not the only practitioner of magic; there are experts in other departments, but these have nothing like the same influence and do not at present demand consideration. Far below the rain-maker in importance there are certain men who are more or less responsible for the temporal government of the community, and who formerly led the fighting men of their *jebel*, though assuredly they would do nothing in opposition to the wishes of the rain-maker. When the rain-maker drinks and eats with other important men, he takes the first sip or mouthful and then tells the others to begin; this makes even a small quantity of food sufficient for all. On Jebel Eliri he keeps the large fire-sticks with which to make the fire on which oaths are sworn 'by this fire and by Kalo,' and the plaintiff must pay him a fee before he will produce the sticks and kindle the fire.

In some communities, as at Dilling, the rain-maker may not leave the hill, while on Eliri he may go no further than the grave of his great predecessor Geberatu (whose spirit is immanent in him), where he performs the rain ceremony.

The power of the rain-maker and the other departmental experts of the Nuba is due to the

immanence in their bodies of the spirit of a great predecessor in their own department of magic; thus Koko, the rain-maker of the Lafafa of Jebel Eliri, is supposed to have in him the spirit of Geberatu,¹ who lived three generations ago, and the remains of whose homestead still exist at the base of Jebel Eliri. According to the commonly accepted belief, the spirits of the dead cause the ancestral spirit of the expert, *i.e.* the spirit of the great predecessor, to become immanent in the new expert. It is held that this occurs while the future expert is quite young, and the writer has more than once been told how a mother will wake up in the night to find that her child is not by her side, though he is there in his old place in the morning. She tells her friends, and it may be thought that the spirits have taken her child to make him an expert. It is believed that the spirits come to the experts in dreams and help them, but informants frankly admitted that they knew nothing about this, for, as one of them said, experts are not given to relating their experiences. The rain-maker may be a woman, as is the case on Jebel Kawarma at the present time, and as among the Lafafa three generations ago, when Nalu, the grandmother of Koko, was rain-maker.

At Dilling the rain is called *ara*, and each rain-maker has immanent in him the spirit of Orsera, the first rain-maker. Soon after the death of a rain-maker his spirit becomes immanent in his successor, possessing him by night and causing him to shiver, groan, and shout. The next morning the assistants of the dead rain-maker are told that the *oro* (*i.e.* the ancestral spirit immanent in rain-makers of the tribe) has come to him. They take him to the holy cave Kulignala, which he enters and where he speaks with Belet. When he comes out, they put round his neck a very old piece of (woven?) material which is kept in the cave, and at the same time he is given certain sacred spears (*oro*) and a metal bracelet, said to have been the property of Belet, which are taken to Kulignala whenever a rain-maker dies. The rain-maker keeps these spears in a special house, and uses one of them to kill the sacrifice at the rain ceremony. The house of the dead rain-maker is destroyed, and a new house built on the same site with fresh materials; for, if the rain-maker were to live in the house which belonged to his predecessor, he would soon die.

The accounts of the technique of rain-making given below show very considerable variations on different hills or different groups of hills. Each community 'makes' its own rain, and no one seems to have realized that one rain-maker would be sufficient for each *massif*. On the contrary, the greatest wonders are told of rain-makers only a little way off. Thus, the Lafafa people believe that the rain-maker of Jebel Tekeim on the Eliri *massif* is associated with a 'red' snake, whose form he is said to assume at will. According to

¹ The writer first heard of Geberatu as a long-dead hero of extraordinary wisdom and foresight, who generations ago led the Lafafa up the *jebel*, and it is certain that to most of the Lafafa Geberatu is the mighty hero of a remote and almost legendary age. When the name of the first rain-maker is asked, the answer is invariably the same, 'Geberatu,' yet Nalu, the sister of Geberatu, is still alive, though she is an old woman; and on the Lafafa plateau there are still standing the remains of walls said to have belonged to a group of huts occupied by Geberatu after he and his people left their settlement on the plain below. Nalu, with whom the writer talked in 1910, cannot be more than 60 or 70 years old. It was not possible to discover how many years separated her birth from that of Geberatu, but, as she and the rain-maker had one mother, the maximum can scarcely have been more than 25 years; probably it was less, and Geberatu must have been in his prime not more than 50 or 60 years ago. Thus, although Geberatu died within memory of living folk, and although his near relatives are still alive, the identity of the rain-maker is fast being forgotten, and for it there is being substituted the figure of a legendary hero, gifted with extraordinary wisdom and foresight.

the Lafofa, the Tekeim people, to obtain rain, take milk and put it in a special hole high on a hill, where it is taken by the snake or rain-maker in his snake form.

In connexion with the rain-making snake of this hill, it was extremely interesting to find at Jebel Kaja, in the far north of Kordofan, among a people who have been Muhammadans for some generations, that, though it is recognized that Allah sends the rain, a ceremony is held in honour of or to propitiate Abu Ali, a great ancestor and rain-maker who did not die but disappeared, and whose spirit still possesses folk at the ceremony. But Abu Ali is also a great snake; indeed, in some villages of the Kaja massif he is known only in that form, and, although he has not been seen since the Mahdiya, the yearly ceremony is performed in and before a special hut built by the crevasse on the sacred hill which was his place. A goat is killed and its blood smeared upon the rocks, its flesh being cooked at a fire newly made with fire-sticks, and eaten by those concerned in the ceremony who become possessed by Abu Ali, who was described as 'riding' them.

At Talodi the rain-maker keeps in his house a potsherd on which lie three fragments of *dura* grinding-stones and one fragment of one of the larger stones on which the grain is ground. To bring rain, he pours water on these stones inside his house and kills a ram or pig, cutting its throat in the central court of his house. The blood is caught in a gourd and brought outside the house, when first the rain-maker and then the people take some of the blood in their hands and fling it in the air towards the sky, and into the rain-maker's house. Then the rain-maker takes a gourd of water and throws its contents towards the sky. Before he does this, the people howl as on joining battle, and the women shriek; only the rain-maker is silent, praying inwardly. The rain should come the same day, or at most in two or three days. When it comes, the potsherd and the stones on it are brought out of the dark corner where they have been kept, and placed where the water from the roof will drip on them during the whole of the rainy season. Then, when the crops are cut, the stones are brought inside the house.

The rain-maker should stay in the house all the rainy season, leaving it only when absolutely necessary. A rain-maker will not give strangers (or any people other than members of his own family) anything to eat or the rain will not fall. The rain-maker takes *merissa* with others, but drinks first, and this blesses the liquor.

The site of the rain-making ceremony of the Lafofa is at the foot of Jebel Eliri, where among the ruins of what was once a considerable settlement there are certain remains which are associated with Geberatu. These are: (1) the foundation of his house, showing remains of large pots and of his granaries; (2) his grave; (3) a slab of rock near by, bearing the foundations of a hut in which, it was said, Geberatu made his rain-medicine. These remains are excessively holy, and it was only after prolonged negotiations that the writer was allowed to visit them, and certain preliminaries (said to be those preceding the rain ceremony) were necessary. These included the sacrifice of a goat, which was eaten where it was killed in the pass above the remains, its blood being sprinkled on the rocks at the side of the track. It was not possible to ascertain anything as to the procedure of rain-making on this hill, but it appeared that a special hut or shelter (perhaps temporary and destroyed after use) would be erected not far from the site of the hut used by Geberatu for making rain, and in this the rain-maker would perform his office.

At Dilling before the rain-making ceremony a clean vessel filled with beer is left overnight for Belet in his sacred cave. In the morning the bowl is empty, and it is supposed that Belet has drunk it.

The following is an account in outline of the rain-making ceremony, but it must be remembered that it was given by a man standing in no specially close relationship to the rain-maker.

The rain-maker builds a special house, henceforth regarded as sacred, and provides a white cock and a virgin she-goat of any colour. His assistants make a hole in front of the sacred house and let the blood of the cock and of the goat run into the hole; the skin, feathers, bones, and bowels also go in. This is all done privately by night, and at the same time the rain-maker puts some of his own *dura* and *merissa* in the hole. Then, as it is believed, the rain-maker goes the same night to the cave Kullgala and there communes with Belet. After this

the rain comes; if the *dura* put in the ground by the rain-maker comes up well, all the country will have a good crop. The flesh of the goat and fowl is eaten by his assistants and by certain old men.

5. Magic and departmental experts.—Although the rain-maker whose prayers bring the rain is the spiritual and temporal head of the community, yet he has not universal control, for there are other departments each of which has, or may have, its own expert. On Jebel Eliri there are only two, but there is a larger number on more northern hills. On Jebel Eliri, where there is a 'sickness expert' and a 'grain expert,' the former, Deboi by name, is much looked up to, but little consideration is shown to the grain expert, perhaps because he is an old and feeble man belonging to the weak Eliri community. The position occupied by Deboi is particularly interesting, though it is difficult to appreciate its significance. With the possible exception of a few old men who are his relatives, he eats alone, and he always drinks alone; no one would touch *merissa* from which he has drunk, for he has the *korgo* (control?) of sickness and his mouth is 'hot.' Yet he is obviously a man respected and feared; he exacts what seem enormous fees for curing people (whoever he treats is assuredly cured, so many say), and does not hesitate to refuse to treat people who seem unlikely to get well. The writer feels tolerably confident that the awe in which Deboi is held is not due to his practising magic to induce disease or death, yet he cannot account for it, nor could his informants explain it. Probably the explanation of the matter is to be found in the remark that 'the stronger the man, the more important he is both in life and after death,' and Deboi is certainly one of the most striking people upon the hill.

When a man is sick, some one, usually his *imbib* (mother's brother, sister's son), takes some iron to the smith. This the latter makes into a bracelet, receiving a comparatively small fee of *dura* or something equivalent in value for his pains. The *imbib* takes the bracelet to Deboi, who puts it in the ashes of his sacred fire. Next morning the *imbib* conducts the patient to Deboi, taking with him a sheep or *dura* and beans. The patient does not go into Deboi's house, but sits down under the tree near the special fire which Deboi has lighted early in the morning by rubbing together two pieces of wood. The *imbib* takes the offering into the house and Deboi bleeds the patient, the blood being buried in the ground. He then takes ashes from the special fire and rubs the wounds, mumbling charms meanwhile; he also puts the iron bracelet, now regarded as a potent amulet which must never be removed, on the patient's wrist. He then washes his hands and sprinkles the patient's whole body with the water, telling him to go away, for he is cured. After ten days, when the patient is better, he goes back to Deboi, who awaits him under the tree where he has again kindled a fire: Deboi pours some water over the patient's head and tells him to go and have his head shaved. Young men go to Deboi before the ceremonial heating at the end of their first period of seclusion; he pours sour milk on their bodies, and they smear ashes of the fire on themselves to prevent them from feeling pain.

The corn expert is an old and decrepit man, a native of the Eliri community. He has in his house in special gourds a supply of *dura* of his own growing, which is mixed with the seed *dura* of the people of Eliri and Lafofa before planting. Both the sickness and the corn expert have within them an ancestral spirit, namely that of the original departmental expert; but, though iron-working on Jebel Eliri is conducted in a small rock-shelter by one man, who besides smelting the ore performs a certain rite to ensnare a good smelting year, the writer could not discover that any ancestral spirit was thought to be immanent in him. At Dilling besides the rain-maker there are corn, sickness, and war experts, in each of whom an ancestral spirit is immanent.

6. Oaths.—Reference has been made above (§ 2) to the form of oath used among the Lafofa on Jebel Eliri. On Jebel Kavarma oaths are sworn upon a very old spear-blade kept by the rain-maker. The man taking the oath licks the blade, and, holding it to his throat, says, 'If I swear

falsely, may I be killed!' Sacred spears also exist at Dilling, but the writer cannot say whether oaths are taken upon them as they are upon special iron bracelets and perhaps other metal objects which are the property of the rain-maker whose insignia they probably are. At Tasume on Jebel Talodi men swear by the earth, the formula being, 'By this earth in which I shall be buried.'

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NUBIA.—See ABYSSINIA.

NUMBERS.

Introductory (T. DAVIDSON), p. 406.

Aryan (A. B. KEITH), p. 407.

Semitic (W. CRUICKSHANK), p. 413.

NUMBERS (Introductory).—1. **Origins.**—From our observation of the minds of children in learning arithmetic, as well as from the evidence gained among savage races, we may conclude that numeration ultimately depends upon the evidence of sense. The very names still used to denote lengths, such as 'hand,' 'foot,' 'span,' show how the art of mensuration had its origin, and it is equally certain that arithmetic began by counting on the fingers and toes—by fives, tens, and twice tens, or twenties (quinary, decimal, and vigesimal notation). The next step to the primitive mind was the formation of numeral words, which served as numerals after their original sense was forgotten. Numeral figures began by the adoption of special marks for the fives, tens, hundreds, etc., leaving the simple strokes for the few units left over, as in ancient Egypt and Assyria, and our present Roman numerals. Another device was to employ the letters of the alphabet in their order to stand for numbers, as in the sections of Ps 119, which are numbered by the letters of the Hebrew alphabet. Or the initial letter of the word for the several numbers might be used, as in the Greek inscriptions, χ (χίλια), 1000, etc. The Roman C has been understood to be the initial of *centum*, M, of *milie*. The history of the word 'calculate' (Lat. *calculus*, 'pebble') throws a light on the ancient use of pebbles for counters—a method of figuring systematized in the Roman *abacus*, with lines of holes for pegs, the Chinese *swan-pan*, with balls strung on wires, to be found in our own infant-schools. The last stage is the invention of the sign for zero, or nothing, to show the empty column in the *abacus*, whether due to the Arabs, as we suggest in speaking of 'Arabic numerals,' or to the Indians, as ascribed by the Arabs themselves. The quinary system is frequent among the lower races, among whom we find also the vigesimal system, but the more developed races show a preference for the more convenient intermediate decimal system. The Roman numerals, i., ii., . . . v., vi., . . . x., xv., etc., form a quinary system; the Gaelic 'one, ten, and two twenties'=51, a vigesimal; and we find a vigesimal system surviving in the midst of a decimal system, as in the French *quatre-vingt-treize*=93. The introduction of the late Latin *dozena* (Lat. *duodecim*) shows an apprehension of the practical advantage of counting by dozens. And we see a striking example of the vitality of an older system of numerals in the survival to this day of the so-called 'Anglo-Cymric score,' a corrupted form of the Welsh numerals in doggerel rhymes, still used in Cumberland for counting sheep, and by children in their games in many parts of Great Britain and even America. Our own system of numerals is decimal, yet we find such survivals as 'three-score-and-ten'=70. The scheme of grammatical number (singular, dual, plural), as in Hebrew, Greek, etc., has been ingeniously and plausibly explained as a survival of

a primitive stage of thought when all beyond two was an idea of indefinite number.

2. **Significance.**—In the folklore of many peoples we find evidences of peculiar sanctity attaching to certain numbers, notably 7, 10, 70, and in a lower degree, 3, 4, 5, 12, 40, and 100. In Scripture we find that some of the numbers are meant to be taken representatively rather than determinatively. The numbers 7, 10, 40, 100 are regarded as giving the idea of completeness—a notion found in the speculations of Pythagoras, the Gnostics, and even St. Augustine. Philo explains the six days of the Mosaic creation as not so much a chronological succession as an order attached to created things; 6 is chosen on account of its perfection, and because it contains the male and female principles, being the product of 3 and 2, the first of the odd and even, or the male and female, numbers. The number 7 is an image of God, and is impressed on the universe, as well as on the bodily and mental constitution of man; 2 is the image of matter, being divisible; while 3 is the image of solid body, which has three dimensions. But among the numbers up to ten 7 alone neither produces nor is produced, not being formed from any other number by multiplication. Everything in the kosmos is enamoured of 7—the idea of the planets, as unity is of the fixed sphere. Such fantastic speculations were carried further by many of the Kabbalists, but their conclusions may be neglected.

'Away with all niceties of Pythagorean calculations; all numbers are alike to me,' says Joseph Hall (*Select Works*, London, 1811, p. 510), 'save those which God himself hath chalked out to us.'

3. **Superstitions.**—Folklore is full of superstitions about lucky and unlucky days. Eschew the fifth day, says Virgil (*Georg.* i. 277, 284), but choose the seventeenth. Hesiod (*Op. et dies*, 823) distinguishes between 'mother-days' and 'step-mother' days. Shakespeare notices the belief that there is luck in odd numbers, but Virgil had already said 'numero deus impare gaudet' (*Ec.* viii. 75), and, accordingly, three threads of three hues are used in the thrice-repeated charm to draw Daphnis home. The number 3, or some multiple of it, is the most popular of mystic numbers in Britain. It enters largely into all prescriptions of folk-medicine, while 7 hardly appears, except with reference to the personal healing powers of a seventh son. It is still counted peculiarly unlucky to be the thirteenth guest at table, or to rent a house numbered 13. And few superstitions have greater vitality than the belief that there is grave danger to life in the attainment of the sixty-third year—the 'grand climacterie' of ancient medicine.

'For the dates of men,' says Sir Thomas Browne, 'are usually cast up by Septenaries, and every seventh year conceived to carry some altering character with it, either in the temper of body, mind, or both. But among all other, three are most remarkable, that is, 7 times 7 or forty nine, 9 times 9 or eighty one, and 7 times 9 or the year of Sixty three; which is conceived to carry with it the most considerable fatality'

(*Pseudodoxia Epidemica*, bk. iv. ch. 12, *Works*, ed. S. Wilkin, London, 1835-36, ill. 48).

4. Mystical numbers.—Another use of numbers has given rise to much perverse ingenuity. Thus the mystical number 666, in Rev 13¹⁸, is now usually read NeRON KeSaR, the Hebrew form of the Latin Nero Caesar:

N R O N K S R
60+200+6+50+100+60+200=666.

It is needless to point out that it may be read equally well as Lateinos, or perhaps other words.

Perhaps the most remarkable example of this fantastic use of numbers is to be found in Sir Thomas Browne's *Garden of Cyrus*. Its aim is to show that the number 5 not only pervades all the horticulture of antiquity, but recurs throughout all plant life, as well as the 'figurations' of animals. 'You have,' says Coleridge, 'quincunxes in heaven above, quincunxes in earth below, and quincunxes in the water beneath the earth; quincunxes in deity, quincunxes in the mind of man, quincunxes in bones, in the optic nerves, in roots of trees, in leaves, in petals, in everything' (*Biographia Epistolaria*, ed. A. Turnbull, London, 1911, l. letter 127 [1804]).

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T. DAVIDSON.

NUMBERS (Aryan).—1. Indian.—(a) *Vedic*.—In Vedic religion and mythology the numbers 3, and its multiples, and 7 occur frequently, and for the most part without any trace of the earlier use of either 3 or 7 as the more primitive unit. In the case of the number of worlds, however, it is clear that 3—heaven, sky, and earth—is the earliest division, from which in the Rigveda is often derived the triplication of each of these, making 9 divisions in all. There is mention, however, of 7 regions and 7 places of the earth in the Rigveda (IX. cxiv. 3, I. xxii. 16), probably derived from the conception of 7 points, which itself is a development of the 4 or 5 of the Rigveda, and the 6 or 7 of the Atharvaveda. That Veda (X. viii. 18) and the *Aitareya* (II. xvii. 8) and the *Pañchavimśa* (XVI. viii. 6) *Brāhmaṇas* agree in using 1000 as the number to describe the distance of the heaven from the earth, whether measured by the day's flight of a bird, or journey of a horse, or by cows placed on the top of one another. There is no clear mention of 7 worlds before the *Mundaka Upaniṣad* (I. ii. 3).

The number of the gods in the Rigveda is often given as 33, divided into 3 sets of 11 each, which once (I. cxxxix. 11) are said to be situated in the heaven, the earth, and the waters, presumably the aerial waters. By a mere freak the number is once given as 3339 (III. ix. 9). In the *Brāhmaṇas* a different conception of the composition of the number 33 appears: the main elements are the 8 *vasus*, 11 *rudras*, and 12 *ādityas*, but the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* adds either (IV. v. 7. 2.) Dyaus and Pṛthivī or (XI. vi. 3. 5) Indra and Prajāpati to make up 33, while the *Aitareya* (II. xviii. 8) adds the *vaśaṭ* call and Prajāpati. The number in the Rigveda and the *Brāhmaṇas* does not include all the gods. Other passages of the *Satapatha* make the gods 7-fold (VI. v. 3. 11) or 3 (XIII. i. 7. 2), but these are mere cases of speculation. The division into 3 worlds leads to an occasional grouping of the 3 chief gods of these worlds: the Rigveda in a late hymn (X. clviii. 12) connects Sūrya and the heaven, Vāta and the air, and Agni and earth; the *Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā* (IV. ii. 12) declares that Agni, Vāyu, and Sūrya are sons of Prajāpati, and, by Yāska's time (c. 500 B.C.), theologians existed who reduced all the gods to one of the triad Agni, Indra or Vāyu, and Sūrya (*Nirukta*, vii. 5). It is not improbable that this triad is to be traced to the simpler conception of the 3 forms of fire—on earth, in the atmosphere, and in heaven—which appears

also to be the explanation of the story of Trita Aptya,¹ and the Avestan Thraetaona. There are also 3 sacrificial deities who are invoked in the *Apri* hymns of the Rigveda—Sarasvatī, Idā, and Bhārati. The number 7, however, is also prominent, especially in connexion with Agni; he has 7 wives, mothers, or sisters, 7 flames, rays, or tongues; the sun has 7 horses; the song for Agni is 7-fold. Rudra, who has 3 mothers already in the Rigveda (VII. lix. 12), is given 8 and 9 names in the *Kaṣṭhaki* (vi. 1 ff.) and *Satapatha* (vi. 1. 3. 7 ff.) *Brāhmaṇas*. The *maruts* are numbered as 3×60 (VIII. lxxxv. 8) or 3×7. The cow, or the dawn as the mother of the cows, has 3×7 names. There is a group of 7 *ṛsis*, who in the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* (II. i. 2. 4) are identified with the stars in the constellation of the Great Bear; 7 demons are also grouped together (Rigveda, X. cxx. 6). The Atharvaveda mentions 7 honeys of the *āsvins*' whip, 7 reins and wheels of time, and 1007 births of Rohita. The rivers and seasons are 7 as well as 5. The number 3, however, appears as that of the heads of Viśvarūpa, son of Tvaṣṭr, and a 99-armed demon is mentioned in the Rigveda (II. xiv. 4). The demons, especially Śambara and Vṛtra, have 90 or 99 citadels, and their numbers sometimes go as high as 30,000 or 100,000. On the other hand, ancient priestly clans of Navagvas and Daśagvas seem to be connected with the numbers 9 and 10 respectively.

The *ādityas* are 12 in the *Brāhmaṇas*, but in the Rigveda no more than 6 are mentioned by name, and the number is given as 7 or 8 only in late hymns (IX. cxi. 3, X. lxvii. 8). In the *Brāhmaṇas* their connexion with the 12 months of the year is obvious: a year of 12 months with 360 days is clearly known in the Rigveda (i. 25 and 164), and the intercalation of a month is also referred to. The theory² that earlier the *ādityas* represented the 7 planets, being borrowed from a Semitic source, is not supported by any evidence. The *4ṛbhus* who sleep for 12 days (Rigveda, IV. xxxiii. 7) in the house of Agohya, perhaps the sun, apparently may represent the seasons: the 12 days may be merely a representation of the months of the year rather than 12 days added to bring a lunar year of 354 days up to a solar year of 366 days, neither of which is known to the Rigveda.³ The 27 *nakṣatras* of the *Samhitās* after the Rigveda, and the 27 *gandharvas*, developed from the one *gandharva* normal in the Rigveda, indicate a scheme of 27 lunar mansions which may be borrowed from a Semitic source. The later *Samhitās* also present the numbers in the light of deities to whom offerings are made at the horse-sacrifice.

In the ritual there is a group of 7 *hotrs*, from whom the conception of 7 *ṛsis* may have been borrowed; the full soma-ritual, however, requires 16 arranged artificially in 4 groups of 4.⁴ Though in the developed ritual all kinds of numbers appear, 3 remains very frequent, animal victims often being offered in threes, as at the horse-sacrifice; 7 or 3×7 stalks of *darbha*-grass are used; there are 7 layers or 21 bricks of the fire-altar. The number 3 is also important for the arrangements of the soma-sacrifice: there are 3 pressings, each accompanied by songs and recitations, 3 soma-tubs, and 3 sacrificial fires. Among the forms of chanting used the 3-fold, 15-fold, 21-fold, and 25-fold are prominent. The number 12 is also important; soma-sacrifices up to 12 days' length were classed as *ahina*-sacrifices, those of 12 days might be either

¹ See A. A. Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology* (= *GIAP* m. I. A, Strassburg, 1897), pp. 67 ff., 93 f.

² H. Oldenberg, *Religion des Veda*, Berlin, 1894, p. 185 ff.; *ZDMG* xlix. (1895) 177 f., l. [1896] 60 ff.

³ A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keltb, *Vedic Index*, London, 1912, II. 413; Keith, *JRAS*, 1915, pp. 131-133.

⁴ The Iranian ritual has 8; cf. Oldenberg, p. 383 ff.

¹ Traces of an earlier belief in 10 gods are seen by E. W. Hopkins, *Oriental Studies*, pp. 150-154; but for this view there are no adequate grounds.

ahinas or *sattras*, and those above 12 days were *sattras*, based on the 12-day form as a norm. In the *Mahad Uktha* of the *Gavāmāyana* ceremony the litany was made up of 3 sets of eighties of triplets. The number 7 is of importance in the marriage ritual in the form of the 7 steps which, when taken, render the marriage securely concluded. A period of 9 days' impurity follows after childbirth; the naming of the child on the 10th day ends the impurity. In the funeral rites, after a death the relatives in some cases had to sleep for 3 days on the ground; when the *pitṛmedha* was performed, the place of burial was thrice circumambulated, 3 stones were thrown into a hole in the ground, and 7 furrows were dug. The favourite day for offerings was the 8th of certain months, though the 9th was sometimes chosen.

Vedic magic is also full of references to 3, 7, and 21 as numbers; of special interest is the enumeration of 55, 77, and 99 in a charm in the *Ātharvaveda* (vi. 25). In another passage (xix. 47) the numbers 11, 22, 33, 44, 55, 66, 77, 88, and 99 are enumerated, but their signification is obscure.¹ Mention is also made of 53 sorceries, 100 sorcerers, and 7 charms. The 55 and 77 may be compared with the 55 and 78 steeds offered at the horse-sacrifice by Bharata on the Gaṅgā and the Yamunā (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, XIII. v. 4. 11).

(b) *Post-Vedic*.—Of the many mentions of number in post-Vedic religion and mythology only a few have any special characteristic. In the epic and in *Manu*² appears for the first time the doctrine of 4 ages: each has a dawn and a twilight of a tenth of its whole duration, and the periods of the main portions of the 4 are 4000, 3000, 2000, and 1000 years respectively, though the exact length of each year is obscure. The total is 12,000 years. The geography of the world is also stereotyped in the theory of 7 concentric continents,³ and an elaborate doctrine of hells⁴ is developed: the *Mārkaṇḍeya* and *Padma Purāṇas* give 7, the *Mahābhārata* 6, *Manu* and *Yājñavalkya* and the *Āgṇi Purāṇa* 21, and the *Bhāgavata* and *Viṣṇu Purāṇas* 28. The importance of the number 4 appears in the definite acceptance of 4 Vedas and 4 orders of life in place of the simpler 3—student, householder, and ascetic—of the Vedic texts. The quarters now number 8 and are provided with deities, the 8 *lokapālas*. Moreover, the gods now appear in sculpture with more than a normal number of heads and arms. *Brahmā* is 4-headed, probably to signify his omniscience and omnipresence, which is an inheritance from Vedic conceptions of *Puruṣa* and *Prajāpati*. *Śiva*, again, has, besides 5 heads, 3 eyes, which may be connected with his epithet *Tryambaka*, 'having three mothers,' in Vedic texts. He has 1008 names to *Viṣṇu*'s 1000. His names are, however, in practice usually 8 as against 9 in Vedic times. *Viṣṇu*'s *avatars* are given at 10, 20, or 22, not with multiples of 3.

The triad of *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu*, and *Śiva* as creator, preserver, and destroyer of the universe is probably later than a conjunction of *Viṣṇu* and *Śiva* under the name *Harihara*, and in any case cannot be traced beyond the latest portions of the epic and the *Purāṇas*.⁵ Nor does it appear ever to have been anything but a philosophic view.

(c) *Buddhist and Jain*.—In Buddhist literature we find frequent references to the gods as *tīḍasa* or *tāvatiṃsa*, 30 or 33. The former term is also used in the epic and probably must be explained as merely a more convenient expression for the 33 of

the more regular use; that it means 13¹ is quite incredible. In the accounts of the Buddha the number 7 recurs with remarkable frequency: the new-born *bodhisattva* takes 7 steps (*SBE* xix. 3 f.); on a 7-gemmed ladder Buddha descends from heaven (*ib.* p. 241); there are 7 jewels of the Buddha (*ib.* xxxvi. 220), 7 sacred places at *Vesālī* and *Rājagaha* (*ib.* xi. 40, 56 ff.), 7 ramparts and 7 rows of palm-trees in King *Sudassana*'s town, 7 terraces in the world *Sukhāvātī*, 7 kinds of instruments, 7 classes of minds, 7 acts which bear fruit even in this life; the earth shook 7 times at *Vessantara*'s largesse; and there are even 7 Buddhas. This list, which could be indefinitely extended, is clear proof that the number 7 is as holy for the Buddhists as for India in general, and the fact that Buddhist hells are 4, 8, 16, and 32 by preference cannot be treated² as a real proof that 8 is the holy number of Buddhism in place of 7 of Hinduism, for 8 has otherwise no special appeal to Buddhism. The number 10 is found in the statement that Buddha is possessed of 10 noble states, 10 powers, understands 10 paths of *karma*, and is endowed with 10 attributes of *arhat*-ship (*ib.* xiii. 141 f.). The *Lalitavistara*³ tells that Buddha left the *Tuṣita* heaven 12 years after it had been predicted that he would do so, and that he chose the 13th of the possible forms presented. More important, however, is the fact that Buddhism is devoted to enormous numbers, especially in the *Mahāyāna* school, but also quite markedly in the *Hinayāna*, such numbers as 84,000⁴ and multiples being quite common (*ib.* xi. 239, xvii. 1 ff., xxi. 1 ff., xlix. [ii.] 2 ff.).

Jainism, with its passion for systematizing, divides the gods into 4 classes, each assigned in definite numbers years of existence of colossal amount (*SBE* xxii. 222 ff.), and it arranges all its tenets under numerical categories in which every number is given full consideration. The 4 noble truths of Buddhism, a conception which has affinities in Indian medicine, are replaced by 9, while Buddhism lays stress on 3 in its triad of Buddha, the *Dharma*, and the *Saṅgha*. The doctrine of 24 *tīrthakaras* in Jainism has a Buddhist analogue, and modern Jainism lays stress on the 4-fold character of the community as composed of monks and nuns and male and female lay adherents respectively.⁵ The number 12 is found in the Buddhist doctrine of causation, where the number of members is so loosely constructed that it is not impossible that the desire to make up the full number had something to do with the production of the chain.

Buddhists and Jains alike share in the ordinary views of sacred numbers of other Indians: the mother of a Jain child is solemnly bathed on the 9th day after birth, the child's name is given on the 12th day, its hair is cut in the 3rd, 5th, 7th, or 9th month of its first year of life, and in the feeding ceremony performed by the maternal aunt the food is given 7 times.⁶

2. *Iranian*.—In Iranian literature the number 3 and its multiples appear together with 7, which is certainly more frequent in the later *Pahlavi* texts than in the *Avesta*. The conception of 3 worlds appears to be reflected in the form of the 3 heavens through which the soul ascends to *Garōnmāna* (*Yast* xxii. 15), while a 9-fold division occurs in the 3 heavens, 3 intermediate spaces, and 3 hells. *Yima* is also said to have enlarged the earth by a third on 3 occasions (*Vendidad*, ii. 11, 15, 19). But the *Yasna* (xxxii. 3) clearly recognizes 7 *karšvars*

¹ Oldenberg, p. 516.

² E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India*, London, 1896, p. 418 ff.

³ G. Thibaut, *Astronomie* (= *GLAP* iii. 9, Strassburg, 1889), p. 21.

⁴ L. Feer, *J.A.*, 1833, i. 112 ff.

⁵ Hopkins, *Rel. of India*, p. 457 ff.

¹ E. Böken, *Die 'Unglückszahl' Dreizehn*, p. 4, n. 4.

² Hopkins, p. 478.

³ See S. Lefmann's tr., Berlin, 1874, p. 11 ff.

⁴ So also often in the *Purāṇas*.

⁵ Mrs. S. Stevenson, *Heart of Jainism*, Oxford, 1915, p. 42.

⁶ *ib.* p. 194 f.

of earth, and it is impossible to prove either from the 10 kinds of men in the *Bundahišn* (xv. 5) or from a reduction of the 16 lands enumerated in the *Fargard* to 10¹ that 9 was the primitive number. From each of the 2 chief streams, in later Parsiism, 9 minor streams are derived. In the *Bundahišn* (i. 8 ff.) is found the doctrine of a world age of 12,000 years divided into 4 periods of equal length; in the *Ardā Viraf* (18, 54), however, the period is 9000, while in Plutarch (*de Is. et Osir.* 47) it is 6000—which suggests that it is not of Aryan origin.²

Among the gods certain traces of triads can be found. Thus Ahura Mazdāh, Aša, and Vohu Manah stand in specially close association (*Ys.* xxx. 9, xxxiii. 6), and Artaxerxes Mnemon joins Ahura with Anāhita and Mithra in his inscriptions. Thraetaona is not to be dissociated from the Vedic Trita; he is credited with 3 sons. The demon, Azi Dahāka, overthrown by Thraetaona has 3 heads (*Yt.* v. 29), like the snake Srobar, who has been compared with the 3-headed Kerberos. Later tradition saw in the 3 maidens mentioned in *Yt.* xiii. 141 f. the mothers of the 3 saviours—which has led to their being compared with the Norns.³ Late texts ascribed a spirit to each of the 30 days of the month (*SBE* v. 401–406), and 33 lords of ritual order appear earlier (*ib.* xxxi. 198, 205). The 24 deities mentioned by Plutarch (*de Is. et Osir.* 47) appear to be unknown in Iranian texts.⁴ According to the *Bundahišn* (xxx. 2 f.), when the end of the world comes near, one taste of consecrated food affords nourishment for 3 days and 3 nights, and in the last 10 years men need no food at all. For 90 days the heavenly powers contend with Ahriman, and after Keresāspa's death 99,999 *fravašis* guard his body (*Yt.* xiii. 61). The 4 regents in the heaven of the *Ishtiya Yast* are probably not primitive. The 7 planets and the 7 powers of the demon Aesma are only recorded late (*SBE* v. 108, 113), but the number of the Amesha Spentas as 7 is already foreshadowed in the close association of the 7 in the *Yasna* (xiv. 10, xlvii. 1).

In the ritual the purification of a woman after childbirth is produced by 3, 6, or 9 drinks of a certain preparation. Death in the house renders it necessary to extinguish the sacred fire for 9 days; the mourners follow the dead to within 90 paces of the burning place; a dog is taken 3, 6, or 9 times over the road along which the body is carried to make it pure. The priest murmurs thrice the 3 words, 'Good thought, good word, good deed.' In the 3 nights after death an account is made of merits and rewards, of faults and punishments.⁵ For the pious man the Chinvat bridge extends to the breadth of 9 spear- or 27 arrow-lengths. Up to the 9th generation the sinner affects his descendants. The number 9 appears also in the ordinary sacrificial ritual: the *Vendidad* (xxii. 20) records the offering of 9 bulls, 9 horses, 9 camels, and 9 of each male kind of lesser animal. The sacred *barsom* is made up of 3, 5, 7, or 9 bundles (*SBE* xxxi. 299). The *Vendidad* (iii. 14) knows of 9 openings of the body, and (xxii. 2) of 9 diseases which are magnified to 99,999. The number 5 is of importance in so far as the Avestan doctrine recognizes 5 divisions of human personality,⁶ but the number 12 is unimportant.

3. Greek.—In Greek religion and mythology the leading numbers are unquestionably 3, 9, and 12, which occur much more frequently than any others. Among the great gods indeed no triad is definitely to be found: the triad Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades (*Il.* xv. 193) seems poetical rather than religious,

and there is no clear evidence that at Eleusis Zeus, Demeter, and Kore formed a triad in close relationship.¹ But among the lesser divinities triads are not rare: 3 Horai appear on an old Spartan relief;² the Erinyes, Eumenides, or Semnai are 3 as early as Euripides (*Or.* 408); the number 9 in the Orphic *Theogony* (frag. 218) appears to be later. Though Hesiod (*Theog.* 273 f.) knows only 2 Graiai, they appear as 3 in Aischylos (*Prom. Vinct.* 795). Hesiod himself (*Theog.* 902) knows of 3 Horai, and the 3 nymphs mentioned by Longos (*Past.* ii. 23) were doubtless a popular view. We hear also of 3 forms of Aphrodite and 3 of Hera. By the time of Plato (*Gorg.* 523 ff.) Aiakos, Rhadamanthys, and Minos had become a triad of judges of the dead, and the number 3 appears often in the mythology, though that number is not specifically distinctive of either the Charites, of whom Homer seems to recognize many, or the Graiai.³ The Muses are 9 in Hesiod (*Theog.* 77 ff.) and the *Odyssey* (xxiv. 60), though elsewhere their number appears as 2, 3, 4, or 7; the Korybantes and Kouretes also appear as 9. The same number appears in the years of exile allotted to Apollo and Herakles, and in the strange story recorded by Pliny (*HN* viii. 81) of the practice in the worship of Zeus Lykaeos for a man of the family of Anthos to go and live for 9 years among the wolves as one of them. The same period of 9 years is allotted to the souls for purification in Pindar's eschatology (frag. 133).

The number 12 is not formally recorded of the gods in Homer, even in the late *Theomachia*; but Hesiod has 12 Titans (*Theog.* 133 ff.), and the *Homeric Hymn* (ii. 128) speaks of Hermes dividing into 12 pieces the two oxen which have been slain, implying a knowledge of the 12 gods. Later the view is accepted generally: Aristophan (*ap. Athen.* 563) represents Eros as a 13th god cast out from the circle of the 12, but Herakles is said to have refused to be included in the 12 since some other must be omitted to provide room for him (Diod. Sic. iv. 39). The narrative in Plato, *Phaedr.* 247 A, implies 13 gods, and Philostratos (*Ep.* 39) declares that the Athenians added Eleos as the 13th god. The labours of Herakles are 12, and in the 13th generation he arises to set free Prometheus. The story of Odysseus is marked by the number 12: he has 12 ships (*Od.* ix. 159), he goes with 12 companions to the cave of Polyphemos (ix. 195), he shoots through 12 axes (xix. 573 f.), and has 12 women working at the mill (xx. 107). After 12 years Erichthonios is the supplanter of Amphiktyon (Apollod. III. xiv. 6). Of Neleus's 12 sons Nestor alone survives (*Il.* xi. 692). The children of Niobe are reckoned at 12 or 14. The number 13 appears in the tale of Ares being fettered for 13 months in a bronze jar in the *Iliad* (v. 387), and in the tale of the wooers of Hippodameia who were slain in seeking her hand.

The number 7 is confined to groups like the Pleiades or the stars of the constellation of the Great and Little Bear. The 50 sons and daughters of Selene and Endymion are possibly also of astronomical origin, the months of the Oktateris. E. Siecke⁴ finds also in the 3 heads of Hermes, Hekate, Kerberos, the Lernaean hydra, and Skylla and in the birth of Hermes on the 4th day of the month allusions to the 3 days of no moon and its birth on the 4th day.

In the ritual 3 and 9 are favourite periods of time; thus offerings to the dead were made on the 3rd, 9th, or 30th day after death. For 9 days before the Thesmophoria women were required to observe strict chastity (Ovid, *Met.* x. 434). The

¹ G. Hüsing, *Die iranische Überlieferung*, p. 27 ff.

² J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913, p. 403 ff.

³ Hüsing, p. 183.

⁴ Cf. Böhlen, p. 60.

⁵ Moulton, p. 289.

⁶ *ib.* p. 255 ff.

¹ W. Ridgeway, *Dramas and Dramatic Dances of non-European Races*, Cambridge, 1915, p. 40 ff.

² *GGA*, 1895, p. 312.

³ O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie*, Munich, 1906, p. 1083.

⁴ *Hermes der Mondgott*, pp. 18 ff., 68 ff.

Karneia, and the festivals known as Agogia and Katagogia of Aphrodite (*Ælian, de Nat. An.* iv. 2, *Var. Hist.* i. 15), were carried on for 9 days. Every third year, by inclusive reckoning, the Bacchic revels were normally held, and every 9 years, according to Plutarch (*Thes.* 15), the Athenians were compelled to send tribute to Minos, whose 9-yearly rule (*Od.* xix. 179) is a problem of much obscurity.¹ But Apollo's birthday was on the 7th of the month; he was also a 7-month child (Lucian, *Dial. Deorum*, ix. 2), and great festivals like the Karneia and Thargelia began on the 7th day, while there was a festival of 7 days' duration to Demeter Mysia of Pellene (Paus. vii. xxvii.). The older period of 9 days is, however, predominant in Homer; thus the king of Lycia entertains Bellerophon for 9 days and slays 9 oxen in his honour (*Il.* vi. 174), and for 9 days the Trojans are to mourn for Hektor (*Il.* xxiv. 664), as opposed to the 7-day periods of mourning for Adonis. In other points the same facts can be observed: the tripod and triaina are especially sacred; the first at least is clearly connected with 3, and the latter was so understood in classical Greek times, whatever its original sense. The same number appears in the important offering of 3 perfect male beasts—bull, ram, and boar—which was common from Homer (*Od.* xi. 130 f.) onwards especially in oaths (schol. *Il.* xviii. 197). The hekatomb was divided often into 3 classes of animals, and the funeral pyre was circumambulated 3 times (Dio Cass. lvi. 42). The number of victims was often 9; in Homer the hekatomb is already a mere description of a large sacrifice, and the largest described had 9 × 9 bulls (*Od.* iii. 7 ff.). At Mykonos an annual offering was made to Semele of which a ninth was given to the goddess and the rest consumed (Dittenberger, *Syll.* 615). In Homer (*Od.* xiv. 434 ff.), on the other hand, one out of 7 parts is given to Hermes and the nymphs and the rest eaten by Eumaios and the others. Selene was offered 6 *selenai*, or round cakes, with a 7th shaped like an ox (Poll. vi. 76); but that goddess had a special connexion with the number 7, and offerings of 7 animal victims are totally unknown, the evidence of Vergil (*Æn.* vi. 38 f.) being of no value for historical purposes.²

4. Roman.—In Roman religion a fairly important place is taken by the number 3, and, with the development of this religion, by multiples of 3. The oldest pantheon seems to have treated Jupiter, Mars, and Quirinus as the 3 chief; they appear as the gods with *flamines maiores*, as opposed to *flamines minores*, and they occur in conjunction in such solemn and ancient rites as the conclusion of treaties by the *fetiales* (Livy, viii. 9), the ritual of the Salii (Servius on *En.* viii. 663), the formula of *devotio* (Livy, viii. 9), and in the dedication of the *spolia opima* (Festus, p. 189). Similarly in the *Iguvine Tables* the three gods, Jupiter, Mars, and Vofonius, bear the name Grabovius apparently as a mark of their special rank among the Umbrians. Other triads are not primitive: the 3 Fates are Greek borrowings, Parca being originally a single goddess concerned with childbirth. The 9 Muses are also Greek, but 12 divine powers were invoked, according to Servius (on *Georg.* i. 21), at the offerings to Tellus and Ceres performed by the *flamen Cerialis* at the time of sowing. A formal list of the great gods as 12 is not found before 217 B.C., when a *lectisternium* to the 12, Jupiter, Juno, Neptunus, Minerva, Mars, Venus, Apollo, Diana, Vulcanus, Vesta, Mercurius, and Ceres, was held and the number 12 introduced

in imitation of the Greek practice (Livy, xxii. 10). The same number appears in the legend of Romulus, who took the place of the 12th son of Acca Lanrentia, and who saw 12 vultures while Remus saw only 6. The *ancilia* were also 12.

The numbers 3 and 12 play a part in the priestly colleges which are so prominent in Roman religion.³ The 3 *flamines maiores* had beside them 12 *flamines minores*. Of the *augures* and *pontifices* alike the original number seems to have been 3, raised first to 6, then by the *Lex Ogulnia* to 9, by Sulla to 15, and by Cæsar to 16. The classical number of the Vestal Virgins was 6 (Festus, p. 344), and it is doubtful what faith can be put in the odd tradition (Dion. Hal. ii. 67, iii. 67; Plut. *Num.* 10) that they were originally not 3, but 4; only quite at the end of the classical period do we find 7 or 10 mentioned. The *III. viri epulones*, instituted in 196 B.C., increased, through the stage of 7, to 10 in Cæsar's time. On the other hand, the Arvales were 12, the Salii 12+12, and the Luperci probably the same number. Those charged with the divinity of Rome were also 12. The *XV. viri sacris faciundis*, on the other hand, seem to have grown from 2 to 10 by 367 B.C. The Sibylline Books which were their care were, according to tradition, originally 9, but were reduced to 3 or 1 as a result of the slowness of King Tarquin to avail himself of the offer. As performers of dances in honour of the gods we hear of bands of 10 girls and 10 boys, or of 27 of either sex, as at the *Ludi Seculares* of Augustus. The *Sodales* instituted by Tiberius in honour of Augustus numbered 21 (Tac. *Ann.* i. 54)—a number later increased to 28.

In the ritual we find that vows were sometimes offered for 5, 10, or 20 year periods: thus the *ver sacrum* recorded in Livy (xxii. 10) was for the event of 5 years' success. The duration of religious festivals, originally fixed at one day, tended in the case of celebrations of victory to be extended from 2 or 3 to 10, 25, or 50 days. The number 9 appears in the *novemdiale sacrum*, which was regularly ordered when a shower of stones fell (Livy, i. 31, xxx. 38), the festival lasting for 9 days. The usage seems to have been no more than an extension to public life of the offerings of purification made on the 9th day after the birth of a child, when its name was given (Macr. i. xvi. 36), and when apparently the adoration of the *fata scribunda*, the writing Fates, mentioned by Tertullian (*de Anima*, 39) may have taken place,² and the sacrifice offered to the dead on the 9th day recorded by Porphyry (on Horace, *Epod.* xvii. 48). The use of the name in the last two cases can be explained only on the theory that the term applied originally to the whole period of impurity after birth or death respectively, which was brought to an end by the offering on the last day. On the *nundinæ* offerings were regularly made to Jupiter, according to Macrobius (i. xvi. 30); in that case, the reckoning being inclusive, the offering recurred every 8 days.

The amounts and numbers of victims varied. In the old offering to Mars and Silvanus for the welfare of the cattle (Cato, *de Agr.* 83) the offerings were 3 portions each of spelt and wine, and 4 of lard and pulp. From the spoils of Camillus 3 golden vessels were dedicated in the temple of Jupiter (Livy, vi. 4). The offering of 27 Argei by throwing them from the Pons Sublicus into the Tiber is variously explained,³ but the significance

¹ G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, Munich, 1912, p. 603 ff.

² *Ib.* p. 205 f. With this rite may be compared the Indian belief that on the 6th day the fate of the child is written invisibly by the goddess of the day (Mrs. Stevenson, p. 193 f.).

³ W. Warde Fowler, *Religious Experience of the Roman People*, London, 1911, pp. 54 ff., 321 ff.; *GH*, pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, II. 107 f.

¹ J. G. Frazer, *GH*, pt. iii., *The Dying God*, London, 1911, p. 70 ff., takes the period as 8 years.

² P. Stengel, *Opferbräuche der Griechen*, Leipzig, 1910, p. 222 ff.

of the number is the same in any case. Other numbers occurring are 20 (Livy, xl. 2), 40 (xliii. 13), 120 (xxx. 21), 300 (xxii. 10), and 50 (xlv. 16). In magic also the number 3 and its multiples are common; noteworthy are the *dodra*, a drink of 9 elements, mentioned by Ausonius (*Ep.* 86), 7 or 9 knots used in a magic rite reported by Pliny (*HN* xxviii. 48), and the rule of repeating a formula against gout 27 times recorded by Varro (*de Re Rust.* i. ii. 27). The number 9 in connexion with the *manes* occurs in Ovid, *Fast.* v. 439, 443.

5. Celtic.—In Celtic religion and mythology the number 3 is of very frequent occurrence, 9 and other multiples are not rare, and 7 is fairly often found, but, in the main at least, probably owing to Christian influence, and certainly so in works which were composed in their present form long after Christianity had worked upon the Celts. The number 3 is often connected with a group of goddesses known from many inscriptions found in Celtic areas on the Continent, the *Matres* or *Matronæ*, in whom has been seen an earth-goddess developed into 3 under the influence of a division of the year into 3 seasons.¹ As *Nemetiales* the *Matres* were divinities of the grove, as *Campestres* of the fields; they were specially worshipped by women, whom they protected. They survive in folklore as the *dames blanches*, as wise women, and as fairies. They are found in Roman Britain, once as the 3 *Lamiæ*, but whether of indigenous origin is uncertain; in Ireland the conception seems attested by the legends of 3 *Brigits* and 3 *Morrigans*, and perhaps also in the legend of the 3 wives of the 3 kings of Ireland who asked that that country should bear their names. Another triad is to be seen in the figure on a Paris altar of a woodman cutting down a tree,² the branches of which are carried round to the next side of the altar, on which is a bull with 3 cranes; the woodman is the god *Esus*, who with *Taranis* and *Teutates* is mentioned by Lucan (i. 444), but there is no evidence that these three ever formed a real triad of great gods among any branch of the Celts. A 3-headed or 3-faced god, perhaps *Cernunnos*, is found represented on several altars in France. In myth the number 3 is found in every form; the sun,³ or vegetation,⁴ hero *Cúchulainn* has hair of 3 colours, he bathes in 3 baths, the heat from his body melts the snow for 30 feet around him; the 3 blemishes of the women of Ulster arise from love of him; he steals the 3 cows of *Mider*; he is slain through the agency of the 3 sons and 3 daughters of *Calatin*; his body is buried under the 3 flagstones of *Lugaid's* courtyard; in one version his feats are numbered as 27. *Medb*, queen of the west, had 3 brothers, the white ones of *Emain*, and 2 sisters; *Gwydir* is one of the 3 herds of Britain; we hear also of 3 landless monarchs, 3 holy clans, 3 astrologers; *Manannan* is one of 3 golden cordwainers of Britain; he is reputed to have 3 legs, and banishes 3 men from fairy-land to the Irish court of *Tara*, to remain there for 3 reigns as a punishment for lying or injustice. The *Fians* are numbered as 3000, divided into smaller bodies of 100, 50, and 9, under captains.

The number 9 appears in the myth of *Manannan*, who is submerged by 9 waves but rises on the 10th; he has 9 daughters. *Medb* always needed 9 chariots, and the doors of the palace in which *Conaire* was slain were 9. There are 9 porters at the 9 gates of *Yspadaden Pencawr*, in the story of *Kulhwch* and *Olwen*. *Peredur* vanquished the 9 witches of Gloucester; 9 maidens fed with their breath the fire beneath the cauldron of the Head of

Hades; in the Irish story 9 sacred hazels grow over the well of wisdom. *Niall* has 9 hostages, *Fedelm* 9 forms or hearts, *Forgall* perhaps 9 tricks. In art we find a god represented with a ring to which are attached 9 symbols of S shape.¹ The number 7 is in comparison of little importance: the step of *Arthur* causes 7 years' sterility; *Bres* grows twice as fast as other children until he is 7; for 7 years the magic birds of *Rhiannon* charm *Bran's* companions; at 7 *Cúchulainn* takes *Conchobar's* weapons and overcomes 3 champions; he has 7 eye-pupils; he also fought the waves for 7 days; there are 7 daughters of the sea, and one legend tells that a child set floating on the waves every 7 years keeps them in their place. There are 7 or 8 *Maine*, and 8 officers of *Arthur's* court, 7 of whom serve under one.

For other numbers there is little evidence; round the image of *Cenn Craich* were 12 others,² but this is an isolated case. For 13 days *Nuada* resigns his throne to *Lug*. More significant is the custom recorded of the *Galati* by *Strabo* (xii. 5. [p. 567]), according to which 12 priest-kings were with 300 others concerned in the great assemblies held in the *Drunemetum*. The initiation of the Irish *Filé* lasted from 7 to 12 or even 20 years (*Cæsar, de Bell. Gall.* vi. 14). The number 4 occurs in the story of *Kulhwch* and *Olwen*, from whose footsteps sprang 4 white trefoils, in the legend of the 4 dimples of *Cúchulainn*, and in the 4 kisses of *Oengus* which turned into birds to haunt the youth of *Erin*. Mention is made in the story of *Olwen* of the 24 sons of *Custennin* slain by their uncle, with whom may be compared 24 ladies released by *Owein ab Urien*.³ Of larger numbers may be mentioned the 3×50 islands to the west of *Erin* which occur in the story of *Bran*, the same number of queens who loved *Cúchulainn*, and the 300 years spent by *Oisín* in *Elysium*.

Of the ritual so little is recorded that it is not surprising that numbers are not prominent; it was, however, customary to perform the *dcasil*, or ceremonial circumambulation, 3 times, and there are many traces of numbers as used in magic: thus 3 berries of one tree make a man young, while one berry is an equivalent of 9 whole meals. From the grave of *Diancecht*, the Irish god of medicine, grew 365 healing plants, doubtless one for each day of the year,⁴ and *Diodorus* (v. 32) mentions a great quinquennial human sacrifice.

6. Teutonic.—Throughout Teutonic mythology and religion there are clear traces of the importance of 3 and its multiples, especially 9. There is some evidence for a belief in 9 worlds and 9 heavens; to *Valhalla* are ascribed 540 doors, and *Asgard* is not merely divided into 12 or 13 spheres, but, according to *Honorius of Augustodunum*, appears to have consisted of 3 heavens with 9 spheres each.⁵ More unequivocal is the evidence regarding the gods: there was a distinct tendency to group the 3 chief deities together; *Cæsar* (vi. 21) speaks of *Sol*, *Luna*, and *Vulcanus* as worshipped by the Germans; *Tacitus* (*Germ.* 2) tells of the origin of the tribes of *Ingvæones*, *Istævones*, and *Erminones* from *Mannus*; in the 3 names have been seen designations of *Tius*, or of *Nerthus*, *Wodan*, and *Tius* respectively. In *Germ.* 9 he speaks of the worship of *Mercurius*, *Mars*, and *Hercules*, in whom we are, no doubt, to see *Wodan*, *Tius*, and *Thor* respectively. The heathen Saxons, when required to abjure their gods in A.D. 776,

¹ S. Reinach, *Bronzes figurés de la Gaule romaine*, Paris, 1900, p. 33.

² J. Loth, *RCel* xxv. [1904] 157.

³ Rhys, p. 491 f., sees in them the 24 hours of the day.

⁴ So at the *Daphnephoria* 365 purple ribands signified the days of the year (*Proclus, ap. Phot. Bibl.* p. 321).

⁵ Cf. K. Weinhold, *Die mystische Zahlenzahl bei den Deutschen*, p. 52 f.

¹ J. A. MacCulloch, *Religion of the Ancient Celts*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 44.

² S. Reinach, *RCel* xviii. [1897] 254 ff.

³ J. Rhys, *Celtic Heathendom*, London, 1883, p. 431 ff.

⁴ MacCulloch, p. 189 f.

abjured Thuner, Woden, and Saxnot, the last being the Saxon appellation of Tius. At Upsala Adam of Bremen (iv. 27) tells of the worship of Thor, Odin, and Freyr, the equivalent there of Tius. Other triads are also known, but doubtless are less primitive—those of Odin and his two brothers, Veli and Ve, of Odin, Hœnir, and Loki, and of Har, Jafnar, and Thiridi. The last combination, the final member of which has been compared with the Vedic Trita, is late, and doubtless not influenced by the doctrine of the trinity.¹ More primitive are the 3 Norns and the 3 swan-maidens; and the Valkyries sometimes go in threes. The stones on which Loki is bound to undergo the penalty of slaying Balder are also 3.

While there is no set of 9 recorded for the high gods, lesser divinities are not rarely thus grouped: there are 9 daughters of Aegir, 9 mothers of Heimdall, 9 daughters of Odin; the *Beovulf* (575) mentions 9 sea-monsters, and 9 is a frequent number of spirits of various kinds—ghosts, elves, and so forth. The Valkyries are sometimes 9; they consort with men for 7 years, probably a later variant of the 9 years which the swan-maidens may spend with men. For 9 days men remain werewolves, and leave the skin on the 10th day, according to the *Volsunga Saga* (8); other accounts make the condition last 3, 7, or 9 years. Tyrr's wife has 900 heads, and the sun wheel seems to have been thought of as having 9 spokes.² After slaying the serpent in the last battle of the gods, Thor goes 9 steps before he dies.

The number 12 for the gods is not found before the late Edda, where it occurs in the *Hyndlalied* (30).³ The *Gylfaginning* (14) speaks of 12 seats for the gods with one for the All-father. The Norns also appear later as 12, the Valkyries as 13 or 27. The 12 knights and 12 nuns of Kreuzburg⁴ seem to be based on the doctrine of 12 gods. The number 12 occurs in other connexions: Mimir has 12 workers under him; heroes are ascribed the strength of 12 men.

For the ritual there is the important evidence of Thietmar of Merseburg, who (i. 9) gives an account of New Year sacrifice at Ledra in Denmark, at which every 9 years 99 men, horses, dogs, and cocks were offered, and of Adam of Bremen, who (iv. 27) describes a spring festival held every 9 years at Upsala, in which 9 of each male kind were offered. It is possible in each case, but not recorded, that the sacrifice lasted 9 days. The *Ynglinga Saga* (29) tells of the Swedish king Aun or Ani who offered his 9 sons, one every 9 years, to Odin to secure long life; the people prevented his offering a 10th son, so that the king died. We hear also of the use of cakes of 9 constituents in the ritual. The name of a child was given on the 9th day after birth, when it became a subject of *vergeid* (*Lex Sal.* xxiv. 4, xli. 10). After death the souls returned on the 3rd or 9th day, and feasts for the dead seem to have been held on the 3rd, 6th, or 9th day after death; spirits rove about at the 3rd, 9th, or 12th hour.

Diseases are numbered variously as 3, 9, 70, 72, 77, and 99. Plants used against them are often counted as 9, while a single plant is stated to have 9-fold strength. The number 9 repeatedly occurs in magic and divination, often beside 3. It figures also in the ordeal, where 9⁵ ploughshares are used as the test, and appears in many prescriptions of law, as in the numbers 9 and 12 for witnesses.

¹ W. Goltber, *Germanische Mythologie*, Leipzig, 1895, p. 355.

² In suni spells the number 9 is very often found in both Teutonic and Celtic records; see *GE*³, pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, l. 155, 172, 201, 271, 278.

³ Goltber, p. 199 f.

⁴ Böken, p. 25 f. This may be Slavic in origin.

⁵ In late Indian use the number 7 is normal; in Iran 6 and 33 oracles are known; for 9 cf. the years of punishment of an oath-breaker in Hesiod, *Theog.* 801.

and judges. In all these cases traces of the substitution of 7 for 9 under Christian influence are found.

7. *Slavic*.—In the scanty records of Slavic religion and in the mythology there are clear signs of preference for the numbers 3 and 9, 7 being due to Christian influence. Among the ancient Prussians, at their chief sacred place, Romove, in the niches of the sacred oak were placed images of the 3 chief gods, of whom Perkunos, the thunder-god, was the most important.¹ Other evidence speaks of 3, 9, or 27 Pehrkonis as Lithuanian deities. With the last number may be compared the 27 lands or 30 kingdoms which occur often in Russian folk-tales.² The Serbian hero Balatchko, like the Celtic Cernunnos, is believed to have had 3 heads, and the same account is given of Pegam of Carniola. The Russian folk-hero, Fjodor Tugarin, watches for 3 days without sleeping 12 mares belonging to an old woman; he accomplishes this task with the aid of 3 grateful beasts, and is rewarded by the gift of a foal which grows up in 3 days. Another story tells of Ivan, the cow son, who by the aid of 12 smiths compels a dragon, who has sons with 3, 8, and 9 heads, to disgorge his two brothers whom in the shape of a sow she had swallowed. The number 12 occurs frequently in other folk-tales in conjunction with 3 and 9. Among the Letts the conception of the *Parcæ* is not found as a trinity; a late legend reported in 1839 tells of 7 goddesses, of whom 3 spin the life of men, the fourth tells tales to divert the spinners and shorten the duration of life, the fifth exhorts to industry, the sixth cuts the threads, and the seventh washes the garment and gives it to the most high god, and it becomes the man's winding-sheet.³ The Bulgarian Samodévy have affinities with both the 3 Fates and the 3 swan-maidens.

8. *Signification of numbers*.—The evidence cited shows clearly that 3 and 9 are Aryan numbers, and suggests that they had definite sacred associations before the development of the different branches of the family, though it is possible that the development of the sacred character of the numbers is later and independent. The explanation of the choice of these numbers is doubtful. The most popular theory appears to be that which derives the use from reckoning of time by weeks of 9 days, 3 of which make up, with 3 *epagomenai*, a full synodie month. Hüsing,⁴ who takes this view, explains the choice of a week of 9 days as due to the effect of the 3 *epagomenai* which led to the division of the visible phases of the moon by 3, with the result of 3 weeks of 3×3 days. The existence of this week as a division of time derived from observation of the moon is open to serious doubt; it is supposed to be supported by the Latin *nundinæ*, but that week was one of 8 days only, the reckoning involved in the term *nundinæ* being due to the fact that the Romans reckoned inclusively the date of the market-day from the previous market-day; moreover, the Romans carried on the system of reckoning without regard to the fact that it never did coincide with the movements of the moon. Rhys,⁵ who accepts for the Celts a week of 9 nights and 8 days, which he compares with the *nundinæ*, though we have no evidence that the *nundinæ* were ever so conceived, admits that such a week has no reference to the moon. For other Aryan peoples there is no evidence⁶ in favour of the 9-day week except what is deduced from its appearance in religion and custom.

¹ J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, Oxford, 1892-83, l. 171 ff.

² A. N. Afanassjew, *Russische Volkennärchen*, Germ. tr. by Anna Meyer, Vienna, 1906, no. 23.

³ Grimm, l. 416, n. 2.

⁴ P. 20.

⁵ P. 209 ff.

⁶ For Greece see Gruppe, p. 940.

as a period of solemnity, and this use need not, of course, be in any way connected with a reckoning of time. Böhlen¹ holds that the origin of the use is to be traced to the fact that the period from the last quarter of the moon to the appearance of the first sickle of the new moon is 9 days; it would be convenient to reckon from the last quarter in order to predict the appearance of the new moon, which it would be difficult to observe if the sky was obscured. He supports this view by the fact that the word 'nine' (Skr. *nāvan*) may be connected with 'new' (Skr. *nāva*), and that in magic practices it is common to count backwards from 9 to 1—which has certain analogues in the Greek and Roman calendars. Moreover, in many myths a decided issue is arrived at with the 9th or 10th day, 10 being a variant reckoning of the period in question. The grounds adduced are clearly far from strong, and it is in this view hardly sufficiently recognized that the number 9 is constantly used in places where 3 is also used: a good example of this is the Vedic recognition of 9 worlds, which is clearly based on the assignment to each of the 3 of 3 divisions. In this sense it may safely be said that many nines are merely developments of primitive threes, and the problem reduces itself to the origin of the sanctity of 3. This is hardly to be traced to a reduction from the number 12, or to the 3 *epagomenai*, or, as suggested by Böhlen for stories of the Trita type, the full moon, waning half-moon, and last visible moon phase, but may rather owe its importance to the fact that it is in the Aryan languages which distinguish a dual the first expression of plurality; this may be enough to explain its prominence in all forms of religious and secular life.

The number 7 has certainly in many cases in Celtic, Teutonic, and Slavic myth superseded an older 9, nor is it reasonable to doubt that this is directly due to the influence of the Jewish and, later, Christian week; there is clear evidence that in the 1st cent. B.C. at latest there had sprung up in Rome the use of a week in which the names of the days were given according to the planets,² and the fact that the days of the week in Teutonic mythology are heathen names suggests that the 7-day week was received before Christianity. But the theory that 7 is due to Babylonian influence—apart from the fact that the 7-day week is not proved for Babylon—is open to the serious objection that 7 is a favourite number in the Rigveda, and that it must therefore be assumed that this number was borrowed at a very early period by the Vedic Indians from a Semitic source; but this is improbable in the absence of any other clear indication of Semitic influence on the Rigveda. Hüsing and Böhlen agree in seeing in the 7-day week a week based on the phases of the moon, making up a month of 4 weeks+2 days, in the view of the former, while, in the opinion of the latter, the origin of the choice of 7 is that, when the period of 9 days takes the place of the last quarter, the remaining part of the month naturally falls into 3 sets of 7 days. Neither explanation is convincing, and, as the Vedic Indians did not know the 7 planets,³ and, though they knew 7 *ṛṣis*, these were not stars in the Rigveda period, the question of the origin of the sacred character of 7 must probably remain unsettled.

The numbers 12 and possibly 7, if taken as 6+1, are usually ascribed to Babylonian influence, and brought into conjunction with the sexagesimal reckoning which is indicated by the forms of the numbers for 11, 12, and 70 in Gothic, and of which traces are seen in the Latin use of *sexaginta* and

sescenti as indefinite numbers;¹ in the ship catalogue in the *Iliad* numbers like 12, 60, and 90 are found; 12 is prominent in Odysseus's adventures, and 360 as a round number appears in the total of Eumaios's swine. But too much stress must not be laid on this evidence; 12 is found in the Rigveda in connexion with the months of the year, and this is most probably the significance of the 12 *ādityas* of the *Brāhmanas*. By far the most plausible explanation of 12 is its connexion with the months, and of the sexagesimal system the 360 days of the year, also Rigvedic, and there is no ground to ascribe either 12 or 360 in the Rigveda to Semitic origin.² Other theories of the origin of 12 are the 12 *epagomenai* added to make up a year of 354 days to 366, itself probably a late conception derived from the 12 months, or the 12 signs of the zodiac, which are clearly quite late. Böhlen, however, insists that the 12 are moon phases, that the idea goes back to neolithic times, but was probably developed by the Babylonians, who transferred it into a solar method of reckoning. He supports his theory by insisting that it offers the best explanation of the unlucky character of 13, which, however, if early, as is most improbable,³ can equally well be explained by the unsettled character of the 13th month seen already in the Rigveda (i. xxv. 8), and of its frequent alternation with 12, the alternation of 12 with 14, with 16, with 24—the phases being counted as double, and the full moon being omitted—with 27, and with 40 (i.e. 30+10). He also derives the number of months, or *epagomenai*, and the figures of the zodiac from this source. But all these hypotheses lack solid grounds; the only clearly lunar number is 27 in the case of the Indian *nakṣatras*, which may be Semitic in origin, but are not found in the Rigveda.

LITERATURE.—The following are the more important of recent works on numbers in Aryan religion: E. W. Hopkins, 'The Holy Numbers of the Rigveda,' *Oriental Studies*, Boston, 1894, pp. 141-169; H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, 'Les Nombres trois et neuf,' *Les Celtes*, i. 177 ff.; W. H. Roscher, 'Die Sieben und Neunzahl im Kultus und Mythen der Griechen,' *AG* xxiv. (1904); 'Die Tetrakontaden und Tetrakontadenlehren der Griechen und anderer Völker,' *Berichte der phil.-hist. Klasse der königl. sächs. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, lxi. (1900); K. Weinhold, *Die mythische Neunzahl bei den Deutschen*, Berlin, 1897; W. Schultz, 'Gesetze der Zahlenverschiebung im Mythen und in mythenhaltigen Überlieferung,' *Mitteilungen der anthropologischen Gesellschaft in Wien*, xxx. (1900); E. Siecke, *Hermes der Mondgott*, Leipzig, 1908; G. Hüsing, *Die iranische Überlieferung und das arische System*, do. 1909; E. Böhlen, *Die 'Unglückszahl' Dreizehn und ihre mythische Bedeutung*, do. 1913; H. Hirt, *Die Indogermanen*, Strassburg, 1907, pp. 535-539; H. Usener, *Rhein. Museum*, lviii. (1903) 1 ff., 161 ff., 321 ff.

A. B. KEITH.

NUMBERS (Semitic).—1. Scope of term 'Semitic.'—In his *Vergleichende Grammatik der semitischen Sprachen* (Berlin, 1898) H. Zimmern exhibits five comparative lists of the numbers 1-10 (p. 179), in Assyrian, Aramaic, Hebrew, Arabic, and Ethiopic, all of which show marked similarity. The first three of these may be considered as falling within the scope of this article. He further presents the oldest forms of the names of these numbers, now reduced to a single list (p. 181), and finds that Egyptian shows analogy to this in respect of the numbers 2, 6, 7, 8, and 9, but that 1, 3, 4, 5, and 10 are altogether different. On philological grounds, therefore, we should be justified in leaving Egyptian in a neutral position, the difference being equal to the agreement. G. A. Barton (*A Sketch of Semitic Origins*, New York, 1902, p. 170; cf. *EBJ* iii. 3434) classes the Hamito-Semitic system of number as one, being decimal or

¹ P. 84 ff.

² Gruppe, p. 960 ff.

³ A. B. Keith, *JRAS*, 1911, pp. 794-800; cf. E. Meyer, *Gesch. des Altertums*, Stuttgart, 1913, i. li. 588, 878.

¹ H. Hirt, *Die Indogermanen*, p. 535 ff.

² Macdonell and Keith, ii. 123 f.

³ Keith, *JRAS*, 1916, pp. 350-355.

quintal, in opposition to the sexagesimal system of the earlier Babylonians. Comparison of the system of signs used to express numbers also reveals a considerable degree of likeness between Egyptian and Aramaic notation. We may add to the latter Hebrew,¹ since there are grounds for believing that signs were in use among the Hebrews, although, it is true, their Scriptures reproduce numbers only by words. The ostraka discovered at Samaria show signs and words in combination, the ninth and tenth years being spelt in full, and two others, apparently the eleventh and the thirteenth, always expressed by figures (D. G. Lyon, in the *Harvard Theological Review*, iv. [1911] 138). S. R. Driver remarks that, on the supposition that their numbers were not written in full, but expressed by symbols, 'the ancient Hebrews, it is reasonable to suppose, would have adopted a system similar to that in use amongst their neighbours, found equally in Phœnician, Palmyrene, Nabatean, and Old Aramaic inscriptions, and used also in Syriac' (*Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Books of Samuel*, Oxford, 1913, p. 97, n. 2). We shall subsequently note the leading features in this notation by means of symbols, which was current among the W. Semitic peoples who made use of the decimal (or quintal) system of numeration. But in the first place it is necessary to look more closely at the sexagesimal system of Babylonia (E. Semitic, it may be termed), which at all times had a good claim to be regarded as decimal also,² and which in the course of centuries came to be closely approximated to the purely decimal system of adjacent lands to the west and south.

2. Babylono-Assyrian (or E. Semitic) notation. —A flood of light has been cast on the earlier stages of the science of numbers by the discoveries at Nippur, the results of which, in so far as they are relevant to our purpose, have been set forth by H. V. Hilprecht (*The Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania*, Philadelphia, 1906, vol. xx. pt. i. chs. ii. and iii.) in a treatise to which every student of the subject acknowledges his indebtedness.³ To deal only with the 'mathematical' tablets, excluding the 'metrological' (ch. iii.)—they show for the most part a series of multiplication and division tables, symbolically represented. Such terms as are necessary to supplement the symbols are derived from the Sumerian language, which suggests that the whole numerical system was derived from the older civilization of Sumer and Akkad. It may, indeed, be affirmed that the sexagesimal-decimal system of the Semitic Babylonians is in reality Sumerian. The list of these terms as given by Hilprecht (p. 23) includes:

A-DU (=x), 'times'; A-AN, rendering a number distributive; IGI-GAL (= 'denominator,' used to express a fraction); LAL (= -), 'minus'; SI-A (= +), 'plus'; IB-DI, 'square'; and BA-DI-E, 'cube.'

The lists of multiplication tables actually known to Hilprecht from the Temple School and Temple Library of Nippur number from 44 to 46. All the integers from 1 to 9 are used as a basis, with the exception of 7, i.e. all the numbers which are divisors of 60 or its powers. Generalizing, it is found that the tables range from 2×1 to $180,000 \times 1$, and that they are all related to 60^4 , or 3600^2 , which is 12,960,000. In the sexagesimal system the numbers 60, 600, and 3600 bear special names, viz. *šoss*, *nér*, and *šar*, corresponding to units, tens, and hundreds among ourselves, or, more accurately, to tens, hundreds, and thousands.

¹ Josephus (*Ant. l. viii. 2*) credits Abram with having communicated arithmetic to the Egyptians.

² A. Jeremias (*The OT in the Light of the Ancient East*, London, 1911. l. 63) holds that both systems are of pre-historic origin.

³ See the remarks of T. G. Pinches, in *Hilprecht Anniversary Volume*, Leipzig, 1909, p. 77.

The symbols employed for the units are upright wedges (I), combined in such a way as immediately to suggest the number for which they stand. Tens and multiples of 10 are represented by oblique wedges or 'crotchets' (◁) up to 50. With the *šoss* (60) the upright wedge used for absolute units is renewed, each wedge standing for a multiple of 60. The value to be attached is determined by the position of the upright wedges relatively to the smaller numbers, i.e. tens and units, following them. Intermediate tens are represented by a combination of upright and oblique wedges—e.g., $\text{I} \llcorner = 70$; $\text{II} \llcorner = 140$. The *nér* has, as a rule, its own symbol (Γ), and likewise the *šar* (◁), although the oblique wedge alone, by virtue of its position in the scale, can do duty for 600, and the upright wedge alone for 3600, and the series can be continued indefinitely, thus:

I ◁ I ◁ I ◁ I ◁ I

12,960,000 2,160,000 216,000 86,000 8600 600 60 10 1

As an example of how the system works out,¹ the following (Hilprecht, no. 16, l. 24 rev.) may be given:

◁◁◁ A-DU (=x) ◁◁◁ = ◁◁◁◁◁◁◁

i.e. 1 *nér* + 2 *šoss* + 8 tens × do. = 156 *šar* + 1 *nér* + 5 *šoss*, or, by the above series:

12 *šoss*
i.e. 600 + 2 × 60 + 80 × do. = 2 × 216,000 + 3 × 86,000 + 6 × 8600 + 1 × 600 + 5 × 60
(i.e. 750 × do.)
i.e. 562,500 = 562,500.

Owing to the absence of the 'zero' in the Babylonian system, there is, according to our idea, an element of ambiguity present. It is difficult to know whether absolute units or *šoss*-units are dealt with, and it is only by reference to the context (as in the above example) that the truth can be ascertained. The ambiguity is not found in later texts, where the *šoss* symbol never terminates a number and the rule as stated above is strictly adhered to. In early texts, however, the *šoss* is found at the end, even in numbers relatively small. Thus, A. Poebel (*Historical Texts*, Philadelphia, 1914, p. 190, n. 1; cf. plates xx., xxi.) gives $5700 = 3600 + 3 \times 600 + 5 \times 60$. The *šoss* in this instance is indicated by a horizontal instead of a vertical wedge. On the same tablet (no. 34) can be seen the circles and semi-ellipses out of which the conventional wedges arose. The *nér* is composed of a horizontal wedge followed by a semi-ellipse, and the tens are complete circles.

A. T. Olaj (*The Babylonian Expedition of the Univ. of Penn., ser. A, xiv. [1906] 16 f.*) informs us that 'in the pre-Sargonic period, when the circle had the value ten, and the semi-elliptical impression stood for one, it is very likely that the upper end of the stylus was round; and that it was used to make the numerals. The circle was made by pressing the stylus perpendicularly into the soft clay; and the semi-elliptical by leaning it lengthwise, as in writing.'

An interesting number given by Poebel in the tablet referred to is 5864 (col. 20, 10), which is made up of $6000 - (2 \times 60 + 10 + 6)$. That is, the LAL sign (= -) is employed, covering 2 *nér*s, 1 ten, and 6 units. As a rule the LAL has a much more restricted use than this, entering into the number 19 principally; 19 is 20 LAL 1, which, appearing in our type as 21 - LAL, is apt to be mistaken for 20—another evidence, as it seems, of the disadvantage arising from the want of 'zero.'² It should be noted that in lists where we make the entry '0,' as an alternative to leaving blank, the Babylonians in some cases make use of the sign *ul*, meaning 'not,' 'nothing.'

It will readily be seen that the Babylonians (or rather the Sumerians), by employing the *šoss* (60)

¹ It is unsuccessfully applied by D. W. Myhrman in *The Babylonian Expedition of the Univ. of Penn., ser. A, vol. iii. [1910] pt. i. p. 63, n. 2*. In this instance the true sign of *nér* is given, as can be proved by means of three partial totals in the body of the text.

² On this point see C. H. W. Johns, *Assyrian Deeds and Documents*, Cambridge, 1893-1901, II. 100.

⁵ *Bab. Exped.* xx. pt. i. p. 24 n.

⁷ *Ib.*, pp. 40, 52.

peoples,¹ the differences will be found to be very slight. Even the Egyptian system is not unlike.²

The so-called Alexandrian system, according to which numbers are compounded by means of the letters of the alphabet—a system in general use about the time of Christ, and still to be seen in the Hebrew Bible—is here left out of account, as having entered into Semitic use from an extraneous (probably Greek) source,³ and as being common property among so many nations and peoples of antiquity. The system is one very apt to lead to corruption in numbers relating to foreign matters.⁴

4. Semitic numbers in general. — It can be gathered both from the language of numbers and from the symbols employed to represent them that, in theory at least, no upper limit is to be assigned to Semitic enumeration. If we except indefinite expressions (e.g., myriads)—a form of speech common to all nations past and present—we find that in practice numbers are confined to sums under 1,000,000. In the OT there is only one instance of a number exceeding this (1,100,000 [1 Ch 21⁵]). The notation appears to us clumsy, but cannot be characterized as amateurish. Indeed, we marvel at the ease with which *sošses*, *nērs*, and *sars* are manipulated. We have insisted on the difficulty presented by fractions, and we find that the results of problems involving fractions are only approximately correct. This is especially true of Egypt, where, it is evident, knowledge was the outcome of repeated trials and practical tests, the truth, when attained or approximated, being carefully treasured and transmitted. The method is inductive, and 'the answers given represent the accumulated experiences of many previous writers.'⁶ In the keeping of accounts the accuracy of the scribe is not lightly to be questioned. The many business tablets that have now been deciphered, recording a single transaction that did not require to be transcribed, with their system of partial totals and grand totals,⁶ can readily be checked, and as a rule they are found to be correct. It is otherwise with numbers occurring in annalistic records. These have often been copied, and show a tantalizing number of discrepancies. A glaring example may be seen in the figures relating to Shalmaneser III.'s campaign of 854 B.C., where four sets of enemy losses are given, the numbers ranging from 14,000 to 29,000. There is reason to think that the Assyrians in this instance were actually defeated.⁷ Equally unreliable are the figures appearing in the Elephantine papyri, which are supposed to be a transcript of the Inscription of King Darius at Behistūn.⁸ While these discrepancies may be due to the copyist,⁹ the chief reason for the doubtfulness of the figures lies in the tendency to exaggerate—a common failing among the despots of the ancient East. The Oriental partiality for large numbers is shared even by the Chronicler of the OT.¹⁰ Where exact numbers were no longer obtainable, round numbers took their place—an evident

feature of the chronology of the book of Judges,¹ and far more evident in the length of the reigns of the mythological kings before and after the Flood. The foreshortening of the historical perspective, to which Sayce has called attention² in connexion with the narrative of the book of Kings, as a source of certain subtle errors in chronology, finds its counterpart in the protracted figures attached to the times that are unhistorical and even mythical, which prevent a reliable chronology ever being drawn up. The same phenomenon that meets us in Genesis in the great age ascribed to the antediluvians and the reduced longevity of the generations following is found in the Babylonian records, as can now be studied in the new lists of kings published by Poebel (*Historical Texts*, pp. 73-140).³ In another connexion the same writer comments (p. 50) on the idea that whatever man made (e.g., a boat or a landmark) in those old days was of enormous dimensions, and connects it with the belief in enormously long life and higher stature than at present.⁴ This tendency to gild the past has therefore to be allowed for in dealing with numbers, but usually we have no great difficulty in drawing the boundary-line between the mythical and the historical.

5. Sacred numbers.—Jeremias asserts⁵ that a preference for odd numbers is universal: 'Numero deus impare gaudet.' This accords with the selection of 5 and 7 to be the fundamental ciphers of the astral system, to which he attaches himself. It is in reality duodecimal-sexagesimal: $5+7=12$; $5 \times 12=60$. To this may be opposed the finding of Hilprecht (p. 34), who says that 7, 11, and 13, being no divisors of 12,960,000, have continued even to the present to be regarded as unlucky numbers in the life and history of man. He invites us in this light to examine the Babylonian Sabbath question. It may be assumed that 3 and 5 as factors of the sexagesimal unit are to be excluded from this condemnation. The fact, therefore, would appear to be that facility or difficulty in operating with the various numbers was of chief account. It is difficult to see why any number, abstractly considered, should be either lucky or unlucky. Numbers had to be related to deities, magic, divisions of time, etc., before moral or sacred significance could arise. A 'science of number' in the Pythagorean sense was not yet conceived of; number had not been exalted as the ἀρχὴ καὶ ὅλη of which the world was made.⁶ At the same time, all numbers were sacred to the Babylonians:⁷ but there was a limit set to their sanctity:

'Numbers might be sacred, they could never be deified, they were not worshipped, nor were artistic representations of them imagined' (F. Cumont, *Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans*, New York and London, 1912, p. 112).⁸

In Babylonia the numbers from 60 down to 1 came to be reserved each for a particular deity, the planetary deities having their numbers apportioned with less regularity than the great gods, which points to the fact that the latter were brought in, and, as it were, 'canonized,' last of all. Thus, 60 = Anu (father of the gods), 50 = Bel, 40 =

¹ HDB II. 817f.; G. F. Moore, *Judges* (ICC), Edinburgh, 1903, pp. xxxviii f., 424, 428f.

² Pp. 422, 429f.

³ Cf. H. Zimmern, *The Babylonian and the Hebrew Genesis*, London, 1901, p. 40f.

⁴ Cf. E. Naville, *Archæology of the OT*, London, 1913, p. 85f.

⁵ *OT in Light of Ancient East*, I. 63, n. 3.

⁶ Gow, p. 301f.

⁷ Jeremias, *OT in Light of Ancient East*, I. 63, with specimens of the application of the numbers 0-15 (1 and 8 excepted), 40, 70, 72, 73.

⁸ Several apparent exceptions are given by A. Smythe Palmer, *The Samson-Saga*, London, 1913, p. 205 and note 3. The references are to the Canaanite deity, Baal-shalisha, 'the Lord of Three'; the Hittite god named 'Three' (Sala, Salu); the Egyptian 'god Eight'; the Babylonian 'god Seven'; and 'god Four.' These do not seem to be sufficient to impair the force of Cumont's generalization.

¹ See G. A. Cooke, *A Text-Book of North-Semitic Inscriptions*, Oxford, 1903, pp. 43f., 55, etc.; M. Lidzbarski, *Ephemeris für semitische Epigraphik*, Giessen, 1900, p. 106ff.; EBR¹¹, art. 'Numeral,' with table.

² J. G. Wilkinson, *The Ancient Egyptians*, London, 1878, II., table opp. p. 493.

³ J. Gow, *A Companion to School Classics*³, London, 1893, p. 11f.; SDB, art. 'Number,' sect. 3; A. Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East*, London, 1911, p. 275ff.

⁴ Poebel, *Hist. Texts*, p. 105.

⁵ W. W. Rouse Ball, *Hist. of Mathematics*², London, 1893, pp. 3, 8; C. Warren, *The Ancient Cubit*, do. 1903, p. 31f.

⁶ Assy. *napharu* = 'total'; Sum. *šunigin šunigin* = 'total of totals', 'grand total'.

⁷ R. W. Rogers, *Cuneiform Parallels to the OT*, New York, 1912, p. 289f.; A. H. Sayce, *The 'Higher Criticism' and the Monuments*², London, 1894, p. 391, note 6.

⁸ Ungnad, p. 83ff.

⁹ McCurdy, II. 87 n.

¹⁰ Sayce, p. 463f.; cf. G. B. Gray, *Numbers* (ICC), Edinburgh, 1903, p. 10ff.

En, 30=Sin, 25=Merodach, 20=Šamaš, 15=Ištar, 10=Ramman.¹ This species of identification is dependent upon the calendrical system—e.g., Sin=30=days of the ordinary month.² It would be difficult to show that the whole of the numbers 1-60 were thus appropriated, but at least 'sixty' is representative of all the gods, and equivalent to 'the entire pantheon.'³ An interesting contrast in number is afforded by the 'fifty' renowned names of the great gods, with which Merodach was at last endowed.⁴

Among the units 7 has come to be regarded as the sacred number *par excellence*. In Babylonia it was so esteemed, Jastrow thinks, largely, if not solely, because it was a large number (cf. seven spirits of Scripture—a miscellaneous mass of spirits).⁵ It holds the foremost place in magical formulæ. We have already noted the fundamental position accorded to it in the astral system. By others it has been regarded as sacred because of its astronomical relations—e.g., the seven planets, and the division of the lunar month into four quarters of seven days.⁶ The tabu on the seventh day (and multiples thereof) of certain Babylonian months has generally been regarded as transitional to the sanctity of the seventh day (Sabbath) among the Hebrews.⁷ The number 7 is favoured by the Priestly Writer, 5 figures prominently in the Joseph story,⁸ and 3 (and its multiples by 10) in the story of Samson.⁹ For reasons associated with deity or deities, 1, 2, 3, and 9 have special claims to sanctity (monism, dualism, triads, enneads). By reason of a recent discovery, made by Poebel,¹⁰ whereby the goddess Nin-Harsag took a part in the creation of mankind along with the triad, An, Enlil, Enki, the number 4 may also be included in this category. Groups of 5 and 10 (pentads and decads) have recently acquired significance in the laws of Babylon and Israel.¹¹

A comparison of articles on 'Number' in *HDB*, *SDB*, and *EBI* discloses the fact that 1, 3, 4, 7, 10, 12, 40, and 70 are specially treated for their sacred and symbolical significance. The symbolism of such numbers has been variously interpreted—e.g., by C. F. Keil,¹² H. Schultz,¹³ R. L. Ottley,¹⁴ and A. H. McNeile,¹⁵ the last-named prefacing his rendering by the caution:

'It is easy to be led into extravagance in attempting to interpret the significance of numbers; allegorical arithmetic has called forth fantastic absurdities from both Jewish and Christian writers.'

This caution is all the more needed in view of the methods of the astral school, represented by H. Winckler and A. Jeremias, whose *motifs* are still open to considerable doubt.

Their main thesis would, however, appear to be strengthened by Hilprecht's exposition¹⁶ of the meaning of the number 12,960,000 (=60⁴ or 3600²). This is none other than the famous 'number of Plato' (*Republic*, viii. 546 B-D), as determined by

J. Adam¹ and others, the 'lord of better and worse births,' a geometrical number constructed out of the elements of the number which expresses the shortest period of gestation in the human kind (216 days). Hilprecht takes the number as the arithmetical expression of a great law controlling the universe, which he calls the 'law of uniformity or harmony.' For this reason 12,960,000 has a claim to be regarded as the sacred number in chief of Babylonia. When related to time, 12,960,000 days=36,000 years (counting 360 days in a year), which is 'the great Platonic year' and also a Babylonian cycle.

The conclusion is obvious that Babylonia, and not Greece, is the home of this whole cult. The number 12,960,000 is fundamental both in astronomy and in astrology, governing the universe (the macrocosm) and also the life of man (the microcosm). Everything in man's life from his birth to his death is governed by this number or one of its divisors, especially the period of gestation; 216 days, the period of the seven months' child, and 270, the period for a nine months' child, inaugurate a lucky birth, for both are divisors of 12,960,000. So with every other number which is a divisor of 12,960,000 (for unlucky numbers, see above).

From this it will be seen what an elaborate astrological structure has been reared upon the foundation of the geometrical number 12,960,000. Granting the theoretical validity of this number, there is a serious difficulty about its application, if we think only of births, for the multiplication and division tables now known (§ 2 above) are far more extended than would be necessary for the particular end of determining lucky and unlucky births. The situation is somewhat relieved by bringing in the periods of the moon, in its phases or in its course (see art. BIRTH [Assyro-Babylonian], vol. ii. p. 643). Even with this added, we are left in ignorance about many points in the Babylonian praxis. 'How far they carried their liking for numbers and mystic calculations we have yet to learn.'² While the theory of Hilprecht, which, as we have seen, is astral, may be said at present to rule, there may be some who will share the view of R. W. Emerson, who said of Plato that, 'in his eighth book of the Republic, he throws a little mathematical dust in our eyes.'³ What has now been added to Plato or, rather, what has been shown to be the source of the ideas of Plato (and Pythagoras) may seem to them like throwing a little more dust.

LITERATURE.—This has been given in the article, the more important references being embodied, the others appearing in the footnotes.

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NUSAIRIS.—The Nnsairis, also known as Ansariyah, are not only a sect, but a nation, inhabiting the mountainous country north of the Lebanon, between ancient Eleutherus, the Orontes, and the Mediterranean coast. Although the Nnsairi population in this mountainous barren region live a rather wretched life, cultivating mainly the vine and tobacco, the colonies which it has founded in Antioch, Mersina, Tarsus, and Adana are very prosperous. We may reckon the total of this population at 150,000; in earlier times they were no doubt more numerous.

1. Etymology.—The name 'Nnsairi' has given rise to a great many theories: it has been thought to be a diminutive of the Arab *Nasrani* ('little Christian'), but this etymology is contrary to Arabic grammar, and, as the supposed conversion of the race to Christianity took place before the establishment of Islām in this region, it would be

¹ J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, Cambridge, 1902, ii. 201-203, 264-306.

² T. G. Pinches, in *Hil. Ann. Vol.*, p. 77.

³ *Representative Men*, 'Plato: New Readings,' last paragraph.

¹ G. Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*, Eng. tr., London, 1901, p. 673; M. Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1893, p. 465 f.; Smythe Palmer, p. 207.

² Jastrow, p. 465. ³ *HDB* v. 557*, note 1†.

⁴ Pinches, *The OT in the Light of the Hist. Records of Babylonia and Assyria*, London, 1903, p. 45 ff.

⁵ Jastrow, *The Rel. of Bab. and Assyr.*, p. 265.

⁶ Jastrow, *Hebrew and Babylonian Tradition* (Haskell Lectures), London and Leipzig, 1914, p. 170 ff.; L. R. Farnell, *Greece and Babylon*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 293 f.

⁷ Sayce, p. 75 ff.; W. R. Smith, *The Religion of the Semites*, new ed., London, 1907, p. 181 f.

⁸ J. Skinner, *Genesis* (ICC), Edinburgh, 1910, p. 483.

⁹ Smythe Palmer, p. 199.

¹⁰ *Hist. Texts*, p. 24 ff.

¹¹ C. H. W. Johns, *The Laws of Babylonia and the Laws of the Hebrew Peoples* (Schweich Lectures, 1912), London, 1914, pp. 26, 61, 71 (with references).

¹² *A Manual of Biblical Archaeology*, Edinburgh, 1887, i. 127 ff., 133 ff.

¹³ *OT Theolo.* 5.

¹⁴ *Aspects of* 34.

¹⁵ *The Book* p. lxxxviii.

¹⁶ Pp. 29-34.

surprising if the name was borrowed from Arabic. Another theory, which is more wide-spread, is that 'Nusairi' comes from Muḥammad ibn Nuṣair, who is said to have founded the sect in the 11th century. But this Ibn Nuṣair was a follower of the eleventh *imām*, Ḥasan al-'Askari, while the doctrine of the Nusairis recognizes only seven *imāms*; and this etymology, which has given rise to popular accounts placing Muḥammad ibn Nuṣair in the time of the Umayyads Mu'āwiyah and Yazid, cannot be admitted, although upheld by S. Guyard, C. Huart, and H. Lammens. It has no more to recommend it than the theory which connects them with Nuṣair, a freedman of 'Alī, or with the Anṣārs of the Prophet. As Dussaud abundantly proves, the Nusairis of our day are the Nazerini mentioned by Pliny the Elder (*HN* v. 81) as forming a tetrarchy separated from Apamea by the river Marsyas (Orontes). The Greek historian Sozomen (*HE* vii. 15) shows them at the end of the 4th cent. helping the pagans of Apamea against the Christians; he gives them the name of Galileans, which Lammens, by an extremely ingenious hypothesis, derives from Bargagylus, a supposed ancient form of Bargylus, the name given by Pliny to one of their mountains.

2. History.—The Nusairis, being isolated, preserved their paganism in spite of the triumph of Christianity, and later of Islām, in the surrounding country. Nevertheless it is certain that the contact of these two religions was not without influence upon the Nusairi beliefs. The greatest influence, however, was exercised by the Ismā'īlis, who were forced in the 12th cent. to leave their ephemeral dwelling-place in Bānās and settle in the Jebel, where they became famous under the name of Assassins (*q.v.*). Further, the influence of the Ismā'īli doctrines had begun as early as the 9th cent., and we see from a refutation by Hamzah, the apostle of the Druse religion, that the Nusairi religion was established at the beginning of the 11th century. After the victories of Baibars and the destruction of the Ismā'īli power the Muslims made an unsuccessful attempt to convert the Nusairis. Their massacre, which was demanded by certain fanatics—among others the theologian Ibn Taimiyyah, in a *fatwā* published by Guyard (*JA* vi. xviii. [1871] 158–198)—would have been contrary to the interests of the Muslims. They have maintained their independence, and survive down to the present day divided into clans, often at war with one another, but paying tribute to the pasha of Tripoli. In the middle of the 19th cent. a chief arose among them, Ismā'il Beg by name, who proclaimed his authority, and secured recognition by the Turkish government as ruler of the country of Safta. By paying an annual tribute of 300,000 francs he enjoyed absolute authority, and, like Rashid al-Din Sinān among the Ismā'īlis, became the hero of legends far more ancient than himself. After his death the Turkish government succeeded in establishing its direct administration in the country—the result of which, as everywhere else, was the persecution and ruin of the land.

3. Present-day religion.—The religion of the Nusairis, therefore, is the ancient pagan religion of the district, very much altered by Christian, Muslim, and especially Ismā'īlian influences, but not reaching the stage of Christianity and Islām. The groundwork of their doctrines is contained in the *Kitāb al-Majmū'*, published and translated by Dussaud (*Hist. et religion des Nusairis*, appendix, pp. 161–198). Like the Ismā'īlis, they divide time into seven eyles, each having its own manifestation of deity; this resembles the doctrine of the pagan Harrānians, according to which the creator was single in his essence but multiple in his manifestations in bodies, and these bodies were

the seven planets which govern the world. The Ismā'īlis and the Druses hold that a prophet appears in each entrusted with a new religion (*nātiq*, 'utterer'). The *nātiq* multiplies into seven persons, the first of whom is called *asas* ('foundation'). The *asas* are inferior to the *nātiqs* (except 'Alī) among the Ismā'īlis and the Druses. With the Nusairis the *asas* are superior to the *nātiqs*; the *asas* are Abel, Seth, Joseph, Joshua, Asaph, Peter (Shema'un), and 'Alī; the *nātiqs* Adam, Noah, Jacob, Moses, Solomon, Jesus, and Muḥammad. 'Alī, the *asas* of the seventh period, has become a god; he bears the epithet Ma'nā, corresponding to that of 'the Word' for Jesus; it is to the Ismā'īlian influence that he owes this rôle.

'Alī ibn Abu Ṭālib was not begotten; he is unique, immortal, and has existed from all time; his essence is the light; from him the stars shine; he is the light of lights. Although deprived of all attributes, he cleaves rocks, drives back seas, and directs affairs; it is he who destroys empires. He is hidden, not enveloped, that is to say, he is hidden by the nature of his divine essence, not by a covering. He is mind, *ma'nā* (*Kitāb al-Majmū'*, tr. Dussaud, p. 162).

The formula employed is copied from the Muslim formula: 'I testify that there is no god but 'Alī ibn Abu Ṭālib.' Dussaud ingeniously conjectures that there is a confusion between 'Alī el 'Alā and the epithet of the old Phœnician deity Elyum ('the very high'), whom the Greeks called Adonis. 'Alī created Muḥammad, whom he called his 'name' (*ism*), and who is also his 'veil' and his 'dwelling-place.' Muḥammad in his turn created Salmān al-Fārisi from the light of his light, made him his 'gate' (*Bāb*), and entrusted him with his propaganda. These three persons form a triad, which seems more ancient than the Christian Trinity, and which goes back to the divine triads of the Syro-Phœnician cults, and in particular to the Palmyrene triad 'Alī=sun (Ba'al-Shamain, Balsamem), Muḥammad=sun (Malak bel), and Salmān=moon (Aglibol). In the initiation ceremonies this triad is represented by 'the mystery of 'Ain-Mim-Sin' (the initial letters of 'Alī, Muḥammad, and Salmān). Muḥammad created the five 'incomparables,' who in their turn created the world and are the five planets. The five 'chosen ones' are the five divine emanations to which the five prayers of the day are consecrated.

The Nusairis do not believe in the immortality of women, who have no reasonable soul, and they hold that the use of wine is lawful.

4. Sects.—The Nusairis are divided into four classes: the Ḥaidāris (from the surname given to 'Alī, El-Haidar, 'lion'), who have come most into contact with foreign influences, the Shamālis, the Kalazis, and the Ghaibis. The Shamālis claim that the god 'Alī, identified with the sky, dwells in the sun, which represents Muḥammad. This idea recalls the Syrian cult of Ba'al-Shamaim (sky-god) assimilated by the Greeks with Helios. The name Shamāl (from which the Jews derive Samuel, the angel of death) seems to represent the sun (another name of the sect is Shamsi) in its nocturnal course; it should be noticed that the Shamālis go a great length with their worship of Muḥammad, who, in the primitive triad, is identified with the sun, united with 'Alī by the light, but separated from him by the manifestation of appearance. With the Kalazis, or Qamaris, the moon is the abode of 'Alī; it is celebrated in the poems that we possess of this sect and represented by wine: in their figurative language, according to Dussaud, by drinking pure wine one reaches a close acquaintanceship with the moon. Some writers hold that there are traces here of a lunar goddess who is none other than the great Syrian goddess Astarte. Their name is derived from that of the *shaiḥ* Muḥammad ibn Kalāzi. The fourth sect, the Ghaibis, 'believe that God appeared, and then became

invisible; the present time is that of the absence' (*ghaibah*), whence their name; they seem to be influenced by the Ismā'īlian doctrine of the *Tanzīh*, which deprives God of His attributes; they therefore consider the absent (*ghaib*) as God (Ali), identified with the air, as, among others, with the sky.

5. Initiation.—The initiation ceremonies seem to have been borrowed by the Nusairis from the Ismā'īlians, and to have replaced the ancient mysteries; but, as in the case of the doctrine of the *nāṭiqs* and the *asas*, the Ismā'īlis initiate into a doctrine, the Nusairis into mysteries (Dussaud, p. 105). They have retained the use of wine and the veiling of the initiate. The nine degrees of Ismā'īli initiation are reduced to three, overburdened with ritual elements. The initiate must be the child of Nusairi parents; he receives instruction from a stranger to his family—which creates between him and his teacher very close bonds of relationship. The *imām* receives him into the number of the faithful after certain ceremonies, in the last of which wine plays a very important part, in the form of communion. It should be noticed that, among non-initiated Nusairis, Khodhr (Khadhr=Eli) is the name of the god *par excellence*, as 'Ali is among the initiated.

6. Metempsychosis.—Metempsychosis is one of the dogmas of the Nusairis, but it differs from that held by the Ismā'īlis. The faithful is transformed seven times before he goes to take his rank among the stars, of which Ali is the prince. If he is blameworthy, he is re-born as a Christian or a Muslim, until expiation is complete. Infidels, who have not worshipped Ali, live again in the form of dogs, camels, mules, asses, or sheep.

7. Festivals.—The chief festivals of the Nusairis are: (1) the *El Ghadir* ('the pond') festival, on the 18th of Dhū'l ḥijjah; it is of Shi'ite origin, and commemorates Muhammad's appointment of 'Ali as his successor; it is celebrated among the most important *shakhs*; (2) the festival of the breaking of the fast (*fiṭr*); (3) that of the sacrifices (12th of Dhū'l ḥijjah); (4) that of the *Firash*, which commemorates the self-sacrifice of 'Ali exposing himself to the blows of the Quraysh in place of Muhammad; (5) that of *Ashurāh* (10th of Muḥarram) in memory of the massacre of Karbālā. According to the Nusairis, Ḥusain did not die, but disappeared like Jesus. The festival of the second *El Ghadir* (9th of Rabī' I.) celebrates the recognition of the sons of 'Ali by Muhammad. That of the Birth commemorates the nativity of Jesus Christ, but it is of Muslim origin; perhaps it is a remnant of that which the pagans of Harrān celebrated at the winter solstice for the birth of the sun. The spring and autumn equinoxes are the occasion of festivals in forms borrowed from the Persians—the *Nauruz* and the *Mihrajan*. Those are the official festivals. Some popular ones are: that of the Baptism (*El Qiddas*), the day of the Epiphany, of the Palms, of Pentecost, and especially of St. Barbe. Lastly, there are several pilgrimages, the most important of which is that of Khodhr (Khadhr=Eli).

8. Conclusion.—Like all secret sects, the Nusairis have been subjected to all kinds of accusations: the Ismā'īlis have contended with them by rivalry, and the Christian historians of the Crusades have re-echoed the slanders hurled at them by the Muslims.

LITERATURE.—The chief work on this sect is R. Dussaud, *Hist. et religion des Nusairis*, Paris, 1900, which has been followed in this article (cf. art. by R. Basset, in *RHR* xlv. [1902]; C. F. Seybold, *LCBL* lll. [1901] 1255 ff.; M. Hartmann, *ZDPV* xiv. [1901] 186-194; R. Duval, *RA* xxxvi. [1901] 184-189; C. Clermont-Ganneau, *CAIBL* [1900] 700-702; J. Halevy, *RS* ix. [1901] 88 ff., and I. Goldziher, *ARW* iv. [1901]); on pp. xlii-xxxv will be found the complete list of works, both Eastern and Western, that have appeared on the Nusairis down to 1900. See also H. Lammens, 'Notes de géographie syrienne,' in

Mélanges de la faculté orientale de Beyrouth, i. [1900] 271-283, 'Une Visite au šāih suprême des Nusairis Haidaris,' *JA* xi. v. [1916] 139-159. RENÉ BASSET.

NYANJAS.—The peoples dealt with in this article are those speaking the Nyanja or Lake language of the Protectorate of Nyasaland and adjoining territories. They cover the district embraced by the southern portion of that Protectorate, extending from Port Herald on the south as far north as the 13th parallel of south latitude. Divisions of the tribe stretch into Portuguese territory on the west, and into N. Rhodesia, where they inhabit the lower part of the Loangwa valley. They are also to be found in a narrow strip of country along the east shore of Lake Nyasa, into which they were driven by pressure of the Yao tribe from the east.

The tribe is divided into various subdivisions, which differ from each other to a small degree both in dialect and in customs. These divisions are: Amang'anja, Ampotola, Amaravi, Ambo, Antumba (or Akantunda), Achewa, and Achipeta. About the time of Livingstone's first visit to Nyasaland, a tribe of Zulus called Angoni migrated from the south and after various wanderings conquered the country inhabited by the northern divisions of the Nyanja tribes, on whom they imposed several of their habits and customs, while at the same time they adopted the language of the conquered people. Now Zulu has entirely given place to Nyanja in one or other of its dialects.

i. Clans.—Like many other Bantu tribes, the Nyanjas are divided into clans or families, which trace their descent through the mother. The better known of these clans are the following: Abanda, Apiri, Amwale, Anilanzi, Adzimbiri, Ankhomā, Ambewe, and Anthanga. The clan-names are to be found all through the adjacent tribes—the result largely of intertribal warfare and slaving, in which women formed the most prominent and most valuable asset. Though the origin of these names has been accounted for by the theory of the totem, there is now no trace of any such ideas connected with the names as would point to a totem origin. The names are not those of any animal or object in nature, nor do they carry any custom of tabu peculiar to the clan. Certain of the clans, however, used to have customs peculiarly their own. The Abanda, e.g., always killed slaves to put into the grave along with the dead body of their chief. Among the Apiri a man used to take a temporary wife, living with her for a year, and then putting her away before taking a permanent wife, or wives, according to native rite and custom.

With the arrival of the Zulu Angoni there came the custom of the descent following the clan of the father, and then a series of new clans was introduced: Apovu, Anjobvu, Anamvu, Ansomba, Ananyoni, etc. These are the names of wild animals—gazelle, elephant, hippopotamus, etc.—and to the members of the clan the flesh of its name-animal is tabued. This custom has gradually spread over the northern portion of the tribe—especially those parts conquered by the Angoni—and now it is common to find natives who claim to belong to two clans, one by the father and one by the mother, the former carrying with it the tabu. Such clan-names are now largely employed as surnames.

2. God and spirits.—(a) The generic name for God among the Nyanja is Mulungu or Mlungu, which appears in Swahili as Muungu, and in Lomwe and Makuwa as Muku. Under this term is embraced not only the deity, but all that appertains to the spirit world. Whether in its primary sense it conveys the idea of personality is doubtful,

as the word belongs to an impersonal class of nouns, and always takes the concord of an impersonal class. When, however, the deity is alluded to in respect of any of his attributes, there is no doubt that personality is assigned, as when the Nyanja speak of 'Leza, the Nurse,' 'Mlengi, the Creator,' 'Mphambi, the heavens,' and 'Chauta, the Almighty.' Other names are also assigned to the Supreme Being, as Chanjiri, Chinsumpi, Mbamba, Mphezi, but these are generally confined to certain local manifestations of the deity through the possession by some individual of divine powers. Among the tribe of S. Angoniland in 1910 there appeared an individual who claimed such divine powers under the name of Chanjiri, and demanded tribute in the form of offerings from the people, at the same time attempting to dissuade them from paying the annual tax to the Government. While the names Leza and Chauta are the common appellatives of the deity among the neighbouring Awemba and Atonga, the name Mulungu is universally recognized as signifying the Supreme Being, and among the Nyanja people is the only designation in use.

(b) Some districts have their local deities or spirits to whom worship is paid at definite shrines—generally on the top of some prominent mountain. In the Blantyre district there are two such shrines on the summits of Mounts Soche and Michiru, where offerings are made in time of public distress to the spirits of Kankhomba and Mpalele. There is little doubt, however, that these are the names of two chiefs who ruled in the respective districts before the time of historical record, and whose names are thus preserved in the worship paid to their spirits. Till recently a local *mbona*, or seer, lived near Port Herald who claimed divine powers for himself, and whose wife—always chosen from a certain family—acted as priestess and means of communication with the outer world, he having shut himself up in complete seclusion.

(c) The *mizimu*, or spirits of the dead, form the chief inhabitants of the unseen world. The word is used to denote the disembodied spirit or soul of man, and there is no spirit which was not at one time existent in a living bodily personality. When this disembodied spirit is conceived as a worker of evil and as possessing an evil influence, it is termed *chivanda*.

It is to the *mizimu* that the people most frequently resort when they wish to get into communication with the unseen. It is to the *mizimu* that prayers are most frequently offered and sacrifices made. Only in time of great local fear or calamity, such as drought or famine or pestilence, are addresses paid to Mulungu or to the local deities.

The *mizimu* make their presence known and communicate their wishes to the living by means of dreams, when the spirits of the dead hold converse with the spirits of the living and the spirits of the living hold converse with each other, and through the medium of the *mlaula*, or prophet, who is inspired by the *mizimu* to rave (*bwebwela*)—the ravings being accepted as the voice of the dead.

The *mizimu* have their abode at the hut of the deceased or at the grave where the body is buried. Offerings are not usually made at the grave—as among so many of the neighboring tribes—but at the hut where the person lived, or at some place such as the foot of a tree near the hut where he was accustomed to resort. Sometimes in the case of an important chief a small sacrifice hut, called *kachisi* or *gombazi*, is built on the outskirts of the village, and there the customary offerings are made.

(d) The spirit may take up its abode in some

wild animal, as a lion, leopard, or python. This is the case only with such persons as have while in life secured medicine which has the power of effecting such a transmigration of the soul. These animals are held in awe, and are rarely interfered with; but, should one be killed accidentally or of necessity, the native has no theory as to what comes after. There, as in so many problems of life, he confesses that he is against a dead wall which he has no means of surmounting.

(e) Among the Angoni Nyanjas the spirit may be made to locate itself in any object such as a piece of cloth, a basket, a doll, or, in the case of a person of importance, such as a chief or headman, in a fowl, a goat, or an ox. The spirit is 'captured' by the *mlaula*, or, if it is that of a person of lower rank, by an old woman who has ceased to bear children. Such objects or animals are set aside as sacred. Should the animal die, another animal is chosen and set aside as *wa mizimu*, the property of the spirits. The other class of objects in which the spirits are located are treasured among the household stuff, and are generally kept near the bed or sleeping-place of the head of the family.

3. Burial customs.—Immediately after death the corpse is bathed, if of a man by men, if of a woman by women. Any one may perform this office, but it usually falls to the older people. Any neighbour may assist in carrying the corpse to the grave, and in digging the grave, but on those who go down into the grave and receive the corpse from those above special duties are laid. They are known as the *adzukuru* (from the root *kuru*, 'greatness'). There are no official *adzukuru*; any person may perform the function, but by habit and custom of the community certain individuals usually have the office assigned to them. To them afterwards falls the duty of offering the sacrifices to the spirit of the dead. Theirs are the portions of food which are left over from the sacrifice, and which they have the right of dividing among their friends. After the burial the mourners return to the empty hut, which the *adzukuru* pull down. Should it be decided to take steps to ascertain the cause of the death, the *ula* is consulted (see § 9), and the case may proceed to the chief's court to be settled there. Two months or so after the burial the *adzukuru* summon the mourners together, and a feast is made (generally of beer), a sacrifice is offered, and the shaving of heads of the mourners finishes the mourning.

4. Sacrifices. — Sacrifices are offered (a) to Mulungu, (b) to the spirits of the dead chiefs and headmen, and (c) to the spirits of dead relatives.

(a) Sacrifices to Mulungu as the Supreme Being are offered in a small sacrificial hut (*kachisi*) built on the outskirts of the village or at the foot of any large tree where there is shade—preferably the large tree in the village *bwalo*, or courtyard. Any tree, however, that gives shade may be a place of sacrifice. Persons on a journey or in the hunting-field place an offering almost anywhere—under a tree, if possible, or at the meeting of two roads. The offerings consist mostly of food—beer, flour, etc.—while pieces of calico are offered by being torn up and hung from the tree or spread over the sacrifice hut. At the beginning of harvest offerings of first-fruits are made in the sacrifice hut, the whole village joining in the sacrifice and the chief or headman acting as officiating priest for the occasion.

(b) Sacrifices are offered to the spirits of the dead chiefs or headmen. These, like the others, consist of food—beer, flour, etc. They may be offered near the hut where the dead person lived, or at the sacrifice hut where his spirit may be approached. The offerings are made by some descendant or relative of the deceased chief, generally by his

successor in office. In one instance near Blantyre the dead chief had been the chief of a tribe which had been conquered and its members scattered by the present chief of the country. When a sacrifice was made, a member of the conquered tribe—a relative of the deceased—had to be found to offer the sacrifice, as likely to be more acceptable to the spirit whose favour was sought. Among the Angoni Nyanjas the offering may take the form of an animal in which the spirit of the dead is located, and the animal is thereafter looked upon as the property of the spirit. If it is a fowl or goat, it is not usually separated from its fellows, but if it is an ox—usually dedicated to chiefs only—a special kraal may be built for it and a special caretaker set apart.

(c) Sacrifices are made to the spirits of dead relatives or friends—a little flour, beer, a fowl, or a goat, part of which is made the offering, the remainder being partaken of by the friends of the *adzukuru*, or offerer. Where the spirit of the dead has been located in any article of household use, the offering is placed close to it.

5. Initiation ceremonies.—Among the whole of the Nyanja-speaking peoples there is no initiation ceremony for males and no rite of circumcision. This shows that they had not come under the influence of the coast Arab or Muhammadan. There is, however, in the case of females a ceremony of initiation at the age of puberty. The period of instruction varies among the different sections of the tribe from one or two days to a month. During this period the girls live in a hut apart by themselves and are instructed by old women in the duties and acts of the married state. There is no form of mutilation or circumcision, but the girls are taught by manual manipulation to prepare the organs for the marital acts. When the married woman becomes pregnant for the first time, the old women again take her aside and instruct her in the mysteries of childbirth and motherhood.

6. Marriage.—In the marriage ceremony of the Nyanja people the chief agents, next to the persons themselves, are the 'sureties' (*ankhosove*), by whom the marriage is arranged and on whom the responsibility for its well-being depends. They are usually the brothers or some very near relatives of the contracting parties. The man and woman take no part in the preliminary negotiations; everything is done for them by their respective 'sureties.' Should difficulties arise between the husband and wife, the duty of making reconciliation or of permitting a divorce lies with the 'sureties,' and without their consent no alteration in the condition of husband and wife is sanctioned.

The woman remains in the village of her parents, where the husband builds her a hut if her father has not already built one for her. The mother-in-law expects help from him in the hoeing of her garden. Beyond this the husband has no other indebtedness to his wife's family. When the hut is ready, the husband makes his wife's village his home. If he has other wives, he pays it periodical visits. There is no marriage ceremony beyond the entry of the husband into the wife's hut. Should the husband prove impotent, this is a ground for annulling the marriage at once. The first-born child is named by the husband's relatives, and, when other children are born, it goes to the home of the mother-in-law and is reared by her, 'in the place of the daughter whom she has lost.'

The custom of *ukulobola*, or payment by the husband to the wives' relatives, does not exist among the Nyanja tribes. Only in the northern districts, where they are in close touch with the Angoni (Zulu) tribe, does one find the custom occasionally introduced.

Wives are inherited from the maternal uncle along with other property. The uncle's head-wife may become the head-wife of his successor. More generally she is allowed to retire into private life, and her place as head-wife may be taken either by the successor's first wife or by some other of the inherited wives. Separation is common, the cause generally being adultery on the woman's part or neglect on the husband's part. The matter is decided by the 'sureties.' If divorce is sanctioned, the husband hands over some small article (*kuper-eka mubvi*, 'to hand over an arrow') to the wife as a token of her freedom, and without this ceremony no divorce is complete. The whole marriage principle is simple. The woman is the property of her clan or family, and so are the children. Hence the husband makes his home with his wife's relatives. This is altogether a different state of society from that in which the husband takes the wife to his home—in which case he must pay the *ukulobola* as compensation to her family for the loss of the woman and her children.

7. Witchcraft and disease.—The power of witchcraft belongs to a certain clan of witches (*afiti*). Their object in seeking this power is to obtain the means by which they may avenge themselves on their enemies and destroy their fellow-beings. As they keep this power by eating human flesh, they may be supposed also to exercise it that they may secure the necessary food. They work their spells by means of 'medicines,' which they keep in small antelope's horns, and hence they themselves are euphemistically described as a *nyanga*, 'they of the horns.'

The *afiti* have their enemies, who are bent on their discovery and destruction. These may be renegade *afiti*, who turn their knowledge to the destruction of their old associates. The *seketera*, or *setekera*, the 'throat-cutter,' is the most commonly recognized of these enemies. The *ua nyundo*, 'he of the hammer,' is another. By means of more powerful medicine they compel the *afiti* to reveal themselves, when they attack them, the one with his knife, the other with his hammer. The *afiti* form a secret society into which only the initiated are admitted. The fear of them hangs a dark cloud over the whole of native life, and the superstition is the cause of more deaths than all the diseases of the climate put together.

The *mabisalira* is a professional witch-finder, generally a woman, who is known over a large district, and who is called in when all other means of inquiry have failed. She obtains her power by means of medicine, which she purchases or otherwise secures from another member of the craft. In the process of her divination she works herself into a frenzy and her audience into a state of excitement by a weird dance, accompanied by physical contortions and bodily postures such as enter into all native dancing. She seizes and smells the hands of the bystanders till she is able to fix on the guilty person, whom she names. In the course of her performance she digs up with a spear the various horns of medicines and charms which have formed the suspect's stock-in-trade. In this way the village is purged of all occult agencies. The *mabisalira* has also the power of expelling from any person the *afiti* power which he may have acquired without realizing what its possession meant. By application of medicines the patient is caused to vomit, and in this way gets rid of the occult powers which he has acquired. Of course, against an accusation by a *mabisalira* the accused has always the resources of appeal to the poison ordeal (see § 9).

Disease has its origin in witchcraft, whatever be its nature. The same applies to all accidents, epidemics, losses, and misfortunes. Although a

disease may be acknowledged as contagious or infectious, its ultimate origin is always to be found in the dark operations of the *afiti*. Hence medicines are almost always charms, working through occult powers. No doubt experience and experiment have led the native to acknowledge the medicinal value of certain substances, and for external diseases the application of certain drugs is recognized to have its curative effect. But for the treatment of deep-seated or unknown disease it is to the occult powers of charms that resort is always had.

8. *Fetishes and charms*.—Among the northern branches of the Nyanja tribe, the Achewa and the Achipeta, as has already been pointed out, certain articles may become the abode of the spirits and are fetishes, objects of reverence as well as worship. Among the southern branches of the tribe there is no such belief, except in so far as the spirit of the dead may be believed to enter into some wild animal. Charms, however, are used and worn among all classes and for almost every variety of purpose. They range from the application of some medicinal herb either as an ointment or as an ash rubbed into incisions made in the skin of the affected part, or the little twigs worn in the necklace to cure a headache or toothache, to the big bag of medicine worn round the neck of the elephant-hunter by which he brings the game within reach and range of his guns and obtains accuracy in shooting. Charms are worn to secure safety on a journey, success in trading or in war, and to protect the hut from the visits of the dreaded *afiti*, or the garden from the depredations of wild pigs or thieves. Doubtless these charms were originally fetishes, endowed with occult power from being the abode of some spirit. Now, however, in the native mind they are entirely dissociated from any spirit-possession, and the powers which they possess are ascribed to the articles themselves.

9. *Divination*.—(a) *Lots*.—Divination is by means of *ula*, 'lots,' which are resorted to on all occasions of doubt, or when the disclosure of secrets is desired. For the discovery of such crimes as witchcraft, theft, or adultery it is the invariable means. The lots are consulted whenever the fortunes of the future are in doubt, as before going on a journey, making war, or starting on a hunting expedition. The *ula* exist in a large variety of forms, from simple divination by means of the position in which small pieces of a cup or plate fall when thrown out of a dish to the *phenda*, or ordeal by boiling water, and the use of the divining-rod. In the last the holder of the rod grasps it by both hands, and is dragged by it to the spot where the object sought for is concealed or where the guilty individual is to be found.

(b) *The poison ordeal*.—The poison ordeal (*mvabvi*) is the supreme court of appeal for a final declaration on all questions of innocence or guilt. The verdict of the *ula* or the *mabisalira* may be refused or denied; the verdict of the poison ordeal is accepted by both parties as a final closing of the case. It consists of a decoction of the bark of the *mwabvi*-tree, which is pounded in a mortar with a certain quantity of water warmed by means of a hot stone dropped into it, and given to the accused or appellant to drink. Sometimes both parties drink together to assert the truth of their asseverations. Upon the effect of the poison hangs the verdict. If the accused dies, he is guilty, and, the case being thus decided against him, his friends and relatives have to pay compensation for the crime which he committed. If the accused vomits, he is innocent, and the accusers, having made a false accusation, have to pay compensation to the person whom they thus defamed.

The poison ordeal is administered in several ways. (1) It may be drunk by the accused himself in the presence of the accusers. As soon as the poison begins to show that it is to have a fatal effect, the accuser and his friends usually set upon their victim and beat him or otherwise maltreat him till he dies. The body may then be burned, or thrown into the bush to be devoured by beasts of prey or vultures. It is never given ordinary burial. (2) The poison may be administered to some domestic animal, a fowl or a dog, and by the result the innocence or guilt of the accused is declared. (3) Among the Angoni Nyanjas the poison is administered to villages or even districts, in order to clear them of the accusation or suspicion of witchcraft, or to purge them of all persons suspected of using occult powers. Not infrequently, if an Angoni chief doubted the loyalty of any of his villages, he would order a wholesale drinking of the poison. In this way many deaths occurred, whole villages being sometimes almost entirely wiped out.

10. *Social organization*.—The chief sitting in the council of his elders or headmen is the head of all authority and the highest court of law in his country. Decisions may be given in smaller cases by the headmen, but all serious cases are taken to the chief's court for final decision. War is declared by the chief alone. None of his people can go on a foray without his consent. The chief is responsible for the acts of his subjects. The members of a village or clan are all held individually responsible for the actions of any of their fellow-members. There is no criminal law nor such a thing as 'crime' in native law. All offences are civil offences—against property—and so may be atoned for by payment according to the amount of damage done. This is the fundamental principle at the root of native law. The native whose goods have been stolen fails to see the justice of merely imprisoning the thief while the stolen property is left unrestored. Under native law the thief would have been obliged to make restitution for the stolen goods, or his relatives would have paid the amount for him. Assault on the person is compensated for by a monetary payment according to the amount of the injury inflicted. Adultery is punishable by death or by payment of a slave or the value of a slave. It is, in native law, an offence against the property or rights of the husband.

The line of descent being through the mother and the laws of property demanding that it be kept within the clan, inheritance falls to the brother by the same mother; failing him, to the oldest sister's son. The heir takes the name as well as the property of the deceased. No one can fall heir to two names. Under the native régime monogamy is the rule and polygamy the exception. Wealth or inheritance alone is responsible for polygamy.

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NYAYA.—*Nyāya* in Sanskrit signifies 'Logic,' and is the title of the latest of the six philosophical systems of the Brāhmins. These are in order the Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Vaiśeṣika, and Nyāya. Its founder is known either by his gentile name of Gotama (Gautama) or by a nickname which has lost its opprobrious meaning and has supplanted the personal name, Akṣapāda, 'the eye-footed,' i.e. with the eyes directed on the feet.

The name of 'Logic' has been given to the system, because it treats of formal logic in the most exhaustive manner, and this forms its principal theme. In the first sentence of Gotama's text-book, the *Nyāya-sūtras*, which were composed c. 150 B.C., sixteen logical ideas are found enumerated, with the characteristic addition that the true knowledge of their nature leads to the attainment of final emancipation, i.e. the release of the soul from the cycle of existence. Nothing shows more clearly the dominant position assumed by formal logic in the Nyāya system.

Gotama's logic enjoys great popularity in India, and for a long time has served as the foundation of all philosophical research, as is shown by the fact that the terminology of the Nyāya has found its way into the later text-books of all the other schools. The Nyāya philosophy, however, is in no way limited to logic and dialectic, but claims to be a complete philosophical system. Regarded as such, it is only a further development and completion of the Vaiśeṣika system (see art. VAIŚEŚIKA), from which it has borrowed not only its doctrine of atoms and of the origin of the universe, but also its psychology. Just as in the philosophy of the Vaiśeṣika, so according to the doctrine of the Nyāya, souls are infinite and eternal, possess definite qualities, and are only by means of the material organ of thought which they possess capable of experience and knowledge. Nevertheless the Nyāya philosophy is set to a different key from that of the system of the Vaiśeṣika. In harmony with the older systems in its theory of the universe it maintains the consistent pessimism and the ascetic character which above everything else require the suppression of the desire for action; and in connexion with this it again presents deliverance from the misery of empirical existence, i.e. the attainment of a condition of absolute unconsciousness, as the supreme goal of human endeavour—prominent characteristics which in the Vaiśeṣika philosophy (at least in Kaṇāda's text-book) appear toned down to a remarkable degree.

In all the Indian systems the means by which knowledge may be attained are discussed, now a greater and now a less number of methods being recognized, but nowhere is the subject so fully expounded as in the Nyāya. Here four sources of true knowledge are recognized: (1) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) inference (*anumāna*), (3) analogy (*upamāna*), (4) credible testimony (*śabda*). It is obvious, however, that inference, as the only reliable means of attaining philosophical knowledge, completely overshadows the other three. There are three kinds of inference: (1) inference from the cause to the effect (*pūrvavat*), when, for instance, from the rising clouds the conclusion is drawn that a storm of rain is impending; (2) inference from the effect to the cause (*śeṣavat*), when, for instance, from the swelling of the rivers it is inferred that rain has fallen in the uplands; (3) conclusion as to something beyond the reach of the senses only to be known in the abstract (*sāmānyato drṣṭa*), when, for example, the individual senses are made the foundation on which to base a general conception of the instrument of perception. The distinction usual in European logic since the time of Aristotle between induction and deduction was strangely enough never made in India.¹

The syllogism of the Nyāya consists of five members, which are illustrated by the standing example of fire inferred from the smoke on the mountain:

(1) Proposition (*pratijñā*): there is fire on the mountain.

(2) Cause (*hetu*): for the mountain smokes.

(3) Exemplification (*dṛṣṭānta*): wherever there is smoke there is fire, as, for example, on the hearth in the kitchen.

(4) Recapitulation of the cause (*upanaya*): the mountain smokes.

(5) Conclusion (*nigamana*): therefore there is fire on the mountain.

If this scheme is contrasted with the simple threefold syllogism of Aristotle, it is seen to be unnecessarily diffuse, since the members (4) and (5) are, in fact, only repetitions of (2) and (1). The aim, however, of the founder of the Nyāya system was not in the least to propound the most concise form of syllogism possible; he desired to teach how best to impart to others a conviction reached by an inference. Thus, from the sphere of logic he encroached on that of rhetoric. Even in India, therefore, no difficulty was found in accommodating the above-mentioned scheme of five members to that of three, to which we are accustomed. The conception on which the theory of the syllogism of the Nyāya rests bears the name of 'invariable association' (*vyāpti*). Instead of starting as we do with an affirmative proposition, universally valid—'All smoke presumes the existence of fire'—the Nyāya philosophy asserts the 'invariable association' of smoke with fire. The sign observed (*linga*)—in this instance the smoke—is 'invariably associated' (*vyāpya*); the vehicle of the sign which is to be inferred (*liṅgin*)—in this instance the fire—is the 'invariable associate' (*vyāpaka*). Logically the conception is quite correct, although the form of the expression conveys to us a suggestion of strangeness. For smoke is always and unconditionally associated with fire, but not *vice versa* fire with smoke; for there is smokeless fire. The definitions of the conceptions here mentioned, and the doctrines of their application, not only occupy a large place in the literature proper of the Nyāya system, but have a wider range in the philosophical systems of India.

The conception which the Nyāya philosophy presents of causality is somewhat different from that of the older systems, in which only two kinds of causes are admitted, the material and the effective. The material cause of a thing (*upādāna-kāraṇa*) is the matter from which it proceeds or of which it is composed or consists; the effective cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) is both the motive-power from which it originates and the means by which it is produced. The material cause of a given object is always the same, and therefore is described as the chief cause. The effective causes, on the other hand, of which frequently a whole series present themselves, need not be the same in similar cases, and are therefore termed also accompanying or secondary causes (*sahakārikāraṇa*). In place of the expression 'material cause,' which is elsewhere customary, the Nyāya philosophy employs in exactly the same sense the term 'inhering cause' (*samavāyikāraṇa*), with evident reference to the sixth category of the Vaiśeṣika system, and together with the two kinds of causes here named postulates a third, the 'not-inhering cause' (*asamavāyikāraṇa*), which we may describe as 'formal.' To use the ordinary example of the Nyāya books, in the case of a carpet the threads are the inhering cause, the combination of the threads the not-inhering cause; the weaver's tools, his diligence and skill, and the weaver himself are the effective causes. The carpet itself is the inhering cause of its qualities; the qualities of the threads are the not-inhering cause of the qualities of the carpet.

The most important features of the Nyāya philosophy have here been set forth. But the system further treats of the meaning of numerous logical conceptions, and of fallacies, sophisms, and other

¹ Cf. Max Müller, *ZDMG* vi. [1860] 235; Albert Bürk, *WZKM* xv. [1901] 251 ff.

errors of speech, accompanied always with elaborate and subtle classifications and subdivisions. To those desirous of investigating the subject further, the able article of H. Jacobi on 'Indian Logic' may be recommended.¹

One point of importance remains to be noticed, which has to do with the Vaiśeṣika system as well as with the Nyāya.

The *Vaiśeṣika*- and *Nyāya-sūtras*, the treatises upon which the two schools are founded, contain no mention of God. Since they, moreover, assert the eternal and uncreated nature of both soul and matter, and conceive the fate of the individual in harmony with the universal Indian view as the result of his good and evil deeds in the present or earlier existences, there can be no doubt of the originally atheistic character of both systems. Probably we ought to recognize here the influence of the Sāṅkhya system; and in fact the doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika-Nyāya, although in several respects opposed to the Sāṅkhya, seem, on the other hand, to be dependent upon it in some of their fundamental tenets. When later the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems came to be blended together, the combined school adopted theistic views, but never saw in the personal God, whom they assumed, the creator of matter. Their theology is set forth in the *Kusumāñjali* of Udayanāchārya (c. A.D. 1300), and in various later works which discuss the two systems in common. According to the view which they hold in harmony with the doctrine of the Yoga, God is a distinct soul like the other individual souls, and these are equally with Him eternal. He is, however, distinguished from them by the fact that He alone possesses the attributes of omniscience and omnipotence, which qualify Him for the government of the universe; and that, on the other hand, He lacks those attributes which result in the entanglement of all other souls in the cycle of existence.

LITERATURE.—F. Max Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1899, ch. viii.; M. Monier-Williams, *Indian Wisdom*, London, 1893; *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha*, tr. E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough², London, 1894, ch. xi.

R. GARBE.

NYIKA.—I. Distribution.—'Nyika (Wanyika), also 'Wanika' and in the Portuguese records 'Vanica,' is a name applied to several Bantu tribes in E. Africa. It is not an ethnic designation, as it simply means 'people of the wilderness,'³ and appears to have been used by the Swahili to denote a set of tribes who, during the 16th cent., migrated down the coast in a south-westerly direction from the steppes on the left bank of the Tana. It is not used indiscriminately for the inland natives, as the Taita, Pokomo, Segeju, and Kamba do not seem ever to have been included under it, though the first three, at any rate, are probably connected in some way with the nine tribes to whom it has—whether arbitrarily or not—been assigned. These are distributed as follows:

(1) The Giryama, in the country north and south of Mt. Munga, which lies, roughly speaking, about 39° 40' E. by 3° 20' S. They extend beyond the Sabaki—in fact, the important settlement of Garashi lies north of that river; and in recent years single families have been migrating farther and farther north, even beyond the Tana. Their southern boundary is the Mleji, the stream which crosses the road from Rabai to Kaloleni.

(2) The Ravai³ between the Mleji and the Mtsapuni stream, the latter being about half-way between Rabai Boma and Mazera's station on the Uganda Railway.

(3) The Duruma, west of the Mtsapuni. They are said to be partly descended from a number of Makua brought to Mombasa by a Portuguese known as 'Bwana Kigozi' (De Goes?).

¹ GGN, phil.-histor. Klasse, 1901, p. 400 ff.

² *Nyika*, in Swahili, originally meant 'grass,' and is used for the 'bush steppe,' the open ground covered with coarse grass and scrub, as distinguished from the forest, *muritu*.

³ *r* here denotes the 'bilahali r,' which is the sound used by the people themselves. The Swahili call them 'Warabai,' and the name in this form has been officially given to the district. It does not belong to the present mission station (founded by Rebmann in 1850), which is properly called Kisulitini.

(4) The Digo, west of the Duruma and extending over the border into German E. Africa, where they occupy the hinterland of Tanga (Baumann, *Usambara und seine Nachbargebiete*, pp. 144-161). These four are the larger Nyika tribes; the remaining five are (now, at any rate) of less importance. They are chiefly found on the ridge of hills running southward from the Voi river, between the Giryama country and the sea.

(5) The Kauma have their principal *kaya*, or fortified village, about a day's march south of Mtanganyiko on the Voi river (which runs into the Kilifi creek). Some of them live north of the Sabaki, near Garashi.

(6) The Chonyi, whose *kaya* lies south of Kaya Kauma. There are also a few of them near Garashi.

(7) The Dzihana (Jibana), a few miles south of Kaya Chonyi, on the way to Ribe. Their clan-names (see below) seem to indicate a close connexion with Chonyi.

(8) The Kambe (not to be confounded with the Kamba of Ukambani, the district south-east of Nairobi) have one *kaya* between Jibana and Ribe (but a little off the main road) and another (Kaya Kambe ya Bate) north of the Sabaki, near Jilore.

(9) The Rihe ('Ribe') are a small tribe living almost within sight of Mombasa and a few miles from Rabai. The old *kaya* is not quite an hour's walk from the present (Methodist) mission village of Ribe.

Krapf (*Reisen in Ost-Afrika*, i. 180) mentions twelve tribes of 'Wanika,' but nowhere gives a definite list of them. He incidentally refers to the tribes of Shimba and Mtawi (ii. 91), who are subdivisions of the Digo, and on the same page mentions the Lungo tribe 'der zu den Wadigo-Stämmen der Wanika gehört,' so that it is not clear whether he reckons it separately. He may, however, have reckoned as the twelfth the Tiwi, which he does not mention, but which occurs in an Arabic MS of which translations are published by both Owen (*Narrative of Voyages*, i. 418) and Guillaumin (*Documents sur l'hist. . . de l'Afrique orientale*, i. 618). Among the 'cities of the Vanikat' (evidently meaning the *kayas*) enumerated in this MS, nine can easily be identified as the tribes given above; the others are Mtawi, Mtawi-Shimba (probably an offshoot of the former), Tiwi, and Lungo. There is a village called Tiwi about half-way between Mombasa and the German frontier, and on the Shimba hills, just south of Mombasa, are several Digo villages somewhat isolated from the rest of the tribe, to which, no doubt, all four names really belong.

2. Origin.—The general native tradition is that the Wanyika come from Sungwaya (Shungwaya, Shingwaya), the native name for the plains on the left bank of the Tana (Hollis, *JRAI* xxx. 276, n.). They are said to have been driven thence by the Galla. According to the old headman of Kaya Kauma, this happened thirteen generations ago. Some say that all the Wanyika are descended from Matseze and his wife Mbodze, who lived near Sungwaya.¹

Another Kauma informant told the writer that, at the time of the migration, the Pokomo (*q.v.*) were already settled in the Tana valley and the Segeju in the delta of the same river, 'from the old Ozi to Chodoro.' The former preferred to submit to the Galla, and were treated as their serfs till within the last fifty years; the latter marched south with the Wanyika till they arrived at or near their present abode, viz. the neighbourhood of Tanga, though there are some within British territory, south of Gasi (Baumann, p. 25 f.). The Wanyika appear to have remained with them for some time; but, as their numbers increased, they sent off three successive swarms northward, the first being the Kauma, the second the Rabai (who, according to this informant, built their *kaya* at Mbuyuni, not far from what is now Mazera's station on the Uganda Railway, migrating afterwards to Rabai Mpia, where Krapf found them), and the last the Duruma, who seem to have settled much about where they now are. Krapf's account (i. 411; cf. also his *Dict. of the Swahili Language*, London, 1882, s.v. 'Mutsi muiru') at first sight

¹ Near Kaloleni, in Giryama, is the grave of another Mbodze, by some said to be a descendant of the first, where rain-making ceremonies are performed in time of drought.

seems incompatible with the above; he says (and this is borne out by a MS kindly placed at the present writer's disposal by Miss Austin) that they came from Rombo in Chaga and built their *kaya* on Mriale hill, where the site is still shown, though quite overgrown with forest. Thence they moved to Rabai ya Kale ('Old Rabai,' or Vokera), and later to Rabai Mpia ('New Rabai'), which had, in 1845, been occupied only for about 30 years (Krapf, i. 251). He gives no very clear indication as to the site of Rabai ya Kale, which he visited more than once (i. 215, 230), but it seems to have been near the head of the Jomvu creek.

As this migration is evidently much later than the other, it was probably a return movement. There is nothing to prevent our supposing that some, if not all, of the Wanyika had reached the neighbourhood of Kilimanjaro, or that they were joined by some of the Chaga clans when they once more set their faces northward. The MS above referred to states that Chonyi and Dzihana are offshoots of this tribe.

A note of time for the southward migration from Sungwaya is furnished by the recorded fact that the 'Mosseguejos' assisted the Portuguese, in 1589, to defend Malindi against the Wazimba (Guillain, i. 402; Baumann, p. 26; Strandes, *Die Portugiesenzeit von Deutsch- und Englisch-Ostafrika*, p. 153).

The Giriama are said by some to have come from the Taita hills and to be quite distinct from the Wanyika who came out of Sungwaya. The probable solution is suggested by other informants, according to whom the Giriama and Taita tribes left Sungwaya together and settled down, as did the Wanyika and Wasegeju. Later, the Giriama, leaving the others behind, went north again and established themselves on Mt. Mangua, which is looked on by some as their original centre of dispersion (Krapf, i. 359; Wakefield, *Thomas Wakefield*, p. 60). The Kambe insist that they left Sungwaya as a separate tribe, along with the Kauma, of whom the Rihe are an offshoot. But 'the Rihe are the most ancient of all the Nyika sub-tribes, and if members of all the sections meet together, the Rihe representative has the right to speak first' (Hollis, MS information). Probably some of these conflicting accounts are to be explained by the fact that the tribes are not always homogeneous. Thus, some perplexity was occasioned by a statement that the Pokomo came from Taita. This appears to mean that, when the Rabai left Mriale, they 'split up into several sections, going respectively to Pokomo, Chonyi, Jibana, Mtahi, and Mtongwe. . . . To this day the section which went to Pokomo are said to be distinguishable by their Rabai names' (Austin, MS). This is confirmed by members of the Pokomo tribe.

3. Physical characteristics.—The Giriama present a well-marked physical type: they are tall, many well over 6 ft., muscular and well made, with a peculiar breadth of head and squareness of face; the complexion is a very dark brown; the nose, as a rule, not excessively flat. Similar types are sometimes found among the Rabai, but these are far less homogeneous; their situation, within easy reach of Mombasa and in touch with several inland tribes, exposed them to frequent contact with strangers who came to trade and frequently settled down and intermarried with them. Besides, we find that, as long ago as 1614, Rabai was inhabited by the slaves of the Sultan of Mombasa (Guillain, i. 419), and these would be drawn from various parts. Many of the present inhabitants are freed slaves, or the children of such, belonging to the Nyanja, Yao, Ngindo, and other tribes. The Duruma are far from homogeneous, perhaps for the reason already stated. The population of Rihe is also

very mixed. Chonyi and Jibana may perhaps represent the primitive Rabai rather better than those who go under the latter name.

The Digo 'are slender and remarkably well built; they have pleasant, oval faces, in which the negro type is not exaggerated, and which decidedly indicate an affinity with the northern Hamitic tribes, such as the Galla and Somali. The predominant colour of their skins is a shade between cinnamon and coffee-brown; but, as might be expected, innumerable gradations occur' (Baumann, p. 145).

4. Social organization.—(a) *Clans*.—All these tribes are organized on a basis of exogamous clans, among which, however, there are important distinctions. The Giriama trace descent through the father, as do the Kauma and Kambe, Chonyi, Dzihana, and Rihe. The Digo and Duruma trace it through the mother, and the Rabai appear to be passing from one stage to the other. They have two sets of clans, called 'male' and 'female'—the men belonging to the first, and the women to the second. A man inherits two clans, his father's and his mother's, but for all practical purposes he is counted as belonging to his father's, while the reverse is the case with his sister. The statement that one of the Dzihana clans is 'a women's clan' seems to indicate that this tribe may once have had a similar arrangement. We have a hint of the change from matrilineal to patrilineal descent in the case of the Kauma, in a pedigree which goes back for seven generations in the male line, then changes to the female; also perhaps in the fact that the tribal ancestress, Mbodze, is always named before her husband, Matsezec.¹

A former Assistant District Commissioner at Rabai says: 'It is probably not very long since the Northern Nyika passed from the stage when mother-right obtained, for I remember a case . . . in 1898, of a Rabai man suing his nephew for seizing the estates of his deceased father' (Hollis, MS).

(b) *The kaya*.—The *kaya* is intimately connected with the clan-organization. It is usually situated on a hill-top in the densest part of the forest (Kaya Jibana has a particularly commanding situation and difficult approach); it is surrounded by a circular palisade of stout stakes, with two gateways at opposite points, closed by heavy wooden doors and approached by a steep and narrow pathway. Usually there are three gateways at each entrance—perhaps there was formerly a triple palisade, but, since people have been able to live outside the *kaya*, the defences have fallen into decay. Kaya Rihe and Rabai Mpia are now deserted, though the latter is still used for assemblies of the elders, and the *mwanza* is kept there; and, in the former, the site of the old council-house can still be traced. The *moro*, or council-house, is the meeting-place of the men, and serves the purposes both of a parliament-house and of an ordinary club. At Garashi and both the Kambe *kayas* it seemed to be open to strangers; at Kaya Kauma, though the place was pointed out, the present writer was not allowed even to approach it. Should any unauthorized person (i.e. one not belonging to the order of elders, or armed with their permission) go there, it was said that he would fall down in a fit and not recover till treated by the elders. Besides the *moro* each clan (*mbari*), or in most cases each of the larger divisions of the tribe (usually consisting of several *mbari*), has its club-house (*lwanda*, but the Swahili word *baraza* is often used), round which the huts of the families belonging to that section are grouped. Evidently the only name for these larger units is *kabila*, from the Swahili; it is possible that they were originally *mbari* which branched off into the smaller divisions now known by that name, and it is sometimes difficult to keep the two sets of names distinct. There are five sections of the Kauma tribe: the Andarari, Adzaka, Amongwe, Adzundza, and Amvitsa, compris-

¹ This is not accidental, for the present writer was expressly corrected by an old man when mentioning them in the reverse order.

ing seventeen *mbari*; but there are only two club-houses, the Amvitsa and Amongwe sharing one opposite the north gate of the *kaya*, the other three the corresponding southern one. At Kaya Chonyi, however, eleven out of seventeen *mbari* have a *baraza* each; the remaining six share three between them, perhaps indicating a recent subdivision. Kaya Dzihana and Kaya Rihe each have (or had) four *barazas*.

(c) *Totemism*.—There are traces of totemism, though, as far as our present state of knowledge goes, it seems to be almost forgotten. The Giryama clans 'are divided into two sections, according as they avoid the *kasiji* or the *katsendzere* bird' (MS information communicated by Hobley). The *kasiji* is a tiny finch, sky-blue and grey in plumage; it is never killed or eaten, but it is difficult to determine how far it is actually regarded as sacred. The *katsendzere* is a still smaller bird, grey, with a crimson spot just behind the head. Some of the Chonyi clans refuse to eat the *loma* (ant-bear), an animal to which some curious superstitions are attached. There are other food-prohibitions, though it is not certain whether these have anything to do with totemism or not; Chonyi, and certain clans of Kauma and Kambe, may not eat the flesh of the *funo* antelope within their *kaya*, though there is no objection to their doing so elsewhere (Hollis, MS).

How far the curious veneration for the hyena (Krapf, i. 248, and *Dict. of the Suahili Language*, s.v. 'Fisi'; New, *Life . . . in E. Africa*, p. 132; Taylor, *Giryama Vocabulary*, p. 82) is really totemistic is difficult to say. It is not connected with any particular clan, as with the Nandi, who certainly have a hyena totem (Hollis, *The Nandi*, Oxford, 1909, p. 11; some usages with regard to the hyena extend to the whole tribe [*ib.* p. 7]). Nor can it be connected with a custom of leaving the dead to be devoured by hyenas, for among the Nyika tribes the dead are always buried. Sham traps were set up on recent graves outside Kaya Kauma, to prevent exhumation by hyenas or bush-pigs. Neither the Galla nor the Pokomo venerate the hyena, though the latter remark on such veneration as a peculiarity of the Wakoshoro (their name for the Giryama). Giryama of middle age say that a man was formerly fined by the elders if he killed a hyena, but the regulation is no longer observed.

(d) *Government*.—There is nothing like a paramount chief of any Nyika tribe, though the Digo have hereditary sultans, with the title *kubo* (Hollis, *JRAI* xxx. 276, 289, and MS information). The government is carried on by the 'elders' (*azhere*). Any member of the tribe who has passed through the preliminary degrees (Taylor, pp. 43-45) is eligible for entrance into the *kambi*, or council, on payment of the proper fees, the badge of this status being an ivory armlet (*luvo*). Members of the *kambi* may afterwards be admitted, first to the *vaya*, or 'circle of the elders,' who 'may deliberate on smaller judicial questions in their own district, but are really nothing more than a convivial club' (Taylor, p. 44), and afterwards to the *Fisi* 'Hyena'—the Inner Circle of all and very select. . . . The members of the Hyena inspire great terror, as they are the depositories of the most potent spells and oracles' (*ib.* p. 45). From these last two classes are chosen the three *enye-tsi*, 'owners of the land,' who carry on the government during the space of a *rika* (or 'circumcision-cycle') and then 'hand over the country' to their successors, i.e. all those circumcised next after them, the ceremony taking place about once in thirteen years, which, according to one native informant, is the duration of a *rika*. But the collective circumcision-festival is falling into disuse, the operation being regarded more and more as a purely individual, or at most a family,

matter; and this, perhaps, is the reason for the difference in a recent account:

'There are now among the Wagiryama a considerable number of native councils or *kambis*. An elder more intelligent than his confrères soon becomes the nucleus of a *kambi* and by general assent is established as their president (*mwanamuli*). All the people living within the sphere of his influence send their elders to the *kambi* which meets at or near his village' (Hobley, MS).

The whole system seems, in its general features, to be common to Nyika, Pokomo, Kamba, Kikuyu, and probably other Bantu tribes, also to the Galla (*Journ. of the Afr. Soc.*, 1913, p. 369, 1914, p. 262 ff.), Masai (Hollis, *The Masai*, Oxford, 1905, pp. 260-263), and Nandi (Hollis, *Nandi*, p. 12). The *mwanza*, or friction-drum, used for convening the *kambi*, is kept by the elders in a hut built for the purpose in the *moro*, and carefully hidden from all but the initiated (Krapf, i. 312 ff., where the ceremonies connected with it recall the W. African *poro*). It is sounded when a new law is to be promulgated, or as a signal for dances and other ceremonies which take place at the beginning of the rains—usually in February.

5. *Religion*.—The Nyika, like other Bantu tribes, use the name Mulungu, which, according to Taylor (p. 47), 'is often popularly understood as (1) sky, (2) luck, (3) manes of father,' etc. The greater part, if not all, of their religious observances seem to be connected with ancestor-worship. There appear to be some spirits (*pepo*) which are, or have become, distinct from ancestral spirits (Taylor, pp. 32, 81); of these, Katumbakazi recalls certain mythical beings of Pokomo tradition, and also the Zulu legends of the Abatwa (Bushmen). The Duruma say (native MS communicated by Hollis) that every person is accompanied by a guardian spirit (*pepo*); it may be ancestral, but, if so, the native mind is not apt to perceive any incongruity between this and the belief that the shade (*koma*) of the dead haunts the vicinity of the grave. An important grave is marked by a carved post (*kigango*), sometimes surrounded by other posts representing wives or relatives not necessarily buried in the same place (see photographs taken by Captain Knox at Kaya Dzihana, in *Man*, ix. [1909], facing p. 145, with note by Hollis). It is here that offerings are made to the *koma*, usually of meal and beer (*pombe*); occasionally a fowl is killed (Taylor, p. 81). Possession by spirits is frequent (*ib.* p. 32, and Hollis, MS) and gives rise to the usual dances, etc. (cf. the Nigerian *bori*); it is sometimes induced by dancing, in order to obtain information believed to be communicated by the spirit, as in a case witnessed by the writer, where the mother of a sick child had the appropriate remedy revealed to her. Diviners (*tsuha mburuga*) are frequently consulted in case of illness or other difficulty, and make use of a process analogous to the *bula* of the Baronga, etc. There do not appear to be any professional rain-makers; in fact, it is not rain-making that is attempted in time of drought so much as the discovery of the persons who are keeping back the rain, having buried certain charms for the purpose. A ceremony for producing rain, however, has sometimes been performed at the grave of Mbodze, and is of the nature of sympathetic magic; the main point of it is the setting up of a *kinu* (wooden mortar) on the grave and filling it with water (native information; cf. also Taylor, p. 82).

The elders of the *fisi* supply the charms (*kiraho*) which protect growing crops, etc., and entail a curse on any one who removes or disregards them. They, with the *vaya*, also administer the ordeal (*kiraho*, *kurya muma*) in certain criminal cases (Hollis, MS).

6. *Material culture*.—The material culture of the Nyika offers some interesting peculiarities. Their huts are quite unlike the hemispherical ones of the Zulus, the slightly different ones of the Pokomo

and Galla, or the circular ones with a conical roof of the Kikuyu, Nyanja, etc. They are rectangular in ground-plan, with a thatched roof descending from the ridge-pole to the ground, so that there are, properly speaking, no walls, and the general outline is not unlike that of a haystack. Sometimes this kind of house has straight gable-ends, filled in with upright stakes; more usually the ends are sloped and thatched down to the ground like the sides. Those of the Digo are somewhat different (Baumann, p. 147). The dress of the men is the usual waist-cloth of cotton fabric, with or without an upper cloth draped over one shoulder; the characteristic costume of the women (where they have not adopted the two cloths of the Swahili women) is the *rinda*, or kilt, reaching from the waist to the knees (*ib.* p. 146).

The most usual weapon is the bow; the Giriama bow differs slightly in form from that used by the Wasanye. The arrows are often poisoned; in this case they are reed-tipped; otherwise they have barbed iron heads. The Giriama also use the parrying-stick (*kupungu*), which is very rarely found elsewhere in Africa; and another peculiar weapon is a three-sided club (*ndata*) used for killing snakes. They also have swords (*mushu*, *mufyu*), which are as much implements as weapons, and smaller knives.

The Giriama are said to have been once highly skilled in metal-work, but now they buy from the Kamba the fine copper and iron chains which they wear as ornaments and which, so they say, they taught the Kamba to make.

The Nyika live chiefly by agriculture, which is mainly the concern of the women; they keep goats and sheep, but few, if any, cattle. In recent years they have taken to planting coco-nuts, less for the sake of the nuts than for tapping them for palm-wine, which formerly they bought from the Swahili. The ground is cultivated with the hoe (*jembe*) and the most usual crops are maize, millet, sweet potatoes, beans, pumpkins, etc.

7. Conclusion.—Different opinions have been expressed as to the character of the Wanyika, and they consist of such various elements that it would be difficult to give a compendious judgment of them as a whole. The unfavourable estimate, *e.g.*, of H. H. Johnston (*The Kilima-njaro Expedition*, London, 1886, p. 42) must be qualified by the consideration that the Rabai people are a very mixed race, consisting largely of ex-slaves, and that a starting-point for caravans is much on a level with a seaport in the types of character that it presents. The Giriama are a vigorous race, full of fine possibilities; and the others, with all deductions, contain very good material for future development. Their old institutions appear to be breaking down, which is unfortunate, as there are many important facts yet unrecorded; but, so far as one can judge, this is not a symptom of decay, but a stage of growth, to be watched with interest and fostered with judicious care.

LITERATURE.—C. Guillain, *Documents sur l'histoire, la géographie, et le commerce de l'Afrique orientale*, 3 vols., Paris, 1866-67; W. F. W. Owen, *Narrative of Voyages to explore the Shores of Africa, Arabia, and Madagascar, performed in H.M. Ships Leven and Barracouta*, London, 1833; J. L. Krapf, *Reisen in Ost-Afrika*, Kornthal, 1859; C. New, *Life, Wanderings, and Labours in E. Africa*, London, 1873; E. S. Wakefield, *Thomas Wakefield, Missionary and Geographical Pioneer in E. Equatorial Africa*, do. 1904; O. Baumann, *Usambara und seine Nachbargebiete*, Berlin, 1891; W. E. Taylor, *Giriama Vocabulary and Collections*, London, 1891; J. Strandes, *Die Portugiesenzzeit von Deutsch- und Englisch-Ostafrika*, Berlin, 1899; C. Eliot, *The E. Africa Protectorate*, London, 1905; W. W. A. FitzGerald, *Travels in the Coastlands of British E. Africa and the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba*, do. 1899; A. C. Hollis, 'Notes on the History of Vumba, E. Africa,' in *JRAI* xxx. [1900] 275-297, and MS information; MS information obtained from C. W. Hobley, Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, H. R. Tate, District Commissioner at Malindi in 1913, and Miss Austin, C.M.S., Rabai; A. Werner, 'The Bantu Coast Tribes of the E. Africa

Protectorate,' in *JRAI* xlv. [1915] 326 ff., and MS information personally collected in E. Africa; A. H. Hardinge, 'Report on the Condition and Progress of the E. Africa Protectorate from its Commencement to the 20th July, 1897,' *Parliamentary Paper*, Africa, no. 7 [1897] [o. 8683]. A. WERNER.

NYMPHS.—See NATURE (Greek), vol. ix. p. 226^b.

NYSA (Νύση).—The sacred name of Nysa is from the beginning an integral element of the legend of Dionysos. There is, doubtless, an etymological connexion between the two names, but their significance escapes us (Diod. iv. 2. 4: *Διὸς καὶ τραφέντα τὸν Διόνυσον ἐν τῇ Νύσῃ τυχεῖν τῆς προσγωγῆς ταύτης ἀπὸ Διὸς καὶ Νύσης*).¹ The name of Nysa first occurs in one of those tantalizing passages, of which there are several in Homer, in which we get a glimpse into a whole world of legend lying behind the Homeric poems. The story is told, merely in outline, of the fate of Lykoergos, king of the Edones of Thrace, who withstood by violence the spread of the orgiastic cult in this its native home:

ὅς ποτε μαινομένοιο Διωνύσοιο πιθήνας
σεῖε κατ' ἡγάθεον Νυσήϊον,
'that erst chased through the goodly land of Nysa the nursing
mothers of Dionysos' (*Il.* vi. 132 f.).

As we come down the stream of Greek poetry and myth, the name frequently recurs—now as that of a mountain, now as that of a city, now, again, as that of a nymph fabled to have mothered the infant deity; but, whatever its guise, it is always a mystic entity, eluding exact analysis and baffling all attempts at precise localization. Hence it has been happily described as 'in fact, a mountain which attended Dionysos on his travels' (quotation in J. E. Sandys, *Bacchæ of Euripides*, Cambridge, 1892, line 556).

The vine, the god's chief gift to man, must, it was felt, have had somewhere on earth a place of origin, and in much the same way as Attica claimed to be, for Greece if not for the whole world, the motherland of the olive (Herod. v. 82: *λέγεται δὲ καὶ ὡς εἰλαίαι ἦσαν ἀλλοθι γῆς οὐδαμῶς κατὰ χρόνον ἐκείνον ἢ ἐν Ἀθήνῃσι*; cf. Soph. *Œd.* Col. 694 ff.: *ἐστὶν δ' οἶον ἐγὼ γὰρ Ἀσίας οὐκ ἐπακούω . . . φύτειν ἀχείρωτον αὐτοποιόν, κτλ.*—Where note the reference in the opening words [678 f.]: *ἵν' ὁ βακχίωτας αἰεὶ Διόνυσος, ἐμβαρεῖς*), so did various places, nearer or more remote, in all parts of the Greek world, claim to be the original home of the vine (*e.g.*, Soph. *Antig.* 1131: *καὶ σὲ Νυσῶν ὄρεον | κισσῶν οὐχ ἔχει χλωρὰ τ' ἀκτὰ | πολυστάφυλος πέμψει*—alluding to the claim of a Nysa in Eubæa near Ægæ; cf. Soph. frag. 235).

Hence Herodotos (iii. 97; cf. ii. 146) knows of a 'sacred Nysa' (Νύση Ἱερή) among the Ethiopians who border upon Egypt. Diodoros, who greatly exercised himself over the antecedents and early history of Dionysos, holds that the scene of his birth was in Arabia (in support of which opinion he is never tired of quoting *Hymn. Hom.* i. 8 f.: *ἐστὶ δὲ τις Νύση, ὑπατον ὄρος, ἀνθέν Ὀλῆ, | τηλοῦ Φοινίκης, σχεδὸν Αἰγύπτου ῥοάων*—which does not appear very convincing; see Diod. iii. 66. 3, and cf. iv. 2. 3: *πρὸς τὸ ἄντρον τὸ ἐν τῇ Νύσῃ, κείμενον μεταξὺ Φοινίκης καὶ Νεῖλου*—the cave at any rate is vouched for by *Hymn. Hom.* xxvi. 5 f.: *Νύσης ἐν γυάλοις· ὁ δ' ἄεξετο πατρός ἔκρηι | ἄνθρω ἐν εὐώδει*); but he knows also of a serious claimant in Libya (iii. 68. 5), not to speak of a third in India (i. 19. 7). Similarly in poetry, starting as, for Homer, a Thracian locality (whether mountain or plain is not clear),² it has already 'won over into the mythical' in Soph. frag. 782:

ὅθεν καρεῖδον τὴν βεβακχισμένην
βροτοῖσι κλεινὴν Νύσαν, ἥν ὁ βούκερος
ἱαχὸς αὐτῷ παῖαν ἠδίστην νέμει,
ὅπου τις ὄρεος οὐχὶ κλαγγαῖαι;
(*ap.* Strabo, xv. 637).

¹ P. Kretschmer's view, in *Aus der Anomia*, Berlin, 1890, p. 17 ff., that the element *νύος* is a masculine form of a Thracian *νύσα* = 'nymph,' or 'daughter,' is not now accepted. The first part of the name Διόνυσος is, of course, from the same root as the word Ζεύς, and means 'god.'

² In Apoll. Rhod. ii. 1214 (*οὔρεα καὶ πεδῖον Νυσῆϊον*) it is both mountain and plain—though, of course, now far removed from Thrace.

Euripides also never commits himself to any clear indication of locality. It was not until the time of Alexander that the floating mass of legend and imagery connected with the name became anchored upon a definite spot. Until that time came we see Nysa, as the geographical horizon of the Greeks widened, being pushed ever farther away towards the edge of the world, a far-off land of wild beauty, fit birth-place of a god of wine and revelry and sensuous delights, who was also connected so closely with the mystery of life as exhibited in vegetation and wild animals.

The triumphant irresistible bursting of Alexander the Great into the secrets of the Far East naturally appealed to the imagination of his generation as a sort of incarnation of a fabled progress of Bacchus through these same regions. The exploits of Alexander it was that gave birth to the legend of the conquest of India and the East by Dionysos, rather than the converse; and the imagination of court flatterers was exercised to provide divine prototypes of Alexander's achievements. Being himself reputed son of Zeus-Ammon, and Dionysos also being, in some stories, a son of Ammon (Diod. iii. 68. 2 f.), it was altogether suitable that Alexander should tread literally in the footsteps of his divine predecessor, and at last come upon that very city of Nysa which had existed in the imagination of so many generations as built by Dionysos for his wearied Bac-

chanals, and upon that same Mt. Mēros on which his troops had refreshed themselves amid its ivy and laurels:

πολὺν παρ' αὐτοῖς Νύσαν Διονύσου κτίσμα, καὶ ὅρος τὸ ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως Μηρόν, αἰτιασάμενοι καὶ τὸν αὐτὸς κισσὸν καὶ ἀμπέλων, οὐδὲ ταύτην τελεσίκαρπον, κτλ. (Strabo, xv 687. c. Arrian, *Anab.* v. 1 ff.).

Perhaps these stories were set afoot by Aristobulos and Kleitarchos, who accompanied Alexander's campaigns for the express purpose of glorifying them. Arrian (*loc. cit.*) makes it clear that Alexander himself desired and encouraged these inventions and flatteries, being by this time far gone in megalomania. He also makes it clear that sensible people mocked at these pretensions (*Anab.* v. 3, criticism by Eratosthenes). It is interesting to mark the misplaced ingenuity of these fabulists. Alexander could not well be allowed to outdo the god, so he merely re-discovers the town which Dionysos founded. Herakles, however, was at best but a demi-god, and, besides, an ancestor of his own; consequently there was nothing unseemly in feigning that Herakles had failed to capture Aornos, which Alexander, a greater son of Zeus, mastered (*ib.* iv. 28, v. 28). Aornos has been identified as Mahāban (q.v.), a precipitous stronghold above the Indus. The city of Nysa which Alexander discovered is thought to have lain at the foot of the peak of Koh-i-Mor,¹ a culmination of a spur of the Kunar range in the district of Bājaur, or Bājaur. If so, the Koh-i-Mor itself will be the Mt. Mēros of Arrian. According to T. H. Holdich (*Geogr. Journ.* vii. [1898] 42 ff.), a section of the Kāfir community of Kandesh² actually claim a Greek origin, and still chant hymns to the god who sprang from Gir Nysa ('mountain of Nysa'). Wild vines and ivy growing in profusion recall the classical attributes of the region (see the remarkable art. above quoted, where, on p. 48, some lines of a hymn are translated).

LITERATURE.—There is nothing known to the present writer except stray remarks in commentaries upon the ancient passages here quoted. W. J. WOODHOUSE.

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OAHSPÉ.—The Book of Oahspe, though little known, possesses considerable interest for students of the pathology of religion; and from this point of view it is, perhaps, of greater value even than the Book of Morimon (for which see SAINTS, LATTER-DAY). Its author had evidently read fairly widely, the result being an indigested—and indigestible—farrago of superficial Orientalism, Gnosticism, baseless history, fantastic cosmology, Freemasonry, spiritualism, and fads of every sort, combined with hatred of Christianity.

The author of Oahspe was an American dentist, John Ballou Newbrough. According to his preface, he was a spiritualist who, about 1881, claimed to have received from 'angels' revelations which he took on a typewriter for half an hour daily. These lucubrations, which he was forbidden to read until, after fifty weeks, the whole work had been 'mechanically written through my hands by some other intelligence than my own,' form the Book of Oahspe. The followers of the religion are to call themselves 'Faithists,' and are to be pacifists, vegetarians, and altruists, besides avoiding intoxicants, drugs, and tobacco, and abolishing all competitive systems, national tariffs, national legislation, and the like.

To give a full analysis of the some 800 pages of Oahspe, with its multitudinous 'books,' would be futile, and only the most salient points will be noted here. The work is so named because 'it relates to earth, sky and spirit' (Oahspe, v. 2^o), but is not infallible (v. 2^o). It 'is not a destroyer of old systems or religions. It reveals a new one, adapted to this age, wherein all men shall be as brethren' (pref. to 1st ed.).

The Supreme Being is named Jehovih ('from the sounds the wind uttereth . . . E-O-Ih' [Book of Jehovih, 17]), who possesses two entities, unseen and potent (Es) and seen and impotent

(Corpor), Es being further divided into 'etherean' and 'atmospherean' worlds, only the former of which are inhabitable (*ib.* 1^o 2). Between Jehovih and mankind numerous beings intervene, the hierarchy being: Lord, Lord God, God, Orion Chief, Nirvanian Chief, and Jehovih. Those of immediate concern to man are the Lords and Gods, who are ex-mortals, and whose origin is as follows:

The earth and the family of the sun travel in an orbit requiring 4,700,000 years to traverse. Every 5000 years the earth passes through etherean lights, and angels from the second heaven come to earth. These form ties with mortals and cannot inherit the 'emancipated heavens' of Jehovih till their children are redeemed 'in wisdom and power even to the sixth generation.' The chief of these is called God, who appointed, among other assistants, Lords. At the end of the dominion of a God and his Lords, Jehovih sends ships from Etherea to them and to Brides and Bridegrooms and carries them 'up to the exalted regions I have prepared for them.' These are called Harvests, and take place every Dan (=six generations of mortals). When angels cohabit, they 'shall rise in wisdom and virtue; but such of them as cohabit with asuans [human beings] will bring forth heirs in the descending grade of life.' God and the Lords appoint Ashars as guardians of mortals, and Asaphs for the Es'yans, or spirits of the dead (*ib.* 7).

The first God was Sethantes, son of Jehovih; but there were many others—Ithua Mazda, who inspired Zarathustra, Yima, who inspired 'Po, Div, who inspired Brahma, Vishnu, who inspired Abram of Par'sic and (later) of Arabin'ya, and Os', who inspired Ea-Wah-Tah of N. Guatemala (N. America).

The world is now in its sixth era, which began when the Beast (self) divided itself into four heads—Brahman, Buddhist, Christian, and Muham-madan; but in the seventh era, which is now dawning, the Faithists will separate from the

¹ The Koh-i-Mor is visible from the Peshāwar valley. On its southern slope is the village of Nuzar, or Nusar.

² These live in the lower Bashgol valley—the Bashgol being an affluent of the Kunar river, joining it from the north-west some 40 miles below Chitral.

Uzians (the rest of mankind) and found Jehovah's kingdom on earth. This revelation was made in A.K. 33 (=A.D. 1881, the era of Kosmon beginning in A.D. 1848). There have also been sixteen cycles, whose Gods were Sethantes, Ah'shong, Hoo Le, C'pe Aban, Pathodices, Goemagak, Goepens, Hycis, See'iticius, Miscelitti, Gobath, Faiyis, Zineathaes, Tothsentaga, Nimeas, and Neph.

The earth is divided into Whaga (or Pan), Jud (Asia), Thouri (America), Volu (Africa), and Dis (Europe). Because of the general decay of mankind Whaga was submerged by a deluge, though a trace is left in Japan, or Zha' Pan, which means 'relic of the continent of Pan.' After the flood the kingdom passed 'near and over the land of Jaffeth' (China). Finally, after many vicissitudes, the dominion of the Lords and Gods on earth will be completed in Thouri, thus fulfilling what the I'hins of Whaga began (Lords' First Book, 1²³⁻⁴³; *65*; Synopsis of Sixteen Cycles, 3; Book of Aph, 4, 6; Sethantes, 11⁴⁻⁷). These I'hins, who were the 'mound-builders' and Puebloan Indians (First Book of First Lords, 3⁴⁻⁸; Book of Thor, 1¹⁹), were Abels, begotten of heaven and earth. Through association of man with Asu'ans (Adams) arose the Druks (Cains), who were idle, naked wanderers in the wilderness. 'The I'hins were white and yellow, but the Druks were brown and black; the I'hins were small and slender, but the Druks were tall and stout.' From the Druks and Asu'ans sprang the Yak, or 'ground people,' walking on all fours, and made eunuchs and servants by the I'hins. Asu'ans, Yaks, and Druks have all disappeared, except where the last have cohabited with I'hins, thus giving rise to the Phuans or Ong'wce (American Indians), who were 'red like copper; and they were taller and stronger than any other people in all the world' (First Book of First Lords, 1-3, 6).

The first Faithists were the Par'si'e (Persians), whom Jehovah 'created as a shield, to guard his chosen, the I'hins' (Lords' Fifth Book, 3⁴), and many of the great men in the Bible followed this religion. Thus, according to the 'Basis of Ezra Bible,' set forth in the Book of Savah, Moses, Samuel, Elijah, and the Prophets were Faithists, and from them sprang the Asenean (Essene) Association. From the Aseneans came Joshu in Nazareth, who 're-established Jehovah, and restored many of the lost rites and ceremonies. In the thirty-sixth year of Joshu's age he was stoned to death in Jerusalem by the Jews that worshipped the heathen gods' (cf. God's Book of Eskra, 42-44). Forty years later a false God, Loveamong, brought on war, and later 'changed his name and falsely called himself Christ, which is the Ahamic word for knowledge. And he raised up tribes of mortal warriors, who call themselves Christians, who are warriors to this day.'

Loveamong, with the other Triunes, Ennochissa and Kabalactes, endeavoured to overthrow Jehovah, assuming the names of Brahma, Budha, and Kriste to combat Ka'yu (Confucius), Sakaya (Buddha), and Joshu. But Loveamong failed to keep his word to his chief angel warrior, Thoth, or Gabriel, who rebelled in consequence, and raised up Muhammad. Muhammadanism is to perish first, then Brähmanism, then Buddhism, and finally Christianity. During the period treated by the Book of Es (c. 1448-c. 1848) there is an abrogation of revelations, ceremonies, etc., and liberty of thought begins to prevail. Melkazad is divinely sent to inspire a migration to Guatama, and he raises up Columbo to discover it to broaden the sphere of Jehovah's kingdom and to aid in overthrowing the Triunes and Thoth. Then Loveamong inspires his followers (Roman Catholics) to punish heresy, thus giving rise to Protestantism,

which also is inspired by evil spirits. The Pilgrim Fathers were inspired by the God, but corrupted by Loveamong; the Quakers were Faithists at heart. Thomas Paine was inspired by Jehovah, the other chief men 'raised up by God, to establish the foundation of Jehovah's kingdom with mortals,' being Jefferson, Adams, Franklin, Carroll, Hancock, and Washington. During the decay of Loveamong's kingdom petty Drujan Gods set up little principalities, such as Methodists, Presbyterians, and Baptists, while Pirad founded the Mormons, Lowgannus the Shakers, and Sayawan the Swedenborgians.

Jehovah's earlier struggles are recorded in the Book of Wars against Jehovah, but these need not be summarized, any more than the fantastic biography of Zoroaster in the Book of God's Word, or the life of Sakaya, who became a Zoroastrian (God's Book of Eskra, 24-29). The wildness of the work in history is evident when we say that it alleges that Buddhism and Christianity were made up chiefly from the history and miracles of Zoroaster, who flourished 8900 years ago; that Abram was a Persian; that Brahma, who lived 5800 years ago, re-established Zoroastrianism in India; and that Ea-Wah-Tah, Brahma's contemporary, established a United States of America, called O-pah-e-go-quin or Algonquin, which formed the model for the present country of that name.

There are three resurrections: the first, when the corporean doffs his mortal body and is born a spirit; the second, when the individual self is put off and an organic community is begun; and the third, when angels rise so high that they pass into Ethera (Sethantes, 14²; Book of Discipline, 1¹⁹ 2-4). As to those not yet prepared for future blessedness, Drujas, Fetals (spirits who graft themselves on mortals), and Es'yans are taken to 'a place in My exalted heavens suitable for them; and ye shall wall them about in heaven that they cannot escape, but that they may be weaned from evil' (Synopsis of Sixteen Cycles, 3¹⁸; cf. Book of Aph, 6³⁻¹¹).

The keynote of Jehovah's message to man is 'Order, Purity, Discipline, Justice, and Good Works—or, Retribution' (Book of Discipline, 3¹⁸). Asceticism, charity which does not make its recipient self-supporting, and missionary activity are condemned (celibacy is, however, regarded as higher than the married state); law is to be abrogated as necessity for it diminishes; freedom of opinion and of judgment is urged (*ib.* 26-29; Book of Inspiration, 11); and separatism from secular governments is advocated (Book of Jehovah's Kingdom on Earth, 26¹²⁻²⁰). Seven castes exist: prophets, those of highest lineage, priests, nuns, physicians, very rich, and very poor (First Book of God, 5¹³); and systems of government are threefold: monarchies, republics, and fraternities, the last being the highest (Book of Discipline, 11¹⁴). The doctrines are best summed up in Book of Judgment, 1³³⁻⁵⁰ 21¹⁸⁻²² (cf. Book of Discipline, 6, 9¹⁻²⁸).

About 1894 a community called Shalam was established by the Faithists in New Mexico, the most of its area of some 14,000 acres being for children (of non-Faithists) and their nurses, teachers, and caretakers. This was to be conducted according to the principles set forth in the Book of Jehovah's Kingdom on Earth. The remainder, called Levitica, is regulated by the rules of the Book of Gratiyus (not contained in Oahspe itself). Heavenly schools, factories, nurseries, etc., are repeatedly mentioned in the book; and what may have been intended as initiation rites are described in the Book of Savah.

The sect still survives, though its numbers are very small.

LITERATURE.—The first ed. of *Oathspe* was printed at Boston in 1882; a second ed., considerably changed, do. 1891 (reprinted London, 1910). See also C. L. Brewer, *Historical Outline of Oathspe*, the *Cosmic Bible*, San Francisco, n.d.; J. N. Jones,

Thaumdt-Oathspe, Melbourne, 1912. This sect publishes, at Los Angeles, Cal., *The Faithist Messenger*.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

OAK.—See TREES.

OATH.

Introductory and Primitive (A. E. CRAWLEY), p. 430.

Chinese.—See ORDEAL (Chinese).

NT and Christian (W. ERNEST BEET), p. 434.
Semitic (M. A. CANNEY), p. 436.

OATH (Introductory and Primitive).—The oath¹ connects with the vow, the ordeal, the covenant, and the wager. Its definition must distinguish it from those, but we must recognize the fact that their primary constituent is the oath; they are special applications of it. A vow is not actually such, unless there is a personal condition realizable upon fulfilment; an ordeal 'involves an imprecation with reference to the guilt or innocence of a suspected person, and its proper object is to give reality to this imprecation, for the purpose of establishing the validity or invalidity of the suspicion.'² So in the Middle Ages 'an oath was an indispensable preliminary to every combat, and the defeat was thus not merely the loss of the suit, but also a conviction of perjury, to be punished as such.'³ But the oath of the ordeal was tested immediately. A covenant—the blood-covenant, e.g.—has no force except from the fact that it is 'accompanied by curses or self-imprecations,'⁴ and it is mutual. With regard to the distinction between the oath and the covenant, it is clear that the latter is a mutual oath. A good parallel is to be found in the distinction between the Moroccan *l'ār*, the individual oath, and *l'āhēd*, the mutual, 'both parties transferring conditional curses to one another.'⁵ A wager, as in the old Roman method of action at law, is also a mutual process, and involves the oath in the form of a promise to pay. The ethical significance of the oath is, throughout, personal responsibility. As such, it is eminently fitted for legal use, and has always figured conspicuously in the legal process of all races; it is still, in the highest civilizations, a formal guarantee of truthfulness, both in courts of law and in ordinary social intercourse, and still retains some of its primitive supernatural force and dignity, which seem to have been based originally upon the magical power of the spoken word, and later upon the appeal to a supernatural being.

The *OED* defines oath as 'a solemn and formal appeal to God (or to a deity or something held in reverence or regard), in witness of the truth of a statement, or the binding character of a promise or undertaking.' This definition is defective, because many primitive oaths have no appeal to anything 'held in reverence or regard,' but are absolutely direct; there is only the personal will or wish. Tylor defined an oath as 'an asseveration or promise made under non-human penalty or sanction.'⁶ But oaths can be taken under human sanctions and upon living persons, just as a life may be insured.

Westermarck developed the conception of oath by emphasizing, not its indirect reference, but its essential character.

'An oath is essentially a conditional self-imprecation, a curse by which a person calls down upon himself some evil in the event of what he says not being true. The efficacy of the oath is originally entirely magical, it is due to the magic power inherent in the cursing words.'⁷

But the essence of 'cursing and swearing' was in existence before human speech was at all well

¹ Old Eng. *adh* (the derivation is doubtful), 'swear'='answer'; *jurare*='bind'; so *ῥῶκος*.

² *MI* i. 505.

³ *Id.* ii. 208.

⁴ Art. 'Oath,' in *ED* vii. xix. 939b.

⁵ *MI* ii. 118.

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ *Id.* ii. 623.

developed, and the efficacy of the spoken word was no doubt preceded by the efficacy of emotion, of the inarticulate will or wish. To complete the definition proposed by Westermarck, it is necessary to note that where a magical process is involved the imprecation is frequently not formally expressed; but a magical process may imply an imprecation, or itself be actually the imprecation, translated from words into matter.¹ When oath gives place to solemn affirmation, the guarantee of good faith and of truth-speaking is now in the moral sphere of personality; there is no more magic or religion. The process has this in common with the pre-animistic, that its essence is emotional—the emotion being that of self-respect and personal responsibility. And this has always been 'the nature of an oath.'

1. Early forms.—The oath in the form of a pure self-imprecation without a medium (or object sworn upon, or, rather, with which contact is established) or reference to a helper, witness, or punisher (king, spirit, or god), is naturally rarely found, but *a priori* it should precede the materialistic magical oath or the spiritualistic. A man may say or wish, 'May I be hurt, or die, if what I say is untrue!' and such a process may clearly be antecedent to elaborate use of objects and spirits. Even in advanced culture, when religious sanctions are real and, later, customary, this mode is natural and frequent, both in serious (though not public) swearing and in profane oaths like 'Damn me!' where there is no real reference to a divine power. In cases like that of the Sumatran oath, and a story by Eusebius, we do not know the form of the oaths, but they may have been merely spoken wishes without references. Marsden writes that the Sumatran swears thus:

'If what I now declare is truly and really so, may I be freed and cleared from my oath; if what I assert is wittingly false, may my oath be the cause of my destruction.'² The 'oath' here may be the object sworn by or merely the spoken word, which in primitive thought early acquired an almost material substance, and was fully material when written.

Eusebius records that three men accused Bishop Narcissus and confirmed the charge by solemn oaths, the first that he might perish by fire, the second, by pestilence, the third, that he might lose his sight. These self-imprecations were fulfilled.³

'The Dharkār and Majhwār in Mirzapur, believe that a person who forswears himself will lose his property and his children; but as we do not know the contents of the oath, it is possible that destruction of the latter is not ascribed to mere contagion, but is expressly imprecated on them by the swearer.'⁴

The oath is in the first place a curse, and the 'magic power inherent in the cursing words'⁵ is its essence. The words may come to be regarded as a form of *mana*, magical power, semi-material and semi-spiritual.

Thus, in old Teutonic folklore, the curse settles and takes flight, like a bird.⁶ The Irish believed that 'a curse once uttered must alight on something.'⁷ 'To take an oath of any

¹ *MI* ii. 690.

² W. Marsden, *Hist. of Sumatra*, London, 1811, p. 233.

³ Eus. *HE* vi. 9.

⁴ *MI* i. 60, quoting W. Crook, *TC*, Calcutta, 1896, ii. 287, iii. 444.

⁵ *MI* ii. 118.

⁶ J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, Oxford, 1882-83, iv. 1690.

⁷ *Id.* ib. 1227.

sort is always a matter of great concern among the Bedouins. It seems as if they attached to an oath consequences of a supernatural kind.¹ An oath must be taken at a distance from the encampment, 'because the magical nature of the oath might prove pernicious to the general body of Arabs.'² 'The curse,' says Westermarck, 'is looked upon as a baneful substance, as a miasma which injures or destroys anybody to whom it cleaves.'³ Therefore Arabs, 'when being cursed, sometimes lay themselves down on the ground so that the curse, instead of hitting them, may fly over their bodies.'³

'The punishing power of a word is particularly conspicuous in the case of an oath,'⁴ and its contagious character resembles that which is attributed to tabued persons and things, and it acts mechanically.

Berbers undress when about to take an oath, and Westermarck concludes that the real reason is 'a vague idea that the absence of all clothes will prevent the oath from clinging to themselves. They say that it is bad not only to swear, but even to be present when an oath is taken by somebody else.'⁵

Passing from the oath 'on' the swearer's self, we come to what are apparently cases of substitution. An intermediate stage is swearing on this or that part of the swearer's person.

In Samoa a man says, 'Touch your eyes if what you say is true.'⁶ This is putting a conditional curse on his eyes. So the Romans swore by eyes and head.⁷

When a man swears to his truthfulness or innocence 'on' another person, the oath may be a conditional curse on that person, as a substitute for the swearer, or as if the swearer had insured that person's life, especially if held in reverence.

Thus, it is common for a man to swear on his children or parents. The Tungus swears, 'May I lose my children and my cattle!'⁸ The same oath is found in Mirzapur, and is common in the N.W. Provinces of India. Men swear on the heads of their children, or hold a child in their arms. 'May my children die if I lie!' says the Kol.⁹ In Ashanti a criminal may swear on the king's life, and is then pardoned, or harm would result to the king.¹⁰ The Hottentots hold that the highest oath that a man can take is 'by his eldest sister.'¹¹

2. The embodied oath.—The largest class of oaths in the early and middle cultures, continuing also into the higher, is that in which the swearer swears 'by' or 'on' some object, powerful, dangerous, or sacred, or some person or animal with like qualities. This form of oath involves some questions of theory which will be discussed after some typical examples have been submitted.

In N.W. India a cock is killed and, as the blood is poured on the ground, the oath is taken 'over it.'¹² The Khond swears on a tiger-skin, praying for death from a tiger if he lies, upon a lizard-skin 'whose scalliness they pray may be their lot if forsworn,' or upon an ant-hill 'that they may be reduced to powder.'¹³ The Naga of Assam stands within a circle of rope, praying that he may rot as a rope rots, or he holds a gun-barrel, a spear, or a tiger's tooth, saying, 'If I do not faithfully perform my promise, may I fall by this!'¹⁴ The Ostyak imitates the act of eating and calls on a bear to devour him.¹⁵ 'The Iowa have a mysterious iron or stone, wrapped in seven skins, by which they make men swear to speak the truth. The people of Kesam . . . swear by an old sacred knife, the Bataks of South Toba on their village idols, the Ostyaks on the nose of a bear.'¹⁶ The Moors lend efficacy to an oath by placing it in contact with, or making it in the presence of, 'any lifeless object, animal, or person endowed with *baraka*, or holiness, such as a saint-house or a mosque, corn or wool, a flock of sheep or a horse, or a shereef.'¹⁷ The last is a comprehensive example. The oath upon sacred relics was prevalent in medieval Christendom, and 'so little respect was felt for the simple oath that the adjuncts came to be looked upon as the essential feature, and the imprecation itself to be divested of binding force without them.'¹⁸

The Latins swore by *Jupiter lapis*, holding the sacred stone in the hand.¹ The Athenian archons stood on a sacred stone and swore to rule righteously.² The ancient Danes swore on stones, and the same oath is recorded of the islanders of Iona.³ In Samoa the accused lays his hand on the sacred stone of the village, and says, 'I lay hand on the stone. If I stole the thing, may I speedily die!'⁴ The Old Prussians placed the right hand on the neck and the left on the holy oak, saying, 'May Perkun (the thunder-god) destroy me!'⁵ The Lombards swore 'lesser' oaths on consecrated weapons, 'greater' on the Gospels.⁶ The chief oath of the Danes was on a sacred ring; their oath to Alfred was taken on this.⁷ The Ksatryia swore by his weapons or his horse.⁸ The mediæval knight swore 'super arma.'⁹ Achilles swore by his sceptre.¹⁰ Mediæval theory distinguished the written or spoken oath from that which was ratified by contact with or inspection of a sacred object. The latter was a corporal or bodily oath, and the sacred object was a 'haldomc.'¹¹ A frequent oath among the Bedāwin was 'to take hold with one band of the *wasat*, or middle tent-pole, and to swear by the life of this tent, and its owners.'¹² The most stringent oath among Hindus is that in which water of the Ganges is held in the hand.¹³ Similarly, the Homeric gods swore by the river Styx.¹⁴ Other natural forces, such as the sun and moon, are frequently sworn by,¹⁵ as Westermarck supposes, because of 'their superior knowledge' as all-seeing.

Arabs swore by dipping hands in the blood of a camel. The Sānsiya swear over the blood of a cock. The Homeric oath, given by Tyndareus for the defence of Helen, was taken standing on a sacrificed steed.¹⁶ The old Danish ring held during the oath was sprinkled with the blood of a bull.¹⁷ Hannibal's famous oath, or vow, against Rome was taken 'tactus sacris'; and the Homeric Greeks laid the hand on the sacrifice,¹⁸ as the mediæval European touched the altar or the relics. So Harold is depicted in the Bayeux tapestry.¹⁹ Another method of the Nāgas of Assam (involving a mutual oath) is for the two men to hold a dog which is chopped in two; this is emblematic of the fate which will befall the perjurer.²⁰ According to one interpretation of a Roman oath, the swearer invoked the heaven god, while a hog was slain with the sacred flint-stone, representing the god's thunderbolt, and he prayed, 'So smite the Roman people if they break the oath!'²¹ 'The Tungus brandishes a knife before the sun, saying, "If I lie may the sun plunge sickness into my entrails like this knife."'²²

It is perhaps in accordance with primitive thought at one stage of its development that the strongest of all oaths is that in which the sacred object, or medium, is eaten or drunk.

Frazer regards this process as being the differentia of the 'Aino sacrament.'²³ The Tenimberese dip a sword in their own blood and drink it, praying for death if they are forsworn.²⁴ So, in Malaysia, water is drunk in which daggers, spears, or bullets have been dipped; 'May I be eaten up by this dagger or spear!' is the formula.²⁵ The Tunguses have another oath, in which the swearer drinks the blood of a dog, the throat of which has been cut and its flesh cut up. The swearer says, 'I speak the truth, and that is as true as it is that I drink this blood. If I lie, let me perish, burn, or be dried up like this dog.'²⁶ The Chuvashes place bread and salt in the mouth, and pray, 'May I be in want of these, if I say not true!'²⁷ The 'great oath' of the Tibetans includes the eating of a portion of an ox's heart.²⁸ The Masal drinks blood, saying, 'If I have done this deed, may God kill me!' If he is innocent, no harm happens; if guilty, it is expected that he should die in a fortnight.²⁹ On the Gold Coast a man taking an oath eats or drinks something which has a connexion with a deity, who is invoked to punish him if he forswears himself.³⁰ Elsewhere on the Gold Coast an accused man had to drink the 'oath-draught' and pray that the fetish may slay him if guilty.³¹ 'If I have been guilty of this crime, then,

1 J. E. Tyler, *Oaths*, London, 1835, p. 121.

2 *GB*, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 160.

3 *Id.*

4 Turner, pp. 80, 184.

5 Tyler, *loc. cit.* p. 940a.

6 *Id.*, quoting J. Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsaltertümer*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 890.

7 Tyler, *loc. cit.* p. 940b.

8 *SDE* xxxiii. [1889] 100.

9 Du Cange, *Glossarium medicæ et infirmæ Latinitatis*, Nior, 1833-87, s.v. 'Juramentum', iv. 459.

10 Hom. *Il.* i. 234.

11 Tyler, *loc. cit.* p. 941b.

12 Burckhardt, p. 72.

13 *MI* ii. 120.

14 Hes. *Theog.* 784-806.

15 *MI* ii. 122.

16 Paus. iii. xx. 9.

17 *MI* ii. 621.

18 Livy, xxi. 1; *Il.* iii. 276, xix. 175.

19 Tyler, *loc. cit.* p. 941b.

20 *Id.* p. 939b.

21 *Id.* p. 940a, quoting Livy, i. 24, Polyb. iii. 25.

22 *Id.*

23 *GB*, pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, ii. 313.

24 J. G. F. Riedel, *De sluit- en kroesharige Rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua*, Hague, 1880, p. 234.

25 W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, London, 1900, p. 525.

26 *MI* ii. 119, quoting Georgi.

27 *Id.*

28 L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, p. 569, note.

29 A. O. Hollis, *The Masai*, Oxford, 1905, p. 345; M. Merker, *Die Masai*, Berlin, 1904, p. 211.

30 A. B. Ellis, *Tshi-speaking Peoples*, London, 1887, p. 100.

31 W. Bosman, *Descr. of the Coast of Guinea*, London, 1721, p. 126.

1 J. L. Burckhardt, *Notes on Bedouins and Wahabys*, London, 1831, pp. 13, 105.

2 *MI* i. 67.

3 *Id.*

4 *Id.* ii. 118.

5 *Id.* i. 59.

6 G. Turner, *Samoa*, London, 1884, p. 184.

7 W. Smith, *Diet. of Gr. and Rom. Antiquities*, London, 1890, s.v. 'Oath'.

8 Georgi.

9 Crooke.

10 A. B. Ellis, *Five-speaking Peoples*, London, 1890, p. 224.

11 T. Hahn, *Tsuni-Goam*, London, 1831, p. 21.

12 Crooke, *TC* iv. 231.

13 S. O. Macpherson, *Memorials of Service in India*, London, 1805, p. 83.

14 *JASE*, 1875, p. 316.

15 G. A. Erman, *Travels in Siberia*, Eng. tr., London, 1848, i. 492.

16 *MI* ii. 119, quoting authorities.

17 *Id.* ii. 120.

18 H. C. Lea, *Superstition and Force*, Philadelphia, 1892, p. 29.

Mblam i thou deal with me!', swears the accused in Calabar,¹ after drinking filth and blood, the ju-ju drink, *mblam*. So with the majority of ordeale, their essence being an oath, a self-imposed imprecation.²

3. Psychology of the oath.—The above-cited examples illustrate the more primitive forms of oath. It seems probable that eating or drinking the 'oath' is the latest of these forms, and that the earliest is the merely verbal self-imprecation. As for the original meaning of the employment of a concrete object, sacred or otherwise, which itself comes to be regarded as the 'oath,'³ containing, as it does, the words or the power of the curse, ready to act with mechanical precision if the swearer has lied, the principle is clearly magical, passing into symbolism as the belief in magic decays. But the question remains as to what psychological process developed the employment of a concrete object.

'Sometimes,' says Westermarck, 'the person who takes the oath puts himself in contact with some object which represents the estate referred to in the oath, so that the oath may absorb, as it were, its quality and communicate it to the perjurer.' 'In other cases the person . . . takes hold of a certain object and calls it to inflict on him some injury if he perjure himself.'⁴ Again, 'another method of charging an oath with supernatural energy is to touch, or to establish some kind of contact with, a holy object on the occasion when the oath is taken.' Such are some of the methods of increasing the magical power 'inherent in the cursing words.'⁵

At a stage of religious evolution when sacred objects are in being, it is natural that they should be employed to strengthen the oath. Later still, the oath is strengthened by contact with a god, or his name is invoked, or a sacrifice is made. But in earlier stages, when the object or medium is not sacred of itself, but indifferent, how came it to be used in a magical way and on magical principles? A large proportion of primitive oaths are cases of imitative magic. The swearer, for instance, may apply a spear to his body and pray that he may be slain by the spear if he is forsworn. But is such ritual due to a belief in imitative magic? It seems more probable that an act of pre-imitation (so characteristic of early psychology) came to be employed as a mode of realizing the nature of an oath, and that from this was developed the magical force of the embodied words. Pantomime led to imitative magic, not *vice versa*. In such cases as where a man stands on a stone and the strength of stone adds confirmation to his words,⁶ there is natural association of ideas, which may lead to a belief in a magical connexion.

4. The oath and the god.—When the theistic stage of religion is reached, and the god subsumes in his own person a multitude of holy lines of force, the oath is brought into connexion with the god. But even here the connexion remains magical for a considerable time, before it decays into a symbolic relation or is changed into that between offender and punisher.

'The oaths which the Moors swear by Allah are otherwise exactly similar in nature to those in which he is not mentioned at all. But the more the belief in magic was shaken, the more the spoken word was divested of that mysterious power which had been attributed to it by minds too apt to confound words with facts, the more prominent became the religious element in the oath. The fulfilment of the self-imprecation was made dependent upon the free will of the deity appealed to, and was regarded as the punishment for an offence committed by the perjurer against the god himself.'⁷

When the god is appealed to, the appeal may be for his help or his witness; or, again, his divine name may be invoked, and in case of perjury the power of the name, thus wrongly used, will punish the forswearer. In many cases there is merely an

act of transference; the swearer, so to say, hands his oath over to the god, who will deal with it according to the innocence or guilt of the swearer.

The god Mwetyi, in S. Guinea, is 'invoked as a witness, and is commissioned with the duty of visiting vengeance upon the party who shall violate the agreement.'¹ The Comanche Indian calls upon the great spirit and earth to testify to the truth of his oath.² The Solomon Islander swears by a *tindalo*, 'spirit.'³ The Greek said, 'Let God know,' 'Let Zeus know'; the Latin, 'I call to witness,' among other things, the ashes of his forefathers. The Egyptian called Thoth to witness;⁴ he would also swear by the name of the Pharaoh.⁵

The ordinary 'invocation' of a deity is a vague appeal,⁶ but it seems that the phrases corresponding to 'by,'⁷ common in most languages, imply that the god is a helper or a guarantor.

When contact is established between the swearer and objects belonging to or representative of the deity, the principles of magic apply, for the punishment is mechanically administered by means of the sacred object. Traces of the emotion which prompts these ideas may be found even when magic is superseded by symbolism or mere reverence.

Laying the hand on the altar, the sacrifice, or the sacred relics is a regular method where these holy paraphernalia are existent.⁸

The Iranian swore before a bowl of water containing incense, brimstone, and one *danak* of molten gold.⁹ 'To make an oath binding,' the Gold Coast people give the swearer 'something to eat or drink which in some way appertains to a deity, who is then invoked to visit a breach of faith with punishment.'¹⁰ So in mediæval Europe the host was eaten, and the swearer prayed that it might choke him, if he lied.¹¹

When the priesthood is influential, an oath may be made on the priestly person, as by the Hindu touching the legs of a Brâhman.¹²

By far the most usual medium in the higher religions is to touch, hold, or kiss the sacred books of the faith.

The Hindu swears on the Sanskrit *Hari vanâ*; the Muhammadan on the Qur'an; the Jew on the Hebrew Bible; the Christian on the 'book,' viz. the New Testament.¹³ The old Lombards swore the 'greater oath' on the Gospels.¹⁴ The Sikh swears on the Granth; the Iranian on the Avesta.¹⁵ In mediæval Europe the book was laid on the altar.¹⁶ The words of Chrysostom show an early development in the Christian Church, possibly due to the Jewish practice, which itself has been said to be a loan from the Roman.¹⁷ He writes: 'Do thou, if nothing else, at least reverence the very book thou holdest forth to be sworn by, open the Gospel thou takest in thy hands to administer the oath, and, hearing what Christ therein saith of oaths, tremble and delect.'¹⁸ The practice of kissing the book appears quite early in the Middle Ages.

5. Various rituals.—The ritual and rules of oath have interesting varieties.

Greeks and Latins distinguished between the sexes in the oaths proper to each. Both Greek and Jew lifted up the hand. The French and the Scots raise the right hand, saying respectively, 'Je jure,' and 'I swear by Almighty God.'¹⁹

Among formulæ there is as early as Justinian the lengthy invocation:

'I swear by God Almighty, and His only begotten Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and the Holy Ghost, and the Most Holy Glorious Mother of God and ever Virgin Mary, and by the Four Gospels which I hold in my hand, and by the Holy Archangels Michael and Gabriel,' etc.²⁰

Derived from Latin idiom, the phrase, 'So help me God!' and its varieties have persisted. 'Sic me adjuvet Deus!' was used in Charlemagne's

¹ J. L. Wilson, *Western Africa*, New York, 1856, p. 392.

² *MI* ii. 120.

³ R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 217.

⁴ O. F. Tiele, *Comparative Hist. of Egyptian and Mesopotamian Religions*, Eng. tr., vol. i. 'Egyptian Religion,' London, 1882, p. 229.

⁵ *GBS*, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, l. 419.

⁶ Latin had 'Ita me iuvet!' as English has 'So help me God!' (as I speak true).

⁷ Greek *ἐν*, Latin *per*.

⁸ Tylor, *loc. cit.*; J. E. Tyler, p. 104.

⁹ *SEE* iv. (1895) 49.

¹⁰ Ellis, *Tshi-speaking Peoples*, p. 106.

¹¹ F. Dahn, *Bausteine*, Berlin, 1879-80, II. 10.

¹² *MI* ii. 120.

¹³ Du Cange, *loc. cit.*

¹⁴ *ib.* p. 941b.

¹⁵ *Ad pop. Antiochenum*, hom. v.

¹⁶ Tylor, *loc. cit.* p. 940b; *II*. xix. 175, 254; Gn 14²², Dt 32⁴⁰;

Tylor, p. 97.

²⁰ Tylor, *loc. cit.* p. 941b.

¹ M. H. Kingsley, *Travels in W. Africa*, London, 1897, p. 465.

² See *MI* ii. 639 ff.

³ The Greek *ἑσθας* also meant the object sworn by; this word for oath has this meaning in most languages.

⁴ *MI* ii. 118 f.

⁵ *GBS*, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, l. 160.

⁶ *MI* ii. 122.

days; old French had 'Si m'ait Dex'; German, 'So mir Gott helfe.' Hebrew variations were, 'As the Lord liveth and as thy soul liveth,' 'By the life of,' 'So do God to me and more also!'

The selection of an object to swear by has given play to the imagination, and in other cases has been determined by special circumstances.

Instead of swearing by the *genius* of the emperor, the early Christians swore by his safety, to avoid possible idolatry.¹ The Brāhman swore by truth, or by his own good deeds;² Telemachus by the sorrows of his father.³ In mediæval Europe a man swore by his beard or his name, or by the head of God. There was a 'great oath' 'per Regiam majestatem.' William the Conqueror swore 'by the splendour of God,' the most magnificent oath in history;⁴ also 'per creaturas.' Rufus swore 'per hoc et per hoc'; Richard I. by God's legs; John Lackland by God's teeth.⁵

The profane oath, used to emphasize an asseveration, has many quaint varieties in all languages.

The Latin was fond of *me hercle*!; the Italian is addicted to *per Bacco*. The Elizabethan English used many curious conversational oaths, mostly modelled on the official formula, such as 'Zounds' ('God's wounds'), 'Odsbodkins' ('God's body'), 'Sdeath' ('God's death'). A pious instinct prompted substitution, to avoid using the sacred name, hence *morbleu* ('mort Dieu'). Similarly Socrates swore 'by the dog,' 'by the cabbage,' and 'by the —'; Lampon 'by the goose,' as did Socrates also.

6. Penalty of false oath.—Whatever the ritual and formula of the oath, or the nature of the object with which the oath is brought into contact, the practical sense is the conditional punishment for perjury. The fear of magic power in the primitive mind has the same value as the fear of God; behind both is the fear of retribution. It was psychologically inevitable that the oath should come to be based on the moral resentment of a deity. Even in the case of the African swearing by a fetish or the New Hebridean invoking punishment from the spirits, man's personal responsibility puts itself in the hands of a retributory power. And from the earliest stages the community, in some way or other, has made real the supernatural penalty, either by shamanistic terrorizing or by prosecution for perjury.

If, as Westermarck holds, the god in early thought is, even though appealed to, 'a mere tool in the hand of the person invoking him,' since the efficacy of an oath is magical,⁶ yet the fear of retribution is still present, and in the highest cultures this conception probably overrides the idea of 'the moral nature of the Divinity' being depreciated. This view of the god's relation to perjury, as to other crimes, is clearly a late sophistication, without any practical social meaning. Grotius was therefore mistaken when he wrote that even the man swearing by false gods is bound by his oath 'because, though under false notions, he refers to the general idea of godhead, and therefore the true God will interpret it as a wrong to himself if perjury be committed.'⁷ God and His equivalents are the supreme and supernatural sanction of the judgments of the social organism. It is precisely because of this principle that the gods have come to be regarded as all-good no less than all-powerful.

'If, e.g., Westermarck notes, 'a god is frequently appealed to in oaths, a general hatred of lying and unfaithfulness may become one of his attributes. . . . There is every reason to believe that a god is not, in the first place, appealed to because he is looked upon as a guardian of veracity and good faith, but that he has come to be looked upon as a guardian of these duties because he has been frequently appealed to in connection with them.'⁸

In turn the god's perfect veracity and hatred of a lie make the supernatural sanction stronger.

The process by which an oath becomes personified into an oath-deity presents no psychological difficulty, nor that by which a god, like Zeus, sub-

sumes the attribute of an avenger of perjury. The Erinyes of the Greeks were personified oaths and curses; so, too, were the Arai. It is significant, however, that Horkos hardly became a deity; the oath-object was too much of a fetish to develop independently into anything higher.

Owing to its invocation of supernatural sanction, perjury is considered the most heinous of all acts of falsehood.⁹ Like all gross crimes, it is supposed to disseminate a contagious miasma.² The Greeks held that, if not punished in this life, it would be after death.³ Such cases as are extant of its being ignored by custom or law are probably due to some transitional stage in the social régime, when, e.g., custom was giving place to law, or to a certain decadence. Westermarck quotes the Rejangs of Java, some Battak of Sumatra, early Greeks, Hebrews, and Teutons, as having no penalty for perjury.⁴ There are indications that the early Romans also ignored the crime. But, as Westermarck adds, if not regarded as a crime, it was regarded as a sin, in which case the shamanistic machine would effectively carry out the required retribution.

Kafirs and Malays punish it severely. The old Hindus banished or fined the perjurer. The cutting off of the right hand, uplifted during the oath, was the penalty among the ancient Scandinavians and Teutons, and lasted into the Middle Ages, and beyond.⁵

7. Applications of oath.—Among the applications of the oath and the institutions which essentially involve it, the following may be noted briefly, in order to illustrate the general range of the oath:

Early kings, especially of the magical type, may have been constrained by some form of shamanistic engagement. The kings of Mexico swore to make the sun to shine, the rain to fall, and the crops to grow.⁶ On similar principles gods were believed to swear among Hindus, Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans.⁷ Gods swore in human fashion, lifting up the right hand.⁸ A Homeric god, forsworn by the Stygian oath, was exiled for nine years.⁹

The archons, generals, and other officials of Athens swore oaths on taking office. The official oath was more prominent there, it seems, than in Rome. The emphasis placed upon the oath in mediæval Christian theory seems to have developed the coronation-oath, which also brought the monarch, in a sense, into responsible contact with the Church. This oath still survives in constitutional and other monarchical régimes. Both Greek and Roman soldiers took an oath. The Roman *sacramentum* included an *execratio*, but Tylor traces it to the Roman legal wager, according to which each party to a suit paid money into court, forfeiting his pledge in case of defeat.¹⁰ Originally this legal *sacramentum* may have been accompanied by a self-imprecation. It is supposed that the military *sacramentum* developed into an oath of fealty to the emperor.¹¹ In the Athenian *ἀνάκρισις*, preliminary stage of a suit, each party swore.¹²

Primitive examples of the oath at law are not wanting. On the Slave Coast of W. Africa the god Mawu is appealed to not only by the parties, but by the judge.¹³

The majority of ordeals are really concrete oaths taken by the accused party, and the self-imprecation is realized immediately. In modern law the legal oath is taken by witnesses alone, though the juror's oath survives. This is in direct opposition to the mediæval principle, which developed considerable abuses in the practice of compurgation (*q.v.*). Evidence was not wanted; only proofs were asked for, and, in default of proof, an oath. This could be multiplied by one or more *compurgatores*, practically witnesses to the truth of the party's oath of innocence or right. When unsupported, the party swore 'sua manu.' According to the number of his *compurgatores*, he swore by any number of 'hands.' A bishop of Ely swore 'centesima manu,' and as many as 300 are recorded. The *compurgatores* laid their hands on the *pyz*.

¹ *Id.* li. 123. ² *SDE* iv. 49 (Zoroastrians).

³ W. Smith, *loc. cit.* p. 1045. ⁴ *MI* li. 123.

⁵ *Id.*, quoting authorities up to the 16th century.

⁶ *GBA*, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 356.

⁷ *SBE* xxxiii. 98; Homer and the OT.

⁸ Tylor, p. 93. ⁹ *Hes. Theog.* 793.

¹⁰ Tylor, *loc. cit.* p. 939b.

¹¹ Smith, *loc. cit.* p. 1049. ¹² *Id.*

¹³ J. Spieth, *Die Ewe-Stämme*, Berlin, 1906, p. 415.

¹ Tertullian, *Apol.* 32.

² *SBE* xxv. (1886) 274, 299, xxxiii. 97.

³ *Od.* xx. 330.

⁴ *Id.*; and Tylor, *loc. cit.* p. 941b.

⁵ *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, li. xlii. 12.

⁶ Du Cange, iv. 462 f.

⁷ *MI* li. 637.

⁸ *MI* li. 123.

Mblam! thou deal with me!', swears the accused in Calahar,¹ after drinking filth and blood, the ju-ju drink, *mblam*. So with the majority of ordeals, their essence being an oath, a self-imposed imprecation.²

3. Psychology of the oath.—The above-cited examples illustrate the more primitive forms of oath. It seems probable that eating or drinking the 'oath' is the latest of these forms, and that the earliest is the merely verbal self-imprecation. As for the original meaning of the employment of a concrete object, sacred or otherwise, which itself comes to be regarded as the 'oath,'³ containing, as it does, the words or the power of the curse, ready to act with mechanical precision if the swearer has lied, the principle is clearly magical, passing into symbolism as the belief in magic decays. But the question remains as to what psychological process developed the employment of a concrete object.

'Sometimes,' says Westermarck, 'the person who takes the oath puts himself in contact with some object which represents the state referred to in the oath, so that the oath may absorb, as it were, its quality and communicate it to the perjurer.' 'In other cases the person . . . takes hold of a certain object and calls it to inflict on him some injury if he perjure himself.'⁴ Again, 'another method of charging an oath with supernatural energy is to touch, or to establish some kind of contact with, a holy object on the occasion when the oath is taken.' Such are some of the methods of increasing the magical power 'inherent in the cursing words.'⁵

At a stage of religious evolution when sacred objects are in being, it is natural that they should be employed to strengthen the oath. Later still, the oath is strengthened by contact with a god, or his name is invoked, or a sacrifice is made. But in earlier stages, when the object or medium is not sacred of itself, but indifferent, how came it to be used in a magical way and on magical principles? A large proportion of primitive oaths are cases of imitative magic. The swearer, for instance, may apply a spear to his body and pray that he may be slain by the spear if he is forsworn. But is such ritual due to a belief in imitative magic? It seems more probable that an act of pre-imitation (so characteristic of early psychology) came to be employed as a mode of realizing the nature of an oath, and that from this was developed the magical force of the embodied words. Pantomime led to imitative magic, not *vice versa*. In such cases as where a man stands on a stone and the strength of stone adds confirmation to his words,⁶ there is natural association of ideas, which may lead to a belief in a magical connexion.

4. The oath and the god.—When the theistic stage of religion is reached, and the god subsumes in his own person a multitude of holy lines of force, the oath is brought into connexion with the god. But even here the connexion remains magical for a considerable time, before it decays into a symbolic relation or is changed into that between offender and punisher.

'The oaths which the Moors swear by Allah are otherwise exactly similar in nature to those in which he is not mentioned at all. But the more the belief in magic was shaken, the more the spoken word was divested of that mysterious power which had been attributed to it by minds too apt to confound words with facts, the more prominent became the religious element in the oath. The fulfilment of the self-imprecation was made dependent upon the free will of the deity appealed to, and was regarded as the punishment for an offence committed by the perjurer against the god himself.'⁷

When the god is appealed to, the appeal may be for his help or his witness; or, again, his divine name may be invoked, and in case of perjury the power of the name, thus wrongly used, will punish the forswearer. In many cases there is merely an

act of transference; the swearer, so to say, hands his oath over to the god, who will deal with it according to the innocence or guilt of the swearer.

The god Mwetyi, in S. Guinea, is 'invoked as a witness, and is commissioned with the duty of visiting vengeance upon the party who shall violate the agreement.'¹ The Comanche Indian calls upon the great spirit and earth to testify to the truth of his oath.² The Solomon Islander swears by a *indalo*, 'spirit.'³ The Greek said, 'Let God know,' 'Let Zeus know'; the Latin, 'I call to witness,' among other things, the ashes of his forefathers. The Egyptian called Thôth to witness;⁴ he would also swear by the name of the Pharaoh.⁵

The ordinary 'invocation' of a deity is a vague appeal,⁶ but it seems that the phrases corresponding to 'by,'⁷ common in most languages, imply that the god is a helper or a guarantor.

When contact is established between the swearer and objects belonging to or representative of the deity, the principles of magic apply, for the punishment is mechanically administered by means of the sacred object. Traces of the emotion which prompts these ideas may be found even when magic is superseded by symbolism or mere reverence.

Laying the hand on the altar, the sacrifice, or the sacred relics is a regular method where these holy paraphernalia are existent.⁸

The Iranian swore before a bowl of water containing incense, brimstone, and one *danak* of molten gold.⁹ 'To make an oath binding,' the Gold Coast people give the swearer 'something to eat or drink which in some way appertains to a deity, who is then invoked to visit a breach of faith with punishment.'¹⁰ So in mediæval Europe the host was eaten, and the swearer prayed that it might choke him, if he lied.¹¹

When the priesthood is influential, an oath may be made on the priestly person, as by the Hindu touching the legs of a Brâhman.¹²

By far the most usual medium in the higher religions is to touch, hold, or kiss the sacred books of the faith.

The Hindu swears on the Sanskrit *Harivamśa*; the Muhammadan on the Qur'an; the Jew on the Hebrew Bible; the Christian on the 'book,' viz. the New Testament.¹³ The old Lombards swore the 'greater oath' on the Gospels.¹⁴ The Sikh swears on the Granth; the Iranian on the Avesta.¹⁵ In mediæval Europe the book was laid on the altar.¹⁶ The words of Chrysostom show an early development in the Christian Church, possibly due to the Jewish practice, which itself has been said to be a loan from the Roman.¹⁷ He writes: 'Do thou, if nothing else, at least reverence the very book thou holdest forth to be sworn by, open the Gospel thou takest in thy hands to administer the oath, and, hearing what Christ therein saith of oaths, tremble and desist.'¹⁸ The practice of kissing the book appears quite early in the Middle Ages.

5. Various rituals.—The ritual and rules of oath have interesting varieties.

Greeks and Latins distinguished between the sexes in the oaths proper to each. Both Greek and Jew lifted up the hand. The French and the Scots raise the right hand, saying respectively, 'Je jure,' and 'I swear by Almighty God.'¹⁹

Among formulæ there is as early as Justinian the lengthy invocation:

'I swear by God Almighty, and His only begotten Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and the Holy Ghost, and the Most Holy Glorious Mother of God and ever Virgin Mary, and by the Four Gospels which I hold in my hand, and by the Holy Archangels Michael and Gabriel,' etc.²⁰

Derived from Latin idiom, the phrase, 'So help me God!' and its varieties have persisted. 'Sic me adjuvet Dens!' was used in Charlemagne's

¹ J. L. Wilson, *Western Africa*, New York, 1886, p. 892.

² *MI* ii. 120.

³ R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 217.

⁴ O. P. Tiele, *Comparative Hist. of Egyptian and Mesopotamian Religions*, Eng. tr., vol. i. 'Egyptian Religion,' London, 1882, p. 229.

⁵ *GB* 3, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, i. 410.

⁶ Latin had 'Ita me luvet!' as English has 'So help me God!' [as I speak true].

⁷ Greek *μά*, Latin *per*.

⁸ Tylor, *loc. cit.*; J. E. Tyler, p. 104.

⁹ *SBE* iv. [1895] 49.

¹⁰ Ellis, *Tshi-speaking Peoples*, p. 106.

¹¹ F. Dahn, *Bausteine*, Berlin, 1879-80, II. 10.

¹² *MI* ii. 120.

¹³ *MI* ii. 120.

¹⁴ Du Cange, *loc. cit.*

¹⁵ *Ib.* p. 941b.

¹⁶ *Ad pop. Antiochenum*, hom. v.

¹⁷ Tylor, *loc. cit.* p. 940b; *II.* xix. 176, 254; Gn 14²⁷, Dt 32⁴⁰; Tyler, p. 97.

¹⁸ Tylor, *loc. cit.* p. 941b.

¹ M. H. Kingsley, *Travels in W. Africa*, London, 1897, p. 465.

² See *MI* ii. 689 ff.

³ The Greek *ὅρκος* also meant the object sworn by; the word for oath has this meaning in most languages.

⁴ *MI* ii. 118 f.

⁵ *GB* 3, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, I. 160.

⁷ *MI* ii. 122.

days; old French had 'Si m'ait Dex'; German, 'So mir Gott helfe.' Hebrew variations were, 'As the Lord liveth and as thy soul liveth,' 'By the life of,' 'So do God to me and more also!'

The selection of an object to swear by has given play to the imagination, and in other cases has been determined by special circumstances.

Instead of swearing by the *genius* of the emperor, the early Christians swore by his safety, to avoid possible idolatry.¹ The Brāhman swore by truth, or by his own good deeds;² Telemachus by the sorrows of his father.³ In mediæval Europe a man swore by his beard or his name, or by the head of God. There was a 'great oath' 'per Regiam majestatem.' William the Conqueror swore 'by the splendour of God,' the most magnificent oath in history;⁴ also 'per creaturas.' Rufus swore 'per hoc et per hoc'; Richard I. by God's legs; John Lackland by God's teeth.⁵

The profane oath, used to emphasize an asseveration, has many quaint varieties in all languages.

The Latin was fond of *me hercle*!; the Italian is addicted to *per Bacco*. The Elizabethan English used many curious conversational oaths, mostly modelled on the official formulae, such as 'Zounds' ('God's wounds'), 'Odsbodkins' ('God's body'), 'Sdeath' ('God's death'). A pious instinct prompted substitution, to avoid using the sacred name, hence *morbleu* ('mort Dieu'). Similarly Socrates swore 'by the dog,' 'by the cabbage,' and 'by the —'; Lampon 'by the goose,' as did Socrates also.

6. Penalty of false oath.—Whatever the ritual and formula of the oath, or the nature of the object with which the oath is brought into contact, the practical sense is the conditional punishment for perjury. The fear of magic power in the primitive mind has the same value as the fear of God; behind both is the fear of retribution. It was psychologically inevitable that the oath should come to be based on the moral resentment of a deity. Even in the case of the African swearing by a fetish or the New Hebridean invoking punishment from the spirits, man's personal responsibility puts itself in the hands of a retributory power. And from the earliest stages the community, in some way or other, has made real the supernatural penalty, either by shamanistic terrorizing or by prosecution for perjury.

If, as Westermarck holds, the god in early thought is, even though appealed to, 'a mere tool in the hand of the person invoking him,' since the efficacy of an oath is magical,⁶ yet the fear of retribution is still present, and in the highest cultures this conception probably overrides the idea of 'the moral nature of the Divinity' being depreciated. This view of the god's relation to perjury, as to other crimes, is clearly a late sophistication, without any practical social meaning. Grotius was therefore mistaken when he wrote that even the man swearing by false gods is bound by his oath 'because, though under false notions, he refers to the general idea of godhead, and therefore the true God will interpret it as a wrong to himself if perjury be committed.'⁷ God and His equivalents are the supreme and supernatural sanction of the judgments of the social organism. It is precisely because of this principle that the gods have come to be regarded as all-good no less than all-powerful.

If, e.g., Westermarck notes, 'a god is frequently appealed to in oaths, a general hatred of lying and unfaithfulness may become one of his attributes. . . . There is every reason to believe that a god is not, in the first place, appealed to because he is looked upon as a guardian of veracity and good faith, but that he has come to be looked upon as a guardian of these duties because he has been frequently appealed to in connection with them.'⁸

In turn the god's perfect veracity and hatred of a lie make the supernatural sanction stronger.

The process by which an oath becomes personified into an oath-deity presents no psychological difficulty, nor that by which a god, like Zeus, sub-

sumes the attribute of an avenger of perjury. The Erinyes of the Greeks were personified oaths and curses; so, too, were the Arni. It is significant, however, that Horkos hardly became a deity; the oath-object was too much of a fetish to develop independently into anything higher.

Owing to its invocation of supernatural sanction, perjury is considered the most heinous of all acts of falsehood.¹ Like all gross crimes, it is supposed to disseminate a contagious miasma.² The Greeks held that, if not punished in this life, it would be after death.³ Such cases as are extant of its being ignored by custom or law are probably due to some transitional stage in the social régime, when, e.g., custom was giving place to law, or to a certain decadence. Westermarck quotes the Rejangs of Java, some Battak of Sumatra, early Greeks, Hebrews, and Teutons, as having no penalty for perjury.⁴ There are indications that the early Romans also ignored the crime. But, as Westermarck adds, if not regarded as a crime, it was regarded as a sin, in which case the shamanistic machine would effectively carry out the required retribution.

Kafirs and Malays punish it severely. The old Hindus banished or fined the perjurer. The cutting off of the right hand, uplifted during the oath, was the penalty among the ancient Scandinavians and Teutons, and lasted into the Middle Ages, and beyond.⁵

7. Applications of oath.—Among the applications of the oath and the institutions which essentially involve it, the following may be noted briefly, in order to illustrate the general range of the oath:

Early kings, especially of the magical type, may have been constrained by some form of shamanistic engagement. The kings of Mexico swore to make the sun to shine, the rain to fall, and the crops to grow.⁶ On similar principles gods were believed to swear among Hindus, Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans.⁷ Gods swore in human fashion, lifting up the right hand.⁸ A Homeric god, forsworn by the Stygian oath, was exiled for nine years.⁹

The archons, generals, and other officials of Athens swore oaths on taking office. The official oath was more prominent there, it seems, than in Rome. The emphasis placed upon the oath in mediæval Christian theory seems to have developed the coronation-oath, which also brought the monarch, in a sense, into responsible contact with the Church. This oath still survives in constitutional and other monarchical régimes. Both Greek and Roman soldiers took an oath. The Roman *sacramentum* included an *execratio*, but Tylor traces it to the Roman legal wager, according to which each party to a suit paid money into court, forfeiting his pledge in case of defeat.¹⁰ Originally this legal *sacramentum* may have been accompanied by a self-imprecation. It is supposed that the military *sacramentum* developed into an oath of fealty to the emperor.¹¹ In the Athenian *ἀνάκρισις*, preliminary stage of a suit, each party swore.¹²

Primitive examples of the oath at law are not wanting. On the Slave Coast of W. Africa the god Mawu is appealed to not only by the parties, but by the judge.¹³

The majority of ordeals are really concrete oaths taken by the accused party, and the self-imprecation is realized immediately. In modern law the legal oath is taken by witnesses alone, though the juror's oath survives. This is in direct opposition to the mediæval principle, which developed considerable abuses in the practice of compurgation (*g.v.*). Evidence was not wanted; only proofs were asked for, and, in default of proof, an oath. This could be multiplied by one or more *compurgatores*, practically witnesses to the truth of the party's oath of innocence or right. When unsupported, the party swore 'sua manu.' According to the number of his *compurgatores*, he swore by any number of 'hands.' A bishop of Ely swore 'centesima manu,' and as many as 300 are recorded. The *compurgatores* laid their hands on the *pyz*.

¹ Ib. ii. 123.

² W. Smith, *loc. cit.* p. 1045.

³ Ib., quoting authorities up to the 16th century.

⁴ *GE*³, pt. i. *The Magic Art*, i. 356.

⁵ *SBE* xxxiii. 98; Homer and the OT.

⁶ Tylor, p. 93.

⁷ Tylor, *loc. cit.* p. 939b.

⁸ Smith, *loc. cit.* p. 1049.

⁹ Ib.

¹⁰ J. Spieth, *Die Erce-Stämme*, Berlin, 1906, p. 415.

¹¹ Hes. *Theog.* 793.

¹ Tertullian, *Apol.* 82.

² *SBE* xxv. [1886] 274, 299, xxxiii. 97.

³ *Od.* xx. 339.

⁴ Du Cange, iv. 462 l.

⁵ Ib.; and Tylor, *loc. cit.* p. 941b.

⁶ *de Jure Belli et Pacis*, ii. xiii. 12.

⁷ *MI* ii. 637.

⁸ *MI* ii. 123.

and the accused laid his hand upon theirs.¹ One attempted remedy for the abuse was the judicial duel, wager of battle.² The final remedy was found in confining the privilege of oath to the witnesses.

The essence of ordeals is the oath, though the fact is obscured by the unfair incidence of the physical result. Hindu theory recognized the essential connexion; the word *śpatha* connotes both 'oath' and 'ordeal.' Oaths were used for lesser offences, ordeals for heavy crimes.³ The mediæval wager of battle was a mutual ordeal, each party taking an oath (see ORDEAL).⁴

The covenant and the treaty have been largely based on the mutual oath, until signatures replaced the spoken word.

The Greeks and Romans ratified their treaties by oaths, the text of which was inscribed in the official inscriptions.

In primitive ritual the mutual oath was strengthened by various imitative and magical methods.⁵ The blood-covenant is 'regularly accompanied by curses or self-imprecations.' Similarly with other forms of compact.⁶ Tylor notes the differentia, which also applies to the vow, in the following typical cases:

Grasping hands, putting one hand between the hands of another, are compacts, not oaths. The hand 'under the thigh' is a rite of covenant. Mixing blood or drinking one another's blood is not an oath unless there is a mutual self-imprecation, such as dipping weapons in the blood.⁷

8. Prohibition of oath.—Certain sacred persons are prohibited from incurring the dangerous risks of an oath.

Such was the *flamen* of Juppiter, and Plutarch suggests that the reason was that otherwise 'the peril of perjury would reach in common to the whole commonwealth, if a wicked, godless, and forsworn person should have the charge and superintendence of the prayers, vows, and sacrifices made in the behalf of the city.'⁸ Nor might the Vestal Virgins take an oath.⁹

The sect of the Essenes were averse from the oath; they prided themselves on their truthfulness; they argued that those who could not be believed without swearing were self-condemned.¹⁰ Christ taught, 'Swear not at all.'¹¹ His exponents have explained the precept to refer to profane and frivolous oaths alone. But the teaching, 'Let your yea be yea and your nay nay,' is clearly inclusive, and of the same character as the Essene doctrine. The Anabaptists and, later, the Quakers refused oath-taking. The latter have argued that, 'If on any particular occasion a man swear in addition to his yea or no, in order to make it more obligatory or convincing, its force becomes comparatively weak at other times when it receives no such confirmation.'¹²

But this argument neglects the power (apart from that of superstition or religious feeling) of ceremony, which is practically the imperious gesture of the social body. Charles Bradlaugh initiated the right of affirmation in place of the oath.

LITERATURE.—This is quoted throughout the article. See also E. von Lasaulx, *Der Eid bei den Römern*, Würzburg, 1844.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

OATH (NT and Christian).—I. NT times.—The true starting-point of our investigation of the place of the oath in the new régime initiated by Christ must of necessity be found in the *ipsissima verba* of the Master Himself. Here, at the outset, we are met by a difficulty; for, on the face of things, the almost universal practice of Christendom appears to be in flagrant disregard of an explicit injunction of Christ, whose words on this subject, taken by themselves, seem to amount to nothing less than an absolute prohibition of the oath under any circumstances or in any form (Mt 5³⁴⁻³⁷; cf. also Ja 5¹²). But a final conclusion upon this matter is not so simple as appears on the surface.

¹ Du Cange, s.vv. 'Sacramentum,' 'Juramentum'; Tyler, p. 286.

² *MI* i. 505 f.

³ *SBE* xxxiii. 97, 99 ff.

⁴ *MI* i. 504 ff., II. 637.

⁵ See *GE* 3, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, I. 289; Gn 15⁹, Jer 34¹⁸.

⁶ *MI* II. 208, 624, 636.

⁷ Tylor, *loc. cit.* p. 940^{ab}; cf. Gn 24²⁷; Herod. IV. 70.

⁸ *Quæst. Rom.* 44.

⁹ *Aul. Gell.* x. xv. 31.

¹⁰ Jos. *EJ* II. viii. 6.

¹¹ Mt 5³⁴.

¹² J. J. Gurney, *Views and Practices of the Society of Friends*, Norwich, 1842, quoted in *MI* II. 124.

It is evident that, if Christ's admonition be interpreted as an absolute prohibition, some of His early followers, who had the best opportunities for knowing His mind and what the modern logician would describe as His 'universe of discourse,' were in serious error as to the meaning of His words. St. Paul, e.g., again and again expresses himself in terms that are indistinguishable from the oath (cf. 1 Th 2⁵, 2 Co 1²³, Gal 1²⁰, Ro 1⁹); the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews makes use of language which bears unmistakable witness that he also was unaware that the practice of swearing had ceased to be legitimate (6¹⁶, 7²⁰); and the seer of the Apocalypse does not hesitate to put an oath into the mouth of the angel-representative of the Eternal (10²¹). Christ Himself, moreover, to all intents and purposes submitted to be sworn (Mt 26⁶³); and His ἀμὴν, ἀμήν, is almost, if not quite, an oath. In view of these facts, our Lord's apparent prohibition should not be regarded as being too explicit to be discussed; it rather demands careful consideration in relation to NT teaching as a whole, if haply superficial contradictions may be resolved.

The classic passage—a very interesting section of the Sermon on the Mount—that constitutes the inevitable starting-point of any discussion of the lawfulness or otherwise of the Christian oath forms one of a series of illustrations of the contrast between the new life in Christ and the old Hebrew ideal of religious living. That the Christian man should always abide by his word is the real burden of Christ's injunction, which was in truth greatly needed. For the Jews held that only oaths, as distinguished from the mere promise, and only some of these, need be kept. An elaborate system of distinctions between oaths, which would have moved the admiration of a mediæval casuist, had been gradually evolved; a lie was not held to be sinful unless sworn to, and even perjury itself was at worst venial, unless the broken oath had been taken in a particular form. Such a system necessarily cut at the root of that good faith apart from which a well-ordered social organism becomes impossible, and in foreign relations could not fail to bring upon a people who practised it a very bad name. This is what actually came to pass; and it was the fate of the Jews to be generally regarded with suspicion and dislike not only in the time of Christ, but also for many centuries to follow. Herein also may be found an explanation, at any rate in part, of the oppression to which the Jew was normally subject throughout the Middle Ages, and from which he is not entirely free even to-day. So great, indeed, did this anti-social trifling with the plighted word become that the Talmud laid down that, if repeated (as in Mt 5³⁷), a simple 'Yes' or 'No' ought to be regarded as being as binding as an oath. It should also not be overlooked that Christ did not exactly say that anything beyond a simple statement is absolutely evil, but that it springs from evil—a delicate distinction, perhaps, but a real one none the less. In an ideal condition of society absolute truthfulness and perfect sincerity would prevail in all personal relations. The oath would naturally disappear, inasmuch as a simple 'Yes' or 'No' would afford adequate assurance of good faith. That more than this is required in practice is entirely due to the imperfection of all human society; whence it follows that the oath, whether absolutely evil or not, certainly springs out of evil, i.e. out of that ill condition of social relations which demands more than a simple affirmation or denial as a guarantee of truth in statement or honest performance of promise (cf. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* vii. 8).

Though, on the face of it, Christ's statement (Mt 5³⁴) has all the appearance of an absolute prohibition, it is difficult, in view of the practice of

His immediate followers and His own apparent recognition of the legal oath, not to suppose that it was meant, and was at the time understood, to be limited in its reference. The fact that the oaths mentioned in this prohibition, in which there is no specific citation of the Divine Name, are typical examples of just the kind of oath that many Jews of that day lightly took, and broke without scruple, renders it not improbable that what our Lord had in mind was not so much the oath seriously taken and honourably observed as the light swearing and the casuistical distinctions (cf. Mt 23¹⁶⁻²²) that all too frequently degraded the oath into a form as useless as it was profane.

These considerations should at least warn us against hastily accepting a theory based upon a single passage regarded in isolation from the teaching of the NT as a whole. We may, however, conclude with assurance that Christ sought to impress upon the minds of His hearers not merely that playing fast and loose with the oath was an offence in the sight of God, but that the absence of an oath in no way lessened man's obligation at all times to speak the truth.

2. **Early Church.**—However unnecessary it might be in an ideal society, this has ever been so far from realization in practice that the carrying over of the oath into the newly-established Christian system will commend itself to the reason of most men. The age was an illiterate one, and illiteracy remained the rule for many centuries after Christ. In a community among the members of which writing was a rare accomplishment the oath contributed to fill the place occupied in a society such as our own by the written as compared with the merely verbal agreement. It is not, however, altogether a matter for surprise that, custom, convenience, and the practice of the Apostolic Church being on the one side, and the apparently express prohibition of Christ on the other, there was much difference of opinion, in the early Church, as to the lawfulness or otherwise of the oath. This is apparent to any one who has even a nodding acquaintance with Patristic literature. A few illustrative examples, culled almost at random from the writings of the Fathers, are all that can be given here. Conspicuous among the advocates of prohibition was Chrysostom, for whom the oath was nothing less than 'a snare of Satan,' and by all means to be avoided (*Serm. ad pop. Ant. hom. xv., in Acta Apost. hom. viii. f.*; cf. also *hom. x.*; on the same side see also *Clem. Hom. iii. 55, xix. 2*; Justin Martyr, *Apol. i. 16*; *Clem. Alex. Strom. v. 14*; cf. also *vii. 8*). Augustine also disliked the oath, not so much on the ground of divine prohibition as through fear of perjury (*Enarr. in Ps. lxxxviii. (lxxxix.) 4, de Mend. 28*; cf. also *Ep. xlvii. 2*). As against these views, while trifling or profane swearing was universally condemned, it was argued by others, on the ground of NT usage in general and the example of St. Paul in particular, that Christ could not have intended to put completely under the ban the serious use of the oath. As a conspicuous exponent of this view of the case, we may mention Athanasius, whose practice certainly squared with his theory (cf. *Apol. ad Imp. Const. 3*).

3. **Middle Ages.**—By the time that Christianity had established itself as the religion of the empire, there was really little to differentiate Christian and pagan circles in the matter of the oath. Christian imperial legal procedure required that witnesses should be sworn (*Cod. Theod. xi. 39*; *Cod. Just. iv. 20, 59*)—a practice that has been maintained until our day. As time went on, the oath, in ever growing measure, became a factor in almost every social relationship; e.g., in addition to the judicial oath, guaranteeing truth, may be mentioned

those pledges of fidelity, the oath of fealty, the coronation oath, and the oath of office generally. This was the case in ecclesiastical no less than in civil life, as witness ordination oaths, monastic and crusaders' vows. Not only did the oath prevail beyond all precedent in mediæval religious circles, but the Church was at pains to take the oath generally into her keeping and control (*Decret. Grat. can. xxii.*), and claimed as her peculiar prerogative the right of absolving from performance of an oath duly sworn. The Christian oath rested ultimately upon a religious basis; this the Church held to justify her claim, as the earthly representative of Him to whom the actual or implied appeal of the swearer had been addressed, and who, as she at any rate believed (cf. *Eus. HE vi. 9*), did not on occasion disdain to visit with material penalty abusers of the oath.

For an oath to be valid the Church required (1) *veritas in mente*—the words used must be a straightforward expression of what the swearer means to do or to assert; (2) *judicium in jurante*—clear understanding of what is involved in taking an oath, for lack of which idiots, children, atheists, and convicted perjurers were held incapable of being sworn; and (3) *justitia in objecto*—the object of the oath must be legitimate, for even an oath cannot bind a man to do the forbidden or to commit sin, a classic example being found in Herod's oath, which is quoted again and again in Patristic and early Christian literature. It was under the last head that the Church especially claimed her right to determine in respect of the oath, as being in most cases the only competent judge of *justitia in objecto*, whence it followed as a matter of course that to her appertained the right of annulment.

In spite of the prevalence of the oath in Christian circles generally, communities have existed from early times which, whether attributing an absolute prohibition to Christ, or shrinking from the responsibility of the act, have made it a matter of conscience to avoid the oath in any shape or form. As these communities have often been small, both in numbers and in historical importance, it will suffice to name the Waldenses, Hussites, Mennonites, Anabaptists, Moravians, and Friends (*qq.v.*).

4. **Modern.**—Though the Reformation changed many things, it retained the oath as a recognized and serviceable social institution. Art. xxxix. of the Church of England, e.g., embodies a formula which may be accepted as a fair statement of Protestant opinion with reference to the use of the oath as conformable to religion and common sense. For, while the assertion of untruth is always a sin, it is manifestly impracticable that it should always be treated as a legal crime. But the well-being of the community, the maintenance of an ordered state of society, demands that, under certain circumstances, it should be treated as such. The legal oath secures this; perjury is a crime, for which due penalty may be exacted. That the oath is not the only means of securing this end is, of course, true; this has been publicly recognized in the Oaths Act, 1888, in which provision was made for those who, like the Quakers, on conscientious grounds decline to swear or, as non-Christians, decline to take the Christian oath. But, allowing this, the oath generally meets the case; it has, moreover, acquired associations and a religious sanction which add to its effectiveness; it has on historic grounds become an integral part of the apparatus of social life; there appears, therefore, to be no sufficient warrant for discontinuing its use, though, of course, its abuse cannot be deprecated too strongly. Yet, in the last resort, it must be admitted that the very existence of a need for the oath or some equivalent for it is due solely to

the imperfect Christianity of Christian people at the present day as throughout the past. If the ideal of living set up by Christ were actually realized in practice, the oath would forthwith become superfluous; for lying and ill faith would be unknown, a simple affirmation or denial would meet all needs, and a promise would require no further guarantee. Unhappily this is far from being the case; and, society being what it is, the retention of the Christian oath appears to be entirely justified, alike on the grounds of religion, ethics, common sense, and practical convenience.

LITERATURE.—Among the not over-numerous works dealing with the oath in general the following may be named: E. Coke, *Institutes of the Laws of England*, ed. F. Hargrave and C. Butler, London, 1759; *The Book of Oaths* (anonymous), do. 1649; C. F. Stäudlin, *Gesch. der Vorstellungen und Lehren vom Eide*, Göttingen, 1824; J. E. Tyler, *Oaths: their Origin, Nature, and History*, London, 1835; K. F. Göschel, *Der Eid*, Berlin, 1837; F. A. Stringer, *Oaths and Affirmations*³, London, 1910; C. Ford, *On Oaths*, do. 1903. There is much matter bearing on the subject in commentaries on Holy Scripture, readily available; in the writings of the Fathers, and later ecclesiastical literature, partial reference to which has been given in the text; and in more official documents, such as certain of the Papal Decretals, and so forth. For the practical study of the institution in detail, reference may be made to the *Histories*, primary and secondary, which are too numerous to mention here.

W. ERNEST BREYER.

OATH (Semitic).—Oaths are very common in Semitic speech, particularly in Arabic. This need not imply that the ordinary assertions of a Semite could not or cannot be trusted, though the Arabs have a bad reputation in this respect.¹ It may point rather to a fondness for emphatic speech. In the case of the Hebrews much of this particular kind of emphasis may have been lost in editorial refinements and manipulations; but the use in Hebrew of such syntactical constructions as those with the infinitive absolute and with the perfect of certitude may be taken to indicate that emphatic utterance was characteristic of the people and the language. When, therefore, the oath as a solemn asseveration came into use, its growth on such soil would be rapid and luxuriant. But in its more original form the oath was more an action than an utterance. It was part of the ceremony of a compact or agreement. Such ceremonies, more or less elaborate at first, gradually become modified and simplified until only a gesture may remain. In the judicial oath, which is usually for the most part a form of words, we have the later or latest development. It implies considerable progress both in law and in religion.² The oath is still of the nature of a compact or agreement.³ Hebrew and Arabic philology may be said clearly to indicate the ceremonial origin of the oath among the Semites. Some of the words for oath—Heb. *šebhu'ah*; Arab. *yamin* and *qasam*—imply ceremonies. The Heb. *šebhu'ah* is connected with the word for 'seven' (*šebba'*); and 'to swear' (*nishba'*) is literally 'to do things by sevens' or 'to come under the influence of seven things'.⁴ Seven was a sacred number among the Semites (cf. Gn 33³, Lv 4⁶, Nu 23¹, Jos 6⁴, etc.; Qur'an, ii. 27, xxiii. 17, xv. 44, 87, xxxi. 26,

etc.). It probably had magical significance.¹ In any case, certain narratives confirm the view that some action by sevens was the primary idea. Thus seven ewe lambs figure in the oath regarding a well made between Abraham and Abimelech (Gn 21³¹), and on this account the place is said to have been called Beer-sheba, 'Well of Seven'.² Again, Herodotus describes an Arabian oath of covenant (iii. 8) in which seven stones are smeared with blood (cf. Hom. *Il.* xix. 243 ff.; Paus. iii. xx. 9). The Arab. word *qasam*, used of the judicial oath, is derived from a root which in its simple form means 'to divide into parts' (*qasama*; iv. 'aqsama, 'to swear'). Here again some magical ceremony may be implied;³ and we are again helped by an OT narrative. In Gn 15^{10, 17} we have a story of the making of a compact in which certain animals are cut up and the pieces arranged in a particular way. At sunset a smoking oven and a flaming torch pass between the pieces (cf. Jer 34^{18f.}). In this narrative, which is composite and confused, there is a hint of some ancient and rather elaborate ceremony (probably magical). We need not think of a sacrifice; and originally no doubt it was the contracting parties who passed between the pieces.⁴ The significance of the pieces or parts is doubtful.⁵ But, in any case, just as the Heb. word has some such primary idea as 'to do a thing by sevens,' the Arab. word would seem to denote primarily 'to do a thing by parts.' The Arab. word *yamin* really means 'the right hand.' Since the right hand was much used in contract or oath ceremonies, the same word came to denote an oath.⁶ The Arabs give the hand in swearing. There is reference to the same action among the Hebrews as well. In 2 K 10¹⁵ the giving of the hand is an indication of loyalty (cf. La 5⁸, 2 Ch 30⁹). In Ezr 10¹⁹ the expression is equivalent to 'promise' or almost to 'swear'.⁷ In 1 Ch 29²⁴, where RV has 'submitted themselves unto Solomon the king,' the Heb. text has 'gave the hand under Solomon.' This was perhaps the more original form of the expression. The person who swore put the hand or hands under the person to whom the oath was sworn. In the Qur'an (xlviii. 10) we find the words:

'In truth, they who plighted fealty to thee, really plighted that fealty to God: the hand of God was over their hands.'

The original ceremony may have been something like that described in Gn 24²⁻⁹. When Abraham makes his servant swear, he directs him at the same time to put his hand under his (Abraham's)

¹ Cf. R. C. Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, London, 1903, p. 104 ff., etc.; W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, do. 1900, p. 225 f.; also GDB, pt. ii., *Taboo and the Perils of the Soul*, do. 1911, p. 305 f.

² This is no doubt the meaning, though the name might be explained 'well of the oath,' or even 'well of Sheba.' O. F. Burney (*JThSt* xii. [1910] 118 f.) explains Sheba as the god Seven; but, since in Assyrian *mamitu*, 'oath,' occurs as the name of a goddess (Mercer, *The Oath in Babylonian and Assyrian Literature*, p. 27), Sheba here may be the oath personified (cf. the personification of Gr. *ἔπος*). *Mamitu* is never mentioned in oath formulae; but we find reference to 'the mistress (goddess) of the oath' as witness to a treaty (Mercer, p. 28). Of course the story in Genesis may be only a popular etymology invented to explain an already existing name; but in any case it throws light on the primary idea in the Heb. word 'to swear.'

³ Especially as other forms of the same Arab. root are used of practising divination (see F. Brown, S. R. Driver, and C. A. Briggs, *A Heb. and Eng. Lexicon of the OT*, Oxford, 1891 ff., s.v. *ḥṣṣ*, and Wellhausen, p. 133 f.).

⁴ Not 'as a symbol that they were taken within the mystical life of the victim' (W. Robertson Smith, *Rel. Sem.* 2, p. 480 f.). This idea is hardly primitive enough.

⁵ Mercer (p. 40 f.) finds an interesting analogy in an Assyrian inscription of the time of Ašur-nirāri ii. (754-745 B.C. (Mercer)) in which a treaty between Ašur-nirāri, king of Assyria, and Matī'ilu, ruler of a district west of Hama, occurs. A ram was taken from the herd and beheaded. According to Mercer, this was done, not as an offering or sacrifice, but to typify what would be the fate of the perjurer.

⁶ Possibly the same word in Hebrew should sometimes be translated 'oath.' In Ps 144⁸, e.g., we might translate 'their oath is a false oath.'

⁷ The same thing is expressed by the 'striking of hands' in Job 17³, Pr 6¹ 11¹⁵ 17¹⁸ 22²⁵.

¹ Cf. C. M. Doughty, *Wanderings in Arabia*, i. 110: 'To speak of the Arabs at the worst, in one word, the month of the Arabs is full of cursing and lies and prayers; their heart is a deceitful labyrinth.'

² time mur. Babylonians as early as 2000 B.C.

³ It always implies as its full form a conditional sentence. Indeed, the simplest oath, judicial or otherwise, may be said to do this. Perjury is a repudiation of sacred things, a violation of religion. When a modern Arab swears by God, *Wallahi* or *Wallahi-Billahi* or *Wallah-Ballah* (Doughty, i. 110), the original implication is: 'If I perjure myself, I am false to my belief that God is the living God, and I call down upon myself the punishment due to such infidelity.'

⁴ Wellhausen (*Reste*, p. 150) thinks that the word may imply a sevenfold repetition. But the repetition of a formula is probably a later idea.

thigh.¹ This suggests that originally the hand was placed under the most sacred part of the person, the seat of a mysterious, awe-inspiring, life-giving force.² We may suppose that in course of time instead of this the hand of one person was placed under the hand of the other. Out of this practice grew a still simpler action, first a kind of handshake, and then a mere lifting of the hand. Thus 'to lift the hand' became equivalent to 'to swear' (Gn 14²², Dt 32⁴⁰, Ex 6⁸, Ps 106²⁶).³

The judicial oath, unless followed by an ordeal, is more a form of words. But various other ceremonies have been noted in connexion with oaths, judicial or otherwise. Doughty (i. 110) speaks of a faithful form of swearing among the Arabs called *halif yemîn*:

'One takes a grass stalk in his fist, and his words are *Wa hydt hâtha el-âad*, By the life of this stem, *wa'r rubb el-mabûd*, and the adorable Lord.'⁴

Burckhardt mentions others. One of the most common in ordinary life is to take hold of the *wasat*, or middle tent-pole, with one hand and to swear 'by the life of this tent and its owners.' A more serious oath, used only in exceptional cases, is called *yemîn el-khet*, the 'oath of the cross lines.' The account of this oath may be given in Burckhardt's words:

'Thus, if a Bedouin accuses his neighbour of a considerable theft, and cannot prove the fact by witnesses, the plaintiff takes the defendant before the sheikh, or kady, and calls upon him to swear in his defence whatever oath he may choose to demand from him. If he complies readily, his accuser leads him to a certain distance from the camp, because the magical nature of the oath might prove pernicious to the general body of Arabs, were it to take place in their vicinity. He then with his *sekin*, or crooked knife, draws on the sand a large circle, with many cross lines inside it. He obliges the defendant to place his right foot within the circle, he himself doing the same, and addressing him in the following words, which the accused is obliged to repeat—"By God, and in God, and through God, (I swear) I did not take it, and it is not in my possession." Some persons enter the circle with both feet. It is said that Mohammed once made use of this oath, and to swear falsely by it would for ever disgrace an Arab. To make it still more solemn, a *shemle* (or camel's udder-bag) and an ant (*el nemle*) are placed together within the circle; indicating that the accused swears by the hope of never being deprived of his camel's udder, and of never experiencing a time when he should want even the winter provision of an ant' (ii. 127 f.).

In this form the oath is called the *yemîn el shemle wa nemle*, or 'oath of the *shemle* and *nemle*.'

In Babylonian and Assyrian contract-tablets and inscriptions there are many references to mere oaths of attestation, from the early days of Baby-

¹ Mercer (p. 89) thinks that this narrative can be paralleled by a passage from the Nimrod Epos (xl. no. 70, l. 210): *il-pu-ut pu-ut-ni ma iz-za-az ina bi-ri-in-ni i-ka-ra-ban-na-si*, '(he made my wife kneel down by my side) touched our foreside, walking in between and blessing us.' He gives reasons for thinking that *il-pu-ut pu-ut-ni* may be translated here 'he touched (in oath) our foreside (i.e. our privy parts)', and compares the common phrase *istên pit šant naši*, 'one lifts the forepart of another,' i.e. 'one answers for another.'

² We might think of phallic worship here (cf. Holzinger on Gn 24⁷); but this is not necessary. The genital organs (represented by the thigh) are regarded simply as the instruments of a kind of divine power. The conception was wide-spread; and there are traces of the same kind of ceremony in various parts of the world (see H. Ewald, *Allerthümer des Volkes Israel*,³ Göttingen, 1860, p. 26, and note particularly the Australian parallel cited by G. J. Spurrell, *Notes on the Text of Genesis*², Oxford, 1896, p. 218). Other explanations have been offered. Dillmann explains by the fact that (avenging) descendants proceed from the loins (Gn 46²⁶, Ex 16, Jg 8³⁰). Others (Targum Jon., Rashi) think that the generative organ was considered sacred because sanctified by circumcision. A. J. N. Tremearne (*The Ban of the Bori*, London, 1914, p. 62), in reference to this explanation, adds: 'Perhaps a survival of this is seen in the practice found amongst certain West African tribes of passing a knife or other piece of iron between the legs when taking an oath.'

³ The Assyrian word *nîš*, 'oath,' is from the verb *našu* (Heb. *nâšâ*), which means 'to lift up (the band),' especially as a gesture in taking an oath (Mercer, p. 29).

⁴ According to Burckhardt, the 'oath of the wood' is often taken before a judge. His account of the oath is as follows. A small piece of wood (or some straw) is taken up from the ground and presented to the person who is to swear. He is requested to 'take the wood and swear by God and the life of him who caused it to be green and dried it up' (*Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys*, ii. 127).

lonian business life down to the Persian period. These are interesting as giving often the occasion, place, time, and general circumstances of the oath. It appears that the Babylonians and Assyrians went to the temple to take their oaths (cf. the expression 'before the god'). A very common place was the 'gate' of the temple; but other places also are mentioned.¹ In contracts dating from the second part of the so-called dynasty of Ur oaths are taken in the temple of Nin-mar-ki by the name of the king with or without witnesses; or by the name of the king with witnesses and before certain named persons; or without invoking any one and with or without witnesses. In the contracts from the Hammurabi dynasty the oaths are with or without witnesses. They are by the name of the god and the king, and sometimes also of the city; e.g., we find invocation of 'Shamash and the king,' 'Shamash, Marduk, and the king,' 'Shamash, Marduk, the king, and the city of Sippar,' etc. (Mercer, p. 7).² These are the two gods most frequently invoked. With them is generally associated the reigning king. In contracts of the Cassite dynasty the oath is sworn by En-lil, Ninib, Nusku, and the king. But in this dynasty the custom of taking the oath seems to be less common, and in subsequent periods it falls more and more into disuse. In treaties the oath figures as early as c. 2900 B.C. (treaty made by E-an-na-tum, king of Lagaš or Sirpulla; see Mercer, p. 21). There are several references in the Tell-el-Amarna tablets (29, 67, 148, 149, 164) and in Assyrian inscriptions (Mercer, p. 22).

Among Hebrews, Babylonians, and Arabs the ordinary judicial oath has much in common. The Hammurabi Code in the case of grievous assault demands an oath of lack of malice and payment of the doctor. As Johns points out, Exodus (21¹⁸) omits the oath and orders payment for loss of time. If the injured man dies, the Hammurabi Code allows an oath of want of malice to be taken (§ 207), and accepts compensation. The same Code requires a person accused of incest either to take a solemn oath or to submit to an ordeal, as the case may require. In Nu 5¹¹⁻³¹ a woman accused of incest has to take an oath and to submit to an ordeal as well. Among the ancient Arabs a wife suspected of infidelity had to ride on a camel between two sacks of dung to the sanctuary and there swear seventy times that the suspicion rested upon calumny. The requirement of the Qur'ān is simpler.³ If a man accuses his wife of infidelity, he must swear four times that he speaks the truth, and then ask that the curse⁴ of God may fall upon him if he lies. The woman can meet this by swearing four times that he lies and then calling down upon herself the anger of God if he speaks the truth. In Ex 22¹⁰ it is ordered that, if an animal has been entrusted to a man, and it die or be hurt or be driven away, the man to whom it was entrusted

¹ Whether *Šurînnu*, which is often mentioned, was a place (Muss-Arnott, 'column'), an 'emblem' (Thureau-Dangin), or the receptacle of the oath-emblems, is doubtful; but at any rate it seems to belong to the temple (Mercer, p. 35).

² Certain parts of the temple are mentioned as the place of attestation. Sometimes the parties are said to go to 'the divine emblem' (KU. 715; see Mercer, p. 11 f.).

³ D. S. Margoliouth (*The Early Development of Mohammedanism*, London, 1914, p. 48 f.) points out that the ruling of the Qur'ān in the matter of oaths reveals the development of a change of attitude. In xvi. 93 there is a command to keep oaths. In v. 91 the principle of compensation is introduced: an oath may be violated, and atonement made by some other performance. In xvi. the new principle is confirmed. The tendency is towards laxity; 'and it has had the decidedly serious result that there appears to be no mode known to Mohammedan law whereby an oath can be made legally binding.'

⁴ As Wellhausen says, the oath is always eventually a curse. The Heb. word for 'a curse,' *ālāh*, is often translated 'oath.' Where *ālāh* and the more usual word for oath, *šebhu'āh*, are combined, the severity of the eventual curse is increased and emphasized (see Nu 5³¹; and cf. 1 K 8³¹, 2 Ch 6², Neh 10²², Dn 9¹¹).

may clear himself by taking a solemn oath. This is the oath of purgation (cf. 1 K 8³¹). The same provision is made in the Hammurabi Code (cf. S. R. Driver, *Exodus*, Cambridge, 1911, p. 423). Among the Arabs it is still possible for a person suspected of theft to clear himself by taking a solemn oath (see Burckhardt, i. 126-129; Doughty, i. 267; and cf. E. W. Lane, *Modern Egyptians*⁵, London, 1871, i. 384). According to Dt 21¹⁶, when a man was found slain, the elders of the place had to swear that their people were guiltless of the murder. Robertson Smith (p. 64) thinks that exactly the same custom prevailed in Arabia (cf., however, Wellhausen, p. 189, n. 1).

Several oath formulæ are mentioned in the OT—e.g., 'God do so to so and so and more also' (1 S 14⁴ 25²², 2 S 3⁹ 35, 1 K 2²³); 'As Jahweh liveth!' (1 S 14³⁹ 19⁶); 'As Jahweh liveth and as thou thyself (thy soul) livest' (1 S 20³); 'As Jahweh liveth and as my lord the king liveth' (2 S 15²¹); 'Jahweh is a witness between me and thee for ever' (1 S 20²³, inserting 'ēdh after *Jahweh*; or 'Jahweh is an everlasting witness,' reading simply 'ēdh *ōlām*); 'By myself have I sworn' (Gn 22¹⁶, Jahweh being the speaker). Among Arabic examples are the following: 'By what this (copy of the Qur'an) contains of the word of God'; 'I impose upon myself divorcement'; 'I impose upon myself a triple divorcement'; 'I impose upon myself interdiction'; 'By God the Great'; 'As the Lord liveth' (*Wa hyāt Ullah*); 'As I live' (*Aly lahyaty*). The Jews swore by the Temple (Jer 7⁴) as well as by persons. They are said to have sworn also by heaven (cf. G. H. Dalman, *Worte Jesu*, Leipzig, 1898, i. 163 f.), by the earth, by the sun, by Jerusalem (see *Shēbū'ōth*, iv. 2; Mt 5³⁴ 23¹⁶; *Brāk'hōth*, 55; *Qiddūshīn*, 71a; Maimonides, *Yad Ha-Hazakā*, *Hil'koth Shēbū'ōth*, 12). The modern Arabs swear by the life of persons or parts of a person (e.g., the head, the beard; see Lane, *Modern Egyptians*⁵, i. 349), and even of things (e.g., fire, coffee, etc.; see Doughty, *Arabia Deserta*, Cambridge, 1888, i. 269). According to S. I. Curtiss (*Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, London, 1902, p. 113 f.), Muhammadans at Hamath, in N. Syria, swear by God's phallus.

'In the village of Bludan, about twenty-five miles west from Damascus, which is composed of Greek Christians of a very low type, the same oath is heard on the lips of women. . . . Another form of oath of a similar sort may be heard in Nebk, in the Syrian desert, and at Zebedan.'²

Muhammadans are said also to swear by the sacred pilgrimage route to Mecca. If the text of Am 8¹⁴ is correct, the Israelites used the same kind of oath: 'As the way of Beersheba liveth.' But the oath is peculiar and without parallel in Heb., and the text is perhaps corrupt.³ The pilgrimage

¹ The word translated 'as liveth' has been less correctly rendered 'by the life of.' It is an adjective, and is pointed differently by the Massorettes (e.g., in 2 S 16²¹) to distinguish oaths sworn by Jahweh from oaths sworn by false gods and other non-enduring persons and things. If Hos 4¹⁵ has preserved the true text, the Israelites are forbidden there to swear 'As the Lord liveth!' This prohibition, however, is very unlikely. W. R. Harper (*Amos and Hosea* [ICC], Edinburgh, 1905, p. 263 f.) is probably right in conjecturing (with Wellhausen, Nowack, and G. A. Smith) that 'in Beersheba' has fallen out. Read: 'And swear not in Beersheba, "As Jahweh liveth!"' This oath was permitted (Jer 42 35¹⁰), and at a later date was even commanded (Dt 6¹³ 10²⁰).

² The use of this oath may be taken perhaps to imply phallic worship as its origin. Or it may be due to the kind of tradition that makes certain persons the offspring of a divine father. The stories of the opening of Leah's womb (Gn 29³¹) and of the visit of the angel of Jahweh to Samson's mother (Jg 13⁷) have been referred to in this connexion (see R. C. Thompson, *Semitic Magic*, p. 78).

³ It has been suggested that *we-hē derek* should be read *we-hē dōdeka*, *dōd*, literally 'darling,' being used here in the sense of patronage. Thus *we-hē derek* = 'as the darling of the Lord liveth.' And as liveth thy patron, . . . *dglossen*, v. [Leipzig, 1912] 252) even conjectures that there is no oath

to Mecca is of such importance that it is natural to find this and other oaths associated with it. Thus the sanctity of him who instituted it, or of him in whose honour it is made, is, of course, a sanctity by which to swear. In Hariri's *Magāmah* of Alexandria (as rendered by T. Preston, *Makamat of Al Hariri of Basra*, London, 1850) occur the

nes: 'Lo! here I swear by Mecca's Lord divine,

Whose pilgrims, sped by camels, seek his shrine' (p. 108).

Preston compares a similar asseveration in the poem of Nabegra: 'By the eternity of Him to whom I have gone on pilgrimage of the Hadj!' In the *Magāmah* of Koufa we have (Preston, p. 218): 'By the sanctity of the Shaikh (Abraham) who ordained the hospitable meal and founded the place to which the hadj is made (the Kaaba) in the mother of towns.'

The Essenes refrained altogether from swearing (Jos. BJ II. viii. 6). It has been thought that even in Ec 9² the taking of an oath is regarded as objectionable.¹ In any case the Jews came to regard the taking of an oath as a very serious matter. The general principle is, 'Let thy yea be yea and thy nay be nay' (*Bābhā M'ēa*, 49a); for he who utters an untruth is excluded from the divine presence (*Sōtāh*, 42a). There are many passages in Rabbinic literature which express abhorrence of false or vain oaths. Such falsehood is one of the seven capital sins which provoke God's severest judgment on the world (*Abhōth*, v.). A false oath, even if made unconsciously, involves a man in sin, and is punished as such (*Gittin*, 35a). The oath or vow which a man was charged to make by a Jewish court of justice could be absolved by no Rabbi or Rabbinical tribunal. Oaths uttered over the Scroll of the Law were particularly sacred. In the age of the Geonim no dissolution of business contracts made on oath was permitted (cf. E. Landau, *Responsen*, Prague, 1776, 21810-11, p. 123).²

LITERATURE.—HDB; EBi; Herzog-Hauck, *Realencyklopädie*³; JE ix. 885; DI; J. D. Michaelis, *Das mosaische Recht* (ed. J. L. Snareschütz, Berlin, 1846-48; W. Nowack, *Lehrbuch der hebräische Archäologie*, 2 vols., Freiburg, 1894; S. A. B. Mercer, *The Oath in Babylonian and Assyrian Literature*, Paris, 1912; J. L. Burckhardt, *Notes on the Bedouins and Wahābys*, London, 1831; J. Wellhausen, *Reste arabischen Heidentums*, Berlin, 1897; W. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*², London, 1894, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*, new ed., do. 1903; C. M. Doughty, *Wanderings in Arabia*, 2 vols., do. 1903; C. H. W. Johns, *The Relations between the Laws of Babylonia and the Laws of the Hebrew Peoples* (Schweich Lectures, 1912), do. 1914. Some other works have been referred to in the course of the article.

MAURICE A. CANNEY.

OBEDIENCE.—In the sphere of ethics the term 'obedience' signifies the practical submission to an authority regarded as universally valid or to an authority of a concrete or provisional character. In the former case it stands opposed to disobedience; in the latter to self-determination, culminating in complete personal autonomy, which, however, must be distinguished from romantic caprice.

1. Obedience as an ethico-religious principle.—Unconditional obedience is demanded in certain stages of religion—in those, namely, which are characterized by the enunciation of positive laws. The laws in question may be grounded on ancient custom, priestly enactment, or the ordinances of sacred books. The motives for obedience, too, may be of the most varied kind, such as convention, fear, hope of reward, and even belief in the real excellence of the law, and trust in the authority here at all. For *hē* he would read in both clauses 'ē, and, for *we-hē derek*, *we-ē derek*: 'And they shall say, Where is thy God, Dan? and Where is thy Spring, Beersheba?'

¹ But this is probably due to a wrong interpretation. Rather one who takes an oath and loyally keeps it is contrasted with one who is afraid to take an oath or to keep it.

² For the Rabbinic references the writer is indebted to Maurice H. Farbridge, M.A., Faulkner Fellow in Manchester University.

behind it. In no case, however, is the individual really free, for, while he is regarded as sufficiently intelligent to propose tasks for his own will, he is assumed to be still spiritually dependent and immature.

To begin with, there are religions in which obedience to the deity takes the form of obedience to particular laws. Instances of this attitude are found in the law-book of Manu, in the religions of Egypt, Babylonia, and Persia, in Judaism, and in Muhammadanism. The inevitable result of this is a constant increase in the number of particular commandments, and a corresponding tendency to casuistry, as seen in Judaism, especially in the *Halakhā*. External scrupulosity is here conjoined with a decline in ethical feeling, though it is true that feeling itself is sometimes brought under law, as when the Jesuits ask how often one must love God—if, e.g., twice a day will suffice. The laws may vary greatly in their subject-matter, but this is of less importance than the fact that laws have actually been given. A characteristic feature of this stage of development is that each law tends to stand by itself, and there is also a tendency to separate the works of the law from the individual doer, as in the Parsi religion (cf. the *Thesaurus operum* of Roman Catholicism), though it should be noted that in Parsiism purity of thought is demanded no less than purity of word and action.

Nevertheless, it is impossible, in these forms of religion, to bring the inward spirit and the outward action into complete harmony, for the spirit enjoined is simply that of readiness to obey. Moreover, as the laws are regarded as ordinances of the deity and therefore unchangeable, they often, as, e.g., in Islām, become a clog upon moral development, though it is true that the Jesuits, who make obedience a principle of ethics, have in the clergy an authority which decides each case by itself.

The doctrine of absolute obedience presupposes that there are some who command and some who obey. The latter are those who are assumed to be spiritually in their nonage. They are free in a purely formal sense, i.e. either to obey or to disobey, but not to reason why. In fact, the more rigorous the demand for obedience, the less possible is it for them to perceive the goodness of the law, so that their obedience itself becomes purely formal, and tends to degenerate into spiritual indifference, while in turn the commanding authority becomes in its decisions more and more inclined to mere caprice (cf. the probabilism of the Jesuits). At this stage disobedience may be simply an act of will in conflict with a particular law, or it may be a fundamental revolt against mere submission, in which case it is construed by the authority as rebellion against God. But, while such revolt may rest upon self-will and arrogance, it may sometimes proceed from doubt as to the divine character and origin of the law enjoined, and this doubt may even prompt the question whether the individual ought to be permanently treated as spiritually immature. Thus disobedience and doubt may usher in a higher movement—a process of development transcending the standpoint of absolute submission to authority.

This process, again, exhibits various stages. The advance can be traced to some extent in several of the Aryan religions. Brāhmanism insists upon the law of caste and the authority of the Vedas, but accords perfect freedom to those who are absorbed in the contemplation of Brahman. Buddhism in time re-instituted the distinction between monk and layman, and prescribed laws for each, but still asserted that redemption was for all, and that the more passive virtues of pity and contemplation should rest upon individual initiative. It

was in Greek ethics, however, that the principle of obedience was more fully transcended. The Sophists, applying the solvent of doubt to convention and tradition, founded moral laws on *deus*, voluntary determination. In the *Republic* of Plato the classes corresponding to 'appetite' and 'courage' are certainly pledged to obedience, but those representing 'reason' are to act from their intuition of the Idea of the Good. A still greater measure of spontaneity and independence appears in Aristotle's doctrine of virtue and the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics.

Christianity, again, in so far as it is linked with the OT law, still retains a certain authoritative tendency, but in reality, as Christ proclaimed a free interpretation of the law, its characteristic attitude is fundamentally different. While the law still stands, the Holy Spirit is given to the Christian; love is the fulfilling of the law; the spiritual man judges all things. In its historical development, however, Christianity assumed a more statutory character as regards both doctrine and practice. In the Greek Church the authority set up was more of a doctrinal nature; in the Roman the laity became wholly dependent upon the ecclesiastical institution. It is true that, originally, Protestantism urged the rights of personality in the religious sphere, but neither in doctrine nor in ethics did it free itself fully from the standpoint of obedience. The authority of the Scriptures and of the Decalogue was maintained, and that of the confessions was added to it; and, in short, submission to the Church met with more approval than the denial of papal infallibility might lead one to expect. Official Protestantism, in fact, is a transitional stage in which the religion of obedience and the religion of freedom have each a place. The same thing appears in recent Protestant ethics, which at once recognizes secular morality, and seeks to base morality upon Scripture and even upon the Church (J. Weiss, F. H. R. Frank, C. E. Luthardt). All along, however, there were thinkers to whom Christianity was essentially the religion of freedom, who either, like Clement and Origen, distinguished between popular faith and knowledge, and found the source of a free and rational morality in a voluntary union with the Logos, or interpreted Christianity as a form of mysticism, whether of a more contemplative or a more ethical character, as, e.g., in Dionysius the Areopagite and in the *German Theology* (ed. F. Pfeiffer, Gütersloh, 1875) respectively. In Reformation times we find a broader conception of ethics among certain dissenters, while subsequently the Quakers appealed to the Inner Light, the testimony of the spirit, in every heart.

Within Christianity there has also been a rationalistic tendency which based ethics less upon obedience than upon action regulated by personal insight. Spinoza, who, though he did not belong to the Church, was in his ethics anything but a Jew, held that man shares in the divine activity, and so acts freely in the various relations of life. The English deists, notably Herbert of Cherbury, advocated a morality founded upon universal consent, virtue being thus based upon natural reason. But the most pronounced opponent of statutory obedience was Kant, who founded ethics on the autonomy of the practical reason. He rejected all attempts to find a basis for morality in authority of any kind, and, in particular, in religious authority. Religion itself, he holds, rests upon morality: we postulate God simply as the guarantee that the moral law and the law of nature are ultimately one. The moral law is to be obeyed, however, because it is in itself good, and not on the ground of its divine origin. Nietzsche, too, asserts that authority and tradition must be transformed

into freedom, and that we must recognize ourselves as organs of divine Providence and as able to grasp the content of moral law by intellectual intuition. Hegel likewise brings morality under the standpoint of freedom, the final stage of this being the *Sittlichkeit* in which the human spirit comes into complete harmony with the moral content revealing itself in the family, civil life, and the State. Autonomy of a kind is found also in the religious ethics of Schleiermacher: the divine spirit acts in man as the incentive to moral conduct, and knowledge of moral content is drawn from the Christian consciousness and from the moral reason, so that ethical action is free, resting upon religious impulse and personal insight.

The results of the foregoing survey may be set forth as follows. As long as the individual falls short of complete self-mastery, he is dependent upon the community for his ethical conceptions, these being usually represented as of divine origin; at this stage his normal practice is simply obedience. A further point is reached when he asks for the grounds on which obedience is demanded. Here obedience may still be counselled—as the more profitable course. But this is not an ethical solution at all, and the next step is to inquire into the content of the moral law. Should obedience still be enforced, the individual begins to question the rightness of the law, and his mind oscillates between doubt and submission. The highest stage of moral life is reached when the subject not only acts from an ethical motive, but feels responsible for his knowledge of moral content, *i.e.* claims the right to test that content in each particular case.

2. Obedience in practical life.—It is obvious, however, that in certain phases of social life obedience to a concrete authority, *i.e.* the subordination of private judgment and private choice to the expressed will of others, may rightly be demanded. These phases may be enumerated as follows: (1) the training of children—the necessity of obedience to parents or their representatives; (2) the married state—the position of the wife in relation to her husband; (3) domestic and industrial arrangements, or the hierarchy of private or public service—the servant's submission to the master, or that of the subordinate to the superior official; (4) the Church—the duty of the members to the constituted authority; and (5) the State—the relation of the subject to the law. With the exception of (3) these are dealt with in some detail in the art. EMANCIPATION (vol. v. p. 270 ff., esp. § 2), and, more generally, also in the art. AUTHORITY (vol. ii. p. 249 ff.). For (3)—in part—see artt. EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYMENT (vol. v. pp. 295 f., 297 ff.); here it need only be noted that the relation of master and servant, now that civilization has passed beyond the stage of slavery, is in essence a contract, that the servant's obedience is simply his faithfulness to an agreement which was voluntarily entered into and may be voluntarily dissolved, and that the relation may become an ideally ethical one when both employer and employee take a kindly human interest in the concerns and welfare of each other. In the public service, again, the obedience of the inferior to the superior official would seem to be absolutely necessary for the sake of order, and the question here is how the inferior is to preserve his moral responsibility when commanded to do what offends his moral judgment. For him to abandon the service might mean that the State thus lost its most conscientious officials, while to leave the responsibility of his conduct to his superior would be to reduce himself to a moral cipher. The practical solution of the problem is probably to be found in the right of free discussion: the inferior must be at liberty to lay his objections before the

higher authority, and the latter must be willing to discuss them; but in the last resort the conscientious objector, if still unsatisfied, should have the power of relinquishing his office. This case bears some affinity to that between subject and State (5). Here, however, another factor presents itself, viz. that in a free State the subject has a share in making the laws which he is asked to obey. He has the right to challenge any part of the established order, and to work for its reform, and accordingly it would seem that until the desired reform has been instituted it is his duty to obey.

3. Obedience and freedom.—The fact that in certain concrete relationships obedience may be justly required is not in any real sense incompatible with the fundamental personal freedom to which our inquiry in § 1 led us. In that inquiry we saw that the individual must attain to a sense of complete responsibility as regards his moral task. But it is a necessary condition of that task that, so far from being an isolated individuality, he is connected with other individuals, and stands with them in a vast complex of relations. His freedom is thus to be realized, not by breaking away from such order as has been established, but rather by exercising his inherent right to test all the laws, institutions, and counsels that constitute the established system of things. In this way his obedience is as far from blind submission as his freedom is from mere caprice.

In any existing system of social relations the possibility of improvement and progress depends in the ultimate upon free criticism. If the convictions of the individual are not at variance with the existent order, his obedience to it is obviously free action. Should there be antagonism, however, between his convictions and the course of action demanded of him, he must be at liberty to state his views publicly, while, similarly, the authority claiming his obedience must be prepared to set forth the other side, and must not fall back upon any arbitrary dictum or ancient convention. In such conditions the individual should submit to the established order until it is abrogated. His obedience will then be no abandonment of the duty of forming and defending his own convictions; on the contrary, it will rest upon a recognition of the fact that statutory laws are essential to the existence of a community, and especially of the State—essential, that is, to the preservation and extension of freedom itself. Cf. also the artt. EDUCATION, ETHICS AND MORALITY, FILIAL PIETY, FREE WILL, LOYALTY, SLAVERY, etc.

LITERATURE.—The more important works relating to the subject are given in the literature to the artt. AUTHORITY and EMANCIPATION, to which may be added A. Dörner, *Philosophische Ethik*, Berlin, 1895, pp. 437 ff., 657 ff., 407 ff., 503 ff., 469 ff., 717 ff.

A. DÖRNER.

OBI.—See VAUDOUX.

OBJECT, OBJECTIVE.—Whatever the mind can hold before it—attend to, think of, perceive, or contemplate—is called an 'object' of the mind; and this content of the mind's interest is said to be 'objective.'

The term 'object' has been used in philosophical discussions loosely and ambiguously; and in recent discussions the attempt is made to give it the consistent though very general meaning formulated in the definition above (cf. *DPHP*, s.v.). The principal confusion has arisen from the use of 'object' for 'external object' or physical thing, the 'objective' world being the 'physical' world. This is very inadequate for two reasons.

(1) To identify the objective with the physical is to limit the process by which the mind apprehends objects or contents generally to a single case, the

external. This is quite illegitimate. The process of the objectifying of contents is one which arises genetically very early in conscious life and develops through a series of stages in which objects of many sorts are constructed — objects of perception (things), of memory (images), of fancy, of imagination, of play, of thought. There are religious and æsthetic objects, mental no less than physical, fancied and imagined no less than seen and felt objects. The self is an object as the other person is; the 'castle in Spain' and the imagined thought or idea. The absurd, the visionary, the impossible, all become mental objects when set up in consciousness for inspection, thought, or contemplation (cf. A. Meinong, *Gegenstandstheorie*, Leipzig, 1907, and J. M. Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, 3 vols., London and New York, 1906-11).

The external or physical thing, therefore, is only one among many 'objects,' each having its own characters or 'co-efficients,' upon which the mind proceeds in giving it its place and mode of reality.

(2) A second reason for rejecting the usage which makes the objective co-extensive with the external arises from the consideration of the dualism between subjective and objective. This dualism appeared late in the history of reflexion, as it arises late also in the development of the individual. It requires the separation from each other of the two spheres of existence or reality as distinct worlds, one of experience, the other of that which is the cause or occasion of experience. But, before this is attained, the dualism of internal and external is already in force. From the rise of competent perception the external world is distinguished from the world of persons, and things are foreign to the observer and actor. Accordingly we have to say that the external thing takes on a new phase when it becomes an 'object' to the mind that perceives it, a phase in which it is recognized as being not only a thing but also an element in experience and in so far a mental state. These two meanings are clearly distinguishable, as they are not always co-extensive; hallucination shows the objective wrongly treated as external, and certain illusions such as those of persecution show the external endowed with properties which, while objective in force, are subjective in origin.

In brief, then, the objective is a sphere within experience; and, in a given case, the object may or may not have external value as well.

There are, therefore, strong reasons supporting the definition given above. It enables us to consider objectivity and externality as two relatively distinct problems. In the analysis of mature consciousness it is important that the question of epistemology—what is the meaning of the external?—should not be embarrassed by complications arising from the problem of the objective.

LITERATURE.—See the classic discussions of theory of knowledge by Locke, Hume, Berkeley, etc., and the chapters on 'Knowledge' in the principal systematic treatises on psychology.

J. MARK BALDWIN.

OBLIGATION.—See MORAL OBLIGATION.

OBSCENITY.—The definition of obscenity both in language and in law is vague.

The OED, s.v. 'Obsceno,' says: 'ad. L. *obscenus*, *obscænus*, adverse, inauspicious, ill-omened; trans. abominable, disgusting, filthy, indecent; of doubtful etymology.' 'The precise meaning,' says Craies, 'is decidedly ambiguous,' but 'the test of criminality . . . is whether the exhibition or matter tends to deprave.'

In Craies's definition not only is it necessary to define 'deprave,'¹ but it is extremely improbable that the original intention of the law was this alone. The law merely codifies social resentment, but why social opinion originally resented 'obscenity' is a difficult question of psychology. Mean-

¹ W. F. Craies, *EEA* l xix. 953.

while, with regard to the meaning of the idea and the etymology of the Latin term, it is to be noted that the differentia of obscene things, acts, and words is, negatively, concealment, or, positively, publication. In other words, to take a considerable percentage of obscene matter, this consists of natural acts and terms, and the exploitation of the organs from which they are derived, which, on being made public, offend social opinion. Thus, a plausible derivation of the word connects it with Latin *obscurus*, 'concealed,' and terms in various languages corroborate this. But the primary meaning of the Latin word seems to have been 'inauspicious,' 'ill-omened,' and the Latins resented obscenity just for this reason of ill-omen.¹ A parallel to this is the social objection to profane swearing. The most probable derivation, therefore, is perhaps that of Littré and Skeat:² connected with the Lat. *scævus*, 'left,' 'left-handed,' and 'inauspicious,' the word *obscænus*, *obscænus*, may presuppose *obscævinus*, on the strength of the verb *obscavare*, found in Plautus.³

The things, acts, or words which when published constitute obscenity cannot produce social resentment on one ground alone. There is, e.g., a tendency to explain the modern feeling as a development from a primitive magical use of the sexual and excretory areas. Thus, Ellis suggests that the universal gesture of contempt by exposure was originally magical and intended to drive away evil spirits, the evil eye, and the like.⁴ But it is difficult to see how a gesture of magical potency should have substituted for this the quality of contempt, based, as it here is, upon excretory relations. Again, the idea of obscenity is fully developed among primitive peoples, and they show no trace of the magical meaning, though the suggestion of filthiness is frequent. On the other hand, though the psychology of sex is always complicated by the excretory relations, it is impossible to refer obscenity to the latter sphere alone.⁵ Again, it is doubtful whether even in the Greek and Roman use of the phallus as an *ἀπορροῖον*, *fascinum*, amulet against evil and the evil eye,⁶ the original potency of the charm was 'magical.' The erect form of it, as, e.g., in the statues of Priapus which protected gardens, rather suggests contempt, based upon sexual power. Vague magical ideas would naturally attach themselves later.

The application of obscenity as a form of abuse, among both primitive and civilized peoples, and certain facts of sexual and excretory mental pathology, throw light upon the whole subject of the psychical bases of the idea of obscenity. The simpler societies, as, e.g., those of the Dutch East Indies, are familiar with the idea and practice of obscenity. They chiefly use it, as do the children of European peasants, by way of opprobrium and insult. Exposure, gestures, and language include both the sexual and excretory spheres. Natural modesty is violated, contempt is expressed, and there is a minor form of curse, consisting in a wish that the victim may break this or that sexual tabu—in other words, commit this or that form of incest or self-abuse.⁷ The only trace of a super-

¹ H. Havelock Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, i, The Evolution of Modesty, Philadelphia, 1899, p. 67.

² Littré, *Dict. de la langue française*, iii. [1873] 780; Skeat, *Etymological Dict. of the Eng. Language*, Oxford, 1910, s.v.

³ *Asinaria*, ii. l. 18.

⁴ *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, v., *Erotic Symbolism*, Philadelphia, 1906, p. 1001.

⁵ As E. Fuchs, *Das erotische Element in der Karikatur*, Munich, 1912, p. 26, quoted by Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, iv., *Sexual Selection in Man*, Philadelphia, 1905, p. 47.

⁶ *Fascinum* means both the evil eye and the charm, in shape of the phallus, worn by children to protect them against it (W. Smith, *Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Antiquities*, London, 1890-91, i. 827).

⁷ J. G. F. Riedel, *De sluit- en kroescharige rassen tuschen Seles en Papua*, The Hague, 1886, p. 43.

stitious or magical content is in reference to the menses. But the so-called 'horror' of this function is probably in origin based upon disgust at excretory phenomena, magical ideas following as usual.

The obsession known as 'exhibitionism' illustrates what may be called the tendency to obscenity, which seems to be connected with a self-feeling based upon sex.¹ Similarly, the obsession known as 'befouling' is a pathological replica of the normal method of expressing contempt by an obscene act.

Some typical expressions of social practice and theory may here be noted. In common with civilized peoples generally the natives of N.W. Central Queensland employ two vocabularies for the sexual organs, a 'decent' and an 'indecent.'² Throughout human history there has persisted some form of veneration for the organs which perpetuate the race. Greek religion had its *phallophoria*,³ and Indian religion has from the earliest times had its veneration or worship of the *linga* and *yoni*. The British *raj* has made special exemptions for representations in temples or in processions of idols which to the European might appear obscene.⁴ Respect for the genital organs has, to the credit of humanity, prevailed over disgust, and the so-called 'phallic worship' of early investigators was a fact, though misconstrued (see PHALLISM).⁵

The employment of sexual functions as a magical method of stimulating the growth of vegetation has been illustrated by Frazer.⁶ This and the similar practice of exposing the person in agricultural ritual constitute a sort of legalized obscenity. In saturnalian proceedings also obscenity, especially of language, is enjoined. Similarly on other occasions obscene language is allowed to women if they are interrupted by men in their own rites.⁷

Whether ritual obscenity in agricultural magic is based on the idea of homeopathy, and is originally to stimulate growth, is very doubtful. Many cases seem to have the character of the *fascinum*, and to be intended to drive away evil influences. There are many others also which are not concerned with agriculture. *A priori*, it would be expected that obscenity legalized in ritual should retain the meaning of obscenity in general, and a comparison of these ritual uses seems to show the same conclusion.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works cited in the article see J. G. Bourke, *Sexual Rites of all Nations*, Washington and London, 1891.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

OBSCURANTISM.—The significance of this term is moral rather than intellectual, the state of darkness which it denotes being the result not merely of unenlightenment, but also and far more of opposition to the light (Is 50³ 'Woe unto them that put darkness for light, and light for darkness'; Lk 11³² 'Ye have taken away the key of knowledge').

'For the true *obscurantists* are the passions, the prejudices, the blinding delusions of our nature, warped by evil habits and self-indulgence; the real *obscurantism* is bigotry, in all its forms, which are many and even opposite' (J. O. Hare, in *Guesses at Truth by Two Brothers*, London, 1897, 2nd ser., p. 501 f.).

As regards the sphere of its operation, however, *obscurantism* is a term of intellectual import, since it has reference to the interests of knowledge rather than to those of practical life.

The name owes its origin to the mediævalizing tendency prevalent in Europe during the earlier part of the 19th century.

¹ See Ellis, *Erotic Symbolism*, p. 100 f.

² W. E. Roth, *Ethnological Studies*, etc., Brisbane and London, 1897, p. 154.

³ L. R. Farnell, *CGS* v. 197.

⁴ Crales, *loc. cit.*

⁵ R. Andree, *ZE* xxvi. [1895] 678.

⁶ *GD*, pt. I., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, II. 97 f.

⁷ *GD*, pt. II., *Taboo*, London, 1911, p. 154.

Then 'the world, as that generation dreamed, was to be made young again,—not by drinking, where Wordsworth led, from the fresh springs of nature,—but by an elixir distilled from the withered flowers of mediæval Catholicism and chivalry, and even from the old roots of primeval wisdom' (W. Wallace, *The Logic of Hegel*, Oxford, 1874, p. xxx).

On this subject the writer of the passage already quoted from *Guesses at Truth* had remarked just before:

'People have been sounding the alarm for many years past all over Europe against what they call *obscurantism* and *obscurantists*; that is, against a supposed plot to extinguish all the new lights of our days, and to draw down the night of the middle ages on the awakening eyes of mankind' (p. 501).

Probably he has in view the ecclesiastical as well as the literary movements of the century, but in any case the attempted revival of mediævalism gave rise to the employment of the term. At the present time *obscurantism*, so far as it is not used in a general sense as signifying opposition to inquiry and enlightenment, suggests mediæval associations in their more historical connexion rather than their revival in the 19th century. As thus understood, however, the term always should be, though it by no means always is, applied not so much to what went on during the Middle Ages as to what went on at their close. For it was not until scholasticism, *e.g.* (which is most often the reference intended), had ceased to serve its purpose that it could with justice be described as *obscurantism*; *i.e.*, it was not until then that it could truly be said to be injurious to intellectual interests from an ethical point of view. In other words, *obscurantism* can be rightly ascribed to mediæval thought only when the latter, in the days of its decline, came to stand in direct opposition to humanism. The humanistic movement was no doubt primarily directed to the removal of intellectual hindrances, such, *e.g.*, as those enumerated by Bacon in his list of *idola* (cf., however, *Novum Organum*, bk. I., aphorisms lxx., lxxxix., and xc., for some of the more strictly *obscurantist* impedimenta). But, besides thus contributing to the progress of knowledge, humanism also acted as a purifying influence with respect to that corruption proceeding from moral causes which had been produced by mediæval *obscurantism*, and especially it served this purpose with respect to the revival of the sense of truth.¹

The impulse to *obscurantism* in its more general signification arises from a deeply-rooted, if not inherent, tendency of human nature to distrust knowledge. This tendency is especially liable to become aggravated when it operates in the sphere of religion:

in the religious world generally, an uneasy suspicion of knowledge and its results, of intellect and its cultivation, 'a mistrust not of any result of science, but of science itself, a disaffection not to this or that critical investigation, but to the inquiring mind,' 'a sentiment of jealousy towards intelligence, as something not wholly good in its nature' (Mark Pattison, *Sermons*, London, 1885, p. 188 f.; sermons vi. and vii. are both, in fact, directed against *obscurantism*).

Obscurantism, when it is wide-spread, commonly makes its appearance in a decadent state of society and under conditions favourable to the growth of professional or class exclusiveness. As thus considered, it is the vice of a select body which stands in no relation to the common conscience and the light of day.

The more exclusive the professional class becomes, the more separate, collectively, from the body of the Church, the more serious is this danger. Not even Christianity 'could have been preserved from moral dissolution but for the incessant revolt from beneath of the unsophisticated conscience of the multitudes. . . . It is an ominous symptom in a Church when it is content to look upon the masses in darkness, when it discourages every attempt to make their share in the common

¹ 'The revival of the sense of Truth was due to the secular philosophers of the seventeenth century—men like Bacon, Descartes, and Locke' (W. E. H. Lecky, *Spirit of Rationalism in Europe*, London, 1866, II. 400)—an overstatement, but one which is perhaps not surprising, having regard to the nature and extent of the effects produced (for a presentation of these in a popular form see Edith Sichel, *The Renaissance*, London, n.d.).

heritage accessible to them, when it sets itself to thwart upward movements' (J. Denney, 'The Dissolution of Religion,' in *Exp* v. iv. [1896] 265, 267 f.).

The forms which obscurantism assumes are many and various. Not unfrequently it endeavours to prevent the truth from coming to light by means of a studied ambiguity, resorting for this purpose to unmeaning phrases, undefined issues, and Rabbinical subtleties. Or, again, sometimes the obscurantist, taking advantage of the undoubted fact that 'the background of thought is . . . a mystery for all of us, a realm of things which even if known cannot be fully expressed' (H. M. Gwatkin, *The Knowledge of God*, Edinburgh, 1908, ii. 314), misrepresents this truth so as to make it serve for the purpose of excluding from the province of legitimate inquiry matters which, within limits, admit of investigation as likewise of intelligible explanation. Or, once more, a kindred distortion of the moral sense is evidenced by the unwholesome preference of obscurantists for that which is secondary and derivative as contrasted with that which is primary and fundamental, for the accretions and embellishments of truth as contrasted with the sources of its inspiration, for the peculiarities of practice and doctrine as contrasted with the obligations which are universally binding.

Thus, it was the complaint urged by his contemporaries against the prophet Isaiah that 'the general truths of spiritual religion' which he proclaimed were of the nature of 'common-place repetitions':—"precept upon precept, precept upon precept, line upon line, line upon line . . ." . . . the complaint of the hblers of Ephesus against S. John, the protest of all scholastic and pedantic systems against the freeness and the breadth of a Greater than John or Isaiah' (A. P. Stanley, *Lect. on the Hist. of the Jewish Church*, ed. London, 1889, ii. 335).

Lastly, this dislike of simplicity and of those common moralities which are always the soul of religion usually takes practical effect in the substitution of mechanism and authority for the seeing eye and sympathetic heart, the result being a gradually diminishing respect for truth and a total absence of enthusiasm on its behalf.

Obscurantism always sooner or later provokes a reaction, the presence of which makes itself felt sometimes negatively—e.g., in a sense of dissatisfaction and state of unrest—at other times in positive and constructive efforts such as the reconsideration of the standards of faith or the revision of formularies and Church government. The methods adopted by obscurantism for the purpose of suppressing such manifestations resemble those previously adopted by it for the purpose of preventing them from making their appearance.

Thus, 'what was meant innocently, though, perhaps, without due regard for the consequences,' is by the obscurantist represented as 'a conspiracy, a rebellion, an attempt to overthrow the faith' (ib. i. 195).

Or, it may be, the obscurantist canonizes the dead prophets whom his prototypes in the past persecuted, whilst living prophets are persecuted by himself.

But, though obscurantism is possessed of almost unlimited resources, and though its intensive power is only increased owing to its being compelled by the progressive tendencies of modern civilization to work beneath the surface, we may remember for our comfort, on the other hand, that the really notable thing that has been achieved during the last three centuries is not so much any addition which has been made to our knowledge, or any result of inventive skill or industrial effort, as rather the education of precisely those truth-loving propensities of human nature which are most likely to be of service in the struggle against obscurantist influences. Thus, what most counts now in religious inquiry, philanthropy, and physical science (to take only three examples) is the *spirit* which prevails in these spheres, and this spirit will

be found in each case to have been acquired as the result of an evolution by antagonism to such influences through long ages. There are, however, other more specific encouragements which we may likewise cherish—e.g., the love of publicity in the modern world, the growth of sympathy, the spread of democracy, the more critical spirit in which estimates and claims once taken for granted are now examined. These remedies have their value and are in their measure efficacious, but it should never be forgotten that obscurantism is due to a deliberate intention and cannot therefore be successfully combated merely by those agencies which are designed for the removal of error or ignorance.

LITERATURE.—The literature, involving, as it does, references to text-books on the reactionary movements in history and to miscellaneous works illustrative of the anti-progressive tendencies in human nature, is too comprehensive to be here summarized. More specific references which may be found useful (in addition to those mentioned in the article) are the following: Plato, *Phaedrus*, 272 to end, *Republic*, 382 ff. (and cf. *ὑποκρισόμενοι* in 400 E), *Laus*, 876; Thucydides, iii. 82; Abelard, *Introd. ad Theologiam* (*Opera*, ed. A. Duchesne, Paris, 1616, p. 1046 [on the depreciation of religious knowledge]); C. Werner, *Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters*, Vienna, 1831-87, ii.; A. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., London, 1894-99, vi. 161 (on the decline of scholasticism), vii. 108 (on Liguori); C. Beard, *Port Royal*, ed. 1873, vol. i. bk. ii. chs. ii., iv. f., vol. ii. bk. iii. ch. ii.; J. Tulloch, *Hist. of Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the 17th Century*, Edinburgh, 1872, i. 381.; C. J. Abhey and J. H. Overton, *The English Church in the 18th Century*, London, 1878, i. 297-300 (on the conditions which give rise to obscurantism); I. A. Dorner, *Hist. of Protestant Theology*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1871, ii. 77, 256; A. Plummer, 'Recollections of Dr. Dollinger,' in *Exp* iv. i. [1890] 274 f. (three admirable examples); B. Jowett, *Thessalonians, Galatians, Romans*, London, 1894, esp. 'Dissertation on Casuistry'; G. Tyrrell, *Medievalism*, London, 1905; G. Salmon, *Infallibility of the Church*, do.; and a great number of others, though by many who make use of the term it is understood merely in their own sense and is applied merely for their own point of view.

C. A. WHITTUCK.

OBSSESSIONS.—See **INSANITY**.

OCCASIONALISM.—Occasionalism, or the doctrine of occasional causes, is a theory which was propounded in the Cartesian school in order to explain the relation between soul and body. Pre-Cartesian (scholastic) philosophers had believed in a reciprocal causal relation between body and mind, a natural or physical interaction, consisting in the passage of substance from the one to the other (*influxus physicus*). But the extreme dualism of Descartes (1596-1650), according to which matter and mind were absolutely independent and disparate substances, rendered such an explanation impossible for himself. He believed in interaction, but was unable to explain it in terms of anything known. He could only regard it as a unique fact; and he left the problem which it implied without any satisfactory solution.

Here lay one of the most obvious weaknesses of the Cartesian system, and Descartes's followers were not slow in realizing it and endeavouring to remove it. Descartes himself had spoken of mind and matter as alike dependent on nothing but the 'ordinary co-operation' of God. This suggestion was seized by several of his disciples. Louis de la Forge declared the relation between body and soul to be explicable only on the supposition that they had been originally united by God. J. Clauberg (1622-65) denied that body could influence mind, though he did not deny the reverse action, and taught that bodily events are only the occasions, not the causes, of mental. G. de Cordemoy (1620-84), on the other hand, held that, without divine intervention, it is as impossible for the soul to receive new ideas as for the body to receive new motions: on the occasion of a bodily change God produces the corresponding 'idea' in the soul, and on the occasion of our willing God moves our limb. S. Régis (1632-1707), another Cartesian, reached

the inference that God is the only truly efficient cause.

These doctrines were developed and systematically formulated as a coherent theory by Arnold Geulincx (1623-69), a Cartesian of the Netherlands; he, therefore, is usually regarded as the founder of occasionalism. Geulincx held that self-activity cannot be unconscious; that one can do nothing without being conscious of how the action is performed; for whatever is produced from the mental substance must be produced clearly and distinctly. From this he deduced that the body is beyond control; we are only spectators of its motions; it is managed by the Deity. And, if mind cannot be conceived as working the body, much less can the material thing be capable of influencing the mental. Finite beings, then, are only occasions or instruments for the activity of God. The correspondence between the series of bodily movements and the series of volitions and ideas was illustrated by analogy with two clocks which keep time, not because the one affects the other, but because they are the work of one and the same maker. Such occasionalism does not, as is often supposed, imply the arbitrary intervention of a *Deus ex machina* or universal special providence. The correspondence between the bodily and the mental series is ruled by general laws ordained by God. The correlation is thus pre-established, not the result of perpetual isolated miracles. But Geulincx does not ground the concomitance and correspondence between the bodily and mental in the real nature of the material and spiritual substances; he recognizes immanent causality no more than transeunt.

In these respects Geulincx's theory is to be distinguished from Leibniz's (1646-1716) doctrine of pre-established harmony, with which it has much in common. Indeed, the Leibnizian doctrine grew out of, and was intended to replace, occasionalism. But, whereas the theory of Geulincx made the connexion between body and soul, and their concomitant phenomena, merely arbitrary, Leibniz's pre-established harmony was rational, in that each monad was supposed to unfold its series of states in an intelligible order.

The extreme development of occasionalism is to be found in Malebranche (1638-1715), whose *La Recherche de la vérité* appeared about nine years later than the *Ethica* of Geulincx. Occasionalism was first intended as a theory of the relation between body and soul, such as should obviate the necessity of asserting their interaction. Its application was extended, however, to causation in general, and it culminated in the denial of transeunt, or efficient, or, indeed, of any kind of secondary causes. In denying necessary connexion between two events which we relate as cause and effect, Malebranche foreshadowed part of Hume's doctrine. Further, Malebranche gives the doctrine an epistemological significance. Not only can mind and matter not interact; mind cannot even know matter. We 'see things in God'; i.e., apart from our connexion with Him and His activity upon us, we can neither perceive nor will. As God is the only cause, so is He the only source of all our knowledge. Matter is thus only the 'occasion' of our knowledge. Our knowledge of nature is fully explained by God's working in us. Logically, Malebranche should have abolished one of the 'substances' of Cartesian dualism or else have applied extension to the nature of God, as did Spinoza. It is interesting to see that Berkeley (1684-1753), who did take the former of these alternative steps, arrived by a different road at the main result of the occasionalists—that there is no secondary efficient causality. The 'occasional causes' of Geulincx and Malebranche are the equivalents of Berkeley's 'signs.' Had Geulincx

and Malebranche not been restrained from following out the latent consequences of their occasionalism by their devotion to the Christian religion, they would inevitably have been led on to Spinozism. Their theory supplied them with a regular and orderly world, with its necessary connexions. But these necessary connexions did not inhere in things; they inhered solely in the will of God. That the world is a cosmos, not a chaos, is due, for them, to the uniformity of God's will. This uniformity is merely postulated. Moreover, it is such that Malebranche can call it 'usual' only; he thus seeks an opening for miracle and divine personality. A little more rigour in logicity, and these premisses yield the conclusion of Spinozism.

The rise of occasionalism (a solution of causality on theistic lines) involved the emergence of 'the causal problem' (see CAUSE, CAUSALITY). The Cartesian school prepared the way for Hume. But, since the 17th cent., occasionalism has been of little more than historical interest.

LITERATURE.—R. Descartes, *Meditations*, tr. J. Veitch⁹, London, 1837, v. and vi., *Passions de l'Âme*, etc.; A. Geulincx, *Ethica*, 1665, p. 113, and *Metaph. vera*, 1691, i. 5-8; N. Malebranche, *Entretiens sur la métaph. et sur la religion* (dial. vii.), and *Recherche de la vérité*, v., vi., etc. (*Œuvres*, ed. J. Simon, Paris, 1842-53); G. V. 11-end; G. Berke *Hylas and Philono* Histories of Philosophy—e.g., A. H. Ritter (Eng. tr., Oxford, 1838-46), F. C. A. Schwegler (Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1867), F. Ueberweg (Eng. tr., London, 1885), J. E. Erdmann (Eng. tr., do. 1890), W. Windelband (Eng. tr., New York, 1893), H. Höfding (Eng. tr., London, 1900). For Clauberg see *Dict. des Sciences philos.*, par une société de professeurs de philos., Paris, 1844, i. 523. F. R. TENNANT.

OCCULTISM.—'Occultism' is a term of recent invention; it is unknown to most dictionaries. Popular use, however, is apparently tending to give it both a general and a special meaning. It purports generally to signify the doctrines, practices, and rites of things hidden and mysterious, and thus extends its meaning to cover the realms of magic and mystery, marvel and miracle of every kind; not only so, but it would further claim for itself authority in the well-nigh limitless regions of abnormal psychical phenomena, and even those of religious experience. It thus aspires to embrace so vast a field of such varied phenomena that it has all the appearance of being a vague generalization of no scientific value; and it seems highly improbable that it will maintain its own lofty claims against the popular hardening of its meaning into a more special sense. This popular restricted meaning associates occultism with the occult sciences and their study; the term should therefore be more particularly confined to the claim that there are really such sciences, and that the rumours of them are not due solely to the vivid imagination of the credulous or to the modern uncritical revival of superstitions from a pre-scientific age. The *OED* implies this when in such reference it gives 'occult' the signification 'of the nature of or pertaining to the ancient and mediæval reputed sciences (or their modern representatives) held to involve the knowledge or use of agencies of a secret or mysterious nature (as magic, alchemy, astrology, theosophy and the like).' The open verifiable human knowledge to which the name 'science' is reserved by general use has, as every one knows, gradually encroached upon the one-time private preserves of the artificially occult. It is not only that chemistry, e.g., has superseded alchemy, and astronomy astrology, so that the occultist, in defence of the ancient claims of these once reputed sciences, has to withdraw to psychic ground and the subjectivism of symbolism, but also that a whole world of psychical phenomena, some of which, consciously or unconsciously, formed

the main stock-in-trade of the magicians and psychic initiates of the past, are now being openly experimented with by scientific methods of observation and description. In the phenomena of hypnosis and suggestion, of abnormal psychology and psychical research, we are gradually acquiring a vast territory from the hitherto occult and mapping it out, and it is on this common ground of so-called 'borderland' science that the claims of occultism are being, and will continue to be, scientifically tested. The special meaning of 'occultism,' then, as found in current literature dealing with psychism and allied subjects, is the claim to knowledge of a scientific nature which is inaccessible to the accepted methods of positive objective scientific research.

That there are innumerable physical and psychical secrets of nature and man still to be discovered no one will deny; that there are phenomena which it is the habit of scientific men not to admit until compelled to do so those acquainted with the history of so-called mesmerism and of the opposition to the work of even organized psychical research will find little difficulty in acknowledging. But the claim of the occultist goes far beyond this; his claim is that the perfect science of all these matters not only already exists in the divine mind or even in the minds of superhuman intelligences, but that it is possessed actually here and now by certain perfected individuals of human lineage—that there already exists a secret science of nature and of man to which access can be gained only by the duly initiated. Occultism thus stakes its all on the claim of being science; it is neither religion nor religious mysticism, neither philosophy nor art. An occultist in any precise sense of the word is one who claims to be an initiated pupil of the adepts or secret holders and dispensers of this reputed precise, hidden knowledge of nature and of man.

There is, of course, nothing new in all this, except that the modern claims are vastly greater than those of antiquity and of the Middle Ages. In the past, in all ages and climes, there have been persistent rumours of secret knowledge and claims to the possession of secret powers. Indeed, secrecy was for long the general condition of all special knowledge. From the primitive magician and medicine-man onwards, manifold reports of secret societies and associations, of mystery-institutions, of initiation and adeptship, are recorded throughout the centuries. A generation ago it was supposed that positive science had put an end to all such pretensions and extravagances. But to-day we have a marked renaissance of these rumours and a widely-spreading interest in everything connected with the idea of initiation. In some circles claims that beggar the proudest boasts of the past are openly advanced; and it is asserted that the government of the world, if not of the universe, is in the hands of those who know the inner nature and secrets of the cosmos, and who constitute a hierarchy of ever loftier grades reaching even up to deity itself. These reputed perfected men claim to be the masters of inexhaustible sources of occult scientific knowledge attained by means of laboriously and carefully trained psychical and spiritual powers, the nature of the lowest of which may be deduced from a study of abnormal psychical phenomena and of the traditional systems of psychology and mental discipline in India and other Eastern lands.

The general tenor of the claims of occultism is thus seen to be that there is an indefinitely extensible domain of the secret science of inner things or of occult causation; that this knowledge is far more accurate and detailed than that of the open sciences of material and mental phenomena, which deal solely with normally accessible data and their inter-

relations and, therefore, at best with secondary causes; and that such knowledge may be acquired by definite methods of training and research under the direction of those who have been already initiated into these reputed mysteries. In the first place, we are asked to believe that there is a wealth of as yet profanely undiscovered physical facts which are already known to the adepts of occult science—facts which can and will be gradually discovered by the normal progress of open scientific research and its continually improving methods and instruments. In the second, we are told that these secrets are otherwise learned by the occultist, who holds that all physical facts and forces are mainly, if not exclusively, determined and ruled from within by means of psychical facts and forces. The immediate instruments of his science, he asserts, are therefore necessarily psychical—extensions by psychical intensification of the normal range of physical sensation and the development of new organs, or the actualizing of latent or potential organs and orders of sense, and of a great variety of psychic and mental powers.

The contention, therefore, is that the science of inner nature is not an arbitrary withholding of knowledge, but a natural secret, and necessarily so, because the means of research are not normally possessed by mankind. Open science is confined to accurate observation and description of phenomena by the normal powers of sense and mind, aided by delicate instruments of research perfected by human ingenuity to extend the range and correct the inaccuracy of the normal senses. The claim of occultism, on the contrary, is that the range of the senses can be enormously extended psychically, and so the imperfection and inaccuracies of the normal senses can be progressively corrected by the natural development of the powers of the human organism itself; and, as these are said to be indefinitely, if not infinitely, developable, the knowledge so acquired can, *ex hypothesi*, become more and more perfect, not only as to the superficial observation and cataloguing of physical facts, but also in the more immediate observation of mental and spiritual processes and realities. And, such being the conditions of research, it follows inevitably, it is said, that this order of science must necessarily be secret; for it can be proved and authenticated only by those and to those who are possessed of such powers. Thus, *e.g.*, with regard to purely physical phenomena, a man, it is claimed, can become, as it were, his own microscope and telescope psychically. It is further asserted that the range and accuracy of such psychical powers, when properly trained, can be so extended as to make the most powerful and delicate instruments known to physical science appear, in comparison, as crude and clumsy as the implements of the stone age alongside of a 15-in. gun or the most delicate chemical balance.

Occultism sharply distinguishes itself from mediumship or from passive sensitivity, as seen in the phenomena of spiritism or of hypnotism, suggestion and auto-suggestion, and, indeed, from any and every form of sporadic and uncontrolled automatism or psychical sensitivity or activity. There are, as all who have studied the subject are well aware, many cases of healthy natural sensitivity and also innumerable cases of abnormal sensitivity, of hyperæsthesia, anaesthesia, and telæsthesia due to disease or morbid and hysterical states. These are very probably indications of psychical capacities normally latent in all men and manifested in the case of such sensitives, subjects, and patients in an embryonic stage. The occultist claims that these latent capacities can be developed and made usable at will, so that they can be as fully controlled as, or even more so than, the normal powers of

sense and mind; that beyond these extensions there are other orders of powers and capacities, of which mediumship and other observable psychical phenomena can give no indication; that along this way there opens up a path of ascent to ever higher powers; and that these orders of powers are the keys which open the gates of progressive initiation into ever deeper or more exalted orders of knowledge. An initiate into even the lowest of the grades of occultism, it is claimed, is not a medium or hypnotic subject to be used by profane experimenters or even controlled by invisible intelligences, but always a self-conscious and self-controlled individual using his self-developed powers at will.

With regard to modern occultism, extravagant ancient pretensions of every sort and kind have been disinterred, not only from the accessible memory of the past, but also from what may be called the subconscious of history, and uncritically heaped together and embellished with all the glamour which the garish borrowed trappings of a modern scientific terminology can lend them. The modern occultist professes to bring into the field of the fully conscious, not only what the scientist regards as still in the unfocused marginal consciousness of present scientific observation, but also dim impressions from the foreconscious of ancestral memory and the mass impulses of general human subconsciousness. Claims which have been put forward for mysticism in the domain of religion are now advanced for occultism in the province of science. Now, the philosophical problems raised with regard to genuine mysticism are already of very great and grave importance.

To mention only one of them: Is religion in the best sense dependent on the possession of mystical gifts? In other words, Is mystical experience the test of spiritual achievement? Must the saint necessarily be a mystic? If so, it is evident that the non-mystic can never attain to the height of sanctity and the realization of spiritual verities. He is barred by his mystical incapacity, and not by his moral worth, from such an achievement. From this view both the common sense and the moral intuition of religion strongly dissent; and this is perhaps one of the main reasons why mysticism has been and still is regarded with suspicion by many sincerely religious minds. They ask, Is religion essentially spiritual, and therefore open to all who wholeheartedly turn to God and practise the commandments of the good law, or is it an art, such as painting, sculpture, or music, which depends upon natural talents quite apart from any moral qualification? The contention is that the man who lives a good life is nearer and dearer to God, and therefore more really than any other knows what is worth knowing. To live a good life, it is said, is open to all; it is a question of conversion of the will and not of the possession of any special powers of sense or understanding; it is not dependent on a special gift or talent other than that of the general grace of God. There is not a gift of goodness in the same sense that there are gifts of vision or of mathematical ability and the rest. Goodness belongs to another order of things; it belongs to the moral and therefore genuinely spiritual and divine order of realization. The powers of the spirit are the virtues. To this the defender of mysticism in a spiritual sense replies that the doing of the will is truly the pre-requisite of the knowing of the doctrine; but this knowing of the doctrine is a vital spiritual knowledge—so much so that to the doer of the will all things are added—and therefore the genuine mystics are not necessarily those possessed of a natural talent for mysticism from the start, but rather those who by living the spiritual religious life necessarily attain to a knowledge of spiritual verities, and spiritual verities are synthetic and naturally include all other orders of truth. Here goodness is set before knowledge, doing rightly before understanding correctly.

Science in the ordinary sense of the term, on the contrary, has no necessary connexion with goodness; a man may be an excellent chemist or mathematician, and at the same time live viciously. It is true that it is hoped by many that in proportion as science extends its conquests general ethics will improve; but there is little to show that this must necessarily be so; we may at any moment find ourselves involved in a period of scientific barbarism as the result of the extension of purely intellectual progress. Now, in so far as occultism claims to be possessed of scientific knowledge, it is evident that the possession of occult knowledge is no guarantee whatever of moral goodness; and

this is freely admitted in all the literature of the subject.

It is true that the natural instinct of mankind has ever been to keep secret any knowledge that it might possess in order to use it for its own advantage; but from the beginning the spirit of modern science has been opposed to secrecy. The test of its facts is that they can be openly verified. It has therefore been opposed to such antitheses as esoteric and exoteric, initiated and profane. The occultist retorts that he has not made the distinction, but finds it in nature. To this the scientist rejoins that, in proportion as open science has won territory from the occult, it has proved the emptiness of these claims. Our struggle is not only with nature, whose secrets we admit as something which patient research will gradually reveal, but also with unscientific human nature whose formerly professed 'secrets' we have scientifically proved to be in general arbitrary pretensions to real knowledge. The experience of history and the history of experience justify us in rejecting the division of mankind into the initiated and the profane in the traditional sense of these terms, and we refuse to believe that the men who have added to human knowledge by careful observation, by workable hypotheses and openly verifiable methods, are as if they knew nothing in comparison with initiates into the mysteries of a secret knowledge.

But, on the other hand, science has to be true to herself and to her highest ideals. Contemptuous denial of the very existence of so-called occult phenomena, and not only of the claims of the occultist about them, which till recently dismissed the whole subject as utterly unworthy of serious consideration, has at length had to be modified; and it is now recognized by a not inconsiderable number of open-minded scientific investigators that these exaggerated claims are due to the uncritical acceptance of a large mass of psychical phenomena which demand careful investigation. The work that has already been done points to such a wide extension of scientific research into hitherto obscure and unrecognized facts of consciousness and psycho-physical and psychical activity as to promise to future generations the possibility of getting to know the mind of man almost as intimately and precisely as the science of the present day knows the physical facts of nature. That, however, any but the most modest claims of the occultist will be justified is highly improbable; it is far more likely that his present secret science of mind, if he possesses one, will be found to involve as many crudities as ancient alchemy when compared with modern chemistry.

The battle must naturally be first fought out over such classes of psychical phenomena as are controllable and whose veridical nature is susceptible of definite proof or disproof—namely those dealing with verifiable facts which are beyond the range of normal sensation and outside the prior knowledge of all concerned. Take, e.g., clairvoyance and clairaudience, not simply visual and auditory hyperesthesia at short distances where acute normal sight or hearing might be held to afford sufficient explanation, but at long distances or through obstacles impenetrable to the most acute normal powers of sense. There is already a mass of evidence which has established the possibility of such genuine clairvoyance and clairaudience to the satisfaction of many careful observers as belonging to a class of phenomena entirely distinct from those subsumed under the much abused term 'telepathy,' which signifies the intercommunication between two or more minds under conditions which exclude all known physical connexion. A clairvoyant is supposed to see independently of any other mind. Here, then, for many investigators

there is a class of phenomena of immense importance for an extended science of mind. Such extensions of physical sense, however, are apparently sporadic, occasional, and beyond the control of the will. Yet on this limited basis of fact the occultist erects a vast structure of assertion. He asserts that by training it is possible to be clairvoyant and clairaudient at will; that all physical phenomena, no matter at what distance, can be deliberately investigated by the adept clairvoyant as immediately and minutely as the scientist can observe things within the normal range of vision or in his laboratory aided by the most delicate instruments. It is further asserted that there are modes of clairvoyance that go far beyond this and are incapable of objective proof for the profane. But with regard to this physical clairvoyance, at least within certain limits, we have a claim susceptible of definite proof or disproof, phenomena that can be controlled by methods of scientific research open to every careful observer. So far, however, scientific psychical research has had to be content with cases of telepathy and clairvoyance that are of the 'hit and miss' variety, the least successful results, indeed, being attained when deliberate experiments have been attempted. Nevertheless, if clairvoyance of even the limited nature referred to above is a fact—and it seems to be so—reason also leads us to believe that the possibility is open for clairvoyance extending beyond the earth and its atmosphere; but an open-minded admission of possibility is a very different thing from proved fact. The evidence required for the proof of extra-terrestrial clairvoyance must be ample and, above all, consistent; and no item of evidence has so far been brought into court, nor, indeed, has any attempt been made to adduce it.

So, too, with regard to the phenomena of psychometry, as it is called, where a series of impressions, representations, or pictures is subjectively felt by or presented to a sensitive from contact with a physical object, such, *e.g.*, as a letter or a piece of worked or natural metal or stone, with which the subject has never had previous contact. Sometimes these impressions or pictures can be proved to be fairly accurate, and in some cases astonishingly so. Here we have another class of psychical phenomena which deserves the most searching investigation of science. But here also the occultist avers, not only that the whole past history of the successive environments of any physical object—say, *e.g.*, a celt from the stone age—can be accurately read in subjective picturings by the trained possessor of this psychometric capacity, but also that such limited psychometry is a very small thing for the occultist, and simply one of the many indications that there is an objective world-memory, or what he would call the etheric record, of everything that has ever happened; also that this memory of inner nature is accessible at will to the trained occultist, who can thus check and correct all history and supplement it indefinitely right back to the very beginning of things.

The phenomena of clairvoyance and psychometry that fall within the region of controllable physical fact are susceptible of exact research and form part of the subject-matter of scientific psychical investigation; but modern occultism lays claim to far more extended powers of physical vision than these. It claims, *e.g.*, to be able at will to analyze the theoretical units of matter, whether atoms or electrons. By the use of this extended power of sight, it is asserted, an atom can be magnified to any extent, and analyzed, not only into a system of electrons, but into successively extended complexities of contents far beyond its electronic constitution. Though, of course, in the nature of the

case there is no direct means of controlling such statements, they can be indirectly dealt with; for, precisely because the assertions of what is called 'occult chemistry' agree more or less with the general data of recent scientific hypotheses, there is more than a suspicion that such statements are constructs of the imagination of natural visualizers, conditioned by what is already the common knowledge of every student of chemistry and physics. If, however, it were a fact that a number of clairvoyant occultists, independently of one another, had arrived at the same results, then there would be an intensely interesting problem to consider. But at present there is no evidence of such genuinely independent experiments having been attempted; though such claims have been made, they have been found on investigation to depend on the 'clairvoyant observation' of two or three at most, and in every case the two or three were together and not isolated, and the investigation was determined by the predominant psychism of one individual. What, moreover, the makers of such claims do not explain is that not a syllable of such notions was breathed by occultists before science had announced its facts and enunciated its hypotheses.

Again, with regard to the phenomena of modern spiritism that depend on mediumship, and are believed by convinced spiritists to be determined by invisible intelligences—and those, too, for the most part incarnate human beings—occultism admits the phenomena and the existence of the spirits, but it deprecates mediumship and professes to be able to communicate at will directly with the invisible world and its inhabitants. The method that occultism advocates—and, if it is based on fact, few will deny that it is to be commended as preferable—is not to bring the dead back to earthly conditions, but for the living to develop the power of consciously entering into the state of the departed in order to establish communication with them. These mediumistic phenomena are common ground, not only for the spiritist and occultist, but also for the student of abnormal psychology and psychical research.

With regard to the 'powers' which it is the main object of the occultist to develop, there is an enormous field of research in the literature and traditions of the East, as well as of Western antiquity and mediævalism, that has so far scarcely at all engaged the attention of modern scientific inquiry. It is a slight acquaintance with this vast literature and with some of the many practices recorded in it that has suggested and encouraged most of the occult claims. Accordingly, occultists are confident that, before their claims can be disposed of, the psychical science of the West will have to reckon with these Eastern traditions, which consistently aver that the various abnormal capacities now definitely proved by the modern study of psychical phenomena to be possessed in some degree by certain hypersensitive individuals have been not only known in the Orient for many generations, but also in some circles systematically developed and studied. This is more or less historically true, and, whether or not the occultists themselves who make the claims will ever be thought worthy of serious scientific attention, one of the chief psychological tasks of the future will, in all likelihood, have to be a methodical re-investigation on scientific lines of these accomplishments of Eastern genius, with a view to seeing what objective truth and utility they possess; and then, indeed, it may possibly be found that by this revision and re-experimentation a science of mind will gradually be built up that will be a worthy counterpart and complement to those high achievements of physical science

which have indubitably inaugurated a new age of genuine knowledge such as the world had not previously dreamed of. Whether the mental science of the future will as far surpass the psychical knowledge of the past, including what is best in Eastern and especially Indian tradition, as our present-day physical science transcends the fondest dreams of the ancients is upon the knees of the gods. But there seems no sufficient reason to doubt that, as the West is at last beginning to take an interest in the world-old problem of 'self-knowledge,' its energy and industry and the fearlessness of its open research will carry it far into the region of the hitherto unknown in its pursuit of objective truth. And the further it goes the more will occultism be driven to seek refuge in the pure subjectivism of personal psychism and the boundless realms of the uncriticized imagination. This much virtue, however, will have to be allowed it, that in the welter of its extravagant claims it has advertised the existence of some things at least that undoubtedly deserve the most serious attention and careful investigation of the best trained minds that we possess.

LITERATURE.—The literature is copious and of an exceedingly diversified character. Among special books on the subject are the following: A. Besant, *Essays and Addresses*, iii., 'Evolution and Occultism,' London, 1913; *Occultism, Semi-Occultism, and Pseudo-Occultism*, do. 1899; *Cambridge Encyclopedia of Esoteric Subjects*, New York, 1903-05; J. H. Dewey, *New Testament Occultism*, do. 1895; J. W. Frings, *The Occult Arts*, London, 1913; D. P. Hatch, *Scientific Occultism*, Los Angeles, 1905; L. Jacolliot, *Occult Science in India and among the Ancients*, New York, 1900; K. Kiesewetter, *Der Occultismus des Alterthums*, Leipzig, 1896, *Gesch. des modernen Occultismus*, Berlin, 1889; A. Lang, *Magic and Religion*, London, 1901; C. W. Leadbeater, *Some Glimpses of Occultism, Ancient and Modern*, Chicago, 1903; F. Lenormant, *Les Sciences occultes en Asie*, Paris, 1874; J. P. Migne, *Encyclopédie théologique*, Paris, 1844-06, 1st ser., vols. 48 and 49 ('Sciences occultes'); E. O'Donnell, *Ghostly Phenomena*, London, 1910; 'Papus' (G. Encausse), *L'Occultisme*, Paris, 1902, *Traité élémentaire de science occulte*, do. 1903, *Qu'est-ce que l'occultisme?*, do. 1905; E. B. Salverte, *Des Sciences occultes*, do. 1850; 'Sephariel,' *A Manual of Occultism*, London, 1910; A. P. Sinnett, *The Occult World*, do. 1881, *Occult Essays*, New York, 1906; J. B. Tissandier, *Des Sciences occultes et du spiritisme*, Paris, 1866; A. E. Waite, *The Occult Sciences*, London, 1891; B. Wilson, *Occultism and Common Sense*, do. 1903. Some aspects of the subject will be found treated under CHARMs AND AMULETS, CRYSTAL-GAZING, DEMONS AND SPIRITS, DIVINATION, HYPNOTISM, MAGIO, PSYCHICAL RESEARCH, SPIRITISM, THEOSOPHY.

G. R. S. MEAD.

OCEANIA.—See AUSTRALASIA, MELANESIA, POLYNESIA.

ODDFELLOWS.—During the first half of the 18th cent. the popularity of Freemasonry led to the establishment of similar secret societies, partly convivial and partly charitable. R. W. Moffrey, who is a past Grand Master of the Manchester Unity of Oddfellows and writes with authority, suggests that, while the Masonic Order was founded on the traditions of the craft-gild of the masons, there were other crafts which were not strong enough to establish an order of their own, and that a combination of these crafts formed themselves into an order, and adopted the title of 'Oddfellows' (*Oddfellows' Magazine*, Sept. 1888, and *A Century of Oddfellowship*, p. 16). Spry (*Hist. of Oddfellowship*) gives minutes of a meeting of a 'lodge,' no. 9 of the Order of Oddfellows, dated 12th March 1748, from which it would seem that eight previous lodges had been established before that date. A quotation by the same authority of a supposed reference to Oddfellows' lodges as social institutions in the *Gentleman's Magazine* for 1745 has not been verified, and is thought to be erroneous. The Freemasons secured as members several noblemen and gentlemen of the best rank, and along that line their evolution proceeded. The Oddfellows had more self-reliance or less success in attracting patronage, and hence

their evolution has proceeded along lines which have led to their developing into a number of large Friendly Societies (*q.v.*), one of which is now the greatest Friendly Society in the world. Some Oddfellows are not contented with this plain story of their origin, and claim that their order was founded in A.D. 55, in the reign of Nero, and that the title of 'Oddfellows' was bestowed upon it by Titus. An Ancient Order of Oddfellows and a Patriotic Order of Oddfellows existed in the 18th cent., and appear to have become part of the Grand United Order, which may thus probably be entitled to be considered the oldest order of Oddfellows in existence. The ritual of the Patriotic Order of Oddfellows describes the proceedings at the initiation of a member.

Every brother present wore a mask, and the presiding officer a long white band and wig, and an apron of white leather bound in scarlet. The candidate for membership was led into the lodge-room carefully blindfolded. After an interval of absolute silence, he was ordered to stand, and noises were made by rattling heavy chains and otherwise. He was then tumbled in among brushwood, or soured over the head in a large tub. On the bandage being suddenly removed, he found a person presenting a sword at his breast. He was then shown a transparency representing a skeleton, and a charge was delivered to him (J. F. Wilkinson, *Mutual Thrift*, p. 14).

The practice of all these absurdities indicates that the main function of these lodges was conviviality, and the incidental application of funds to benevolent purposes continued until the early part of the 19th cent., when lodges began to be established promising definite allowances in sickness in return for fixed contributions. At first the conditions under which benefits were assured were framed without any real knowledge of the nature and extent of the burden which the lodges were undertaking. The contributions were not graduated according to age, and the benefits promised were the same for every member, whatever his age at entry may have been. In this respect the lodges were in the same condition of ignorance as the early life assurance companies, which insured every person at a 'flat rate' of £5 per cent. The history of Oddfellowship after that early day has been one of steady and continuous improvement. Moffrey (*Century*, p. 18) fixes the year 1810 as that in which the Manchester Unity of Oddfellows started, though it was not till 1814 that the minutes of its Grand Committees began to be printed. These bodies, which afterwards became the Annual Moveable Committees and ultimately the Annual Moveable Conferences, have been the principal organs of the successive reforms that have taken place. In 1815 it was resolved that each lodge should relieve its own sick (*ib.* p. 22) and that every member should subscribe one shilling towards a funeral fund in the hands of the Grand Master of the order. Gradually the system of districts grew up, as intermediaries between the lodges and the order. In 1825 returns of the number of members were called for from each lodge, for the purpose of seeing whether the order in general was in a state of prosperity or not (*ib.* p. 29). At that time, however, 'the bond of union with the Order was frail.' In 1827 the Board of Directors was established. In 1828 a graduated scale of initiation fees was adopted, and it was resolved that no person should be initiated above 45 years of age. In 1844 an annual financial statement was required from every lodge, and graduated tables of contributions prepared by G. Davies, an eminent actuary, were circulated. As the returns of lodges showed many irregularities, a first step towards financial improvement was taken in 1845 by an arrangement that separate funds should be provided for management and other expenscs. In 1850 Henry Ratcliffe, the secretary of the order, published his *Observations on the Rate of Mortality and Sickness*, derived

from the returns of the lodges, and in 1853 a system of graduated contributions according to age at admission was adopted. In 1864 tables founded upon Ratchliffe's observations were accepted, and in 1867 it was unanimously resolved that these tables, and others that the directors might certify to be equivalent, should be made part of the general rules of the order, and adopted in its several districts. In 1871 it was resolved that every lodge in the Unity should be valued and the results tabulated and laid before the society. It was also resolved that every lodge should be registered under the Friendly Societies Acts. By the Act of 1875 the valuations upon which the order had insisted for its lodges in 1871 were made obligatory on all Friendly Societies, and returns of them were required to be made to the registrar. In 1879 R. Watson was appointed actuary to the order, to supervise these valuations. In 1882 a Unity Superannuation Fund was established. In 1884 the practice of raising funeral funds by an equal levy was abolished. In 1890 the central fund required by the Act of 1875 to be raised in every order was so organized as to provide relief to lodges in distressed circumstances. In 1891 it was resolved that that relief might take the form of guaranteeing by the Unity the funeral benefits. In 1893 branches to consist of female members were authorized, but they were not fully recognized until 1898. In 1895 the rules relating to secession were revised and made more stringent, so as to provide that a seceding lodge with a surplus should contribute towards any deficiency which might exist in the funds of the district to which it had belonged. In 1909 it was resolved that no lodge having surplus capital should be allowed to appropriate that surplus to the benefit of its own members without setting aside at least 5 per cent of the amount for the relief of other lodges having a deficiency. By the voluntary efforts of this great order there had been built up an organization which had gradually been improved and rendered more stable, until it might have been thought that the goal of absolute solvency in every branch and a federal guarantee of the benefits of all the branches by the Unity were within sight, when in 1911 the Legislature intervened and, by the passing of the National Health Insurance Act, substituted for the voluntary principle, which had been so fruitful in good results, a system of compulsory insurance. It will be convenient, therefore, to review the position of Oddfellows' societies, in the first instance, as they were before the passing of that Act, and then to consider the influence which that Act is likely to have on their voluntary work.

The position of Friendly Societies generally before the introduction of national insurance is shown in the report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies for the year ending 31st Dec. 1906 (*Parliamentary Papers* of session 1907, no. 49, xi. pp. 16-81). If we extract from that report the details relating to Societies of Oddfellows, it appears that there were 46 orders of Oddfellows then in existence, but 10 of them had only a single branch, and are therefore hardly qualified to be recognized as orders. Others had only a small number of members. These orders had 6990 branches and, on the average of the whole, each branch had 148 members, the total membership being 1,035,785. The income of the benefit funds was £1,703,674, or £1 12s. 11d. per member, and the payments out of those funds aggregated £1,307,814, which was equivalent to £1 5s. 3d. per head. The difference between the income and the payments was £395,860. This went to increase the total assets, which amounted to £12,483,004, or on the average to £12 1s. per

member, or to 7½ years' income of the benefit funds.

In many respects the Oddfellows compare favourably with other orders, in which the number of members of each branch was 122 only, the income of the benefit funds £1 6s. 8d. per member, the payments out of those funds £1 1s. per member, and the total assets £7 0s. 6d. per member, or 5½ years' income of the benefit funds, and also, with the societies not having branches, in which the income from benefit funds was £1 0s. 8d. per member, the payments out of those funds 17s. 10d. per member, and the total assets £5 12s. 5d. per member, or 5½ years' income of the benefit funds. So great, however, is the variety of the benefits assured by different societies that these figures are not in all respects comparable. Among the Oddfellows' societies the Manchester Unity far out-distanced every other, having 60 per cent of the total number of lodges, 73 per cent of the members, 80 per cent of the benefit income, 77 per cent of the benefit payments, and 88 per cent of the accumulated funds of all the orders of Oddfellows. Each of its lodges had on the average 180 members; the income of the benefit funds was £1 16s. per member, the payments out of them £1 6s. 7d., the total assets £14 10s. per member, or 8 years' income of the benefit funds. In every respect, therefore, it had the advantage over other societies. Six other orders of Oddfellows had each more than 100 lodges and more than 10,000 members and £10,000 income with assets ranging from £50,000 to nearly £500,000. The rest were very small in comparison. Manchester is the seat not only of the Manchester Unity, but of the next two largest orders in succession—the Grand United Order of Oddfellows and the National Independent Order of Oddfellows.

A comparison of the Chief Registrar's return for 1906, so far as regards the orders of Oddfellows, with a similar return for five years earlier shows an increase of 52,865 in the number of members, of £41,721 in the surplus benefit income of the year, and of £2,317,343 in the total assets. These increases appear to have taken place in the smaller orders as well as in the Manchester Unity, and support the inference that under the voluntary system there had been a gradual improvement going on among all the societies of Oddfellows which went far to justify them in their instinctive resistance to any proposal of State control or State interference with the working of Friendly Societies. It had been the wise policy from the first of the various Acts of Parliament dealing with Friendly Societies to respect and maintain this freedom of action in many matters which in other countries would be regulated by authority.

With regard to the position of Oddfellows' societies as affected by the National Insurance Act, 1911, reference may be made to statements by Sir Alfred W. Watson, the actuary to the Insurance Commissioners, who was formerly actuary to the Manchester Unity. The principal orders of Oddfellows have become 'approved Societies' under that Act.

'Parliament, in incorporating the Friendly Societies in the new work of National Insurance, did not intend to interfere with their private enterprises. It might happen, in the course of years, that a great deal of what would have been private enterprise of the Societies would come to be State business; and, therefore, in the course of time, the complete liberty which the Societies enjoyed would extend, proportionately, to a smaller part of their affairs than it did at present. But with regard to the voluntary business of the Societies, whether obtained before or after the passing of the Insurance Act, they were left with almost the same amount of unfettered freedom as they possessed before the Insurance Act was passed. The rules which the Societies must make to the satisfaction of the Insurance Commissioners mean the rules for the transaction of their business under the Act. For the transaction of their voluntary business they might make any rules they pleased.

and the Commissioners had practically no concern with those rules. So far as the valuations of the Societies outside the Act were concerned, that is, the valuations of their voluntary funds, they made those valuations at the same time and in the same way as they previously made them. They employed whom they liked, and they had absolute freedom to act or not to act upon the advice which the valuer tendered to them. Each Society under the Act was valued as though it were an absolutely independent unit. If, however, it had fewer than 5000 members and it had a surplus, one-third of that surplus was carried to the county pool, the other two-thirds being absolutely its own for its disposal in its own way, subject to the provisions of the Act and the sanction of the Commissioners. The object of that transference of surplus was to enable the pool to make good the deficiencies in other Societies connected with the pool, up to a limit, in the normal case, of three-fourths of the deficiency; so that the pooling referred to was only intended to correct the fluctuations due to a limited membership. The separation of accounts as between male and female members was only partial. If the rules of a Society enabled or required the contributions of men and women to be paid into the same fund, no separate account keeping was called for. Under Section 72 of the Insurance Act every registered Friendly Society which provided benefits similar to those of the Act . . . had to make a scheme dealing with the contributions and benefits of its members on the voluntary side. But Parliament had been so careful to refrain from interfering with the private contracts of Societies and their members, that it had laid it down that the scheme might provide for the continuance of the existing contributions and benefits; it might provide, in fact, for the reduction of the contributions and benefits, or for their continuance, as the Society determined. The primary purpose of the insistence on a scheme was, therefore, to bring home to the members the fact that a change had taken place, and that National Insurance extended to the majority of them; and to cause them to apply their minds to the problem whether their Friendly Society should continue to maintain its old contracts to their full extent, or whether it was desirable that some modification should be made. The whole thing was in the hands of the Society, and it was a matter of great interest, and to some a matter of great surprise, that the vast majority of the Societies had allowed their members to determine for themselves whether they would continue their old contracts or accept a reduction of contributions and benefits on the private side. The great majority of the members, certainly as many as 80 per cent., taking all Societies together, had decided that they would continue their old contracts. The result was that, in respect of several millions of people, from 1912 onwards the contribution of each person for provident purposes was increased by about 3d. a week, not 4d., the insured person's share of the contribution under the Insurance Act, because a person did not require two doctors, and generally the members had reduced their contribution by a penny a week, which was about the sum they used to pay to the doctor. But in the case of several million people, the contributions had been increased since 1912 by 3d. a week, and the sickness benefit by 10s. a week. As a consequence, an enormous number of people were now insured for amounts which approximated far more closely to their wages than anything which previously had been regarded as practicable in sickness insurance. That fact might be connected with the large increase in the rate of sickness which several Friendly Societies had reported since 1913. It was an interesting circumstance that rather than reduce their contracts in their private Friendly Societies, the vast majority of people who had entered into Friendly Society membership had elected to take the obligations of the Insurance Act, and get the benefits of the Insurance Act, in addition to their previously existing arrangements with their Societies. When regard to the Manchester Unity of Oddfellows, the largest of them, it was an indication of the extent to which progress was being made, that, although in 1900 the Society had a balance of assets and liabilities, the valuation showing an equality of surpluses and deficiencies, the Society in 1905 had a surplus of nearly half a million. In 1911, when it had taken courage, and had resolved to be valued on a modern basis obtained from its own experience, a decision which added many hundreds of thousands of pounds to the estimate of its liabilities, the valuation showed again an almost exact balance of assets and liabilities. Making due allowances for the change of valuation basis, this meant that that Society was not only solvent on the strongest test that had ever been applied to any Friendly Society, but that it had made great progress during the preceding five years, as it was shown to have done during the five years before that' (*Journ. Royal Statistical Society*, lxxviii. 433-438).

Reference may also be made to the answer to Sir Alfred W. Watson's statements made on the same occasion by the writer of this article (*ib.* pp. 443-445), who takes a less hopeful view of the probable effect of the Act on the voluntary work of the societies.

With regard to the relation of Oddfellows' societies to the European war, it was estimated in 1915 that more than 100,000 members of the Manchester Unity were in the fighting line or in training. At an early stage the Annual Conference

decided to pay the contributions of members on active service, but it was probably not then contemplated how numerous they would be or how heavy would be the burden thus assumed. In 1915 a further step was taken by the establishment of a War Mutual Liability Fund of the order for the purpose of assisting lodges to meet their liabilities in respect of members serving as soldiers or sailors. This fund is to be supported by a levy upon every lodge in proportion to the number of its members. As one obvious result of the war will be to increase the burden upon the lodges arising from sickness, disability, and death, the foresight with which the Oddfellows have determined to spread that burden over their whole Unity is much to be commended.

LITERATURE.—R. W. Mofrey, *Rise and Progress of the Manchester Unity*, Manchester, 1905, *A Century of Oddfellowship*, do. 1910; J. Spry, *Hist. of Oddfellowship*, London, 1867; J. F. Wilkinson, *Mutual Thrift*, do. 1891; F. G. P. Nelson, *Contributions to Vital Statistics*, do. 1857; H. Ratcliffe, *Observations on the Rate of Mortality and Sickness*, Colchester, 1850, 1852, 1861; C. Hardwick, *Hist. of Friendly Societies*, London, 1859; *Oddfellows' Magazine*, *passim*; Quarterly Reports of the Manchester Unity, *passim*; Reports of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, *passim*; Reports of the Royal Commission on Friendly Societies, 1870-74; *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, xxxviii. [1875], xlviil [1885], lviii. [1895], lxxviii. [1905], lxxviii. [1915]; E. W. Brabrook, *Provident Societies and Industrial Welfare*, London, 1898, *Institutions for Thrift*, do. 1905. E. BRABROOK.

OFFERINGS.—See SACRIFICE.

OFFICE, THE HOLY.—This name, which is now the formal title of the Roman Congregation created in the 16th cent. to watch over the purity of the faith, seems to be due to the former technical association of the word *officium* with the function of detecting and repressing heresy. In the ecclesiastical courts causes of 'instance' were opposed to causes of 'office,' the former consisting of actions for the recovery of legal rights, the latter of proceedings by way of accusation, denunciation, or inquisition. Roughly speaking, therefore, the word 'office' was used specially in connexion with the criminal, as opposed to the civil, jurisdiction of an ecclesiastical judge. In any case there is no doubt that the phrase '*officium inquisitionis haereticae pravitatis*' had become stereotyped among the canonists long before the close of the 15th century. Torquemada, the first Inquisitor General of Spain (1483-98), was himself accustomed, if we may trust the text of his *Instructions* printed in 1576, to refer compendiously to the tribunal over which he presided as *El Sancto Oficio* without any further addition.

In tracing the history of the name one may remark how Sixtus iv., in a bull of 1484, directs that any Spanish bishop who might be of Jewish descent was not to act himself, but to be represented by an *officialis*, in all those matters 'quae Inquisitionis haereticae pravitatis officium concernunt' (see F. Fita, in *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia*, Madrid, xv. 475, and cf. pp. 476, 477, 478, etc.). Both the name '*officialis*' as applied to the chief legal functionary who represented a bishop (the judge of the Arches Court of Canterbury is to this day designated '*Official Principal*' in the patent by which he is appointed) and the oath *ex officio*, only abolished in England by statute in 1640 (16 Carol. i. c. 11), probably find their explanation in this technical meaning of the word '*office*.' Cf. some of the decretals of Innocent iii. in the *Corpus Juris*, c. 31, X. v. 3 and c. 10, X. v. 34, also one of Clement iv. (1265) in the *Sext.*, cc. 10 and 11, in *VI^o v. 2*.

The medieval procedure employed in the detection of heretical pravity having been dealt with in the art. INQUISITION, it remains to treat of the later developments of the same movement commonly known as the Spanish Inquisition and the Roman Congregation of the Holy Office.

1. The Spanish Inquisition.—(*a*) *History*.—When Spain under the rule of Ferdinand and Isabella became in a sense one kingdom, conditions prevailed which seemed to demand exceptional legislation. All through the 12th and 13th cen-

tures the large Jewish population of the peninsula had grown in numbers and importance. On their part usurious practices and a certain love of display, on the part of their enemies envy and such wicked calumnies as the ritual murder charge, had helped to keep alive the blind religious prejudices of the Christians, which every now and then were fanned into a flame by some fanatical preacher. A particularly violent outburst of anti-Semitic hatred took place in 1390-91. Vast numbers of the Jews, whom prosperity had probably robbed of their staunchness, were cowed into seeking baptism, and many more were won over a few years later by the extraordinary eloquence of the Dominican St. Vincent Ferrer. But, as a body, these converts, known to their Jewish fellow-countrymen as Marranos (a word which also means 'swine'), were inconstant and at best only half-hearted. In many cases they still maintained in secret the practices distinctive of their race.

'The insincerity of the conversion of a large portion of the Marranos was incontestable' (Lea, *Inquisition in Spain*, i. 150).

This constituted a danger alike to Church and State, the more so that the highest offices in both were frequently filled by men of Jewish descent. There is evidence that Pope Sixtus IV. suggested the introduction of an organized inquisition in 1474, proposing N. Franco, who was then acting as papal legate, for inquisitor. But Ferdinand had no wish to sanction an institution which would be almost entirely controlled by the Holy See. He wanted an inquisition of his own, and after some negotiation a bull was procured from Sixtus in 1478 which empowered the sovereigns to nominate either two or three inquisitors who should be men over forty, of blameless life, and of attested learning (the bull is printed by Fita, *Boletín*, xv. 450 f.). A beginning was made at Seville, where 'Judaizing,' i.e. relapse into Jewish practices, was believed to be most rife, in Dec. 1480. Here from the outset the two Dominican inquisitors conducted the proceedings with a ferocity which outraged all the conventions prescribed even by the common (ecclesiastical) law of those days to secure justice for the accused. Complaint was made to Rome, and Sixtus remonstrated with vigour in letters addressed to the sovereigns. Dollinger (*Kleinere Schriften*, p. 330 f.) has mocked at the vacillations of this intervention, but it is a fact that the pope did intervene and that as a consequence the grosser forms of abuse seem to have been checked, while substantial changes were made in the whole organization (see Grisar, *ZKT* iii. 561-563). On the other hand, Sixtus undoubtedly sanctioned soon afterwards the extension of inquisitorial proceedings to Aragon, Catalonia, Valencia, and Majorca. There were disputes over the question of the appeals which the victims of the tribunals of the Holy Office addressed to Rome in great numbers, but some sort of final settlement was arrived at by the appointment of the Dominican Thomas de Torquemada, formerly Isabella's confessor, a man of mortified life and strong religious convictions, however fanatical his zeal, to the newly-created office of Inquisitor General. Torquemada's personal austerity is admitted even by such writers as Llorente and Sabatini. Under Torquemada a code of *Instructions* was issued which secured uniformity of practice in the tribunals of the Holy Office, and the institution was extended to the whole of Spain. There can be no doubt that in these early years the proceedings against the unfortunate Judaizers were of frightful severity. A great deal of Llorente's partisan history has been controverted, and the documents from which he worked, notably those connected with the Inquisition of Seville, have

been destroyed, but there are plenty of materials surviving which leave room for no illusions as to the merciless character of the whole organization. The account given by Sebastian de Orozco, a contemporary and eye-witness, of the proceedings of the Inquisition of Toledo from 1485 to the end of the century has been printed entire by Fita (*Boletín*, xi. 296 ff.). On an average some twenty relapsed Judaizers were annually burned at Toledo in those early years, and many thousands were penanced, though even this savagery does not quite bear out the exaggerated pictures of blood-thirstiness drawn by such writers as Amador de los Rios or W. H. Rule. The Toledo tribunal supplanted one that had been previously established at Villa Real (the modern Ciudad Real), but this and Seville were only two out of eight or ten great centres of inquisitorial activity which the ample powers accorded to Torquemada enabled him to set up. There were others at Cordova, Murcia, Llerena, Jaen, Saragossa, Valencia, Barcelona, Majorca, etc., and their sphere of action was continually extending. It may be said that the earlier history of the Spanish Inquisition culminated in the expulsion of the Jews, first from Andalusia and then in 1492 from the whole of Spain. This expulsion was, of course, a political measure carried out by the sovereigns and the Cortes, but undoubtedly their action had been much influenced by Torquemada and by the famous inquisition process following upon the supposed ritual murder of a child afterwards venerated as El santo Niño de la Guardia. It is noteworthy that even so severe a critic of the Holy Office as R. Sabatini (*Torquemada*, pp. 271-355) finds it impossible, after an elaborate study of the documents of the process, to arrive at any satisfactory explanation of this mysterious murder. He admits the fact that the child was put to death, and he acquits Torquemada of any foul play or forgery of documents, thus rejecting the solution of such Jewish apologists as M. Loeb (*REJ* xv. [1887] 203-232). The original depositions from the Inquisition records have been printed by Fita (*Boletín*, xi. 7-160). Anti-Jewish feeling undoubtedly ran very high at this period, and economic conditions, as may be inferred from the terms of the *Pragmatica* published by the sovereigns on 30th March 1492, largely contributed to it. Nor was this hatred of the Jews confined to Spain or to the adherents of the papacy. Luther, at any rate in his later years, held anti-Jewish views quite as uncompromising as those of Torquemada.

'Their synagogues,' he declared, 'ought to be razed to the ground, their houses destroyed, their books, including the Talmud and even the Old Testament, taken from them and their rabbis compelled to earn their bread by hard labour' (see *JE*, s.v. 'Luther,' where full references are given).

Partly perhaps as a result of the expulsion which must have cowed the Marranos and weakened Jewish influences, the violence of the inquisitorial persecution declined during the first quarter of the 16th century. Cardinal Ximenez, who was Grand Inquisitor of Castille from 1507 to 1517, was by nature humane and just, so that he is commended for many things even by Llorente, notably for his prosecution of the iniquitous inquisitor Lucero. So, again, in reference to the successor of Ximenez E. Armstrong remarks:

'Hitherto under the influence of Adrian of Utrecht the Holy Office had shown singular moderation towards the Moorish or Morisco population. The King had given up the proceeds of confiscation to build churches for the converts, the term within which relapsed heretics might be reconciled to the Church was extended, the obligation of wearing the *sanbenito* after public abjuration was no longer imposed' (*The Emperor Charles V.*, new ed., London, 1910, i. 100).

There can be no doubt also that during all this period considerable influence was exercised by the Holy See in restraining the excesses of the inquisi-

tors. Alexander VI., Julius II., Leo X., and Clement VII. all at different times found themselves in conflict with the officials of the Spanish Holy Office. The history of the introduction of the Inquisition into Portugal, which after six years of negotiation was only brought about under Paul III. in 1536, is particularly significant. All the delay was caused practically by the limitations imposed by the papacy with the view of obtaining more merciful treatment for the new Christians, who, as the victims themselves protested, had been converted by force from the Judaism or Muhammadanism which they formerly professed.

From about the middle of the reign of Charles V. there was a change in the main direction of the activities of the Holy Office. Spain, and especially certain districts on the east coast, had not altogether escaped the influence of the new learning. In some places the doctrines of the Reformers were discussed and secretly propagated, while elsewhere the religious unrest of men's minds found expression in extravagant forms of mysticism. It may be said, then, that during the greater part of the 16th cent. it was the Protestants and *alumbrados* ('illuminated'), rather than the converted Jews and Moors, who principally attracted the attention of the Inquisition. Both St. Ignatius Loyola and St. Theresa in their different periods fell under suspicion and were made the subjects of inquisition proceedings. The works of the celebrated ascetical writer Luis of Grenada were for a long time under discussion. The famous process of Bartholomew de Carranza, archbishop of Toledo, lasted seventeen years, and only the revocation of the cause to Rome by Pius V. saved him from what must now seem most unjust and arbitrary condemnation. It would not be quite fair to lay directly at the door of the Inquisition the expulsion of the Moors in 1609. Political reasons—e.g., their connivance with the Barbary rovers in kidnapping Christians, and their engaging in political intrigues with the Sultan—were put forward in the edicts of Philip II., 10th Dec. 1567, and Philip III., 9th Dec. 1609 (these are printed by Balmez, *El Protestantismo comparado*, French tr., in vol. ii. appendix), but undoubtedly the facts, or supposed facts, elicited under torture in the Inquisition trials had much to do with the decision arrived at. The whole matter has been very fully and straightforwardly dealt with by P. Boronat y Barrachina, *Los Moriscos Españoles y su Expulsion* (Valencia, 1901), who, in spite of strong national and religious sympathy with the Inquisition, fully admits the expulsion to have been economically disastrous for Spain. It had, however, the approval of many enlightened contemporaries—e.g., Cervantes. In the 17th and 18th centuries the action of the Holy Office undoubtedly grew much milder, and at this stage a good deal of its energy was spent in investigating cases of atheism or blasphemy and also the conduct of ecclesiastics accused of offences against morality. The Holy Office in Spain, revived in 1814 after a temporary eclipse under Napoleonic influences, was formally and finally suppressed in 1820.

(b) *Distinctive features.*—A prevalent view of the Spanish Inquisition, and one much favoured by Roman Catholic apologists such as J. de Maistre, C. J. von Hefele, J. Hergenröther, A. Knöpfler, etc., holds that the Holy Office in Spain was a State institution. To this L. von Ranke has lent countenance by calling it 'a royal tribunal equipped with spiritual weapons' (*Die spanische Monarchie*, in *Werke*, xxv., [Leipzig, 1877] 195). The truer statement, as H. Grisar has pointed out, would be the converse. It was really a spiritual court invested with royal authority. The situation in Spain (see K. Benrath, in *PRE* ix. 158–161) was very much akin to that in Venice. There

also the State was thoroughly willing to co-operate in the work of suppressing heresy, but only on condition that the control of the tribunal was not taken out of its hands. Whether the establishment of the Inquisition in 1478 owed anything to the initiative of the Holy See seems doubtful. But, on the other hand, it was from the pope from first to last that the Holy Office derived its powers. The peculiarity of the Spanish tribunal lay in its centralization, i.e. in the appointment of a single Inquisitor General, and, though this office was for a brief space entrusted to a commission of four, and although under Ximenez a separate Grand Inquisitor was named for Aragon, the institution for more than three centuries possessed a unity of organization which inevitably made it an instrument of great power in the hands of the crown. In practice the sovereign nominated the Inquisitor General, though it would be wrong to infer that it was customary to appoint any but men of recognizedly high character. Some of them, like Ximenez and Adrian of Utrecht (afterwards Pope Adrian VI.), were ecclesiastics not only of ability but also of the sincerest piety. Another distinctive feature was the council of the 'Suprema'—a body which in 1483, under the designation of the 'Consejo de la Suprema y General Inquisicion,' was added to the four royal councils already existing. The number of members, at first uncertain, came to consist of five, besides the Inquisitor General, and to these Philip II. added two from the Council of Castile. These were sometimes laymen, and, as the king nominated, even though the names were submitted to him by the board itself, the influence exerted by the civil power was enormously great. The Suprema (see Lea, *Inquisition in Spain*, ii. 166 f.) gradually gained influence at the expense of the Inquisitor General, but it was through the latter that the members of the council as well as all subordinate officials of the Holy Office formally derived the spiritual powers with which they were invested. The Suprema also acted as a court of appeal with respect to the local tribunals.

As regards procedure the Spanish Inquisition does not appear to have differed materially from what has been already described in the art. INQUISITION (vol. vii. p. 330 f.). It need only be said here that the practice was by no means so arbitrary or even so unfair as the reader would infer from the accounts given by Lea and other critics, all of them quite unacquainted with the technicalities of the canon law upon which the procedure of the Holy Office was based. While there is much—particularly the use of torture and the inadequate representation of the accused by counsel—which every right-thinking man must condemn, there is no sufficient ground for saying that the Spanish inquisitors as a body were intent only on securing a conviction without regard for either truth or justice. The Holy Office, in fact, contrasts favourably so far as concerns the observance of forms of law with the secular tribunals of other countries, notably those English courts which pronounced sentence upon religious dissentients tried for high treason during the reigns of Henry VIII. and Elizabeth. Lea does not deny (sec. c.g., iii. 43–52) the existence and formal recognition of certain safeguards to protect the accused, but he declares them to have been mere affectations which were of no practical avail. It is to be regretted that he has not printed in *extenso* a few of the processes upon which his verdict is based, so that the trained canonist might be in a position to judge of the evidence for this very unfavourable view.

As for the terrible barbarities committed by the Spanish tribunals in torturing suspects and relaxing, i.e. requiring the secular arm to burn the

condemned, there is unfortunately no room for doubt of their reality. At the same time it should in fairness be remembered that as late as 1784 a woman was burned at the stake at Portsmouth for murdering her husband (see L. O. Pike, *Hist. of Crime in England*, London, 1876, ii. 379), and that about 1735 such executions by fire simply for uttering counterfeit coin were common in England, often numbering as many as half a dozen in a year.

Of the frequency of relaxations to the secular arm in the early days of the Inquisition it is difficult to obtain an impartial estimate. Llorente, whose figures have too often been accepted without discussion, is certainly untrustworthy wherever the numbers given are merely a matter of speculation.

'There is no question,' says Lea (iv. 517), 'that the number of these [Inquisition victims] has been greatly exaggerated in popular belief, an exaggeration to which Llorente has largely contributed by his absurd method of computation on an arbitrary assumption of a certain annual average for each tribunal in successive periods.'

The most striking example quoted by Lea is that of the Canaries, where Llorente estimates the number of persons burned at 1118, whereas we now know the actual number to have been exactly eleven; but this misrepresentation, of course, is quite exceptional. Down to the death of Torquemada in 1498, according to Llorente, 8800 persons were burned. The true number is probably not many more than the quarter of that, but, on the other hand, Rodrigo's estimate of 400 is absurdly below the mark. In the absence of the Seville records no accurate computation can be attempted. What we know for certain is that in the following centuries the numbers steadily diminished. Probably no calculations have been more carefully made from first-hand sources than those of Schäfer. According to him (*Beiträge zur Gesch. des span. Protestantismus und der Inquisition*, i. 156f.), the estimates of Inquisition victims made by such writers as Fliedner and Llorente, at any rate as regards the punishment of Protestants, are enormously exaggerated. Out of 2100 persons indicted for Protestantism whose processes are preserved, only about 220 were burned in person, and 120 in effigy, and these figures include the great antos of Valladolid and Seville, which alone account for 70 burnings in person and 30 in effigy. Moreover, many who suffered in this way were admittedly foreigners.

However much the Inquisition and its methods may run counter to modern feeling, there is force in the contention 'No Church, no morals; no dogma, no Church; therefore purity of faith is of supreme importance.' It is this conviction that has led such straightforward and patriotic Spaniards as J. L. Balmez and Menendez y Pelayo to urge that there may still be something to admire in this unpopular institution. In any case those who can see in it nothing but a brutal and mercenary organization to fill the coffers of the State and the pockets of the inquisitors have certainly misread the facts. We shall not have a trustworthy and impartial history of the Inquisition until the point is grasped that there are many men, not only among the simple but also among the learned, worldly-minded as well as spiritual, who conscientiously hold that orthodox dogmatic belief is the pearl of great price for which all other things in the world ought to be sacrificed.

2. The Holy Office in Rome.—This does not call for very full treatment. The bull of Pope Paul III., *Licet ab initio*, anticipating in some sense the action of the long-looked-for Council of Reform, nominated in 1542 a congregation of six cardinals to watch over the purity of the faith, gravely imperilled in that time of religious unrest. No very sensational developments followed. Al-

though by an obscurantist policy which Pastor has not hesitated (*Gesch. der Päpste*, Eng. tr., xii. 507) to denounce in outspoken language the Holy Office still refuses all direct access to its Roman archives, and although the best sources of information, even though many have perished, are thereby withheld from students, still a good deal of valuable material has been collected *aliunde* by Buschbell (*Reformation und Inquisition in Italien*) and others. Buschbell makes it clear that in the early years—at any rate until the pontificate of Paul IV.—much humanity was shown to the Inquisition prisoners in Italy. Consideration was shown to the sick, strict confinement was enforced only in a few extreme cases, the use of torture was rare, and the inquisitors were personally merciful (pp. 219-222). Proceedings in the south of France were much more severe at the same epoch (c. 1545). This moderation, however, was not maintained during the pontificate of Paul IV. (G. P. Caraffa, 1555-59). In spite of his violent anti-Spanish bias, he is believed to have brought from Spain, where he was legate, strong convictions as to the need of severity in dealing with heretics. The Roman Inquisition was stimulated to an activity which even the most earnest and orthodox condemned. It has often been maintained by Roman Catholic apologists, such as Lacordaire or even Balmez, that the Roman Inquisition never pronounced a capital sentence. Fuller investigation has shown that this is untrue. In 1556 twelve (some say twenty-four) Marranos were burned at Ancona after trial by the Holy Office, and other condemned persons were executed at the stake even in Rome itself (see Pastor, German edition, vi. 507, 518). Many of those delayed and imprisoned at this period were afterwards declared free from the slightest taint of heresy. The case of Cardinal Morone (and we might add that of Cardinal Pole) was a conspicuous example of such injustice. Popular feeling raged so high that at the death of Paul IV. the Inquisition buildings were sacked and many of its records destroyed. Paul IV. also introduced in Rome the Index of forbidden books. Undoubtedly the severity shown at this time, which lasted on, though with mitigated activity, during the reigns of such pontiffs as Pius V. and Sixtus V., did have an effect in checking the progress of Protestantism and in restoring a more austere standard of morals than had prevailed during the Renaissance period, but the milder attitude of most succeeding popes showed that they regarded these extreme measures as justified only by some crisis exceptionally menacing to the purity of the faith. Taken as a whole, and considered in comparison with the action of the tribunals of the Inquisition in other parts of the world, the Roman Congregation of the Holy Office has throughout its history conspicuously shown a spirit of moderation. It has lately been reconstituted by Pope Pius X., and it still takes the first place among the Roman Congregations, having now added to its duties the decision of all questions arising out of the doctrine and practice of Indulgences. In its judicial capacity, as need hardly be said, the Holy Office now enforces none but what are, practically speaking, spiritual penalties.

3. The Holy Office elsewhere.—The activities of the tribunals of the Inquisition, always deriving their jurisdiction mediately or immediately from the Roman pontiffs, in various other parts of the world have been chronicled by many different investigators. Benrath, e.g., has occupied himself more particularly with the Inquisition in Venice, especially during the 16th century. Here, as in Spain, the secular power exercised many checks upon the freedom of the inquisitors, and here capital punishment, when inflicted, took the form

not of burning the culprit, but of drowning him in one of the lagoons, in itself certainly a more merciful procedure. In a summary of the 16th cent. cases which he has investigated Benrath tells us that there were 803 processes for Lutheranism, 5 for Calvinism, 35 for Anabaptism, 43 for Judaizing, 65 for blasphemy, 148 for the possession of heretical books, 199 for sorcery (involving more particularly sacrilege with consecrated hosts), 22 for perjury in Inquisition trials, 23 for grosser forms of immorality, 20 for clerical concubinage, 45 for contempt of religion, and 27 for disregard of the laws of fasting and abstinence. In the 17th cent. the number of prosecutions was much less on all counts. As regards the Netherlands, P. Frédéricq has produced five volumes of his *Corpus Documentorum* dealing with the Inquisition trials. The Holy Office during the 16th cent. was very active and created much popular resentment. It was here that, on 1st July 1523, two Augustinian monks were burned—the first victims who suffered for Lutheranism—at the Grand' Place of Brussels. It was on this occasion that Luther composed the hymn, or, more correctly, the historical ballad, beginning: 'Ein neues Lied wir heben an.' Throughout the Spanish dependencies tribunals for the detection of heretical pravity were introduced almost as soon as any settled ecclesiastical government had been established. A Chilean scholar, J. T. Medina, has devoted much labour to investigating the past history of the Inquisition not only in his own country, but also in Cartagena, La Plata, Mexico, Lima in Peru, and the Philippines. Quite recently he has published a volume on the very early days of the institution in America, pointing out that, while inquisitorial powers were still left in the hands of the ordinary bishops, abuses and excesses were more rife than when, as happened later, special inquisitors were appointed for the purpose. It is generally admitted that in many cases the inquisitors, who claimed no jurisdiction over the natives themselves, as long as they were unbaptized, proved to be true friends to the unfortunate aborigines and stood between them and the brutal oppression of their conquerors.

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OIL.—See ANOINTING.

OJIBWA.—The Ojibwa (Ojibway, Chippewa) are an Algonquian tribe scattered over a region extending 1000 miles from east to west, and including both shores of Lake Huron and Lake Superior, with the Turtle Mountains of N. Dakota approximately marking their western limit. Naturally, the bond connecting groups spread over this immense area is linguistic and cultural rather than political; and even culturally there has been an appreciable degree of local differentiation, so that it would be permissible to speak of several distinct tribal groups. The westernmost Ojibwa outposts, transcending the boundaries given above, viz. the Saulteaux and Bungi of S. Manitoba and Saskatchewan, have in considerable measure assimilated features of Plains Indian (*q.v.*) life as opposed to the Woodland culture connected with their pristine habitat. The total number of the Ojibwa may be set at 35,000, of whom about 15,000 reside in Canada. In the United States (Census of 1910) there were 20,214 Ojibwa, of whom, however, only 34.5 per cent were full-bloods.

Linguistically the Ojibwa are very closely related to the Ottawa and Pottawatomi, with whom the groups south of Lake Superior formed a loose confederacy, while the bands to the north have affiliated and almost merged with the Cree. Historically the S. Ojibwa have played a more important part than their northern kinsmen. Having secured firearms before the other tribes west of Lake Michigan, they waged successful wars against the Foxes and E. Sioux, driving the latter westward towards the Plains and forcing the Foxes to unite with the Sauk Indians.

Apart from the characteristics due to contact with the Plains, the Ojibwa represent a typical form of the 'Eastern Woodland culture' of American ethnographers.

I. Material culture.—The Ojibwa were essentially hunters, and in a minor way fishermen, but south of the Straits of Mackinaw and Lake Superior they also cultivated the soil for maize, pumpkins, and beans, and gathered wild rice. Their style of habitation varied locally and seasonally. The principal types were (1) a rectangular lodge covered with the bark of elm or cedar trees, the roof being oval or gabled; and (2) a dome-shaped structure, used especially in cold weather, which was covered with flag-reed mats or sheets of birch-bark. In addition there were conical lodges like those of the Plains and a long lean-to similar to the bark house, but lower, longer, and with a double entrance. Clothing was made from the dressed skins of deer, moose, elk, and caribou. The men wore loose shirts, breech-clouts, leggings extending nearly to the hip, and moccasins. The women wore a belted dress reaching below the knee and open at the neck and arms, or a skirt with a short loose jacket. They also had moccasins and leggings, but the latter barely reached up to the knee. Both sexes had skin robes with the hair left on. Fire was made by twirling a stick in the socket of a block of wood with the aid of a bow, or by striking one piece of flint against another. Water transportation was mainly in birch-bark canoes, though south of the Straits of Mackinaw

dug-out canoes were employed. In the winter toboggans were used, sometimes with dogs. The bow and arrow formed the principal weapon, to which was added a war-club. There is traditional evidence for the use of pottery cooking vessels, but the principal arts were matting and weaving. Bags woven from cord made from the inner bark of bass or cedar and from wild hemp fibre were often decorated with beautiful geometric designs. On account of the ease with which vessels of all sorts could be fashioned of birch-bark, neither basketry nor wood-carving was well developed, though checkerwork baskets and wooden spoons are found. For amusement the Ojibwa had a great variety of games, both of chance and of an athletic character; of the latter may be mentioned lacrosse, which has since been borrowed by the Whites.

2. Social and political organization. — The Ojibwa are divided into a large number of exogamous clans, or (in the nomenclature of American ethnologists) gentes, descent being in the paternal line. While transgressions of exogamy in a number of other American tribes were disapproved rather than strictly punished, as, say, in Australia, there is evidence that the Ojibwa exercised greater rigour and punished offenders with death.¹ The kinship terminology, though varying in minor points in the several bands, conforms to the classificatory type that, according to W. H. R. Rivers, may be expected in a tribe with exogamous subdivisions. The gentes, of which there were more than twenty, bear animal names, some of the most important in numbers and prestige being the Crane, Catfish, Bear, Marten, Wolf, and Loon gentes. In the native traditions the original number is set at five, the eponymic ancestors being described as suddenly appearing from the depths of the ocean. While the term 'totem' is of Ojibwa origin and while totemic features naturally occur, the religious elements of totemism do not seem to be fully developed. We learn, e.g., that members of the Bear gens resembled their ancestor in their pugnacity and bad temper, but we do not know whether the bear was tabu to the totemites or was the object of a distinctively totemic cult. The totem-animal was, however, pictorially represented to indicate an individual gentile affiliation.² There is some indication that at one time the individual names were associated with the individual's gens; but in recent times the custom has been for the parents to select a sponsor, who gives the child a name in no way related to its gens, but referring to his own personal *manitu* (see below, p. 456^a).³

The gentes were grouped together in a number of feeble phratries of obscure function. Thus, we learn that the Noka phratry was once composed of gentes named after parts of the bear's body, and later of two divisions affiliated, respectively, with the common and the grizzly bear. In several of the phratries one gens seems to have been the predominant one. Whether all the phratries, like the gentes, bore animal names remains undecided; and we are also left in doubt as to whether the phratries were exogamous. The only functions specifically ascribed to them are of a political character: the Crane and Awaase 'were first in council, and the brave and unflinching warriors of the Bear family defended them from the inroads of their numerous and powerful enemies.'⁴ Moreover,

to the Bear phratry was entrusted the guardianship of the war-pipe and war-club.

The political organization was loose even in the early days. There was a general council of adult males with somewhat vague powers, which selected the chief, whose office was nevertheless in a measure hereditary, since there was a tendency to choose a chief's son provided he gave any evidence of ability. The incumbent of this office likewise had rather vague functions, his influence depending on his personal qualities rather than on his station. A chief usually had an adjutant, whom he might request to speak for him and send on errands.¹ Different bands had distinct councils and chiefs; there was no confederacy uniting all the Ojibwa under a single executive or legislative head. Among the W. Ojibwa there was the characteristically Plains Indian feature of a soldier organization of tried warriors who controlled the buffalo-hunt and also acted as a police body in camp.

Among the Timiskamig Ojibwa of N. Ontario, and probably other bands as well, each family had a distinct hunting territory, which must not be trespassed upon by other families, offences being sometimes punished with death and more frequently by evil magic directed against the offender.²

3. Miscellaneous social customs. — Certain social usages must be referred to on account of their ethnological importance. The method of giving names has already been described. The Ojibwa had the reluctance shared by many tribes to mention their personal names, though they did not object to others doing so in their presence. Husband and wife never mentioned each other's name, nor did a mother-in-law utter her son-in-law's name.³ The latter circumstance deserves mention, since we are positively assured that the Ojibwa lacked the familiar mother-in-law tabu.⁴ As among the Dakota, two young men frequently adopted each other as special friends or comrades for life, in which case they exchanged gifts and thereafter always shared their property if either was in want.⁵

In so warlike a tribe feats of arms were, of course, highly esteemed, and at festive gatherings each warrior recounted his exploits, which were also symbolically represented by feathers worn in the head, as among the Sioux. To boast of deeds not actually performed was to lose social prestige in the tribe.⁶

The mode of disposing of the dead and relevant customs may be treated under this head, though there is, of course, a religious aspect to these usages. The body was interred with the belongings of the dead, and over it was placed a wooden covering with a hole in the side, where the relatives placed food and tobacco. Pictographic drawings were sometimes traced on a board serving as a tombstone, to indicate, e.g., the buried warrior's gens and his martial deeds. A funeral feast occurred with singing and drumming to cheer up the mourners, and an offering of food and drink was made to the dead. When the corpse was removed from the lodge for burial, it was never carried out of the doorway, but through a hole cut out in the bark in the lodge. The entire lodge was pulled down and the fire extinguished. By way of mourning the relatives blackened their faces with charcoal, tied leather strips round their wrists and ankles, cut off their hair, and assumed

¹ A *Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures of John Tanner*, New York, 1880, p. 313; W. H. Warren, 'Hist. of the Ojibways,' *Collections of the Minnesota Historical Society*, v. (St. Paul, 1885) 42.

² Tanner, p. 175.

³ William Jones, 'Central Algonkin,' *Annual Archaeological Report*, 1905, Toronto, 1906, p. 180 f.; Peter Jones, *Hist. of the Ojibway Indians*, London [1861], p. 161.

⁴ Warren, p. 99.

¹ J. G. Kohl, *Wisconsin Indians*, 1890, p. 161 f.

² F. G. Speck, *Life of the Ojibwa*, 1902, p. 102; and Social Life of various Algonquian Tribes, *Canada Geological Survey Memoir*, 70 [Ottawa, 1915]; Tanner, p. 91; Kohl, p. 421.

³ Kohl, pp. 273-276; P. Jones, p. 161 f.

⁴ Tanner, p. 146. ⁵ Kohl, p. 271.

⁶ *Id.* p. 21.

the most unsightly clothing possible; laceration was also practised by running knives and thorns through the flesh. During the period of mourning, which lasted for a whole year, daily offerings were made to the dead by putting a portion of food into the fire, and during occasional visits to the grave feasts and offerings, including tobacco, were made in honour of the departed spirit. Widows and bereaved parents were wont to fashion a doll-like parcel of clothes representing the deceased and carry it about for the entire year on all their travels.¹

4. Religion.—(a) *Manitu concept.*—The centre of Ojibwa religious life is occupied by the *manitu* concept, which corresponds fairly closely to the *wakanda* of the Dakota and the *orenda* of the Iroquois. In the interpretation of William Jones,² which, in view of his Algonquian lineage, combined as it was with anthropological training, is entitled to special consideration, *manitu* (q.v.) is 'a cosmic, mysterious property which is believed to be existing everywhere in nature,' and with which the individual sought to enter into personal relation. In the trance induced by the rigorous fast to which he subjected himself, he might be 'fortunate enough to experience a mystic transport at the sight of something animate or inanimate,' then that object would probably become one of religious veneration to be supplanted in the critical times of life. The essential point in this interpretation is the abstract character of the *manitu*; according to Jones, the various spirits or deities are such in so far as they are endowed with common mystic property, being differentiated by the varying degrees in which they participated in this essence. As for the individual reaction, the emphasis is placed on the peculiar and overwhelming emotional thrill that invests an experience with the quality of the uncannily strange. Thus, we have the case of an Ojibwa who in a state of fatigue lay down facing a huge boulder. As he looked at it, it seemed to oscillate, advance towards him, make a bow and then return to its former position. The Indian at once felt the greatest veneration for the rock, regarded it as his tutelary god, and never thereafter passed by without leaving a tobacco offering.³ The rock did not become supernatural, according to the view expounded, because of any spirit residing there or controlling it, but simply because the psychological experiences connected with it led the individual to associate it automatically with the unindividualized concept of the mysterious, i.e. *manitu*.

Jones's interpretation has been generally accepted by American ethnologists, with whose observations among other tribes it seems to harmonize admirably, but was recently challenged by another field worker among the Ojibwa. According to P. Radin,⁴ the accepted view suffers from the over-systematization of observers imbued with Caucasian metaphysics, and does not correctly represent the attitude of the Indian mind. *Manitu*, he insists, always refers 'to definite spirits, not necessarily definite in shape.' An arrow possesses specific virtue because it is a transformed spirit or the seat of a spirit; a peculiar object receives offerings because it belongs to a spirit or is similarly possessed by it. *Manitu* as an essence distinct from definite spirits, Radin concludes, is 'an abstraction created by investigators.'

Radin's critique undoubtedly has the merit of crystallizing discussion of the subject, but it

cannot be said to have shaken the older interpretation. The danger of over-systematization, of attributing to the Indian a philosophical belief in a definite force immanent in the cosmos, seems illusory, since Jones himself emphasizes the unsystematic character of the belief. Accounts of Indian visions fairly bristle with experiences of precisely the type cited above from Kohl's work. Pacc Radin, there is not the slightest evidence that many of these rocks, trees, charms, etc., derive their sacred character from a spirit already existing for the religious consciousness and subsequently associated with these objects. *Manitu* remains, accordingly, the concept of a cosmic force, unanalyzed, not nearly so definite as corresponding concepts of our science and philosophy, but comparable to the vague folk-generalizations familiar to the student of language and denoting the objective basis of the specifically religious emotions.

(b) *Visions.*—The deliberate quest of supernatural power is one of the most wide-spread features of N. American religious life, but among the Ojibwa it was characterized by a distinctive peculiarity—the extraordinary extent to which the procedure was regulated by the older members of the visionary's family. At the age of puberty or, as would appear from some authorities, rather before it, a boy was ordered by his parents, or preferably his grandparents, to retire to a secluded spot, abstain from food and drink, and await a supernatural revelation. If, after several days' abstention, he succumbed to temptation, all his efforts went for naught and he was obliged to begin again, his actions being watched by his elders. Nor were his reactions to the mystic experience a purely individual affair; he was warned to decline certain evil revelations vouchsafed by malignant *manitu* powers that might lead to his destruction. Thus, one of Radin's informants had rejected the blessing of a chickadee in accordance with his grandmother's injunctions and only accepted the subsequent revelation of a white loon, which offered him long life and immunity from disease. In short, we are not dealing with a simple psychological experience or with that experience as moulded by the tribal pattern for visions, which would operate automatically under any circumstances; we have in addition the far-reaching conscious control of the situation by the individuality of the supervising elder. Practically everything is pre-determined, something sharply defined is expected by the prospective visionary, and the interpretation of the vision is cast in a pre-existing mould. It is clear that in this way a virtual inheritance of shamanistic power is rendered possible since the elder prescribes the content of the vision.¹

Visions were not restricted to the time of puberty, though those seen then were of the greatest importance, and, as illustrated by the case of the swaying rock, were not confined to deliberate quests. Women were not barred from either mode of communication with the world of mystery.

The vision secured by an individual was likely to shape the future course of his life: the promise that he was to become a famous hunter would make him specialize in that direction, the sight of some object held in reverence by the members of the Midé society might lead the visionary to seek admission, and so forth.

(c) *Mythology.*—While the number of *manitu* beings was indefinite, embracing at least potentially the entire animate and inanimate universe, there were among them not a few clearly individualized and localized deities, some of them doubtless of significance only in the theoretical speculations of

¹ Kohl, pp. 106-112; P. Jones, pp. 98-101.

² P. 190, and 'The Algonkin Manitu,' *JAF* xviii. (1905).

³ Kohl, p. 59.

⁴ 'An Introductory Enquiry in the Study of Ojibwa Religion,' *Papers and Records of the Ontario Historical Society*, xii. (1914) 1-11, 'Religion of the N. American Indians,' *JAF* xvii. (1914) 344 ff.

¹ Kohl, pp. 223-242; Radin, 'An Introductory Enquiry,' p. 1 ff.

the shamans, while others played a dominant part in the everyday life of the people. Of great interest is the dualistic conception of a Great Spirit or Master of Life, Kitchi-Manitu, opposed to an evil divinity, Matchi-Manitu, that controls all the bad spirits. That missionary influences have affected this belief is the impression of both W. Jones and Radin. On the other hand, it is by no means certain that the conception was created by Christian doctrine, which may merely have had the effect of emphasizing the ethical motive involved. It is important to note that, while Kitchi-Manitu is continually referred to in the sacred festivals, he corresponds otherwise to Andrew Lang's notion of an otiose high god, being completely overshadowed in practical life by the lesser *manitus* and in mythological folklore by Nenebojo (known among the several local groups and in the orthography of different writers as Nānabneco, Minalhojo, Menaboju, etc.).

Nenebojo, who impressed some observers as an intermediary between the higher deities and mankind, as a sort of Prometheus or Hercules, seems, in fact, the supreme figure of Ojibwa mythology. Great social and ceremonial institutions were traced to him as their founder, and even such material possessions as the canoe were derived from his inventive genius.¹ He was miraculously conceived through a girl's facing west contrary to her mother's warnings, and thus falling a prey to the west wind. He spent his boyhood with his grandmother, then began to travel through the country, meeting with innumerable adventures in the course of his journeyings. In many of these Nenebojo figures as an unscrupulous trickster, who stops at nothing to attain his ends.

Thus, when in need of food he offers to teach the ducks a new dance during which they are to close their eyes; when they unsuspectingly obey his instructions, he wrings their necks, one after another.

Frequently, as in the story cited, he is not permitted to enjoy the fruits of his cunning, but is beaten at his own game by some being of superior shrewdness. The disharmony between the heroic features revealed in some of the myths and the dastardly and deceitful character that appears in others is not a distinctively Ojibwa problem, but presents itself in many of the N. American mythologies.

One of the most important tales deals with his exploits against the water-spirits, who had slain his brother (nephew or grandson in other versions), a fox or wolf, which subsequently comes to preside over the spirits of the deceased. Lying in ambush, Nenebojo succeeds in badly wounding one of the enemies' chiefs, then slays an old woman, puts on her skin, and pretends to doctor the patient, whom, of course, he destroys. The other water-spirits cause a general deluge, which threatens to overwhelm him though he flees to the highest summits. He constructs a raft, however, and not only saves himself and all the animals that he meets, but re-creates the world from a little earth brought up by the musk-rat, which he ordered to dive for some.²

Of the other *manitus* the Thunder is of considerable importance, being the patron of one class of shamans, the *jessakid* (see below). Four great deities are believed to occupy, respectively, the four corners of the earth. Finally, mention must be made of the Windigo, a term extended in recent times to human cannibals, but primarily designating a race of gigantic ogres who fed on human flesh.

The Ojibwa conception of a future life is devoid of the notion of reward or punishment for earthly activities, and centres largely in the picturing of serious dangers that menace the soul on its way to the spirit land, which lies in the west.

The souls are obliged to travel along a path in the centre of which they are tempted by an enormous strawberry, to eat of

which involves instant destruction. After proceeding for several days they encounter a broad river, only partly spanned by what appears to be a vibrating log, which bars the way. In reality it is a snake, and the wanderers are obliged to leap across the gap on to its head. If they jump short or fall from the bridge into the water, they are transformed into toads or fishes; hence the special grief over the death of little children, who are deemed unable to make the difficult crossing unless escorted by an older friend or relative.

The goal of the souls is familiar from the accounts of seers and of those who have died and come to life again, the spirits deeming that their time had not yet come and accordingly sending them back to earth again. In the land of spirits every one is happy; there is no strife, labour, or hunting, but a continual round of pleasure with drumming, singing, and feasting.³

(d) *Shamanism and magic*.—During the puberty fast the Thunder occasionally blesses an individual with the gift of prophecy and certain other supernatural powers. Such persons are known as *jessakids* (*teisa'kiwin*), and are quite unorganized, each practising his profession independently of the others. The *jessakid* foretells the success or misfortune of hunters and warriors, predicts the recovery or death of a patient, announces where game can be found, whether distant friends are yet living, and the like. These prophecies are delivered from within a roofless, cylindrical, chimney-like structure covered with bark or robes. When the *jessakid* had seated himself inside the structure, it began to sway violently from side to side, and strange voices, interpreted as those of the *manitus*, became audible to the crowd without. In addition to the Thunder, the Great Turtle is mentioned as a leading spirit in this performance. A *jessakid* also exorcizes demons and, more particularly, sucks out pathogenic spirits from the patient's body by means of tubular bones, swallows them, and ultimately vomits them out.⁴

Another type of shaman is represented by the *wabano*, who likewise become such as the result of a vision. They, also, are not organized into a society. A *wabano* furnishes hunting and love medicines, but his distinctive power consists in his immunity from the effects of fire and heat, which is demonstrated in public performances. A shaman of this class will pick up red-hot stones and coals, or plunge his hand into a kettle of boiling water and extract the head of the animal cooked.⁵ The last-mentioned feat is probably historically connected with the Hot Dance of the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara, and part of the Heyoka cult of the Dakota.

A third class of shamans corresponds more closely to the ordinary medicine-men. These are medical practitioners cognizant of the mysterious curative properties of roots and herbs, administered after the chanting of sacred incantations. According to W. Jones, they also practise the *jessakid* trick of sucking out malignant spirits by the aid of round, slender bones.⁶

Magical practices are not by any means the exclusive prerogative of a favoured class of shamans. The laity avail themselves in part of the same principles, viz. those of sympathetic and imitative magic. Thus, when a man desires to bring grief upon another, he makes a small image of the enemy and pierces its head or heart, causing an affliction of that part; if the desire is to kill, the effigy is buried or burned amidst magic spells. A corresponding device is employed to ensure success in the chase, the game animals being sketched on

¹ Kohl, pp. 214-226; P. Jones, pp. 102-104.

² W. J. Hoffmann, 'The Mide'wiwin or "Grand Medicine Society" of the Ojibwa,' 7 *RBEW* (1891), pp. 1571-215-255; W. Jones, 'Central Algonkin,' p. 145; Schoolcraft, *Historical and Statistical Information respecting the History, Condition, and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States*, Philadelphia, 1851-57, I. 388 ff.

³ Tanner, p. 135 f.; Hoffmann, p. 1561.

⁴ Hoffmann p. 169; W. Jones, 'Central Algonkin,' p. 145.

¹ Kohl, p. 34; W. Jones, 'Central Algonkin,' p. 145.

² H. R. Schoolcraft, *The Myth of Hiawatha*, Philadelphia, 1856, pp. 13-51, *Algie Researches*, New York, 1839, I. 134-174; Radin, *Some Myths and Tales of the Ojibwa of South-eastern Ontario*, Ottawa, 1914, pp. 1-23; Kohl, pp. 225-234.

birch-bark or carved in wood. The incantations associated with these rites bear reference primarily to the mythological character Nenebojo. They, as well as the songs of the Midé'wiwin, were represented pictographically by realistic images drawn on birch-bark; these were mnemonic in character, a single sign often helping to recall a group of ideas and the air of a song.¹ Sympathetic magic is also used to induce love on the part of a beloved woman; the magician in such a case uses carved effigies of himself and his beloved, with mysterious powders in bags fastened with a lock of hair. By piercing the heart with a needle dipped into the several powders, various results may be effected, such as the relenting of the woman to the extent of pining for her admirer or her punishment for spurning his offers.²

While the shamanistic performances hitherto treated are manifestations of individual power or knowledge, the Midé'wiwin was a secret society, composed of both men and women. Magical practices of the type described above were by no means dissociated from this organization, but its special function was concerned with life after death. Since, according to Ojibwa eschatology, the souls of the deceased encounter various dangers, the object of the Midé'wiwin is to overcome these obstacles by the use of formulæ known exclusively to the members. Initiation follows only after a long period of instruction, and the fees required are very considerable. Among some of the Ojibwa there are no fewer than four degrees of initiation, and from other groups as many as eight are reported. Foremost among the rites of initiation is the 'shooting ceremony,' in which the leader points a medicine-bag at the novice, who falls prone upon the ground, rendered unconscious by a magic shell that is believed to have entered him. When restored to life, he shows his newly-acquired powers as a member by similarly shooting those of older standing in the society. Admission is sought

either because of a vision suggesting it to the candidate or in order that he may replace an individual who died during the time of preparation. As Radin points out, the essential secret knowledge is imparted by the novice's individual preceptor during the preparatory period; it is then that he receives instruction in the specific teachings of the Midé'wiwin and learns to interpret the symbolic birch-bark records. While the Midé'wiwin is undoubtedly a definite organization, the individual element is thus nevertheless of great significance from the subjective point of view.¹ From the point of view of the tribe at large the Midé'wiwin performances constitute the one ceremony of overshadowing importance, comparable to the Sundance of the Plains. The membership was numerous, while the unassociated shamans of the other groups never comprised more than a few isolated individuals.

(e) *Various religious practices.*—A number of religious practices, while less impressive than the rites of the Midé'wiwin and the shamanistic performances already described, are nevertheless of great importance in the daily life of the people. In this connexion may be mentioned the constant offering of tobacco to all sorts of objects viewed with religious veneration and sacrifice of dogs at religious festivals.² Like the majority of the N. American Indians, the Ojibwa indulged in sweat baths, not from purely hygienic motives, but as a religious rite accompanied with sacred songs.³

Among the W. Ojibwa the Sun-dance of the Plains Indians, though an intrusive feature, was prominent. They also had a Windigokan, or cannibal cult, shared with the Assiniboin and Cree, in which masked clowns performed ludicrous rites, expressing the opposite of their intended meaning, and exorcized disease-causing demons.⁴

LITERATURE.—This is cited in the footnotes.

R. H. LOWIE.

OLD AGE.

Psychological (E. D. STARBUCK), p. 458.
Introductory and Primitive (P. J. HAMILTON-GRIERSON), p. 462.
American (L. H. GRAY), p. 465.
Chinese (R. F. JOHNSTON), p. 466.
Greek (W. J. WOODHOUSE), p. 469.
Hebrew and Jewish (MORRIS JOSEPH), p. 471.

Hindu.—See ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE (Hindu).

Iranian (L. H. GRAY), p. 473.
Japanese (M. REVON), p. 474.
Roman (A. SOUTER), p. 475.
Semitic and Egyptian (G. A. BARTON), p. 478.
Teutonic (B. S. PHILLPOTTS), p. 480.

OLD AGE (Psychological).—If we should follow the custom of dividing life into the traditional seven ages, as is not infrequently done, the period of old age would cover the last two ages—elderliness, from about 55 or 60 to about 70 years, and senescence, which moves progressively from 70 towards 'second childhood and mere oblivion' (E. C. Sanford, 'Mental Growth and Decay,' *AJP's* xiii. [1902] 426-449). Both ages are alike in marking a decline from the physical vigour and mental acumen which characterize the middle years of life. The essential underlying condition of the transition to the state of age has usually been supposed to be the decline and, later, the termination of the reproductive functions. This notion harmonizes many of the phenomena of age, including the fact that its inception among women is from five to ten years earlier than among men. It has been much discredited, however, by recent researches.

1. Symptoms.—In enumerating the marks of approaching age it is of the utmost importance to distinguish between the fundamental and ac-

cidental, and between the normal and pathological. It has been altogether too common in the discussions of this period to hit upon the superficial changes that easily strike the attention, and to overlook the deeper-lying events. Among the marks that indicate the normal approach of senescence are: transfer of interest away from things of sense to those of deeper human concern; moving past the technique of science to its higher meanings (Socrates' confession in Plato, *Phædo*); seeing things in perspective (Tennyson, in *Locksley Hall*, *Sixty Years After*); lack of originality in discovering new interests, but greater enthusiasm for old ones—even old aversions and pessimisms (Schopenhauer); freedom from the stress of passion, and the transfer of energy to higher loves (Tolstoi, *Augustine*); fixity of habit of thought, giving,

¹ Hoffmann, pp. 149-300; Kohl, pp. 41-52; W. Jones, 'Central Algonkin,' p. 146; Radin, 'The Ritual and Significance of the Winnebago Medicine Dance,' *JAPL* xxiv. [1911] 149-203; Frances Densmore, 'Chippewa Music,' *Bull. LS BE* [1910], p. 13 ff.

² Kohl, pp. 23, 60.

³ *Ib.* p. 293.

⁴ A. Skinner, *Political Organization, Cults, and Ceremonies of the Plains-Ojibway and Plains-Cree Indians*, New York, 1911, pp. 500-511, 'The Cultural Position of the Plains Ojibway,' *American Anthropologist*, xvi. [1914] 314-318.

¹ Kohl, p. 231; Tanner, pp. 174, 189 f., 341, 351, 363; W. Jones, 'Central Algonkin,' p. 144.

² Kohl, pp. 395-397.

within a certain range, poise and stability of judgment (Darwin, Huxley, Kant).

Age suffers losses, even among the normal, that are irrevocable. The senses are less delicate. Memory for details is gone past recovery. The bent form, the shrivelled bulk, the halting step, the tremulous hand, the falling teeth, the wrinkled skin, the whitened hair, and the corresponding internal changes, even within the central nervous system, with its disrupted nuclei, its pigmented and shrunken tissues, and its depleted cellular substance—all these are unmistakable signs of physical degeneration, which increases until at last the organism must pay its full debt to nature.

Are these the marks merely of progressive degeneration of the entire personality? Are they the characteristics of age, or its necessary accident? Are the relatively few instances of men and women who appear to grow in grace, wisdom, and power to the very end of life merely the exceptions to the rule of senescent decline? Or do they represent the norm? In order to escape a hasty judgment, it is well to keep in mind the law of progressive variation, among individuals of the same species or genus, along with increasing years. During foetal life and early infancy individuals are much alike. Heredity and selection have busied themselves cutting off the variants and fixing stable lines of inheritance. From babyhood on through life there is, however, an ever-increasing departure from the central highway of development. In other words, the average deviation in the species from the norm increases more and more, until at last there are relatively few persons who are true to type. Their sparseness is no necessary sign of eccentricity.

2. The origin of senescence.—A positive answer to the questions raised can be approached by raising another—Why did old age and death come into the world? Among many of the lower kinds such a fate is not always necessary. Single-celled organisms that propagate themselves by cell-division enjoy, barring fatalities, a sort of terrestrial immortality. When one organism splits, in order to pass on into two others (to the extent that they are 'others'), it cannot be said to die, although in a sense the original structure disappears, for 'there is nothing left to bury.'

Living forms soon discovered the utility of union and co-operation. They colonized. The result was an organism. This arose through division of labour among the various cells, and the consequent specialization of structure and function. Some of the cells wore out faster than others, while many of them, as always happens in a democracy, built themselves up at the expense of their fellows. The colony was soon full of discord. It was, furthermore, a charnel-house of worn-out units. It had to clean house and start afresh. As a colony, it broke up. The organism died. Our first result is that 'death was the price paid for a body' (P. Geddes and J. A. Thomson, *Evolution*, London, 1911, p. 88). The debt is paid in instalments; and the period of old age is the time allowed for the settlement of all arrears.

Old age may, however, be interpreted in terms of life as truly as in terms of death. Nature as a whole seems to behave like an organism, and to have a passion for continuance and progress. She is full of resources. She is a shrewd bargainer. She pawned individual deathlessness for a body, but the body was only a means to an end—that of higher biological efficiency. By 'scrapping' the worn-out organism frequently, and starting afresh, there is no sacrifice, if only the successes and acquirements of each generation can be conserved in every succeeding one. This was provided for by the fact of heredity, both 'blood' and 'social.'

Indeed there is a total gain, since each fresh individual, like Nature herself, having the obsession for progress, can profit by its own experience, discover new adjustments, and thus add a little to its own original capital. This exchange of individual terrestrial immortality for biological conservation and improvement lies, surely, at the very heart of racial progress. So clear is its truth that an ageing person, if only he thinks in terms of life as a whole, might, as his end draws near, cheerfully 'lay him down with a will,' knowing that his demise is part of a plan of higher fulfilment. He could at least accept gracefully that which Nature bestows graciously.

Nature's problem has always been, and is, at death to discover ways of saving, from the rubbish of the old organism, the elements for the rebuilding of a new one, and a better than the old. She has found no fewer than five ways of sloughing off old bodies and reconstructing along better lines. All five methods centre in the fact of reproduction. They stand for a series of movements biologically in two directions, one of which is progressively fatal to the cosmic individual, while the other is progressively beneficial to the race, seemingly at the expense of the individual. On the one hand, they have planted the fact of old age and death so deep within the laws of life that among higher kinds it is inviolable and irrevocable; on the other hand, they are but five discoveries of ways, not only of progress, but of the liberation of intellectual and spiritual values. The first method is that of 'regeneration,' involving dedifferentiation and rejuvenescence. By this means of reproduction almost any fragment of the original organism can reproduce its kind, as when a 'cutting' from a rose-stem or grass-root, or a fragment of an earth-worm or planarium, is sufficient for the regeneration of a new adult structure true to type. The various cells or cell-groups in the organism somehow, strangely, completely reflect within themselves its entire composite life (according to Weismann and his school, the fragments contain original, changeless germ-plasm, out of which the new organism develops). The sequent or fragment goes through a process of reduction or simplification or dedifferentiation, along with increased metabolism, and rediscovers the road leading to a repetition of the life-cycle. The process of dedifferentiation, which is an act of ageing, is an anticipatory step towards a rejuvenescence. Among these kinds senescence is a utility—that of 'scrapping' and renewal—though not a necessity. It is a function of metabolism. If the relation between nutrition and repair, on the one hand, and waste and decay, on the other, can be kept constant, the age-cycle can be eliminated, and terrestrial immortality is attained. C. M. Child has kept *planaria velata*, whose life-cycle, with abundant feeding, is three or four weeks, in a state of perpetual youth, by giving them a quantity of food just sufficient to prevent reduction, and not sufficient to permit growth (Child, *Senescence and Rejuvenescence*, Chicago, 1915, p. 167f.). At the end of three years the animals showed all the signs of health and youth, and none of the marks of age.

Three other methods of reproduction, which progressively emphasize the life-cycle, are 'budding,' 'sporulation,' and 'parthenogenesis' (q.v.), the first two being asexual, and the other standing at the parting of the ways between the several lower types of perpetuation of the species and the highest mode, the sexual.

Many of the lower species have employed the sexual mode of reproduction on occasion, as when the aphid multiplies its numbers all the summer long by parthenogenesis, and then, in autumn, leaps the winter by the aid of sex. But now at

last have come the species that have burned all bridges behind them, and have depended solely upon the one biologically successful method of reproduction. Up to the time of implicit dependence upon sexual reproduction Nature was more concerned with the amount of life in the world than with its quality. Henceforth she prized quality even at the expense of amount.

There have been many gains from depending exclusively at last upon the accident of sexual reproduction. Important among them is the increased variation among offspring that has resulted from the crossing of strains through mating, and consequently the enrichment of the individual, and also indefinitely greater adaptation from generation to generation. But the supreme advantage has arisen through the complete establishment of the life-cycle ending in old age and death. Out of this single biological fact have radiated innumerable resultants, most of them representing the lines of liberation of essentially all the higher mental and spiritual values that make man that which he distinctively is. Among the gains, in addition to the priceless one of starting each generation with a clean slate and also with the refined and corrected wisdom of the race as its dowry, are the following: the care of offspring, resulting in the spirit of kindness; warm-bloodedness and increased metabolism, with corresponding mental alacrity and acumen; helpless babyhood and lengthened infancy, demanding even greater love, wisdom, and purpose; colonization, in the family and larger groups, and the full birth of sympathy, co-operation, and other social virtues; the habit of adjustment, the habit of learning, the habit of growth, which contain the secret of progress and development. Progressively, among all kinds above the protozoa, terrestrial immortality has been sacrificed for sympathy, intelligence, and appreciation.

Old age, as the termination of the physiological cycle, has gained psychologically in many ways: enrichment to itself, through giving its wisdom back to the rising generation; greater eagerness to make the most of life while it lasts; in facing the fact of change and dissolution the more careful re-evaluation of all values in the quest of the changeless; the intensification of values, as the individual is caught between life and death, between love and sorrow. Other mental compensations centre in the fact of senile rejuvenescence, and will be described below.

3. Causes of old age.—It has ever been one of the lively problems of physiology to determine the direct contributing factors involved in bodily decline. None of the theories seems as yet altogether satisfactory. Most of them are but statements in other words of the fact of senility, or of the accompanying conditions of old age, rather than of underlying causes.

It is due to the wearing out of the organism (Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1897, i. 50-62); to a 'vital ferment' in the organism (O. Bütschli, 'Gedanken über Leben und Tod,' *Zoolog. Anzeiger*, xv. [1892]); to a progressive decrease in the metabolism of the body (A. Bühler, 'Alter und Tod,' *Biolog. Centralblatt*, xiv. [1904]); to 'greater stability of the organism along with decreased dynamic activity' (Child, p. 459); to the incapacity of cells to reproduce for replacement of worn-out tissues (A. Weismann, *Über Leben und Tod*, Jena, 1884, *Das Keimplasma*, do. 1892); to increased cell-differentiation at the expense of recuperation (H. S. Jennings, *Popular Science Monthly*, lxxx. [1912] 563 f.); to the increase and differentiation of the cytoplasm of cells at the expense of nuclear substance (C. S. Minot, *The Problem of Age, Growth, and Death*, New York, 1908). There is a bewildering array of other 'causes,' entangling themselves with biological reproduction, chemical inhibitors, colloidal substrata, and autocatalyzers.

Whatever be the more intimate processes involved, it seems clear that senescence is accompanied by a break-down of the physiological mechanism at some vital spot. It is well known that the

brain substance is intimately concerned in the process (H. H. Donaldson, *The Growth of the Brain*, New York, 1909, ch. xvii.; M. Mühlmann, 'Beiträge zur Frage nach der Ursache des Todes,' *Arch. für Path. (Virchow)*, cxv. [1914]) and that it suffers a disappearance of nuclei and a depletion of cytoplasmic substance.

One of the most highly popularized notions is that of E. Metchnikoff (*The Nature of Man*, Eng. tr., London, 1903, *The Prolongation of Life*, Eng. tr., do. 1907). Senility is due, according to Metchnikoff, to the auto-intoxication of the organism through poisoning from the bacteria cultured chiefly (for man) in the superfluous sack, the large intestine. As a result of the poisoning, the phagocytes, or white corpuscles of the blood, are diverted from their normal function of protection against the invasion of harmful bacteria, and themselves attack the tissues of muscles, bones, arteries, and brain, bringing about their final destruction. The theory has found small acceptance so far among biologists. Old age is clearly an older fact biologically than Metchnikoff treats under that caption.

Perhaps the most intimate and minutely critical study of the problem to date is that of C. M. Child. He shows that senescence is relatively independent of sexual reproduction, and that both are organically bound up as utilities within the biological processes, which move rhythmically through a neat balancing of the processes of expenditure and recuperation, of differentiation and dedifferentiation, of progression and regression, combined with an act of rejuvenescence.

'Death is the inevitable end of the process of senescence when regression and rejuvenescence do not occur' (p. 461).

4. Interpretation of the state of age.—As seen and felt from within; what meanings and values really characterize the last years of life? The answers are varied in the extreme. In boldest outline it will be sufficient to mention three types of attitude, the first two more or less fatalistic, the third genial, perhaps idealistic.

(a) *Degeneration*.—The marks of senescence are physiological disintegration and mental decline. This conception draws largely from the two sources of physiology and pathology. It is true in the majority of instances of senility. The various powers or functions do not age equally rapidly among themselves (Minot, p. 249), nor are any two persons alike in the date, rate, or order of weakening. There is, accordingly, a vast variety of spiritual attitudes of senescents towards the approaching state of age.

Classic instances are: graceful acceptance of the result by Cicero in *de Senectute*; the superior disregard of death by Epicurus; the Stoic acceptance of the order of Nature by Marcus Aurelius; the pathetic disillusionment about the vanity of all things by the writer of *Ecclesiastes*; the warm sunset afterglow in *Over the Teacups* (1890) of Oliver Wendell Holmes; the frank pessimism of O. R. E. von Hartmann, whose soul finds consolation in a 'philosophy of the unconscious' (*Philosophy of the Unconscious*, Eng. tr., London, 1884); and the sombre passion of the tragically musical dirge of Matthew Arnold, who finds at the close of the act of 'growing old' 'a hollow ghost,' 'immured in the hot prison of the present,' adding 'month to month with weary pain' (*Growing Old*).

Unless there is found some new centre around which later life reconstructs itself, or some old love or present enthusiasm or new hope that springs up, the usual outcome of senescence is a total decline of body and mind. On the pathology of senility there has grown up an extended literature (see *DPhP*, s.v. 'Senescence'; also J. Nötzel, *Über Dementia Senilis*, Zürich, 1895).

(b) *Reversion, or retrogression, leading to a 'second childhood'*.—This theory is a refinement of the preceding through discovering a law which seeks to determine the nature of senescent decline, some of its stages, and its final quality. The law is that the procedure from the period of highest

power, efficiency, and insight of the forties and fifties is the exact reversal, step by step, of the processes of upbuilding from childhood to the height of attainment. A convenient comparison, though something more than a mere analogy, since it suggests a fundamental law of development, is that of the growth of a fruit-bearing tree. It first shows a stalk or trunk, then branches and leaves; soon it bears blossoms without fruit, then fruit, and finally a rising curve of quantity of fruit. The fruitage then begins to decline; then come blossoms without fruit, leaves without blossoms, leafless twigs, twigless branches, and at last only a trunk, which stands as a relic of a departed glory and a symbol of a completed cycle.

There is much in the psychology and the pathology of old age to fortify this law. T. Ribot has shown that in the diseases of the will 'dissolution always follows the inverse order of evolution,' and that 'the complex manifestations of will disappear before the simpler ones, and the more simple ones before automatic activity' (*The Diseases of the Will*, Eng. tr., Chicago, 1896, p. 114). He has demonstrated a similar law in maladies of memory (*Les Maladies de la mémoire*, Paris, 1881, p. 119 ff.). It is a matter of common observation that very old people enjoy most the reminiscences of very early life, and that their memories of childhood are extremely vivid. It is more than a figure of speech that designates extreme old age as a 'second childhood.'

In so far as this law of reversion is true, it is clear that the quality of mentality of extreme age, and of its pathologies, will be determined by the release of those instincts and impulses that are biologically old, and by those tastes and aptitudes peculiar to the early years of each individual.

(c) *Rejuvenescence and the attainment of full spiritual majority.*—The conviction has been rather wide-spread that the maturest wisdom and the highest spiritual satisfactions belong to the closing years of life. Indeed, a considerable number of the world's most productive geniuses have borne testimony to that fact. In early India it appears that the fourth and last stage of life was regarded as the choicest of all periods, and was anticipated with eagerness (Max Müller, *Three Lectures on the Vedānta Philosophy*, London, 1894, pp. 18-20). This notion has been most successfully immortalized in the familiar lines of *Rabbi Ben Ezra*, of Robert Browning.

Are the instances of sober, creative old age the exceptions that prove the rule of senile degeneration, or do they obey a higher law? Is the renewed spiritual serenity that often attends extreme age born out of a gratuitous optimism, or is it the natural flavour of a ripened insight? The answer to these questions has many conditions. Has one by good fortune, or by the grace of a good judgment, found and kept 'the middle way,' 'the golden mean,' 'the straight and narrow way,' that leads progressively onward? The chances are against it. It seems to be the rule that, after the passing of the middle years of productivity, men and women fall into something of a slough of despond. Do they then look backward, and seek to cultivate still the athletic powers, the mental acumen, and the lively sentiments of the glorious middle years of life? That way leads to despair and defeat. Do they, on the contrary, look onward to the pleasures and satisfactions peculiar to old age? Much depends, apparently, on the mental attitude in such matters. Often the secret of deliverance from the valley of discouragement lies in a wrestling of soul, like that of Tolstoi, when he had completed his first successful career, to gain a hold upon the things of permanent worth and value. Then began the real Tolstoi. If one can safely

'cross the dead-line' that lies in the bottom of the valley, then the hills of a higher perfection rise more clearly into view.

There are a good many lines of evidence, apart from the biographical and autobiographical, that there may be a genuine rejuvenescence in extreme age, with a rebirth upon higher levels of mentality.

(1) *Delayed senescence of the central nervous system.*—The central nervous system, the mechanism particularly concerned with mentality, is the most stable tissue of the body. Its cells persist throughout life. It resists exhaustion even at the expense of other tissues. It is the last to give way under starvation. It has a delayed senescence as compared with the rest of the organism. The rest of the bodily functions have been placed progressively, biologically, at the disposal of the brain for a copious supply of blood, to furnish it with nourishment, and to wash it free of toxic products through a generous supply of adrenaline. Towards the close of life the central neural processes become the ruling power in the original democracy of functions.

(2) *Mental rejuvenescence.*—Just as among lower organisms some fragment of the body can be a nucleus for the re-centring of all the life processes in a new young creature true to type, so in a growing individual it is possible for a functionally young part of the mechanism to form a centre of healthy reconstruction, giving a fresh lease of life. So true is this law that Child remarks:

'These experiments leave no basis for the contention that the organism or the cell cannot become young after it has once undergone senescence, and that the only source of youth is an undifferentiated germ-plasm' (p. 179).

The central nervous system, which has resisted most successfully the processes of decline, becomes naturally the centre of reformation. The consequence is a fresh psychic release. From this standpoint one can understand better the successive rebirths after pessimisms of Goethe, who wrote to Zeller in his eighty-third year:

'I am delighted to find that even at my great age, ideas come to me, the pursuit and development of which would require a second life' (for a study of Goethe's old age see Metchnikoff, pp. 270-300).

(3) *Refinement, in the new nucleus, of original endowments.*—It is evident from the foregoing that the secret of senile rejuvenescence, when it occurs, is the formation of a new nucleus of self-hood on higher levels of mentality. It arises in part from the refinement, or 'sublimination,' of native instincts and impulses. In the case of Swedenborg, e.g., the condition of 'crossing the dead-line' and of progressive renewal during later years seems to have been the re-awakening and release, on spiritual levels of his nature, of the two native instincts of self-regard, resulting in a sense of divine leadership, and of sex, which culminated in the passion of 'divine love.' The ingredients which enter into the final complex of refined instincts and secondary characters, that constitute the final 'spiritualized' self-hood, vary greatly in different individuals.

(4) *Enrichments through contact with life and through conservation of experiences.*—Each person at any point in his career is 'part of all he has met.' If the course of his life has proceeded normally, the stream of life widens, the judgments are more tried and trustworthy, the perspective clearer, with each succeeding stage. Even the sub-conscious experiences, from earliest childhood throughout, it has been amply proven, are indelibly stamped upon the character, and are 'conserved' as active elements in later mentality (consult, e.g., Morton Prince, *The Unconscious*, New York, 1914). Furthermore, the processes of selection and rejection, of discrimination and

last have come the species that have burned all bridges behind them, and have depended solely upon the one biologically successful method of reproduction. Up to the time of implicit dependence upon sexual reproduction Nature was more concerned with the amount of life in the world than with its quality. Henceforth she prized quality even at the expense of amount.

There have been many gains from depending exclusively at last upon the accident of sexual reproduction. Important among them is the increased variation among offspring that has resulted from the crossing of strains through mating, and consequently the enrichment of the individual, and also indefinitely greater adaptation from generation to generation. But the supreme advantage has arisen through the complete establishment of the life-cycle ending in old age and death. Out of this single biological fact have radiated innumerable resultants, most of them representing the lines of liberation of essentially all the higher mental and spiritual values that make man that which he distinctively is. Among the gains, in addition to the priceless one of starting each generation with a clean slate and also with the refined and corrected wisdom of the race as its dowry, are the following: the care of offspring, resulting in the spirit of kindness; warm-bloodedness and increased metabolism, with corresponding mental alacrity and acumen; helpless babyhood and lengthened infancy, demanding even greater love, wisdom, and purpose; colonization, in the family and larger groups, and the full birth of sympathy, co-operation, and other social virtues; the habit of adjustment, the habit of learning, the habit of growth, which contain the secret of progress and development. Progressively, among all kinds above the protozoa, terrestrial immortality has been sacrificed for sympathy, intelligence, and appreciation.

Old age, as the termination of the physiological cycle, has gained psychologically in many ways: enrichment to itself, through giving its wisdom back to the rising generation; greater eagerness to make the most of life while it lasts; in facing the fact of change and dissolution the more careful re-evaluation of all values in the quest of the changeless; the intensification of values, as the individual is caught between life and death, between love and sorrow. Other mental compensations centre in the fact of senile rejuvenescence, and will be described below.

3. Causes of old age.—It has ever been one of the lively problems of physiology to determine the direct contributing factors involved in bodily decline. None of the theories seems as yet altogether satisfactory. Most of them are but statements in other words of the fact of senility, or of the accompanying conditions of old age, rather than of underlying causes.

It is due to the wearing out of the organism (Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1897, i. 50-62); to a 'vital ferment' in the organism (O. Bütschli, 'Gedanken über Leben und Tod,' *Zoolog. Anzeiger*, xv. [1892]); to a progressive decrease in the metabolism of the body (A. Bühler, 'Alter und Tod,' *Biolog. Centralblatt*, xiv. [1904]); to 'greater stability of the organism along with decreased dynamic activity' (Child, p. 459); to the incapacity of cells to reproduce for replacement of worn-out tissues (A. Weismann, *Über Leben und Tod*, Jena, 1884, *Das Keimplasma*, do. 1892); to increased cell-differentiation at the expense of recuperation (H. S. Jennings, *Popular Science Monthly*, lxxx. [1912] 563f.); to the increase and differentiation of the cytoplasm of cells at the expense of nuclear substance (C. S. Minot, *The Problem of Age, Growth, and Death*, New York, 1908). There is a bewildering array of other 'causes,' entangling themselves with biological reproduction, chemical inhibitors, colloidal substrata, and auto-catalyzers.

Whatever be the more intimate processes involved, it seems clear that senescence is accompanied by a break-down of the physiological mechanism at some vital spot. It is well known that the

brain substance is intimately concerned in the process (H. H. Donaldson, *The Growth of the Brain*, New York, 1909, ch. xvii.; M. Mühlmann, 'Beiträge zur Frage nach der Ursache des Todes,' *Arch. für Path.* (Virchow), cxv. [1914]) and that it suffers a disappearance of nuclei and a depletion of cytoplasmic substance.

One of the most highly popularized notions is that of E. Metchnikoff (*The Nature of Man*, Eng. tr., London, 1903, *The Prolongation of Life*, Eng. tr., do. 1907). Senility is due, according to Metchnikoff, to the auto-intoxication of the organism through poisoning from the bacteria cultured chiefly (for man) in the superfluous sack, the large intestine. As a result of the poisoning, the phagocytes, or white corpuscles of the blood, are diverted from their normal function of protection against the invasion of harmful bacteria, and themselves attack the tissues of muscles, bones, arteries, and brain, bringing about their final destruction. The theory has found small acceptance so far among biologists. Old age is clearly an older fact biologically than Metchnikoff treats under that caption.

Perhaps the most intimate and minutely critical study of the problem to date is that of C. M. Child. He shows that senescence is relatively independent of sexual reproduction, and that both are organically bound up as utilities within the biological processes, which move rhythmically through a neat balancing of the processes of expenditure and recuperation, of differentiation and dedifferentiation, of progression and regression, combined with an act of rejuvenescence.

'Death is the inevitable end of the process of senescence when regression and rejuvenescence do not occur' (p. 461).

4. Interpretation of the state of age.—As seen and felt from within; what meanings and values really characterize the last years of life? The answers are varied in the extreme. In boldest outline it will be sufficient to mention three types of attitude, the first two more or less fatalistic, the third genial, perhaps idealistic.

(a) *Degeneration*.—The marks of senescence are physiological disintegration and mental decline. This conception draws largely from the two sources of physiology and pathology. It is true in the majority of instances of senility. The various powers or functions do not age equally rapidly among themselves (Minot, p. 249), nor are any two persons alike in the date, rate, or order of weakening. There is, accordingly, a vast variety of spiritual attitudes of senescents towards the approaching state of age.

Classic instances are: graceful acceptance of the result by Cicero in *de Senectute*; the superior disregard of death by Epicurus; the Stoic acceptance of the order of Nature by Marcus Aurelius; the pathetic disillusionment about the vanity of all things by the writer of *Ecclesiastes*; the warm sunset afterglow in *Over the Teacups* (1890) of Oliver Wendell Holmes; the frank pessimism of O. R. E. von Hartmann, whose soul finds consolation in a 'philosophy of the unconscious' (*Philosophy of the Unconscious*, Eng. tr., London, 1884); and the sombre passion of the tragically musical dirge of Matthew Arnold, who finds at the close of the act of 'growing old' 'a hollow ghost,' 'immured in the hot prison of the present,' adding 'month to month with weary pain' (*Growing Old*).

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association, of analysis and synthesis—in short, the gaining of wisdom through experience—go on as truly in the subconscious life as in the conscious. Senescence, accordingly, may enjoy the cumulative wisdom of the years.

As has been indicated, the progress towards extreme age is marked by the progressive suppression, in reverse order, of later acquisitions. The first rejections are, therefore, those things that are relatively secondary, accidental, and accessory; but they have not been weakened until they have poured their riches into the channels of expression and thought that are more primary and fundamental. On the basis of the initial and original, enriched by all later acquisitions, life is simplified and clarified; its wisdom is a disciplined insight into that which has the more abiding worth. The dross is thrown off; 'what remains is gold.'

(5) *Recentring the personal life within the biological norm.*—The return to a 'second childhood,' transfigured and spiritualized, as it now is through its contact with life, is, at the same time, a return to the central highway of racial progress. There is a profound truth in the statement of Havelock Ellis that the progress from childhood to maturity is a growth in degeneration (*Man and Woman*⁵, London, 1914, p. 26). It is equally true that the movement towards normal old age is a progress in the direction of the biologically stable and the psychologically fit.

The foregoing facts, seen in relation, show that the losses in advancing from the sixties to the eighties or nineties, may be so far counter-balanced by gains as to leave a clear profit. An analogy will help. The fineness and accuracy of the special senses improve, on the average, through childhood years, and reach their highest point during the middle teens. From that point on there is a gradual decline in sensory efficiency during the late teens and twenties. Nature has been bartering that sort of skill for the more profitable acquisition of guidance by ideas. Shall we not say that she has, at a much later period, exchanged knowledge for insight, and insight for the appreciation of spiritual values?

The entire meaning of normal senescence, its rejuvenescence, and its transfiguration, is fittingly symbolized in the following confession of Wa-su-Luta, a Sioux Indian of 83 years, that the Rev. Dr. A. McG. Beede, of Cannon Bell, N. Dakota, has allowed the writer to use from his large collection:

'I was getting old,' said Wa-su-Luta, 'I wanted the Living Ones (Woniga) to come to me and give me new life. I was discouraged. I had been a wicked man, worse than men were before the white man came. I went out on to a hill and prayed: "Great Spirit, pity me and make me new before I die." I prayed this over and over until I was discouraged. Then a bird came near me and sang, "Easy, easy, easy." I thought awhile and then I said, "If it is so easy, it must be something that a child may do." So I let the child-man in me come out of me. When I saw the child-man that was there by my side, he looked so sinless and happy that I cried. Then the Living Ones came floating over the hill like undulating zephyrs (Wasieu). New life came into me. I could see Great Spirit's kingdom. I saw His home everywhere in the Earth and Heavens, the same as my grandfather saw it before they initiated him into the White Lodge. I was glad.'

The third, or optimistic, view of old age is clearly more than an apologetic for the seeming richness and serenity of the ripper years. Only a mechanistic or materialistic philosophy could look upon the end of life without finding in it a possible rich compensation. If one combines the conception of old age viewed simply in the personal life with the notion, to which the entire developmental scheme bears much evidence, that, in the world order, spiritual values are being conserved, it is evident why the 'declining years' are so often approached in a spirit of gratitude for their profounder satisfac-

tions, and of renewed consecration to a Higher Wisdom.

LITERATURE.—See the works cited throughout.

EDWIN D. STARBUCK.

OLD AGE (Introductory and Primitive).—
I. Variance of view as to the old.—'There is,' writes Sir Henry Maine,¹ 'a story of a New Zealand chief who, questioned as to the fortunes of a fellow-tribesman long ago well known to the inquirer, answered, "He gave us so much good advice that we put him mercifully to death." The reply, if it was ever given, combines the two views which barbarous men appear to have taken at different times of the aged. At first they are useless, burdensome, and importunate, and they fare accordingly. But at a later period a new sense of the value of wisdom and counsel raises them to the highest honour. Their long life comes to be recognised as one way of preserving experience.'² It seems, however, to be hardly accurate to regard these views as respectively earlier and later in point of time, for in not a few instances they co-exist. It is not the number of their years that determines the position of the aged, but the degree of their weakness and helplessness. So long as they can work and fight, they have little to fear; but, so soon as they become unfitted for these pursuits, longer life is a calamity, unless their family and clan regard the value of their wisdom as outweighing the burden of their support. It is the advance of culture that first ameliorates their lot. But this law of progress, if law it can be called, is subject to many important exceptions. Sometimes the restless nomad, dependent upon scanty means of support, and feeling, by reason of his manner of life, the full weight which the maintenance and conveyance of the sick and old impose upon him, treats them with care and listens to them with respect. And sometimes peoples on a far higher plane of civilization than his neglect, ill-use, and despise them.³ In short, the treatment accorded to old age differs widely in different cases. It is affected by many influences, such as the natural disposition of a people, the circumstances of its daily life, and the nature of its religious views. Sometimes more than one of these elements are found in conjunct operation, and sometimes a diversity of usage prevails among near neighbours or even within a single people.

Thus, certain tribes in Central Africa show every kindness to the aged in order to secure their good will after death, while adjoining tribes cast out their old people as food for wild beasts.⁴ A similar divergence is found among the Banaka and Bapuku—peoples of the Cameroons—who treat old people well, while some of the neighbouring tribes spear or abandon them.⁵ Some of the Namaquas are kindly to the aged and infirm, while others, when they are about to change their camp, put their old fathers and mothers into small enclosures of bushes, with some food and water, and leave them there to die.⁶ Agalo, A. Macenzie,⁷ in writing of the Chippewas, says that the practice of abandoning the old and feeble was not in general use; and a somewhat similar statement is made regarding the Caribs.⁸

2. Respect and kindness towards the old.—By

¹ *Dissertations on Early Law and Custom*, London, 1833, p. 23 f.

² This seems the best explanation of the vast authority which, in the infancy of civilisation, was assigned to assemblies of aged men, independently of their physical power or military prowess' (*ib.* p. 24). Maine cites Freeman as giving 'a long list of honorific names belonging to classes or institutions, which indicate the value once set by advancing societies on the judgment of the old. Among them are, Senate, *γερουσία* (the Spartan Senate), *ἐμπροσθεν* (its Homeric equivalent), *ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀμπαδωτάδους*, Eldorman, Elder, Presbyter, Monsieigneur, Seigneur, Sire, Sir, and Sheikh' (*ib.* p. 23). See art. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.

³ H. Schurtz, *Allerelassen und Männerbünde*, Berlin, 1902, p. 56 f.

⁴ F. S. Arnot, *Garenganze*², London, 1889, p. 78, note.

⁵ S. R. Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern in Afrika und Ozeanien*, Berlin, 1903, p. 41.

⁶ J. Campbell, *Travels in S. Africa*³, London, 1815, p. 423.

⁷ *Voyages . . . through N. America . . . in 1769 and 1793*, London, 1801, p. cxxviii.

⁸ L. de Poirey, *Hist. naturelle et morale des Antilles de l'Amérique*, ed. C. de Rochefort, Rotterdam, 1631, p. 665.

many of the rudest peoples old age is held in high respect.

Among the Andaman Islanders the sick, the aged, and the helpless receive every attention;¹ and in the Nichahars the old are allowed to live out their lives, and are invariably treated with kindness and consideration.² The Patagonians are said to show deference to age;³ and among the Fuegians the word of an old man was accepted by the younger people as law, and his authority was never disputed.⁴ This statement is, however, to be read along with that of Bridges, who says of the Yahgan of Cape Horn that, while they are bound to maintain their aged parents, they often neglect them, and sometimes use them cruelly, and that cases are not unknown in which they have killed them, when they have grown weary of the burden of attending to them.⁵ Von Martius observes that the Botocudos exhibited a tenderness towards helpless age hardly to be expected of them;⁶ while Ehrenreich gives an instance of their neglect of a man totally blind who was left without guidance or assistance to follow the tribe as best he could.⁷ The first duty inculcated upon their children by the Ainu of Japan is deference to parents, a careful regard for their elder brother, and reverence for the old men of their village.⁸ The Kamilaroi youth⁹ and the novices at Tutu and Mahua¹⁰ are instructed to support the old and infirm; and a somewhat similar account is given of the Aetas of the Philippines.¹¹ Respect to the aged is paid by the Bogotos of S. Mindanao,¹² and by the inhabitants of Ceram and many of the islands and archipelagoes described by Riedel;¹³ by the Barea and Kunama,¹⁴ the Jekris¹⁵ and the Wagogo.¹⁶ The Ovambo tend and nurse the old and the crippled;¹⁷ and, among some of the tribes of Togoland, those of the old people who are in poverty or unable to provide for themselves are supported by their relatives.¹⁸ The Malagasy respect the aged, and care for the infirm and the sick;¹⁹ a similar account is given of the Chinooks,²⁰ Botocudos,²¹ and Samoans;²² and the Kurile Islanders treat the aged with reverence.²³ Among the Mandingoes an old man is never found in destitution. They hold it to be a son's duty to provide for his aged father; and, indeed, if a son has lost his father, it is very likely that he will look out for some childless old man, and support and care for him. 'There is no nation,' writes Laing,²⁴ 'with which I am acquainted, where age is treated with so much respect and deference.' The Aleuts provide the sick and old with food when they have nothing of their own, and love and reverence their parents, grandparents, and near relatives. Sons sacrifice their prospects in order to care for them in old age, and it is a thing unheard of that a son or daughter should maltreat a parent.²⁵ Among the tribes of the Caucasus old age is revered. The Ossetes show the strongest love for their parents

and the greatest deference to age.¹ The Circassians treat old people with respect, and whoever insults or maltreats an old man or woman is by law made liable to severe punishment.² Among the Khevsures of Georgia respect for age is required to a degree quite remarkable;³ and to yield it is a universal custom among the Avars, a Lezghian tribe. Indeed, among the latter the will of a parent is so sacred that the child would die rather than disobey.⁴ The Reindeer Chukchis show considerable deference to their old people; and among the coast Chukchis the aged who cannot walk are carried by their relatives.⁵

Deference to the old is in many instances attributable not to reverence for age in itself, but to age and the wisdom, knowledge, and experience which are deemed to be its almost invariable accompaniments.

Thus, Loskiel says of the Iroquois and Delawares that 'age is everywhere respected, for long life and wisdom are regarded as always conneeced';⁶ and, according to Carver, 'the words of the ancient part of the community are esteemed by the young as oracles.'⁷ Among the natives of Toogatahoo old age and its attendant experience are highly respected;⁸ the Eskimos of Behring Strait⁹ and Point Barrow¹⁰ defer to the opinion of the aged, whether men or women; and a very similar account is given of the Veddas of Ceylon.¹¹ Among the Gilyaks the 'old men' of the clan decide questions of cult and clanship. They are the repositories of clan customs, genealogies, and traditions, and in such matters are of high authority.¹² The 'old man' of the Yukaghir, who is generally the oldest member of the community, regulates war and fishing and hunting expeditions, selects the resting-places of the group during its wanderings, sacrifices to the clan ancestor, presides at festivals, and enforces obedience to established custom, while his wife holds a somewhat similar position among the women.¹³ It has been said of the Kurnai that among them 'age was held in reverence, and a man's authority increased with years. If he, even without being aged, had naturally intelligence, cunning and courage, beyond his fellows, he might become a man of note, weighty in council, and a leader in war; but such a case was exceptional and, as a rule, authority and age went together. The authority of age also attached to certain women who had gained the confidence of their tribespeople. Such women were consulted by the men, and had great weight and authority in the tribe. . . . Together with the old men, they were the depositaries of the tribal legends and customs, and they kept alive the stringent marriage rules. . . . thus influencing public opinion very strongly.'¹⁴ The old men get the best food,¹⁵ and, in N. Queensland, they 'have the youngest and best looking wives, while a young man must count himself fortunate if he can get an old woman.'¹⁶ 'There is no such thing as doing away with aged and infirm people; on the contrary, they are treated with especial kindness, receiving a share of the food which they are unable to procure for themselves.'¹⁷ The truth of this tribute and its general applicability to the natives of Australia are amply attested by other authorities.¹⁸

¹ E. H. Man, *On the Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands*, London, 1883, pp. 14, 17, 25.

² Man, 'The Nichahars Islanders,' *JAI* xviii. [1883-89] 385.

³ R. Fitzroy, *Narr. of the Surveying Voyages of H.M.S. 'Adventure' and 'Beagle,' 1826-36*, London, 1839, ii. 172.

⁴ *Ib.* ii. 179.

⁵ T. Bridges, 'Mœurs et coutumes des Fuégiens,' tr. P. Hyades, *BSAP* iii. vii. [1884] 176.

⁶ Cited by P. Ehrenreich, 'Ueber die Botocudos der brasilianischen Provinzen Espiritu Santo und Minas Geraes,' *ZE* xix. [1887] 32.

⁷ Ehrenreich, *loc. cit.*

⁸ J. Batchelor, *The Ainu of Japan*, London, 1892, p. 113 f.

⁹ A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of S.E. Australia*, London, 1904, p. 594.

¹⁰ Cambridge Anthropological
J 210, 214.

¹¹ Islands, London, 1899,
p. 130.

¹² A. Schadenhurg, 'Die Bewohner von Süd-Mindanao und der Insel Samal,' *ZE* xvii. [1885] 9.

¹³ J. G. F. Riedel, *De sluit. en kroesharige rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua*, The Hague, 1886, pp. 102, 152, 192, 250, 335, 370, 404, 433.

¹⁴ W. Munzinger, *Ostafrikanische Studien*, Schaffhausen, 1864, p. 474.

¹⁵ R. V. Granville and F. N. Roth, 'Notes on the Jekris, Sobos, and Ijos of the Warri District of the Niger Coast Protectorate,' *JAI* xviii. [1893] 109.

¹⁶ J. E. Beverley, 'Die Wagogo,' *ap.* Steinmetz, p. 212.

¹⁷ O. J. Andersson, *Lake Ngami*, London, 1856, p. 197 f. Steinmetz gives a similar account of the Banaka and Bapuku, the Msalala, the Ovaherero, the Amahlubi, and several tribes of the French Sudan (pp. 41, 114, 165, 276, 302, 355).

¹⁸ Asmis, 'Die Stammesrechte des Bezirks Atakpame,' *ZFRW* xxv. [1911] 125 f.

¹⁹ J. Sihree, *Madagascar and its People*, London, 1870, p. 187.

²⁰ H. H. Banerott, *The Native Races of the Pacific States of N. America*, London, 1878-79, i. 242.

²¹ Maximilian Prinz zu Wied Neuwied, *Reise nach Brasilien, 1815-1817*, Frankfurt, 1821, ii. 40.

²² G. Brown, *Melanesians and Polynesians*, London, 1910, p. 55.

²³ S. P. Krashennnikov, *The Hist. of Kamtschatka and the Kuril Islands*, tr. J. Griev, Gloucester, 1764, p. 236.

²⁴ A. G. Laing, *Travels in the Timannee, Kooranko, and Soelina Countries in W. Africa*, London, 1825, p. 134.

²⁵ J. Weinaminow, in K. E. von Baer and G. von Helmersen, *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des russischen Reiches*, Petrograd, 1839, i. 189, 206.

¹ A. von Haxthausen, *Transcaucasia*, London, 1854, p. 414 f.

² J. S. Bell, *Journal of a Residence in Circassia during the Years 1837-39*, London, 1840, i. 202; K. Koch, *Reise durch Russland nach dem kaukasischen Isthmus, in den Jahren 1856-58*, Stuttgart and Tübingen, 1842-43, i. 373.

³ C. von Hahn, *Bilder aus dem Kaukasus*, Leipzig, 1900, p. 81.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 179.

⁵ Oxford, 1914, p. 23.

⁶ of the United Brethren
O. I. La Trobe, London,
1794, i. 15.

⁷ J. Carver, *Travels through the Interior Parts of N. America in the Years 1766-68*, London, 1778, p. 242.

⁸ W. Mariner, *An Account of the Natives of the Tonga Islands*, Edinburgh, 1827, ii. 95; J. Wilson, *A Missionary Voyage to the Southern Pacific Ocean, in the Years 1796-98, in the Ship 'Duff'*, London, 1799, p. 362.

⁹ E. W. Nelson, 'The Eskimo about Bering Strait,' *18 RDEW* (1899), p. 304.

¹⁰ J. Murdoch, 'Ethnological Results of the Point Barrow Expedition,' *9 RDEW* (1892), p. 427.

¹¹ P. and F. Sarasin, *Ergebnisse naturwissenschaftlichen Forschungen auf Ceylon in den Jahren 1884-86*, Wiesbaden, 1893, iii. 486 f.

¹² Czaplicka, p. 49; see art. GILYAKS.

¹³ *Ib.* p. 87 f.

¹⁴ Howitt, p. 316. In British Guiana the old women occupy a somewhat similar position (R. Sehomhurgk, *Reisen in Britisch-Guiana, 1840-44*, Leipzig, 1847-48, ii. 320).

¹⁵ E. J. Eyre, *Journals of Expeditions of Discovery into Central Australia in 1840-41*, London, 1845, ii. 385. Howitt (p. 594) tells us that at the Bora ceremony Kamilaroi youths are instructed to support the aged and infirm.

¹⁶ C. Lumholtz, *Among Cannibals*, Eng. tr., London, 1883, p. 163; L. Fison and A. W. Howitt, *Kamilaroi and Kurnai*, Melbourne, 1880, p. 351; G. F. Angus, *Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zealand*, London, 1847, i. 82; Scott Nind, 'Description of the Natives of King George's Sound,' *JRGS* i. [1832] 38 f. J. Gumilla (*Hist. naturelle, civile et économique de l'Amérique*, tr. M. Eidous, Avignon, 1758, i. . . . account of the Othomacos.

¹⁷ *Ib.* pp. 10, 12; K. L. Parker, *The Euahlayi Tribe*, London, 1905, p. 79; Howitt, p. 766; T. L. Mitchell, *Three Expeditions*

3. Influence of nomadic life on treatment of the old.—Eyre observes of the tribes with which he was acquainted that, while the blind and infirm were well treated when young, they were left to perish as soon as age added to the burden of caring for them.¹ This change of attitude has been observed to prevail among many nomadic peoples, and, indeed, is an almost necessary consequence of their habits of life.

Thus, the Sioux and Assinibolins abandoned those who were no longer able to follow the wanderings of their tribe; and it seems that a similar practice was followed by the Minnetarees, Ricaræ, and others, who, when living in settled villages, treated their old people with kindness.² Catlin observes that this custom was common to all the tribes who roamed the prairies;³ it was followed by many of the northern Indians;⁴ and it was found not only among the nomadic Ahts, but among those who were settled on the coast.⁵ In Rotuma the aged were well cared for, but, as soon as they were seized with illness, they were much neglected, and even allowed to die unnoticed;⁶ the Lenguas attend to their old people with care, except in cases of incurable sickness, when, after they have employed in vain every means of cure, they abandon or even strangle them.⁷ The Eskimos of Greenland do not exhibit any pronounced reverence for the aged. They honour them so long as they are able to work, and are subject to their influence if they have sons and were good hunters in their day. Even a woman of advanced years, if she has able-bodied sons, is respected. But, when men or women become too old to take care of themselves, they receive scant consideration, and are sometimes even treated with ridicule.⁸ A similar account is given of the Thonga of E. Africa.⁹

4. Place of the old in tribal ceremonies.—In numerous instances the old people of a tribe take a prominent part in the performance of its ceremonies.¹⁰

Thus Kosa boys, after they have undergone circumcision, are instructed by an old man as to their duties as tribesmen;¹¹ and, in the case of the Larakia tribe near Port Darwin, the old men school the youths on their arriving at puberty in endurance, by imposing on them heavy tasks accompanied with kicks and blows.¹² An old woman plays an important rôle in the puberty rites observed by the girls of the Tanganyika plateau,¹³ and ornaments the marriageable girls of the Ahipones by pricking the skin with thorns and rubbing ashes into the bleeding wounds.¹⁴

into the Interior of E. Australia, London, 1838, ii. 340; art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Australian).

¹ Eyre, ii. 382. See A. Oldfield, 'On the Aborigines of Australia,' *Trans. of the Ethnological Society*, new ser., iii. [1865] 248; J. Dawson, *Australian Aborigines*, Melbourne, 1881, p. 62.

² M. Lewis and W. Clarke, *Travels to the Source of the Missouri River*, London, 1815, ii. 421.

³ G. Catlin, *Letters and Notes on the Manners, Customs, and Condition of the N. American Indians*, London, 1841, p. 216 f.; see art. ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE.

⁴ In writing of the Chippewas, A. Mackenzie (*Voyages*, p. cxxviii) attributes their abandonment of old people to the necessities of a wandering life; J. Long (*Voyages and Travels of an Indian Interpreter and Trader*, London, 1791, p. 74 f.) states that they tomahawked them, thinking that, in so doing, they were sending them to a better country, where their strength would be renewed, and they would be able to hunt again with all the vigour of youth. Cf. S. Hearne, *A Journey to the Northern Ocean*, do, 1795, p. 345 f.; cf. p. 202 f.

⁵ G. M. Sproat, *Scenes and Studies of Savage Life*, London, 1868, p. 256 f.

⁶ J. S. Gardiner, 'The Natives of Rotuma,' *JAI* xxvii. [1893] 408.

⁷ W. B. Grubb, *Among the Indians of the Paraguayan Chaco*, London, 1904, p. 75.

⁸ F. Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, tr. W. Archer, London, 1893, p. 177 f.

⁹ H. A. Junod, *The Life of a S. African Tribe*, London, 1912, p. 211.

¹⁰ E. Torday and T. A. Joyce, 'Notes on the Ethnography of the Ba-Yaka,' *JAI* xxxvi. [1906] 46; K. Endemann, 'Mittheilungen über die Sotho-Negros,' *ZE* vi. [1874] 37; Spencer-Gillen, p. 214 f.; S. Passarge, *Die Buschmänner der Kalahari*, Berlin, 1907, p. 101; J. Macdonald, 'Manners, Customs, Superstitions, and Religions of S. African Tribes,' *JAI* xix. [1889-90] 264 f.; H. Zache, 'Sitten und Gebräuche der Susheli,' *ZE* xxxi. [1899] 61 ff.; R. S. Rattray, *Some Folklore Stories and Songs in Chinaiya*, London, 1907, p. 102; E. Gottschling, 'The Bavenda: a Sketch of their History and Customs,' *JAI* xxxv. [1905] 372 f.; H. S. Stannus, 'Notes on some Tribes of British Central Africa,' *ib.* xl. [1910] 297.

¹¹ G. McCall Theal, *Hist. of S. Africa [1791-1795]*, London, 1888, p. 295.

¹² Spencer-Gillen, p. 331 f.

¹³ C. G. Gouldsbury and H. Sheane, *The Great Plateau of N. Rhodesia*, London, 1911, p. 159 f.

¹⁴ M. Dohrzhoffer, *Account of the Ahipones, an equestrian People of Paraguay*, tr. S. Coleridge, London, 1822, ii. 20 f.

5. Special employments of the old.—In some cases special employments are assigned to the aged when they are no longer able to fight or engage in hard work.

Thus, among some of the Californian tribes the old warrior has to carry as best he can without assistance the game which his son has killed, or is compelled to do menial work under the superintendence of the women.¹ In Ceram the old man who can no longer work acts as the nurse of little children;² and by order of one of the Yncas such a person was employed to scare birds from the crops.³

As to the place of old people in the organization of primitive society see art. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.

6. Contempt and ill-treatment of the old.—In some instances old age is despised.

Thus, among the Hupa, Pomo, and Gallnomero tribes of California the aged were treated with the greatest contumely.⁴ At Tahiti no respect is accorded to old people. They are thrust aside and receive little attention.⁵ In Fiji they excite contempt;⁶ and in some of the Solomon Islands they are, along with the sick, the objects of ridicule.⁷ The Lapps are said to be undutiful to their aged parents;⁸ and a similar account is given of the Yakuts, among whom parents who are decrepit and of feeble understanding are especially the object of ill-treatment.⁹ The Kagoro show little reverence for age except in the case of their chief and an important official (*meakwep*), who administers ordeals and leads them in all sacred ceremonies;¹⁰ the Bechuanas¹¹ and the Indians of British Guiana despise old people.¹²

In some cases the old suffer from mere neglect; in others they are cruelly used, abandoned, or even killed.

By the Kutchins of the Yukon they are simply neglected;¹³ among the Ba-Huana they are often subject to ill-treatment.¹⁴ By the Yahgan of Cape Horn they are often much neglected and even cruelly handled, and, in some instances, they have been killed by their own children who had grown weary of tending them.¹⁵ At Huahine the aged received little attention in illness, many died as much from hunger as from disease, and sometimes, if there was but faint prospect of their recovery, they were clubbed to death, speared, or hurled alive.¹⁶ In the Island of Pines all aged and decrepit persons, and those who were suffering from protracted illness, were either put to death by their relatives or conveyed to one of the small islands and left to starve;¹⁷ and in olden times the Koryaks killed all their aged parents.¹⁸ The Corannas, like the Bushmen, expose their old people to be devoured by wild beasts.¹⁹ The Bechuanas pay so little regard to them that they are sometimes allowed to starve or to be eaten by dogs;²⁰ the Damaras kill useless and worn out people, and even sons smother their sick fathers.²¹ A very similar account is given of the Nukkas,²² and of the Gallnomeros of California.²³ Old age is but little respected among the Thetans of Kokonor. Indeed, it is by no means an infrequent case when the son kills the father who has become a burden.²⁴ At Fazolq on the Blue Nile old people were hurled alive; and the same custom is said to have existed among the Negro

¹ S. Powers, 'Tribes of California,' *Contributions to N. American Ethnology*, Washington, 1877, iii. 118 f., 169.

² Schulze, 'Über Ceram und seine Bewohner,' *ZE* ix. [1877] 121.

³ Garcilasso de la Vega, *Royal Commentaries of the Yncas*, pt. i., ed. C. R. Markham (Hakluyt Society), London, 1869-71, ii. 205.

⁴ Powers, iii. 118 f., 169, 178. Among the southern Californian tribes the youths were taught to venerate old age (*NR* i. 390).

⁵ J. Wilson, *Missionary Voyage*, p. 362.

⁶ T. Williams and J. Calvert, *Fiji and the Fijians*, ed. G. S. Rowe, London, 1853, l. 183.

⁷ R. Thurnwald, 'Ermittlungen über Eingeborenenrechte der Südsce,' *ZVRW* xxlii. [1910] 342.

⁸ J. Scheffer, *The Hist. of Lapland*, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1674, p. 14.

⁹ W. G. Sumner, 'The Yakuts,' *JAI* xxxi. [1901] 76; see Czaplicka, p. 161.

¹⁰ A. J. N. Tremearne, 'Notes on the Kagoro and other Nigerian Head-Hunters,' *JRAI* xlii. [1912] 141, 159.

¹¹ J. Campbell, *Travels in S. Africa . . . a second Journey*, London, 1822, ii. 210.

¹² E. F. im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, London, 1889, p. 224; see Schomburgk, ii. 320.

¹³ *NR* i. 131, note 224.

¹⁴ Torday and Joyce, 'Notes on the Ethnography of the Ba-Huana,' *JAI* xxxvi. [1906] 292.

¹⁵ Bridges, p. 176.

¹⁶ W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, London, 1830, ii. 231 f.

¹⁷ A. Cheyne, *Descrip. of Islands in the W. Pacific Ocean*, London, 1852, p. 8.

¹⁸ Czaplicka, p. 150.

¹⁹ Campbell, ii. 235, 276.

²⁰ *ib.* ii. 210.

²¹ Andersson, p. 187 f.; F. Galton, *The Narr. of an Explorer in Tropical S. Africa*, London, 1853, p. 112.

²² W. C. Grant, 'Description of Vancouver's Island,' *JRGS* xxvii. [1857] 304.

²³ Powers, p. 178.

²⁴ W. W. Rockhill, *The Land of the Lamas*, London, 1931, p. 81. As to Tibetan anthropophagy see below.

tribes south of Kordofan.¹ It is said to be the practice of a dwarfish people in Timor for sons to force their aged fathers to join a foray, and, having slain them in combat, to claim the reward for their heads.²

7. Voluntary death of the old.—The burden of old age is felt in many instances to render longer life so undesirable that the aged ask to be put to death or at all events are content to die at the hands of their relatives.

Among the Payaguas of Brazil men offered themselves to be buried alive when weary of life by reason of old age, decrepitude, illness, or tedium.³ Among the Koryaks death at the hands of their fellow-tribesmen was accepted as the natural end of life;⁴ and in N. America the aged of the prairie tribes acquiesced in their abandonment.⁵ In some of the northern islands of the Solomon group those who are too old to work or fight are put to death, as it seems, with their own consent.⁶ The burying alive of parents who had become burdensome was of almost daily occurrence among the Fijians,⁷ and was understood by the people themselves, who thought they would be vigorous in the

to the west of Hudson Bay those who were too old to support themselves requested their children to strangle them. A grave was dug, in which the old man placed himself, and, when he had signified that he was ready, two of his children strangled him with a tbong.⁸ In Fate, one of the New Hebrides, the aged were buried alive at their own request. It was even considered a disgrace to the family of an aged chief that he should meet his end in any other manner.⁹ A somewhat different account is given of the fate of the old at Malekula, another island of the same group. There a person who is old and decrepit is informed that his or her burial will take place on a certain day. Sometimes he or she is buried alive, and sometimes strangled before burial.¹⁰ In Mota, Pentecost, and Leper's Island the sick and aged are buried alive out of kindness. It is a common thing for them to beg their friends to put them out of their misery.¹¹ The Caribs, at the request of their parents, slew them, believing that they did a good work in delivering them from the weariness and misery of old age. The practice was not, however, a general one.¹² Among some of the tribes of Florida children killed their parents on the ground that they were useless and a burden to themselves, and considered that in so acting they showed a sort of religious and pious affection.¹³ The Hottentots abandon aged and helpless persons, so that they may not linger on in misery.¹⁴ With the Chukchis voluntary death is a regular custom. The old people are killed at their own request by some near relative, or shooting. Before the ceremony is performed, after which no retreat is promised and will be heard the death is the work of evil spirits (*kelet*), and these are escaped by voluntary death; and those who have ended life in this way have the best abode in the future life.¹⁵ This voluntary death is said to prevail among the Eskimos of the Alaskan shore,¹⁶ and was practised by the natives of Kamtschatka¹⁷ and the Yakut.¹⁸

8. Cannibal practices in regard to the old.—In many instances old people are not only killed, but eaten.

The stock instance of this practice is that of the Battak of Sumatra, who, according to Leyden, eat their parents when aged and infirm, not so much to gratify their appetites as to perform a pious ceremony. When a man becomes old and

weary of the world, he is said to invite his own children to eat him. He ascends a tree round which his friends and family gather, and, as they shake the tree, they join in a funeral dirge, of which the import is, 'The season is come, the fruit is ripe, and it must descend.' The old man comes down from the tree and his relatives put him to death and eat him.¹ Yule was told almost exactly the same story of some wild tribes of Arakan.² Oederic says of the Tibetans that they eat their parents out of respect for their memory,³ and Ruhrquius and Carpini gave the same account.⁴ Barbosa gives a like report of certain tribes in the interior of Siam;⁵ and several non-Aryan peoples, such as the Massagetas, the Padai, and the Issedones,⁶ the Birbors of Central India,⁷ and certain wild tribes of Kweichan,⁸ have been credited with the practice. The Samoyedes and Ostiaks themselves admit that formerly old parents unfit for work were killed and eaten by their children in the expectation that after death they would fare better;⁹ a somewhat similar account is given of the Cachibos of Brazil,¹⁰ and the Tupis are said to eat their dead as a last demonstration of affection.¹¹

9. Motives impelling to voluntary death and cannibalism.—Frazer has pointed out that among many peoples the belief prevails that a man will enter upon the future life with precisely the same powers and capacities as those of which he was possessed at the time of his death;¹² and it is to this belief that the practice of voluntary death in use among the Fijians has been attributed.¹³ Another motive to such an act is fear of the contempt which attaches to physical weakness among a nation of warriors;¹⁴ and, no doubt, views such as these may incline old people to acquiesce in or even desire death while still in the enjoyment of health and vigor. On the other hand, those who kill or kill and eat their old people not infrequently represent their practice as an act of kindness, as a pious ceremony, or as an honourable burial.¹⁵ Westermarck, however, observes with great cogency that usages such as these, 'like so many other funeral customs which are supposed to comfort the dead, may be the survival of a practice which was originally intended to promote the selfish interests of the living.'¹⁶

LITERATURE.—In addition to the references cited in the art. see E. Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, London, 1906-08, Index, s.v. 'Old Age'; A. H. Post, *Die Anfänge des Staats- und Rechtslebens*, Oldenburg, 1878, p. 242 f.; *Afrikanische Jurisprudenz*, do. 1887, i. 298 f.; *Studien zur Entwicklungsgesch. des Familienrechts*, do. 1889, p. 337 f.; *Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz*, do. 1894-95, ii. 43 f.; art. ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE, CANNIBALISM, EUTHANASIA, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.

P. J. HAMILTON-GRIERSON.

OLD AGE (American).—I. North America.—The treatment of the aged in N. America seems to have been, on the whole, unfavourable, especially among the barbarous tribes of the Pacific coast.

¹ J. Leyden, 'On the Languages and Literature of the Indo-Chinese Nations,' *Asiatic Researches*, x. [1811] 202.

² H. Yule, *Cathay and the Way Thither*, London, 1806 (Hakluyt Society), i. 100, note 3.

³ *Ib.* i. 150.

⁴ *The Texts and Versions of John du Plano de Carpini and William de Ruhrquius*, London, 1903 (Hakluyt Society), pp. 118, 232.

⁵ Duarte Barbosa, *The Coasts of E. Africa and Malabar . . . in the Beginning of the 16th Century*, London, 1866 (Hakluyt Society), p. 190.

⁶ Herod. i. 216, iii. 99, iv. 26. See O. Schrader, *Reallexikon der indogermanischen Sprachen*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 33.

⁷ *Asiatic Researches*, x. [1811] 202.

⁸ *Asiatic Researches*, x. [1811] 202.

⁹ *Asiatic Researches*, x. [1811] 202.

¹⁰ *Asiatic Researches*, x. [1811] 202.

¹¹ *Asiatic Researches*, x. [1811] 202.

¹² *Asiatic Researches*, x. [1811] 202.

¹³ *Asiatic Researches*, x. [1811] 202.

¹⁴ *Asiatic Researches*, x. [1811] 202.

¹⁵ *Asiatic Researches*, x. [1811] 202.

¹⁶ *Asiatic Researches*, x. [1811] 202.

¹ R. Lepsius, *Letters from Egypt, Ethiopia and the Peninsula of Sinai*, tr. L. and J. B. Horner, London, 1853, p. 202.

² H. O. Forbes, 'On Some of the Tribes of Timor,' *JAI* xiii. [1883-84] 407.

³ R. Southey, *Hist. of Brazil*, London, 1817-19, iii. 619, citing Jaboato, Pream, § 24.

⁴ P. Sartori, 'Die Sitte der Alten- und Krankentötung,' *Globus*, lxvii. [1895] 103, citing G. Kennan, *Tent Life in Siberia*, New York, 1870.

⁵ Catlin, p. 216 f.

⁶ H. H. Romilly, *The W. Pacific and New Guinea*, London, 1897, p. 70.

⁷ J. E. Erskine, *Journal of a Cruise among the Islands of the W. Pacific*, London, 1853, p. 250.

⁸ Williams and Calvert, i. 183; O. Wilkes, *Narr. of the United States Exploring Expedition, 1838-1842*, London and Philadelphia, 1845, iii. 94 f.; J. d'Eves, *China, Australia, and the Pacific Islands in 1855-56*, London, 1857, p. 204; B. Seeman, *Viti*, Cambridge, 1862, p. 103.

⁹ H. Ellis, *A Voyage to Hudson's Bay*, London, 1748, p. 191.

¹⁰ G. Turner, *Samoa a Hundred Years ago*, London, 1894, p. 335.

¹¹ B. T. Somerville, 'Notes on some Islands of the New Hebrides,' *JAI* xxiii. [1894] 6.

¹² R. H. Goddington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 347.

¹³ L. de Polroy, p. 565. ¹⁴ *Ib.* ¹⁵ McCall, *Theal*, p. 90.

¹⁶ Czaplicka, p. 317 f.; H. de Windt, *Through the Gold-fields of Alaska to Bering Straits*, London, 1893, p. 223 f.; W. H. Hooper, *Ten Months among the Tents of the Tuski*, do. 1853, p. 188.

¹⁷ De Windt, p. 225.

¹⁸ G. W. con dem Lande von Kamtschatka, 1774, p. 294.

¹⁹ Czaplicka, p. 101.

3. Influence of nomadic life on treatment of the old.—Eyre observes of the tribes with which he was acquainted that, while the blind and infirm were well treated when young, they were left to perish as soon as age added to the burden of caring for them.¹ This change of attitude has been observed to prevail among many nomadic peoples, and, indeed, is an almost necessary consequence of their habits of life.

Thus, the Sioux and Assiniboin abandoned those who were no longer able to follow the wanderings of their tribe; and it seems that a similar practice was followed by the Minnetarees, Ricaras, and others, who, when living in settled villages, treated their old people with kindness.² Catlin observes that this custom was common to all the tribes who roamed the prairies;³ it was followed by many of the northern Indians;⁴ and it was found not only among the nomadic Ahts, but among those who were settled on the coast.⁵ In Rotuma the aged were well cared for, but, as soon as they were seized with illness, they were much neglected, and even allowed to die unnoticed;⁶ the Lenguas attend to their old people with care, except in cases of incurable sickness, when, after they have employed in vain every means of cure, they abandon or even strangle them.⁷ The Eskimos of Greenland do not exhibit any pronounced reverence for the aged. They honour them so long as they are able to work, and are subject to their influence if they have sons and were good hunters in their day. Even a woman of advanced years, if she has able-bodied sons, is respected. But, when men or women become too old to take care of themselves, they receive scant consideration, and are sometimes even treated with ridicule.⁸ A similar account is given of the Thonga of E. Africa.⁹

4. Place of the old in tribal ceremonies.—In numerous instances the old people of a tribe take a prominent part in the performance of its ceremonies.¹⁰

Thus Kosa boys, after they have undergone circumcision, are instructed by an old man as to their duties as tribesmen;¹¹ and, in the case of the Larakia tribe near Port Darwin, the old men school the youths on their arriving at puberty in endurance, by imposing on them heavy tasks accompanied with kicks and blows.¹² An old woman plays an important rôle in the puberty rites observed by the girls of the Tanganyika plateau,¹³ and ornaments the marriageable girls of the Abipones by pricking the skin with thorns and rubbing ashes into the bleeding wounds.¹⁴

into the Interior of E. Australia, London, 1838, ii. 340; art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Australian).

¹ Eyre, ii. 382. See A. Oldfield, 'On the Aborigines of Australia,' *Trans. of the Ethnological Society*, new ser., iii. [1865] 248; J. Dawson, *Australian Aborigines*, Melbourne, 1881, p. 62.

² M. Lewis and W. Clarke, *Travels to the Source of the Missouri River*, London, 1816, ii. 421.

³ G. Catlin, *Letters and Notes on the Manners, Customs, and Condition of the N. American Indians*, London, 1841, p. 216 f.; see art. ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE.

⁴ In writing of the Chippewas, A. Mackenzie (*Voyages*, p. ccxvii) attributes their abandonment of old people to the necessities of a wandering life; J. Long (*Voyages and Travels of an Indian Interpreter and Trader*, London, 1791, p. 74 f.) states that they tomahawked them, thinking that, in so doing, they were sending them to a better country, where their strength would be renewed, and they would be able to hunt again with all the vigour of youth. Cf. S. Hearne, *A Journey . . . to the Northern Ocean*, do. 1795, p. 345 f.; cf. p. 202 f.

⁵ G. M. Sproat, *Scenes and Studies of Savage Life*, London, 1883, p. 266 f.

⁶ J. S. Gardiner, 'The Natives of Rotuma,' *JAI* xxvii. [1893] 408.

⁷ W. B. Grubb, *Among the Indians of the Paraguayan Chaco*, London, 1904, p. 75.

⁸ F. Nansen, *Eskimo Life*, tr. W. Archer, London, 1893, p. 177 f.

⁹ H. A. Junod, *The Life of a S. African Tribe*, London, 1912, p. 211.

¹⁰ E. Torday and T. A. Joyce, 'Notes on the Ethnography of the Ba-Yaka,' *JAI* xxxvi. [1900] 46; K. Endemann, 'Mittheilungen über die Sotho-Negros,' *ZE* vi. [1874] 37; Spencer-Gillen, p. 214 f.; S. Passarge, *Die Buschmänner der Kalahari*, Berlin, 1907, p. 101; J. Macdonald, 'Manners, Customs, Superstitions, and Religions of S. African Tribes,' *JAI* xix. [1889-90] 264 f.; H. Zache, 'Sitten und Gebräuche der Suaheli,' *ZE* xxxi. [1899] 61 ff.; R. S. Rattray, *Some Folklore Stories and Songs in Chingaiya*, London, 1907, p. 102; E. Gottschling, 'The Bavenda: a Sketch of their History and Customs,' *JAI* xxxv. [1905] 372 f.; H. S. Stannus, 'Notes on some Tribes of British Central Africa,' *ib.* xl. [1910] 297.

¹¹ G. McCall Theal, *Hist. of S. Africa [1791-1795]*, London, 1888, p. 205.

¹² Spencer-Gillen, p. 331 f.

¹³ C. Gouldsbury and H. Sheane, *The Great Plateau of N. Rhodesia*, London, 1911, p. 159 f.

¹⁴ M. Dobrizhoffer, *Account of the Abipones, an equestrian People of Paraguay*, tr. S. Coleridge, London, 1822, ii. 201.

5. Special employments of the old.—In some cases special employments are assigned to the aged when they are no longer able to fight or engage in hard work.

Thus, among some of the Californian tribes the old warrior has to carry as best he can without assistance the game which his son has killed, or is compelled to do menial work under the superintendence of the women.¹ In Ceram the old man who can no longer work acts as the nurse of little children;² and by order of one of the Yncas such a person was employed to scare birds from the crops.³

As to the place of old people in the organization of primitive society see art. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.

6. Contempt and ill-treatment of the old.—In some instances old age is despised.

Thus, among the Hupa, Pomo, and Gallinero tribes of California the aged were treated with the greatest contumely.⁴ At Tahiti no respect is accorded to old people. They are thrust aside and receive little attention.⁵ In Fiji they excite contempt;⁶ and in some of the Solomon Islands they are, along with the sick, the objects of ridicule.⁷ The Lapps are said to be undutiful to their aged parents;⁸ and a similar account is given of the Yakuts, among whom parents who are decrepit and of feeble understanding are especially the object of ill-treatment.⁹ The Kagoro show little reverence for age except in the case of their chief and an important official (*mekwao*), who administers ordeals and leads them in all sacred ceremonies;¹⁰ the Bechuanas¹¹ and the Indians of British Guiana despise old people.¹²

In some cases the old suffer from mere neglect; in others they are cruelly used, abandoned, or even killed.

By the Kutchins of the Yukon they are simply neglected;¹³ among the Ba-Huana they are often subject to ill-treatment.¹⁴ By the Yahgan of Cape Horn they are often much neglected and even cruelly handled, and, in some instances, they have been killed by their own children who had grown weary of tending them.¹⁵ At Huahine the aged received little attention in illness, many died as much from hunger as from disease, and sometimes, if there was but faint prospect of their recovery, they were clubbed to death, speared, or buried alive.¹⁶ In the Island of Pines all aged and decrepit persons, and those who were suffering from protracted illness, were either put to death by their relatives or conveyed to one of the small islands and left to starve;¹⁷ and in olden times the Koryaks killed all their aged parents.¹⁸ The Corannas, like the Bushmen, expose their old people to be devoured by wild beasts.¹⁹ The Bechuanas pay so little regard to them that they are sometimes allowed to starve or to be eaten by dogs;²⁰ the Damaras kill useless and worn out people, and even sons smother their sick fathers.²¹ A very similar account is given of the Nukkas,²² and of the Gallineros of California.²³ Old age is but little respected among the Tibetans of Kokonor. Indeed, it is by no means an infrequent case when the son kills the father who has become a burden.²⁴ At Fazolq on the Blue Nile old people were buried alive; and the same custom is said to have existed among the Negro

¹ S. Powers, 'Tribes of California,' *Contributions to N. American Ethnology*, Washington, 1877, iii. 118 f., 169.

² Schulze, 'Über Ceram und seine Bewohner,' *ZE* ix. [1877] 121.

³ Garcilasso de la Vega, *Royal Commentaries of the Yncas*, pt. I, ed. O. R. Markham (Hakluyt Society), London, 1809-71, ii. 205.

⁴ Powers, iii. 118 f., 169, 178. Among the southern Californian tribes the youths were taught to venerate old age (*NR* i. 390).

⁵ J. Wilson, *Missionary Voyage*, p. 362.

⁶ T. Williams and J. Calver, *Fiji and the Fijians*, ed. G. S. Rowe, London, 1883, i. 183.

⁷ R. Thurnwald, 'Ermittlungen über Eingeborenenrechte der Südsee,' *ZVRW* xxiii. [1910] 342.

⁸ J. Scheffer, *The Hist. of Lapland*, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1674, p. 14.

⁹ W. G. Sumner, 'The Yakuts,' *JAI* xxxi. [1901] 76; see Czapliska, p. 161.

¹⁰ A. J. N. Tremearne, 'Notes on the Kagoro and other Nigerian Head-Hunters,' *JAI* xlii. [1912] 141, 189.

¹¹ J. Campbell, *Travels in S. Africa . . . a second Journey*, London, 1822, ii. 210.

¹² E. F. im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, London, 1893, p. 224; see Schomburgk, ii. 320.

¹³ *NR* i. 181, note 224.

¹⁴ Torday and Joyce, 'Notes on the Ethnography of the Ba-Huana,' *JAI* xxxvi. [1903] 292.

¹⁵ Bridges, p. 176.

¹⁶ W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, London, 1830, ii. 231 f.

¹⁷ A. Cheyne, *Descrip. of Islands in the W. Pacific Ocean*, London, 1852, p. 8.

¹⁸ Czapliska, p. 150.

¹⁹ Campbell, ii. 235, 276.

²⁰ *ib.* ii. 210.

²¹ Andersson, p. 197 f.; F. Galton, *The Narr. of an Explorer in Tropical S. Africa*, London, 1853, p. 112.

²² W. C. Grant, 'Description of Vancouver's Island,' *JRGS* xxvii. [1857] 304.

²³ Powers, p. 178.

²⁴ W. W. Rockhill, *The Land of the Lamas*, London, 1891, p. 81. As to Tibetan anthropophagy see below.

tribes south of Kordofan.¹ It is said to be the practice of a dwarfish people in Timor for sons to force their aged fathers to join a foray, and, having slain them in combat, to claim the reward for their heads.²

7. Voluntary death of the old.—The burden of old age is felt in many instances to render longer life so undesirable that the aged ask to be put to death or at all events are content to die at the hands of their relatives.

Among the Payaguas of Brazil men offered themselves to be hurried alive when weary of life by reason of old age, decrepitude, illness, or tedium.³ Among the Koryaks death at the hands of their fellow-tribesmen was accepted as the natural end of life;⁴ and in N. America the aged of the prairie tribes acquiesced in their abandonment.⁵ In some of the northern islands of the Solomon group those who are too old to work or fight are put to death, as it seems, with their own consent.⁶ The burying alive of parents who had become burdensome was of almost daily occurrence among the Fijians,⁷ and was undertaken at the instance of the old people themselves, who thought that, if they died while vigorous, they would be vigorous in the future life.⁸ Among the Indians to the west of Hudson Bay those who were too old to support themselves requested their children to strangle them. A grave was dug, in which the old man placed himself, and, when he had signified that he was ready, two of his children strangled him with a thong.⁹ In Fate, one of the New Hebrides, the aged were hurried alive at their own request. It was even considered a disgrace to the family of an aged chief that he should meet his end in any other manner.¹⁰ A somewhat different account is given of the fate of the old at Malekula, another island of the same group. There a person who is old and decrepit is informed that his or her burial will take place on a certain day. Sometimes he or she is buried alive, and sometimes strangled before burial.¹¹ In Mota, Pentecost, and Leper's Island the sick and aged are buried alive out of kindness. It is a common thing for them to beg their friends to put them out of their misery.¹² The Caribs, at the request of their parents, slew them, believing that they did a good work in delivering them from the weariness and misery of old age. The practice was not, however, a general one.¹³ Among some of the tribes of Florida children killed their parents on the ground that they were useless and a burden to themselves, and considered that in so acting they showed a sort of religious and pious affection.¹⁴ The Hottentots abandon aged and helpless persons, so that they may not linger on in misery.¹⁵ With the Chukchis voluntary death is a regular custom. The old people are killed at their own request by some near relative, by shooting, or by poisoning.¹⁶ In the case of the Eskimos, the aged are sometimes killed at their own request by some near relative, by shooting, or by poisoning.¹⁷ The natives of Kamtschatka¹⁸ and the Yakut.¹⁹

8. Cannibal practices in regard to the old.—In many instances old people are not only killed, but eaten.

The stock instance of this practice is that of the Battak of Sumatra, who, according to Leyden, eat their parents when aged and infirm, not so much to gratify their appetites as to perform a pious ceremony. When a man becomes old and

weary of the world, he is said to invite his own children to eat him. He ascends a tree round which his friends and family gather, and, as they shake the tree, they join in a funeral dirge, of which the import is, 'The season is come, the fruit is ripe, and it must descend.' The old man comes down from the tree and his relatives put him to death and eat him.¹ Yule was told almost exactly the same story of some wild tribes of Arakan.² Oederic says of the Tibetans that they eat their parents out of respect for their memory,³ and Rührig and Carpi gave the same account.⁴ Barbosa gives a like report of certain tribes in the interior of Siam;⁵ and several non-Aryan peoples, such as the Massagets, the Padari, and the Issedones,⁶ the Bihors of Central India,⁷ and certain wild tribes of Kweichow,⁸ have been credited with the practice. The Samoyedes and Ostiaks themselves admit that formerly old parents unfit for work were killed and eaten by their children in the expectation that after death they would fare better;⁹ a somewhat similar account is given of the Cachibos of Brazil;¹⁰ and the Tupis are said to eat their dead as a last demonstration of affection.¹¹

9. Motives impelling to voluntary death and cannibalism.—Frazer has pointed out that among many peoples the belief prevails that a man will enter upon the future life with precisely the same powers and capacities as those of which he was possessed at the time of his death;¹² and it is to this belief that the practice of voluntary death in use among the Fijians has been attributed.¹³ Another motive to such an act is fear of the contempt which attaches to physical weakness among a nation of warriors;¹⁴ and, no doubt, views such as these may incline old people to acquiesce in or even desire death while still in the enjoyment of health and vigour. On the other hand, those who kill or kill and eat their old people not infrequently represent their practice as an act of kindness, as a pious ceremony, or as an honourable burial.¹⁵ Westermarck, however, observes with great cogency that usages such as these, 'like so many other funeral customs which are supposed to comfort the dead, may be the survival of a practice which was originally intended to promote the selfish interests of the living.'¹⁶

LITERATURE.—In addition to the references cited in the art. see E. Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, London, 1906-08, Index, s.v. 'Old Age'; A. H. Post, *Die Anfänge des Staats- und Rechtslebens*, Oldenburg, 1878, p. 242 f.; *Afrikanische Jurisprudenz*, do. 1887, i. 293 f.; *Studien zur Ethnographischen Geschichte des Familienrechts*, do. 1889, p. 337 f.; *Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz*, do. 1894-95, ii. 43 f.; artt. ABANDONMENT AND EXPOSURE, CANNIBALISM, EUTHANASIA, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION.

P. J. HAMILTON-GRIERSON.

OLD AGE (American).—I. North America.—The treatment of the aged in N. America seems to have been, on the whole, unfavourable, especially among the barbarous tribes of the Pacific coast.

1 J. Leyden, 'On the Languages and Literature of the Indo-Chinese Nations,' *Asiatic Researches*, x. [1811] 202.

2 H. Yule, *Cathay and the Way Thither*, London, 1866 (Hakluyt Society), i. 100, note 8.

3 *Id.* i. 150.

4 *The Texts and Versions of John du Plano de Carpi and William de Rubriguis*, London, 1903 (Hakluyt Society), pp. 118, 232.

5 Duarte Barbosa, *The Coasts of E. Africa and Malabar . . . in the Beginning of the 16th Century*, London, 1866 (Hakluyt Society), p. 190.

6 Herod. i. 216, iii. 99, iv. 28. See O. Schrader, *Reallexikon der indogermanischen Altertumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 33.

7 E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872, p. 220 f.; H. Yule, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, rev. H. Cordier, London, 1903, ii. 293, 298, note 5.

8 Yule, *Marco Polo*, loc. cit.

9 E. Eichwald, *AA* iii. [1868-69] 333, cited by H. Vos, 'Die Verbreitung der Anthropophagie auf den asiatischen Festlande,' *AE* iii. [1899] 71.

10 F. de Castelnau, *Expédition dans les parties centrales de l'Amérique du Sud*, Paris, 1850-59, iv. 389; see J. G. Müller, *Gesch. der amerikanischen Urreligionen*, Basel, 1867, p. 243.

11 Southey, i. 370.

12 GE³, pt. iii. *The Dying God*, London, 1911, p. 11 f. The Mexicans held that those who died of old age went to a land of darkness (F. S. Clavigero, *The Hist. of Mexico*, Eng. tr., London, 1807, i. 242 ff.).

13 Wilkes, loc. cit.

14 Frazer, loc. cit.; H. Hale, *U.S. Exploring Expedition*, Philadelphia, 1846, p. 65 (Fiji); Turner, p. 335 (New Hebrides).

15 P. Kolben, *The Present State of the Cape of Good Hope*, Eng. tr., London, 1731, i. 322 (Hottentots); Hooper, p. 183 f.; Seemann, p. 192; Leyden, in *Asiatic Researches*, x. 202; Yule, *Marco Polo*, i. 293, 298, note 5.

16 *Id.* i. 390.

1 R. Lepsius, *Letters from Egypt, Ethiopia and the Peninsula of Sinai*, tr. L. and J. B. Horner, London, 1853, p. 202.

2 H. O. Forbes, 'On Some of the Tribes of Timor,' *JAI* xiii. [1883-84] 407.

3 R. Southey, *Hist. of Brazil*, London, 1817-19, iii. 619, citing Jahontao, Preface, § 24.

4 P. Sartori, 'Die Sitte der Alten- und Krankentötung,' *Globus*, lxvii. [1895] 108, citing G. Kennan, *Tent Life in Siberia*, New York, 1870.

5 Catlin, p. 216 f.

6 H. H. Ronilly, *The W. Pacific and New Guinea*, London, 1887, p. 70.

7 J. E. Erskine, *Journal of a Cruise among the Islands of the W. Pacific*, London, 1853, p. 250.

8 Williams and Calvert, i. 183; C. Wilkes, *Narr. of the United States Exploring Expedition, 1838-1842*, London and Philadelphia, 1845, iii. 94 f.; J. d'Eves, *China, Australia, and the Pacific Islands in 1855-56*, London, 1857, p. 204; B. Secman, *Viti*, Cambridge, 1862, p. 103.

9 H. Ellis, *A Voyage to Hudson's Bay*, London, 1748, p. 191.

10 G. Turner, *Samoa a hundred Years ago*, London, 1884, p. 335.

11 B. T. Somerville, 'Notes on some Islands of the New Hebrides,' *JAI* xxiii. [1894] 6.

12 R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 347.

13 L. de Poiray, p. 565. 14 *Id.* 15 McCall Theat, p. 90.

16 Czapliska, p. 317 f.; H. de Windt, *Through the Gold-fields of Alaska to Bering Straits*, London, 1893, p. 223 f.; W. H. Hooper, *Ten Months among the Tents of the Tuskis*, do. 1853, p. 188.

17 De Windt, p. 225.

18 G. W. Steller, *Beschreibung von dem Lande von Kamtschatka*, Frankfurt and Leipzig, 1774, p. 204.

19 Czapliska, p. 161.

The Gallineros of California behaved towards the old with utter contempt, forcing even aged warriors to do the most menial work under the supervision of women. Aged parents were killed by the same tribe, and among the Lower Californians the aged were neglected and put to death if ill for a long time. In like manner, the old were abandoned by the Shoshones when they became a nuisance. Turning to the Algonquian and kindred stocks, we find that the condition of the aged was, on the whole, apparently preferable to their lot in the west. It is true that the *Jesuit Relations* represent the Hurons as intending to kill a certain old man, and as abandoning two sick and aged women, whom, however, they were glad to receive back when the Jesuit missionaries succeeded in restoring them to health (*Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents*, ed. R. G. Thwaites, Cleveland, 1896-1901, xx. 239, xxx. 135-137). It is expressly stated that at Three Rivers, Quebec, 'old age and poverty are held in the utmost contempt by the savages' (*ib.* xlv. 128), a condition which is quite analogous to the western Yuma contempt for the aged (H. H. Bancroft, *NR* i. 515). The Jesuit missionary G. Lalemant makes the following statement of the Iroquois near Quebec:

They were accustomed 'to kill their fathers and mothers when they are so old that they can walk no longer, thinking that they are thus doing them a good service; for otherwise they would be compelled to die of hunger, as they have become unable to follow the others when they change their location' (*Jes. Rel.* iv. 189).

Herein lies the clue to the retention of the practice of abandoning or killing the aged among relatively advanced American Indian tribes. It was regarded as an act of mercy, and there is little doubt, in view of the conditions under which these tribes lived, that this view was correct (cf. also T. Waitz, *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1860-77, iii. 116). Honour and respect for the old were by no means unknown, as is clear from the repeated ascription of these virtues to the Hurons, as well as to the Abenakis of New Brunswick (*Jes. Rel.* ii. 212, xiii. 37, xlv. 174), while among the western Koluschans honour towards parents was a duty obligatory on children (H. Ploss, *Das Kind*², Leipzig, 1884, ii. 409).

2. Central America.—Among the sessile population of Central America the aged were held in high esteem. The Zapotecs regarded old age with the utmost reverence (*NR* i. 661), and the ancient Mexicans and Peruvians did equal homage to their elders.

3. South America.—In S. America the aged seem to fare better than in the more rigorous northern part of the continent. Yet their fate is scarcely enviable among tribes such as are described by E. F. im Thurn in Guiana:

'Powerless old age meets with no respect. When old and past work, they are indeed allowed to remain in their hammocks in the houses which once, perhaps, belonged to them, and are fed by their younger relations in a rough and grudging manner; but no further care or kindness is shown to them' (*Among the Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883, p. 224).

The practice of putting the aged to death when hopelessly ill is also known in S. America, even among tribes which hold the old in high honour, so that W. B. Grubb writes:

'The aged are well cared for, no neglect being shown except in cases of incurable sickness, when, after every effort to cure them has been made in vain, they are abandoned, or even suffocated or strangled' (*Among the Indians of the Paraguayan Chaco*, London, 1904, p. 75).

LITERATURE.—See the authorities cited throughout.

LOUIS H. GRAY.

OLD AGE (Chinese).—Among the innumerable mottoes expressive of hopes and good wishes which are to be seen pasted over the doorways of Chinese houses none is commoner than a scroll consisting

of four characters which mean 'May this house be visited by the Five Blessings.' These blessings are long life, worldly prosperity, health, love of virtue, and a natural death. The first is popularly regarded as the most important; for the others, as the practical Chinese mind argues, necessarily presuppose the maintenance of life, and, so long as life lasts, there is always room for hope that the other blessings will be added.

The conviction that a long life is eminently desirable is carried to its logical result in that reverence for age which is perhaps one of the most remarkable and beautiful characteristics of the Chinese people. In no country in the world are the aged treated with more courtesy, respect, and deference than in China.

Among the Chinese reverence for age is essentially connected not merely with the traditions of social practice, but also with ethical theory. All the Confucian classics lay emphasis on the duty of treating the aged with respect. The 'Book of Rites' tells us that the ethical standards of the Yü, Hsia, Yin, and Chou dynasties were not identical in respect of all the things which they held in honour; but that, whereas virtue was honoured by the Yü sovereigns, rank by the Hsia, riches by the Yin, and kinship by the Chou, all four dynasties gave honour to old age.¹ Mencius says that 'the proper object of the loyalty of virtuous men is the prince who knows how to provide for the welfare of the aged.'² King Wên, to whose efforts the foundation of the Chou dynasty (12th cent. B.C.) was mainly due, was regarded as a model prince, because (among other reasons) he was one of those who 'knew how to provide for the welfare of the aged.' Mencius observes that 'the people whom we described as starved and famished are those who lack food, and warmth, but among the subjects of King Wên there were no old people to whom food and warmth were lacking.'³ Confucius himself is said to have declared that one of his chief desires was to secure rest and peace for the aged.⁴

The 'Book of Rites' gives instances of the manner in which the royal sages of olden times proved their moral worthiness by their respect for old age. Among persons of the same rank at court precedence was accorded to the eldest. Aged ministers and officials were granted various special privileges. Under the rule of these kings 'residents in the country took their places according to their age, and the old and poor were not neglected, nor did the strong come into collision with the weak.'⁵ After the royal hunting expeditions the largest share of game went to the aged. When the king gave audience to a minister who was seventy years of age, the minister was privileged to sit in the royal presence. If the king wished to consult a minister or ex-minister who had attained a very great age, it was unnecessary for the latter to come to court; the king himself would go to his house and would bring the old man presents of delicate food.⁶ When the king went forth on ceremonial journeys, or to perform the customary rites at the sacred mountains, he would make inquiries about the local princes and chiefs who had reached extreme old age, and would visit them in their own homes.⁷

A certain amount of scepticism as to whether the monarchs of ancient China were really in the habit of treating old men with all these marks of

¹ *SBE* xxviii. [1885] 229 f.

² J. Legge, *Chinese Classics*, Hongkong, 1861-72, II.2 (Oxford, 1895) 461. The tr. here given is not verbally identical with Legge's. Cf. also p. 803 f.

³ *ib.* II.2 462.

⁴ *SBE* xxviii. 230.

⁵ *ib.* xxvii. [1885] 241, 465, xxviii. 232.

⁷ *ib.* xxvii. 216, xxviii. 232.

⁴ *ib.* I. 193.

deference is perhaps permissible. But it is easy to see why the early recorders of law and custom in China should have attributed such conduct to the semi-mythical sovereigns of the Chinese 'golden age.' Just as the Hebrews and other ancient peoples enormously enhanced the influence and prestige of their moral codes by attributing them to divine inspiration or to 'the finger of God,' so the old Chinese moralists sought to sanctify the highest ethical ideals and principles known to their own race by tracing them to the almost supernatural wisdom and virtue of their ancient holy kings. In describing what was assumed to have been the ethical standard of the royal founders of Chinese civilization, the moralists aimed at setting an ideal before the rulers and people of their own time. They always professed not to be inculcating a new or a higher morality than that hitherto practised, but to be merely reaffirming the teachings of past ages. Confucius himself repudiated all claims to originality: he was no innovator—merely a 'transmitter.'

Whatever may have been the true history of the origin and development of the moral ideas of the Chinese, we have ample evidence that reverence for age has been one of their most conspicuous and characteristic moral qualities from the earliest days of which we have authentic record. This reverence was by no means confined in its manifestations to acts of a merely ceremonial nature. That it also had a thoroughly practical side is shown in the legal provision which exempted (and still exempts) old men from severe forms of punishment in the law-courts.¹ Under the semi-socialistic system of ancient China tenderness for age is also shown in the acceptance by the State of full responsibility for the proper care and nourishment of old people. There were several classes of persons who received regular subsistence-allowances. Among these were young orphans, childless old men, old widowers, and old widows. Chinese sympathy and charity were not, indeed, directed towards the alleviation of the needs of only these; for provision was also made for the dumb, deaf, lame, blind, crippled, and deformed, and for supernannuated government officials and the parents and grandparents of those who had died in their country's service.² But it was in connexion with the needs and claims of the aged that the State regulations reached their highest degree of elaboration. The old-age pensions were paid in kind, not in money; they consisted, however, not merely of grain and other food-stuffs, but also of various useful articles, such as benches and walking-sticks.³ We are told of a very remarkable custom whereby the aged pensioners were entertained as guests of the State in the government schools.⁴ Thus the very young and the very old were brought together in circumstances which cannot have failed to strike the youthful imagination and to exercise a highly beneficial influence on the development of the moral sentiments. That children should treat their elders with respect was, indeed, impressed upon them by their schoolmasters in the ordinary course of the scholastic routine.

'Let careful attention,' says Mencius, 'be paid to education in schools. Above all, let emphasis be laid on the filial and fraternal duties. If that is done properly, we shall not see, on our public roads, grey-haired old men carrying burdens on their backs or on their heads.'⁵

¹ This is referred to in the 'Book of Rites' (*SBE* xxvii. 66); but it is also a well-known provision of the criminal law. The exemption is not, of course, absolute; but, even when convicted of murder, old men have been treated with extraordinary leniency (see E. Ahabaster, *Notes and Commentaries on Chinese Criminal Law*, London, 1899, pp. 93 f., 103).

² See *SBE* xxvii. 240-244, 444 f.; and E. Biot, *Le Tchou-Li*, Paris, 1851, i. 82 f., 287, 411.

³ *SBE* xxvii. 257 f.

⁴ *Id.* xxvii. 242; see also Legge, ii. 243 (footnote).

⁵ Legge, ii. 213 f.; see also p. 149.

But the impression made on youthful minds by the striking example set them by the State itself in its public demonstrations of respect for age must have been far deeper and more lasting than any which can have been made by the mere force of pedagogic precept. The 'Book of Rites' tells us that the king personally presided at the entertainment of the pensioners and superintended the distribution of food and drink.¹ No doubt these duties were, in practice, usually carried out by deputy; in any case the royal share in the proceedings would necessarily become, or tend to become, formal or symbolical. It may be compared, perhaps, with that venerable custom whereby the emperor of China ploughed three furrows in front of the Altar of Agriculture, thus setting an example of industry to his people and dignifying the labours of the millions who toil in the fields.

Seventy was the age at which officials were entitled to claim release from the cares of office.² When the ex-official reached the age of eighty, one of his official friends was released from public duties for the express purpose of attending on him. When he attained his ninetieth year, all members of his family employed by government were allowed unlimited leave of absence so that they might devote themselves to the old man's welfare.³

The Chinese moral code contains various rules and suggestions as to the etiquette which should govern the relations between old and young.

We are told, e.g., that a man should treat those who are twice as old as himself with the same kind of deference as he would show to his father, and he should treat one who is ten years older than himself as he would treat an elder brother. In the company of one who is senior by five years he should not walk abreast with him, but a little way behind him. When a group of men of various ages are sitting together, the eldest should be allowed to take the seat of honour.⁴ If an old man and a young man are walking together, and each carries a burden, the young man should take the old man's burden in addition to his own, if he is physically able to do so; if he is not able to carry both burdens, he should carry the heavier of the two. An elderly man should not be expected or allowed to carry a burden which is too heavy to be carried in one hand.⁵ When a death occurs in a family, the aged survivors are not expected to carry out the full rites of mourning. This is because the privations and fasts which are necessary in the case of young mourners might be injurious to an old man's health.⁶

Though the attainment of old age is regarded as a matter for congratulation, it is necessary to avoid direct and pointed references to the advanced age of those whom one is addressing. In this matter tact and discretion are as necessary in China as they are in Europe; and only long experience of Chinese social conventions, and a delicate appreciation of the circumstances of each individual case, will save the well-meaning European from unconsciously offending against Chinese canons of good taste. The 'Book of Rites' tells us that, when a man is addressing his parents, he must not remind them of their age;⁷ and in the 'Twenty-four Examples of Filial Piety' this precept is illustrated in somewhat grotesque fashion by the story of the elderly man who, in order to divert the thoughts of his venerable parents from decay and death, played and gambolled in their presence as though he were still the darling of their early wedded life.⁸ But old age has been treated by poets and essayists in a much more serious manner than this; and, indeed, a very attractive anthology might be made of the graceful and touching utterances of Chinese writers on the different aspects of this subject. If they love to dwell on the tranquillity and beauty which mark the evening of a

¹ *SBE* xxviii. 231 f.

² *Id.* xxvii. 241, 466, 470.

³ *Id.* xxvii. 466. Similar rules applied in the case of the blind.

⁴ *Id.* xxvii. 63 f., 73 f., 76 f.

⁵ *Id.* xxvii. 244; cf. xxviii. 230.

⁶ *Id.* xxvii. 83; cf. xxviii. 439 f., and Legge, iv. pt. ii. 473, 475.

⁷ *Id.* xxvii. 63.

⁸ See *The Book of Filial Duty*, tr. Ivan Chén, in the 'Wisdom of the East' series, London, 1908, p. 40.

well-ordered life, they do not ignore the weariness and pain, the vain regrets and wistful longings, from which old age is rarely free. 'Dust thou art and unto dust shalt thou return' is a truth which the religious and ethical teachers of China make no attempt to conceal; indeed, they themselves have given expression to it in precisely the same language.¹

The Chinese ideograph which stands for 'long life' or 'old age' is very frequently brought into artistic association with that which stands for 'happiness.' These two characters have been written in innumerable fanciful ways, for artistic reputations can be won and lost, in China, by the degree of skill or ingenuity which a calligraphist displays in his treatment of these almost sacred symbols. The Chinese, as is well known, regard their wonderful system of ideographic writing with feelings akin to reverence; but among all the thousands of existing characters none occupies a more exalted place in popular esteem than the two which stand for 'long life' and 'happiness.' They meet the traveller's eye wherever he goes, though sometimes they are so fantastically written as to be almost unrecognizable. He will find them carved on the rugged boulder that crowns the summit of some sacred mountain—and will learn, perhaps, that they reproduce in facsimile the handwriting of some famous calligraphist of a thousand years ago; and he will find them embossed on the buckles and napkin-rings that are manufactured for Western 'globe-trotters' by the Chinese silver-smiths of to-day.

But it is not only in the written ideographs that the ideas of long life and happiness find artistic expression. Many evergreen trees are regarded as symbolical of longevity, and a fir-tree with snow upon its branches is an emblem of a happy and serene old age. Similar ideas are associated with the bamboo. Among animals the crane and the tortoise are universally recognized in China as emblematic of longevity and immortality. These animals frequently appear in the paintings and embroideries which are presented to old people on their birthdays and other anniversaries. When used in this symbolic way, the tortoise is often represented as having a row of tails. This is based on an old fancy that, until a tortoise passes its hundredth year, it possesses only one tail, but that by the time it has reached the age of a thousand it has ten tails. Perhaps it might be a difficult task to disprove this.

The Chinese reverence for age rests to a great extent on the sound principle that there is no period of human life which cannot furnish its appropriate contribution towards the development of the complete man. That character is something which each man builds up for himself throughout the whole course of his life is a belief which is no less clearly recognized by Confucianism than it is by modern psychology in the West. Old age is revered in others and desired for oneself; for it is believed by the Chinese that the normal lifetime of a man, from childhood to old age, is no longer than is necessary for the full realization of a man's moral and spiritual capacities. The Chinese divide life into various stages, and it is not till he has arrived at the age of sixty that a man is supposed to have reached the stage of moral and intellectual development that entitles him to be described as a person of 'wisdom and experience.'²

¹ The passage occurs in a Chinese commentary on the 'Book of Rites.' *Hsing shêng yü t'u erh fan yü t'u*, 'the body takes its rise from the earth and will return to the earth.' The Chinese say that, when the white hair turns yellow (in extreme old age), this is a sign that the bodily organism (*hsing*) is about to return to the place whence it sprang (its *pên*, or origin)—namely, the earth; for yellow is the colour with which, in China, earth is symbolically associated.

² *SBE* xxvii. 65 f., 478 f.

The Confucian conception of the normal stages of moral growth, under the most favourable conditions, may be learned from a well-known passage in the *Analeets*, which tells us that Confucius, at the age of fifteen, was bent on acquiring knowledge; at thirty he 'stood firm'; at forty he had 'no doubts'—i.e., he had tested his own capacities and had defined his relationship to the world; ¹ at fifty he 'knew the decrees of heaven'—i.e., he had developed the spiritual side of his nature; at sixty his ears were 'attentive to the truth'; at seventy he could follow the impulses of his heart without going wrong.² As Confucius died at the age of seventy-two, we find from this analysis that the development of his character was practically continuous throughout all the years of his life. From the biographical point of view, the passage is not without interest; but it is valuable mainly as an early and instructive example of introspective psychology, and as implying a recognition by the Chinese of the important fact that no period of human life—not even the period of physical decay—is necessarily unprogressive or sterile. It is not till he has safely arrived at the haven of old age—an old age that has been preceded by strenuous and continuous moral activity—that man can hope (theoretically at least) to 'follow the impulses of his heart without going wrong.'³

Confucian psychology in this respect is by no means contradicted by that of 20th-century Europe. William MacDougall describes how, after repeated moral conflicts, resulting in the acquirement of 'the irresistible strength of a fixed and consolidated habit' of right doing, the self may come 'to rule supreme over conduct.' The individual has at least the potential capacity of rising above moral warfare; 'he attains character in the fullest sense and a completely generalized will, and exhibits to the world that finest flower of moral growth, serenity.'⁴ It is interesting, in the same connexion, to note that the crowning spiritual experience of some of the Christian mystics seems to have been a sense of complete liberation from the state of moral unrest and strife.

'"La guerra è terminata," all the energy of a strong nature flows freely in the new channels, and modification ceases, mechanically, to be possible to the now unified or "regenerated" self,' writes E. Underhill, with special reference to the case of St. Catherine of Genoa.⁵

In spite of the fact that many of the customs recorded in the 'Book of Rites' have long been obsolete, the moral sentiments of the Chinese with regard to old age have undergone no material alteration. The modifications which have taken place in outward observances may be traced to a variety of causes, of which the most important is the crystallization of the rules and duties relating to the cult of ancestors. If in normal circumstances the State no longer provides for the necessities of old men and women, this is because the care of the aged is a responsibility which is assumed as a matter of course by sons and other relatives. The State recognition of the mutual claims and responsibilities of parents and sons is illustrated in a striking way by the frequent reduction or remission of sentences imposed on criminals on the ground that the accused persons were the sole support of their aged parents. Such pleas are often advanced in the law-courts, and always receive careful con-

¹ We are told on Confucius's authority that 'a man who is unpopular at forty will always be unpopular'—i.e., that such further development as may take place after that age will proceed along lines which have been already laid down (*Legge*, i. 320).

² See *Legge*, i. 146 f.

³ Confucius realized, of course, that old age is liable to certain moral perils which may be regarded as peculiarly its own. He pointed to poverty as one of these (*ib.* p. 313).

⁴ *Social Psychology*, London, 1913, pp. 261-263.

⁵ *Mysticism*, London, 1912, p. 264; see also W. B. Inge, *Personal Idealism and Mysticism*, do. 1907, p. 16.

sideration.¹ The ethical basis of the Chinese social system is filial piety, and the duties and obligations as well as the rights and privileges of every member of a Chinese family are so clearly defined and so rarely repudiated that only in quite exceptional circumstances (such as those brought about by famine, plague, floods, earthquakes, and war) are old men and women liable to become dependents on private charity or the bounty of the State.

'If it be objected,' writes an English-educated Chinese student of sociology, 'that the burden of the family drags down individuals from self-development, at least it is true that publicly organized relief is a much less urgent problem with us than it is in England.'²

It may not be out of place to mention that in the territory of Wei-hai-wei, now under British rule, there is not, among the 150,000 inhabitants, a single individual who requires to look elsewhere than to his or her own family-group for the means of support in old age.

Young China is showing many signs of restiveness under the social and ethical restraints of the old order, and it is not unreasonable to question whether respect for old age will, in the future, be as conspicuous a feature of the Chinese character as it has been in the past. Fortunately, however, the old ways have not yet fallen into oblivion, and even among the ardent young patriots of the New China there are many who believe that the regeneration of their country is not by any means contingent upon the wholesale surrender of all that has contributed to China's moral greatness in the past.

As an interesting indication of President Yuan Shih-k'ai's determination not to give up the old customs whereby public homage was rendered to virtuous old age, we may cite a Presidential mandate which was published in Peking as recently as 6th Jan. 1915.

This mandate refers to the fact that the mother of Lieut-General Liu Hsien-heng had reached the age of one hundred years. This lady, it continues, is noted for her admirable personal qualities and for the unwearying devotion which she showed in the education of her distinguished son. In spite of her advanced age, it is gratifying to learn that her health and good spirits are by no means impaired. 'She is indeed a person of whom the State may well be proud.' The mandate concludes by specifying the honours that are to be conferred upon the old lady. These are to include a *pien* (honorific tablet) bearing the four characters *Shu T'z' Ch'ü Nien*, 'Womanly Virtue and Venerable Age.' This tablet is to be hung on the walls of her home as a perpetual token of the State's recognition of her virtues and in commemoration of her attainment of a great age.

It will be noticed that in this mandate (which is typical of multitudes of similar decrees that have been issued by Chinese emperors in past centuries) emphasis is laid, not merely on the age of the person concerned, but also on the fact that her life has been well spent. That the good sometimes die young is a lamentable fact which the Chinese know as well as we do; but they love to think that a virtuous life receives its appropriate reward in a serene and happy old age; and nothing gives greater satisfaction to their ethical sensibilities than the contemplation of cases in which the ideal combination of exalted virtue and great age has been attained in real life. Thus it is that many of the virtuous kings of ancient times are credited with abnormally long lives.³ Even in later and more degenerate times it was supposed that the proper span of a good man's life was a hundred years. It is largely because a long life is believed to be one of the rewards of virtue that the funeral of an old man (especially if he has left behind him a large and prosperous family of descendants) is

regarded as a congratulatory festival rather than as an occasion for sorrowing and condolence.¹

There is a story told of an elderly English admiral who, while walking with a fellow-countryman in the streets of Canton, unexpectedly found himself surrounded and threatened by an excited and turbulent mob of anti-foreign Chinese. Acting on the suggestion of his companion, who knew the Chinese character, the admiral removed his hat and displayed his grey locks; whereupon the angry crowd immediately fell back in abashed silence, and the Englishmen proceeded on their way unharmed.

This story may be apocryphal; but, so long as the telling of such stories in illustration of the Chinese character continues, as at present, to be deserved by the Chinese people, it will be impossible for Western critics to withhold from the civilization of China a high tribute of respect and admiration.

LITERATURE.—This has been indicated in the article.

R. FLEMING JOHNSTON.

OLD AGE (Greek).—The ordinary Athenian view of old age is well summed up by the aged Kephalos at the opening of Plato's *Republic*:

'Old men flock together; they are birds of a feather, as the proverb says; and at our meetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is—I cannot eat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away: there was a good time once, but that is gone, and now life is no longer life. Some of them lament over the slights which are put upon them by relations, and then they tell you plaintively of how many evils their old age is the cause' (*Rep.* 320A, tr. B. Jowett, Oxford, 1881).

The speaker indeed goes on to say that the real cause of this discontent lay not in old age *per se*, but in the individual character (doubtless Plato's own view), and the testimony of the aged poet Sophocles is quoted in witness of the blessed calm and freedom of old age from the tyranny of the passions; but Greek literature of all periods is far too thickly strewn with obviously sincere dispraise of age to permit us to doubt that it was wholly hateful to the average Greek. No Greek writer has surpassed Sophocles himself, the *Republic* notwithstanding, in the bitterness of his references to old age—and that in the latest of his tragedies:

'For when he hath seen youth go by, with its light follies, what troublous affliction is strange to his lot, what suffering is not therein?—envy, factions, strife, battles and slaughters; and, last of all, age claims him for her own,—age, dispraised, infirm, unsocial, unfriended, with whom all woe of woes abides' (*Ed. Col.* 1230 ff., tr. R. C. Jebb, Cambridge, 1900).

At the other end of the scale, Aristotle, in a long passage unrivalled for the cruel ruthlessness of its characterization, gives a picture of old age in the same pessimistic style (*Rhet.* ii. 13=1389^b 13). An 'ingrained horror against the condition of life which destroys beauty and mars enjoyment,'² and the haunting thought of the two inevitable demons (Keres [*g.v.*] of Age and Death, ever waiting in the background of life, came near to poisoning the springs of happiness for the Greeks.³ The vanishing of youth like a sunbeam, and the pains of age (*frag.* i. 5: *δδυστηρόν γῆρας*; v. 5: *ἀργαλέον καὶ ἀμορφόν γῆρας*) which make a man ugly (*αἰσχρόν*) and wretched (i. 6), and death more tolerable than life (ii. 10), is the burden of Mimmemos. Even Aeschylus hardly finds anything better to say of a man stricken in years than that 'his leaf is withered, and with his three feet he wanders weak as a child, a day-lit dream' (*Agam.* 79 ff., tr. A. W. Verrall, London, 1889). Euripides in the same vein contrasts youth and age in a great ode that sounds like the swan-song of his own golden youth (*Herc. Fur.* 637 ff.). For Pindar, the poet of the 'delightful things in Hellas' (*τὰ περὶνὰ ἐν Ἑλλάδι*), the very heart of life lay in wealth, strength, and

¹ On this subject see DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Chinese), vol. iv, p. 451 § 10.

² Mahaffy, *Social Life in Greece from Homer to Menander*, p. 249.

³ Cf. Theog. 767: *τηλόδ' ἀπὸ κῆρας ἀμύται, | γῆρας τ' οὐδ' ἀμεινον καὶ θανάσιον τέλος*. See the vase in the Louvre (Pottier, *Cat.*, no. 343; figured in J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge, 1903, p. 174), in which Herakles with his club is about to beat out the brains of a shrivelled ugly little figure, labelled *Γῆρας*, which leans on a stick.

¹ For the legal usages in this matter see Alabaster, pp. 103-106.

² P. L. K. Tao, 'The Family System of China,' in *Sociological Review*, Jan. 1913.

³ For statements to this effect cf. the *Shu King* (Legge, vol. iii, pt. 1, pp. 25 and 51, pt. ii, p. 4661.); cf. also *SBE* xxvii. 344, and Wang Ch'ung, *Lun Heng*, tr. A. Forke, i. (London, 1907) 818-817, 825 f.

beauty, and in 'glorious-limbed youth' (ἀγλαόθυμος ἦβα [*Nem.* vii. 5]). The Athenian Solon really stands on the same plane, in his definition of the happy man as one who is 'whole of limb, free from disease, a stranger to misfortune, happy in his children, and comely to look upon, and who shall also end his life well' (Herod. i. 32).¹

In a word, the ancient Athenian knew little of the art of growing old gracefully;² nowhere is Greek literature so querulous, so wanting in dignity, as in dealing with age and its disabilities; while, conversely, the glory of youth, especially in its purely physical aspect, is the dynamic impulse of Greek art in all its forms, especially in sculpture. Mimermos prays that free of disease and sorrow he may die at the age of sixty years. We are not surprised to read that the old people of Keos, when they reached the age of sixty or upwards and felt their powers decaying, put themselves quietly out of the way with a draught of hemlock—being indeed compelled by law to do so, in order that there might be a sufficient maintenance left for others, and that they themselves might not suffer from sickness and weakness of extreme old age (Strabo, p. 438: προσέταρτε γὰρ, ὡς εἴκεν, ὁ νόμος τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἑξήκοντα ἔτη γεγονότας κωνεῖν ἑσθαι καὶ τοῦ διαρκεῖν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὴν τροφήν. And see the story there told in reference to τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους. Cf. *Ælian, Var. Hist.* iii. 37; *Heraci. Pont.* in Müller, *FGH* ii. 215).

It seems clear that, while the Athenians, in theory, respected and honoured the old, the facts of life were hardly in harmony with theory.³ Thorough, and perhaps supersensitive, humanists as they were, the actual objective aspect of old age seems to have been repulsive to them; involving, as a rule, enfeebled powers of enjoyment of most forms of social intercourse, it was *per se* a hateful thing, and its victims were regarded with at best a half-contemptuous tolerance as living a very death in life.⁴ Notwithstanding some examples and utterances in a contrary sense (e.g., in literature, the tendence of *Œdipus* by *Antigone* [*Soph. Œd. Col.* 347f.: δέλεοι ἡμῶν δύσμορος πλανωμένη, γερωνταγωγεί]), the general sentiment and conduct towards the aged, in historical Athens, fell far short of that kindliness which must be regarded as a touchstone of social progress, a derivative of that whole attitude towards the weak and the helpless, the young and the suffering, which is one of the prime distinctions between modern and ancient times. The truth is that under the strenuous conditions of ancient life, in which one must be either hammer or anvil, there was but little room for the claims that might be urged by age on the ground of long and varied experience; and this impatience of age in the political sphere reacted upon the general social conception, being reinforced also by that intense selfishness which so deeply stained the national character.

In this respect, as in most other things, Sparta stood in conspicuous contrast with Athens; and, while Athenians did not hesitate to applaud the Spartan practice as a matter of principle, they made little attempt to imitate it—for all their own altar of Compassion in the Agora (cf. *Xen. Resp. Lac.* x. 8: καὶ γὰρ τὸ πέντον θαυμαστάτατον ἐπαυνοῦσι μὲν πάντες τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιτρέψματα, μισοῦσι δὲ αὐτὰ οὐδεμία πόλις ἐθέλει).⁵ There lies probably some deep significance behind the fact that it was in Sparta that honour to the aged as such was a fundamental of the social system (cf. *ib.* x. 2: θεῖς γὰρ τοὺς γέροντας κυρίου τοῦ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγῶνος διεπράξεν ἐντιμώτερον εἶναι τὸ γῆρας τῶν ἀκαζόντων ῥώμης). Herod. ii. 80 remarks that Egypt and

Sparta agreed in the respect paid to age; it evidently struck him as very strange. Here we may recall the hackneyed anecdote of Cicero (*de Senect.* xviii. 63f.) of the aged man to whom the Lacedæmonian ambassadors in the Athenian theatre offered a seat—and brought down the house—*disixisse ex his quendam, Athenienses scire quare recta essent, sed facere nolle.* For the respect paid to the old by the young in Sparta see the anecdote in *Plut. Lyc.* 15.

Perhaps the early decay of respect for the aged is in part traceable to the fiery experiences of the migratory age, which must have destroyed many of the finer elements in civilization (cf. G. Murray, *Rise of the Greek Epic*, p. 101). Partly also, perhaps, it was a natural result in military societies, where with decay of bodily powers practical fighting value disappeared—the universally recognized limit of age for active military service in Greece was sixty years. How far, if at all, it is to be brought into relation with the primitive practice of slaying the man-god as soon as he exhibited symptoms of failing powers, in order to transfer his spirit with unimpaired vigour to a successor—a practice and belief which undoubtedly took a broader sweep, beyond the circle of rulers, and affected the general sentiment touching bodily decay and death in the case of ordinary folk—must be left here undetermined (see J. G. Frazer, on the preference for a violent death, in *GB*, pt. iii., *The Dying God*, London, 1911, p. 9 ff.). Certain is it that, apart from the example of Sparta, there is ample evidence of a time when the aged counted for more in public life than was the case generally in Athens.

A reminiscence of the pristine status of the aged lingers in the use of the word πρέσβεις = 'ambassadors.' The use of the term τὰ πάτρια to express 'ancient law,' 'the way of ancestors,' is derived from a time when the old men of the tribe (οἱ γέροντες) were the repositories of the sacred tradition or institutions of the community (cf. G. Murray, *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, New York, 1912, p. 51). This was an actual working fact at Sparta, where the γεροντοκρατία of twenty-eight men over sixty years of age,¹ in conjunction with the two kings, was the guardian of the custom of the State, and 'in case the people decided crookedly the senate with the kings were to reverse their decision' (*Plut. Lyc.* 6: αἱ δὲ σκολιὰν ὁ δῆμος λήστω, τοὺς πρεσβυγενεῖας, καὶ ἀρχαίτας ἀποστατήρας ἡμῶν—τοῖς ἐστὶ μὴ κυροῦν, ἀλλ' ὅλους ἀφίστασθαι καὶ διαλέγειν τὸν δῆμον). The constitution of Sparta was in this respect a survival from a time when an oligarchy of old men decided all matters of importance, to the practical exclusion of the younger men, who in general assembly (Apella or Agora) had merely a right of acceptance or rejection of definite proposals, without power of amendment or discussion (cf. *Thuc.* i. 87). In Athens a similar council also existed, a mere shadow of its former self, in the shape of the once venerable Areopagus, which under the developed democracy was entirely cut off from all direction of political affairs. Only when the policy of the younger men had brought the State to the brink of ruin, by the failure of the expedition to Sicily, in 413 B.C., was recourse had once more to the counsel of the old, to save it that were still possible (*Thuc.* viii. 1: καὶ ἀρχὴν τινα πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρῶν εἰλίσθαι, οἵτινες περὶ τῶν παρόντων ὡς ἂν καιρὸς ἢ προβουλευσούσι).

Even in Homer the precariousness of the rights of the aged as against the young and lusty is clearly evident through the glamour of courtly and heroic life and poetry. Nestor is no real exception, for, besides having plenty of sons to champion him, he is represented as more than merely old—he has lived so far beyond the usual span of life that he enjoys the prestige of a sort of sanctity for his very age; and, besides, he is deliberately treated by the poet as a privileged figure.² With Pelus, for all that he is mated with an immortal, the case is very different. Achilles in the under world puts the anxious question to Odysseus:

¹ Cf. *Tyrt. ap. Plut. Lyc.* 6: πρεσβύτας γέροντας as an element of the Spartan constitution. In the light of his observation of the ill effects of life-tenure by men of advanced age in oligarchically organized States, Aristotle criticizes this, especially in respect of the judicial functions of the Spartan Gerusia; for there is, he says, an old age of the mind, as well as of the body (*Pol.* ii. 9. 25 = 1270b). On the same lines, he would not approve of the life-tenure of the members of the Athenian Areopagus. The best men in his ideal State become priests in advanced age. And Plato is of much the same opinion (*Lysis*, 755 A, 923 B).

² Cf. A. Lang, *Homer and his Age*, London, 1903, p. 234: 'Of all the characters in Homer that of Nestor is most familiar to the unlearned world, merely because Nestor's is a "character part," very broadly drawn.'

¹ Aristotle, *Rhet.* i. 5 = 1360b 14 ff., says almost exactly the same thing, with some amplifications.

² For Sparta cf. *Plut. An seni sit ger. resp.* 24: ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἶπεν, ὡς ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ κάλλιστα γῆρας.

³ In his *Rise of the Greek Epic*, Oxford, 1911, p. 107, G. Murray says: 'Any sympathetic reader of early Greek poetry will have noticed the importance, almost the sanctity, attached to three classes of human beings: strangers, suppliants, and old people.' He is referring, of course, chiefly to Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 331 (see below), but he certainly exaggerates—in regard to the last class, at any rate.

⁴ Cf. *Semon. frag.* 71: τίς γὰρ ἀδονᾶς ἀτερ | θνατῶν βίος ποιεῖνός; *Soph. Ant.* 1165 ff.: τὰς γὰρ ἡδονὰς | ὅταν προδῶσιν ἄνδρες, οὐ τίμη' ἐγὼ | ζῆν τοῖτον, ἀλλ' ἐμψυχον ἡγούμεαι νεκρόν.

⁵ Cf. *Paus.* i. xvii. 1: Ἐλέον βωμόν, ὃ, μάλιστα θεῶν ἐς ἀνθρώπων βίον καὶ μεταβολὰς πραγμάτων ὅτι ὠφέλιμον, μόνον τιμὰς Ἑλλήνων νέμονται Ἀθηναῖοι. He goes on to mention an altar of Αἰδώς also. At the best it was allowed that age brings wisdom (cf. *Hom. Il.* iii. 103f.). But the characteristic of Athenian democracy is expressed in the complaint of the Erinyes—ἐπεὶ καθιπτάξει με πρεσβύτερος νέος (*Æsch. Eum.* 734).

'Tell me of noble Peleus—is he yet held in honour among the Myrmidons, or do they set him at naught from Hellas to Phthia, for that old age blinds his hand and foot? For I am no longer his champion under the sun' (*Od.* xi. 484 ff.).

And the father of Odysseus himself is fain to betake himself to his distant farm 'withered, unkempt, and clad unseemly' (*Od.* xi. 187 ff., xxiv. 225 ff.).

Hesiod, in his fanciful sketch of the evolution of the world through the various ages, imagines a first or golden age in which men did not grow old, but passed away without pain or decay, as if falling on sleep (*Works and Days*, 113 ff.). The fifth or iron age of the poet's own time is one which, as it passes gradually into the sixth age, will exhibit a progressive depravity, among the marks of which will be that children dishonour their ageing parents and set at naught their admonitions (182 ff.). Hesiod's catalogue of deadly sins includes, along with injuries done to suppliants, guests, or orphans, harsh words to aged parents (331 ff.). The limitation or narrowness of range here observable is found in later Athenian society; for in Athens also the obligation of reverence or kindness towards the old tended to be thrown entirely upon the family group, and to be confined to the special relationship obtaining between parents and children. The very insistence of Greek lawgivers upon this specific form of the obligation may well raise a suspicion that, even as thus limited, it was by no means universally honoured in practice. Among the Athenians, in fact, it was a counsel of perfection for the individual member of the family rather than, as in Sparta, a general attitude of society, binding without further question, even where the narrower relationship did not exist.¹ We are thus compelled to make special reference to this particular form of obligation, as dealt with in Athens.

The general term was *γροτροφείν* or *γροβοσκείν*. The law compelling children to nurture and protect their parents in old age (ὁ τῆς κακώσεως νόμος, in *Is.* viii. 32, where the speaker is at pains to insist that it covered also grandfather and great-grandfather)² was, of course, attributed to Solon (*Aristoph. Birds*, 1354 ff.: ἐν ταῖς τῶν πελαγῶν κύβερσιν; *Dem.* xxiv. 103). It seems to have specified four forms of breach—ill-usage, refusal of bed or of board, and neglect of funeral rites (τὰ νομίζοντα; see *Lys.* xlii. 51; *Dem.* xxiv. 107; *Aristoph. Birds* 767). It was enforced by a γραφή γονέων κακώσεως, which came before the chief Archon (*Arist. Ath. Pol.* lvi. 6; *Hyper. Pro Euxen.* 6: φαυλὸς ἐστὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐάντους γονεῖς ὁ ἀρχὼν ἐπὶ τούτῳ καθήκει). In accord with his own exalted conception of filial duty (see the remarkable passage in *Laws*, 931 A: πατήρ οὐδ' ὅτε καὶ μήτηρ ἢ τούτων πατέρες ἢ μητέρες ἐν οἴκῳ κείνται κειμήλιοι ἀπεριχρήστος γῆρας, μηδὲς διανοηθῆναι ποτὶ ἀγῶμα αὐτῶν, τοιοῦτον ἐξέστιον ἴδρυμα ἐν οἴκῳ ἔχειν, μάλλον κύριον εὐσεβεῖν), Plato prescribes as penalty for its violation perpetual exile and exclusion from the temples (*Laws*, 881 E). His penalties are sterner than those actually in use. At Athens a son convicted of maltreatment of parents became ἀτιμία τὸ σῶμα (but without confiscation [*Andoc.* i. 74; see art. *ATIMIA*]). This meant that he was excluded from the Agora, i.e. from the ordinary privileges of civic intercourse, and could not speak in the assembly (*Aeschines*, i. 28: εἰάν τις λέγῃ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὸν πατέρα τύπτων ἢ τὴν μητέρα, ἢ μὴ τρέφων, ἢ μὴ παρέχων οἰκτρον³ τούτων οὐκ ἐξ λέγειν). Whether this was the solo penalty is not known. He certainly ran the risk of being excluded from office; for one of the questions put at the 'scrutiny' (δοκιμασία) of a candidate for the Archonship was whether he treated his parents well (*Arist. Ath. Pol.* iv. 3: γονεὺς εὖ ποιεῖ), and a negative proved against him entailed rejection (*Xen. Mem.* ii. 2. 13). The obligation, however, was subject to the proviso that a parent had given his son an education befitting his station in life (*Plut. Sol.* 22: οὐδὲν πρέβειν τὸν πατέρα μὴ διδασκόμενον τέχνην ἐπ' ἀνάγκης μὴ εἶναι).

The provision by which a suit might be instituted by a son against an aged father for mental imbecility, in order to deprive him of the management of his estate, seems sometimes to

have been improperly used (cf. *Plat. Laws*, 928 E: οὐκ ἔστι πατήρ οὐδὲ νόσων ἢ γῆρας διατεθειμένος αἰσχρὸς εἶναι παρανομίας γράφασθαι; *Aristoph. Clouds*, 844 f. The well-known story of the prosecution of the aged Sophocles by his son Iophon is, however, an invention or mere mistake). Socrates was accused of encouraging this undutifulness (*Xen. Mem.* i. 2. 49; cf. the scene in *Aristoph. Clouds* [1321 ff.], in which Pheidippides, represented as a pupil of Socrates, asserts his right to inflict bodily chastisement upon both father and mother). Aristophanes in another play represents an old juror as congratulating himself that his official position and pay enable him to command at least a show of family affection, together with more tangible comforts (*Wasps*, 605 ff.).

It is, of course, not to be gathered from the above that either aged parents or old folk in general were treated as a rule especially badly in Athens. Probably few States in Greece offered as efficient protection to life and limb, personal dignity, and property as was given by the laws of Athens (cf. *Dem. Meid.* 221 ff.); perhaps none provided so ready access to legal protection and redress to even the humblest and most helpless. And, notwithstanding their tendency to a certain smugness of self-glorification on this score,¹ we may readily grant that the public conscience of the Athenians was more tender in regard to breaches of the 'unwritten laws' of mankind (κοινὸς νόμος ὁ κατὰ φύσιν [*Arist. Rhet.* i. 13=1373. 4])² than that of the rest of the Greeks. It still remains a fact, however, that reverence and care for the aged, as such, had in Athens, outside the family relationship, no stronger force behind it than the vague feeling of αἰδώς, 'shame,' the 'unseen barrier' (*G. Murray, Rise of the Greek Epic*, p. 103 f.)—a mere emotion, not organized in a conscious and binding social ordinance. What must have been the disintegrating effect upon this of the not infrequent ruthless enslavement and massacre of whole communities, e.g. Skione (*Thuc.* v. 32: ἀπέκτειναν τοὺς ἡβώνας, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἡνδραπόδισαν) and Melos (*Thuc.* v. 116)? The cynical contempt for justice and mercy exhibited in the latter case was indeed symptomatic of a terrible deterioration in Athenian character—a change for the worse which, according to Thucydides, passed like a blight over the whole Greek world in the course of the Peloponnesian war (*Thuc.* iii. 82 f.: καὶ μὴν τὸ ἐγγυγερὲς τοῦ ἐταιρικοῦ ἀλλοτριώτερον ἐγένετο).

LITERATURE.—Beyond a few pages in J. P. Mahaffy, *Social Life in Greece from Homer to Menander*, London, 1898, the subject has apparently not been treated, except by way of mere reference.

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OLD AGE (Hebrew and Jewish).—For the Biblical writers this earthly life, despite its many inevitable sorrows, is so essentially good that length of days is accounted a blessing. It is one of the rewards promised to righteousness (cf. *Ex* 20¹² 23²⁶, *Dt* 4⁴⁰ 5³³ 11²¹ 22⁷, *Is* 65²⁰, *Ps* 91¹⁸ 92¹⁴, *Pr* 10²⁷ 12²⁸ etc.). 'Despise not thou,' Eliphaz exhorts Job, 'the chastening of the Almighty'; for then 'thou shalt come to thy grave in a full age, like as a shock of corn cometh in in its season' (*Job* 5¹⁷⁻²⁶). A short life is a life ended before its time, an incomplete life. What constitutes old age in the view of the Biblical writers? *Gn* 5 tells of men who lived more than nine centuries, and in *Gn* 6 the divine decree fixes 120 years as the span of human life. But in the books subsequent to the Pentateuch the average duration of life and the corresponding conception of old age are much the same as those of our day. The statement of the Psalmist (*Ps*

¹ Cf. *Xen. Mem.* iii. 5. 15: Ἀγέεις, ἔφη, πόρρω πού εἰναι τῇ πόλει τὴν καλοκάγαθον. ποτὲ γὰρ οὕτως Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥστερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἢ πρεσβυτέρους αἰδοῦντο, οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν πατέρων ἀρχόνται καταφρονεῖν τῶν γεραιτέρων; *Cic. de Senect.* xviii. 63: 'Lacedaemonum esse honestissimum domicilium senectutis; nusquam enim tantum tribuatur aetati, nusquam est senectus honoratior'; cf. an important passage in *Arist. Eth. Nic.* ix. 2. 7 ff.

² But in Attic prose γονεῖς never properly means anything but 'parents' in the strict sense, though Plato also (*Laws*, 931) would extend the range of the law. For Ionic usage cf. *Herod.* i. 91.

¹ Cf. *Thuc.* ii. 37: ἀεροσεί των νόμων, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ' ὀφελεία των ἀδικουμένων κείνται καὶ ὅσοι ἀγῶροι εἶτες αἰσχύνῃ δημολογουμένην φέρουσι; *Plato, Laws*, 642 D (Athenians the only people who are good by nature, by a dispensation of Providence); *Dem. Meid.* 49; *Paus.* i. xvii. 1: τοῖς τοῖς ἐξ οὗ τὰ ἐξ φιλανθρωπίας μόνον κατέστηκεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ θεοῦ εὐσεβοῦσιν ἄλλων πλέον.

² For the 'unwritten laws' (τὸν Πανελλήνιον νόμον [*Eur. Suppl.* 526]) see *Soph. Ed. Tyr.* 565 ff., and *Xen. Mem.* iv. 4. 10, where Socrates speaks of the ἀγῶροι νόμοι which are ἐν πάσῃ χώρῃ κατὰ ταῦτα νομιζόμενοι, and *Soph. Antig.* 450 f.

90¹⁰) is clear and decisive: 'The days of our years are threescore years and ten, or even by reason of strength fourscore years.' 'At the most,' says Ben Sira (Sir 18⁹), 'the number of man's days are a hundred years.' Nor is there any discrepancy between the two estimates. The first gives the average, the second the extreme, duration of human life. The great personages of the Pentateuch who come after the Deluge—Nahor, Terah, the Patriarchs, Moses, Aaron—live longer than a century. But, as Leopold Löw points out (*Die Lebensalter*, p. 234), 'as regards the post-Mosaic period the Bible names only three persons whose ages exceeded a hundred, viz. Job (a doubtfully historic character), Jehoiada the High Priest, who, according to Chronicles, lived to be 130, and Joshua, who died at 110.' Eli is blind at ninety-eight (1 S 4¹⁵), and is evidently regarded as very old; and Barzillai, at eighty, is described as 'a very aged man,' and as asking, 'Can thy servant taste what I eat or what I drink? can I hear any more the voice of singing men and singing women?' (2 S 19³²⁻³³). Further, as Löw also points out, of the fourteen kings of Judah whose age at death is stated no one reached seventy. Of these Jehoshaphat, Hezekiah, and Josiah are praised as righteous kings, and yet the first died at fifty, the second at fifty-four, and the third before he was forty. According to the view of Maimonides (*Môrêh Nêbîḥūkhîm*, ii. 47), the longevity of the Patriarchs was exceptional; ordinary men and women in their time lived much shorter lives. That even the Pentateuchal writers formed a moderate estimate of the average duration of life is indicated by the laws providing for the compulsory retirement of the Levites from active service on their reaching the age of fifty (Nu 8²³).

In the Bible the disabilities of old age are clearly recognized. The famous passage in Ec 12, with its allusion to the years of which one says, 'I have no pleasure in them,' and its picture of the darkened sun and moon, the trembling keepers of the house, the strong men bent, the diminishing grinders (all images for the physical infirmities of the aged), is typical of the attitude of the OT writers to this aspect of the subject. The thought of the loss of vigour which inevitably accompanies the decline of life is expressed in the Psalmist's prayer (Ps 71⁹; cf. v. 18), 'Cast me not off in the time of old age; forsake me not when my strength faileth.' But over against the physical and other drawbacks of old age are set its moral and spiritual advantages: 'The hoary head is a crown of glory' (Pr 16³¹; cf. 17⁹); it is the embodiment and the symbol of ripe wisdom (Job 12¹³ 32⁷). It is because of such higher attributes as these that old age is honourable and deserving of respect. Mere length of days, which is more or less an accident, does not entitle the aged to consideration. Their real claim to it lies in the intellectual and moral excellences which they have acquired in the course of their long life. 'The hoary head is a crown of glory, if it be found in the way of righteousness' (Pr 16³¹), and 'better is a poor and wise youth than an old and foolish king, who knoweth not how to receive admonition any more' (Ec 4¹³; cf. Job 32⁹). Nevertheless age is, as a rule, the guarantee of experience. A child-ruler is a calamity (Ec 10¹⁶; cf. Is 3⁴), but 'with aged men is wisdom, and in length of days understanding' (Job 12¹²; cf. 15⁹⁻¹⁰). Elihu, however, who is a young man himself, contests the universality of this truth. The spirit of God may give a man understanding independently of his years (Job 32⁷⁻⁹). But, when age goes with wisdom and righteousness, it must be honoured. Not only is it to be regarded respectfully, but it must be treated with outward signs of reverence. 'Thou

shalt rise up before the hoary head' (Lv 19³²)—a command which has for its sanction the warning, 'Thou shalt fear thy God.' He who violates the precept has nothing to fear from the aged; for they are too feeble to avenge the dishonour offered them. But he has to fear God, who protects the weak and makes their cause His (cf. v. 14). Even to interrupt them when they are speaking is improper; Elihu waits before intervening in the famous discussion because the others are 'elder than he' (Job 32⁴). That it is the part of wisdom to listen to the advice of old people in preference to that of the young is implied in the story of Rehoboam (1 K 12; cf. Dt 32⁷). It is a sign of the degeneracy of the times and a cause of impending calamity when youth bears itself insolently towards age (Is 3⁵, La 5¹²). But, even apart from the higher qualities just mentioned, the physical weakness inseparable from old age bespeaks especial consideration for it. To 'nourish' the aged in the wider sense of the term is a duty (Ru 4¹⁵).

The honourableness of old age is set forth in the Apocrypha also. A peculiar charm clings to it: 'As the lamp that shineth upon the holy candlestick, so is the beauty of the face in ripe age' (Sir 26¹⁷). The old must be helped (3¹²); they must not be 'vexed' (*ib.*); their infirmities must be borne with patiently (v. 13). Their society is to be sought out (6³⁴). The aged must not be condemned, 'for some of us also are waxing old' (8⁵). But, again, wisdom and moral worth are the conditions precedent to an honourable old age: 'Understanding is gray hairs unto men, and an unspotted life is ripe old age' (Wis 4⁹). Further, as in Proverbs (32¹⁶), the attainment of old age is made dependent upon a man's way of life (Sir 30²³⁻²⁵).

The doctrine of the Rabbis on this subject is a development of the earlier teaching. They feel the drawbacks of old age as keenly as do the Biblical sages:

'The commonest figs pleased us better when we were young than the costliest peaches do now that we are old' (Jer. *Peḥh*, 20a). 'He that learns when he is young,' the Rabbis say elsewhere (*Abhōth*, iv. 20), 'writes on clear paper; he who learns in old age writes on blotted paper.'

Another saying (*Abhōth d' R. Nathan*, 23) likens the latter to a man who marries when he is old, and to a surgeon who has a knife for his operation, but no ointment with which to close the wound. For the Talmud also long life is the outcome of the well-spent life. Vice ages a man before his time (*Shab*. 152a). He has to pay the penalty for youthful sins in the after years. Needless or excessive physical strain is another agent that shortens life. Thus the Talmud warns us against living in a city set on a hill since it entails toilsome ascents (*Erub*. 56a). In like manner, a Rabbi, questioned as to the reason why he has himself carried to the bath-house, instead of walking to it, answers that he must keep his strength for his declining years (Jer. *Beza*, 60c). What constituted old age for the Talmudic teachers is evident from the saying (*Abhōth*, v. 24) that 'at sixty a man attains old age, at seventy the hoary head.' Death before sixty, they say in another place (*Mo'ed Kaṭon*, 28a), is premature. Some conversations between aged Rabbis and their disciples on the secret of their longevity have been preserved by the Talmud. Each Rabbi accounts for his long life in practically a different way, and assigns more than one reason for it. The explanations range from obedience to the ritual law to the observance of the highest morality:

'I have never risen on the fall of others, or taken with me to my bed the recollection of a wrong done to me during the day'; 'I have never accepted a gift' (i.e. when acting as a judge); 'I have never shown myself angry in my house, or taken pleasure

in the misfortunes of others; nor have I called another by an opprobrious name' (*Meqillāh*, 27b ff.).

The *Midrāsh* (*Midr. Rabbāh* to Lv 14¹) has the story of a man who, masquerading as a mountebank, offers for sale the elixir of life. He gives his customers the verse in Ps 34¹²: 'What man is he that desireth life, and loveth many days . . . ? Keep thy tongue from evil.' Diligent attendance at public worship is another practice conducing to long life (*Brākhōth*, 8a). Physical influences also play their part, especially attention to hygienic rules. Thus the Talmud recommends the habit of eating slowly, due regulation of the bodily functions, bathing, and moderate exercise (*ib.* 54b; *K'thūbhōth*, 77b, 111a). Rabbi Hanina, vigorous at eighty, attributes his strength to his mother's habit of giving him warm baths and anointing his body with oil when he was a child (*Hāllin*, 24b). Maimonides, in his turn, after quoting many dietetic prescriptions from the Talmud, concludes as follows:

'To every man who obeys these rules I guarantee that he will never be ill, but, on the contrary, will achieve old age, need no doctor, and enjoy perfect, uninterrupted health unless he has had a feeble constitution from the beginning, or has been addicted to evil habits from his early years, or is attacked by plague or famine' (*Hil. Deoth*, iv. 20).

A physician, however, Maimonides discerns the powerful influence exerted by the intellectual and the spiritual life upon the physical health, and therefore upon a man's chances of attaining old age. Thus the section (*Hil. Deoth*) of his *Yad* from which the foregoing passage is taken deals as much with morals as with hygiene. He does not stand alone in this respect. Most of the many Jewish aids to right living which have appeared since the close of the Talmud give equal attention to physical and religious wellbeing. For the authors of these manuals the physical life is eminently worth safeguarding as the one certain opportunity for service (see art. LIFE AND DEATH [Jewish]); and, on the other hand, the health of the soul is an essential condition of the bodily health. A typical example is the work entitled *Shebilē Emunah*, written by Meir ibn Aldabi (14th cent.), in which Galen and Hippocrates are placed under contribution equally with the Bible and the Rabbis, and in which disquisitions on anatomy, hygiene, and longevity are inserted between chapters on theological questions. For Jewish teachers, ancient and more modern alike, old age is a good thing; it is the natural rounding off of the physical life. Nevertheless an early death is not necessarily a premature death. A brief life may still be a full life:

'There are those who win their world in a single hour' (*Abōda Zārā*, 10b).

Old age, too, is honourable. The aged have the matured wisdom which youth necessarily lacks.

'He that learns from the young eats unripe grapes, drinks new wine; he that learns from the old eats ripe grapes, drinks old wine' (*Abōth*, iv. 20).

This is said of those who possess both years and learning. As to ordinary folk the Talmud makes a curious discrimination between the sexes. It quotes with approval the current adage, 'An old man in the house is a nuisance, an old woman a treasure' (*Erahin*, 19a). On the other hand, old women are fonder of amusement than old men are:

'A drum sets a woman of sixty jigging as though she were six' (*Moed Kāton*, 9b).

Respect for old age occupies a prominent place in the Talmudic ethics. 'Who is sure of heaven? He that honours the aged' (*Bābhā Bathrā*, 10b). The duty has no limitations of race or religion; it must be practised towards the Gentile (*Qiddūshin*, 33a). On the other hand, moral worth must grace it if it is rightly to claim respect. 'What,' ask the Rabbis (*Midr. Rabbāh* to Gn 24¹), 'is honourable old age?' They answer, 'That which has won

a man both worlds. It is possible to be venerable without being old, and contrariwise. 'Some men are aged, but lack years; others live long, but lack age,' i.e. experience and character; but to be old and venerable is the ideal condition (*ib.*; cf. Wis 4⁹). The Talmud (*Brākhōth*, 28a) tells of a sage (Eleazar ben Azariah) who, appointed head of the Sanhedrin at eighteen, suddenly becomes grey as a sign of his fitness for the high office. For the Talmud, indeed, the learned are always aged, irrespective of their years (*Qiddūshin*, 33a). To them must be shown the deference which is due to old age. The Rabbis lay down detailed rules for their treatment. One must rise before them, reverently salute them, refrain from sitting in their accustomed seats, and from contradicting or interrupting them. They must be addressed respectfully and answered gently (*ib.* 32a, 33a; *Midr. Rabbāh* to Nu 11¹⁶; Maimonides, *Hil. T. Tōrah*, chs. v., vi.). Their advice, even if it be to pull down the Temple, is to be preferred to the opinion of the young, though it be to build it up (*Tosefta*, 'Abōda Zārā, i. 19). Even the old sage who has forgotten his learning must be treated tenderly; for were not the broken tablets of the Law placed in the Ark of the Covenant side by side with the whole tablets (*Brākhōth*, 8b)? So far did some of the Rabbis carry their reverence for age that they would rise before an unlettered old man on the plea that his very longevity necessarily proved that he had merits. A heathen sage was also thus to be honoured, for 'many a sorrow must have lighted upon that grey head' (*Qiddūshin*, 32b, 33a). On the other hand, day-labourers, when at work, are exempt from the duty of rising before the aged, for their time is their money. And the Rabbi is exhorted not needlessly to impose the duty of showing him respect upon the common people. To this end he is counselled to go by unfrequented byways in order to avoid the crowd (*ib.* 33a; Maimonides, *Hil. T. Tōrah*, vi. 2, 3).

Jewish practice is the embodiment of the foregoing precepts. Reverence and tender consideration for old age fill a large place in the Jewish life. The aged who to a long life unite piety and learning are made the object of singular veneration. The chief places in the Sanhedrin and the synagogue, as well as at table, were given to old people. Very aged men, however, were debarred from membership of the Sanhedrin owing to the fear that old age might have blunted their feelings and so made their judgments unduly severe (*Sanh.* 36b; Maimonides, *Sanh.* i. 3). In the charitable domain the old, whether learned or not, are deemed worthy of especial solicitude. The discharge of this obligation was a characteristic feature of the Essenes (Philo [ed. Mangey, London, 1742], ii. 459). Special charities for the relief of the aged have always been a familiar feature in the Jewish communal organization. These took the form of money gifts, but also of institutions called *heqdēsh*, 'the consecrated house'—hospitals in the broadest sense of the term, which offered an asylum not only to the sick, but to strangers and old people. The earliest instance of such an institution known to history is that in Cologne in the 11th century.

LITERATURE.—I. Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages*, London, 1896; Hamburger, artt. 'Alter,' 'Greisenalter,' 'Lebensdauer,' and 'Verlängerung des Lebens'; M. Joseph, *Judaism as Creed and Life*, London, 1910; J.E., artt. 'Charity' and 'Age, Old'; L. Löw, *Die Lebensalter in der jüdischen Literatur*, Szegedin, 1875; S. Suwalski, *Chayē Hayehudi*, Warsaw, 1893. MORRIS JOSEPH.

OLD AGE (Iranian).—Iranian data concerning the treatment of the aged are curiously meagre. Strabo (p. 517), quoting Onesicritus, who flourished in the time of Alexander the Great, says that

the Bactrians were accustomed to throw those who were worn out with age or infirmity to dogs bred expressly for the purpose; so that the space before the Bactrian metropolis was clean, but the land within the walls was covered with human bones. This barbarous custom, he continues, was stopped by Alexander. A similar statement is made by Porphyrius (*de Abstinencia*, iv. 21), while instances of cold-blooded abandonment of the sick are given by Agathias (ii. 23), who wrote in the 6th cent. A.D. In the Avesta itself there is only a single allusion which can be construed as referring to the treatment of the aged. This is contained in the *Vendidad*, iii. 15-21, which states that one who sears a corpse alone, thus bringing upon himself the most dread of all impure demons, must be placed in a dry and barren spot, where few living creatures pass, and at least thirty paces from fire, water, the barsom, and the faithful Zoroastrian. There he is to be confined in an enclosure, and to be clothed and fed wretchedly until he becomes 'old' (*hana*), 'aged' (*zaurura*), and 'impotent' (*pairistā-æsudra*)—terms which the Pahlavi *Frahang-i Oim* (ed. H. Jamaspji and M. Haug, Bombay, 1867, pp. 5, 48; ed. H. Reichelt, Vienna, 1900, p. 9) explains as connoting respectively 'seventy,' 'fifty,' and 'ninety' years of age, while the Pahlavi commentary on the *Vendidad* passage (ed. F. Spiegel, Vienna, 1853, i. 26; ed. D. P. Sanjana, Bombay, 1895, p. 38) makes the adjectives denote 'fifty,' 'fifty' (doubtless a clerical error for 'sixty'; cf. Spiegel, *Commentar über das Avesta*, Leipzig, 1864, i. 91), and 'seventy.' When the person thus defiled reaches these ages, the Mazdayasnians are directed to send to him a sturdy man, who is to cut off his head and leave his corpse for the vultures, while the executioner repeats the words: 'This man repenteth him of all his evil thoughts, and evil words, and evil deeds.' There is, therefore, a certain degree of confirmation of the Greek statements as to the Persian treatment of the aged, but it must be borne in mind that the cases of such abandonment and putting to death of the old are restricted by the Avesta text to a single case of religious pollution of the utmost gravity, so that to this day the Persian Zoroastrians require two corpse-bearers at the *dakhmahs* ('towers of silence'), while each pair of those who carry the dead body to the tower must be symbolically joined by the *kusti*, or sacred girdle (A. V. W. Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, New York, 1906, pp. 389, 392).

Despite the statements of Onesicratus and Agathias, and notwithstanding the Avesta passage already discussed, it would seem that the position of the aged in ancient Persia was one of respect, if the general spirit of the sacred books of Iran forms any criterion, and if the affection for children which characterized the Persians, and which usually implies care for the equally helpless aged, be taken into consideration. This is borne out by the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon (i. ii. 13f., viii. vii. 10), which, romance though it be, is perhaps of more value as a source for Persian life than is generally believed; while the Avesta itself (*Vendidad*, xii. 1) requires the children to mourn thirty days for a deceased parent if good (*i.e.* in heaven) or sixty days if evil (*i.e.* in hell). The Pahlavi *Artā-Virāf* (lxv., ed. Haug and E. W. West, Bombay, 1872, pp. 94-95, 188) likewise assigns a distinct punishment in hell for those children who failed to respect their parents; and the classical writers Herodotus (i. 138), Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* viii. 10), and Quintus Curtius (v. ii. 22) explicitly affirm the reverence of Persian children for their fathers and mothers (A. Rapp, *ZDMG* xx. [1866] 111).

LITERATURE.—F. Windischmann, *Zoroastriische Studien*, Berlin, 1863, pp. 297-299; F. Spiegel, *Eräntische Alterthums-*

kunde, Leipzig, 1878, iii. 632; B. Brisson, *De regio Persarum principatu*, ed. J. H. Lederlin, Strassburg, 1710, pp. 451-453, 597-598. LOUIS H. GRAY.

OLD AGE (Japanese).—Like other races, the Japanese have always both hoped for and feared old age. In the ancient poems, which give expression to their inmost feelings, we find them wishing for the long life of the crane and tortoise, or envying the thousand-year-old pine-tree (see M. Revon, *Anthologie de la littérature japonaise*, Paris, 1910, pp. 144, 150, 157), but at the same time they lament 'the snow and the waves' which year by year they discover in their bronze mirror, and bewail the rapid course of human life, ephemeral as the foam on the water, like the dew or the convolvulus blossom (*ib.* pp. 145, 246, 338, etc.). Old age with them, however, is singularly softened by the respect which is accorded it, and which is noticeable, with but a few exceptions, throughout the whole history of their civilization.

This arose naturally from the respect for parents which we find as early as the mythological stories.

The emperor Keikō, *e.g.*, terrified at the violent temper of his son, the famous hero, Yamato-dake, sends him, almost alone and unarmed, to fight formidable enemies in all parts of the empire; Yamato-dake does not dream for a moment of disputing his father's orders. This fierce warrior weeps at the thought that his father wishes for his death, but he obeys with absolute submission (see *HEROES AND HERO-GODS* [Japanese], vol. vii. p. 663, and cf. *Kojiki*, tr. B. H. Chamberlain, 2, Tōkyō, 1906, p. 200).

This filial respect gradually extends to others besides parents, to all aged men whose experience and wisdom are appreciated (*e.g.*, *Kojiki*, 147). The emperor himself, in spite of his divine character, willingly renders homage to the superior experience of the aged minister Take-uchi, a Japanese Methuselah (*ib.* 353).

If this was the case in the primitive period, it would be much more so when the development of ancestor-worship, under Chinese influence, and the general advance of society had added to this instinctive respect for the aged and given it a more definite moral significance.

It must be said, however, that at the time of the great civil wars of the Japanese feudality, and as a natural consequence of the brutality which necessarily accompanies the warlike spirit, the aged were not always honoured as they ought to have been. To men who admire power above everything else, the old man appears more or less as a useless dotard.

In a historical work of the 12th cent., towards the end of the Heian period, a young *samurai* of twenty speaks to two centenarians in a tone of presumptuous lightness, which makes one of them reply to him thus: 'The aged guard the memory of the past. Wise emperors used to send for all the old people in the country to ask them about the life in former times, and it was by paying heed to what they said that they governed the people. The aged are therefore venerable beings. Do not scorn them, young men!' (Revon, pp. 228-231).

This germ of irreverence could not help developing in the following period, the gloomy warlike epoch of Kamakura.

In a 13th cent. military history a certain Sanemori, a *samurai* more than septuagenary, relates why he has thought it necessary to dye his beard and hair black: 'Old men who take up their bow and arrow to go and fight must dye their hair with black ink. And this is why. Even in times of peace the young laugh at white hairs; much more on the battle-field. If an old man wishes to advance, they say that he has lost his reason; if he retreats, they insult him, saying that he is a coward; and he does not dare to compete with these young people. As for the enemy, they despise the old as good for nothing. The white hairs of old age are the saddest thing in the world' (*ib.* pp. 211-214).

After this long period of civil wars the great peace of the Tokugawa period was established, and respect for old age, and the happy state resulting from it, again appeared and became fixed with the refinement of civilization. Many proofs of this state of mind are found in the philosophers, especially those of the Chinese school. It will suffice here to draw attention to a Japanese custom which

is specially interesting in this connexion, viz. that of *inkyo*.

To understand this custom it is well to know its historical origin, which lies in the practice of abdication, so wide-spread in Japan. When the custom of abdication itself was introduced, in the 7th cent., it was in consequence of Buddhism, which taught contempt for the world, and advised men, especially those of a certain age, to retire into solitude, there to meditate and prepare themselves for the other life. This religious motive did not altogether cease to exist afterwards, but it yielded to a political reason; for, from the time when the Fujiwara and other great families practically monopolized the imperial power, they acquired the custom of strengthening themselves by not allowing any but quite young emperors to reign, often mere children, whom they forced to abdicate whenever they reached an age when they might have shown a disposition to be independent. For this reason emperors often abdicated about the age of twenty, or even earlier (Rokujo [1166-68], e.g., was made emperor at the age of two and resigned when only four years old). But these retired emperors (*in*) were often older men, who continued to act behind the scenes, and sometimes played a more effective part there than during the time of their nominal sovereignty. Now, in consequence of that spirit of imitation which is one of the most powerful social forces, this system of abdication gradually extended to ministers of State, to officials, and even to the most unassuming heads of families, and it ended in the general custom of *inkyo*.

According to the researches of native philologists, the word *inkyo* originally meant 'concealment'; gradually it was applied to 'retirement to one's native place'; and then it denoted 'the withdrawal from the active management of household or government affairs in favour of a son or relative.' Lastly, it may be translated by 'dwelling in retirement'; and it is used in practice to denote either the fact of abandoning the affairs of one's house in order to retire to private life or the man who retires in this way. In the time of the Tokugawa, and down to the Revolution of 1867, it may be said that this was a custom almost generally followed by the Japanese as soon as they had passed middle life. They left their property to their heirs, gave up their official duties or their business affairs, and, having become *inkyo*, they devoted the remainder of their lives, surrounded by tender care, to pleasant rest or quiet studies.

To-day this custom is gradually disappearing, either on account of new necessities and the harder kind of life consequent on the introduction of Western civilization, or perhaps, in some measure, as a result of the tendency of many modern Japanese to exchange their old national customs, often without sufficient reasons, for foreign usages. Nevertheless it is curious that, while the *inkyo* is severely attacked by the Japanese themselves (see Shigeno An-eki, 'The Evils of Abdication, Heirship, and Adoption,' in *TASJ* xv. i. [1887] 72-82), sensible Europeans praise and envy this custom:

'The new government of Japan is endeavouring to put a stop to the custom of retiring to private life, because not European. . . the contrary, barbarous . . . striving, when past the time of life at which he is fitted to do good work' (B. H. Chamberlain, *Things Japanese*, London, 1893, p. 14).

This view seems most just, when we compare the European system fairly with the old Japanese one. With us the best part of life is lost in vain studies; we begin active life much later and consequently have often to prolong it to the extreme limits of old age. In this way neither young nor old have time to enjoy life properly. The ancient Japanese, on the contrary, began practical work when very young, they founded their families

earlier, and consequently they could very soon leave the place to the young people in order to pass the second half of their lives in peace, while the young men worked eagerly, at the normal age of greatest activity, in view of that happy life which they in their turn were soon going to win. For social utility the result was the same; and, as far as the happiness of individuals was concerned, it was infinitely superior. The civilization which devised the *raku-inkyo*, 'the happy retired one,' certainly deserves a place of honour among truly humane civilizations.

LITERATURE.—This is cited in the article.

M. REYON.

OLD AGE (Roman).—The Latin words connected with old age are two, *senex*, 'an old man,' and *anus*, 'an old woman,' with their respective derivatives. The former comes from a root which is present also in other Indo-European languages, and has in its turn perpetuated itself in the Romance languages in the comparative form *senior* (Fr. *sieur*, *seigneur*; Ital. *signor*; Span. *señor*; Portuguese, *senhor*, etc.). The latter finds its kindred in Germ. *ana*, Armen. *han* ('grand-mother'), and Lith. *anyta* ('mother-in-law'), but has left no trace in the Romance languages, having been killed by the other root. The word *antiquus* tended to become used exclusively of things, and the word *vetus* (*vetulus*, *vetustus*, etc.) refers rather to time (period) than to age, though the Romance words like *vieux* (Fr.) and *viejo* (Span.) show that in speech this adjective was generally applied to old people. Of the derivatives of *senex* not all had precisely the same shade of meaning; e.g., *senectus* meant 'old age as a definite period of life,' while *senium* meant 'old age as bringing infirmity with it, helpless old age' (R. Ogilvie, *Horæ Latinæ*, London, 1901, p. 201). The form *senecta* appears to be a coinage of the poets, as more convenient for their metre than *senectus*, of which it is a real synonym (see below, however). The verb *senescere* habitually carries the idea of the weakness of age. One of the most interesting derivatives is *senatus*, lit. 'a body of old men,' but the analogy of *magistratus* and other words would seem to indicate that originally the word was an abstract noun, meaning 'the duty of an old man' (or 'of old men'). An interesting parallel is to be found in the word *γερονσία*, which first means 'old age,' but comes to be used collectively = 'a body of *γέροντες*.' Such a council is mentioned as early as the Homeric poems, and the word, collectively used, is frequently found in Roman imperial times, though at that date it appears to have lost almost all political significance (Pauly-Wissowa, vii. 1264 ff., art. 'Gerontes, Gerusia'; W. M. Ramsay, *The Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, vol. i. pt. i. [Oxford, 1895] pp. 64, 110, vol. i. pt. ii. [do. 1897] pp. 368, 438, 630). Another parallel, which illustrates the original connexion between old age and the wisdom required for State deliberations, is to be found in the words *πρεσβύτερος*, *πρεσβυτέριον* (see the present writer's *Pocket Lexicon Gr. NT*, Oxford, 1916, s.vv.). Why the comparative was used in this connexion (as also, perhaps on the analogy of the Gr., in the case of the Lat. *senior*, especially in the later period) is uncertain, but the probable reason is that it offered an easy way of distinguishing between those who were actually old (positive) and those who were merely officially old (comparative). We are here concerned only with the fact that the use of words properly associated with old age to indicate members of advisory or legislative councils appears to have been almost, if not quite, universal in Mediterranean lands. This is perhaps the proper place to mention that the Roman senate was sometimes worshipped as divine—e.g., along with the emperor

Tiberius and his mother Livia in A.D. 23 by certain towns in Asia Minor. In that year it was decreed to build a temple in honour of this joint cult, and in A.D. 26 the building was entrusted to the people of Smyrna. Other instances of worship of the Roman senate, one as early as Augustus, are collected in W. H. Roscher, *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*, iv. (Leipzig, 1910) 708 ff., art. 'Senatus.' The senate was represented in art as an old man with a tunic and toga, bordered with purple, and with a wreath on his head (Dio Cass. lxxviii. 1, 5).

Among the many personifications of states or abstract qualities which were deified by the Romans, Senecta or Senectus found a place. Senectus was daughter of a father Erebus and a mother Nox, a gloomy conception of old age which probably came to the Romans through the Greeks (Hyginus, *Fab. præf.* p. 9, 7, ed. M. Schmidt, Jena, 1872). Cicero, in his *de Natura Deorum*, iii. 17, 44, enumerates a long list of feelings, passions, and states which, he says, were personalized by the old genealogizers, Senectus being a sister of Æther and Dies. The qualities enumerated are Amor, Dolus, Metus, Labor, Invidentia, Fatum, Senectus, Mors, Tenebræ, Miseria, Querella, Gratia, Fraus, Pertinacia, Parcæ, Hesperides, Somnia—for the most part a gloomy brood, all of them children of Erebus and Nox. Some of them reappear in Vergil's description of the lower world, as having their quarters in front of the entrance: *tristis* ('gloomy') Old Age is flanked by *Morbi* ('diseases') that make the sufferer sallow, and by *Metus*, in which the fear of death may be comprised (*Æn.* vi. 275). In Lygdamus [Tibullus], iii. 5, 16, Old Age appears with white hair, bent body, and slow-moving feet. In a catalogue of gloomy and evil states or qualities in Silius Italicus (xiii. 583) Old Age appears as *queribunda*, 'full of tearful complaint,' while in a similar list in Seneca (*Hercules Furens*, 696) 'slow-moving Old Age, hidden away in a corner, is aiding her steps with a stick' (see Roscher, iv. 710; H. Usener, *Götternamen*, Bonn, 1896, p. 366; and cf. Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. 'Geras,' as well as art. OLD AGE [Greek]).

From this gloomy side of old age it is a relief to turn to the pages of Cicero's *Cato* or *de Senectute*, the Roman classic on the subject. Cicero did well to choose Cato the Censor as the type of old age, for he was both vigorous and contented. The secret was that he, according to the Stoic teaching, lived in harmony with nature. The faults of old age are generally due to the character of the complainants. Prosperity may make old age easier, but without a well-trained character it is intolerable. Fabius Maximus, Plato, Ennius, and others are instanced to show that old age can be happy. A series of charges against old age is then refuted. These charges are: (a) it unfits men for business; (b) it weakens the bodily powers; (c) it renders men incapable of pleasures; (d) it must be gloomy, because it cannot be free from the anticipation of death. Cato very skillfully rebuts these, and is certainly on strong ground in his insistence that character has most to do with the attitude of the old to their age. The growth of physical weakness is admitted, but it is compensated for by a growth of wisdom, which is above all things necessary to temper the hot-headedness of youth. Any lack of memory in old age is due either to an original defect or to insufficient exercise of the memory. The bodily strength of an old man depends almost entirely on his having lived temperately in youth and manhood. Moreover, he is not expected to exert it. Cases of weakness are due to ill-health, and caution in old age is very helpful (cf. the admirable work of a modern Cato, Henry Thompson, *Diet in Relation to Age*

and Activity, London, 1902). Cato proceeds to argue that physical pleasure is in itself bad, and that we ought to be thankful that old age saves us from its domination. The really lasting pleasures, such as conversation, literature, and agriculture, are open to him, as they are to younger men. He maintains that death cannot in any case be an evil, as the right object is a good, not a long, life. Moreover, death is natural, and what is natural is good. Surely accomplished old men can meet death as calmly as the uncultured young. To Cato, also, death is the entrance on an unending life. From the present life one should be content to depart, once one has had one's full share of it (cf. the introduction to the best ed., that by J. S. Reid, Cambridge, 1879, 1887, and later; the ed. of C. Simbeck, Leipzig, 1912, is important for the text).

Cicero was sixty-two years old when he wrote this treatise, which he intended to be to his friend Atticus and to others, as it had been to himself, a real means of alleviating the burden of old age. He seems to have had also another purpose, namely to point back to the period at which Cato had lived (the 2nd cent. B.C.) as the golden age of Rome's history. Cicero missed in the men of his time the 'serious simplicity, the unswerving adherence to principle, the self-sacrificing patriotism, which were the ideal Roman virtues' (Reid, p. 12). The value of his dialogue as representing the best Roman point of view is at first sight somewhat impaired by the knowledge that it is in part based on Greek sources. Reid has shown in detail that he has used Xenophon's *Economicus* and *Cyropædia*, and Plato's *Republic* and *Phædo*. Moreover, the influence of Aristotle's lost dialogues on the form of Cicero's is apparent. In those nearly all the speaking was done by one person, the interlocutors merely interjecting occasional remarks, and they were more popular than Plato's. It is probable, too, that Cicero used in addition, as the main basis of his tractate, a Greek work on this specific subject, whether that by Aristo of Ceos, a Peripatetic of the 3rd cent. B.C., or that of Theophrastus, or that of Demetrius Phalereus. Nevertheless, the treatise is really Roman. For Cicero, though deeply read in Greek literature, was a real son of the soil, and had been drilled in the Roman native dramatic literature by his father; so that we can after all regard the treatise as in the main an expression of the Roman attitude at its best. And it is fortunate that this is so, because, while there are, of course, many allusions to this subject in Roman literature, no other *specific* Roman treatise on old age has come down to us. Some of these allusions may now be quoted.

An epithet like *silicernium*, 'sack of dry bones' (Terence, *Adelphi*, iv. ii. 48), is a term of abuse, probably translated from the Greek original of the play, and with no significance in the attempt to gauge the general Roman attitude to old age. We are on more secure ground when we come to the well-known description of Horace:

'Many disadvantages surround the old man, both because he seeks rain and (wretched man!) forbears and fears to use what he has and . . . active, eager for longer life, cross-grained, complaining, pining the days of his boyhood, blaming and criticizing the younger generation. The years till one's prime is over bring many advantages with them, but many disappear as we come nearer to the end' (*Arts Poet.* 169-170).

The writings of Seneca abound in references to old age. Some of the more striking or interesting may be translated, and it must be kept in mind that what sounds commonplace to us was not necessarily so to the first readers. Perhaps the most important writings of Seneca on this subject are *Epistles* xxvi., lviii., ci., and cviii. *Ep.* xxvi. was written when Seneca was 'within sight of old

age' (§ 1). He feels the burden of ill-health, and that, while his mind is vigorous, his body is already prematurely aged. He describes it as melting, as having bits plucked from it, and as losing some strength every day. He tries to welcome the prospect of the gradual dissolution, which is after all a natural process. Only death will decide what moral progress he has made. *Ep.* lviii. 30-32 has the following thoughts:

'Plato himself by care prolonged his life to old age. He had indeed been blest with a strong body, and bad got his name from the breadth of his chest, but sea-voyages and perils had greatly impaired his fort-eager him to old way. For reward of his care Plato had the good fortune to reach the age of full eighty-one years. . . . Frugality can prolong old age. It is not I think to be longed for, yet it is not to be rejected either. It is pleasant to have one's own company as long as possible, when one has made one's own company worth enjoying.'

He then goes on to consider the question, natural in a Stoic, whether one ought to cut short one's old age by suicide. In *Ep.* ci. 10-15 he expresses strong disapproval of Mæcenas's sentiment that life is desirable, even if every part of the body be decayed or under torture. From the long *Ep.* cviii. one extract may be given (§ 28):

'The present day is always the best, because diseases come upon one, because old age begins to weigh on us and is over our heads, while we are still thinking of youth. Vergil, it is said, always puts diseases and old age together, assuredly not without reason; for old age is an incurable disease. Besides he has added the epithet *tristis* to it' (*Georg.* iii. 67, *Æn.* vi. 275, then quoted).

In *Ep.* lxxvii. 2 he thanks old age, because it has chained him to his reading-couch, where he can enjoy the letters of his young friend Lucilius, as if he were conversing with him. In *Ep.* xiii. 17 he speaks of old men whom one may meet any day, engaged in the pursuit of ambition, foreign travel, or business.

'What can be more disgraceful,' he says, 'than an old man beginning life?' The same sentiment recurs: 'An old man learning his alphabet is a subject for laughter and contempt' (*Ep.* xxxvi. 4; cf. xxxiii. 7).

In *Ep.* iv. 2 he speaks of the childishness which sometimes persists in old age:

'We have the authority of old men, but the defects of boys, and not only of boys, but even of infants: for the former are afraid of trifles, the latter of boogies, but we are afraid of both.'

'On a courtier being once asked how he had managed to reach old age at court, he replied: "By suffering injuries and giving thanks"' (*de Ira*, n. xxxiii. 2).

Ch. xx. of the *de Breuitate Vitæ* is concerned with the old who will not give up toil.

'Some,' he says, 'in the last stages of old age, yet make arrangements for the attainment of something fresh, as if they were young, and in the midst of undertakings great and evil alike collapse through weakness.'

He tells the story of a certain Turannius, who, being over ninety years old, was excused from the performance of his official duty by the emperor, without having made application for the indulgence. He went to bed, and commanded that he should be mourned as if dead, and remained there until his office was restored to him. In the *de Tranquillitate Animi*, ii. 6, the trite remark occurs that 'old age is slow to make changes.' There is a warning, in the *de Breuitate Vitæ*, ix. 4, for those on whom old age has come unexpectedly, while they have still the minds of boys, and are unprepared and 'unarmed' for it, not having perceived its daily approach.

'Some people hate to hear of old age and grey hairs, etc., and yet these are the very things for which they pray' (*Dial.* n. xvii. 2; cf. Augustine, *Tract.* in Joh. xxxi. 9, in Ps. 26, serm. iii. § 9).

'The most irascible people are little children, old people, and invalids' (*de Ira*, i. xiii. 5). 'Old men are cross-grained and given to complaining, like invalids and the convalescent' (*ib.* ii. xix. 4).

The most striking passage on old age in Latin literature is Juvenal, *Sat.* x. 183-288. Beginning with the universal prayer for length of days, he goes on to describe the crop of serious troubles

which awaits those who reach old age. He gives a loathsome description, with abundance of detail, of the physical unsightliness of many old persons, the decay of the various senses, and the diseases to which they are liable. There is also the loss of memory, he says, leading even to injustice towards one's relatives. It is clear from that part of the satire that he is thinking primarily of the old age of people who have led evil lives. Then there is the distressful state of a man who has survived all his loved ones, illustrated by accounts, mostly imaginary, of the later years of Nestor, Pelens, Laertes, and Priam. Turning to Rome, he writes eloquently of the cases of Marius and Pompey, though the latter, indeed, never reached real old age. J. D. Duff points out that Swift derived some of the details of the Struldbrugs (*Gulliver's Travels*, pt. iii. ch. x.) from this picture by Juvenal. In *Sat.* iv. 97 he mentions how seldom a nobleman reaches old age, because nearly all fall victims to the jealousy and cruelty of emperors (see J. E. B. Mayor's note on this passage and also on line 154; cf. *Sat.* x. 112 f. with notes). The same thought is given expression by other writers like Tacitus, Suetonius, and Dio Cassius, with particular reference to Nero's murders (see the passages in Mayor's Juvenal, i. [London, 1889] 409). The subject of *orbi* (*orbæ*), persons of advanced age without heirs to inherit their wealth, occurs with almost sickening frequency in the literature of the period. These persons were the victims of *captatores* (*heredipetæ*), who courted them and performed every menial service to them on the chance that they might inherit their wealth. The great influence wielded by the *orbi*, and the capricious behaviour which seems to characterize such people, are often mentioned (passages in Mayor's notes on Juvenal, iii. 129, pp. 195, 368, iv. 19, pp. 220, 395). A pleasanter side of old age is revealed in the references to the games played by old men. They were especially fond of games with dice and draughts (Juvenal, xiv. 4, with the note of Mayor).

If we pass to the writings of the 4th cent. A.D., the impressions that we get are on the whole more pleasant. The astrological writer, Julius Firmicus Maternus, who afterwards became a Christian, in the course of his exposition of his subject, conveys to us, by the way, a good deal of information about the manners and morals of his time. Some of it is gruesome enough, but the picture is relieved by such phrases as 'longæ ac beatæ senectutis spatia' (*Mathesis*, III. iii. 15), 'longioris uitæ et bonæ senectutis' (III. x. 9), and 'usque ad mortem felicem senectutem' (III. iii. 6). The Christian heaven had been working for three centuries, and one of the blessings which it brings is beautiful old age. The writings of Ambrose abound in passages illustrating this:

'Aetas senectutis uita est immaculata' (*Cain et Abel*, II. 1). 'Senectus portus debet esse, non uitæ superioris naufragium' (*Jacob*, II. 10). 'In Aetibus Apostolorum Barnabas Marcum adsumpsit, Paulus Silam, Paulus Timotheum, Paulus Titum. Sed illis superioribus uidemus diuina officia, ut seniores consilio præuulerint, luniores ministerio. Plerumque etiam uirtutibus pares, disparis ætatis, sui delectantur copula, sicut delectantur Petrus et Iohannes. Nam adolescentem legimus in euangelio Iohannem, et sua uoce, flect meritis et sapientia nulli fuerit seniorum secundus, erat enim in eo senectus venerabilis morum et cana prudentia. Uita enim immaculata bonæ senectutis stipendium est' (*Off.* II. 20, § 100 L). 'Aetates quædam sunt meritum, nam et senectus morum inuenitur in pueris et innocentia infantum reperitur in senibus,' etc. (*Sermo* lv.).

From Jerome also many passages might be produced in illustration, though his youthful behaviour and the bitterness of his disposition would hardly lead one to expect them. In a remarkable passage of *Ep.* lli. (§ 3), he describes how in the old, while all other virtues wane, that of wisdom alone increases. By the waning virtues he explains that he means that 'cuncta, quæ per corpus

exercentur, fracto corpore minora fiunt.' He admits that in very many old men wisdom itself fades through age. Yet those who have acquired honourable accomplishments in their youth and have studied the law of the Lord day and night (Ps 1²) become more learned with age, more experienced, wiser, and 'reap the sweetest fruits of their old pursuits.' He then proceeds to give a number of instances of Greek philosophers and poets who continued learning to the last, and to these he adds the Roman name of Cato. An exhortation to Furia (*Ep.* liv. 14) gives, by way of warning, the other side of the picture :

'Iam incanuit caput, tremunt genua, dentes cadunt, "et frontem obscenam rugis arat" (Verg. *Æn.* vii. 417), uicina est mors in foribus: designatur rogos prope. Uelimus, nolimus, senes sumus. Paret sibi uitium, quod longo itinere necessarium est. Secum portet, quod inuitus dimissurus est; immo præmittat in caelum, quod, ni cauerit, terra sumptura est.'

Other passages in Jerome bearing on this subject are: in *Ecclesiasten*, xi. (ed. Venice, 1767, iii. (1) 483); *Præf. in lib. ii. Comm. in Amos* (vi. 263, 264), a very important passage; *Ep.* liv. 9 (the diet of the old); *Comm. in Esaiam*, III. v. 2 (iv. 48c, d, e, 49a) (distinction between *senex* and *presbyter*; cf. on v. 4, pp. 53a, 54a); *Comm. in Tit.* ii. 2 (vii. 714b).

At the same period Claudian, who, whether secretly Christian or not, writes in the pagan manner, penned an exquisite little poem on an old man near Verona who never travelled beyond the suburbs of that city (*Carm. Min.* 20 [52], ed. J. Koch, Leipzig, 1893, p. 223). He had passed all his life in the same house. He was not affected by the buffetings of fortune or the discomforts of emigration. He never trembled at danger, like the merchant prince or the soldier or the lawyer. Being in the country, he enjoys the ampler air and counts his years by the seasons. He has seen little of the world, but, possessing splendid physical strength and descendants, he knows more of real life than the man who has journeyed to the ends of the earth. The debt which Claudian here owes to Horace's second *Epode* is evident, but he chooses a different metre, and certain of the details, as well as the local setting, are his own.

The greatest of all Latin writers, Augustine, is full of references to this subject. In commenting on the 70th (71st) Psalm, v.¹⁸, which in his Bible read 'usque in senectam et senium,' he points out that these two words are subdivisions of *senectus*, corresponding respectively to the Greek words *πρεσβύτης* and *γέρων*. He considers that *πρεσβύτης* connotes *gravitas*, and *γέρων* a later stage. Pointing out that the Latin *senex* has to do duty for both of these Greek words, he says that *senectas* indicates the earlier stage of *senectus*, and *senium* the later (cf. *de Genesi contra Manicheos*, I. xxiii. 39). In the *de diuersi: Quæstionibus lxxxiii.*, qu. lviii. § 2, he says that *senectus* comprises as much time as all the other ages put together, because it is said to begin at sixty, and it need not end till one hundred and twenty. A pithy summing up occurs in *Sermo lxxxi.* 8:

'Homo est, nascitur, crescit, senescit. Querellæ multæ in senecta: tussis, pituita, lippitudo, anxietudo, lassitudo inest. Ergo senuit homo; querellis plenus est; senuit mundus; pressuris plenus est.'

He points out in *Tract. in Joh.* xxxii. 9 the folly of praying both for old age and for beauty, as the two are inconsistent. In *Enarr. in Ps.* cxii. 2 occurs the exhortation:

'Sit senectus uestra puerilis, et pueritia senilis; id est, ut nec sapientia uestra sit cum superbia, nec humilitas sine sapientia.'

The sense of *senior* in the Scriptures is expounded in *Locutiones in Heptateuchum*, vi. 29; *Quæstiones in Genesis*, i. 70, is important for the precise sense of the Scriptural words indicating 'old.' In a fine passage of *Sermo cxxviii.* (9, § 11) he says that the

spiritual enemies of the old are wearied, but that they still have to contend with minor enemies who disturb the peace of old age (see also *Catéch. Rud.* xvi. 24).

It will not be necessary here to pass beyond the period of Maximian, a poet of the middle of the 6th cent., who in his first *Elegy*, about 300 lines long, pours forth his soul in a dolorous lament. According to his story, he had every blessing that man could desire in his youth, of which he gives a long and detailed account. Sometimes his conceit is such as to excite laughter in the modern reader (e.g., 59 ff.).

LITERATURE.—Except as a divinity, for which see the art. 'Senectus' in Roscher, the subject has not been, so far as this present writer knows, treated in modern times. The above article has been compiled from the ancient authorities quoted.

A. SOUTER.

OLD AGE (Semitic and Egyptian).—1. Desirability.—In the early times a long life was desired and considered a blessing by all Semites and Egyptians whose thoughts we can trace. This is natural, since all men, when in health, love life and abhor death. A Babylonian king invokes a blessing upon every one who shall respect his decree defining a boundary thus:

'May the river god and Nina, mistress of goddesses, be with him in fidelity and might, with Ea, creator of all, may they fix for him the destiny of life, days of old age, and blissful years may they prolong for him as a gift!'¹

The OT contains many expressions that voice the same point of view on the part of the Hebrews (see 'Hebrew and Jewish' section).

A similar point of view was entertained by the Egyptians. In the *Precepts of Ptahhotep* we read:

'How good it is when a son receives that which his father says. He shall reach advanced age thereby.'²

Ramses IV. inscribed at Abydos a prayer to Osiris in which he says:

'And thou shalt give to me health, life, long existence and a prolonged reign. . . . Thou shalt double for me this long life, the prolonged reign of king Ramses II., the great god.'³

As Ramses II. reigned sixty-seven years, the petition is an appeal for a very long life.

The desirability of a long life led naturally to a longing for immortality. The Egyptian conceptions of the life beyond the grave are fairly well known.⁴ They were transformed, through the influence of faith in Osiris, from belief in a colourless existence in an under world to faith in a bright heavenly hereafter. Although such a faith developed more slowly among the Semites, it is not wanting. The belief that man was denied immortality through divine purpose finds expression both in Gn 3 and in the Babylonian Adapa myth. The Hebrews, however, went farther than the Babylonians. In the period after 200 B.C. they developed a faith in a resurrection to a happy life on the earth for 500 years (*Enoch*, x. 10), and then to an eternal life (Dn 12⁴). This faith was taken over by Muhammad, who apparently had no question either as to the eternity of the bliss of the righteous or as to the torment of the wicked.⁵

2. Traditions of long life.—Among both the Hebrews and the Babylonians traditions were cherished that early men lived much longer than the average of human life in the historic period. The Hebrew tradition is embodied in Gn 5, and is familiar to all. Most of the antediluvian patriarchs were believed to have lived more than 900 years each. A Babylonian tablet in Philadelphia

¹ H. V. Hilprecht, *Old Babylonian Inscriptions*, Philadelphia, 1893-96, no. 83, reverse, lines 15-20.

² Cf. J. H. Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt*, New York, 1912, p. 235 ff.

³ Cf. Breasted, *Hist. of Egypt*², New York, 1909, pp. 453, 459.

⁴ See G. Steindorff, *Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, New York, 1905, p. 115 ff.; Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought*, lectures II-VI, viii.

⁵ See, e.g., Qur'ân, xxii. 20 ff., iv. 60 ff.

contains a list of Babylonian kings who are said to have ruled for a like large number of years. They are as follows:

BABYLONIAN KINGS.
Galumum, 900 (?) years.
Zugagih, 840 (?) years.
Aripi (perhaps read Admê),
720 years.
Etana, the shepherd who
went to heaven, 635 years.
Pilkam, 850 years.
Enmennunna, 611 years.
Melamkish, 900 years.
Barsajnunna, 1200 years.
Ninurta, 905 years.

HEBREW TRADITION.
Adam, 930 years.
Seth, 912 years.
Enosh, 905 years.
Kenan, 910 years.
Mahaiel, 895 years.
Jared, 982 years.
Enoch, 365 years.
Methuselah, 969 years.
Lamech, 777 years.
Noah, 950 years.¹

Gilgamesh, 125 years.

It is the present writer's belief that the antediluvian patriarchs of Gn 5 are transformations of some of these names,² but in any event the names are evidence that the Babylonians shared the belief that early men lived exceedingly long lives. Later Babylonian tradition, as represented by Berossos, increased the length of the reigns of antediluvian kings to many thousands of years each. Among the Hebrews it was believed that the average age of man was gradually reduced. Thus Shem is said to have lived 600 years; Arpachshad, 438 years; Shelah, 433 years; Eber, 464 years; Peleg, 239 years; Ren, 239 years; Serug, 230 years; Nabor, 148 years; Terah, 205 years;³ Abraham, 175 years;⁴ Sarah, 127 years;⁵ Jacob, 147 years;⁶ Joseph, 110 years;⁷ and Moses, 120 years.⁸ The belief in these ages, which are all found in the P document, was doubtless caused by Babylonian influence. A very early tradition embodied in the J document fixes the age of man at 120 years (Gn 6³). The ages reported in the OT after the settlement in Palestine were of normal length. The belief that in the earlier time, the Golden Age of humanity, men lived to such great ages is eloquent testimony to the value which the Semites attached to old age.

3. Honours of age.—Among all Semitic people great honour has been given to old men. This arose in part from the patriarchal honours paid to the head of a family and in part from the semi-democratic organization of the clans. In Semitic patriarchal society sons married young, and brought their wives to the house of their father or grandfather, and the patriarch directed the fortunes of his descendants as long as he lived. The solidarity of the family made him alone responsible. The whole family was held guilty for his deeds. Thus Achan's family were all put to death for his sin (Jos 7). Similarly, the head of a family was responsible for the conduct of its members. Thus in Babylonia we hear of a woman, Belilit, the head of a family, who brought a suit to compel the payment of a debt. The debtor was able to exhibit receipts, showing that he had paid the money to her two sons, who were, apparently, grown men; the sons had embezzled the money. Such was the solidarity of the Babylonian family, however, that Belilit was fined an amount equal to the debt which she had sought to collect.⁹ Such conditions led naturally to the honouring of old men, as well as to the belief that they were

wiser than their juniors. Thus in the book of Job Elihu said:

'I am young, and ye are very old;
Wherefore I held back, and durst not shew you mine opinion.
I said, Days should speak,
And multitude of years should teach wisdom' (32²⁵).

Earlier in the book Eliphaz has said:

'What knowest thou, that we know not?
What understandest thou, which is not in us?
With us are both the grayheaded and the very aged men,
Much elder than thy father' (15⁹).

It was, as some scholars think, in part because of Job's age that he received the honours described in 29⁷, though the honour paid him by other old men was doubtless on account of his wealth and charity. He says:

'When I went forth to the gate unto the city,
When I prepared my seat in the street,
The young men saw me and hid themselves,
And the aged rose up and stood;
The princes refrained talking,
And laid their hand on their mouth;
The voice of the nobles was hushed,
And their tongue cleaved to the roof of their mouth' (29⁷⁻¹⁰).

Since such honours were paid to old men of wealth and character, it was natural to conceive of God as the Supreme Old Man. Thus in Daniel God is called 'Ancient of Days' (7⁹, 18, 22), and in the Enoch parables He is several times referred to as the 'Head of Days,'¹ apparently because He was conceived as a venerable Being with white hair like an old man.

4. Government by old men.—Among all the Semitic clans the government was in the hands of old men or of an old man. This was the natural outcome of the honour in which old men were held. The Arabic term for chieftain is to this day *shaiikh*, which means 'old man.' In the OT there is abundant evidence that in the settled life of Israel the government of the cities was in the hands of the old men; the 'elders'² as rulers are referred to more than a hundred times (e.g., see Dt 21^{2, 3, 4}). That this government was known among the Semites of Babylonia appears from a contract which mentions the 'city and elders' as the source of legal authority.³ Similar testimony is supplied by the Code of Hammurabi, in which *sibu*, or grey-haired men, are frequently mentioned as witnesses (see §§ 10, 13, etc.). In one of the sections erased from the pillar found at Susa, but recently recovered in a copy of the Code from Nippur, they appear in a capacity similar to that of the OT elders. The passage reads:

'If a man borrow grain or money from a merchant and for payment has no grain or money, whatever is in his hand, in the presence of the elders, he shall give to the merchant in place of the debt; the merchant shall not refuse it; he shall receive it.'⁴

Doubtless the Semitic custom of transacting important business in the presence of the elders led to the employment of *sibu* in Babylonia in the sense of 'witness.'

5. Decay in old age.—Late Semitic thought became reflective, and, where not illumined by the hope of a bright hereafter, it lost its delight in old age. Thus Qoheleth says (Ec 11¹⁰):

'Put away vexation from thy heart
And remove misery from thy flesh,—
For youth and prime are vanity.

While the evil days come not,
Nor approach the years of which thou shalt say
I have in them no pleasure;
While the sun be not darkened,
Nor the light and moon and stars,
Nor the clouds return after rain,

¹ See Enoch, xvi. 1, xlvii. 3, xlviii. 2, etc.

² Cf. Elders (Semitic), vol. v. p. 253 ff.; also HDB and SDB, s.v. 'Elder (in OT).'

³ Published in F. Thureau-Dangin, *Lettres et contrats de l'époque de la première dynastie babylonienne*, Paris, 1910, no. 232, and tr. in M. Schorr, *Urkunden des altbabylonischen Zivil- und Prozessrechts*, Leipzig, 1913, no. 285.

⁴ Published in Poebel, *Historical and Grammatical Texts*, and tr. Barton, *AJSJL* xxxi. [1915] 225.

¹ Tr. from A. Poebel, *Historical and Grammatical Texts* (= Publications of the Babylonian Section of the University Museum of the University of Pennsylvania, v.), Philadelphia, 1914, no. 3. Poebel has translated the tablet in *Historical Texts* (= *ib. iv.*), p. 73 ff., but the writer's rendering differs from Poebel's in a number of points.

² G. A. Barton, *JBL* xxiv. [1915], and *Archæology and the Bible*, Philadelphia, 1916, pt. II. ch. viii.

³ See Gn 11¹⁰.

⁴ Gn 23¹.

⁵ Gn 50²⁶.

⁶ See *Babylonian and Assyrian Literature*, ed. R. F. Harper, New York, 1901, p. 276. Cf. also Ezk 18.

⁷ Gn 25⁷.

⁸ Gn 47²³.

⁹ Dt 34⁷.

In the day when the keepers of the house shall tremble
 And the men of valor bend themselves,
 And the grinding-maids cease because they are few.
 And the ladies who look out of the windows are darkened,
 And the doors on the street are shut
 When the sound of the mill is low,
 And he shall rise at the voice of the hird,
 And all the daughters of song are prostrate,—
 Also he is afraid of a height,
 And terror is on the road,
 And the almond-tree blooms,
 And the grasshopper is burdensome,
 And the caper-berry is made ineffectual,
 For man goes to his eternal house,
 And the mourners go around the street;—
 While the silver cord is not severed,
 Nor the golden bowl broken,
 Nor the water-jar be shattered at the spring,
 Nor the wheel broken at the cistern,
 And the dust shall return to the earth as it was,
 And the spirit shall return unto God who gave it.¹

In this passage the decay of the powers in old age is allegorically described, and the description shows that to its author old age had lost its charm.² Kindred to this is a line in the *Mu'allaqāt* of Zuhair:

'I have grown weary of the troubles of life, and he who attains
 To eighty years will grow weary, or mayest thou become
 fatherless!'³

The recognition of the joylessness of age and the swiftness of approaching death led Qoheleth to urge the enjoyment of life while possible. In addition to the passage quoted, Ec 9⁷⁻¹⁰ may be compared. This view had been reached by Babylonians and Egyptians much earlier. A fragment of the Gilgamesh epic reads:

'Since the gods created man,
 Death they ordained for man,
 Life in their hands they hold,
 Thou, O Gilgamesh, fill indeed thy belly,
 Day and night be thou joyful,
 Daily ordain gladness,
 Day and night rage and make merry.
 Let thy garments be bright,
 Thy head purify, wash with water;
 Desire thy children, which thy hand possesses,
 A wife enjoy in thy bosom.'⁴

Similarly an Egyptian poet, probably of the Middle Kingdom, wrote:

'Put spices upon thy head!
 Let thy clothing be byssus
 Expensively dyed
 In observance of the divine behests!
 Outdo thy past joyousness!
 Let not thy heart be anxious!
 Accomplish thy earthly affairs
 According to the desire of thy heart!
 To thee will come that day of lamentation,
 When a paralyzed heart hears not their wailing.
 Not with wine can one compel
 The heart-beat of the man in the grave.'⁵

Not all Egyptian poets looked at the approach of death in this way. Another, who felt the joylessness of life, composed a poem on death which Breasted has entitled 'Death a glad release.' Each stanza expresses by means of a different figure how gladly the writer welcomes death. He concludes:

'Death is before me to-day
 As a man longs to see his house
 When he has spent years in captivity.'⁶

LITERATURE.—Authorities have been fully cited in the article.
 GEORGE A. BARTON.

OLD AGE (Teutonic).—It seems as if the custom of putting the aged and infirm to death, or of allowing them to commit suicide, must have

¹ Quoted from Barton's tr. in *ICC*, 'Ecclesiastes,' Edinburgh, 1908.

² The passage has been differently interpreted by different scholars. For a summary of these opinions cf. Barton 'Ecclesiastes,' *ad loc.*

³ See F. E. Johnson, *Es-sab'a al-mu'allaqāt*, *The Seven Poems suspended in the Temple at Mecca*, London, 1894, p. 83, line 47.

⁴ Published by B. Meissner, *MVG* vii. [1902] I., quoted by Barton, 'Ecclesiastes,' p. 162.

⁵ Tr. from the German of W. Max Müller, *Die Liebespoesie der alten Ägypter*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 30.

⁶ See Breasted, *Development of Religion and Thought*, p. 195.

been prevalent among the Teutonic races in early times. Procopius¹ tells us that a peculiarity of the Eruli (the latest of the Germanic tribes described by him to accept Christianity) was their practice of putting the aged to death. It behoved any one overtaken by age or disease to ask his relatives to put an end to his life. He was thereupon placed on a funeral pyre, and a man not of his kin stabbed him to death with a dagger, after which the pyre was kindled. In the light of this passage the Scandinavian rite of marking a dying man with the point of a javelin to dedicate him to Oðin may well be a survival from earlier times, when the sick man was actually put to death (H. M. Chadwick, *The Cult of Oðin*, London, 1899, p. 34).

It seems to have been a custom among several Teutonic races for the aged to commit suicide by casting themselves over precipices. It is mentioned in the late *Gautreks Saga* (ch. i.) as regularly adopted by the members of a mythical Swedish family on the approach of age, to relieve their descendants from the burden of their support, and the historian Geijer maintains that the names of many cliffs in Sweden testify to some such custom. Bede² mentions a similar method of self-destruction during a famine in Sussex, and the elder Pliny³ speaks of it as a form of suicide usual among the Hyperboreans on the approach of age. In Iceland we can see the custom gradually falling into desuetude. It is reported that some men cast their aged kinsmen over cliffs in a famine in A.D. 976; but, though the sagas occasionally mention that the suggestion of putting the aged and infirm to death, or of letting them starve, was made under stress of famine, we hear of no other case of the proposal being actually carried out.⁴ The practice of exposing infants long outlasted that of killing the aged. The last trace of any such method of disposing of adults unable to support themselves is found some time after the introduction of Christianity in Norway in the law which enacts that freedmen and freedwomen in want shall be placed in a hole dug in the graveyard and left to die.

A people like the early Scandinavians, who considered it a dishonour to die of disease or age instead of in battle, would not be likely to hold the aged in high honour; but in the period of which most of the sagas treat the old are usually treated with respect, and occasionally looked up to for their wisdom and experience. The god Oðin is thought of as old, and is represented in a poem as advising his listener to heed the words of the aged.

LITERATURE.—See the sources cited throughout.

B. S. PHILLPOTS.

OLD AND NEW TESTAMENTS IN MUHAMMADANISM. — I. Introduction. —

There appears to be no evidence that any portions of the Bible were accessible in Arabic before the prophet Muhammad's time. This is strange, since Christianity had already been accepted by numerous tribes in both N. and S. Arabia, and the tradition connects the origin of the modern Arabic script with the Christian State of Hira; conceivably, however, the closely allied Syriac and Ethiopic dialects may have been considered sufficiently near these idioms respectively to permit of versions in them serving instead of copies in the vernacular. Indeed, here and there both the Qur'an and the Tradition exhibit phrases which owe their origin to one or other of these translations, and of which the sense has sometimes escaped the native commentators; thus the apostles are called

¹ *De Bell. Goth.* ii. 4.

² *HE* iv. 13.

³ *HN* iv. 26.

⁴ Cf. Saxo, *Gesta Danorum*, ed. A. Holder, Strassburg, 1898, viii. 284.

hawāriyyūn (Ethiopic), which the commentators render 'fullers'; the name *masih* (Syriac *mshihā*, 'Christ') is thought to mean 'wanderer'; the Syriac *hāl*, 'sand,' occurs in a tradition about the Red Sea (Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, Cairo, 1313, i. 245); and *furgān*, 'salvation' (Syriac), is supposed to mean 'discrimination.' It seems clear that, had there been an Arabic version of the Bible at the time, either the sense of these technicalities would have been preserved or Arabic expressions would have been employed to represent them. On the rare occasions on which the Qur'ān quotes the Bible, the nature of the quotation is not such as to suggest that it was derived from a version in the same language. There is a tradition that, when Muhammad came to Medina and came in conflict with the Jews, a member of the latter community prepared a translation of 'the Tōrah' in order to convince the Prophet's followers that his accounts of its contents were untrustworthy; they were not, however, allowed to peruse it. The earliest Biblical quotation found in Arabic literature outside the Qur'ān is in Ibn Ishāq's biography of the Prophet (ed. F. Wüstenfeld, *Das Leben Mohammeds*, Göttingen, 1858, p. 150), viz. Jn 15²²⁻¹⁶; this appears to be translated from the Palestinian Syriac version, whence the rendering *mnahmana* is quoted for the Greek *παράκλητος*. The word doubtless means 'comforter,' and is wrongly rendered 'praised' by Ibn Ishāq.

Since proselytism among Muslims was never permitted in Muslim States, translations of the Bible into Arabic were not made with that object in mediæval times; a demand arose for them among the Christian and the Jewish communities when the language of the Muslim conquerors had been adopted by the former in Syria, Egypt, N. Africa, and elsewhere. Yet, if the Arabic bibliography called *Fihrist* is to be believed, one Ahmad b. Abdallah b. Salām translated the whole Bible from Hebrew and Greek into Arabic for the library of Hārūn al-Rashid (786-809); he also rendered the Ṣābian books from the Ṣābian language. We know from other sources that translation was carried on at this sovereign's court on a great scale, whence it is highly probable that this enterprise was either ordered or encouraged. The translator gives a few words of Hebrew in order to illustrate his method of translation, but they are not actually taken from the Bible. Possibly we have the first chapter of Genesis in this translation in Mutahhar b. Tāhir's *Kitāb al-bad' wa'l-ta'rikh* (ed. C. Huart, *Le Livre de la création et de l'histoire*, Paris, 1901, ii. 3), since Abdallah b. Salām is quoted in the immediate neighbourhood, and the substitution of the father's name for the son's would be a pardonable slip. The OT was often revised or retranslated, and so also was the NT.

The canon given by Ahmad b. Abdallah is curious, as it gives the number of 'revealed books' as 104, commencing with the book of Adam, and proceeding to those of Seth, Enoch, and Abraham; the only others mentioned are those of Moses and David. According to A. Sprenger, *Das Leben und die Lehre des Mohammed*, Berlin, 1869, i. 49, Ibn Munajjim, in 231 A.H., made a list of the canonical Scriptures of the OT and the NT. The *Fihrist* (377 A.H.) contains a list both of the Jewish and of the Christian Scriptures.

2. Place in the Prophet's teaching.—The Qur'ān repeatedly claims that it 'confirms what was before it,' and occasionally gives the names of the books to which this phrase applies. These are the *Rolls of Abraham and Moses*, the *First Rolls*, the *Taurāt*, the *Injil*, the *Zabūr*, and the *Furgān*. There is no difficulty in identifying the four last names respectively with the Tōrah, the *Euangelion*, the *Mazmure* (Syriac name for the Psalms), and the

Pragim (a Rabbinical treatise, *Sayings of the Jewish Fathers*); but the process by which they have assumed these forms is not perfectly clear; popular etymology has probably influenced them all, and, indeed, Arabic etymologies are offered for all four words by those who maintain that the language of the Qur'ān has no foreign elements.

Though actual quotation from these works is unusual, a great deal of the matter which occupies the pages of the Qur'ān is reproduction of the Biblical narratives; being obtained from hearsay, these reproductions are inaccurate, mixed up with apocryphal matter, vague, destitute of chronology, and contradictory. The Qur'ān appears to contain Biblical narratives delivered by the Prophet at all periods of his career; in these errors are at times corrected, or difficulties explained away, yet it is not clear that the writer's command of his subject was at any one time greater than at any other.

In the Prophet's biography we can trace the difference of the standard by which his utterances on these subjects were judged at different times. In a pagan prophet, endeavouring to convert his countrymen to monotheism, a very little knowledge was thought remarkable; hence we may well believe that *sūrah* xix., when communicated to the Abyssinian king, as an apology for the Muslim refugees, won high approval; it certainly displayed some acquaintance with the OT and NT, and the slip by which the Virgin Mary is addressed as 'Sister of Aaron' may have seemed pardonable, like Vergil's 'Inarime.' When, however, Muhammad claimed to lecture Jews and Christians on their sacred history, a very different standard was applied; and the discussions between the Prophet and the Jews after the migration to Medina led to stormy scenes. The differences between their respective versions of the Biblical narratives were explained by Muhammad as due to deliberate corruption of the text by the Jews (ii. 75, v. 44, iv. 45).

The way in which the Bible was utilized by Muhammad determined the attitude which his followers have ever since assumed towards it. That attitude is necessarily one-sided; the older Scriptures may be employed in defence of Islām, but not to its detriment; an appeal was made to them when evidence was required that the matter which the Prophet claimed to have received by revelation was veracious; but, when they were cited in order to expose his errors, they were not to be heard. The formula employed by some Muslim theologians, according to which the earlier Scriptures require confirmation from the Qur'ān, expresses this principle very clearly. Hence, when the evidence of the Qur'ān is quoted in favour of the earlier Scriptures, the Muslim controversialist replies that he recognizes them only to the extent to which the Qur'ān attests them. The famous Mutazilite Abū'l-Hudhail († 226 A.H.) is commended for having silenced a Jew thus (Jauzi, *Kitāb al-Adhkiya*, Cairo, 1306, p. 95).

The tradition ascribes to Muhammad not a few quotations of Biblical passages which are not utilized in the Qur'ān. So, according to Bukhārī (ed. L. Krehl, Leyden, n.d., ii. 224), he told his followers to shoot because their father Ishmael was a shot (Gn 21²⁰). He told (according to the same author, ii. 280) the story of the sun standing still, though without the name of Joshua, and combined with this the enactment of Dt 20⁷. In the *Musnad* of Ibn Ḥanbal (vi. 21) he recommends the Lord's Prayer as a spell. Certain aphorisms which belong to Ecclesiastics are ascribed to him in these collections. The Qur'ān itself, besides reproducing Biblical narratives, at times expresses itself in decidedly Biblical language, and the same is true of matter embodied in the books of tradi-

3. Use of the Bible by historians.—The study of history is, on the whole, popular in Islām, and, although it is chiefly occupied with the national vicissitudes, the need for locating these in the history of the world has led to a certain amount of research—sometimes of a highly creditable kind—into the records of other communities. Since the Qur'ān claims to be a development of the Biblical revelations, it was considered on the whole proper to obtain pre-Islāmic history from the latter, corrected, of course, from the statements of the Qur'ān. Those writers, then, who composed universal histories after the rise of secular prosaic literature, or who compiled compendia of the same, utilized the OT and NT Scriptures for their purpose on those conditions. Works of this sort are the *Chronicle* of Ya'qūbī (250 A.H.), the *Historical Handbook* of Ibn Qutaiba († 270), and the *Chronicle* of Ṭabarī († 310). The first and second of these evidently quote at first hand. A remarkable work in a kindred field is the *Chronology of Ancient Nations* by al-Birūnī († after 422), in which the differences between the chronologies of the Hebrew, the LXX, and the Samaritan copies of the Pentateuch are tabulated. Somewhat earlier is the summary of Israelitish chronology published by Ḥamzah of Isfāhān; he got it in the year 920 from a Jew in Baghdād, who knew by heart twelve Biblical books, whose names are somewhat disfigured in the Arabic transliteration. It is not probable that these extracts ever appealed to large circles of Muslims before imitation of European modes of education became popular. Hence allusions to Biblical history are rarely made, and would not be expected to be understood.

4. Use by preachers.—Although the extent to which the Ṣūfī movement was influenced by Christianity is apt to be exaggerated, it seems clear that there was often identity of aim between the Christian and the Muslim preachers, and that the latter found valuable material in both Testaments. Thus the earliest Ṣūfī writer, Muḥāsibī († 243), uses the parable of the Sower; numerous quotations from Biblical books (sometimes cited as *al-Isrā'īyyat*) are to be found in the *Qūt al-qulūb* of Abu Ṭālib al-Mekki († 386), some of which can be identified with texts in the canonical books, whereas others are clearly apocryphal. The OT (Isaiah) is also used in the *Mukāshafat al-qulūb* of Ghazālī († 505), probably at second hand, since the quotation is very much amplified. Such quotations are much less common in the works of the mystical (as opposed to the homiletic) Ṣūfīs, yet it is noticeable that in the most famous of the former, the *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* of Ibn al-'Arabī (A.H. 627), the Biblical account of the sacrifice of Abraham, according to which Isaac was the victim, is preferred to that ordinarily got from the Qur'ān, which makes the victim Ishmael; and in the commentary on this work by Dawūd al-Qaisari († 751; Bombay, 1300, p. 71) Jn 14²⁸ is cited as the saying of 'the revealer of the divine secrets, the seal of the universal saintship.'

5. Use in Qur'ānic exegesis.—The employment of the Bible for the elucidation of the Qur'ān is not ordinarily approved; and, indeed, one of the charges brought against Muḥammad b. Ishāq, the Prophet's biographer, is that he adopted this practice (Yāqūt, *Dict. of Learned Men*, ed. D. S. Margoliouth, London, 1913, vi. 401); a certain amount of Biblical matter has, however, got into the most orthodox commentaries, chiefly, it is supposed, through Ka'b al-Aḥbār and Wabḥ b. Munabbih, servants of the first Islāmic century. Thus Baidāwī inserts in his commentary on *sūrah* iii. a genealogy which is taken from that prefixed to the First Gospel. First-hand employment of the Gospels is found in the commentary of Fakhr

al-dīn al-Rāzī († 606), who chiefly employs that of John. His references are respectful, but he does not attempt to harmonize the conflicting statements. In quite recent times, owing to the spread of European education and, with it, of acquaintance with the contents of the Bible, endeavours to explain the discrepancies between it and the Qur'ān and to justify the assertions of the latter have been made on a much more considerable scale. The late Egyptian Mufti Muḥammad Abdo and his disciple Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍa have done more than others in this line, and have come nearer the European treatment of this subject than their predecessors.

6. Use by controversialists.—Although conversion from Islām to other religions was not tolerated in any Muslim State, and conversion to Islām was usually effected by other methods than reasoning, the fact of members of different religious communities mixing on nearly equal terms in lecture-rooms and debating-societies in Baghdād and other Islāmic capitals naturally led to religious controversy; and it was hard to keep it out of discussions on logic or even geometry. Hence works professing to refute the Jewish and Christian systems were produced in a fairly constant series during the 'Abbāsīd Khalīfate, and thence to our own time. In order to attack these systems with success it was necessary to study the Scriptures to a certain extent, and some of the controversialists took considerable pains in the matter. The Prophet's method is generally adopted, but the degree varies very much. The Spanish Zāhirite Ibn Ḥazm († 456) goes the length of treating the OT and NT as impudent forgeries; he denies that we even know the names of the apostles. His studies in the Pentateuch led him to anticipate some of the objections urged by modern critics—e.g., J. W. Colenso. In the polemical work of the Syrian Ibn Taimiyyah († 728) a much more moderate view is taken. He urges, indeed, that the only prophets known to the Muslims are those mentioned in the Qur'ān, and that, as the stream cannot rise higher than the source, belief in these implies belief in Muḥammad; but he is disposed to think that the alterations which the Scriptures have undergone are not very considerable, and he finds a whole series of predictions concerning Muḥammad in the book of Isaiah; and this more nearly approaches the general practice of the controversialists. For the number of passages in the OT and NT which can be interpreted as predictions of the Muslim prophet is very large; and, in order that these may be utilized, a certain amount of authority must be granted the works which contain them. With some of these writers there is a tacit assumption that Arabic is the original language of the Scriptures; and it is sometimes said that the Christian doctrine of the Sonship of Christ is due to the misplacing of points in Ps 27, the words *anta nabī* ('Thou art a prophet') having been misread *anta bunayya* ('Thou art my Son').

7. Use for guidance.—The question is discussed in treatises on the principles of jurisprudence 'whether we are bound by the codes of our predecessors,' and, though it might seem that only parts of the OT and NT had been abrogated, the doctrine of interpolation renders the use of the existing Bible improper in the minds of Muslim authorities; in practice, then, it does not count as a source of law, and reference to it is not approved by legal authorities.

The most curious case recorded in Islāmic history of resort to the Bible for assistance in an emergency is that of one 'Umar b. Bilāl al-Asadi, who was asked by the Umayyad Khalīfah 'Abd al-Malik (683-705) to effect a reconciliation between himself and his queen, 'Atika. This personage borrowed the expedient of the 'wise woman' in 2 S 14¹⁻⁷, and told the same story about his two sons, but deviated slightly

from the precedent in inducing the queen to intercede with the Khalifah that the execution of the supposed murderer should not be carried out (*Aghant*, Cairo, 1285, ii. 140). Cases of this kind are very rare; and it is not probable that, outside the group of specialists noticed, reading of the Bible was ever common among Muslims.

8. Biblical forgeries.—The theory having been accepted that the books in the hands of Jews and Christians are forgeries, it seemed desirable to supply the missing revealed books; and there are a certain number of compositions of this sort in existence, which adopt the literary form of the Qur'an, in which the Deity addresses the prophet in rhyming sentences. A spurious Psalm of this kind is described by S. M. Zwemer in *The Moslem World*, v. [1915] 399-403. Sprenger (i. 51) claims to have discovered a fragment of the *Rolls of Abraham* mentioned in the Qur'an, which doubtless is a fabrication meant to replace them. He quotes Ibn Munajjim († 300) for the identity of a work called *Sham' ata*, in the hands of the Jews but not of the Christians, with the *Rolls of Abraham and Moses*. There is naturally no difficulty in recognizing in this the Talmud, which often uses the word quoted of its contents. In the *Qut al-qulub* there is a quotation from the 'Sirah of Yearning' in the Tōrah, which the author Abu Tālib al-Mekki had himself read; in it the Deity taunts the reader with neglect of His communications, whereas he would stop his business in order to read a letter from a friend. This author appears to have had access to several apocryphal collections of this kind.

Probably the most remarkable among these apocrypha is the *Gospel of Barnabas*, which, after it had been occasionally mentioned for some centuries, was edited in Italian and English from a Vienna MS by Lonsdale and Laura Ragg, Oxford, 1907. Its date is acutely fixed by the editors for A.D. 1500-50 from the mention of 'Jubilee celebrated every hundred years'; and, though the Arabic scribbles on the margin of the MS suggest that Arabic was the original language, the editors are probably right in rejecting this opinion and supposing the Italian to be the original; it seems that a Spanish copy also existed at one time. The work, immediately after its appearance in English, was translated into Arabic for use in anti-Christian controversy; but no reference to its existence in Arabic before that date has been discovered in any Islāmic writer.

Besides apocryphal documents a considerable amount of matter of a similar kind collected round the names of those prophets who are mentioned in the Qur'an; tales of this sort were invented by preachers, and then circulated. Several collections were made bearing the name *Qisaṣ al-Anbiyā*, 'Tales of the Prophets'; the most popular is the '*Arā'is al-Majālis* of Tha'ālībī († 427 A.H.), which has been translated into other Islāmic languages. Much similar matter is to be found in the religious poetry of the Persians—e.g., the *Būstān* of Sa'dī and the *Mathnavī* of Jalāl al-dīn Rūmī.

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OLD CATHOLICISM.—Old Catholicism is the modern revival of Catholicism as it was understood in the first centuries—not an attempt to perpetuate the faults either of doctrines or of works, revealed by history in the Christian Church of the early centuries, but an endeavour, on the part of its supporters, while conforming to their own times and their own countries, to be guided by the spirit of Christ, their only leader, and to

labour, by this spirit, to put an end to the imperfections and vices that have defiled the Church in the course of time.

They are called 'Old,' not to disown the improvements which reason and the gospel declare to be necessary, but to show their fundamental dependence on Christ and His gospel. They have no intention whatever of founding a new religion or of joining one of the sects that dream of a faneiful Christianity in the future; but, faithful to the Church founded by Christ and preached by the apostles, as it appears in the books of the NT and in the Christian writings of the first centuries, they claim to live by the spirit of their fathers and the saints worshipped by their ancestors, and thus to unite the Christian past with the Christian present and the Christian future. When they speak of the first centuries, they speak especially of the first three, but in thought they include the next five also, because, in reality, the Church of the first eight centuries, in spite of its turmoils and its numerous dissensions, succeeded in remaining one in both East and West. It was not until the 9th cent. that Pope Nicholas I. fell away from the Eastern Church and caused schism. Although they are Westerners, the Old Catholics do not accept the inheritance of the faults of this pope, and they claim to go further, by extending the hand to Christians of the East and inviting them to labour with them for the restoration of union between the Christian Churches of the East and the West.

In this article we shall note (1) the occasion and origin of the Old Catholic movement; (2) its aims; (3) the results already attained; and (4) its present condition and expectations.

1. Occasion and origin.—Convinced long before the Vatican Council (1870) that the doctrines of papal infallibility and the universality of the jurisdiction of the bishop of Rome over the Church were absolutely erroneous, the Old Catholics did not allow that the simple fact of the dogmatization of these two errors by the pope and the majority of the Council was sufficient to transform them into truths—still less, divine truths; and after, as before, the 18th of July, 1870, they rejected these two dogmas. It is hardly necessary to recall the proofs established by the Old Catholics of the falsity of these new dogmas—a falsity clearly shown up by the Scriptures, by universal tradition, by the history of the seven Ecumenical Councils, and by several other undoubted facts. None of these proofs has been seriously refuted by Roman Catholic theologians. The Old Catholics, therefore, by rejecting these false dogmas, remained faithful to the Catholicism of the time before the Vatican Council; they did not leave the Catholic Church to form a new Church; they remained in the Catholic Church of which they had always formed a part, and they continued to set the 'universal, unvarying, and unanimous' testimony of the Church in opposition to Roman innovations.

This attitude and the theological works which they have had to produce to prove the truth of their cause have led them to discover a number of errors made by Roman theologians and transformed into dogmas in the course of the ages, so that the protest against the false dogmas of the 18th of July, 1870, has logically incurred on their part the protest against all the false dogmas previously promulgated by the papacy (see especially W. Guettée, *La Papauté schismatique*, Paris, 1863, and *La Papauté hérétique*, do. 1874, and E. Michaud, *La Papauté antichrétienne*, do. 1873). This discovery of the errors of the Roman papacy from the 9th cent. to the present day, and in all the individual Churches under the jurisdiction of Rome, has given fresh impetus and considerable

importance to the Old Catholic movement. It is a complete history of Roman theology, re-made in accordance with authentic sources and contrary to the thousands of Roman falsifications pointed out recently by the most eminent theologians of all the Churches, including even Roman theologians. We may say that these new publications—this veritable resurrection of ancient documents that were believed to be buried in darkness—have created a new situation and started a thorough reformation of so-called Catholic theology.

This is a part of the work of the Old Catholics, but it is only one of their proposed aims.

2. Aims.—The chief aims may be reduced to three: (a) theological reform; (b) ecclesiastical reform; and (c) union of the Christian Churches.

(a) *Theological reform.*—This reform was not undertaken arbitrarily; nor is it conducted by each theologian according to his personal opinions on each of the disputed questions. A strict method governs all their actions, a method which results especially in distinguishing dogma from theology—dogma, which is the word of Christ as it is recorded in the Gospels, from theology, which is the explanation given by the apostles and scholars to secure the acceptance and practice of the precepts of Jesus Christ. Christ, being 'the way, the truth, and the life,' is the only Scholar, the only Master; He has declared it Himself to His disciples. It is therefore He alone who, as the only Mediator and Saviour, possesses the words of eternal life; it is He alone who is the light of the world, and it is He alone who has the right to impose His doctrines, decrees, and dogmas on His disciples. On the other hand, every disciple is entitled, and even duty-bound, to try to understand the dogmas of Christ, to see their depth and beauty, and to derive profit from them for the sanctification of his soul. Dogma is the divine truth which is taught by Christ; theology is the explanation given by men—an explanation more or less luminous, which each one may judge according to the light of his reason, conscience, and knowledge: 'Prove all things; hold fast that which is good' (1 Th 5²).

The distinction between dogma and theology is made by the application of the Catholic test to every disputed point. The test is the one so well epitomized by Vincent of Lérins: 'What has been believed everywhere, always, and by all' the Christian Churches is Catholic (*Commonitory*, ii. [6]). The Catholic faith is the 'universal, unvarying, and unanimous' faith, because, even humanly speaking, all the Christian Churches cannot be making a mistake when they attest, as a fact, that they have always believed or not believed, from their very foundation, in the doctrine which the apostle-founders of their particular Church had taught them or not. It is not a question of settling an important discussion, but of making a simple statement of fact. As to the theological explanations which may be given of the established doctrine, they depend, like all the explanations in this world, on reason, science, history, and all the knowledge which humanity has at its disposal.

Thus faith and liberty are reconciled—the faith which depends not on any caprice or any school, but solely on the historical and objective testimony of the Churches; and liberty of criticism or of reason, which, conscientiously speaking, belongs to the religious truth transmitted to all the Churches, to the best of the religious interests of each Church. Thus the faith is a depository—a depository of all the precepts confided by Jesus Christ to His disciples, a depository which does not belong exclusively to any one person, but to everybody, to the preservation of which all faithful

Churches carefully attend, so that none of it may be suppressed, and also that no foreign doctrine may be surreptitiously introduced into it (*depositum custodi*). And theology is a science which, like all other sciences, belongs to reason, to history, to criticism, and which also obeys fixed rules.

It is therefore neither a bishop nor a priest nor a scholar that is entrusted with the preservation of dogma, but all bishops, all priests, all scholars—in a word, all the faithful, members of the Church. Christ being the only Master of His Church, there is no other rule than His; it is sufficient to guard His doctrine and precepts. The Church was not instituted to found a religion other than that of Christ, but merely to preserve it and spread it throughout the world ('Go ye therefore, and teach all nations' [Mt 28¹⁹]). Its mission is not to add to the dogmas of Christ, but only to preach them in order to sanctify the world by them ('Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you' [Mt 28²⁰]). The Church is therefore a guardian of the teachings and precepts of Jesus Christ; its title, the 'teaching' Church, means, not that it has the right to teach any doctrines that it pleases, but that it is its duty to preach openly what Christ taught His disciples in secret.

Real theological reform should consist in communicating to all men the teachings of Jesus Christ, as they are collected in the Scriptures and recorded in the universal tradition of the Church—a tradition which also belongs to all the members of the Church. It is the duty of pastors and scholars to explain them, and it is the duty of each member to study the explanations which appear to him wisest and most useful; the good sense and the Christian spirit that prevail in the Church are sufficient to ensure the final triumph of truth over error: 'Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them' (Mt 18²⁰).

Since the Church is not a chair to which might be addressed all the questions that arise in the minds of the inquisitive and the imaginative, it is not obliged to solve them or to prevent men from discussing among themselves matters which neither God nor Christ has thought fit to make clear. It is the work of scholars to elucidate the mysteries of science; the apostles have simply to preach the truths which Christ thought sufficient for the edification and sanctification of humanity. The fruitfulness of the faith does not consist in discovering new dogmas or in transforming the Church into a reveler, charged with completing the revelation made by Christ; the faith is fruitful, it increases, it grows by the closeness of its adherence to the word of Christ, and not by the proclamation of unknown dogmas. It is Christ alone who is the religious light and the religious life of the world; the Church must only be His humble servant.

(b) *Ecclesiastical reform.*—This reform should consist in reminding the Church what Christ wished it to be. Christ established a hierarchy for the service of the faithful. That hierarchy, therefore, ought to serve, and not to rule. Its office is a ministry, and not an authority. There is no *imperium* in the Church of Christ: 'neither as lording it over the charge allotted to you' (1 P 5³); and the obedience of the disciples must be reasonable, and not servile (Ro 12¹). If any member wanted to be first, he had to be the first to serve his brothers, and not to give them orders—to feed the flock, i.e. to lead it into good pastures, and not to enslave it by false dogmas or exploit it by superstitions. The main duties of pastors are to arouse the conscience of the faithful, to enlighten it, to act as if each of them were another Christ:

'Christ liveth in me' (Gal 2²⁰). Christ took a firm stand against the Pharisees of His day, but He did not charge any of His disciples to rebuke his brothers, still less to excommunicate them or curse them.

The mission of the Church also is essentially religious and spiritual. Christ did not give it any worldly and temporal authority; He chose apostles and disciples only to lay the most strict duties on them, and thus to make examples of them for the flock. The early bishops or superintendents were only overseers, and not masters: 'for one is your Master' (Mt 23⁸).

The primitive Church, then, was simply a gathering or reunion in which the first and only chief was, in the eyes of the faith, Christ Himself. Pastors and people simply formed a school, a body and a soul. This was the parish, and, if a dispute arose between any of the members, it was 'the Church' that restored peace: 'Die Ecclesiae.'

Gradually bonds of brotherhood and charity were formed between the various local churches, and in this way synods came into being—special and very limited synods, before the idea of general councils was heard of. It is not only the idea of the true bishop, therefore, that has to be restored, but also that of the synod and the council. Because the so-called ecumenical council was believed to be the representation of the whole Church, it was soon confused with the Church, and rights were assigned to it which the Church itself hardly possesses. Under the pretext that the council was, as it were, the supreme jurisdiction of the Church, this jurisdiction was made a universal and absolute jurisdiction, to which was soon joined the privilege of infallibility. The practical consequences resulting from this confusion and the numerous abuses arising from them to the detriment of the Church are well known.

The Old Catholics are also engaged in restoring the true conceptions of pastor, bishop, synod, council, ecclesiastical authority, and even infallibility, according to the precise meaning of the Scriptures and according to ancient traditions. The constitution of the Church, they hold, is monarchical only because Christ is its only monarch; but, inasmuch as it is a society composed of men, the Church has been called from its very beginning a simple 'church,' and it has been regarded in its universality, since the time when the question of universality arose, as a Christian 'republic.' It would give a wrong idea of the early bishops to represent their action as an aristocratic government; the words of St. Peter himself are opposed to that.

The episcopal see of Rome was not long in attaining a certain priority, Rome being the capital of the empire; but it was merely a priority of honour, and not of jurisdiction. Christ did not appoint a master among His disciples. When He told Peter specially to feed His lambs and sheep, it was to restore to him the function of which he had proved unworthy, and of which he had been deprived in denying Christ. As Peter repented, he deserved to be reinstated, and he was; but it is a mistake to transform this reinstatement as a simple apostle into an exaltation above all the other apostles. The alteration of the constitution of the Church was accomplished by Rome by means of grossly erroneous interpretations of texts; the policy and the ambition of the bishops of Rome did the rest.

Such is the spirit in which the Old Catholics have set about restoring the true conception of the Church and realizing the ecclesiastical reform claimed for such a long time 'in capite et in membris.'

(c) *Union of the Christian Churches.*—This reform

of the Church would have been very imperfect if it had not from the very beginning implied the re-establishment of union among the separate Churches. It has been rightly said that 'it is as difficult to see Christ behind the Church as to see the sun behind the darkness of night.' From the very start of their work the Old Catholics have made it one of their aims to study means of reviving this union. Their efforts during their international congresses, and their writings on this question in their *Revue internationale de théologie* (1893-1910), are well known; great reconciliations have been effected among all the Churches that have taken part in these, and, if the union has not yet been sanctioned, it is because there are still administrative obstacles to be overcome, and especially prejudices of a hierarchical kind to be put down—a matter of time, which more favourable social circumstances will undoubtedly help to bring to a successful issue.

It is already apparent to all eyes that the 'union' aimed at is not the 'unity' which many had at first imagined; that the latter is not necessary; and that, moreover, it is impossible, considering the needs of various kinds which are prevalent among the nations and which form part of human nature itself. The chimera of a false unity being removed, matter-of-fact men will return to the real nature of spiritual union and of the 'bond of peace' (Eph 4³), which will be sufficient to form real Christian brotherhood throughout the world.

A better understanding has already been reached as to the respects in which the Christian Churches ought to be one, and those in which they ought to remain distinct and even different, in order to safeguard the autonomy of each and all. When all are one in loving one another, in working together for the social well-being, in banishing from their theology every trace of anthropomorphism and politics, in becoming more spiritually-minded after the pattern of Christ, and in establishing the reign of God in every individual conscience, then the union in question will be very near being declared: 'that they may be one, even as we are one' (Jn 17²¹).

3. Results attained.¹—(a) *Dogmatic.*—Among the dogmatic results already attained by the Old Catholics we may mention the following: the rejection and refutation of papal infallibility and of the pope's absolute and universal jurisdiction over the whole Church; the rejection and refutation of the other false dogmas taught by Rome in the *Syllabus* and elsewhere; the re-establishment of the true idea of dogma, of its distinction from theological speculation; the restoration in practice of the Catholic test: 'What has been believed everywhere, always, and by everybody is Catholic'; the ruling that purely Western and papist councils are not Ecumenical Councils, the latter being only seven in number (325-787); the declaration of the orthodoxy of the Eastern Church, called the 'Church of the seven Ecumenical Councils' because it has no other faith than that which was taught by them; the bringing into prominence of the union of the Churches, which must be neither a submission to the pope nor a neglect of dogma, but the maintenance of the autonomy of each individual Church in the universality of the whole Church.

(b) *Constitutional.*—Of these we may mention: the reduction of the primacy of the pope to the simple degree of *primus inter pares*—a title which does not confer any authority on him, but which lays on him the duty of attending more carefully than any other bishop to the decisions of the Church, to which he is subordinate; the binding of the pope to renounce every political vocation, and to

¹ On this subject see the present writer's study in *Revue internat. de théol.*, July 1897, pp. 600-621.

confine himself to his essentially religious vocation; the return of the bishops to the simplicity of the early bishops, who were by no means prince-bishops, but who, simply elected by the members and the clergy, remained independent of the pope, and directed their dioceses in union with their synod; the re-establishment of the simple worshippers in their rights as active members of the Church, who also attend to the guarding of the Church's interests and the maintenance of its discipline; and the revival of national and autonomous Churches, Catholic by the unity of their faith: 'una fides, unus Christus, unum baptisma.'

(c) *Disciplinary*.—Among disciplinary results are the following: the right of each individual Church to judge of the manner most useful to itself of applying the canons of discipline formulated in the provincial synods and the Ecumenical Councils; and the right of restoring among the clergy the choice of celibacy or marriage.

(d) *Liturgical*.—The liturgical results are: the return of the proper idea of the sacraments, which are neither empty symbols nor means of producing grace 'ex opere operato,' but simply acts of worship, in which Jesus Christ communicates His grace to well-affected souls; the revival of public penitence and the suppression of papal indulgences; the return of the spiritual conception of the Eucharist, with rejection of material transubstantiation as it was practised during the Middle Ages; the celebration of worship in the national language of each country, as well as the free gift of all religious work.

(e) *Politico-ecclesiastical*.—Lastly, among politico-ecclesiastical results mention may be made of the independence of individual churches towards the political commands of Rome, and towards any political interference whatever, the Church being a spiritual and religious society, and in no way a political society.

4. *Present condition and expectations*.—The Old Catholic Church exists in Germany, Austria, France, Holland, Russia, Switzerland, and America.

In Germany it is managed at the present day by Bishop George Moog, who is also president of the synodal representation. It has parishes in the chief towns of Prussia, Bavaria, the grand-duchy of Baden, Hesse, Saxe, Würtemberg, etc. Every year the episcopal administration publishes official statistics.

In Austria the episcopal administrator, Czech, who is also curate of Warnsdorf, attends to the parishes founded in Bohemia, Moravia, Styria, Carinthia, etc.

In France the Church (called Gallican Catholic) has only two parishes—one in Paris, the other in Nantes.

In Holland Mgr. Gul is the archbishop of Utrecht, and Mgr. Prins and Mgr. Spit are the bishops of Haarlem and Deventer. The archiepiscopal seminary is at Amersfoort. There are about 24 parishes.

In Russia the Church (called Mariavite) has three bishops—John Kowalski at Plock, Prochniewski at Warsaw, and Golenbiowski at Lodz. In the kingdom of Pologne 66 parishes are administered by about 100 priests; in White Russia (Lithuania) there are three parishes, and in Little Russia (government of Kieff) there are also several parishes.

In America Bishop Hodur (Scranton), along with three vicars-general, manages several parishes which are extending daily.

There is a parish in London.

In Switzerland Bishop Eduard Herzog, along with the national synod and the synodal council, manages numerous parishes in twelve cantons.

The organization is excellent. Apart from the faculty of Catholic theology, which forms part of the cantonal University of Berne, and whose funds are administered by the State of Berne, numerous commissions are in full swing, for examinations of the clergy, religious music, the press, the interests of the Church, the care of the sick, reunions of young people, the diaspora, etc. Annually the bishop and the president of the synodal council give an account, with all the necessary details, of the life of the parishes, the religious instruction of the children, etc. Reviews, journals, and instructive and edifying libraries are more or less prosperous.

It may be said that, in spite of the efforts put forth by the Old Catholics, they have not realized all the hopes entertained in their movement at the beginning of their work. But it must be added that political and social circumstances, and, still more, the almost universal religious indifference, have been exceedingly unfavourable to all advance. The stones which may be thrown at them strike all the other Churches at the same time. This is not a justification—far from it; but it is at least an explanation, which may possibly arouse hopes for the future. The Old Catholics are convinced of the truth of their cause. If during the first fifty years of their existence they have not worked with great enough skill, they have the hope that, by dint of struggling against thousands of obstacles, they have learned better how to struggle; that the serious events which are overturning Europe at the present day will not pass without creating new religious and even ecclesiastical conditions, which, with the grace of God and the zeal of the serious Christians of all the Churches, may become fruitful.

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OLD PRUSSIANS.—1. *Ethnology*.—The Old Prussians formed the westernmost branch of the group of peoples which is represented to-day by the Letts and the Lithuanians. The Old Prussian language died out in the 17th cent., and the only specimens of it which have come down to us are three catechisms from the 16th cent. and an Elbing vocabulary dating, probably, from the beginning of the 15th. These remains show clearly that Old Prussian belonged to the Indo-Germanic family of languages and was most closely related to Lithuanian. The Old Prussians inhabited the coast of the Baltic, east of the Vistula, but their exact geographical position is hard to determine. Peter von Dusburg (in *Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum*, i. 50, 146) makes the river Memel the boundary between Prussia and Lithuania; but in the chronicles of the Teutonic Order the word 'Prussia' is a political rather than an ethnological term. The eastern boundary of the Old Prussians was probably nearer the river Pregel than the river Memel (cf. H. G. Voigt, *Adalbert von Prag*, p. 128).

In the 2nd cent. A.D. Ptolemy (III. v. 21) mentions the Galindi and Sudini as peoples living to the east of the Vistula. The Galindi are frequently mentioned in later times as a distinct division of the Old Prussians, and the Sudini seem to have been another division of the same kind or at any rate a closely related people.

Another name which occurs more frequently in this region in early times is that of the *Æstii*. Tacitus (*Germ.* 45) describes them as an agricultural people inhabiting the amber coast of the Baltic. They are again mentioned by Cassiodorus (*Var.* v. 2) and by Jordanes (5, 23). It can hardly be doubted that the *Este*, described by King Alfred—in the account of Wulfstan's voyage which he inserted in his translation of Orosius—as inhabitants of the country immediately to the east of the Vistula, are the same people. It is usually held that the *Æstii* were Prussian, though a difficulty is caused by the fact that the name *Æstii* is obviously identical with German *Elsten*, O. Norse *Eistr*, which in later times has denoted the Estonians, a Finnish people belonging to a totally different linguistic family. We have no evidence that the Estonians ever extended so far to the south-west as the Vistula, although the occurrence of the name *Finni* in Ptolemy's map should be noted. Whatever may be the solution of the difficulty, Alfred's account of the *Este* gives reason for believing that they were connected in some way with the Old Prussians. We may note in particular his account of horse-racing at funerals, which finds a curious parallel in the burial customs of the Prussian natives of later time (Lucas David, *Preussische Chronik*, ed. E. Hennig, i. 141). Reference may also be made to the laws ascribed to the *kriwe kirwaite* by Lucas David (p. 23). Both the *Este* and the Old Prussians drank mare's milk and mead (Dusburg, in *Script. Rer. Pruss.* i. 54; Alfred, ed. H. Sweet, London, 1883, pt. i. p. 20 f.). The art of artificial freezing ascribed by Alfred to the *Este* appears to have been known to the Prussians (cf. M. Praetorius, *Deliciae Prussicae*, ed. W. Pierson, pp. 45, 46, and note).

The name '*Pruzi*' is first mentioned in the 10th cent. in Ibrahim ibn Ja'qub's account of the Slavic countries (his journey took place in A.D. 965; cf. W. Wattenbach, *Geschichtschreiber der deutschen Vorzeit*², Leipzig, 1884-1912, xxxiii. 139 f.), and in the lives of St. Adalbert and elsewhere (cf. H. G. Voigt, p. 125 and note).

2. History.—The earliest known incident in Old Prussian history is the unsuccessful attempt made by St. Adalbert, bishop of Prague, in the 10th cent. to introduce Christianity. The saint was martyred (probably on the coast of Samland) on account of his having penetrated into a sacred grove which was forbidden ground to men of alien race and religion. In the 11th and 12th centuries, according to the Polish chronicles, Old Prussians frequently raided Poland, sometimes in conjunction with neighbouring peoples, Russians and Pomeranians. In the 13th cent. Conrad, duke of Masovia, who was greatly harassed by these raids, gave to Christian, bishop of Prussia, part of Culmerland as a fief, and together they founded the Knights Order of Dobrzin. In 1228 Conrad and Christian, who had failed to convert the Prussians either by persuasion or by force of arms, called to their aid the Teutonic Knights (a body of German Crusaders), granting them Culm and any other lands that they could wrest from the heathen. The conversion and conquest of the Old Prussians were gradually effected, within the next fifty years, in spite of vigorous opposition. Their political organization was destroyed and they lived thenceforward as subjects of the Teutonic Knights, who, before this, had made themselves independent of all authorities except the papacy. The lay subjects of the order were now divided into two classes: in the first rank were the German immigrants and the Prussians who had freely submitted, and below them were the Prussians who had resisted to the last and were reduced to a condition of serfdom. In the 15th cent. the power of the Teutonic Order began to decline. The conversion of Lithuania and its alliance with Poland were a serious menace, especially as the discontented Prussian laity had strong Polish sympathies. In 1410 Ladislaus, king of Poland, inflicted a crushing defeat on the Teutonic Knights at Tannenberg. In 1454 the Prussian League (which had been formed in 1440 to resist the rule of the order) offered Prussia to the Polish king.

In 1466 the Peace of Thorn gave W. Prussia to Poland. The order, however, retained E. Prussia as a fief from the Polish king. The Grand Master was to sit on the Polish Diet and half of the knights were to be of Polish race. The E. Prussian brethren, however, continued to choose Germans for their Grand Masters. In 1526 the Hohenzollern Albert of Brandenburg, who was then Grand Master, having become a Protestant, secularized his territories and turned them into a hereditary duchy, to be held as a fief from Poland. In 1618 John Sigismund, elector of Brandenburg, on the death of his father-in-law, Albert Frederick, duke of Prussia, succeeded to his dukedom. In 1655 war broke out between Sweden and Poland. Frederick William, the 'great elector' of Brandenburg, who had made good his claim to the dukedom of Prussia, succeeded by his vacillating and treacherous policy in obtaining the complete independence of both Sweden and Poland. In 1701 the duchy of Prussia was converted into a kingdom by the emperor in favour of Frederick III., elector of Brandenburg.

3. Sociology.—The Old Prussians lived by agriculture, hunting, and fishing. They were acquainted with the art of navigation, and ships from Samland used to visit the commercial town of Birca in Sweden (Adam of Bremen, *Gesta Hammaburg. Eccles. pontificum*, i. 62 [*Script. Rer. Pruss.* i. 239]). According to accounts given by historians of the Teutonic Order, the civilization of the Old Prussians in the 13th cent. was by no means high. The art of writing was unknown to them (cf. Dusburg, in *Script. Rer. Pruss.* i. 53). Human sacrifice was common. Aged and infirm people and weakly or superfluous female infants were put to death (cf. David, i. 22, and papal bull of Honorius III., 1218). Over against German accounts of Prussian ferocity, we have Adam of Bremen's description:

'Pruzi, homines humanissimi, qui obviam tendunt his ad auxiliandum, qui periclitantur in mari vel qui a pyratibus infestantur . . . Multa possent dici ex illis populis laudabilia in moribus' (iv. 18).

The Old Prussians were polygamous, although, according to the laws of the *kirwaite* (cf. David, i. 22), they were limited to three lawful wives. The condition of women was low. Marriage was by purchase or by capture. The wife was the servant of all in the house and did not eat in the presence of her husband (Dusburg, in *Script. Rer. Pruss.* i. 53; cf. also Meletius, *Epist. ad Sabinum*, tr. in *FL* xii. 299 ff.). Marriage of step-mothers was practised by the Old Prussians (David, i. 133).

According to Grunau (*Preuss. Chronik*, i. 98) and David (i. 138), there were three modes of disposal of the dead: the *kunigs*, as the highest noblemen were called, were cremated; noblemen of less exalted rank, called *suppanen*,¹ were buried in their castle-yards together with horses, hunting dogs, gold, and a barrel of mead; the common people were sometimes buried and sometimes cremated. According to Dusburg, both nobles and commons cremated their dead. We learn from the Treaty of Christburg that the dead man's most valued possessions, his animals, and even his favourite servants were burned with him (*Preuss. Urkundenbuch*, Polit. Abth. i. [Königsberg, 1852] 1).

When the Teutonic Knights invaded Prussia, they seem to have found there no central political organization, but a number of separate divisions or kingdoms. We hear, however, of a chief priest called *kriwe*, whose authority was recognized not only by all Prussians, but also by Letts and Lithuanians. The holy oak and fire at Romove, over which he presided, seem to have been the central sanctuary of the Baltic peoples (Dusburg, in *Script. Rer. Pruss.* i. 53). According to Grunau and David (who profess to derive their information from Bishop Christian), Romove, or Rickoyot, was at one time the seat of political as well as of religious authority (cf. Grunau, i. 62; David, i. 24 ff.). The story of king Widovuto and his

¹ It is worth noting that the first of these titles is of Teutonic origin (O. Norse *konungr*, O. Sax. *kuning*). The second is current in most of the Slavic languages, whatever its ultimate origin.

brother Bruteno, the high priest, and of the division of the kingdom among the twelve sons, is generally dismissed as an invention of Grunau, suggested by the Biblical stories of Moses and Aaron and the origin of the twelve tribes of Israel. It seems likely, however, that the legend contains at least a germ of genuine tradition. It is not difficult to find parallels for the double kingship and for the survival of the kingship as a religious institution after it had ceased to have any political significance.

4. Religion. — (a) *Authorities.* — References to Old Prussian religion occur in Lives of St. Adalbert, dating from the end of the 10th cent., in the *Chronicon Polonorum* of Vincent Kadlubek (dating from the beginning of the 13th cent.), and in an original document of the Treaty of Christburg (1249). The *Cronica Terre Prussie* of Peter von Dusburg (dedicated to Hochmeister Werner von Orselm in 1326) contains a treatise entitled *de YdolatRIA et ritu et moribus Pruthenorum*. This is important because heathen ideas and practices undoubtedly survived in Dusburg's time; and he may well have derived his information from men who could speak of the old religion from personal experience. Chroniclers of the 16th cent. have much to say concerning the history and the social and religious life of the Old Prussians; but their evidence is not accepted as altogether trustworthy. Erasmus Stella, who composed in 1510 a treatise *de Borussiae Antiquitatibus*, is not considered a reliable authority; but there is nothing intrinsically improbable in his statements about religion. The *Preussische Chronik*, completed in 1521 by the monk Simon Grunau of Tolkemit, is usually held to be a mass of falsehoods, composed in the interest of Poland. The Chronicle of Christian (who was made the first bishop of Prussia at the beginning of the 13th cent.) which Grunau mentions as the source of his description of Old Prussian religion is dismissed as a product of his imagination. Lucas David, a Protestant historian of acknowledged accuracy and critical ability, also states that Christian's Chronicle was the source of much of the information contained in the first volume of the *Preussische Chronik*, which he wrote in the latter part of the 16th century. It is generally thought that David's only knowledge of Christian's Chronicle was derived from Grunau, although David himself expressly states at times that he is using Christian's Chronicle and at other times gives Grunau as his authority. It has perhaps been taken for granted too readily that Christian's Chronicle never existed. A comparison of the parallel passages in Grunau and David suggests that they used the same source independently. Matthaeus Praetorius (born 1635) states that Christian's Chronicle was used by his great-grandfather, the historian Johann Bretkius, which again raises difficulties in the current explanation (cf. pp. 3, 4, 19, 39). Many of the customs and rites which Bishop Christian is said to have recorded are of a kind that can be paralleled from different religions in other parts of the world. Both Grunau and David describe some pagan festivals and superstitions from personal observation; for in their time the natives, though professing Christianity, continued to perform in secret the rites of their old religion. This was still the case in the following century when Praetorius wrote his *Deliciae Prussicae* in order to supply the lack of information concerning the customs of the Old Prussians by a study of the 'existing superstitious ceremonies of the Nadravians, Zalorians, and Sudavians.'

(b) *Gods.* — The earliest reference to an Old Prussian deity occurs in the Treaty of Christburg (1249) —

'Ydolo quem semel in anno collectis frugibus consueverunt confingere et pro deo colere, cui nomen Curche inposuerunt.' The feminine form Curche was later replaced by the masculine Gurchō. This deity is described as a god of food and drink, and his cult was said to have been derived from the Masurians (Poles).

In a document of 1418 it is stated that the Teutonic Order expelled from Prussia 'gentes servientes demonibus, colentes Patolom, Natrimpe [according to another reading, Pacullum, Patrimpe] et alia ignominiosa fantasmata' (see Usener, *Götternamen*, s.v. 'Natrimpe').

Probably these two deities are to be identified with the Patollo and Potrimpo who are said to have shared with Perkuno the worship at Romove, and who are coupled together as having an especial taste for human blood (David, i. 34). It has been stated that Curche, Patollo, and Natrimpe are the only divinities that we can ascribe to the Old Prussians with any certainty, and that the numerous names that occur in later sources are of Lithuanian rather than Prussian origin. It is, however, impossible to draw a hard and fast line between the religions of the two peoples.

The *Constit. Synod. Evangel.* of 1530 contains the following list of deities who were still worshipped by the Sudavians in Samland:

'Occopirmus, Swalxtix, Ausschauts, Autrympus, Potrympus, Bardoayts, Piluytis, Parcuns, Pecols atque Pocols, qui dei, si eorum numina secundum illorum opinionem pensites erunt Saturnus, Sol, Aesculapius, Neptunus, Castor et Pollux, Ceres, Juppiter, Pluto, Furiae.'

Occopirmus was invoked as the 'mighty god of heaven and stars' (David, i. 147). Swalxtix, 'the god of light' (ib. i. 86), was invoked at agricultural festivals. Ausschauts is probably to be identified with 'Auscautum deum incolumitatis et aegritudinis' (Meletius, *Epist. ad Sabin.*; see *Archiv für slav. Phil.* xviii. 76) and Auschleuts (also Auschauts), 'der Gott aller Gebrechen, Krankheiten und Gesundheit,' who was invoked when there was a poor harvest (David, i. 91). The name Autrympus occurs only here, and is probably a scribal error for Antrimpus, who is frequently mentioned as a god of the sea (cf. Meletius, *loc. cit.*; David, i. 86). Potrympus has already been described. He was a god 'von deme alles Glück keme, in Streitten, Regierung, Hauzhaltung ausm Ackerbau und andern mehr' (David, i. 34). He was a god of fertility, and snakes were consecrated to him (Praetorius, p. 46). He appears to have some connexion with water: 'auch wurden Ime zugeeignet die fliessenden Wasser' (David, i. 87). Perhaps Autrympus and Potrympus should be taken together as different names for the deity identified with Neptune. *Na, po, an* are prepositions; *trumpa* may be connected with Prussian *trumpa* = *fluvius* (cf. Nesselmann, *Thesaurus Linguae Prussicae*, p. 191). Bardoayts is probably the same god as 'Perdoytus deus navium' (see Grienberger, in *Archiv für slav. Phil.* xviii. 78), 'Perdoytus Gott der Kaufleute' (Praetorius, p. 27). He must be connected in some way with 'Gardoaeten deum nautarum' (Meletius, *loc. cit.*) and Gardoaits, the special god of the fishermen living by the Kurische Hafl and the Frische Hafl, of whom Lucas David (i. 116) gives an interesting description. Probably forms in *b* and *g* existed side by side, which might account for the identification of Bardoayts with Castor and Pollux. Piluytis (cf. the Lettish Pilnitis, god of riches) was one of the gods invoked at agricultural festivals. Parcuns is to be identified with the thunder-god Perkun, the most important deity of the Baltic peoples (cf. *NATURE* [Lettish, Lithuanian, and Old Prussian]). The names of the deity or deities connected with death appear in many different forms:

'Pecols atque Pocols'; 'Pluto, Friae' (*Constit. Synod.*); 'Poculum inferni ac tenebrarum deum, Pocollum aëreorum spirituum' (Meletius, *loc. cit.*); 'Pecullus deus inferorum et tenebrarum.' . . . 'Pocullus deus spirituum volantium et cæcodaemonarum' (*Archiv für slav. Phil.* xviii. 79); 'Potollos odes

Pickollos regierte in der Luft' (see *Archiv für slav. Phil.* xvii. 79).

The various forms have been hopelessly confused, but there seem to have been at least two different deities. Peools, who is identified with Pluto (see above), is no doubt related to the Lithuanian *pekla*, 'hell' (cf. Polish *piekło*, 'hell'), and it is possible that he is a personification of the land of the dead. 'Potollos oder Pickollos' is probably to be identified with the god of the Romove sanctuary whom David (i. 33) describes as 'chief god of the Prussians, and he was held to be a god of death and had power to kill.' Pickollos is probably connected with *pickuls*, the Old Prussian word for 'devil' (Nesselmann, p. 128). Cf. also Lith. *piktas*, 'evil'; *pykti*, 'to be angry.' A Nadavian peasant in conversation with Praetorius (p. 20) coupled together Perkunus and Pyeullis as having power over the oak-tree. The heads of a horse and a cow were an accepted offering to Pikullis (Praetorius, p. 26); Patollo had a similar treasure at Romove (David, *loc. cit.*). This deity sometimes appears as the head of a host of similar beings. At the spring festival Perkunus was prayed to strike and drive away 'Pockollos with his companions and underlings' (David, i. 91), 'Patollos das seindt die fliegende Geister oder Teuffel' (ib. i. 87), 'Pocols = Furiae' (*Constit. Synod.*). We are reminded of the Valkyries, and of Odin, the leader of the Wild Hunt.

(c) *Sanctuaries*.—The Old Prussians seem to have had no temples, but there are many references to sacred groves, lakes, hills, etc. Sometimes offerings were made near holy stones.

'In dem Hockerlande soll auch ein Stein sein gewesen, darauf die Fischer wenn sie gefischet den ersten Fisch, so von Inen gefangen werden, gedachten Abgotte dem Kurkos geopfert und verbrant haben' (David, i. 83; cf. also Praetorius, p. 21 f.).

The cult of Gurcho was also connected with the holy oak and perpetual fire at Heiligenbeil and other places, where corn and fruit, etc., were burned as an offering to the god (David, i. 82). Romove, or Rickoyot, which has already been mentioned, was a sanctuary of this type. It is described in detail by Grunau (i. 78) and David (i. 28 ff.). The oak was divided into three parts, each division consecrated to one of the three gods, Patollo, Perkuno, and Potrimpo, and containing his image. Before each god was placed his peculiar treasure. Patollo had the heads of a horse, a cow, and a man; Potrimpo a snake kept in a jar crowned with sheaves of corn; before Perkuno burned the perpetual fire. The oak was surrounded by curtains and round it dwelt priests and priestesses living in virginity, whose duty it was to offer sacrifices, tend the fire, feed the sacred snake, and serve their high priest, the *krive kirvaito*. Although David calls Patollo the chief god, it is always Perkuno who is said to communicate with the chief priest by means of thunder and lightning. Foreign potentates were not allowed to appear before the holy oak (Praetorius, p. 39). Dusburg, Grunau, and David agree in locating Romove in Nadavia. In the *Hochmeister Chronik* (15th cent.) we read that the heathen pope lived in Samland 'in dat dorp dat Romawe heit, end noemden sy alsoe ne Romen' (*Script. Rer. Pruss.* i. 53), and certain documents, written by John, bishop of Samland, in the 14th cent., referring to places in the neighbourhood of the villages of Romelnen and Lenknitten, mention 'Rummove,' 'Campns Rumbow . . . quereum viridem stantem prope sacrum campum' (J. Voigt, *Geschichte Preussens*, Königsberg, 1827-39, i. 644). At the end of the 13th cent. the Teutonic Knights were fighting in a part of Lithuania 'in qua villam dictam Romene que secundum ritus eorum sacra fuit combussit' (Dusburg, p. 159). Place-names compounded with Rom occur frequently in Prussia

and Lithuania. It seems likely that Romove is a common rather than a proper noun, and the evidence of Praetorius leads to the same conclusion:

'Alle Art Bäume, deren Stamm sich von einander gczweiget und wieder zusammen gewachsen gewcsen, sind den Preussen heilig gewesen und sind es manchen noch. So war ein zusammen gewachsener Birnbaum in einem Garten zu Nibudzen, den die Leute rombotha Krauszis nanten und ein Maldinink oder Waidelot aus Zamaiten, der ihn gesehen, betrachtete ihn mit Ehrfurcht' (p. 16). There was also a fir-tree of this kind at Nibudzen 'welche noch anno 1661 gestanden. Bis weit aus Litauen sind die Leute zu diesem Baum gewallfahrt. Sie haben diese Tanne auch Rumbuta genannt und gesagt, wenn sie zu ihr gingen: "eikim Rombhowa." Romove oder nach der altpreussischen Mundart Rombhove von romblu, rombothi zusammen wachsen' (p. 17).

(d) *Priesthood*.—There seems little reason to doubt that the Old Prussians possessed a highly developed priesthood. Its organization was destroyed when the Teutonic Knights burned down the oak at Rickoyot, but the priests exercised their functions in secret for several centuries. In the year 1520 a *waideler* (the usual word for 'priest') was forced to perform a severe penance for having offered up a sacrifice on the shores of Samland (David, i. 117 ff.). Grunau on one occasion found a number of Prussians assembled in a house, performing ceremonies in honour of Perkuno. The *waideler* who presided absolved the people from their sins, and immediately afterwards they all fell upon him, beating him and pulling his hair, and the louder he shrieked the more efficacious was their absolution. The ceremony concluded with the sacrifice of a goat, whose flesh was cooked with oak-leaves (i. 91). As late as the 17th cent. *waidelers* sometimes offered up prayers and sacrifices at the periodic festivals, and exhorted the people to remain faithful to the gods and their ancient customs (Praetorius, p. 23 f.). Even the traditional high-priestly office was not quite forgotten (ib. p. 48). According to the traditions recorded by Grunau and David, the Old Prussians had priestesses as well as priests, who were compelled to live in virginity.

Poggezana, the eponymous heroine of a district in Prussia, 'wohnete in einem Eichwald, und blieb ihre Tag eine Jungfrau, und wardt eine Waidelotinne'; she was said to have danced with the gods (David, i. 72 f.).

(e) *Sacrifice and festivals*.—The papal bull issued by Honorius III. in 1218 contains the statement that the Old Prussians 'immolate captives to their gods.' According to Bishop Christian's account (David, i. 47 f.), it was customary for a Prussian warrior to bind on to his saddle the first man taken in battle, and to burn to death both horse and rider as an offering to the gods. We hear of Teutonic Knights being put to death in this manner (see H. G. Voigt, p. 307, note 596). Apparently it was not unknown for a man to give up a servant, a child, or even himself to be burned alive as a sacrifice (David, i. 23). Horses were also sacrificed in this way (Dusburg, *loc. cit.*). Milk, honey, corn, etc., were thrown into the sacred fire at Heiligenbeil and elsewhere as . . . to (David, *loc. cit.*). David . . . between village festivals and . . . ore pompous ceremonies at Rickoyot. When the holy oak was destroyed, prayer and sacrifice were offered to the gods in other places, but no longer 'with burnt offerings, incense and the guarding of a perpetual fire.' Sacrifices were offered in case of sickness, war, etc., and also in connexion with the regular agricultural festivals. The ceremony usually consisted of invocation of the gods and the partaking of bread, beer, etc., and the flesh of the slaughtered animal—usually a bull or goat (for further particulars cf. David, i. 90-92, and Meletius, in *FL* xii. 293 ff.). Praetorius (pp. 48-69) describes the agricultural ceremonies in great detail. In all of them a drink-offering was poured on the ground, as a libation to Zemynelē, the earth-goddess, who seems

to have taken the place of Pergubrius, Pilwitis, and various other gods mentioned by David and Meletius in this connexion (cf. Praetorius, p. 66).

(f) *The soul*.—Kadlubek (*Monumenta Polonica Historica*, i. 423) tells a curious story of the 'Pollexiani Getarum seu Prussorum genus, gens atrocissima.'

After a defeat by Casimir of Poland certain of their number were captured and held as hostages. The Prussians, however, refused to be influenced by any regard for the safety of these prisoners, because they believed that those who suffered an honourable death would thereby attain a more honourable re-birth, 'est enim Getarum communis dementia exutas corporibus quasdam etiani brutorum assumptione corporum brutescere.'

This is the only reference to an Old Prussian belief in metempsychosis. All authorities, however, attribute to them a strong faith in the immortality of the soul.

'Birth-days and funerals were celebrated alike . . . with the greatest hilarity and rejoicing' (Erasmus Stella, in *Script. Rer. Pruss.* iv. 294; cf. also Dusbürg, *loc. cit.*).

In 1249 the Old Prussians promised to give up 'Tulissones vel Ligaschones,' priests who presided at funerals, and praised the dead for the deeds of violence and plunder that they had done in their lifetime.

'They also declared that they could see, there and then, the dead man flying through the sky on horseback, adorned in shining armour, with iron spear in hand, and together with a great company proceeding into the other world' (Treaty of Christburg, cited by H. G. Voigt, p. 590, note 31).

The *krīwe* was also supposed to see the dead leaving this world for the next (Dusbürg, *loc. cit.*). The dead were connected in some way with the earth-deity:

'Zlamduks ist bei den heutigen Preussen, Nadraven, Zalovenien, Zamaiten, Lithauen noch so viel als ein Herr oder Gott der Erde und derer die in der Erde begraben worden' (Praetorius, p. 7).

At the funeral feast drink-offerings were poured out to Zemynle (the earth-goddess) and prayer was made:

'Be joyful, Zemynle, receive this soul well and guard it well' (ib. p. 101).

Festivals of the dead were held at regular intervals.

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ENID WELSFORD.

OLD TESTAMENT.—See BIBLE.

OM.—The origin of the word *om* is wholly uncertain. It has been traced to a pronominal base *av-* and its formation has been compared with that of *ay-am*, 'this,' on the theory that the whole word *avam* was resolved by the process of *sahprasaṛaṇa* into *au-m*, whence came by ordinary euphonic combination *om*. For the development of sense may be cited the fact that *hoc illud* became the French *oui*, *om* having often definitely this meaning. But the evidence in support of this view is quite inadequate, and the most probable explanation is that the word is purely an exclamation, being the nasalized form of *o*, which again is connected with *ā*. This view is strongly supported by the fact that the common phrase *om śrāvaya* alternates with both *o śrāvaya* and *ā śrāvaya*, and the nasalizing of sounds when prolonged in pronunciation is a regular part of Vedic usage. A further suggestion

of its origin is contained in the earliest name given to the sound, the word *praṇava*. It is probable that this term properly denotes the protracting of the last syllable of the offering verse (*yājya*), which was nasalized, the vowel being altered to *o*, and that *om* as an independent exclamation was derived from this use. With this would accord the rule of the grammar (Pāṇini, vi. 1. 95), according to which a short or long *a* before *om* does not as usual result in *aum*, but is omitted.

That *om* is not a primitive exclamation is supported by the fact of its comparatively late appearance in the literature. It does not appear at all in the *Rigveda*, which shows that it does not belong to the earliest sacerdotal literature, and it is equally wanting in the *Atharvaveda*, which shows that it was not an expression in popular use. In the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* it does not occur in any *mantra* passage, but it is alluded to once as the *praṇava*, in which passage (iii. 2. 9. 6) it clearly denotes the sound at the end of the offering verse uttered by the *hotṛ*. In the *Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā*, on the other hand, we actually find *om* in the phrase *om pratiṣṭha* (ii. 13), and it is stated (xix. 25) that by means of the *praṇavas* the form of the *śastras* is made complete. The *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā* also uses *om* in the phrase *om śrāvaya* (iv. 1. 11) and in a set of exclamations in iv. 9. 21. It is, however, in the *Brāhmaṇas* that we first find the definite use in the asseverative sense; the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (vii. 18), in describing the mode of the recitation of the legend of Sunahṣepa, which was recited on the day of anointing in the ceremony of the consecration of a king, states that the response to each verse of the *Rigveda* employed in the rite by the *hotṛ* priest is to be an *om*, said by the *adhvaryu*, while the response to each *Gāthā* verse is to be a *tathā*, on the ground that the former response is divine, the second human, and this distinction is preserved in the *sūtras* which deal with the rite. The ordinary use as a solemn 'Yes' is found more freely in the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* (i. 4. 1. 30, x. 6. 1. 4, xi. 6. 3. 4) and elsewhere. But its use is confined to very formal responses, and normally to responses in the ritual.

Much more important than its use as a particle of asseveration is the development of its use as a mystical symbol embodying in itself the essence of the Vedas and of the universe. The first evidence of this important position of the word is to be found in the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (v. 32), in which it is declared that *om* is the world of heaven and the sun, and where it is resolved into the three letters *a*, *u*, and *m*. These in turn are derived from the three *vyāhrtis*, Bhūh, Bhuvaḥ, and Svar, these from the *Rigveda*, *Yajurveda*, and *Sāmaveda*, these from the gods Agni, Vāyu, and Aditya, and these from earth, atmosphere, and air. The passage may be later than the rest of the text, but it is of special value as it opens a set of speculations which come to a head in the *Upaniṣads*. It is noteworthy that it has no parallel in the *Kaṣṭhīki Brāhmaṇa* or in any other *Brāhmaṇa* text prior to the *Gopatha*.

In the *Upaniṣads* the doctrine of the sacred character of the syllable is steadily developed. The *Taittirīya* (i. 8) declares that it is the Brahman, the holy power which constitutes the universe, and derives this conclusion from the fact that in the ritual *om* takes an important place in each part; thus it is employed by the *hotṛ*, the *sāman* singer, the *adhvaryu*, and the *brahman*, and forms an integral part of the ritual of the *agnihotra*, the most regular of all Vedic offerings. The essence of this treatment of the syllable is to make it a symbol of the Brahman and to substitute meditation upon it in place of study of the Vedas—an idea helped by the doctrine that the word repre-

sents the essence of all three Vedas and of existence which the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* first sets out. The *Kāthaka Upaniṣad* (ii. 15) declares that all the Vedas proclaim the syllable *om*, and that it is for its sake that men practise holiness. But the full development of the doctrine is first found in the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*, which contains two elaborate accounts of *om*; they are followed by some supplementary and doubtless later remarks on it, and constitute the *Pranava Upaniṣad*. According to the first of these accounts, the Brahman created Brahmā as masculine on a lotus leaf. He in turn created *om* with two letters and four *mora*. The first letter of *om* produced the waters, the second the luminaries; then the first three *mora*, which no doubt represent the three syllables in *o*, pronounced with prolongation, produced earth, atmosphere, and heaven; fire, wind, and sun; the three Vedas; the three *vyāhrtis*; the three metres, *gāyatrī*, *triṣṭubh*, and *jagatī*, and so on. So far the account is in fair accord with that of the earlier texts, but the special Atharvan character of it is made clear by the derivation from the *v* sound (taken from the *o*) of water, moon, the *Atharvaveda*, *om* itself, *janat*, which is the *vyāhrti* of the *anṅiras*, or dreadful formulae, of the *Atharvaveda*, the *anustubh* metre, etc., while from the letter *m* are derived the *Itihāsa Purāṇa* and other categories of literature, musical instruments, singing and dancing, the *brhatī* metre, etc. It is added that with *om* the *brahman* priest is able to make good all defects in the sacrifice, and that the repetition of *om* a thousand times secures all desires. In the second account we learn that in one of their interminable conflicts the *asuras* defeated the gods until the latter followed the leadership of *om*, whence *om* received the reward that no holy text might be recited without it, whether *ṛc*, *yajus*, *sāman*, or *śloka*. In the supplementary remarks other details of the word are given; it is stated to be pronounced differently in the different Vedas, and its four *mora*, which are here differently explained from the account given before—which indeed seems to assume five—are connected with the deities Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Śāna, and Sarva, the two last being forms of Śiva.

The *Upaniṣads* connected with the *Atharvaveda* naturally develop further the views of the *Gopatha*. They devote their attention in large measure to the means of meditation by which the seeker for the Brahman can attain union with the Brahman, and for this purpose set little importance upon knowledge of the scriptures. In the place of such knowledge is set the study of the syllable *om*, which is described in a series of metaphors. Thus it is, in one view, the bow from which the soul as an arrow flies to the Brahman, in another the arrow which is shot from the body as a bow in order to pierce the darkness. It is also the ship on which a man travels over the ether of the heart, and the chariot which bears him to the world of Brahmā. The old analysis into three *mora* occurs in the *Maitrāyaṇī Upaniṣad* (vi. 3), which describes them as fire, sun, and wind, and calls them the essence of all things. The *Praśna Upaniṣad* (v. 5), acting on the same basis, states that he who meditates by one *mora* attains the world of men, by two the way of the fathers (*pitryāna*), and by three the way of the gods (*devayāna*). This conception, however, changes, and, while four or five *mora* are recognized in the *Gopatha*, we now hear of a fourth *mora*-less part which forms the crown of the syllable (*Maitrāyaṇī*, vi. 23). In the latest stage of the Atharvan *Upaniṣads* this is definitely called the third and a half *mora*, and is said to lead to the supreme goal, and to be represented by the point (*bindu*) of the *anustāra*. Its sound is variously described, but normally as some sort of

echo, and some versions turn the half *mora* into a fourth or add to a half *mora* an echo. It is, however, made clear that the meditation on *om* is not the highest stage, which can be performed only in absolute silence; and the syllable is compared with a chariot which is abandoned when the high road ceases and the foot-path begins. *Om* is only, after all, a word, and, ascending from it, man attains to nothingness in that which is not a word.

Side by side with the philosophic development of the symbolism of *om* in the *Upaniṣads* its ritual use is elaborated and closely defined by the *Śrauta Sūtras*. The variety of its employment does not conceal the essential nature of its uses, which are either the solemn affirmation or agreement, as in the response (*pratigara*) of the *adhvaryu*, or the intimation of the commencement and end of a recitation or an offering verse—a usage which explains the statement that *om* separates divine and human utterance. The special nature of the word is marked out by the care taken to define its mode of pronunciation and the treatment of final letters before it, when it ends a sentence. The *Prātisākhya* of the *Rigveda* records its use in approval, while the *Prātisākhya* of the *Vājasaneyi Samhitā* seems to refer to its use as commencing a litany by its assertion that in the Vedas the word *om*, here described by its less usual name *omkāra*, has the same sense as *atha* in the current speech (*bhāṣya*).

In the *sūtras* which deal with the domestic ritual and customary law a different aspect of the use of *om* from that treated in the *Śrauta Sūtras* presents itself. In the latter *om* is merely used as an important part of the recitation of the texts, but as early as the *Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtra* we are told that a man should daily recite the Veda privately, be it only the syllable *om* or the *vyāhrtis*, and that this constitutes the offering to Brahmā. Similarly, while an ascetic is not allowed to give up the study of the Veda altogether, he is permitted to confine himself to the meditation on *om*, which is the root of the tree of the Veda and its essence, and by this means he becomes united with the Brahman (ii. 10. 23 f.). Still more important is the place taken by *om* in connexion with rites of expiation and purification. *Baudhāyana*, in setting forth (iv. 1) the advantages of the suppression of the breath, adds that *om* begins and ends the Vedas, and that *om* and the *vyāhrtis* are the eternal and everlasting Brahman. For him who engages in reciting *om*, the *vyāhrtis*, and the *gāyatrī* no danger exists anywhere. Sixteen suppressions of the breath, accompanied by recitation of the *vyāhrtis* and of *om* repeated daily, after a month purify even the slayer of a learned Brāhman. The same rules reappear in *Vasiṣṭha* (xxv. and xxvi.), and by being repeated in the code of Manu (xi. 249 f.) complete the holiness of the word *om* as part of the ceremonies of purification. On the other hand, the use of *om* is equally necessary to the magic worker: the *Kauśika Sūtra*, that storehouse of Indian magic, in describing (ix. 8 f.) the preparation of the holy water, insists that the preparation shall be accompanied by the use of the syllable.

In the philosophic literature *om* holds its place as the object of meditation in the effort to realize the Brahman. Thus in the *Bhagavad-Gītā* it is identified with Kṛṣṇa as the universe and the Brahman, and the triad *om tat sat* is declared as comprehending the nature of the Brahman. In the system of the Vedānta as interpreted by Bādarāyaṇa (*Sūtra*, iv. 3. 14 f.) it seems that the use of *om* for purposes of meditation falls under the same disadvantage as all meditation on the Brahman by means of symbols: the result is not the clear vision of the Brahman, but only the reward appropriate for the meditation on the particular symbol in each case;

but this doctrine does not harmonize with that of the *Praśna Upaniṣad*, which, as we have seen, declares that meditation on the three *mora* of *om* leads to the *devayāna* and thus, of course, to the Brahman. Nor does it appear that this view of *om* was ever generally accepted, meditation on *om* being regarded as a normal stage in the development of the knowledge of the highest Brahman.

This position of *om* is intensified in the Yoga system as it appears in the *sūtra* of Patañjali (i. 27-29); it is there brought into connexion with Īśvara, God, and, under the name of *praṇava*, declared to express him. The repetition of the word and reflexion on its meaning are enjoined as desirable, and it is stated that the result of this practice is the removal of obstacles and the right knowledge of him who thinks in an inverse way, i.e. of one who does not seek truth in ordinary consciousness. Hence the word has a definite and important place in all subsequent doctrine of Yoga practices.

On the popular side the syllable *om* persists throughout the whole of Indian religion as the proper accompaniment of *mantras*, whether Vedic or not. Thus, on the one hand, it is used invariably to accompany the sacred *gāyatrī* which it is part of the daily duty of the orthodox Hindu to repeat, and, on the other hand, it plays a great part in the innumerable varieties of Tantric *mantras* which form an important feature of the real religion of India. Its popularity depends no doubt in part on the normal equation of its elements with the Hindu trinity of Viṣṇu, Śiva, and Brahmā which is already found in the later *Upaniṣads* and is foreshadowed earlier. On the other hand, despite its popular character, it remains very sacrosanct: at the festival of Śiva on 27th February, when even the lowest castes take part in the rites, while women are permitted to make use of the *mantras*, an exception is made of the syllable *om*, doubtless because of its special holiness.¹ As an auspicious symbol, from the 6th cent. A.D. onwards, the initial letter is found in different forms to denote the commencement of a text in MSS and inscriptions.

To Jainism and to Buddhism the syllable *om* and its use were primarily characteristic of the Brāhman, but the force of the popularity of the syllable is shown by the fact that it became an integral part of the *mantra* of Avalokiteśvara in the Buddhist pantheon, the famous *oṃ maṇi padme*² *hūm*. So in the crypto-Buddhism of the 16th cent. in Orissa we find that from the *śūnya*, or void, is derived the *praṇava*, thus bringing the *praṇava* close to the principle of nonentity of the nihilist school of Buddhism.

In the *Purāṇas* besides assertions as to its general sanctity we find the syllable turned to sectarian use. Thus in the *Līṅga Purāṇa* the *līṅga*, which reduces both Viṣṇu and Brahmā to the recognition of their inferiority to Śiva, bears upon it the sacred syllable. On the other hand, it is said that the three letters represent Viṣṇu himself, his wife Śrī, and the worshipper; that the syllable is the three Vedas, the three worlds, the three sacred fires, and the three footsteps of Viṣṇu; and that by meditation upon it devotees attain supreme bliss.

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A. B. KEITH.

OMAHA INDIANS.—See SIOUANS.

OMENS.—See DIVINATION, PRODIGES AND PORTENTS.

OM MANI PADME HUM.—See JEWEL (Buddhist).

OMNIPOTENCE, OMNIPRESENCE, OMNISCIENCE.—See GOD.

OMPHALOS (ὀμφαλός).—The Greeks had a story that Zeus, wishing to ascertain the exact centre of the earth, sent forth two eagles to fly simultaneously at equal speed from its eastern and western ends. They met at Delphi, and there in Apollo's temple was set up in commemoration the holy Navel-stone, or Omphalos, with a golden eagle at either side to mark earth's central point.¹

The Delphian Navel-stone is described by Pausanias as 'made of white marble' (x. xvi. 3: λίθον πεποιημένον λευκόν). Strabo says that it was covered with sacred fillets (p. 420: καὶ ὀμφαλός τις ἐν τῷ ναφ̄ τειταίνωμενος). Numerous representations of the Omphalos, especially on coins and vases—on the latter most frequently in connexion with the appeal of Orestes to the protection of Apollo against the avenging spirits of his mother—enabled us to form a good idea of it, even before the recovery of actual specimens. Generally it is represented as in shape like a half-egg standing on a low quadrangular base; sometimes it emerges, as it were, so far as to be nearly like a whole egg with the lower end flattened, to enable it to stand on its pedestal. Sometimes bare, at others it is draped with hanging fillets, at others again covered with a kind of coarse-meshed diagonal network of fillets, which are represented either as plain ribands or as tied tightly at regular intervals so as to look like a string of eggs (see for many representations J. H. Middleton, 'The Temple of Apollo at Delphi,' *JHS* ix. [1888] 295 f.).² These ancient pictorial representations are now superseded by two marble Omphaloi actually found at Delphi by the French excavators, one of them, covered with a network of fillets worked in the marble, having been found near the great altar of the Chians in front of

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¹ E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India*, London, 1896, p. 453.

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A curious difficulty arises as to the exact position of the Omphalos at Delphi. From *Æsch. Eum.* 391., where the priestess, on her way to the inmost shrine, sees Orestes seated *ἐν ὀμφαλῳ*, we infer, though the passage is not very clear, that it stood within the temple, and probably in the inmost shrine. This is indicated still more clearly in the conversation between Ion and the chorus of women standing without the temple, in *Eur. Ion*, 223 f., as well as by the remark of Strabo, whether or not that was his own observation. On the other hand, Pausanias mentions the Omphalos before he proceeds to the description of the exterior of the temple, and long before he speaks of its contents. He appears, therefore, to place the stone somewhere outside the eastern end of the temple, not far from the altar of the Chians on the left of the Sacred Way (Paus. x. xiv. 7; cf. Herod. ii. 135). If he is right, the Navel-stone must have been moved from its place within the temple in the interval between Strabo (1st cent. B.C.) and Pausanias (c. A.D. 180). The question thus becomes important, as the change may be indicative of a corresponding change in attitude towards the Navel-stone and the ideas with which it was associated.²

Perhaps the ejection of the stone was due to Nero, who played havoc with the temple (Paus. x. vii. 1; so J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, 6 vols., London, 1893, v. 317). But why was the stone not restored when the prophetic chasm, which he had tried to ruin (Dio Cass. lxi. 14), was purified? It has also been suggested (by Verrall, *The Ion of Euripides*, Cambridge, 1890, p. xli) that, when Pausanias mentions as within the main cella an altar of Poseidon, with statues of two Fates,³ he is in fact unconsciously describing the Omphalos itself with its two mysterious figures that were variously interpreted as Gorgons or eagles. If insistence is to be laid upon his disjointed notes,⁴ perhaps we should hold that Pausanias simply mistook a facsimile for the genuine object, which he was not allowed to see in its own place in the *adyton*. It is possible that the excellently preserved specimen mentioned above is the very Omphalos which Pausanias had before his eyes at this point in his description. There is nothing about it to suggest that it is primitive. The original primitive Omphalos, however, was perhaps the oldest object in Delphi, and was probably not movable.⁵

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At Megara a pyramidal stone (Paus. i. xiv. 2: *λίθος πυραμίδος σχήμα οὐ μεγάλην*) was worshipped under the name of Apollo Karinos; at Sicyon there were images of Zeus Melichios and Artemis Patros, the former in the shape of a pyramid, the latter in that of a column (*ib. ii. ix. 6*). Apollo, god of streets (Agyleus), was generally represented as a conical pillar in front of the house-door.⁶ The image of Aphrodite in her Cyprus was a conical white stone (*ἡ ἱεὴς humana, continuus orbis latiore infit netae modo exurgens*).⁷ Other examples are given by Frazer (*Paus.* v. 318 f.). Nor, again, was the name borne by the Delphian stone peculiar to it. At Phleious there was what was called the Navel,⁸ which, it was claimed, was the centre of the Peloponnese (Paus. ii. xlii. 7: *ὁ καλούμενος ὀμφαλός, Πελοποννήσου δὲ πάσης μέσον, εἰ δὴ τὰ*

¹ A marble Omphalos found in Athens (*JHS* i. [1890] pl. v., *ib. ix.* 209) has a truncated top for the reception of a statue.

² This inference has been drawn, though not with entire success, by A. W. Verrall (note 3 on p. xiv of his ed. of *Æsch. Eumenides*, London, 1908, where he points out that in the time of Pausanias the Omphalos is 'a mere curiosity, and apparently is not even within the building').

³ Note that the temple of Apollo at Delphi consisted of four parts, namely a *pronaos*, a *naos* (or main cella), the *adyton* (inmost shrine or sanctuary), and the oracular vault. The *adyton* was not open to the public (Paus. x. xxiv. 5: *ἐς δὲ τοῦ ναοῦ τὸ ἐσωτέρω παρίστανε τε ἐς αὐτὸ δάιτυς*); and even into the cella apparently not all were permitted to go (cf. *Eur. Ion*, 226 f.). The original place of the Omphalos was the *adyton*.

⁴ Paus. x. xxiv. 4: *Ποσειδῶνος βωμὸς, οὗ τὸ μαντεῖον τὸ ἀρχαιοτάτον κτήμα ἦν καὶ Ποσειδῶνος, ἐστῆκε δὲ καὶ ἀγάλματα Μοῖραν δῖον*.

⁵ His account of Delphi is more confused than any other part of his book. Possibly his loose notes, made on the spot, got mixed up, and he was unable afterwards to arrange them correctly' (Middleton, *JHS* ix. 292).

⁶ It is possible that the original oracular cleft, with its sacred Omphalos, was not at the spot afterwards occupied by the great temple. It would be upon the occasion of the transference that the original grave-mound with its stucco (*λευκωμα*) and cone was translated into stone in the form in which we know it.

⁷ Cf. CGS iv. 148 f. It goes back to the primitive stage 'when pillar and altar and divinity were not clearly distinguished.'

⁸ Note that the Phleasian Omphalos was in close proximity to an *οἶκος μαρτυρικός*, behind the Agora. It apparently is referred to on the coins (B. N. Head, *Hist. Num.*, Oxford, 1911, p. 409). Cf. the object called the Navel of Rome (*Umbilicus Romæ*) which stood behind the *Rostra* in the Roman Forum.

ὄντα εἰρηκασίν); and in Crete, but for a different reason, a certain place bore the same name (Diod. Sic. v. lxx. 4).

Various explanations of the Omphalos have been suggested. It was a really brilliant idea of some of the ancients, or else a remarkable example of tenacity of tradition, when it was held that it marked the grave of the Python or of Dionysos.¹ The Omphalos really was a grave-mound of the sacred snake of Delphi, his abode after death, the seat of his power to aid through his oracular voice. It is a complex of grave and grave-stone, and as the latter it is not merely commemorative but magical. In its aspect as grave-stone it is ultimately of phallic origin. It is thus not confined to Delphi, nor associated only with Apollo.² Its primary connexion is with the primitive earth-deity and the spirits of the dead, who are also in some mysterious way the source of life and fertility for the living.³ Apollo dethroning Gaia from her ancient seat, slaying the snake-daimon Python and usurping the oracle, though he is fain to keep the old machinery—the cleft, the tripod, and the Omphalos—represents the incoming of a new race with different, and, on the whole, higher ideas of religion. To the end, however, Apollinism, as well as the other 'Olympian' cults of Greece, continued to be rooted in the far more ancient pre-Hellenic, in some respect universal, type of religion, characterized by worship of daimonic earth-powers, ghosts of the dead strong for good and evil, exhibiting themselves as the sacred snake whose power is located in his tomb and magic column.⁴

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W. J. WOODHOUSE.

ONEIDA COMMUNITY.—See COMMUNISTIC SOCIETIES OF AMERICA.

ONEIDA INDIANS.—See IROQUOIS.

ONTOGENY AND PHYLOGENY.—Ontogeny, in biological language, means the life-history of the individual organism; phylogeny the racial history of the class, order, family, genus, or species to which the organism belongs. Ontogeny is individual development; phylogeny is racial evolution. The usage is due to Haeckel, who formulated the recapitulation-doctrine that ontogeny tends to recapitulate phylogeny. As ontogeny has been discussed under DEVELOPMENT, and phylogeny, in

¹ Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* vii. 17: 'sed terrae medium non hoc sed quod vocant Delphis in aede ad latus est quiddam ut thesauri specie, quod Graeci vocant ὀμφαλόν quem Pythonos alunt tumulum.' Cf. Hesych, s.v. *Τοῖον Βουρὸς*: καὶ ὁ ὀμφαλὸς τῆς γῆς, τάφος ἱστοῦ τοῦ Πυθῶνος. By the *thesaurus* Varro is now taken to mean not, as was formerly supposed, a heathen tomb, like the so-called Treasury of Atreus, but a money-hox of the beehive tomb shape. See H. Graeven, in *Jahrb. des arch. Inst.* xvi. [1901] 160.

² The Omphalos in connexion with the cult of Aphrodite is noticed above. For the snake-twined Omphalos of Asklepios on coin of Pergamos see J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, p. 384. Asklepios is, of course, a snake-daimon of earth, giver of health and fertility through his dream-oracle.

³ Hence H. N. Ulrichs was so far right in interpreting the Omphalos as a fetish stone of the earth-goddess (*Reisen und Forschungen*, i., Bremen, 1840, p. 77 f.). Cf. an inscription of Argos, which tells how the *προφάντες* and *προφῆται* of Apollo Pythios 'established in accordance with the oracle the omphalos of Ga . . . and arranged a *thesaurus* in the oracular shrine' (W. Vollgraff, in *BCH*, 1903, p. 271 f.)—probably a reconstruction of a primitive sanctuary.

⁴ Cf. CGS iv. 193: 'What strikes us as most alien to Apollo in the Delphic ritual is the idea that the source of the inspiration is in the subterranean world, for he of all Greek deities has no part or lot in this.'

but this doctrine does not harmonize with that of the *Prasna Upaniṣad*, which, as we have seen, declares that meditation on the three *morā* of *om* leads to the *devayāna* and thus, of course, to the Brahman. Nor does it appear that this view of *om* was ever generally accepted, meditation on *om* being regarded as a normal stage in the development of the knowledge of the highest Brahman.

This position of *om* is intensified in the Yoga system as it appears in the *sūtra* of Patañjali (i. 27-29); it is there brought into connexion with Īśvara, God, and, under the name of *praṇava*, declared to express him. The repetition of the word and reflexion on its meaning are enjoined as desirable, and it is stated that the result of this practice is the removal of obstacles and the right knowledge of him who thinks in an inverse way, i.e. of one who does not seek truth in ordinary consciousness. Hence the word has a definite and important place in all subsequent doctrine of Yoga practices.

On the popular side the syllable *om* persists throughout the whole of Indian religion as the proper accompaniment of *mantras*, whether Vedic or not. Thus, on the one hand, it is used invariably to accompany the sacred *gāyatrī* which it is part of the daily duty of the orthodox Hindu to repeat, and, on the other hand, it plays a great part in the innumerable varieties of Tantric *mantras* which form an important feature of the real religion of India. Its popularity depends no doubt in part on the normal equation of its elements with the Hindu trinity of Viṣṇu, Śiva, and Brahmā which is already found in the later *Upaniṣads* and is foreshadowed earlier. On the other hand, despite its popular character, it remains very sacrosanct: at the festival of Śiva on 27th February, when even the lowest castes take part in the rites, while women are permitted to make use of the *mantras*, an exception is made of the syllable *om*, doubtless because of its special holiness.¹ As an auspicious symbol, from the 6th cent. A.D. onwards, the initial letter is found in different forms to denote the commencement of a text in MSS and inscriptions.

To Jainism and to Buddhism the syllable *om* and its use were primarily characteristic of the Brahman, but the force of the popularity of the syllable is shown by the fact that it became an integral part of the *mantra* of Avalokiteśvara in the Buddhist pantheon, the famous *om maṇi padme*² *hūm*. So in the crypto-Buddhism of the 16th cent. in Orissa we find that from the *śūnya*, or void, is derived the *praṇava*, thus bringing the *praṇava* close to the principle of nonentity of the nihilist school of Buddhism.

In the *Purāṇas* besides assertions as to its general sanctity we find the syllable turned to sectarian use. Thus in the *Linga Purāṇa* the *linga*, which reduces both Viṣṇu and Brahmā to the recognition of their inferiority to Śiva, bears upon it the sacred syllable. On the other hand, it is said that the three letters represent Viṣṇu himself, his wife Śrī, and the worshipper; that the syllable is the three Vedas, the three worlds, the three sacred fires, and the three footsteps of Viṣṇu; and that by meditation upon it devotees attain supreme bliss.

LITERATURE.—The derivation of *om* from *aram* is defended by F. Max Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, new ed., London, 1903, p. 322f., but is definitely rejected by O. Böhtlingk and R. Roth, *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch*, Petrograd, 1855-75, i. 1122. For the *praṇava* see J. Eggeling, *SBE* xxvi. [1855] 68, n. 3. *Om* in the *Upaniṣads* is discussed by P. Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1906, pp. 101, 390-392; see also A. Weber, *Indische Studien*, Berlin, 1849-54, ix. 24, 60, 99, 91, 107, 108, 125, 132, 134, 140-143, 153, 160. For the *Purāṇas* see H. H. Wilson, *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, ed. F. Hall, London, 1864-77, i. 1. *Om* in the Bud-

dism of Orissa is dealt with by Nagendra Nath Vasu, *Modern Buddhism*, Calcutta, 1911, pp. 44, 60, 62, 71, 72. For *om* as a *mantrāla* see G. Bühler, *Indische Paläographie*, Strassburg, 1896, p. 85. For *om* in the formula of Avalokiteśvara see L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme*, Paris, 1909, p. 381. *Om* in the Vedānta is discussed in *SEE* xxxiv. [1890] 169f., xxxviii. [1890] 103, 190-199, 232f., xlviii. [1904] 311f., 362, 604, 682-685.

A. B. KEITH.

OMAHA INDIANS.—See SIOUANS.

OMENS.—See DIVINATION, PRODIGES AND PORTENTS.

OM MANI PADME HUM.—See JEWEL (Buddhist).

OMNIPOTENCE, OMNIPRESENCE, OMNISCIENCE.—See GOD.

OMPHALOS (ὀμφαλός).—The Greeks had a story that Zeus, wishing to ascertain the exact centre of the earth, sent forth two eagles to fly simultaneously at equal speed from its eastern and western ends. They met at Delphi, and there in Apollo's temple was set up in commemoration the holy Navel-stone, or Omphalos, with a golden eagle at either side to mark earth's central point.¹

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LITERATURE.—J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, Cambridge, 1912, p. 384f., and art. 'Delphica,' in *JHS* xix. (1899) 205 ff.; J. H. Middleton, 'The Temple of Apollo at Delphi,' in *JHS* ix. (1883) 282f.; O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*, in *Iwan von Müller's Handbuch*, v. ii., Munich, 1897; C. Bötticher, *Der Omphalos des Zeus zu Delphi*, Berlin, 1859; W. Deonna, *REG* xxviii. (1915) 444, remarks: 'La question de l'omphalos est à l'ordre du jour archéologique, ces derniers temps.' He mentions a number of recent papers and books to which access has not been possible for the present writer.

W. J. WOODHOUSE.

ONEIDA COMMUNITY.—See COMMUNISTIC SOCIETIES OF AMERICA.

ONEIDA INDIANS.—See IROQUOIS.

ONTOGENY AND PHYLOGENY.—Ontogeny, in biological language, means the life-history of the individual organism; phylogeny the racial history of the class, order, family, genus, or species to which the organism belongs. Ontogeny is individual development; phylogeny is racial evolution. The usage is due to Haeckel, who formulated the recapitulation-doctrine that ontogeny tends to recapitulate phylogeny. As ontogeny has been discussed under DEVELOPMENT, and phylogeny, in

¹ Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* vii. 17: 'sed terræ medium non hoc sed quod vocant Delphis in aede ad latus est quiddam ut thesauri specie, quod Graeci vocant ὀμφαλὸν quem Pythonos aiunt tumulum.' Cf. Hesych, s.v. Τοῖον Βουρός: καὶ ὁ ὀμφαλὸς τῆς γῆς, τὰφος ἐστὶ τοῦ Πυθῶνος. By the *thesaurus* Varro is now taken to mean not, as was formerly supposed, a beehive tomb, like the so-called Treasury of Atreus, but a money-box of the beehive tomb shape. See H. Graeven, in *Jahrb. des arch. Inst.* xvi. (1901) 160.

² The Omphalos in connexion with the cult of Aphrodite is noticed above. For the snake-twin Omphalos of Asklepios on coin of Pergamos see J. E. Harrison, *Themis*, p. 334. Asklepios is, of course, a snake-daimon of earth, giver of health and fertility through his dream-oracle.

³ Hence H. N. Ulrichs was so far right in interpreting the Omphalos as a fetish stone of the earth-goddess (*Reisen und Forschungen*, i., Bremen, 1840, p. 77f.). Cf. an inscription of Argos, which tells how the *προφάντες* and *προφῆται* of Apollo were seated in the oracular shrine in the oracular shrine—probably a reconstruction.

as most alien to Apollo in source of the inspiration is in the subterranean world, for he of all Greek deities has no part or lot in this.

¹ A marble Omphalos found in Athens (*JHS* i. (1880) pl. v., *ib.* ix. 299) has a truncated top for the reception of a statue.

² This inference has been drawn, though not with entire success, by A. W. Verrall (note 3 on p. xiv of his ed. of *Æsch. Eumenides*, London, 1908, where he points out that in the time of Pausanias the Omphalos is 'a mere curiosity, and apparently is not even within the building').

³ Note that the temple of Apollo at Delphi consisted of four parts, namely a *pronaos*, a *naos* (or main *cella*), the *adyton* (inmost shrine or sanctuary), and the oracular vault. The *adyton* was not open to the public (Paus. x. xxiv. 5: *ἐς δὲ τοῦ ναοῦ τὸ ἐσωτάτω παρίσσι τε ἐς αὐτὸ ὀλίγοι*); and even into the *cella* apparently not all were permitted to go (cf. *Eur. Ion*, 2281f.). The original place of the Omphalos was the *adyton*.

⁴ Paus. x. xxiv. 4: *Ποσειδῶνος βωμός, ἐν τῷ μαντεῖον τὸ ἀρχαῖοτατον κτήμα ἦν καὶ Ποσειδῶνος, ἐστῆκε δὲ καὶ ἀγάλματα Μοιρῶν δύο*.

⁵ His account of Delphi is more confused than any other part of his book. Possibly his loose notes, made on the spot, got mixed up, and he was unable afterwards to arrange them correctly.

⁶ The cleft, with its sacred Omphalos, occupied by the great temple. It would be upon the occasion of the transference that the original grave-mound with its stucco (*ἀεκόμα*) and cone was translated into stone in the form in which we know it.

⁷ Cf. *CGS* iv. 148f. It goes back to the primitive stage 'when pillar and altar and divinity were not clearly distinguished.'

⁸ Note that the Phleiasian Omphalos was in close proximity to an *οἶκος μαντικός*, behind the Agora. It apparently is referred to on the coins (B. V. Head, *Hist. Num.*, Oxford, 1911, p. 400). Cf. the object called the Navel of Rome (*Umbilicus Romæ*) which stood behind the Rostra in the Roman Forum.

part, under EVOLUTION, this article will deal mainly with the relation between them.

1. Ontogeny.—(1) The term must be taken to include the whole life-history of the individual until the adult form is reached, but no precise punctuation is possible. Thus the brain may go on developing in complexity of nerve-cell connexions after all the other parts have reached their climax. It is often possible to distinguish an *embryonic* period within the egg-envelopes, a *larval* period, when the developing organism looks after itself but has not yet assumed the characteristic form of the adult (e.g., caterpillar and tadpole), a *juvenile* period, when it shows the definitive features but is still very immature, an *adolescent* period, when the sexual maturity begins to be attained, and an *adult* period, when development wanes. One period may pass smoothly and gradually into another, or there may be crises of change. When these crises are very marked and involve re-organization—e.g., when a pupating caterpillar gives rise to a butterfly, or a free-swimming Pluteus-larva to a sea-urchin, or a tadpole to a frog—the term metamorphosis is appropriate. It is sometimes useful to distinguish an early period of organ-forming (organogenesis) within the egg from a later period of functional development when the young creature actively uses its various parts.

(2) It is important to recognize that there are usually successive chapters in ontogeny, and that one organism may differ from another in the emphasis that is laid on one or other of these. One chapter may be long-drawn-out and another may be telescoped, and this seems to have come about in adaptation to particular conditions of life. Thus many fresh-water animals, such as the crayfish, have suppressed the larval stages which their relatives in the sea exhibit. This is adaptive, for the risks of being borne into unsuitable places are serious in rivers, but negligible in the open sea. That some river animals, such as caddis-worms, have prolonged larval stages does not affect the argument, for it will be found that they in turn have special adaptations, such as gripping structures or adhesive secretions which secure safety. The echinoderms of Polar seas have in most cases suppressed the free-swimming larval stages which are so characteristic of this class of animals, and this may be reasonably interpreted as adaptive to the inhospitable character of the surface waters. To take a very different illustration, it was observed by Alfred Russel Wallace that the mound-birds, or megapods, of Celebes leave their eggs to hatch, all unattended, in great hotbeds of dead leaves, and that the young birds can fly away on the day of their birth. In other words, a very peculiar condition is met by a precocious development of the flying power; the suppression of incubation has its counterpart in the suppression of the chick stage. The general idea is clear, that the great variety of life-history may be in part described as an elongating or a telescoping of this or that chapter in the ontogeny, and that this may be adaptive to particular conditions of life.

(3) Ontogeny is always a function of the hereditary nature on the one hand, and appropriate nurture on the other. The inheritance cannot be expressed except under the influence of certain environmental conditions and liberating stimuli; and the expression varies in some measure according to the nurture and the use which the organism makes of it from stage to stage. A rich nature may enrich itself; a poor one may impoverish itself. In a general way it may be said that the intrinsic factors implied in the germinal organization are directive, and that the extrinsic factors implied in the environmental or nurtural conditions serve as stimuli or inhibitors, or have a directly modifying influence.

2. How phylogeny may be discovered.—Very little is as yet certain in regard to the detailed phylogeny of living creatures. The construction of elaborate genealogical trees is still premature unless their provisional character is emphasized. Thus, while it is probably safe to say that birds evolved from the extinct deinosaursian reptiles, and from the subdivision Ornithischia, what the precise pedigree has been we do not know. Similarly it is still impossible to speak with definiteness in regard to the relationship of the numerous orders of living birds. It is easy to convince ourselves that swifts are not nearly related to swallows, nor cranes to herons, but it is only in a very tentative way that we can piece the parts of the pedigree together. The difficulties seem to be greatest when we inquire into the origin of the distinctive phyla (or series of related classes)—vertebrates, molluscs, echinoderms, and so forth. We have more definite knowledge of the descent of modern elephants from forms like *Palæomastodon* than we have of the origin of mammals, and we are much more convinced as to the derivation of mammals from reptiles than as to the origin of vertebrates from, let us say, annelid worms.

The establishment of a probable pedigree is an inference from various kinds of evidence. (a) There are the remains of extinct types buried in the fossil-bearing rocks, and, were this record complete and available, the deciphering of pedigrees would simply be a question of time and patience.

But, as Darwin said, the geological record is like 'a history of the world imperfectly kept, and written in a changing dialect; of this history we possess the last volume alone, relating only to two or three countries. Of this volume, only here and there a short chapter has been preserved; and of each page, only here and there a few lines.'

On the other hand, the rock-record is often surprising. A good deal is known in regard to fossil jelly-fishes; certain stages in the life-history of some extinct forms, such as graptolites and brachiopods, are decipherable: the young ichthyosaurs can be seen within their mother; and the actual variations of some fresh-water snails (*Paludina neumayri* and *Planorbis multiformis*) can be studied. W. B. Scott of Princeton remarks:

'The geological record is not so hopelessly incomplete as Darwin believed it to be. Since *The Origin of Species* was written, our knowledge of that record has been enormously extended and we now possess, no complete volumes, it is true, but some remarkably full and illuminating chapters. The main significance of the whole lies in the fact, that just in proportion to the completeness of the record is the unequivocal character of its testimony to the truth of the evolutionary theory.'

(b) The second basis for a pedigree is found in the structural resemblances of living forms. A deep-seated similitude in hip-girdle, hind leg, shoulder-girdle, and skull links modern birds back to the Ornithischia already mentioned, and the affiliation is corroborated by homologies between modern birds and modern reptiles. Thus both have a complex lower jaw which articulates with the quadrate bone; both have an inter-tarsal ankle joint; both have epidermic scales. These three resemblances are merely instances, and they are of unequal importance, the first being more significant than the second, and the second more significant than the third; but it is evident that, secure as may be the palæontological basis for the conclusion that birds have evolved from a reptile stock, we reasonably look for some corroboration in homologies between extant representatives of the two classes. In proportion to the specialization of the modern derivatives of a common ancestral stock will it be difficult to find other than very deep-seated resemblances between them, and in such cases great interest often attaches to vestigial structures—useless dwindling relics—which linger

1 *Origin of Species*, London, 1852, p. 253.

2 *Darwin and Modern Science*, ed. A. O. Seward, Cambridge, 1909, p. 109.

as tell-tale evidences of a superficially obliterated affinity. Thus the vestigial hip-girdle and hind-limb of eelaceans are of some significance in suggesting pedigree.

(c) In trying to discover the phylogeny of a type, recourse may also be had to the study of development. A clue is sometimes to be found here when none is offered either by palæontology or by the anatomical comparison of extant forms. A signal case was Kowalevsky's discernment (1866) of the chordate affinities of ascidians. No one had suspected that these peculiar sedentary animals were retrogressive chordates till Kowalevsky showed that the free-swimming larva had a dorsal nerve-cord, a notochord in the tail region, gill-slits opening from the pharynx to the exterior, and an eye developing from the brain. In the same way Vaughan Thompson's discernment of the position of barnacles among crustaceans was due to his discovery of the life-history. It may be said, however, that the study of development does not usually reveal the pedigree, but serves only to confirm the conclusion arrived at from the study of homologies and connecting links. To sum up, then: our knowledge of the phylogeny of a type rests on three sets of data—those derived from a study of extinct forms, those derived from comparative anatomy, and those furnished by embryology. Interesting corroborations may sometimes be found in other quarters; thus the mingling of the blood of two related types, such as horse and ass, hare and rabbit, is harmonious, while the mingling of the blood of unrelated types is destructive. Or, again, some light has occasionally rewarded the study of variation whether experimentally induced or occurring spontaneously in wild nature. Reversions, for instance, may occasionally serve as finger-posts in inquiries into phylogeny.

3. Relation of phylogeny to ontogeny. —The phylogeny, or racial history, of a type, such as spider or snail, frog or stork, implies a succession of achievements (differentiations and integrations) which, taken as a whole, seem to have required long ages for their establishment. Taking the last example, we think of the remote and obscure origin of back-boned animals or chordates, of the diverging of one vertebrate class after another until reptiles appeared, of the emergence of birds from the bipedal Ornithischian stock, of the appearance of primitive Ciconiiformes, and of the differentiation which led to the stork type at last. Now these successive steps in evolution have been, in a manner which we cannot conceive, enregistered in the germinal organization of the germ-cells by which the lineage is continued from generation to generation. Could we have seen into the details of the germ-cell of a primitive bird, we should probably have discovered more complexity than lay in the germ-cell of the primitive reptile, and much more than in the germ-cell of the primitive vertebrate. Even if microscopical sections of the germ-cells of extinct types were available, the various degrees of germinal complexity lie beyond the limits of visual demonstration, but the probability is that the germinal organization becomes increasingly intricate in an ascending phylogenetic series. (As a matter of fact some germ-cells are visibly much more complicated than others.) The difficult problem is how the enrichment of the germinal organization could come about.

We are adhering to the generally accepted view that the course of evolution has been from the apparently simple to the obviously complex—a process of increasing differentiation and integration except in parasitism, degeneracy, and other paths of retrogression. It may be noted, however, that W. Bateson has recently directed attention to the number of evolutionary changes which may be

interpreted as due to loss, or to the removal of inhibiting factors.

He asks that biologists should consider 'whether the course of Evolution can at all reasonably be represented as an unpacking of an original complex which contained within itself the whole range of diversity which living things present' (President's Address, Brit. Assoc., Australia, 1914; see *Nature*, xciii. [1914] 640). On this view organic evolution has been a sequence of emancipations, a throwing off of shackles; we adhere to the conception of a sequence of experiments in 'creative synthesis,' a series of adventures, often wild, in self-expression. To vary the metaphor, for the problem is hardly as yet discussible in other terms, we think of the living creature as a creative artist with itself as its chief work. Or, again, we think of it as trafficking with its environment, as trading with time, as putting its hereditary talents out to usury, or even speculating with them. In this, it seems important to observe, there need be much less of the fortuitous than is usually supposed. For the variation which arises in a germ-cell is in some measure conditioned by the already established organization—by the already accepted architectural style. Nor is the sifting or selection which decides the fate of the individual expression of the variation in question to be thought of as blind or haphazard; it is in definite and subtle relation to the correlations of organisms, the linkages, the web of life—the *systema naturæ*, in short—already established.

If the course of evolution has been a series of discoveries or inventions, or even a sequence of emancipations, there must have been registrations in the germinal organization, and there are two ways in which this enregistering may be thought of. (1) On the one hand, the experience of the fully developed individual may in some definite way affect the germinal organization. Thus Lamarckians have thought of the germ-cells being continuously enriched or impoverished by the gains or losses of the individual organism, and that in a perfectly specific or representative manner. There are very few facts which lend support to this view, and yet it seems premature to foreclose the question, or to assert that the experience of individuals counts for nothing in the evolution of the race. Many facts suggest that experiences of the individual may serve as variational stimuli to the complex germ-plasm. Though they do not leave representative imprints of themselves, they may pull the trigger of changefulness or sever another of the threads that bind the insurgent life. (2) On the other hand, the available data make it seem likely that most of the raw materials of progress are due to germinal variations or mutations, intrinsic changes in the germinal organization, permutations and combinations of hereditary items. Apart from what may occur during the growth and multiplication of the germ-cells, there are ample opportunities in the processes of maturation and fertilization for fresh shufflings and deals of the hereditary cards. The variations thus arising in the arcana of the germ-cells find expression in the individual life of the developed organism, and are there tested and sifted. If the metaphor be permissible, the germ-cell is the blind artist whose many inventions are expressed, embodied, and exercised in the developed organism, the seeing artist, who, beholding the work of the germ-cell, either pronounces it, in the light of the success which it brings, to be good, or, when it spells ruin, curses it effectually by sinking with it into extinction. There is never any difficulty in understanding how a germinal variation, having arisen, comes to stay. That is provided for in the continuity of the germ-plasm. It is probably, then, by the entailment of the results of intrinsic germinal experiments, and not by the imprinting of the results of individual experiences, that the

steps made in phylogeny become registered in the germ-cells and thus made expressible in ontogeny.

4. *Recapitulation doctrine.*—Long before the evolution idea was accepted by zoologists, the idea was mooted (e.g., by Meckel in 1821) that the stages in individual development corresponded to grades of organization in the animal kingdom. Von Baer called attention to common features observable in vertebrate embryos in early stages, but he indicated at the same time that there was a remarkable specificity almost from the first. Louis Agassiz, in his *Essay on Classification* (London, 1859), expressed his belief in a correspondence between stages in embryonic development and the grades of differentiation recognized in the classification of living and extinct animals. Though no evolutionist, he wrote:

'It may therefore be considered as a general fact, very likely to be more fully illustrated as investigators cover a wider ground, that the phases of development of all living animals correspond to the order of succession of their extinct representatives in past geological times.'

His son, Alexander Agassiz, compared stages in the development of echinoderms with the fossil series, and said:

'Comparing the embryonic development with the palæontological one, we find a remarkable similarity.'

To Haeckel, in particular, credit is due for recognizing the importance of the recapitulation doctrine and stating it clearly in the light of evolution. He called it the 'fundamental law of biogenesis' ('biogenetisches Grundgesetz'), and stated it in the familiar words: 'Ontogeny is a recapitulation of phylogeny.' He also introduced the idea of paligenetic characters, which correspond to those of the ancestral stock, and kainogenetic characters, which are relatively recent additions. The latter, he said, may disguise the former in a perplexing way; in any case, the recapitulation is general, not exact, and often shows great condensation. Fritz Müller was another who did much (e.g., in his *Für Darwin*, Leipzig, 1864) to illustrate and corroborate the recapitulation idea.

This doctrine has suffered considerably at the hands of its friends, who have sometimes stated it in an exaggerated and inaccurate way. When Milnes Marshall said, 'Every animal in its own development repeats its history, climbs up its own genealogical tree,' he was speaking picturesquely, for the recapitulation is general, not detailed; it often shows telescoping, and it is truer of stages in organogenesis than of stages in the development of the embryo as a whole. It is hardly necessary to say that a developing bird is never like a reptile, but only like an embryo reptile. It has also to be remembered that one term in the comparison, the phylogeny, is very imperfectly known, so that assertions as to the exactness of the recapitulation must be taken with much reserve. And, again, the illustrations that have been adduced have not always been very happy. The simplest animals are single cells; there are some balls of cells, like *Volvox*, on the border-line between unicellulars and multicellulars; and there are some very simple two-layered sacs of cells, such as *Protohydra*. But, when we see an animal of relatively high degree, such as the primitive vertebrate *Amphioxus*, beginning its life as a fertilized egg-cell, which develops into a ball of cells (blastula) and a two-layered sac of cells (gastrula), we are probably mistaken in regarding this as a recapitulation of very ancient phylogeny. Reproduction by means of isolated germ-cells need not have any historical reference to the Protozoa; a ball of cells may be the natural result of the cleavage of an ovum when it is not encumbered with too much yolk; and it is possible to account for the formation of a gastrula without dragging in the hypothetical ancestral gastræa.

An important criticism concerns specificity, i.e.

the individuality and uniqueness of every well-defined type. A fish may be identified by a few scales, a bird by a few feathers. The cells lining the windpipe of a horse are readily distinguishable from those of a dog, and the palate of a land-snail from that of a periwinkle. There is pronounced chemical individuality in species, as may be detected in the milk of nearly-related mammals or the juice of the grapes in nearly-related vines. It is most literally true that 'all flesh is not the same flesh.' There is no doubt that increased precision of embryological work has disclosed the individuality or specificity of the organism even in early stages of ontogeny. Thus the number of chromosomes within the nucleus of a cell is, with few exceptions, constant for each kind of organism, and the embryo of a mouse could thus be distinguished from that of a rabbit, or that of an onion from that of a lily. But a recognition of the fact that an organism is from the start itself and no other is not inconsistent with admitting a significant correspondence between steps in individual development and steps in racial evolution. A tadpole is from the first in several ways an amphibian and not a fish, and yet in its two-chambered heart and branchial circulation it is for a time distinctly piscine.

One reason why the ontogenetic recapitulation of phylogeny must be general, not precise, is that the successive gains made in the course of racial evolution are not superimposed one upon another, but are severally incorporated into the organization and unified with it. The additions from millennium to millennium are not like new wings added to a house, for the tenements which we call individuals are continually dissolved, and there is re-unification at the start of each new life. Whatever further saving clauses may have to be appended to the 'recapitulation doctrine,' the broad fact remains that ontogeny is the making explicit of the germinal organization which is what it is because of phylogeny. The past lives on in the present in a manner peculiar to and characteristic of living creatures, and it is because it is determined by the past that an embryo moves towards a goal as if it had the future consciously in view. The ages that are gone have bent the bow in the plane along which the arrow of the individual flies. But ontogeny must not be thought of as the uncoiling of a wound-up spring, or as the unpacking of a marvellous treasure-box; it is a function of the individuality which is somehow condensed within the germ-cell. It is the transformation of the germinal organization into the adult organization, and it implies a series of steps in 'creative synthesis.' The fundamental fact which we are so far from understanding is that the fertilized ovum is at once the repository of ages of organic inventions and a unified individuality in the one-celled stage of its becoming.

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J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

ONTOLOGY.—1. Definition.—Metaphysics is traditionally divided into ontology, or the philosophy of being, cosmology, or the philosophy of nature, and psychology, or the philosophy of mind. Ontology, dealing with the most general characteristics of the real, includes those subjects which as common to the other two branches cannot be dealt with by either exclusively; cosmology and psychology study, in a very general way, one or other of the concrete forms which reality takes, while ontology is concerned only with the nature of the real in abstraction from its specific embodiments.

While it is possible to distinguish these branches of metaphysics, it does not follow that they can be kept rigidly apart, for psychological or cosmological conclusions inevitably act upon ontology. The question, What is being itself? implies a previous acquaintance with the *things which are*; and, if we hold that all that is essentially a cosmos organized in a particular way, or if we believe that 'matter' is essentially relative to and constituted by consciousness, our ontological views will be coloured accordingly. Much of recent ontological speculation is vitiated by false psychological or cosmological assumptions.

The idea of being is the most general and consequently the least capable of definition with which philosophy is called upon to deal. As we do not find 'matter in general' in *rerum natura*, but always this or that concrete matter, possessed of specific qualities which differentiate it from other matter, so it is impossible to isolate being and examine its nature directly. 'Being-in-itself' is meaningless, for only that which has a definite nature of its own can be. Nor can we regard being as an additional predicate to be attached to that which is already a complex of various qualities, only lacking this further quality of 'being' in order to become an actual thing. As a complex of qualities, the thing already 'is.' Being is not a quality, but is latent in all qualities. Nor can we expect to show how 'being' itself came to be. We can to a certain extent understand how one thing 'comes into being' and another 'ceases to be,' in the unceasing flux of things, though here, too, further examination reveals change of form, and not creation or extinction; but the question of the origin of being is meaningless, for, presupposing, as it does, a previous complete nothingness out of which being proceeds, it postulates an effect for which there is *ex hypothesi* no cause, and thereby involves self-contradiction. We are compelled, therefore, to take being as given in the fact that 'something is,' and to proceed to investigate what is implied in the fact that something is as well as the special forms which the something may take.

2. Reality and knowledge.—If asked to specify what he regards as being or having existence, the unsophisticated individual would reply that 'things' at any rate existed, and would doubtless admit further that 'minds' might also be said to exist. He would also recognize that there was some relation between the two whereby the mind was aware of the existence of the thing; the precise nature of this relation has formed the crux of much philosophical discussion, and an erroneous conception of it has vitiated much ontological speculation. The question is asked, What must the nature of things be in order that they may be known?, and the answer is given that they must be in some way akin to the mind which knows them. What is this kinship? The mind, it is held, can know only that which is, in some sense or other, within it; and that which is within the mind is an idea; the mind, therefore, can know only its own ideas. It is concluded, therefore, either that things do not exist or that they can never be known. The fallacy lies in the sense at-

tached to 'within the mind,' for 'being within the mind' simply means 'being known.' In direct experience we do not *know* ideas at all. An idea is an act of knowledge, either of a directly presented object or by way of memory, etc., and 'to have an idea of' means nothing more than 'to know.' The proposition that in order to be known a thing must be akin to the mind means simply that in order to be known a thing must be capable of being known.

The same fallacy of the 'mental' nature of things is found in the doctrine which, starting from sensation as given, postulates the activity of thought in ordering and correlating the data of sensation in order to make the object (e.g., Green). There is no reality, we are told, apart from the activity of consciousness: the order of nature is nothing other than the relations which the mind imposes on the crude data of sensation. We do not know things, therefore, but only 'phenomena.' 'Nature,' says Green (*Prolegomena to Ethics*, Oxford, 1883, § 36), 'is the system of related appearances, and related appearances are impossible apart from the action of an intelligence.' Kant's theory implied that the sensations, still undetermined by relations, are 'the work of unknown things-in-themselves, acting in unknown ways upon us' (§ 38). Green, in the interests of the intelligibility of the real world, discards the things-in-themselves as meaningless, because, while claiming to be completely independent of our knowledge and themselves never known, they are yet the cause of our knowledge, and causation, being a relation, is the work of the mind and cannot be predicated of the world of things-in-themselves.

'That sensations therefore, the matter of our experience, should be connected as effects with ... which all that can be said is that they ... than the world of our experience, and subject to which it is relative, is a statement self-contradictory or at best unmeaning' (§ 41).

This indubitably disposes of Kant, but what is left of the doctrine? There are two points to be noted. (i.) The 'sensations' are not 'arranged' by the understanding purely at random or capriciously. Why does the understanding give to one set of sensations a particular spatial order, to another the relation of cause and effect, etc., if it be not because of the inherent nature of the sensations themselves? *I.e.*, the 'sensations' (which really means the different qualities of the thing) come to the understanding already ordered and related in a definite way. (ii.) Any theory which seeks to show that the objects of experience are 'made' by the intelligence is ultimately incapable of accounting for the material out of which these objects are made (*viz.* sensations). For we cannot have any sensations we choose. Hence the argument finally reverts to something not 'made by the intelligence' upon which our sensations are dependent; of this entity idealists are precluded, by their own presuppositions, from giving an account. Green, e.g., after criticizing Kant's things-in-themselves, is driven to speak of 'the exciting cause of sensation' (§ 59), the 'afflection of the sentient organism by matter external to it' (§ 60), and 'a sensation excited by an external irritant' (§ 64). There is, then, after all an external matter which causes sensations; it can have no relations or qualities, for these are the work of the mind; it is therefore open to all the objections which Green alleges against Kant's things-in-themselves.

This confusion is due to the attempt to identify perception with object, and the failure to recognize that perception is the act of relating the mind to its object. A similar fallacy underlies the identification of reality with experience.¹ Experience

¹ Cf. F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, London, 1903; A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, do. 1903.

cannot be an ultimate and self-existent entity, because it implies two elements beyond itself: (1) the mind which experiences, and (2) the object which is experienced. Doubtless we cannot know reality without the mind; but this in no way implies that it is a general characteristic of reality to be incapable of existence apart from the mind or to be *psychical* matter of fact. In this type of argument the word 'experience' is used ambiguously as (a) the fact that we do have an experience, and (b) the object of which we have experience, and that which is true of (a), viz. that it cannot exist without the mind, is illegitimately transferred to (b).

The conclusion is, then, that the mind is capable of knowing an 'external' reality with qualities and relations of its own which are independent of their being known;¹ and the argument involves equally the reality of space and time.

3. Forms of being.—To investigate all the characteristics of reality would be to exhaust the contents of all the sciences. Ontology is concerned with only the most general *formal* characteristics, or categories. The widest possible interpretation was given to the idea of category by Hegel, who attempted to exhibit the framework of reality in the development of categories from the simplest (being) to the most complex and adequate (the absolute idea), which summed up and included all the others. Apart from criticisms on details of this deduction, it may be doubted whether the deduction itself is really valid. It would certainly be possible to show that one category is more complex than another; it might even be possible to arrange the categories in the order of their complexity; but to deduce them from a primary category of being without reference to the actual constitution of particular things is fundamentally impossible, for (1) we cannot tell *a priori* what the forms of things are to be, and (2), while some forms are united by mutual implication, others are united only by their simultaneous actualization in a concrete whole, and their connexion in consequence can be discovered only by experience. Hegel's deduction is in fact an attempt to correlate categories discovered in experience, and not a true deduction.

4. Being as a unity.—A fundamental characteristic which meets us in examining reality is the fact that 'things' are not isolated but interrelated. Philosophy seeks to exhibit this interrelation as the concrete development of one unifying principle: the ontological categories are subordinate types of order or unity, abstracting particular aspects of things; they are ways in which the 'manifold' reveals its inner unity. How that which is 'many' can also be 'one' was a problem which caused the Greeks much trouble before it was realized that it is not one and many in the same respect, and that a unity is essentially a union of many elements, not an undifferentiated whole.² The puzzle of the one and the many is a puzzle only when relevant considerations, which even language recognizes, are neglected; e.g., a heap of apples is one heap of many apples, but not many heaps.

In the infinite variety which being presents there are features which transcend mere heterogeneity and reveal system. A system is a unity in which diverse elements are held together by a common principle. Some important types of unity must be indicated.

(a) The primary unity is the substance, or inde-

pendent, self-existent being. A substance is commonly regarded as that which exists in its own right, while its attributes are dependent upon it and incapable of existence apart from it. The implied separation between substance and attribute must not be pressed too far, for the substance is itself incapable of existing apart from attributes, and ought to be regarded as their unity rather than as something to which they are merely attached, for attributes are nothing more than the activities of substance, and consequently the ways in which it is. It is evident, however, that no particular thing is a complete unity, or really self-dependent, for it always carries us beyond itself; it is related to other objects in the universe, and is what it is only because the laws of the whole universe are operative in constituting it. The only substance, therefore, in the sense of completely self-contained and independent reality is the whole, the cosmos, and, when we call particular things substances, we do so in a relative sense only, referring to their indifference to particular relations, not to an absence of all relation.

(b) If a thing is not completely independent, neither is it 'constituted by its relations.' We cannot suppose an entirely unrelated 'thing' subsequently entering into relations, but neither can we adopt the notion that relations alone are constitutive of reality, for a relation implies at least two terms between which it maintains itself, or which by a union of certain of their aspects constitute it, and which are therefore *logically* prior to the relation. There can be no relation if there is nothing to relate. A relation is a particular unity of two or more terms, not necessarily something common to them, though it may be based on their common possession of some particular nature (as existence in space); or the one may be complementary to the other (as in the subject-object relation); the relation is the being of one term in so far as it concerns itself with the being of another. This connexion may be permanent or temporary, essential or unessential: the general types of relation of which a thing is capable remain unaltered, but particular relations may vary without change of the thing itself. Those who deny this include in the essence of the thing every relation in which the thing happens to be at any given moment, which contradicts the notion of essence. A relation is dependent on the mind only when the mind enters into it as a term; there is frequent confusion between the mind's presence as a term in the relation of knowing and the presentation to the mind of the relation known.

(c) A most important type of relation is that of subsumption under the same universal. A thing or quality is not merely itself; it is a particular instance of a general type which also exemplifies itself in other ways. A universal is no mere creation of the mind, even though it cannot be handled; it has no existence apart from particulars, but it exists in its particulars: a book is not merely 'this,' it possesses a nature identical in some respects with that possessed by other objects. Berkeley rejected the theory of general ideas formed by abstraction, because he thought of them as general mental images, and he could not picture to himself a triangle which was neither equilateral nor isosceles nor scalene. So far he was right, but a universal is not a mental image; nor is it an idea formed by abstraction, for before we can begin to abstract we must already have recognized the common nature which is the universal. It is a form or law of being, a general nature which is capable of expressing itself in a variety of ways. We cannot 'picture' this kind of being; and, though we may have a conception of it, the universal is not merely our conception; it is implied

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in the universal that it is a real type of existence, a unity which holds together its particulars in a unique relation. Reality shows itself in definite, recurring forms, which the particular sciences make it their business to classify.

(d) From what has been said under (a) and (c) it follows that each particular thing is a unity of universals.

(e) Not only are existences united by similarity; their diversity also is essential to their systematization. Diverse material things 'interact' upon one another in an infinity of ways, whereby changes arise in their constitution; these changes are not fortuitous, but proceed according to a definite system, as is inevitable from the fact that each factor has a definite nature of its own, and consequently their interactions, which are determined by their natures, are also definite. This phenomenon of definite changes is generally known as causation; this implies more than the mere succession of one phenomenon upon another to which it has sometimes been reduced. It is implied that the earlier phenomenon is directly concerned in initiating the existence of the later; their relation is not merely temporal; there is involved an activity in the first phenomenon which deposits the second. The cause is thus strictly the whole collection of conditions necessary to the production of a phenomenon; but it is usual to regard as cause either the last added in time or any one of the conditions which happens to be prominent for any other reason, permanently present conditions being neglected. Laws of causation which thus provide the connecting link between dissimilar phenomena are themselves only a case of that unity in difference which is the nature of the universal; and they constitute an order throughout which one general principle prevails. Being in its universal nature remains the same amid the flux of particulars; everything changes, yet the types remain.

(f) It is evident that experience is a unity of subject and object, but it has also been argued that mind is the source of *all* unity, that, in knowing, the mind unifies the data of sense and forms them into an object, unifies phenomena into universal law, etc. This contradicts the very idea of knowledge, which implies the mind's attitude to something already there, and not the production of an object. Mind in its cognitive aspect selects its objects, doubtless, and may take a thing now in its unity, now as an element in a wider unity, but only because it already is such a unity or element; in its activity of will, however, mind is constantly engaged in organizing its objects for the realization of its own purposes and thus does create unities in which a number of material objects are united as instruments with mind for the attainment of an end. Reason and emotion unite minds in common purposes, which are limited only by the boundaries of mind itself. There is, then, an ever-expanding system of unities, from the unity of the mere thing to the unity of minds in society, and finally to the ultimate unity of nature and mind in the whole.

(g) Can anything be said as to the nature of this final and supreme system? Parmenides, Plato, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hegel are among the names that one recalls in this connexion, but with little of secure and accepted result. Attempts have been made to exhibit the whole, the absolute, as a complete, perfect, harmonious, and self-consistent system, but thereby considerable violence is done to the details of reality in order to force them to take their place in an idealistic universe. For Bradley, *e.g.*, the real is the self-consistent; but all the particulars with their relations are found to be self-contradictory and therefore only appearances. Hence the absolute, while containing and

forming the ground of all appearances, does not reproduce them as they appear to us; they are transmuted, fused, merged into something harmonious and consistent. Anything which falls short of the whole is self-contradictory (this is untrue; to be at the same time whole and part would be self-contradictory) and therefore unreal to that degree in which it does fall short. As self-contradictory it cannot directly take its place in the absolute, yet it is *something* and consequently must be represented in the absolute, in which all contradictions are reconciled and to the perfection of which all imperfection is contributory. The puzzles of time and space, relation and causation, good and evil, etc., are solved by the process of merging these phenomena in an absolute which knows them not. A satisfactory metaphysic can hardly be raised on such a basis. If nothing is what it appears to be, and each appearance is only a quite indescribable element in an unknowable whole, the fact that this whole is perfect and harmonious and contains the answer to all our questions does not afford much consolation. For, as soon as we begin to describe the absolute, the contradictions of experience are nothing to the irrationalities which emerge. For Bradley attempts to describe the whole in language applicable to the parts only, and consequently self-contradictory, while the parts, having been transmuted, are no longer the same, and the whole is not the whole of these parts. Such a procedure ignores the 'systematic' character of reality.

Accepting, as we must, the reality of the particular elements, with their incompleteness and unsatisfactoriness, we are precluded from any easy acquiescence in a complete and perfect whole already present. We must regard the whole as being itself a developing system, in which nature and mind are organic to each other, and ideals not themselves final are not yet finally realized. The real must not be identified with the ideal; the real is not, but is striving to be, the rational. We cannot recognize completeness apart from value, as Plato showed when he made the Good the mainspring of the system of reality; and that finite values are also ultimate and rooted in the nature of things seems to be a necessary condition of their being recognized as values at all. Whether the development as a whole is teleological or organic, whether all ideals exist final and complete in the mind of God and form the plan of development, or this is only the outcome of an internal necessity inherent in the finite, are questions which transcend the limits of ontology.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works mentioned under art. METAPHYSICS the following may be consulted: Plato, *Republic*, v. and vi., *Parmenides*, *Timaeus*; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*; E. B. Holt and others, *The New Realism*, New York, 1912; S. S. Laurie, *Syntheticism*, London, 1906; H. Lotze, *Metaphysics*, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1884; H. A. Prichard, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, do. 1909.

J. TURNER.

OPHITISM. — This is a designation, taken over from the Patristic writers, for an important phase of the Gnostic movement. The name *Ophite* properly belonged to one particular sect, but it was extended to a large group of sects whose practices and beliefs appeared to resemble those of the Ophites. With these other sects, however, the cult of the serpent, which the name denotes, had a quite subordinate place.

Our knowledge of the original Ophite sect is derived mainly from Origen's work *contra Celsum* (vi. 24-38) and his account is supplemented by Irenaeus (*adv. Har.* i. 30), Epiphanius (*Har.* xxxviii.), and pseudo-Tertullian (ii.). No document emanating from the sect itself has been preserved. Celsum had attributed to the Christians certain beliefs which he had found embodied in a

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resemblance sufficient to distinguish them from the classical types of Gnosticism. How are we to account for these points of agreement and difference? According to the generally accepted view, the Ophite sects represent the primitive Gnosticism, which was gradually developed and transformed into a religious philosophy by a series of historical teachers. Hippolytus, our chief Patristic authority, regards the Naassenes and the kindred sects as the fountainhead of Gnosticism; and this judgment has been endorsed and worked out as a scientific hypothesis by a number of modern scholars (cf. Bousset, Reitzenstein). A different view has lately been advanced, in the light of a searching examination of the sources, by de Faye (*Gnostiques et gnosticisme*). He holds that the Ophite sects arose comparatively late, and were ultimately based on the anti-Biblical teaching of Marcion. Their variety he attributes to a process of mutual infiltration, at a period when the great Gnostic schools had begun to break up and to fall into new and often incoherent combinations. It is the merit of this theory that it recognizes the many accretions which have found their way into the systems, in the form in which we now possess them. They cannot, in any case, be accepted as anything but composite creations, borrowing largely from one another and from rival types of Gnosticism. But on several grounds preference must be given to the older view. (a) The Ophites are already known to Celsus, who wrote about A.D. 170, and it is improbable that at so early a date the great schools should have disintegrated. (b) The influence of Marcion, if it is indeed accountable for the anti-Biblical tendency, is at best superficial. In the rôle assigned to Ialdabaoth, the oppressor of mankind, we have primarily to do with ideas derived from astral religion; and the identification with the God of the OT is of the nature of an after-thought. (c) It is impossible to ignore the strong affinities between the Ophite doctrines and those of the pagan sects which are known to us through the Hermetic literature. These sects were probably pre-Christian, and were certainly anterior to the emergence of historical Gnosticism. (d) In spite of occasional details which suggest the influence of the great Gnostic schools, we have scarcely a trace in Ophitism of their more characteristic developments—e.g., the reonology, the fall of Sophia. If the Ophite myths had arisen from a re-combination of the larger systems, these features would almost certainly have found a prominent place.

On these grounds it may be concluded that Ophitism, although at a later time it may have been modified by the influence of other Gnostic schools, represents in the main a primitive phase of the Gnostic movement. It had its true antecedents in those theosophical sects which had grown up in Egypt and the East during the age of syncretism, and it marks the beginning of the alliance of those alien sects with Christianity. In this consists the historical importance of Ophitism. It reflects the Gnostic movement in its earlier stages, and helps us to determine the sources and intrinsic character of its beliefs. From the evidence which it thus affords we may reasonably infer that Gnosticism, although it assumed the form of a Christian heresy, was in substance non-Christian, and that its speculations were for the most part a mere colouring for mythological ideas.

Dependent as we are on ecclesiastical writers who composed their notices with little understanding, from insufficient and perhaps garbled data, we have no means of ascertaining the history of Ophitism. The investigations of de Faye seem to make it clear that the original systems were gradually modified by contact with one another,

with orthodox Christianity, and with the great Gnostic schools. At the same time, they seem to have maintained themselves, though with diminishing numbers and ever-lessening importance. By the middle of the 3rd cent. they had ceased to constitute a danger to the Church, and it had become difficult to discover their precise beliefs. That they continued to exist, and to exercise a certain influence even on the latest phases of Gnostic thought, may be gathered from the many coincidences between their mythology and that of the *Pistis Sophia* (q.v.) and other Coptic writings.

LITERATURE.—The subject is treated, more or less fully, in almost all the works enumerated under Gnosticism. The following are of special value for the study of Ophitism: A. Hilgenfeld, 'Der Gnosticismus und die Philosophumena,' in *ZWT* v. [1862] 400 ff.; R. A. Lipsius, 'Über die ophitischen Systeme,' *ib.* vi. [1863] 410 ff.; A. Hönig, *Die Ophiten*, Berlin, 1839; R. Liechtenhan, art. 'Ophiten,' in *PRE³*; W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Göttingen, 1907; R. Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, Leipzig, 1904; E. de Faye, *Gnostiques et gnosticisme*, Paris, 1913.

E. F. SCOTT.

OPTIMISM.—See PESSIMISM.

ORACLES.—See DIVINATION.

ORÃOONS. — 1. Introduction. — The Orãoons (Orãoñ, Orão) are a cultivating tribe numbering at the present time 751,983, of whom the greater part inhabit the Rānchi and Palamāu districts included in the province of Bengal, and some of the tributary States of Orissa, with a small number of emigrants in the Assam districts of Jalpaiguri and the Darjiling Tarāi, where they have gone to work in the tea-gardens. They call themselves Khurūfik or Kūrukū, a Dravidian term of uncertain origin, connected by some with the word *horo*, 'man,' or with *kuruk*, 'a crier,' or one capable of speaking, in contradistinction to the other races, whose language is not intelligible to them (for other explanations see Sarat Chandra Roy, *The Orãoons of Chōtā Nāgpur*, p. 3 ff.). This word *horo* is probably the origin of the name Orãoñ, which in other forms appears in the titles of kindred tribes, like the Kol, Korwa, and Korku. The eastern branches of the Kol tribe, according to Driver (*JASB*, 1891, pt. i. p. 25), use the initial *h*, while those farther west prefer *k*. If the names Orãoñ and Khurūfik be derived from the same root, the tribal names, like that of the allied Malē tribe, simply mean 'men'; and some have supposed that Orãoñ was a title conferred upon them by the Aryan invaders, possibly that of one of the septs with whom the newcomers first came in contact. Dalton (*Descriptive Ethnology*, p. 245) thinks that it may have been a nickname conferred upon them in reference to their roving propensities.

2. Racial characteristics. — The Orãoons are Dravidians of the full blood.

The colour of most Orãoons is the darkest brown, approaching to black; the hair being jet black, coarse, and rather inclined to be frizzy. Projecting jaws and teeth, thick lips, low narrow foreheads, broad flat noses, are the features which strike a careful observer as characteristic of the tribe. The eyes are often bright and full, and no obliquity is observable in the opening of the eyelids. No signs of Mongolian affinities can be detected in the relative positions of the nasal and malar bones, and the average naso-malar index for a hundred Orãoons, measured on the system recommended by Mr. Oldfield Thomas, comes to 113.6 (the average cephalic index is 75.4) (Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, ii. 139; cf. his *Tribes and Castes in Bengal: Anthropometric Data*, Calcutta, 1891, f. 402 ff.; Roy, pp. 17 ff., 80 ff.).

Taking him all round, the Orãoñ is a heavier and stronger man than the Mūndā or Santāl.

3. Traditions of origin. — The remarkable fact about the Orãoons is that, as will be seen below (§ 4), they speak a language quite distinct from that of the Mūndā tribes which surround them. This has been taken to suggest that their settlement in their present home is of comparatively recent date. According to Dalton (p. 245), whose view was

'diagram,' or graphic presentation; and Origen recognizes the diagram as one current among the *Ophianoi*, whom he describes as an insignificant body, with no title to rank as Christians. Within this sect, he tells us, the God of the OT was known as 'the accursed God,' and the serpent which had led men to transgress His commandments was an object of reverence. The members of the sect made use of a seal, bearing the formula, 'I have been anointed with white ointment from the tree of life,' and mystical observances of various kinds played a great part in their worship. Their myths, so far as it can be deciphered from the diagram which Origen sets forth in detail, seems to have been closely similar to that of the anonymous 'Gnostics' of Irenæus. But it may be gathered that the sect laid little stress on doctrine, and was a *τελετή*, or mystery-association, rather than a school. From the notice of pseudo-Tertullian it would appear that actual worship was offered to the serpent. Epiphanius describes the chief rite as a Eucharist, in which a serpent was released from a box and was allowed to entwine itself round the sacred elements.

This shadowy sect, however, was only one of many which are classed together under the comprehensive name of Ophites. The following are usually assigned to the group: (1) Cainites, (2) Perates, (3) Sethians, (4) 'Gnostics' of Irenæus, (5) Naassenes, (6) Barbelo-Gnostics, (7) Severians, (8) Nicolaitans, (9) Archontics, and (10) Justinians. In all these systems a place is given to the serpent, though its rôle is never much more than incidental. For the most part, as in Ophitism proper, it appears as the enlightener, and therefore the benefactor, of men; and by the Perates and Sethians it is identified with the Logos principle which at last manifested itself in Jesus. The 'Gnostics' of Irenæus view it under two contrary aspects. At first the benefactor of man, it shared in the punishment inflicted on him by the hostile God, and henceforth became his enemy. But, while the serpent is thus brought into connexion with the Biblical story, it is associated in some of the systems with a different order of ideas. It is the symbol, not so much of man's emancipation, as of the vitalizing principle of nature, or soul of the world. Thus the Naassenes described the serpent as a moist substance pervading everywhere and informing all existence. The Sethians conceived of a wind in the form of a serpent entering into the mingled world of light and darkness and begetting *voûs*. In the system of Justinus the serpent has a similar significance, which may be traced likewise in the figure of Leviathan, the circle enclosing the concentric spheres of the archons, in the Ophite system proper. In view of the wide-spread prevalence of serpent symbolism in Oriental religion, it is possible that this cosmical conception was the primary one, and that the Biblical interpretation was adopted later, as the result of Christian influence.

The figure of the serpent, however, has only a minor place in the Ophite systems, and their employment of it cannot be singled out as their common characteristic. It is impossible, indeed, to define the various members of the group in terms of any one distinguishing feature. They are best regarded simply as the anonymous Gnostic systems, contrasted with those which bear the names of historical teachers. The fact that they thus stand apart from the classical forms of Gnosticism is highly significant, though its significance, as we shall presently see, may be interpreted in two different ways.

While the Ophite sects are marked out by no definite peculiarity, they broadly resemble one another in so many respects that their inclusion in

a common group is justified. Like the Gnostic schools generally, they rest on the conception of a cosmical disaster, whereby a portion of the heavenly light has become imprisoned in the lower world of darkness. The redemption of this higher essence is achieved by a being who descends out of the heavenly world, and who accomplishes his work partly by a weakening of the hostile powers and partly by the communication of a mystical gnosis (see Gnosticism). But, apart from the doctrines which they share with all forms of Gnosticism, the Ophite sects present a number of features which are more specially characteristic.

(1) The highest being is generally designated by the name *Anthropos*, the First Man. (2) A prominence is given to a female principle (*Μήνη*), who is conceived as presiding over the work of redemption. The figure of *Sophia*, the fallen divinity, plays an altogether minor part, and was probably absent from Ophite teaching in its original form. (3) In almost all the systems a triad stands at the beginning of the cosmical process. Thus the Sethians commence with Light, Spirit, Darkness; the 'Gnostics' of Irenæus and the Naassenes with the Father and the Son, to whom the Holy Spirit is added, as a female principle. (4) The systems are mythological rather than speculative, and the occasional attempts to construe the myths in a philosophical sense are naive and unsuccessful. The mythology is based mainly on astral conceptions—e.g., the archons are planetary divinities, of whom Saturn (*Ialdabaoth*) is the chief. There is little trace of the æonology which is so conspicuous in the more elaborate systems, and the various powers are conceived as originating from each other by a process of generation. (5) A cardinal importance is attributed in all the sects to magical rites, sacraments, secret watch-words, charms, and amulets. It is apparent that the beliefs embodied in the myths were little more than a background for the mystical observances in which the true gnosis consisted. (6) A peculiar feature of the sects is their anti-Judaistic bias, in which they appear to reflect, in exaggerated form, the attitude of Marcion. *Ialdabaoth*, the chief of the archons who hold man in bondage, is identified with the God of the OT, and opposition to his decrees is held to be incumbent on the true Gnostic. For this reason honour is rendered not only to the serpent, but also to the characters which stand condemned in Biblical history—Cain, the Sodomites, Esau, Korah, Judas. In some of the sects the revolt from the OT expresses itself in the encouragement of licentious practices; but the general tendency is towards a rigid asceticism. The God of the OT is viewed primarily as the Creator, responsible for the material universe, out of which the higher natures seek to be delivered. (7) The Ophite systems are impregnated with Christian ideas to a far less extent than the classical Gnostic schools. In some of them (Ophites of Celsus and Origen, Nicolaitans, Archontics) the figure of the Redeemer is entirely absent. In others (e.g., Perates) no historical function is given to the Redeemer, who is a being of purely mythological or metaphysical nature. Even in systems which assume the identity of the Redeemer with Jesus the Christian elements seem to be little more than an embroidery on a pagan groundwork. Of this we have a striking evidence in the Naassene document preserved by Hippolytus, where the pagan original can be detached, without much difficulty, from the Christian commentary with which it is interwoven.

In Ophitism, therefore, we have a group of widely diversified systems—built up out of the debris of Babylonian, Persian, Syrian, and Egyptian mythologies—which yet possess features of

resemblance sufficient to distinguish them from the classical types of Gnosticism. How are we to account for these points of agreement and difference? According to the generally accepted view, the Ophite sects represent the primitive Gnosticism, which was gradually developed and transformed into a religious philosophy by a series of historical teachers. Hippolytus, our chief Patristic authority, regards the Naassenes and the kindred sects as the fountainhead of Gnosticism; and this judgment has been endorsed and worked out as a scientific hypothesis by a number of modern scholars (cf. Bousset, Reitzenstein). A different view has lately been advanced, in the light of a searching examination of the sources, by de Faye (*Gnostiques et gnosticisme*). He holds that the Ophite sects arose comparatively late, and were ultimately based on the anti-Biblical teaching of Marcion. Their variety he attributes to a process of mutual infiltration, at a period when the great Gnostic schools had begun to break up and to fall into new and often incoherent combinations. It is the merit of this theory that it recognizes the many accretions which have found their way into the systems, in the form in which we now possess them. They cannot, in any case, be accepted as anything but composite creations, borrowing largely from one another and from rival types of Gnosticism. But on several grounds preference must be given to the older view. (a) The Ophites are already known to Celsus, who wrote about A.D. 170, and it is improbable that at so early a date the great schools should have disintegrated. (b) The influence of Marcion, if it is indeed accountable for the anti-Biblical tendency, is at best superficial. In the rôle assigned to Ialdabaoth, the oppressor of mankind, we have primarily to do with ideas derived from astral religion; and the identification with the God of the OT is of the nature of an after-thought. (c) It is impossible to ignore the strong affinities between the Ophite doctrines and those of the pagan sects which are known to us through the Hermetic literature. These sects were probably pre-Christian, and were certainly anterior to the emergence of historical Gnosticism. (d) In spite of occasional details which suggest the influence of the great Gnostic schools, we have scarcely a trace in Ophitism of their more characteristic developments—e.g., the æonology, the fall of Sophia. If the Ophite myths had arisen from a re-combination of the larger systems, these features would almost certainly have found a prominent place.

On these grounds it may be concluded that Ophitism, although at a later time it may have been modified by the influence of other Gnostic schools, represents in the main a primitive phase of the Gnostic movement. It had its true antecedents in those theosophical sects which had grown up in Egypt and the East during the age of syncretism, and it marks the beginning of the alliance of those alien sects with Christianity. In this consists the historical importance of Ophitism. It reflects the Gnostic movement in its earlier stages, and helps us to determine the sources and intrinsic character of its beliefs. From the evidence which it thus affords we may reasonably infer that Gnosticism, although it assumed the form of a Christian heresy, was in substance non-Christian, and that its speculations were for the most part a mere colouring for mythological ideas.

Dependent as we are on ecclesiastical writers who composed their notices with little understanding, from insufficient and perhaps garbled data, we have no means of ascertaining the history of Ophitism. The investigations of de Faye seem to make it clear that the original systems were gradually modified by contact with one another,

with orthodox Christianity, and with the great Gnostic schools. At the same time, they seem to have maintained themselves, though with diminishing numbers and ever-lessening importance. By the middle of the 3rd cent. they had ceased to constitute a danger to the Church, and it had become difficult to discover their precise beliefs. That they continued to exist, and to exercise a certain influence even on the latest phases of Gnostic thought, may be gathered from the many coincidences between their mythology and that of the *Pistis Sophia* (q.v.) and other Coptic writings.

LITERATURE.—The subject is treated, more or less fully, in almost all the works enumerated under GNOSTICISM. The following are of special value for the study of Ophitism: A. Hilgenfeld, 'Der Gnosticismus und die Philosophumena,' in *ZIT' v.* [1862] 400 ff.; R. A. Lipsius, 'Über die ophitischen Systeme,' *ib.* vi. [1863] 410 ff.; A. Hönig, *Die Ophiten*, Berlin, 1889; R. Liechtenhan, art. 'Ophiten,' in *PRE³*; W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, Göttingen, 1907; R. Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, Leipzig, 1904; E. de Faye, *Gnostiques et gnosticisme*, Paris, 1913.

E. F. SCOTT.

OPTIMISM.—See PESSIMISM.

ORACLES.—See DIVINATION.

ORÆONS. — 1. Introduction. — The Orāons (Orāōn, Orāo) are a cultivating tribe numbering at the present time 751,983, of whom the greater part inhabit the Rānchi and Palamāu districts included in the province of Bengal, and some of the tributary States of Orissa, with a small number of emigrants in the Assam districts of Jalpaiguri and the Darjiling Tarāi, where they have gone to work in the tea-gardens. They call themselves Khurūnk or Kūruk, a Dravidian term of uncertain origin, connected by some with the word *horo*, 'man,' or with *kuruk*, 'a crier,' or one capable of speaking, in contradistinction to the other races, whose language is not intelligible to them (for other explanations see Sarat Chandra Roy, *The Orāons of Chōtā Nāgpur*, p. 3 ff.). This word *horo* is probably the origin of the name Orāon, which in other forms appears in the titles of kindred tribes, like the Kol, Korwa, and Korku. The eastern branches of the Kol tribe, according to Driver (*JASB*, 1891, pt. i. p. 25), use the initial *h*, while those farther west prefer *k*. If the names Orāon and Khurūnk be derived from the same root, the tribal names, like that of the allied Mālē tribe, simply mean 'men'; and some have supposed that Orāon was a title conferred upon them by the Aryan invaders, possibly that of one of the septs with whom the newcomers first came in contact. Dalton (*Descriptive Ethnology*, p. 245) thinks that it may have been a nickname conferred upon them in reference to their roving propensities.

2. Racial characteristics. — The Orāons are Dravidians of the full blood.

'The colour of most Orāons is the darkest brown, approaching to black; the hair being jet black, coarse, and rather inclined to be frizzy. Projecting jaws and teeth, thick lips, low narrow foreheads, broad flat noses, are the features which strike a careful observer as characteristic of the tribe. The eyes are often bright and full, and no obliquity is observable in the opening of the eyelids. No signs of Mongolian affinities can be detected in the relative positions of the nasal and malar bones, and the average naso-malar index for a hundred Orāons, measured on the system recommended by Mr. Oldfield Thomas, comes to 113.6' (the average cephalic index is 75.4) (Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, ii. 139; cf. his *Tribes and Castes in Bengal: Anthropometric Data*, Calcutta, 1891, i. 402 ff.; Roy, pp. 17 ff., 80 ff.).

Taking him all round, the Orāon is a heavier and stronger man than the Mūndā or Santāl.

3. Traditions of origin. — The remarkable fact about the Orāons is that, as will be seen below (§ 4), they speak a language quite distinct from that of the Mūndā tribes which surround them. This has been taken to suggest that their settlement in their present home is of comparatively recent date. According to Dalton (p. 245), whose view was

accepted by Caldwell (*Dravidian Grammar*², p. 40), their traditions connect them with the Konkani, the lowland strip along the western portion of the Bombay Presidency, lying between the range of the W. Ghâts and the sea. Thence they are said to have wandered eastward along the central range of hills forming the backbone of the peninsula, and finally to have reached that portion of the range which overlooks the Gangetic valley in the province of Bengal, known as the Kaimûr hills. Here for a time they settled in the plateau of Rohtās in the Shahābād district. When they were expelled from his refuge by the Muhammadans, the tribe is believed to have split into two divisions—one, under the leadership of their chief, following the course of the Ganges and finally settling on the Ajmahāl hills, the other, led by his younger son, going up the valley of the Son into alamān, turning eastward along the river Koel, and taking possession of the north-west portion of the plateau of Chotā Nāgpur. The Malē or Maler tribe and the Pahārias, who still occupy the Rajmahāl hills, are closely connected with the Orāons and speak an allied language.

'Some say that they expelled the Mundas from this portion of the country, and forced them to retire to their present settlements in the south of Lohardagā; but this statement is not borne out by local tradition, nor can it be reconciled with the fact that the few Mundas found in the Orāon pargands on the plateau are acknowledged and looked up to as the descendants of the founders of the villages in which they live' (Risley, ii. 239; Roy, p. 17 ff.).

The Orāons, again, are identical with the Dhāngars, whose name implies that, like the Pahārias, they are highlanders.

4. Language.—The traditions of the tribe are in some degree confirmed by their language. The old theory that the non-Aryan tribes of this part of India can be divided into a Dravidian and a Kolarian branch has broken down before the evidence of anthropometry. The distinction between the so-called Kolarian and Dravidian branches is purely linguistic, and does not correspond to any differences of physical type. Sarat Chandra Roy, however, disputes this assertion, and remarks that 'any one who has lived long enough amongst them and observed them with some attention can in most cases distinguish a genuine Orāon from a genuine Mūdā' (p. 82). The Dravidian branch, which includes the Orāons, speaks a Dravidian language, while that of the Kolarians is now designated Mūdārī. Kurukh, the Orāon tongue, is decidedly a Dravidian language, and is still spoken by over 500,000 people, though more than 100,000 Orāons have substituted Hindi or Mūdārī for their mother-tongue.

The Orāons, then, are closely allied to their neighbours the Malē Pahārias and Dhāngars, and seem to have emigrated to this part of the country later than the Mūdārī tribes which surround them. The most primitive branch of the tribe is that known as the Bergē or Bergā Orāons, who occupy the State of Gangpur, the long undulating table-land, which gradually slopes down to the north from the higher plateau of Chotā Nāgpur. They are a savage, fierce-looking people, probably a mixed race who have lived for centuries isolated from their brethren, and now speak a dialect distinct from theirs.

5. Religion: general characteristics.—

'The religion of the Orāons is of a composite order. They have, no doubt, retained some portion of the belief that they brought with them from the Mūdās and the Mundas and the Jhārs, but they have to a great extent blended them with their own beliefs.'

They differ from the Mūdās in always possessing some visible object of worship—a stone, a wooden post, or a lump of earth. Their religion in its general outline is a form of animism, closely

allied with that practised by their Dravidian brethren (see DRAVIDIANS [North India]).

6. The worship of Dharmesh, or Dharmē.—The head of their pantheon is a spirit known as Dharmī, Dharmē, or Dharmesh. One of the writers of this article, Hahn, is disposed to regard this name as philologically distinct from the Skr.-Hindī *dharma*, 'virtuous,' 'godly,' and to translate it 'creator.' But there seems to be no sound evidence in support of this view, and it appears safer to regard the name as borrowed from the Hindus of the Plains. The name as used by the Orāons is feminine; but Dharmē is more generally regarded as a male, the husband of Dhartī Mātā, or Mother Earth. The worship of a deity with a similar name, Dharmarājā, is common in Bengal. There he is by some identified with Yama, the Hindu god of death-land, by others with the sun. Others, again, who have been more fully Hinduized, regard him as a snake-god, and some as a form of Śiva or Viṣṇu. He is a god of the lower castes, worshipped, not through Brāhmins, but by a member of one of the castes who adore him (Gait, *Census Report Bengal, 1901*, i. 201). He has, again, been identified with Buddha in that debased form of Buddhism which still survives among the Sārā tribe in Orissa (*ib.* i. 204). As the Orāons regard Dharmē as manifest in the sun, the identity of these two forms of belief may be regarded as established. Dharmē, in fact, seems to represent one member, the male, in the androgynous cultus of a pair of deities, of whom the female is represented by Mother Earth.

Dharmē is regarded as the source of light and life. If sacrifice is made to him, which is usually done in the harvest season or in performance of a vow, it must, under the usual principle of imitative magic, consist of fowls or goats white in colour. The existence of the world, the gift of children, the growth of the fruits of the earth, are all believed to be due to him. The Orāon turns his thoughts to him in times of sickness or other calamity, when sacrifices to the evil spirits have proved to be of no avail. At such times the usual prayer offered to him runs: *Ana Dharmē akkun ninim ra'adāi*, 'O God! now all rests with thee.' Sacrifices are vowed to him in order to obtain children and for the cure of diseases of the reproductive organs.

In the legends of the tribe he is described as slaying the monstrous dragon into whose mouth the human race entered, believing it to be a cleft in the rocks. The body of this creature was destroyed by a rain of fire, by the heat of which the Hanumān ape (*Semnopithecus entellus*) got the black marks on his face which he bears to this day, and the mahogany tree (*Diospyros melanoxylon*) its black wood. Only one boy and one girl escaped destruction by hiding themselves in a crab shell, where the hounds of Dharmē, which were of all the colours of the rainbow, as befitted those of the sun-god, discovered them. To this pair Dharmē presented a pumpkin which contained the seeds of all varieties of corn, vegetables, and fruit. Thus the world was peopled.

Another legend of Dharmē is etiological, explaining the peculiarities of certain birds. Some Asuras, a Bengal tribe which still practises the art of iron-smelting, were at work and the smoke of their furnace incommoded the god. He first sent the wagtail to remonstrate with them; but they twisted its tail so that it has gone on wagging ever since. Next he sent the crane; but they caught it by the head and dragged it, so that its neck became as long as it is now. Then he sent the robin redbreast; but they caught with a pair of red-hot pliers, and hence he comes to have a scarlet breast. Finally, he sent his son in the form of a leprosy youth. He entered the furnace, pulled out some ingots of gold into which the iron had become converted, and came out cured of his disease. He had then no difficulty in tempting the Asura men to enter the furnace themselves, while their women worked the bellows to make the fire blaze more fiercely. But they all perished, and their wives craved the mercy of Dharmē, who banished them to the forests, where their spirits are propitiated with animal sacrifice and rice, and with oblations of spirituous liquor.

The most important rite in the worship of Dharmē consists in his emblematical marriage to Mother Earth, which is celebrated at the annual *Ktaddi* festival, *ktadd* meaning 'offspring' or the

sprouting of plant life. This is one of the common rites of imitative or symbolical magic by which the fertility of the soil and the growth of the crops are promoted. Here Dharmē is clearly symbolized by the sun, because at sowing time the sower faces the sun and throws the first handful of seed towards it in order to secure the blessing of Dharmē. His union with the Earth Mother is celebrated in the spring, when the *sāl* (*Shorea robusta*), one of the sacred trees of the tribe, puts forth its blossoms.

Dharmē is represented for the occasion by the tribal priest, and his consort by Kālo Pakko, the spirit which occupies the sacred grove attached to every Orāon village. Hither the priest, accompanied by his wife and other villagers, repairs, and, after sacrificing a fowl and offering rice and flowers, daubs the roots of an old *sāl*-tree with vermilion and oil, and, tying a cord round the trunk of the tree, weds Mother Earth to himself as representing Dharmē. He then daubs his own forehead, arms, breast, and ears with vermilion, as is done to this day in the Hindu marriage service—a survival of the original blood-covenant. Then he sacrifices a second fowl, and utters this prayer: 'O Kālo Pakko, may there be abundance of rain and fruitfulness in our houses and fields!' Next several fowls are sacrificed to evil spirits in general, and all the people eat and carouse as at an ordinary marriage feast. Towards evening the priest is carried on a strong man's back to his house, where his wife meets him and washes his feet. Next morning he goes round the village, and at every door the women meet him, wash his feet, and present him with an offering of rice and money, of which he returns part, and it is kept for good luck. His assistant throws water on every roof, and some of this is taken inside with the object of bringing prosperity. After this all eat and make merry, dance, and sing obscene songs, and indulge in orgies during which all self-respect and decency are forgotten.

This is the feast of fertility, and the season for marriages in the tribe. After it closes evil spirits are at rest, and a time of quiet and enjoyment is ushered in, which lasts until the rainy season sets in during June and July.

In his account of this feast under the name of *Sarkūl* Dalton adds an incident which explains the significance of one part of the ceremony. When the priest visits each house, he dances with the women and places some of the *sāl*-flowers in their hair and over the door.

'The moment that this is accomplished, they throw the contents of their water-vessels over his venerable person, heartily dousing the man whom a moment before they were treating with such profound respect. But to prevent his catching cold they ply him with as much of the home-brew as he can drink, consequently his reverence is generally gloriously drunk before he completes his round' (p. 261).

It is clear that we have in this one of the rites of symbolical or imitative magic, in which pouring water over a sacred or tabued personage is regarded as a charm which will produce abundant rain (*GB*³, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, i. 247 ff.; Crooke, *PR* i. 73 ff.).

7. The worship of malevolent spirits.—While Dharmē is a benevolent deity, the chief interest of the Orāon centres in the malignant spirits by which he deems himself to be surrounded. These demand regular periodical propitiation to prevent them from doing mischief. They are known in the Kurukh language as *nād*, which is practically equivalent to the *bhūt* of the Hindus. The following are the chief spirits of this class.

(a) Darhā, whose abode is generally in an ancient grove of *sāl*-trees or of the *bel* (*Aegle marmelos*), where he is represented by a ploughshare or a piece of bamboo fixed in the earth in a slanting position near the root of a *sāl*-tree. Darhā is regarded as the tutelary deity of the village. He is evidently one of those vague impersonations whose titles and functions are not clearly defined and merge in those of other deities. Dalton (pp. 129, 220) identifies him with Dharti, or earth, and with the Dūr Pahār of the Cheros, Kharwārs, and Birhors. According to the same writer (p. 238), Darhā is the only spirit propitiated by the Orāons in some parts of the country.

'If fowls are offered to him, they must be of divers colours, but once in three years he should have a sheep from his votaries;

and once in the same period a buffalo,' the flesh of which is shared with the tribal priest.

But it is believed that at some of his more important shrines, in spite of the pressure of British law, human sacrifices are still sometimes offered. It is said that this rite should be performed once in a generation, and that in default of it great misfortunes will fall upon the tribe. The arrangements are made at a secret council of elders, and certain persons are said to be selected to catch a victim, generally a boy or girl, who is called *ondkā*, 'seized,' 'eaten.' Dalton further remarks (p. 258) that those members of the tribe who are known as *bhagat* (Skr. *bhakti*, 'faith,' 'devotion'), i.e. those who have adopted the worship of the Hindu deity Śiva, have traditions of human sacrifice.

'I have been informed,' he says, 'by a Christian convert, who formerly belonged to the Bhagat fraternity, that in some villages near Lohardāgga, they usually make an image of a man in wood, put clothes and ornaments on it, and present it at the altar of a Mahādeo. The person who officiates as priest on the occasion says: "O Mahādeo! we sacrifice this man to you according to ancient custom! Give us rain in due season, and a plentiful harvest!" Then, with one stroke of the axe, the head of the image is cut off, and the body is removed and buried. The Gonds make a similar offering to their Baradeo, and it was not always in effigy that the human sacrifice is made. There are grounds for concluding that the practice was observed by all the peoples of Dravidian origin.'

This is clearly akin to the well-known rites of propitiatory human sacrifice among the Khonds, or Kandhs (*q.v.*).

(b) The *Deshwālī nād*, the 'evil spirit of the land,' is a female. She is attached to every village, and is represented, like other Orāon deities, by a wooden peg. Every third and tenth year sacrifices must be made to her of buffaloes and fowls. If this rite be neglected, she will cause mischief and bring disease on men and cattle. She lives in the *sarnā*, or sacred grove, attached to each village.

(c) The *Khūntā*, or 'peg,' is the special *nād* of the three clans found in every village. It is represented by a small wooden peg fixed in the ground. Every third year, when the rice seedlings are being transplanted, a goat is sacrificed to the *Khūntā nād*, and yearly a fowl is offered to him at the same season. Every village has its own *Khūntā nād*, of which the residents alone know the secret name. This *nād* is of irritable temper, and, if his name is not kept secret, he is offended. In fact, no other *nād* more resents neglect.

(d) Kālo Pakko, Jhakrā Būrhī, or Sarnā Būrhī is the 'old woman' of the *sarnā*. She has already been mentioned in connexion with the cult of Dharmē (§ 6). She is represented among the Mūndās by Jāhīr Erā and Desauli (Dalton, p. 261). Every year, at the *Khaddī* festival, a black fowl is sacrificed to her with some rice and rice-beer, and an earthen pot of water is placed at the stem of a *sāl*-tree for her refreshment. If, during the night, there has been a considerable evaporation of water from the jar, it portends, according to the usual system of symbolical magic, a failure of rain during the coming year. Again, if the fowls destined for sacrifice pick up some of the grains of rice offered to Kālo Pakko, it is an omen that she accepts the offering and will give them abundant rain and a good harvest. This forms an interesting parallel to the *tripudium* of the Romans (Cicero, *de Div.* ii. 71; F. Granger, *Worship of the Romans*, London, 1895, p. 189 f.).

Some authorities connect the worship of Kālo Pakko with that of the spirits of the Asuras who were slain because they offended Dharmē (§ 6), or suggest that the worship was intended to propitiate the ghosts of a people, the autochthones of the country, dispersed and slain by the later Dravidian and Mūndā settlers. On the other hand, the close connexion of Kālo Pakko with the *sarnā*, or sacred grove, seems to make it clear that she is the im-

personation of the tree-spirit, many representatives of which are found in N. India. They are, like Kālo Pakko, closely connected with the rainfall and the fertility of crops and cattle (*GB*³, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 47 ff.). Hence, among the Orāons, she is often identified with Mother Earth, and her marriage and union with Dharmē are solemnized.

8. Evil spirits which need only occasional propitiation.—Among this class the following are the most important.

(a) Barandā is the hill *nād*, or spirit. When he leaves the mountain, his usual abode, and takes up his residence with men, he brings misfortune and poverty with him. He demands propitiation by an occasional sacrifice. He can be prevented from entering a house by the inmates eating sour or unsavoury food; this disgusts him and he leaves the place. According to Dalton (p. 258), he is propitiated with a sacrifice of bullocks or buffaloes because he is an evil spirit, 'who, when malignantly inclined, frustrates God's designs of sending rain in due season to fertilise the earth.' In Palamāu, according to Gait (i. 197), Barandā is believed to be a female formerly resident in Nāgpur, while in Rānchi he is thought to be, as already described, a malevolent male living in the hills, and always endeavouring to enter a house in order to bring misfortune upon the inmates. In Palamāu he is propitiated once in three years at the harvest-home. Each family has a service of its own, which is conducted by the *baigā*, or aboriginal priest. A she-goat is sacrificed after being induced to eat rice from the hands of the priest, the idea being that it is a willing victim, and that the responsibility for its death will not fall upon the person who arranges the sacrifice. The victim is cooked and consumed then and there by all present, the priest receiving a double share.

(b) The Addi or Erpā *nād* is the spirit of the household and of the landed property which it owns. The oldest among the owners keeps its representative in the shape of a wooden peg suspended in a tiny basket from the roof of his house. Whenever disease occurs to any member of the family, a fowl or goat is sacrificed to the *nād*. Some of the blood is sprinkled on the peg, and a feather of the fowl or a bone of the goat, with a few grains of rice and small coins, is placed in the basket which contains it.

(c) Chandī, the moon-goddess, is identical with Chando Omol of the Mūndās, and with Chando Bonga of the Santāls (Dalton, pp. 186, 214). Among the Orāons she is the goddess of hunting, and to her sacrifices of fowls and goats are offered to ensure success at the tribal hunting parties which take place yearly about the time of the full moon in Mareh (see Roy, pp. 220 ff., 224 ff., 239 ff.).

(d) The *churel* is the ghost of a woman who has died in childbirth or in a state of impurity. When such a woman is buried, her angry ghost is appeased by the sacrifice of a black fowl performed on her grave, on which grains of rice are scattered to appease the spirit. As usual (see BENGAL, § 26), she appears as a woman with her feet turned backwards. She is constantly endeavouring to enter houses where a baby has been born, appearing as a black cat which tears the mother and infant. She also entices away youths and girls at night. When such dangers are feared, special sacrifices are offered at her grave, and the father of the child remains awake to repel her attacks.

(e) The *mūā*, 'the dead ones,' are, like the *bhūt* of the Plains, the ghosts of people who have died a violent death. The most common variety is the *baghaut*, the ghost of a man who has been killed by a tiger. In the place where such a tragedy has occurred a cairn is erected, to which every passer-by

adds a stone. Occasionally a fowl or goat is sacrificed there, or on the spot where a murder has been committed, or where a person has been executed, in order to appease the restless malevolent spirit.

9. Minor spirits and apparitions.—Among these are Barando, the spirit which causes whirlwinds, a disgusted restless *nād*, which goes whirling about in search of a fresh resting-place. The Orāon scares him by shouting *Hādī!*, 'Be off!' The *ekh*, or nightmare, is also a restless spirit of the departed, seeking for repose by entering the body of a sleeping person. The *bai* is another ghost which causes delirium, epilepsy, fainting fits, and lunacy. Charms and spells must be used to scare it. Aerolites and meteors are also departed spirits wandering about in search of a resting-place. In fact, the Orāon is surrounded by a world of spirits, some of which appear in dreams, some while he is awake, in the shape of giants or huge pillars without heads and arms.

10. Tree-worship.—The Orāon conceives trees to be the abode of spirits. Near every village a small fragment of the primeval forest, known as the *sarnā*, or *jāher*, is preserved as a refuge for the tree-spirits which have been disturbed and disestablished when the jungle was cut down. The trees of this grove are guarded by a most effective tabu, and no one dares to cut them down or even to collect the fallen branches (Roy, pp. 108, 172). In this grove the *sāl* is regarded as the most sacred tree, and it is the abode of Kālo Pakko or Sarnā Būrhī, the 'old woman' of the grove. Its flowers, as we have seen (§ 6), are used in the rite of rain-making, and from its branches is made the bower under which the marriage ceremonies are performed. The *karam*-tree (*Nauclea parvifolia*) is another sacred tree, worshipped as a benevolent godling. The *karam* festival is held at the beginning of harvest, about the end of August.

After purifying themselves by fasting, the youths and girls of the tribe go singing and dancing to the forest to fetch a branch of the tree. This is brought in triumph to the village dancing-place (*ākhrā*). Some of the lads, beating drums and clanging cymbals, seem to become possessed by the tree-spirit and throw themselves on the ground, shrieking and moving their heads and limbs in a state of frenzy. The branch, which is stuck into the ground in the centre of the arena, is decorated with flowers and lights. There it is watched by persons told off for the purpose, while the rest of the villagers hold high revel. When the feast is ended, one of the elders is seated on a stool close to the tree. An umbrella is held over him, and the people take their places round him. He recites the tribal legends, in return for which a collection is made for him among the audience. Dancing, drinking, and merriment go on all night. Next morning the tree is taken, with singing, dancing, and beating of drums, to the nearest river or stream, into which it is plunged. While the tree is fixed in the arena, the people worship it by bowing before it, and the priest sacrifices a victim.

The festival is believed to bring good luck and prosperous harvests, and it is regarded as a sort of thanksgiving at the first gathering of the crops. The flinging of the branch into water at the conclusion of the rite seems to indicate that its primary object is to act as a rain-charm.¹

11. Totemism.—The Orāon tribe is divided into a number of septs of which a catalogue is given by Risley (*TC* ii. 113 f.). As in the case of many of the allied Dravidian tribes, these septs are named after various animals, plants, or material objects, such as the tiger, the wild dog, the squirrel, the cobra, the cel, the *bar*-tree (*Ficus Indica*), the *pūsā*, or fruit of the *kusum*-tree (*Schleichera trijuga*), and so on, each of which the members of the tribe are prohibited from cutting, eating, burning, carrying, using, and so forth (*ib.* i. Introd. p. xliii). But totemism, as it appears among the Orāons, is recognized at present merely as a mode of defining the exogamous groups, and, if in ancient times it exercised influence over their religious beliefs, it has now been so completely overlaid by other

¹ For other accounts of the *karam*-tree rites among the Orāons, Mūndās, and allied tribes see Dalton, pp. 193, 239; Gait, i. 191; *PR* ii. 94 ff.

superstitions and usages that it is no longer possible to recognize it. The question of totemism is fully discussed by Roy, p. 324 ff.

12. Ancestor-worship and the condition of the dead.—Dalton (p. 257) was of opinion that the Orāons 'have no belief whatever in a future state.' But this assertion is opposed to the results of his own investigations into their death customs and to other facts which have been brought to light by subsequent research. The body is carefully oiled and shrouded to placate the spirit; offerings of rice and copper coins, the latter probably intended as a viaticum to help the spirit on its way to the other world, are placed in the mouth of the dead, or thrown upon the funeral pyre and grave, both modes of disposal of the dead being recognized among them. After cremation the fragments of the bones are carefully gathered, placed in a new earthen jar, and brought ceremoniously to the village, the mourners scattering parched rice along the road, probably not, as Dalton supposed (p. 261), to mark the route, but rather to pacify the angry vagrant spirits which might trouble the ghost of the man whose obsequies are being performed. The cinerary urn is suspended to a post in front of the residence of the dead in order that the ghost, when so disposed, may have easy access to them. In the following December or January the solemn rite is performed of removing the bones of all those who have died during the last year to the tribal cemetery, which from the first establishment of the community has been appropriated to this purpose. Orāons are extremely tenacious in this matter.

'And even when one of them dies far from his home, his relations will, if possible, sooner or later, recover the fragments of his bones, and bear them back to the village, to be deposited with the ashes of his ancestors' (Dalton, p. 263).

Thus they recognize a conscious life of the departed. The dead are conceived as forming a community, and by the removal of his bones to the tribal cemetery the dead man obtains admission to their society. At the cemetery the bone jar is buried in a shallow grave, over which a slab is placed or an oblong stone is erected as a monument.

The death tabu is also recognized. During the time when the bones of the dead are retained in the village no marriage can take place. The persons who have had occasion to touch the body are regarded as unclean, and must wash their hands and feet after the funeral. One of the degraded Mahili tribe, whom Orāons despise and with whom they will not eat, acts as funeral priest (*kartā*).

The subsequent rites are intended to ascertain if the spirit has really departed to death-land, and to prevent it from returning to trouble the survivors. The first object is attained by spreading ashes on the floor of the house after the removal of the body. The door is carefully shut, and, when the mourners return from the cremation ground, the ashes are examined to ascertain if any foot-prints are visible upon them. If anything appears which suggests the footprint of a man, it is supposed that the wandering spirit has failed to attain its desired rest, and must be appeased by offerings of food at the grave. The same belief prevails among many of the lower castes in N. India (*PR* i. 176, ii. 72 ff.). If the imprint on the ashes resembles the footprint of a cat, it is believed that the ghost has become an evil spirit, in which event sacrifices must be offered to appease it.

From this it would appear that ancestor-worship, in the true sense of the term, does not exist among the Orāons. The dead are regarded not as superior beings, but as dependent upon the living for food and other necessities. Though they are propitiated to induce them to remain in death-land and to refrain from troubling the living, this placation does not reach the dignity of worship. The

grave-stone erected over the place where the ashes and bones have been deposited is daubed at festivals with vermilion (possibly the survival of an earlier blood-sacrifice), and with oil and milk. Sometimes a fowl is sacrificed near these stones to secure the good will of the dead. At each of the tribal festivals fragments of food, with some liquor, are put outside the house, or allowed to fall upon the floor for the refreshment of the ancestors. In the same way, when the new rice is cooked, before any one dares to partake of it a portion is laid aside for them, and a fowl is offered. In times of danger or distress prayers are made to them, and these are accompanied by sacrifices. Some people drop at every meal a fragment of all the food, even tobacco, for the use of the dead.

13. Exorcism.—Dalton, as we have seen, was mistaken in supposing that 'the sole object of their religious ceremonies is the propitiation of the demons, who are ever thwarting the benevolent intentions of Dharmesh'; but it seems correct to say that, like all races in a similar stage of culture, 'they have no notion of a service of thanksgiving; and so far we may regard the religion of the Mundas as of a higher order than theirs' (p. 257). Exorcism of evil spirits forms an important part of their religious practices. When sickness or other misfortune befalls a man, he has recourse to the *ojhā*, or exorcist. Various devices are employed to remove the spirit agency to which they attribute disease. Thus, all the pots in use in the house, brooms, winnowing-fans, and other articles of the same kind, are carried to the cross-roads, and with them it is supposed that the spirit will be expelled. Another method illustrating the principles of contagious magic is for the sick man to place a cotton thread across a road by which travellers pass, and whoever touches the thread is sure to carry away the malady with him. When disease appears among the cattle, a sacrifice is made to the *nād* which haunts the village, and some of the blood of the victim is sprinkled on the wooden bell worn by the leader of the herd, or some streaks are made with lime upon it, and it is then hung round the neck of the herdsman. By this method the disease spirit is transferred to him, and he becomes possessed, rushing about wildly and striking at any one who comes in his way. The villagers then beat him gently with sticks and drive him over the village boundary. By this method the spirit is believed to abandon the village, never to return. By and by the man comes to himself, and all return home assured that no further evil will happen.

Other forms of disease are treated in the same way. Obstinate colic, supposed to be due to a demon entering the body of the patient, is cured by the *deorā*, or medicine-man, who mutters some spells and then sucks the navel of the afflicted person. By and by the mucus in the mouth of the exorcist is believed to assume the form of tiny worms or bones, which, being the root of the malady, he spits out, and recovery is assured. The exorcist deals with a case of snake-bite by sacrificing a fowl, the head of which he cuts off, to the spirit of the snake, while he recites some *mantras* bidding it be gone. Then he sucks the navel of the patient, and flings his spittle on the fowl which he has sacrificed. If the patient recovers, the *deorā* is credited with having expelled the poison with the evil spirit. In ordinary cases of disease the exorcist adds to the recitation of his spells and the sucking of the patient's navel the rite of fanning him with the stalks of thatching grass as a means of expelling the evil influence.

There are various methods of identifying the evil spirit or witch to whose machinations troubles are confidently attributed.

One plan is to sacrifice a fowl, and make an offering of rice in a winnowing-fan, the *mystica vannus Iacchi*, which is everywhere regarded as a wonder-working implement. Over the rice is placed an inverted saucer, such as is used for an oil lamp. The exorcist recites spells, calling on various evil spirits or witches whom he suspects to appear before him. Meanwhile he continues staring into a lighted lamp, moving his head violently all the time. By and by the shadow of an evil spirit or of a witch appears to his view. He then announces which spirit is to be propitiated, or names the witch who is working black magic against the patient. Should this method fail, he becomes himself possessed, shakes his head and body violently, jumps about, moving his limbs, in a state of frenzy, until he falls into a trance, during which he calls out the name of the spirit or of the witch.

It is difficult to say how far these practitioners believe in their own art. When they begin their career, they doubtless believe what they have been taught; but by and by they are tempted to adopt fraudulent practices in order to gratify their own vanity, or help another to satisfy a private grudge.

14. Witchcraft.—Like all the Dravidian races of this part of India, the Orāons believe firmly in witchcraft. The knowledge is said to be communicated to neophytes at annual meetings when witches, riding on broomsticks, assemble and dance. Most reputed witches are old, cranky, deformed women, whose curses upon an enemy, accidentally uttered and apparently fulfilled, show that they know and practise the art. They often deal in poisonous or narcotic drugs, and are hence known as *bisāhā*, or *bishāi*, 'poisoners.' They are believed to exercise their dangerous power over those whom they desire to injure through the hair-clippings and nail-parings of their victims. After reciting their wicked spells over things like these, they are believed to conceal them in a hollow tree, or bury them beneath the threshold of the person against whom their art is directed, with the result that he and his cattle pine and waste away. They are also reported to possess the power of extracting something from, or inserting something into, the body of their victim, which causes disease or death. Dropsy, consumption, and barrenness in women and cattle are popularly attributed to their malevolence. Others claim, or are said to possess, the power of turning themselves into tigers and other beasts of prey, and thus destroying their enemies or their cattle.

The intense dread of witchcraft is shown by the cruelty with which it is punished. In olden times, before the pressure of British law checked outrages of this kind, the punishment was invariably death. Nowadays the penalties are fine, excommunication, refusal to intermarry with them, and personal violence. The witch ordeals in use are as severe as the actual punishments. In one the suspect is bound to two large stones with his knees drawn up to his chin, and a fire of straw is lighted below him. The tests by hot iron, boiling oil, and flinging the suspected person into the village pond are also used. In fact, witchcraft is still a living superstition in the tribe, and it is only by the greatest vigilance that the authorities can repress the outrages which are its natural result.

15. Minor beliefs and superstitions.—Much attention is paid to dreams, which forebode the future, and the appearances observed each indicate some coming event—a snake announces a visit, the fall of a tree a death in the neighbourhood, and so on. It is dangerous to touch an epileptic, as the spirit causing the fit may be able to transfer itself. Curses are much feared. Oaths are taken over a little rice and cow-dung placed in an open space, by touching the shoulder of a mother or son, or by standing on a tiger-skin. In the last form they believe that, if the witness forswears himself, he will be killed by the animal. They strongly believe in omens. A seed of the castor-tree falling on a person walking below it, the

branch of a tree breaking, a jackal passing the road from right to left, are all omens of disaster. Thursdays and Saturdays are unlucky. A house must not be built facing the north, the direction of death-land, and, when a house is being erected, an egg is broken on the site to propitiate the spirit, which is disturbed when the foundations are being dug.

16. The priesthood.—

In an Orāon village 'a priest there must be; an Orāon community cannot get on without one. The fate of the village is in his hands; in their own phraseology it is said that he "makes its affairs." He is also master of the revels, which are for the most part connected with religious rites. The doctrine of the Orāons is that man best pleases the gods when he makes merry himself; so that acts of worship and propitiatory sacrifices are always associated with feasting, drinking, dancing, and love-making' (Dalton, p. 247).

The tribal priest is known as *naigā* or *pāhān*, both being names which seem to be borrowed from the Hindus (Skr. *nayaka*, *pradhāna*, 'leader'), while the exorcist has borrowed his titles from the same source, *sokhā* (Skr. *sūkshma*, 'subtle') or *ojhā* (Skr. *upādhyāya*, 'spiritual teacher'). From this fact it may be argued that the differentiation of the priest from the medicine-man took place in comparatively recent times and under Hindu influence. The duty of the *pāhān* is to perform all the regular sacrifices made to tutelary deities and the special acts by which evil spirits are propitiated. The office is not necessarily hereditary, but is usually conferred on a member of the *pāhān khūnt*, or priestly sept. On the occasion of the resignation, death, or apostasy of a *pāhān* the headmen of the village select two or three members of the priestly sept as suitable candidates. Then a round pebble is taken from the roadside and rolled in the direction of the houses occupied by the priests' sept. The person at whose door the stone stops is selected. He goes at once to the house of the late priest to receive the winnowing-fan, the symbol of his sacred office (§ 13). He is also provided with a knife, with which he sacrifices fowls, and an axe for decapitating goats, both made by the village blacksmith. As sacrificer, his duty is to behold the victim with a prayer that the good or evil spirit in whose name the offering is made will accept it and grant the favour which is desired. Among those members of the tribe who have come under Hindu influence his place is taken by the *pūjār* (Skr. *pūjā-kāri*, 'doer of worship'). The *sokhā* is the witch- and spirit-finder, who ascertains the person who has worked black magic on the patient or the *bhūt* which is offended with him. Any one may learn this art, and the son often succeeds his father. The *deorā* or *ojhā* is the exorcist and medicine-man, who deals with spirits after they have been marked down by the *sokhā*. The knowledge of the craft passes down in a single family, but an exorcist of good repute may form a school and instruct disciples. Often, however, the duties of these functionaries are not carefully discriminated. In fact, there is reason to believe that the distribution of duties between priest, exorcist, and medicine-man is comparatively modern. In former times these varied duties seem to have been combined in a single official.

The priest is supported by a glebe, known as *naighāl* or *pahānket*, 'priest's field.' It is held rent-free, and, if it is occupied by a member of the priestly clan who is not acting as *naigā*, he has to remunerate the actual holder of the office. In some villages a patch of land is reserved, the profits of which are devoted to paying the expenses connected with public sacrifices and tribal feasts. Other patches are sometimes left uncultivated and reserved as a refuge for *bhūts* and evil spirits, who, with the *churel* and the *mūā*, haunt the cremation and burial grounds.

17. Christianity.—Christianity has gained many converts among the Orāons, and its influence has undoubtedly tended to elevate their moral character. The conclusions of Dalton (p. 257) are interesting as describing the situation in the infancy of the Christian Church.

'If we analyse the views of most of the Orāon converts to Christianity, we shall, I think, be able to discern the influence of their pagan doctrines and superstitions in the motives that first led them to become catechumens. The Supreme Being who does not protect them from the spite of malevolent spirits has, they are assured, the Christians under His special care. They consider that, in consequence of this guardianship, the witches and *bhūts* have no power over Christians; and it is, therefore, good for them to join that body. They are taught that for the salvation of Christians one great sacrifice has been made, and they see that those who are baptized do not in fact reduce their live-stock to propitiate the evil spirits. They grasp at this notion; and long afterwards, when they understand it better, the atonement, the mystical washing away of

sin by the blood of Christ, is the doctrine on which their simple minds most dwell.'

LITERATURE.—The classical account of the Orāons is that by E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872, p. 245 ff., to which all subsequent writers, including H. H. Risley, *Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, do. 1891, ii. 133 ff., and W. W. Hunter, *Statistical Account of Bengal*, London, 1877, xvi. 279 ff., are largely indebted. A large amount of fresh information, the result of fifteen years' intimate acquaintance with the tribe, including three years' special inquiries about their customs and usages, has been collected by Sarat Chandra Roy, *The Orāons of Chōtā Nāgpur*, Ranchi, 1915, who promises a second volume devoted to their religion and magico-religious system, domestic ceremonies, usages, and folklore. For their language see F. Hahn, *Kurukh Grammar*, Calcutta, 1900; R. Caldwell, *A Comparative Dravidian Grammar*, London, 1875, pp. 39, 518 f.; E. A. Gait, *Census Report Bengal*, 1901, Calcutta, 1902, i. 327 ff.; G. A. Grierson, *Census Report India*, do. 1901, i. 283. The country occupied by the Orāons has been well described by F. B. Bradley-Birt, *The Story of an Indian Upland*, London, 1905.

F. HAHN and W. CROOKE.

ORDEAL.

Introductory and Primitive (A. E. CRAWLEY), p. 507.

Arabian and Muhammadan (TH. W. JUYNBOLL), p. 512.

Babylonian (S. LANGDON), p. 513.

Celtic (J. A. MACCULLOCH), p. 514.

Chinese (R. F. JOHNSTON), p. 516.

Christian (P. VINOGRADOFF), p. 519.

Greek (P. VINOGRADOFF), p. 521.

Hebrew (J. A. SELBIE), p. 521.

Hindu (A. B. KEITH), p. 522.

Iranian (E. EDWARDS), p. 524.

Malagasy (G. GRANDDIER), p. 526.

Roman (A. C. PEARSON), p. 528.

Slavic (M. E. SEATON), p. 529.

Teutonic (M. E. SEATON), p. 530.

ORDEAL¹ (Introductory and Primitive).—The method of trying an accused or suspected person by subjecting him to a 'physical test fraught with danger, such as the plunging of the hand in boiling water, the carrying of hot iron, walking barefoot and blindfold between red-hot plough-shares,' and the like, the result in injury, more or less or none, being 'regarded as the immediate judgement of the Deity,'² has been practically universal³ during a long period of social evolution. This period may be approximately decided by the facts that the Australian aborigines do not practise the ordeal, and that the peoples of Europe abandoned it shortly after the mediæval age. Before the development of Roman methods the ordeal was the logical conclusion of all legal procedure, and, as such, its history constitutes an important chapter in the book of justice. It should be noted that the ordeal was a concluding method, not a preliminary nor an invariable form, the essential condition of its use from the most primitive to the latest examples being that other more 'legal' methods of deciding the issue shall have failed. With the ordeal in use, verdicts of not-proven and disagreements of the jury were discounted.

'The Malay laws direct that the combat or ordeal shall be had recourse to in the absence of evidence. . . . "If one accuse and another deny, and there be no witnesses on either side, the parties shall either fight or submit to the ordeal of melted tin or boiling oil."'⁴ In W. Africa 'all judicial cases are settled by the people in their collective capacity'. Witnesses are used, and give evidence under an imprecatory oath. But the ordeal is 'preferred'. 'Conscious of their own want of candour and honesty it is but natural that very little confidence is felt in the veracity of others.'⁵ Among the early Teutonic peoples exculpation was possible either by oath, in which *cōjurantes* were admitted, or by ordeal. The whole principle of their administration of justice was diametrically opposed to that of

Roman law, which eventually superseded it. It knew nothing of evidence or trial proper; 'what it knew was proofs,' viz. oaths and ordeals, both being appeals to the supernatural. 'The *Beisurteil*' . . . awarded that one of the two litigants must prove his case, by his body in battle (bilateral ordeal), or by a one-sided ordeal, or by an oath with oath-helpers, or by the oaths of witnesses. The court had no desire to bear or weigh conflicting testimony.⁶ In ancient India the king judged 'by means of questions and even of ordeals.'⁷ Among barbarous peoples the head-man, or more usually the medicine-man, superintends or administers the ordeal. In the early ages of Christian Europe the bishop or priest had a semi-official connexion with its administration, and in India the Brāhman. A special feature of the Teutonic ordeal was that 'the accused should perform its ritus himself; in no case could it be placed in the judge's hands.'⁸ This to some extent prevented the inherent liability to abuse, which is instanced throughout—e.g., in Africa, where the only chance of the accused person is to square the medicine-man. A recurring feature of the ordeal system is that the innocent are apt to demand the test, whereas the guilty dare not. As often as not, therefore, the innocent might be punished, but in many systems refusal to submit to the ordeal was itself regarded as tantamount to proof of guilt. In some cases the administrator submits to the test; in others proxies are allowed.⁴

Before describing the ordeal by its varieties, one or two ethnological points may be noted. At no time did Roman law have anything to do with the ordeal. It was known to the Greeks in its 'Aryan' forms,⁹ but here again the law ignored it. The Chinese and American Indians similarly refused to develop the system. It is forbidden in the Qur'ān. The great spheres of prevalence of the ordeal are the Indian, African, and Teutonic peoples. In Africa the poison method predominates, in India and Europe the water, iron, and similar varieties; the freemen of early Europe preferred the battle ordeal.

It does not seem possible to detect any sequence of development in the different modes of ordeal either generally or in particular countries. Special conditions often dictate the mode adopted, as will appear below.

1. The poison ordeal.⁶—(a) This mode, predomi-

¹ C. P. Ilbert, art. 'Evidence,' in *EDR* x. 113.

² *SDE* ii. (1897) 125, 170.

³ J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1882-88, iii. 1108.

⁴ See M. H. Kingsley, *Travels in W. Africa*, London, 1897, pp. 464, 490; Wilson, pp. 227, 538.

⁵ Æschylus, frag. 254; Soph. Ant. 264 ff.

⁶ See Lea, p. 327 ff.

¹ Ordeal' is a modification of O.E. *ordl* [ordael] or *ordl*, the O.E. equivalent of a general Teutonic term, surviving in mod. Germ. *Urteil*, and having the original meaning of 'allotment,' 'dealing out,' 'judgement' (*OED*). Med. Lat. adopted the term as *ordaliū*, *ordela*, but the more technical terms were *examinatio*, *purgatio*, *judicium* (du Cange, *Glossarium*, Niort, 1883-87, s.v. 'Ordela').

² *OED*, s.v.

³ H. C. Lea, *Superstition and Force*, p. 218.

⁴ J. Crawford, *Hist. of the Indian Archipelago*, Edinburgh, 1820, iii. 92, quoted by Westermarck, *M* i. 504.

⁵ J. L. Wilson, *Western Africa*, London, 1856, p. 133 f.

nant in W. Africa, is closely connected with the prevalent phase of superstition, viz. the belief in witchcraft, according to which every death, other than violent, and every sickness is the result of evil magic. 'If you will read witchcraft as poison,' this state of affairs is better understood; and it is suggestive that the best remedy for witching is a 'brisk purgative and emetic,'¹ while the stock ordeal-water has similar properties.

Of the 'red-water' ordeal of N. Guinea J. L. Wilson wrote an account which deserves to rank as classical for the study of the primitive ordeal.

From the results of this ordeal 'there is and can be no appeal. Public opinion has long since acknowledged its perfect infallibility.' The 'red-water' is a 'decoction made from the inner bark of a large forest tree of the *mimosa* family.² The bark is pounded in a wooden mortar and steeped in fresh water. . . . It is of a reddish colour, has an astringent taste, and in appearance is not unlike the water of an ordinary tan-vat. . . . It is both an astringent and a narcotic, and when taken in large quantity is also an emetic.'

'A good deal of ceremony' is used in connexion with the administration of the ordeal. The people . . . form themselves into a circle, and the pots containing the liquid are placed in the centre. . . . The accused then comes forward, having the scantiest apparel, but with a cord of palm-leaves bound round his waist, and seats himself in the centre of the circle. After his accusation is announced, he makes a formal acknowledgment of all the evil deeds of his past life, then invokes the name of God three times, and imprecates his wrath in case he is guilty of the particular crime laid to his charge. He then steps forward and drinks freely of the "red-water." If it nauseates and causes him to vomit freely, he suffers no serious injury, and is at once pronounced innocent. If, on the other hand, it causes vertigo and he loses his self-control, it is regarded as evidence of guilt. . . . A general howl of indignation rises from the surrounding spectators. Children and others are encouraged to hoot at him, pelt him with stones, spit upon him, and in many instances he is seized by the heels and dragged through the bushes and over rocky places until his body is shamefully lacerated and life becomes extinct.³ 'On the other hand, if he escapes without injury, his character is thoroughly purified and he stands on a better footing in society than he did before he submitted to the ordeal.' Later he arraigns his accusers, and these in their turn must submit to the ordeal or pay him a large fine. 'There is seldom any fairness in the administration of the ordeal. No particular quantity of the red-water is prescribed, and the amount administered always depends upon the state of feeling in the community towards the accused. . . . They are not fond of examining witnesses or scrutinising the evidences. . . . They suppose that the red-water itself possesses intelligence, and is capable of the clearest discrimination in all these doubtful cases. They suppose that when taken into the stomach, it lays hold of the element of witchcraft and at once destroys the life of the man.'⁴

In S. Guinea a decoction of the root of the shrub *nkazya* is used. 'If it acts freely as a diuretic it is a mark of innocence; but if as a narcotic and produces dizziness or vertigo, it is a sure sign of guilt. Small sticks are laid down at the distance of eighteen inches or two feet apart, and the suspected person, after he has swallowed the draught, is required to walk over them. If he has no vertigo, he steps over them easily and naturally; but, on the other hand, if his brain is affected, he imagines they rise up before him like great logs, and in his awkward effort to step over them, is very apt to reel and fall to the ground.'⁵

Among the Yoruba peoples the accused 'drinks *orisha*,' if there is not enough evidence. The *orisha* is a decoction of *odum* bark, and the priest is able to make it harmless or not. This powerful poison, if not at once rejected by the stomach, causes death, thus proving guilt. Its emetic effect often renders it harmless.⁶ By boiling the infusion, by regulating the amount, or by allowing the poison to settle before administration, the witch-doctor is able to control to a considerable extent the action of this and other poisons.⁷ In Calabar the famous 'Calabar bean' is used for the ordeal-water, or eaten without infusion.⁸ As usual, if the recipient vomits, he is accounted innocent. A form of wager of law is reported, each litigant eating half a bean.⁹ The 'great ju-ju' ordeal of Calabar, however, is *mbiam*. The accused recites a long imprecation, on these lines: 'If I have been guilty of this crime, then, *mbiam*! thou deal with me.' The drink is compounded of blood and filth. In its action auto-suggestion seems to have an influence, as in other drinking and eating ordeals. The *mbiam* and other

tests are also applied in the swearing of witnesses.¹ The Malay for their ordeal used the very poisonous *tanahin* nut (see ORDEAL (Malagasy)). Poison ordeals were used by the ancient Indians, arsenic or aconite being the medium, and absence of injurious effect proving innocence.²

(b) Pseudo-poisonous doses are frequently used; in some cases these are emetic, in others they act by superstitious auto-suggestion.

In ancient Greek folklore bull's blood was regarded as a poison. Before prophesying the priestess at *Ægira* drank a dose of this. Pausanias regarded it as an 'ordeal' or test of her chastity, Pliny as a means of inspiration.³ As a method of legal ordeal the Masai drink a mixture of blood and milk. Possibly their custom of avoiding the combination of milk and flesh has something to do with the choice. The accused swears: 'O God, I drink this blood; if I have stolen the cattle this blood will kill me.' If he lives for a fortnight, he is regarded as innocent.⁴ The Temimberese drink their own blood after a sword has been dipped in it. In Aru (also of the Dutch E. Indies) a mixture of arrack, blood, and sea-water is employed.⁵

The following cases show the active principle of superstitious fear.

The Brāhman was exempt from the ordeal of the 'sacred libation'; so, too, were atheists (the condition is significant).⁶ In this ordeal the accused drank water in which the images of 'terrible deities' had been bathed. While and after drinking, he faced the images, and said: 'I have not done this.' A fortnight was allowed for calamity to overtake him or not, as the case might be.⁷ In an Ashanti ordeal 'an angry head is placed in a small vessel with some water; the person holding it puts his right foot against the right foot of the accused, who invokes the power of the head to kill him if he is guilty, and then takes it into his mouth with a little of the water.'⁸ The Melanesian magicians do a regular trade in legal ordeals. One method is for the accused to swallow a magic stone, supplied and heated by the magician. If no harm follows, innocence is proved.⁹ In a Khond ordeal each of two litigants claiming a piece of land swallows a bit of earth therefrom; if it is supposed to slay the false claimant.¹⁰ According to certain Rabbis, the drinking by the Israelites of the dust of the golden calf was an ordeal; the guilty men were exposed by their beards turning red.¹¹ It is possible that the term 'bitter,' used of 'the water of jealousy,'¹² may imply a decoction similar to those of W. Africa, but there is no hint of such a drug in the accounts. When a woman was accused of adultery (for which alone the ordeal was employed), she was required to drink water in which dust from the Temple floor and a curse on parchment had been steeped and which had stood in the sacred laver. If innocent, she remained uninjured; if guilty, injury to thigh and belly (the instruments of the sin) was the result.¹³

Ancient and modern India and mediæval Europe employed a test which depends on the influencing of the masticatory processes.

In the rice ordeal the Hindu took into his mouth some grains of rice and ejected them on a *pipal*-leaf. If the grains were dry, his guilt was established. If they were moistened with saliva, he was innocent. Previously the rice was consecrated or charmed.¹⁴ The same ordeal is employed in Indonesia.¹⁵ In the Anglo-Saxon *cornd* or *nedbread* ordeal the accused ate morsels of bread and cheese consecrated and administered from the altar. If these were swallowed, innocence was proved. In the case of guilt 'God sent the angel Gabriel' to stop the victim's throat; and he would 'fall, dry-mouthed and choking through terror, to get it down.'¹⁶ The mediæval ordeal of the

¹ Kingsley, p. 465. On the poison ordeals of Africa see A. H. Post, *Afrikanische Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg, 1887, li. 110-120.

² E. Balfour, *Cyclopædia of India*, London, 1885, s.v. 'Ordeal'; *SBE* xxxiii. [1889] 114, vii. [1900] 63, 69 (berries of the *sringa-tri* . . . Indian ordeal procedure are given in . . . ada's Laws') 100-117, and of the Ir . . . passim.

³ Sec J. G. . . . 1898, iv. 176.

⁴ M. Merker . . . 211.

⁵ J. G. F. I. . . . *arige rassen tusschen*

Selebes en Papua, Hague, 1880, pp. 284, 284.

⁶ *SBE* vii. 54 l.

⁷ *Id.* vii. 60, xxxiii. 117; see Lea, p. 301.

⁸ T. E. Bowdich, *Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee*, London, 1819, p. 267.

⁹ R. H. Codrington, *The Melanesians*, Oxford, 1891, p. 212.

¹⁰ Lea, p. 225.

¹¹ G. W. Gilmore, in Schaff-Herzog, viii. 251b, s.v. 'Ordeal'; *Ex* 32³⁰⁰⁰.

¹² Nu 511-31.

¹³ A. Macalister suggests 'wasting of . . . of the right thigh, Jos. Ant. iii. xl. . . . abdomen, possibly ovarian dropsy,' l . . . 'Medicine'; L. Blau, in *JE*, s.v. 'Ordeal,' quotes *Der. 63a*, and D. W. Amram, *ib.* l. 217b, s.v. 'Adultery.'

¹⁴ Balfour, *loc. cit.*; *SBE* xxxiii. 118, 318 (spitting blood was also a proof of guilt).

¹⁵ Riedel, p. 441.

¹⁶ Tylor, in *EBR* xi. 174; this *judicium offae sive casti*, said to have been used at Alexandria about the 2nd cent., is practically the same as the *cornd*, 'trial-slice' (see du Cange, s.v. 'Cornd'); Lea, p. 220; Grimm, iii. 1160f.

¹ Kingsley, p. 462.

² Popularly *sass-wood* (*sass* = 'bad'). It is known to all the Bantu tribes (Kingsley, p. 464). For its analysis see Lea, p. 223.

³ Wilson, p. 225 f. ⁴ *Id.* p. 227 f. ⁵ *Id.* p. 398.

⁶ A. B. Ellis, *The Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, London, 1894, p. 190 f.

⁷ Lea, p. 222; Kingsley, p. 464.

⁸ *Physostigma venenosum* (native *e-ser-e*) contains the important alkaloids, esserine (or physostigmine) and calabarine.

⁹ Art. 'Calabar Bean,' in *EBR* i. iv. 902b.

Eucharist was similar. The accused received the host, saying previously the 'intention' of the ordeal—'Si aliter est quam dixi et juravi, tunc hoc Domini nostri Jesu Christi corpus non pertranseat guttur meum, sed haereat in faucibus meis, stranguet me suffocet me ac interficiat me statim in momento.'¹

2. Water ordeals.—The plunging of a litigant or accused person in a river or lake is one of the most ancient tests among the Indo-European peoples, and, by a curious revival, also the latest to survive in Europe itself. It is mentioned in the Code of Hammurabi. The accused was required to plunge into a flowing stream; he was adjudged guilty if the water bore him away.³ The usual proof of innocence is that the person immersed should sink; if he floats very soon after the plunge, he is guilty, 'rejected by the water.'⁴

This view is as early as the ancient Hindu ordeal; Manu says: 'He whom the water does not cast up is to be taken as truthful in his oath.'⁵ Similarly, the Iranians held that Lake Frazdān 'receives what a righteous man throws in, but rejects the gift of the unrighteous.'⁶ In modern times the Hindu has been called upon to repeat his oath while standing in a sacred tank—e.g., that of the Lachman Kund in Ayodhya.⁷ The ordeal of immersion among the early Germanic peoples saw the principle of rejection of the guilty by the water well developed: 'si aqua illum velut innoxium reeperit—innoxii submerguntur aqua, culpabiles supernant.'⁸ As was also the case in the boiling-water ordeal, the conditions of immersion were regulated by law. Even in the 9th cent. Hincmar recommended that 'he who is let down into the water for trial is to be fastened by a rope that he may not be in danger if the water received him as innocent.' A knot was tied on the rope to mark the depth of immersion proper to the case. The person was let down gently (*suaviter*) so as not to disturb the water.⁹ Previously the water was blessed and a special mass was said. The accused was bound, perhaps to allow the water and his person to interact naturally. Possibly, in view of the preference of this ordeal in the trial of witches, which was the case even in the Middle Ages, the idea of the 'natural action' of an element was connected with the belief in the unnatural character of the witch—a principle which seems to have much to do with the modes of ordeal in general. The water ordeal was regarded in medievalism as plebeian; the hot iron and the duel were patrician.¹⁰ The epidemic superstitious fear of witchcraft, which is so curious a feature of the 16th and 17th centuries of European history,¹⁰ reveals a mentality little superior to that of W. Africa, where the witch-doctor goes his rounds after every death. King James I. of England wrote in his *Daemonology*: 'It appears that God hath appointed for a supernatural signe of the monstrous impietie of witches, that the water shall refuse to receive them in her bosom that have shaken off them the sacred water of baptism.'¹¹ The practice of 'ducking,' 'swimming,' or 'feeting'¹² witches became almost a popular sport. The witch was 'stripped naked and crossbound, the right thumb to the left toe, and the left thumb to the right toe [large].'¹³

Both in India and in the E. Indian islands the test has been employed of keeping the head under water longer than the adversary. This is a naively harmless ordeal.

In Ceylon the litigants hold on to stakes fixed in the water; after taking their oaths they duck their heads below the surface, and the man first to emerge is adjudged the culprit. In Aru each litigant holds *sirih* in his hand, and the river of immersion is 'holy.'¹⁴ The Dayaks have a similar test.¹⁵ In the Hindu ordeal the parties entered the water; then a man shot an arrow, upon which they ducked under the water; to secure a favourable verdict it was necessary to remain under water until a man brought the arrow back. A sacred tank was a favourite scene for this ordeal.¹⁶

3. Boiling-liquid ordeals.—As is also the case with certain hot-iron or metal tests, the natural action of the heated element is set against the chance, infinitesimal but real, of escaping injury, by the reaction, hitherto not satisfactorily studied, of the skin; fire-walking 'miracles' and the harmless immersion of the hand in molten metal of a certain temperature are cases in point. But, as

a rule, guilt or innocence is shown by greater or less proportion of injury done.

Hot water or oil is the mode most frequent in primitive ordeals.

In the Dutch E. Indies the test was to take an egg out of a vessel of boiling water or to touch molten lead.¹ The Dayaks employed boiling water,² the Malays boiling oil or molten tin.³ In W. Africa the ordeal of boiling oil is usual for theft and adultery. The accused plunges an arm first in cold water and then in the hot oil; scalding is a proof of guilt. Wilson found that in some cases no scalding resulted, and thought that some special application was used. African chiefs periodically tested the virtue of their wives by this ordeal.⁴ The Japanese and Ainu used the test of boiling water.⁵ Dapper gives a vague account of a Sierra Leone ordeal, 'the water of cursing.' The water was a decoction of bark and herbs. The witch-doctor dipped his staff in this and dropped a little of the water on the accused saying, 'Is he guilty of this? If yes, then let it scald or burn him till the very skin come off.'⁶ A Hindu method was to take a *masha* weight of gold out of boiling oil.⁷ The Zend-Avesta speaks of the ordeal by boiling water, 'the truth-knowing water.' In it were placed incense, brimstone, and molten gold.⁸ One of the most remarkable ordeals recorded is the Iranian ordeal of molten brass, in which a stream of molten metal was poured over the chest. Atūrpa, son of Māhraspand 'appealed to God's ordeal,' and had molten brass poured on his breast; he was unscathed. The words recited were, 'O Good Spirit, Ahura Mazda, by thy fire thou decidest between the opponents, according to the greater degree of piety and sanctity.'⁹ It was also employed as an individual test of piety. Thus, Zoroaster underwent a series of ordeals administered by angels, and among them was this ordeal of molten brass.¹⁰ Zoroaster, by the way, was said to have authorized 83 methods of ordeal.¹¹ The Germanic peoples continued a primitive method in the 'ordeal of the caldron.' This was to take a stone out of a vessel full of boiling water. As is frequently the case, the element was invoked to declare the truth—'O creature of water.' Two refractions appeared at an early date: the depth of immersion varied according to the enormity of the offence, and the measurement was made by tying a piece of string round the arm; or the stone was hung on a cord of a certain length. Another method was to use a weight (*cacabus*) instead of a stone. This varied in weight and required more or less time to extract. After immersion the scalded member was bandaged. The bandages were removed after three days, and the verdict was given according to the nature of the wounds.¹²

4. Hot-iron ordeals.¹³—The continued prevalence of this method, in various forms, is a remarkable feature of the history of ordeals.

Burckhardt has a suggestive observation in this connexion. The Bedawin as an ordeal make disputants lick a hot iron spoon; the one whose tongue is uninjured wins his case. If the iron is clean, and thoroughly white-hot, no injury need be received; if it is only red-hot, it would touch and burn the tongue (we italicize a significant word). Probably, he adds, administrators are aware of this difference and may know also of the possibility of dipping the hand with immunity in molten metal of a certain temperature.¹⁴ Albertus Magnus, in his *de Mirabilibus*, wrote a receipt for protecting the skin. Central Africa is familiar with 'the ordeal of the hatchet.' The accused person repeats the words, 'If I have stolen the property of so and so, or committed this crime, let Mulungu [the deity] respond for me; but if I have not stolen, nor done this wickedness, may he save me.' The superintending witch-doctor passes the red-hot iron 'four times over the flat hand of the accused; and the people believe that if he is guilty his hand will be burned, but that, if innocent, he will suffer no injury.'¹⁵ In ancient India also a red-hot hatchet was used. According to the *Upanishads*, the man knowing himself to be guilty is really burned when he grasps the heated axe, while the man who knows himself to be innocent is unharmed.¹⁶ A ploughshare was also used; ¹⁷ this the accused licked with his tongue.¹⁸ In the E. Indian islands the headman places a piece of hot iron on the hands of the accused; while it is being heated, prayer is made to the coals.¹⁹ Another method is for the accused to carry a ball or mass of hot iron a certain distance. The Greeks were familiar with this. In ancient India the accused walked, carrying the iron, through seven concentric circles,²⁰ distant apart so far that each was reached with a step. Some

¹ F. Dahn, *Bausteine*, Berlin, 1870, ii. 16; see *MI* ii. 630.

² See Lea, pp. 270-280; du Cange, s.v. 'Aquae frigidae judicium.'

³ H. Winckler, *Die Gesetze Hammurabis*, Leipzig, 1904, p. 10.

⁴ Lea, p. 280.

⁵ *SBE* xxv. [1856] 274.

⁶ *Cl. SBE* v. [1850] 56.

⁷ Balfour, loc. cit.

⁸ Du Cange, s.v. 'Aquae frigidae judicium.'

⁹ Lea, p. 283; du Cange, s.v. 'Aquae frigidae judicium.'

¹⁰ Lea, p. 287 ff.

¹¹ *Cl. PC* i. 141 f.

¹² 'Fleet' is dialectal for 'float' (caustive).

¹³ J. Brand, *Popular Antiquities*, London, 1840, iii. 21.

¹⁴ Riedel, pp. 157, 254.

¹⁵ Balfour, loc. cit.

¹⁶ *SBE* vii. 69, xxxiii. 111 f.

¹ Riedel, pp. 441, 254.

² F. Patetta, *Le Ordeali*, p. 41.

³ Crawford, iii. 92.

⁴ Wilson, p. 228; Kingsley, p. 497

⁵ Lea, p. 221.

⁶ O. Dapper, *Africa*, Eng. tr., London, 1670, p. 405.

⁷ Balfour, loc. cit.

⁸ *SBE* iv. [1895] 46, 49.

⁹ *Id.* p. xlvii.

¹⁰ *SBE* xviii. [1897] 153.

¹¹ *Id.* p. 74.

¹² Lea, pp. 244-252; du Cange, s.v. 'Aquae ferventis judicium.' 'Caldaria.'

¹³ See Lea, pp. 252-260; du Cange, s.v. 'Ferrum candens.'

¹⁴ J. L. Burckhardt, *Bedouins and Wahabys*, London, 1831,

p. 69; and Tylor, in *EDR* xi. 174^b.

¹⁵ J. L. Krapf, *Travels, etc., during Residence in E. Africa*,

London, 1860, p. 173.

¹⁶ *SBE* i. [1890] 103 f.

¹⁷ Balfour, loc. cit.

¹⁸ *SBE* xxxiii. 319.

¹⁹ Riedel, pp. 379, 408, 441.

²⁰ *SBE* vii. 67 f.

accounts suggest that the distance between each two circles was a foot. He was allowed to have leaves on his hands.¹ This ordeal was much in favour among the early Teutonic and Scandinavian peoples.² It is noteworthy that the principle of taking so many steps is found here as well as in India. The mass or bar of red-hot iron was carried a distance of nine feet or nine steps. Next to the wager of battle this ordeal had the most elaborate regulations.³ It was allowed only to freemen, and only to such as were unable through sickness or such incapacitation as the loss of a limb⁴ to take the wager of battle; it was also allowed to the clergy. The Laws of Athelstan give very full details. The person fasted before the test, bathed, made confession, and received absolution. His hand was 'sealed'⁵ for some days previously, to prevent the use of methods to render the skin proof. These methods were discussed and believed in. As with other ordeals, the priests superintended and managed the test, and a special mass with special benediction of the iron was said. The hand, just before the test, was sprinkled with holy water, after the seal had been removed. According to the theory of *lada* or *purgatio*, used in all ordeals, the test was *simplex* for lesser charges and *triplex* for greater. Here the difference was in the weight of the iron, one or three pounds. The person carried the iron the proper distance and deposited it. His hand was bound up and sealed, and examined on the third day for verdict. The Danes seem to have used an iron glove, heated. The Teutons also used nine red-hot ploughshares; one step was taken on each, and the whole sole was to be pressed on it.⁶ Melanesians have a curious ordeal in which the two litigants throw catches to one another with a red-hot stone, supplied by the shaman. The worse injured loses.⁷

5. Fire ordeals.—Walking⁸ through a mass of burning fuel is a not infrequent ordeal.

It has always been known in India, a heap of burning *pipal*-leaves being used.⁹ The virtuous Sitā proved her innocence to her husband Rāma by passing through the fire.¹⁰ The Iranians seem to have used not only the ordeal in which molten metal was poured on the chest, but also walking on fire.¹¹ The Siamese walk over a pit of burning charcoal.¹² The Hindu theory personalized the fire, as it did the water; the fire, rather than harm the innocent, restrained its natural action; he whom the blazing fire burns not, whom the water forces not to come up, must be held innocent.¹³ In early Europe the hand was held in a fire, or the person walked between two masses of burning logs.¹⁴ It is possible, as has been suggested, that the folk-custom of leaping over bonfires is a survival or playful adaptation of these ordeals.¹⁵

6. Ordeal by combat.¹⁶—This is the most famous of legal wagers, and is a natural development from the most elemental method of settling a quarrel. As an ordeal, in which victory proves the justice of a cause, it embodies the principle that might is right; but, in order to be specifically an ordeal, combat must involve the element of supernatural interference. The victor wins, not by his own strength, but by the help of the god of justice. In mediæval theory chance was eliminated, though, curiously enough, it is probably the idea of chance, of risking a fall, that lies at the root of the ordeal-method generally. The result of the wager of battle, in mediæval theory, was an immediate judgment of God; the savage might ascribe it to the action of superior *mana*, magic, or spirits. We frequently, however, find restrictions imposed with the object of handicapping force by luck.

According to the *hagalangang* custom of some natives of Borneo, 'both parties are placed in boxes at a distance of seven fathoms opposite one another, the boxes being made of nibong latbands so high as to reach a man's breast. Then both receive

a sharpened bamboo of a lance's length to throw at each other at a given signal. The wounded person is supposed to be guilty.'¹

The connexion between the ideas of pure chance and absolute fairness is well illustrated by such cases.

The Homeric Greeks practised what resembled the wager of battle, and it was known to the Japanese.² It does not seem to have been developed by the Indians. The Scandinavian and Teutonic peoples have chiefly exploited it. A curious exception is the Anglo-Saxons, and the wager of battle was unknown in England until introduced by William the Conqueror.³ The duel was an ordeal among the Teutons in pagan times when there was any doubt as to the guilt of the accused person. It was one application of the Scandinavian *hólmgangr*. As the Christianized peoples of N. Europe developed their civilization, this institution became more popular and was the *judicium Dei par excellence*. The Church connived at it, though in theory denouncing it.⁴ Confined to freemen, it was assisted towards its popularity by the general character of chivalry and especially by the tourney, which lent it all the pomp and circumstance of knightly contests. In its turn the judicial duel supplied forms for the joust and the tourney. The *gaige de bataille* was flung down, and the words '*Laissez aller*' were the signal for commencing. The fight was *à outrance*; the body of the vanquished was hung in chains or mutilated.⁵ The arms of the combatants were previously blessed. The intention was to saturate them with sanctity or to increase their natural sanctity.⁶

Each person confirmed the assertion of the justice of his cause 'by a solemn oath on the Gospels or on a relic of approved sanctity, and called upon God to grant victory to the right. . . . Defeat was thus not merely the loss of the suit, but also a conviction of perjury, to be punished as such.'⁷

One merit of combat was that of correcting 'the abuses of compurgation by oath.' A Burgundian king gave as a reason for authorizing the wager of battle that men might 'no longer take oaths upon uncertain matters, or forswear themselves upon certain.' Charlemagne and Otto II. delivered similar pronouncements.⁸ It was thus an attempt to obviate the inherent defects of Teutonic law, and was a considerable obstacle accordingly to the development of Roman judicial principles. After the abolition of other legal ordeals in England in the 13th cent., the wager of battle survived unimpaired.⁹ The right to demand this ordeal was actually claimed in England in 1818 by a man accused of murder. It was then formally abolished.¹⁰

Single combats between champions of armies have some similarity to the wager of battle. That between David and Goliath involved supernatural interference. It was a Frankish custom for the respective princes to fight one another if their armies could not decide the battle.¹¹

'In most European countries,' Westermarck sums up, 'the judicial duel survived the close of the Middle Ages, but disappeared shortly afterwards. . . . From an early period Councils and popes had declared against it, but with little success; many ecclesiastics, indeed, not only connived at the practice, but authorised it, and questions concerning the property of churches and monasteries were decided by combat. There were other more powerful causes at work—the growth of communes, devoted to the arts of peace, seeking their interest in the pursuits of industry and commerce, and enjoying the advantage of settled and permanent tribunals; the revival of Roman law, which began to undermine all the institutions of feudalism; the ascendancy of the royal power in its struggle against the nobles; the increase of enlightenment, the decrease of superstition. But though finally banished from the courts of justice, the duel did not die. In the sixteenth century, when the judicial combat faded away, the duel of honour began to flourish.'¹²

Thus there was a return to the conditions from which the wager of battle arose. See, further, art. **DUELLING**.

7. Miscellaneous ordeals.—From a large assort-

¹ C. A. L. M. Schwaner, *Dorneo*, Amsterdam, 1853, I. 212, quoted in *MI* I. 504.

² *Iliad*, iii. 276 ff.; Lea, p. 99.

³ Lea, p. 105; Tylor, in *EBR* xx. 175.

⁴ Patetta, p. 179 ff.; Lea, p. 103 ff.; Tylor, in *EBR* xx. 175.

⁵ Froissart, iii. ch. 49; O. de la Marche, *Le Livre de l'advis de gaige de bataille*, ed. B. Prost, Paris, 1872, pp. 15, 19; du Cange, s.v. 'Duellum.'

⁶ *MI* I. 506.

⁷ *Id.* I. 505.

⁸ *Id.*

⁹ A.D. 1215–19. *A summa de pugna*, giving the detailed scheme of procedure, is printed by Patetta, p. 478 ff.; another order of battle, more detailed, is printed by du Cange, s.v. 'Duellum.'

¹⁰ Tylor, in *EBR* ii. s.v. 'Ordeal.'

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² *MI* I. 507.

¹ *SBE* xxiii. 108 f.

² Du Cange, s.v. 'Ferrum candens'; J. Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*, Leipzig, 1899, p. 918 ff. (Scandinavian *jernbyrd*).

³ See du Cange, s.v. 'Ferrum candens.'

⁴ *Mahemium*.

⁵ Du Cange, s.v. 'Ferrum candens,' 'Vomeris igniti,' 'Pedale examen.'

⁶ Codrington, p. 212.

⁷ Lea, pp. 266–270.

⁸ Balfour, *loc. cit.*; *pipal* is *Ficus religiosa*.

⁹ Stenzler, in *ZDMG* ix. 663, quoted by Tylor, *EBR* ii. 174 b; cf. the story of the wife of Charles the Fat passing the fire unscathed in a waxed shift (Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*, *loc. cit.*).

¹⁰ *SBE* xlvi. 74, 159.

¹¹ Balfour, *loc. cit.*

¹² Manu (*SBE* xxv. 274).

¹³ Du Cange, s.v. 'Ignis judicium.'

¹⁴ *PC* i. 64 f.; 'to haul over the coals' is so explained by J. Jamieson, *Etymological Dict. of Scottish*, Edinburgh, 1808.

¹⁵ Lea, pp. 93–216; C. de Smedt, *Le Duel judiciaire et l'église*; du Cange, s.v. 'Duellum.'

ment of ingenious tests a few of the more conspicuous may be mentioned, as bearing upon the principles and origin of the ordeal.

There is a Melanesian ordeal in which the accused person is shot at with arrows from a certain distance. A hit means guilt.¹ At the other extreme is the Indo-Iranian ordeal of holding and swearing by a twig of a sacred tree. Here superstitious fear and a guilty conscience are in view. Leaves of basil, sacred to Vishnu, were used by the Hindus.² A very practical ordeal was invented by some Melanesian medicine-men; the accused person had to swim across a river infested with alligators, after these had been specially summoned by the medicine-man.³ The same people worked also on the guilty conscience; and, since fear of tabu is known to cause sickness and death, it may be concluded that similar success attended the practice of the ordeal. The accused touched a spear and swore, 'If I did the thing, may I die with this spear.' Or the medicine-man sang a *saka* song, and the accused said, 'Well, that song is for me; if I did that, let me and my children suffer.'⁴ Other tests of endurance besides that of holding the head under water are found. In early Europe there was the ordeal of the cross. The two litigants stood before a cross, with arms out-stretched (like the cross which they faced), and the first to let his arms drop was the vanquished.⁵ In a Hindu ordeal the two persons stood on one leg, which was fixed in the ground, till one or other gave in.⁶ A curious ordeal, which can hardly be credited with any success due to influence upon the nervous system, is that of the balance. In this Hindu ordeal the accused was weighed in a large pair of scales. His weight was taken by a basket of stones or other equivalent, and he then re-entered the scale. If he was lighter than before, he was innocent; if heavier, guilty.⁷ The ordeal of *examen in mensuris* is mentioned in early European *benedictiones*, but its meaning is doubtful. Possibly it was a comparison of measurements of the accused taken at intervals.⁸ The Hawaiian ordeal of *wai haalulu* involved a nervous reaction; the accused had to hold his hands over a bowl of water; if the water shook, he was adjudged guilty.⁹ In the ordeal, or rather confrontation, known to the early English as *bier-right* the accused had to approach or touch the corpse of the murdered man. If he was guilty, the wounds bled afresh. In the *Nibelungenlied* the wounds of the dead Siegfried break open when Hagen approaches. Shakespeare uses the same motive. The phenomenon of blood liquefaction has been suggested as the principle of this ordeal. Or there may have been a belief that the soul remains near the body till vengeance is taken; by the murderer's touch it was roused to indignation and appeared in the form of blood.¹⁰

8. Ordeal by lot.¹¹—The principle of chance enters into many ordeals; in some it seems to be the main element.

In a Hindu ordeal a ring and a live cobra were placed in a pot full of earth; the accused had to find and take out the ring with his hand. In another he had to draw one of two small images from a vessel, the image of justice or that of injustice, *dherem* or *adherem*.¹² In the *borru* ordeal of the Niam-niam the witch-doctor moistens two pieces of polished wood and slides one upon the other. If it glides smoothly, the man is innocent.¹³ The W. African witch-doctor uses a pot and its lid. Repeating the names of suspected persons he takes off the lid

at each name and looks in the pot. When the lid sticks, the name then uttered is that of the guilty person. This kind of symbolic work shows that the witch-doctor is absolute master of the law. The crudest case perhaps is his going round the village ringing his bell, which stops at the hut of the guilty person. The natives' only method of obtaining justice, as also of avoiding punishment when guilty, is to bribe the doctor.¹ Indians of the N.W. Provinces balance two arrows; one of these moves in the direction of the hand of the accused.² Mediaeval Europe had a test in which a loaf of consecrated bread was hung between two witnesses by means of a stick passed through it. If it turned round, the accused was guilty. A similar method was that of the sieve, though used only unofficially, both by the ancient Greeks and by Europeans of the Middle Ages.³ Held by the two middle fingers, the sieve turned over when the name of the culprit was mentioned.⁴ Similarly a Psalter or Bible was hung by a key tied in it at Ps 50:18—'When thou sawest a thief, then thou consentedst with him.' The ring of the key was balanced on the fingers, and the book turned or fell at the mention of the guilty person's name. Sometimes the ruling was that, if it turned from west to east, guilt was established; if from east to west, innocence.⁵ In the above cases there may have been at work the same phenomena of muscular suggestion as in table-turning. In a Burmese ordeal plaintiff and defendant took candles of equal length, and lighted them simultaneously; judgment was for him whose candle lasted the other out.⁶ Possibly some kind of lot ordeal is involved in the narrative of Jos 7:13ff.; 1 S 14:1 proves the existence of such a test. A Dayak ordeal between litigants reduces the method to an almost frivolous plane. Each man is represented by a shell-fish on a plate; these are irritated by a sprinkling of lime juice, and the first to wriggle settles the innocence or guilt according to prearrangement.⁷

9. Origin of the ordeal.—Apart from the abuses which discredited the ordeal, the method possesses a real psychological merit. It challenges the accused person who protests his innocence to put that innocence to a dangerous physical test. The man conscious of guilt must be very strong-minded, in a superstitious, or any, age, to run the risk. If, as often happened, he refused to do so, the law punished him with torture or retribution appropriate to his crime. The demerit of the method is in its treatment of the innocent. He is bound by mere considerations of self-preservation to embrace the ordeal. In a superstitious age he has full confidence in its fairness, i.e. in its upholding of the right. Apart from superstition, he is in the position of a gambler who has a 'certainty,' and cannot refuse to put it to the touch. And the records again and again hint that self-confidence or consciousness of innocence has, at least occasionally, served as a mysterious factor of immunity.

In social psychology the ordeal has connexions with torture, divination, oath, and wager. Metaphor consistently repeats the idea of torture, not only risked, but, as a rule, undergone. This is a popular recognition of the great odds against immunity. The guilty person who submits to the ordeal and is injured is *ipso facto* in receipt of a punishment. But the idea of punishment does not appear to have connected itself with the ordeal, except in some European refinements, where a litigant outsworn was bound to submit to an ordeal, the result of which had no bearing on his case.⁸ With regard to torture, Lea remarks that ordeal and torture are 'virtually substitutes for each other'; they have rarely co-existed.⁹ In W. Africa, when an accused person denies his guilt, but refuses to submit to the ordeal, he is tortured. This is quite a logical conclusion from the principle of the ordeal.¹⁰ It amounts to a compulsory submission to the ordeal. Psychologically, the successful endurance of torture applied, e.g., for the extraction of evidence, is equivalent to the passing of an ordeal by an innocent man, and popular language describes both in similar terms.

¹ Codrington, p. 213.

² *SBE* xxxvii. [1892] 55; Balfour, *loc. cit.*

³ Codrington, p. 213.

⁴ *J. P. Kirsch*, art. 'Ordeal,' in *CE*; Lea, p. 296.

⁵ Lea, p. 299.

⁶ *SBE* vii. 53, 561., xxxiii. 105 (the *tola* ordeal); Balfour, *loc. cit.*

⁷ Kirsch, *loc. cit.*

⁸ *MI* ii. 659.

⁹ Lea, p. 315 ff.; Tylor, in *EBR* ii, s.v. 'Ordeal'; Shakespeare, *Richard III.*, act. i. sc. ii.; Brand, iii. 231; *MI* ii. 690.

¹⁰ Lea, pp. 311-315.

¹¹ Balfour, *loc. cit.*; Lea, p. 311.

¹² Lea, p. 223.

¹ Lea, p. 223; Kingsley, p. 464.

² Balfour, *loc. cit.*

³ Kirsch, *loc. cit.*

⁴ 'Sieve-turning,' 'coseloinaney'; Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, iii. 1103 f.; Tylor, in *EBR* ii, s.v. 'Ordeal'; Theocritus, iii. 31.

⁵ Brand, iii. 35; Tylor, *EBR* ii, s.v. 'Ordeal.'

⁶ Shway Yee, *The Burman*, London, 1882, ii. 254.

⁷ S. B. St. John, *Life in the Forests of the Far East*, London, 1862, i. 59.

⁸ Lea, p. 339 ff.

⁹ *Ib.* p. 371.

¹⁰ Kingsley, p. 464.

Most observers have noted the similarity between the ordeal and the primitive oath. The Nahuas, who practised no ordeals, made witnesses swear an oath, putting the forefinger to the earth and then to the tongue.¹ An oath has been regarded as an ordeal.² Tylor acutely observed that an oath, of the primitive concrete variety, becomes an ordeal when the curse takes effect at once.³ Conversely, many ordeals involve waiting days, weeks, or months, before their issue is revealed. Westermarek has developed the connexion of the ordeal with the oath.

The ordeal is essentially a magical ceremony. In many cases at least, it contains a curse or an oath which has reference to the guilt or innocence of a suspected person, and the proper object of the ordeal is then to give reality to the imprecation for the purpose of establishing the validity or invalidity of the suspicion.⁴

An oath was 'an indispensable preliminary' to every wager of battle, and failure was perjury, to be punished as such. It is curious that one object of the judicial duel was 'to correct the abuses of compurgation by oath.'⁵

In W. African ordeals great importance is attached to the reciting of the oath.⁶ The point of these oaths is the imprecation of the special result of the ordeal; but, when this result is practically certain, the oath is rarely used. In India one word, *śapatha*, denoted both 'oath' and 'ordeal,'⁷ but the fact proves nothing but similarity. The oath, with its conditional curse (see art. CURSING AND BLESSING), is certainly a variety of the same species as the ordeal, but neither need be derived from the other. They proceeded on separate lines, the one on verbal, the other on physical. Both, in all probability, are derived from the elemental factor of a belief in luck or chance.

A distinction may be noted between the primitive and the barbarous conceptions of the ordeal. In mediæval Europe there was an appeal to the immediate judgment of God. Later, both oath and ordeal were 'appeals to the moral nature of the divinity.' But in savage theology the god, or his equivalent, is a mere tool in the hand of the person invoking him. Thus Westermarek rightly concludes that the idea of ordeal is not 'primordially based on the belief in an all-knowing, all-powerful, and just god, who protects the innocent and punishes the guilty, but that it largely springs from the same notion as underlies the belief in the efficacy of an oath,'⁸ i.e. the mechanical power of cursing.⁹

Lea observes that the ordeal in its appeal to the supernatural or to chance made a great step towards practical justice. Tylor emphasizes the relation between the ordeal and the idea of chance; and there is little doubt that the concept of luck, itself patently primitive, is the root element in the ordeal. Many ordeals shade into divinatory processes, and the wager element, the risking of odds, is absent from no form of ordeal. The mechanism of magic seems to be quite secondary—to be, in fact, the mechanism by which luck works or may be worked by the operator. And this possibility of 'working the oracle' is no less prominent in primitive than in civilized affairs. When the Australian bier-carriers ask the dead man who bewitched him, and the bier moves to touch the guilty person, or when the W. African corpse causes the bearers to dash against the house of the murderer,¹⁰ there is 'special knowledge' being applied in what is apparently a 'gamble.'

Even Roman law in classical times approved the method of the wager at law. The concept of abstract justice and fairness seems to have developed from a primary notion of chance. One of its embodiments is the ordeal; magic and religion came in as reinforcing agents.

LITERATURE.—Federico Patetta, *Le Ordalie*, Turin, 1890; H. C. Lea, *Superstition and Force*, Philadelphia, 1878; E. Westermarek, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, London, 1906; E. B. Tylor, art. 'Ordeal' in *EBR*¹¹; C. H. Funkhanel, *Philologus*, ii. [1847] 385-402; A. F. Stenzler, *ZDMG* ix. [1855] 661-682; J. Kohler, *ZFRW* v. [1884] 368-370; C. de Smedt, *Les Origines du duel judiciaire*, Paris, 1894, *Le Duel judiciaire et l'église*, do. 1895; F. Dahn, *Studien zur Gesch. der germanischen Gottesurtheile*, Berlin, 1880.

A. E. CRAWLEY.

ORDEAL (Arabian and Muhammadan).—I. ARABIA.—The heathen Arabs, like many other primitive peoples, had recourse to ordeals when the truth could not be detected by other means.

1. Oaths.—In the first place, the oath, strengthened by imprecations, was generally regarded as a sort of ordeal. He who swore invoked by means of magical formulae the wrath of God and all sorts of misfortunes, either upon himself if he was lying or upon others if they had committed some crime against him. Often fifty of his nearest relatives had to swear with him in order to strengthen the magical effect of the oath. No one doubted that the supernatural powers would punish the perjurers. The following instance is mentioned by Bukhārī:

A man of the Hudhail was slain by a Yemenite. The Hudhailites brought the murderer before 'Umar. The defence was that the slain, being formerly expelled by the Hudhailites themselves, was an outlaw. Fifty men of the Hudhailites swore that this was a lie, and the murderer was condemned. But divine judgment followed soon after; for, when the party returned, the perjurious Hudhailites were killed by the falling in of the cave in which they had taken shelter from rain (*Ṣaḥīḥ*, Leyden, 1908, iv. 323 [ḍiyāt 22]; cf. J. Wellhausen, *Rechte arabischen Heidentums*, Berlin, 1897, p. 188, for another example).

The judicial oath in early Arabia was taken by the plaintiff, or by the defendant, or sometimes by both. The old Arabic names of the oath, *jamīn* (i.e. the right hand, held forth in magical attitude) and *casāmāh*, show clearly the connexion between exorcism and oath (see R. Dozy, *Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes*, Leyden, 1877-81, ii. 345^b; and J. Pedersen, *Der Eid bei den Semiten* [*Der Islam*, iii., Supplement], Strassburg, 1914, p. 11 ff.). Magical practices resembling the oath were employed also in order to get back stolen property. If a man missed something, he proclaimed it in the market or some other place of assembly, cursing the unknown thief if he should refuse to restore the stolen object (Wellhausen, p. 192). Among the Bedawin tribes many of the old ceremonies are still in use. A person suspected of having committed a crime is placed in a magical circle drawn on the ground and must swear an oath (several instances of this custom are given by J. L. Burekhardt, *Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys*, London, 1831, i. 127 ff.; C. Landberg, 'Notes sur quelques serments et pratiques sacramentales chez les Bédouins de l'Arabie,' *Arabica*, v. [Leyden, 1898] 121 ff.; A. Jaussen, *Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab*, Paris, 1908, p. 188; A. Muhl, *Arabia Petraea*, Vienna, 1907-08, iii. 338; Pedersen, p. 152).

2. Fire ordeal.—The fire ordeal was also well known in early Arabia. Every tribe, says Abū 'Ubaidah (ap. Jauhari, *Qāḥāh*, Cairo, 1282, s.v. 'Haul'), had a sacred fire with a priest. When a question was to be decided, the two disputants were placed at the fire and swore to their statements. The one who was in the right had nothing to fear; but his adversary was often hurt or even devoured by the fire. An instance of the fire test in Yemen is found in Ibn Hishām (ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Göttingen, 1859, i. 17; see, further, Wellhausen, p. 189).

In modern Arabia the fire ordeal (*bishā'ah*) has

¹ H. H. Bancroft, *NR*, San Francisco, 1832-83, ii. 444.

² Lea, p. 323.

³ Tylor, *EBR*¹¹, s.v. 'Ordeal.'

⁴ *MI* ii. 657 f.; see i. 505.

⁵ *Id.* i. 505.

⁶ Kingsley, p. 465.

⁷ *MI* ii. 639, quoting J. Jolly, *ZDMG* xlv. [1870] 246, and Patetta, p. 14.

⁸ *MI* i. 605, ii. 657.

⁹ Lea, p. 93.

¹⁰ E. J. Eyre, *Journals of Expeditions of Discovery into Central Australia*, London, 1845, ii. 244; Wilson, p. 231.

another form. The litigating parties come before the so-called *mubasshi*, who heats a sword, a spoon, or some other object, in the fire. Each of the disputants must lick the hot iron, and the one whose tongue becomes severely hurt loses his case (see Burckhardt, i. 121; Landberg, p. 162 ff.; I. Goldziher, 'Das Strafrecht im Islam,' *Zum ältesten Strafrecht der Kulturvölker: Beantwortung der Fragen zur Rechtsvergleichung*, ed. T. Mommsen, Leipzig, 1905, p. 108).

3. The *'arrāf*.—Another ordeal was applied by the *'arrāf*, the holy man in early Arabia, who was said to be endowed with special talent for detecting crimes. He placed the suspected persons in a circle, took a jug between his index fingers, uttered magic formulae, and went along the row with the jug. When he came to the thief, the jug began to turn by itself in the *'arrāf's* hand (see Maidāni, *Arab Proverbs*, Cairo, 1310, and many edd., ch. xviii. no. 103, ch. xxiv. no. 494; G. W. Freytag, *Einleitung in das Studium der arab. Sprache*, Bonn, 1861, p. 159; Wellhausen, p. 207; other methods of detecting witches, murderers, thieves, and other sinners by means of ordeals are described by H. von Maltzan, *Reise nach Sūdārabien*, Brunswick, 1873, p. 263 ff.; Wellhausen, pp. 189, 207; and C. M. Doughty, *Travels in Arabia Deserta*, Cambridge, 1888, ii. 188).

II. ISLĀM.—Islām forbade all sorts of exorcism and, properly speaking, the ordeals which are still in use among the Bedawin tribes are in opposition to the precepts of Islām. The only survival of the old ordeals in Muslim legal procedure is the judicial oath, either of the defendant or of the plaintiff; witnesses, according to Muhammadan law, do not swear an oath that they will speak the truth (see art. LAW [Muhammadan], vol. vii. p. 880).

In two special cases the old form of the heathen oath with imprecations is still used in Islām. (1) When a husband suspects his wife of infidelity, he may accuse her of adultery and contest the legitimacy of her child, invoking God four times as a witness that he is speaking the truth and calling down His curses if he has lied; then the marriage is dissolved, and the wife must be punished for adultery, unless she swears four times by Allāh that her husband has lied, invoking God's wrath upon herself if her husband has spoken the truth (see Qur'ān, xxiv. 6-9). This is called *li'ān*, 'mutual imprecation.' (2) When a person is killed and his next of kin accuses somebody of the murder without being able to prove his accusation, two cases are to be distinguished. When the circumstances under which the murder took place make it probable that the accuser is right, the judge requires him to confirm his accusation fifty times by oath (*casāmah*), and, when the accuser has sworn these oaths, the accused person is regarded as guilty and must pay the blood-price. But, when the charge seems unfounded, the accused person is liberated if he swears fifty times that the accuser is in the wrong. In both cases the fiftyfold oath seems to be a Muhammadan form of the old heathen *casāmah*, sworn by fifty men of a tribe.

The Muslim feeling is that the perjurer will not escape the evil consequences of his sin, but the law does not prescribe a special punishment for him, the oath rather being by itself an ordeal.

LITERATURE.—This is sufficiently cited throughout.

TH. W. JUYNBOLL.

ORDEAL (Babylonian).—Although magic forms an extremely important element in the religion of the Sumero-Babylonians, nevertheless their sound sense of justice and high development of law prevented the adoption of the ordeal in judicial procedure, except in those cases where the truth could not be discovered by real evidence. The only

survival of this primitive practice which is recognized in the great Code of Hammurabi, a code adopted as the foundation of all Babylonian and Assyrian practice at law, is the test of the water ordeal for witchcraft. The second law of this code records the following ritual:

'If a gentleman has cast the accusation of witchcraft against a gentleman and failed to prove it against him, he against whom the accusation of witchcraft has been cast shall go to the river; having plunged into the river, if the river overcome him, his accuser shall seize his house. But if the river declare that gentleman clean and he be rescued, he that cast the accusation of witchcraft against him shall be put to death. He that plunged into the river shall seize the house of his accuser.'

Although we possess many tablets which record the settlement of all kinds of lawsuits, yet none has been found to exemplify this law for the examination of sorcerers. It is probable that the law is only an antiquated remnant of an ancient ceremony no longer practised. But the water ordeal probably survived, and was apparently resorted to in some less dangerous form to settle disputes to which the ordinary methods could not apply.

E.g., in the Cassite period the king Adadshumiddin bestowed an estate of a man who died without heirs upon the deceased's brother. The son of the deceased's daughter contested against his great-uncle, and the king rejected his claim; the son of another sister of the deceased sued for a portion of the estate in the reign of eided against him. In the reign of in man (Aḥudaru) who claimed to be owner, and he accused the owner kings of having been no brother owner was now dead, his son was in possession, and the reigning king, obviously in doubt, not only called in the surviving brothers of the original owner, but ordered an ordeal² between the son of the confirmed owner and the pseudo-brother of the original owner.³ But the pseudo-brother did not come to the ordeal,⁴ and died the same year. Thereupon the king put the son of this pseudo-brother to the ordeal with the son of the previously confirmed owner.⁵ The ordeal took place in the city Parakmāri, but the ritual is not described. The result was that the son of the owner confirmed by two preceding kings was declared clean.⁶ Obviously the ordeal, if it consisted in plunging into the river, did not involve the drowning of the guilty man as in the ordeal of the wizard in the Code.

We have probably to do here with a modified form of the water ordeal. That it really is a water ordeal performed on the bank of a river is proved by a passage in the Babylonian Job, where the triumphant sufferer proclaims his deliverance from unjust torture.

'At the shore of the river where (men) ban⁷ the lawsuits of mankind,

My forehead was sheared of the mark of a slave. . . .'⁸

The Babylonian scholars wrote the following comment upon this passage:

'"Shore of the river" means "oracle of God."'

We have here the same phrase for the ordeal as that employed in the Cassite lawsuit described above.⁹ As late as the 7th cent. we find a lawsuit settled by this water(?) ordeal in the reign of Shamash-shum-ukin.¹⁰

¹ The nominal verb employed here, *mu-ub-bi-ir*, really means 'he who accuses of sorcery.' The verb *habāru* > *ebēru* means originally 'to blind,' 'to surround,' and is employed in the *pī'el* for 'to blind by a curse,' 'to ban,' 'to accuse of banning,' and also in the reduced sense of 'to accuse' simply, and may be employed of ordinary accusations.

² That the passage refers to an ordeal was recognized first by Peiser, *OLZ* xiv. 477. The phrase is written partly in ideograms *ḫar ša DINGIR*, and means 'oracle of god.'

³ *Dup-pa ana tēti ša ilī ilūraššunūtīmma*, 'he wrote them a tablet (ordering them) to an oracle of god' (L. W. King, *Babylonian Boundary Stones and Memorial-Tablets in the British Museum*, London, 1912, p. 16, iv. 33).

⁴ *Ana tēti ša ilī ilī ilik* (ib. v. 4).

⁵ *Ib.* p. 17. 14.

⁶ *Ina tēti ša ilī ilī ilik Parak-māri ilu Marduk-kudurri-ur izkamma*, 'by the oracle of god, in the city Parakmāri, Marduk-kudurri-ur was clean' (ib. p. 17. 17 f.).

⁷ *Ibbirru*, lit. 'they bind,' i.e. put a case to a magic test.

⁸ Text not wholly certain (V. Rawlinson, 47b, 30).

⁹ In the reign of Nabu-mukin-apli of the VIIth dynasty occurred a long and intricate lawsuit in which the king took part. Here again the king orders two litigants in a minor affair to pass the ordeal (*ana tēti ilī išpurna*, 'he sent them to the oracle of god') and one of them 'was found clean' (*izkamma*) (King, p. 66. 3-5).

¹⁰ Peiser, *Keilschriftliche Bibliothek*, iv. [189a] 163, no. II. 6-7.

More often the ordeal of the oath was employed in cases which could not be settled by direct evidence.

E.g., in the reign of Sînuballit of the 1st Babylonian dynasty the heirs of an estate sued the business partner of their father and obtained the value of the father's business. The case was settled in the temple of the sun-god before nine witnesses, and the heirs signed an agreement not to complain again. But, having suspicion that this business partner was still retaining part of the estate, they sued him again before a judge who caused him to come to the temple of the sun-god and pass the ordeal of the oath. 'Erib-sin he gave over to the temple of Shamash for cleansing. At the great gate he swore "Whatever belonged to Gírragamil from straw to gold is not in my possession," and so annulled their complaint.'¹

The Code of Hammurabi also recognizes the ordeal of the oath as a means of self-rectification when no evidence can be adduced.

E.g. § 20 provides for the case of a man who has captured a runaway slave and failed to guard him until he could be handed over to his owner. The captor was supposed to have exercised all possible care to prevent the escape of the slave, and he is put to the ordeal of the oath. If he swears in the name of a god that such was the case, he clears himself of suspicion.

The Code provides the same ordeal for an agent who, when travelling for a merchant, is robbed of his money or goods. In that case, the agent being alone, no evidence could be adduced to prove that he had been robbed or that he had disposed of the goods for his own benefit. If he takes an oath in the name of a god that he has been robbed, he establishes his innocence.²

The ordinary legal expression for taking the ordeal of the oath is 'to make a cleansing' before god.³

Thus § 206 of the Code provides for a shepherd whose flock has been visited by some scourge or preyed upon by a lion. In either case he is not responsible to the owner for the loss. 'The shepherd before god shall make a cleansing and the owner of the sheepfold shall take upon himself the damage to the fold.'

In the division of inheritance the eldest brother usually acts as executor, and he often submits to the ordeal of the oath before the emblem of a god, obviously to free himself from any suspicion of having defrauded the other heirs.⁴ Owing to the terminology and the practice here described, the place in the temples where men took the ordeal of the oath was called 'the place of cleansing.'⁵

LITERATURE.—F. E. Peiser, 'Zum Ordeal belden Babyioniern,' *OLZ* xiv. [1911] 477-479. On the closely related subject of the oath see OATH (Semitic).

S. LANGDON.

ORDEAL (Celtic).—The main references to the use of the ordeal among the Celts occur in the Irish and Welsh laws and in one of the Irish mythico-romantic tales. There are also some apparent references to it in classical sources.

i. Classical references.—Cæsar, in describing the funerals of the Gauls, says that, when a man of rank dies, if the circumstances of his death are suspicious, his relatives hold an examination of his wives after the method adopted towards slaves, and, if their guilt is discovered, they are tortured and put to death.⁶ Probably some kind of ordeal was used as a method of discovering guilt. Julian speaks of the Rhine as an 'incorruptible judge of infants' among the Celts dwelling on its banks, drowning the child of an unfaithful wife, but restoring it to its mother's arms when the birth was legitimate.⁷ The method used is described in a poem in the Greek anthology. The child was put on a shield by the husband and thus consigned to the river. This ordeal is connected with the Celtic cult of rivers—the divine river acting here as a judge.⁸

¹ M. Schorr, *Altbabylonische Rechtsurkunden*, Leipzig, 1913, no. 232 f.

² § 103; for another ordeal by oath see also § 249 of the Code.

³ *Ubbutu*. ⁴ Schorr, no. 194 f.

⁵ *Ib.* no. 170. 16. The ordeal of the oath in case of a murder will be found in A. Ungnad, *Babylonische Briefe*, Leipzig, 1914, no. 218.

⁶ *De Bell. Gall.* vi. 19.

⁷ *Ep.* xvi., *Orat.* ii. (ed. F. C. Hertlein, Leipzig, 1876-76, pp. 495, 104).

⁸ *Anth. Græca*, ix. 125 (ed. Didot, ii. 24).

Aristotle speaks of the Celts plunging infants at birth into the cold waters of a river in order to harden them,¹ but does not mention the ordeal. Elsewhere, among Teutons, Hindus, etc., the water ordeal was decided differently. If a person floated, he was judged guilty, the water rejecting him; if he sank, he was innocent, though he was drowned, for in this case the water received him. This method was used both judicially and popularly in the case of witches until comparatively recent times.²

The duel as a means of settling disputes is also referred to. Poseidonios stated that formerly in Gaul at feasts the strongest seized the thigh of the animal served up, and, if any other warrior attempted also to take it, the two fought and the victor received the meat.³ Among the Celtiberians of Spain, in 206 B.C., P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus found that recourse was had to the duel by two sons of kings who as brothers had held the same throne, in order to settle the succession. They refused Scipio's arbitration and wished as judge only the god of war. Much later Silius Italicus said that this duel was conformable to the national custom.⁴

2. Irish ordeals.—The well-known Irish mythical story of King Cormac's adventure in the land of promise with the god Manannan contains a list of ordeals which has a close correspondence to those referred to in the Irish law-books and serves to explain them. Some of the ordeals in the list and the explanations given of their origin are doubtless mythical, though that only serves to show how firmly the use of the ordeal was fixed in Celtic custom. Morann, son of Carpre Cat-head, is said to have been born with a membrane over his head, which ultimately became a collar when he was placed in the sea and the magic 'ninth wave' passed over him. A covering of gold and silver was now placed on it, and it was used to test guilt or innocence. Placed round the neck of a guilty man, it choked him, but in the case of the innocent it expanded and dropped to his feet. Another collar of Morann's came out of a fairy mound, and, placed on the foot or hand of a guilty man, it cut the member off. He obtained a third collar from St. Paul, and wore it round his neck when delivering judgment. Then he never uttered falsehood. Mochton's adze was placed in a fire of black-thorn until red-hot. The tongue of the accused was then passed over it, when it burnt him if guilty, but did him no harm if he were innocent. Another ordeal was that of Scnela, who cast two lots out of the fire, one for the accused, one for the king. If the accused was guilty, the lot cleaved to his palm. A poet's incantation was first said over the lots. The vessel of Badurn was one which his wife obtained from a fairy mound beneath a well. If a man uttered three false words under it, the vessel separated into three parts, but, if three true words were spoken, these united again. The ordeal of the three dark stones consisted of filling a bucket with bog-stuff, etc., and placing in it three stones, white, black, and speckled. If a man drew the white stone out, he had spoken truth; if the black, falsehood; the speckled stone denoted that he was half-guilty. In the ordeal of the cauldron the vessel was filled with boiling water, in which the accused placed his hand. He was scalded if guilty, unhurt if innocent. Another ordeal was that of the old lot of Sen. Three lots were cast into water—the lord's lot, the ollave's lot, and the lot of the accused. If he was guilty, his lot sank; if he was innocent, it floated, as in the case of the child in the Rhine. Still another was that of Luchta's iron. This iron was seen by Luchta in

¹ *Politica*, vii. 15. 2.

² Hincmar (9th cent.) says: 'The water receives certain persons and thus proves them innocent; it rejects others and proves them guilty' (*PL* cxxv. 623). Cf. J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. E. Stallybrass, London, 1852-53, pp. 1077, 1025.

³ Athenæus, iv. 40.

⁴ Livy, xxviii. 21; Sil. Ital. xvi. 137 f.

Brittany and obtained by him. It was hallowed by wizards, then made red-hot and placed on the palm, with results similar to those of the adze ordeal. The ordeal of waiting at an altar consisted of going nine times round it and then drinking water over which a wizard's incantation had been said. If the person was guilty, the token of sin was manifest on him; if innocent, the water did him no harm. This ordeal is said to have been brought by Cai Cainbrethach out of the land of Israel, and it has some similarity to that described in Nu 5^{11a}. The text then goes on to tell the story of Cormac and how he obtained his cup from Manannan. The cup broke when three words of falsehood were spoken, but was restored if three true words were spoken. Manannan showed its properties to Cormac and then gave him the cup, and he afterwards used it to distinguish truth and falsehood with the Gael.¹

Stokes observes that, if Morann's three collars are different aspects of one collar, and, if Badurn's and Cormac's vessels are identical, this would reduce the number of the ordeals to nine—the number of the *divyāni pramāṇāni* in later Hindu law-books.

A passage in one of the Brehon law tracts speaks of the ordeals of the adze, of the chip of an old tree, of the Lestar Baduirn (Badurn's vessel), of the three stones in the dark, of standing at the altar, of the cauldron, and of the holy draught, and they are said to be tests established by St. Patrick in the reign of King Laegaire to decide the disputes of the men of the land.² The method of using some of these is also explained, though in some instances the explanation is obscure.

The tongue was put across a red-hot adze. 'A chip of an old tree' is glossed as 'of the horse-rod of the patron-saint, or of his coffin, or of the consecrated tree.' Probably it was some species of lot. 'Lestar Baduirn,' is glossed, 'i.e. ba, "good," for durn, "on the hand," it used to break on the hand, i.e. it used to open or burst asunder, but it remained perfect on the hand of the upright.' Two myths of its origin are then given, one corresponding to that in the story of Cormac, except that here Dornn or Badornn is the name of the woman who obtained the vessel, not of her husband. The gloss on the three stones in the dark is, 'i.e. to put three stones in a dark place, a speckled stone, a white stone, and a black one.' These were pagan tests. On the other hand, the ordeals used by Christians and instituted by St. Patrick were lot, *airisem*, and cauldron. *Atrisem* seems to mean standing at the altar, glossed as 'standing at the stone of adoration'; hence it must have been pagan in origin. Of the cauldron it is said that 'what makes pagan tests of them is to bring *suba* to them'—probably the use of some old pagan incantations or charms.³ The holy draught is obscurely glossed as 'the book drink, such as the long book of Leithglinn, its perusal on water.'⁴

The ordeal of the red-hot adze is specifically mentioned in one MS in connexion with the case of a woman clearing her character from charges affecting it, when she had failed to find living purgators. She rubbed her tongue on a red-hot adze of bronze or on melted lead (not iron—a proof of the archaic character of the ordeal). The adze was heated in a fire of rowan or black-thorn, magical trees with the Irish Celts. The MS describes this as 'a druidical ordeal.'⁵ The red-hot metal ordeal is of wide occurrence—among the Arabs, Hindus, and Chinese. The ordeal of the cauldron has been sufficiently explained in the reference from the story of Cormac. The phrase used for it is *fir cairé*, 'the proof of the cauldron.' Instances of its use in the laws are found in the case where distraining or distress is deferred until the *fir cairé* has taken place in connexion with some other process, but only when the man has gone into an 'externe territory' for it.⁶ Again, the *dubhfinc*, i.e. the uncertain family or members of the tribe smuggled in surreptitiously or concern-

ing whose pedigree donbt had arisen, could receive no share of the family land until they tendered the proof of the cauldron.¹ Again, the illicit offspring of a harlot or of a woman who absconded from her husband must not settle among the tribe without invitation or the test of the cauldron or of the holy expurgation.² In the case of the *dubhfinc* the proof of the cauldron is called *fir dé*, 'test of God,' showing that the older pagan rite had been Christianized. In earlier times the water itself gave judgment; now God gave judgment through the water. This ordeal, which is of wide occurrence,³ is referred to by St. Gregory of Tours in the case of two ecclesiastics, one heretical, one orthodox. One of them suggested the judgment of boiling water. A cauldron was to be placed on a fire and a ring dropped into the boiling water, and each was to attempt to draw it forth.⁴ The ordeal of the lots cast into the water has a certain parallel in one suggested by King Laegaire to St. Patrick and the Druids. They were to throw their respective books into water, and he would honour him whose books were unhurt. Patrick agreed, but the Druids dissented because the saint regarded water as a god (probably a reference to baptism). The ordeal by fire was offered by St. Patrick. A Druid was to go into a closed house with the saint's chasuble round him, and one of his clerics was to wear the wizard's tunic. Then the house was to be set on fire so that 'God might deal dooms.' The wizard was burnt, though he had gone into that side of the house which had been moistened.⁵

The idea of water, cold or hot, serving for an ordeal is further illustrated by the fact that it and air, sun, moon, etc., were taken as sureties for fidelity to an oath. They destroyed the oath-breaker, as in the case of King Laegaire, who demanded tribute after thus promising not to do so. 'God's elements gave a doom of death on the king.'⁶

The casting of lots was used by the Druids and in much later times was common both among the Irish Celts and in Brittany.⁷ But it is referred to in the *Laws* as an ordeal, its technical name being *crann-chur* (*crann*, 'tree,' 'wood,' 'stick'); hence, perhaps, small pieces of wood were used, though it is said in O'Curry's *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish* that the *crann-chur* consisted of putting in a box or pot black, white, and red pebbles, from which the accused drew until he drew either black or white. Black meant guilty, white innocent.⁸ This is the ordeal of the three dark stones in the story of Cormac, and doubtless there were various methods of the *crann-chur*. The *Laws* refer to its use in a variety of cases—e.g., in that of the *dubhfinc*, alternately with the proof of the cauldron; in that of an animal killed in a pound by other animals; and in several others.⁹ The lot was approved of by canon law in Ireland.¹⁰

The duel or combat was also recognized and is mentioned in the *Laws*, but it had to be gone through according to strict rule. It was illegal to fight without verbal engagements, viz. 'without proper security by word of mouth for restoring or righting the thing about which he gives the challenge.'¹¹ This appears to have been in a case of debt, and hence the duel after verbal engagements, literally 'contracts of the lips,' was legal. Elsewhere the consent of relatives to the duel

¹ *Ancient Laws of Ireland*, iv. 285, 288. ² *Ib.* v. 457.

³ H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, *Études sur le droit celtique*, Paris, 1895, i. 32, 35.

⁴ *de Gloria Martyrum* (= *Mirac.* i.), 81.

⁵ Stokes, *Tripartite Life*, London, 1887, pp. 55, 460.

⁶ *Ib.* p. 567. ⁷ J. Loth, *RCel* xvi. [1895] 313.

⁸ i. *Introd.* p. cclxxxix; cf. p. clxiv.

⁹ *Ancient Laws*, iv. 285, 295, ii. 6; cf. iii. C6, 327, 433.

¹⁰ D'Arbois de Jubainville, ii. 100.

¹¹ *Ancient Laws*, iv. 33.

¹ *The Irish Ordeals, Cormac's Adventure in the Land of Promise*, ed. and tr. W. Stokes, in E. Windisch and Stokes, *Irische Texte*, iii. [Leipzig, 1891] 206 ff.

² *Ancient Laws of Ireland*, Dublin, 1865–1901, v. 470 l.

³ *Ib.* vi. 384.

⁴ *Ib.* v. 473

⁵ E. O'Curry, *Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish*, London, 1873, ii. 216, citing MS H 8, 17 Trin. Coll. Dublin.

⁶ *Ancient Laws of Ireland*, i. 195, 199.

seems to have been necessary, and, where that consent was obtained, the victor who slew his opponent was not charged with murder.

'If it be a sensible adult that is drawn into the combat-field with the consent of his family, and if there was no crime charged upon the person who drew him, or though there were a charge he avowed it, whether life-wound or death-wound ensue, he is exempt.'¹

Witnesses were also necessary, as the gloss upon a story of two men about to engage in combat shows: 'There was nothing to delay them from engaging in the combat except that they had not a witness.'² Where the combatant was 'lawful spoil,' his arms and clothes were also lawful spoil to the victor.³ Canon law attributed to St. Patrick the regarding of the duel as an offence meriting excommunication—e.g., in the case of a debtor who, in spite of proof, denied his debt and had recourse to combat.⁴

3. Welsh ordeals.—The Welsh codes do not mention ordeals, but a late treatise states that there were three ordeals by the law of Dyrnwal Moelmud, for theft, for *galanas* (murder or composition for murder), for treason to a lord. They consisted of the hot iron, the boiling water, 'by putting the limb that did the deed therein,' and combat to such as should demand it lawfully. There was no punishment for the victor in the combat, for it stood instead of proof. But in amending the laws Hoel the Good and his judges observed that this was not just, and they established proof by men.⁵ These three ordeals correspond to those already described in Irish procedure, and, though the reference is a doubtful one, this likeness tends to prove that the ordeal had actually been in use among the Brythonic Celts.

LITERATURE.—This is cited throughout the article.

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ORDEAL (Chinese).—The use of the judicial ordeal in China is now mainly confined to the mountainous districts of the south-west, where numerous tribes of non-Chinese origin still maintain themselves in semi-independence. The decay of the ordeal is due partly to a growing disbelief in the superstitions which supported it and partly to the painful teachings of experience which compelled men to realize its fallibility as a test of truth. Its disappearance, however, leaves Chinese legal principles unaffected; Chinese law never accorded it theoretical recognition, but merely granted it a more or less grudging tolerance as a concession to immemorial custom. The fact that the notions and practices relating to ordeal have been regulated and modified by custom, not by law, explains why very few explicit references to the subject are to be found in the Chinese law-books.⁶

There is, however, an interesting passage in that constitutional handbook of the Chou dynasty known as the *Chou Li* (ascribed to the 12th cent. B.C.), from which we learn something of a legal practice that seems to have closely approximated to what we understand by ordeal. We are told that before a litigant in a civil suit was allowed to state his case in court he was required to hand in a sheaf of arrows (50 or 100), and that in criminal prosecutions initiated by private individuals the accusers were called upon to deposit in court a specified quantity (30 catties or Chinese pounds) of copper.⁷ According to the best interpretation

of this procedure, when a litigant or prosecutor handed in a sheaf of arrows or 30 catties of copper, his action was equivalent to (and was probably, indeed, accompanied by) a solemn declaration of the justice of his cause and a self-condemnation to righteous punishment if he were guilty of uttering untrue statements or making false accusations. The arrows were emblematic of unswerving and unerring truth. 'Straight as an arrow' was, and is, as well understood an expression in China as it is in the West, and the arrow's flight was regarded as an unmistakable symbol of moral rectitude. Similarly, the prosecutor who brought accusations against another was expected to show proof that he was willing to abide by the consequences of a complete elucidation of the rights and wrongs of his case. The metal which he deposited in court was a symbol of the justice to which he made his appeal. In demanding justice against his opponent he invoked retributive justice upon himself if his accusations were false. Hence the man who shrank from an appeal to the test of the arrows or the copper was confessedly uncertain of the truth or justice of his cause, or was secretly aware that his opponent was in the right. Thus, if only one of the parties to a case ventured to submit to the test, judgment went against the other by default.

'Certain ordeals,' as Tylor has said, 'are closely related to oaths, so that the two shade into one another. Let the curse which is to fall on the oath-breaker take effect at once, it then becomes a sign condemning the swearer—in fact, an ordeal.'¹ Lack of detailed information makes it difficult to decide whether the arrow and metal tests referred to in the *Chou Li* should be regarded as ordeals or merely as quaint and picturesque methods of oath-taking. It is certainly true, however, that in China, as elsewhere, many of the usages connected with oath-taking are almost identical with some forms of ordeal, and it is not always easy to draw distinctions between the two.

A Chinese chronicle contains an account of the following episode, which it assigns to the middle of the 13th century.

There was a certain man whose trade it was to sell temple-incense. His wares were of inferior make, but, when any of his customers grumbled at their price or expressed doubts as to their quality, he was in the habit of certifying to their excellence by means of the following oath: 'If this incense is not as excellent as I say it is, may a goblin meet me on the road and annihilate me!' One day, as he was crossing a bridge behind his shop, he was seen suddenly to fall prone on the ground as though he had been tripped up by some uncanny spectre visible to himself alone. When the bystanders ran to his assistance, he was already dead.

Stories of this kind, turning on a solemn invitation to the powers of the spiritual world to bring sudden death or calamity on the swearer if his words are untrue, are very common in Chinese annals. Confucius himself, on a certain memorable occasion, is said to have uttered such an oath.

rendered by Biot 'gold or (other) metal.' In this passage the word can hardly mean gold. The amount to be paid into court would have been prohibitive; and the obligation to pay the same amount in all cases, irrespective of the nature and magnitude of the interests involved, would have implied the creation of an arbitrary and irrational uniformity which could hardly have failed to defeat the ends of justice. The original uses the character *chin*, which in modern Chinese usually signifies gold, but which formerly indicated metal of any kind, and was applied indifferently to gold, silver, copper, tin, and iron. A modern Chinese commentator (not cited by Biot) explains the word as signifying, in this particular passage, iron. Iron certainly suits the context well enough, for that metal would aptly symbolize the inflexibility of justice; it is perhaps more probable, however, that the metal was copper, which, indeed, was often known as *huang t'ieh*, 'yellow iron,' and which, though a ductile metal, has an exceptional degree of tenacity. We learn from other sources that copper was in ancient times frequently used in connexion with judicial procedure, and there would therefore be nothing exceptional in its use here. English readers will find a reference to the use of copper in judicial proceedings in J. Legge, *Chinese Classics*, Hongkong, 1861-72, vol. iii. pt. II. p. 695.

¹ *EB* ix. 174.

¹ 'Book of Aicill,' *Ancient Laws*, iii. 297.

² *Ib.* i. 251 ff. ³ *Ib.* iii. 303.

⁴ D'Arbois de Jubainville, l. 46, il. 100.

⁵ *Ancient Laws and Institutes of Wales*, London, 1841, p. 707.

⁶ In this respect China and India are at one. Cf. *SBE* xxv.

(1886) p. cii; see also E. B. Tylor, *FC*, London, 1893, i. 141. Montesquieu, *De l'Esprit des lois*, xxviii. 16 (*Œuvres complètes*, Paris, 1875-73), remarks that under the Salic law trial by ordeal was not a thing legally ordained, but was privately agreed upon and legally permitted.

⁷ See F. Biot, *Le Tchou-Li*, Paris, 1851, il. 311; and *SBE* xvi. (1852) 103. The Chinese word here translated 'copper' is

* Confucius went to pay a visit to a lady whose moral character did not stand high in public estimation. A disciple ventured to remonstrate with him for having done so; whereupon Confucius cried out with an oath, "If I have done anything wrong, may God strike me dead, may God strike me dead!"

In a Chinese lawsuit, when the statements made or evidence given by the two parties are irreconcilable, and the truth cannot be elicited by ordinary methods, the parties sometimes adjourn from the law-court to a temple, and there perform the ceremony known as *tu chou*—the 'ordeal (or rather wager) by imprecation.'

The swearer unplaits his queue (if he has one), and lets his hair fall down over his shoulders, as though he were a criminal condemned to death. He then kneels before the altar, and utters the words upon the truth of which he is ready to stake his life. 'If I am guilty of the charge, or if my evidence is untrue, or if I have made a false accusation [as the case may be], I call upon the god to strike me dead before his altar.' The procedure varies in detail according to local custom or special circumstances. Sometimes the oath-taker proceeds by writing on a piece of paper the *pa-ko-tzu*, the 'eight characters' denoting the essential facts relating to his personal identity and time of birth. After lighting a stick or two of incense he kneels before the altar, and, uttering a set form of words, condemns himself and all his family to death if the statement to which he has sworn is perceived by the god to be untrue. The 'eight characters' are ceremonially burned, and the oath-taker's life is then wholly at the disposal of the deity addressed.

The procedure known as *fa-huang-piao*, 'the sending of a yellow missive,' is similar to this.

The swearer writes his accusation or evidence, accompanied by an oath-formula, on a piece of white paper. He also writes his name, address, and residence, the name of the temple where the ceremony is to take place, and the name of the divinity invoked. The oath-formula varies according to circumstances, but is usually framed in such terms as these: 'If I did so-and-so, may I die before sunset to-day!' or 'If I have spoken falsely, may I never be able to stand up again!' The white paper is folded up and enclosed in a covering or envelope of yellow paper, which is then committed to the flames. When it has been wholly consumed, the belief is that the message has reached its destination and that it will receive the due attention of the god whose intervention has been invited.²

As a rule, the deity in question is the *ch'ing-huang*, the 'city god,' who presides over the fortunes of the walled town in which the district magistrate's court is situated.³ The ceremony may, however, be performed in other temples besides that of the *ch'ing-huang*, and the deity invoked may be almost any one of the numerous gods, spirits, or canonized personages who throng the Taoist pantheon.

It is well known that a Chinese witness will often claim the right to consecrate his oath by cutting off the head of a fowl. This is a symbolical way of saying, 'If I am lying, may I be killed as I kill this cock!'⁴ This rite is still fairly common in inland China and is not unknown in the annals of British law-courts in Hongkong and the 'mixed courts' of the treaty-ports. Sometimes the killing of a real cock is dispensed with and a paper image of the animal substituted. The image is held up in front of the setting sun, and the swearer cuts off the head of the image just as the sun sinks below the horizon. According to another practice, the witness puts a number of beans into a basin and pounds them into a paste. By this action he condemns himself to be clubbed to death if his evidence is false. Yet another old custom was the ceremonial breaking of an arrow, which signified that the witness was willing to be broken in two if he committed perjury. Another practice was to blow out a candle-flame and to utter the words, 'If I have lied, may I be extinguished like this candle' (*ssü ju huo mieh*).

It is obvious that even the most solemn forms of oath-taking will be of little practical value in

helping a magistrate to discriminate between true and false evidence, unless he feels justified in assuming the sincerity of the witness's belief that perjury will involve him in serious difficulties with the unseen powers. A guilty man will hesitate to send a 'yellow missive' to the spirit-world if he feels morally certain that the spirits will receive it and will take him at his word. But, though many Chinese—perhaps the great majority—are rather sceptical in these matters, conscious guilt is liable to reveal itself involuntarily in some slight outward sign, such as the blanching of the cheek or tremor of the hand. These signs will be instantly noted by an attentive and experienced magistrate, who in spite of his own scornful disbelief in the objective efficacy of an elaborate oath-taking ceremonial, will often draw shrewd and valuable deductions from the appearance and general bearing of the parties and their witnesses.

The suggestion that the parties should adjourn to the city temple to swear oaths and dispatch 'yellow missives' usually comes not from the magistrate himself but from one of the parties concerned—not always the innocent one. But cases have been known when a clever magistrate has elicited the truth by making the parties undergo a bogus ordeal of his own devising. The following is an instance of how a magistrate succeeded by this means in unmasking the guilt of a man who had been accused of theft.

He informed the accused that he must prove his innocence by successfully undergoing the 'bell-touching ordeal.' He explained that in a certain temple there hung a bell which had the singular power of detecting the presence of thieves. When touched by a thief, he said, it would give forth sound, but, when touched by other persons, it would remain silent. The magistrate then gave orders that all the prisoners in his gaol, including the man accused of theft, should be marched off to the temple and made to stand in front of the temple-bell. He himself followed them, and gave a touch of solemnity to the proceedings by approaching the bell with reverence, as though it were a symbol of divinity, and uttering a short prayer suitable to the occasion. Having then caused a large curtain to be suspended in front of the bell so as to conceal it from view, he gave secret orders that the portion of the bell nearest to the curtain should be smeared with ink. This having been done, he bade the prisoners advance one by one and touch the bell by thrusting their hands under the curtain. A number of prisoners did as they were told, and as each of these withdrew his hand the magistrate noted that it was stained with ink. Then came the turn of the suspected thief. Believing that the magistrate's words would come true and that the bell, which had hitherto remained silent, would emit a sound if he touched it, he put his hand under the curtain as the others had done, but carefully abstained from bringing it into contact with the magic bell. He withdrew his hand, but his satisfaction at the success of his manoeuvre was short-lived. Observing that there was no trace of ink on the man's fingers, the magistrate promptly declared that the case was closed and the guilt of the accused made manifest. Thereupon, we are told, the outwitted thief made a full confession.

That such bogus ordeals may often be far more useful than real ones will be readily conceded. The drawback is that the more successful and ingenious they are the smaller will be the likelihood that they can be resorted to on subsequent occasions with the same prospects of success.

There is a curious book of Chinese medical jurisprudence known as the *Hsi-yuan-lu*, which was formerly in the hands of all Chinese coroners and was widely used in official circles up to a very recent date. Though the book was compiled as late as the 13th cent. of our era, many of its prescriptions and directions are manifestly based on very ancient folk-lore and the surviving traditions of pre-historic magic, while some of the methods which it prescribes for discovering the truth in matters affecting criminal procedure are strongly suggestive of ordeal. We may cite, e.g., the test of 'the yin-yang water,' which was no less irrational than the Christian ordeal of the Bible and the key. It is, or till recently was, Chinese law that, if a man finds his wife in the arms of a lover, he may, with impunity, put her to death, provided he does it immediately on discovery, before his natural

¹ H. A. Giles, *Confucianism and its Rivals* (Hibbert Lectures, 2nd ser.), London, 1915, p. 71.

² For brief accounts of these customs see L. Wleger, *Moral Tenets and Customs in China*, London, 1913, p. 521f.; and H. Doré, *Recherches sur les superstitions en Chine*, Shanghai, 1912, pt. i. vol. ii. no. 3, p. 344f.

³ Cf. a story in the *Liao Chai*, tr. H. A. Giles, *Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio*, Shanghai, 1908, p. 212f.

⁴ Cf. Legge, vol. v. pt. i. p. 5; and Giles, *Strange Stories*, p. 858.

wrath has had time to cool, and provided he kills the lover at the same time. The proper way to effect the killing is to cut off both heads, if possible, by a single blow of a sword. To kill one of the guilty parties only will not excuse the homicide, for it will show that he acted with cool deliberation and might therefore have restrained himself from killing either. The reason why the killing is condoned is not that Chinese law regards human life as a thing of small account (for that is the opposite of the truth), but that it recognizes the weaknesses of human nature and makes allowance for acts committed under an ungovernable impulse. It sometimes happens, however, that the husband may be called upon to prove, in court, that his wife and her paramour were really guilty of the offence for which he killed them; and he may have serious difficulty in satisfying the magistrate of this, if the relatives of the dead man or woman insist that no act of adultery had been committed or was meditated. In that case the homicide may offer to abide by the results of the *yin-yang* test, which the *Hsi-yüan-lu* describes as follows:

'Take a water-jar and fill it with water, one half from the river and the other half from the well.¹ This is called "yin-yang water." Take a stick and stir the water into a swiftly whirling eddy. Then take the heads of the decapitated corpses of the man and woman and place them without delay in the water. If the pair were really guilty, the heads will turn nose to nose; but, if they were innocent, they will turn back to back, one above and the other below in the jar.'²

Strictly speaking, this is not a case of ordeal, but of divination, or rather it is a kind of *post mortem* ordeal if we regard it primarily as a test of the guilt or innocence of the slain wife, and divination if we regard it as a test to prove the guilt or innocence of the surviving husband.³

There is reason to believe that ordeal by fire was not unknown in China in former days, though the ceremony of walking over hot coals, which is occasionally practised in certain localities, is not necessarily, if ever, connected with judicial procedure. In Buddhist annals there is a legend that tells us of a victory obtained by Buddhism over Taoism by means of a fiery ordeal. The incident is assigned to the 1st cent. A.D.

Certain distinguished members of the Taoist priesthood strongly objected to the emperor's patronage of Buddhism, and offered to prove that theirs was the true religion by an appeal to miracle. 'Take the books of the barbarians [i.e. the Indian missionaries of Buddhism] and our own holy writings,' they said, 'and set them afire. If theirs are consumed, let them be banished; if ours are burned, we are prepared to suffer death.' This suggestion met with the emperor's approval, but to the surprise and mortification of the Taoists, who relied for their success on their proficiency in magic arts, all their books except one were utterly consumed in the flames. The sacred objects of the Buddhists, on the contrary, were preserved intact; for 'the flames were miraculously transformed into petals of water-lilies, by which all the books and images were enfolded and supported.'⁴

It was remarked at the outset that the ordeal is nowadays confined mainly to the tribes of non-Chinese origin which inhabit the mountainous regions of the south-west. These tribes form a

¹ This is because the river is *yang* (active and therefore male) and the well is *yin* (passive and therefore female).

² E. T. Williams, in *JRAS*, N. China Branch, xxxviii. [1907] 91.

³ Ordeal and divination are both 'methods resorted to for discovering the truth'; but 'the ordeal is undergone by the person accused to vindicate his innocence,' whereas 'divination is practised by third parties to fix the guilt of a crime on a particular person' (C. S. Burne, *The Handbook of Folk-lore*, new ed., London, 1914, p. 131).

⁴ R. F. Johnston, *Buddhist China*, London, 1913, p. 137 ff. Cf. the Zoroastrian story of the ordeal successfully undergone by Atūrpāt in the reign of Shāhpūr II. about A.D. 330 (*SBE* iv. [1895] p. xlvii). For an amusing account of the rivalry between the two orders of friars in Salamanca in the reign of Philip II., and the fiery ordeal which resulted, see Goldsmith, *Citizen of the World*, Letter cxi. Giles (*Strange Stories*, p. 243) tells the story of the Buddhist monk who 'was to be thrown into a cauldron of boiling water in a fiery pit, when suddenly a lotus-flower came forth, the fire was extinguished, and the water became cold.'

considerable proportion of the population of Yunnan, Kuei-chow, and western Ssu-chuan. It may be observed that the ordeals known among these scattered communities are identical with many of those practised by the peoples of the Shan States, Siam, Cambodia, and Burma. This is readily accounted for by the fact that some of the Indo-Chinese races are ethnologically connected with the Lolo, Miao, Moso, and other tribesmen of the Chinese south-west, and that the latter, in spite of many centuries of isolation in an alien environment, have maintained many of the social usages and traditions of their more prosperous kinsmen.¹

Writing of the Lolo, Colborne Baber says:

'Trial by ordeal is common. An article of value having been stolen and the thief remaining undiscovered, the people of the place are assembled by the medicine-men, and a handful of raw rice is served out to everyone. A solemn period of mastication follows, after which the resultant is spat out, and a stala of blood on the chewed mouthful infallibly betrays the culprit. It is affirmed that the gums of the guilty bleed, and that a confession always ensues.'²

The following is an account of a trial by ordeal which took place among a community of Black Miao as recently as 1911.

A quarrel arose between two women, the elder of whom objected to the younger coming to her house, on the ground that the younger woman's visits always brought bad luck. Her husband, for instance, had died after one such visit and her son after another. The younger woman's indignation at this charge was so intense that violent hostility broke out between the two households. Finally the relatives of the accused woman demanded the right of vindicating her character by means of the ordeal of boiling millet. 'A day was appointed and a great crowd gathered to see this trial. A large cauldron was brought out and set over a rudely prepared fireplace. Into this a mess of millet was put to boil and an axe-head was laid in the bottom of the cauldron. When the contents began to boil, the young woman's champion stripped his arm bare. His duty was to reach down into the boiling porridge and snatch out the axe-head with his naked hand. If the skin were blistered, then the young woman's cause was lost; if not, her honour was vindicated. Each side had also wagered a stake of some Tls. 25 [i.e. about 63s.]. To snatch out the axe-head was the work of an instant and the man's hand and arm came out uninjured from the scalding bath. It was clear therefore that the young lady was not the minister of bad luck.'³

We may conclude by citing a somewhat similar case of ordeal which took place still more recently in one of the tribal districts of N. Yunnan. Writing under the date of 20th June 1915, a correspondent of a Shanghai newspaper thus describes the proceedings:

'Some Chinese workmen were engaged in putting up some school buildings in connexion with missionary work. A twenty-cent piece was missing one day, and the owners, the carpenters, accused the masons of theft. The masons stoutly denied the charge, and then there was an appeal to trial by ordeal. At night, when the missionary was not about, a large iron pan of boiling water was got ready, and into this a half-dollar was thrown. The selected representative of the accusing carpenter first put his hand and arm into the water and took out the coin. Then the head mason had to follow suit. The carpenter's arm received no injury, but the mason was so badly burnt that it was many weeks before he could resume work. I examined the two arms and do not know why one was badly burnt and the other escaped injury. The carpenters concluded that the masons were guilty, and claim that the missing coin was returned to them on the quiet while they were sleeping. Such trial by ordeal is quite common in these parts.'⁴

LITERATURE.—This is indicated in the article.

R. FLEMING JOHNSTON.

¹ For an account of the ordeals practised among the Siamese and neighbouring peoples see G. E. Gréin's art. on the subject in *The Asiatic Quarterly Review*, 1895.

² 'A Journey of Exploration in W. Ssu-chuan,' *Royal Geographical Society, Supplementary Papers*, London, 1880, I. 70. Precisely the same test existed in Vedio India (see ORDEAL [Hindu], 3 (c)).

³ *FL* xxii. [1911] 234. The boiling-water test is common throughout the Far East. For Japan see art. DIVINATION (Japanese), vol. iv. p. 895. It is also noteworthy that an axe was used in ancient Japanese ordeals as it is used to-day among the tribes of S.W. China, though in China the axe is placed in a tub of boiling water, whereas in Japan the axe 'was heated red-hot and placed on the palm of the hand' (ib.).

⁴ *North China Daily News*, Shanghai, 6th July 1915. In Vedio India there was an ordeal whereby an accused person was 'required to take a gold-piece from a vessel of heated ghi and oil.' See art. DIVINATION (Vedio), vol. iv. p. 830a, and ORDEAL (Hindu), 3 (c).

ORDEAL (Christian).—The word 'ordeal' corresponds to the German *Urteil*, meaning 'judgment,' or 'doom.' In German law *Urteil* has kept its general sense and *Ordal* is used with the same signification as the English 'ordeal,' viz. 'judgment of God.'

The subject of ordeals has been treated too much as a unity, whereas it is really a combination of several modes of procedure. The main idea is, undoubtedly, that supernatural powers are called upon to decide in a case, instead of leaving the decision to human wisdom. We find, however, that, notwithstanding this unity of the fundamental conception, three different methods are employed in order to reach the result. The three corresponding types are: (1) the practices grouped round the idea of struggle, the outcome of which is, of course, influenced by the divine power; (2) the group of appeal to chance (casting lots); and (3) the group of appeal to miracle; this group falls again into two subdivisions: (a) appeal to a direct manifestation of God's judgment; and (b) appeal to miraculous support against a human presumption.

1. The idea of struggle.—The idea of struggle leads to the trial by battle, which presents features both of self-help and of a judgment of Providence. The Bavarian law (cl. 2, sect. 1), *c.g.*, treats of a case of trying a man who is accused of conspiracy

takes place. There must be three

If there be one witness only and if his statement be denied by the accused, that witness will have to prove by combat that what he has said is true: 'Cui Deus dederit victoriam illi credite.'

The treatment of battle in Bavarian law is also curious in other respects: a man could fight by a substitute; the struggle is not self-help in this case; we find even that the decision which of the two champions shall fight for which side is left to chance.

Thus (cl. 9, sect. 2), if a freeman be charged with stealing an ox or a milk-cow, either he must purge himself by oath with six oath-helpers, or else two champions will have to fight, but lots should be cast to decide to whom God will assign the stronger of the two champions. *Cl. Lex Baiuvar. Additio* (Synod of Nihinga, cl. 4): lots shall not be cast in the case of a duel before the champions are ready, lest they might be insidiously hampered by incantations, diabolical devices, or 'magic arts.'

As another instance of the struggle-ordeal, the ordeal of the cross may be mentioned.

The contending parties having to hold up their hands, the decision is arrived at according as one or the other could hold out longer with outstretched arms (see *Capitulary of Charlemagne* of 806 on the division of the empire among his three sons [Boretius, *Capitul. Reg. Franc.* i. 129, cl. 14]). It is noticed

as to the *Capitulary* to the limits of the three kings stand and hold up their hands, but it had to be done through champions).

2. Appeal to chance.—The most interesting case of this is presented by the Frisian laws (sect. 14):

A man has been slain in a crowd; the man who claims composition does not know who is the slayer; he must ask Providence to decide. He is allowed to charge up to seven men, each of whom will have to purge himself by an oath with eleven oath-helpers. Thereupon all should go to a church (or to a saint's relics), and two sticks, one of them marked with a cross and both wrapped up in clean wool, should be put on the altar or the relics. Then, after prayers that God may show 'through an evident sign' if the oaths have been truthfully taken, a priest (or an innocent boy) should take one of the sticks. If it be the one marked with a cross, the seven are discharged. Otherwise each of the seven men should mark a separate stick with a sign, all these seven sticks should be wrapped up in wool and put on the altar (or on the relics), and then taken, one after the other, by the priest (or the innocent boy). The man whose stick is last to be taken will have to pay the composition. If the first seven

appeal to lots. Lot appears also in a combination where it would not *a priori* be expected, and that is in the case of slaves.

A good example is *Pactus de tenore pacis domin. Hildeb. et Chlot.* 5. If a slave is suspected of a crime, but there is no proof against him, his fate will be decided by lot. The freeman would in such a case clear himself with oath-helpers.

The Salic law represents here an ancient point of view; it does not try to make the thing easier for the slave, but it cannot let him have oath-helpers. (Of course, torture very soon develops for slaves—*e.g.*, in the *Lex Visigothorum*, which was compiled under strong Roman influence.)

Lot in its very essence is based on equal possibilities for both sides.

3. Appeal to miracle.—(a) *Appeal to miraculous manifestation of the truth.*—A conspicuous example of such a manifestation is presented by the trial of the bier. There is a description of such a trial in Walter Scott's *Fair Maid of Perth*.

Oliver Proudfoot has been killed because he had been mistaken for Henry Smith. Nobody knows who committed the murder. The body is laid in state in a church and suspected persons have to approach it and to swear that they are innocent of the murder. Should the murderer dare to approach it, it is expected that the veins of the slain will open and blood will flow.

Within the group of miraculous manifestations may also be ranged the trial of cold water, often used in cases of witchcraft; it consisted in noting whether a person thrown into water will be submerged as a token of innocence, or whether the water refuses to receive him because he is guilty.

An example of the trial of bread and cheese is found in the Laws of Aethelred (8. 22):

If a clerk in lower orders is charged and has no 'friends,' *i.e.* no relatives, and, therefore, 'has no oath,' *i.e.* cannot for that reason take an oath with compurgators, then he must try to swallow bread and cheese, 'and let him meet with what God willeth.' As an exception, the accused can take the Sacrament; evidently the choice of the procedure depended on the decision of the court (Liebermann, *Gesetze der Angelsachsen*, i. 266).

The ceremony of trial by bread and cheese included the prayer of which we have an English example in the following words:

'Deprecor te, Domine sancte, Pater omnipotens, aeternae Deus, qui celum formasti et terram fundasti, mare limbitibus terminasti, solem et lunam in splendore lucere fecisti, ut intelligentes astantes, quia tu es (Deus), qui facis mirabilia. Et te dominum Iesum Christum humiliter prece deprecor, ut qui furtum istud commisit vel qui consentaneus est, gula eius vel lingua seu fauces suae sic flant contritae et obligatae, ut panem vel caseum istum non praeualeat manducare' (ib. i. 425, cl. 5).

In all such cases the position in which the accused is placed presents no natural difficulty, and only bad conscience would make the trial a dangerous one.

(b) *Appeal to miraculous salvation.*—In this group of practices there is quite a different set of possibilities, and the position of the accused is from the outset a difficult one. Let us take *Lex Salica*, ch. 14.

The man who cannot find oath-helpers must go to the trial of the cauldron, *i.e.* take a ring or a stone out of boiling water; otherwise he will have to pay a heavy fine (62 shillings). This clause relates to the trial of a Roman who is accused of having robbed a Salian Frank, and cannot find the prescribed number of oath-helpers, while the truth of the charge does not appear certain.

Another important example is presented by the Riparian law (sect. 31. 5).

If a stranger be accused within the Riparian land and cannot find oath-helpers, let him clear himself by the fire or by the lot.

Why should such a difficult form of trial be imposed? Because he has no friends and, therefore, has only a low standing in society.

Another feature which illustrates strongly the fact that miraculous purification is adjudged only in exceptional circumstances is that a man who has been condemned to that form of trial may buy himself out. Here *Lex Salica*, ch. 53, is in point.

If the succumbing party would have to pay 600 shillings, the accused can, before the trial, redeem himself by a fine which amounts to one-fifth of the sum. Cl. 4 makes an interesting addition: if the accused gives more than one-fifth to his adversary, he may do so, but the peace-money will have to be paid to the public officer in such case. The public authority takes care that it should not be cheated of its rights (cf. 2 Aethelstan, 21 [Liebermann, i. 162]; if a man wants to make

an agreement about an ordeal, let him make an agreement about the private compensation but not about what we may call the 'criminal fine'.

One may ask, why should not the accuser await the event of the trial and then claim the whole sum, instead of accepting a part? There was certainly the fear that the accused might be successful and thus his accuser would get nothing, but perhaps also an important motive was provided by the consideration that the accused might turn out to be insolvent.

One more characteristic feature is disclosed by Aelfred, 4 and 4. 1 (Liebermann, i. 50). When a man has conspired against the life of the king either directly or by harbouring exiles or their vassals, he has forfeited his life and all that he owns. If he wants to clear himself, he must swear with oath-helpers. Now, in Aethelred, 5. 30 (*ib.* i. 244), we read: 'He has to clear himself through threefold ordeal.' In one of the MSS (*ib.* 245, col. 1) he must clear himself in the 'deepest' manner which the witan can ordain. In Cnut, ii. 57 (*ib.* i. 348-350), this occurs again and the oath disappears. Thus we can observe a gradual change: first, there is only the oath; then, the oath and the ordeal; finally, only the ordeal.

Of course, the tremendous importance of the accusation is decisive in this case. From our point of view it may seem strange to make the defence more difficult because the accusation is more grave, but this is not uncommon in human psychology, and we may not be justified even in thinking that we are not sometimes acting under the same psychological motive—in some respects it holds good even to-day.

In Aethelstan, ii. 7 (*ib.* i. 154), we find that those who are often subject to accusations are to be driven to the simple ordeal. This relates to thefts. We see the same thing in Eadward, i. 3 (*ib.* i. 140), concerning a person who is not worthy to take an oath. What is expected here is conviction, unless the accused is freed by a miracle.

The worst form is the triple ordeal, occurring, e.g., in *Leges Henrici*, 64 (*ib.* i. 584). In regard to the misdoings of corrupt people and to conspiracies of perjurers, these should be subject to a more strict and difficult formula of oath. But it is so much feared that they may be unable to take the oath (as they would lose if they made a slip) that they prefer the ordeal. In its 'deepest' form as a triple ordeal it took the shape of lifting a red-hot bar of iron of three times the weight of the one used in simple ordeal, or plunging the arm instead of the hand into boiling water. The following was among the prayers used in Anglo-Saxon times (*ib.* i. 419, cl. 5) before the trial by red-hot iron was started:

'Deus, iudex iustus, qui auctor pacis es et iudicis equitatem, te suppliciter rogamus, ut hoc ferrum, ordinatum ad iustam examinationem cuiuslibet dubietatis faciendam, benedicere et sanctificare digneris, ita ut, si innocens de prenominate causa, unde purgatio querenda est, hoc ferrum ignitum in manus acceperit (vel pedes immerit), illius appareat, et si sit culpabilis atque reus, iustissima sit ad hoc iuris tua in eo cum veritate declarandum, quatinus iusticie non dominetur iniquitas, sed subdatur falsitas veritati.'

There are some further points to which attention is due. We find that sometimes the accuser has to bear the burden of proof. This happens if the accuser requires something extraordinary—e.g., if he challenges witnesses. *Lex Salica*, ch. 94, is here in point.

If one bring the charge of false testimony, he shall put his hand into the cauldron, and, if he takes out the hand not burnt, the accused shall pay 15 shillings; if, on the other hand, the hand is burnt, the accuser shall pay a like sum.

Such cases show that popular tribunals in the Middle Ages were not so passive as we might have thought. The court could assign the burden of proof to one party or the other, and this was a great power. The burden of difficult proof is

generally assigned to the party making an improbable assertion.

Certain facts seem to be due to later development. Thus in 2 Aethelstan, 23. 2 (Liebermann, i. 162-164), it is ordered that in the case of an ordeal there should stand on each side no more than twelve men; and, if the accused have with him more than twelve, then the ordeal shall be lost for him unless they be willing to go from him. It is not said distinctly that these supporters are kinsmen, but they were probably kinsfolk. The accused might have produced oath-helpers in this case, and yet ordeals had become so common that resort is had to them instead of to an oath.

Another fact worth noticing is that in later times the miracle is invoked for the decision of private disputes and has settled down into something which might be called judgment of God at private law. The *Domesday Book* gives a number of such cases; we shall take only two examples:

'Vultis probare offert se portatum iudicium quod non ita est sicut dicunt' (l. 333). 'Hanc terram calumpniatur esse liberam Vichetel homo hermeri, quorumque modo iudicetur licet bello licet vel iudicio. Et alias est presto probare eo modo quod jacuit ad ecclesiam die qua rex E. obiit; sed tunc hundredus testatur eam fuisse terram regis et ad sanctum adelf' (ll. 334).

Judicium and *bellum* are thus contrasted and the former admitted in a civil trial, but such cases seem to have occurred particularly when the testimony of the neighbourhood was challenged.

How did people in those days look on those forms of procedure? From our modern point of view it seems preposterous to ask a person to take up red-hot iron or to plunge his hand into boiling water. We may quote Lea on the subject:

'In general . . . as the result depended mostly upon those who administered the ordeal, it conferred an irresponsible power to release or to condemn, and it would be expecting too much of human nature to suppose that men did not yield frequently to the temptation to abuse that power. When Sigurd Thorlaksson was accused by Saint Olaf the King of the murder of his foster-brother Thoralf, and offered to clear himself by the red-hot iron, King Olaf accepted his offer, and appointed the next day for the trial at Lyngra, where the bishop was to preside over it. When Sigurd went back at night to his ship, he said to his comrades that their prospects were gloomy, for the King had probably caused himself the death of Thoralf, and then brought the accusation against them, adding, "For him it is an easy matter to manage the iron ordeal so that I doubt he will come ill off who tries it against him"; whereupon they hoisted sail in the darkness and escaped to their home in the Faroe Islands (Olaf Haraldsson's Saga, chiv., Laing's Heimskringla, ii. 210). The injustice thus hinted at must often have been practised, and must have shaken the most robust faith, and this cause of disbelief would receive additional strength from the fact that the result was not seldom in doubt, victory being equally claimed by both parties' (*Superstition and Force*, p. 331).

Pseudo-Cnut, *de Foresta*, 11. 2 (Liebermann, i. 622), shows that in the 12th cent. ordeal was regarded as an *ultimum refugium* of uncertainty; the purgation by red-hot iron shall nowise be admitted, unless the naked truth cannot be otherwise investigated. Eadmer, in his *Historia Novorum*, says about William the Red that he declared *iudicium Dei* to be worth nothing, because it can be plied either one way or the other:

'Quod pro voto cuiusque hinc inde plicatur' (ed. Rolls ser., lxxxi. 102).

The last stage is reached when a very important canon of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) forbade priests to give their blessing to ordeals on any account:

'Nec quisquam purificationi aque ferventis vel frigide; seu ferri candentis ritum cuiuslibet benedictionis aut consecrationis impendat: salvis nihilominus prohibitionibus de monachis sine decessis antea promulgatis' (cap. 15, 'De iudicio sanguinis et decessis clericis interdicto').

The ordeal continued to linger for a long time in local tradition (e.g., M. Bateson, *Borough Customs* [Selden Society Publications, vols. xviii. and xxi.], London, 1904-06, gives examples of it in later times) But the rule of the Lateran Council exerted a powerful influence; it cleared

the atmosphere and had much to do with abolishing that particular form of procedure in the principal courts.

LITERATURE.—J. Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*, Göttingen, 1828, 1899; H. Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1887-92, ii.: H. C. Lea, *Superstition and Force*, Philadelphia, 1878; F. Liebermann, *Gesetze der Angelsachsen*, Halle, 1903-12, i., ii.

PAUL VINOGRADOFF.

ORDEAL (Greek).—The appeal to God for the settlement of a difficulty in human affairs is deeply ingrained in human nature, and therefore we find examples of trial by ordeal among all the tribes of the world (see J. Kohler, 'Die Ordalien der Naturvölker,' *ZfVw* v. [1884]).

In particular the Greeks seem to have developed many practices based on the idea of a direct appeal to a pronouncement of the gods. Forms of procedure of that kind were freely used in archaic Greece, and lingered on in many localities. The procedure of enlightened States like Athens, however, discarded this line of development, and we do not find direct testimony in this respect. This is natural enough, as the evidence of the classical period comes from a rationalistic age. The facts reported from other localities, however, are very characteristic. The cult of the Erinyes, the goddesses of revenge, was specially apt to call forth the direct manifestation of divine power. We learn from Pausanias (vii. xxv. 7) that a man who had committed homicide, or some other crime involving religious pollution, was supposed to become insane if he dared to enter the sanctuary of the Erinyes at Cerynea. Here punishment is coincident with the manifestation of guilt. And the same idea of immediate retribution appears in the story told by Philostratus in his biography of Apollonius of Tyana (i. 6). It relates to the water, *ὕδωρ ὀρκίου Διός*, which brought blindness and sickness to the man who had committed perjury. The same kind of superstition was attached, it seems, to the Horkos-stream in Bithynia: that stream was considered a most horrible one to swear by, as it used to pull the perjurer towards its whirlpools. A very curious development of this idea is presented by the legend relating to the water of the Styx. Hesiod tells us (*Theog.* 782 ff.) that the gods themselves used a form of ordeal to make sure of the truth in cases of dispute.

Iris was sent by Zeus to bring to Olympus a can of water from an underground stream (the Styx). The litigants had to drink of that water and the god who had made a false assertion would be overtaken by 'sleeping sickness' which lasted a year. When the ordeal had in this way led to a declaration of guilt, the delinquent convicted of the crime had to suffer further punishment for nine years and was, during that time, deprived of the food which conferred immortality on the gods.

We have no such detailed description as to an appeal to the Styx by mortals, although the oath by the water of the Styx was regarded as an especially terrible form of imprecation. The Horkos-stream in Thessalia is described thus:

ὄρκου γὰρ δεινὸν Στυγὸς ὕδατος ἔστιν ἀπορρέειν (Il. ii. 765); ὅς τε μέγιστος ὄρκος δεινότητος τε πέλει μακάρεσσιν θεοῖσιν (ib. xv. 371.).

In a very definite form the practice of ordeal is described in Sophocles, *Antigone*, 264 ff.:

ἦμεν δ' ἔτοιμοι καὶ μύδρους αἰρεῖν χερσίν,
καὶ πῦρ διέρπειν, καὶ θεοῦ ὄρκω μωρεῖν
τὸ μήτε δρᾶσαι μήτε τῷ ἔννειδέναι
τὸ πρᾶγμα βουλευσάντι μὴτ' εἰργασμένῳ.

The μύδρου remind us forcibly of the ordeal of red-hot iron which was so widely diffused in mediæval practice, and there can be no doubt that in this case a regular form of procedure before umpires was gone through. This particular ordeal may even have left a trace in Athenian practice, if the oath by the fire alluded to by Demosthenes (liv. 40) may be referred to the trial by red-hot iron.

The scantiness of information about actual trials

must not lead to the conclusion that the recourse to these or similar practices was very rare. The extreme decentralization of Greek life and custom made it possible for the minor commonwealths to keep up ancient rites which had almost disappeared from the principal cities. We may notice in this connexion that the practice of finding out the guilt of a murderer by watching the oscillations of a suspended battle-axe (*axinomantia*) is reported (Pliny, *HN* xxxvi. 19), although it is impossible to settle the exact area in which such a practice was used. Something of the same kind was also used in connexion with shells, in the movement of which popular superstition discovered indications as to suspected guilt.

LITERATURE.—R. Hitzel, *Der Eid*, Leipzig, 1902; K. Binding and others, *Zum ältesten Strafrecht der Kulturvölker* (miscellanea in answer to queries by Mommsen), do. 1905.

PAUL VINOGRADOFF.

ORDEAL (Hebrew).—The only OT practice which involves the application of an ordeal in the proper sense of that term is described in Nu 5¹¹⁻³¹. It was resorted to in order to disclose the guilt or the innocence of a wife accused by her husband of adultery. The ordeal was administered by the priest, who placed in the woman's hands the 'jealousy offering' (כֶּזֶב קִנְיָה), consisting of barley meal (אֵרָאָה), without oil or incense upon it. Some of the dust of the tabernacle was placed in a vessel full of water, and the solemn oath of purgation was administered to the woman. Thereafter the oath (called in v. 21 *קִנְיָה קִנְיָה*, 'oath of cursing') was written on parchment, and the writing was then blotted out with the dust-impregnated water, which the woman was compelled to drink. If she was innocent, no effect followed; if guilty, 'the water that causeth the curse shall enter into her and become bitter, and her belly shall swell, and her thigh shall fall away' (וְקִנְיָה בִּקְנָה וְקִנְיָה בִּקְנָה)—the punishment thus falling upon the instruments of her sin.

It is evident that the efficacy of the ordeal described is regarded as due entirely to divine intervention; the ingredients employed are innocuous. No doubt fear of the result often led to a confession of guilt. It is equally clear that the result is expected to show itself speedily (cf. *Sôṭah*, iii. 4, where an interval of from two to three years is allowed). Unlike many of the prescriptions of the Levitical code, which were rather theoretical than practical, the 'jealousy' ordeal was really employed by the Jews (*Jer.* 63a; *Eduy.* v. 6; *Sôṭah*, i. 58). According to Jewish testimony (*Sôṭah*, ix. 9), it was efficacious only when the husband himself was innocent, and it was applied only in doubtful cases, and solely at the request of the husband (*ib.* iii. 6, iv. 2). It is said to have been abolished in the 1st cent. A.D., at the instigation of Johanan ben Zakkai, because adultery on the part of husbands became so common that the 'bitter waters' had no effect when administered to an unfaithful wife (*ib.* ix. 49). Johanan grounded his action on Hos 4¹⁴.

It is possible that the 'jealousy' ordeal is only a particular instance of the water ordeal, which Robertson Smith and others believe to have been widely practised by the Hebrews (cf. *Rel. Sem.*², London, 1894, p. 181). It does not appear to the present writer that there is any allusion to an ordeal in Ex 32²⁰ (the children of Israel compelled to drink the dust of the golden calf), or in Ex 22⁷⁻¹⁰ (*Eng.* 2²¹), or Jg 17² (cf. Lv 5¹).

LITERATURE.—B. Stade, *ZATW* xv. [1895] 166-178; W. Nowack, *Lehrb. der hebr. Archäologie*, Freiburg, 1891, ii. 243-253; the Comm. on 'Numbers,' *ad loc.*, esp. G. B. Gray (*ICC*, Edinburgh, 1903), who also discusses textual questions to which it has not been found necessary to refer in above article; *HDB* iii. 273b, 325b; *EBD* ii. 234 ff.; *PRE³* vii. 33-35; *JE*, art. 'Ordeal' (ix. 427 f.), and 'Adultery' (i. 217 f.).

J. A. SELBIE.

ORDEAL (Hindu).—1. In Vedic texts.—So little of the early judicial procedure of the Indians is revealed to us by the Vedic texts that it is hardly to be wondered at if the traces of any use of the ordeal as a means of establishing disputed facts are of the slightest character. The oath in a similar use is seen by native tradition in one passage of the *Rigveda* (vii. 104. 14 f.), and it has been suggested that there are traces of the fire and water ordeals of later India in the story of Dirghatamas (*Rigveda*, i. 158. 4), while one hymn (ii. 12) of the *Atharvaveda* has been interpreted as intended to accompany the performance of the fire ordeal. But in all three cases the suggestion of an ordeal is inadmissible, and it is in the *Brāhmaṇa* literature that we find not only the oath (*Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, v. 30), but also the closely connected ordeal. In the *Pañchaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa* (xiv. 6. 6) we are told that Vatsa established his purity of origin against a taunt by a rival by walking through the fire—a phrase exactly parallel to that used in the *Antigone* (264) of Sophocles.¹ In the *Chhândogya Upaniṣad* (vi. 16), a work of the close of the Vedic period, we learn of the ordeal of carrying a heated axe as applied in a case of theft, and a parallel to this passage has been seen in the *Rigveda* (iii. 53. 22), but without any real ground. The *Kaustika Sūtra* (lii. 8) seems to refer to the ordeal by the hot piece of gold. Finally, in one passage of the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa* (xi. 2. 7. 33) there has been seen a reference to the balance ordeal as practised in later India. There remain, therefore, as proved for the Vedic period, say to 500 B.C., no more than one voluntary ordeal and one apparently judicial, and neither of these accords with the ordeals of the jurists.

2. In the early jurists.—The unimportance of ordeals in the Vedic period receives confirmation from the slight place which they occupy in the early jurists. In the *Dharma Sūtras*, which belong to the period from 500 B.C. onwards, they are passed over in silence by all except the latest of all, Āpastamba, who (ii. 11. 29. 6) merely refers to the use of ordeals as one way of deciding disputed cases. In the code of Manu the ordeal for the first time appears as a definite part of judicial procedure. It stands in the closest connexion with the oath, and it is plain that the ordeals mentioned are merely more stringent forms of the oath, a characteristic which holds good of Hindu ordeals throughout their history. The commentators see in the passage of Manu a reference (viii. 114–116) to the fire and water ordeals normal later, but this cannot be correct: the reference is merely to the person subjected to the ordeal escaping burning by the fire, and to his not being thrown up by the water; and, as the former ordeal is illustrated by the case of Vatsa, it seems clear that we have merely a case of fire-walking, and the second form was presumably nothing more or less than the ordinary Teutonic ordeal in which the person was thrown into the water and held innocent if he sank. The commentators say, in accord with the later usage, that these ordeals were reserved for graver cases.

3. In the later juristic literature.—The *Mānava Dharma Śāstra* was probably redacted in its present shape before A.D. 200, and the first evidence for the development of a system of ordeals is found in the *Smṛtis* of Yājñavalkya and Viṣṇu, dating probably from before A.D. 300. From that time on the *Smṛtis* develop the subject in increasing detail and on the same lines. The most important accounts are those of Nārada (c. A.D. 500), preserved in two versions, Brhaspati (c. A.D. 600), Kātyāyana, and Pitāmaha, who are possibly the former rather earlier, the latter rather later, than

Brhaspati. The later text-books of law rely on the *Smṛtis*, and the continuity of practice is illustrated by the fact that in 1783 the chief magistrate of Benares was actually carrying out ordeals in the manner prescribed in the texts. In the course of time many changes took place in the mode of carrying out the ordeals, the number was increased, and detailed rules for their administration multiplied—for the most part, it must be noted, in the direction of making the ordeal less onerous on the person by whom it was carried out. As usual, the texts differ in innumerable details, but the following are the chief points of importance in their accounts of the circumstances under which ordeals could be applied.

(a) *Conditions of application.*—The form of procedure contemplated in all cases is one by formal plaint expressed in writing, to which the defendant lodges a formal reply; the mode of proof is then decided upon, and the decision is based on the success or failure of the defendant, or plaintiff, as the case may be, to make good his contention. The normal modes of proof recognized by the *Smṛtis* are documents and witnesses, with a preference for the former, and it is only when these two means fail to yield guidance, through insufficiency or equality of weight, that the ordeal can have a place, according to Yājñavalkya; the same rule seems usually to be recognized by the other *Smṛtis*, if not explicitly stated, while Kātyāyana goes so far as to rule that, even if only a part of the case can be established by witnesses, nevertheless the ordeal may not be applied. Even, however, when an ordeal is permissible, there is one important limitation on its use: it implies normally that the other party shall undertake as part of the proceedings to accept the penalty appropriate, be it merely a fine or even corporal punishment. To this rule there are two kinds of exceptions: in the first place, if a man desires to justify himself, he may undertake, according to Nārada, the ordeal without the other party undertaking to pay the penalty; in the second place, in cases of accusation of grave offences, which would be classified as crimes in modern jurisprudence, the king is allowed to decide that the ordeal shall be imposed without the accuser undertaking to bear the penalty, which would be, often at any rate, a capital one. These cases are given by Yājñavalkya as treason and great sins, by Viṣṇu as offences against the king and offences of violence (*sāhasa*); with this view Kātyāyana agrees, and Pitāmaha allows in these cases the application only of the ordeal by sacred libation. Nārada has two different accounts: in the first he restricts the administration of the ordeal without the other party accepting the penalty to cases of high treason and to the king's own servants; in the second he allows it in all cases of persons suspected by the king or denounced as criminals by intercourse with robbers. This version is noteworthy by reason of the stress laid on the rule that the ordeal should never be resorted to without the consent of the plaintiff, and by the statement that the ordeal is superior to human methods of proof. Brhaspati prescribes the ordeal for ruffians, adulterers, forgers of gems, pearls, or coral, and those who withhold deposits, and authorizes its employment for serious crimes or the appropriation of a deposit even when there are witnesses. But, though he asserts the superiority of ordeals properly administered to witnesses, he still restricts the use normally to cases where doubt arises as to a document or oral evidence and where ratiocination fails. Apparently in the special cases mentioned the ordeal might be imposed without the other party accepting a penalty, but this point is left obscure by the text. Pitāmaha shows that ordeals were not regarded universally with confidence, as

¹ O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie*, Munich, 1906, p. 877; cf. above, p. 521a.

he provides for the case where there is no human evidence and where the two parties do not wish to resort to ordeal, in which event the king is to decide. The cases which thus are left to be dealt with by ordeal—normally only in the absence of human means of proof—are offences against the king, serious crimes, especially those of violence and adultery, theft and robbery, the withholding of a deposit or denial of an obligation, and matters done in secret, in the interior of a house, in a forest, or so long ago that there can be no evidence, and cases where the human evidence is perjured or otherwise suspect.

Even when an ordeal is permitted, however, it need not take any more severe form than that of an oath, the *Smṛtis* being all agreed that the oath is a form of ordeal suited for the lesser cases. Strictly speaking, it would seem from Manu that the test of the truth of the oath was whether any calamity came to the swearer, but, as no time within which the test was to be made good is specified in the later *Smṛtis*, and, as the oath is reserved for cases of less weight, it seems probable that in point of fact the sanction of the oath itself was considered to be sufficient.¹ Viṣṇu specifies in detail the oaths for smaller offences, estimated in money-value as not exceeding 5 *kṛṣṇālas* in the case of a Śūdra; for an offence valued at or exceeding 5 *kṛṣṇālas* but under half a *suvarṇa* the ordeal by sacred libation is imposed; for any more serious case any of the other four, the balance, fire, water, and poison. In the case of a Vaiśya the rates are increased twofold, for a Kṣatriya threefold, for a Brāhman fourfold, but he is exempt from the ordeal by sacred libation unless as a test of his future conduct in a transaction; any one convicted previously of crime must be subjected to an ordeal, however trifling the amount. Brhaspati prescribes for persons of the lowest order the poison ordeal when property worth 1000 *paṇas* has been stolen, the fire ordeal where the value is 750, the hot oil where the value is 400, the ordeals by rice, sacred libation, and *dharma* and *adharmā* for values of 300, 150, and 100 respectively, and the ordeal by the ploughshare for the theft of a cow. These sums are doubled and quadrupled for persons of superior merit. Nārada and Piṭāmaha agree in ascribing the rice ordeal to cases of larceny. The other *Smṛtis* leave the matter to the discretion of the king or the presiding judge.

Normally the ordeal fell to be performed by the defendant, but Yājñavalkya and Nārada clearly permit it to be performed, by mutual agreement, by the plaintiff, the defendant then undertaking the payment of the penalty. This, however, seems distinctly to be contrary to the views of Viṣṇu, Kātyāyana, and Piṭāmaha. Kātyāyana alone appears to allow a substitute to undertake the performance of the ordeal, but only if the person concerned is an unbeliever, or guilty of one of the mortal sins, or of a mixed caste, or outside the Brāhmanical community.

(b) *Limitations of the use of ordeals.*—Certain restrictions are imposed on the use of ordeals according to the caste or the personal condition of the person concerned or the time of year. Nārada, in one version, Hārta, and Piṭāmaha seek to provide that the ordeals by the balance, fire, water, and poison shall be assigned to the Brāhman, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, and Śūdra respectively; and Kātyāyana, while giving as an alternative the use of all kinds for all castes, exempts the Brāhman from the water ordeal. Elsewhere Nārada states that ordeals should not be imposed on persons performing vows, ascetics, women, distressed persons, and those who are disensed; that the poison ordeal is not to be inflicted on the young, the old, ascetics, distressed

persons, and madmen; that the balance is the suitable ordeal for eunuchs, distressed and afflicted persons, infants, old men, and the blind, and the balance and the sacred libation for women. He also forbids the use of poison for bilious people, water for those distressed, and fire for lepers, the blind, and those with bad nails. Viṣṇu prescribes the balance for Brāhman, women, infirm old men, sick persons, and persons deficient in an organ of sense, and forbids the use of fire in the case of lepers, infirm persons, and blacksmiths, of poison for lepers, bilious persons, and Brāhman, of water for persons affected by phlegm or other illness, the timid or asthmatic, or those who live by water, and of sacred libation for atheists or in time of disease. Kātyāyana agrees in forbidding the use of fire for blacksmiths and water for fishermen, and adds a prohibition of poison in the case of sorcerers, presumably because their native element would be too favourable to the accused.

As regards time, the rule is that the fire ordeal is appropriate in the rains and the cold and chilly seasons, the water ordeal in summer and autumn, the poison ordeal in the cold and the chilly seasons, while the balance is improper only in stormy weather; but these rules are, it is clear, rather counsels of perfection than binding regulations. An ordeal should never be performed in the afternoon, at noon, or at the twilight, but in the morning, and in a suitable public place.

(c) *The numbers and kinds of ordeals.*—Yājñavalkya gives a list of five ordeals: the balance, fire, water, poison, and sacred libation; and this list is also found in Viṣṇu. Nārada, however, in one account adds to it the ordeals of rice and the hot piece of gold, and Kātyāyana agrees with this account; Hārta, who also gives seven, has that of choosing lots in place of the hot piece of gold. Brhaspati and Piṭāmaha bring up the number to nine by adding to Nārada's list the ordeals of the ploughshare, and *dharma* and *adharmā*. These nine alone are recognized as admitted by the law as legal means of proof, and the *Smṛtis* expressly state that irregular ordeals are quite improper. In all cases the ordeals are essentially religious in nature, and certain features derived from this characteristic are common to all forms. The person affected must, as in the case of a great sacrifice, fast the day before, and he must bathe and perform the rite in wet garments; each ordeal is accompanied by prayers, which, according to Yājñavalkya, are to be said by the accused, but, according to the other *Smṛtis*, by a Brāhman; in each case offerings are made, and the presiding judge is actually compared to the *adhvaryu*, or sacrificing priest, while in the case of the ordeal by balance the balance is treated in a manner analogous to the use of the sacred post at the normal sacrifice. The place must be public, in the hall of justice, or before the king's palace, or a temple, or at cross roads, just as a royal sacrifice is public.

In the ordeal by balance two posts are erected, 6 ft. high, and a transverse beam is placed over them 3 ft. long; from it by an iron hook is suspended the beam of the balance, which is 7 ft. long, and from the two ends of which scales are suspended, the ends working in arches to permit of the accurate marking of the position of the scales. Then the defendant is put on one side and on the other an equal weight of stone, earth, etc., the position of the scales is marked, the defendant descends; the judge then adjusts the man charged with the weighing and the balance, and the defendant is re-weighed, being acquitted if he proves lighter than at the first time. If he is of equal weight, he is condemned, according to Viṣṇu and Nārada, but re-weighed, according to Brhaspati, who provides for his condemnation if the scales break, while Nārada acquits him and Viṣṇu requires a re-weighing.

In the fire ordeal the defendant is required to walk at an even pace across seven circles of 10 *angulas* in diameter and separated by an equal distance, carrying in his hand a piece of iron of 60 *palas* in weight, made red-hot. The number of circles is given as eight and nine by Nārada and Piṭāmaha respectively, but in each case the defendant stands in the first, and in the second

¹ So in Greece (Hesiod, *Theog.* 735 ff.).

case he drops the ball in the last.¹ The bands are marked before the ceremony to show any abrasions, and, before the iron is placed on them, seven leaves of the fig-tree are put on, and, according to some authorities, grains, *śamī* and *dūrā* leaves, and curds also. If the bands on examination show no sign of burning, the ordeal is a proof of innocence. Before the iron is placed in the defendant's hands, the judge addresses a prayer to the fire to decide the case. If the defendant drops the iron, the test must be repeated.

In the water ordeal the defendant is required to plunge under water while holding on to a man standing upright in the water, and to keep below the surface until a runner fetches an arrow shot from a bow at the place of immersion. This ordeal, which was obviously a very severe one in its simplest form as it appears in Yājñavalkya and Vignu, is rendered less unfair by the rule of Nārada and Bhṛhaspati that three arrows are to be shot from a bow of middle strength, that the midmost of the three arrows is to be chosen, and that two men are to be used, one to go to it and one to return. A further refinement noted by Nārada makes the distance one of 225 ft., while Kātyāyana allows the innocence of the defendant to be recognized although the top of his head may be seen above the water before the return of the runner. In this case the prayer is addressed to the water before the defendant enters it.

The ordeal by poison consists in the administration of seven *yavas* of the poison of the *śṛṅga* plant from the Himālaya or the *Vatsanābha* (*Aconitum ferox*) mixed in *ghī*; the accused is kept in a shaded place for the rest of the day without food, and is acquitted if he shows no signs of untoward effects. Nārada mitigates the severity of this rule by limiting the time for untoward symptoms to the period occupied by 500 hand-claps, and then allows the use of antidotes. In this case the prayer is addressed to the poison itself.

The ordeal by sacred libation consists in drinking three mouthfuls of water in which images either of dread deities or of the man's special deity have been bathed. The test of innocence is the freedom in the following 7, 14, or 21 days from any calamity such as illness, fire, death of kin, or punishment by the king, the latter provision affording considerable room for unfair treatment of the accused, which seems to be avoided by Bhṛhaspati and Pītāmaha, who omit this detail. In place of a prayer the accused denies the charge formally.

The rice ordeal consists in chewing a number of unhusked rice-grains mixed with water in which an image of the sun has been bathed. The accused states the charge and faces east, i.e. towards the sun, as he eats; injury to the gums, the appearance of blood when he spits out the grains on a leaf, or trembling is a proof of guilt.

The ordeal by the hot piece of gold consists in taking out a hot piece of gold or a signet-ring from a pot of boiling *ghī*, or *ghī* and oil, with the thumb and forefinger; innocence is proved by absence of injury to the finger, and the prayer is addressed to the boiling liquid.

In the ploughshare ordeal a piece of iron, twelve *palas* in weight, is formed into a ploughshare, and made red-hot; the thief must lick it with his tongue, and is acquitted if it escapes injury.

In the ordeal by *dharma* and *adharma* images of these two powers are painted on leaves, which are duly worshipped and then wrapped in balls of earth and placed in a jar, from which the defendant must draw one. If he draws the *dharma* lot, then he is to be honoured by the assessors before whom the trial takes place, just as in the case of the five main ordeals Nārada prescribes that, if the defendant is successful, he is to receive a sum of 150 *paṇas* as a reward—from what source is not clear.

4. In non-juristic literature.—The evidence of the jurists is supported by the occasional references to ordeals found in other portions of the literature. Thus in the *Mahābhārata* (iii. 134. 27 ff.), which is parallel in time with Manu, we hear of a man proving an assertion by entering the water, and a fire ordeal seems also to be referred to in Sītā's vindication of herself in the *Rāmāyaṇa* (vi. 116), but only in the vague sense of the ordeal as found in Manu. It is in harmony with this that the ordeals play no part in the *Artha Śāstra*, which may² belong to the period before the Christian era. On the other hand, in act ix. of the *Mṛchchhakatikā* we find a criminal trial conducted upon the model laid down by Nārada and Bhṛhaspati, and decided by evidence, while the condemned man alludes to the four ordeals of fire, water, poison, and the balance. The *Pañchatantra* (i. 403) expresses the rule of the *Smṛtis*, which prefer documents to witnesses and witnesses to ordeals as a means of proof. Hiuen Tsiang (7th cent.) mentions the fire, water, poison, and balance ordeals, but his account of the poison and water ordeals differs considerably; in the latter the process adopted was to fling into

water the man tied in one sack and a stone tied in another, and innocence could be proved only by the man sinking and the stone floating. Snleiman (A.D. 851) mentions the fire ordeal and that with boiling fluid. Al-Bīrūnī (11th cent.) has a full account (*India*, tr. E. Sachau, London, 1888, ii. 159 f.); he states the preference for documentary proof, then the use of witnesses, failing whom divine tests are resorted to. The defendant must normally swear, but he may also tender an oath to the suitor, and the form of test ranges from the oath to the ordeal in the narrower sense of the word. The first ordeal is that by fire, the second that by water, in which the proof of innocence is afforded by the accused escaping drowning when thrown into a deep well or a deep and rapid river. The third is the drinking of holy water, guilt being proved by the vomiting of blood. The fourth is the balance, innocence being proved by increase of weight, not decrease. The fifth and sixth are the ordeals of the hot piece of gold and the fire in the usual forms. It is clear that the local practice varied; thus the *Smṛtichandrikā* (c. A.D. 1200) states that the water and the poison ordeals were obsolete at that time, but this statement can have applied only to the school of lawyers in whose circles that work was produced. Right down to the introduction of the rule of British law which forbids ordeals, there is abundant evidence in India of the practice of many different ordeals. Thus 'Alī Ibrahim Khān gives as practised at his own time, ostensibly in accordance with older texts, variants of the ploughshare and poison ordeals. As tests of witches we hear of the use of the ordeal of handling hot balls, the walking over hot coals and heated ploughshares, the throwing into water, the test by tying a bag of cayenne pepper over the head (if it failed to suffocate, guilt was held to be proved), and the rubbing of the eyes with capsicum (failure to shed tears was thought to establish innocence).

LITERATURE.—For the Vedic period see H. Zimmer, *Alt-indisches Leben*, Berlin, 1879, p. 1831; M. Bloomfield, *JAOB* xii. (1887) p. cxxi ff.; A. Weber, *Indische Studien*, Berlin, 1850-98, ix. [1865] 441, x. [1865] 731; R. Fischel and K. F. Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, Stuttgart, 1888-1901, ii. [1892] 159; A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index*, London, 1912, i. 381 f. The passages of Manu, Vignu, Nārada, and Bhṛhaspati dealing with ordeals are translated by G. Bühler and J. Jolly in *SBE* xxv. [1886], vii. [1880], and xxxiii. [1889]. Of the accounts of ordeals in the later juristic literature the most important are those in the *Mitākṣarā* (c. A.D. 1100), a commentary on the *Yājñavalkya Smṛti*, in the *Smṛtichandrikā* of Devanabhāṭa, in the *Divyātattva* of Ragbunādana (c. A.D. 1600), and in the *Vṛamitrodaya* of Mitrāmīśra (c. A.D. 1700). Of modern accounts the most important are those of A. F. Stenzler, *ZDMG* ix. [1855] 661-682, E. Schlagintweit, *Die Gottesurtheile der Indier*, Munich, 1866, and J. Jolly, *Recht und Sitte*, Strassburg, 1890, pp. 144-146. The question of the connexion of Indian and other Indo-European ordeals is discussed by A. Kaegi, *Alter und Herkunft des germanischen Gottesurtheils*, Zürich, 1887, and E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India*, London, 1896, pp. 275-279. The modern witch ordeals mentioned are given by W. Crooke, *PR*, 2, do. 1896, ii. 271 f.

A. B. KEITH.

ORDEAL (Iranian).—At what period in the history of Irān the practice of the ordeal originated we have no means of determining. Tradition, as reflected in the legendary portion of Firdansī's *Shāhnāmāh*,¹ assigns to that custom a vogue in very remote antiquity. The innocence and purity of Siyāvush, or Siyāvakhsh, son of Kaikāus, the second in the line of the so-called Kaianian kings, could be vindicated only by the use of the fire ordeal, to which he elected to submit himself. Two colossal walls of wood² were erected at just

¹ Ed. T. Macan, Calcutta, 1829, i. 396-398; tr. A. G. and E. Warner, London, 1905 ff., ii. 218 ff.

² A tradition associated the scene of this ordeal with Herghuh, a city 80 miles south-west of Isfahan, that there existed both regard this custom but with aqūt, ed. F. Wüsten-

¹ The number 7 is here the primitive number, and this fact tells against a historical connexion with the 9 in Teutonic ordeals (K. Weinhold, *Die mystische Neunzahl bei den Deutschen*, Berlin, 1897, p. 53).

² A. B. Keith, *JRAS*, 1916, p. 137.

such a distance apart as would barely allow a horseman to pass between them. Siyāvush, however, emerged from between the flaming walls without scar or burn, thereby placing his honour beyond cavil, while his slanderess, Sūdābch, had not Siyāvush magnanimously interceded for her, would have been put to death.

1. Sources.—The existing portions of the Avesta contain few allusions to ordeals; and the passages usually so interpreted (Ys. xxxi. 3, xliii. 4, li. 9 [SBE xxxi. (1887) 41, 100, 181 f.]; Vend. iv. 46, 54 [SBE iv.² (1895) 46, 48 f.]), with, perhaps, the exception of *Vendīdād*, iv. 46, 54, are not sufficiently explicit to render beyond doubt a reference to an ordeal as essential to their right understanding (but see below). If, therefore, we had formed our ideas of the place of the ordeal in the legal and religious life of the Iranians from the meagre and somewhat ambiguous references to that rite in the existing parts of the Zoroastrian scriptures, we should have erred grievously. It is to Pahlavi literature that we owe our knowledge of the very extensive and important use of the ordeal in early and later Iranian times. The Pahlavi *Dinkart* has preserved a brief account of the contents of the lost *nasks* of the Avesta, and, although details are, unfortunately, wanting, we are thus able, in a measure, to form a conception of the prevalence and the elaborate development of ordeals and their ceremonies in Avestan times. The *Dāstān-i-Dīnik*, *Shāyast la-Shāyast*, and *Zāt-Sparam* also materially supplement our knowledge.

2. Origin and history.—The institution of the ordeal is attributed to Zoroaster in the *Dinkart* (VII. v. 4-6 [SBE xlvii. (1897) 74 f.]):

'And one marvel is the provision, by Zarātūst, of the achievement of the ordeal, that indicator of the acquitted and incriminated . . . of which it is said in revelation there are about thirty-three kinds. These, too, the disciples of Zarātūst kept in use, after that time, until the collapse of the monarchy of Iran.'¹

Whether that statement represents historical fact or not cannot, of course, be definitely ascertained.² That the ordeal in some of its forms was practised in the Prophet's time and by him has much probability. And the veneration with which it is spoken of in so many of the references to it is due, perhaps, only in a lesser degree to the belief in its institution and use by Zoroaster than to its being the instrument of a divine communication.

3. Purposes and functions.—The general purpose of the ordeal, properly so called, was to discover guilt and innocence where other evidence was absent or insufficient. It was an invocation to God to judge and reveal His decision where human knowledge failed. Hence the appropriate and descriptive character of the German term *Gottesurtheil* for this rite.

But among the Iranians, at least, the ordeal had another, though kindred, function. It served as a test not merely of the innocence or guilt of a person, but of the truth or falsity of a religious system or a religious movement together with the veraciousness of the apostle or leader of such a religion. Its function in Zoroastrianism was identical with that of miracles for the Christian and Jewish religions and of the *mu'jizāt* in Muhammadanism. In the *Zāt-Sparam* Zoroaster is represented as undergoing a form of the fire ordeal with this purpose:

'The archangels exhibited three kinds of achievement [for ordeal] for the religion; first, by means of fires, and Zarātūst walked three steps on them, with the words, "good thoughts, good words, and good deeds," and was not burnt' (xxi. 24 [SBE xlvii. 185 f.]).

The *Dinkart* exemplifies the performance of the ordeal of molten metal for the same end by a reference to the deed of Atūrpat, son of Māhraspand, under the Sasanian king Shāhpūhr II. (A.D. 309-379), when the Zoroastrian faith was in conflict with the Manichaean heresy.

'These, too [i.e. the ordeals], the disciples of Zarātūst kept in use, after that time . . . and the custom of one of them is that of pouring melted metal on the breast, as in the achievement of the saintly Atūrpat, son of Māhraspand, through whose preservation a knowledge about the religion was diffused in the world; and of the manifestation, too, through that first wonder, this is also said, on the same subject, in the good religion, that of those, many, when they behold that rite of ordeal, it convinces the wicked' (VII. v. 5 [SBE xlvii. 74 f.]).

4. Forms.—The *Dinkart*, as already mentioned, states that revelation (meaning thereby, no doubt, the Avesta) recognized about 33 kinds (VII. v. 4 f.). If so many were in use at any period, only comparatively few of that number are mentioned in any documents. There would seem to have been a general classification into hot and cold ordeals. According to the *Shāyast la-Shāyast*¹ (xiii. 17 [SBE v. (1880) 360]), there were six hot ordeals. Fire itself would, naturally, constitute at least one, and, in various forms, possibly more than one of the six. The instance, already referred to, in which Zoroaster is described as walking on fires, would seem to indicate that such a form involved bodily contact with that element²—its sacred character notwithstanding. On the other hand, if we accept a reference to an ordeal, so called, as implicit in Ys. xxxi. 3, no physical contact is presupposed. The revelation, or 'decision' between the 'disputants,' for which the prophet prays, was evidently expected by the discernment, through the spirit, of the form or colour or some other visible feature of the sacred fire. In the strict and narrower sense of the term the process was not a case of ordeal; it was rather an instance of divination, the ordeal being really a species of divination (see also art. DIVINATION [Vedic], vol. iv. p. 829). But in the Pahlavi books the name 'ordeal' (*varih*) is applied to both indiscriminately. The sacred twig, or *barsom*, ordeal (*barsomōk varih*), mentioned more than once in these books, belongs to the same category (see *Dink*. VIII. xxxviii. [SBE xxxvii. 121 f.]). Whether we should deduce from the passage, 'The *Gāthās* for an ordeal of the spiritual existence' (ib. IX. xvii. 8), that those hymns had a similar function it is impossible to determine. It may be nothing more than a metaphorical expression. The whole passage is obscure.

The clearest and most explicit reference to an ordeal in the existing portions of the Avesta is to another of the heat ordeals, namely, boiling water.

'Before the boiling water publicly prepared, O Spitama Zarathushtra! let no one make bold to deny having received [from his neighbour] the ox or the garment in his possession. . . . Down there the pain for his deed shall be as hard as any in this world: to wit, the deed of a man, who, knowingly lying, confronts the brimstoned, golden, truth-knowing water with an appeal unto Rashnu and a lie unto Mithra' (Vend. iv. 46, 54 [SBE iv.² 46, 48 f.]).

The water employed for this ordeal contained incense, brimstone, and molten gold. The formula recited at the performance of this rite was as follows:

'Before the Amshaspand Babman, before the Amshaspand Ardibehesht, here lighted up . . . I swear that I have nothing of what is thine, N. son of N., neither gold, nor silver, nor brass, nor clothes, nor any of the things created by Ormazd' (SBE iv. 40, note 2).

Among the cold ordeals, one of the most frequently resorted to would appear to be that by poison. From the illustration in which the *Dāstān-i-Dīnik* (xxxvii. 74 [SBE xviii. (1882) 102,

¹ That work also claims to incorporate much material from lost *nasks* of the Avesta. See M. Haug, *Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsis*, London, 1897, p. 100.

² But see *Dink*. VIII. xx. 42 (SBE xxxvii. [1892] 59).

feld, Leipzig, 1896, i. 86; F. Spiegel, *Erän. Alterthumskunde*, do. 1871-75, i. 96, 593; A. V. W. Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, New York and London, 1906, p. 341 f.).

¹ Cf. *Dink*. VII. vii. 2 (SBE xlvii. 82).

² See Jackson, *Zoroaster*, New York and London, 1898, p. 97.

case he drops the ball in the last.¹ The hands are marked before the ceremony to show any abrasions, and, before the iron is placed on them, seven leaves of the fig-tree are put on, and, according to some authorities, grains, *śamī* and *dūrva* leaves, and curds also. If the hands on examination show no sign of burning, the ordeal is a proof of innocence. Before the iron is placed in the defendant's hands, the judge addresses a prayer to the fire to decide the case. If the defendant drops the iron, the test must be repeated.

In the water ordeal the defendant is required to plunge under water while holding on to a man standing upright in the water, and to keep below the surface until a runner fetches an arrow shot from a bow at the place of immersion. This ordeal, which was obviously a very severe one in its simplest form as it appears in Yājñavalkya and Viṣṇu, is rendered less unfair by the rule of Nārada and Bhṛhaspati that three arrows are to be shot from a bow of middle strength, that the midmost of the three arrows is to be chosen, and that two men are to be used, one to go to it and one to return. A further refinement noted by Nārada makes the distance one of 225 ft., while Kātyāyana allows the innocence of the defendant to be recognized although the top of his head may be seen above the water before the return of the runner. In this case the prayer is addressed to the water before the defendant enters it.

The ordeal by poison consists in the administration of seven *yavas* of the poison of the *śṛga* plant from the Himalaya or the *Vatsanābha* (*Aconitum ferox*) mixed in *ghī*; the accused is kept in a shaded place for the rest of the day without food, and is acquitted if he shows no signs of untoward effects. Nārada mitigates the severity of this rule by limiting the time for untoward symptoms to the period occupied by 500 hand-claps, and then allows the use of antidotes. In this case the prayer is addressed to the poison itself.

The ordeal by sacred libation consists in drinking three mouthfuls of water in which images either of dread deities or of the man's special deity have been bathed. The test of innocence is the freedom in the following 7, 14, or 21 days from any calamity such as illness, fire, death of kin, or punishment by the king, the latter provision affording considerable room for unfair treatment of the accused, which seems to be avoided by Bhṛhaspati and Pitāmaha, who omit this detail. In place of a prayer the accused denies the charge formally.

The rice ordeal consists in chewing a number of unhusked rice-grains mixed with water in which an image of the sun has been bathed. The accused states the charge and faces east, i.e. towards the sun, as he eats; injury to the gums, the appearance of blood when he spits out the grains on a leaf, or trembling is a proof of guilt.

The ordeal by the hot piece of gold consists in taking out a hot piece of gold or a signet-ring from a pot of boiling *ghī*, or *ghī* and oil, with the thumb and forefinger; innocence is proved by absence of injury to the finger, and the prayer is addressed to the boiling liquid.

In the ploughshare ordeal a piece of iron, twelve *palas* in weight, is formed into a ploughshare, and made red-hot; the thief must lick it with his tongue, and is acquitted if it escapes injury.

In the ordeal by *dharma* and *adharma* images of these two powers are painted on leaves, which are duly worshipped and then wrapped in balls of earth and placed in a jar, from which the defendant must draw one. If he draws the *dharma* lot, then he is to be honoured by the assessors before whom the trial takes place, just as in the case of the five main ordeals Nārada prescribes that, if the defendant is successful, he is to receive a sum of 160 *panas* as a reward—from what source is not clear.

4. In non-juristic literature.—The evidence of the jurists is supported by the occasional references to ordeals found in other portions of the literature. Thus in the *Mahābhārata* (iii. 134. 27 ff.), which is parallel in time with Manu, we hear of a man proving an assertion by entering the water, and a fire ordeal seems also to be referred to in *Sitā's* vindication of herself in the *Rāmāyana* (vi. 116), but only in the vague sense of the ordeal as found in Manu. It is in harmony with this that the ordeals play no part in the *Artha Śāstra*, which may² belong to the period before the Christian era. On the other hand, in act ix. of the *Mṛcchhakatikā* we find a criminal trial conducted upon the model laid down by Nārada and Bhṛhaspati, and decided by evidence, while the condemned man alludes to the four ordeals of fire, water, poison, and the balance. The *Pañchatantra* (i. 403) expresses the rule of the *Smṛtis*, which prefer documents to witnesses and witnesses to ordeals as a means of proof. Hiuen Tsiang (7th cent.) mentions the fire, water, poison, and balance ordeals, but his account of the poison and water ordeals differs considerably; in the latter the process adopted was to fling into

water the man tied in one sack and a stone tied in another, and innocence could be proved only by the man sinking and the stone floating. Suleiman (A.D. 851) mentions the fire ordeal and that with boiling fluid. Al-Bīrūnī (11th cent.) has a full account (*India*, tr. E. Sachau, London, 1888, ii. 159 f.); he states the preference for documentary proof, then the use of witnesses, failing whom divine tests are resorted to. The defendant must normally swear, but he may also tender an oath to the suitor, and the form of test ranges from the oath to the ordeal in the narrower sense of the word. The first ordeal is that by fire, the second that by water, in which the proof of innocence is afforded by the accused escaping drowning when thrown into a deep well or a deep and rapid river. The third is the drinking of holy water, guilt being proved by the vomiting of blood. The fourth is the balance, innocence being proved by increase of weight, not decrease. The fifth and sixth are the ordeals of the hot piece of gold and the fire in the usual forms. It is clear that the local practice varied; thus the *Smṛtichandrikā* (c. A.D. 1200) states that the water and the poison ordeals were obsolete at that time, but this statement can have applied only to the school of lawyers in whose circles that work was produced. Right down to the introduction of the rule of British law which forbids ordeals, there is abundant evidence in India of the practice of many different ordeals. Thus 'Alī Ibrahim Khān gives as practised at his own time, ostensibly in accordance with older texts, variants of the ploughshare and poison ordeals. As tests of witches we hear of the use of the ordeal of handling hot balls, the walking over hot coals and heated ploughshares, the throwing into water, the test by tying a bag of cayenne pepper over the head (if it failed to suffocate, guilt was held to be proved), and the rubbing of the eyes with capsicum (failure to shed tears was thought to establish innocence).

LITERATURE.—For the Vedic period see H. Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, Berlin, 1879, p. 183 f.; M. Bloomfield, *JAS* xiii. [1887] p. exxi ff.; A. Weber, *Indische Studien*, Berlin, 1850-98, ix. [1865] 44 f., x. [1868] 73 f.; R. Pischel and K. F. Geldner, *Vedische Studien*, Stuttgart, 1888-1901, ii. [1892] 159; A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index*, London, 1912, i. 364 f. The passages of Manu, Viṣṇu, Nārada, and Bhṛhaspati dealing with ordeals are translated by G. Buhler and J. Jolly in *SBE* xxv. [1886], vii. [1880], and xxxiii. [1889]. Of the accounts of ordeals in the important are those in the

mentary on the Yājñavalkya
Devavabhāṭta, in the *Divyātattva* of Raghunandana (c. A.D. 1600), and in the *Vīramitrodaya* of Mitrāmīśra (c. A.D. 1700). Of modern accounts the most important are those of A. F. Stenzler, *ZDMG* ix. [1855] 661-682, E. Sehlagintweit, *Die Gottesurtheile der Indier*, Munich, 1886, and J. Jolly, *Recht und Sitte*, Strassburg, 1898, pp. 144-146. The question of the connexion of Indian and other Indo-European ordeals is discussed by A. Kaegi, *Alter und Herkunft des germanischen Gottesurtheils*, Zürich, 1887, and E. W. Hopkins, *Religions of India*, London, 1896, pp. 275-279. The modern with ordeals mentioned are given by W. Crooke, *PR*², do. 1896, ii. 271 f.

A. B. KEITH.

ORDEAL (Iranian).—At what period in the history of Irān the practice of the ordeal originated we have no means of determining. Tradition, as reflected in the legendary portion of Firdausi's *Shāhnāmāh*,¹ assigns to that custom a vogue in very remote antiquity. The innocence and purity of Siyāvush, or Siyāvakhsh, son of Kaikāus, the second in the line of the so-called Kaianian kings, could be vindicated only by the use of the fire ordeal, to which he elected to submit himself. Two colossal walls of wood² were erected at just

¹ Ed. T. Macan, Calcutta, 1829, i. 396-398; tr. A. G. and E. Warner, London, 1905 ff., ii. 218 ff.

² Parsi tradition associated the scene of this ordeal with Abarguh, or Abarguh, a city situated about 80 miles south-west of Yazd, where Ibn Haukal and Yāqūt say that there existed extensive heaps or a large hill of ashes, and both regard this phenomenon as connected not with Muhammadan but with Parsi history (Yāqūt, *Geographisches Wörterbuch*, ed. F. Wüsten-

¹ The number 7 is here the primitive number, and this fact tells against a historical connexion with the 9 in Teutonic ordeals (K. Weinhold, *Die mystische Neunzahl bei den Deutschen*, Berlin, 1897, p. 53).

² A. B. Keith, *JRAS*, 1916, p. 137.

such a distance apart as would barely allow a horseman to pass between them. Siyāvush, however, emerged from between the flaming walls without scar or burn, thereby placing his honour beyond cavi, while his slanderess, Sūdābeh, had not Siyāvush magnanimously interceded for her, would have been put to death.

1. Sources.—The existing portions of the Avesta contain few allusions to ordeals; and the passages usually so interpreted (*Ys.* xxxi. 3, xliii. 4, li. 9 [*SBE* xxxi. (1887) 41, 100, 181 f.]; *Vend.* iv. 46, 54 [*SBE* iv.² (1895) 46, 48 f.]), with, perhaps, the exception of *Vendidad*, iv. 46, 54, are not sufficiently explicit to render beyond doubt a reference to an ordeal as essential to their right understanding (but see below). If, therefore, we had formed our ideas of the place of the ordeal in the legal and religious life of the Iranians from the meagre and somewhat ambiguous references to that rite in the existing parts of the Zoroastrian scriptures, we should have erred grievously. It is to Pahlavi literature that we owe our knowledge of the very extensive and important use of the ordeal in early and later Iranian times. The Pahlavi *Dinkart* has preserved a brief account of the contents of the lost *nasks* of the Avesta, and, although details are, unfortunately, wanting, we are thus able, in a measure, to form a conception of the prevalence and the elaborate development of ordeals and their ceremonies in Avestan times. The *Dāstān-i-Dīnik*, *Shāyast la-Shāyast*, and *Zāt-Sparam* also materially supplement our knowledge.

2. Origin and history.—The institution of the ordeal is attributed to Zoroaster in the *Dinkart* (vii. v. 4-6 [*SBE* xlvii. (1897) 74 f.]):

'And one marvel is the provision, by Zarātūst, of the achievement of the ordeal, that indicator of the acquitted and incriminated . . . of which it is said in revelation there are about thirty-three kinds. These, too, the disciples of Zarātūst kept in use, after that time, until the collapse of the monarchy of Irān.'¹

Whether that statement represents historical fact or not cannot, of course, be definitely ascertained.² That the ordeal in some of its forms was practised in the Prophet's time and by him has much probability. And the veneration with which it is spoken of in so many of the references to it is due, perhaps, only in a lesser degree to the belief in its institution and use by Zoroaster than to its being the instrument of a divine communication.

3. Purposes and functions.—The general purpose of the ordeal, properly so called, was to discover guilt and innocence where other evidence was absent or insufficient. It was an invocation to God to judge and reveal His decision where human knowledge failed. Hence the appropriate and descriptive character of the German term *Gottesurtheil* for this rite.

But among the Iranians, at least, the ordeal had another, though kindred, function. It served as a test not merely of the innocence or guilt of a person, but of the truth or falsity of a religious system or a religious movement together with the veraciousness of the apostle or leader of such a religion. Its function in Zoroastrianism was identical with that of miracles for the Christian and Jewish religions and of the *mu'jizat* in Muhammadanism. In the *Zāt-Sparam* Zoroaster is represented as undergoing a form of the fire ordeal with this purpose:

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The *Dinkart* exemplifies the performance of the ordeal of molten metal for the same end by a reference to the deed of Ātūrpat, son of Māhraspand, under the Sasanian king Shāhpūr II. (A.D. 309-379), when the Zoroastrian faith was in conflict with the Manichean heresy.

'These, too [*i.e.* the ordeals], the disciples of Zarātūst kept in use, after that time . . . and the custom of one of them is that of pouring melted metal on the breast, as in the achievement of the saintly Ātūrpat, son of Māhraspand, through whose preservation a knowledge about the religion was diffused in the world; and of the manifestation, too, through that first wonder, this is also said, on the same subject, in the good religion, that of those, many, when they behold that rite of ordeal, it convinces the wicked' (vii. v. 5 [*SBE* xlvii. 74 f.]).

4. Forms.—The *Dinkart*, as already mentioned, states that revelation (meaning thereby, no doubt, the Avesta) recognized about 33 kinds (vii. v. 4 f.). If so many were in use at any period, only comparatively few of that number are mentioned in any documents. There would seem to have been a general classification into hot and cold ordeals. According to the *Shāyast la-Shāyast*¹ (xiii. 17 [*SBE* v. (1880) 360]), there were six hot ordeals. Fire itself would, naturally, constitute at least one, and, in various forms, possibly more than one of the six. The instance, already referred to, in which Zoroaster is described as walking on fires, would seem to indicate that such a form involved bodily contact with that element²—its sacred character notwithstanding. On the other hand, if we accept a reference to an ordeal, so called, as implicit in *Ys.* xxxi. 3, no physical contact is presupposed. The revelation, or 'decision' between the 'disputants,' for which the prophet prays, was evidently expected by the discernment, through the spirit, of the form or colour or some other visible feature of the sacred fire. In the strict and narrower sense of the term the process was not a case of ordeal; it was rather an instance of divination, the ordeal being really a species of divination (see also art. DIVINATION [Vedic], vol. iv. p. 829). But in the Pahlavi books the name 'ordeal' (*varīh*) is applied to both indiscriminately. The sacred twig, or *barsom*, ordeal (*baresmōk varīh*), mentioned more than once in these books, belongs to the same category (see *Dink.* viii. xxxviii. [*SBE* xxxvii. 121 ff.]). Whether we should deduce from the passage, 'The *Gāthās* for an ordeal of the spiritual existence' (*ib.* ix. xvii. 8), that those hymns had a similar function it is impossible to determine. It may be nothing more than a metaphorical expression. The whole passage is obscure.

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The water employed for this ordeal contained incense, brimstone, and molten gold. The formula recited at the performance of this rite was as follows:

'Before the Amshaspand Bahman, before the Amshaspand Ardibehesht, here lighted up . . . I swear that I have nothing of what is thine, N. son of N., neither gold, nor silver, nor brass, nor clothes, nor any of the things created by Ormazd' (*SBE* iv. 49, note 2).

Among the cold ordeals, one of the most frequently resorted to would appear to be that by poison. From the illustration in which the *Dāstān-i-Dīnik* (xxxvii. 74 [*SBE* xviii. (1882) 102,

¹ That work also claims to incorporate much material from lost *nasks* of the Avesta. See M. Haug, *Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsis*⁴, London, 1907, p. 106.

² But see *Dink.* viii. xx. 42 (*SBE* xxxvii. [1892] 59).

feld, Leipzig, 1866, i. 86; F. Spiegel, *Erän. Alterthumskunde*, ed. 1871-78, i. 96, 598; A. V. W. Jackson, *Persia Past and Present*, New York and London, 1906, p. 311 f.).

¹ Cf. *Dink.* vii. vii. 2 (*SBE* xlvii. 82).

² See Jackson, *Zoroaster*, New York and London, 1893, p. 97.

and note, p. 102f.]) refers to this ordeal, it would appear that the two litigants chose each a particular kind of poison, and each took or was supposed to take his own and his opponent's poison. Frequently, however, a dishonest litigant substituted an innocent powder for his own poison. But nemesis always followed, since he could not avoid taking his opponent's. The more cautious litigant took his opponent's poison, but trusted to being able to diagnose the nature of that poison, and then selected as his own one that was its antidote, and thus himself survived.

Associated with the ordeal of walking on fires and that of pouring molten metal on the bosom, and devoted to the same purpose, was the surgical ordeal:

'Cutting with a knife and the vital parts becoming visible. . . with a flowing forth of blood; and, after the hands had been rubbed over it, it became healed' (*Zāt-Sparam*, xxi. 26 [*SBE* xlvii. 159]).

One further aspect under which the Iranians practised ordeal was that of excessive eating (*pāūrū-khūrānō*). The *Dinkart*, detailing the contents of the *Nikādum Nask*, attributes to it the efficacy of causing escape from distress by bailiffs (VIII. xx. 33).

5. Regulations governing performance of ordeals.—The choice of, and preparation for, as well as the actual performance of, an ordeal were subject to very detailed and carefully systematized rules, embodied mainly, it would appear, in the *Sakādum* and *Nikādum*¹ *Nasks* (see *Shāyast la-Shāyast*, x. 25). Scarcely any of the rules themselves, but only an enumeration of the points upon which regulations existed, are given in the Pahlavi analyses of those *nasks*. As regards the choice of the ordeal, several questions would emerge—among them, probably always, whether the ordeal was to be severe or one that was not severe (*Dink*. VIII. xxxviii. 64). Whether the rank of the subject influenced that decision in Irān, as was the case elsewhere (see art. DIVINATION [Vedic]), we have but little if any documentary evidence upon which to base any conclusion. The *Dinkart* speaks of an ordeal that was 'not that for their own station, but that for the station of others' (VIII. xx. 12 [*SBE* xxxvii. 55]). But that passage admits of various interpretations.

The priest or righteous man presided over the performance and acted as judge of the outcome of the ordeal (*ib.* 56, 67). Attendants had their prescribed functions, probably to attend to the various appliances (*ib.* 16). In the case of the ordeal by fire, wood of a particular character was prescribed and used after special preparation (*ib.* 41).

References to certain rules—such, e.g., as those for protecting the limbs during ordeal (*ib.* 14)—shed some light on the extent to which, after all, the system of ordeals was really believed in as an instrument of divine revelation.

6. The ordeal in relation to eschatology.—The authors of the Avesta (*Ys*. xliii. 4, li. 9), and the followers of the 'good religion' generally, evidently believed that Ahura Mazda would bring his mighty work to its final consummation by a great ordeal by fire and molten metal (*ayah khsrušta*) through which the righteous and the wicked were destined to pass, and which was to act as the great sifter and final separator of true believers from those who had refused to believe (see *Bundahishn*, xxx. 20 [*SBE* v. 126]; A. V. W. Jackson, in *PAOS*, Oct. 1890, pp. 58-61; J. H. Moulton, *Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913, p. 158, note 1).

LITERATURE.—To the works referred to in the course of the article it remains to add W. Geiger, *Civilization of the Eastern Iranians in Ancient Times*, tr. Dastur Peshotan Sanjānā, London, 1885-86, pp. 43-45. E. EDWARDS.

¹ The *Hūspāram* and *Babō Nask*s also had references to ordeals.

ORDEAL (Malagasy).—The custom of judicial trials or judgments of God, i.e. ordeals, was widespread throughout the island of Madagascar down to the time of its conquest by France; it took the place of inquiry and trial in criminal matters.

Whenever a person was accused of a crime in Madagascar (murder, theft, and especially witchcraft), and had not been taken *in flagrante delicto*—which was usually the case with pretended sorcerers, to whom were attributed illnesses, misfortunes of all kinds, and even death—recourse was had to the ordeal. Among certain tribes—e.g., the Merina—all the slaves employed in the interior of the palace, before being allowed to exercise their respective functions, had to submit to it in order to show if they had any evil intentions or if they were sorcerers, and, down to the time of Radama II., princes and persons of high rank took the same precautions with regard to their cooks; otherwise they would not have touched the food served to them.

The 'guilty' were always put to death by being beaten with sticks and stones, for the shedding of a sorcerer's blood—impure blood, which was supposed to defile the earth—was avoided, and, as a rule, his body was not buried, but given as food to the dogs and wild animals; it was imperative that no part of him should remain on this earth, that he should be completely annihilated, and that even his *manes* might not come in contact with those of honest men. Not only were his belongings confiscated and divided among the chief of the country, the magistrate, and the accuser, but often his wives and children were regarded as participants in his 'crime' and were sold as slaves; they, however, and his near relatives, had to abjure all complicity with the criminal. On the other hand, an indemnity was paid by the accuser to the one who came forth victorious from the ordeal.

Ordeals by poison, by boiling water or red-hot iron, by wild animals (crocodiles), as well as by sacred food or water, were in use in Madagascar until the year 1895. The earliest inhabitants mentioned in history—the Vazimba—did not make use of ordeals, as we know not only from traditions in Imerina, but also from the stories of those who still inhabit the Menabé; but, since the 17th cent. at least, they have been in use throughout the whole island, although all the tribes did not have recourse to the same ones. They seem to be due in the east, north, and west, and afterwards in Imerina, to the Jewish immigrants who came from Yemen long ago, and in the south to the Arabs who have come to settle in those districts since the 16th century. To the former are due the ordeal by poison, by the *tanghin*, which is similar to the bitter waters of the Jews, and which was practised in the north and the centre, and to the latter those by red-hot iron, boiling water, and crocodiles, which were practised in the south.

Until recent years the Malagasy believed in the infallibility of these tests, which they applied to all crimes and to all classes of individuals; innocent persons themselves often requested to be subjected to them when they felt that they were being suspected. They were applied sometimes to isolated persons, sometimes to groups, villages, or even whole cantons.

1. Ordeal by poison (*tanghin* or *kisompa*; north of 20° S. lat.).—(a) The *tanghin* (*Tanghinia venenifera*) is a beautiful tree of the family of Apocynaceæ, which grows abundantly in the wooded parts of the east and north; its fruit, which is of a yellowish colour and the size of a small peach, forms towards the middle of November and is ripe at the end of December; in the middle of a soft greyish pulp, which has a bitter, disagreeable taste, it contains a woody nut, with a rough surface;

inside the nut is a highly poisonous kernel, which changes in colour, when ripening, from white to a brownish-red; the red kernels are the most poisonous. The poison, whether inoculated under the skin or introduced into the stomach, produces the same effects, only not so quickly in the latter case; it stops the movements of the heart and is a general convulsant; the symptoms are considerable difficulty in breathing, uneasiness, nausea, and vomiting, increasing weakness, without convulsions or cries, but with some moaning; death is due to paralysis of the heart. The *tanghin*, which in large doses is a very violent poison, in small doses acts as a powerful emetic; the riper the kernel, and the nearer it is scraped to the germ, the greater is its toxicity. The *mpanozon-doha* (lit. 'he who administers') had therefore every facility for grading the dose of the poison according to his interests.

On the east coast, when a person was accused or even merely suspected of witchcraft, he was called upon to undergo the *tanghin* test: the kernel of a fruit gathered on the ground, and therefore very poisonous, was simply rubbed on a stone, over which a little water was then poured; this the accused drank, and his death decided his guilt. The wife and children of the guilty man became the slaves of the accuser. In the north-west, among certain tribes—the Bezanozano, the Sakalava, and the Antankarana—the *tanghin* was given to young chickens when a stranger arrived in order to find out whether he had good or bad intentions, and whether it was wise to form a connexion with him.

The *tanghin* ordeal was brought, as was said above, by the colonists who came from Yemen. During the reign of the third king of Javanese origin, Andrianjaka (1640-65), the chief, Andrianentoarivo, who had got some *tanghin* nuts from Ravo, a Sakalava king of the north-west, introduced it among the Vonizongo, whence it spread throughout the remainder of Imerina in the reign of Andriamasinavalona (1696-1740).

After making sure of the efficacy of the 'drink,' as they called it, by making a chicken (*mamono sotry*) swallow some of the gratings of the *tanghin* kernel, they put some of it into a *sosoa* ('rice-soup'), which the accused person ate; if he fell ill, he was declared guilty, and if he vomited, without any other discomfort, he was declared innocent.

The grandson of Andriamasinavalona, Andriambelomasina (1755-76), introduced modifications into this practice—notably that the accused had to swallow three pieces, the size of a finger, of the skin of an aroida, the *songo*; if he vomited the three pieces, he was declared innocent; if not, he was recognized as guilty, and was put to death. Under Andrianampoinimerina (1787-1810) these were replaced by three fragments of the skin of a hen, each two centimetres square, and for the rice-water (*ranom-bary*) they substituted the *ranon-koba* ('flour-soup'); it was also in the reign of this king that in lawsuits and disputes the *tanghin* was given to dogs or fowls.

Since the beginning of the 19th cent. the circumstances connected with the ceremony of the administration of *tanghin* have changed very little; they were always marked by great solemnity.

The men who were present did not wear *sadika* (Malagasy breeches), and the women had bare shoulders, the *lamba* being fastened under the arms; the magistrate went to the person who was denounced as a sorcerer or a rebel, and arrested him wherever he was, saying to him: '*Sarobabay!*' ('Alas! I am very sorry [to arrest you, but it is the king's command]'), and the *tanghin* was administered on the spot. The test took place during the day, but the house was hermetically closed in order that the darkness might be complete; a candle was lit, and there were brought a calabash full of water which had been put underground during the night, 'not having seen the sun,' two

chickens, which had to undergo the preliminary test to find out the toxicity of the poison, a hen, which was killed in order to get the three pieces of skin, and a *tandroho* ('fishing-net'), in which the suspect was to vomit. The accuser had then to swear that he was not accusing for the purpose of harming an enemy, but that he was telling the truth. Then two *tanghin* kernels were taken, and, in order to make sure of the uniformity of the poison, a half of each of them was rubbed on a stone or on a sort of rasp moistened with a little juice taken from the trunk of a young plantain during the repetition of cabalistic words. The suspect had first to swallow a little rice; then the officiant, placing his hand on the accused's head, addressed an invocation to the *tanghin*, beginning with the words: 'Listen, listen carefully! Be attentive! *Manamango!* You are only a simple seed, quite round, without eyes, and yet you see clearly, without ears and you hear, without a mouth and you speak! By means of you God shows us his wishes!' They watched the suspect to see the effect of the *tanghin*, or gave him a drink of rice-water, and what he vomited was carefully caught in the basket in order to see if he put up the three pieces of skin, which had not only to be thrown up, but to be untouched, neither chewed nor rolled. Neither must he, in his efforts to vomit, fall with his head to the south—which was an 'evident' proof that he was a sorcerer. When his guilt was declared, his relatives, who had all been present at the test, retired, showing all the horror with which he inspired them from that time.

The number of victims to the *tanghin* is considerable, and difficult to estimate exactly. The popular belief is that one person in every five of those who take it dies. Now, during last century about one-tenth of the population of Madagascar were subjected to the test—which means the death of 40,000 to 50,000 individuals in a generation, i.e. 1500 to 2000 every year.

(b) In the west, in Menabé and further north, where the *tanghin* does not grow, the inhabitants used instead the root of the *kisomparavy* (lit. 'the female *kisompa*' [*Menaboa vcnenata*]), which acted on the medullary nervous system; only the members of a certain family had the right to gather it, and it was very carefully guarded in the house in which were kept the *jiny*, or relics of the dead Sakalava kings.

The accused was led to the north of the enclosure of the king, and his *aoaly* ('talisman') were removed, his hair was untwisted, and made to stand on end, and he was placed on the ground; one of the great chiefs of the country rubbed a piece of the root mentioned on a flat stone, slightly damp, invoking the ancestors of the king, the dead Maroseranana. When a sufficient dose of poison was rubbed down, another chief made some pellets of rice which had been cooked the previous night; the patient swallowed them, and then lay on his face and licked up and swallowed the poison paste on the stone. He was next led into one of the huts situated in the western part of the village, where *fihetsa* ('soldiers') kept him in sight, watching his movements—for he had not to scratch himself, to chase away a fly with his hands, to rave, or to vomit, under pain of being instantly put to death by blows of *akalo* ('drum-sticks'), sticks, and stones. As a rule, the corpse was dragged outside the village, on the west side, and abandoned as food for the dogs and wild animals.

2. Ordeals by red-hot iron, boiling water, or crocodiles.—These ordeals were sometimes practised indifferently by one and the same tribe, sometimes one or other of them was peculiar to a particular tribe. Before subjecting the accused to the test, the officiant always addressed a prayer to God to ask Him to make known the truth—a prayer which, except for the constant repetitions and redundancies in all Malagasy speeches, was always practically the same:

'Pay great attention, iron (or boiling water, or crocodile), listen carefully to what I am going to say to you. Do not burn (or do not kill) without reason. We have not caught the accused in the act; we have only suspicions, but, if he is really a sorcerer, an assassin, a thief, may his tongue be burned (or may his hand be scalded, or may the crocodiles devour him), let him die! But, O God of our fathers, if he is innocent, do not let him succumb, one, two, three, four, five, six times let him come forth triumphantly from this test, but the seventh, if he is guilty, may his tongue be burned (or may his hand be scalded, or may the crocodile devour him), and let him die.'

(a) In the ordeal by red-hot iron the iron was usually heated with wood of a special kind, during the prayer of the officiant, who afterwards touched the tongue of the accused three times (Antambahoaka), four times (Mahafaly and Antandroy), or seven times (Betsimisaraka of the south and the Antanosy), or else made him lick the iron once

(Antifheranana and Betsileo), after a few scrapings of a royal *hazomanitra* ('sacred wood') had been put on it.

(b) In the ordeal by boiling water the accused, as a rule, had, without burning his hand, to take a pebble out of a pot half-full of boiling water, into which had been thrown some cow-dung and a few tamarind leaves (if, during the preparations, two dogs fought, if a crow flew over the gathering, if a house in the village went on fire, if bad news was heard, or if the accused let the stone fall, he was at once declared guilty); he had afterwards to lay down the stone beside the royal *hazomanitra* and cover his hand for twenty-four hours, but during all that time he was watched so that he might not apply a remedy. If he then had blisters on his hand, he was declared guilty.

(c) In the ordeal by crocodiles the accused was conducted to the bank of a river, which, after the necessary harangue, he crossed twice; if he came out of this test unharmed his accusers usually paid him as indemnity two oxen, then two others, one for the chief and one for the magistrate.

LITERATURE. — J. Chatin, *Recherches pour servir à l'hist. botanique, chimique et physiologique du tanguin de Madagascar*, Paris, 1873; H. H. Cousins, 'Tanghin or the Poison Ordeal of Madagascar', *Antandranarivo Annual*, 1896, pp. 385-388; J. Sibree, 'A Malagasy Ordeal among the Tatsimo', *ib.*, 1876, pp. 65-71, *The Great African Island*, London, 1880; A. and G. Grandidier, *Hist. physique, naturelle et politique de Madagascar*, Paris, 1903-16, vol. iv. (in the press); and for complete literature see G. Grandidier, *Bibliographie de Madagascar*, do. 1905-06, p. 882. G. GRANDIDIER.

ORDEAL (Roman).—The nature of an ordeal has been explained above (p. 507), and all that is necessary here is to bring into line such vestiges of primitive ritual relating to ordeals as can be discovered in the Roman tradition, and the legendary stories which appear to show that a system of ordeals was at one time familiar to the Italian peoples. Not only are the materials scanty, but the elucidation of them is the more difficult because Latin literature is so largely dependent upon Greek models that it constantly tends to represent as native what is actually of alien origin. This qualification must always be borne in mind, even where the evidence is not on the surface such as to awaken suspicion.

1. Fire ordeal.—One of the commonest forms of ordeal is that in which the guilt or innocence of an accused person is tested by fire, *i.e.*, according to his ability or failure to endure unscathed the contact either of the fire itself or of a substance such as iron made red-hot by fire. Vergil puts into the mouth of the Etruscan Arruns the statement that his countrymen, while worshipping Apollo on Mt. Soracte, were enabled, owing to the strength of their piety, to walk through the flames, bearing live embers (*Æn.* xi. 785 ff.). It is probable that Vergil is alluding to the survival of an ancient rite in which Apollo had succeeded to the place of honour previously occupied by Vediovis in his capacity of an under-world god (G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, Munich, 1902, p. 191). Pliny (*HN* vii. 19) describes the immunity from the effects of fire as belonging to certain households known as Hirpi, who on that account were exempt from military and other State burdens. Varro (*ap. Serv. in Verg. loc. cit.*) ascribed their insensibility to the use of an ointment which they spread over the soles of their feet before exposing them to the fire. From Silius Italicus (v. 175 ff.) we get a clearer impression of the ritual: the celebrant was required to pass three times through the fire bearing offerings to the god, which, if successful, he deposited on the altar. One might guess that the aspirant to initiation in the order of the Hirpi, before securing his admission, made public celebration of his proficiency.

The word *hirpus* signified 'a wolf' in the Sabine dialect (Strabo, p. 250), and an aetiological explanation of the rite preserved by Servius declares that wolves robbed the *exta* from the altar of Dis pater, that they were pursued by the shepherds as far as a hollow which emitted pestilential vapours, that an epidemic followed, and that an oracle promised relief to the sufferers on condition that they imitated the wolves by living on plunder. We infer that the wolf-priests, who, so far as their name is concerned, may be compared with the Luperci Quinctiales and Fabiani in Rome (Wissowa, p. 483, n. 6), were the human representatives of the malignant power whose anger it was essential to appease.

A number of similar cases of walking through fire from India, China, and elsewhere have been collected by Frazer (*GB*³, pt. vii., *Balder the Beautiful*, London, 1913, ii. 1-20), who concludes that the fire-walk was in its origin a form of purification, the flames being thought either to burn up or to repel the powers of evil (see also W. F. Otto, in Pauly-Wissowa, viii. 1934 f., and art. FIRE-WALKING, vol. vi. p. 30). So far as the evidence goes, the Latin rite had not become an ordeal in the sense that its successful performance was used to establish the innocence of an accused person, and is therefore an incomplete parallel to the proceedings referred to by Sophocles (*Ant.* 264 ff., as quoted above, p. 521^a). The case of Mucius Scaevola voluntarily thrusting his arm into the flame (Livy, ii. 12f.) is essentially different; his purpose was not to declare his innocence by immunity, but to prove his courage by suffering. Nor can we attach any importance to the statement of the scholiast on Soph. *Ant.*, *loc. cit.*, who, in attributing the practice of touching molten iron to the Romans of his own day, was apparently speaking of the Byzantine period (R. Hirzel, *Der Eid*, p. 199). It is probable therefore that allusions to walking through fire as a type of extreme danger (Prop. i. 5. 5; Hor. *Carm.* ii. 1. 7) should be regarded as literary reproductions due to Greek influence.

2. Other similar tests.—There are more definite traces of the employment of other tests similar to the fire ordeal. An isolated instance of what Grimm called the *iudicium offæ* is recorded by the Horatian commentator Acron (on Hor. *Epist.* i. 10. 10). When slaves were suspected of theft, they were taken to a priest, who gave to each of them a crust of bread magically drugged. The culprit was discovered by the bread sticking in his throat. 'To pour water into a sieve' was a proverbial image used to express futile labour (Plaut. *Pseud.* 102); yet it was said that Tuccia, a Vestal virgin charged with unchastity, had successfully cleared her character by the invocation of Vesta to become her witness by enabling her to draw water from the Tiber and convey it thence in a sieve to the temple of the goddess (Val. Max. viii. 1, abs. 5; Pliny, *HN* xxviii. 12; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* ii. 69). Another Vestal, Emilia, who, while in charge of the sacred fire, had temporarily entrusted it to a novice, with the result that it became extinguished, freed herself and the whole community from the suspicion of an undiscovered taint by submitting to the judgment of the goddess as a test of her purity. Although the altar was absolutely cold and not a spark remained among the ashes, a sudden flame at once broke out and spread itself over the linen girdle which the priestess had thrown on the slab (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* ii. 68). A similar story was current regarding Claudia Quinta, a Roman matron of blenished reputation, who successfully accomplished the self-imposed task of drawing off from a sandbank in the Tiber the ship which had struck there when conveying to Rome the statue of the Great Mother (Ov. *Fast.* iv. 305 ff.). Another chastity ordeal is recorded in connexion with a dragon's cave in the precinct of the temple of Juno at Lavinium (*Ælian, Nat. An.* xi. 16). On

stated occasions the priestesses entered the cave blindfolded, bearing a barley-cake to be consumed by the dragon. So long as they remained chaste, the sacred animal accepted their offering; but, if it was sensible of pollution, the cake was left untouched, and was subsequently broken into small fragments and removed from the precinct by the ants which acted as cleansers. The guilty woman was then traced and punished.

In some of these cases the offer immediately to submit to the test converts a protestation of innocence on oath into a trial by ordeal. For the test of an ordeal as contrasted with an oath lies exactly in the willingness of the swearer to invoke the immediate fulfilment of the curse (E. B. Tylor, in *EBR*¹ xx. 174, s.v. 'Ordeal'; Hirzel, p. 211). An example of what is actually an ordeal, though known as an oath, may be taken from the mysterious cult of the Palici in Sicily (Verg. *Æn.* ix. 585). Their sanctuary contained a fountain which rose to the height of some 10 ft. and again subsided. Here a sacred oath might be taken, with the result that, when its terms were inscribed on a tablet and thrown into the water, the tablet would float, if the words of the oath were true, but, if they were false, it would sink, and the perjurer was consumed with fire (Steph. Byz. p. 496, 14; [Arist.] *Mir. Ausc.* 58).¹ The scantiness of the literary evidence suggests that the practice of ordeals disappeared at a very early time, probably owing to the encouragement which the system offered to the fraudulent devices of the priests. According to the best authorities, there is no trace of them to be found in the Roman criminal law, and the nearest approach to one was the custom of allowing a criminal who was thrown over the Tarpeian rock to go free if he escaped unhurt after the execution of his sentence (H. F. Hitzig, in *Zum ältesten Strafrecht der Kulturvölker* [Fragen zur Rechtsvergleichung gestellt von Th. Mommsen], Leipzig, 1905, p. 44). So far as private law is concerned, it has been conjectured that the oldest form of civil process (*legis actio sacramento*) was the survival of an earlier ordeal (R. von Ihering, *Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz*, Leipzig, 1891, p. 385 ff.). In general, however, the place of ordeals was taken by the oath in the case of citizens and the torture applied to extract the truth from slaves (W. Smith, *Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Antiquities*, London, 1890-91, ii. 852^b). The exculpatory oath (*iusiurandum in iure*), if accepted by either party when proffered to him by his opponent, furnished a complete defence (*exceptio iusiurandi*) to any further proceedings on the same issue. In primitive jurisprudence oaths were of the highest importance, but in the developed system of the later republic and the early empire the challenge to an oath and its refusal had become so entirely the instruments of the pleader's chicanery that Quintilian discusses (*Inst. Or.* v. 6) the various ways in which an orator should make use of them.

3. Ordeal by battle.—The custom of ordeal by battle has left traces more easily recognizable. We are informed that the Umbrians down to historical times were accustomed to submit their private disputes to decision by fighting in full armour, and that the disputant who succeeded in slaying his opponent was considered to have established the justice of his case (Nicol. Damasc. *ap. Stob. Flor.* x. 70 [*FBG* iii. 457]). This has been compared with the survival until recent times of the Vehmgericht in Westphalia and the blood-fend in the mountains of Corsica and Sardinia (H. Jordan, *Die Könige im alten Italien*, Berlin, 1887, p. 44 f.). That the same principle extended to

claims to office may be seen from the famous example of the *Rex nemorensis* at Nemi; and the legends which tell of the violent deaths suffered by several of the Roman kings (Livy, i. 14, 48; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* iv. 38) have suggested that they habitually gained the throne by success in mortal combat (*GB*³, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, London, 1911, ii. 321). However this may be, there are not infrequent examples in early Roman history in which the decision of a quarrel between two nations is made to depend upon the result of a single combat between champions selected from the armies of either side.¹ The idea seems to be that the selection of champions who are equally matched or at any rate representative of the power of the respective opponents leaves the issue to the decision of the gods, who, as it is believed, will award the victory to the just cause.² In the contest between Æneas and Turnus, which in its details clearly suggests that it was an ordeal by single combat between representatives of the Trojans and Rutulians, the judgment of heaven is figured by the balance in the hands of Juppiter—an image borrowed by Vergil from Homer (*Æn.* xii. 725 ff.). Romulus, the legendary founder of the city of Rome, was challenged to single combat by Acron, the king of the Cæminenses, and his success was the occasion of the earliest dedication of the *spolia opima* (Plut. *Rom.* 16). The desire to procure an equal arbitrament appears clearly in the arrangements made for the combat between the Horatii and the Curiatii, who were selected as equally matched in number, age, and strength (Livy, i. 23 f.). T. Manlius took up the challenge of a gigantic Gaul, who, when the opposing armies were ranged opposite to each other on either side of the Anio, offered to decide the issue by the result of a duel between himself and the bravest man on the Roman side. The Gaul was slain and Manlius earned his cognomen Torquatus from the collar which he stripped from the neck of his fallen enemy (*ib.* vii. 9 f.). On a later occasion of the same kind M. Valerius received the manifest favour of the gods in the appearance of the raven which, by settling on his helmet, harassed and discomfited his adversary (*ib.* vii. 28).

LITERATURE.—Besides the references given throughout see K. H. Funkhanel, 'Gottesurtheil bei Griechen und Römern,' *Philologus*, ii. [1847] 385-402; R. Hirzel, *Der Eid: ein Beitrag zu seiner Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1902, esp. pp. 182-220.

A. C. PEARSON.

ORDEAL (Slavic).—Ordeal plays a part in the customs of almost all branches of the Slavic race, and of the Balkan Slavs especially. The attitude of Russia towards judicial combat and ordeal seems to show the influence of Scandinavian custom, and is therefore less typical of Slavic mentality.

Ordeal appears to have been known to the Czech peoples at an early day; thus, in Bohemia in the early 11th cent., under Duke Brzctislav, the *judicium Dei* seems to be the only form of evidence in a case where proof was difficult, as in a charge of cruelty brought against a husband by a wife. In the early 14th cent. redaction of Bohemian law by Rosenberg (called rather unwarrantably *Práva Země Česká*, or 'Law of the Czech Country,' by A. Kucharski, *Älteste Denkmäler der slowenischen Rechte*, Warsaw, 1838, pp. 227-335) ordeal has apparently disappeared, and its place has been taken by the system of compurgation. In a still later redaction of the same century, the *Rad prava zemského*, or *Ordo iudicii terræ*, the

¹ Good examples of single combats as applied in Germany and Spain to the settlement of public and private quarrels are given by Tac. *Germ.* 10 and Livy, xxviii. 21. 4 ff.

² Cf. Prop. iv. (v.) 6. 51 f. Such is also the implication of the familiar *Mars communis* (Cic. *de Orat.* iii. 167). The decision in battle is given by a veritable judgment of God: 'tunc ea habenda fortuna crit quam di dederint' (Livy, xxx. 30. 22).

¹ The account of Polemo followed by Macrobius (v. 19. 21, 26 ff.) is more indefinite.

chief test is the duel; thus, in a charge of murder, a judicial combat could be ordered. It was conducted with great formality, and was attended with ceremonies peculiar to the Czechs; the victor cut off the head of the vanquished, and placed it between the knees of the dead body; he then laid two dollars on the body and departed, safe from pursuit by the avengers of blood (tit. 26; Kucharski, *op. cit.* p. 436). Here too appears another peculiarity of Bohemian duelling customs; a woman over eighteen years of age, or a widow, could claim to fight her own duel, and was indeed encouraged to do so, in preference to choosing a champion, lest the life of an innocent man might be endangered. Her adversary was handicapped by being made to stand in a pit up to the waist; both man and woman were similarly equipped with sword and buckler (tit. 40; *ib.* p. 440). The peasant who, in fighting against a noble, had formerly been limited to a stick and small shield was now allowed to use sword and full-sized shield (tit. 37; *ib.* p. 440). Offences of damage done to harvests and gardens were once tested by ordeals of boiling water or red-hot iron; but now the iron ordeal was abolished, the redactor being of opinion that it had been instituted as a deterrent to the people rather than from any fear of God (tit. 53; *ib.* p. 446). Polish custom of the 13th cent. under Boleslav V. was very similar to Bohemian as regards the duel, which was not obligatory, but could be claimed by an accuser unconvinced by the witnesses. Ordeals of hot iron and of hot and cold water seem to have been merely alternatives to the duel.

Among the South Slavs ordeal is varyingly found. Stephen, founder of the Hungarian monarchy early in the 11th cent., apparently did not know of it; but after the conversion of the Magyars it is well established in the laws of the end of the same century (cf. I. de Batthyán, *Leg. Eccles. Hung.*, Claudiopolis, 1785, i. 439, 454). It is unknown in the monuments of the 13th cent.; the statute of Matthew of Slavonia (1273) knows oath and judicial combat, and that of Vinodol (1288) recognizes oath only. Serbian law, however, had full cognizance of ordeal, and the code of the emperor Stephen Dushan in the 14th cent. gave great prominence to it. Hot-water ordeal is held in such respect that a man convicted by means of it has no possibility of appeal or justification (tit. 64; Kucharski, *op. cit.* p. 186). This was the test for any charge against a commoner, but the oath was sufficient for a nobleman (tit. 78; *ib.* p. 189). A man charged with theft had to carry hot iron from the door of the church to the altar; this ordeal, formerly known as the *pravod sheljézo*, is now designated by a word of Turkish origin, *mazija*, and the hot-water ordeal (*na vodon*) is still practised in Serbia and Bosnia.

The ordeal is known in Russian law, but never plays a very important part. The earliest written monuments, the treaties between Russia and Greece of the 10th cent., show no sign of ordeals, but use only the oath; this may, however, be due to consideration for the Greeks, or to the lack of scope for such tests in treaties primarily commercial. The first Russian code, the *Russkaia Pravda* of Jaroslav in the 11th cent., reflects much of Scandinavian judicial ideas, but it is not until a 12th cent. revision of it that ordeals by iron and water appear (tit. 28; cf. J. Esneaux, *Hist. de Russie*, Paris, 1830, i. 181). The first mention of the judicial duel is in treaties of the 12th cent. between the princes of Novgorod and the Germans, and it does not appear as fully regulated until the late 15th cent., in the Decree of Pskov. Ivan III. attempted in his *Oulogenia* of 1497 to harmonize the old law with the new influences which had come in from

the Mongols, and more especially from Byzantium; the result was that the judicial duel is secondary to oral and written testimony and to the oath as a means of proof, and is further robbed of its danger to life by being fought with a short club for sole weapon (cf. Rambaud, *Hist. de la Russie*, tr. L. B. Lang, London, 1879, i. 248). Judicial duel thus lessened in importance, but still persisted until the reign of Ivan the Terrible, when the new code of 1550, the *Soudebnik*, completed the transformation from the tolerant native customs to a criminal code of the harshest severity. The attitude of the Russian Church, influenced by the Greek clergy, favoured this change, and may be contrasted with the early favour shown to ordeal by the Roman Church, the most striking instance of which occurs in the 12th cent. and is reported by Helmold (*Chron. Slav.* i. 24; Leibniz, *Script.*, Hanover, 1710, ii. 608); when Bishop Geroldus converted the Slavs of Mecklenburg, he replaced their primitive belief in oath-taking by trees, stones, and fountain with the custom of bringing criminals to the priest for examination by red-hot iron or by the hot ploughshares.

LITERATURE.—A. Rambaud, *Hist. de la Russie*, Paris, 1878, tr. L. B. Lang, London, 1879; R. Dareste, *Hist. du droit*, Paris, 1889, chs. vii.-x. M. E. SEATON.

ORDEAL (Teutonic).—Like most primitive peoples, the Teutons were adherents of the principles of the ordeal, and it seems possible to trace certain distinguishing characteristics of their mentality in the forms of ordeal particularly affected by them; thus the judicial duel was an attempt, by regularizing the blood-feud, to bring into play a rough and elementary kind of justice; so too the *corsned* of the Anglo-Saxons displays in the conditions of the test their shrewd, though perhaps only instinctive, common sense. It is doubtful whether the evidence on Teutonic ordeal throws any light on the two conflicting theories held on the origin of ordeal, the first and most generally accepted regarding it as an appeal to divine judgment, the second as 'an intrusion of magic into a purely legal idea' (cf. *MI* ii. 687, 690). If anything, the Teutonic evidence would appear to favour the religious origin, according to which divine aid is invoked in cases where man's knowledge is lacking, his judgment at fault, or his means of procuring reliable testimony limited. The use of inanimate objects in revealing the divine decision would be perfectly natural to people who had been familiarized by primitive belief and magic practices with the idea of supernatural qualities inherent in inanimate nature. As Hobhouse (*Morals in Evolution*², London, 1916, ch. iii. § 9, p. 116) suggests, the practice of the oath probably preceded that of the ordeal; but it did not carry conviction so forcibly, for its results were not immediately manifest; thus in early Scandinavian law the oath is called 'man's ordeal' in contradistinction to God's ordeal, 'and if a man first offer God's ordeal, he shall have no right afterwards to man's ordeal' (*Norges Gamle Løve*, i. 389).

There is very little actual evidence for Teutonic ordeal in pre-Christian times. Classical authorities throw little light upon it; there is a cursory reference in Velleius Paterculus (*Hist. Rom.* ii. 118) to the regulation by justice of disputes which the Germans formerly decided by arms. Tacitus (*Germ.* 10) does indeed describe a single combat, but its conditions are so different from that of the true ordeal that it must be regarded as a means of determining angry rather than justice. We can, however, assume the familiarity of the Teutonic peoples with ordeal from several circumstances: first, the prevalence of similar forms of ordeal among various Indo-Germanic peoples,

which points to its being a general Indo-Germanic institution (cf. Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgesch.* ii. 400). Certain customs and forms preserved in ordeals may indeed carry us back to great antiquity; F. W. Maitland (*Collected Papers*, Cambridge, 1911, ii. 448 f.) points out that the use of wooden weapons in certain judicial duels may indicate an origin before the Iron Age. It is very noteworthy that the names for the various ordeals in the different vernaculars are entirely free from any Christian significance. Again, this assumption is supported by the fact that one of the earliest extant Teutonic laws, the first text of the *Salic Law*, which was promulgated so soon after the introduction of Christianity among the Franks as to be practically unaffected by Christian belief, has two references to the *æneum*, or trial by boiling water, references so casual and so devoid of detail as to presuppose great familiarity with the circumstance (*Lex Salica*, i. 52, ed. J. M. Pardessus, Paris, 1840, pp. 30, 313). The early propagandists of Christianity among the Teutons did their best to put down ordeal, as against the spirit of Christian belief. Thus in the early 6th cent. Avitus, bishop of Vienne, remonstrated with King Gundobad on the importance assumed by the judicial duel in the Burgundian laws. In the 9th cent. Agobard, archbishop of Lyons, wrote in vigorous protest against all forms of ordeal, and against the judicial duel in particular (cf. *PL* civ. 113-126, 251, 254 B). Throughout the 9th and 10th centuries the ordeal was the subject of various condemnatory papal decrees; but the Church, unsuccessful in its early attempts, had been forced to adopt and adapt ordeal, and had done it so thoroughly that the lesser authorities proved reluctant to give it up, and disregarded the successive papal and episcopal enactments against it (cf. Lea, *Superstition and Force*, p. 355). The opposite point of view, that ordeals were not known to Germanic peoples, but were introduced by the Church, is upheld by Karl von Amira (Paul, *Grund. der germ. Phil.* vol. iii. sect. ix. B. 7, pp. 218-220).

The forms of ordeal vary slightly from one Teutonic people to another, although the chief kinds seem to have been known to all. Those chiefly practised by the Scandinavians were the duel (*hólmganga*), the carrying of hot iron (*jarnburðr*), the walking on hot ploughshares (*af skraganga*), and the passing under the turf-arch (*ganga undir jarðarmen*). The fullest account of wager by battle occurs in *Kormaks Saga*, 10, where the reference to the accompanying sacrifice of a steer and to the use of a ritual formula proves its religious significance, and the strictly regularized and safeguarded conditions of the fight testify to its legal validity (see *DUELING*). Saxo (v. 153) gives one enactment of the so-called Law of Froði: 'Any quarrel whatsoever should be decided by the sword'; but few of the many wagers by battle of which he speaks are strictly ordeals (see F. Y. Powell's *Introd. to O. Elton's tr.*, London, 1894, p. 38f.), many being merely those trials of strength in which the champions delighted. In the same way the alleged power of the berserks to bite steel, to swallow hot coals, and to go through fire (cf. Saxo, vii. 221) were probably confused in the popular mind with the corresponding ordeal-trials, although exhibited for no other purpose than proof of supernatural strength or endurance. The fight between Thór and Oláfr Tryggvason at Randsey may perhaps be regarded as a trial of strength, but also surely as a religious test, similar to Elijah's test between Baal and Jahweh (see *Saga Ólafs Konings Tryggvasonar*, 150 [*Fornmanna Sögur*, i.]).

The carrying of hot iron appears as a religious ordeal in the famous story of Bishop Poppo and King Haraldr Gormsson of Denmark, whom he

converted to Christianity. There are many discrepancies in the various versions of the tale (cf. J. Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*, p. 576 f.), but one of the most trustworthy (Adam of Bremen, *Gesta Hammaburg.* ii. 33; *Mon. Germ. Script.* vii. 318) represents the heathens as demanding the sign ('cum barbari suo more signum quaerent'). Vigfusson, however, considers the ordeal by hot iron to have been introduced into Scandinavia from Germany with the advent of Christianity, and to have superseded the *hólmganga* and the *ganga undir jarðarmen* (R. Cleasby and G. Vigfusson, *Icelandic-English Dictionary*, Oxford, 1874, s.v. 'Bera' A. iii.). One interesting use of the ordeal by hot iron was to establish a claim to paternity, a use to which it was frequently put during the civil wars in Norway, in order to prove the pretensions of claimants to the throne; thus in *Sverris Saga*, 59 (*Fornm. Sögur*, viii.), Eiríkr carries red-hot iron *ser til fadernis*, i.e. to prove his claim to be the son of King Sigurðr. Sometimes the test of endurance was further complicated by the obligation of hurrying the hot iron into a trough placed at a set distance; the iron is variously spoken of as a bar (*jarnslá*) or as a kind of gauntlet ('*ferrum . . . in modum chirothecae*'). A variant form of the *judicium ferri candenti* was that of walking on hot ploughshares; but this is found only rarely in Scandinavia; it does occur, however, as a paternity test (*Saga Sigurðar Jörðsalafara*, 47 [*Fornm. Sögur*, vii.]).

That form of the ordeal of boiling water which consisted in feeling for a stone in a kettle (*ketillak*, *ketilfang*) was not practised in Sweden and Denmark, but in Norway it assumes importance as the legal variant for *jarnburðr* in the trial of women. There is a noteworthy traditional instance of it in the Poetic Edda (*Guðrúnarkviða*): Guðrún, to clear herself of a shameful accusation, demands this ordeal, but asks King Atli to send for Saxi, lord of the Southmen, who understands the necessary ritual. This would seem to point to this form of ordeal not being Scandinavian in origin. In this version of the tale the stone is called *jarknastein*, properly a milk-white opal, a name which would seem to point to magic properties, for it is the word applied in *Völundarkviða*, 25, to the stones made by Völundr from the eyes of children. In Frisian law the ordeal of *keszselfang* was a last resort to convict the perjurer in a case where two opposing parties persisted in contradictory oaths on a conviction for theft (cf. *Asega Buch*, ed. T. D. Wiarda, Berlin and Stettin, 1805, p. 236).

The ordeal of throwing the accused into deep water (*judicium aquae frigidae*) is unknown in Scandinavian practice, although, as Grimm points out (*op. cit.* p. 586), some connexion may be traced with the sacrificial drowning at Upsala mentioned in Adam of Bremen (*Gesta Hammaburg.* iv. 26, Sch. 134; *M.G. Script.* vii. 379). The purely Scandinavian practice of creeping under a *jarðarmen*, or strip of turf detached from the ground, was not invariably a form of ordeal, but sometimes simply an infliction of disgrace (cf. 'jugum subire'); but it does occur as an ordeal in *Laxdæla Saga*, ch. 18. These forms of ordeal appear in all Teutonic countries with certain local variations and with the additions and deviations which ingenuity could suggest, or Christian practice could sanction. Thus Frisian law seems to be unique in recognizing an ordeal of twigs, a kind of drawing of lots, carried out with ecclesiastical ritual to discover a homicide (*Lex Frisionum*, 14. 1; *Mon. Germ. Leges*, iii. 631 ff.). Ordeals were early forbidden in Scandinavian countries; *hólmganga* was suppressed early in the 11th cent., although isolated instances of it occur later, and the vogue

revived in feudal times; ordeals in general were abolished in Norway in 1247 by Valdemar II.

In Old English usage the judicial duel was practically unknown, but curiously enough it became legally established in the very century in which it was abolished in Scandinavia (see *DUELLING*). The importance attached to ordeal is proved by the fact that in a treaty dating from the 10th cent., between the Anglo-Saxons and the Welsh, ordeals were appointed to settle all disputes between the two nations (*Ordinances of the Dunsetas*, 2; B. Thorpe, *Anc. Laws of England*, London, 1840, p. 150). Ordeals by hot water and hot iron were most frequent, and were strictly legalized and regulated by the laws of Edward, Æthelstan, and Æthelred. According to these enactments, ordeal was open to the freeman if he was unable to obtain the necessary number of compurgators for the oath (Æthelred, i. 1; Thorpe, p. 119). The serf was not given the choice of the oath, but forced to undergo the ordeal, unless his lord bought him off, and swore on his behalf (*ib.*); so too the coiner of false money (Æthelstan, i. 14; Thorpe, p. 88), or the freeman who by a former perjury had already forfeited the confidence of the community (Edward, 3; Thorpe, p. 69). In both water and iron ordeals an attempt was made, apparently peculiar to English law, to regulate the test, not only according to the nature of the offence, but also to the character of the offender. For a first offence the iron was of one pound weight, and the stone was hung to the depth of the wrist; for an offender whose character could not be vouched for by oath threefold ordeal was prescribed, in which the weight of iron was increased to three pounds, and the stone was hung to the depth of the elbow (Æthelred, i. 1; Thorpe, p. 119; Æthelstan, iv. 7; Thorpe, p. 96). Certain offences, such as incendiarism and murder, were proved by threefold ordeal only, but the accuser in this case had the choice of water ordeal or of iron ordeal (Æthelstan, iv. 6; Thorpe, p. 95). Like oaths, ordeals were not to be held on festivals and fasts (Edward and Guthrum, 9; Thorpe, p. 74); and in the ecclesiastical law the procedure both for the accused and for the officiating priest was fully described (Æthelstan, iv. 7; Thorpe, p. 96). Iron ordeal reappears in the laws of William the Conqueror and of Henry I. as an alternative to the duel in cases of dispute between individuals of French and English nationality (William I., iii. 12; Thorpe, p. 212; Henry I., lxxv. 6; Thorpe, p. 253). If Liebermann is correct in his contention that, in the Laws of Ine, 37 and 62 (Thorpe, pp. 54, 62), the word *ceape* should be emended to *ceace* ('kettle'), it would seem that the hot-water ordeal was prevalent in England at a much earlier date than is generally supposed (Liebermann, 'Kesselfang bei den Westsachsen im 7^{ten} Jahrh.', *SBZW*, 1896, ii. 829-835). References in the laws to water ordeal do not always make it clear whether the cold- or the hot-water ordeal is intended; but supplementary evidence can be gained from the rituals, which sometimes, by a reference such as that to the passage of the Israelites through the Red Sea, make it clear that the cold-water ordeal is in question (cf. Liebermann, *Gesetze der Angelsachsen*, vol. i. p. 404, § 20, vol. ii. pt. ii. s.v. 'Kaltwasser'). The late prevalence of this test in charges of witchcraft proves the tenacity of the idea of ordeal in the popular mind.

A form of ordeal which found particular favour in England was that of swallowing a morsel of bread or cheese (*judicium offae*); this was generally consecrated, but not always, and the lack of religious significance in the names given to the ordeal (*corsned*, 'trial-portion,' *nedbread*, 'forced bread') suggests that the test was practised in pre-

Christian times. This ordeal should not be confused with the oath taken on the sacrament, which was a more definitely religious ceremony, and almost entirely confined to the clergy (cf. Liebermann, vol. ii. pt. ii., under 'Geweihter Bissen,' 'Abendmahlsprobe'). The ordeal of walking on hot ploughshares does not occur in Old English law; but there is the famous story, traditional, though not well authenticated, of Queen Eilma, mother of Edward the Confessor, who thus cleared herself of an accusation of misconduct (J. Brompton, in R. Twysden, *Hist. Ang. Script.*, London, 1652, i. 942). The bier ordeal does not appear in Old English custom, although it is frequent in later practice as the conviction of a murderer. The ballad of 'Earl Richard' (Walter Scott, *Minstrelsy*, ii. 421) has one of the fullest of the many literary references to this belief that in the presence, or at the touch, of the murderer, the wounds of the dead body would 'open their congeal'd mouths and bleed afresh' (Shakespeare, *Richard III.*, i. ii.). A reference by James I. (*Daemonology*, III. vi.) shows the persistence of this belief; and W. Henderson (*Folk-lore of the Northern Counties*, London, 1879, p. 57) traces to this ordeal the custom lately prevalent in Durham, that every visitor to see a dead body should touch it, even though there might be no suspicion of violence.

Evidence is clear that ordeals soon fell into disrepute with the Norman kings; William Rufus declared his incredulity of the iron ordeal, as Eadmer tells in horror (*Hist. Nov.* 102, Rolls Series). Henry II. permitted the water ordeal to clear a man of a specific charge, but he nevertheless took the precaution of banishing him if he were of ill-repute (*Ass. Clar.* c. 14). The almost complete disappearance of ordeals from the records after the reign of John testifies to the thoroughness with which England, for the time entirely submissive to the papacy, accepted the decree of the fourth Lateran Council in 1215, excluding the clergy from participation in ordeals.

Ordeal plays so large a part in the law and customs of the remaining Teutonic peoples, especially of the Franks, that it is impossible to do more here than give a short summary of its course, and touch on representative examples; the later instances are so entirely ruled by ecclesiastical procedure that there is little distinctively Teutonic about them (cf. Ducange, *Glossarium*, Niort, 1883-87, s.vv. 'aquæ judicium,' 'ferrum candens,' 'ordallium'). The Visigoths, more influenced by Roman custom, seem to have favoured torture rather than ordeal as a means of proof, to judge by the absence of ordeal from the earlier redactions of the *Lex Visigothorum*; but in a 7th cent. code, probably by King Egica, there is an ordinance for hot-water ordeal, interesting for its wide territorial scope, and for the proof which it gives of trust in the validity of this form of test (*Lex Visigothorum*, VI. i. 3.; *M.G. Leges*, 1893, p. 250).

The Langobard treatment of ordeal is interesting in its variety. The Laws of Rothair (A.D. 643) make no mention of ordeal other than the duel, and that only in case of obstinacy on the part of an offender (Rothair, 198; *M.G. Leges*, iv. 342).

Luitprand (A.D. 731) ordains the duel as a test in a charge for the murder of a freeman, but at the same time he shows his distrust of a method retained only because of its antiquity: 'Quia incerti sumus de iudicio Dei, et multos audivimus per pugnam sine iustitia causam suam perdere, sed propter consuetudinem gentis nostrae Langobardorum legem ipsam vetare non possumus' (Luitprand, 118; *M.G. Leges*, iv. 156). It is not until the Langobard submission to the Franks that element ordeals play any part in Langobard

laws, as a result of their important place in Frankish codes. The Franks soon after their conversion Christianized the element ordeals, one of which had already appeared in the Salic Law (see above, p. 531*), but the Church strove against the duel; the Burgundian code, however, persisted in giving special prominence to it, and in the 6th cent. it was again legally recognized. Charlemagne was a convinced upholder of ordeal, especially of the unilateral forms. He recognized the duel, but attempted to replace it by a new form of bilateral ordeal, that of the cross, in which both plaintiff and defendant stood motionless, with arms outstretched against a cross; whichever first moved or let fall his arms was judged guilty. This is obviously a Christian ordeal, but its heathen prototype is found in the *stapfsaken*, or asseveration, with right hands outstretched, described in *de Populi Leg.*, tit. 6 (*M.G. Leges*, iii. 465). The cross ordeal first appears in Frankish law under Pepin (A.D. 753), for a claim of a woman against her husband. In Charlemagne's laws for the Franks it is the test for theft and for disputes of boundaries (*M.G. Capit.* i. 129); for the Lombards he makes it the alternative to the duel (*M.G. Leges*, iv. 511, tit. 130), but for other charges, such as certain murder-charges, decrees the nine ploughshares (*ib.* p. 507, tit. 104). The cross ordeal persisted in Lombard law until forbidden by Lothair in the early 9th cent., 'ne Christi passio . . . cujuslibet temeritate contemptum habeatur' (*ib.* p. 556, tit. 93); Lothair also applied to the Lombards the Frankish decree of his father, Louis the Pious, annulling the cold-water ordeal (*ib.* p. 548, tit. 56; *M.G. Capit.* ii. 16).

In spite of this enlightened attitude, ordeal became so deeply rooted in the popular custom of the two following centuries as to be known in Canon Law as *purgatio vulgaris*. The Church itself relied upon it for the conviction of both clerical and lay offenders (cf. Lea, *op. cit.* pp. 356-363), and was unwilling to forgo a privilege at once so impressive and so lucrative; there was a growing tendency, however, to confine its use to the conviction of heretics, and this use of the iron ordeal was allowed even by the Lateran Council of 1215. In secular usage the practice of it tended to be confined to accusations of unchastity and of conjugal infidelity; thus Richardis, wife of Charles the Fat, and Kunigund, empress of Henry II., both underwent the ordeal of the nine ploughshares. Distrust in the efficacy of ordeal did, however, appear, in spite of this royal and ecclesiastical acknowledgment of it, and in spite of its vigorous defence, supported by Biblical warrant, by Hincmar of Rheims in the 9th century. This distrust found expression in many quarters (cf. Lea, *op. cit.* pp. 348-350), and affects a legal code in the Assize of Jerusalem, where ordeal was allowed only when the accused accepted it voluntarily. It is reflected in literature, both in the courtly epic of Gottfried von Strassburg, where Isolde escapes the conviction of iron ordeal by an oath literally exact, but intentionally deceptive (*Tristan*, i. 15731ff., *Werke*, ed. F. H. von der Hagen, Breslau, 1923, i.), and in popular realistic poetry, as in the poem where a guilty husband openly practises trickery in the iron ordeal (cf. M. Haupt, *ZDA* viii. [1851] 89-95). Yet these references from German literature are not to be taken as proof of general disregard of ordeal; on the contrary, ordeal persists later in German codes than in those of any other Teutonic nation; thus provision for the duel appears in the *Schwabenspiegel* of the 13th cent. (tit. 340, 359, 360, ed. W. Wackernagel, Zürich, 1840); and for the duel, alternating with the water and iron ordeals, in the *Sachsenspiegel* of the 14th century (i. 39. iii. 21, ed. C. G. Heymer,

Berlin, 1827). In S. Germany forms of ordeal still occur in popular custom perhaps more persistently than in any other country, though often much weakened and disguised.

LITERATURE.—H. C. Lea, *Superstition and Force*, Philadelphia, 1878, pp. 240-368; J. Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*, ed. Heuser and Hübner, Leipzig, 1890, vol. ii. ch. vii.; H. Paul, *Grund. der germ. Philologie*, Strassburg, 1900, vol. iii. sect. ix. B. 7, § 91 (by K. von Amira); H. Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1892, ii. 393-419; J. Patetta, *Le Ordaile*, Turin, 1890; F. Liebermann, *Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen*, Halle, 1903-12, vol. i. pp. 401-430, vol. ii. pt. ii., s.vv. 'Ordal', 'Kaltwasser', etc.

M. E. SEATON.

ORDER.—I. Orderliness and its uses.—In dealing with sets or collections that consist of individual objects—sets of objects such as the stars in the sky, the men who are members of a social group, or the articles of furniture that are present in a given room—we may proceed in either of two ways.

(1) The first is the purely empirical way, which we follow when we note each individual object by itself, and then consider its relations to the other objects which belong to the collection. Thus we may take note of various chairs in one room, that one is near this window, another close to that door, and so on. Again, we may notice that, at a given time, one star is visible in the east, another is prominent in the west, and that the north star stands in such and such relations to stars which belong to the constellation called the Great Bear. This method of studying the objects which make up a given collection is of great importance, but, unless it is supplemented, it leaves us without a knowledge of the orderliness of the objects and of the collection which we study.

(2) The second is a way dependent upon our power to discover that the objects of the collection which we have studied are subject to such laws that, when we have observed some of the facts with regard to those objects, we can infer from the knowledge of these facts what may prove to be a multitude of other facts to which the objects of the same collection are also subordinate. In so far as we can effectively draw such inferences, we are able to make the empirical knowledge which we first obtain, and which may be, so to speak, 'ruler over a few things,' into the source of a knowledge which also makes us 'rulers over many things.' That is, from the empirical knowledge which has for its object individual members of the collection which we are studying, we may be able to infer, through general laws known to us, a knowledge relating to other members of the same collection, and, on occasion, to a great many other such objects.

When a collection of objects has characters so subject to law that from a knowledge of some portion of the objects, their characters, and relations we are able to infer what are the characters and relations of at least some of the other objects, it has, in a highly general sense, the character of orderliness. The objects of this collection form in some sense an order, or what is also sometimes called an array. A closer examination shows that there are many different kinds of orderliness and order, some of which are much more important than others. But in the most general sense we may say that a collection of objects possesses order by virtue of the fact that, from a knowledge of what is true of some of its members we can infer in definite ways what is or will be true about the other objects of the collection, or about some portion of them. Order is important for us because, in the first place, by means of such properties belonging to collections we can and do economize the work both of our science and of our conduct in dealing with collections of objects which possess especially the more important kinds of order. In-

stead of dealing with all the details of a collection of objects, we deal with a portion of the facts, and then use our information to guide our behaviour in dealing with the rest, or with some portion of the objects.

The simplest instance of the value of order is furnished by the distinction between a confused or disorderly collection of men and an orderly array of individuals, such as is represented by soldiers drawn up in battle line, or by officials taking part in a public ceremony. If you look from a window upon a crowd of people in a park or in a market-place, and if they are not notably an ordered collection, you may make the general statement that the lack of order among them is exemplified by the fact that each individual is going his own way, so that, if you want to find out what he is doing or whether he is going, you must watch him for himself; his neighbour's doings may not be in any clearly observable relation to his own. What one is doing does not enable you to infer what others are doing. If, as in many a market-place or street, the people are in various ways imitating one another, and are engaged in common activities, this very fact introduces, as far as it goes, some sort of order into the group. The ebb and flow of the crowd in the market-place or street, if subject to observable laws at all, makes possible the inference that some of those present are leaders in the movements which go on, while others are followers and imitators, that some preside, incite or address the crowd, or offer their wares for sale, while others are followers, or buyers, or are led or influenced by leaders or by the vendors of wares. So far as such knowledge permits you to make valid inferences from the observed facts regarding certain individuals to the observable or predictable facts regarding others, the crowd in question is not a disorderly assembly, or a collection devoid of what may be regarded as its own sort of order. The uninitiated observer who looks down upon the floor of a Stock Exchange finds a general appearance of disorder, or of the lack of order, in the collection of people whom he at first observes. When he is better acquainted with the business going on, and with the way in which it is done, he is able to draw inferences with regard to some of the people and the modes of behaviour represented, while he learns to base his inferences upon what he observes about the people and the conduct that first attracted his attention. The observer gradually learns something about the laws followed by those who do business in the Stock Exchange, while, precisely as his knowledge grows, the people on the floor of the Stock Exchange appear to him more and more as an assemblage of persons having, and engaged in following, a more or less determinate order.

2. Law and order.—It will be observed that, in the sense which we here emphasize, order depends upon the presence of definable law, and varies with the laws which are in question. On the other hand, there is a difference between the lawfulness, or general subjection to law, which may belong to the real world, to our conduct, or to our thought, and that which we call 'order' for the purposes of the present discussion. By 'lawfulness' we mean a character which is generally viewed as belonging, not to individuals or collections of individuals, but to the general modes of behaviour, the general qualities, character, or relations which nature follows, which we regard as belonging to the real world, or which we discover when we contemplate the natural world, the metaphysically real world, or our world of thought or of conduct. But 'order' belongs to sets of individuals, to collections, to arrays of things, persons, deeds, or events. In other words, to use the term first prominently associated with the famous doctrine of Duns Scotus concerning the nature of individuals, order belongs to collections of 'haecceities,' to groups of individuals, or of objects which are viewed as haecceities; but laws and lawfulness in general especially belong to our science, thought, and modes of behaviour.

E.g., the planetary motions are subject to Kepler's laws, or to the Newtonian law of gravitation. But the solar system possesses, or is, an order, since there are some facts about planets moving in orbits external to the earth's orbit which can be inferred from this very fact. Thus from the fact that the orbit of Jupiter is related in a well-known way to the orbit of the earth, while the orbit of Venus lies between the orbit of the earth and the sun, we can infer that, on occasion, Jupiter and Venus, as viewed from the earth, appear to be nearly opposite each other, while Jupiter and Saturn, being so related to the earth that the earth's orbit lies between each of them and the sun, cannot appear to us as occupying positions in the sky which are opposite to each other. These simple facts can be inferred from our knowledge of the way in which the orbit of the earth is related to the orbit of these other planets. But such facts and inferences relate to the haecceities, to the planets

in question, and to their real or apparent relative positions as members of the order of the solar system.

In brief, a law of nature is an invariant mode of change which some process, or class of processes, exemplifies. Analogous definitions apply to laws and lawfulness wherever these are present in the ethical or the metaphysical world, or in any world, real or ideal, which is properly to be conceived as subject to invariant modes of change or behaviour. But an order is a set of haecceities, or of individuals, such that, by virtue of laws to which these haecceities or their general characters are subject, it is possible to draw the inferences exemplified above from some members of the order to other members of the same order.

The contrast between laws on the one hand and order on the other is easily seen in the ethical as well as in the natural realm. The moral law relates to principles and modes of conduct, and so explicitly to universals. The golden rule, the Kantian categorical imperative, Bentham's maxim regarding the choice of the greatest happiness, are all definitions of supposedly invariant modes of action, ideal types of behaviour, which the moral law counsels for various classes or sorts of moral agents. On the other hand, in a court of law plaintiff and defendant, together with their counsel and the judge, are individuals constituting a determinate legal order. They constitute such an order because, from the fact that we know that somebody, *A*, is plaintiff, while somebody, *T*, is judge, and somebody else, perhaps *D*, is counsel for the plaintiff, we can infer certain other facts, with regard to the functions, interests, duties, purposes, or perils of other actual or possible members of the same court, occupied with this same business.

3. The whole numbers.—One of the most familiar and important instances of order with which the exact sciences are acquainted is the order of the so-called 'whole numbers.' This order is made up of the first member of the order, and then the sequence of numbers represented by the terms three, four, and so on. It consists of an ideally endless sequence of terms whose properties are such that a vast number of assertions can be made with regard to the properties of numbers. These assertions are, ideally speaking, as infinite in their multiplicity as is the series of whole numbers itself. Yet, logically speaking, all the arithmetic of whole numbers can be deduced from the following simple propositions which relate to elementary properties of the order in question:

(1) There is a relation which may exist between two whole numbers, and which is called the 'relation of next successor to.' Thus four is the next successor to three, two is the next successor to one: and, in general, if *n* is a whole number, the next successor to *n* is the whole number called *n*+1.

(2) There is a whole number, and one only, which is not the next successor to any whole number. This, also called 'the first whole number,' may be conveniently represented by the symbol 0. The next successor to 0 is then called one; the next successor to one is called two, and so on.

(3) Given any number, *n*, then its next successor, *n*+1, is thereby uniquely determined, so that, if every whole number has a next successor, every whole number also has but one next successor.

(4) Every whole number, without exception, has a next successor.

(5) If any property whatever is such that it belongs to the first whole number, and if it is such that, if it belongs to any whole number, it belongs to the next successor of that whole number, then this property belongs to all the whole numbers.

From these principles it is easy to show that this series of whole numbers thus defined possesses this property of being what is called 'infinite,' i.e., since every whole number has a next successor, there is no last whole number. In brief, the order of the whole numbers is such that it has a first member and no last, while every one of its members has a next successor, and while it is subject to the principles often called 'the law of mathematical induction'—

the law that permits the so-called 'reasoning from n to $n+1$, and so to all,' in case of orders which have the same properties as those of the whole numbers. Orders of this kind have been called by A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell 'progressions.' They are of enormous importance for all the exact sciences and for the whole progress of the human mind. It will be observed that one can exemplify the order of the whole numbers by considering a very few, such as zero, one, two, three. When one thus becomes aware of the general laws to which the whole order is subject, one can deduce not merely countless theorems belonging to the arithmetic of the whole numbers, but countless properties exemplified by whole numbers not mentioned in the foregoing elementary example. The orderliness of the whole numbers and the properties both of the individual members and of possible groups of members thus become deducible from the principles just stated, and from whatever experience we have for knowing or for asserting that the order of the whole numbers is actually exemplified in the real or the ideal world. How important this knowledge of order may be we can realize if we remember how groups of individual objects or men can be arranged so as to correspond to some portion of the whole number series, while such an arrangement is useful in guiding conduct and reasoning in the most significant ways. The heads of a discourse, the stages of a plan of action, the officers or dignitaries of a given hierarchy or other numerically ordered array of individuals, the deeds of a life, the hours of the day, the days of the year, the watches turned out by a manufacturer, may be either arranged or labelled by a set of whole numbers. Such an arrangement is useful for the most manifold purposes, in planning, seeking, or using objects, or in bringing individual human beings into co-operation.

4. Further illustrations.—There are cases in the realms of science, art, and life in which we deal very extensively with laws and lawfulness without paying attention to the orders in which these laws find their concrete exemplification. Thus, while our account of any given instance of order always involves a recognition of certain laws to which the members of the order are subject, we can have elaborate exposition of theories which deal with laws and their consequences in general terms, while largely neglecting to emphasize those orders in which the laws get many highly important and concrete illustrations. Thus the science of mechanics deals with the laws of motion under conditions very often conceived as ideal; and, in so far, that science does not tell us about the natural order of the physical world. For astronomy the order of the solar system has a certain primary interest, at least from one mode of approach. Newton's *Principia* dealt in considerable part with the laws of bodies subject to gravitation, and, in so far, did not lay stress upon the order of the solar system, but upon the laws of planetary motion and of the motion of bodies in general.

On the other hand, where our discussions relate to general laws and do not primarily lay stress upon the concrete orders that we find existing in the real or ideal world, then, in so far as they are exact and well reasoned, they inevitably include a more or less extended description of systems of ideal objects—conceptual embodiments, so to speak, of the laws the logical or the rational principles of which we are making use. In this sense any exposition of the laws to which the natural or the moral world is subject inevitably includes a presentation of some ideally ordered system of conceptual entities, of numbers, of possible deeds, or of other objects, whose array illustrates those laws with which we are dealing.

Once more, the instance of the whole numbers serves to illustrate what happens when we reason about the laws of nature, or of the ideal or moral world. If the watchmaker labels his watches with numbers that stand for the order in which they were turned out of the factory, he constructs an ordered system of hæcceities. This may be convenient for the process of finding lost watches, or of registering the purchase or the fortune of individual watches. On the other hand, if a man deals, as the arithmetician does, with the laws of whole numbers, he inevitably makes use of the ideal order of the whole numbers themselves. This order is constituted, not by the principles of the arithmetic of whole numbers cited above, but by the ideal hæcceities, called the whole numbers themselves. On the other hand, every study of a system of law, as it becomes explicit, involves the definition of an orderly system of ideal hæcceities, which exemplifies the laws in question. Thus the relations of law and order become more obvious and definite in our discussion. The maxim, 'Order is Heaven's first law,' gets at least one possible and fairly definite interpretation. Viewing heaven as a realm whose members are hæcceities that belong to a world which our experience does not at present at all adequately cover, we, in faith, or in hope, regard these hæcceities as having a certain array. This array will also exemplify justice, the true values which our human life was intended either to exemplify or, in heaven, to attain. The distinction between the law and the order will be perfectly clear, precisely in so far as the laws are understood, and in so far as, in the heavenly world, the order will be needed, since in heaven justice will exist, not merely as a principle, but as the concrete order of the 'just made perfect.' Possibly the law of heaven may be, as St. Paul maintained, the law of charity. But the order of heaven will then be the order of the concrete individuals whose spiritual unity, with one another and with their Lord, the Apostle so eloquently characterizes.

5. Series and the correlation of series.—The term 'series' has already been explained by the endless ideal series of the whole numbers; but there are many other series besides. We early become familiar with a new type of series when we study 'fractions,' better named 'rational numbers.' The rational numbers—*e.g.*, decimal fractions—form a series, in so far as we take account of the fact that two decimal fractions or other rational numbers which are equal to each other may be treated, for certain purposes, as if they were identical. Thus the fractions $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{2}{4}$, $\frac{3}{6}$, and the decimal fractions .5, .50, .500, and so on, are all mutually equivalent. We may regard them, therefore, as all different representations of the same fractional value. If we confine our attention to those rational numbers called 'proper fractions,' *i.e.* those which lie between 0 and 1 in value, we may notice that the series of the proper fractions has the following character:

(1) When two proper fractions are distinct, *i.e.*, when they do not possess equivalent values, there is a relation existing between them which is very familiar and possesses decidedly important properties. This may be called 'the relation of greater and less,' *i.e.* in the case supposed one of the fractions is the greater, while the other is the less of the two.

(2) The relation of greater and less is not a mutual relation; as the logicians sometimes say, it is asymmetrical. If a proper fraction P is greater than a proper fraction Q , then Q is never greater than P , but stands to P in what we call the relation 'less than.' The relation 'less than,' like the relation 'greater than,' is an asymmetrical relation. Each of these relations is the inverse of the other, and is, in a way, opposed to it in 'sense,' or in what may also be regarded, from a certain point of view, as 'direction.'

(3) If we choose any two rational fractions, r and t , which are not equal to each other, then there is always to be found in the series of rational numbers a third rational number which is distinct both from r and from t . Let us call this third rational

number s . Now s may be, as the third member of this class, so chosen that s is greater than r and less than t . In this case we may say that ' s lies between r and t in the series of rational fractions.'

(4) If we choose to regard 0, not as one of the rational numbers, but as lying before all the rational numbers, and forming the inferior one of the two extremes between which all the proper fractions lie, while 1 is the superior extreme, then, as we can readily see, there is no proper fraction which is the least of all the proper fractions. For a perfectly analogous reason the series of rational fractions has no greatest member, since, whatever proper fraction we choose, such as $\frac{9999}{10000}$, we can always find a proper fraction which is greater than this chosen fraction, and which is nevertheless not equal to 1, so that it lies between the proper fraction which we just chose and 1.

(5) To sum up, the series of proper fractions possesses these properties: any two of its distinct members stand to each other either in a certain unsymmetrical relation of the first to the second or in the converse of this relation, so that of two proper fractions a determinate one is the greater, while the other is the less. Between any two rational fractions we can always find or determine a third which is greater than one of the pair and less than the other. There is no rational fraction which stands first in the series of proper fractions, and no rational number that stands last. The series of proper fractions has, in this sense, neither beginning nor end. Yet, if we choose, we can regard 0 and 1 as extremes so related to the entire series of the proper fractions that 0 precedes all of them, despite the fact that there is no first member in the series of proper fractions, while 1 follows all of them, despite the fact that there is no last member in the series.

(6) Last of all, we may mention a property of the 'greater-less' relation which is of cardinal importance for establishing and determining the characters which belong to the series of proper fractions. This property is expressed by saying that, if there are three proper fractions such that b is greater than a , while c is greater than b , then c is greater than a ; i.e. the relation 'greater than' is not only asymmetrical, but is also what logicians call 'transitive'; it is a relation which passes over from pair to pair, or which follows what William James, in the closing chapter of his *Principles of Psychology* (London, 1901), calls 'the axiom of skipped intermediaries.'

The simple but highly abstract example of the series of proper fractions has, as we now see, characters which sharply distinguish it from the series of the whole numbers, in which there is a first although no last member. Corresponding to every member, n , there is its next successor, $n+1$. On the contrary, the series of proper fractions has no first and no last member, while none of its members has either a next predecessor or a next successor. Yet the two series have certain notable features in common. In each there is a relation, which we may call 'the relation of successor,' whose converse may be regarded as 'the relation of predecessor.' This relation, so long as it is viewed as between two members of a series which are not of equivalent value, rank, or place, is unsymmetrical and transitive. We can say that, given two proper fractions which are not mutually equivalent, one is a successor of the other, in the same way in which we may call one of them greater than the other; and, if we choose two whole numbers, so long as they are not equivalent whole numbers, one of them is, in the whole number series, a successor of the other, while the other is a predecessor of the one. Different as the two series of whole numbers and proper fractions are, they still possess common and relational characters, which make both of them series. This may be viewed as a general characteristic of all those series which, like the points on a straight line in ordinary geometry, the events in a story or in a man's life, the members of a file of soldiers, or the positions of a heavenly body as it seems to move from a point in the eastern horizon to a point where it disappears in the western horizon, are possessed of the character of being 'open series,' i.e. series which do not return into themselves, and which possess no repetitions of a member.

Open series are of enormous importance for the whole theory of order. The events of time, so far as these are known to us, form open series. No event recurs. In like manner, any physical process which follows, more or less definitely, the course of an open line, be it straight or curved, presents the features of an open series. The movements of a man, when he walks once over a road and does

not return, or cross his own tracks at any point, form an open series. All our business, all our plans of life, all that makes our life a progress or the reverse, all that gives ethical significance to a personality and to its activities, are things depending upon the character of the open series. In the light of the foregoing instances, we may now give a definition of the order of an open series.

Let there be a set of objects, S . The objects may be physical or ideal, theoretically or practically significant—points, numbers, deeds, people, or whatever you will. Let the members of S be subject to the following general law:

If we choose any two members of S , there will be a relation which in some way has already been exemplified by the relation 'greater and less.' This relation will apply uniformly to whatever pair of the members of S is taken into consideration, with this sole proviso, that, if you call it 'the relation G ,' and if you consider two members p and q of G , then a determinate one of these two members of S , i.e. either the member p or the member q , will stand in this asymmetrical and transitive relation G to the other member of the pair. Since, by hypothesis, the relation G is asymmetrical and transitive, if p stands in relation G to q , q will not stand in the relation G to p , but in the converse of this relation.

If all the members of S are subject to this general law, the members of S stand in the order of an open series, and actually constitute such a series. The two cases of the whole numbers and the proper fractions are instances of such a serial order.

In the form of a definition, this account of the order of an open series may be stated thus: by an 'open series' is meant a set, or collection, of objects, so that there exists, or is definable, some one relation, G , asymmetrical and transitive, such that whatever pair, p and q , of the members of the set be chosen, one, and of necessity only one, of them stands in the relation G to the other, while the other inevitably stands in the converse of the relation G to the first.

It is obvious that an open series conforms to our definition of what constitutes order. It is a set of objects. From some assertions regarding members of this set other assertions can be inferred. The series consists of individuals, while the asymmetrical and transitive relation, upon which each instance of a series depends, itself exemplifies a very general relational law. That the members of the series themselves illustrate this law makes it possible to infer from the relations of some of them certain relations belonging to others.

In the actual work of the sciences as well as in the formation, control, and use of serial orders, a large part is played by another set of relations, to which we must call attention in passing. In general we define various distinct series, if we have occasion to define any one series. Thus the series of the whole numbers is usually defined, not merely in the highly general and abstract manner just referred to, but more concretely, namely, in connexion with such a process as the counting of objects, or the numbering of watches, or, again, in connexion with the study of the laws of nature. The series of the proper fractions is both theoretically and practically used, not merely in dealing with abstract arithmetic, but in the processes of measurement. Concretely the proper fractions become useful to us when we are considering an ounce as a determinate subdivision of a pound, measurable by means of a certain proper fraction, or a foot as a determinate part of a yard. In other words, the abstract series of order, such as are exemplified by our proper fractions and our whole numbers, get their more concrete, and in general their more practical, significance when they are brought into relation with other series.

Now the operation of connecting a serial order like the whole numbers with an ordinary process like the counting of individual things is a special

instance of what logicians often call 'correlation of series.' A set of individual objects stand before me. I need, for various purposes, to count them, to know how many of them there are. I do this by using the series of whole numbers, treated, for the purposes of counting, as an order. I consider the concrete set of objects so that, by means of pointing, labelling, or some such process, I attach, in due order, each one of my whole numbers to the members of this collection, continuing until every one of the objects to be counted has been pointed at, or labelled, by one of my whole numbers. Then I regard the last one of the whole numbers of which I make use for this purpose as letting me know how many members the collection of objects which I have been counting contains.

When we are dealing not merely with collections which we can count, but with collections which we measure, we have frequent reason for correlating such series as those of the rational numbers with the various real quantities—with length, distance, weight, size, and so on. The operations upon which such correlations depend in many cases are of great complexity. Our present interest lies in the fact that by means of such processes we get our knowledge of the measurable facts of our natural world into order, and that we do so by correlating the observable or measurable series of lengths, distances, and other measurable objects, with our already known ideal and logically defined serial orders. By means of such correlations the ideal order of the abstract numbers—*e.g.*, of the whole numbers, of the rational numbers—comes to pervade, to dominate, or, as one may sometimes say, to infect, the at first less orderly or even apparently disordered world with which our experience has to deal. Order is thus correlated with the facts which the real world presents to our notice, and which experience presents to be operated upon by our processes of counting, measuring, or otherwise applying our ideal series, such as whole numbers or rational numbers, to the objects of our experience. Through such correlation our conduct gets an orderly organization, which constitutes one of the most general and important consequences of our scientific study of the world. Instead of dealing with a world which seems one of chance facts, we discover what appears to be a world well arrayed, or at any rate capable of being controlled by serially ordered, precisely defined modes of action. The discovery of the whole number series was one of the first advances of the human mind in the exact sciences. All our discovery of order in nature, and all the orderly serial arrangement of our lives, ideals, and social order have been influenced by the whole number series, ever since we learned how to think in terms of this number series. Thus man first discovers order in the form of series of ideal objects, which are, indeed, suggested to him by the real world, but which he learns to understand through such constructive and ideally orderly activities as those which counting and measuring represent. Thus, by means of correlation, man continually introduces order into his real world, and is stimulated by whatever he finds orderly in that world to an effort to increase his own power to construct and to understand orderly series and their correlation.

6. Order in the moral and social world.—The foregoing accounts of instances of order as we find them in the regions with which our theoretical science deals illustrate the fact that, in so far as we take account of order, we not only gain a theoretical control over our knowledge of facts, but prepare ourselves for forms of practical activity which are made possible through the recognition, the definition, the production, and the control of order. The rows, the series, the array

of real and ideal objects with which our science deals acquire their importance for us in close connexion with two principal facts, which result from the very nature of order.

(1) In so far as we are dealing with a collection of objects which, when taken together, constitute an order, we at every point economize the processes of our knowledge, and consequently make it a more powerful instrument for grasping the facts of nature and the connexions of the universe; for it is of the very nature of an order that, from a knowledge of a part of the system which possesses it, we can infer what is true about other parts of the same order, and, upon occasion, about the whole of the order. The general concept of material order, and of the correlation of series, has shown us how, wherever series are known to us and can be systematically correlated, we can constantly make use of some of our knowledge about the facts with which we deal to infer properties without which the advance of our knowledge would be greatly impeded.

It is customary to suppose that the most important concept of the exact sciences is the concept of quantity. That it is the characteristic work of the intellect to be guided by the effort to describe the world in quantitative terms—this is a thesis which has played a large part both in the theory and in the criticism of the work of the human intellect. The well-known Bergsonian criticism of the office and limitations of the intellect is founded upon a tendency to interpret the work of the exact sciences as, in large part, an effort to define nature, as well as reality in general, in prevailingly quantitative terms, so that, from this point of view, the intellect primarily measures, weighs, or otherwise quantitatively defines its task and its material. But this way of viewing the tasks of the intellect is as unjust to the logic of the exact sciences as it is unable to define the actual range which the conception of order has in the guidance of our practical, and, above all, our ethical life.

The quantitative sciences are indeed of very great importance. But their importance is due to the fact that the quantities are subject to certain very interesting laws and types of order, which hold true for many other real and ideal systems besides those systems which the quantitative sciences study and which the arts of measurement make prominent. The science of mathematics is ill-defined as the science of quantity. On the other hand, what gives the quantitative sciences their mathematical importance is the fact that in the realm of quantities there are certain peculiarly interesting types of order present. But these quantitative types of order are not the only exact types of order. Modern mathematical science is interested in a vast number of order types, and of orderly structures in general, which are in their nature not quantitative, and which can be neither defined nor studied in terms of quantitative relations. Geometry, by virtue both of its original name and of a good deal of its actual history, appears to be, upon its face, the science that deals with space measurement—*e.g.*, with the measurement of lengths, areas, volumes, and similar objects. Bergson has been deceived by this aspect of it into calling our geometry 'a geometry of solids,' and into supposing that the pre-eminence which geometry has attained in our physical sciences, and which in consequence the concepts that depend on measurements have possessed in the development of all our philosophy, is due to the evolutionary accidents which have bound the human intellect to a dominant interest in the construction of solid bodies.

As a matter of fact, however, it is not an anti-intellectual tendency, but a profoundly logical

interest in the purely orderly, and in the primarily non-quantitative aspect of things, that has come to be expressed in what is technically called 'non-metrical geometry.' Such a geometry science possesses in the branches of mathematics which are called 'projective geometry' and 'descriptive geometry.' These can be very highly developed without making any use of the idea of measurable geometrical quantities. Their source lies not in our power to measure, to weigh, and muscularly or mechanically to manipulate solids, but, as F. A. Enriques of Bologna has shown, in our sense of sight, in our power to notice the orderly alignment of points and sets of points, and the orderly intersections of systems of lines, as such intersections appear in the field of vision. This non-metrical or ordinal geometry may, therefore, be called 'visual geometry.' In fact the eye gives us a certain knowledge of order, distinct from that which we get through our muscles, or through various operations of measurement and metrical comparisons. The ordinal properties of the field of vision have an importance which the logic of science has neglected until recently. It is the eye that, despite all its illusions of perspective, has shown to man, from very early in his career, the distinction between heaven and earth, and the order of the heavenly movements themselves. In this sense the eye has played a large part in man's development in the conception of order. Furthermore, it is the purely ordinal aspect of the series of whole numbers and of rational numbers that lies at the foundation of some of the most important conceptions and theories of arithmetical science. In sum, then, the essence of the exact sciences lies in the fact that they reveal, as well as use, order, while quantity and the realm of the quantitative furnish only a special instance of order, not the only instance, and in certain respects by no means the most theoretically fruitful instance.

(2) With these considerations in mind, we shall now be able to make a transition to the types and the nature of order which have the greatest interest in the moral world. As we have just seen, the order of the heavenly motions proved to be of great importance in giving men a conception of the kind of order that ought to prevail in a justly organized moral and social world. From the first, then, human conceptions of order have had as genuine a moral and social as a scientific and theoretical significance. The one great task of the intellect is to comprehend the orderly aspect of the real and of the ideal world. The conception of order lies, therefore, just as much at the basis of an effort to define our ideals of character and society as at the basis of arithmetic, geometry, or the quantitative sciences in general, or of those non-quantitative types of exact science which are now on their way to higher development. It is, therefore, not a matter of mere accident or of mere play on words that, if a man publishes a book called simply 'A Treatise on Order,' or 'The Doctrine of Order,' we cannot tell from the title whether it is a treatise on social problems or on logic and mathematics, whether it deals in the main with preserving an orderly social order against anarchy or with studying those unsymmetrical and transitive relations, those operations and correlations upon which the theories of arithmetical, geometrical, and logical order depend. The bridge that should connect our logic and mathematics with our social theories is still unfinished. The future must and will find such a bridge. Then exactness of thinking will become consistent with the idealizing of conduct; the realm of the Platonic ideas that are to guide man in his search for wisdom will be conceived, at least in part, in terms of an order which will not be

'ageometrical'—not foreign in type to the sort of order which the geometers, especially in the non-metrical part of their work, have long had reason to study. It only remains now to mention some ethical and social relations among human beings which are of importance in enabling us to infer from known facts about given human individuals what the duties, offices, and social rights and positions of other individuals either are or may become.

Among the moral and social relations of human beings there are a number of dyadic relations well known to us as furnishing a basis for serial order, and as being useful in both the lesser and the greater matters of social life. Thus the relation of superior and inferior in cases where authority is concerned enables us to define serial order. If A commands B , and B commands C , and if orders can be transmitted from pair to pair, then, in general, or under more or less precisely definable conditions, the commands of A may pass, as we often say, indirectly, through his subordinate B to B 's subordinate C . In such cases it may be as well for A to transmit his commands through B to C as to express his authority directly. How far such a series may extend and how many terms it may have will vary with the type of authority in question, with the range of its application, and so with the number of members who constitute the series. But, as far as the order goes, its essential characteristics are the same as those exemplified by a selected series of ordinal numbers, such as 3, 4, 5, 6. The usefulness of the idea of order is strictly analogous in the two cases. The significance of the series consisting of an officer and his subordinates, their subordinates, and so on, lies in the fact that, from a knowledge of some of the facts relating to the persons in question and to their authority, the relations of others of the facts can be deduced, and thus what is called an orderly mode of activity can be predetermined.

A relation decidedly different from that of authority, but of great practical importance, is that of some one who writes a letter, hands it to a messenger, who in his turn passes it over to some predetermined receiver of messages, while the process of indirect transmission is thus continued in an orderly way, until the letter reaches its destination. Such indirect but orderly transmission of messages may be as effective for purposes of communication as if the writer gave his letter to his correspondent without the use of intermediaries. Of such orderly transmission the conveyance of correspondence through the Post Office is a familiar example. What is essential to this sort of order is that, since from some facts you can, in an orderly system, deduce the existence of other facts, the whole undertaking of transmitting information, or other contents of letters, becomes definite, and, subject to the well-known fallibility of human conduct, predictable. The whole business world depends for the order of its transactions upon systems of organization which involve this serial order. Civilized man does most of his work through intermediaries. He pays a foreign creditor a debt by drawing upon his own local bank. He purchases in a distant part of the world by transmitting his orders through all sorts of indirect channels. What he needs to know in order to guide his actions reasonably is the same sort of thing as a student of non-metrical geometry has to recognize when he draws conclusions about an orderly array of points, or the arithmetician computes when he casts up sums of columns of figures; i.e., the civilized man, like the arithmetician, uses in his business, as the mathematician uses in his computations, some order system. It is an order system because a knowledge of part of

the facts regarding its constitution enables us to reach a knowledge of other facts. In reaching this conclusion we use general principles. So far as these are exemplified by some system of individual men, of individual acts, and, in general, of hæceities, that system is an order system. Its order has for us the value that hereby we are able to arrange our modes of conduct and to predict their outcome.

As in the mathematical, so in the moral and social systems, that form of order called 'serial order' is especially familiar and important. But, wherever the system with which we deal enables us to compute, with greater or less probability, some of its facts from others supposed to be given, we are dealing with an order system.

In general, we may say that, since it is essential to order that we should be able to draw conclusions which to us are novel from knowledge about the relations of certain facts given, the most familiar features of an order system will be those which have been illustrated by the transitivity of the various pairs of members belonging to a given series.

We may say that, if by the symbol $R(a\ b\ x\ y)$ I mean simply the assertion, 'The hæceities, a , b , x , and y , stand in some relation which I call the relation R ,' and if by the symbol $S(c\ d\ x\ y)$ I mean the assertion, 'The hæceities, c , d , x , and y , stand in the relation S to one another,' and if I am able to conclude that, in the system of objects of which I am speaking, the assertion is true that the hæceities, a , b , c , and d , stand to one another in the relation T , so that, using analogous symbols, I can write $T'(a\ b\ c\ d)$, and if general laws of this sort are true of the whole system with which I am dealing, then that system is in some sense an ordered system, although the property of the relations upon which I lay stress is a relational property that permits some sort of elimination. Were the laws of this elimination sufficiently known and sufficiently general, they would permit definite knowledge and, on occasion, definite courses of action, which might rival in their orderliness the states of knowledge and courses of action which we have illustrated by the instances of the numbers and similar mathematical objects.

Such laws may be social. Were it the law of some social order that, if a , b , x , and y belong to the same social club in a great city, and if a , c , x , and y meet in the market-place of the city on a given day, as a fact a , b , c , and d will all bow to one another, and will all take off their hats, then that social order would be subject to a law which it might be worth while to know, and which would certainly give us a right to say that a , b , c , d , x , and y were, at any rate for the time in question, an orderly assemblage of persons. The order in question might not be of an externally peaceable sort. Thus we might suppose an assemblage of men subject to the law that, if a , b , x , and y fought side by side in the trenches, and if c , d , x , and y fought in opposed trenches, a , b , c , and d would, at the earliest opportunity, fraternize and cease fighting. This assemblage of men would be subject to a sort of order. The law characterizing this order might be stated in the form that, in some definable class of instances, the comrades of certain opponents would, at the earliest opportunity, fraternize. However strange the law, it would have some sort of importance if it could be stated and put into application in some determinate manner.

Now in social and ethical matters, quite as much as in mathematical and natural matters, wherever there are laws which permit such eliminations, there is some sort of order in the system characterized by the presence of such laws. To conceive a world in which there is such order is to conceive what makes possible the realization of those ethical ideals most characteristic of organized communities. If an organized and orderly community either exists or is in process of making, we can be loyal to it. For in such a community the individual can devote himself to activities whose fruit does not merely remain his own, but falls to the lot of the other hæceities with whom he is bound by relational ties. Order, therefore, or at least possible order, is the condition upon which depends the existence of anything lovable about our social system. If each acts only as an individual, the mere fact that he happens to be benevolent does not render his benevolence other than envious. Loyal activity, on the other hand, is always orderly, since it involves acting in ways that are determined not merely by personal desires, or by the interests of other individuals, but

by the relations in which one stands to those other individuals. Paying one's debts is a loyal act, as far as it goes. But it is an act which has no meaning for me unless I can recognize the relation of debtor and creditor. If I am not loyal, I say, in substance, 'I will do this if I choose to do it.' If I am loyal, I say, 'I do this in case my relations to others in the community require me to do thus and thus.'

It is possible, no doubt, to recognize relations without possessing the richer spirit of loyalty. Barren intellectualism is as possible in ethics as in our view of reality. But the essence of loyalty is that from the value of our relations to some things—e.g., to some individuals or hæceities—we are able to discover something about the value of our relations to other things. Loyalty which can draw no conclusions, which cannot reason from one's interest in certain hæceities and certain relations to some practically important inference about one's relation to other hæceities and other social ties, remains blind and dumb, a mere sentiment, like the luxuriantly sentimental altruism of a Rousseau, sending his own infant children to the foundling hospital, or of a Shelley, lyrically delighting in the sacrifice

'Of one who gave an enemy
His plank, then plunged aside to die'
(*Prometheus Unbound*, act I.),

while he ruthlessly abandons Harriet Westbrook to commit suicide, 'when the lamp is shattered,' and 'the light in the dust lies dead.'

It is essential to loyalty to draw conclusions, to live in a moral and social world which is, at least in some respects, conceived as orderly. In this sense the idea of order lies at the basis both of the ideal and of the life of any community in which loyalty is possible.

7. Law, order, and negation.—Order, as we have said, is closely connected with law. Law is some aspect of our real or ideal world which permits us to draw inferences. It is fairly obvious that, when we know a law in terms at once general and exact, we are able, granted the suitable data, to draw a series of inferences; i.e., if certain premisses logically warrant a certain conclusion, then, in general, this conclusion may be made the basis of further inferences, which indirectly follow, through the form of reasoning which the traditional text-books of logic call a 'sorites,' from the premisses with which we started. As, in a well-ordered commercial system which includes a series of banks or other agencies for the transmission of payments, one is permitted to pay one's debts more simply, and in a more convenient way, by paying one banker, who transmits some negotiable paper to another banker, and so on to the end of the series, so, wherever an orderly system of computation, rational investigation, or definite inference in serial order is possible, one reaches conclusions which may be important by means of intermediate steps of reasoning, by orderly change of premisses and conclusion. In the case of the reasoning process the series may be interwoven in the most complex manner. In the exact sciences they are so interwoven. The order in that case is not merely an order of a simply serial type. The total result of the interwoven systems of series of inferences whereof the exact sciences consist is the development of a richer and richer system of order. The results of an old investigation become the basis of a new inquiry. One branch of exact science becomes interlaced and combined with another. What is characteristic of the process is that, whatever forms of synthesis appear, inference is everywhere an ally and an instrument both in defining and in attaining at once the conception of order and the orderliness of the system with which one

deals. In consequence it is one of the laws of the more purely theoretical sciences that, whatever special motives determine their development, they constantly tend to produce a richer wealth of orderliness in our own system of ideas. Upon each new stage of orderly conceptions new forms of order and of orderly systems are based. Where the methods of the inductive sciences enable us to recognize that these mathematically definable types of order have their corresponding systems of facts in the real world, our theories, developed by the process of inference, become more and more widely applicable to our understanding nature, so that the world seems to us more and more orderly. In so far as, at any point of our mental development, we see ways of creating facts and systems of facts, social orders and systems of social orders, which correspond to the ideas which we have so far organized, our moral and social worlds tend to become more orderly.

In brief, our power to infer, in the world of theory and of practice, both accompanies and, where it is limited by our ignorance or lack of intelligence, in its turn limits our power to conceive ideal order and to understand the order of nature, and, finally, our power to give to our lives that orderliness which can win and hold our loyalty and render our life that of the spirit. And that is why the maxim, 'Let all things be done decently and in order,' is no mere expression of pedantry or formalism, but an ideal maxim, whose practical and religious significance finds its principal limitation in our ignorance or inability to give expression to our orderly ideals.

Order, then, is known to us through inference; i.e. the orderly is that which corresponds, in the real or the ideal world, to what we infer when we systematically draw conclusions from premisses. Therefore the understanding of the inmost nature of order logically depends upon understanding the relations on which our power to infer rests.

We may sum up with the observation that, if we had no exact idea of what inference is, we should have no exact idea of what order is, while our very idea of what inference is depends, in all cases where an inference relates to classes and to general law, upon our idea of what constitutes the negative of a defined class of objects or cases. Without negation there is no inference. Without inference there is no order, in the strictly logical sense of the word. The fundamentally significant position of the idea of negation in determining and controlling our idea of the orderliness of both the ideal and the real world, of both the natural and the spiritual order, becomes, in the light of all these considerations, as momentous as it is, in our ordinary popular views of this subject, neglected. To the article NEGATION we must, therefore, refer as furnishing some account of the logical basis upon which the idea of order depends. From this point of view, in fact, negation appears as one of the most significant of all the ideas that lie at the base of all the exact sciences. By virtue of the idea of negation we are able to define processes of inference—processes which, in their abstract form, the purely mathematical sciences illustrate, and which, in their natural expression, the laws of the physical world, as known to our inductive science, exemplify. Serial order is the simplest instance of that orderly arraying of facts, inferences, and laws upon which, on the theoretical side of its work, science depends; while, as we have seen, in the practical world, the arraying, the organizing, of individual and social life constantly illustrates, justifies, and renders spiritually precious this type of connexion, which makes our lives consecutive and progressive, instead of incoherent and broken.

Relations of the general type of 'correspondence'

enrich and interweave the various serial orders which nature, as well as our ideas, life as well as theory, present to our knowledge. If order is only one aspect of the spiritual world, it is an indispensable aspect. Without it life would be a chaos, and the world a bad dream. Loyalty would have no cause, and human conduct no meaning.

When logically analyzed, order turns out to be something that would be inconceivable and incomprehensible to us unless we had the idea which is expressed by the term 'negation.' Thus it is that negation, which is always also something intensely positive, not only aids us in giving order to life, and in finding order in the world, but logically determines the very essence of order.

LITERATURE.—Hegel's *Logic*, both his briefer statement in his *Encyclopædie*, Heidelberg, 1830, and his much longer discussion in his *Larger Logic*, vols. iii.-v. in his collected *Werke*, Berlin, 1832-40, treats the idea of negation at length, but does not clearly see in what relations negation stands to order. The first really modern treatment of the conception of order is contained in Bertrand A. W. Russell, *Principles of Mathematics*, Cambridge, 1903. A much fuller discussion of various mathematical aspects of the concept of order appears in A. N. Whitehead and B. A. W. Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, 8 vols., Cambridge, 1910-13. A considerable number of modern treatises on geometry give an account of so much of the concept of order as is especially important for the understanding of projective geometry. J. Royce has a summary discussion entitled 'Principles of Logic,' in the *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences*, Eng. ed., London, 1913; here logic has been defined as 'the science of order,' and some of the considerations which are used in this article have been somewhat more technically stated in vol. i. pp. 67-120.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

ORDINAL.—See ORDINATION (Christian), PRAYER, BOOK OF COMMON.

ORDINATION (Christian).—By this term is meant the manner of admission of persons to ministerial office in the Christian Church. For methods of appointment (such as election or nomination) see LAITY; for the ordainer see MINISTRY (Early Christian). This article has to deal only with the liturgical side of the matter, i.e. with the ceremonial and forms used in admission to the ministry in the various Christian communities in the world in ancient and in modern times.

1. First six centuries in East and West.—(a) *Phraseology*.—It is necessary, before we discuss the customs of different ages and countries, to consider the words used for admission to the ministry. We find that, just as there was a considerable fluidity of nomenclature in the names of the ministerial offices in the earliest Christian period (see MINISTRY, § 2), so in the succeeding ages there was no fixed terminology for 'ordination.'

One of the most common forms of expression was to speak of 'appointing' ministers, and their 'appointment' (*καθίσταειν* or *καθιστάν*, *κατάστασις*); so in Ac 6³ of the Seven, in Tit 1⁵ of presbyters, in He 6¹ 7²³ 8³ of the Jewish high priest, in Clement of Rome (*Cor.* i. 42) of 'bishops' and deacons, in the 10th canon of the Council of Antioch in *Encænus* (A.D. 341) of readers, subdeacons, and exorcists, in Eusebius, *HE* vii. 9 (*κατάστασις* used with, and as equivalent to, *χειροτονία*), in Athanasius (*Apol. c. Adrian*, 111.), and elsewhere; and in the Church Orders this mode of expression is used of any order from bishops downwards, though at Antioch in *Encæn.* (as above) it is used of the minor orders in contrast to the word *χειροτονία*, used of bishops, priests, and deacons (for the references in the Church Orders see A. J. Maclean, *Ancient Church Orders*, p. 78). We find the expressions 'to ordain,' 'ordination' (*χειροτονία*, *χειροτονία*), especially but not exclusively of the three higher orders, as at Ancyra (can. 18; A.D. 314), Nicaea (can. 19; A.D. 325), Antioch (as above), Neocaesarea (can. 9; A.D. 314 or a little later), and frequently in the Church Orders; these words do not necessarily imply laying on of hands, and sometimes mean election (properly by a show of hands) or even appointment only; but they do not negative the laying on of hands. In Ac 14²³ this verb is used of 'appointing' presbyters by Paul and Barnabas, but there is no indication here that it means the act of 'ordination,' though we can scarcely doubt that the way in which they appointed presbyters was by such an act (see *DAC*, art. 'Ordination,' § 1). So in the *Didache*, 15 (c. A.D. 130?): 'appoint (*χειροτονήσατε*) therefore for yourselves bishops and deacons.' In the *Apostolic Canons* (c. A.D. 400), *χειροτονία* signifies an ordination service over bishops, presbyters, deacons,

and the 'rest of the clerks' (ἐκκλησικοί; can. 1, 2). On the other hand, 'to lay on hands' (χειροθετεῖν) and 'laying on of hands' (χειροθεσία) are used, though less often, for ordination, especially when that ceremony is emphasized, while they are also frequently used for other impositions of hands, such as in confirmation, and even for benediction, when hands are stretched out over persons, as in the dismissal of catechumens in the liturgy (Apost. Const. vii. 39; c. A.D. 375); the verb is used with reference to ordination in the Const. through Hipp. 13 (Funk, *Didascalia et Const. Apost.* ii. 82) and apparently included in Apost. Const. iii. 10 (see Maclean, pp. 153-155). The instance in the *Constitutions through Hippolytus* is remarkable. In this work (probably an epitome of a first draft of Apost. Const. bk. viii.) χειροθετεῖν is used of ordinations generally, but of a reader it is expressly said οὐ χειροθετεῖται—i.e., he is appointed by a form of ordination, but hands are not laid upon him. The substantive χειροθεσία is used in Apost. Const. ii. 32 of the gift of the Holy Spirit by our Lord to His ministers, in the 9th canon of Neocaesarea of the ordination of a presbyter (in the same canon χειροτονία is used in this sense, but the emphasis in the phrase where χειροθεσία occurs is on the laying on of hands), and in the 19th canon of Nicæa, which denies that deaconesses have been ordained—as they have not received any χειροθεσία they must be classed merely among the laity. We may note here, in anticipation, that in the present Orthodox Greek ordination services χειροθεσία is used for ordination of the minor orders (or perhaps only of subdeacons and deaconesses?; see below, § 16), χειροτονία for that of bishops, presbyters, and deacons (Littledale, *Offices of the Holy Eastern Church*, p. 266). In Sarapion's *Sacramentary* (c. A.D. 350) a double phrase is used: 'laying on of hands of the appointment of a bishop' (χειροθεσία κατὰ κράτος ἐπισκόπου, § 14), and similarly for this ordination of presbyters and deacons (§ 12 f.). For other instances of the above terms see *JTHS* i. 273 f. In Ac 20²³ τίθημι is used of the Holy Ghost appointing 'bishops.'

Corresponding words in Latin are *ordinare*, *ordinatio* (Tert. de *Præser.* 41), and *constituere* (often in Cyprian, e.g. Ep. i. [lxv.] 1, iii. [lxiv.] 3, xxix. [xxiii.], iii. [xlviii.] 2, though these and similar words were often used of nomination to the ministry). The ordained person was said to be promoted (*promoveri* [Elvira, can. 80; c. A.D. 305], προχειρίζεσθαι [Nicæa, can. 10; Apost. Can. 82 (81)], προαριθεῖν [Apost. Const. vi. 17, var. lect. παρὰθεῖν], προάγεισθαι [Ankyra, can. 12; Nicæa, can. 1]), or to be 'blessed' (Orange, can. 23 [A.D. 441], where *benedictio* = 'ordination to the diaconate'), or 'consecrated' (Leo the Great, Ep. vi. [lv. 6]). These details of nomenclature are extremely important, as erroneous deductions have often been made from Patristic statements owing to a failure to distinguish the terms used. Further details, especially regarding later centuries, may be seen in Hatch's art. 'Ordination' in *DC4*, to which several additions are here made.

At a later date a difference was made in the West between 'consecration' of a bishop and the 'ordination' to other orders. But no such distinction is found in the earlier period or is known in the East at the present day.

(b) *Descriptions of early ordinations.*—In the whole of the early period ordinations to every grade were simple, consisting of prayer (usually a single prayer) and laying on of hands. At the most one or two other ceremonies were added. In the NT imposition of hands at ordination is mentioned in Ae 6⁶ (the Seven) and 1 Ti 4¹⁴, 2 Ti 1⁶ (Timothy). It is not referred to in the case of the presbyters in Ao 14²³ (though there need be little doubt that it was then used, for St. Luke does not mention all the details on every occasion); but we find it in 13³, where, however, it is doubtful if 'ordination' proper is meant (see *DAC*, art. 'Ordination,' § 8). In 1 Ti 5²² it is mentioned, but here also it is doubtful if the writer is speaking of ordination. That ordinations in the NT were accompanied by prayer is seen from Ae 6⁶ 14²³; cf. also 1²⁴ (Matthias's appointment) and 13³ (mission of Barnabas and Saul).

After the Apostolic Age we have no descriptions of ordinations till the 4th cent., but then they become plentiful. The Church Orders, even several of them which do not give the forms used in the eucharistic liturgy, give ordination prayers. Thus we have them in the *Canons of Hippolytus*, the *Ethiopic Church Order*, the *Testament of our Lord*, the *Apostolic Constitutions*, the *Constitutions through Hippolytus*, the appendices to the *Arabic Didascalia*, and some others. These are probably all of the 4th or beginning of the 5th century.

1 The numbers in square brackets are those of the *Ante-Nicene Christian Library*. Those in *PL* are lxi., lxx., xxiv., xlix.

Sarapion's *Sacramentary* also gives us a set of ordination prayers for the three highest orders, though it has no rubrics and no descriptions of the rite. In all these manuals laying on of hands is emphasized in the ordination of bishops, presbyters, and deacons, and in one or two of them in that of the minor orders. The usual rule with regard to the latter is that they do not have this ceremony; so expressly most of the Church Orders, and so a passage in Basil (*Ep. can. tertia*, cxxvii. 51), where a clear distinction is made between the clergy who are 'in orders' (ἐν βαθμῶν) and those 'in the ministry which is conferred without imposition of hands.' But in *Apost. Const.* viii. 19-22 subdeacons, readers, and even deaconesses receive it; so *Const. through Hipp.* 9-13, except in the case of readers (see above). In these books we sometimes read of the laying on of 'hands,' sometimes of 'a hand,' and sometimes in the same work we find both customs. No difference seems to have been made between them in the early period. There is one apparent exception to the universal practice of laying on hands at ordinations. In the *Apostolic Constitutions*, though it is mentioned in all other cases, even, as we have seen, of minor orders, it is not explicitly referred to in the ordination of a bishop. In this work (viii. 4) one of the bishops says the ordination prayer over the candidate for the episcopate, two others stand beside him, the other bishops and the presbyters pray in silence, and the deacons hold the book of the Gospels over the candidate's head.¹

Considering the unanimity of all the parallel Church Orders and of Sarapion, and the fact that the *Apostolic Constitutions* have this ceremony for all other ordinations, pressing it where the other manuals forbid it (for the minor orders), it is unlikely that the writer of this work meant to exclude it at the ordination of a bishop. It is much more probable that he assumed it. The *Constitutions through Hippolytus* use the same language as the *Apostolic Constitutions*. Laying on of hands was not confined to the Catholic Church. In the Clementine literature Peter uses it in ordaining Clement (*Ep. of Clement*, 2, 19) and Zacheus (*Clem. Hom.* iii. 72; *Clem. Recog.* iii. 66). In the last passage it is recorded that he also ordained twelve presbyters and four deacons. This literature is now usually ascribed, in its present form, to the 4th century.

In the ordination of a bishop there is a variety of usage as to the part taken by the assisting bishops. Sometimes one bishop, and sometimes all the bishops, lay on hands; sometimes one says the prayer (the usual practice), sometimes all do so. In the *Testament of our Lord* (i. 21) all the bishops, having first washed their hands (the presbyters standing beside them), lay on hands and say a declaration: 'We lay hands on the servant of God who hath been chosen in the Spirit, for the true and pious disposing of the Church,' etc.; and then one of their number, at their command, lays hands on him and says the prayer of ordination. After this the people cry thrice 'Axios' ('He is worthy')—a great feature of Greek ordinations in all ages—and give him the kiss of peace. The usage in the *Apostolic Constitutions* has been given above. But what do the two selected assistant bishops in that manual do? Nothing is said. They do not hold the Gospels over the candidate's head. Probably they, with the presiding bishop, lay on hands, and we may possibly conclude, in view of the direction to the other bishops not to pray aloud, that all the three joined audibly in the ordination prayer. In this work, after the prayer, 'one of the bishops' offers 'the sacrifice on the hands of him who has

¹ The meaning of this ceremony seems to be that our Lord is acting through His ministers.

been ordained.' The meaning is not clear; but it probably refers to the custom (for which see below, § 3 (c)) of concelebration of the Eucharist by all the bishops, or all the presbyters, as the case may be. The new bishop is then enthroned by the other bishops, and receives the kiss of peace. After the lections from the Law and the Prophets and the Epistles and Acts and the Gospels, the new bishop salutes the Church and preaches. The liturgy then proceeds. In this work the people before the ordination are asked thrice if the elect is worthy, and three times they affirm that he is. In most of the early authorities (e.g., *Verona Fragments*, *Can. of Hipp.*, *Egypt.* and *Eth. Ch. Ord.*, and apparently *Apost. Const.*, and probably others) the new bishop celebrates the Eucharist.

The ordination prayer in the earliest Church Orders, the *Canons of Hippolytus*, the *Verona Fragments*, and the *Ethiopic Church Order*, is short and simple, and is in nearly identical words. The same may be said of the *Constitutions through Hippolytus*. These parallel forms are clearly all derived from a single original, each writer introducing slight variations. After praying for the Spirit to be given to the candidate for the episcopate, and asking that his life may be exemplary, the presiding bishop in the *Canons of Hippolytus* concludes:

'Receive his prayers and offerings which he shall offer to thee day and night, and may they be to thee a sweet savour. Give also to him, O Lord, the episcopate and a mild spirit, and power to forgive sins; and give him ability to loose all bonds of iniquity of demons and power to heal all diseases, and bruise Satan under his feet shortly, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom be glory to thee, with him and the Holy Ghost, for ever and ever. Amen' (for the full prayer see Maclean, *Ancient Church Orders*, p. 76 f.).

This prayer is expanded in the *Testament of our Lord* and in the *Apostolic Constitutions*. The prayer in Sarapion (§ 14) is even shorter than that given above. This book is not one of the parallel Church Orders, and the prayers are quite independent of those there given, but the ordination forms are even simpler. That for a bishop asks for him the Spirit and that he may be a worthy shepherd.

It has usually been said (by the present writer also) that the prayer used in ordaining a presbyter was the same as that used in ordaining a bishop, except that the name of the office was changed. This is the statement in the *Canons of Hippolytus* (iv.; ed. Achelis, §§ 30-32), which also say that in the case of a presbyter enthronization is omitted, and in the *Egyptian Church Order* (Horner, *Statutes of the Apostles*, pp. 245, 307; Maclean, p. 70). But in the other parallel manuals and in Sarapion a separate, though equally simple, form is given for presbyters; and an apparently contradictory rubric in the *Ethiopian Church Order* and the *Verona Fragments* has led C. H. Turner (*JThSt* xvi. 542) to the not improbable conclusion that all that is meant in the two first-named authorities is that the first part of the ordination prayer for bishops is identical with that for presbyters. In several books the prayer for presbyters refers to the elders appointed by Moses (e.g., *Test. of our Lord*, i. 30). In *Apost. Const.* viii. 16, 'priestly duties' on behalf of the people are mentioned; in Sarapion, § 13, the function of reconciliation. The prayer in the last book is peculiar in not mentioning the office to which the person is ordained. In the ordination of presbyters in most of the Church Orders the presbyters join with the bishop in laying on hands (see MINISTRY, § 8).

The prayer for deacons in the Church Orders and in Sarapion is also very simple; it usually refers to St. Stephen and the Seven. The minor orders have still more simple forms.

It must be noticed that in the ordination of

bishops and presbyters there is no trace of an imperative formula like 'Receive the Holy Ghost,' such as we find in the mediæval and modern books in the West.

(c) *Delivery of symbols of office*.—In later times this became a regular part of all the ordination ceremonies; but in the early period it is found only in connexion with the minor orders, for which, as a rule, imposition of hands is not used. In the *Canons of Hippolytus* the Gospels are given to a reader; in the *Testament of our Lord*, the *Ethiopic Church Order*, and the *Constitutions through Hippolytus* (not in the *Apostolic Constitutions*), 'a book'; in the *Egyptian Church Order* the 'Apostle,' i.e. the Pauline Epistles. For this feature in the *Gallican Statutes* see below (c).

(d) *Ordination in pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita*.—The author of the *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, who wrote c. A.D. 480, perhaps in Edessa, deals in ch. v. with 'priestly consecration,' i.e. with the ordination of 'hierarchs' (bishops), priests (*lepeis*), and 'ministers' (*leitourgoi*, deacons). At his ordination a deacon kneels on one knee, a presbyter on two—a piece of symbolism, borrowed and worked out by the E. Syrians and Maronites (see below, § 13 f.). All these ordinations consist of laying on of hands with prayer and the sign of the cross; the name of the candidate and the office conferred are proclaimed; in the consecration of a bishop the Gospels are held over his head, to show the fullness of his powers. The kiss of peace is mentioned: 'all of the clergy (*τῶν λειτουργῶν τᾶς ἐκκλησίας*) who are present greet him who is initiated' (*τετελειωμένον*). The account in pseudo-Dionysius is very like that in the *Apostolic Constitutions*, but the details are more precise. The absence of minor orders in this work is probably due to its pseudonymous form; a contemporary of the apostles is supposed to be speaking.

(c) *Ordination in the 'Gallican Statutes'*.—This is the convenient name given by J. Wordsworth (*Ministry of Grace*, p. 58) to the collection of regulations which used to be known as the canons of the Fourth Council of Carthage, but which have nothing to do with Africa. They are also called *Statuta Ecclesiae Antiqua*. They appear to come from the south of Gaul, and may be dated c. A.D. 500 (for their contents see C. J. Hefele, *Hist. of the Church Councils*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1876, ii. 410 ff.). With reference to our subject they say that a bishop before ordination is to be examined as to the faith, and whether he does not disapprove marriage, or condemn second marriages or the eating of flesh; all the bishops are to be present, and the clergy and laity are to give their consent, and especially all is to be done with the authority of the metropolitan (§ 1). At the ordination two bishops are to hold the Gospels over the elect's head and neck; and, while one pronounces the blessing over him (i.e. says the prayer of ordination), all the other bishops lay their hands on his head (§ 2). This seems to be all that is done in ordaining a bishop. When a presbyter is ordained, the bishop lays his hand on his head, and all the presbyters present also lay their hands on his head (§ 3). When a deacon is ordained, the bishop who 'blesses' him (see above) alone lays his hand on his head (§ 4). The minor orders which are mentioned (§§ 5-10) are the subdeacon, acolyte, exorcist, reader, doorkeeper, and singer. These are not to be ordained with imposition of hands—so it is enacted explicitly with regard to the subdeacon, and the same thing would *a fortiori* hold good of the other offices named. The empty paten and chalice, water-cruet, plate (?), and napkin are given to a subdeacon; a candlestick with tapers to an acolyte; a book with exorcisms to an exorcist;

the codex from which he is to read to a reader; the keys of the church to a doorkeeper. These are ordained by the bishop. A singer, on the other hand, may be admitted by a presbyter without the previous knowledge of the bishop; the words of admission are given, and are remarkable as having remained to the present day: 'See that what thou singest, thou believe with the heart; and what thou believest with the heart, thou prove by thy works.' This formula, which is found in *Magdalen College Pontifical* (p. 59; see below, § 3) at the ordination of a singer, is still used in the Roman pontifical in ordaining a reader, and is adapted as the ordinary 'vestry prayer' in the Anglican communion, where there is a surpliced choir.

(f) *Early Roman ordinations*.—It is one of the misfortunes of the student of Christian origins that we know so little of Roman liturgical customs in the early ages. We know next to nothing of ordinations in Rome before the 6th century. But, if the common original of the parallel Church Orders be Roman, as is very probable—it may possibly be the work of Hippolytus—by comparing the forms in the earliest of these manuals, for which see above (b), and by retaining what is common to them all, striking out what is peculiar to one of them, we may provisionally arrive at the form of ordination (at least that of a bishop) which was in use in Rome early in the 3rd century (see Maclean, *Recent Discoveries illustrating Early Christian Life and Worship*², London, 1915, p. 109 f., for an attempt in this direction). When we come to the 6th cent., the *Leonine Sacramentary* (c. 550) gives us the customs in Rome before the reforms of Gregory the Great. It has ordination prayers for bishops, presbyters, and deacons, but not for any orders below these. The simplicity of the ordinations is their principal characteristic.

2. Intermediate period in the West.—For this period our chief authorities are the Roman *Ordines*, especially the *Ordo of St. Amant* (§ 7, giving directions for the ordination of presbyters and deacons), which Duchesne prints (*Christian Worship*, p. 475), and the *Ordo IV.* and *Ordo VIII.* of J. Mabillon (*PL* lxxviii.), which give directions for the ordination of all orders; the *Gelasian Sacramentary* (c. 700 [*PL* lxxiv., and ed. H. A. Wilson, Oxford, 1894]), which gives the Roman rite as modified by Gallican influence, but is chiefly Roman; and the *Missale Francorum* (*PL* lxxii.), which is a fragment of about the same date, 'generally Roman, but with some Gallican rubrics' (Wordsworth, *Ministry of Grace*, p. 74)—these two contain ordination prayers, etc.; Isidore, *de Officiis ecclesiasticis*, ii., which gives the prayers and rubrics of the Gallican rite.

(a) *Ordinations in Rome* (Duchesne, p. 352 ff.).—The ordination of bishops was always on a Sunday, during mass. After the gradual has been sung, the litany and Kyrie follow; the pope bids prayer and says two prayers, one a 'collect' concluding the litany, and the other a eucharistic prayer of ordination, beginning with the 'Suscipe Corda.' The pope, bishops, and presbyters give the new bishop the kiss of peace and the mass proceeds. The lections are Mt 10¹ 24², Mk 6⁵, Lk 10¹, Jn 10¹² 12²⁴, 1 Ti 3¹, Tit 1⁷ (F. E. Warren, *Liturgy and Ritual of the Celtic Church*, Oxford, 1881, p. 69). In this case the pope officiates alone and the other bishops do not take part, this being an exception to the general rule that a bishop must be ordained by at least three bishops. Presbyters and deacons are ordained on the Ember Saturday, having been presented to the people in the churches of Sta. Maria Maggiore and the Holy Apostles on the preceding Wednesday and Friday, when the

people are called upon to make objections if they have any. The ordination takes place in the mass of the vigil, i.e. in the afternoon or evening. The candidates for the diaconate, vested in dalmatics, are presented to the pope before the Gospel by the archdeacon. After the litany the pope lays on hands and says two prayers (see above). The new deacons receive the kiss of peace from the pope and clergy. The candidates for the presbyterate, vested in chasubles, are then presented to the pope, and he says two prayers over them and gives them the kiss of peace. The lections for a deacon are 1 Ti 3⁸, Jn 12²⁴, and for a presbyter Ezk 35², Mt 24⁴² (Warren, p. 69). The older Roman books give no ceremony for the ordination of exorcists, readers, and doorkeepers. The acolyte (holding a linen bag) and the subdeacon (holding an empty chalice) only received a blessing from the bishop at an ordinary mass; and even this was not before the 7th century.

(b) *Gallican ordinations* (Duchesne, p. 363).—A bishop is usually ordained in the cathedral of his see. He is presented on the day of the ordination to the people, who cry 'Dignus' ('He is worthy'). After a bidding there follows the consecration prayer (different from and longer than the Roman one), when two bishops hold the Gospels over the elect's head, and each bishop lays on hands. His hands are anointed, and a prayer is said. The lections are Mal 1¹¹, 1 Co 9⁷⁻¹², Lk 20⁴²⁻²¹ (Warren, p. 69). The candidate for the presbyterate is presented to the people, who cry 'Dignus,' and the bishop lays on hands and says the prayer; the other presbyters also lay on hands. The bishop anoints the new presbyter's hands. The lections are Tit 1⁵⁻⁶, Lk 12⁴²⁻⁴⁴. The procedure in the case of the diaconate is the same except that the anointing is omitted. The lections are Ezk 44¹⁵, 1 Ti 3⁸⁻⁹, Lk 9⁵⁷⁻⁶². The minor orders receive their badges of office, for which see above § 1 (c), and a blessing and prayer are said. An address is made to subdeacons.

(c) *Fusion of the two rites and developments*.—From the 7th to the 9th cent. a process of fusion of the Roman and Gallican rites was going on. The consecration or 'eucharistic' prayers were joined, and the directions of the *Gallican Statutes* (above, § 1), which the later Gallican books reproduced, were prefixed as rubrics. The result of this arrangement of rubrics was that at a later date the laying on of hands was transferred to the first part of the service and took place in silence, instead of after or with the ordination prayer. A later feature was the introduction of the *porrectio instrumentorum*, or delivery of badges of office, to bishops, presbyters, and deacons as well as to the minor orders. To the bishop a ring and staff were given, to the presbyter a chalice and paten with the elements prepared for the mass, to the deacon the Gospel-book, with the charge to read the liturgical Gospel (the last was not before A.D. 1000 in the Roman rite). Unction of the head was also added, but afterwards dropped except in the case of a bishop (Frere, *Hist. of the Book of Common Prayer*, p. 354 f.).

(d) *The Celtic rite*.—There were some differences in the ordinations of the Celtic Church from those described above (see Warren, p. 68 ff.). A bishop was commonly consecrated by a single bishop. The lections were 1 P 1³ 15¹ 23² 2¹⁰, Ac 1¹⁵, 1 Ti 3¹², Mt 16¹⁶⁻¹⁸. Both presbyters and deacons were anointed on the hands, and this is found in the Epistle of Gildas (c. 550), in Egbert's pontifical (early 8th cent.), and elsewhere; the anointing of deacons was peculiar to the Celtic and Anglo-Saxon Churches, the latter probably borrowing it from the former. The book of the Gospels was given to a deacon, and a stole to the presbyter.

These features are not found in the earlier Roman and Gallican rites.

3. *Later Western pontificals.*—We can now consider the results of the fusion of the Roman and Gallican rites as seen in the later pontificals. The Roman pontifical is still in use in the Roman communion. The pre-Reformation Anglican pontificals are as a rule difficult to obtain, but the Henry Bradshaw Society has published that of 'Magdalen College,' edited by H. A. Wilson, which gives the consecration of bishops and ordination of the other orders—for by this time the difference of nomenclature is well established in the West. This pontifical is perhaps from Hereford, or from Canterbury, and seems to be of the 12th century. Maskell has also published in his *Monumenta* the Lincoln (?) rite for consecrating or enthroning a bishop and ordaining clergy, with notes giving the chief differences of the Exeter rite. The pontificals vary a good deal in detail, and the following description is taken from the fullest of them.

(a) *Consecration of a bishop.*—The elect is presented to the archbishop by two bishops, is interrogated at length, and makes the oath of canonical obedience. The mass begins. After the collect there is an exhortation, bidding to prayer, and litany with special suffrage. Two bishops hold the Gospels over the elect and the other bishops lay on hands in silence; in some forms the archbishop says 'Receive the Holy Ghost.' The 'Veni Creator' (in some forms) and collect follow, and the first consecratory prayer (with 'Sursum Corda') is said. The elect is anointed on the head, and two consecratory prayers follow, the archbishop extending his right hand at the second (in some forms). He gives a sevenfold blessing, and anoints the new bishop's head and hands. The latter puts on gloves (so some forms) and is given the staff, ring, and mitre, with a blessing. The Gospel-book is (in some forms) given; and the mass continues, said by the archbishop. The formula 'Receive the Holy Ghost' is not universal, and does not occur in most English pontificals. That given by Maskell directs two bishops to hold the Gospels and the rest of them to touch the head with their hands, and the ordainer to say the 'Veni Creator'; but the formula is absent. The Exeter book alone among the English pontificals has it; it directs the consecrator and the assistant bishops to touch the elect's head with both their hands, and all to say 'Receive the Holy Ghost.' The Roman pontifical agrees with this. The enthronization is a separate ceremony, as the consecration did not usually take place in the new bishop's cathedral church (for this service see Maskell, iii. 281; Wilson, p. 77).

(b) *Ordinations to other orders.*¹—Before the Epistle the minor orders and subdeacons are admitted with the giving of the badge of office and prayer, but without laying on of hands (so expressly, even in the case of subdeacons, the *Magdalen College Pontifical* [Wilson, p. 63]). After the Epistle and Tract the candidates for the diaconate and presbyterate are presented (in some forms all the candidates are presented at the beginning of the service). The deacons are then (in some forms) instructed, the bishop lays a hand on them in silence (at a later period he here says silently 'Receive the Holy Ghost'), bids prayers, says a collect, and then the consecratory prayer, vests the ordinands with a stole (on one shoulder), gives them the Gospels (in some forms), says a second bidding (not Sarum) and a second con-

secratory prayer (some forms) or else a blessing, and (in some forms) vests the new deacon in a dalmatic. The Gospel is then read by one of the newly-ordained deacons, and the presbyters are ordained (in some forms they are presented here). They are instructed (so some forms) and the bishop and presbyters lay on hands in silence; the bishop bids prayer and says a collect and the first consecratory prayer; he vests the ordinand in stole (over both shoulders) and chasuble, says a second bidding (not Sarum) and (in some forms) a second consecratory prayer; in some forms 'Veni Creator' is said; and the new presbyter is blessed and anointed on the hands. The bishop gives him the paten and chalice prepared for the Eucharist, saying, 'Receive power to offer the sacrifice to God, and to celebrate mass for the quick and dead, in the name of the Lord.' The mass proceeds, and (in some forms) there is another imposition of hands with 'Receive the Holy Ghost' after communion. The kiss of peace, blessing, exhortation (so some forms), and post-communion complete the service.

(c) *Concelebration.*—In the present Roman ritual the practice is preserved, at the ordination of presbyters, of the new presbyters celebrating the Eucharist with the bishop; and this may be a convenient place for referring to the custom. This was an ancient custom at every Eucharist, which has survived only at ordination. In the *Ordo Romanus Primus* (ed. E. G. C. F. Atchley, London, 1905, p. 148 f.), on festivals, the cardinal presbyters each hold in their hands a corporal and three loaves, and, standing round the altar with the pope, say the canon, and 'simultaneously consecrate the body and blood of the Lord.' A similar rule is found in the *Ordo of St. Amand* (Atchley, p. 158), where the bishops and presbyters hold two loaves in their hands and consecrate them when the pope is consecrating at the altar. This custom is also found in some of the Church Orders, where the presbyters lay hands on the eucharistic loaves at the offertory (*Test. of our Lord*, i. 23; *Can. of Hipp.* iii. [ed. Achelis, § 20]; *Egypt. Ch. Ord.* 31; *Eth. Ch. Ord.* 21, etc.). The last manual, in J. Ludolf's version (*Ad eam historiam Aethiopicam commentarius*, Frankfurt-on-Main, 1691), directs the presbyters to say the eucharistic prayer with the bishop. The *Magdalen College Pontifical* (Wilson, p. 69) says: 'Let all who have been ordained [presbyters] bring the oblations to the hands of the bishop.' If the customs at Bourges, where the present writer lately witnessed an ordination, are general in the Roman communion, the new priests kneel behind the bishop, at some distance from the altar, and, taught by the ceremoniaris, say the canon of the mass with him, but do not hold a host in their hands.

(d) *'Matter' and 'form.'*—It may be noticed from the descriptions which have been given that the 'matter' (imposition of hands) and 'form' (the consecratory prayer) are not necessarily synchronous. So in Ac 6^s 8^{ss} the prayer, at ordination and confirmation, precedes the laying on of hands.

(e) *The word 'ordinal.'*—This is now commonly used to denote the book of ordination services. But there was no mediæval word to represent this. 'Pontifical' has a wider sense, being a collection of offices used by a bishop. In the Middle Ages an 'ordinal' meant a book of directions or of ceremonies.

4. *Anglican post-Reformation ordinations.*—The following is a description of the forms now in use, dating from 1662, and the chief changes made between the Reformation and that date will be noted in passing. There are now no minor orders

¹ In the Middle Ages the minor orders in the West were doorkeepers, readers, exorcists, acolytes. Subdeacons were reckoned with the higher orders.

recognized in the formularies of the Anglican communion.

(a) *Bishop*.—The consecration must take place on a Sunday or holy day after mattins (so 1662), during the Eucharist, which from 1662 has had a proper collect—before that the collect of the day was used—and a proper Epistle and Gospel. After the Nicene Creed there is a sermon (1662 only), and the elect, vested in his rochet (so 1662, while in 1549 [1550] he was vested in surplice and cope, and in 1552 no vestment was named), is presented to the archbishop by two bishops. Up to 1865 the oath of the king's supremacy was then taken, but now this and all subscriptions at ordinations are taken beforehand, except that the oath of canonical obedience to the archbishop is still taken by bishops at this point in the service. The archbishop bids prayers, and the litany with special suffrage is said, ended by a special collect, and followed by interrogations, exhortations, and blessing. The elect puts on the rest of his episcopal habit (1662), and the archbishop and bishops sing or say over him, by verses (so 1662), the 'Veni Creator.' The consecration prayer is said by the archbishop (but without 'Sursum Corda' as in the pontificals), and then he and all the bishops lay on hands, and the archbishop says, 'Receive the Holy Ghost for the office and work of a bishop in the Church of God now committed unto thee by the imposition of our hands,' and quotes 2 Ti 1st (adapted). (The words 'for the office . . . hands' were inserted in 1662.) He gives him the Bible with an exhortation, and the Eucharist proceeds. In 1549 (not 1552) the Bible was put on the new bishop's neck, and at the words 'Be to the flock of Christ a shepherd' the archbishop gave him the pastoral staff. At all consecrations and ordinations the newly-ordained must communicate, and two special collects or post-communions precede the final blessing.

(b) *Presbyter*.—After mattins (1662) there is a sermon, and the archdeacon presents the candidates ('decently habited,' 1662). Objections are asked for, the bishop bids prayers, and the litany with special suffrage is said; and the Eucharist has a special collect (1662), which is one of the ordination prayers, and a special Epistle and Gospel. (Up to 1662 the 'Veni Creator' was said after the Gospel, and the candidates [in 1549, not 1552, vested in plain albs] were then presented, objections asked, and the special collect said; the collect of the day was used before the Epistle.) Then follow an exhortation and interrogations, bidding and silent prayer, 'Veni Creator,' and the second ordination prayer. The bishop and presbyters lay on hands and the bishop says 'Receive the Holy Ghost for the office and work of a priest in the Church of God now committed unto thee by the imposition of our hands,' and adds Jn 20²³ and a single sentence of exhortation. (The words 'for the office . . . hands' were inserted in 1662.) The bishop gives the Bible (also, in 1549 but not in 1552, 'the chalice or cup with the bread') with a short formula, and the Eucharist proceeds. There is a curious rubric that 'all they that receive orders shall take [the Communion] together and remain in the same place where hands were laid upon them until such time as they have received the Communion.' This seems to be a relic of the custom of concelebration; see above, § 3 (c). It occurs only at the ordination of presbyters.

(c) *Deacon*.—After mattins (1662) and sermon, the archdeacon presents the candidates ('decently habited,' 1662; in 1549, not 1552, in plain albs) to the bishop, who asks for objections and bids prayers. The litany is said with a special suffrage. The Eucharist has a proper collect, which is the real ordination prayer (up to 1662 this was first said and then the Eucharist began and the collect

of the day was used), and a proper Epistle. Then follow interrogations and exhortation, and the bishop lays on hands and says, 'Take thou authority to execute the office of a deacon in the Church of God committed unto thee: In the name,' etc. The New Testament is given and the new deacon reads the proper Gospel (in 1549 he puts on a tunicle, and both in 1549 and in 1552 he reads the Gospel of the day), and the Eucharist proceeds.

These forms are based on the pre-Reformation pontificals, with considerable simplifications; but, especially in the case of deacons, the ordination prayers have become somewhat displaced, and the comparatively modern imperative formulæ have been unduly magnified at the expense of the prayers. The interrogations and exhortation to priests are largely derived from Bucer (see below, § 8).

5. *Presbyterian ordinations*.—Directions as to ordination are given in *The Form of Presbyterian Church Government and of Ordination of Ministers* (see under Literature below), which was agreed upon by the Assembly of Divines at Westminster and approved by the Presbyterian General Assembly in Edinburgh, 1645. In this work ordination is directed to be always continued, and is stated to be 'the act of a presbytery'; 'every minister of the word is to be ordained by imposition of hands and prayer with fasting, by those preaching presbyters to whom it doth belong,' and 'the power of ordering the whole work of ordination is in the whole presbytery.' Directions are given for the candidate's examination by the presbytery, and for his preaching before the people and before the presbytery or ministers of the word acting as their deputies. The ordination is to be performed in the church which he is to serve, and on the day appointed for it a 'solemn fast shall be kept by the congregation.' At least three or four ministers of the presbytery are to attend. One of these is appointed to preach about the ministerial office and duty, and the preacher is to interrogate the candidate. The ministers then lay on hands and say a short prayer or blessing to this effect, though no exact form of words is given:

'Thankfully acknowledging the great mercy of God in sending Jesus Christ for the redemption of his people; and for his ascension to the right hand of God the Father, and thence pouring out his Spirit, and giving gifts to men, apostles, evangelists, prophets, pastors, and teachers; for the gathering and building up of his church; and for fitting and inclining this man to this great work [here let them impose hands on his head]; to entreat him to fit him with his Holy Spirit, to give him (whom in his name we thus set apart to this holy service) to fulfil the work of his ministry in all things, that he may both save himself, and his people committed to his charge.'

After the prayer the preacher exhorts the new minister and the people, and by another prayer commends him and his flock to the grace of God. A psalm is sung and the congregation is dismissed with a blessing.

The Church Service Society, founded in Scotland in 1865, has published, after several revisions, a book called *Euchologion, a Book of Common Order* (see under Literature below) in which forms of prayer, interrogations, and exhortations are given, the above outline being followed. In the ordination prayer the presiding presbyter lays both hands on the candidate's head, and each of the other presbyters lays on his right hand (p. 383). After the prayer the 'Gloria Patri' or other doxology is said, and the presbyters in turn give the new minister the right hand of fellowship (p. 384). The ordination prayer and the addresses in this book are taken in the main (see pp. 419, 431) from the *Provisional Liturgy of the American German Reformed Church*, 1859, and the interrogations from *Knox's Liturgy and Church of Scotland Prayers for Social and Family Worship* (1st ed.).

6. The Scandinavian rite. — i. SWEDEN. — The Swedish post-Reformation ordination services deserve special consideration, as they have some very peculiar features. They are described by G. M. Williams (*The Church of Sweden*, pp. 9-43), who gives most of the prayers in full. The ordinations are to the episcopate and the presbyterate; there are now no deacons in Sweden.

(a) *Bishop*.—According to the present rite (1881), the consecration must take place on a Sunday or holy day, in the cathedral church. The assistants, if bishops, stand inside, but, if priests, stand outside, the altar rail, all being vested in chasubles. They bring in the cope and other episcopal insignia. After an address there is a prayer (this is really the ordination prayer), and the notary reads the king's commission. Several lections, with an exhortation, are read. The elect says the Apostles' Creed and is interrogated. The archbishop says a formula, committing to him the bishop's office, and giving him the king's commission, also the pectoral cross and pastoral staff; meanwhile the choir sing an anthem consisting of a prayer to the Holy Ghost. The elect is vested in the cope, the assistants lay their hands on his head, and the archbishop says the Lord's Prayer. The mitre is put on, and a prayer and blessing conclude the service. Consecrations do not now take place, as in 1571, during the Eucharist. The chief peculiarities of this rite are the laying on of hands *after* the delivery of office, the displacement of the ordination prayer, the Lord's Prayer said at the laying on of hands, and the prominence given to the modern feature of delivering the office to the ordinand as compared with the ordination prayer. There have been several revisions since 1571; in that year an ordination prayer was said at the laying on of hands.

(b) *Presbyter*.—The present form (1894), the last of several revisions, follows the lines of a bishop's consecration, and many of the prayers and interrogations are the same, only the name of the office being altered. Most of the lections are different. Instead of the king's commission, the bishop gives the ordinand his *prestbref* ('letters of orders to the priesthood'), *before* the laying on of hands, and the ordinand is then vested in a chasuble. If more persons than one are ordained at one time, the Lord's Prayer is said over each separately. The word *prestembet* ('priesthood') is now used, as in 1871, while in some of the previous revisions *predicembet* ('preacher's office') replaced it (see J. Wordsworth, *National Church of Sweden*, pp. 355-357).

ii. NORWAY.—Of Norwegian consecrations of bishops before the Reformation we have the following interesting account, given by Dr. Bang, the present bishop of Christiania:

'The archbishop came before the altar accompanied by his assistants. The ordinand presented himself before him with a bishop on each side. The introit and verse were sung; then, instead of Kyrie eleison, the archbishop began the Great Gloria ['Gloria in excelsis'], whereupon the mass was interrupted and the ordination act begun. The ordainer took the Gospel-book and laid it first open, then closed, on the head of the ordinand, in which position it was held by the two assistant bishops. The archbishop then sprinkled the ordinand with holy water, laid his hand on his head, and repeated a long ordination prayer. . . . Thereafter he anointed his hands and head with suitable prayers and delivered him the pastoral staff, and put the episcopal ring on the fourth finger of his right hand. Vested with the episcopal insignia, he was now placed upon the episcopal throne during a long prayer, whereupon the consecration ended with a blessing upon the ordained bishop' (Williams, p. 30).

It would appear that the Scandinavian pontifical, like so many English ones, lacked the 'Accipe Spiritum sanctum.'

7. Moravian ordinations.—We are not here concerned with the disputed question of the ministerial succession in the *Unitas Fratrum*, or Moravian

body, but only with the rite used by them in ordination.

Their first recorded ordination, in 1464, was noticeable because of their use of the lot, after the example of the appointment of the apostle Matthias (de Schweinitz, *Moravian Episcopate*, p. 10). But this was followed by an ordination; according to de Schweinitz, by an ordination (with prayer and imposition of hands) to the priesthood by the priests present in the synod then held, and afterwards by an ordination to the episcopate by two Waldensian bishops.¹ The use of the lot appears to have continued in the Moravian body, as it is mentioned as existing in A. G. Spangenberg's *Exposition of Christian Doctrine as taught in the . . . Unitas Fratrum*² (Eng. tr., Bath, 1796, § 257, pp. 450, 453).

In 1478 the Brethren stated to the Masters of Prague:

'In consecrating to the priesthood, we have no set form of words, but the election is according to prayer and the desire of the congregation, and then the ordination through laying on of hands' (J. Truhlar, *Manuale Vacillava Korandi*, Prague, 1888, p. 351.).

The Brethren had the following offices: bishops, presbyters or seniors, ministers (deacons), acolytes; and to these offices they ordained successively; while in Waldensian ordinations priesthood and episcopate were conferred together, by a single act. In 1504 they told the Masters of Prague:

'We have priests who are properly ordained, as well in accordance with the divine institution (presbyterial ordination), as in accordance with that order which comes from men (episcopal ordination).' See de Schweinitz, p. 18; also p. 12 (2).

John Lasicky (Lasitius), in his *de Ecclesiastica Disciplina* (Amsterdam, 1660, but written c. A.D. 1570), describes the ordination of presbyters thus (ch. xv.):

There is an examination and presentation followed by silent prayer. The bishop with two or three presbyters lays on hands, the congregation meantime singing 'Veni Creator.' The bishop blesses and exhorts the new presbyter, and the people acclaim 'Amen' (this is equivalent to the 'Axiom').

The ordination of bishops is similar. After the ordination follow the liturgy and a solemn giving of hands, and all the ministers partake of a repast together.

In the present *Liturgy and Hymns for the Use of the . . . Unitas Fratrum* (London, 1906) the following is given under the head of 'Ordinations':

'The service being opened by the singing of the hymn "Come Holy Ghost, come Lord our God," etc., or some other suitable verses, the bishop addresses the congregation . . . and candidate . . . after which he offers up a prayer, imploring the blessing of God upon the solemn transaction, and commending the candidate to his grace, that he may be endowed with power and unction of the Holy Ghost for preaching the word of God, administering the holy sacraments, and for the exercise of his office to the edification of the Church. The bishop then proceeds to ordain the candidate with imposition of hands, pronouncing the following or similar words: "I ordain (consecrate) thee NN. to be a deacon (presbyter, bishop) of the Church of the Unity of the Brethren, in the name," etc.' (He adds a blessing; silent prayer, a doxology, 'Amen,' 'Hallelujah,' a hymn, and 'the New Testament blessing' conclude the service. A note is added that at the consecration of bishops two or three bishops generally assist.)

8. German Reformed ordinations.—These do not call for particular remark. Lutheran forms may be seen in H. A. Daniel's *Codex Liturgicus* (4 vols., Leipzig, 1847-53, ii. 517 ff.). The present German 'Evangelical Church' consists of a fusion of the Lutheran and Calvinist communities. The Calvinists were, both in theory and in practice, strictly presbyterian in polity, while the Lutherans in theory were not so (as we see in the Swedish Church, which has more than one order); and for our purpose the draft 'Ordinal' of Bucer (a Lutheran) is of great interest. It was arranged so that it might be used either for those communities which had one order or for those which had more. The essential portions of it, with parallels from

¹ It is disputed, however, whether the former of these two ordinations actually took place.

the Anglican 'Ordinal' of 1549 (1550), may be seen in *CQR* xlv. [1897] 132 ff. The chief interest lies in the fact that Bucer's draft furnished the noble address in the English Prayer Book to the candidates for the presbyterate, and the basis of the interrogations, though most of his suggestions for other parts of the service were rejected by the Anglican Reformers.

9. The Græco-Russian rite.—The forms of ordination of the three higher orders in the Orthodox Eastern Church in the present day are given in Greek with an English translation in *Littledale's Offices of the Holy Eastern Church*. These ordinations take place in the course of the eucharistic liturgy; but it is noteworthy that the point at which they occur is not the same as in the West. In the Græco-Russian rite the bishop is ordained early in the service, the presbyter later on, and the deacon nearly at the end.

(a) *Bishop*.—The form given in *Littledale* (pp. 40, 158) is the oldest and shortest of the three forms found in the *Euchologion*. It is that here described. After the Trisagion, or hymn 'Holy God, Holy Mighty, Holy Immortal, have mercy upon us,' sung at the beginning of the *Missa Catechumenorum* (F. E. Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, Oxford, 1896, p. 369), the candidate is presented by three bishops, and a declaration of election made, and the presiding bishop bids the prayers of the people. The Kyrie ('Lord have mercy') is said thrice. The open Gospels are laid on the candidate's head and neck by the presiding bishop, and the other bishops lay on hands with him (*συνεπαρτομένω*). The president says a short prayer secretly (i.e. in a low voice), naming the office of bishop, and praying for the strength of the Holy Spirit for the elect. The deacon's ectene ('litaney') follows, with a special suffrage, and the president says secretly a short prayer, naming the function of offering sacrifice and oblations for all the people, and that of being a shepherd and teacher. The book of the Gospels is taken from the new bishop's neck and placed on the holy table. The president vests the new bishop with the pallium (*omophorion*) and says 'Axios,' and the clergy say the same. The kiss of peace is given by all the bishops, the newly-ordained takes his seat in the apse, and the liturgy proceeds. He offers the prayer for peace at the 'lection of the Apostle' (the liturgical Epistle; Brightman, p. 371). At the communion he first communicates himself and then communicates the president and the rest. This is a relic of the older custom in which the newly-ordained himself celebrates the liturgy after his ordination (above, § 1(b)). In another form an elaborate profession of faith by the candidate is made, and the pastoral staff is given.

(b) *Presbyter* (*Littledale*, pp. 34, 153).—After the 'Cherubic Hymn,' i.e. after the Great Entrance (Brightman, pp. 377-379), the candidate is led up to the holy doors by two deacons. Then two priests lead him round the holy table (which stands out from the east wall of the church), singing the hymn 'Holy Martyrs, who valiantly contended and are crowned, intercede with the Lord that he may have mercy on our souls,' while the bishop sits on a throne before the holy table. The bishop rises and signs the candidate thrice on the head and bids the prayers of the people. The Kyrie is said thrice, and the candidate is again signed thrice with the sign of the cross. The bishop lays his hand on his head and says a prayer, naming the office. The principal priest says the deacon's ectene with special suffrage; and the bishop, holding his hand still on the candidate's head, says a prayer, naming the function of offering 'gifts and spiritual sacrifices' and that of

renewing the people 'through the laver of regeneration.' He then raises the new presbyter and brings the back part of his stole to the front of the right side, saying 'Axios.'¹ The bishop vests him in the chasuble and again says 'Axios,' and the clergy and singers chant the same. The newly-ordained kisses the bishop and the presbyters, and stands with them and reads the *contakion* (short hymn). The liturgy proceeds, and at the epiclesis the new presbyter receives the holy bread (apparently a small particle of it) from the bishop, and holds it in his hands, afterwards returning it to the bishop.² At the communion the new priest is first communicated by the bishop, and he says the prayer behind the ambo (pulpit).

(c) *Deacon* (*Littledale*, pp. 28, 148).—After 'And the mercies' (the blessing which follows the Commemoration of the Quick and the Dead and precedes the Lord's Prayer; Brightman, p. 390) two deacons lead the candidate to the bema (sanctuary) and conduct him three times round the holy table, singing 'Holy Martyrs' (see above). The bishop signs him thrice on the head, and the maniple and girdle are taken from him. The bishop bids prayers, the Kyrie is said thrice, and the candidate is signed thrice. The bishop lays his right hand on his head and prays, naming the office, and referring to St. Stephen and the 'good degrees' of 1 Ti 3¹⁸ (but not in the sense of promotion). The archdeacon says the ectene with a special suffrage, and the bishop says another prayer, holding his hand on the candidate's head. He puts the stole on his left shoulder and says 'Axios,' which is taken up by the clergy and singers. The bishop gives him the fan and says 'Axios,' and the deacons give him the kiss of peace; the new deacon, standing at the corner of the holy table, waves the fan above the holy gifts. The newly-ordained receives Holy Communion before the other deacons, and he says the remaining diaconal portion of the liturgy. (Deacons are more numerous in the East than in the West, and every church has at least one.)

(d) *Minor orders*.—The office for ordaining a deaconess (*Littledale*, p. 152) resembles that for a deacon; she receives the laying on of hands, and is vested with the diaconal stole. At the communion she partakes of the two species separately (unlike the ordinary lay people, who are communicated by intinction), and handles the chalice, and herself places it on the holy table. This office has been unused since the 12th cent. except for abbesses. The *Euchologion* gives other offices for minor orders: singers, readers, subdeacons—very simple and informal. To a singer a psalter is given, to a reader the book of the 'Apostle' (the liturgical Epistles). See *Littledale*, p. 266 f., for a description.

10. The Armenian rite.—The minor Eastern Churches have more elaborate ordination offices than the Græco-Russians. For a Latin translation of these offices see Denzinger, *Ritus Orientalium*, vol. ii.

(a) *Bishop* (Denzinger, ii. 356).—The ordination takes place on a Sunday, and occurs in the liturgy after the Trisagion ('Holy God,' etc.), which, as in the Greek rite, comes at the beginning of the *Missa Catechumenorum* (Brightman, p. 424). The clergy and people kiss the hand of the catholikos (patriarch) and receive his blessing. The elect is then presented and testified to. He is interrogated, and makes a profession of faith, in which

¹ The priest's stole, unlike the deacon's, is worn over both shoulders, and, in this Church, the ends are joined together so that it is of one piece.

² This seems to be a relic of concelebration, for which see above, § 3(c); but Symeon of Thessalonica says that it is meant to show that it is the direct ministrations of our Lord Himself which he has now taken upon him (*Littledale*, p. 272, note 23).

Eutyches is anathematized. The catholicos lays his hands on his head and says a short prayer; then he puts the episcopal pluviale on his shoulders and kisses him on the mouth. They proceed with the liturgy, and two bishops take the elect by the hand and lead him to the altar. The catholicos puts the open book of the Gospels (held by a bishop) on his shoulders and lays his right hand on his head, while Psalm 89 ('*Misericordias Domini*') is sung. The chief deacon makes a proclamation, and a bishop reads a certificate of election and of its confirmation. The catholicos announces the elect's name and the see to which he is called, and prays secretly for the Holy Spirit, while two bishops make proclamations (ectenes), bidding to prayer. He again lays on hands and prays. All the clergy proclaim the vocation of the elect to the episcopate (naming him), and the people answer 'Axios.' The catholicos proclaims the vocation and bids to prayer. A long prayer follows, and then the choir sing Psalm 132 ('*Memento Domine*'), and three lections and a Gospel are read. A bishop says an ectene and then the catholicos says a prayer; and he anoints the new bishop's head with a long prayer, and then his two thumbs; he gives him the pastoral staff and ring and the book of the Gospels. He receives the kiss of peace from the catholicos, the bishops, and all the clergy; the mitre is put on his head, but it is expressly said that gloves are not used. The liturgy is offered on behalf of the new bishop, the catholicos celebrating. At the communion the bishop communicates himself in either kind, and then he communicates the others. After the ordination the new bishop remains in the sanctuary (i.e. the precincts of the church) for forty days continuously. (In the case of a bishop's ordination Denzinger does not give the complete rite, but only a long description of it. It appears from the description that the assistant bishops do not lay on hands. The anointing in this rite is very significant; see below, § 16.)

(b) *Presbyter* (Denzinger, ii. 297, 306).—On the evening before the ordination there are long exhortations and interrogations. The ordination itself takes place (as does that of a deacon) at the same point of the liturgy as in the case of a bishop, before the lections. After psalms and hymns the ordinand is presented, and Psalms 25-27 ('*Ad te Domine*,' '*Judica*,' '*Dominus illuminatio*') are sung. The deacon's bidding and the Kyrie (thrice) follow, and the bishop lays his right hand on the candidate's head and prays. The new presbyter turns to the people, and his vocation to the presbyterate and his name are proclaimed; the people reply 'Axios.' The bishop lays on his right hand and announces his vocation; then, when he has bidden to prayer, the Kyrie is said twelve times. The bishop again lays on his right hand and prays. He arranges the stole round his neck, saying, 'Accept the yoke of our Lord Jesus Christ, for his yoke is sweet and his burden light.' They sing Psalm 132 ('*Memento Domine*'), and read for the prophetic lesson Ezk 31⁷⁻¹⁹, Mal 2⁵⁻⁷, Is 61¹⁻⁶, for the Epistle 1 P 5¹⁻⁴, 1 Ti 1²⁻¹⁷, and for the Gospel Lk 4¹⁴⁻²². They say the creed, and after the offertory the bishop sits in his throne and they sing Psalm 119 ('*Beati immaculati*')—apparently the whole psalm. An ectene with a special suffrage follows, concluded with a prayer by the bishop. He lays his right hand on the head of the new presbyter, who is then vested (prayers being said during the action), and anointed on forehead and two hands, and is given the chalice and paten containing the [reserved] sacrament as a sign that he can now celebrate the liturgy. At the end of the service (the authorities differ as to whether he communicates himself or whether the bishop com-

municates him) he receives the kiss of peace from 'the bishop and the other priests,' and a blessing. After the ordination he is to remain in the church forty days.

(c) *Deacon* (Denzinger, ii. 286).—After psalms and hymn the ordinand is presented to the bishop, and his name and vocation are proclaimed. The bishop lays on his right hand and prays. Psalm 119 (the whole psalm) is sung. The bishop again lays on his right hand and prays. His ordination is proclaimed, and the people say 'Axios.' The bishop lays his hands on his shoulders, then his right hand on his head, proclaims his ordination, and bids prayers and prays. The prophetic lessons are Pr 4¹⁻⁹, Jer 1¹⁻¹⁰ 23⁵⁻⁶, Hos 14¹⁰; then Ac 6²⁻⁷; the Epistle is 1 Ti 3⁷⁻¹⁶; and the Gospel Lk 10²¹⁻²⁴. After the creed and offertory and deacon's ectene the bishop lays on his right hand and prays. After a hymn and introit the new deacon is vested in the diaconal vestment and the bishop puts the stole on his right shoulder, and gives him the book of the Gospels and the thurible. The new deacon censes the altar thrice and receives the kiss of peace.

(d) *Minor orders* (Denzinger, ii. 274).—The ordination rites are preceded by an office for conferring the tonsure; the candidate's hair is cut in the form of a cross. There are offices for the ordination of doorkeepers, readers, exorcists, acolytes, subdeacons. To the doorkeeper the key of the church is given; he goes to the door and opens and shuts it. To the reader the book of the apostles and prophets is given. To the exorcist is given the ritual in which the exorcisms at baptism or the renunciations are written. To the acolyte are given a candlestick with burning lights and a cruet to hold the eucharistic wine.¹ The ordination of subdeacons is more elaborate; it contains laying on of hands with prayer preceded by the lections, Pr 4¹⁻⁹, Is 61¹⁻¹⁰, He 9¹⁻¹⁵, Mk 10¹³⁻¹⁶; the new subdeacon is vested and the maniple is put on his left arm; the empty chalice and paten and other appointments for the liturgy are given to him.

ix. *The Coptic rite.*—(a) *Bishop* (Denzinger, ii. 18, 28).—The clergy and people give their testimony to the elect by a written document. If he is a deacon, he is to be ordained presbyter before he is ordained bishop. The ordination to the episcopate is to be on a Sunday, during the liturgy, after a vigil has been held with psalmody and doxology and reading of the Gospel. When they have said 'the Only-begotten Son' in the liturgy (Brightman, p. 148), i.e. just before the *Missa Catechumenorum* begins, the patriarch (*archisacerdos*) receives and causes to be read the deed of election and the testimony. The archdeacon says a short exhortation, and the archbishop (patriarch) goes to the altar and offers incense. After the ectene, with Lord's Prayer and special suffrages, has been said, the people repeat the Kyrie fifty times, and the bishops lift up their hands and receive (or, in the Arabic, touch) the elect, and put their hands on his shoulders. A prayer by the patriarch over the elect, a short exhortation by the archdeacon, and another prayer by the patriarch, said facing the east, follow. The latter then lays his right hand on the elect, the bishops put their hands on his neck and shoulders, and the patriarch says the ordination prayer, and then, facing the east, another. Turning to the new bishop, he signs him and says, 'We call Bishop N. to the holy church of N.' etc. The new bishop is vested and signed thrice, and another declaration of ordination is made; the people cry thrice 'Axios.' The archdeacon says an ectene and the patriarch prays.

¹ The Armenians alone among Easterns do not mix the chalice.

The new bishop is placed on the right of the altar, holding the Gospel in his bosom, and the liturgy, celebrated by the patriarch, proceeds. At the Gospel (Jn 20¹⁹⁻²³) the patriarch breathes in the face of the new bishop and says 'Axios,' and at v.²² breathes on him again. The new bishop communicates *after* the other bishops; he makes the fraction with the patriarch (a relic of concelebration). When the patriarch communicates the new bishop, he breathes in his face and lays his right hand on his head, and every one cries thrice 'Axios: N. bishop of the city of N. and of this (?) province.' The sacerdotal *σολή*¹ is taken off the new bishop by the patriarch, who puts on him the black *ono*.² It may here be remarked that in all these Eastern rites we find different versions in the various authorities. There is not in the same community any great conservatism of a particular form. In this case of Coptic episcopal ordinations there is another form given by Denzinger (ii. 28) from Renaudot. The differences are not material; but the Gospel (Jn 20¹⁹⁻²³) is read after the communion of the bishops; and the book of the Gospels is put over the head of the new bishop by the patriarch.

(b) *Presbyter* (Denzinger, ii. 11).—After testimony has been given to the candidate, he stands with stole (*orarium*) on one shoulder before the bishop, who offers a prayer with incense. The archdeacon makes an exhortation and the Kyrie is said thrice; the bishop prays and the Kyrie is again said thrice. Then the bishop turns to the candidate, lays on him his right hand, and says the ordination prayer, and then, facing the east, another. The bishop turns, signs the new presbyter on the forehead, and says, 'We call thee unto the holy Church of God, Amen.' The archdeacon announces his name and that of the church which he is to serve, and the bishop proclaims that he is called to be presbyter. He signs him three times, naming the Holy Trinity, vests him with the *σολή* (see above), says a prayer, and exhorts him. The new presbyter kisses the altar and the bishop and clergy, and he is communicated (with the reserved sacrament?). Hands (or a hand) are laid on him thrice and all say three times the 'Axios': 'N., presbyter of the holy catholic apostolic Church of the Christ-loving city of N., is worthy, in the peace of God, Amen.' (It is not said that the ordination is to take place during the liturgy.)

(c) *Deacon* (Denzinger, ii. 7).—The ordination is almost exactly in form the same as for a presbyter, though the prayers are not all the same. In each case the office is named. After the ordination the bishop places the zonarium (girdle), or in some copies the orarium (stole), on the left shoulder of the deacon. There is a short exhortation, the newly-ordained is communicated, and the bishop says, 'N., deacon of the holy Church of God, Amen.'

(d) *Minor orders* (Denzinger, ii. 2).—There are forms of ordination for a subdeacon and for a reader, very nearly as for a deacon, some of the prayers being the same; but a hand is not laid on them (so expressly). The bishop touches their temples. To the reader a book is given, and on the subdeacon a stole is placed. There is a short exhortation. Nothing is said of their receiving Holy Communion at ordination. A singer is ordained (Denzinger, ii. 63) by the bishop with three prayers, the kiss of peace, and the sign of the cross.

12. The W. Syrian (Jacobite) rite.—(a) *Bishop* (Denzinger, ii. 74).—After they have 'brought

¹ This is perhaps the name of the whole set of vestments (see Brightman, p. 691), or a chasuble may be meant.

² The assumption is that the consecration takes place in the patriarchal church. The new bishop is enthroned in his own church later.

round the divine mysteries' (Brightman, p. 80?, or perhaps the end of the liturgy is meant), a mitre is put on the elect's head, and two bishops present him to the patriarch, who says a prayer. The elect makes a confession of faith, and the patriarch prays and salutes the people. The Pater Noster is said, and one of the bishops, naming the elect and his see, makes proclamation of his being called and bids prayers. The Kyrie is said thrice. The patriarch takes the two eucharistic elements and commingles them, saying a prayer. Then all the bishops hold the Gospels over the elect's head and the patriarch lays both hands on him, both the patriarch's hands and the Gospels being moved up and down thrice. The patriarch lays his right hand on the elect's head, moving his left hand round his head, while the bishops hold the Gospels over him in silence, and meantime the patriarch says two ordination prayers. He vests the new bishop and places him on the throne. They then lead him round thrice, the patriarch each time saying 'Axios.' The patriarch leads him down from his throne, and both he and the other bishops take the pastoral staff in their hands, and the new bishop receives it from them, and prays, after which the patriarch and bishops and clergy sing Ps 110² thrice, and leave the staff with the new bishop, who goes to the entrance of the sanctuary and signs the people with it in the form of a cross, and then returns it to the patriarch. (Denzinger does not give the text of the prayers at the ordination of a W. Syrian bishop, and the description is not very full; nothing is said of the communion of the new bishop, nor is the ceremony of coimmixture explained; but see below (b), and § 14.)

(b) *Presbyter* (Denzinger, ii. 71, 87).—The ordination takes place at the end of the liturgy (but see below). Psalms and prayers are said, and the lections (1 P 6¹⁻³, Tit 1¹⁻³, Jn 16^{31-17¹³}) are read. The bishop gives the tonsure, cutting the candidate's hair in the form of a cross; the candidate is then brought to the sanctuary, wearing a stole deacon-wise. The archdeacon makes a proclamation and bids prayers. The Kyrie is said thrice. The bishop lays his hands on the consecrated elements and thrice stretcheth out his arms over them (apparently indicating that the strength and power are from our Lord); then he lays both hands on the candidate's head, and raises them thrice. He puts his right hand on his head, moving his left hand to and fro over his neck and face, and covers the candidate's head and face with the phaina (chasuble), while the deacons wave a fan. He says the ordination prayer, and then, again turning to the candidate, lays his right hand on his head and signs him with the sign of the cross between the eyes, saying, 'He is ordained in the holy Church of God.' The archdeacon proclaims his ordination, naming him and the place that he is to serve. The new priest returns to the altar and says a prayer. He is vested and given the thurible and receives the kiss of peace. The bishop then communicates him and bids him communicate the people.¹ If more persons than one are ordained at one time, the prayers are said in the plural.

(c) *Deacon* (Denzinger, ii. 67, 82).—The ordination is at the end of the liturgy. The ordinand kneels on one knee only, and the chief deacon makes a proclamation and bids to prayer. The bishop lays his hands on the consecrated elements and then on the candidate's head and carries out the same ceremony as in the case of a presbyter; he then says the ordination prayer. The rest

¹ This shows that the ordination takes place after the consecration of the elements, but before the communion of the people.

follows as above (but the prayers are not the same). The stole is put on the new deacon's shoulder, he receives the fan and censer, and then the kiss of peace, and he is communicated.

(d) *Minor orders* (Denzinger, ii. 66, 78).—Offices are given for the ordination of a reader and a subdeacon. The bishop touches their temples and prays. In the case of a subdeacon the bishop first touches the paten and chalice with his fingers (see above). A book is given to a reader, a stole to a subdeacon. The kiss of peace and communion are given to them. The form for a subdeacon is more elaborate than that for a reader.

13. The E. Syrian (Nestorian) rite.—(a) *Bishop* (Denzinger, ii. 238).—After a vigil the faithful assemble in the morning at the third hour; the patriarch or metropolitan and the bishops, having their mitres and staves, come to the sanctuary, and the elect stands before them in the middle. After prayers, anthems, and offering of incense the president takes the Gospel-book and puts it on the elect's back, the bishops on either side laying on their hands and holding them there till the prayer is finished; lections from the Gospels (Mt 16¹⁸⁻¹⁹, Jn 21¹⁵⁻¹⁷, Mt 16¹⁹) are read while the elect is being ordained. The president prays thrice and lays his right hand on the elect, stretching forth his left hand as one who prays. After the prayer the archdeacon bids prayer for the newly-ordained, naming him and his see, saying a form of the 'Sursum Corda': 'Lift up your minds and ask of God mercy for N.,' etc. They answer, 'It is meet and right,' once if a bishop is being ordained, twice if a metropolitan, thrice if a patriarch. After another prayer they take the Gospels off the new bishop's back and the patriarch vests him in the ma'aphra (a sort of cope, taking the place of a chasuble) and mitre, and gives him a staff. The kiss of peace is given, the 'Anthem of the Sanctuary' (Brightman, p. 253) is sung, and the lections read. (This places the ordination before the Trisagion [Brightman, p. 255].)

(b) *Presbyter* (Denzinger, ii. 233).—The ordination takes place at the sanctuary door. The bishop gives the tonsure, cutting the ordinand's hair in the form of a cross, girds him, and puts his ma'aphra on the ordinand's left shoulder. Prayers and anthems follow, and the ordinand kneels on both knees, signifying that he receives two talents, while the bishop stretches his hands over his eyes, signifying that he is given power to invoke the Holy Ghost and to bless, and to beget spiritual children and to feed them with spiritual food (see above, § 1 (d)). The bishop places his right hand on the ordinand's head and says two ordination prayers secretly; he places the ma'aphra on his shoulder, and arranges the stole on his breast.¹ The bishop gives the new presbyter the Gospel-book, and announces his ordination, naming him. A 'canon' (anthem) is sung and the kiss of peace is given. If there is a liturgy, it now proceeds, and they say, 'Before the throne of God,' and begin the 'Anthem of the Sanctuary' (Brightman, p. 253; see above).

(c) *Deacon* (Denzinger, ii. 229).—The ordination is at the sanctuary door, and the tonsure is given. The ordinand kneels on one knee, to signify that he receives one talent only (see above). The bishop places his right hand on his head, extending his left hand as one who prays, and says two ordination prayers. He places the stole on the new deacon's left shoulder, gives him the book of the 'Apostle' (the liturgical Epistles), announces his ordination, naming him, and gives him the kiss of peace. The new deacon is led round to the

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(b) *Presbyter* (Denzinger, ii. 148).—The ordinand, vested as a deacon, kneels on both knees and is blessed and signed by the bishop. Prayers with archdeacon's bidding and with offering of incense follow, and the ordinand is presented by the archdeacon; the Kyrie is said thrice. The ordinand kneels on both knees, and the bishop lays his hand on his head and prays; he then places his hands on the host and chalice and thrice spreads out his arms. He lays his right hand on the ordinand's head, covers the latter's face with his chasuble, moves his left hand over his face and neck, and says the ordination prayers. He puts his hand on the elements and on the ordinand's head and again prays several times. He anoints the hands of the

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new presbyter, and both he and the archdeacon proclaim the ordination, naming him, the archdeacon also naming the charge which he is to serve. The bishop vests him with girdle, amice, stole, and chasuble, and blesses him. Lections from 1 Co 12²³, 1 Ti 3⁴ 4¹¹, Tit 1⁵⁻⁹, 1 Ti 4¹⁵ 14. 15, Jn 21¹⁵⁻²² follow, and then the ectene and prayer. The thurible is given, and they lead the new presbyter round, giving him the Gospels to carry, and they put the consecrated bread in the paten. Several prayers follow, the cross is laid on his head, the kiss of peace is given, and the new presbyter is bidden to cense the people. The bishop then intinges the host and the chalice and bids him communicate the people. A long exhortation concludes the service.

(c) *Deacon* (Denzinger, ii. 128).—The procedure is similar, though the prayers are different. The newly-ordained deacon (who has been kneeling on one knee only [see above, § 13]) is vested in tunic and stole and is given the 'Apostle' to read; the lection is 1 Ti 1¹⁻³ 15.* He is given the thurible to go round the sanctuary; he is given the Apostle to go round the church, a hymn being sung meanwhile; the chalice and paten are put on his head. His ordination as deacon is proclaimed; and there is an exhortation.

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16. *Summary.*—In reviewing the ordination rites which have been described above, we notice that for ordaining bishops, priests, and deacons there is an irreducible minimum which is common to them all—laying on of hands and prayer—for it is impossible to believe, with Hatch, that the episcopal ordination in the *Apostolic Constitutions* is a real exception to this. The extreme simplicity of the earliest rites continued for many centuries in both East and West, and it was only by slow degrees that they became more elaborate.

A conspicuous feature of ordinations in earlier and often in later times was the difference between those of the lower and of the three higher orders, laying on of hands being expressly confined to the latter, except in the *Apostolic Constitutions* (and in the *Constitutions through Hippolytus*), and except in the present Greek rite (in the case of subdeacons and deaconesses), the Armenian and Maronite (in the case of subdeacons), and the E. Syrian. In the Coptic and W. Syrian rites the bishop touches the temples of, but does not lay hands on, those admitted to minor orders. In the Maronite rite the bishop touches the temples of the orders under the rank of subdeacon. See § 1 (b).

It is practically the universal custom to name the office to which the person is ordained, in at least one of the ordination prayers. But the word 'presbyter' is absent from that for the second order in Sarapion, and the word 'deacon' from that for the third order in the *Canons of Hippolytus*, though the latter work refers to St. Stephen and to the *διακονία* of the ordinand.

One of the earliest ceremonies added at the ordination of a bishop was the holding of the Gospel-book over him. It is mentioned in the *Apostolic Constitutions* (viii. 4, when the deacons hold it, not, as in the other books, the assistant bishops); also in pseudo-Dionysius, the *Gallican Statutes* and other Gallican books, in the later Western pontificals (including the Norwegian), and in the Greek, Armenian, W. Syrian, E. Syrian, and Maronite rites. In the Coptic rite the new bishop holds the Gospel-book in his bosom, and, in some forms of it, it is held over him; but, at any rate at one time, this custom was observed in Alexandria only in the case of the ordination of a patri-

* This seems to be a mistake. Another MS has 1 Ti 5⁵⁻¹⁰ 122.

follows as above (but the prayers are not the same). The stole is put on the new deacon's shoulder, he receives the fan and censer, and then the kiss of peace, and he is communicated.

(d) *Minor orders* (Denzinger, ii. 66, 78).—Offices are given for the ordination of a reader and a subdeacon. The bishop touches their temples and prays. In the case of a subdeacon the bishop first touches the paten and chalice with his fingers (see above). A book is given to a reader, a stole to a subdeacon. The kiss of peace and communion are given to them. The form for a subdeacon is more elaborate than that for a reader.

13. The E. Syrian (Nestorian) rite.—(a) *Bishop* (Denzinger, ii. 238).—After a vigil the faithful assemble in the morning at the third hour; the patriarch or metropolitan and the bishops, having their mitres and staves, come to the sanctuary, and the elect stands before them in the middle. After prayers, anthems, and offering of incense the president takes the Gospel-book and puts it on the elect's back, the bishops on either side laying on their hands and holding them there till the prayer is finished; lections from the Gospels (Mt 16¹⁸⁻¹⁹, Jn 21¹⁵⁻¹⁷, Mt 16¹⁹) are read while the elect is being ordained. The president prays thrice and lays his right hand on the elect, stretching forth his left hand as one who prays. After the prayer the archdeacon bids prayer for the newly-ordained, naming him and his see, saying a form of the 'Sursum Corda': 'Lift up your minds and ask of God mercy for N,' etc. They answer, 'It is meet and right,' once if a bishop is being ordained, twice if a metropolitan, thrice if a patriarch. After another prayer they take the Gospels off the new bishop's back and the patriarch vests him in the *ma'aphra* (a sort of cope, taking the place of a chasuble) and mitre, and gives him a staff. The kiss of peace is given, the 'Anthem of the Sanctuary' (Brightman, p. 253) is sung, and the lections read. (This places the ordination before the Trisagion [Brightman, p. 255].)

(b) *Presbyter* (Denzinger, ii. 233).—The ordination takes place at the sanctuary door. The bishop gives the tonsure, cutting the ordinand's hair in the form of a cross, girds him, and puts his *ma'aphra* on the ordinand's left shoulder. Prayers and anthems follow, and the ordinand kneels on both knees, signifying that he receives two talents, while the bishop stretches his hands over his eyes, signifying that he is given power to invoke the Holy Ghost and to bless, and to beget spiritual children and to feed them with spiritual food (see above, § 1 (d)). The bishop places his right hand on the ordinand's head and says two ordination prayers secretly; he places the *ma'aphra* on his shoulder, and arranges the stole on his breast.¹ The bishop gives the new presbyter the Gospel-book, and announces his ordination, naming him. A 'canon' (anthem) is sung and the kiss of peace is given. If there is a liturgy, it now proceeds, and they say, 'Before the throne of God,' and begin the 'Anthem of the Sanctuary' (Brightman, p. 253; see above).

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arch (*DCA* i. 222). It is not found in the present Anglican and Swedish rites. And originally it was not in use in Rome, while in the 8th and 9th centuries it seems to have disappeared from Gaul, Germany, and Spain (*ib.*).

The custom of delivering the Gospel-book to the new bishop was not known in Rome before the 11th century (Morinus, *de Sacr. Ord.* iii. 23). It is in the present Roman pontifical; and so in Maskell (iii. 275); but not in that of Magdalen College (Wilson, p. 77). In the Anglican rite a Bible is given: The Gospels are given in the Armenian and Maronite rites; and the same thing seems to be implied in the Coptic rite.

Anointing at ordinations seems to have originated in the Gallican rite, perhaps in Britain, where we find it in the 6th century (Duchesne, p. 378). From the Gallican rite it passed to Rome, and it is perhaps because of the influence which Roman customs have had on the Armenians and Maronites that they alone of Easterns have it at the present day.

The vesting of the newly-ordained is very general, but it is not found in the earliest forms. Ordinarily it takes place immediately after ordination, but in the present Anglican rite (at the consecration of bishops) it comes before it. The giving of the insignia of office is confined to the minor orders in the earlier forms, and, when it was extended to the higher orders it became for a long time in the West the most prominent part of the rite.

In the later Western pontificals the fusion of the Gallican and Roman rites produced some dislocation. The displacement of the imposition of hands and the multiplication of ordination prayers were among the principal results of this fusion. In almost all Western rites, whether before or after the Reformation, the introduction of imperative or declaratory formulæ and the delivery of the insignia of office changed the centre of gravity of the office from a prayer to God to ordain to an act done by the ordainer. This is not the case in the East, though there the ordainer and also usually the archdeacon proclaim the ordination to the people (cf. pseudo-Dionysius, above, § 1 (d)). The Anglican use of Jn 20²³ at the laying on of hands in the ordination of a presbyter is parallel to the reading of this passage as a lection at the ordination of a bishop in the Coptic rite.

In the East, and to a lesser extent in the West, the custom (found in the *Testament of our Lord* and the *Apostolic Constitutions*) of the people crying 'Axios' is one of the most prominent features in the service.

The only doctrinal development that calls for notice is found in the Western pre-Reformation pontificals. In these the function of offering sacrifice is greatly emphasized in the ordination of a presbyter. This is the case both in the ordination prayers and in the comparatively modern imperative formulæ.

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ORDINATION (Jewish).—There are in the Hebrew language two words meaning 'ordination'—*s-mikhah* and *minnu*. The latter was used for a few centuries only; the former goes back to Biblical precedent and has been retained to this day. It must be pointed out that the Jewish ordination does not partake of a sacerdotal or sacramental character; it is in the main an 'appointment,' yet not entirely devoid of spiritual significance. Behind this institution there lies a chapter of Jewish history which has not yet been sufficiently elucidated, viz. the appointment of judges, of those who would have to administer the law, both temporal and spiritual. It is a very obscure chapter, for it marks the division between State and Church, which could not have been sharp and decisive. The Jewish law is not a civil law in the ordinary sense of the term. The laws are not human decisions, but divine ordinances. To obey the law means to perform a religious act; to transgress the law means to commit a sin, which has to be expiated in a religious manner; hence the character of the judge could not be that of a mere civil authority. The indications in the Bible go a long way to prove that from the very beginning such a division was intended in the Mosaic legislation. The sacerdotal functions of the Temple belonged to a family; the priest was born into it; he could neither be ordained nor appointed.

The word used in the appointment of Aaron and of the Levites is not the same as that used in the appointment of Joshua and the Seventy Elders. In the former case Moses 'filled' their hands (Ex 28⁴¹ 29⁹, Lv 21¹⁰; AV and RV translate wrongly 'consecrate' instead of 'filling the hands')—no doubt, with those objects which they were to offer up in the Temple, flour or oil, or part of the sacrifice. Moreover, they were anointed; not so Joshua. Moses 'placed his hands' (Nn 27¹⁹) (*samakh*) upon him in exactly the same way as the priest put his hand on the sacrifice (Lv 1⁴ etc.), or as the witnesses laid their hands upon the head of the guilty (Lv 24¹⁴). In all these cases it meant a transfer of personal responsibility either in the exercise of authority or in the expiation of sin and guilt. There can be no question of a transmission of the spirit, as Joshua already had the spirit before Moses was ordered to place his hands upon him. It is not within the power of man to dispense

the grace of the spirit. Joseph is mentioned as the man upon whom there was the spirit of God (Gn 41³⁸); he neither got it from Jacob nor handed it on to his children; and even in the tents of the Seventy Elders the spirit came to them not directly from Moses but as a spirit of prophecy from above, and ceased with them (Nu 11²⁵). Joshua, moreover, was commanded distinctly (Nu 27¹) to stand before Eleazar and to consult him by the Urim and Thummim in all matters of supreme importance. Joshua was clearly appointed the civil administrator of the law, the supreme judge, the king, for we shall see that the power of appointing judges rested with the king.

It is nowhere stated that these men were to be priests or Levites to the exclusion of Israelites. On the contrary, it was, no doubt, Israelites who acted as local magistrates in the various tribes (see below). True, in the highest tribunal which was in the centre of the divine worship the high priest acted as the supreme judge; thus the direction Dt 17⁹ can best be explained in harmony with the Mosaic legislation. And probably this is also the best explanation of the passages in which the judges are called the *'elohim* (e.g., Ex 22²⁴) and the judge who decided the case by the use of the Urim and Thummim the divine oracle. According to Dt 16¹⁸⁻²⁰, judges were appointed in every tribe. These were formed by the elders (see Dt 21¹⁸⁻²²), who were called upon to decide in such cases as the rebellious son in the case of immorality, the dead body found outside the town and the murderer unknown, the case of Yibbum (Ruth), etc. These judges were regarded as the men upon whose authority one could rely (*samak*), upon whom part of the responsibility for right and wrong had been devolved, just as in the case of the sacrificial animal, upon which part of the sin and responsibility of the people had been laid. We find nowhere that the blunders which prevented the priest from acting in the Temple were a bar to the judge. Of course, the judges from Joshua to Saul were, in fact, the temporal rulers, the tribal kings who for the time being exercised authority over the rest by their military prowess and victory in battle.

Samuel, who acted in a double capacity as priest and king, went also in a circuit to judge Israel (1 S 7¹⁶), but, later, the people asked him to appoint a king over them who would rule them (1 S 8⁹). David appointed from among the Israelites and Levites 'officers and judges' (1 Ch 23⁴ 26²⁷). The author of the book of Chronicles states (2 Ch 19⁵⁻⁷) that Josaphat appointed judges in all the fenced cities of Judah, and (vv. 8-11) established in Jerusalem a high court consisting of priests, Levites, and the heads of the houses of Israel. Here we have practically the composition of the high court as it developed in Jerusalem after the Exile. It was a tribunal whose members claimed the right to decide in all kinds of controversies, and to inflict punishments—even capital punishment; and, above all, they reserved to themselves the sole right of determining the Jewish calendar. They did not interfere except rarely in those ordinances which referred to the sacrifice and the service in the Temple, but, on the other hand, they claimed the right of being the representatives of the oral law; they were the living tradition which was applied authoritatively to the interpretation of the law for the daily necessities of life; they were the Pharisees, i.e. the authoritative interpreters of the law—hence their sway over the people; they were the *smilkhim*, men not only appointed but worthy of being relied upon in all matters of interpretation and application of the divine ordinances of the law, for upon them that authority had been devolved—as they claimed—in historical succession. This was the result of a

long process of evolution. The difficulty began immediately after the return from the Exile. The high priest became under Persian rule the virtual administrator and governor of the province; he was thus invested with the power of appointing officers and judges. Then a conflict must have arisen between the heads of the fathers' houses and the priestly caste. Each one probably claimed power and authority, and no doubt this led to the establishment of what is known as the Great Assembly, which was succeeded by the Sanhedrin (the Greek equivalent for the Hebrew assembly). The conflict must have been a keen one; and it evidently grew in strength and bitterness after the Maccabean success, for then some of the high priests (Jannai and his successors) endeavoured to combine publicly the authority of the king with that of the high priest. Much more is meant by this than has hitherto been understood. It meant that the high priest was the sole authority in all matters of civil and criminal law in addition to the spiritual, or rather sacerdotal, functions which he alone could exercise in virtue of his Aaronite descent. In the long run the absolute power was wrested from his hand, and the laymen gained the victory. They retained the right of administration and interpretation of the law, and, above all, the sole authority in the regulation of the calendar. They claimed to be the true representatives of that tradition which Moses had given to the Seventy Elders in the wilderness. It is for this reason that in the chapters of the fathers (*Pirke Abhoth*) which contain the chain of the oral tradition no notice is taken of the high priests—with the sole exception of Simon. The tradition is made to descend in a direct line from Moses to Joshua, from Joshua to the elders, from the elders to the prophets, from the prophets to the men of the Great Assembly, and so on, until it reached the patriarchs and the other heads of the Rabbinical schools. In the *Midrash Eshah* the names of the Seventy Elders are given (*Yalkut Shimoni*, i. § 736). This list is more fully elaborated in the other chain of the tradition known as *Seder Olam*. Curiously enough, the Karaites, who reject the oral tradition, have nevertheless preserved a similar chain, though in a modified form (*Dod Mordkhai*). The Sanhedrin claimed to be the direct continuators of the authority which was vested by Moses in the Seventy Elders. It had reached them through the intermediary of the prophets. Zechariah and Malachi were counted among the first members of the men of the Great Assembly, who were the direct predecessors of the Sanhedrin. They appointed the local judges in various towns of Palestine, who derived their authority to decide in all matters, civil and criminal, direct from that of the Sanhedrin. The appointment, according to a vague tradition, took the form of the appointment of Joshua by Moses. The Nasi—i.e., the Prince, the title given to the president of the Sanhedrin—alone or in conjunction with other members of this, the highest tribunal, placed his hands upon the candidate and proclaimed him worthy in the first place to be among those initiated into the secret of the computations of the calendar (*Sed ha'Ibbur*) and to decide in all legal questions exclusive of those affecting the Temple. Even there the Sanhedrin claimed a certain jurisdiction in the matter of probing the purity of descent of a Kohen who came to participate in the service. They examined his documents and rejected him if they found them insufficient. It is not to be thought, however, that priests were excluded from this college; the members were chosen for their capabilities, whether they were Israelites, Levites, or Kohanim. The case recorded in the NT of the high priest Caiaphas (Mt 26⁷¹), etc., proves this

point. He, no doubt, was consulted in a matter which affected the spiritual worship and the service of the Temple. Other high priests may have had their seat in the Sanhedrin, and one of them—Rabbi Ishmael, the high priest—is always mentioned with great veneration. These new judges thus became the sharers in the authority which came down in direct succession. They became *s'mikhim*, men of authority who were 'ordained,' i.e. 'appointed,' as men upon whom the people could 'rely.' They exercised certain spiritual functions, for Jewish life in all its forms depended upon their interpretation of the law. Things became pure or impure, allowed or forbidden, according to their declaration, sanction, or refusal. They declared the festivals; and even on a memorable occasion, when one of the great scholars, relying on his own calculation and observation of the moon, had drawn up a different calendar, he had to submit to the decision of the patriarch Gamaliel II. and his colleagues in power and keep the Day of Atonement on the day fixed by them (*Rōsh Hash. 25a, b*). The 'ordination,' or *s'mikhāh*, was one of the means by which the oral tradition preserved its authoritative character; for, so long as there were men who were the lawful heirs of the authority of the Sanhedrin, the Jewish law had its authoritative exponent. The point which has hitherto remained obscure, viz. the disuse of the *s'mikhāh*, as has been alleged, after the destruction of the Temple, will now become perfectly clear. The reason is obvious why the Roman Government punished with death any one who would continue this practice of *s'mikhāh*, i.e. ordain pupils to become Rabbis; for, as soon as the chain of *s'mikhāh* was broken, there was no longer any central authority great and respected enough to command universal obedience, to interpret the laws, and, above all, to fix the calendar; and, as soon as the people no longer knew when to keep their Sabbaths and their festivals or how to apply the law, their spiritual dissolution was near at hand. And it is easy to understand why Judah b. Baba (*Sanh. 14a*) exposed himself to die by the hand of the Romans whilst granting *s'mikhāh* to four pupils; he had thus re-established the legal authority for the oral law, and a proper succession for its interpretation.

The Roman rule did not tolerate any Jewish civil tribunal or any Jewish magistrates who would judge the people according to the Jewish law, and therefore the practical use of the *s'mikhāh* as a regular continuous institution on a large scale had to come to an end for a time after the war of Bar Kokhba (A.D. 130). But, when the civil local government of the Jews was re-established soon afterwards under the headship of one of the descendants of the house of David, or rather the house of Hillel, under the name of 'patriarch of the Jews,' the right of *s'mikhāh* was vested in the patriarchs, though there was no longer a real Sanhedrin with its autonomous jurisdiction and unquestioned authority on all matters of political and religious life. The new judges now appointed had, however, to decide, as before, not only what was right and wrong, but also what was religiously correct or incorrect. It was now a limited form of authority that was vested in the *s'mikhāh*, though it still carried with it the same spiritual authority. Any one who received the *s'mikhāh* received at the same time the right to decide with the others in the fixing of the calendar. But this right was centred in Palestine. No school, no head of a college in Babylon, could ever obtain it. It was jealously guarded as a privilege of the patriarchate in Palestine. When the great scholar from Babylon, R. Eleazar b. Pedath, came to Palestine, he considered it a very great honour to have obtained

the *s'mikhāh* there (*Jerus. Rōsh Hash. 58b*; cf. *Sanh. 18c* and *B. K'thūb. 112a*). But the name of this institution and the form of the appointment had been changed. It was no longer called *s'mikhāh* in Palestine, but *minnuy* (from the Aramaic word *mana*, *Dn 1^{5.10}*). The old name had obviously an ominous ring about it in the ears of the Romans, and therefore the Jews of Palestine avoided using it. It was retained, however, in Babylon, and is still used. The laying on of hands was no longer practised (*B. Sanh. 13b*) either for the same reason as the name had been abandoned—not to arouse too much suspicion of the Romans—or possibly because the Church had adopted this practice for the purpose of ordaining priests. The laying of hands on the pupils (*Ac 6⁶*) and on Saul and Barnabas (*13³*) need not be taken as ordination, but merely as a form of blessing like that of the priests, and, at the same time, it may have been a symbol of authority, granting them the power to be judges who would declare the law in the community. Later this became the symbol of consecration for sacerdotal office, and this very likely was the reason why the practice was discontinued by the Jews. Shortly afterwards the right of the patriarch became limited, inasmuch as he could appoint only with the concurrence of the heads of the legal tribunal, *Bēth Din*—the judges of the Jewish court.

The constant persecution by the Roman and then by the Byzantine emperors pressed heavily on the Jews of Palestine, and thus it came about that one of the patriarchs, Hillel or Jndah in the 4th or 5th cent.—the time has not yet been definitely decided—established a calendar upon the basis of mathematical calculation only. It was no longer to be made dependent on the real observation of the appearance of the new moon. On the other hand, the oral law had become codified and had been further enlarged and expounded by the great schools of Palestine and Babylon, all of which became the 'written' Mishnāh and Talmud. Thus the *s'mikhāh* lost its essential character of being the only legal authority for the calendar, and for the interpretation and declaration of the oral law.

With the extinction of the patriarchate the institution came practically to an end in Palestine. No Rabbi could henceforth be appointed either by 'nomination' or by 'ordination' and laying on of hands capable of exercising functions like those vested in the Sanhedrin and the patriarchate. In one form or another, and either in the name or by the hand of the college, the *Rōsh Yeshibāh*, or *Gāon*, granted by 'nomination' or in the form of a written certificate a degree of qualification for the function of teacher and judge. Much that happened in Palestine during the first centuries of the Muhammadan conquest is wrapped in obscurity. Fragments from the Genizah in Cairo, however, give us a glimpse into some movements which must have taken place in the 9th and 10th centuries, when among others a certain Ben Meir endeavoured to resuscitate the ancient power of *s'mikhāh*, and claimed for himself and possibly for others in Palestine the right of again fixing the calendar by observation and, no doubt, of exercising such functions as formerly belonged to the holders of the *s'mikhāh*. Saadyah entered into long polemics with Ben Meir and his associates, but very little is known about this dispute except the fact mentioned above. Again, the re-establishment of the *s'mikhāh* became a burning question among the Jews of Palestine when Bē Rab in the year 1538 claimed for himself and his tribunal the right of resuscitating the ancient *s'mikhāh*. He based his claim on a statement of Maimonides which seemed to grant to the Rabbis of Palestine the right of re-establishing the *s'mikhāh* if they had all come together and had

unanimously decided upon it. Bê Rab, who lived in Safet, had evidently not paid sufficient attention to the susceptibilities of his colleagues in Jerusalem, the chief of whom was Levi aben Habib; a controversy arose between them, and the attempt of Bê Rab was entirely frustrated. He emphatically denied the intention of touching the calendar or interfering with the criminal law, but declared that his aim was to create a spiritual centre for Judaism in Palestine, just as the patriarchate and the Sanhedrin had been before. There was another motive which may have prompted Bê Rab to this action—Messianic aspirations. The plan which afterwards matured under Don Joseph of Naxos, the favourite of Selim—to create, as it were, a small Jewish commonwealth in Galilee with its centre in Tiberias—may have prompted Bê Rab to this step, which was to be a preliminary step to the re-gathering of the Jews in the Holy Land.

The *smikkhah*, shorn of its special character, is still a practice in the ordination of a Rabbi. It does not carry with it the same authority as it had in Palestine, but it is a necessary condition for the qualification of a Rabbi. When in the 12th cent. Judaism again suffered under the shock of the persecution which threatened to destroy the unity of Israel and to undermine the authority of the representatives of the law, R. Meir resuscitated the old practice in the manner and to the extent that it had been practised in the Diaspora. It was to be henceforth as a certificate for the holder, a kind of *venia docendi* which was granted to him by one who was a recognized authority himself and a holder of such a diploma. It was precisely the same as in olden times in so far as the authority of the giver guaranteed the qualifications of the recipient. No community would appoint a man to be the Rabbi—i.e. the judge in all matters legal and religious—who did not have the *smikkhah*, for upon his decision alone many doubtful legal questions can be solved; he is responsible for the upholding of the written law in its entirety and for the carrying out of all the divine ordinances in conformity with the old tradition; he grants divorce; he decides all the questions of the ritual slaughter of animals; he declares the food fit or unfit for Jewish consumption; and in all questions of a legal character he is the authority upon whom the community relies. Thus the *smikkhah*, or ordination, is still a valid principle in Judaism. It is now the token of qualification for eventual appointment as a Rabbi, who is then called *mtsmakh*. Among the Ashkenazic Jews the diploma is now called *Hätarath Höräah venia docendi*—i.e. he has now the permission to declare the law—whilst the Sephardic Jews and the Jews of the East have retained the old name of *smikkhah*.

It is of interest to note that among the titles of the priests and elders of the Samaritans there is also that of *sämikkhah*, the one who is worthy of being relied upon, a man of authority, and also he who has been appointed to high office. The appearance of this title among those of the Samaritans shows its great antiquity and its wider use in Palestine.

LITERATURE.—The chief sources are the 1st ch. in the Mishnah of Sanhedrin and the two Talmudic treatises of that name, esp. Jerus. Sanh. 10a, c, and Bab. Sanh. 17a: Maimonides, (†1204), *Yad ha-hazakah*; *Hilkhoh Sanhedrin*, l.-iv.; Asher b. Yehiel (1340), *Tür Höshen Mishpat*, chs. l., vii., viii., and Káro's commentary to it, as well as *Shulhan 'Arukh*, same chapters; I. ben S. Lampronti, *Pahad Ishaq*, s.v. 'Semikah'; Levi aben Habib, *She'eloth u-T'shuvot*, Venice, 1665; Bê Rab, *She'eloth u-T'shuvot*, do. 1663, and M. Gaster's Cod. 931, fol. 3a-44b, containing under the heading 'Iggereth Has'mikah' the full correspondence of Bê Rab (the MS was copied in his MGWJ xxxviii. [1894] 123-127: A. rl, Berlin, n.d.; M. Glödemann, *Gese*. und der Kultur der abendländ. Juden, Vienna, 1880-88; M. Gaster, *Rabbinical Degree*, London, 1900. M. GASTER.

ORENDA.—*Orenda* is a word of Iroquoian origin, being an Anglicization of the Huron *iarendä* or *orenda*, which has cognates in the related dialects. The word signifies the inherent power or energy which every object, in some characteristic degree, possesses and exerts; and, indeed, it is not so far removed in meaning from our own looser use of the term 'energy,' regarded as potential or active and related in kind and degree to the object which it defines. That the meaning of the aboriginal word is more intimately psychical than ours—*orenda* being conceived as indissolubly bound up with desire and will—is but the natural reflexion of a more primitive stage of thought; but it is at least a fair question whether our own use of 'energy' does not covertly carry the same psychical connotation. 'Magic power' is the phrase most commonly employed by J. N. B. Hewitt in translating *orenda*; but 'magic,' as he points out, is derogatorily associated with superstition and supernaturalism, and is not, therefore, a fair rendering of the native conception.

By primitive man all motions and activities were interpreted as manifestations of life and will. Things animate and things inanimate were comprised in one heterogeneous class, sharing a common nature. All things, therefore, were thought to have life and to exercise will, whose hehests were accomplished through *orenda*—that is, through magic power, reputed to be inherent in all things' (Hewitt, 21 *ABEN* [1903], p. 134).

In another connexion Hewitt gives a number of phrases illustrative of the use of the concept in Iroquoian tongues:

'When a hunter is successful in the chase, it is said, *wa'tharendogé'sini*, he baffled, thwarted their *orenda*, i.e., the *orenda* of the quarry; but, conversely, should the huntsman return unsuccessful, it is said, *wa'tharendogé'sini*, they (the game) have foiled, outmatched his *orenda*; . . . when the elements are gathering and a storm is brewing, it is said, *wa'rendogé'sini*, it (storm-maker) is making, preparing its *orenda*; and when the lowering storm-clouds appear to be ready, it is said, *totrendogé'sini*, it has finished, has prepared, its *orenda*; these two expressions and their conjugational forms are equally applicable to an animal or bird that is angry or in a rage; . . . anything whose *orenda* is reputed or believed to have been instrumental in obtaining some good or in accomplishing some purpose is said "to possess *orenda*" (*toréndare*), just as a wealthy person is said "to have money," that is, "an abundance of money"; and if these things or portions of them be chosen and kept against the time of their use, they become what are commonly called charms, amulets, fetiches, mascots, shields, or, if you please, "medicine" (*Amer. Anthropologist*, new ser., iv. 381.).

Hewitt goes on to indicate the relationship of the exercise of *orenda* to willing and desiring and to singing—relations which he regards as of primary importance in the interpretation of the term, showing, as they do, its intimately psychical intention:

'*Roteréndogé'sini*, he is arrayed in his *orenda*, and *rotéréndogé'sini*, he has effused or put forth his *orenda*, are two expressions, sentence-words, which are said in reference to a man who is exerting his *orenda* for the accomplishment of some purpose, this is its primary signification; the first term, *rotéréndogé'sini*, has come to mean, as a secondary usage, he is hoping for it, is expecting it, because it was the habit to put on one's *orenda* to obtain what is desired; now, the second sentence-word, *rotéréndogé'sini*, as a secondary meaning has come to signify, he is singing, is chanting, but literally, he is holding forth his *orenda*. Thus, singing was interpreted to signify that the singer, chanter, whether beast, bird, tree, wind, man, or what not, was putting forth his *orenda*, his mystic potency, to execute his will; hence, too, it comes that the shaman, when exerting his *orenda*, must sing, must chant, in imitation of the bodies of his environment. Let it be noted, too, that this is the only word signifying to sing, to chant, in the earlier speech of the Iroquoian peoples.'

Orenda is not applied to muscular strength or to any purely mechanical force, but only to invisible powers conceived as analogous to will and intelligence, although there is a curious suggestion of emanation, or efflux, about it, that seems to bring it within the range of what are sometimes spoken of as 'telepsychic powers.'

In the Onondaga version of the Iroquoian cosmology it is said of Sapling, the vegetation spirit, that so soon as he becomes old he is transformed again into a youth:

Moreover, it is so that continuously the *orenda* immanent in his body—the *orenda* with which he suffuses his person, the

point. He, no doubt, was consulted in a matter which affected the spiritual worship and the service of the Temple. Other high priests may have had their seat in the Sanhedrin, and one of them—Rabbi Ishmael, the high priest—is always mentioned with great veneration. These new judges thus became the sharers in the authority which came down in direct succession. They became *smikhām*, men of authority who were 'ordained,' i.e. 'appointed,' as men upon whom the people could 'rely.' They exercised certain spiritual functions, for Jewish life in all its forms depended upon their interpretation of the law. Things became pure or impure, allowed or forbidden, according to their declaration, sanction, or refusal. They declared the festivals; and even on a memorable occasion, when one of the great scholars, relying on his own calculation and observation of the moon, had drawn up a different calendar, he had to submit to the decision of the patriarch Gamaliel II. and his colleagues in power and keep the Day of Atonement on the day fixed by them (*Rōsh Hash. 25a, b*). The 'ordination,' or *smikhāh*, was one of the means by which the oral tradition preserved its authoritative character; for, so long as there were men who were the lawful heirs of the authority of the Sanhedrin, the Jewish law had its authoritative exponent. The point which has hitherto remained obscure, viz. the disuse of the *smikhāh*, as has been alleged, after the destruction of the Temple, will now become perfectly clear. The reason is obvious why the Roman Government punished with death any one who would continue this practice of *smikhāh*, i.e. ordain pupils to become Rabbis; for, as soon as the chain of *smikhāh* was broken, there was no longer any central authority great and respected enough to command universal obedience, to interpret the laws, and, above all, to fix the calendar; and, as soon as the people no longer knew when to keep their Sabbaths and their festivals or how to apply the law, their spiritual dissolution was near at hand. And it is easy to understand why Judah b. Baba (*Sanh. 14a*) exposed himself to die by the hand of the Romans whilst granting *smikhāh* to four pupils; he had thus re-established the legal authority for the oral law, and a proper succession for its interpretation.

The Roman rule did not tolerate any Jewish civil tribunal or any Jewish magistrates who would judge the people according to the Jewish law, and therefore the practical use of the *smikhāh* as a regular continuous institution on a large scale had to come to an end for a time after the war of Bar Kokhba (A.D. 130). But, when the civil local government of the Jews was re-established soon afterwards under the headship of one of the descendants of the house of David, or rather the house of Hillel, under the name of 'patriarch of the Jews,' the right of *smikhāh* was vested in the patriarchs, though there was no longer a real Sanhedrin with its autonomous jurisdiction and unquestioned authority on all matters of political and religious life. The new judges now appointed had, however, to decide, as before, not only what was right and wrong, but also what was religiously correct or incorrect. It was now a limited form of authority that was vested in the *smikhāh*, though it still carried with it the same spiritual authority. Any one who received the *smikhāh* received at the same time the right to decide with the others in the fixing of the calendar. But this right was centred in Palestine. No school, no head of a college in Babylon, could ever obtain it. It was jealously guarded as a privilege of the patriarchate in Palestine. When the great scholar from Babylon, R. Eleazar b. Pedath, came to Palestine, he considered it a very great honour to have obtained

the *smikhāh* there (*Jerus. Rōsh Hash. 58b*; cf. *Sanh. 18c* and *B. K'thūb. 112a*). But the name of this institution and the form of the appointment had been changed. It was no longer called *smikhāh* in Palestine, but *minnuy* (from the Aramaic word *mana*, *Dn 15.10*). The old name had obviously an ominous ring about it in the ears of the Romans, and therefore the Jews of Palestine avoided using it. It was retained, however, in Babylon, and is still used. The laying on of hands was no longer practised (*B. Sanh. 13b*) either for the same reason as the name had been abandoned—not to arouse too much suspicion of the Romans—or possibly because the Church had adopted this practice for the purpose of ordaining priests. The laying of hands on the pupils (*Ac 6⁹*) and on Saul and Barnabas (*13³*) need not be taken as ordination, but merely as a form of blessing like that of the priests, and, at the same time, it may have been a symbol of authority, granting them the power to be judges who would declare the law in the community. Later this became the symbol of consecration for sacerdotal office, and this very likely was the reason why the practice was discontinued by the Jews. Shortly afterwards the right of the patriarch became limited, inasmuch as he could appoint only with the concurrence of the heads of the legal tribunal, *Bēth Din*—the judges of the Jewish court.

The constant persecution by the Roman and then by the Byzantine emperors pressed heavily on the Jews of Palestine, and thus it came about that one of the patriarchs, Hillel or Judah in the 4th or 5th cent.—the time has not yet been definitely decided—established a calendar upon the basis of mathematical calculation only. It was no longer to be made dependent on the real observation of the appearance of the new moon. On the other hand, the oral law had become codified and had been further enlarged and expounded by the great schools of Palestine and Babylon, all of which became the 'written' Mishnāh and Talmud. Thus the *smikhāh* lost its essential character of being the only legal authority for the calendar, and for the interpretation and declaration of the oral law.

With the extinction of the patriarchate the institution came practically to an end in Palestine. No Rabbi could henceforth be appointed either by 'nomination' or by 'ordination' and laying on of hands capable of exercising functions like those vested in the Sanhedrin and the patriarchate. In one form or another, and either in the name or by the hand of the college, the *Rōsh Yeshibāh*, or *Gāōn*, granted by 'nomination' or in the form of a written certificate a degree of qualification for the function of teacher and judge. Much that happened in Palestine during the first centuries of the Muhammadan conquest is wrapped in obscurity. Fragments from the Genizah in Cairo, however, give us a glimpse into some movements which must have taken place in the 9th and 10th centuries, when among others a certain Ben Meir endeavoured to resuscitate the ancient power of *smikhāh*, and claimed for himself and possibly for others in Palestine the right of again fixing the calendar by observation and, no doubt, of exercising such functions as formerly belonged to the holders of the *smikhāh*. Saadyah entered into long polemics with Ben Meir and his associates, but very little is known about this dispute except the fact mentioned above. Again, the re-establishment of the *smikhāh* became a burning question among the Jews of Palestine when Bē Rab in the year 1538 claimed for himself and his tribunal the right of resuscitating the ancient *smikhāh*. He based his claim on a statement of Maimonides which seemed to grant to the Rabbis of Palestine the right of re-establishing the *smikhāh* if they had all come together and had

unanimously decided upon it. Bê Rab, who lived in Safet, had evidently not paid sufficient attention to the susceptibilities of his colleagues in Jerusalem, the chief of whom was Levi aben Habib; a controversy arose between them, and the attempt of Bê Rab was entirely frustrated. He emphatically denied the intention of touching the calendar or interfering with the criminal law, but declared that his aim was to create a spiritual centre for Judaism in Palestine, just as the patriarchate and the Sanhedrin had been before. There was another motive which may have prompted Bê Rab to this action—Messianic aspirations. The plan which afterwards matured under Don Joseph of Naxos, the favourite of Selim—to create, as it were, a small Jewish commonwealth in Galilee with its centre in Tiberias—may have prompted Bê Rab to this step, which was to be a preliminary step to the re-gathering of the Jews in the Holy Land.

The *smikhah*, shorn of its special character, is still a practice in the ordination of a Rabbi. It does not carry with it the same authority as it had in Palestine, but it is a necessary condition for the qualification of a Rabbi. When in the 12th cent. Judaism again suffered under the shock of the persecution which threatened to destroy the unity of Israel and to undermine the authority of the representatives of the law, R. Meir resuscitated the old practice in the manner and to the extent that it had been practised in the Diaspora. It was to be henceforth as a certificate for the holder, a kind of *venia docendi* which was granted to him by one who was a recognized authority himself and a holder of such a diploma. It was precisely the same as in olden times in so far as the authority of the giver guaranteed the qualifications of the recipient. No community would appoint a man to be the Rabbi—i.e. the judge in all matters legal and religious—who did not have the *smikhah*, for upon his decision alone many doubtful legal questions can be solved; he is responsible for the upholding of the written law in its entirety and for the carrying out of all the divine ordinances in conformity with the old tradition; he grants divorce; he decides all the questions of the ritual slaughter of animals; he declares the food fit or unfit for Jewish consumption; and in all questions of a legal character he is the authority upon whom the community relies. Thus the *smikhah*, or ordination, is still a valid principle in Judaism. It is now the token of qualification for eventual appointment as a Rabbi, who is then called *mismakh*. Among the Ashkenazic Jews the diploma is now called *Hätarath Hôrâah venia docendi*—i.e. he has now the permission to declare the law—whilst the Sephardic Jews and the Jews of the East have retained the old name of *smikhah*.

It is of interest to note that among the titles of the priests and elders of the Samaritans there is also that of *smikhah*, the one who is worthy of being relied upon, a man of authority, and also he who has been appointed to high office. The appearance of this title among those of the Samaritans shows its great antiquity and its wider use in Palestine.

LITERATURE.—The chief sources are the 1st ch. in the Mishnâb of Sanhedrin and the two Talmudic treatises of that name, esp. Jerus. Sanh. 19a, c, and Bab. Sanh. 17a; Maimonides, (†1204), *Yad ha-azakah*; *Hilkhôth Sanhedrin*, l.-iv.; Asher b. Yehiel (1340), *Tôr Hôshen Mishpat*, chs. i., vii., viii., and *Karo's* commentary to it, as well as *Shulhân 'Arûkh*, same chapters; I. ben S. Lampront, *Paḥad Ishak*, v. 'Semikhah'; Levi aben Habib, *She'elôth u-Teshûbôth*, Venice, 1665; Bê Rab, *She'elôth u-Teshûbôth*, do. 1663, and M. Gaster's Cod. 931, fol. 3a-44b, containing under the heading 'Iggereth Hasmikhah' the full correspondence of Bê Rab (the MS was copied in his lifetime); W. Bacher, *MGWJ* xxxviii. (1894) 122-127; A. Goldmann, *Monatsschrift*, Berlin, n.d.; M. Gûdemann, *Gesell.* und der Kultur der abendländ. Jude M. Gaster, *Rabbinical Degree*, London, 1900. M. GASTER.

ORENDA.—*Orenda* is a word of Iroquoian origin, being an Anglicization of the Huron *iarenda* or *orenda*, which has cognates in the related dialects. The word signifies the inherent power or energy which every object, in some characteristic degree, possesses and exerts; and, indeed, it is not so far removed in meaning from our own looser use of the term 'energy,' regarded as potential or active and related in kind and degree to the object which it defines. That the meaning of the aboriginal word is more intimately psychical than ours—*orenda* being conceived as indissolubly bound up with desire and will—is but the natural reflexion of a more primitive stage of thought; but it is at least a fair question whether our own use of 'energy' does not covertly carry the same psychical connotation. 'Magic power' is the phrase most commonly employed by J. N. B. Hewitt in translating *orenda*; but 'magic,' as he points out, is derogatorily associated with superstition and supernaturalism, and is not, therefore, a fair rendering of the native conception.

'By primitive man all motions and activities were interpreted as manifestations of life and will. Things animate and things inanimate were comprised in one heterogeneous class, sharing a common nature. All things, therefore, were thought to have life and to exercise will, whose behests were accomplished through *orenda*—that is, through magic power, reputed to be inherent in all things' (Hewitt, *21 RBEW* (1903), p. 134).

In another connexion Hewitt gives a number of phrases illustrative of the use of the concept in Iroquoian tongues:

'When a hunter is successful in the chase, it is said, *wa'tharêndogê'ni*, he baffled, thwarted their *orenda*, i.e., the *orenda* of the quarry; but, conversely, should the huntsman return unsuccessful, it is said, *wa'thorêndogê'ni*, they (the game) have foiled, outmatched his *orenda*; . . . when the elements are gathering and a storm is brewing, it is said, *wa'trêndogê'ni*, it (storm-maker) is making, preparing its *orenda*; and when the lowering storm-clouds appear to be ready, it is said, *wa'trêndogê'ni*, it has finished, has prepared, its *orenda*; these two expressions and their conjugational forms are equally applicable to an animal or bird that is angry or in a rage; . . . anything whose *orenda* is reputed or believed to have been instrumental in obtaining some good or in accomplishing some purpose is said "to possess *orenda*" (*ôrêndarr*), just as a wealthy person is said "to have money," that is, "an abundance of money"; and if these things or portions of them be chosen and kept against the time of their use, they become what are commonly called charms, amulets, fetishes, mascots, shields, or, if you please, "medicine" (*Amer. Anthropologist*, new ser., iv. 38f.).

Hewitt goes on to indicate the relationship of the exercise of *orenda* to willing and desiring and to singing—relations which he regards as of primary importance in the interpretation of the term, showing, as they do, its intimately psychical intention:

'*Rotêrêndogê*, he is arrayed in his *orenda*, and *rotêrêndogê*, he has effused or put forth his *orenda*, are two expressions, sentence-words, which are said in reference to a man who is exerting his *orenda* for the accomplishment of some purpose, this is its primary signification; the first term, *rotêrêndogê*, has come to mean, as a secondary usage, he is hoping for it, is expecting it, because it was the habit to put on one's *orenda* to obtain what is desired; now, the second sentence-word, *rotêrêndogê*, as a secondary meaning has come to signify, he is singing, is chanting, but literally, he is holding forth his *orenda*. Thus, singing was interpreted to signify that the singer, chanter, whether beast, bird, tree, wind, man, or what not, was putting forth his *orenda*, his mystic potency, to execute his will; hence, too, it comes that the shaman, when exerting his *orenda*, must sing, must chant, in imitation of the bodies of his environment. Let it be noted, too, that this is the only word signifying to sing, to chant, in the earlier speech of the Iroquoian peoples.'

Orenda is not applied to muscular strength or to any purely mechanical force, but only to invisible powers conceived as analogous to will and intelligence, although there is a curious suggestion of emanation, or efflux, about it, that seems to bring it within the range of what are sometimes spoken of as 'telepsychic powers.'

In the Onondaga version of the Iroquoian cosmology it is said of Sapling, the vegetation spirit, that so soon as he becomes old he is transformed again into a youth:

'Moreover, it is so that continuously the *orenda* immanent in his body—the *orenda* with which he suffuses his person, this

orenda which he projects or exhibits, through which he is possessed of force and potency—is ever full, undiminished, and all-sufficient; and, in the next place, nothing that is *otkon* or deadly, nor, in the next place, even the Great Destroyer, *otkon* in itself and faceless, has any effect on him, he being perfectly immune to its orenda; and, in the next place, there is nothing that can har his way or veil his faculties' (21 *RBEW*, p. 219).

The word *otkon*, or *otgon*, which here appears as a name for hostile or malevolent orenda, is, says Hewitt (*Amer. Anth.*, new ser., iv. 37 n.), gradually displacing orenda, for the reason, he thinks, 'that the malignant and the destructive, rather than the benign, manifestations' of this power produce the more lasting impressions on the mind. It is possible that this word is related to the Huron *oqui* or *oki*, which D. G. Brinton (*The Myths of the New World*³, Philadelphia, 1896, p. 64) regards as of Algonquian origin.

The word *oqui*, and its plural *ondaqui*, signifies among them (i.e. the Hurons) some divinity; in a word, what they recognize as above human 'nature' (*Jesuit Relations*, ed. R. G. Thwaites, Cleveland, 1896-1901, v. 257).

The term orenda is, in fact, only one of a large group of terms, members of which are found in most, if not all, Indian languages, which have the same general meaning—invisible power or energy. Hewitt (*Amer. Anth.*, new ser., iv. 37 ff.) mentions the Siouan *wakan*, Algonquian *manitowi*, Shoshonean *pokunt*. W. Matthews ('Navaho Legends,' *Memoirs of the American Folk-Lore Society*, Boston and New York, 1897) describes the Navaho *digin* (p. 37). J. Swanton (*Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History*, viii. [1909] 13) says of the Haida *sgāna* that it is 'a word which my interpreters liked to render by "power"', applied to supernatural beings, shamans, etc. F. H. Cushing ('Zufii Fetiches,' 2 *RBEW* [1883], p. 9) describes the Zufii conception, in essence equivalent to the Iroquoian. Apparently the Inca word *huaca* (Garcilasso de la Vega, *Royal Commentaries*, London, 1871, II. iii.) is a S. American instance.

The whole group of terms designate the American equivalent of what is generally known to anthropologists by the Polynesian term *mana*. As applied to American Indian beliefs, *manitu* and *wakanda* (Algonquian and Siouan respectively) are much the most common in use. There is the difficulty, however, that *manitu* is very generally used for a spirit or deity, i.e. a kind of invisible personality, which is not at all the meaning of orenda—by which a spiritual attribute rather than entity (to employ a scholastic distinction) is designated. Something of the same objection extends to *wakan*, *wakanda*, which, although most commonly used in the attributive sense, is still also employed in a sort of personification of that power for which the white man has no better term than Great Spirit:

'The Wakonda addressed in tribal prayer and in the tribal religious ceremonies which pertain to the welfare of all the people is the Wakonda that is the permeating life of visible nature—an invisible life and power that reaches everywhere and everything, and can be appealed to by man to send him help. From this central idea of a permeating life comes, on the one hand, the application of the word *wakonda* to anything mysterious or inexplicable, be it an object or an occurrence; and, on the other hand, the belief that the peculiar gifts of an animate or inanimate form can be transferred to man. The means by which this transference takes place is mysterious and pertains to Wakonda but is not Wakonda. So the media—the shell, the pebble, the thunder, the animal, the mythic monster—may be spoken of as *wakondas*, but they are not regarded as the Wakonda' (Alice C. Fletcher, 27 *RBEW* [1911], p. 599).

In view of this tendency to personify, which does not appear in the case of the Iroquoian orenda, there may be reason in adopting the latter term, as Hewitt urges, to designate the fundamental view of the world, as actuated by interplaying and invisible powers, which underlies all American Indian myth and religion (cf. art. NATURE [American]).

See further art. MANA.

LITERATURE.—See the sources cited throughout, especially J. N. B. Hewitt, 'Orenda and a Definition of Religion,' *American Anthropologist*, new ser., iv. [1902] 33-46.

H. B. ALEXANDER.

ORGANIC SELECTION.—This is a theory supplementary to Darwinism (*q.v.*) according to which the course of evolution by natural selection is guided by individual organic accommodations in lines coincident with themselves. The accommodations or adjustments made by individuals are conceived as affording a screen or protection, against elimination, to those variations with which they coincide in direction; these variations, thus screened, have a chance to accumulate themselves from generation to generation until they become of independent 'selection-value.'

This principle was announced independently in 1896 by three naturalists—C. Lloyd Morgan, H. F. Osborn, and J. Mark Baldwin, the last-named giving it its name and developing it in *Development and Evolution* (New York and London, 1902), in which the original papers of the other authorities as well as his own, and citations from others (E. B. Poulton, H. W. Conn, etc.), are reprinted.

The theory of evolution founded upon organic selection has received the name of the 'orthoplasy theory' in opposition to the 'orthogenesis theory,' which assumes determinate variations properly so called. It is held to afford a valuable supplement to that based upon Darwinian selection, in various ways. Certain striking applications of it may be briefly stated (cf. the co-operative article on this topic in Baldwin's *DPhP*).

(1) If this view of the directive effect of individual accommodations is true, there is no further need of the Lamarckian principle of the 'inheritance of acquired characters,' since the 'direction' secured, although ultimately due to variation, is in lines coincident with the characters or modifications acquired in experience. The case for Lamarckism against Darwinism, as a theory of evolution, is therefore greatly weakened by the 'organic selection' theory, as is quite generally admitted.

(2) The theory finds an interesting application in the account of the origin of animal instinct. The instincts, according to it, are functions due to accumulated variations which have been screened and protected during their immature stages by individual habits of intelligent and conscious adjustment. Under this protection—in cases such as the theory of organic selection recognizes—these functions have developed on the organic side, while the intelligent adaptations associated with them, becoming less and less necessary, have finally been superseded entirely by the instinct. This gives the look of intelligence to the instincts—they have arisen as substitutes for intelligent action, by coincident variation. The Lamarckian theory of instinct developed by Spencer under the name of the 'lapsed intelligence' theory is thus completely replaced by the 'organic selection' theory.

(3) To psychologists and students of sociology and ethics certain bearings of the theory are of extreme interest. If conscious individual accommodations may have such a directive effect upon evolution, then a purposive or teleological factor is introduced into Darwinism. The course of organic evolution is no longer to be looked upon as haphazard, accidental, or fatalistic, but as proceeding in lines of progress marked out by intelligent adjustments. Consciousness, mind in general, becomes an efficient, though indirect, factor in biological evolution. And mental evolution takes the lead, in a sense; not, indeed, in the way of determining variation in certain directions, but in the way of controlling variation, and of securing the selection of functions and characters which subserve the purposes of mind.

Moreover, the special modes of accommodation found in co-operative life, social and moral, get

the same directive efficiency. The whole range of social and ethical group-activities reflects its values into the instinctive and other more plastic potencies of the individuals making up the group. The opposition between Darwinian evolution and morality, signaled by Huxley, completely disappears.

(4) Philosophically considered, in view of these points, the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection is very materially recast. It is no longer a theory resting exclusively upon fortuitous congenital variations. For in many important instances it is not upon such variations, taken simply for themselves, that the preserving hand of selection falls, but upon those only which show their fitness to serve the ends of conscious adaptation and of mind. Selection falls upon the variations only because it falls first upon the entire living function in which the variations are included and protected. The function which survives, and with it the anatomical characters, are those which present the successful union and joint operation of endowment (present in the variation) and experience (present in the accommodation).

LITERATURE.—Besides the citations made above, the following works contain accounts and critical estimates of the theory of organic selection: C. Lloyd Morgan, *Habit and Instinct*, London, 1898; *Animal Behaviour*, do. 1900; L. H. Plate, *Das Selektionsprinzip und Probleme der Artbildung*, Leipzig, 1908; F. W. Headley, *The Problems of Evolution*, London, 1900; H. W. Conn, *The Method of Evolution*, New York, 1900; Y. Delage and M. Goldsmith, *Les Théories de l'évolution*, Paris, 1909; W. McDougall, *Body and Mind*, London, 1911; C. Lloyd Morgan and A. Welsmann, in *Darwin and Modern Science*, ed. A. G. Seward, Cambridge, 1909; C. Groos, *The Play of Man*, Eng. tr., London, 1901; J. A. Thomson, *Darwinism and Human Life*, do. 1909; J. T. Gulick, *Evolution, Racial and Habitual*, Washington, 1905.

J. MARK BALDWIN.

ORGY.—The practice of periodic relaxation of social restraints has been followed by the majority of peoples, and is the unconscious response to a real social need. The study of the orgy as a normal phenomenon throws light on the whole mechanism of society. Primitive 'bursts' and modern Bank Holiday 'mafficking' fulfil an identical purpose, and their conditions are identical, though more stringent in the case of early society.

Thus, of the Central Australians we are told that 'the life of a native is hedged in with arbitrary rules that must be obeyed, often at the peril of his life. To the casual onlooker the native may appear to live a perfectly free life; in reality he does nothing of the kind; indeed, very much the reverse.'¹

We may here take exception to the epithet 'arbitrary'; there is little in any social organization to which it can be applied. It cannot, e.g., be applied to the orgy itself, so far as this is indulged in by normal members of the society. The orgy is to the routine of ordinary life what the religious feast is to the fast. It supplies a rest and a change, but particularly an emotional and physical expansion and discharge of energy. Excess and dissipation are almost inevitably involved, but they are not in principle essential conditions. Nor, again, is the criminality which often appears. The functions in which this neuro-muscular discharge takes place are those belonging to the general muscular system—eating, drinking, and sex. The main psychological element, relief from restraint, is connected with others—the play-instinct, the pleasure of exhilaration and neuro-muscular excitement, and religious enthusiasm in many cases.

The economic conditions of savage life themselves suggest periodic excess. The savage hunter often practically fasts for days together. He is in-

ured to this, and especially capable of gorging himself when he has killed his game. This capacity indeed is part of his survival value.¹

In origin an unconscious social reaction, the orgy has clearly been thus understood in later ages and accepted.

'Having a function to fulfil in every orderly and laborious civilization built upon natural energies that are bound by more or less inevitable restraints,' it has been deliberately employed in great religious ages, the rule of abstinence being 'tempered by permission of occasional outbursts.'²

Possibly such regulation of excess and dissipation has assisted the general development of self-control. In some cases the orgy combines all possible forms of expression, in others it is specialized in a particular direction; e.g., the dramatic element was conspicuous in the Feast of Fools, the idea of change and social inversion in the Roman Saturnalia, religious ecstasy in the Dionysiac orgy. The Hindu followers of the Śākta Tantras require at their feasts the 'five n's'—fish, flesh, wine, corn, and women. But even these Śāktists seem to omit dancing and to emphasize drinking; they 'drink, drink, and drink until they fall on the ground in utter helplessness.'³ The Jews at Purim seem to have indulged in most forms of excess.⁴

Various dates lend themselves to the orgy. Such are the harvest festival and other agricultural occasions of celebration, the passage from the old to the new year, and other seasonal changes. In many such instances, as in the case of feasts of firstfruits, the sudden access of a supply of food and liquor inevitably encourages an outburst.

A few typical examples will illustrate the chief characteristics of the orgy.

At the Pondo festival of firstfruits 'the young people engage in games and dances, feats of strength and running. After these are over the whole community give themselves over to disorder, debauchery, and riot. In their . . . games they but did honour to the powers of nature, and now, as they eat and drink, the same powers are honoured in another form and by other rites. There is no one in authority to keep order, and every man does what seems good in his own eyes. . . . People are even permitted to abuse the chief to his face, an offence which at any other time would meet with summary vengeance and an unceremonious dispatch to join the ancestors.'⁵ During the yam-harvest feast in Ashanti the grossest liberty prevails; 'neither theft, intrigue nor assault is punishable,' and 'each sox abandons itself to his passions.'⁶

The New Year feast of the Iroquois formed 'a kind of saturnalia. Men and women, variously disguised, went from wigwam to wigwam smashing and throwing down whatever they came across. It was a time of general license; the people were supposed to be out of their senses, and therefore not to be responsible for what they did.'⁷

The Hos of N. India 'have a strange notion that at this period [harvest festival] men and women are so overcharged with vicious propensities that it is absolutely necessary for the safety of the person to let off steam by allowing for a time full vent to the passions.'⁸

This shrewd description illustrates the safety-valve function of the orgy. After eating and beer-drinking people expand in other ways; the feast is 'a saturnale during which servants forget their duty to their masters, children their reverence for parents, men their respect for women, and women all notions of modesty, delicacy, and gentleness; they become raging bacchantes. . . . Sons and daughters revile their parents in gross language, and parents their children; men and women become almost like animals in the indulgence of their amorous propensities.'⁹

Of the Roman Saturnalia Frazer writes: 'Feasting and revelry and all the mad pursuit of pleasure are the features that seem to have especially marked this carnival of antiquity. . . . But no feature of the festival is more remarkable, nothing in it

¹ Westermarck, *MI* li. 290, with examples.

² H. Havelock Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, vi., *Sex in Relation to Society*, p. 218.

³ Rajendralala Mitra, *Indo-Aryans*, London and Calcutta, 1881, i. 401f.

⁴ See Frazer, *GE*³, pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, p. 263 f.

⁵ J. Macdonald, *Religion and Myth*, London, 1893, p. 136 f.

⁶ Frazer, *GE*³, pt. v., *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild*, London, 1912, li. 62, quoting A. B. Ellis, *The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast*, do. 1857, p. 229 f., and T. E. Bowdich, *Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee*, do. 1873, p. 226 f.

⁷ Frazer, *GE*³, pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, p. 127.

⁸ *Ib.* p. 130.

⁹ E. T. Dalton, *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1872, p. 196 f.

¹ The Greek *orgia* meant primarily 'acts of ritual.' Then it was specially applied to 'secret' or 'mystic' cults, such as the Eleusinian *mysteria* and the Dionysiac *epiphany*. From the Bacchanalia suppressed by Rome the term derived its modern meaning of 'feasting or revelry, especially such as is marked by excessive indulgence or licence' (*OED*).

² B. Spencer, *Native Tribes of the Northern Territory of Australia*, London, 1914, p. 342 f.

seems to have struck the ancients themselves more than the license granted to slaves at this time. . . . The slave might call at his master, intoxicate himself like his betters, sit down at table with them. . . . Masters actually changed places with their slaves and waited on them at table.¹

The two days of the Jewish festival of Purim were designated as 'days of feasting and gladness, and of sending portions one to another, and gifts to the poor' (Est 9:22). 'Purim has been described as the Jewish Bacchanalia, . . . and everything is lawful which can contribute to the mirth and gaiety of the festival.' The Jew must drink 'until he cannot distinguish between the words "Cursed be Haman" and "Blessed be Mordecai."' During the two days of the feast the Jews, we are told, in the 17th cent. 'did nothing but feast and drink to repletion, play, dance, sing and make merry; in particular they disguised themselves, men and women exchanging clothes.'²

The Christian Church in early Europe seems to have adopted folk festivals of the Saturnalian type, especially on Shrove Tuesday and New Year's day. The dramatic element and freedom of movement were prominent at the former festival: 'Some go about naked without shame, some crawl on all fours, some on stilts, some imitate animals.'³

The Feast of Fools, or *Kalender*,⁴ was an ecclesiastical orgy, conspicuous chiefly for inversion of rôle. 'Priests and clerics may be seen wearing masks and monstrous visages at the hours of office. They dance in the choir dressed as women. . . . They sing wanton songs. They eat black puddings at the horn of the altar while the celebrant is saying mass. They play at dice there. They cense with stinking smoke from the soles of old shoes. They run and leap through the church without a blush at their own shame. Finally they drive about the town and its theatres in shabby traps and carts, and rouse the laughter of their fellows and the bystanders in infamous performances with indecent gestures and verses scurrilous and unchaste.'⁵ Chambers notes that the festival was confined to the inferior clergy, and infers it to be 'an ebullition of the natural lout beneath the clerical, allowed as a 'reaction from the wonted restraint.' The inversion of status is especially marked by such offices as bishop, pope, and king—all examples of the mock authority common in folk-festivals.⁶ The curious title of this orgy may be due merely to the fact that the clerics played the fool, but ancient Rome had a *stultorum feriae* on Feb. 17, the title of which is also obscure.⁷ The Dionysiac orgy was conspicuous for the prominence of women. Probably men dressed as women. Dancing and excessive physical exertion, drinking, and the eating of raw flesh and drinking of warm blood were features.⁸ Among the Central Australians an exchange of wives at the end of the Engwura ceremonies may be regarded as an orgiastic element.⁹

Farnell regards the production of exhilaration in the Dionysiac orgy by means of dancing and drinking as not only religious exaltation but a means of acquiring supernatural energy for the working of vegetation-magic. This cannot be the primary object of the orgy.¹⁰ Frazer, in view of its frequent connexion with expulsion of evils, observes:

'When a general riddance of evil and absolution from all sin is in immediate prospect, men are encouraged to give the rein to their passions, trusting that the coming ceremony will wipe out the score which they are running up so fast. On the other hand, when the ceremony has just taken place, men's minds are freed from the oppressive sense, under which they generally labour, of an atmosphere surcharged with devils; and in the first revulsion of joy they overleap the limits commonly imposed by custom and morality. When the ceremony takes place at harvest time, the elation of feeling which it excites is further stimulated by the state of physical wellbeing produced by an abundant supply of food.'

Again, in special reference to the Saturnalia of Italy, he remarks:

'What wonder then if the simple husbandman imagined that by cramming his belly, by swilling and guzzling just before he proceeded to sow his fields, he thereby imparted additional vigour to the seed?'¹¹

These suggestions miss the main point of the problem of the orgy, which is quite satisfactorily explained by Ellis. They refer to secondary applications of a natural, self-regarding, human need.

¹ Frazer, *GB*, pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, p. 307. In an English hotel at the present day it is the custom at Christmas for the visitors and servants to change places. The custom seems to have originated spontaneously as an expression of fellow-feeling. This is an element of the orgy.

² *Id.* p. 363.

³ Ellis, p. 219.

⁴ See du Cange, *Glossarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis*, Niort, 1883-87, s.v.; there are several other terms.

⁵ E. K. Chambers, *The Mediaeval Stage*, Oxford, 1903, i. 294, translating a Latin letter of the 15th century.

⁶ *Id.* i. 326 ff.

⁷ *Id.* i. 334, 355.

⁸ *CGS* v. 159-160.

⁹ Spencer-Gillen, p. 381; see Crawley, *Mystic Rose*, London, 1902, pp. 273, 479.

¹⁰ *CGS* v. 161 ff.

¹¹ Frazer, *GB*, pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, pp. 225, 347.

Nietzsche's Dionysiac theory and Aristotle's *κἀλαπεί* are both suggestive in the psychology of the orgy.¹

LITERATURE.—H. Havelock Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, vi., *Sex in Relation to Society*, Philadelphia, 1910, pp. 218-223. A. E. CRAWLEY.

ORIENTALISM.—See SYNCRETISM.

ORIGEN.—See ALEXANDRIAN THEOLOGY.

ORIGINAL SIN.—I. *THE TRADITIONAL CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE*.—1. Preparation in the Old Testament.—Christian theology has identified original sin with a consequence of the Fall, and has described the sinfulness thus introduced into human life in terms of contrast with the original or unfallen state of man. The ecclesiastical doctrine of original sin, from the time of St. Paul, has been regarded as contained or implied in Gn 3, and therefore as having a foundation in OT theology. That some form of doctrine concerning original sin was exegetically derived from the Paradise story by Jewish writers before the Christian era is plain, as will presently be seen; but it seems no longer tenable that any such teaching was intended by the compiler of that narrative.

Gn 3 does not assert that any corruption or dislocation of human nature was occasioned by the sin of Adam and Eve; it does not mention any withdrawal of divine gifts such as before the Fall might have enabled man to remain morally innocent; it does not represent that Adam's posterity was involved in the consequences of his sin, except exclusion from the garden and from access to the tree of life, and liability to the physical ills of life. Further, no element of the conception of original sin seems to have been present to the Jahvist compiler's mind. Subsequent sins, such as Cain's, are in no way connected with Adam's; undiminished responsibility is attributed to the sinner of the second generation, evil is not predicted of human nature, sinfulness is not regarded as universal in Adam's posterity, and the general corruption which evoked the Flood is assigned, in the Jahvist history, to a different cause from the sin of the first parent. Lastly, the story of Paradise does not receive any doctrinal exposition in any of the books of the OT, and no connexion between the sinfulness of mankind and Adam's sin is ever hinted at in them.

But the OT testifies to the growth of several ideas which were afterwards embodied in the conception of inherited or original sin, and to a growth uninfluenced by any such conception. Sin is sometimes personified as a power external to man, in which we see exhibited the tendency, so disastrous in later theology, to conceive of sin in abstraction from the sinner, apart from whom it can have no existence. Man is credited with an evil imagination (*yēser*), though this imagination or disposition was not a result of the Fall. Sin is regarded as a state, as well as an isolated act. The universality of sinfulness is sometimes emphasized. Sin is occasionally spoken of as inherent in man from his birth, and in Ps 51 this inherent and inherited sinfulness is regarded as guilty. Facts and conceptions are thus recognized which were afterwards connected and explained by the idea of original sin derived from Adam; but in the OT itself the inherent and inherited sinfulness of mankind is not identified with a moral consequence of the first sin. Indeed, OT thought seems to preclude the possibility of such identification.

2. Development of thought in uncanonical Jewish literature.—Perhaps the earliest extant exegesis of the Fall-story is contained in Sir 25¹

¹ Ellis, p. 223 f.; *CGS* v. 237.

'From a woman was the beginning of sin; and because of her we all die.' That 'beginning' is to be interpreted here in a temporal, and not in a causal, sense is rendered overwhelmingly probable by the recovered Hebrew text and, more especially, by other passages of Sirach. In this case Ben Sira makes no advance upon OT teaching in connexion with original sin; but the latter part of the verse quoted above supplies evidence that in his day the way was being prepared for an interpretation of Gn 3 such as would lead to a doctrine of original sin.

The book of Wisdom affords new instances in Jewish thought of approach towards this doctrine—e.g., in its teaching that sin and (spiritual) death were introduced into humanity from without, in speaking of Adam as 'the protoplast,' and in affirming the actuality of transmitted depravity (though this is local and derived from the Cainites, not universal and derived from Adam). The data for the doctrine are all present in this book; but they are unconnected, not generalized into a single conception. The last sentence will serve equally well to summarize the more elaborate teaching of Philo and of Alexandrian Judaism generally. But in an apocalyptic writing of the same period largely influenced by Hellenic thought, the *Book of the Secrets of Enoch*, original sin derived from Adam is plainly taught (see below).

(a) *Rabbinical literature*.—In this department of Jewish literature we find much said of the glory of the unfallen state of Adam, and something as to the cosmic effects of the Fall. But the privileges forfeited by Adam for the race are not the *dona superaddita* of later Christian theology. The idea of the evil inclination, the germ of which is met with early in the OT, is greatly elaborated; but this bias to evil seems never to have been regarded by Rabbis before the Christian era as a consequence of the first sin. A crude legend that Eve was polluted by Satan (or the serpent), and her taint transmitted to her posterity, occurs in several forms in Rabbinic writings; but it does not seem to have served the purpose of an explanation of the universal sinfulness of man. What is most remarkable, in connexion with the antecedents of St. Paul's teaching, is the apparent absence from this department of Jewish literature, until medieval times, of any reference to the idea of all the race being included in Adam, or identified with Adam, when he sinned. Death, and various supernatural adornments of Adam's life at its beginning, are the only consequences of the Fall which early Rabbinism seems to recognize.

(b) *Jewish apocalyptic literature*.—If the ground-work of the *Book of Enoch* is the earliest extant specimen of pseudepigraphic literature, it points to a tendency, in the first beginnings of Jewish exegesis, to explain the sinfulness of mankind by reference not to the Fall story of Gn 3, but to the legend of the 'elohim' (or 'watchers,' as they are called in *Enoch*) contained in Gn 6¹⁻⁴. As we pass to later apocalypses, we find the emphasis increasingly shifted to Gn 4, and signs of confusion of these two distinct Biblical stories, which seems to have resulted in detaching the idea of the fall of the race from the setting in which it first grew up, and transplanting it to the history of the first temptation and the loss of Paradise. Thus the Fall-story came to be regarded as the explanation of much besides human death. In the A recension of *Slavonic Enoch*, or the *Book of the Secrets of Enoch*, the idea appears that mankind inherits from Adam, and as a consequence of his sin, moral infirmity of nature—a much more explicit doctrine of original sin than that taught by St. Paul. Possibly this teaching, which would be very unusual for an early Jewish book, is not really

ancient. The *Apocalypse of Baruch*, which is more akin to Rabbinic literature than any of the pseudepigrapha, seems to regard the Fall as having brought upon the whole race liability to future punishment, and as thereby having affected the spiritual destiny of all men, while at the same time it asserts, with an emphasis which suggests a polemical intention, that ultimately each individual is 'the Adam of his own soul.' But for a difference of emphasis on these two different lines of doctrine, the teaching of pseudo-Baruch is similar to that of St. Paul. Similar again to the teaching of both these writers, and probably contemporary, is that of the *Apocalypse of Ezra* (2 Esdras of the Apocrypha). But, while pseudo-Baruch minimizes the effects of the Fall on man's moral state, pseudo-Ezra is full of the sense of human infirmity; his doctrine as to original sin, however, is so greatly qualified by the teaching as to the 'evil heart' (*yēser hara*), which follows Rabbinic lines, that he is led practically to repudiate original sin in the sense of inherent corruption, deriving human infirmity not by heredity from fallen Adam, but from 'the following of Adam' in indulging the evil impulse which was as much in Adam when he was created as in us when we were born.

We conclude, then, that Judaism, at the beginning of the Christian era, possessed two distinct conceptions of original sin. The one, presumably originating in the Alexandrian school, is stated in terms of the idea of inherited depravity or corruption, and is analogous to an important and characteristic factor of Augustine's doctrine. The other asserts, quite indefinitely, a connexion between Adam's sin and his posterity's liability to punishment, and offers no connecting link between them; if we possess analogy with any later form of the doctrine of original sin, it would seem to be the imputation theory. The passage from this form of the Jewish doctrine to the teaching of St. Paul involves but a slight step.

3. *St. Paul's doctrine of original sin*.—There is only one passage in his Epistles in which St. Paul deals explicitly with the connexion of human sinfulness with Adam's transgression, viz. Ro 5¹²⁻²¹. This connexion is plainly affirmed; but no attempt is made to express how the connexion is to be conceived. It is easy to read into St. Paul's statement each of the later ecclesiastical theories as to the nature of this connexion, just because that statement is so indefinite and colourless as to be capable of accommodating them all; but none of them can safely be extracted, for the same reason, from the Apostle's vague language. The Apostle certainly teaches original sin—more or less after one manner in which it was current in the Jewish schools of his day; but in what form he conceived it it is perhaps for ever impossible for us to determine with certainty. He says that sin 'entered into the world by one man, and death through sin; and so death made its way to all men, because all sinned.' Exegesis of these words involves an answer to two distinct questions. (1) Does St. Paul mean that death passed to all because all sinned personally, or because all sinned when Adam sinned? The latter interpretation, it may be answered, is to be preferred, because otherwise the whole of the parallel between Adam and Christ, and therefore the whole argument of the context (in which reference to original sin is incidental), would be destroyed, and the force of the aorist tense ('all sinned') would be lost. (2) What did St. Paul conceive to be the mediating link between Adam's sin and the sin and death of his descendants? Is it simply God's appointment (cf. *Apocalypse of Baruch* and *Apocalypse of Ezra*); or the seminal existence in Adam of his

posterity (cf. He 7th); or their identity with, or inclusion in, Adam, in the sense of Augustine's 'realism'? The first two of these alternatives could each be naturally attributed to St. Paul, because we know that they were current at or near his day. It is also possible, however, to interpret St. Paul in terms of his own thought in other contexts, and to suggest that he refers the sins of all mankind to the first sin, not in the sense that all shared in that sin, but in a similar sense to that in which he speaks of believers as being crucified to the world, and having died to sin, when Christ died upon the Cross. Or, again, just as the believer's renewal is conceived by St. Paul as wrought in advance, though he did not suppose it actually to be so wrought, so also he may regard the consequences of Adam's sin as having been wrought simultaneously with it. But, whichever, if any, of these meanings were present to St. Paul's mind, the only certainty that we have is that he states none of them.

4. **Development of the doctrine in the Patristic period and the Middle Ages.**—We have seen that St. Paul taught a doctrine of original sin, and that he probably (perhaps we should say certainly) imbibed it, along with many other particular views, from his Jewish surroundings. But, when we pass on to consider the writings of the Fathers of the early Church, we find that they did not directly adopt St. Paul's teaching as the basis of their doctrine, nor borrow that presented in Jewish literature. They started afresh to elaborate a doctrine of original sin. The three chief pioneers, before Augustine, in this work were Irenæus, Origen, and Tertullian. And it may be pointed out that each of these Fathers derived his particular contribution to the fabric of future orthodox doctrine from his own reflexion on texts, philosophical tenets, or institutions, none of which had been a source of the similar conclusions previously reached by Jewish thought.

Justin Martyr was entirely uninfluenced by St. Paul's teaching on original sin, and practically repeated the doctrine characteristic of Rabbinical, rather than of later Jewish apocalyptic, literature. It is not until the Gnostic controversy had invested the general problem of evil with considerable importance for Christian thought that the doctrines of the original state and of the Fall began to receive definite shape in the Church. By the time of *Irenæus*, moreover, the Pauline Epistles had come to be accepted as Scripture, and therefore as a guide to doctrine, or a source thereof. *Irenæus*, however, did not set out from St. Paul's doctrine of original sin as a foundation already laid. It is in working out his idea of recapitulation, according to which Christ is the son and the representative of restored humanity, that he begins to shape his teaching as to the Fall; and, had it not been for the requirements of the recapitulation-doctrine, it is probable that he would not have been inspired by the Epistle to the Romans to develop any teaching concerning original sin. The teaching which he supplies exhibits no real advance upon that of St. Paul. He merely emphasizes the idea that the Fall was the collective deed of the race, in virtue of the unity, in some undefined and perhaps mystical sense, of the race with Adam. On original sin as an inherent disease, or as the source of concupiscence, he is quite silent. In a recently recovered work of this Father (*Εἰς Ἐπίδειξιν τοῦ Ἀποστόλου κηρύγματος*, ed. by A. Harnack from the Armenian version, Leipzig, 1908), however, there occurs a somewhat curious doctrine of original sin, or of inherited sinfulness, especially associated with the descendants of Cain. God's curse on Cain is spoken of as handed down by natural heredity to his

posterity. This teaching is, of course, different in important points from that which became general in the Church, and it was obviously adopted by *Irenæus* from Alexandrian Judaism. It is characteristic of Alexandrian Jewish literature to emphasize the gravity of Cain's sin, and the sinfulness of his descendants, and somewhat to minimize that of Adam; and it is in the book of *Wisdom*, as was seen above, that we find the first clear conception of hereditary sin. This work of *Irenæus* serves further to show that in his time the idea of inherited sinfulness was not as yet definitely coupled with that of Adam's fall.

Origen's name is generally associated with a theory of the source of inborn sinfulness which is incompatible with the ecclesiastical doctrine of original sin. This Father taught, especially in his earlier years, that the Biblical story of Paradise was an allegory describing the fall of all individual souls in a previous, celestial existence. According to this view, suggested by Plato's myth (*Phædrus*), original sin is not derived from the first forefather of the race, but is the result of individual free will. The guiltiness of inborn sin is thus secured at the expense of that racial solidarity upon which *Irenæus*, following St. Paul, had insisted. Naturally this theory never received general sanction in the Church. Quite another line of teaching, however, was adopted by Origen in his later years—a doctrine of inherited corruption, introduced by Adam's fall; and thus he became the precursor of Augustine.

It has been suggested with great probability that Origen's change of view was occasioned by his coming in contact, during his banishment from Alexandria, with the practice of infant baptism at Cæsarea. His writings of this period refer frequently to a stain of sin defiling every man, and requiring to be cleansed away in baptism. Thus it would seem that Origen developed his later teaching as to inborn sin in order to account for the ancient and wide-spread practice of infant baptism. The texts of Scripture which speak of universal and inborn uncleanness (e.g., Job 14th, Ps 51st), and the Hebrew ceremonial of purification, seem to have suggested to Origen the idea of an inborn taint; and, having become possessed of the idea, he proceeded to associate it with Adam's fall, though express association of the two ideas very rarely occurs in his writings. Of solidarity of the race with Adam, again, Origen offers a very definite conception. He borrows the idea of seminal existence from the Epistle to the Hebrews, and by means of it explains the unity of the race with its first parent in sin. Thus, without revealing any influence from *Irenæus* or Tertullian, Origen independently supplied the two main conceptions involved in the Augustinian doctrine of original sin.

The third early and independent pioneer in the elaboration of the doctrine was *Tertullian*. On the point of the mode of derivation of universal inborn sin from fallen Adam—a point as to which *Irenæus* is silent and to which Origen scarcely refers—*Tertullian* lays down full and definite teaching. He does so in terms of the traducianist doctrine of the origin of the soul, which he adopted from current Stoic philosophy and not from Scripture. This psychological tenet plays for Tertullian the same part as infant baptism played for Origen, and the recapitulation-doctrine for *Irenæus*. The conception that every human soul is a 'branch' of Adam's, reproducing its qualities, and therefore its corruption (which Tertullian considered to be in a state of actual sinfulness), readily lent itself to the formulation of a definite theory of original sin. The traducianist explanation of the propagation of original sin was not generally accepted by the

Church; but the results attained by its means were permanently retained.

From the time of Origen and Tertallian to that of Augustine the doctrine of original sin received no important development, save that, alongside of the view, emphasized by the two founders of the doctrine just mentioned, that original sin consists in a positive corruption of human nature (a view also advocated with varying degrees of clearness and emphasis by Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, Macarius of Egypt, Hilary of Poitiers, and Ambrose, and greatly developed by Augustine), we meet frequently with the supplementary conception of original sin as a loss of supernatural graces with which man was endowed at the first. This aspect of original sin, destined to become predominant in Scholastic theology, is presented by Irenæus (with great inconsistencies) and Athanasius, and, along with the more positive aspect, by some other Fathers, including Augustine. As has been shown above, it has no more Scriptural authority than the assertion that the Fall introduced positive derangement into man's nature. It originates apparently in the peculiar and baseless teaching of Tatian, that the communion of the Spirit was withdrawn from Adam (Tatian says nothing as to Adam's posterity) when he sinned, and in the distinction drawn first by Irenæus between the image of God (belonging to man's nature, and never lost) and the likeness of God (generally identified with supernatural endowments, the loss of which was due to the Fall). This is, of course, merely a piece of false exegesis, though upon it is based the whole superstructure of what has been regarded by many theologians, Anglican as well as Roman Catholic, as the most essential and most catholic element in the doctrine of the Fall and original sin. As to its 'catholicity,' there is no reason to believe that the conception of original sin as loss of *dona superaddita* was more general among the Fathers than that of original sin as a positive *vitium* or *corruptio* of human nature; and in respect of moral consequences it encounters even graver difficulties.

The development of the doctrine of original sin in the pre-Augustinian period having now been traced, it is necessary to call attention to such instances as may be found of Patristic teaching which deviated from that which was generally accepted. Though *Clement of Alexandria* was not unfamiliar with the writings of Irenæus, he seems not to have held any doctrine of original sin whatever, as distinct from a doctrine of the Fall. He vaguely identifies Adam with the race, or considers him as its representative; but Adam's sin was to this writer a type of human sin rather than the cause of human sinfulness. His exegesis of Ro 5 even repudiates the idea that death was a consequence of the Fall. Like most Eastern Fathers, Clement insists most strongly on the unimpaired free will of mankind. *Athanasius* too, in spite of his adoption of the view that the Fall occasioned the withdrawal of Adam's supernatural gifts, deviates from the generally received teaching of the Fathers in regarding the fall of mankind as having been gradually brought about, rather than as having been catastrophically effected by Adam. It is in the Antiochene school, however, that we find the most conspicuous instances of heterodox teaching concerning original sin. *Chrysostom* does not appear to have countenanced this doctrine in any form, or to have regarded natural concupiscence as of the nature of sin, while *Theodore of Mopsuestia* was practically a Pelagian, denying that baptism removed inherited sinfulness and also the practically universal belief that Adam's transgression was the cause of death.

It was the Pelagian controversy that obliged

Augustine to make a more complete and systematic study of sin than had yet been undertaken in the Church. During the controversy he was led to modify his earlier views, which were practically identical with those of the majority of Eastern and Western Fathers since Irenæus. He expressed the solidarity of the race with Adam sometimes in terms of Origen's idea of seminal existence in the first parent (c. *Julianum*, v. 12), and sometimes in terms of the realistic notion that Adam's personality, and not merely his nature, was shared by his posterity:

'Omnes enim fuimus in illo uno, quando omnes fuimus ille unus, qui per feminam lapsus est in peccatum. . . . Nondum erat nobis singillatim creata et distributa forma, in qua singuli viveremus; sed iam natura erat seminalis, ex qua propagamur' (*de Civ. Dei*, xiii. 14).

In *de Vera Religione*, 51, he speaks of the sin which our nature committed (in Adam), which implies his adoption from Greek philosophy of the idea that universals or generic concepts exist apart from their individual or particular cases. Being, especially before the Pelagian controversy, a champion of free will, he admits Pelagius's premiss that there can be no sin without willing, but he falsely thought that he could secure our guilt for Adam's sin by incorporating our nature in Adam, whereas our wills would also require to be identical with Adam's, and consequently our personalities and individualities. Augustine was also inconsistent in regarding Adam as at the same time an individual and a generic idea.

Original sin, with Augustine, involved guilt. Hence the unbaptized, even unbaptized infants, incurred, and (he taught) would receive, damnation:

'Infans perditione puniatur, quia pertinet ad massam perditionis' (*de Peccato Originali*, 81).

The most characteristic feature in Augustine's doctrine of original sin is his exaggeration of the effects upon human nature of Adam's fall. He taught that the depravity thus introduced was complete, so that fallen man is unable even to will what is good. To this belief was chiefly due his teaching concerning grace, and consequently his doctrine of predestination.

On passing from the Patristic to the Scholastic age, we find no important changes from the main trend of the teaching of the pre-Augustinian Fathers. Augustine's extreme views were left aside; doubtless they seemed to be provincial rather than catholic. *Aquinas* held that, on its positive side, original sin was a disordered condition (*vulneratio nature, dispositio inordinata*) consequent upon dissolution of the harmony in which original righteousness essentially consisted; while, on its negative side, it was loss of original righteousness or of superadded graces. *Aquinas* could not follow Augustine on several important points. He denied that natural goodness was forfeited at the Fall, that free will was more than impaired, that concupiscence is of the nature of sin proper. At the same time he emphasized the positive side of original sin more strongly than Anselm had done, who, while not denying the guiltiness of inborn sin in the infant, was dissatisfied with the view that original sin is strictly sin (i.e. personal sin), and compared it with deformity or misery. *Duns Scotus* represented a standpoint still more remote from Augustinianism than that of *Aquinas*. He held that the first sin—which he has a tendency to minimize—had not affected man's nature at all, but only his supernatural gifts. He more strongly emphasizes fallen man's freedom of will, and denies that original sin is to be identified with concupiscence, because concupiscence belongs to our unwounded nature. There is indeed little in common between *Duns Scotus* and Augustine,

in so far as Augustine differed from the Fathers who preceded him.

If the Thomist and Scotist views sum up the two main tendencies of Scholastic teaching in its maturity, *Abelard* may be mentioned as the most conspicuous representative of views markedly divergent from the general trend of mediæval doctrine. In some respects he is a precursor of *Jeremy Taylor*. He revolts somewhat at the idea of Adam's sin being so serious as to be an adequate cause of the condemnation of mankind. Appetite, he teaches, is natural and innocent, and the conflict between sense and reason is characteristic of man as God made him. If it be said that we sinned in Adam, 'sin' is used in an improper sense. For these and other particular views concerning original sin *Abelard* was censured by *Bernard*.

The Scholastic doctrine of original sin, more especially in the form which it received from *Aquinas*, became at the Council of Trent the official teaching of the Church of Rome. The decrees of that Council affirm that the Fall caused loss of original righteousness, infection of body and soul, thralldom to the devil, and liability to the wrath of God; that such original sin is transmitted by generation, not by imitation; that all which has the proper nature of sin, and all guilt of original sin, is removed in baptism; that concupiscence remains after baptism, but this, though called 'sin' by St. Paul, is not sin truly, but only metonymically.

The Anglican Article diverges from this doctrine in asserting that man is 'far gone from original righteousness,' and in apparently, though not explicitly, sanctioning the Pauline usage of 'sin' to describe concupiscence. In all other essential points it is in agreement with the doctrine of the Roman Church.

The various Protestant denominations which formulated their doctrine as to original sin in the 16th cent. inclined rather to the elements in Augustinianism which the Schoolmen rejected. It will not be necessary here to enter into points of difference between the Lutheran, Calvinist, and other symbols. Roughly speaking, these agree in asserting the depravity of human nature to be total, using the strongest and most extravagant language to describe the fallen state; and in explicitly affirming concupiscence to be of the nature of sin. The rest of their positive teaching, in so far as the broader and more important issues are concerned, is similar to that of the Roman and Anglican Churches.

5. The doctrine from the 16th to the 19th century.—The chief point of interest in theological thought concerning original sin since the detailed formulation given to the doctrine in the 16th cent. consists in the signs which have appeared from time to time of dissatisfaction with some element of its contents. One or two of the more important of these witnesses may be briefly alluded to here.

In the 17th cent. *Jeremy Taylor*, in his *Unum Necessarium, or the Doctrine and Practice of Repentance*, chs. vi. and vii., protests strongly against the extremer forms which this doctrine had taken. The sin of Adam, he argued, neither made us heirs of damnation nor rendered us naturally and necessarily vicious. He spurned the idea that unbaptized infants are damned, as inconsistent with the goodness of God; denied that the loss, at the Fall, of Adam's graces, in so far as they were indispensable to rectitude, was a punishment of mankind, on the ground that such a belief detracts from the divine justice; and rejected the teaching that the Fall introduced an inheritance of total depravity, as well as various methods by which the mediation of this depravity had been stated to

be effected. Original sin, *Taylor* held, is not an inherent evil, not 'sin' at all in the strict, but only in a metonymical, sense; i.e., it is the effect of one sin and the cause of many—a stain rather than sin. It consists in loss of supernatural endowments (as to the nature of which Scripture gives no information) and in an aggravation of our natural concupiscence.

S. T. Coleridge (*Aids to Reflection*, 'Aphorisms on Spiritual Religion,' x.) endorses *Jeremy Taylor's* protests, but criticizes the alternative interpretation of original sin which he offered. The assertion that to man, since the Fall, obedience was possible, though incomparably more difficult, he regards as inconsistent with the admission that sin is universal; hence *Taylor* has not succeeded in vindicating the divine justice, i.e. in explaining why the unoffending sons of Adam were sentenced to be born with so fearful a disproportion of their powers to their duties. The difficulty of reconciling the traditional doctrine of original sin with theodicy was thus beginning to be felt, and *Coleridge* himself can find relief from it only by adopting the view, opposed to *Taylor's*, that original sin is truly sin, i.e. personal or volitional. In order to advocate this view, he relies on the teaching of *Kant* (see below), but introduces a further obscurity into it by substituting for its individualism the notion that the Fall was the collective voluntary deed of humanity. Assuming that original sin is a fact, recognized by all religions, he indeed also, like *Kant*, asserts it to be a mystery for ever inscrutable. But, again following *Kant*, he teaches that moral evil can have its seat in the will alone. Original sin must therefore be the ground of evil in the will. It is a consequence, but not an effect, of Adam's sin. The first evil will in time is selected as 'the diagram,' and Adam means the race rather than the individual. The resort by *Coleridge* to conceptions so obscure, in order to escape the moral difficulties which the problem of original sin, as apprehended down to his time, presented, is a witness to the intractability of the problem as it had as yet been stated.

Another witness, even more interesting and striking, is supplied by the work of *Julius Müller* (*The Christian Doctrine of Sin*, 2 vols., tr. W. Urwick, Edinburgh, 1877-85), which contains a more exhaustive and able treatment of the theology of sin than had previously been written. *Müller* was led, perhaps reluctantly, to find the Augustinian, or any similar ecclesiastical, theory insufficient to solve the great antithesis which *Kant* had emphasized, between individual responsibility for sin and the fact that sin seems inborn and prior to sinful action. He therefore supplements it by resorting to a view which is apparently intermediate between *Kant's* theory of the timeless origin of sin and *Origen's* theory of an ante-natal origin. He postulates an individual fall, which he calls extra-temporal, but which is nevertheless prior to birth. This would seem to him to be the only possible solution—a last resort. That *Kant*, *Coleridge*, and *Müller* should all be driven in the same direction bespeaks that a solution of the problem was perhaps impossible, from their presuppositions, along any other lines; and yet all these thinkers, avowedly or not, only banish the problem to the realm of mystery. *Müller's* fundamental assumption is that there is in us already when moral consciousness dawns an abiding 'root of sin,' so that sin does not then originate in us, but rather 'steps forth.' Like *Kant*, he also endeavours to see the source of sin in the will abstracted from the appetitive factors of human nature. It will later be argued that it is in virtue of these two assumptions, both false,

that Müller's and similar attempts to explain the origin and universality of sin necessarily fail, and that with their abandonment satisfactory explanation is for the first time rendered possible.

II. THE PROBLEM OF ORIGINAL SIN IN PHILOSOPHY.—Modern philosophy first attacked the problem of evil in independence of ecclesiastical doctrine when *Spinoza* unfolded his pantheistic system. It is true that, in so far as he taught that evil is of negative character (privation or defect), *Spinoza* was in agreement with many of the Fathers, notably *Augustine*, who had adopted this view from ancient Greek philosophy and the Neo-Platonists, and had endeavoured to assimilate it with Christian theology. But *Spinoza*, in virtue of his intellectualism, identified evil with defect of knowledge, and, in virtue of his pantheism, with non-being. Evil, for him, was mere appearance, and the conception of it, he affirms, would be impossible if we saw things *sub specie eternitatis*. For *Spinoza*, then, inquiry into the problem of the origin of sin was superfluous.

Leibniz distinguished 'moral' evil from 'metaphysical' evil, or the necessary imperfection of all things finite. The latter alone he held to be necessary, and he did not regard it as the source of sin. But it is only lack of self-consistency that prevents *Leibniz* from denying, like *Spinoza*, that evil is real. Nor is it easy to find a place in *Leibniz*'s philosophical system for the orthodox doctrine of original sin. He adopted this doctrine in a form similar to that developed by *Tertullian*, and regarded all souls as existing (germinally) in that of Adam. If he had been consistent, he would have been compelled to identify original sin with the imperfection of human nature as it was created.

The doctrine of original sin received its most serious treatment, at the hands of philosophy, from *Kant*, who, while rejecting Augustinianism, developed a remarkable theory of 'radical badness.' *Kant* set out from the Christian view that the ultimate seat of sin is in the will alone, and, taking this premiss more seriously than the Fathers of the Church had done, was compelled (like *Origen* in his earlier years) to seek for a purely individualistic explanation of inborn sinfulness. His overlooking of the fact that the will does not work *in vacuo*, or in abstraction from appetitive elements common to all mankind in virtue of heredity, led him both to exaggerate the volitional factor in sinful activity and to ignore the real solidarity of the race.

Another presupposition of *Kant*'s doctrine of moral evil is the dualism of the phenomenal and the noumenal in man, which is a consequence of his general theory of knowledge. Sin, he teaches, is brought about when a man adopts the impulses of sense rather than the dictates of his reason into the 'maxims,' or subjective ruling principles, which his will appoints to itself for the exercise of its freedom. The subjective condition of the possibility of adopting evil maxims, however, is what especially needs to be accounted for. This cannot be due to any determining act in time; for the temporal, empirical world, according to *Kant*, is governed by necessity, whereas necessary moral evil is a contradiction in terms. It is therefore an innate propensity, in force before free activity is (sensibly) experienced. Its origin must be in our freedom—else it could not be called evil; and it must belong to the noumenal sphere, i.e. must be a timeless, 'intelligible,' act, which cannot be traced further without indefinite regress, and which, in the last resort, is quite inscrutable.

The 'intelligible act' and the division of man into the phenomenal and the noumenal are in

themselves obscure conceptions, which, when worked out in the subsequent development of the Kantian teaching, proved futile. And other difficulties inhere in his doctrine of radical evil. In the first place, the evil maxim is one of those pieces of ingenious mental machinery of which *Kant* was so surpassingly inventive. It has no meaning for actual experience, and is superfluous. Further, it is difficult to conceive how the supersensible essence of man which gives him the categorical imperative could also give him the evil maxim. Similar difficulties might be multiplied; but it will be more profitable to inquire why it is that *Kant*'s investigation of the origin of sin avows that it leads only to inscrutable mystery.

It is surprising that *Kant* should set out from the statement that sinfulness is absolutely universal among mankind, as if this were an *a priori* principle, whereas the universality of sin is but an empirical generalization—and not an exceptionless one—unless original sin be first proved on independent grounds to be a fact. The one side of the antithesis which it is his intention to resolve is therefore not an absolute or necessary truth, but an approximate generalization based on necessarily inadequate knowledge; it does not therefore require for its adequate explanation, as *Kant* seems to assume, to be derived with logical necessity from an universal or *a priori* principle. *Kant*'s quest in supersensible realms is, in fact, from the outset unnecessary. That he failed to take the right road saves us from concluding the non-existence of the goal that he never reached.

Again, that there is an evil bias (in *Kant*'s sense of the word 'evil') in us at birth is by no means an unchallengeable premiss. *Kant* must call our propensity evil if he is to enjoy the right to call it blamable; but he merely assumes—after the manner of uncritical common sense—that it is morally blamable, in order to deduce its volitional character. This is to argue the wrong way round. The propensities inborn in human nature are now known to be existent before will has emerged into actuality, much more before will is capable of moral choice. If we do not assume volition to exist until we empirically find it, and impute guilt only where we see volition, we avoid the necessity for resort to the supersensible; for the possibilities of the phenomenal have not been exhausted. Such are the radical errors in *Kant*'s procedure. He assumes that conduct below the standard of moral perfection is blamable or guilty; consequently he has to prove such conduct to be volitional. To make it volitional he has to assume volition where experience tells us there is none, and morally evil propensity where as yet there cannot be any. *Julius Müller* arrived practically at the same negative result as *Kant*, because he too set out from some of the same presuppositions.

Hegel is another of the greater philosophers who have devoted considerable attention to the subject of original sin, though his references to it are scattered, and perhaps somewhat desultory. He regards the natural (unmoralized) state as inherently evil, because not morally good, or something which 'ought not to be'; and it is thus that he interprets the Christian doctrine of original sin. Original sin, in fact, is a defect of nature, and simply expresses the truth that the natural man is at first only potentially good. Of course, the Christian doctrine means much more than this; otherwise it would be well to substitute for 'original sin' some other name, wholly unsuggestive of strictly moral implications, and to declare roundly that 'original sin' is not sin.

Schleiermacher's tendency, in spirit though not in letter, is in this direction. He retains the term *Erbsünde* not at all in the old sense of inherited

corruption, but as simply expressing the universal sense of the need of redemption, or the influence on the individual of the actual sin of the human environment. Schleiermacher, practically for the first time since Pelagius, shifts the emphasis from physical to what is now called social heredity. The guilt of what he calls original sin attaches to an individual only in respect of his membership of a guilty race, and his making the common sinfulness his own. But this is merely to blur the line between inherited disposition and acquired habit.

Ritschl regarded Schleiermacher's treatment of original sin as sophistical. But he himself seems to have considered the social heredity of evil influences sufficient to take the place of physically inherited disharmony of nature as an explanation of the universality of sinfulness. And, indeed, several more recent attempts to explain and justify the doctrine of original sin reveal the same tendency. Social interaction, however, is insufficient to account for the general prevalence of moral evil. Something universally and unconditionally present in human nature is called for. Ritschl hints at this condition of practically universal sinfulness when he teaches that evil springs out of the merely natural impulses. But he made no attempt to lay the foundations of a psychologically accurate theory of sin, and, while recognizing the relevance of moral development to the question, ignores factors other than ignorance in his account of the origin and growth of sin.

It will appear from this brief sketch of the chief contributions from philosophy to the discussion of original sin that the ecclesiastical doctrine has received no support therefrom. It has not infrequently been repudiated by philosophers on account of inherent difficulties, and, when the conception has been retained, it has practically always been so completely transformed as scarcely to persist, except in name.

III. ORIGINAL SIN IN RELATION TO RECENT THOUGHT; CRITICISM AND RECONSTRUCTION.—Until quite recently the doctrine of original sin, in its traditional form, received almost unquestioned acknowledgment within the Church. Poets and men of the world have frequently voiced their agreement with theologians as to its truth. This is largely because original sin has been confounded with the general tendency of mankind towards actual sin, and a hypothetical cause of the universality of sin has been mistaken for the observed manifestations of sinful volition. Original sin is not a fact, however, but an inference, an alleged, conjectural, explanation of the facts. At the same time, there has seldom been wanting evidence of dissatisfaction with the theory in individuals here and there; and this recurrent dissatisfaction has been occasioned by the violence offered to the moral consciousness when called upon to attribute guilt to that for which the individual person is not responsible, or to reconcile the divine entailment of hereditary loss of moral endowments, or acquisition of spiritual fetters, with the divine justice.

At the present day, however, not only is original sin recognized not to be of the nature of observed fact, and sometimes felt to be an oppressive doctrine, but the various foundations on which it was supposed to be securely based have been severally called in question. It is seen to have no basis in Scripture save in an incidental analogy drawn by St. Paul, and it is known that he derived his conception of Adam and the Fall from free Jewish speculation. It is recognized that the doctrine of the unfallen state of man—the necessary presupposition of a doctrine of original sin occasioned by a 'fall'—is equally unscriptural, and due partly to the fancies of Jewish Haggadists and partly to erroneous Patristic exegesis. But more than this:

evolutionary anthropological science has rendered belief in a primitive state of simple moral rectitude, and a general 'fall' therefrom, almost impossible; psychology and biology make acceptance of the idea that human nature could be deranged by an act of sin, or that such an effect, if caused, could be propagated by physical heredity, extremely difficult; and these sciences, guided by the theory of evolution, are able to supply an explanation of the presence in man of appetite and impulse which prompt the will to sin, and so remove all necessity to invoke a catastrophic fall in order to account for the world-wide prevalence of sin. Genetic psychology, once more, has established that man is (necessarily and normally) an impulsive before he is a volitional animal, and a volitional before he is a moral agent, and so furnishes knowledge which makes superfluous all conjectures as to 'a root of sin' in us at birth, or an innate sinfulness which, when moral consciousness awakes, 'steps forth.'

Thus modern science has supplied ideas and facts which suggest not only the manifold erroneousness of the traditional doctrine of original sin, but also the lines along which may be sought a substitute for the old conception, equally capable of explaining the facts which the idea of original sin was fashioned to explain, while free from its scientific, psychological, and ethical deficiencies. If Christian theology is to adhere consistently to the doctrine that sin proper is always volitional and intentional activity—and this is fundamental for Christian theology and ethics—then it must unreservedly allow that sin proper cannot be inherited. It must repudiate the correlation of guilt with original sin, and must admit that in adhering to the phrase 'original sin' it uses 'sin' in a metonymical sense; 'original sin' must mean merely the solicitations of the lower nature, conceived of prophetically as sin because they constitute its potentiality. It must further recognize that these solicitations do not imply withdrawal of any supernatural graces by which they were replaced or coerced, or any dislocation or corruption of human nature; that they are necessarily and normally inherent in that nature as such, in virtue of our animal ancestry; that they are 'stock tendencies,' morally neutral in respect of the good or the evil which the will may make out of them, and non-moral in virtue of their necessary presence and their non-volitional character at birth; that they are what the Schoolmen called *fomes peccati*, not sinful in themselves. What is original cannot be sin, and sin cannot be original. Yet it is precisely these neutral and non-moral conative elements, fixed by heredity in the human species without exception, that account for racial solidarity in sinfulness. It is they that are original, innate, and universal. Augustine substituted for them, in order to account for the universality of sinfulness, a corruption of nature and a fictitious sinning of each individual in, or with, Adam; Kant and Müller, overlooking their non-morality, saw in them signs of a mysterious root of sin present before birth, and so were led to abandon race-solidarity for individualism. But the view just indicated preserves the fact of racial solidarity while leaving room for the individual responsibility and guilt. Empirical science thus succeeds where *a priori* methods failed, and gives a natural explanation of the origin of sin where previous methods merely led to inscrutable mystery. And this view, in accounting for the origin of sin in both the race and the individual, explains the practical universality of sinfulness. For the inherited appetitive propensities, natural and necessary for the animal life of our non-human ancestry, are entrenched in every one of us before the moral consciousness dawns, and require incessant coercion

and voluntary direction throughout life. Here is the precondition of human morality, which is not provided by volition and conscience alone; and also the explanation of the familiar fact that, among human beings who have attained to complex moral life, none has absolutely avoided moral failure at some time and in some degree. *Ex uno omnes.*

Thus may be reconstructed the doctrine of original sin, its errors being discarded, and the vital truth which it sought to express being retained. If the reconstruction be sound, it will appear that there was more aimed at in the old ecclesiastical theory than can possibly be re-stated in terms of social heredity alone. From the time of Schleiermacher various attempts have been made to explain the universality and the propagation of sin in terms of the influence, after the dawn of moral consciousness in the individual, of the social environment. The most recent, and perhaps the most interesting, is that of J. Royce (*The Problem of Christianity*, i., New York, 1913). Original sin is exalted by him into one of the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, and he uses the phrase to denote a moral burden from which the individual can never be saved apart from the Church. The moral self, Royce affirms, is bred through social conflict. The community relieves the first tension between individuals by its codes, thus evoking and educating moral consciousness and at the same time creating new tensions, and heightening self-will, which perhaps obeys, but with internal revolt. Cultivation breeds at the same time civilized conduct and conscience independence. Thus conscience is a product of spiritual warfare, and our knowledge of good and evil is inevitably tainted by its origin. The 'divided self' produced by social life in every individual is what should be meant by 'original sin'; it is a human necessity, inhering in the conditions of the development of self-consciousness.

Such emphasis on the influence of social life and the social conditions of moral consciousness is called for in any complete account of sin. But it needs to be supplemented by insistence on the factors derived through physical heredity, and which until lately Christian theology, from lack of the requisite empirical knowledge, was not in a position adequately to describe.

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ORISSA (Orisā, Skr. Odra-deśa, 'the land of the Odra race').—1. Name and statistics.—The meaning of the term Odra is disputed. It is popularly derived from Skr. *odra*, the Chinese rose, which grows in its jungles; Lassen believes that the word means 'north country'; modern Hindus explain it as 'land of filth', in allusion to the low estimation in which the country is held by Sanskrit writers and the modern belief in the stupidity of its people. Orissa is a division now forming part of the province of Bihar and Orissa, the result of changes of administrative areas which came into effect in 1912. Its area is now 8,238 sq. miles, and its population 4,188,109. Of this population 4,059,744 (96.93 per cent) are Hindus; 113,708 (2.72 per cent) Muhammadans; 5145 (·12

per cent) Christians; 8770 (·21 per cent) animists; 434 (·1 per cent) Buddhists; with 308 whose religion was not described. As usual, the majority of the animists seem to have been recorded as Hindus. The Hindu population is predominant in the alluvial tract between the sea and the Chotā Nāgpur plateau; the animists are mostly found in the hilly inland region.

2. Language.—The language of Orissa is known as Oriyā, Odri, or Utkālī, the last term being derived from an old name of the division, Utkaladeśa, 'the glorious country,' or 'the outlying strip,' in reference to the Ganges valley. It is spoken by 95.96 per cent of the population. The earliest written example of it is found in an inscription of the 13th century A.D.

Oriyā is handicapped by possessing an excessively awkward and cumbrous written character. This character is, in its basis, the same as Dēva-nāgarī (the script in which Hindi is written), but it is written by the local scribes with a stylus on a talipot palm leaf. The scratches are themselves legible, but in order to make them more plain, ink is rubbed over the surface of the leaf and fills up the furrows which form the letters. The palm leaf is exceptionally fragile, and any scratch in the direction of the grain tends to make it split. As a line of writing on a long narrow leaf is necessarily in the direction of the grain, this peculiarity prohibits the use of the straight top line which is a distinguishing peculiarity of the Dēva-nāgarī character. For this, the Oriyā scribe is compelled to substitute a series of curves, which almost surround each letter. It requires remarkably good eyes to read an Oriyā printed book, for the exigencies of the printing press compel the type to be small, and the greater part of each letter is this curve, which is the same in nearly all, while the real soul of the character, by which one is distinguished from another, is hidden in the centre, and is so minute, that it is often difficult to see. At first glance, an Oriyā book seems to be all curves, and it takes a second look to notice that there is something inside each. Oriyā is sometimes called a dialect of Bengālī, but this is incorrect. 'It is a sister, not a daughter, and the mutual points of resemblance are due to the fact that they have a common origin in the ancient Māgadhā Apabhraṃśa' (G. A. Grierson, *Census of India*, 1901, vol. i., 'India,' pt. i. p. 316 ff., vol. vi., 'Bengal,' pt. i. p. 321).

3. Religious history.—The earliest inhabitants were non-Aryan tribes like the Kandhs (*q.v.*) and Savaras. At the dawn of history Orissa formed part of the kingdom of Kalinga, which stretched from the mouths of the Ganges (*q.v.*) to those of the Godāvarī (*q.v.*). On the early history see J. Beames, *IA* i. [1871] 74 ff.

(a) *The Buddhist period.*—In the early Buddhist period it was invaded by the Yavanas, a tribe whose history is obscure. This name is often applied to the Ionian Greeks, and Hunter tries to prove that they were Græco-Bactrians. But in Orissa the word probably means no more than that they were, from the Hindu point of view, foreign barbarians. They entered Orissa from the north-west and probably brought Buddhism with them (J. Fergusson and J. Burgess, *The Cave Temples of India*, p. 60 f.; W. W. Hunter, *Orissa*, i. 207 ff.). In 261 B.C. the country was conquered by Aśoka (*q.v.*), and one of his edict pillars is found at Dhauli about seven miles south of Bhuvanavar in the Puri District (V. A. Smith, *Asoka, the Buddhist Emperor of India*, Oxford, 1909, pp. 131, 179 ff.). Buddhism remained the religion of the land, and the tooth relic was honoured there, intermittingly it may be by the kings, but certainly by the people, down to A.D. 322, when it was removed to Ceylon. Buddhism survived in an attenuated form under the last Yavana kings (328-474), when it was finally abolished by the Keśarī dynasty. The extensive series of Buddhist caves has been fully described by Fergusson-Burgess (p. 55 ff.; cf. Hunter, i. 180 ff.). Among those at Udayagiri and Khandagiri the finest is the Rānī kā Nūr, or Queen's Palace, which is inferior to the great *cāhāras* of W. India, and owes its interest more to sculpture than to architecture. It was excavated in the 1st century A.D. The Buddhist pilgrim, Hīnen Tsiang (Yüan Chwang; A.D. 629-645), visited Orissa. He calls the country U-cha, i.e. Odra.

'The people are uncivilised, tall of stature, and of a yellowish black complexion. Their words and language differ from Central India. They love themselves to it without intermission. Most of them are law of Buddha. There are some hundred *saṅghārāmas* [monasteries], with 10,000 priests. They all study the Great Vehicle. There are 50 Dēva [Hindu] temples in which sectaries of all sorts make their abodes. The *stūpas*, to the number of ten or so, point out spots where Buddha preached. They were all founded by Aśoka-rāja' (S. Beal, *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, London, 1884, ii. 204 f.).

Buddhism has now practically disappeared, the only survivors of this faith being a small colony in the Baramba State, among a caste known as Sarāk, a term derived from Skr. *śrāvaka*, 'a hearer,' used by the Buddhists to designate the second class of monks, who mainly occupied monasteries, as distinguished from the Arhans, the highest class, who lived solitary lives as hermits, and the lowest class, the Bhikṣus, or mendicants, who supported themselves by begging (*Census of India*, 1901, vol. vi., 'Bengal,' pt. i. p. 427 f.). The Vaiṣṇava cultus at Jagannāth (*q.v.*) preserves clear survivals of Buddhism, and the same origin is attributed to the cult of Dharma which is current among Pods, Doms, and other menial castes (*ib.* i. 157, 201).

(b) *Saivism*.—On the downfall of Buddhism as the State religion, the cult of Śiva was established by the Keśari, 'the long-haired' or 'lion' dynasty, at Bhuvanesvar about A.D. 500. This sacred city was built between that date and 657, and the cult-titles of Śiva established there were Maheśvara or Mahādeva, 'the great lord,' Bhuvaneśvara, 'lord of the earth,' Brahmeśvara, 'lord of lords.' From this period dates the introduction of the Brāhmans. The Keśari dynasty is said to have imported 10,000 Brāhmans from Oudh, and to have settled them at Jājpur on the sacred river Vaitaraṇī. Jājpur is now desolate, having been destroyed by the Muhammadans, but an annual fair is still held in honour of the sacred river, and the site contains some fine images of Indrāṇī, consort of Indra, lord of the atmosphere, and of Varāhiṇī, consort of Varāha, the boar incarnation of Viṣṇu—immense monoliths dragged by an enormous expenditure of labour from the mountains of the Tributary States 100 miles distant (Hunter, i. 238 f., 265 f., 267, ii. App. 67).

(c) *Vaiṣṇavism*.—On the downfall of the Keśari dynasty, which favoured the cult of Śiva, they were succeeded by the Chor Gangā dynasty of Kalinganagar. The latter were devoted Vaiṣṇavas, and under their auspices were erected the famous temple of Jagannāth at Puri and the Black Pagoda, built by Languliya Narasiṃha in A.D. 1238 at Konārak, a title meaning 'the *arka* (sun-god) at Kona' (*IGI* xv. 391 f.). Sun-worship also appears at Jājpur and other places, and the cult of fire at Santīśvara, 'lord of peace,' at the temple near Jājpur (Hunter, i. 286).

4. *Hinduism*, its present position.—Orissa is thus one of the most distinctively Hindu regions in India. The Brāhman community is numerous and influential. At Puri they are divided into two classes, Vaidik and Laukika. The Vaidiks, or priests learned in the Veda, are said to be descended from immigrants from the Ganges valley, who appeared in the 12th century A.D. They are divided into two groups: the Kulīṇa, who are notorious for their exaggerated polygamy, and the Srotiya, or those learned in the scriptures. The second class, the Laukika, or 'worldly,' are supposed to represent the original Aryan settlers (Hunter, ii. App. i. 7, App. ii. 37 ff.).

5. *Animism*.—The animism of Orissa presents no distinctive features, and it has been already described (artt. BENGAL, DRAVIDIANS [North India], KANDH). The village godlings are, as a rule, feminine, and are known by the titles of

Grāmdēvatī or Thakurāṇī. Each village has one of its own, and their status was officially recognized in the first regular land settlement, when a piece of land was left unassessed to provide for their worship (*Census of India*, 1901, vol. vi., 'Bengal,' pt. i. p. 280, note).

6. *Islām and Christianity*.—Neither Islām nor Christianity has as yet attained much success in the priest-ridden area.

'The missionaries have been the pioneers of popular education in Orissa, as indeed everywhere throughout Bengal. Their labours date' from 1822; 'and during this period they have not only made a small population of converts, but they have, by schools and printing-presses, introduced a new culture and a new literature into the District Capitals of Cattaek and Balasor. The Cattaek Mission has chiefly received its pastors from the Baptists of Derbyshire and Nottingham.' During recent famines they have supported a large number of orphans, whom they have trained to agriculture. Other missionary bodies are the American Free Will Baptists and the Roman Catholics (Hunter, ii. 141 f.).

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ORMAZD.—Ormazd is the Parsi form of the name of the highest god of Mazdeism, the principle of good opposed to Ahriman (*q.v.*), the lord of the bad creation. This form, which has become the current one for non-specialists, is an adulteration of Pahlavi Auharmazd, coming from Avestan Persian Auramazda, while, in the oldest portion of the Avesta, the name is not yet felt as a compound and is generally Mazdāh or Mazdāh Ahura. Ahura is a title given not only to Mazdāh but occasionally to Mithra (*Yt.* x. 25, 69) and to Apām Napāt (*Ys.* ii. 5, i. 5, lxv. 12). It is, however, given with a special persistence to Mazdāh, and Ahura employed *kar' ētōxšn* without further determination is always the supreme god, Mazdāh, as, in India, the great Asura is Varuṇa. In India the word *asura*, the equivalent of Ahura, is used for a deity in general and more especially for a god or a spirit endowed with a mysterious power (*maya*). As for Mazdāh, it is the Iranian form of Skr. *medhas*, 'science.' Etymologically, Ahura Mazdāh is thus 'the knowing one,' 'the omniscient,' or 'the wise Ahura,' a title sometimes given in the Vedas to Varuṇa (*Rigveda*, i. xxiv. 14: *asura pracheta*).

In the fully developed Mazdean system of the Sasanian period Ormazd is the real god, being called in Pahlavi books 'the being *par excellence*, the One who was, who is, and who shall be, the pure intangible spirit, the spirit of spirits.'¹ He is omniscient and omnipotent, perfectly good, beneficent to all, benevolent and merciful. Being the spirit of light and of wisdom, he foresees the end of his struggle with Ahriman. The latter, on the contrary, being the spirit of darkness and ignorance, possesses only a knowledge of past events. He is rather a negative being, having the reverse of all the qualities possessed by Ormazd. He is the generator of all evil and evil beings which are opposed to Ormazd's creatures. Though he is to be finally conquered by Ormazd, he is no emanation from him and his being is the limitation of Ormazd, who, as an unavoidable consequence of dualist principles, cannot possess infinity. The *Bundahishn* tries to explain the rather curious relation in which the one stands to the other:

'Both spirits are limited and unlimited, for this supreme light is called infinite and there is a void between the two and thus the one is not contiguous to the other, and, secondly, both the spirits are limited as to their bodies' (i.e. the partial extension of their personality).²

¹ L. O. Casartelli, *La Philosophie religieuse du Mazdeisme sous les Sassanides*, vii. § 27.

² *Bundahishn*, i. 5.

Consequently, Ormazd has an aspect and a residence different from Ahriman's. He dwells in the eternal and endless light, while Ahriman lies in darkness so thick that the hand can grasp it.

The intricacies and the mass of contradictions into which dualism leads in its ultimate consequences have induced the religious philosophers of Sasanian times to look for some principle of unity above Ormazd and Ahriman. One of these attempts is characterized by the famous theory of the boundless time (*zervan akarana*), which was represented as having generated both Ormazd and Ahriman. Another school found in fate (*bakht*) a primordial principle. In spite of those efforts, the Mazdæan theology remained dualistic in form, though the very negative nature of Ahriman makes Ormazd practically play the part of a monotheistic god (see DUALISM [Iranian]).

The exalted conception of God in later Mazdæism, as well as the theory of dualism, is traceable to the Iranian religion of older times, as we find it both in the Avesta and in the Achæmenian inscriptions.

The *Gāthās*, the oldest and finest portion of the sacred book, which very likely date back to Zoroaster himself, tell us (Ys. xxx. 3 f.) that at the beginning of the world two spirits manifested themselves, one as the good one, the other as the evil one. They created the world animate and inanimate. Men have to make their choice between those spirits, and the wise know how to choose; not so the fools. At the end of things the former will triumph with the victory of the good spirit.

Mazdāh Ahura is for Zoroaster the god of the supreme law, the law of justice and truth (*asha*), who wants men to follow his path, practising good words, good thoughts, good deeds, rejecting the works of the mendacious spirit (*druj*) so that they can reach the kingdom (*xshathra*) of blessings (*adā*), which is the reward (*ishti*) of the just in this life and after. Mazdāh is spoken of in the most exalted terms:

'This I ask thee, tell me in truth, O Lord, Who was the first originator and the father of Right? Who gave to the sun and the stars their path? Who made the moon to wax and to wane? All that, O God of Wisdom, I wish to know and other things, O Lord! Who gave a fundament to the earth and to the clouds, so that they would not fall? Who created water and plants? Who gave swiftness to clouds and wind? Who is the creator of the Good Spirit (*Spenta Mainyu*)? . . . O Lord, I ask thee, tell me in truth, Who is the artist who made light and darkness? Who is the artist who made sleep and watch? Who made morning, mid-day and night, that reminds the wise of their duties?'¹

He is thus the *asura* of marvellous science and mysterious power, the knowing one, the seeing one. He appears in the *Gāthās*, above all, as the omniscient protector of morality. His strong personality has no material aspect, though he is essentially a god of light.

Auramazda, the great god of the Persian Great Kings, appears with a very exalted character also on the Achæmenian inscriptions. Darius gives himself out as an Auramazdæan, and in the name of his god he proclaims the truth of his statements. It is Auramazda who made Xerxes a king.² Auramazda is the 'great god' (*mathishta baganām*). He is all-powerful by his will (*vashna*), and it is he who makes the nations into slaves or tributaries of Darius.³ He gives the victory in battle. He is the god who knows all and provides (§ 18) for all. He is the god 'who created these heavens, who created this earth, who created man, who created man's happiness.'⁴

Auramazda stands high above the other deities mentioned in the inscriptions, the *aniya bagāha*, 'minor gods,' also called 'gods of the clans.' Two gods, however, are spoken of in a more conspicuous way, and form with Auramazda a kind of a triad:

Mithra, who is in close relation to the sun, and Anāhita, the goddess of the fertilizing waters.

Herodotus¹ does not mention Auramazda. He observes that the Persians have no images or shrines. They offer sacrifices on the highest peaks of the mountains to Zeus, calling the whole vault of the sky Zeus. They also sacrifice to sun, moon, earth, fire, water, and winds. In this the Greek historian, though he depicts a situation apparently very different from what we have in Mazdæism and in the Old Persian inscriptions, gives a very precious account of the Indo-European elemental cult, centring in Dyēus. He gives us thus to understand that the old Aryan beliefs had been preserved with a remarkable purity by the people of Irān.

Though it would be exaggeration to say, as some have said,² that the gods of the Indo-European pantheon were indifferent to morality, since we find the Homeric Zeus, e.g., protecting guests, faithfulness to oath, etc., we may safely assume that there is great contrast between the elemental gods of the sky, invoked on account of their might, and Ahura Mazdāh, who is essentially the guardian of morality. While Dyēus as the god of the sky is surrounded by gods who embody the forces of nature—moon, stars, wind, fire, earth, etc.—Ahura Mazdāh in the Zoroastrian system is at the head of a certain number of personified moral entities—Asha, 'justice,' 'truth'; Vohu Manah, 'good and religious mind'; Xshathra, 'the reign of the good'; Armaiti, 'piety,' 'wisdom'; Haurvatāt, 'prosperity'; Amcētāt, 'immortality'; Sraosha, 'obedience,' 'rule,' etc. They are often constituted into a group of seven, the heptad of the Amesha Spentas, 'holy immortal ones.'

The religious situation in the other branch of the Aryans, as it is described in the Vedas, shows striking similarities to the Iranian one. There the cult of the Indo-European elemental deities, of the heavenly ones, is at the basis of Vedic religion, where the power of the gods and their continuous action in and through natural phenomena provide us with an exuberant mythology, but, among the deities, the group of the Aditya occupies a very special position and stands eminently for the maintenance of the moral law, reproducing to a great extent the characteristics of the religion of Ahura Mazdāh.

Here also there is a triad. Instead of Mazdāh, Mithra, and Anāhita, we find Varuna, Mitra, and Aryaman. The last member of the triad is different; instead of a goddess of fertilizing waters we have a beneficent and healing deity, essentially helpful to man, and invoked at times (Rigveda, I. cxli. 9) as the dispenser of beneficent waters. The identity of the first two members, on the other hand, is hardly questionable. In India as well as in Irān the eye of Mitra is the sun, with which he is watching over the human tribes (*ib.* III. lix.). His activity is expressed by the verb *yaj*, which is also used for the payment of debts (in Rigveda, II. ii. 4, he and Varuna are mentioned as the gods who make men pay their debts). He is the god of contracts and pledges. Those who do not abide by their pledged word are sinning against him, like the *mithrōdruj*, 'breakers of contract' in Irān (Yz. x. 2, 45, etc.).

The original identity between Varuna and Mazdāh is also generally accepted. Varuna is the most exalted deity of the Veda. As it was the will of Mazdāh that had made Darius a king, it is Varuna's will or command (*vrata*, *dhāman*) that rules the world. He is the *dhr̥tavrata*, he whose commands are firm and immutable. His will is often identified with the *rta*, the *asha* or *arta* of

¹ Ys. xlv. 3-5.

² Bh. § 7.

³ Xerx. Pers. c. § 2.

⁴ Dar. N.R.A. § 4.

¹ I. 131-140.

² E.g., H. Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 284

the Iranians, which is the great law of the world, moral and material, the principle of all order, causing the sun to rise, rain to fall, rivers to flow, fire to come out of the rubbed sticks (*rtajan agni*), and imposing on man the moral obligations of justice, truth, and piety. If man be guilty of rebellion against the *rta*, he becomes loaded with the chains of Varuna and has to pray him to be released from his fetters and obtain the freedom of innocence (*aditi*).

'Sunahcēpa, bound to three pillars, invokes thee, O Aditya, O Varuna, O king, release him . . . May our prayer and our sacrifice release us from thy wrath, of thee who art the king, wise Asura, release us from the chains of the sins which we have committed. May Varuna make loose my chain . . . may we then follow thy path and go to Aditi.'¹

As Ahura Mazdāh is surrounded by a court of moral hypostases, so the wise Asura of India is the first in a group of personified religious abstractions—the Ādityas. Their number is not quite fixed, but in its oldest form the group was a heptad as in Irān, and in both countries the seven-number appears to be a ready-made frame into which entities have been introduced out of a larger number, so as to fill up a group previously put at seven. In India, among those abstractions we find Bhaga, 'good lot,' Āṁsa, 'the share,' Dakṣha, 'ability,' etc. If they happen not to be the same as the Amesha Spentas, it is probably a mere chance, because the equivalents of the various religious hypostases of Irān are to be found also in the Vedic mystic. Not only does *rta* correspond to *asha*, *arta*, but *aramati*, 'piety,' 'prayer,' is the equivalent of *ārmaiti*, 'piety,' 'wisdom,' *kṣatra* is the kingdom of Varuṇa as *Xshathra Vairya* is the realm of Mazdāh, *saurvatāti*, 'integrity' is *Haurvatāt*, while the conception of the good mind (*Vohu Manah*), though not found in the Vedas, seems to have belonged to the moral vocabulary of the ancient Indians, since one of these Vedic priests is called Vasumanas, 'he who possesses good mind.'

The original identity between Mazdāh-Mithra and the Amesha Spentas, on the one hand, and Varuṇa-Mitra and the Ādityas, on the other, can thus be established as regards their moral aspect, which is by far the most developed and the decidedly prominent character of those deities. Even in India the physical attributes of those gods are in the background, though they are associated with light more clearly still than in Irān. Āditya in later Skr. has even become a name of the sun. The sun also is explicitly mentioned as being the eye of Mithra, and the connexion of Mithra with the sun in India as well as in Irān does not seem to be doubtful.

As for Varuṇa, he is sometimes said to preside over night while Mithra is the god of the daylight. The Atharvaveda, which shows us the more material side of ancient Indian religion, says:

'God at night becomes Varuṇa, at dawn he rises up in the form of Mithra. All that Varuṇa has concealed during the night, Mithra discloses at dawn.'²

On account of such passages and of the reiterated statement of commentators that Mithra is for day and Varuṇa for night, Oldenberg thinks that, since Mithra's connexion with the sun is fairly evident, Varuṇa must at one time have been put in some relation to the moon. The material aspect of this god, practically forgotten in the Rīgveda, in presence of his high moral character, has subsisted to a certain extent in the more or less gnostic or magical teaching about the gods, such as we find it in the Atharvaveda. In Irān the moral aspect of the great Ahura Mazdāh is still more prominent. Some epithets seem to refer to a previous period when there was a connexion between Mazdāh and the night-sky:

¹ Rīgveda, i. xxiv. 10-15.

² Oldenberg, p. 191.

'When Ahura Mazdāh who has put on his cloth, made by the spirits and adorned with stars, is there with Mithra and Rashnu and the Holy Ārmaiti who has neither end nor beginning' (Yt. xiii. 8).

In a hymn to the moon (Yt. vii. 3) it is said to be the abode of the Amesha Spentas, from which they bestow their blessings on the earth created by Mazdāh. The moon is repeatedly called the *ratu*, 'master,' 'patron,' of Asha, 'justice' (Yt. vii. 3, 4, 6).

Not only is the material aspect of Varuṇa-Mitra thus decidedly secondary to their moral activity, but even their names seem to refer to the latter. A. Meillet³ has made it fairly probable that Mithra is the same word as Skr. *mitra*, 'friendship,' Av. *mithra*, 'contract,' and possibly Varuṇa is a derivative from the same root as *vrata*, 'ordinance,' the word regularly used for his indefectible commands. He is the god of divine will, the promulgator of the law of *rta*.

The moral aspect seems thus as old as the very names of those gods, and their situation in the Aryan pantheon, as moral gods with a somewhat dim connexion with sun and moon, is the more surprising, since the Indo-Europeans already possessed deities for sun and moon as for other natural elements—Sūryā, 'the sun,' Mās, 'the moon,' as well as in Greece Ἥλιος and Σελήνη. As a supreme god, the great Asura (Mazdāh or Varuṇa) is also in direct competition with Dyēus, the sky-god, who with the Persians of Herodotus as well as with other Indo-Europeans is the highest deity, while his name does not appear in Mazdæism and occupies only a very subordinate position, as Dyāus, in India. For the priestly and ruling classes Dyēus, in his quality of the bright supreme deity, has been absorbed by the wise Asura, the god of indefectible commands, and his surrounding of moral deities, Mitra, Aryaman, and the Ādityas or Amesha Spentas.

This situation seems so exclusive of any explanation through a natural development from the naturalistic religion of the Indo-Europeans that Oldenberg,⁴ followed by O. Schrader,⁵ has come to the conclusion that Mitra-Varuṇa and the seven Ādityas are sun and moon followed by the planets and are an acquisition from the Chaldean astral religion. The prominence of the moon-god with Sumerians induces Oldenberg to believe in a specially strong Sumerian influence on Aryan religion.

Though many Indianists are reluctant to accept this theory, it has been made rather more probable by recent discoveries. In the remnants of the Hittite capital in Boghaz-Keui an inscription has been found in which the names of the Aryan gods, Mithra, (V)aruṇa, Indra, Nāsatya, are clearly mentioned along with the Hittite gods, sun (Shamash), moon (Sin), and storm (Teshab). The identification of Varuṇa with a moon-god seems thus equally probable with the equivalence between a sun-god and Mithra, and a storm-god and Indra, who is essentially the storm-god of India. As for Nāsatya it is the epithet of the Ashvins, who are in close connexion with Indra, and the same as the Av. Nāōhaithya, an Ahrimanian spirit always mentioned in company with the *daēva* Indra. The existence of the Aryan moral gods in the 2nd millennium B.C. and the contact between Aryan and Semito-Hittite religion at that time are confirmed by the mention of Mithra on a Palestinian stele described by W. Max Müller⁶ and by a list of Assyrian gods published by Vincent Scheil.⁷ Among those gods we find Assara Mazaash (or Asura Mazdās, the old, pre-historic form of the name Ahura Mazdāh). Curiously enough, the name is immediately followed by the mention of

³ JA x. x. [1903] 143.

² Pp. 185 ff., 194.

⁴ ERE ii. 89.

⁵ OLZ xv. [1912] 252.

⁶ RT^r xiv. [1893] 100.

the seven spirits of heaven (Igigi, 'the strong ones') and the seven spirits of earth (Anunnaki). Now, it is to be observed that the Igigi and the Anunnaki are supposed to concentrate all spirits which have power in the world just as the world has been apportioned to the Amesha Spentas in Mazdeism (Asha is for the fire, Armaiti for the earth, Xshathra for the metals, etc.). Moreover, the number seven, which seems to have no special meaning with Aryans, is for the Babylonians the conventional expression for a great number.

Not only does the Aryan heptad around the great Asura in this way receive an explanation, but we find in Assyrian religion the equivalents of the two Indian and Persian triads. Two triads are especially apparent in the Assyrian religions system. One unites Sin (moon), Shamash (sun), and Ishtar (goddess of fertility), and corresponds clearly to the Achæmenian triad, Auramazda, Mithra, and Anāhita. The Iranian goddess repeatedly identified with Aphrodite, *e.g.*, under the name of 'Aphodīrā' *Avatris*, is the dispenser of the fertilizing waters of heaven. Another triad is mentioned in Sargon's palace—Sin, Shamash, Ramman. Ramman, an Assyrian deity, was originally a god of lightning and storm, so that the Assyrian triad, Sin, Shamash, Ramman, corresponds to the Hittite group, Sin, Shamash, Teshab. Now, Ramman is looked upon as the helper of mankind *par excellence*. The kingly name Ramman-nirari means 'Ramman is my helper.'¹ He is especially associated with Shamash, a god of justice, and, while Shamash, like Mithra, gives victory, he gives superabundance.² This makes him very near to Aryaman, 'the friend,' the beneficent, helping, healing deity of the Aryans, who bestows abundance by pouring water, and who forms the third member of the famous triad Varuna, Mitra, and Aryaman. The phonetic similarity between Ramman and Aryaman may be purely fortuitous, but may also be explainable by a folk-etymology.

It is thus by his moral side that Aryaman can be connected with Ramman. This applies also to Mithra and Shamash, Varuna and Sin. The central and essential activity of Mithra, as embodied in his name, is the protection of law and justice among men. He is the guardian of the great law of the world (*rita*) and more especially of good faith and oath, punishes pitilessly all crimes and delicts, but brings the good and the brave to victory on earth and to the abode of the blest after death. Shamash, who is mainly a sun-god with astral functions in Chaldaea, assumes in Assyria a much more decided moral character. He is for Ashurbanipal and Shalmaneser³ the judge of the world who guides mankind aright, the lord of the law who judges according to unchangeable principles (*cf.* the *rita* of the Aryans). He sees the wickedness of the foes of the country and he helps to conquer them. He is the king in heaven, and his favour produces order and stability. He loosens the bonds of the imprisoned, like Varuna and Mithra. This character comes out especially in the hymns quoted by Jastrow:

'The law of mankind dost thou direct,
Eternally just in the heavens art thou, . . .
Thou knowest what is right, thou knowest what is wrong. . . .
Oh Shamash! Supreme judge of heaven and earth art thou. . . .
O Shamash! on this day purify and cleanse the king . . .
Release him from the ban.'⁴

As the god of law, he is accompanied by two divinized abstractions—Kettā, 'justice,' and Mēsharu, 'rectitude.' It cannot be a mere coincidence that Mithra in Iran has likewise two satellites—Rashnu, 'justice,' and Sraosha, 'discipline,' 'rectitude' (*Yt.* xvi. 17, xiii. 3).⁵ *Yt.* x. 41 says:

¹ M. Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1895, p. 159.

² *Ib.* p. 237.

³ *Ib.* p. 210.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 300 f.

⁵ H. Zimmern, *ERE* ii. 811.

'Mithra strikes fear into them; Rashnu strikes a counter-fear into them; the holy Sraosha blows them away from every side.'

In the Behistān inscription (§ 63) Auramazda similarly declares that 'he has proceeded with Justice and Equity.' Not only is the correspondence very striking, but the very existence of such personified moral entities in Assyria is very suggestive in presence of the peculiar hypostases-system of India and Iran.

The comparison which has proved so suggestive between Aryaman-Mithra and Ramman-Shamash can be applied to Varuna and Sin with no less interesting results. The moon-god enjoys a remarkably high prestige in the Assyro-Babylonian pantheon. The moon is, indeed, like the guide of the stars and planets, the overseer of the world at night. This was reconcilable with a high moral character. The planets became spirits subservient to his will. He is a king, a ruler of men and nature, producing stability and order, but he is also a judge who, like Varuna, loosens the fetters of the imprisoned. His light, like Varuna's, is the symbol of righteousness. He is a god of wisdom like Mazdāh. Like him also, he is a supreme god of morality, whose material side has become quite secondary. He is addressed in very lofty hymns in the same exalted tone as Varuna, and, what is most striking, he is celebrated above all as the god of strong commands, whose will is indefectible—which we have concluded to be the typical feature of Varuna, possibly expressed in his name.

'O lord, chief of the gods, who on earth and in heaven alone is exalted. . . .

Strong chief . . . who, from the foundation of heaven till the zenith,

Passes along in brilliancy (?), opening the door of heaven, Preparing the fate (?) of humanity. . . .

Lord, proclaiming the decisions of heaven and earth,

Whose command is not set aside, . . .

Thy strong command is proclaimed in heaven, and the Igigi prostrate themselves. . . .

Thy strong command on high, like a storm in the darkness, passes along, and nourishment streams forth . . .

Thy strong command produces right and proclaims justice to mankind. . . .'¹

The rest of the hymn celebrates the commands of Sin, and it is very remarkable how the hymns, which after all are our most trustworthy testimonies about the gods, emphasize both for Sin and for Shamash that very central feature which the Vedic hymns are chanting for Varuna and Mithra. This makes it probable that the great Asura of India and Iran, the protector of moral law, with his triad and his heptad of moral deities, has been introduced into the naturalistic pantheon of the Aryans, not on account of their material and astral side (the Aryans had already deities of that kind), but by reason of their moral value. They accordingly received names in connexion with that moral aspect.

It does not belong to our present task to locate with more or less precision the place where the contact between Assyrians or Hittites and Aryans took place. The discoveries of recent years leave a wide field open to possibilities. As Iranian art received its peculiar features through contact with the people of Northern Asia Minor and Assyria,² Aryan religion was under the influence of Hittite beliefs in Cappadocia. The Mittani kings entertained relations with the Harri, or Aryans, their king Artatama, and his aristocracy, the *marya*, 'men' (Arm. *mar*, 'a man').

The hypothesis of L. von Schroeder (*Arische Religion*, i., Leipzig, 1914, p. 314 ff.), that Varuna, Mithra, etc., are simply epithets of the Aryan sky-god, can be reconciled with the one given here, inasmuch as the epithets of the diurnal and nocturnal sky would not have developed into special deities if a syncretism had not taken place with Sin and

¹ Jastrow, p. 303 f.

² Cf. Perrot-Chapiez, v. 515, etc.

Shamash. The indebtedness of Aryans towards Semites in this important point of their religion must not lead us to minimize the part played by Zoroaster. The personality of the great god had not been sufficiently isolated from other deities and especially from Mithra. Zoroaster alone in his *Gāthās* has ignored Mithra, and retained around Mazdāh no deity but moral entities with a very shallow personality. Mazdāh for Zoroaster concentrates in himself all science, all virtue, all good. He is the supreme and constant object of man's hope and desire. The dualistic conception has prevented him from developing a complete monotheism, while the realistic though imaginative temperament of the Persians has dwelt in symbolism and has always ignored Indian mysticism, let alone Christian love of God.

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A. J. CARNOY.

ORTHODOX EASTERN CHURCH.—See EASTERN CHURCH, GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH, RUSSIAN CHURCH.

ORTHODOXY.—To be 'orthodox' is to hold or profess opinions which are regarded as in some sense 'right.' *Orthodoxia* is the character of a 'right-thinking' person, society, school of thought, or Church. *Erepoðoxia*, an awkwardly formed yet useful derivative, is the character of thinking which is 'other' than right. Neither term attempts in itself to indicate what constitutes 'rightness,' and in practice there is a constant danger that the distinction between them may revert to the primitive difference on which Byron's wit fastened when he said: 'Orthodoxy is my doxy, Heterodoxy is another man's doxy.' Orthodoxy is thus very apt to denote nothing more than the accepted faith of a particular denomination regarded complacently from its own standpoint, heterodoxy being simply religious opinion at variance with it, a species of intellectual 'dissent' from ecclesiastically 'established' views. There are, indeed, as many types and standards of orthodoxy as there are distinctive denominations in the Church, and, for that matter, distinctive parties within any branch of the Church. Even when orthodoxy in a superdenominational sense is under review, it will be found that it is distinguished from heterodoxy by many considerations other than doctrinal. Its 'rightness' may rest upon traditional continuity, or upon the numerical strength of its devotees, or upon its real or supposed congruity with Holy Scripture. But at its lowest and narrowest, even when most intimately associated with prejudice, mere use and wont, or gross literalism, orthodoxy asserts a claim to credence and authority as the *truth*.

By the same instinct that has prompted schools of religious thought and ecclesiastical organizations to define with varying precision the doctrines or opinions which they have come to consider valid and right, and which they urge the world to accept as a sacred obligation, orthodoxies have also been evolved through intuition, speculation, and experience in such departments as law, morals, medicine, economics, æsthetics, literary criticism, and history. In each of these a species of dogma has established

itself through controversy or through convention, and contributes strength and stability to the structure of human life and knowledge. Against the recognition of an orthodoxy in religion there ought to be no *a priori* prejudice, for analogy is all in its favour, so long as it is not suffered to become artificial, oppressive, or blindly hostile to correction.

Strictly speaking, orthodoxy in religion is concerned only with doctrine or belief, with the intellectual element in spiritual life. It is opinion raised to its highest power and dignity. But, since religion embraces feeling and activity as well as thought, orthodoxy becomes an inadequate criterion of its worth apart from right experience and right conduct. It ought to have for its correlatives such words as 'orthopathy' and 'orthopraxy,' the inward experience and the outward exercise of piety. True religion calls for soundness of heart and of will not less than of head. It is not to be forgotten, however, that the emphasis which has been laid so persistently upon orthodoxy in all the great world-systems of religion springs ultimately from a just perception that what a man thinks, believes, or knows is supremely determinative of his experience and conduct.

It is significant and interesting that the Greek or Eastern Church has elected to designate itself the Orthodox Church, thus adhering in its name to its ancient predilection for theological discussion, whereas the Latin or Western Church chooses above all to style itself the Catholic Church, adhering with equal fidelity to its imperial instincts. Different as the titles are, they are based upon essentially similar conditions. The Eastern Church is not more jealous on behalf of sound doctrine, as it conceives it, than is the Western. The Western Church is not more alive to the value of *semper, ubique, and ab omnibus* as tests of catholicity than is the Eastern. They are conserving the same interests, operating with the same ideas, though they approach the problem of substantiating the received faith from widely separate directions. To the Greek 'truth' or opinion was the fundamental. To the Roman 'law' and 'custom' were supremely sacred. But each in vindication of his own ultimate standard instinctively had recourse to the other's principles. Universal acceptance offers an irresistible presumption of a doctrine's truth. And, in like manner, the truth of a doctrine is the surest guarantee that it will prevail and prove itself catholic.

Is there a Christian orthodoxy in fact as well as in name or claim? If there is a religion, truly one in spite of all sectarian division, to which the name 'Christian' can properly be given, there must be a Christian orthodoxy, just as there must be a Christian ideal or standard of ethical duty, moral character, and spiritual experience. The difficulty is to locate and identify it. Is it the sum of all doctrines actually received and taught among those who name the name of Christ? Or is it the common doctrine present in all systems, received in all communions? The former seems hopelessly excessive, unless incompatible teachings are permitted to cancel each other. The latter seems painfully scanty, unless a very simple residuum of uncontroversial teaching is held to be sufficient for religious needs. The problem brings the investigator into the very heart of the most delicate and distressing of all Christian controversies—the discussion as to the validity, genuineness, and sufficiency of the claim of ecclesiastical organizations, doctrinal systems, ministries, and individuals to be Christian. If orthodoxy be defined as the Christian doctrine which has been received always, everywhere, and by all, it is at once obvious that no existing system in the world

can substantiate that claim, neither the fullest nor the barest, or else, alternatively, that in reckoning the always, the everywhere, and the all we must have been enabled by some legerdemain to eliminate the countless exceptions to the rule of faith which we have arbitrarily laid down, very much in the same fashion as the necessary unanimity was sometimes secured in ancient Ecumenical Councils for momentous decisions in matters of faith by coercing, intimidating, or excommunicating the recalcitrant minority. Yet the problem must be faced with resolution and courage, for, so far from being academic or abstract, it is in reality nothing else than the problem of Christian concord and Church reunion. What is Christianity? Who are true Christians? What constitutes a Christian? What are the marks by which we may recognize a true Church, the true Church? No Christian individual and no Christian church ought to be asked to belong to a communion which has not a satisfactory title to be considered Christian, but what kind of title is to be held sufficient? The history of the Christian Church, and a survey of the Christian world, afford instant proof that there is very much in Christendom which does not belong to Christ, and also suggest that there is not a little in the world outside the constituted Church which well deserves to be ranked with Christianity. Too seldom we have gone to our supreme authority in the Gospels for guidance in essaying the problem. When we despair of discovering any unifying principle of orthodoxy in the accredited Churches and systems with their unlimited diversity and discord, we have a right, and an obligation, to turn to such indications of the mind of Christ as the Gospels preserve. The faith which Simon Peter professed at Caesarea Philippi was expressly accepted by Christ as true; its possession made Peter 'blessed'; it was not revealed to him by 'flesh and blood' but by the Father in heaven; it either was itself, or constituted him, a rock on which Christ was to build His Church beyond the reach of decay and death (Mt 16¹⁸). Its profession was for the earliest age of the Church a passport to baptism. And in fact that faith is a common possession of every Christian communion and every Christian individual to this day. It remains a sound and sacred criterion of Christian profession, a criterion which is also searching and, when seriously applied, sufficient. That it is to be applied in a tolerant and charitable spirit and at the same time heart-searchingly seems to be implied in such sayings as those in which Christ refused to forbid the worker who healed in His name though not belonging to the apostolic circle—'he that is not against us is for us' (Mk 9⁴⁰, Lk 9⁵⁰)—and extolled the child-spirit in the receiving of the kingdom of God (Mk 10¹⁵ and parallels), and bade His followers beware of false teachers in days to come:

'By their fruits ye shall know them. . . . Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven. . . . Every one therefore which heareth these words of mine, and doeth them, shall be likened unto a wise man, which built his house upon the rock. . . . And every one that heareth these words of mine, and doeth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man, which built his house upon the sand' (Mt 7¹⁵⁻²⁷).

It was foreign to the method and design of Christ to impose or to exact a precise system or scheme of faith. The abuses of set codes of law and doctrine were only too obvious in His day. For the same reasons that led Him to write out no tables of Christian observance and practice He refrained from exacting an orthodoxy with formulated tenets. In both spheres of Christian responsibility He preferred to bequeath a Spirit. Loyalty is more than obedience. Faith is more than conviction. To trust, to revere, and to love His person,

to receive His own Spirit and to surrender one's life to its influence, is a surer guarantee of right-mindedness towards Him than any acceptance and profession of authorized opinions could ever be.

As a matter of fact, no Church in Christendom ventures or can afford to ignore those principles of sincerity and charity in the everyday economy of its own ecclesiastical life. Without exception a working latitude is assumed by the members in their relationship to official standards. In every Church the more superstitious believe more and the more sceptical accept less than dogma prescribes. There is endless variety in the measure of individual docility and credulity. No Church would arraign its members by the same standard of orthodoxy which it expects its clergy to maintain. Even in Churches which boast of their orthodoxy and make a fetish of their creed there is amazing diversity in the sense in which their doctrines are interpreted by parties, schools, and individuals within their acknowledged fellowship. In the Roman communion itself it is notorious that, though a modernist who publishes his opinions receives but a short shrift before excommunication, the modernist who keeps his counsel within his own private circle and performs the duties of his office faithfully and decorously has little to fear. And in all other Churches from Greek Orthodoxy to Quakerism room has had to be found for party differences which are at least as serious as those which separate two communions from each other. Examine the facts closely, and it becomes apparent that they rest upon no anarchical foundation. At bottom the explanation is that doctrine is but one among several tests of loyalty and bonds of fellowship. The Christian Church is everywhere and always in principle the communion of *saints*, not of identical believers. Men look for other intercourse within her bounds than the comparison of doctrinal notes. Orthodoxy enjoys no evident monopoly of the Christian spirit, of the Christian tone and accent, of the graces and virtues of the Christian life. Among both clergy and lay-folk, accordingly, it is recognized in all Churches that very different types of doctrine may live and work together under the shadow of a common rule of faith, united by a common devotion to the Church's Lord and the coming of His Kingdom. It was so among the Twelve first called. It is so among the NT writers. To the end of time it may well be so in the Church. Christian remains a greater name than Orthodox or Catholic. Ritual, doctrine, and government—these are the spheres in which denominational differences flourish and run riot. But not even when they are added up to form one sum do they become a definition of Christianity. The Christian spirit is not confined within their provinces. It may, indeed, thrive on a very limited portion of their territory as Rome gained spiritual prestige through the unwelcome shrinkage of her temporal kingdom. Grave matters though they are, they are ultimately open questions, matters for controversy and for compromise or toleration. Simplicity and complexity must learn to respect each other with regard to each of them. Behind them and above them are the ultimate tests of conformity to the will of God and the example of Christ in the outward life and in the secret heart. By comparison with these our ecclesiastical tests of orthodoxy and conformity appear poor and ineffectual indeed. It is to travesty and caricature the Divine Majesty to picture Him as deeply concerned about the particular denomination to which a human soul before the tribunal of His Son had belonged in life. The Salvation Army and the Society of Friends practise neither baptism nor the Lord's Supper, but no one will dare or care to

unchurch them who believes the rule 'ubi Spiritus ibi Ecclesia.' The Unitarian fellowship declines to profess the traditional doctrine of the Trinity, or to accept the doctrine of the deity of Jesus, but with Peter it hails Jesus as the Christ and recognizes in some sense His divinity, and its saints, scholars, philanthropists, and singers have not been cut off from the wellspring of inspiration. Partial it may be in its grasp of the verities and experiences on which any Church that aspires to be world-wide and popular must depend, but it is unmistakably Christian in its spirit and essential convictions, and has a distinctive service to render to Christendom as it is still constituted.

History suggests, accordingly, that, as ecclesiastical differentiation is not necessarily subversive of the religious unity which underlies the denominational variety of Christian life, but may be the divinely-appointed way to the permanent enrichment of Christian truth, worship, organization, so the apparently endless diversity of the doctrinal systems of Christendom is not necessarily destructive of the concept and ideal of orthodoxy. Varying systems teach us to look beyond the letter which divides and distracts to the spirit which may be the bond of unity and the common source of truth. They direct our thoughts beyond the merely or exclusively doctrinal tests of legitimacy in the household of faith. They prompt the thought that, as the vast empires of the future must be erected on an ever-widening foundation of provincial, linguistic, racial liberty and autonomy, so in the ecclesiastical future the orthodoxy which shall qualify for true membership in the Church on earth must be something at once more comprehensive and more simple than the great organizations hitherto have formulated for the purpose. The orthodoxy of a great communion is its fidelity to its *working* creed. The orthodoxy of the universal Church is, in like manner, its fidelity not to its formal or outward Confessions of Faith viewed as an aggregate, nor to any mechanically extracted essence or consensus of them, but to the living faith, personal and intellectual, devotional and practical, which each of the historic creeds and formularies is an effort to capture and enshrine in words. The Augustinian maxim, 'Securus indicat orbis terrarum,' which meant so much for Newman and his school, is a sound and invaluable principle in religious apologetics, but it is a fond imagination that seeks to harness it to the exclusive service of any particular system, however imposing. Weight of numbers, length of time, width of diffusion do tell heavily in favour of any doctrine, worship, or organization that is on its trial. That is beyond question. But other things are needed. Truth is not always on the side of the big battalions, length of days is not immune from error. Nothing is more universally diffused than sin or superstition. Christianity itself not only remains but is still likely long to remain but one of a group of religions with millions for their following, and the *orbis terrarum* has not yet completed its judgment upon its orthodoxy, its soundness for all times, all tongues, and all climes. We base our assurance of its absoluteness and finality upon something deeper than its diffusion. So with orthodoxy, we are led to adopt a discriminating attitude towards its claims. We recognize the honourable nature of the principle which inspires its formulation and recognition. We appreciate the value of the evidence which even its excesses furnish to man's sense of the power for good and evil which organized common opinion commands in the Church as in the State. We see that conflicting orthodoxies may discredit one another's exclusive claims without invalidating the presumption that in religion there is a body of truth on which all men might agree,

and without deterring truth-lovers from devoting their lives to the ardent quest for it. History does not suggest a kindly judgment upon the political, administrative, and mechanical methods which have been employed to secure the permanence of particular orthodoxies in their respective communions, for Truth is a spirit and can neither be engaged nor kept outside the bars, but the impulse to seek for a doctrine which shall hold good not for the individual merely but for all believers, a doctrine which can be received as from God because it is found to lead to God, a doctrine which has endured the tests of time and experience, has appealed to men of varying type, temper, and race, and contains within it the guarantee that it will last, is not only legitimate and honourable but vital to religion and to man.

See, further, AUTHORITY, CONFESSIONS, COUNCILS, CREEDS, HERESY, and INFALLIBILITY.

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OSSETIC RELIGION.—The Ossetes are a people of about 170,000 souls, dwelling half-way along the main range of the Caucasus; their country is about 80 miles from east to west and 50 miles from north to south; through it runs the only road across the mountains, the pass of Darial; accordingly, they alone of Caucasian peoples are found both north and south of the watershed; a few also are about Mozdok in the plain of the Terek. They speak an Iranian language which shows special features that also occur in the remains of the Iranian formerly spoken in the plains of S. Russia, viz. names found in great numbers in the inscriptions of Olbia, Tanais, and Panticapaeum, one or two names of Sarmatians preserved in literature, and certain river names: Danube, Dnestr, Dnêpr, and Don all probably contain the Ossetic *don*, 'river.' It is therefore clear that the Ossetes reached their present position not from the main body of the Iranians to the south, separated from them by the Georgians and Armenians, but from the north; they are the descendants of the 'Osi' of Georgian Chronicles, the 'Yasy' of the Russians, both identified with the 'Alans,' themselves described as a branch of the Sarmatians. Their neighbours on the north are the tribes of Kabarda and now the Russians, on the east the Ingushes, Kists, Pshavs, and Khevsurs, on the south the Georgians, on the west the Balkartses, or mountain Tatars. The last are comparatively late comers, and the place names of their country show that it was formerly inhabited by Ossetes. There are two main dialects of Ossetic, Iron (the same word, it appears, as *Iran*) and Digorian; the latter, spoken in the western district and the valley of the Uruk, is more archaic than Iron, which has spread over the greater part of the country. The Alans, or Ossetes, were more or less Christianized by Byzantine and Georgian missionaries, but one of them, Theodore, in the 13th cent. calls them Christians

in name only (*PG* xli. 410, § 24). Soon after his time, under the influence of Tatar and Kabarda invasions, they superficially adopted Islām. During the past century the Russians have had a certain success in combating Islām among them; some, the more genuine Musalmāns, emigrated to Turkey, while many embraced Christianity, but they are said only to have attained to the ritual, not to the ethics or any full understanding of their new faith. Their religion consists, therefore, of the original paganism into which their former Christianity has been absorbed, covered with a surface layer of Muhammadanism now being displaced by Christianity; perhaps no Indo-European people outside India has preserved so much of primitive heathenism. This has, as it were, crystallized about the places and persons hallowed by the ancient missionaries, so that several of the powers worshipped bear the mutilated names of saints, and the most sacred spots are the sites of old churches or monasteries; no doubt many of these had been sacred long before the missionaries came.

The Ossetes reserve the name of God, *Khutsau*, for the supreme divinity, the 'God of Gods,' but, though often invoked in daily talk, he is regarded as too high and inaccessible to take part in human affairs. These are ruled by *dzwars*, saints or lesser powers—a *dzwār* (Georgian *dzhvari* = 'cross') is anything holy, a cross, a praying-place, a sanctuary, a falling star, and also one of these powers or saints—in whose train are angels, *izād* (Avestic *yazata*) or *dawäg*, and every man has a guardian angel. The chief of these powers are: *Watsilla* (St. Elias), the lord of the thunder and also of crops; *Wastyrdzhi* (St. George), imagined as riding on a white horse, the protector of good folk and their cattle against thieves and wolves; *Tutyr* (St. Theodore of Tyre), lord of wolves, and to be appeased accordingly; *Fälvära* (SS. Florus and Laurus), the kindly lord of sheep; *Ävsati*, lord of wild creatures; *Barastyr*, lord of the under world, who meets the dead and sends them to *džänät*, 'heaven,' or *zyndon*, 'hell,' according to their deserts; *Kurdalägon*, the heavenly smith; *Safa*, guardian of the hearth; *Donbyttyr*, the water-bogey, with his daughters; *Sau-dzwār*, the black saint, lord of the forest; *Rynybarduag*, lord of murrain; *Alardy*, lord of smallpox; *Khntsawy Dzwār*, God's saint, guardian of marriage and giver of children; another with much the same province is *Fyry-dzwār*, the ram's saint, who had an idol in the shape of a ram at *Dergavs*. The women chiefly reverence *Mady Mairäm*, Mother Mary, who takes the form of a big stone outside each village. Every house has its *bynaty khitsau*, 'lord of the place'; a bride must ask his leave when departing from her old home and must do homage to that of her new house; so every village has its guardian angel. There are also patrons of robbers, of travellers, of the back, giving clothing, of the belly, giving food, and so on. It is remarkable that women are allowed to pronounce the name of *Alardy* only; other powers they must refer to by a periphrasis—e.g., *Wastyrdzhi* is 'the men's saint.'

Sanctuaries as well as saints or powers are called *dzwars*; their sanctity is due to their being regarded as the dwelling-places of the personal *dzwars*. Some are regarded as holy by all the Ossetes—these are mostly Christian sites—others only by the villagers near them. By far the most important are *Rekom*, once a church dedicated to St. George, and *Mykalygabyrte*, which still contains the name of St. Nicolas. The former is full of miscellaneous offerings, horns, clay cups, glasses, beads, coins (which no one would dare to steal), and especially silver braid and cotton wool, once no doubt to serve as decoration and wicks for holy lamps, now thought of only as evidence to the *dzwār*

that due prayers have been offered. There used to be a bell with a Georgian inscription recording its dedication by George Bagration; there were many of the name, so the date is uncertain. It at least points to Georgian foundation, and some families of the neighbouring village, *Tzey*, trace their descent from Georgian clergy. But other *dzwars* are more primitive—a cave, a grove, a tree, a dolmen, a stone, and the like. Special events may make a place become a *ntog dzwar*, 'new sanctuary.' A family might have a special *dzwār*. An ancestor of the *Atait* was cutting wood when he heard a voice say 'Cease.' He tried another tree and from it flowed milk and blood. So he took the log home as a wealth fetish, and from that time the family waxed rich. It was kept till 1876, and every year a ram, beer, and arak were offered to it.

Ossetian life is a round of many feasts and fasts, several of them Christian in origin. The year begins on the Friday following new moon in the winter month *Basiltymai* (Jan. 1 is St. Basil's day); next is *Komakhsän*, guarding the mouth, and *Komdaräni*, binding the mouth, corresponding to the beginning and end of Lent; then come *Marti* (March), *Nikkola* (St. Nicolas, May 9), *Fälvära* (Florus and Laurus, Aug. 18, does not quite fit); the other names, *Amistol*, *Sosäni*, *Rukhän*, *Käfti*, *Gëwärgoba*, *Tsäpporsë*, are of native origin, except that *Gëwärgoba* contains the name George.

Religious rites are divided into two main classes: *kuud*, 'worship,' and *khist*, 'service of the dead.' Essential to all are *chirittä*, 'thin cakes'; there is usually a sacrifice as well, carried out by an old man who prays, *dräpçerä*, by singeing the hair, and makes a libation into the fire, and a young man who outs the beast's throat in due fashion. When all have sat at their tables, the head of the household makes a long prayer and the others answer 'Amen' to it; at the end he throws some of the lungs wrapped in fat upon the fire. The next in age to him makes a short prayer and pours some arak into the fire. Food and drink being thus blessed, the feast begins. Women do not come in, but eat up the leavings.

The chief events of the year are: New Year and the fetching of the waters, about Epiphany; in between comes a sacrifice of a lamb to the house-spirit, part being buried inside the house; at this time of the year some people can ride to the world of the dead and bring back the seeds of good fortune; but, if they are tempted to bring back flowers or fruit, these cause epidemics. The dead shoot at the invaders, and these, if hit, die soon after their return.

Komakhsän, at carnival time, is the general feast of the dead: each household in which a death has occurred takes its part of the village and regales it with many sheep, much arak, and beer. After a laudation of the dead man there is a horse-race in his honour, and his arms and belongings are given away as prizes. Next follows a month or more of fasting in honour of *Tutyr* to make him keep in his wolves and spare the sheep. Another explanation is that *Tshiristi* ('Christ') gives a place in heaven only to those who have only fasted; and they ask *Barastyr* to let their deserving ancestors enter heaven.

In the spring is a great festival to propitiate *Alardy*. Families join by twos, one sacrificing an ox, the other several sheep, and both providing enough beer and arak to last a month. Next comes the feast of St. Nicolas, one ox to every four families. In May comes Great God's day (i.e. Trinity Sunday) at the end of the ploughing; at this time the graves of the past year are covered with turf. This is followed by the women's service at the village *dzwār*; no man must be present except the sacrificer, and the object is to secure the

coming harvest. The next feast precedes the hay harvest; in each ward of the village an ox is sacrificed and a banquet held. At the beginning of the grain harvest each household has its own feast; the special prayer is that the year's grain shall be used for festivals and not for *khists*, or service of the dead. In August comes the festival to Fälvära for the preservation of the cattle. Then there is the harvest thanksgiving when the grain has been brought home and threshed. It is celebrated every Sunday for a whole month. Another festival marks the first ploughing for the winter corn; again the object is to secure a good crop. Next follows Khorybon, specially addressed to Watsilla. The prayer is that the harvest shall be as rich as when Watsilla sowed at Kurp (a very fertile spot) and Mairäm followed him holding the seed basket. There is also a wearing of clothes inside out and a dousing of a boy with small-beer, that the fields may give corresponding overplus. At the end of autumn is the maidens' vigil on account of Mady Mairäm. They receive pies of different sorts and divine what husbands they will have by what they find in the pies. The last sacrifice and feast of the year is in honour of Wastyrdzhi. Mention may be made of the peculiar Digorian feast of Katzbadän; it lasts five days, during which there is even more eating and drinking than usual, and a stranger found within the house is compelled to stay through it.

The *khists* in honour of the dead are as numerous as the festivals of the *dzuars*. The chief, or *styr-khist*, over a dead man involves his family and more distant kinsfolk in a sacrifice of five or more oxen, fifty or more sheep, hundreds of gallons of beer (made in special cauldrons 6 ft. high, for the hire of which they pay a gallon of beer, a sheep, and other victuals), and thousands of *khist*-cakes. All the men of the settlement are invited, and after the feast there are races and archery with valuable prizes. The women have their turn, as every Friday for a year after a death the family must provide all victuals for a feast eaten by them at the cemetery. Besides the *styr-khist* there are nine others in the course of a year. Families in which several members die one after another may be absolutely ruined, as to honour each of them properly costs about £200.

The ceremonies in connexion with birth are mainly in honour of Mady Mairäm. Those of marriage have reference to her and still more to the house-spirit. The funeral ceremonies equip the dead man with all that he may want in the next world, and show clear traces that the wife and the horse must once have followed their lord thither, as was the custom of the Scyths and Sarmatians. For a year after the death the widow wears deep mourning and must sit up every night till cock-crow waiting her husband's return. As to the relation of soul to body, the Ossetes believe that the soul is quite independent; that on the fatal day the decree of death is made by six men (for a man) or four women (for a woman); that then the 'withdrawer of souls' appears to the dying man in the form of a wolf. After the soul is withdrawn from the body it flies above it until the burial, when it re-enters it in the grave, but at once leaves it and flies to the next world, where after judgment it resumes human shape. Souls grow old in the next world and have to be fed.

Musalman influence upon the Ossetes is shown by their calling Muhammad the 'Son of the sun' (*Khori fyr*), and by their ablutions and observance of Friday, Ramadan, and other holidays; but it does not seem to have sunk so deep as the Christian element, which is now being revived.

LITERATURE.—The best authority on the Ossetes is Vsevolod Miller, on whose *Osetinskie Etydy*, Moscow, 1881-87, the above

has been based; cf. his *Die Sprache der Osseten*. Much material on their customs and beliefs is found in *Sbornik Svědění o Kavkazskikh Gortsakh* ('Miscellany of Information on Caucasus Mountaineers'), Tiflis, 1871 ff., but there is very little in languages more accessible than Russian.

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OSSIANIC CYCLE.—See FEINN CYCLE.

OSTRACISM.—Ostracism was the method employed in Athens for the greater part of a century for imposing a check upon the acquisition by any politician of too great power in the State. The name is explained by the form of voting adopted, according to which each voter wrote upon a potsherd (*ostrakon*) the name of the person to be proscribed. The normal procedure was as follows. Every year at the regular meeting of the assembly (*ekklēsia*) held in the sixth prytany (Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 43. 5) a division was taken on the question whether the provision relating to ostracism should be put in force. If the question was answered in the affirmative, a special assembly was called to meet in the Agora for the actual voting (Philochorus, frag. 79^b [*FHG* i. 396]; Plutarch, *Aristid.* 7). The voters deposited in the urn set apart for their tribe the shell containing the name of the candidate chosen for expulsion. In order that a definite result might be attained it was necessary that at least 6000 votes should be recorded;¹ and, if this was not the case, the whole of the proceedings became abortive. If, on the other hand, the necessary number were present and voted, the nominee who obtained the largest vote was proclaimed by the public herald as subject to the penalties of ostracism. These involved removal for ten years to a fixed distance from Athens, or, in default, perpetual disfranchisement (*atimia*). The sentence must be carried out within ten days of the decree, but was subject to revocation by an extraordinary resolution. The exile was allowed the enjoyment of his property during his banishment, so long as he did not infringe the prescribed limits (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22. 8; Philoch. and Plut. *loc. cit.*).

Ostracism was introduced by a law of Cleisthenes (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22. 1) in the year 508-507 B.C., and lasted until the year 417 B.C.,² in which Hyperbolus was condemned. An unusual incident of the process on that occasion was that Hyperbolus himself had advocated a recourse to ostracism, but, owing to a temporary coalition of the parties headed by Nicias and Alcibiades, he became the victim of his own proposal (Plut. *Nic.* 11). It has been commonly asserted that ostracism fell into disuse because the vote condemning a worthless person like Hyperbolus was felt as the degradation of a punishment hitherto regarded as a distinction rather than as a disgrace (Plut. *loc. cit.*, quoting Plato Comicus, frag. 187 [i. 654 K.]). This account is accepted in substance by some modern historians (e.g., Grote, vi. 378), but it is probable that Hyperbolus, who was murdered in 411 by the oligarchs at Samos (Thuc. viii. 73), although the accident of our tradition has left his reputation at the mercy of his unscrupulous opponents, was a more important person than his detractors admitted (Busolt, iii. 1260). Hence it is more likely that ostracism gradually passed out of use because it was felt to be no longer needful as a protection against the preponderating influence of any individual, while at the same time it had become subject to abuse by being employed in the interest

¹ Grote (*Hist. of Greece*, iv. 84n.) favours the alternative view that the minimum applied to the number of votes given against any particular name. The Greek authorities bearing on the point appear to be inconsistent; but Plutarch's explicit statement is to be preferred to the abbreviated and perhaps corrupt text of the lexicographers.

² For the considerations which fix the date see G. Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.* iii. 1257.

of partisanship without any resulting advantage to the State.

It has been suggested that the law of ostracism was formally repealed during the archonship of Euclides (Lugebil, in *Jahrb. für klass. Philol.*, Suppl. iv. 170), and that it was superseded in practice by the *γραφὴ παρανόμων*, which, though it may have been earlier in existence as a means of correcting irregularities of the statute law, first became an important political weapon in the course of the 4th century (J. P. Mahaffy, in *Hermathena*, vii. [1881] 87 ff.).

The original purpose for which ostracism was instituted is clearly stated by Aristotle in more than one passage (*Pol.* iii. 13, 1284^a 17, *Ath. Pol.* 22. 3), viz. the preservation of equality among the citizens by the removal of any one whose wealth or influence had become dangerously pre-eminent. The peril of such exaltation had been brought home to the Athenians by the history of the rise of Pisistratus; and it accords well with the professed object of the law that the first person who suffered under its provisions was Hipparchus, the son of Charmus, a kinsman of Pisistratus (*Arist. Ath. Pol.* 22. 4). Not long afterwards Megacles, the son of Hippocrates and a nephew of Cleisthenes himself, was ostracized as an adherent of the Pisistratids (*ib.* 6); and the first person unconnected with the formerly reigning house who was punished solely in consequence of his eminence was Xanthippus, the father of Pericles (*ib.*). It very soon came about that ostracism ceased to be used for the welfare of the State, but was employed merely as an instrument of faction (*Arist. Pol.* iii. 13, 1284^a 23) in order to suppress the leader of a political party, and leave his opponent free to pursue his own measures without hindrance, or even to inflict annoyance upon an adversary by securing the removal of his friends. Such were the conditions when Aristides was ostracized on the initiative of Themistocles (*Plut. Aristid.* 7, *Them.* 5), when the obnoxious opposition of Thucydides, the son of Melesias, to the policy of Pericles was similarly terminated (*Plut. Pericl.* 14), and when Damon the musician was banished on suspicion of being the secret adviser of Pericles' (*ib.* 4).

While most of the recent authorities conclude that the institution of ostracism was inspired by fear of the return of the Pisistratid dynasty, Grote (iv. 81-90) has argued that it was from the beginning a carefully devised scheme for preventing the dangers likely to arise from the excessive bitterness of party strife and inculcating in the new democracy a growing respect for constitutional permanence. The successful accomplishment of its purpose is proved by the absence of any attempt to overthrow the constitution during the interval between the reforms of Cleisthenes and the close of the Peloponnesian War; and the device itself was allowed to become obsolete when the security of the democracy showed that it was no longer needed. But Grote has probably exaggerated the political value of ostracism, and it is unlikely that Cleisthenes had wider aims than those attributed to him by Aristotle.

Ostracism was in force not only in Athens, but also in Argos (*Arist. Pol.* vii. [v.] 3, 1302^b 18), Miletus, and Megara (schol. *Aristoph. Eq.* 855), although nothing is known of the details of its working in these States. At Syracuse also there was a similar institution known as 'petalism' (*πεταλισμός*) from the laurel leaf which was used instead of the potsherd to receive the name of the

statesman designated for expulsion. Petalism is said to have been introduced at Syracuse in imitation of the Athenian law, but to have lasted for only a few years. The period of exile prescribed at Syracuse was five years instead of the Athenian ten (*Diod. xi.* 86 f.); but all our information on the subject rests on very unsatisfactory authority.

LITERATURE.—C. Lugebil, 'Das Wesen und die historische Bedeutung des Ostrakismos in Athen,' in *Jahrb. für klass. Philologie*, Suppl. iv. [1881] 119-175; J. M. J. Valetton, 'De Ostracismo,' in *Memosyne*, xv. [1897] 83 ff., 129 ff., 337 ff., 357 ff., xvi. [1898] 11., 162 ff., 214 ff.; H. Hager, in *Smith's Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Ant.*, London, 1890-91, i. 818 f.; G. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, new ed., 12 vols., do. 1869-70, iv. 79-90; G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, ii. 2, Göttingen, 1895, pp. 439-441; G. Gilbert, *Handbuch der griech. Staatsaltertümer*, i. 2, Leipzig, 1893, pp. 167 f., 346; K. F. Hermann and V. Thumser, *Lehrbuch der griech. Staatsaltertümer*, do. 1889-92, § 71, p. 405.

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OSTYAKS.—Three different tribes of N.W. Siberia are known under this name; the Ugrian (Ougrian) Ostyaks, the Samoyedic Ostyaks, and the Yenisei Ostyaks. The Ugrian Ostyaks live along the Ob, the Irtysh and its tributaries the Konda and the Vasyugan, in the Tobolsk Government, and in the Narimsk District of the Tomsk Government. Their number in 1897 was 17,221 (9012 males). The Samoyedic Ostyaks, or Ostyak-Samoyeds, live along the rivers Baikha, Tysk, Karakonsk, Karasinsk, and Taz. Their number in 1897 was 5805 (2962 m.). The Yenisei Ostyaks live along the Yenisei from the village of Antsiferova near Yeniseisk to the lower Kureika, a tributary of the Yenisei, and along the tributaries Stony Tunguska, Bakhta, Lower Tunguska, Kureika, and the little left tributary Yelogyua. They numbered in 1897 about 998 altogether (535 m.). From various local administrative and ecclesiastical papers we may suppose that the number of Ostyaks of Yenisei has since decreased.

The first two peoples, though of different stock, are linguistically as well as racially akin, both forming groups of Castrén's¹ Uralo-Altayan family of races, while the Yenisei Ostyaks are linguistically like none of the living tribes in Siberia, and were perhaps originally also unlike physically, but the admixture of Russian and other blood makes it difficult to define their physical type now.

The name 'Ostyak' has no linguistic affinity with any of the languages of the three peoples. The Ugrian Ostyaks are known also simply as Ostyaks, or as Ugra, Yugra; the Yenisei Ostyaks as Yeniseians, being the oldest inhabitants of the Yenisei of all the peoples now living along that river. The Ostyak-Samoyeds really form one group of the Samoyed tribes, and will be discussed in the art. SAMOYEDS.

Under the existing Russian administration all three nations and their clans are mixed, and artificially divided into *rody*, 'clans,' with territorial names; the more scientific books and educated travellers, however, will never confuse these tribes.

I. UGRIAN OSTYAKS.—1. Ethnology.—The origin of the name Ostyak has been variously explained.

Novicki (1715)² naively suggests that it may be derived from the Russian *ost*, 'fish-bones,' for the Ostyaks, living chiefly on raw fish, leave heaps of fish-bones behind them after camping. His other derivation is from the Russian word *ostatki*, the remains of the only large nation of Ugra who once lived, as some authors say, in the middle of the present Russia, according to others, on both sides of the Urals. Wherever their original home was, it is certain that the Ostyaks in Europe have been nearly exterminated or merged into the neighbouring Zyryan, Vogul, and Samoyed tribes, and it is only in W. Siberia that they remain in comparative integrity.

One of the more probable explanations of the name is that deriving Ostyak from Asnyakh, 'people of Ob,' the local name of the Ostyaks of the Ob in contradistinction to the Ostyaks of the Konda or other rivers and lakes, although the general name by which the Ostyaks as well as the Voguls call themselves is *mans* or *man's*; in older days they are supposed to have called themselves Aryakhi (ar. 'many'; kho, 'man').

The most probable derivation is from the Tatar word *oustak*,

¹ *Nordische Reisen und Forschungen*, ii. 75, iv. ('Ethnologische Vorlesungen') 14 f.

² *Iraktoye opisyaniye o narodie ostyatskom*, ed. Mainoff, p. 28.

¹ On the question of the identity of this Damon with Damonides, also described as a political adviser of Pericles, see Sandys on *Arist. Ath. Pol.* 27. 4; U. Willamowitz-Möller, *Aristoteles und Athen*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1893, i. 134.

'harbarian,' by which the Tatars called all the tribes of the middle Yenisei and the Ob when they came to the Yenisei valley in the 13th century. It is they who are responsible for the classing of different tribes together under one name. In the old Novgorod annals of the 11th cent. the Ostyaks are known as Ugra, while their neighbours, the Samoyeds, are known under their present name. The entry for the year 1398 mentions the Voguls as distinct from but allied to the Ugra; the same nomenclature is to be found in 1483, when the Moscow military expedition conquered the lands of these tribes. The Russians have probably adopted the Tatar word Oushtak, which was perhaps already corrupted into Ostyak. The old name Ugra, Yögra (plur. Yögrajass), is still used by the Zyryans for their neighbours, the Ostyaks of the Urals. The Samoyeds call the Ostyaks Yaran, Yargai (*yara*, 'stranger'), which some people think is derived from *yögra*. Still more problematic is the derivation of Yurak from *ugra*, *yögra*. The Yurak, like the Ostyak-Samoyeds, form a group of Siberian Samoyeds, and their name may very well be derived from their word *yur* ('hundred').

The Finno-Ugrian tribes form four linguistic groups: (1) the Ugrian, to which at the present day the Voguls and the Ostyaks belong, and from which the Magyars branched off; (2) the Permian, to which the Votyaks, Permiaks, and Zyryans belong; (3) the Cheremiss and Mordvin; (4) the Western Finnic group, to which the Finlanders, Chud, Vess, Ests, and Lives belong; to this group may also be added the Laplanders.

Fischer¹ thinks that the Samoyeds and the Ugrian Ostyaks are the remnants of a once large nation of mid-Siberia, called Chud. This historical and rather vague name must not be confused with that of the Finnic tribe mentioned above, who inhabit N.E. Europe. According to Fischer, these ancient Chud were driven northward by Tatar and Kirghiz, migrating from the Sayan mountains to the banks of the Yenisei. But it seems fairly settled now that most of the so-called Chud remains in Siberia should be ascribed to the old Turkic and Turkicized tribes, and perhaps Strahlenberg² is more correct in thinking that the Ugrian Ostyaks at any rate, if not the Samoyeds also, are of Finnish parentage and have migrated from Lapland eastward and southward. The Finnic physical type is generally understood to be fair, reddish-haired, light-eyed, and long-headed, but, even if it were so originally, at the present moment the division of the Russian investigator Mainoff³ of the Finnic tribes into dark-haired and fair-haired is the only one justified by the facts. The Ugrian Ostyaks would belong to the dark-haired section, and are, vaguely speaking, mesocephalic or dolichocephalic, and the Mongoloid influence is less seen among them than among the Mordvins, although the Ugrian Ostyaks now live almost entirely in Asia and the Mordvins in Europe. The lack of a sufficient number of anthropometric data makes it difficult to define their type more closely than has been done by S. Shirokogorov.⁴ He bases his generalization on the researches of Rudenko, who places the Ostyaks according to their physical type between the Voguls and the Samoyeds.⁵

About a thousand years ago, when the Ostyak lands still stretched into E. Europe, though the eastern corner of Siberia was also occupied by them at that time, the Magyars went to the Danube valley, and are now known as Hungarians. In the middle provinces of Russia there are numerous place- and river-names of Ugrian origin, and it is probable that, while the Ostyaks had to give up their European dominions to the Russians, they concentrated in W. Siberia, fighting with the Samoyeds, who were then losing their southern Siberian dominions, for supremacy in the lands between the Ural and the Ob.

¹ *Sibirische Gesch.*, § 65, p. 120, § 67, p. 123, § 69, p. 129.
² *Das nord- und ostliche Teil von Europa und Asien*, pp. 86, 64.

³ D. N. Anuchin, 'Ostyaki,' in Andreyevski, *Encyclopædia*, Petrograd, 1897, x.11, 368-370.

⁴ *Zadachi Antropologii v Sibiri*, p. 23.

⁵ Rudenko has taken measurements of 127 Ostyaks; see his *Antropologicheskaya Issledovaniya Inorodtsev Syvvero-Zapadnoi Sibiri*.

These fights are vividly described in the old heroic epos of the Ostyaks, which has been specially studied by I. Patkanoff. Neither the Samoyeds nor the Ostyaks were exterminated as a result of the fighting. Some of the latter, such as the Narimsk Ostyaks, were merged into the Samoyed tribes, but the nucleus of the Ostyak nation still exists on the same lands as they have occupied for many centuries, and they still number about 17,221, while of the Voguls there are only 6500.

The heroic epos, *Tarnyn-ara* (*ara*, 'song'; *Tarn*, *Taran*, *Tarin*, an evil anthropomorphic power, bringing war, sickness, etc.), does not mention any fights with the Tatars, who subdued the whole valley of the Irtysh not earlier than the end of the 14th and the beginning of the 15th century. Nor does this epos mention the fights with the power who succeeded the Tatars in subduing the Ostyaks, namely the Muscovites. While the Ostyaks had already had to fight with the Novgorodians in the 11th cent., when the latter took possession of the White Sea, and made military expeditions against the Ugra, they were not conquered, and paid taxes only when these were exacted at the point of the Novgorodian sword, but in 1581 the Ugra did succumb to the Muscovites, and in 1586 the first Russian *ostrog*, or Cossack settlement, was built at the mouth of the Irtysh on pure Ostyak land. It was only after a long and hard struggle, however, and not until 41 Ostyak villages had been destroyed, that the Russians conquered them; later the Ostyaks helped the Russians in conquering other native tribes.

The Ostyaks live in three groups: the northern Ostyaks, in the northern Berezovsk District; the eastern Ostyaks, along the Surgut and the Vasugan as far as its tributary the Chayanka; and the south-western or Irtysh Ostyaks, in the northern part of the Tobolsk District, along the Ob, the Irtysh, and the Konda. The Surgut is said to be the purest of the Ostyak dialects.

2. *Material culture.*—The *Tarnyn-ara* gives the following picture of Ostyak life in pre-Tatar times. While their general material welfare has changed for the worse since then, yet the northern and eastern Ostyaks have not changed much in their material culture. The south-western Ostyaks are the most affected by Russian colonization, and in some places they give up their nomadic life, though they remain seasonal nomads; i.e., they live in their wooden huts for the fishing season, and often for the hunting season as well. Very few of them take up agriculture. Syphilis and other diseases, and the abuse of vodka, are most prevalent among these Ostyaks.

The northern and eastern Ostyaks are wanderers, living in reindeer-skin tents, and occasionally in half-underground log-huts covered with snow. Their summer tents and domestic utensils are made of birch-bark. Their occupations are hunting, reindeer-breeding, and fishing; they also fish through the ice. In summer they eat raw fresh fish, in winter frozen fish. The bowels, heart, and liver of reindeer are eaten raw, still warm, after the killing of the reindeer; the rest of the meat is usually cooked. The sledges are made of driftwood, and joined by being sewn with skin thongs: the runners for winter are covered with reindeer-skin. The winter dress is made of reindeer-skin, or birds' skin, ornamented with furs of other animals; the summer dress is often of *nalim* (fish)-skin, or woven by women from the nettle plant (*Urtica*). The same material is used for mosquito nets. The Russian cotton shirt is very little known among the northern Ostyaks, but the south-western Ostyaks use more and more European cloth.

3. *Social customs.*—In the north the old custom of burying the dead in a canoe is still in practice. All the belongings of the dead man are laid in the grave. To show their sorrow, the relatives tear hair from their heads and throw it on the body; this will help the soul-life of the dead. Those in mourning go a couple of days with unwashed body and unkempt hair. The widow makes a wooden doll representing her husband, dresses it in his

clothes, and treats it as her husband for a year; then she buries it also.

A woman just before her confinement is separated from society, and lives for three weeks in a special tent which no man is allowed to enter. After her seclusion she is purified by jumping three times through the fire.

In olden days the Ostyaks used to tatu their bodies with red ochre or soot, with which they coloured their dress and even 'signed' Russian official papers. At the present day their 'signature,' like that of the other northern Siberians, is a drawing of a bow and arrow.

When a girl marries, a bride-price (*kalym*) is paid, and only when the whole of this has been received is the girl allowed to be taken by the bridegroom. When visiting his betrothed, the young man has to enter the tent with his face turned away, lest he should show his face to his parents-in-law, towards whom he has to observe various prohibitive restrictions (e.g., he must avoid meeting his mother-in-law). The bride has to observe the same restrictions towards the bridegroom's family until her first child is born. Clan exogamy was until recently strictly kept, even though the clan was composed of people who were not blood-relations. Now that the south-western and many of the northern Ostyaks are nominal Christians, the marriage ceremonies are a combination of Christian and shamanist rites.

In comparison with the old war epic, *Tarnyn-ara*, the language of which is known to very few Ostyaks of to-day, the modern songs and tales seem very poor. Yet even now, especially under the influence of vodka, or of a particular kind of fungus, of which they eat seven, fourteen, or even twenty-one at once, in order to become intoxicated, the Ostyaks sing to the accompaniment of the 'swan' (Russian *lebid*, Ostyak *toron-iix*), or of the *dombra* (Russ.; Ostyak *nares-iix*). The latter is said by the Ostyaks to be their original instrument, and indeed the five reindeer-sinew strings of the *nares-iix* correspond to the five notes of the *Tarnyn-ara* melody. The Ostyaks of Konda call the *toron-iix* 'Ob music,' and say that this instrument, in the form of a swan, and with nine metal strings, came to them from certain of their Ob neighbours.

At the time of the *Tarnyn-ara* the Ostyaks were composed of many small sovereignties, each with a chief, living in a settlement, village, or perhaps small town. They were all united into a confederacy, with a chief (*yor, ur, urt*) over all the other chiefs. His subjects were known as *mygdatyaks*, 'earth-people,' for they lived in half-underground dwellings; there were also slaves—*tey-ort*, 'man-slave,' and *tey-ney* or *ort-ney*, 'woman-slave.' The chief was identified with the hero (*urt*).

Their legends say that after the Russian conquests the Ostyak heroes were taken by the gods up to the sky, and there they live as holy men; the Ostyaks bring sacrifices to them even now.

4. Religion.—(a) *Gods and spirits*.—Many of the Ostyaks have since 1715 belonged officially to the Russian Orthodox Church, but this has not influenced their shamanist beliefs and practices to any great extent, and in the Berezov and Taz Districts they are even officially still classed as pagan.

The dualistic division of gods and spirits is very strongly marked. The chief gods are represented by anthropomorphic figures, or sometimes by stones of peculiar shape. These are seldom kept in their tents; there are special places for them, usually among the hills and mountains. Near these sanctuaries there is usually a shaman (medicine-man), who looks after the image of the god, whose special protection he enjoys while he is performing his shamanistic ceremonies. All the propitiatory cere-

monies take the form of sacrifices to the gods, either of objects, especially of dresses, which are put on the figure one on the top of another, or sometimes of blood-sacrifices, consisting in the killing of animals and the smearing of the lips of the figure with their blood. Each god has his special sphere of influence.

There are three great gods common to all the Ostyaks—Yeman' gnyem, called by some Yega-teigenen, 'the old man from the mouth of the Ob'; the goose-god; and the god of the Konda.

The descriptions of 'the old man from the mouth of the Ob' are somewhat confused. Sometimes he is the god of all fish (according to the Ostyaks, all the fish in creation live in the Ob and its tributaries); every season the first catch of fish is sacrificed to him, and many other sacrifices of animals or various objects are placed on the spot where he lives, the cape at the mouth of the Ob which bears his name, in order to secure good weather and divert unfavourable winds. The god of river-fertility, he also shows the way to travellers in winter, for he keeps fires burning (*aurora borealis*) during the winter darkness. He does not, however, always inhabit the mouth of the Ob; every alternate three years he spends at the mouth of the Irtysh. Thus it seems that the Ostyaks, by moving him from place to place, hope to secure his patronage for both rivers. His figure is made of driftwood, with eyes of glass and breast of plated gold. He also has small metal horns. His first garment is of 'worms' skin,' above which he wears a large number of different dresses which have been offered to him as sacrifices. One detail suggests that this old man of the mouth of the Ob and the Irtysh may be derived from the hero who once lived among the Ostyaks, and whose deeds are recorded in their songs—he is always represented with a bow and arrows and a shield. The chief good god of the Voguls, Kors-Torum, and his son Yanykh-Torum, are never represented with weapons. Nobody may hunt or shoot near the place where the image of Yeman' gnyem is kept, or take water from the river near by, or pitch a tent in the neighbourhood, except the shaman who looks after the god.

The goose-god is the protector of all birds—i.e. the birds of the river Ob. His figure resembles a goose, and is made of copper and clothed with many sacrificial garments. He lives in the Byelogorsk hills near the Ob, and the shaman who looks after him also looks after the nest in which he lives, made of pieces of skin, fur, and cloth.

About the god of the Konda we know very little.

The chief destructive god is Tarn, god of war, sickness, bad weather, and everything destructive to life. This god is usually represented as a female; her full name is Ey-vet'ne kimtaran, 'double Tarn with one face.' She is also the personification of flames of fire. Of a man who has experienced great hardships the Ostyaks say that he has 'seen the face of Tarn.'

In the northern part of the mouth of the Ob, to the north of the abode of the good god, the protector of Ob, lives a dark under-world spirit sometimes called by the Vogul name Kul Odyr. The dark spirits dependent on him are known as *menkva* (Vogul).

Some of the heroes of the old Ostyak folk-songs are believed to have gone, after their death, to the sky, and to live there in the form of iron wolves (*kart yevra*), and, since the Ostyaks no longer make war for themselves, these heroes are now imagined as destroying the enemies of the Russians, the allies of the Ostyaks.

Besides these great gods, each Ostyak tent has a lesser family-god. Mystical properties are possessed by the swan and the goose among birds and

by the bear among animals, but by none more prominently than the bear. After a bear has been killed, his body is placed on the ground and the people dance round it, saying:

'We did not want to kill you, we are not to be blamed. The Russians have beaten the iron for the arrow-heads and the wing of the arrow we received from Eagle Father.'

(b) *The soul*.—The Ostyaks believe that man is composed of the body, its shadow, and its soul. After death the soul, with the characteristic individuality of the man, is reborn in some baby of the same clan, while the shadow goes to the under world, and there lives another life similar to the life that it lived on the earth.

(c) *Shamanism*.—The office of shaman is not necessarily hereditary. The shaman chooses a successor, male or female. When the spirits pass into the newly-chosen shaman, he has to suffer both physically and mentally. He is recognized as a shaman when he knows how to deal with the dark spirits. The shaman's costume is very similar to that of the Samoyedic shaman, and is made of reindeer-hide with many metallic jingles. At one point in his incantations the shaman must have his face covered with a piece of cloth. The drums of the Ostyak shamans differ from the type used by the other natives along the Yenisei in being round instead of oval.

II. OSTYAKS OF THE YENISEI OR YENISEIANS.

—i. *Ethnology*.—According to Castrén,¹ the Yeniseians belong to the Indo-Chinese linguistic group, and their only relatives in Siberia were the not long extinct Arine, Kotte, and Assane. In physical type the Ostyaks of the Yenisei differ from their neighbours in the fact that none of the latter, namely the Tunguses, Ugrian Ostyaks, Samoyeds, and Yakuts, are so decadent or have such mixed blood in their veins, so that the latter tribes have a more characteristic racial type.

The Ostyaks of the Yenisei were from the 7th cent. under Turkic and Uigur influence; then came the Mongols in the 13th cent., while, since the beginning of the 17th, Russian influence has over-ridden all others. Hence it is no wonder that their present physical type is different from what it was in pre-Turkic times. It is supposed, though not proved, that they are descendants of the old Dinlin (Ting-ling) people who, together with the Usuni and the Khakas (Kirghiz), were, according to the Chinese annals (Radloff,² Bichurin³), of fair complexion, fair hair, and blue eyes. Of these three peoples we can trace so far only the Khakas, who in the 7th cent. took the name of Kirghiz, and came under the domination of the Turkic tribe Tiukiū (called by the Chinese Tchili, Dili, or Tele), whose language and script they adopted on the *pisaniṭsy* (pictographs), and later of the northern Uigur (called by the Chinese Kao-tche). In 970 the Khakas were strong enough to subdue the Uigur, but in the 13th cent. they could not stand against the Mongols. Yet the latter did not subdue them for any length of time, and, after fighting for about a quarter of a century against the Russians, whose conquests they could not check, most of them migrated to the other side of the Sayan mountains to the steppes of S. Mongolia. The rest were merged in the Turkic and Mongolic people of the Minusinsk country.

All this has been traced partly from Chinese annals and partly from the old Khakas *pisaniṭsy* from the Orkhon valley and the Minusinsk country, which have been deciphered by V. Thomsen and Radloff.⁴ It may be supposed that the Dinlin tribe was similar to that of the Khakas-Kirghiz, but the link between

them is missing. One of the clans of the Kyzyl 'Tatars'—Shin—is said to be of Yenisei-Ostyak origin.

The present Yeniseians have lighter hair than the dark brown or black hair of the Samoyeds, Ugrian Ostyaks, and Tunguses, and blue eyes are also found; but this must rather be ascribed to an admixture of Russian blood. The name by which they call themselves, according to Novicki,¹ is Tindigyet, according to Castrén,² Kanasket (derived probably either from the river Kan or from the river Ulukan), while V. I. Anuchin,³ with whom the present writer's own observation agrees, says that they use for themselves the name Din ('people'). According to Radloff,⁴ the still existing tribe of Koibal, living on the right side of the middle Abakan, or the greater part of them, are of Yeniseian (Yenisei-Ostyak) origin, while Kai Donner,⁵ the student of the Samoyedic and Finnic languages, believes them to be Tatarized Samoyeds, who one hundred years ago spoke Samoyedic, like the nearly extinct Kamashints (Kamajenil), a few of whom still live in the Kansk District.

2. *Material and social culture*.—All the Ostyaks of the Yenisei live along the rivers, grouped into seven clans of unequal size, and are fishermen, usually working for one of the Russian traders. Their hunting and trapping also are limited to the area in the neighbourhood of the river. A small number of them possess reindeer, and consequently lead a really nomadic life; others have adopted a more settled mode of life, never, however, living long in one place. Demoralized, weak, unhealthy, fond of alcohol and tobacco, like all the natives, they are yet kind-hearted, and, as a rule, honest; they are, on the whole, the most hopelessly degenerate of all the tribes of the Yenisei region.

In their social life they have preserved very few of their old customs connected with birth, death, or marriage, although one of the old customs still enforced is that of avoidance of father- and mother-in-law. In their religion, on the other hand, although they are all officially reckoned as members of the Russian Orthodox Church, they have remained comparatively faithful to their old traditions.

3. *Religion*.—The gods of the Yeniseians may be grouped in two classes.

(a) *The benevolent gods*.—The highest kind god is Ess, whose duties are somewhat vaguely described, as is the people's relation to him. No one ever saw him, for he lives above the seventh sky. He does not take part in human affairs; only once a year, on the longest day of spring, he makes a review of the earth and the stars. The people celebrate this day with feasting, during which women dance an erotic dance. This celebration has no direct connexion with Ess as an anthropomorphic god, but, since the sky is also called Ess, it may be a ceremony connected with sky-worship, on his special day of the year.

Next to Ess they put Tomam (*am*, 'mother'). She lives among the rocks of the far south, and is very beautiful and kind. Every spring she ascends a high rock on the coast of the Yenisei and shakes her hands over the river; from her sleeves fall downy feathers, which change, while floating to the river, into geese, swans, and ducks; these fly northwards to the Yeniseians. She is the personification of the warm and fertile south.

Besides these two most important, there are some other less important deities. Such are the *eskyns*, the servants of Ess; in winter they keep a fire burning in the sky (*aurora borealis*), to see by its light what the bad goddess Khosadam is doing in her dark northern region. Some of the mythical

¹ ii. 281, iv. 87.

² *Aus Sibirien*, i. 123 f., 138.

³ *Sobranie svyedenii o narodakh obitayushchikh*, i. 443.

⁴ Thomsen, 'Déchiffrement des inscriptions de l'Orkhon et de l'Enisei', *Bull. Ac. Science*, Copenhagen, 1894, pp. 1-15, 'Inscriptions de l'Orkhon', *Mémoires de la Soc. Finno-Ougrienne*, v. [Helsingfors, 1894] 17; Radloff, *Die alttürkischen Inschriften der Mongolei*, pp. 425-503.

¹ P. 7.

² ii. 281.

³ *Ochork shamanstva u Yeniseyskikh Ostyakov*, p. 27.

⁴ *Aus Sibirien*, i. 209.

⁵ In a private communication to the writer.

persons, such as Alba, the hero defender of the country, who had to struggle with Khosadam for the sake of his nation, rise also to the dignity of deities who live in the three skies nearest to the earth. Alba is expected to return to the earth when the Yeniseians need him very much.

The other mythical person who is worshipped is Dokh, the greatest shaman of all time, and the law-maker. 'So said Dokh,' is the usual end of songs, legends, and proverbs. Dokh cannot return to the earth till his *ulvei*, the most important of his souls, is freed from the power of Khosadam by the hero Alba.¹

(b) *Malevolent powers*.—The Yeniseians are, on the whole, more occupied with struggles against bad powers than with the worship of good ones. Chief of these bad spirits is Khosadam, who was once the wife of Ess, but left him, together with her servants, and went to live with the moon, Khyp (i.e. 'grandfather'). Ess punished her by throwing her down to the earth, where she now symbolizes cold, darkness, sterility, disease—everything bad that can happen to men. To punish the moon, Ess made him serve man, for whom he divides the time and also foretells the weather. Khosadam is personified as having decaying eyes, dishevelled hair, and animal paws; her servants, *kyns* or *selkyns*, are black birds with hooked beaks. Khosadam once lived in the southern Yenisei, but was driven to the north by the hero Alba, since her presence disturbed the peace of the Yeniseians. As the Yeniseians advanced northwards, pushed by some 'people from the mountains,' Alba drove Khosadam still further north to the 'dead island,' where no one can touch her; 'even a Russian cannot thaw her ice.'² No animals except fishes (which have no soul) are at her disposal.

Less evil but still mischievous is Dototam, who owns the mountains. In spite of the ending of the name, Dototam is a masculine being, personified by night-birds, who frighten people with their screaming, and have the bat as their best friend. As long as men do not look for his home Dototam is not harmful.

According to V. I. Anuchin,³ the Ostyaks of the Yenisei believe also in spirits of the forest, and of water, and in the daughters of the latter; the conceptions of all these resemble the Russian conceptions of the owners of forest and water. These spirits were sent down to earth at the same time as Khosadam. Lityss, the spirit of the forest, has fur like a bear, and leaves tracks like a reindeer.

In every tent there is also the spirit protector of the household (*alalt*), who looks after the people at night when they are asleep. This *alalt* is friendly, but there are also *alalt* of wind, and of mice, who are harmful. As protection against these their figures are carved and thrown into the river.

(c) *The soul*.—Every man, according to the philosophy of the Yeniseians, has seven souls. All animals except fishes have one soul, and the bear has two, one an animal soul (*kontol*), the other the soul life possessed by men also (*ulvet*). Man gets most of his souls from his mother, who again acquires them in the course of eating plants and animals before the child is born. His chief soul, *ulvei*, he gets from outside after he is born. The *ulvei* is personified as a minute man, and its picture is always represented on a shaman's coat. Man's souls are situated in his head and heart, but the *ulvei* is outside the man, though near him. When the *ulvei* is sick, his condition reflects on the man, and the shaman has to find and cure the *ulvei*, and occasionally to fight to free it from the power of the bad spirits.

(d) *Death*.—When Khosadam eats the *ulvei*, the man dies. But Alba often appears and frightens

Khosadam so much that her bowels are relaxed and all the souls are set free. A good shaman can achieve the same result. The souls are immortal. In olden days man also was immortal. It is owing to the dog that people die now.

'Long ago when the first old man died, people were weeping, so Ess sent to them a dog with the message that they must not be afraid, but must wrap the old man up in grass and put him up in a tree. But the dog cheated them, and told them to bury the dead man in the ground. Since then all men die, and the dog was punished by being left to live on the earth and eat human excrement'¹ (this is the habit of dogs in the north).

After the death of the man his souls go one after another to the seven underground caves, where are neither sun nor stars, and where in a river a special kind of fish lives, but where only one land-animal, the mammoth, lives. From there the souls return to the earth, entering animals or plants before returning to man. The *ulvei*, however, can go only to the bear. When the bear feels the moment of death approaching, he goes to his cousin, man, and asks him to free the *ulvei*. The man kills the bear, and then makes a little image of the man-bear which he places on some tree. By this act the soul of the bear is freed.

(e) *Burial*.—At the present time the Ostyaks of the Yenisei bury their dead in accordance with the Russian Church regulations; i.e., they dig the grave in the earth, and carry the dead man in a sleigh or in a canoe with his head turned to the front. But in olden days they used to cut a piece out of a tree, lay their dead in the cavity, and then force the piece back into its original position.

(f) *Animal-worship*.—Although the Ostyaks of the Yenisei live almost exclusively on fish, there is no rôle for fish, as there is none for insects, in their shamanistic conceptions. Of trees the birch is connected with shamanism, of flowers the red lily, concerning the origin of which there is the legend that it is a drop of the blood of the hero Alba, shed when he was coming from the north after a severe fight with Khosadam. Although there are no reptiles north of the Middle Tunguska, the serpent (*tikh*), which is the servant of Khosadam, is very often represented. The bat and the mole (*lya*) are also symbols of black magic. The eagle, the diver, the swan, the bear, the reindeer, and the red squirrel are symbols of white magic.

(g) *Idea of the universe*.—To the Ostyaks of the Yenisei the earth is flat, surrounded by seven seas; above it there are seven skies, and beneath seven underground worlds. All these have to be represented on the shaman's drum. Each of the skies has a fire burning—the sun—and also the moon. The Bear constellation is called Kay, i.e. 'elk.' The four stars of the constellation are the feet of the elk, the other three stars represent the hunters. The first star represents the Tunguses, the second the Ostyaks of the Yenisei, and the third the Russians. By means of this constellation the Ostyaks of the Yenisei divide the seasons of the year. Orion is called Seld, and is said to be the head of a reindeer which belonged to the hero Alba. Fire is still respected, though no longer worshipped; no dirt must be thrown into the fire, nor must it be touched with a knife.

(h) *The shaman*.—There may be distinguished two kinds of shamans, dark and light, the latter being the more numerous. The dark medicine-man, or woman, is called *nikkor*, or *banoket*, 'man from the ground.' The smith also is supposed to have a certain amount of supernatural black power. In the tent of the black shaman skins of the mole or the bat are always to be found hanging from the tent-pole. These people shamanize only during the dark nights. They can send a man a disease, but they can also, as well as the white shaman,

¹ V. I. Anuchin, p. 7.

² *Ib.* p. 5.

³ *Ib.* p. 6.

¹ V. I. Anuchin, p. 12.

Radloff, *Aus Sibirien*, and *Die alttürkischen Inschriften der Mongolei*; A. P. Stepanoff, *Yeniseyskaya Guberniya* (Russ.), Petrograd, 1835; Strahlenberg, *Das nord- und östliche Teil von Europa und Asien*; P. I. Tret'yakoff, *Turukhanskii Krai* (Russ.), Petrograd, 1871.

M. A. CZAPLICKA.

OUDH.—See UNITED PROVINCES.

OUT-CASTES (Indian).—1. The out-castes of the early Hindu period.—Caste, in the form which it exhibits at present, is an institution of comparatively recent origin (see art. CASTE, vol. iii. p. 234 f.). The true out-castes, therefore, as we now observe them in India, did not exist in the early Hindu period. But, as the Indo-Aryans consolidated their power in N. India, with the growth of Brahman ascendancy, the theory of the personal purity of the dominant tribes came to be generally accepted. It was held that one region should be regarded as specially pure.

That land created by the gods, which lies between the two divine rivers Sarasvati and Drishadvati, the (sages) call Brahmanvarta. The custom handed down in regular succession (since time immemorial) among the (four chief castes (varṇa) and the mixed (races) of that country, is called the conduct of virtuous men' (*Laws of Manu*, ii. 171. [SEE xxv. (1886) 32]).

The races residing beyond this sacred pale were known to the Hindus by different titles.

(a) *The Mlechchha*.—First come the Mlechchha, or barbarians.

That land where the black antelope naturally roams, one must know to be fit for the performance of sacrifices; (the tract) different from that (is) the country of the Mlechchhas (barbarians) (ib. ii. 23).

There is uncertainty about the modern meaning of the word 'Mlechchha.' Manu contrasted Aryas with Mlechchhas, the latter living in a different country and speaking a different language. The land of the Aryas was the region between the Himalayas and the Vindhya mountains; outside this lay the country of the Mlechchha, or barbarians, i.e. mostly the aboriginal races.

According to this definition, the Deccan was comprised in the Mlechchha country, but other writers, such as Vāsiṣṭha, imposed no such limitations. In classical works the natives of the west were called Mlechchhas, but not those to the east or north. The Chinese, Burmese and other eastern nations are never spoken of as Mlechchhas, but the Muhammadans are often so described. In modern Bengali the word "Mlechchha" is a term of abuse for those who do not adopt the rules of cleanliness (*āchāra*) of the Hindus. In other words, it has lost its original meaning and distinguishes Hindus on the basis of cleanliness. It is still used as a designation for those who are to be held in some difference of opinion from the Hindus, and is applied to such races as the Chinese and Japanese. On the whole, the general view appears to be that the term is confined to the western nations. While those who go to Europe and America are liable to excommunication, voyages to China and Japan involve no such penalties' (*Census of India, 1911, Bengal Report*, i. 229 f.).

It may also be remarked that in the more recent law literature the term received a more liberal interpretation. It was provided that, if a Ksatriya or other Hindu king defeated the Mlechchha and reduced them to the rank of Chāṇḍāla, that is to say, forced them to join the lowest grade of the Hindu social system, that country became fit for sacrifice (*Manubhāṣhiya*, ii. 23, in *IA xli. [1912] 76*). On the whole, the word 'Mlechchha' generally seems to connote speakers of the western languages, like the *Kapōv βαρβαροφωνων* of Homer (*R.* ii. 867).

(b) *The Dasyu*.—The second class of aliens was that of the dark-coloured indigenous races which resisted the advance of the Aryans. They were known as Dasyu, 'destroyers of the good,' Rākṣasa, or Asura, 'demons,' Anāsa, 'noseless.'

The black complexion, ferocious aspect, barbarous habits, rude speech, and savage yells of the Dasyus, and the sudden and furtive attacks which, under the cover of the impenetrable woods, and the obscurity of night, they would make on the encampments of the Aryas, might naturally lead the latter to speak of them, in the highly figurative language of an imaginative people, in the first stages of civilisation, as ghosts or demons; or even to conceive of their hidden assailants as possessed of magical or superhuman powers, or as headed by devils' (*J. Muir, Orig. Sanskrit Texts*, ii. [1860] 4091.).

Modern Hindu writers of the S. Indian school, who oppose the theory of Aryan ascendancy, regard the contrast between the Arya and the Dāsa, or Dasyu, as a question of cult and not of race, Arya meaning a worshipper of Indra and Agni, and Dāsa, or Dasyu, either demons opposed to Indra or people that worshipped these demons (P. T. Srinivas Iyengar, *Life in Ancient India in the Age of the Mantras*, Madras, 1912, p. 11 ff.).

(c) *The Śūdra and the Chāṇḍāla*.—When we come to the period of the law-books, we find that the Śūdra are subjected to various disabilities, and, in particular, are excluded from the right of *connubium* with the Aryas (*Laws of Manu*, iii. 13-19, and *passim*). Below the Śūdra, but holding a definite place in the Aryan community, are the Chāṇḍāla, objects of contempt and disgust. Manu regards the Chāṇḍāla as the offspring of a woman of high caste and a Śūdra (*ib.* x. 12, 16).

A Chāṇḍāla, a village pig, a cock, a dog, a menstruating woman, and a eunuch must not look upon the Brahmanas while they eat' (*ib.* iii. 239). 'The dwellings of Chāṇḍālas and Śvapachas ('dog-cooking,' 'dog-feeder') shall be outside the village, they must be made Apapātras [those who use vessels from which no one else will eat], and their wealth (shall be) dogs and donkeys. Their dress (shall be) the garments of the dead, (they shall eat) their food from broken dishes, black iron (shall be) their ornaments, and they must always wander from place to place. A man who fulfils a religious duty shall not

carry out the corpses (of persons) who have no relatives. . . . By the king's order they shall always execute the criminals, in accordance with the law, and they shall take for themselves the clothes, the beds, and the ornaments of (such) criminals' (*ib.* x. 61-66).

2. *The modern out-castes*.—The modern out-castes fall into two classes: (1) the menial, depressed tribes or castes, who occupy the degraded position which Manu assigns to the Chāṇḍāla, such as the Dom, Bhangi, or Chuhrā (*gg.v.*) of N. India, or the Pariah (*g.v.*) of Madras; and (2) those who for some offence against Hindu social regulations have been expelled from their tribe or caste by the sentence of caste tribunal, known in N. India as the council of five members (*pañcāyat*). The common phrase for such expulsion in N. India is *huggah pāni band karnā*, implying that no member of the group will smoke with him, or take water from his hands. In other words, he is boycotted, no caste-man will hold intercourse with him, and—perhaps the most serious of all penalties, in a land where the marriage of children is a religious duty—he loses his rights of *connubium* and other caste privileges. The offences for which this penalty is prescribed vary in different parts of the country and among different castes and tribes, but the general system is the same throughout India.

In Bengal a man is permanently expelled from caste for grave offences—e.g., if he knowingly and persistently partakes of food with, or drinks water from the hands of, or smokes with, a man of lower caste, or marries a woman of lower caste and refuses to put her away. This extreme penalty has even been imposed when a man has married a woman of his own caste without or against the consent of her relatives. Adultery and engaging in an occupation which is looked on as degrading are sometimes punished in this way. Temporary out-casting is ordered as a punishment for less serious offences, and a suspect is frequently out-casted until he clears himself from a charge of violation of caste usage (*Census of India, 1911, Bengal Report*, i. 467, and see also United Provinces and Oudh Report, i. 337 ff., Panjab Report, i. 420 ff., Baroda Report, i. 251 ff.).

3. *Restoration to caste privileges*.—In the case of temporary expulsion, restoration to caste privileges is secured by abject submission to the caste council and by the infliction of various penalties.

In Bihār the offender has to undergo prescribed penances, such as going on a pilgrimage for an appointed period, bathing in the Ganges and swallowing some of its sand, living on alms for a prescribed time, remaining dumb for a certain time, fasting or eating only one meal in the day, swallowing a mixture of the

five products of the cow—cow-dung, cow's urine, milk, curds, and ghee, or clarified butter. Besides these punishments there are rites of expiation (*prāyaścitta*), including sacrifice, worship of the gods, commonly of Śaṅkaraśaṅkara, making a gift of a cow, a heifer, cash, and cloth to the family priest, feeding Brāhmins and presenting gifts to them, and giving a dinner to the caste-men (*Census of India, 1911, Bengal Report, i. 461*). In the case of this committal of one of the most serious offences, cow-killing, the offender has to measure his length on hands and knees along one bank of the Ganges, from the source to the sea, and to return in this same way along the other bank.

4. Pollution by the touch of out-castes.—The touch or even the shadow of an out-caste falling on a man of high caste causes pollution.

In N. India, when a Dom or a Bhangī is called as a witness in a court of justice, the spectators draw in their skirts to avoid contact with him, and careful Hindus bathe after shaking hands with a European. In parts of the Panjāb where the Hindu element is strong one of the unclean castes is not allowed to draw water from a public well used by high-caste Hindus. In such places Chuhārās and Chamārās have wells of their own. In other parts of the province a Hindu's water-vessel is supposed to be polluted if an out-caste happens to stand on the well platform, or if his bucket-rope is still touching the sides of the well (*Census of India, 1911, Panjāb Report, i. 411 f.*). This feeling is even stronger in S. India. The Nayāḍis, an out-caste tribe, pollute a Brāhmin if they come within the distance of 300 ft. of him; he is obliged to bathe, to renew his sacred thread, and to drink the five products (*pañcagavyam*) of the cow; when these out-castes are passing by, they must announce their presence by shouting lest they cause pollution (L. K. Anantha Krishna Iyer, *The Cōchin Tribes and Castes, Madras, 1909, i. 57*). The approach of an Ulladan within a distance of 64 ft. pollutes Brāhmins and other men of high caste; hence they are forbidden to use the public roads or enter bazaars (*ib. i. 85*). Vallans are obliged to announce their presence by shouting, and, if they visit a temple, they have to stand at a certain distance from the outer walls (*ib. i. 260*). In Bombay the touch or even the shadow of a Holeyā or Cānarese Pariah is thought to defile (*BC xxiii. [1884] 214*). In Khāndesh a Brāhmin clerk will not let a Mahār touch his cart, nor will he take anything from his hands; if the Mahār presents a paper, he has to throw it on the ground; the clerk picks it up, and, when he returns it, he flings it to the Mahār, and will not hand it to him (*ib. xii. [1880] 117*).

Even castes of menial status have similar prejudices. The Pulayans, themselves a cause of pollution, have to bathe five times and let a drop of blood flow from a finger in order to purify themselves after touching a Pariah; and the Kurichans, a low jungle tribe, are polluted by the approach of others of the same grade, and their women require water sanctified by a Brāhmin in order to purify themselves (L. K. Anantha Krishna Iyer, *i. 86*; E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India, Madras, 1909, iv. 126*). Out-castes retaliate even on Brāhmins. The Holeyās say that their quarter must undergo purification if a Brāhmin enters it; otherwise ill will befall them. Pariahs also exclude Brāhmins, and, should one of them enter their ward, water mixed with cow-dung is flung over his head, and he is driven out; in former times, in Mysore, it is said that he was beaten to death (Thurston, *ii. 330 f., vi. 88*).

It is a mistake to believe that these out-castes are conscious of their own degradation.

All traditions represent the Pariahs as a caste which has come down in the world (*Census of India, 1901, Madras Report, i. 172*). Hence many of these tribes possess privileges which they tenaciously assert. 'On certain days [in Madras] they may enter temples which at other times they must not approach. There are several important ceremonial and social observances which they are always called to inaugurate or take some share in, and which, indeed, would be held incomplete and unlucky without them; and at particular seasons there is a festival much resembling the classic Saturnalia, in which, for this time, the relation of slaves and masters is inverted, and the former attack the latter with unstinted satire and abuse, and threaten to strike work unless confirmed in their privileges' (M. J. Walhouse, *JAI iv. [1876] 371*). The Pariahs and Pulayans of Cōchin cherish the memory of their former greatness, and regard themselves as the original owners of the soil; in some temples the Holeyās have the right of entry on three days in the year; one of them sits beside the image of Śiva on his elephant and fans the idol during the annual procession; a Pariah annually performs the rite of the 'sacred marriage,' with Egathāl, the tutelary goddess of Madras, and ties the marriage hodge round the neck of her image; Pariahs pull the idol cars at processions without causing any pollution, and they are employed to decide boundary disputes by walking along this line with pots of water on their heads (L. K. Anantha Krishna Iyer, *i. 69*; Thurston, *ii. 332, vi. 83*).

This association of out-castes with religious rites is based on the theory that they are autochthones, that they thus understand the proper modes of propitiating the local godlings, and hence in many parts of India they act as their priests. The same belief accounts for the fact that they are often called in to perform the rites of inauguration and investiture of a Rājā of high caste, as in the case

of the Halbas of the Central Provinces (A. E. Nelson, *Raipur Gazetteer, 1909, i. 102*; cf. the customs of the Bhil, *ERE ii. 554 f.*).

5. Measures of reform.—The attention of sympathetic Europeans has for a long time been attracted to the almost intolerable position of out-castes in India.

W. Ward remarks that the rules of the *Sāstras* or Hindu religious and social regulations regarding the Sūdras of Bengal 'are so unjust and inhuman, that every benevolent person must feel the greatest indignation at the Hindoo lawgivers, and rejoice that Providence has placed so great a portion of this people under the equitable laws of the British Government' (*A View of the History, Literature, and Religion of the Hindoos*, Serampore, 1818, i. 63). J. A. Dubois writes: 'In fact, these Pariahs are the horn slaves of India; and had I to choose between the two sad fates of being a slave in one of our colonies or a Pariah here, I should undoubtedly prefer the former' (*Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1906, p. 49).

Recent political agitation among the educated classes has aroused public attention to the problem of 'the untouchables,' as they are popularly called, and their position is logically regarded as incompatible with those theories of the freedom and equality of man which are in the air at present. A more practical reason has strengthened these considerations—the high-caste Hindu sees that many of them, in order to escape their degraded condition, have sought relief by adopting Christianity or Islām. A movement to ameliorate their condition has been recently started in W. India.

'The attitude of the educated section of the higher castes towards the despised classes has, within the decade, undergone a remarkable change. Theosophists, Brahmo Samajists, Arya Samajists, Prarthana Samajists, high class Hindus and Christian missionaries are all taking an active interest in their welfare. The work of the Depressed Class Mission in Bombay and other parts of Western India is progressing. The untouchables are being touched. The stigma is being removed. The first step has been taken, and there is no doubt that this movement now going on for their elevation is bound to succeed. In the Baroda State H. H. the Maharaja Sayajirao Gaekwad is a keen sympathiser with the lot of these poor people. Schools and Boarding Houses have been opened for their education. Dheds, Bhangis and Chamars can now enter the precincts of Courts and Government Offices, like other castes, and even the public service is thrown open to them' (*Census of India, 1911, Baroda Report, i. 262*).

Up to the present this movement has not made much progress in N. and S. India. It has to encounter the confirmed prejudices of a most conservative priestly body, and, though it is probable that, the question once having been raised, their position may become less degraded than it is at present, it is premature to expect that the process of amelioration will be rapid.

LITERATURE.—This has been quoted in the article.

W. CROOKE.

OUTLAW.—The extent of the area throughout which the social feelings of early man are operative differs in different cases. In some instances they scarcely cross the threshold of his family-group, while in others they reach beyond the boundaries of his clan or even those of his tribe. To him the limits of the group, clan, or tribe seem to form the ring-fence of all possible social life, outside of which lies a world peopled by beings whom he fears and hates as his deadly enemies. Not only the welfare but the very existence of the community of which he is a member depends on the maintenance of the peace which subsists within it. This peace is safeguarded by custom, which is accepted without question and without explanation as the only rule of conduct; and custom is obeyed, in the first place, by reason of this acceptance, and, in the second place, by reason of the conviction that some supernatural power, force, or influence will bring disaster not only upon the man who disregards its bidding, but upon the community to which he belongs. It follows that whoever breaks the peace commits an offence which is at once secular and religious. Sometimes it is the former, sometimes it is the latter, element to which primitive notions regarding the essentials

of criminality assign more importance.¹ In both cases, however, the fate of such an evil-doer is the same. There is no place for him within the community which he has imperilled and polluted. He must be slain or expelled from the company of his fellows.

Frequently expulsion results not only in the civil, but in the actual, death of the outcast.

Among the Masai, if a man is convicted of a particular offence several times, and constitutes himself a public nuisance, he is proclaimed an outlaw, his property is confiscated, he is turned away with blows from every settlement or village, and, unless he can find friends in some stranger tribe, he must die of starvation.² A similar fate awaits the Zulu who has committed a premeditated murder;³ and in early Arabia a man who had killed one of his kindred was either put to death by his own people or became an outlaw, forced to take refuge in an alien group.⁴ In Albania the murderer's house is burned, his movables are confiscated, his immovables are made over to his victim's representatives, and he and his family must flee the country.⁵ In the Nissan Islands criminals are expelled from the village or district to which they belong, and their houses and lands are forfeited;⁶ the Seri Indians outlaw any of their members who are guilty of habitual idleness, of associating with aliens, or of failing in certain of the tests imposed upon would-be bridegrooms.⁷ Among the Wyandots it is the duty of every tribesman to kill the outlaw; and the Bedáwin of Hadramaut permit the slaying of the man who has been banished, after an interval of three days.⁸

Sometimes a man will submit to outlawry rather than face the death which is the punishment of persistent disobedience to tribal custom,⁹ or will himself renounce his clansman's rights and family ties in order to prosecute his vengeance the more readily.¹⁰

Sometimes an offender is outlawed for crimes committed upon persons other than the members of his group.

Thus, among the Barea and Kunína the cattle-thief who robs a friendly tribesman, and refuses to make the reparation which the elders of his own tribe have demanded of him, is expelled by his fellows, his dwelling is broken up, his property is taken from him, and his friends and relatives must share in his fate.¹¹

So, too, when the murderer of a member of a neighbouring tribe learns that an avenging expedition is on his track, if he takes to flight, he does so 'in the full knowledge of being ostracised for ever.'¹²

We find instances in which the kindred of a

homicide escape responsibility for his crime by withdrawing their protection from him.¹

Among the Circassians on the Kuban, the man-slayer for whom his clan refuse to pay compensation, and whom they abandon to the vengeance of his victim's representatives, must flee the country and wander a homeless fugitive (*abraik*), until he either makes his peace with the avengers or finds death at their hands.²

Elsewhere the same principle is applied to the case of the son for whom his father has paid many fines,³ and to that of the spendthrift for whose debts each branch of the family is legally liable. He is, says W. Marsden,⁴ sent forth as a deer to the woods, no longer to be considered as entitled to the privileges of society. It may be noted that to meet or have intercourse with an outlaw was regarded by the Babylonians as a sin.⁵

In the early Aryan community death was the only penalty; and, if the criminal could not be taken, he was expelled from it, to be treated like a wild beast, and, like a wild beast, to be hunted down and slain.⁶ This conception ruled in Vedie⁷ and Germanic⁸ antiquity, and, in the opinion of Schrader, it underlies the *ἀντιπλ* of the Greeks, which originally signified the position of the man who could be slain without penalty or payment or compensation.¹⁰ The case of the *homo sacer* was similar. Fallen under the wrath of the gods, whom he had offended by his crime, he was expelled from all human society; his goods were confiscated, and it was open to any one to slay him. He was not a mere enemy, and, as such, without rights. He was an abomination in the sight of gods and men, to be shunned like a leper, and to be cast out to herd with the wild beasts.¹¹

In ancient Gaul refusal to submit to the judgments of the druids was punished with outlawry;¹²

¹ See below as to outlawry among the Irish and Anglo-Saxons.

² Stahl, cited by E. Kuilscher, 'Untersuchungen über das primitive Strafrecht,' *ZVRW* xvi. (1903) 423. See also, regarding Caucasian tribes, the authorities cited by A. H. Post, *Grundriss der ethnologischen Jurisprudenz*, Oldenburg and Leipzig, 1894-95, i. 332-354.

³ A. Trollope, *S. Africa*, London, 1878, II. 301 (Kaffirs).

⁴ *The Hist. of Sumatra*, London, 1783, p. 207.

⁵ See art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Babylonian).

⁶ O. Schrader, *Reallexikon der indogermanischen Altertums-kunde*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 835.

⁷ H. Zimmer, *Altindisches Leben*, Berlin, 1879, p. 185. From the same root as *parádrj*, the outcast of the Vedas, is formed a series of terms, among which is the English 'wretch,' which clearly indicates what was the impression of the lot of the outlaw made upon the mind of primitive man (Schrader, *loc. cit.*; cf. J. Grimm, *Deutsche Rechtsalterthümer*³, Göttingen, 1881, p. 396 f.).

⁸ See below.

⁹ See art. ATIMIA.

¹⁰ Schrader, *loc. cit.*; see also CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Greek), §§ 4, 6 (5). B. W. Leist (*Græco-italische Rechtsgeschichte*, Jena, 1884, pp. 326 f., 331, 403) observes that the Greeks distinguished between *φόνος ἐκούριος* and *φόνος ἀκούριος*. In the former case, when the homicide had fled beyond the reach of the avenger, the community broke off all relations with him, as having brought pollution upon it and offended its gods. As in the case of the Roman *aqua et ignis interdictio*, his flight was declared an *ἀκούριος*, upon which followed the confiscation of his property. In the latter case he must absent himself from his country only until he has made his peace with the avenger and with the angry gods. See GE³, pt. III., *The Dying God*, London, 1911, p. 69 f.

¹¹ R. von Ihering, *Geist des römischen Rechts*, I. 4, Leipzig, 1878, p. 279 ff. This condition was the consequence not of all but of certain specified crimes—ill-treatment of parents, the betrayal of a client by his patron, and the ploughing up of ancient boundary-stones; and to these the later law added certain other offences. Ihering observes that banishment was not a punishment, but a means of escaping punishment which the Romans left open to the accused until judgment. The community, to free itself of all responsibility to the gods, must renounce all intercourse with the outcast. This was the meaning of the *aqua et ignis interdictio*. It was not mere political banishment, but operated as a purification. Fire and water are the emblems of purity, and were employed in every act constituting or representing a religious union—e.g., sacrifice, marriage, the making of a treaty, etc.—and they were denied to the criminals, not in order to signify a refusal of the necessities of life, but as symbols of the purity of the common life, which he would sully by his use (*ib. p.* 283). See also CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Roman).

¹² Caesar, *de Bell. Gall.* vi. 13; see CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Celtic).

¹ See art. LAW (Primitive); and J. G. Frazer, *Psyche's Task, a Discourse concerning the Influence of Superstition on the Growth of Institutions*, London, 1909, p. 791, where this view is stated that the treatment of homicides was originally conceived as a purification; and that it was when that purification took the form of laying the manslayer under restraint, banishing him from the country, or putting him to death in order to appease the victim's ghost, that it became for all practical purposes indistinguishable from punishment.

² S. L. and H. Hinde, *The Last of the Masai*, London, 1901, p. 108.

³ J. Macdonald, 'Manners, Customs, Superstitions, and Religions of South African Tribes,' *JAI* xx. [1891] 119.

⁴ W. Robertson Smith, *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia*², London, 1903, p. 25.

⁵ R. Daresse, 'Les anciennes Coutumes albanaises,' *Nouvelle Revue historique de droit français et étranger*, iv. [1903] 491.

⁶ F. Sorge, 'Die Nissan Inseln im Bismarck Archipel,' in S. R. Steinmetz, *Rechtsverhältnisse von eingeborenen Völkern in Afrika und Ozeanien*, Berlin, 1903, p. 419.

⁷ W. J. McGee, 'The Seri Indians,' *17 REW* [1899], pt. I. p. 278^a.

⁸ E. Westermarck, *MI* I. 178, citing J. W. Powell, 'Wyandot Government,' *1 REW* [1881], p. 63, and A. von Wrede, *Reise in Hadramaut*, ed. H. von Maltzan, Brunswick, 1870, p. 51.

⁹ E. M. Curr, *The Australian Race*, 4 vols., Melbourne, 1880-87, I. 61 f.; Spencer-Gillen³, p. 495.

¹⁰ That is the case of the *kenaima*, among the Macusis and other tribes of British Guiana. He severs all ties of family and clan; and from the moment when he leaves his village it is the duty of every one to slay him (R. Schomburgk, *Reisen in Britisch Guiana in 1840-44*, Leipzig, 1847-48, I. 155, 323 ff.; E. F. Im Thurn, *Among the Indians of Guiana*, London, 1883, p. 329 ff.; W. H. Brett, *Indian Tribes of Guiana*, do. 1868, p. 357 f.).

¹¹ W. Munzinger, *Ostafrikanische Studien*, Schaffhausen, 1864, p. 470.

¹² W. E. Roth, *Ethnological Studies among the N.W. Central Queensland Aborigines*, Brisbane and London, 1897, p. 140. It may be that by 'ostracised' Roth means no more than mere avoidance. Avoidance is a by no means infrequent punishment, and is in use, e.g., among the Eskimos of Boothia Felix (John Ross, *Appendix to the Narr. of a Second Voyage in Search of a North-West Passage*, London, 1835, p. 11).

and in the laws of early Ireland the outlaw is defined, and the conditions are prescribed by compliance with which his family could be exonerated from his guilt, and subject to which he could be slain with impunity.¹

Among the Germanic peoples outlawry in its oldest form may be described as expulsion from human society to keep company with the beasts of the forest. The outlaw was named 'the wolf' (*wargus*), and was to be treated as the wolf, the enemy of human kind. He could be slain by any one without penalty, and, frequently, a price was set upon his head.² But, unless caught red-handed, his life was safe until the close of the tribunal which had pronounced judgment upon him. He had thus an opportunity of escape. No one might give him food or shelter, and, according to the older law, his goods were confiscated, and his very memory was blotted out by the burning down of his dwelling.³ Thus, in its earlier forms, outlawry included all punishments, while, in its later modifications, each punishment had its separate and independent place.⁴ Even in the former case something was abated of the harshness of the law, either by the interposition of arbitrators or by voluntary submission to a punishment; and, when it became permissible to give to the outlaw the assistance necessary to enable him to quit the country, banishment gradually took the place of the heavier penalty. A milder form of outlawry consisted in a three years' banishment, upon his return from which the exile was restored to his place in the community. If, however, he did not pay the compensation to which he had been adjudged liable, or if he had committed a fresh breach of the peace during the term of his banishment, he fell under the rigours of the old law.⁵ In later times expulsion of the evil-doer from the country was replaced by expulsion from the district ('Mark,' 'Gau') to which he belonged, while, under the influence of Christianity, not only did the Church introduce a form of expulsion, which a secular tribunal had no power to inflict, but secular was conjoined with ecclesiastical expulsion, and pilgrimage to holy places, where he could be cleansed of his guilt, was imposed upon the exile.⁶ Gradually the older system yielded to a new order of things, under which almost all crimes could be atoned for by a money payment.⁷

It was provided by one of the laws of King Edward that the homicide's relatives should escape responsibility for his crime if they forsook him, refused to pay for him, and ever afterwards refused him food or drink.⁸

It is of interest to note that, until the law of

¹ The provisions of the *Book of Aicill (Ancient Laws and Institutes of Ireland)*, Dublin and London, 1865-79, iii. 381 regarding outlawry are quoted in art. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Celtic). See also H. S. Maine, *The Early Hist. of Institutions*, new ed., London, 1890, p. 174; E. O'Curry, *On the Manners and Customs of the Ancient Irish*, ed. W. K. Sullivan, 3 vols., London, 1873, i. p. cxx.

² W. E. Wilda, *Das Strafrecht der Germanen*, Halle, 1842, p. 279 f.; Grimm, p. 733; K. Maurer, *Vorlesungen über altindische Rechtsgeschichte*, Leipzig, 1910, v. 136 ff.; H. Brunner, *Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte*, do. 1837, i. 163. In Iceland the law sanctioned and favoured a sort of war of extermination against the outlaw. Whoever met him and could master him without danger to himself must either slay him or give him over to be slain. The community paid a price to the slayer or captor, and restored to its peace the outlaw who had slain three other wretches like himself (Wilda, p. 282 f.; cf. Maurer, i. 141, 143). The danger to society which results from neglect to take severe measures against those whom it has expelled is illustrated by the case of the Cocina Indians, who are neither a tribe nor a caste, but a band of outlaws, who live by robbing the other inhabitants of the Goajira Peninsula (F. A. A. Simons, 'An Exploration of the Goajira Peninsula,' *Proc. of the Royal Geographical Society*, vii. [1885] 787).

³ Wilda, pp. 283-290. ⁴ Ib. p. 296 f.; Brunner, i. 173.

⁵ Wilda, pp. 297-301. ⁶ Grimm, p. 737.

⁷ Wilda, pp. 270, 320.

⁸ *Ancient Laws and Institutes of England*, London, 1840, p. 105.

Scotland was modified by statutes passed in 1649 and 1661,¹ the man who had been proclaimed rebel for a criminal offence could be slain by any one with impunity, and that his relatives were forbidden to 'resett, supple, or mantaine or do favors to "him," under pane of deid and confiscation of their movable property.²

LITERATURE.—In addition to the works cited in the article, see artt. BANISHMENT and ETHICS AND MORALITY. As to the position of the outlaw in Northern antiquity, see *The Story of Grettir the Strong*, tr. from the Icelandic by Eiríkr Magnússon and William Morris, London, 1900, and the tr. by G. W. Dasent, entitled *The Saga of Burnt Njal*, Edinburgh, 1861, and *The Story of Giskli the Outlaw*, do. 1866.

P. J. HAMILTON-GRIERSON.

OVERSOUL.—'Oversoul' is Emerson's term for the absolute spiritual reality of the universe. The word in this sense was new with Emerson; the idea which he sought to express through it was almost as old as human thought. The early influences which brought Emerson to his doctrine of the oversoul, which in his twenty-fourth year he calls 'the Universal Mind' (*Journal*, ii. 217), were the writings of Coleridge, Wordsworth, Carlyle, and Goethe. Somewhat later he took up the study of Plato and Plotinus with intense enthusiasm. They had a profound influence on his development, and it was probably their doctrine of the soul that suggested to Emerson his term 'oversoul.'

Plotinus, following Plato's suggestion, in the *Timæus*, of a world-soul, presents as a central feature of his philosophy a vast, eternal, all-inclusive soul of the universe, which is at once both a one and a many. It is the unity in one of all the souls that are and of everything that can be called soul in the entire universe, visible and invisible. It is the overflow of the ineffable godhead, flooding out and coming to expression in the myriad forms of man and nature.

'The uncreated ground' of Meister Eckhart and 'the bottomless abyss' of Jacob Boehme also had a positive influence in the formation of Emerson's view of the oversoul, and still more important was the influence of German transcendental philosophy, especially as expounded by Fichte and Schelling.

'There is,' according to Fichte, 'one animating life, one living reason, of which all that seems to us to exist and live is but a modification, definition, variety and form' (*Grundzüge des gegenwärtigen Zeitalters*, Berlin, 1806, lect. ii.). 'One eternal energy separates itself into our consciousness, flows forth as the fountain of being, and remains even in its time-stream always one undivided energy' (ib. lect. iv.). 'One divine life wells up in our consciousness and appears in a world of infinite variety and change' (*Anweisung zum seligen Leben*, Berlin, 1806, lect. iv.).

With even less restraint and greater poetic exuberance, Schelling traced everything up to the absolute, the ground and matrix, both of finite mind and of external nature, which fit each to each like the two poles of a magnet. This absolute is the immense, brooding, organizing life, sleeping in the plant, dreaming in the animal, and waking into full consciousness in man, and revealing itself in ever-heightening forms first in an embryonic way in nature and then in conscious forms through history, art, and religion—a view which Coleridge interpreted in his *Eolian Harp*:

'And what if all of animated nature
Be but organic harps diversely framed,
That tremble into thought, as o'er them sweeps
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze,
At once the Soul of each, and God of all?' (44 ff.).

Emerson's doctrine of the oversoul runs through all his writings both in prose and in verse. It underlies his interpretation of nature, his conception of genius, his faith in man, and his unfailing assurance in the testimony of the soul. His most complete, though still highly poetic, interpretation is

¹ 1649, c. 98; 1661, c. 217 (*The Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland*, ed. T. Thomson, Edinburgh, 1814-76, vi. pt. ii. p. 173, vii. 203).

² D. Hume, *Com. on the Law of Scotland respecting Crimes*, Edinburgh, 1844, i. 187 ff.; 1540, c. 14; 1692, c. 65 (*Acts of Parliaments of Scotland*, ii. 372, iii. 674).

given in his essay, *The Over-soul*, first published in 1841. In this essay the oversoul is called 'the Universal Mind,' 'Supreme Mind,' 'Spirit,' 'Deity,' 'the Eternal One,' 'that Unity within which every man's particular being is contained and made one with all other,' 'the common Heart,' 'the Soul of the whole,' 'the deep Power in which we live.' Like Fichte's 'absolute ego' and Schelling's 'absolute principle,' like 'the universal reason' of Coleridge and 'the infinite Divine Presence' of Wordsworth, the oversoul, in Emerson's view, is an immense spiritual environment of the soul, a vast background presence impinging on the inner border of every personal life, so that man is a veritable 'façade of a temple,' which opens inward into the infinite.

When this presence 'breathes through his [man's] intellect, it is genius; when it breathes through his will, it is virtue; when it flows through his affection, it is love' (*The Over-soul* [Works, ii. 255]). 'It arches over them like a temple, this unity of thought in which every heart beats with nobler sense of power and duty, and thinks and acts with unusual solemnity' (*ib.* p. 260).

He accounts for the genius of Michael Angelo and other artists in the well-known lines:

'The passive Master lent his hand
To the vast soul that o'er him planned'

(*The Problem*, l. 471. [Works, ix. 17]).

One universal sea of life surges into all individual inlets, 'as the water of the globe is all one sea, and, truly seen, its tide is one' (*Over-soul*, p. 276). 'The waters of the great deep have ingress and egress to the soul' (*The Intellect* [Works, ii. 319]), and its 'influx' makes men wise beyond their own private knowledge, and good beyond the narrow range of their human deeds—'the soul is superior to its knowledge, wiser than any of its works' (*Over-soul*, p. 271). Silence, the hush of all that is of the private and exclusive self, is essential to the inflow of the higher truth into the soul. A man must learn to 'listen greatly.'

'Silence is a solvent that destroys [limiting] personality, and gives us leave to be great and universal' (*Intellect*, p. 319). According to Emerson's doctrine, there is no impenetrable wall, 'no screen or ceiling,' between the individual soul and the oversoul.

'There is no bar or wall in the soul, where man . . . ceases, and God . . . begins. The walls are taken away. We lie open on one side to the depths of spiritual nature' (*Over-soul*, p. 255).

'Draw, if thou canst, the mystic line
Severing rightly his from thine,
Which is human, which divine'

(*Worship*, l. 21 ff. [Works, ix. 237]).

'Ineffable is the union of man and God in every act of the soul. . . . For ever and ever the influx of this better and universal self is new and unsearchable' (*Over-soul*, p. 274). 'Thoughts come into our minds by avenues which we never left open.' 'If he [man] have found his centre, the Deity will shine through him' (*ib.* p. 263 f.). Self-reliance is safe because it is soul-reliance, and soul-reliance is safe because it is a 'trust which carries God with it and so hath already the whole future in the bottom of the heart' (*ib.* p. 278).

Like his masters, Plato and Plotinus, and his German and English inspirers, Emerson thinks of this oversoul, this universal reason, as the interpenetrating life and power and intelligence in nature, which is 'the perennial miracle' of spirit. Nature is alive through the same oversoul which is in us. At the centre of nature, as at the centre of man's soul, one supreme mind is actively present, is showing its unvarying laws, and is weaving the web which partly conceals and partly reveals the hidden-working spirit. There is one common, penetrating pulse of nature and spirit—'the earth-beat, sea-beat, heart-beat, which makes the tune to which the sun rolls, and the globule of blood, and the sap of trees' (*Representative Men* [Works, iv. 135]).

Since Emerson's day there have been many interpretations of ultimate reality in terms of oversoul. William James concludes that 'continuous and continuous' with our personal selves there is 'a wider Self through which saving experiences come'

(*Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 508, 515). R. M. Bucke calls this ultimate reality 'cosmic consciousness,' and gives many illustrations of its influence (see his interesting book, *Cosmic Consciousness*). F. W. H. Myers worked out in much detail a doctrine of the subliminal self, from which, he holds, come inspirations, revelations, and a vast number of extraordinary experiences and manifestations (*Human Personality*). There are, furthermore, in contemporary thought, many popular varieties of oversoul doctrine.

LITERATURE.—Plato, *Timæus*; Plotinus, *Enneads* (Emerson read Thomas Taylor's tr., London, 1787); Eckhart, *Predigten*, ed. F. Pfeiffer, Stuttgart, 1857; Works of Jacob Behmen (Boehme) (Emerson read the so-called Law ed., in 4 vols., London, 1764-81); J. G. Fichte, *Popular Works*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, 1889; F. W. J. Schelling, *Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur*, Leipzig, 1797, and *Von der Weltseele*, Hamburg, 1798; S. T. Coleridge, *Works*; W. Wordsworth, *Poems*; R. W. Emerson, *Complete Works*, Riverside ed., 12 vols., London, 1894-99, *Journals*, 10 vols., Boston, 1909-14; W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, London, 1902; R. M. Bucke, *Cosmic Consciousness*, Philadelphia, 1905; F. W. H. Myers, *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death*, 2 vols., London, 1903.

RUFUS M. JONES.

OXFORD MOVEMENT.—The name is given to the religious revival which began at Oxford in 1833. Its formal beginning is held to be a sermon on 'National Apostasy' preached in the University Church at Oxford on 14th July 1833 by John Keble. Later in July there was a meeting at Hadleigh in Suffolk, where H. J. Rose was rector, at which the only resident Oxford Fellow present was R. H. Froude; but far more important were the *Tracts for the Times* by *Members of the University of Oxford*, which began in September 1833, the first three Tracts being written by J. H. Newman. Keble, Froude, and Newman were all Fellows of Oriel College, though Keble had ceased to reside regularly in Oxford ten years before.

1. Causes of the Movement.—The immediate causes were the dangers threatening the English Church from four quarters.

(1) The most obvious danger, though the least serious, was political. The Established position of the English Church seemed threatened. In 1828 the Test and Corporation Acts, in 1829 the penal laws against Roman Catholics, had been repealed. In 1832 the great Reform Bill had become law, and the Whigs who had championed all these measures were in office supported by the emancipated Roman Catholics and the Dissenters. The Church as a whole had been allied to the Tories, and most observers imagined that the old order in the Church as well as in the State was doomed. In 1833 the Irish bishoprics were reduced from twenty to ten (the Church of Ireland was then Established); the Bill for their reduction was before the House of Lords when Keble preached his famous sermon; the interference with the Irish sees appeared an earnest of what might happen to the English in their turn. The opposition of the bishops and clergy to reform had made them singularly unpopular in the great towns. By the isolation of this cause the Movement can be made to appear almost wholly political, as a mere rally in favour of the Tory party, or of the old relations between Church and State.

(2) A second danger was from what is called Erastianism (*q.v.*), though it was not the teaching of Erastus but of the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes—the view that the final authority in religious belief was neither the Bible nor the Church, but the State. Such a view was a commonplace of Whig thinkers, and since the action of the State at the Revolution of 1689, when six English bishops (including the archbishop of Canterbury) and one Irish bishop had been deprived, without any canonical sentence, the Church had inclined more and more in its prac-

tice in an Erastian direction. The strongest teaching against Erastianism came from the Nonjurors (*q.v.*), and it is significant that an edition of the works of Charles Leslie, one of the wisest and most learned of the Nonjurors, had been issued from the University Press, Oxford, in 1832. Keble in his sermon had spoken strongly against State tyranny over the Church, and a strong protest against such a relation of Church and State marked the Movement from its beginning. This view, while it made an appeal to the more spiritual of the Protestant Dissenters, was unlikely to commend the Movement to Whig ministers.

(3) The most vital and the most subtle danger was 'Liberalism.' This was the spirit which had burst out in the French Revolution, but was at work in 1833 in the universities of Germany, unknown to most Englishmen. H. J. Rose had called attention to it in sermons at Cambridge in 1825, when he was answered, strangely enough, by E. B. Pusey. In England in 1833 Liberalism was the view that education, civilization, and reason would cure the evils and sorrows of mankind. Religion, in this view, was apt to be regarded as 'the rubbish of superstition.' By Liberalism the followers of the Oxford Movement meant 'the tendencies of modern thought to destroy the basis of revealed religion, and ultimately of all that can be called religion at all' (Church, *Occasional Papers*, ii. 386; Liberalism is analyzed most carefully in H. S. Holland, *Personal Studies*, London, n.d., pp. 76-82, and by J. H. Newman, in the *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, Note A, 'Liberalism,' added to the 1865 and all subsequent editions).

(4) The fourth danger which in part evoked the Movement was the wide-spread ignorance of the principles for which the English Church stood. Thomas Sikes, rector of Guilsborough, foretold a few years before the Movement began that the general suppression of the truth of the doctrine of the Holy Catholic Church would 'have its reprisals.' The effects of these, he added, 'I even dread to contemplate, especially if it comes suddenly' (*Letters and Correspondence of J. H. Newman*, ii. 484). Certainly one object of the *Tracts for the Times* was 'to avert the danger of people becoming Romanists from ignorance of Church principles' (Church, *Oxford Movement*, p. 241), and the *Tracts* were directed to be advertised as 'Tracts . . . on the privileges of the Church and against Popery and Dissent.' This fact is further borne out by the Preface to Keble's sermon on 'National Apostasy.' The Movement had its origin in part in the anti-Roman feelings stirred by the Emancipation Act of 1829.

These were the immediate causes. There were others which reached further back, prominent among them the horror of the French Revolution which had caused men to look with more favour on the institutions of the past, the Romantic movement in literature headed by Sir Walter Scott, and the Latitudinarian teaching of the Oxford Noetics, whose arguments drove men to sound their position and so forced them to re-discover the foundations of the position claimed by the English Church—viz. the Fathers and the Councils and belief in the Holy Catholic Church. Yet another cause operating in the same direction was the teaching of Charles Lloyd (1784-1829), bishop of Oxford and Regius Professor of Divinity. As professor in 1825 the bishop gave a course of lectures to graduates on the sources of the Prayer Book, and showed its indebtedness to the Latin forms in the Roman service-books. According to an Oxford tradition, breviaries were brought from the Bodleian Library and shown to the bishop's class. Newman, Froude, and Pusey all attended these lectures, which set them to study sympathetically the devotions of

the pre-Reformation and the primitive Church. William Palmer's *Origines Liturgicae* (Oxford, 1832), which owed something to Lloyd, turned men's attention in the same direction. Lloyd's death in 1829 was a heavy loss, for, had he lived, he would undoubtedly have exercised great influence on the Movement. The distinction drawn by Newman, in Tract 90, between the practical and formal teaching of Rome he had learnt from Lloyd.

2. History.—The traditional position had always been held before the Oxford Movement by those who were called since Queen Anne's day 'the High Churchmen,' but it had been obscured by the Latitudinarianism of the previous century. It had suffered from its supposed connexion with Jacobitism; it was held to a man by the Nonjurors. It still had distinguished representatives in 1833, in the little knot of men whom successive archbishops of Canterbury (Manners-Sutton [1805-28] and Howley [1828-48]) had trusted, especially Hugh James Rose (1795-1838) and a devout layman Joshua Watson (1771-1855). To the energies of this group was due the founding of the National Society for the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Church of England in 1811 and the Church Building Society in 1817, and of a monthly Church review, *The British Magazine*, in 1832; and recent researches tend to show the latent strength of this body of Churchmanship, which, though not so prominent as the Evangelical school, in time helped to swell the force of the Oxford Movement. The *Tracts for the Times* roused Churchmen and rallied them to the old standards, and from 1833 until 1839 the Movement gained ground rapidly. This was due in part to the moral and intellectual attraction of its leaders. John Keble, 'the true and primary author of the Movement' (Newman, *Apologia*, p. 75, ed. Wilfrid Ward, p. 119), had made his reputation as a scholar at Oxford before he was twenty-one. In 1827 he had published, anonymously, *The Christian Year*, a volume of religious poetry which won immediate success. John Henry Newman was second only to Keble. The *Tracts for the Times* were his idea, and many of them were from his pen. His books, pamphlets, and, above all, his sermons, were among the most compelling forces on the side of the Movement. Richard Hurrell Froude, originally a pupil of Keble, brought him and Newman together. Froude died young, in 1836, but his ideas and influence as manifested in his diary and letters, printed after his death, had their effect on the revival. Edward Bouverie Pusey joined the Movement in 1834 with a Tract on 'Fasting' (*Tracts for the Times*, no. 18). His personal holiness and profound learning were to have an enormous influence on the later development of the Movement, after Newman had gone.

Pusey had been, like Keble, Newman, and Froude, a Fellow of Oriel, but became Regius Professor of Hebrew and Canon of Christ Church in 1828. Each of these was a scholar, and each (save Pusey) had poetry in his veins; but, above all, each was a man of deep religious earnestness. Keble and Pusey had been brought up in the traditional High Church school; Froude had learnt that faith from Keble; Newman, originally an Evangelical and later inclined to 'Liberalism,' had become a High Churchman from Keble's teaching mediated through Froude.

From 1833 to 1843 Newman's influence was supreme in the Movement, and it was felt not merely through his published writings, but also through his sermons preached in St. Mary's, Oxford, of which he had been vicar since 1828. They have been described by various writers, by none more carefully than by John Campbell Shairp, himself a Presbyterian:

'After hearing those sermons you might come away still not believing the tenets peculiar to the High Church system; but you would be harder than most men, if you did not feel more than ever ashamed of coarseness, selfishness, worldliness, if you did not feel the things of faith brought closer to the soul' (*Studies in Poetry and Philosophy*, Edinburgh, 1868, p. 278).

Thus, 'while men were reading and talking about the Tracts, they were hearing the sermons,' and 'the sermons created a moral atmosphere, in which men judged the questions in debate' (Church, *Oxford Movement*, p. 130). The appeal of the Movement to Christian antiquity and to the great Anglican divines was given practical illustration by the *Library of the Fathers*, begun in 1838 under the joint editorship of Keble, Newman, and Pusey, and by the *Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology* in 1841, directed by a committee of which the same three leaders were members. The Movement from 1836 had a quarterly magazine, *The British Critic*, at first partly edited by Newman, who became sole editor in 1838. He resigned in 1841 and was succeeded by Thomas Mozley.

From 1833 to 1839 was the period of the Movement's great success. Recruits poured in: at Oxford among the younger men it numbered R. I. Wilberforce, Charles Marriott, R. W. Church, J. B. Mozley, Frederic Rogers (later Lord Blackford), Isaac Williams, and W. J. Copeland, each of whom has left a name behind him. But its swift success was a danger. It attracted minds of a different temper from those of the original followers, men who 'cut into it at an angle' and 'whose direction was unquestionably Romeward almost from the beginning' (Newman, *Apologia*, p. 278, ed. Ward, p. 260). Among them were distinguished names: William George Ward, once a follower of Arnold, F. W. Faber, Frederick Oakeley, J. B. Morris, and J. D. Dalgairns. This party gained control of *The British Critic* and forced Newman in the Romeward direction.

In 1839 he first felt a doubt as to the tenability of the Anglican position. Between July and November 1841 this doubt was increased by his study of the history of Arianism, the establishment in connexion with the Protestant State Church of Prussia of an Anglican bishopric in Jerusalem, and the storm of episcopal censure which burst upon him on account of his Tract no. 90, which he had published earlier in that year. The Tract was a comment upon certain passages in the XXXIX. Articles; it applied the strictly historical method to them and showed that much of their language was not directed against the formal teaching of the Roman Church. The honesty of the interpretation would hardly be questioned now, and even in that day old-fashioned High Churchmen such as W. F. Hook of Leeds, G. Moberly of Winchester, and William Palmer came forward in Newman's defence. But popular clamour was aroused, and the effect on Newman was immediate and disastrous. In 1842 he retired from Oxford to live in almost monastic seclusion at Littlemore. In September 1843 he resigned his benefice of St. Mary's and preached his last sermon as an Anglican (the famous 'Parting of Friends') at Littlemore on 25th September. A month later he retired into lay communion with the English Church and performed no more ministerial acts.

Meanwhile the opposition to the Movement had been growing. The Evangelicals had early in its course denounced it as being a return to superstition and popery, the Liberals under T. Arnold had attacked it fiercely on the same ground (see Arnold's art. in *The Edinburgh Review*, cxxvii. [1836]), and the Roman Catholics from another side disliked and denied its assertion of the Catholicity of the English Church. Protestant feeling had been aroused by the publication of the first two volumes of R. H. Froude's *Remains* (ed. Keble and Newman)

in 1838 and by the title of Tract no. 80, 'On Reserve in Communicating Religious Knowledge,' which was 'a beautiful and suggestive' essay by Isaac Williams, written to check the habit of using the most sacred words and phrases at random in hortatory appeals. Tract no. 90, in 1841, added fuel to the flame. The Heads of Houses at Oxford who had at first regarded the Movement with 'contemptuous indifference' from 1841 adopted an attitude of bitter and passionate hostility, with the exception of M. J. Routh, President of Magdalen, then the most learned and venerable divine in England, who stood entirely apart from their proceedings.

In 1841 the Heads issued a decree condemning Tract 90 and branded it as dishonest. In 1843 a committee of them suspended Pusey from preaching in the University pulpit for two years for teaching in a sermon on the Holy Eucharist doctrine contrary to the Church of England. Pusey never knew the precise charge against his sermon or the ground upon which it was condemned. A like violence marked the utterances of some of the bishops. J. B. Sumner, then bishop of Chester, later archbishop of Canterbury, a devout Evangelical, in a charge of 1841 ascribed the Movement to the work of Satan, and other bishops followed suit (their utterances were carefully collected and arranged by W. S. Bricknell, in his *Judgment of the Bishops upon Tractarian Theology*, Oxford, 1845). The silencing of Newman and Pusey in Oxford gave the Romanizing wing an opportunity of coming to the front, and in 1844 W. G. Ward published his *Ideal of a Christian Church*, a book marked by great moral earnestness and containing some extremely shrewd and bitter criticism of the English Church; it assumed that only the Roman Church satisfied the conditions of what a Church should be.

The Heads of Houses at Oxford seized the chance thus given them. They secured the condemnation of the book by the University and Ward's degradation from his degrees; a proposal to censure Tract no. 90 was, however, vetoed by the Proctors. These events on 13th Feb. 1845 meant the downfall of the Movement in Oxford; the drift to Rome set in, and finally on 8th Oct. 1845 Newman was received into the Roman communion.

The Movement then entered upon its second stage, which was appropriately enough marked by the consecration of a new church (the anonymous gift of Pusey), St. Saviour's, in the slums of Leeds. The Movement had ceased to be an academic affair and now made its appeal to the people of the great towns. The Evangelicals in the 19th cent. had left these great populations apart, their own strongholds being chiefly in the inland watering-places such as Bath, Cheltenham, and Tunbridge Wells. The followers of the Movement began the mission work in East and Central London, where such outposts as St. Peter's, London Docks, and St. Alban's, Holborn, became in time famous. This earnest devotion to the masses in the towns was strong in R. H. Froude, who in 1833 had a 'Project for reviving Religion in great Towns' by means of colleges of unmarried priests, which he considered 'the cheapest possible way of providing effectively for the spiritual wants of a large population' (*Remains*, i. 322). Side by side with this attempt to evangelize the poor districts went the movement to raise the standard of worship, and to teach through the eye as well as through the ear. Both developments roused strong opposition, and from 1845, when riots began at Exeter because the surplice was used in the pulpit in place of the black gown, as the bishop had directed, until the infamous riots at St. George's-in-the-East which closed the series in 1860, mob violence was freely used.

Inevitably it failed, as it deserved to fail, and slowly the public worship of the English Church lost its coldness and dinginess and became more dignified and beautiful. Hymns came into more general use; the principal hymn-writers of this period were, with few exceptions, followers of the Movement. Among them were Henry W. Baker, William Bright, S. Baring-Gould, and John Mason Neale. Neale aided this development not only by his original compositions, but by his translations of the old Latin and Greek hymns—a work which had been begun tentatively by Bishop R. Heber (1783–1826) in the previous generation, but in which no one before or since has approached Neale. Music too, as a result of this side of the revival, returned to parish church services and attention was paid to choirs; many of the most popular English Church hymn-tunes owe their origin to the men of the Movement. J. B. Dykes, the much persecuted vicar of St. Oswald's, Durham, and Frederick Gore-Ouseley were both priests who had flung in their lot with it. W. H. Monk and John Stainer were devout lay musicians on the same side, while Richard Redhead and Thomas Helmore did much to restore the old plain-song to the Church's services.

While this revival of Church worship was proceeding, the teaching of the Movement met with fiercer attack. In 1850 the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration came before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of G. C. Gorham, whom the bishop of Exeter had refused to institute to a benefice. The Privy Council in 1851 decided that Gorham's doctrine (which was, in fact, peculiar to himself), though it appeared to deny the Prayer Book teaching, was not contrary to the Church of England. The result was a panic in which many clergymen and lay-folk went over to Rome, among them H. E. Manning, J. R. Hope (afterwards Hope-Scott), and, later, R. I. Wilberforce. Next followed an attack on the doctrine of the Real Presence of the Lord in the Holy Communion. For teaching this doctrine G. A. Denison was prosecuted in 1854, but his opponents failed to secure his condemnation in 1858, on a technical ground. Keble's treatise *On Eucharistical Adoration* (Oxford, 1857) and Pusey's two separate books on *The Real Presence* (1855 and 1857) were evoked by this attack. In 1870 the attack was renewed, the defendant being W. J. E. Bennett, vicar of Frome-Selwood. In 1872, however, the Privy Council decided in his favour. Still fiercer storms raged over the teaching and practice of private sacramental confession. Its use had naturally been revived as the Prayer Book was studied and the power of the sacramental system known in the individual life. Its practice at St. Saviour's, Leeds, was attacked in 1848, in 1858 Richard Temple West, later vicar of St. Mary Magdalene's, Paddington, was assailed for such teaching at Boyne Hill, and there were furious public agitations against the practice in 1873 and again in 1877; the effect of these was to bring the teaching before a wider circle than before. These last agitations were confined to newspaper articles, speeches, and pamphlets; no charge of false doctrine was ever brought against the much-abused clergy in any Church court.

The ceremonial revival, inaccurately but popularly called 'ritualism,' led to a series of suits in the law-courts which began in 1854 and only closed with the judgment in the case of *Read v. the bishop of Lincoln* in 1890. This revival was originally due to an early follower of the Movement and friend of Newman, J. R. Bloxam, Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, a scholar and an antiquary. It was carried on by the Cambridge Camden Society, led by J. M. Neale and others, but with the growth of hostility to the Movement in the

fifties it passed into less learned hands. The Churches began to be re-decorated, and the use of the Eucharistic vestments was revived, the stole being first used in 1837, the chasuble in 1841. The first lawsuit ended with a judgment in favour of the revival in 1857, later the Privy Council changed its mind, and, finally, on the tide of a No-popery agitation, Disraeli, then Prime Minister (assisted by A. C. Tait, archbishop of Canterbury), passed a Public Worship Regulation Act in 1874 'to put down Ritualism.' Under this Act five priests were imprisoned for various terms—a fact which rallied public opinion to the persecuted party—and the Act became a dead letter. The Church of St. Alban's, Holborn, and its vicar, A. H. Mackonochie, bore the brunt of this attack from 1867 to 1883, when Mackonochie was finally deprived of his benefice. He died four years later, worn out by his long persecution. A like fate had overtaken Dykes in 1876 after the merciless hostility of his diocesan C. Baring, bishop of Durham. The judgment of E. W. Benson, archbishop of Canterbury, in the case of the bishop of Lincoln in 1890 brought peace to the Church and practically decided the question in favour of the revivalists.

During these struggles—indeed, from the Gorham judgment in 1851—the fight had been directed against the principle of Erastianism. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had, almost by inadvertence, as Lord Brougham declared, been made the supreme court of ecclesiastical appeal in 1833, when the old Church courts were reconstituted. It was a purely Parliamentary court, destitute of spiritual authority. Consequently, as this became realized, High Churchmen declined to plead before it or to obey its decisions. This led to the accusation of 'lawlessness,' but the moral authority of the protesters has in fact rendered the court and its decisions inoperative.¹

3. Fruits of the Movement.—The spiritual force of the Movement showed itself further in its successful revival of the 'religious' or monastic life. Newman and Keble both sympathized with this development, but its guiding spirit was Pusey. The first sisterhood was founded in 1844, and every decade since then has witnessed the growth of the Movement, a revival without parallel in Christendom; and the great sisterhoods, with their works of charity, penitentiaries, homes, orphanages, and schools, are a marked feature in the life of the English Church, and would have seemed incredible to the Churchmen of one and two hundred years ago. Communities for men have grown more slowly, but the Society of St. John the Evangelist, Cowley, founded by Richard Meux Benson in 1866, is established in four continents, and the Community of the Resurrection and the Society of the Sacred Mission are deeply rooted and widely known. These are some of the fruits of the Movement of 1833. Other results are the zeal for Foreign Missions, which it shared with the Evangelicals, and the wholly changed conception of clerical and episcopal activity. Samuel Wilberforce, bishop successively of Oxford and Winchester, was 'the re-modeller' of the conception of a bishop's duties, and the high standard set by him owed most if not all of its features to the Movement of 1833. Among the rank and file of the clergy the Movement has done much to raise the general level of devotion. Retreats and Quiet Days, parochial Missions, and the like, if originally borrowed from the Church in France, owe their acclimatization to the Oxford Movement.

The first Tractarians re-introduced a type of

¹ Reference may be made to the *Report of Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline*, 1906, p. 67, § 363, which declared that 'the judgments of the Judicial Committee cannot practically be enforced.'

character which had been sadly lacking in the English clergy and laity for a century. They were marked by reserve, resolute self-discipline, unworldliness, shrinking from preferment, hatred of sham and pretence, and a grave distrust of the feelings. Their teaching and preaching exhibited the most tender personal devotion to the Lord Jesus Christ as to a living Friend. Generally speaking, religious men before the Oxford Movement 'spoke of our Lord in a more distant way, as one holding the central place rather in a dogmatic system than in the devout affections' (Shairp, p. 329). This personal devotion was particularly a mark of Keble and of Pusey, but it was reflected very clearly in their followers.

In one respect the Oxford Movement after 1845 showed that it had its right and left wings, both a conservative and a more liberal group; this was when it was confronted by the fresh discoveries of natural science, represented broadly by the term 'evolution,' and by the same methods applied in the department of Biblical criticism. The right or conservative wing was that of Pusey and Keble, the more liberal school that of the founders of the *Guardian* newspaper (in 1846), Church, J. B. Mozley, and Lord Blythburgh. They differed in their view of the sort of opposition to be offered to the next generation of the liberal wing (who carried on in many respects the Newman tradition in the Movement) issued in *Lux Mundi*, an important volume of theological essays, published in 1889.

Apart from the more detailed results noticed here, the Oxford Movement from its beginning in 1833 has stood for the corporate as opposed to the individualistic principle. Thus, while it emphasized the almost forgotten or neglected truth of the Church, and so incurred the suspicion of attaching importance to the institutional rather than the mystical side of religion, its later followers were drawn to apply the doctrine in its fullness to society round them, and Christian socialism is no by-product of the revival, but a true application of its principles to social questions. The Christian Social Union was in fact founded by later followers of the Movement in 1889, though it secured the aid of Churchmen of other views. But guilds and religious societies have sprung from the Movement and its principles naturally and spontaneously. Broadly, too, the Movement has had a wider result. From the thinly-veiled deism of the Latitudinarian Churchmen of the 18th cent., with their Zwinglian view of the sacraments, the Oxford Movement has slowly and painfully brought back into the lives of English people a belief in the supernatural. When the Movement began, Englishmen as a whole were becoming more and more materialistic, less and less spiritual, distrusting enthusiasm and devotion; religion, when it was more than a cold and dry morality, tended to become mere emotionalism which was very apt to feed itself on phrases. The Oxford Movement with its passionate devotion, its appeal to Christian history and to authority, brought back the old conception of the Church, not as a mere human institution and a department of the State, but as the Body of Christ, with life-giving sacraments and a ministry reaching back through the Apostles to the Lord, a society which 'takes its origin not in the will of man, but in the will of the Lord Jesus Christ' (F. Temple, *Twelve*

Sermons preached at the Consecration of Truro Cathedral, Truro, 1888, quoted in H. S. Holland, God's City, London, 1894, p. 20).

LITERATURE.—A brief bibliography will be found in *The Cambridge Hist. of English Literature*, xii. [1915] 453-463. The Movement itself may be studied in the following authorities.

i. *The Tracts for the Times*, London, 1833-41; *The Remains of Richard Hurrell Froude*, do. 1838-39; sermons and other works of J. Keble, E. B. Pusey, Charles Marriott, and Isaac Williams; *The British Critic*, 1830-43; the sermons and lectures, etc., of J. H. Newman before his secession; the treatises of R. I. Wilberforce and of Isaac Williams. These are characteristic productions of the Movement as a whole in its first stage; the works of R. W. Church, H. P. Liddon, W. Bright, and J. M. Neale illustrate the second stage; for the third the works of C. Gore, H. S. Holland, A. L. Moore, R. C. Moberly, W. C. E. Newbolt, Darwell Stone, J. N. Figgis, P. N. Waggett, A. Chandler, F. Weston, and B. W. Randolph give the best general view of its doctrinal and ethical teaching.

ii. The history is chiefly to be found in numerous biographies, but books covering the period are: Church, *Oxford Movement 1833-1845*, London, 1892, and Newman, *Apologia pro Vita Sua*, ed. Wilfrid Ward, 'with differences of various edd. noted,' Oxford, 1914 (these are indispensable, but they carry the story only to 1845). Complete general histories are: P. Thureau-Dangin, *The English Catholic Revival in the XIXth Century*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, 1914; S. L. Ollard, *Short Hist. of the Oxford Movement*, do. 1915; S. Baring-Gould, *The Church Revival*, do. 1914. Other sketches of the Movement are contained in T. Mozley, *Reminiscences, chiefly of Oriel College and the Oxford Movement*, 2 vols., London, 1883; J. A. Froude, *Short Studies on Great Subjects*, 4 vols., London and Bombay, 1903, iv.; F. Oakeley, *Hist. Notes on the Tractarian Movement (1833-1845)*, London, 1865. The biographies of the leaders are important, especially Liddon, *Life of Edward Bouverie Pusey*, 4 vols., London, 1894-98; *Letters and Correspondence of J. H. Newman*, ed. A. Mozley, 2 vols., do. 1891; J. T. Coleridge, *Memoir of John Keble*, 2 vols., Oxford, 1869; *Life and Letters of Dean Church*, ed. M. C. Church, London, 1894; Church, *Occasional Papers*, 2 vols., do. 1897; *Letters of J. B. Mozley, D.D.*, do. 1885; *Letters of J. M. Neale, D.D.*, ed. M. S. Lawson, do. 1910; J. O. Johnston, *Life and Letters of Liddon*, do. 1904; G. W. E. Russell, *Dr. Liddon*, do. 1905; *Letters on Church and Religion of W. E. Gladstone*, ed. D. C. Lathbury, 2 vols., do. 1910; *Letters of Frederic Lord Blythburgh*, ed. G. E. Marindin, do. 1896; Wilfrid Ward, *William George Ward and the Oxford Movement*, do. 1889; *Autobiography of Isaac Williams*, ed. G. Prevost, do. 1892; J. H. Pollen, *Narrative of Five Years at St. Saviour's, Leeds*, Oxford, 1851, and *Life* (by A. Pollen), London, 1912; William Palmer, *Narrative of Events connected with the Publication of Tracts for the Times*, Oxford, 1843, new ed. with additions, London, 1883; A. P. Perceval, *A Collection of Papers connected with the Theological Movement of 1833*, London, 1842; [M. Trench], *Charles Loder: A Biography*, do. 1881; [E. A. Towler], *A. H. Mackonochie: A Memoir*, do. 1899; C. E. Osborne, *The Life of Father Dolling*, do. 1903; W. Crouch, *Bryan King, St. George's E.*, do. 1904; *Autobiography of Dean Gregory*, ed. W. H. Hutton, do. 1912; G. W. E. Russell, *Edward King, Sixteenth Bishop of Lincoln*, do. 1912; *St. Alban the Martyr, Holborn*, do. 1913; J. W. Burgon, *Lives of Twelve Good Men*, do. 1888; A. B. Donaldson, *Five Great Oxford Leaders*, do. 1900; and biographies in H. S. Holland, *Personal Studies*, do. 1905, and A. Cecil, *Six Oxford Thinkers*, do. 1909.

iii. Characteristic of the Movement were its novels and its poetry.

(a) *Novels*: those of Charlotte M. Yonge, Elizabeth M. Sewell, Francis Edward Paget, Harriet Mozley, J. M. Neale, W. Gresley, and A. D. Craike; also *From Oxford to Rome*, London, 1847, and *Rest in the Church*, do. 1848, anonymous, but in fact by F. E. S. Harris; J. H. Newman, *Loss and Gain*, do. 1848.

(b) *Poetry*: *Lyra Apostolica*, London, 1836, ed. H. C. Beeching, do. 1899, which shows the hopes and ideals which animated the leaders in the first days; J. Keble, *The Christian Year* (anon.), do. 1827, *Lyra Innocentium* (anon.), Oxford, 1846, both ed. with Introd. by Walter Lock, London, 1898-99; J. H. Newman, *Verses on Religious Subjects*, London, 1853, many of which are included in his *Verses on Various Occasions*, do. 1868; Isaac Williams, *The Cathedral*, Oxford, 1838, *Thoughts in Past Years*, do. 1838, *The Altar*, London, 1847, *The Baptistry*, 2 vols., Oxford, 1842-44, and others; F. W. Faber, *Poems and Hymns*, collected ed., London, 1914; J. M. Neale, *Collected Hymns, Sequences, and Carols*, do. 1914; Christina Rossetti, *Verses*, do. 1893, *New Poems*, do. 1896. The Oxford Movement from the literary point of view is discussed by W. H. Hutton, in *Cambridge Hist. of English Literature*, xii. ch. xii.

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P

PACIFISM.—See WAR.

PADMAPĀNI.—Padmapāni (Tibetan, Phyang na pad ma), the *bodhisattva* or the god 'with a red lotus in the left hand,' is a name of Avalokiteśvara, who, as has been said, is more than an ordinary *bodhisattva*, who is in fact one of the chiefs of the Buddhist mediæval pantheon (see art. AVALOKITEŚVARA). Many forms of Avalokiteśvara are known from Indian and Tibetan sculptures, from Indian miniatures and Tibetan designs. It is always the same Avalokiteśvara, and the differences are chiefly iconographic, although different legends and speculations may be embodied in the different representations of the same god. From the iconographic point of view it is possible to distinguish the non-human forms, with four, six, twelve, or a thousand arms, from the human forms. Among the latter the figure with a lotus in the left hand is prominent; such a figure was likely to be called Padmapāni,¹ Abjapāni, Kamalahasta, Padmakara, or any name meaning 'lotus-handed.' Padmapāni is the most common. In the same way the figure with a thousand arms is a 'thousand-armed' (*sahasrabhuja*). The right hand sometimes holds a *kalāṣa*, the consecration phial—an attribute of many *bodhisattvas*, possibly a symbol of their consecration as *kumāras*, royal princes in the spiritual kingdom of a *tathāgata*—sometimes a rosary (*aṣṣamālā*); sometimes it is in the attitude of giving (*varanudrā*). Moreover, Padmapāni is sometimes characterized by a fawn-skin on the left shoulder, and by an image of Amitābha—the reigning *tathāgata* of Sukhāvati—in his head-dress. Amitābha is the *tathāgata*, Avalokiteśvara the *bodhisattva*, *par excellence*, Śākyamuni the *nirmītabuddha* (see PHILOSOPHY [Buddhist]) of the present age.

In Tibet, since 1439 (?) Avalokiteśvara-Padmapāni has been incarnated in the Dalai Lama—a *nirmīta-kāya* of secondary rank.

The name Padmapāni does not occur in the *Kāraṇḍavyūha*, the summary of Avalokiteśvara's *āpītorā*. But lotuses are conspicuous in this book. When Avalokiteśvara returned from his pilgrimage to Sukhāvati, the western Buddha's field, he brought back and offered to Śākyamuni lotuses sent as a gift of homage by Amitābha (*imāni Amitābhena prakīṭāni* [pp. 18, 89]), and the representation of Avalokiteśvara 'with a lotus in hand' possibly originated from this story, or *vice versa*. However it may be, in the description of the diagram (*maṇḍala*) of the 'six-syllabled charm' (*om maṇipadme hūm*) we learn that Avalokiteśvara is to be represented with the lotus and the rosary (p. 74). If the name Padmapāni is wanting, synonyms are near at hand: in the *stotra* (hymn) uttered by the Devaputra Maheśvara (p. 89) Avalokiteśvara is styled Padmadhara, 'who bears a lotus'; Subhāpadmahasta, 'who has in hand a pure lotus'; Padmapriya, 'friend of lotuses'; also Padmāsana, 'who sits upon a lotus,' and Padmaśrī, 'lotus glory' (cf. p. 11)—not to be confused with the Padmaśrī of the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*. It is interesting to remark that Avalokiteśvara is Maheśvara (p. 90), and the fiend of Vajrapāni, who never entirely loses his demon character (p. 11).

¹ The same name is given to Brahmā, to the sun, and to Viṣṇu in the Lexicons (see O. Böhtlingk and R. Roth, *Sanskrit-Verörterbuch*, Petrograd, 1855-75), possibly owing to the Buddhist identification of these gods with Avalokiteśvara. 'Pad ma' can equal Viṣṇu, Avalokiteśvara.

There is some evidence that, in Tibet, the name Padmapāni vied with the name Avalokiteśvara. It seems that the *Mani bka bum* prefers the former (W. W. Rockhill, *The Land of the Lamas*, suppl. notes, ii., London, 1891; E. Schlagintweit, *Buddhism in Tibet*, Leipzig, 1863, tr. L. de Milloué, *AMG* iii. [1881] 54; L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet, or Lamaism*, London, 1895, p. 356).

LITERATURE.—See art. AVALOKITEŚVARA. For descriptions of Padmapāni (photographs) see H. H. Cole, *Preservation of National Monuments*, India, Yūsufsāi District, pl. xxv. (ap. Grünwedel, *Mythologie*, p. 22), a Gāndhāra sculpture identified by S. d'Oldenburg; A. Foucher, *Étude sur l'iconographie bouddhique de l'Inde* (*Bibl. de l'École des Hautes Études*, vol. xlii. pt. i.), Paris, 1899, p. 101 f.; A. Grünwedel, *Myth. des Buddhismus in Tibet und der Mongolei*, Leipzig, 1900, pp. 22, 27, 123, 138; Alice Getty, *The Gods of Northern Buddhism*, Oxford, 1914. For literary documents, H. H. Wilson, *Works*, London, 1862-77, ii. 29 (a recension of the visit of Padmapāni to Amitābha); *Kāraṇḍavyūha*, Calcutta, 1873; H. J. von Klaproth, 'On the Oharm Om maṇipadme hūm,' in *JA* vii. [1831] 192; C. F. Köppen, *Die lamaische Hierarchie und Kirche*, Berlin, 1903, ii. 69 (reprint).

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

PADMASAMBHAVA, or PADMAKARA.—This Indian Buddhist missionary, priest, teacher, and saint of the 8th cent. A.D. is of the first importance in Tibetan Buddhism. For, although he is only incidentally referred to by previous writers, merely as the leader of a retrograde movement among the Lāmas, he is shown by the present writer to have been the founder of the order of the first Tibetan Buddhist monks, or Lāmas, as they are generally called. His nationality and training and the circumstances under which he was sent for by the pro-Buddhist king of Tibet, Khri-Srong De-btsan, the son of an ardent Buddhist Chinese prince, to establish an order of Buddhist monks in Tibet, have been indicated in art. LĀMAISM.

Previous to his arrival in Tibet (c. A.D. 747-748) there appear to have been no indigenous Buddhist monks in that country, though Tibet had been visited by occasional Indian and Chinese Buddhist monks since the epoch of King Srong-btsan (†A.D. 650), who had introduced from N. India or Khotan the so-called Tibetan script, and had procured the translation into its characters of some elementary treatises on Buddhism.¹ This universal tradition crediting Padmasambhava with the founding of Lāmaism is also supported by the epigraphic evidence discovered by the writer in the two edict-pillars at Lhasa of the saint's patron, King Khri-Srong De-btsan, dated A.D. 783, or three years before the death of that sovereign. In these two edicts, as well as in a third, of the same date, although referring to religious matters, the word 'Lāma' does not occur; but the king states that 'by a blessing the orthodox religion was procured'²—this term, 'orthodox or inside religion,' is still the ordinary term applied to Buddhism, as opposed to the Bon or other faiths.

The first monastery in Tibet was built under his directions at Sam-yās (c. A.D. 749), after the model, it is said, of the chief monastery of Mid-India, Nalanda, or, according to another account,

¹ In the great Scripture commentary, the *Bstan-gyur Mdo*, vol. 124, are two grammatical works ascribed to his minister, Thonmi, whom he had sent to 'India' (but probably Khotan, which was then Indian in its civilization) to learn the language; also in vol. 123 a doctrinal treatise (*Sku-gzugs-kys mts'an-nyid*) by 'The son of Anu,' an eponym of the same minister (W. W. Rockhill, *The Life of the Buddha*, London, 1892, p. 212), who is generally credited in the vernacular histories with having also translated the *Dhāraṇī* on the *Om maṇi* formula, universal now throughout Tibet.

² L. A. Waddell, *JRAS*, 1909, p. 931 (*nang-ch'os* = 'inside religion').

Udandapur¹ on the Ganges. It was placed under the abbotship of Santa-rakṣita, his reputed brother-in-law, though it is doubtful whether Padmasaṃbhava was really uncelibate, and whether the tradition crediting him with a spouse is not the outcome of later Lāmas identifying him with Avalokita, and so conferring on him a female energy, the counterpart of Tāra (Ishtar), the Buddhist queen of heaven.

It is significant of the enthusiasm and skill imparted by Padmasaṃbhava and his deputy, the abbot, to their students that seven of the very first group of the newly-trained Tibetan monks achieved literary distinction,² and that most of them show by their scrupulously accurate work as translators of different books of the Indian Buddhist canon from Sanskrit into Tibetan that they had attained remarkable scholarly knowledge of both Sanskrit and Tibetan. Especially numerous are the translations by sKa-ba-bha-po dpal-brtsegs (who seems to be the same as dBah-dpal-bahs) and Vairochana. Padmasaṃbhava had also twenty-five ritualistic pupils whose names are preserved.³

Regarding the character of his teaching, there is no certain evidence that it was of the flagrantly magical and necromantic type ascribed to him in the indigenous works on the subject, which are mostly late compositions of the 14th cent. onwards—when works of a similar nature were being issued by the Mahāyāna Buddhists in India ascribing precisely similar ritualistic spells to Buddha himself. From the high literary attainments of his contemporary pupils it seems probable that his teaching was more or less orthodox Indian Buddhism of the Mahāyāna type, and of the 'Middle Path School' (Madhyamaka), to which he reputedly belonged;⁴ and that it afterwards became degraded in the hands of the converts from the indigenous shamanistic Bon religion. The book of spells ascribed to him is of exactly the same class as the *Paritta* or Pāli spells in general use among the southern Buddhists of Ceylon and Burma, and in regular ritualistic use by the Ceylonese Buddhists at the present day.⁵

He is the chief saint of 'The Old Sect' of Tibetan Buddhists, the red-capped Nyin-ma, and, apotheosized, he receives equal worship with Śākyamuni himself, bearing indeed the title of 'The Second Buddha,' and represented as booted, capped, and clad in thick garments, like an ordinary Lāma of the present day.

LITERATURE.—This is quoted throughout the article.

L. A. WADDELL.

PALMISTRY.—Fortune-telling is a superstition which seems destined to survive permanently in the lower strata of even scientific civilizations. Among the ancient Romans it was part of the official religion and the executive procedure. Like gambling, it corresponds to a certain emotional need, the satisfaction of which may justify the existence of a harmless delusion. Of the pseudo-scientific methods of elucidating the past and predicting the future palmistry is the most widely spread. The modern gypsy retails a traditional lore which goes back to the earliest Indian culture.⁶ The Chinese transferred the palmist's attention to the foot, and their curious interest in the compressed female foot has produced a pseudo-science

of 'podoscopy.' The claims of palmistry are in a way a tribute to the human hand and its importance in evolution. The mind has developed *pari passu* with the hand, which as an organic machine is unrivalled.

Chiromnomy professes to read the individual character on the assumption of a correlation between hand and brain; chiromancy claims also to predict the individual future. The general shape of the hand is the first classification; then the flexion-folds of skin (the 'lines') and the muscular projections (the 'mounts') are examined in connexion with the doctrine of signatures and the influence of the planets. Macalister remarks:

'That these purely mechanical arrangements have any psychic, occult or predictive meaning is a fantastic imagination, which seems to have a peculiar attraction for certain types of mind, and as there can be no fundamental hypothesis of correlation, its discussion does not lie within the province of reason.'¹

But palmistry has to be reckoned with as one of the minor psychological factors.

The chief elements of palm-reading were codified by Hartlieb in 1475 (?), and later by d'Arpentigny in 1843.² D'Arpentigny's work is the basis of the modern literature. The individual palmist indulges his fancy and analogical powers, and as a rule is a shrewd judge of human nature.

The left hand, as being less deformed by work, is preferred for examination. Hands are placed by the French authors in seven classes: *main élémentaire* or *à grande paume*, *main nécessaire* or *en spatule*, *main artistique* or *conique*, *main utile* or *carrière*, *main philosophique* or *noueuse*, *main psychique* or *pointue*, and *main mixte*. The outstanding feature of the hand is the thumb. The line surrounding it is the line of life, probably the earliest of the palmist's definitions. Aristotle mentions the belief that a long line of life implies a long life.³ If without sinuosities, the line stands for happiness. The first phalange of the thumb signifies will, the second logic; the ball is termed the mount of Venus, and on its features depends the individual's success or failure in love. The prominence at the base of the index finger is the mount of Jupiter, connoting pride; that of the middle finger is the mount of Saturn, connoting fatality; that of the third is the mount of Apollo, connoting fortune, art, or riches; that of the little finger is the mount of Mercury, connoting science or wit. On the heel of the hand, or the 'percussion,' are the mounts of Mars and of the moon, connoting respectively courage and cruelty, and imagination, fancy, or folly. A simple division of the facts of existence is into life, intellect, emotion, and luck; accordingly the palmist assigns to these the four main flexion-folds of the skin of the palm. Next to the line of life, which it joins beneath the index finger, is the line of head; above and parallel to it is the line of heart; straight up the centre of the hand is the line of fate, and parallel to it, towards the heel of the hand, is the line of fortune. From the origin of the line of life to the base of the little finger runs the line of health. The girdle of Venus is a curved line from the base of the little finger to that of the index. The lines across the wrist, two or more, are the 'bracelets,' *rascettes*, each signifying thirty years of life. The character of the planets controlling each digit is divided among the three phalanges; e.g., the uppermost phalange of the index, referred to Jupiter, implies mysticism, the second intelligence, the lowest instinct.

LITERATURE.—A. Macalister, art. 'Palmistry,' in *EB* 11; J. Hartlieb, *Die Kunst Chiromantia*, Augsburg [1475?]; C. S. d'Arpentigny, *La Chiromnie*, Paris, 1843; A. Desbarrolles, *Les Mystères de la main*, do. 1850; A. de Thèbes, *L'Enigme*

¹ A. Macalister, *EB* 11 xx. 650.

² J. Hartlieb, *Die Kunst Chiromantia*; C. S. d'Arpentigny, *La Chiromnie*.

³ *Hist. Anim.* i. 15; Pliny, *HN* xi. (114) 174; Juvenal, vi. 581.

¹ Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, London, 1895, p. 260f., also 'Buddha's Hermitage of Uren,' *JASB*, 1892, pp. 1-24.

² The names of those novices who are called *sad-mi* (probably *sadhi*, 'pure-liver,' a title of Buddha) are dBah-dpal-dban, rTsaṅs-devendra, Branka Mutig, K'on Nagendra, Sagor Vairochana, rMa Achārya rin-chén-mch'og, gLan-ka Tanana.

³ Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, p. 31 f.

⁴ He received part of his teaching from Śrī Śūtiha of Kashmir, who was in turn a pupil of the Indian monk Gah-rab Vajra.

⁵ Cf. Waddell, 'The Dhāraṇī Cult in Buddhism,' in *Östasische Zeitschrift*, ii. [1913] 155 f.

⁶ *SBE* xiv. [1882] 48.

de la main, do. 1900; M. Gaster, 'Hebrew Version of the "Secretum Secretorum,"' *JRAS*, Oct. 1907; A. R. Craig, *The Book of the Hand, according to the Systems of D'Arpentigny and Desbarrolles, with some Account of the Gipsies*, London, 1887; H. A. Giles, 'Palmystry in China,' *Nineteenth Century*, lvi. [1904] 985-988.
A. E. CRAWLEY.

PALMYRENES.—1. **Introductory.**—Palmyra is the Greek name of the town called Tadmor by its Semitic inhabitants, and so called to the present day. Situated in the middle of the Syrian desert, more than two days' journey east of the cultivated lands, this city apparently owes its origin to an abundant spring which fertilizes the desert and gives birth to an oasis where the palm, olive, vine, and fig-tree flourish. However old it may be, it does not appear on the stage of history until the Græco-Roman period. At that time the inhabitants of Tadmor were Semites, already much imbued with Greek culture. Placed in the Hellenistic world between the two capitals of Syria—Antioch and Seleucia in Lower Mesopotamia—they were the traders of the northern desert, as the Nabateans were between Damascus and Arabia. Like the Nabateans (*q.v.*), they were Arabs who adopted the Aramean language spoken from the time of the Persians by the ancient peoples that cultivated the soil of Syria. Greek was their second language. They borrowed some words of administration from the Romans. Since the *razzia* of the dictator Mark Antony (34 B.C.) they had been under the influence of Rome, which granted them the *jus italicum*. The first inscription dates from the year 9 B.C.; it is generally believed that the last one is from A.D. 271. It is therefore during this period that we must study the religion of the inhabitants of Palmyra. The national monuments are so abundant that we need not seek elsewhere for information which is not so trustworthy.

2. **Inscriptions.**—The inscriptions are mostly honorific. Along the huge colonnade which ran through Palmyra a great many statues had been placed on brackets attached to the pillars. A Palmyrene inscription, often accompanied by a corresponding Greek text, stated why the town, *i.e.* the senate and the people, had conferred the honour of a statue on such and such a person.

Naturally, religious data are more frequent in the inscriptions of dedication to this or that god, usually engraved on altars. In the burying-places each person is named, and more than one genealogy can be reconstructed; but these inscriptions do not give much information beyond divine names contained in certain proper names. On the other hand, very frequent, but very enigmatical, indications of a religious kind are found on small clay tablets to which the name of *tessera* has been given. Unlike the Nabateans and the Arameans of Egypt, the Palmyrenes refrained from engraving their names in order to commend themselves to the remembrance of the gods or the attention of the passers-by. The rocks of their country offered fewer temptations than those of Sinai or Petra; but they might have made use of their monuments as placards. That they have not done so¹ is a noteworthy characteristic of their moral life.

The necessary references for the inscriptions are found most conveniently in the works of M. Lidzbarski, the chief authority on Semitic epigraphy in Germany. We have specially in view the *Handbuch der nordsemitschen Epigraphik* (Weimar, 1898)² and the *Ephemeris für semitische Epigraphik* (Giessen, 1900-12).³ The great work of de Vogüé on *Syrie centrale* (Paris, 1866-77) is so far the most important collection of Palmyrene inscriptions. The *Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum* of Palmyra has not yet appeared; the editors have been waiting to get the latest revision of the inscriptions made on the spot by A. Jaussen and R. Savignac in July 1914.

¹ Two graffiti (de Vogüé, *Syrie centrale*, nos. 68 and 69), the only ones known, are in a tomb, and may therefore refer to the dead (Lidzbarski, *Nordsem. Epigraphik*, p. 169).

² Hereafter cited as *NE*.

³ Hereafter cited as *Eph*.

3. **Gods.**—It would be out of place to repeat here the characteristics that are common to all Semitic religions. We shall confine ourselves to the features peculiar to the Palmyrenes.

(a) The Palmyrenes are the only Semites who very often invoked a deity without addressing him otherwise than by extremely vague epithets. Other races substituted an epithet for the name of their god, but this epithet was always and very specially his; *e.g.*, Dusares is probably the lord of ash-Sharā (Dhu'-sh-Sharā), the real name remaining secret. The Palmyrene custom was quite different: with them the same attributes could be and, as a matter of fact, were applied to several deities. Many stelæ and altars are dedicated to him 'whose name be for ever blessed' (ברוך שמו לעלמא, 'good,' 'good god' (טוב, אלהא טוב), 'compassionate' (רחמנא), 'who grants prayers' (חורא), 'rewarder' (שכרא), 'lord of the world.' The last title was interpreted as 'lord of eternity' by the present writer, but he now admits that Lidzbarski is right, who, following de Vogüé, has always preferred 'lord of the world,' since an inscription discovered by Puchstein gave the formula 'lord of all' (*Eph*. ii. 296); in this case 'totality' stands for 'the world' (כרא עלמא=כרא כל). These names raise several problems. It has been thought that the Palmyrene religion, addressing itself, without mentioning any proper name, to a good god, a merciful god, a rewarder, master of the world, was on the way towards monotheism. But it must be noticed that at the same time homage was being rendered to other gods, even to deified emperors, like the god Alexander (Alexander Severus [*NE*, p. 459]); and it is very probable that this monotheism, such as it was, was not the intrinsic development of the religious thought of the people of Tadmor. There were many Jews there, as is proved by the proper names. At that time they held rigorously to the law that they had prescribed for themselves not to pronounce the proper name of their god. They substituted for it several epithets, some of which are similar to the Palmyrene formulæ. Lidzbarski (*Eph*. i. 256 ff.), who unhesitatingly admits Jewish influence, has recalled 'Blessed be his glorious name for ever' (Ps 72¹⁰; cf. *Dn* 2²⁰ etc.). The capital of a small pillar found at Amwas in Palestine has on one side *εὖ θεός*, and on the other *ברוך שמו לעלמא*, 'Blessed be his name for ever,' which is exactly the Palmyrene formula. The 'master of the world' does not figure in the Bible, but is found in the most ancient Rabbinical literature.

It must be admitted, therefore, that, either under the influence of Greek philosophy or under Jewish influence, the Palmyrenes had attained a high conception of the deity, compatible, in the ideas of antiquity, with polytheism. Is the supreme god an ancient god on the way towards universal rule or a new concept? Lidzbarski believed that the supreme god was Bēl. It is indeed certain, since the discovery of the American mission, that the huge chief temple of Palmyra was dedicated to Bēl. This name, pronounced Bēl, and consequently written בל (and not בל, Ba'al), in Greek Βήλος, is the ancient Bēl of Babylon. Because of his supreme rank, the Greeks called him Zeus. We could very well understand the Palmyrenes conferring on him the epithets mentioned above, but, as a matter of fact, we never come across them associated with the name of Bēl. It was said at one time that Arsu and 'Azizu were good rewarding gods, and that 'Azizu especially was good and compassionate (*Eph*. i. 203); a Nabatean at Palmyra calls his god Shaī-elqōm, 'a good rewarding god' (*ib.* i. 345). But—not to mention the last god, a stranger to Palmyra—neither Arsu nor 'Azizu was important enough there to be the master of the world.

Now this title is expressly given to a god of wide diffusion—Ba'al, or Ba'al-shāmīn. We have now four inscriptions containing his name. He is called 'lord of the world' (בַּא'ל עֲלֵמָא) at Palmyra, A.D. 114 (de Vogüé, no. 73; *NE*, p. 474. 4), 'good and rewarding god' (אֱלֹהִים טָבִים וְשׂוֹכְרִים) at Palmyra, A.D. 67 (*NE*, p. 473. 1), 'lord of the world,' at et-Tayibe, near Palmyra, A.D. 134 (*NE*, p. 477. 4), and lastly, in a Puchstein inscription of the Palmyra camp, 'great and compassionate' (בַּא'ל גָּדוֹל וְרַחוּמִים). The Greek text of et-Tayibe reads *Δι μέγιστον κεραυνία*. Lidzbarski at first tried to prove that the Ba'al-shāmīn, or lord of the sky, had not appeared among the Semites until the time of the Persians, from whom they borrowed him (*Eph.* i. 243 ff.). But he is mentioned in an inscription of Esarhaddon for the Phœnician countries, and quite recently H. Pognon discovered him in an inscription of Zakir, dating from the 8th cent. B.C. (*Inscriptions sémitiques de la Syrie, de la Mésopotamie, et de la région de Mossoul*, Paris, 1907-08). Now Lidzbarski thinks that the Semites borrowed him from the Hittites. The present writer has himself admitted the identity of Ba'al-shāmīn with the Teshub of the Hittites, but at the same time (*Études sur les religions sémitiques*², p. 93 ff.) he has recognized him as the principal god of Syria, usually unnamed, if not as the great master or Ba'al, but known under the name of Hadad or Hadad Rammān, the thunder-god. This was a god of the Semites, who had no need to borrow elsewhere the notion of a sky-god—probably of the agricultural Semites especially, for the master of the sky and the thunder gave them the rain necessary for the fruitfulness of the soil. If the Palmyrenes did not know him in this aspect in the desert, they must have adopted him along with Aramæan civilization. In fact, as de Vogüé has always said, the inscriptions mean him rather than Bēl when they refer to the god by periphrases. We must bear in mind, however, the possibilities of syncretism, applying vague epithets to various gods that the worshipper knew in his heart. Perhaps the Palmyrenes also had given the first rank to a great deity, whom tradition does not mention by name, similar to the *summus deus* of the Roman world, whom the last pagans adopted to oppose to the one god of Christianity. The frequent occurrence of *Zeus ὕψιστος* in Palmyra favours this hypothesis, which does not exclude Jewish influence.

(b) A second characteristic of the Palmyrene religion is its solar nature. The Romans were much struck by it, and believed that the great temple of Palmyra was dedicated to the sun. As is well known, Aurelian, the conqueror of Zenobia, conceived the project of uniting all the cults in the cult of the supreme god, the sun. This syncretism, which tried to absorb Mithra himself, was naturally applied to the god of Palmyra. He also ordered the temple to be rebuilt:

'Templum sane solis . . . ad eam formam volo, quae fuit reddi' (*Hist. Aug.* ii. 148 ff. [Aurelianus], ed. H. Peter, Leipzig, 1892).

We know that this temple was dedicated to Bēl (see above, § 3 (a)). One text speaks of the great basilica of the house of Bēl (בֵּית בַּל) (בְּבִלְקָא וְבֵיתָא דִּי בַל). It is quite natural that Aurelian, who was a great sun-worshipper, should have inclined in the direction of his tastes; but the Palmyrenes, who were themselves addicted to the worship of the sun, gave the same aspect to Bēl on the *tessera*, where the name of the god is accompanied by a small solar disk. It has been noticed also that this Bēl must be the Bēl-Marduk of Babylon, the god of the spring-time sun. It is, however, unquestionable that Bēl is a supreme god rather than a solar god. With the Greeks he is Zeus. On the bas-

relief of Lammens, explained by Ronzevalle, the person called Belos below the figure is called Keraunos above, like Zens the thunder-god (*Eph.* ii. 83, 310). The real sun-god of Palmyra is Malak-bēl (מַלְאֲכִי בַל). He is often mentioned after 'Agli-bēl, the moon-god, following the ancient custom of naming the moon before the sun. In one of the two Roman inscriptions—comparatively late, it is true (middle of 3rd cent. A.D.)—instead of 'to Malak-bēl and the gods of Tadmor' the Latin text says: 'Soli sanctissimo.' On this Lidzbarski has outlined a somewhat astonishing theology: Malak-bēl is 'the messenger of Bēl' (מַלְאֲכִי בַל); then, as if the two ideas were necessarily connected, 'the visible manifestation, the revelation of Bēl' (*Eph.* i. 256 f.). This theory, which seems to be inspired by the 'angel of Jahweh' of the OT, rests on the form Malak, corresponding to מַלְאֲכִי, and proved by the transcriptions Μαλαχβήλος, Malachi-belus, Malag-bel, Malag-belus. The argument would prove only that Malak-bēl is the angel of Bēl, but it does not follow that the messenger-gods are the visible manifestations of the god who sends them: Hermes, e.g., is not a hypostasis of Zeus. Further, the form Malak may be a Palmyrene equivalent of the Hebrew Melek or of the Assyrian Maliku. The present writer has shown elsewhere that the Assyrian Maliku is connected with the Assyrian sun-god Shamash. His wife was called Malkatu (*Études*², p. 107), which cannot mean anything but 'queen.' Malak-bēl, therefore, is rather the king-Bēl, in whom the solar aspect of Bēl is more prominent than in Bēl, although no theological speculation has connected them as the essence of the sun and its perceptible manifestation. For practical purposes, Bēl was the supreme god, otherwise Ba'al-shāmīn and Malak-bēl the sun.¹

There is one more sun-god, viz. Yarhi-bēl (יָרִיחִי בַל). If we take Bēl for the Palmyrene form of the Canaanite Ba'al and the Babylonian Bēl, Yarhi-bēl is another name compounded with Ba'al or Bēl. For a long time the word יָרִיחִי, 'month,' has suggested a lunar deity, but the Lammens relief, with a rayed disk, makes it a solar god. A *tessera* of G. Schlumberger represents 'Agli-bēl with the crescent, and Yarhi-bēl with the rayed disk' (*Eph.* ii. 310). But the present writer is tempted to regard this merely as a result of the progress of the solar cult. Etymology must decide the original meaning. The two gods, who were often associated, were doubtless originally two aspects of the moon-god. 'Agli-bēl was the bull-lord (עֲגִילָא), i.e. the lunar crescent, Yarhi-bēl the lord of the months, to which the sun is a perfect stranger. Both are qualified by 'bull' (חֵרָא) on a *tessera* published very recently (*Eph.* iii. 153). The bull is the special emblem of Hadad, the storm-god; but it is also the symbol of the moon, because of the horns of the crescent moon. There is no doubt that it was when the cult of the sun and the moon became general that Yarhi-bēl became the sun. Another proof of this identification is the name Ἡλιόθεος, the translation of יָרִיחִי.

Lastly, the sun was worshipped at Palmyra under its common name 'sun' (שֶׁמֶשׁ [*NE*, p. 474]) changed into a proper name, exactly as in Babylonia.

(c) The Palmyrenes would not be of Arab origin if they had not worshipped the morning star, which is also the evening star, the planet Venus. With the Southern Arabs it was the god Athtar, who became in Babylonia the goddess Ishtar. With the Palmyrenes the god appears to be double (like the goddess among the Babylonians), and both are masculine in form, Arsu and 'Azizu (אַרְסֻ, אִזִּי), 'good rewarding gods.' The bas-relief con-

¹ The distinction between Bēl and the sun is clear in Zosimus (i. 61), who says of Aurelian: Ἡλίου τε καὶ Πηλίου καθ' ἑαυτὰς ἀγάλματα.

taining this inscription (*Eph.* i. 203) is difficult to interpret.

Clermont-Ganneau (*Recueil d'archéol. orient.* viii. 32 ff.) is of opinion that the scene has 'singular analogies with that of the adoration of the Magi. It may have been images of this kind that had not only an iconographic but also an iconological influence on the formation of the legend relating to Jesus, who like Azizos, was also the *deus bonus puer phosphorus* of Christianity.'

This whole induction takes it for granted that the bas-relief represents the god; on the contrary, it is certain that it represents the giver of the stele. According to Lidzbarski's interpretation (*Eph.* i. 201), there are three persons sitting on the left—two men and a woman; the latter holds a naked child on her knee. On the right there stands a person, probably a man, who is perhaps playing a harp; then come a camel-driver and a person on horseback. There is no trace here of worship, and no reason why the child should be the *bonus puer phosphorus* or the morning star, since the dedication is made to the two spirits.

'Azizu is elsewhere the morning star, who afterwards became al-'Uzzā, the female divinity known in the Qur'ān. A Greek writer, Bartholomew of Edessa, says that the morning star, τὸ ἑσπέρου δῶρον, was the merciful, compassionate god known by the Arabs before Muhammad (*PG* civ. 1385). This is a surprising confirmation of the Palmyrene text which calls 'Azizu a 'good and compassionate god' (אלהא כבא ורחמא). 'Azizu was familiar to the Greeks under his name of Ἀζίζος (*Julian, Or.* iv. 150). His companion Arsu is not so easy to trace. He is found much less frequently than 'Azizu in the Palmyrene texts, but, on the other hand, he was known to the Nabataeans. He may be disguised under the name of Μόνημος placed by the emperor Julian alongside of Ἀζίζος (*loc. cit.*). Lidzbarski very ingeniously identifies him with the god of the Arabs whom Herodotus (iii. 8) calls Ὀροδάλ. The phonetic resemblance would be effected with a reading Ὀροτάρ, which is quite near to the Arab

form *ruḍan* (رذ), preceded by a prosthetic *κ* (*Eph.* iii. 91). Moreover, Arsu would be the real name of Dusares, the god of the Nabataeans. But this point might compromise the former one, for, according to Herodotus, Orotalt is Dionysos—which agrees quite well with Dusares, but not with Arsu, if Arsu is the companion of 'Azizu. Perhaps their union is merely factitious, for the dedicator is a priest of 'Azizu only. All that can be asserted is that Arsu has remained in Palmyrene from the original Arab ground-work; but this also shows the poor esteem in which ancient cults were held, for Arsu is met with only about twice.

(d) Another very clear, although negative, characteristic of the Palmyrene religion is the infrequency of worship rendered to female deities. The great Arab goddess found in Herodotus, Ilāt or Allāt, the feminine of the divine name *par excellence*, is mentioned only once (de Vogüé, no. 8), although she figures in many proper names, of which Wahballat is the most famous. The transcription Athenodorus proves that Allāt was identified with Athene. And it is Athene that figures under her Greek name in the bas-relief of Lammens. Unfortunately only the first two letters (C E) of the Semitic equivalent, also written in Greek under the figure of the goddess, are known. The word was completed by Ronzevalle as CEMIA, which is very probable. Later he proposed CEMIPΩMEI, representing Semiramis, but this is much less likely.

We must also call attention to the absence of ʿĒl (אל), the primitive form of the god of the Semites, whom the Arameans knew down to the 8th cent. B.C. as a separate deity. This want is a fresh proof of the lightness of the Palmyrene

attachment to their ancient deities. ʿĒl is found in some rare theophoric Palmyrene names, and it is very frequent in this form in S. Arabia.

(e) We have still to mention Balti (בלתי), named on the *tessera* de Vogüé, no. 155, and Atargatis (אתרגת) in de Vogüé, no. 3, which are Syrian names, and שררה (*NE*, Lexicon), which is the Phœnician Satrapes.

The theophoric names lead to the conclusion that there was a certain cult of ʿĒl (אל), mentioned above, Bōl (בול), which must be the Palmyrene form of Ba'al, and which probably never was a proper divine name, Nebo (נבו), 'Athe (עה), and 'Ashtor (עשתור), a Palmyrene form of Ishtar or Astarte (עשתר). The name 'Athe was very important in Syria; its fusion with Athar in Atargatis made it impossible to know whether it was masculine or feminine. According to the Palmyrene name נתאם, 'Athe is a mother; Lidzbarski (*Eph.* ii. 303) is in favour of the female sex.

A Latin inscription (Mordtmann, 'Palmyrenisches', p. 47) of a Palmyrene (Theimes=תמיס) is dedicated: 'diis patriis Malachel et Bebellahamon et Benefal et Manavat.'

Below the gods, but perhaps more highly esteemed than some of them, we must place the Gad of the sacred spring which gave existence to the oasis (לגרא יר עינא כרימא). Gad, in Greek Τύχη, or Fortune, was a spirit like that of a tribe (see below, § 4 (b) (i)).

4. Cult.—(a) *Places of worship*.—No high places have been found in Palmyra, hidden in the mountain, like those of Petra. It must be remembered that Palmyra was a great, Hellenized city, surrounded by deserts scoured by caravans. Like all the ancient towns built under the Empire, the town was crossed by a huge avenue, which started from the great temple with a triumphal arch and ended beside the mountain in a small building, probably water-works. On the left were the theatre and the palace, on the right hot baths, a library, and a small temple—that of Ba'al-shāmū.

The great temple, following the plan of every Semitic sanctuary, consisted of a large enclosure, containing the house of the god proper. From the outside this enclosure, a piece of ground 227 metres square, planted with trees, looked like a huge compact building, with rows of storeyed windows. On passing through the gate, one entered a large court, and then discovered that the outside walls simply served as supports for double porticoes, the columns of which, 474 in number, and 14 metres high, corresponded to a row of pilasters. In the centre was the *cella* of the god, a building of considerable dimensions.

The whole building was constructed according to the Corinthian method, adapted to the Semitic principle; e.g., while in the Parthenon the huge temple containing the *cella* opens its porticoes on the side next the public, those of Palmyra were hidden behind a high wall, in conformity with the arrangement of the Temple in Jerusalem as it was built by Herod, but with much larger enclosures. Those of Palmyra are called 'the basilica of the temple of Bēl,' in a text which we have already mentioned (above, § 3 (b)). Another text calls this temple 'house of their gods' (Littmann, *Semitic Palmyra*, p. 50 f.). It was therefore a sort of pantheon. It of our era. The material of the temple as everywhere else in the Semitic East. Attention should be called to a *hammana* (חמנא), which evidently corresponds to the *hammān* of the Bible (2 Ch 14^s 344.7, Ezk 64.6). Rashi had explained this word as 'column of the sun'—a very plausible explanation, as the first *hammana* known by Palmyra was consecrated to the sun-god (*NE*, p. 474.2). We now know of a second one at Ologesias. In this case the place of the column is mentioned, i.e. probably its base or its socle, and the roof of the *cella* which covered it (*Eph.* ii. 280 f.). These allowed of a certain amount of ornamentation (same inscription).

Other objects are mentioned in Greek—a libation-carrier and a censer of gold, a pillow for the sacred bed of the *temenos*, εἰς τὴν . . . κλίνην (*Eph.* ii. 284). This sacred bed (חמנא), placed in a niche (κλῆς, in Greek καμάρα or ψαλῆς (cf. *NE*, p. 477; Lagrange, *Études*, p. 508 f.)), or *arcosolium*, corresponded to the Roman *pulvinar* employed in the solemn *lectisternia*. There were, of course, altars (ἀλτήρ) and braziers (βωμῆς) (*Eph.* ii. 301)). The altars were often dedicated to certain deities—practically forming columns for containing inscriptions.

(b) *Religious associations*.—The religious groups were of two kinds: (i.) natural groups, and (ii.) associations properly so called.

(i.) The cult of the *génos*, or *gens*, existed among the Palmyrenes as clan- or tribe-worship. Certain devotees dedicated a *hammana* (see above, § 4 (a)) to the sun-god, the god of their family (מִן הַבְּיֹטָה). Probably each gens had its own particular god, a Gad (גַּד), which the Greeks assimilated with Fortune (Τύχη). Our authority for this statement is the inscription de Vogüé, no. 3, which is incomplete in Palmyrene, and translated into Greek as [Μαλακ]βήλω καὶ Τύχη θαμνείας. Although this nominative is very strange, it certainly represents a Palmyrene tribe. Perhaps it ought to be translated: 'To Malak-bêl and to the Gad of the Taymi,' or even 'To Malak-bêl, Gad of the Taymi.' The name Gaddi-bôl signifies 'My Gad is Bêl' (Eph. ii. 281); the Beni-Gaddibôl tribe may have had Bêl as their Gad. In this case the god of the tribe would be imposed on it by tradition.

Whatever we may make of this very obscure point, we see that the tribes commended themselves much more frequently to the great god Bêl. The formula in which they did so is really difficult to translate. But, if there are at times doubts as to the exact meaning of the word which unites Bêl and his worshippers,¹ there is no doubt that the Beni-Hela, the Beni-Hanefi, the Beni-Barsa'a, and the Beni-Taymi placed themselves under Bêl's protection just as particular individuals did. We read, e.g., on a *tessera*: 'Bêl bless the Beni-Taymi' (NE, p. 488).

(ii.) Besides these natural groups, there were in Palmyra religious associations which might be described by the Greek word *θλασσι*. This institution is designated כְּרִמָּה, the meaning of which is not given in Lidzbarski's *Handbuch*. Clermont-Ganneau has shown that this word meant the religious feast, the merry banquet held by certain associations. Recently, as originally in the Bible and a Punic inscription, the word has been found among the Jews of Elephantine (Eph. iii. 120), at Petra (ib. p. 278), and at Palmyra. At Palmyra a religious college (כְּרִמָּה [כְּרִי]) where כְּרִי is inserted by Clermont-Ganneau dedicated an altar 'to Aglibôl and to Malak-bêl, their gods.' It was therefore a *θλασσι* consecrated to these gods, and it need not have been composed exclusively of priests, although there was a college of priests of 'Aglibôl (Eph. iii. 300: כְּכִרִי עֲנִיבֹל). It is the same with Bêl. The inscription Waddington 2606 a in Greek takes it for granted that the laity formed part of the association of the priests of Bêl. Two recently-discovered texts mention the post of director or chief of the sacred banquets (כְּרִמָּה=συμποσιαρχία) of the priests of Bêl (Eph. ii. 281, 304)—in Greek, in the second case: ἀρχιερεὺς καὶ συμποσιαρχὸς ἱερῶν μεγίστου θεοῦ Διὸς βή[λου]. In these last two cases did the *θλασσι* include laymen? Undoubtedly in certain circumstances the priests of Bêl formed a group by themselves. On a *tessera* three busts are accompanied by the inscription, 'the priests of the god Bêl' (Eph. ii. 320). We should say nowadays that they had been photographed in a group. These *tesserae* are often connected with the worship of Bêl. Clermont-Ganneau says:

'For a long time I have been inclined to believe that among those numerous Palmyrene *tesserae* which have come down to us, certain groups are connected with the religious associations and priestly colleges of Palmyra. They are a sort of token' (p. 23).

Lidzbarski is of the same opinion, and, as the inscriptions on the *θλασσι* mention the month of April, he conjectures that this was the time of the principal ceremony. Spring-time would suit Bêl very well (Eph. ii. 304).

There is nothing more to be said about the

¹ As in the case of כְּרִי, translated 'protect,' Lidzbarski proposes to translate 'Make to sit, O Bêl, at thy table' (Eph. ii. 320). But then what would כְּרִי mean standing alone?

priesthood. The word מְזַכֵּר, which recurs in Babylon, probably denotes an official in the temple of 'Azîzu (Eph. i. 202).

5. Attitude towards the gods.—Of more importance than their exterior worship are the inner feelings of the Palmyrenes towards their gods. We have already seen that, like all ancient peoples, they had preserved the cult of the national gods (θεοὶ πατρίοι or πατρίοι), the gods of Tadmor. Nevertheless they had reached the idea of a master of the world, good, a rewarder, compassionate, propitious. This conception of the goodness of the god is an admirable trait, and must have given birth to love for this god in their hearts. The inscriptions, however, give no indication of this feeling. The senate and the people render homage to two distinguished citizens, 'who feared the gods and loved their town' (יהוה אלהים ורחם כיריהן). The Greek is εὐσεβεῖς, which we translate 'pious.' The predominating sentiment, therefore, was always the one which is at the foundation of the Semitic religions—fear. But there is no sign of this fear drawing forth vows from the Palmyrenes when in danger. At least the fulfilled vow, which occurs so often in Carthage, does not figure on the stelae. They express merely the gratitude of the worshipper: 'because he has invoked him and he has replied' (de Vogüé, no. 5); 'because he has protected him on land and sea' (ib. 79). We therefore cannot speak of votive stelae except in a very broad sense. Usually the person who dedicates a monument states that he entreated the gods for 'his life,' and adds sometimes one person, sometimes another—his sons, his brothers, etc. What is the meaning of 'life'? It would be tempting to translate 'for his safety,' meaning by that all temporal good expected from the gods, especially health. In an inscription dedicated 'to him whose name be blessed,' Διὶ ὑψίστῳ καὶ ἐπηχ[όρῳ], 'life' is rendered in Greek by *υἱα*, 'health' (Eph. ii. 295). The Palmyrenes, therefore, looked to their gods for success in their enterprises and prosperity. In return they saw to it that the gods were honoured, and especially that the supreme god was blessed. They believed that their prayers were heard, and—what is more remarkable—they believed that the gods could publicly bear witness to those who were distinguished for their devotion to the city. At least this is stated of Yarhi-bôl in a text dating from A.D. 242.

Julius Aurelius Zenobius rendered great services to the army, etc. 'It is of this that the god Yarhi-bôl and Julius have borne witness' (ὡς διὰ ταῦτα μαρτυρηθῆναι ὑπὸ θεοῦ Ἰαριβώλου καὶ ὑπὸ Ἰουλίου). It no doubt refers to an oracle which had added its approbation to that of the leader of the army.

The guardian of the spring was also chosen by the same god (ἐπιμελητὴς ἀειθεὶς Ἐφκάς πηγῆς ὑπὸ Ἰαριβώλου τοῦ θεοῦ [CIG 4502]).

The inscriptions do not imply that the Palmyrenes expected salvation in the future life from the gods. At most we may find an indication of this belief in the epithet 'rewarder' (שָׂכָר). It probably corresponds to the Jewish belief that God gives a good reward (שָׂכָר טוב) to the just in the world to come (Eph. i. 202). But it would certainly be imprudent to build a theory on a word which may apply to the rewards of the present life, upon which the Jews also laid great stress.

6. The dead.—It is to the worship of their dead that we owe the greatest number of Palmyrene inscriptions. The funerary monuments were of two kinds. The most perfect type was undoubtedly the hypogae hollowed in the rock. Those who undertook this difficult work afterwards gave up one or more chambers as a perpetual grant. The dead were placed along the walls in recesses perpendicular to the walls. This is the ordinary Semitic practice. What is peculiar to Palmyra is the very high towers, containing dead bodies on

all the storeys, arranged as in a burial vault. They seem to have wished to imitate the Roman *columbaria*, adapted so as to preserve the dead instead of reducing them to ashes. Each compartment was closed by a stone, which is a bust of the dead person, with indications of his or her name, parents, date of death, and the inevitable 'Alas!' (חל).

While Greek epitaphs sometimes express hopes, doubts, or even denials concerning the future life, the sepulchral inscriptions of the Palmyrenes are, like those of the Phoenicians and the Nabataeans, silent on this point. Evidently, like those peoples, they set great store on not being disturbed after death; although with less verbal insistence, they wish that their tomb may be 'a dwelling-place for ever.' But they do not tell us whether or not it is in view of an existence in the other world that they ask that their bodies may rest in peace. It is probably to the body merely—to the bones—that an inscription refers which mentions this rest (נפש), at Constanza in Rumania [*Eph.* iii. 30]. Desire for the preservation of the body led to the practice of embalming. Some mummies have been found at Palmyra (Simonsen, *Sculptures et inscriptions de Palmyre*, p. 63).

7. Ethics.—The Palmyrene inscriptions do not throw much light on Palmyrene ethics. The welfare of the city depended on its commerce, and particularly on the management of its caravans, and traders were encouraged. The famous tariff of Palmyra shows the amounts collected by the customs-house on the admission of merchandise. On the other hand, the heads of caravans regarded it as a point of honour to be faithful, for the people showed them gratitude by raising statues to them.

The status of women seems to have been higher than in Greek or Roman countries, as the story of Zenobia proves. Their queens, however, do not seem to have been, as a rule, so highly honoured as among the Nabataeans. In this matter, too, the Palmyrenes are far removed from the traditions of Arabia—before Muhammad. Nevertheless the present writer cannot believe, with Lidzbarski (*Eph.* ii. 271), that, contrary to what took place at the Hegira, women had been excluded from the inheritance of tombs. A woman is expressly called 'inheritor of the house and the funeral cave' (רשתה) [*Eph.* ii. 275].

A slave might be set free (כר חרי), but continued to belong to the house of his former master, now his patron; he mentions him, not his father, in his genealogy.

The Palmyrenes' excessive love for statues probably comes from the Greeks. It bears witness to an intense municipal life, and a great desire for glory.

We may say, however, that the basis of Palmyrene ethics is its connexion with religion.

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PAMPEANS.—I. Origin and classification.—The problem of the Red Man is one of the yet hidden mysteries of the world. The history of the S. American continent, as well as that of C. and N. America, previous to the Columbian era is still to a very large extent shrouded by the same dense mists of obscurity as it was when

Cortes and Pizarro landed on the coasts of Mexico and Peru respectively.

Whence came the various nations, what were the origins of the various civilizations, what the many migrations over hundreds of leagues of territory, what the many blendings of the various families, and whether the nations, the original inhabitants, were of one stock or have become one stock owing to countless ages of occupation, are questions which are still puzzling the scientists of both the Old and the New World.

It seems clear that the main strain in N., C., and S. America may be legitimately traced to one origin, but it must have been long before the Christian era that these first immigrants landed on the shores of what is known to us as the New World. Although they approach very closely to what we may call the Malay-Mongol type, the great movement by which the Americas were peopled must have taken place before either the Malay or the Mongol became a marked type; for all practical purposes we must regard the American Indians as now a distinct type.

As far as S. America is concerned, there are signs of four distinct migrations, and it is probable that the great bulk of the population came by way of the Pacific Coast, some from the north, some by way of the islands of the Pacific. Easter Island (*q.v.*), could we unveil its mysteries, might throw some light upon this subject. Probably the first comers were driven eastward and southward by succeeding waves, and a somewhat higher culture thus took possession of the western side. Countless blendings account for the midland peoples. There are Indian traditions and other evidences that at a period long anterior to the Incas, probably 1500 years, an ancient civilization possessing considerable culture existed in Peru and neighbouring regions. This civilization seems to have been upset by warlike migrations from the south and east, of harder but more barbarous races. The fact that signs of very ancient human occupation are claimed to have been discovered in these regions does not necessarily prove that the present peoples derive their origin from any such pre-historic race. We cannot overlook the possibility of there having been a great cataclysm at some remote period which may have destroyed life there. Science may confine itself to proven facts, but such facts depend entirely upon the conclusiveness of the proofs, and the ablest scientists will readily admit that they are far from having complete knowledge in all its branches upon which to build. Few are privileged to live among and study a primitive people for half a generation. In many cases hasty conclusions are arrived at, almost willingly, because they support a theory; even Darwin erred in attributing cannibalism to the modern Fuegians. Their intelligence has been compared to the stationary instincts of animals;¹ but Yahgans with whom the present writer has lived in closest touch had very retentive memories and were not lacking in ordinary intelligence; they certainly believed in the presence of unfriendly spirits, as well as the ghosts of their dead. These ideas were purely native, and had no connexion with Christian or other training. Darwin draws a contrast between the taciturn, even morose, aborigines of S. America and the light-hearted, talkative Negroes. Although S. American tribes may not be as light-hearted and as talkative as the Negroes, it is unjust to assert, in the case at least of many of them, that they are taciturn or morose, except, perhaps, in the presence of strangers. The S. American Indians are very reserved in the presence of foreigners, but, once the latter are on

¹ A. H. Keane, *Central and South America*, London, 1909, vol. i. ch. ix.

perfectly good terms with them, they throw off this reserve and are in reality quite light-hearted and talkative, jokes and puns being a favourite mode of amusement among them.

At the present day many of the tribes that existed in early Spanish times have disappeared, and few Indians of Pampean or Patagonian race proper now survive.

The Indian tribes known by the Spaniards as Pampa Indians were undoubtedly closely allied to and part of the great Araucanian race, but, as these nomads were in the habit of travelling immense distances, even in comparatively modern times, it is highly probable that a large Carib element existed among them, and in the ages that have passed the peoples must have crossed freely from eastern plains to the Pacific sea-board and *vice versa*. Intercourse with Europeans and other modifying influences were exerted upon them by contact in time of war, and earlier they must have come into close touch with the Chaco peoples—a great part of the Taluhets were destroyed in wars with the Mocovies of the Chaco; nevertheless, in spite of such influences, the Pampeans are essentially a part of the Araucanian family, though those of Chile were influenced to some extent by the Incas.

There are two chief nations of Indians who inhabit the land on both sides of the Andes of Chile, the Moluches and the Puelches.¹ Two types of original man inhabit these regions down to the Straits of Magellan, the round-headed races comprising the Moluches, or Araucanians, and the Pampa Indians proper, and the long-headed people including the Patagonians, with the Tehuelches, Onas, and Yahgans; but the Patagonians became so mixed up with the round-headed Pampas that much in common is found among the tribes.

1. **MOLUCHES.**—The Moluches were known by the Spaniards as 'Aucases' and 'Araucanos.' The word *araucaños* signifies 'wild,' 'untamed,' 'savage,' is used not only of men but also of animals, and is derived from their own name Moluehe, from *molan*, 'to wage war,' and *che*, 'people.' The Moluches were divided into the Picunches, Pehuénches, and Huilliches; they held both the Pacific and the Atlantic slopes of the Andes.²

(a) The *Pehuénches*, or northern people, occupied the country from Coquimbo to San Jago de Chile. They were the most valiant and largest-bodied men of this race. Those who live to the east of the Cordillera, reaching somewhat lower than Mendoza, are called by those of the other side 'Puelches,' *puel* signifying 'east.'

(b) The *Pehuénches* border on the Picunches to the north and reach over against Valdivia to 35 S. latitude. They derive their name from the word *pehuen*, 'pine-tree,' because their country abounds with those trees.

These two nations were very numerous formerly, but were in great part destroyed by repeated wars with the Spaniards and the ravages of disease imported by the Europeans.

(c) The *Huilliches*, or southern people, reached from Valdivia to the Straits of Magellan, and were divided into four distinct tribes. They spoke a mixed form of Moluehe, differing from the Picunches in using the letter *s* (the Picunches used *r* and *d* instead of *s*, and *t* instead of *ch*, as, e.g., *domo*, 'a woman,' *somo*, 'a woman'; *vuta*, 'great,' *vuche*, 'great').

II. **PUELCHE.**—The Puelches (eastern people, because they live to the east of the Moluches) are divided into the *Taluhets*, *Diuhets*, *Chechehets*, and *Tehuelhets*. The termination *het*, taking the place of *che* in the Moluehe, means 'people,' or 'people of the mountain.'

It is an interesting fact that the Towothli or Enimaga of the Pileomayo use in some cases the same termination for 'people.' They call the Sanapaná people north of the Paraguayan Chaco the Isonhet, the same as the Wana, and Indian, the Chanca confederacy of ancient Peru. Can it be that the *het* in this case was also connected with the mountain people, and might this show any connexion with the ancient Peruvian legend that the pre-Inca dynasty was overthrown by a great invasion from the south?

Garciasso de la Vega³ claims that his people were Antarctic Indians.

It is probable that a people bearing the name Puelche were distinct from the Araucanian Puelche, by whom they were ousted.

² See T. Falkner, *A Deser. of Patagonia and the adjoining Parts of S. America*.

³ See Clements R. Markham, *The Incas of Peru*, London, 1910, p. 31.

2. **Organization and civilization.**—The Moluches and the Puelches are divided into a multitude of small tribes under their own chiefs, who, however, exercise comparatively little power, that power depending entirely upon the personal prowess and capacity of the holder for the time being. The chieftainship was generally hereditary, but during war-time various clans and even tribes would join together, and appoint their ablest man as war-chief, who for the time exercised almost absolute power. Their favourite time for attack was the early morning about the rising of the morning-star, but before attacking they were in the habit of sending out well-organized scouting-parties, who did their work with great skill and exactitude. These customs are identical with those at present existing among the wild tribes of the Chaco.¹

The Pampean and Patagonian especially were from the earliest days of known history true nomads, always on the move from one place to another, and, as the old Jesuit chronicler remarks, 'neither age nor infirmity would prevent them satisfying their nomadic craving.'² Of civilization even in a rudimentary form we can find no distinct traces, and their religious ideas were always of a very primitive type. The history of the world, however, furnishes us with ample proof that a high type of religion, unless vigorously maintained, tends to degenerate, and even nations once highly civilized have sunk under unpropitious conditions to a very low level. From Indian traditions generally we cannot gather that there is any absolute proof that these people at some remote period had not been influenced by some higher race, but clear evidences cannot be produced.

3. **Religion.**—It is very difficult in these days to obtain accurate information on the primitive religious ideas of the Pampean peoples. Indians are given to absorbing traditions and religious ideas from strangers, especially of other Indian races, altering and accommodating them to suit their own views and ideas of life in general. We have therefore to depend a great deal upon the information handed down to us by early travellers and missionaries, whose lack of thorough knowledge of the Indian language and mode of thought, together with an almost unconscious tendency to read into their conception of spiritual things meanings which may not really be there, leads us to approach such testimony with great caution. On the other hand, the modern tendency is to explain away tradition and so to water down the religious ideas of primitive peoples that they may fit in the better with the scientific theories. Too frequently pseudo-scientific theory is first launched and then proofs to support it are carefully sought, and the tendency is to ignore or modify such Indian views as are obtained to fit in with the theory already launched.

So far as is known, the early Pampeans believed in two supreme beings, one good and the other evil. Among the Moluches the good spirit was termed Toquichen, 'the governor of the people,' the Taluhets and Diuhets called him Soychn, 'he who rules in the land of strong drink,' while the Tehuelhets named him Guayavacunne, 'lord of the dead.'

This somewhat resembles the belief of the Gnara-yos, who regard their great god as the kind grandfather of their people, believing that he lives in a far distant city, which the faithful Indian reaches after a long and perilous journey through spirit-land. In this city he provides the happy ones with an unlimited supply of the very finest *chicha*, or maize-beer. Their ideas of perfect bliss are to

¹ See W. B. Grubb, *An Unknown People in an Unknown Land*, London, 1911, ch. x.

² See Falkner, p. 102.

spend eternity with a number of heavenly wives and a perpetual drunken feast. The Pampeans believe that the good deity made the world, created the Indians in caves, gave them arms with which to hunt and fight, and then left them to shift for themselves. The Lenguas of the northern Chaco have a somewhat similar idea. With them the deity is symbolized by a beetle who created our first parents male and female, but left them to fight the battle against a previous and more powerful race of spiritual beings as best they might.¹ The Spaniards, or Whites, they believe to have been created likewise, but at a later date, and to them were given cattle. The Indians themselves might have had the use of these animals; only, being so frightened at the sight of such large animals and their formidable horns, they stopped up the mouth of the cave from which they were about to issue with great stones and left it to the more courageous Whites to permit their exit. The smaller animals, however, they allowed to come forth from the cave and multiply on the vast plains. The Guayaquil of Paraguay have a somewhat similar idea. But the Pampeans are convinced that the work of creation is not yet finished and that new animals and men may be forthcoming.

The evil spirit the Moluches call Huecuvœ, or Huecuvu, 'the wanderer without.' The Tehuelhets and Chechehets name him Atskannakanatz, and the Puelches Valichu. With him are a great number of demons wandering about the earth, and they are responsible for all the evil done. The wizards are supposed to have two of these demons as assistants who enable them to foretell future events and to know what is passing even at a distance, and to cure the sick by driving away the other demons who molest them. Wizards are supposed to become members of these demon bands after death. The Pampeans, feeling that the good spirit no longer cares for or aids them, devote their whole energies to warding off or appeasing the evil one by means of drums and gourds filled with small shells to make them rattle. The wizards have certain spells which they keep in painted hide bags. They feign fits, during which they are supposed to be struggling with the demon, and doubtless their faith in these matters, together with their great superstitious fear, produces real fits of hysteria in many of them. They hide in a corner of their huts or are shielded from the public gaze by a screen of hides, and, when the opportune moment is supposed to have arrived, announce to the people, by making peculiar noises, that the demon has been vanquished; they lead their tribesmen to believe that such noises proceed from the demon, who, now disappointed, is taking himself off to a safe distance. When they prophesy, they claim to be free from all blame should their prophecy prove to be false, maintaining that the lying information given is entirely the fault of the demon; but they demand their payment all the same. These wizards, however, do not always escape scathless, and, if their intervention, especially in the case of sickness, fails, violent hands are sometimes laid upon them. The wizards are of both sexes and are generally selected when young; the males are compelled to adopt the female costume and are not allowed to marry, although the females may. Wizards must lose their male sex and adopt the female character as far as possible.

In addition to the two leading spirits, there is an infinite number of minor evil spirits attached as familiars to the various clans and families.

The spirit-world is generally believed to be located under the earth in caves beneath hills and lakes. The fact of human remains being found does not of necessity prove the uninterrupted continuance

of the race. Antediluvian man may have lived in these parts, and yet the present race may have come from quite another direction and be of a different type. These religious ideas are very common among the S. American tribes, nor are they unknown among other branches of the human race. The general idea of the spirit-world may have had its origin in the overthrow of the antediluvian world when the great deeps were broken up, the population was engulfed by great earthquakes, and large territories were submerged by new seas, lakes, etc.

Those who have lived for many years in close intercourse with these aboriginal peoples find numerous signs leading to the conclusion that in many cases their religious ideas have degenerated, and that formerly they had a clearer and more perfect grasp of things spiritual, and this in spite of the fact that the present-day idea seems invariably to be that these races, when first we came in contact with them, were gradually developing their religious sense.

It is recorded about 150 years ago, and probably continued to be the custom long after, that, on the death of an Indian, certain women were chosen to make a skeleton of his corpse by cutting out the interior organs, which they burned, and stripping off the flesh as far as possible, burying what was left until the bones were quite clean; this operation completed, the remains were removed to the burial-place of their ancestors. This custom was adhered to by the Moluches, Taluhets, Dimihets, Chechehets, and Tehuelhets, who were in the habit of placing the bones on a platform of canes or twigs, where they dried and whitened by exposure to the sun and rain. The Indians blacken their faces with soot, chanting in a mournful tone and striking the ground to frighten away the demons. It was the custom with many to place the remains with the face towards the west. This is generally supposed to have been simply symbolical of the spirit's winged flight to a setting sun, symbolizing the land of the dead. But, as with some tribes known to the writer, it may have indicated the place from which they originally came. The desire of the spirit would therefore be, while it left its earthly tabernacle with the bones of its immediate ancestors, to wing its way to the traditional land in which dwelt its more remote forefathers; if so, this would point to a connexion with lands which may have previously existed in the Pacific.

The Indians buried with the dead his horses, weapons, and other belongings—a custom widespread among primitive people. Widows were obliged to mourn for a year for their husbands. They abstained from washing their faces and hands and from eating flesh, remained as secluded as possible, and were not allowed to marry during the time of mourning on pain of death. The Tehuelhets and others generally kept the skeletons above ground in their burial-places. Most of their customs were similar to those practised by some of the indigenous Chaco tribes to-day. They have no temples or what might be justly called organized religious worship.

It appears that some venerated the eagle and foretold events by the flight of birds, and that on occasion and for some special reasons they made drinking-cups of skulls, and flutes from human bones (neighbouring tribes assert that this custom is in vogue among the Aii of the Chaco). It seems as if the spilling of soup and other food and drink upon the ground before partaking of it was an offering to the earth-mother, but it may have been derived from contact with ancient Incas.

LITERATURE.—D. G. Brinton, *The American Race*, New York, 1891; G. E. Church, *Aborigines of S. America*, London, 1912; T. Falkner, *A Description of Patagonia and the adjoining Parts*

¹ See Grubb, ch. xi.

of S. America, Hereford, 1774; C. R. Gallardo, *Los Onas*, Buenos Aires, 1911; A. F. Gardiner, *A Visit to the Indians on the Frontiers of Chili*, London, 1841; S. H. Lafone Quevedo, *Etnologia Argentina*, Buenos Aires, 1909; F. P. Moreno, *Viage a la Patagonia Austral*, do. 1879; A. d'Orbigny, *Voyages dans les deux Ameriques*, Paris, 1836; F. F. Outes, *Los Querandies*, Buenos Aires, 1897; A. d'Ovalle, *Historica relatione del Regno di Cile*, Rome, 1646 (Eng. tr. in J. Pinkerton, *Collection of Voyages*, etc., London, 1808-14, xiv.); A. Pigafetta, *Primo viaggio intorno al globo sulla squadra del capit. Magaglianes, 1519-22*, Milan, 1800 (Eng. tr. in Pinkerton, xi.).

W. B. GRUBB.

PANCALISM.—'Pancalism' is the name recently given to a point of view which goes back to Aristotle, from which 'the æsthetic mode of being real, apprehended in the contemplation of the beautiful, is all-comprehensive and absolute.' The word 'pancalism' summarizes the Greek motto τὸ καλὸν πᾶν.

Aristotle held that the true and the good, the supreme idea and the *summum bonum*, were united in the divine contemplation of the universe as a work of art. Kant found in the 'judgment of taste' (*Urtheilskraft*) a function by which the limitations of theoretical and practical reason were overcome in an intuition of harmony between nature, the world of truth, and freedom, the world of ends and values. Schelling explicitly taught that rationalism, founded on intellect, and voluntarism, founded on will, reached their synthesis in æstheticism, founded upon the activities and products of fine art (cf. Baldwin, *Genetic Theory of Reality*, New York and London, 1915, ch. ix. § 4, and ch. xiii. ff., from which both the term 'pancalism' and the definition given above are taken).

The detailed working out of the pancalistic point of view has awaited the modern researches in affective logic and the theory of the artistic imagination, the former due primarily to T. Ribot and the latter to T. Lipps. In view of the former, the experiences upon which the 'love' of Plato and the ecstasy of the Italian and German mystics rested have been taken out of the domain of mere individual feeling and given valid epistemological force. Feeling finds in the artistic or semblant imagination its instrument as organ of a genuine appreciation of the real. And in the outcome, in the work of art, the demand of the reason for the true and that of practice and morals for the good alike find their satisfaction in a synthesis of the self and its object—as intimated speculatively by each of the three thinkers Aristotle, Kant, and Schelling.

In such a view a third alternative takes an articulate form in modern philosophy. Feeling, so long despised by intellectualists and voluntarists alike, attains its true dignity as an organ of the apprehension of reality. The raptures of mysticism are explained and the claims of intuitionism are justified in the reasonable conclusions of the philosophy of art.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the citations made above see R. Adamson, *The Development of Modern Philosophy*, Edinburgh, 1903, i. 266 f.; A. T. Ormond, *The Foundations of Knowledge*, London and New York, 1900, pt. ii. p. 227 ff.; J. Mark Baldwin, *Thought and Things*, London, 1911, vol. iii. ch. xv.; W. D. Furry, *The Aesthetic Experience*, Baltimore, 1908; W. M. Urban, *Journ. of Philosophy*, xiii. [1916] 350 ff.; E. L. Schaub, *Philos. Review*, xxiv. [1916] 639; E. L. Hinman, *JFE* xxvi. [1916] 564 ff. J. MARK BALDWIN.

PĀNCHĀLA.—Pānchāla is a term used in India to describe a group of five castes of artisans, formerly more closely connected with each other than they now are. According to J. T. Molesworth and G. and T. Candy, *Mahratti-English Dictionary* (Bombay, 1857), Pānchāl is a common term for five castes: Sonar (goldsmith), Sutar (carpenter), Lohar (blacksmith), Kansar (copper-smith), and Patharvat (stone-mason). The popular derivation of the term is *panch*, 'five,' and *āl*, 'to melt,' because Pānchāls are said to melt the five metals—gold, silver, copper, brass, and zinc; but

the more probable origin of the term is to be sought in the Pānchālā tribe.

Pānchāls are found in the Bombay and Madras Presidencies and in the Mysore State. In Madras they are more commonly known as Kammīāls. The numbers given in census enumerations are quite unreliable, as members of the Pānchāla community frequently describe themselves as belonging to one of the five castes mentioned above, instead of using the name Pānchāla. The origin of the term is a matter of much speculation. Pānchālas lay claim to the status of Brāhmins, and have some support for this claim in the rights and privileges which they commonly possess. It is not at all easy to decide whether a gild of artisans, working in the five materials, gold, iron, copper, wood, and stone, has in the past raised itself to Brāhmanic status, or whether, on the other hand, Brāhmins, having taken to work in these materials, contrary to the laws of Mann, have become an artisan caste while retaining their superior position. The fact that the skill required for working in metal, wood, or stone does not vary much would explain to some extent both an affinity between castes working in the different materials and the fact that a caste, abandoning literary pursuits for the handicrafts, could adopt all these methods of earning a living. It is on the whole more probable that the caste had its origin in a Brāhmanic group becoming artisans than in an industrial gild rising to the dignity of Brāhmanic rights and privileges. Indeed, the case seems to be a survival from the period in India when status ceased to be determined by occupation and became hereditary. The wealthy position of workers in precious metals may very probably have assisted the Pānchāls to uphold their claims to Brāhmanic status for a long period in face of the strong opposition evinced towards them by Brāhmins of a more orthodox calling. This was notably the case during the rule of the Peshwas, who did not deny to Sonars the right to style themselves Daivadnya Brāhmins.

Care is necessary to distinguish between Pānchāls properly so described and the distinct castes of Sonars, Sutar, Lohars, Kansars, and Patharvats, which in many cases have established a Pānchāla subdivision and show a tendency to adopt the traditions of the Pānchāla caste. They are entirely different in origin, and this is made clear by their remaining as five distinct endogamous groups, not possessing the close resemblance of Pānchāls to Brāhmins in rites and appearance. Pānchāls proper usually intermarry freely; but Thurston (*Castes and Tribes of S. India*, iii. 108) mentions that in certain towns the Sonar section no longer marry willingly with Lohars.

The Pānchāla caste has five *gotras*, or exogamous divisions, known as (1) Suparna Daivadnya, (2) Ababhuvana Tvaṣṭa, (3) Prasthana Silpi, (4) Sanag Manuva, and (5) Sanatan Maya. These names are connected, as shown, with the five sons of Viśvakarma, the divine architect, i.e. Daivadnya, Tvaṣṭa, Silpi, Manuva, and Maya.

Pānchāls have the Brāhmanic *sanskars*, or sacraments, and perform their ceremonies according to the Vedic ritual. Frequent attempts were made in the days preceding British rule to deny them the right to these Brāhmanic privileges; but the decision of the *panḍits*, or religious advisers, when referred to, was in their favour. They are followers of both Śiva and Viṣṇu, and are even found wearing the *liṅgam* of the Liṅgāyats (*q.v.*). They have their own priests and do not call in Brāhmins to perform their religious ceremonies. They will not eat food cooked by Brāhmins, of whom they consider themselves at least the equals.

LITERATURE.—*EG* xv. [1883], xx. [1884], xxi. [1884], xxii [1884], xxiii. [1884], xxiv. [1886]; *Journal of the Ethnological*

Society of London, new ser., i. [1869], iii. [1871]; A. Steele, *Law and Custom of Hindu Castes*, new ed., London, 1868; F. Buchanan, *Journey through Mysore, Canara, and Malabar*, do. 1807, i. 78, 251, ii. 270, 476; B. L. Rice, *Mysore and Coorg*, Bangalore, 1876-78, i. 243, iii. 211; E. Thurston, *Castes and Tribes of S. India*, Madras, 1909, iii. 108.

R. E. ENTHOVEN.

PANCHPIRIYĀ.—**1. Introductory.**—Panchpiriyā is a term applied to the worship of the Pānchoñ Pīr, or 'five saints'—a form of belief very common among the lower Hindu castes in W. Bengal, the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, and E. Panjāb. It seems to be a combination of various forms of animism characteristic of the lower strata of the population and Muhammadan saint-worship.

The Pānch or Panj Pīr, the 'five saints' of Islām, are, properly speaking, the five great saints of the Shī'ah sect—the Prophet Muhammad; his daughter Fātimah; 'Alī her husband, cousin-german and adopted son of the Prophet; and their sons, Ḥasan and Ḥusain, the two martyrs whose pitiful death is celebrated yearly by members of the Shī'ah sect during the first ten days of the Muharram festival (*DI*, p. 407 ff.). But this orthodox cult has little connexion with the Panchpiriyā beliefs, in which each worshipper or group of worshippers selects, according to individual taste, the saints whom he prefers as objects of reverence. Thus in the Panjāb the quintette sometimes consists of the saints Khwājah Qutb-ud-dīn, Khwājah Mu'in-ud-dīn Chishtī of Ajmer (*q.v.*), Shaikh Nizām-ud-dīn Auliya of Delhi, Naṣir-ud-dīn Abu'l-khair, and Sultān Naṣir-ud-dīn Maḥmūd. A second list gives their names: Bahā'ud-dīn Zakariyā of Multān, Shāh Ruq'a-i-'ālām Ḥazrat of Lucknow, Shāh Shams-i-Tabriz of Multān, Shaikh Jalāl Maḥdūm Jahāniyā Jahān-gasht of Uchchā, and Bābā Shaikh Farid-ud-dīn Shakarganj of Pakpattan. In the United Provinces the group usually includes worthies of a much lower rank, one list giving Ghāzī Miyān, Aminā Sati, Bhairon, Buahnā, and Bandē, Aminā being a *sati*, or faithful wife who died on the pyre of her husband, and the three last deified worthies or malignant spirits propitiated by the lowest classes. Here, as in W. Bengal, the enumeration varies from district to district, according to the tastes of the worshippers or the local cults which have been absorbed into this form of worship.

Practically all the lists in the United Provinces and Bengal are headed by Ghāzī Miyān, who has some pretensions to be regarded as a historical personage. His history is found in the *Mirāt-i-Maṣūdi*, of which an abstract has been given by J. Dowson (*H. M. Elliot, Hist. of India*, London, 1869, ii. 513 ff.; cf. *NINQ* ii. 109).

Dowson calls the book 'a historical romance. In it fact and fiction are freely mingled, and the great actions and exploits of other men are appropriated, without scruple, to the hero of the tale.' The conqueror, Maḥmūd of Ghazni (A.D. 997 or 998-1030), it is said, learning of an attack by the Hindu infidels on a division of his forces, sent his nephew, Sālār Sāhū, in command of a force to relieve them. After waging successful war upon the infidels, he was finally slain near Bahrāich in Oudh (A.D. 1034).

It is one of the curious aspects of popular Hinduism that a Musalmān martyr, who waged unceasing war against Hindus and destroyed their temples, should become the head of a quintette of saints widely venerated by the lower orders of Hindus. Wise, remarking that in E. Bengal the *guru*, or spiritual preceptor, of the sect is the *mahant*, or provost, of the Nānakshāhī or Sikh order of devotees, suggests that the origin of the Panchpiriyā beliefs may be traced to Nānak (*q.v.*), the famous Sikh *guru*.

Nānak 'taught universal toleration, and insisted that not only were the essential doctrines of Hinduism and Muhammadanism analogous, but that the Supreme Being, adored as either Hari [Viṣṇu] or Allāh, was sought after by the devout of both creeds. It was natural that in such a tolerant sect eclectic teachers

should spring up, selecting from the ritual of each religion whatever was likely to recommend itself to the vacillation of either party' (*Notes on the Races, Castes, and Trades of E. Bengal*, p. 18 f.).

There seems, however, to be little ground for associating the growth of the Panchpiriyā beliefs with the rise of Sikhism, because it prevails widely in parts of the country where Sikh influence is altogether wanting. It also seems probable that the cult was older than Sikhism itself. It is more reasonable to suppose that it supplies one of many examples of the eclectic character of popular Hinduism, particularly in its lower strata, where the worshipper is prepared to venerate any impersonation of the divine energy from which he hopes to obtain a favour, or by the neglect of which he imagines that he may be exposed to malign influences. In this spirit lower class Hindus will visit the tombs of Musalmān saints or even make offerings at the graves of Europeans, in the former case believing that the vicinity of the grave of the holy man exhales an influence which will be beneficial to them, in the latter dreading that the angry ghost of the powerful stranger, if not duly propitiated, may do them injury.

It does not seem necessary to connect the cult with that of the five Pāṇḍava heroes of the *Mahābhārata* epic in a special way, as some writers have suggested. In fact, in Hindu belief five is a perfect, holy number. Hence comes the respect paid to the *pañchāyat*, or the body which should properly consist of five arbitrators or assessors, the tribal or caste council of the group or locality, which deals with social affairs, such as marriage, divorce, violations of caste rules, and so forth. *Pañch jahān Paramēśvar*, 'Where five agree, 'tis God's decree,' is a common proverb which expresses popular feeling. In the same way there are five great gods worshipped by the orthodox Hindus. The offerings presented to the gods are usually five or some multiple of that number; five unmarried girls or five married women whose husbands are alive bring good luck to the marriage rites, and so on. At the same time the cult of the five Pāṇḍava heroes extends from the Himālaya to Madras, and this was possibly one of the sources contributing to the Panchpiriyā beliefs (*PR*² i. 206).

The Panchpiriyā beliefs, then, appear to be the result of a fusion of Hinduism and Islām, and probably arose after the Muhammadan conquest had impressed upon the minds of the lower classes of Hindus the assurance that the saints worshipped by the newcomers must be powerful personages to whom the success of the invaders might reasonably be attributed. With these saints were naturally associated some of the myriad local deities and malign spirits which the menial classes of Hindus habitually worship. The result was the extraordinary amalgam of divine personages and dangerous spirits which we find in the various lists.

2. Local types of the cult.—(a) *Bengal.*—In W. Bengal the 'five saints' form one of the main objects of adoration, not only of Muhammadans, but also of Hindus of the lower grades. They are often worshipped as family deities, being represented by a small mound on a clay plinth erected in the north-west corner of one of the rooms of the house. On this is fixed a piece of iron, resembling in its shape the human hand, each finger symbolizing one of the quintette, with a piece of yellow cloth bound where the wrist should be.

'Every Wednesday the mound is washed, incense is burned before it and offerings of flowers are made. On special occasions sacrifices are offered, either of goats or cocks. Where the votary is a Hindu he often engages a Dafālī [one of the drummer caste] Fakir to perform the ceremony on his behalf. The Panchpiriyā Hindus eat the flesh of goats killed by Muhammadan butchers in accordance with the forms prescribed by their religion and will not touch the flesh of animals which have been sacrificed before a Hindu god. They do not, how-

PANCOSMISM ($\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$, neut. of $\pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$, 'the whole,' 'all' + $\kappa\omicron\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma$, the universe in its order or arrangement).—This term is of rare occurrence, because the theory denoted by it has seldom been held in the strict acceptance by any competent philosophical thinker; Czolbe (1819-73), in his first period, was a notable exception. It means that all being or reality consists exclusively of the physical universe existing under the conditions of space and time. As a rule, the view has been confused with one or other of the protean forms of pantheism (*g.v.*). Now, when examined closely, pantheism, considered metaphysically, presents but two legitimate standpoints. On the one hand, by participation, all phenomena in the universe share the nature of the absolute substance and, to the extent of this participation (which may be matter of degree), are real. On the other hand, the phenomena are transitory forms or appearances of the absolute substance and thus, in effect, illusions. Whether the doctrine of *metexis* or that of *mimesis* be accepted, the metaphysical problem of immanency presents itself. On the contrary, pancosmism implies the ejection of all metaphysical questions—there is no room for a transcendental factor.

The theory exemplifies a recurrent logical error, a common mark of unphilosophical thinking always, but especially in periods of reaction against dominant theological or 'spiritual' doctrines. Briefly, second intentions are either mistaken for or employed as if they were first intentions. That is to say, conceptual results of reflective thought are taken, *prima facie*, as direct percepts. Phrases like 'the universe' and 'natural law' (e.g., Haeckel's 'law of substance') belong distinctively to mind. Any 'object' indicated by them is 'in' mind. But, according to pantheism, such 'objects' precisely are out of all relation to mind. This fallacy is one among many consequences of a tendency rendered familiar by the premature generalizations of 'modern thought' so called, particularly on the biological side; for the vagueness inseparable from the sciences of organic nature rather than the mathematical exactness of the sciences of physical nature has favoured philosophical delusion. It originates in forgetfulness that the business of science is to offer descriptions of particular things—things whose existence is conditional upon the existence of other things. Thus, 'laws of nature' do not refer to nature as a whole, but to separate parts of it. To extend them to the 'universe' in its totality is quite unwarrantable. Much more is it unwarrantable to transfer descriptions of things, no matter what their cogency or accuracy, to the sphere of the ultimate and necessary—a main vice of pantheism and allied theories. For this reason, then, the pantheist hypothesis has failed to recommend itself to serious thinkers. As history shows, it is associated with deductions drawn from empirical observation, or presumed to be so drawn. These, in turn, when sanctured with the mysticism or even poetry which, by a curious paradox, seems to be compatible with materialism (*q.v.*), come to do duty as a theory of reality. Evidence, itself in need of thorough criticism, is treated as if it guaranteed an ultimate explanation of the universe. Critical analysis of the categories of space and time, in their relation to the category of change particularly, would serve to bare the vicious procedure at once.

R. M. WENLEY.

PANDHARPUR.—Pandharpur is a famous religious town and place of pilgrimage in the Sholapur District of the Bombay Presidency.

situated on the right bank of the river Bhīma, a tributary of the Kistna; lat. 17° 41' N., long. 75° 28' E. The place derives its name from the cult of a deity now regarded as a form of Viṣṇu, variously called Pāṇdurang, Paṇdhari, Viṭṭhal, Viṭṭhaināth, and Viṭhobā, whose noted temple near the centre of the holy part of the town is held in great reverence by Brāhmins.

Viṭhobā, according to Paṇḍit Bhagvānlāl Indrajī (*BG* xx. 423), 'is a short form of Viṭṭhal bāva, that is "Father" or "Dear" Viṭṭhal; Viṭṭhal does not appear to be a Sanskrit name, nor, though several attempts have been made, can the word be correctly traced to any Sanskrit root. The name is probably Kanarese.'

Others explain it to mean 'standing on a brick,' from the position of the image of the god (J. M. Mitchell, *Hinduism Past and Present*, p. 169; M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, vi. 23). It is more probable that the name is a corruption of Viṣṇupati, 'lord Viṣṇu,' through the local form Bistu or Biṭṭu. The present name Pāṇdurang, usually interpreted to mean 'white-coloured,' is more probably a Sanskritized form of Pandaraga, 'belonging to Pandargē'—the old name of the place. From these facts Viṭhobā seems to be a local deity admitted into Hinduism as a form of Viṣṇu.

The date of the erection of the original temple, which has been repeatedly restored and extended, is unknown. It seems to have been erected under the Yādava dynasty of Devgīri, and to have been destroyed by the Muhammadans, as several figures are wilfully destroyed. According to local tradition, the image was several times removed to save it from desecration at the hands of the Muhammadans. It is about 3 ft. 9 ins. in height, and together with the base seems to be cut out of a single block of trap rock. It stands with arms akimbo and hands resting upon the hips, the left hand holding a conch-shell and the right a discus, the emblems of Viṣṇu. No other Vaiṣṇava temple in India seems to possess a similar image. It is served by a colony of Deśaṣṭh Brāhmins, including priests (*badvā*), ministrants, choristers, bathmen, singers, barbers, mace-bearers, and lamp-lighters. The service is performed five times during each day and night.

About 3 a.m. a priest humbly begs the god to wake; the door is opened, the food placed in the bed-chamber on the previous day is removed, and butter and sugar-candy are laid before the god. A torch made of muslin soaked in butter is waved before him from head to foot. Many votaries come to behold the god at this time. After this he is again fed, butter and sugar being placed in his mouth. Lights perfumed with camphor are again waved, the faded garlands are removed, and the feet of the image are washed first in milk and then in water. The service proper (*pūjā*) then begins. The image is unrobed and bathed, a sheet being held before the door while he is naked. After his oath he is wiped dry and dressed in new robes. His face is wiped and rubbed with scented oil until it shines. A turban is bound round his head and garlands of flowers are hung on his neck, while the barber holds a mirror before him. His feet are washed and rubbed with sandal; sandal paste is applied to his brow. After the morning service, about 3 p.m., the god is again dressed; the ministrant bathes and adorns him.

The days specially sacred to the gods are Wednesday and Saturday, unless these fall at the conjunction of sun and moon or ominous conjunctions of planets occur. As in the case with all Vaiṣṇavas, the 11th day of the month is a fast day. The chief fairs are in June to July and October to November, when immense crowds assemble from all parts of the Deccan and S. India. The other temples in the town are numerous, but not of special importance.

LITERATURE.—This art. is mainly based on the full account of the place, the temple, and its ritual by Paṇḍit Bhagvānlāl Indrajī, in *BG* xx. [1884] 415 ff., and J. M. Mitchell, *Hinduism Past and Present*, London, 1885, p. 163 ff. On the local saint, Nāṁdev, see M. A. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, Oxford, 1909, v. 23, 34. On the anti-Brāhminical influence of the Marhātā poet Tīkārām see M. M. Kunte, *Vicissitudes of Aryan Civilisation in India*, Bombay, 1880, p. 464, 497.

W. CROOKE.

PANGENESIS.—The theory of pangenesis, though to some extent foreshadowed in the writings of Buffon, Spencer, and others, was originally put forward by Charles Darwin in 1867. By means of it he sought to connect together many different classes of biological facts with which his studies had brought him into close contact. It was a tentative explanation of phenomena so diverse as the general process of development, the regeneration of lost parts after injury, reversion in offspring to characters present in remote ancestors, the inherited effects of the use and disuse of organs, and graft-hybrids. For these and other phenomena of life Darwin attempted a general explanation in the theory which he termed 'pangenesis.' The tissues of plants and animals are composed of small microscopical units called cells, which increase by self-division. According to Darwin, this is not the sole mode of reproduction whereby these units increase in number. He supposed that they continually throw off minute particles, or gemmules, which permeate the whole system of the individual. Under suitable conditions these gemmules multiply by self-division and ultimately give rise to units similar to those from which they sprang. At the spot where the sexual elements are formed a special attraction is exerted on all the different kinds of gemmule from the body. Here they congregate and constitute the sexual elements. As the sexual cells themselves, especially those produced by the male, are often very small, it must be supposed that the gemmules are exceedingly minute, and quite invisible under the highest powers of the microscope. Fertilization means the union of two sets of gemmules, and subsequent development results in offspring bearing resemblances to the parents by whom these two sets were supplied. In this way is explained the general likeness between parents and offspring. A further supposition is that under certain circumstances gemmules may become dormant and remain so for many generations. Then, through unknown changes in the conditions, they may re-awaken into activity, and bring about the sudden reappearance of the character or characters to which their activities give rise. In this way is explained the phenomenon of reversion on the part of offspring to features which were found in some more or less remote ancestor.

The co-ordinated aggregation of the gemmules which serves to explain the process of normal development serves also to explain the remarkable phenomenon of the regeneration of lost parts, such as occurs when a limb of the lobster is lost or the tail severed from a lizard. The appropriate gemmules congregate at the point of injury and attract others to themselves, so that a complete set necessary for the re-formation of the lost part is eventually assembled.

Darwin also considered that the theory served to explain cases such as the development of an antenna in a crustacean in place of an eye, or the appearance of buds in unlikely places on a plant. Such teratological cases are due to the wrong gemmules having arrived first at the point of growth, and having attracted their own complement of gemmules instead of that necessary to complete the normal sequence.

Some of the phenomena which Darwin sought to explain by the theory of pangenesis have since been shown to be either of doubtful nature or susceptible of a totally different interpretation. The supposed inherited effect of the use and disuse of parts, in which Darwin believed strongly, is now generally discredited by biologists. Recent work, too, has shown that graft-hybrids are in reality made up of two distinct individuals, of

which one supplies certain tissues and the other one the rest. A graft-hybrid may consist of the body of one plant covered over by the skin of another. The resultant is more or less intermediate in appearance, but the cell-tissues of the two kinds remain distinct, and the compound plant breeds true to the member of the combination that supplies the cell-layer from which the germ-cells arise. Of such phenomena the theory of pangenesis offers no explanation.

From the outset Darwin's theory was subjected to much criticism. A few years after its promulgation Galton questioned its validity on experimental grounds. He argued that, if representatives of all the various gemmules given off by the body of an animal are collected into the sexual glands, as the theory demands, they must travel by the passage of the blood. Hence the blood must be full of them, and they must be capable of living in the blood for some time. If, therefore, the blood of one form were replaced by that of another, the offspring of animals with such transfused blood should show effects derived from the interchange of gemmules. Galton accordingly made blood-transfusion experiments between silver-grey rabbits and lops, and subsequently bred from both classes. In spite of the transfusion each class bred true, and in no case did the offspring exhibit any differences that might be set down to the operation. These experiments of Galton are supported by the case of the graft-hybrids mentioned above. A graft-hybrid, as has already been stated, consists of a permanent fusion between individual plants which may belong to different allied species, as, e.g., between the tomato and the common weed *Solanum nigrum*. Nevertheless experiment has shown that the offspring of such compound plants belong entirely to one of the two forms of which the plant is made up. If the doctrine of pangenesis were true, and the gemmules of both forms were collected together in the sexual tissues, some effect would undoubtedly be looked for in the offspring. That no effect is produced certainly tells against the doctrine.

Nor does pangenesis receive any support from what is now known of cell-division. The science of cytology, largely concerned with the characters, origin, and growth of cells, has been revolutionized since Darwin wrote, and the ascertained phenomena lend no support to the view that new cells arise in any way other than by division of pre-existing cells.

Whatever its shortcomings, the theory of pangenesis probably contains one essential truth. The conception that the various characters exhibited by plant or animal depend for their manifestation upon definite units which are transferred unchanged from generation to generation is a conception which has been borne out by recent experimental work (see art. HEREDITY). It is a conception, too, which has formed an integral part of the more important theories of inheritance that have been put forward since Darwin's time, and to this extent pangenesis may be said to have formed the basis of modern heredity. In one respect, however, Darwin's theory differs fundamentally from those which succeeded it, viz. in the conception of the manner in which the somatoplasm is related to the germ-plasm. For Darwin there was no very sharp distinction between the two. At an early stage in development the sexual cells were non-existent as such, but were represented by innumerable gemmules scattered throughout the body. As development proceeded, representative gemmules from the various tissues became aggregated together in the sexual gland, ultimately giving rise to the reproductive tissue or germ-plasm. Sexual cells gave rise to body tissue and

body tissue in its turn, through the formation of gemmules, gave rise to sexual cells. In the sequence of the generations there was a continual alternation between somatoplasm and germ-plasm, the connecting link between them being the gemmules. The theory involved the transportation of the gemmules from the fertilized ovum to the body tissues, and again from the body tissues to the fertilized ovum. Strong objections to this hypothetical transportation of gemmules were soon raised by Galton and others, and the idea was abandoned by Weismann and other successors of Darwin. Following Weismann, most biologists to-day draw a sharp distinction between germ-plasm and somatoplasm. The sexual elements continue to be germ-plasm after their fusion, but from this fused germ-plasm a portion is gradually set aside as development proceeds, is specialized as the body of the new individual, and functions as the carrier and protector of the remaining and unmodified germ-plasm. The body eventually dies; the germ-plasm carried by it alone retains the property of fusion with other germ-plasms to repeat the sequence. After each fusion of separate germ-plasms resulting from the union of two sexual cells a portion is sacrificed to ensure the continued activity of the rest. The germ-plasm goes on from fusion to fusion, from generation to generation, and at each generation is side-tracked a portion which becomes somatoplasm, which drifts thenceforward from the evolutionary current and ultimately perishes. The case for or against pangenesis rests largely upon what is termed the inheritance of 'acquired' characters, upon whether changes in the somatoplasm induced by changed conditions can be transmitted to the next generation through the medium of the germ-plasm. Darwin believed in such inheritance; Weismann did not. As time has gone on, the evidence has become more and more in favour of Weismann and consequently against the view of the relation between somatoplasm and germ-plasm which the theory of pangenesis implies. On the other hand, it is becoming more and more apparent that any explanation of the phenomena of heredity demands the conception of small particles whose presence in or absence from the germ-plasm decides the characters of the somatoplasm that arises from the germ-plasm (cf. art. HEREDITY). To this extent the theory of pangenesis contains an element of truth.

LITERATURE.—H. Spencer, *Principles of Biology*, London, 1864; C. Darwin, *The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication*, do. 1868; F. Galton, 'Experiments in Pangenesis,' *PRS*, 1871; A. Weismann, *The Germ-Plasm*, tr. W. N. Parker and H. Rönfeldt, London, 1893; E. Baur, *Einführung in die experimentelle Vererbungslehre*, Berlin, 1911.
R. C. PUNNETT.

PANJAB AND NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE.—I. Pre-historical creeds.—

It is difficult to say what the primitive religion of the Panjāb or north-west corner of India must have been, but easy to conjecture its general outlines. It was doubtless a form of nature-worship, combined with magic, whose object was to attain power over the material universe generally and in particular to get children, ensure good harvests, and destroy enemies or at least secure immunity from their onslaughts. A type of this primitive religion may have long survived the Vedic period in the *Bon chos*, or religion of the Tibetan Bonpos. The *Bon chos* was also called *Lha chos*, or 'spirit-cult,' and in the *gLing chos* of Ladākh we have probably the earliest type of it.¹

The gods of the Bon religion were those of the red meadow (the earth), of the sun, of heaven, King Kesar and his mother Gog bzang lhamo.² But

¹ A. H. Francke, *Antiquities of Indian Tibet*, Calcutta, 1914, p. 21; cf. art. *gung chos*, vol. viii. p. 75.

² Francke, pp. 2, 65.

at least as primitive were the *pho-lhā* and *mo-lhā*, or deities of the 'male and female principle.'¹ Sun-worship must have been important, as the cult was also called *gyung-drung-bon*, or the *swāstika-bon*.²

Human sacrifice was probably a leading feature of this primitive creed. Oaths at important treaties were made binding by human as well as animal sacrifices, new houses were consecrated by immuring human beings in their walls, and a person was killed when one was first inhabited.³ A. H. Francke mentions a *lāma* in the Sutlej valley who had recently beheaded his father while asleep in order to render his new house habitable.⁴ The old were apparently put to death—a custom toned down in modern times to a rule which relegates a father to a small house when his son marries, and a grandfather to a still smaller one.

The ibex was worshipped for fertility, and figures of it were often carved on rocks. Nowadays 'flour ibex' are offered by neighbours to the parents of a new-born child.⁵ Kesar, a Bruguma, and other pre-Buddhist divinities are still invoked to grant children,⁶ but it does not follow that this was their real or principal function in the *Bon chos*. The *swāstika* was already a symbol of the sun, and the *yonī* of the female principle.⁷ The dead were buried, burned, exposed to the air, or cast into the waters, as might seem appropriate. Thus people who had died of dropsy were cast into a stream.⁸ Even in recent times the people of Kanaur used to practise immersion of the dead in water (*dūbant*), eating (*bhakhant*), and cremation as well as burial.⁹ Corpses were also cut into pieces and packed into clay pots.¹⁰

Spirits played a great part for good or ill. That of the Miru monastery was carried off even in Buddhist times to Hemis in a bundle of twigs.¹¹ When the country suffered from violent gales, the spirits of the wind were caught in pots and stored up in a *stūpa* which had already been built over the home of an evil spirit.¹²

2. Vitality of early beliefs.—J. G. Frazer has noted the unchanging character of the popular, real religious beliefs in India,¹³ and has also pointed out how the confusion between magic and religion, so general among primitive peoples, was rife in ancient India¹⁴ (see *MAGIC [Indian]*, vol. viii. p. 292). But the 'spirit basis of belief and custom' is probably the key by which Indian magic is to be interpreted. However this may be, we find very little difference and no essential variations in the magical art of destroying an enemy by injuring his image to the accompaniment of appropriate spells, rites, or incantations as described in the *Atharvaveda* and that practised by modern Muhammadans in N. India.¹⁵

(a) *Sun-god*.—The cult of the sun-god is probably most widely conserved in the legend of Rājā Rasālu, in spite of R. C. Temple's efforts to find a historical basis for it.¹⁶ No doubt many historical kings and heroes have been identified with Rasālu, but the principal episodes of his epic are stock incidents in sun-myths. Of these incidents some are found in Buddhist iconography; e.g., his horse is born at the same hour as himself and he is the result of a miraculous conception, like the Buddha

himself, and like the hero-god Gūga of later times.¹

(b) *The headless horseman*.—Another cult, if it can be so termed, of extraordinary vitality in the Panjāb is that of the headless horseman.² The devoted warrior, champion, or devotee who sacrifices his head in fight or sacrifice for his country, his faith, or his honour is found in every creed and at every epoch of the history of the province. According to the Hindu *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, Devī assumed ten incarnations in order to destroy the *rakṣasas*, or demons, and one of them was Chhin-namastakā the 'headless,' which she took upon her to destroy Nisumbha. She is the modern Chām-unda or Chaunda, and appears to be the type in which several modern cults are moulded.

A similar cult of a headless champion of the faith is that of the famous Ghāzi Sālār, or Ghāzi Miyān, the historical Sālār Masaud Ghāzi, nephew of Mahmūd of Ghazni who was killed in A.D. 1033. His headless body is buried at Bahrāich, and his shrine is a place of pilgrimage. He is worshipped in the Panjāb principally in the south-west (cf. above, p. 600).

Other cults of this type are those of Lakkhe Shāh Darwesh, who was killed in a great war in Multān, and whose headless trunk fought its way to Ambāla, which town he cursed so that to this day all the wells within its walls are brackish; the Sayyids of Sonapat, Mirān Shāh and his sister's son Sayyid Kabīr; and the Binsirā, or 'headless' saint, of Pānīpat.

The Hindus of the modern Panjāb still preserve such cults. Thus the Bhandāri section of the Khattrīs reverence Bābā Chūda (? Chāmunda) of Batāla, and perform the ear-piercing ceremony of their sons at his shrine. He too fell fighting, after his head had been severed from his body, in the streets of the town, about 1730 (probably during Nādir Shāh's invasion in 1738), and he is revered as a god.

The Sikhs have several similar legends. The Sikh *miśl*, or confederated regiment of the Shahīds (lit. 'martyrs,' a term borrowed from the Muhammadans), is sometimes said to be a *miśl* of the Akālīs, but other accounts ascribe its name to the heroic death of its founder who fought on horseback long after his head had been struck off in an attack on a Muhammadan governor. See, further, art. SHAHID.

3. *The Vedic cults*.—The Aryan invasions introduced the Vedic religion into the Panjāb, if, indeed, it did not take its rise in its plains. The Veda is not, however, a collection of popular poems, but a redaction of hymns composed in the main by a priestly class, and below or beside the Vedic cults the primitive creeds probably survived. Moreover, the Vedic theology was itself largely a worship of nature. It begins with the worship of things of heaven and ends with worship of those of earth. First come the sky-gods, the sun, also known as Savitar, the enlightener, and Bhaga, 'the bestower of blessings'; then Viṣṇu, the kindly god destined to become one of the Hindu triad. As Pūshan, god of agriculture, roads, and cattle, or Kapardin, 'he of the braided hair,' he is also regarded as forming a link between the Vedic gods and Siva. Dyaus, the shining sky, and Varuna, the sky-god—still worshipped in Chamba as Bīr Batāl or under the Muhammadan name of Khwājāh Khizr³—complete the list. Second comes the god of mid-air, Indra, who gained his ascendancy on

¹ Francke, p. 21. ² *Ib.* p. 96. ³ *Ib.* p. 21.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 22. ⁵ *Ib.* pp. 96, 105. ⁶ *Ib.* p. 105.

⁷ *Ib.* pp. 105, 107. ⁸ *Ib.* p. 23.

⁹ Pandit Tīkā Rām Joshi, 'Ethnography of the Bashahr State,' *JASB*, 1911, p. 536.

¹⁰ Francke, pp. 65, 72, 74.

¹¹ *Ib.* p. 81.

¹² *GB*, pt. vi., *The Scapegoat*, London, 1913, p. 89.

¹³ *Ib.* pt. i., *The Magic Art*, do. 1911, i. 228.

¹⁴ *Ib.* i. 63 f., citing H. W. Magoun, 'The Asuri-Kalpa; a Witchcraft Practice of the Atharva-Veda,' *AJPh* x. [1889] 165-197, and Crooke, *PR* ii. 278 f.

¹⁵ 'Rājā Rasālu,' in *Calcutta Review*, lxxix. [1884] 379 f., or *Selections from Calcutta Review*, ix. [1896] 187.

¹ J. P. Vogel, 'A Græco-Buddhist Sculpture in the Lahore Museum,' *Journal of the Panjab Historical Society*, i. [Calcutta, 1912] 138.

² R. C. Temple, 'Folklore of the Headless Horseman in Northern India,' *Calcutta Review*, lxxvii. [1883] 158 f., or *Selections from Calcutta Review*, viii. [1896] 260 f.

³ *Chamba Gazetteer*, Lahore, 1910, p. 101.

Indian soil, where agriculture depends on the periodical rains. As a war-god he leads the Kṣatriyas on earth as he fought in heaven against the demon that dispersed the rain-clouds. Last come the earth-born gods, Agni, the fire-god, and Soma, the moon-plant (*Aselepias acida*), with intoxicating properties, later to be identified with the moon. Below these is the anthropomorphous Yāma, god of the nether world, whose heaven is guarded by two monstrous dogs. Thither are led the souls of the *pitr̥s*, or sainted dead, who have constantly to be refreshed by the food-offerings of their descendants lest they lose their place in the abodes of the blessed. Hence arose the *śrāddha*, or periodical feast of the dead, which has had far-reaching effects on the development of the theory of sacrifice. The *pitr̥s* themselves have also become godlings. This religion has never perished. It has been transformed out of all recognition, but its elements still survive.

4. **Buddhism.**—The Vedic period lasted from 1500 (or even earlier) down to 200 B.C., but the pretensions of its later developments led to at least two great protestant movements, Jainism and Buddhism. Neither originated in the Panjāb, yet both profoundly influenced its religious evolution. The earlier, Jainism, has left its monuments all over the Panjāb, and is still an organized creed within its borders, especially in the south-east. Buddhism, founded by the Buddha (c. 596–508 B.C.), not only became the State religion under Aśoka and his successors, but penetrated into the valleys which run up into the ranges on its western frontier, flourished especially in the Peshāwar valley, and spread all over the mountainous regions west and north of the Indus into modern Buner, Swāt, Dir, and Chitral, over Kashmir, over all the Himalayan region of the N.E. Panjāb, and into Tibet on its northern frontier. The petty modern State of Mandi (known to Tibetans as Zahor) was a seat of Buddhist learning, and its sacred lake of Rawalsar is still an object of Buddhist pilgrimage. But of the Himalayan cantons only Lahul, Upper Kanaur (in Bashahr State), and the Tibetan valley of Spiti are now at all Buddhist by creed, and the only true Buddhists are the pure Tibetans of the last-named valley.

The protestant movements against orthodox or Brāhmanical Hinduism have, however, often been renewed in other guises. From time to time religious revivals have taken the form of revolts against priestly pretensions or theological intricacies. Of all these movements that of the Sikhs, contemporary with the Reformation in Europe, was the most important and enduring (see art. **SIKHS**).

5. **Zoroastrianism.**—Such are the ingredients of which we have literary evidence, but many other elements enter into the composition of the Panjāb religions. Of these the Iranian is the most important and the most obscure. The connexion of the provinces, especially of the Indus valley, with Persia has often been very close from the days of Darius, son of Hystaspes (521–485 B.C.), onwards, though it was frequently interrupted. The Rāvi, a river of the central Panjāb, anciently called the Iravati (Skr. Airavati¹), is etymologically identical with Haraqaiti, now the Helmand (Arghandāb) in Arachosia. Whether these names were brought into the Panjāb by Indo-Aryans formerly settled in E. Irān, or by Iranians who penetrated into it after the Indo-Aryan invasions, it is impossible to say; but, judging from the history of later times, it is certain that the intercourse between India and Irān was once much closer than it became subse-

quently, and Iranian influences may have been considerable.¹ Similarly, the sacred Sarasvatī, now a mere stream of the eastern Panjāb in the Jamnā valley, probably takes its name from the old designation of the Indus, though the descriptions given of it may refer to a time when it was a far greater river than it is now. Hillebrandt's theory that its name, too, was even applied to the Arghandāb² seems to be untenable. However this may be, the later Vedic period saw the Kurukshetra, or 'battle-field of the Kurus,' marked out in the Jamnā valley, between that river and the Sarasvatī or beyond it. Roughly speaking, it corresponded to the modern Sirhind,³ or rather to the Mughal province of that name, but it extended further south than Cunningham would acknowledge.⁴ Known also as the Dharmakṣetra, or 'holy land,' it was the country of the allied Kuru-Panchāla tribes, and within it the great Brāhmanas were undoubtedly composed. But the rest of the Panjāb, exposed to constant invasions from the north-west, rapidly fell away and was lost to orthodox Hinduism, Vedic and Brāhmanical, with the exception of the Himalayan area, where Brāhmanism has always held a strong footing. The Hinduism of the later Vedic and post-Vedic periods was elastic. It admitted not only Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas, but even men of the lowest castes, to Brāhmanhood, and was able and willing to receive foreigners into its fold. Thus, as D. R. Bhandarkar has shown,⁵ Greeks (or at any rate Græco-Bactrians) became Hindu Vaiśnavas as well as Buddhists. Sakas, Abhīras, and Kushanas similarly entered both folds, and on the coins of the latter dynasty we find Hindu, Greek, and Iranian deities figured as well as the Buddha. Just as the Hūnas, or White Ephthalites, became one of the thirty-six genuine Kāṣṭh families, so they and their contemporaries, the Gñjars, became Hinduized. But some of these invaders brought with them Persian *magi*, who became Maga or Sākadvīpi Brāhmanas; and the *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa* relates how Sāmba, son of Kṛṣṇa, suffering from white leprosy, was advised by the sage Nārada to build a temple to Sūrya, the sun-god, on the Chenāb. Thus was founded the great sun-temple at Multān (Sāmba-pura) which was destroyed in the Muhammadan invasions. To serve it ten Maga families had to be brought from Sākadvīpa. They are described as descended from Jarashasta (Zoroaster), and as belonging to the Mihira (a Sanskritized form of the Old Persian Mihr) *gotra*. But Mihirakula (a Sanskritized form of the Persian Mihrkul), son of the Hūna king Toramāna, was converted to the worship of Śiva, and founded a dynasty in Kashmir, which was long a staunch patron of Brāhmanism. Traces of Zoroastrian fire-worship, however, still existed in the Panjāb down to the time of Timūr, as he mentions his destruction of temples dedicated to it⁶ in the valley of the Jamnā.

6. **Islām.**—Side by side with these Hindu and Hinduized cults, Buddhism held its ground, at all events in a debased form, until the Muhammadan invasions. Beginning with inroads from Sind and the conquest of Multān in A.D. 712, Islām obtained a firm footing in the S.W. Panjāb before the rest of these provinces came under its influence, and the oldest Muhammadan shrines in the Panjāb are those at Uch Sharif, now in Bahawalpur, and other places in that State and the adjoining British territory. The later conquests of Muhammad of

¹ It is not necessary to go as far as A. Hillebrandt and place the action of the sixth *maṇḍala* of the R̥gveda in Arachosia.

² II. 437.

³ Macdonell and Keith, I. 170.

⁴ *Archæological Survey Report*, Simla, 1871, II. 215 f.; cf. Rose, *IA* xxxii. [1893].

⁵ *IA* xl. [1911] 18.

⁶ H. M. Elliot, *Hist. of India*, London, 1867–77, III. [1871] 481.

⁷ The gods Yazdān and Ahīmān are expressly said to be worshipped.

¹ J. W. McGrindle, *Ancient India as described in Classical Literature*, London, 1901, p. 27. Its Vedic name was Parusini (A. A. Macdonell and A. B. Keith, *Vedic Index of Names and Subjects*, London, 1912, I. 499).

Ghor and Mahmūd of Ghaznī had singularly little effect on the religions of the Panjāb people as a whole. Though Delhi fell to the former in 1193, the Muhammadans under the Turk Sultāns were too fully employed in the conquest of Hindustan to force conversion on the province, and it was probably not until the Pathāns or Afghāns established themselves firmly in the tracts west of the Indus in the 15th cent. that Islām became the dominant creed, as it is now, in the N.W. Frontier Province and the W. Panjāb. Tradition still preserves memories of Aurangzib's proselytizing zeal, but all the influences combined only succeeded in making the fertile tracts along the great rivers Muhammadan. The naturally barren uplands and the hills to the north and east of the Panjāb remained Hindu or became Sikh. The Kohistān, or mountain region north of the Indus, appears to have been slowly conquered or converted to Islām, and Kāfiristān (*q.v.*) remained primitively pagan down to the time of the late Amīr Abdurrahmān of Afghānistān, if, indeed, it can be said to have yet entirely lost its independence or its ancient faiths. Moreover, the Muhammadan conquest of Sind and Multān was largely effected by schismatics who were compelled or encouraged to find scope for their activities on the remoter frontiers of the Khalifate, rather than at the heart of its dominions. Heretical movements were thus potent from the inception of the Islāmic inroads, and to this cause may be ascribed the chequered history of its progress in the Panjāb. Šūfiistic ideas have always found a congenial soil on the frontiers of Islām, and among the Khojas and other followers of the Ismā'īlian doctrine some of the earliest protestants against its most rigidly orthodox system are still represented.

It is hardly open to question that many of the first Muhammadan shrines were founded on the sites of ancient Buddhist, Hindu, or Jain fanes. Uch itself was anciently known as Deogarh—a name which suggests a religious origin.¹

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practices current which are not easily reconcilable with orthodox Islām. Sakhi Sarwar in particular represents the centre of an ancient cult of the earth and its fertility, and is the object of pilgrimage to the Sultāni sect.

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7. Guga.—The cult of Guga merits somewhat detailed notice.

Guga, or Gugga Chauhan (a Rājput tribe, the ancient Chandamāna), was king of Garh Dadner near Brindaban, and a son of Devi Chand and Bāchila his queen, the latter's sister Kāchila being wife of the king of Garh Mālwa. Both these queens were childless, but by performing *tapas* ('austerities') Bāchila won the regard of Yogi Gorakhnāth. He promised her the boon of a son, but Kāchila, hearing of the promise, forestalled her sister and was given two barleycorns by the Yogi. These she ate and in due course bore twin sons—Arjan and Surjan. When Bāchila visited the Yogi, he reproached her for coming to him again and, incensed at his words, she turned away. Although her hair had already turned grey, she practised *tapas* for twelve years more. Gorakhnāth then came to her again and, placing some ashes in her hand, bade her keep them, but she took umbrage at the form of his gift and threw them away. From them sprang Nurya and Gurya Siddhs, who worshipped Gorakhnāth. He then gave Bāchila a second handful of ashes, bidding her swallow them at home, but she did so on the spot and returned to her palace well advanced in pregnancy. Taunted by her husband with 'having got a bastard from the Yogis and Gosains,' she set out for the house of her father, Rājā Kīrpāl of Ajmer, but on the way her oxen stopped and refused to move. A voice from her womb bade her turn back or her child would not be born for twelve years. When the cart was turned round, the oxen went back to Garh Dadner, and she resumed her place in the palace, where her son, Guga, was born on the first Sunday in Māgh. When he was seven years old, his father abdicated and he became Rājā. Bāchila also had a daughter, Gugerī.

Guga, or Rājā Mundlikh, as he was called, was betrothed to Surjila, a daughter of the Rājā of Bangālā, although she had already been promised to Bāsāk Nāg. Guga set out for Gaur Bangālā with an army of 900,000 men and 62 *bīrs*, or champions, including Kailū Bir his *kottāl* and Hanumān Bir. Kailū Bir, mounted on his steed Agandūāria, sprang across a river to spy out a hostile camp. Leaving his horse, he disguised himself as a Brāhman and met Kalihar Nāg, Bāsāk Nāg's chief officer, who told him of his master's intent to destroy Mundlikh's army and Kailū Bir himself. The latter bade Kalihar conceal his men in some long grass and ambush Mundlikh's army as it advanced. Then he mounted his steed and made it prance. At the second kick its hoofs struck out sparks which set fire to the grass and destroyed the Nāg army. A third bound carried Kailū Bir back over the river to Mundlikh's army. Advancing to Bangālā, he was met by a sorceress commissioned by Surjila to bewitch

¹ *Bahawalpur State Gazetteer*, Lahore, 1904, pp. 161, 385. But it may be named after its Hindu ruler, Deo Singh. Tradition ascribes one of its mounds (*ucha*, 'the height') to the mythical Rājā Hodi.

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³ *Id.* p. 119 ff.

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⁵ *E.g.*, the Shino Bazono, or spring festival, is clearly the Basant Panchmi of the Panjāb (*ib.* p. 95). The moon is eclipsed by Gralin, a giant (p. 107). The worship of a goddess is still in vogue among the women; she is called Sri Bai (p. 103). Nāgi Suchami, another goddess, is still remembered, if not worshipped (p. 103).

him into losing all desire to return to Garh Dadner. She cast a garland of flowers round his neck, but Hanumān detected the spell and at his cry the garland broke and fell off. Thrice this occurred, and the third time the sorceress fell down, exposing her nakedness, who reproved Hanumān for behaviour, took offence and returned to Garh Dadner, declaring that his master would be condemned to remain twelve years in Bangla. After the marriage Mundlikh was overcome with love for his wife, and his followers also came under a spell and were dispersed as servants or slaves all over Bengal for twelve years. Meanwhile disasters fell upon Garh Dadner. Arjan and Surjan regarded themselves as in a sense the sons of Bāchila, having been born in virtue of the boon promised to her, and as such entitled to a share in the kingdom. A wondrous calf, called Panch-kālāni, was also born about this time in Dadner, and they also coveted its possession. So they invaded the kingdom and invited Mahmūd of Ghazni to help them. It fell an easy prey, as all its warriors were absent, but Bāchila and her daughter Gugerī held out in the citadel. Looking from its ramparts and seeing the city in ruins, Bāchila called to Mundlikh, but in vain. Then Gugerī entered his chamber and found all as he had left it. When she invoked his name, his sword flew to her hand, and, donning his head-dress, she sallied forth, attacked the enemy, and routed them single-handed. Then she bethought her of her husband, who lived not far away, and sent him word.

He had been practising *tapas* for a long time, and had seen Mundlikh in a dream fighting without his head. Accompanied by Narsingh Bir, Kāl Bir, and three other bīrs, he reached Bengal, and, disguised as mendicants, he and his companions went from door to door singing the songs of Garh Dadner. One day Mundlikh heard them and insisted on seeing the singers. Recognizing Ajālpāl, he threw off the spell, freed his enthralled followers, and, accompanied by Surjia, returned to Dadner, where he resumed his throne. He is said to have fought thirteen battles with the Muhammadans, and in the last of them his neck was cut through by a *chakra*, or discus, hurled from above, but his head did not fall. Mounted on his steed Nīlarath, and attended by Ajālpāl, who recollected his vision, he fought on. It was believed that, if his head did not fall for two and a half *gharis* (60 minutes, but two and a half is probably a euphemism for three, so 72 minutes may be meant), he would survive, but, when two *gharis* had passed, four kites appeared and exclaimed at the sight of Mundlikh fighting without his head. Hearing their words, he put up his hand to his turban and turned towards Ajālpāl. His head thus lost its balance and rolled off. He himself fell dead from his horse. This befell on the ninth day of the dark half of Bhādon, the Gūganaumi, and during that month and for eight days after that date his *śrāddha* is observed every year at his shrines.

After his death Surjia refused to don a widow's garb, averring that every night he visited her and was alive. But once Gugerī was allowed to conceal herself in the room where Surjia awaited his coming. At midnight a horse's tramp was heard and, when Guga had dismounted, she slipped out and clasped his horse round the neck. In this position she remained and was carried for some distance when Guga rode off. At last he detected her presence and said that, having been seen by her, he could never return.

J. Hutchison, of the Chamba Mission, from whose MS notes the last paragraph above is taken, adds: 'The above version of the Guga legend is current in the Chamba hills; and it is noteworthy that in it there is no mention of Guga having become a Muhammadan or of his having held any intercourse with Muhammadans. It may therefore be assumed to represent the older versions of the legend. As to the historical facts underlying the legend, it seems not improbable that by Guga is indicated one of the Rājput kings of the time of Muhammad of Ghor. The mention of Ral Pithora or Prithvirāja, the last Hindu Rājā of Delhi, makes this probable. He reigned from A.D. 1170 to 1193. The name Mundlikh was probably a title given to Rājput warriors who distinguished themselves in the wars of the time. There were five Rājās who bore this title among the Chudāsana princes of Gīrnār in Kāthiāwār, the first of whom joined Bhīma deva of Guzerāt in the pursuit of Mahmūd of Ghazni in A.D. 1023. From the Chauhan bards, his enemies, we learn that Jaya Chandra Rāthor, the last king of Kannauj (killed in A.D. 1194), also bore this title. He had taken a leading part in the wars with the Muhammadans, whom he repeatedly defeated and drove back across the Indus. But at last, enraged with Prithvirāja of Delhi, he invited Muhammad of Ghor to invade the Panjāb, with the result that both Delhi and Kannauj were overthrown and the Muhammadans triumphed. Jai Chand was drowned in the Ganges in attempting to escape.'

This is, of course, pure legend. Guga probably typifies the devotion of the champion who sacrifices his life in battle and, like him, bears the title of Mundlikh.

8. Hinduism.—Although Hinduism in the Panjāb was for centuries depressed under the Muslim domination, it never lost its vitality even in the plains, and in the Himālayas it flourished. In W. Panjāb it was at one time almost suppressed, but it was largely revived under the Mughals by Bairāgi

Gosains.¹ All through the Muhammadan period Tilla, the Bālnāth of the Yogis, in the eastern Salt Range, preserved its character as a centre of Hindu pilgrimage and worship. The Kurukshetra never lost its sanctity, and Thānesar remained and still is the centre of a great yearly religious fair. But no great seat of religious teaching survived. Modern Hinduism in the Panjāb largely owes its revival to the Arya Samāj (*q.v.*). The great sects of modern Hinduism are equally represented in the Panjāb, but Śaivism appears to have been the first in the field, if the peculiar sanctity attaching to Kailās, the great Himālayan peak in the upper Sutlej, is proof of its antiquity in that tract. It is the home of Śiva. In Chamba State also the Gadderan, or territory of the Gaddi tribe, is a Śiv-bhūmi, or land of Śiva. But this tribe's traditions make it a comparatively modern immigrant into its present seats, and the cult of Śiva cannot be said to be native to or even very ancient in the Himālayan area.

In the Panjāb Himālayas.—The processes by which the ancient faiths of the Panjāb—the Vedic religion, Buddhism, Jainism, and the popular forms of its animistic philosophy—gave birth to modern Hinduism differed in no way from those at work in the rest of India, and will not be described here. It will suffice to say that, though the Jains of the modern Panjāb are few in number, Jain ideas still subsist among the people.² Buddhism merged into Hinduism by easy stages, and in the Himālayan State of Chamba, in Kulu, and other Himālayan valleys, that *nāga*-worship which latter-day Buddhism revived or at least tolerated is still widespread.³ Its ritual differs little from that of the worship of Devi. But the distinctive feature of Himālayan Hinduism is best preserved in the Simla Hills, which are split up into religious jurisdictions, analogous to but not identical with those of the secular or temporal kingdoms and feudatory States into which they are divided. It is possible that some of these territorial gods are of great antiquity, but, owing to the system which prevails of getting rid of an inefficient deity and replacing him by one more successful, it is improbable that many very ancient deities have survived to the present day. A type of such a deity is Jungū, with his twenty-two *īkās*, or feudatory gods, who gives his name to the capital of the State now called Keonthal, near Simla.⁴ When a temple is struck by lightning and burnt—as may easily happen to a wooden temple in the hills—its destruction is attributed to the new god, and the old one disappears, or at least his cult is abandoned.⁵ In other cases he is reduced to a position of vassalage or becomes the new god's chief minister, champion, or servant. Another typical cult is that of the Dūms,⁶ who are found at several centres either singly or as a pair of twin brethren. A third, the family of Mareehh, is represented by seven members, each located at his own temple. The original Mareehh was also named Dithu and came from the Mansarowar lake nearly 4000 years ago. The name Mareehh is said to mean 'dirty' and to be due to the original worship of this deity, which consisted in burning the hair of the dead in *ghī*. A similar cult is that of Māl Padoi, who appears under four names at as

¹ E. D. MacLagan, *Panjāb Census Report*, Calcutta, 1892, p. 127 f.

² Rose, *Panjāb Census Report*, Simla, 1902, p. 218. The aversion to a widower's re-marrying is on the whole strongest in the S.E. Panjāb, where Jain influence is greatest.

³ Vogel, in *Chamba Gazetteer*, Lahore, 1904, p. 185 f.; see also pp. 170-189 for an account of these cults. The antiquity of *nāga*-worship may be gauged from the metamorphosis of the Vedic Indra into Indrū Nāg (*ib.* p. 185). For some other Devil cults see *Simla Hill States Gazetteer*, Lahore, 1904, under 'Keonthal State,' Appendix, p. viii, and *Simla Gazetteer*, Lahore, 1904, pp. 45-48.

⁴ Rose, in *J.A.* xxxvi. [1907] 33 ff., reprinted as Appendix to 'Keonthal State,' in *Simla Hill States Gazetteer*.

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him into losing all desire to return to Garh Dadner. She cast a garland of flowers round his neck, but Hanumân detected the spell and at his cry the garland broke and fell off. Thrice this occurred, and the third time the sorceress's nether garment also fell down, exposing her nakedness. She complained to Mundlikh, who reproved Hanumân for behaving like a monkey. At this he took offence and returned to Garh Dadner, declaring that his master would be condemned to remain twelve years in Bangālā. After the marriage Mundlikh was overcome with love for his wife, and his followers also came under a spell and were dispersed as servants or slaves all over Bengal for twelve years. Meanwhile disasters fell upon Garh Dadner. Arjan and Surjan regarded themselves as in a sense the sons of Bāchila, having been born in virtue of the boon promised to her, and as such entitled to a share in the kingdom. A wondrous calf, called Panch-kallāni, was also born about this time in Dadner, and they also coveted its possession. So they invaded the kingdom and invited Mahmūd of Ghazni to help them. It fell an easy prey, as all its warriors were absent, but Bāchila and her daughter Gugerî held out in the citadel. Looking from its ramparts and seeing the city in ruins, Bāchila called to Mundlikh, but in vain. Then Gugerî entered his chamber and found all as he had left it. When she invoked his name, his sword flew to her hand, and, donning his head-dress, she sallied forth, attacked the enemy, and routed them single-handed. Then she bethought her of the champion Ajiapāl, who lived not far away, and sent him word to bring back Mundlikh. He had been practising *tapas* for a long time, and had seen Mundlikh in a dream fighting without his head. Accompanied by Narsingh Bir, Kālî Bir, and three other *biras*, he reached Bengal, and, disguised as mendicants, he and his companions went from door to door singing the songs of Garh Dadner. One day Mundlikh heard them and insisted on seeing the singers. Recognizing Ajiapāl, he threw off the spell, freed his enthralled followers, and, accompanied by Surjila, returned to Dadner, where he resumed his throne. He is said to have fought thirteen battles with the Muhammadans, and in the last of them his neck was cut through by a *chakra*, or discus, hurled from above, but his head did not fall. Mounted on his steed Nilarath, and attended by Ajiapāl, who recollected his vision, he fought on. It was believed that, if his head did not fall for two and a half *gharis* (60 minutes, but two and a half is probably a euphemism for three, so 72 minutes may be meant), he would survive, but, when two *gharis* had passed, four kites appeared and exclaimed at the sight of Mundlikh fighting without his head. Hearing their words, he put up his hand to his turban and turned towards Ajiapāl. His head thus lost its balance and rolled off. He himself fell dead from his horse. This befell on the ninth day of the dark half of Bhādon, the Gughanaumi, and during that month and for eight days after that date his *śrāddha* is observed every year at his shrines.

After his death Surjila refused to don a widow's garb, averring that every night he visited her and was alive. But once Gugerî was allowed to conceal herself in the room where Surjila awaited his coming. At midnight a horse's tramp was heard and, when Guga had dismounted, she slipped out and clasped his horse round the neck. In this position she remained and was carried for some distance when Guga rode off. At last he detected her presence and said that, having been seen by her, he could never return.

J. Hutchison, of the Chamba Mission, from whose MS notes the last paragraph above is taken, adds: 'The above version of the Gugga legend is current in the Chamba hills; and it is noteworthy that in it there is no mention of Gugga having become a Muhammadan or of his having held any intercourse with Muhammadans. It may therefore be assumed to represent the older versions of this legend. As to the historical facts underlying the legend, it seems not improbable that by Gugga is indicated one of the Rājapūt kings of the time of Muhammad of Ghor. The mention of Rai Pithora or Prith-wirāja, the last Hindu Rājā of Delhi, makes this probable. He reigned from A.D. 1170 to 1193. The name Mundlikh was probably who distinguished themselves were five Rājās who bore this title among the Chudāsama princes of Guznār in Kāthiāwār, the first of whom joined Bhima deva of Guznār in the pursuit of Mahmūd of Ghazni in A.D. 1023. From the Chāuhān bards, his enemies, we learn that Jaya Chandra Rāthor, the last king of Kanauj (killed in A.D. 1194), also bore this title. He had taken a leading part in the wars with the Muhammadans, whom he routed at the battle of the Indus, and drew back across the Indus. But at the arrival of Prithwirāja of Delhi, he invited Muhammad of Ghor to invade the Panjab, with the result that both Delhi and Kanauj were overthrown and the Muhammadans triumphed. Jai Chand was drowned in the Ganges in attempting to escape.'

This is, of course, pure legend. Guga probably typifies the devotion of the champion who sacrifices his life in battle and, like him, bears the title of Mundlikh.

8. Hinduism.—Although Hinduism in the Panjāb was for centuries depressed under the Muslim domination, it never lost its vitality even in the plains, and in the Himālayas it flourished. In W. Panjāb it was at one time almost suppressed, but it was largely revived under the Mughals by Bairāgi

Gosains.¹ All through the Muhammadan period Tilla, the Bālnāth of the Yogis, in the eastern Salt Range, preserved its character as a centre of Hindn pilgrimage and worship. The Kurukshetra never lost its sanctity, and Thānesar remained and still is the centre of a great yearly religious fair. But no great seat of religious teachings survived. Modern Hinduism in the Panjāb largely owes its revival to the Arya Samāj (*q.v.*). The great sects of modern Hinduism are equally represented in the Panjāb, but Saivism appears to have been the first in the field, if the peculiar sanctity attaching to Kailās, the great Himālayan peak in the upper Sutlej, is proof of its antiquity in that tract. It is the home of Siva. In Chamba State also the Gaddēran, or territory of the Gaddi tribe, is a Śiv-bhūmi, or land of Siva. But this tribe's traditions make it a comparatively modern immigrant into its present seats, and the cult of Siva cannot be said to be native to or even very ancient in the Himālayan area.

In the Panjāb Himālayas.—The processes by which the ancient faiths of the Panjāb—the Vedic religion, Buddhism, Jainism, and the popular forms of its animistic philosophy—gave birth to modern Hinduism differed in no way from those at work in the rest of India, and will not be described here. It will suffice to say that, though the Jains of the modern Panjāb are few in number, Jain ideas still subsist among the people.² Buddhism merged into Hinduism by easy stages, and in the Himālayan State of Chamba, in Kulu, and other Himālayan valleys, that *nāga*-worship which latter-day Buddhism revived or at least tolerated is still widespread.³ Its ritual differs little from that of the worship of Devi. But the distinctive feature of Himālayan Hinduism is best preserved in the Simla Hills, which are split up into religious jurisdictions, analogous to but not identical with those of the secular or temporal kingdoms and feudatory States into which they are divided. It is possible that some of these territorial gods are of great antiquity, but, owing to the system which prevails of getting rid of an inefficient deity and replacing him by one more successful, it is improbable that many very ancient deities have survived to the present day. A type of such a deity is Jungi, with his twenty-two *īkās*, or feudatory gods, who gives his name to the capital of the State now called Keonthāl, near Simla.⁴ When a temple is struck by lightning and burnt—as may easily happen to a wooden temple in the hills—its destruction is attributed to the new god, and the old one disappears, or at least his cult is abandoned.⁵ In other cases he is reduced to a position of vassalage or becomes the new god's chief minister, champion, or servant. Another typical cult is that of the Dāms,⁶ who are found at several centres either singly or as a pair of twin brethren. A third, the family of Marechh, is represented by seven members, each located at his own temple. The original Marechh was also named Dithu and came from the Mansarowar lake nearly 4000 years ago. The name Marechh is said to mean 'dirty' and to be due to the original worship of this deity, which consisted in burning the hair of the dead in *ghī*. A similar cult is that of Māl Padol, who appears under four names at as

¹ E. D. MacLagan, *Panjāb Census Report*, Calcutta, 1892, p. 1271.

² Rose, *Panjāb Census Report*, Simla, 1902, p. 218. The aversion to a widower's re-marrying is on the whole strongest in the S.E. Panjāb, where Jain influence is greatest.

³ Vogel, in *Chamba Gazetteer*, Lahore, 1904, p. 183 f.; see also pp. 176-189 for an account of these cults. The antiquity of *nāga*-worship may be gauged from the metamorphosis of the Vedic Indra into Indrā Nag (*ib.* p. 155). For some other Devi cults see *Simla Hill States Gazetteer*, Lahore, 1903, under 'Keonthāl State,' Appendix, p. viii, and *Sirmūr Gazetteer*, Lahore, 1904, pp. 45-48.

⁴ Rose, in *IA xxxvi*, [1907] 33 ff., reprinted as Appendix to 'Keonthāl State,' in *Simla Hill States Gazetteer*.

⁵ *ib.* p. iv.

⁶ *ib.* 'Kumbhārain State,' p. 10 f.

many places. His original name was Mūl and he is only 1500 years old, but he is now generally called Padoi. In Malāna, an inaccessible valley in Kulu on the Tibet border (but not in direct contact with the Tibetan canton of Spiti), the cult of Jamlū has its centre, and the valley is governed by a theocratic republic.¹ Jamlū is probably the Hindu Jamdagga, but one tale makes him Jaimal Khān, a Mughal general.

Nevertheless in the Panjāb Himālayas the cults of these primitive types are inextricably interwoven with the fabric of orthodox Hinduism, and tradition preserves some of the history of its advent into the hills. Thus the most interesting Vaiṣṇava cult in Bashahr State and other parts of the Sutlej valley is that of Pars Rām, whose apostles, the Parsrāmi Brāhmins, are said to have introduced the Bhūnda sacrifice, in which a low-caste Beḍa rides down a huge rope stretched 400 or 500 ft. down a ravine. This rite was subsequently adopted at any place where a Parsrāmi settled and even celebrated in honour of deities other than Pars Rām.² The State of Bashahr itself was founded by Pardhuman, a grandson of Śrī Kṛṣṇa, who came to marry the daughter of Rājā Banasur,³ the 'demon' king, whose capital lay in Kamrū, in a remote canton of Kanaur on the upper Sutlej. Having killed the Rājā, Pardhuman usurped his kingdom, but the Rājā's three sons became *maheśras*, or village deities, and are still worshipped at picturesque temples in as many villages, while his daughter is the goddess Ukha at Nachār. But the State religion is centred in the temple of Bhīma Kālī at Sarāhan, to which one of the *maheśras* is now *wazīr*, or chief minister.⁴

9. Nature-worship.—Throughout the hills nature-worship may be described as dominating all other cults, indigenous or imported. Thus Kālī embodies *sakti*, the female principle, and the great majority of the hill people are Śāktas, or worshippers of it. The tops of hills are usually sacred to this goddess, but the Dhār Chūr, or Chūr Peak, is the abode of Śhrigul (probably Śrī Gurū), a manifestation of Śiva himself.⁵ With his cult is connected that of Bijat, the lightning-god (whose sister Bijār has a temple seven storeys high), and also that of Ghat-rālī, another goddess sister to Bijat.⁶

But the worship of nature in all its aspects is not confined to the hills. It may with truth be said to be at any rate the basis of most of the popular cults in the plains also.

10. Proselytism.—Changes of religion in the Panjāb are not uncommon. Thus a Hindu, even a Brāhmin, may become a Sikh, and many Khattris are adherents of that sect—which is natural enough, seeing that its founder was himself a Khattri by caste. Islām claims many converts, but has made no marked progress since the time of Aurangzib, who put pressure on the Hindus and constrained many to adopt his faith. Modern converts to Islām, Christianity, and Sikhism are largely drawn to those creeds by the prospects of social promotion which they offer, conversion freeing those of low caste or out-castes from the stigma which Hinduism affixes to them. Such converts

may form new castes, like the Mazbi or Mazhabī Sikhs, who were by origin Chūhrās, or scavengers, outside the Hindu pale. Muhammadan converts hardly form new castes, but they are known as Nau-Muslim, 'new Muslims' or Din-dār, 'holders of the faith.' Khoja is a term applied to any man of Chūhrā status converted to Islām, but it is also the term for a body of high-caste Khattris who were converted to Islām some centuries ago, and who now form a distinct caste, if such a term can be applied to a Muhammadan group. A curious type of 'conversion' is found in one or two tracts where Hindu tribes dwelling on a Muhammadan border-land take wives from their neighbours. The bride, by birth a Muslim, is made to enter the Hindu fold. Strange as it may appear, it is very usual for Hindus to affect Muhammadan saints, and many Hindus or so-called Sikhs affect the famous Sakhi Sarwar, while the Hindu Sunārs ('goldsmiths') are often devotees of the Āghā Khān of Bombay, the representative of the sect of the Assassins.⁷ The most striking instance of this blending of Hinduism and Islām is found in the south-east of the Panjāb, in the Mewāt or Meo country.

The Meos are a Hindu people, made up of fragments of Rājput tribes, and they bear indifferently Hindu or Muhammadan personal names. The great saint of the Mewāt was born of Muhammadan parents, but bore the Hindu name of Lāl Dās. He is associated in worship with the stream which bears the name of Chuhar Sidh, a legendary personage famous only as a vulgar miracle-monger. His life was spent in its neighbourhood, and, when its overflow formed a pool, a Lāl Dāsī *sādh*, or monk, was regarded as its natural custodian. But Lāl Dās's own teaching was singularly practical and free from self-glorification and superstition. He inculcated industry and condemned mendicancy. The *sādh* was to be fearless in speech. Spiritual courage was enjoined, and, though asceticism is praised, its absurd excesses are not recommended. Kindliness is justly claimed as an essential part of his system, but it was tempered by a just severity. He caused the death of a Mughal who had laid hands on another man's wife, and bade his successor designate, who shrank from the responsibility of governing the infant sect, either accept the office or bury himself alive. While he performed miracles, he taught that fame and wonder-working would pass away like the wind, that purity and gentleness alone availed. He died about 1647, at the age of 107, if tradition speaks true.⁸ Another saint, Charn Dās, also born in the Mewāt, founded a more orthodox Hindu sect and is buried at Delhi.⁹ Wilson classes his followers as a Vaiṣṇava sect.

11. Christianity.—In such a tolerant milieu Christianity makes considerable progress, but its converts are nearly all drawn from the lower castes, who by adherence to Christianity or to Islām obtain release from the bondage of the Hindu caste system. The invincible eclecticism of India causes members of the higher castes to absorb Christianity, weld it into their own and other established creeds, and sometimes found a new comprehensive sect like that of the Chetrāmis, which teaches that Allāh is the Creator, Parmeshvar the Preserver, and Khudā the Destroyer, while holding to the doctrine of a Christian Trinity.⁵

LITERATURE.—This is given in the footnotes. See also D. C. J. Ibbetson, *Panjāb Census Report*, Calcutta, 1883, the part of which is reprinted as *Panjāb Ethnography* contains his chapters on religion; E. D. MacLagan and Pandit Harikishan Kaul, *Panjāb Census Reports*, Calcutta, 1892 and 1913 respectively.

H. A. ROSE.

PANPSYCHISM.—Panpsychism is the doctrine that whatever exists is essentially soul or spirit—in the sense, however, not of a single or universal spirit, of which all thought and life are the 'appearance' or expression, but of distinct individual souls. Being a soul implies the power

¹ Lit. 'faithful.'

² Converts to this cult are not confined to the goldsmith caste. They may be of any caste, are called Ismā'īlis, accept 'Alī as God, and yet appear to remain good Hindus.

³ P. W. Powlett, 'The Saint of Mewāt,' *Calcutta Review*, lxxviii. [1879] 104, or *Selections from Calcutta Review*, v. [1895] 441; also Powlett, *Gazetteer of Ulwar*, London, 1879, p. 63, and Rose, *Glossary*, iii. 24 ft.

⁴ H. H. Wilson, 'Hindoo Sects,' *Works*, i. (London, 1867) 178; Powlett, *Gazetteer of Ulwar*, p. 591; Rose, *Glossary*, ii. 37 f.

⁵ Rose, *Glossary*, ii. 167 f.

¹ Rose, *Glossary of Panjāb Tribes and Castes*, Lahore, 1914, iii. 263 (s.v. 'Rā-deo').

² *Simla Hill States Gazetteer*, 'Bashahr State,' p. 30 f. For an account of the cult of Pars Rām in Sirmūr, where it is important and free from any trace of human sacrifice, see *Sirmūr State Gazetteer*, Lahore, 1904, p. 39 f.

³ *Simla Hill States Gazetteer*, 'Bashahr State,' pp. 5, 32. Banasur was also called Bavasa Deo, and a variant of the legend gives the present ruling family a Brāhmin origin, one of two pilgrim brothers having been elected to succeed to the throne on the extinction of the old dynasty because he was the first to enter the temple of Bhīma Kālī at a given moment, while his elder brother became priest of the ruling family—an office still held by his descendants (p. 6).

⁴ *Id.* pp. 27, 16.

⁵ *Sirmūr State Gazetteer*, p. 42 ft.

⁶ *Id.* p. 43 ft.

of representing or being aware of the world (i.e. other souls), the possibility of change, and the power of striving to resist change or to direct it towards expansion or development—presentation, affection, and conation. All material things, organized or unorganized, living or dead, are 'in reality' souls. The difficulty is to decide what is 'a thing.' This difficulty is obviated by the assumptions (1) that the universe is made up of discrete entities, that matter is not divisible *ad infinitum*, but that everywhere science in the last resort will come upon the atom, the individual; each such atom is 'animate'; (2) that, when atoms form groups which act independently upon other groups, it is a higher soul that gives unity and consistency—'thingness'—to the group; instances are the living cell, the animal, the 'world' (sun, planet, etc.). Hence we have a hierarchy of souls, from the simple to the complex, with increasing width of representation and intensity of feeling

and of effort. The theory neither requires nor excludes the idea of a single dominant spirit, but most panpsychists do assume that there is one supreme in intelligence, love, and power, by which the activities of all others are co-ordinated to a definite end.

Leibniz (*q.v.*) is the classical panpsychist, but in some form or other the doctrine has prevailed throughout the whole history of philosophy, from the Greek Hylozoists down through G. Bruno and T. Campanella to G. T. Fechner, R. H. Lotze, William James, and H. Bergson.

LITERATURE.—G. W. Leibniz, *Monadology*, and *Principles of Nature and of Grace*, both tr. in R. Latta, *The Monadology and other Philosophical Writings*, Oxford, 1898; G. T. Fechner, *Nanna, oder über das Seelenleben der Pflanzen*, Hamburg, 1903, *Zend-Avesta*, do. 1901; R. H. Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1885-86, *Metaphysics*, pt. II. of *System of Philosophy*, Eng. tr., Oxford, 1884; William James, *A Pluralistic Universe*, London, 1909, *Some Problems of Philosophy*, do. 1911; H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Eng. tr., do. 1912.

J. L. MCINTYRE.

PANTHEISM.

Introductory (A. E. GARVIE), p. 609.

Greek and Roman (FRANK THILLY), p. 613.

PANTHEISM (Introductory).—1. Definition.

—Pantheism, according to the etymology, is the view that all is God, and that God is all, but, since thought may move either from God to all or from all to God, it can assume two forms. If it begins with the religious belief or the philosophic faith in God as infinite and eternal reality, then the finite and temporal world is swallowed up in God, and pantheism becomes acosmism (*q.v.*), i.e. the world is an illusion in comparison with God as reality. If it begins with the scientific conception or the poetic vision of the world as unity, then God is lost in the world, and pantheism becomes pancosmism (*q.v.*). The first is theistic, and the second atheistic; for in the first, if inconsistently, there still survives as a rule a vague apprehension of God as theism conceives Him, and in the second the *deus* becomes but a name for the unity of the world, the multiplicity of which alone is real for observation and imagination. A. M. Fairbairn is not quite just to the religious worth of the first type as compared with the second when he regards them as identical.

'Pantheism and Pankosmism are but the ideal and real sides of the same thought. The pantheist is a metaphysician, the pankosmist a physicist, and they are distinguished by what is but a verbal difference. In neither case can what occupies the place of Deity be an ethical and personal Being' (*Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and History*, London, 1870, p. 302).

The pantheist of the first type is usually more than a metaphysician, as he is often dominated by a religious rather than speculative interest; e.g., how different are Spinoza and Haeckel! The one clothes an intense piety in an altogether too scanty philosophical garment; the other uses the word 'God' only as a fig-leaf to hide the nakedness of his materialistic monism.¹ We may dismiss the

¹ Haeckel denies that his system is materialistic and defines his position as follows: 'On the contrary, we hold, with Goethe, that "matter cannot exist and be operative without spirit, nor spirit without matter." We adhere firmly to the pure unequivocal monism of Spinoza: matter, or indefinitely extended substance, and Spirit (or energy), or sensitive and thinking substance, are the two essential attributes, or principal properties, of the world, the universal substance.'—*Monism*, tr. J. McCabe, London, 1903, p. 8).

This identifying of spirit with energy gives his system, in spite of his protestations, a materialistic character, and matter and mind in the working out of it are not left as parallel and distinct attributes of one substance, but are causally related. One difficulty of the system, Kūpe points out, is that 'the terms energy and spirit or soul are used without distinction beside and for one another.' Another is that 'the soul life on the one

Hindu (A. S. GEDEN), p. 617.

second type of pantheism as equivalent to naturalism (*q.v.*), and confine ourselves to the first.

2. Origin and emphasis.—The origin of this type of pantheism is either philosophical or religious. The pantheism of Hegel has its roots in the soil of the speculative intellect, the pantheism of Brāhmanism in the soil of the religious spirit. However philosophical in form Spinoza's pantheism is, yet its essence is religious; and the piety often breaks the bounds of the philosophy. According to the origin, so will the emphasis of the system lie on the transcendence or the immanence of God. While it is usual to distinguish monotheism (*q.v.*) from pantheism on the one hand, and deism (*q.v.*) on the other, because it combines the two attributes of immanence and transcendence which each of the others holds apart (pantheism asserting immanence and deism transcendence), this distinction is only theoretically valid. In some forms of religious pantheism the infinitude (i.e. the transcendence) and the absoluteness of God are so emphasized that the finite and relative world as known to man, while identified with God, obscures rather than manifests His reality, and He is so far other than it is that He is the inconceivable. *Brahman* is for the Indian thinker above all knowledge, and man must lose all consciousness of difference in a supra-conscious unity as the goal of the search for God. While Spinoza regards all things and persons as only modes of the two divine attributes of extension and thought, and so asserts immanence, yet he treats these attributes as not exhausting the divine nature, which, on the contrary, possesses an infinite number of attributes, and so he asserts the transcendence by God as He is of the world as we know it. It is in this emphasis on the transcendence by the inconceivable God of the known world that pantheism joins hands with mysticism (*q.v.*). The mystic claims the immanence of God in himself and strives to realize his identity with God, but, be it observed, not by plunging himself into the full tide of the world's life as one with God's, but rather by winging his lonely flight to the God who is above rather than in and through all. For

hand is found in every kind of matter, on the other appears as a function of a particular kind of matter, the psychoplasma.' In asserting this causal relation between matter and energy, brain and thought, Haeckel contradicts his fundamental assumption of the two attributes of the one substance, and he is thus unjustified in his claim that his system is a pantheism like Spinoza's (see O. Kūpe, *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland*, Leipzig, 1911, p. 42).

mysticism identity with God is an achievement rather than an actuality, and God is found away from rather than in the world. At its goal more than its starting-point mysticism is pantheistic, while its starting-point is rather emanationist. Spinoza's principle, 'Omnis determinatio est negatio,' is thoroughly mystical in raising God above all definition and even comprehension; and yet inconsistently for him the world consists of modes of divine attributes and so God should be known in it.¹

3. Neo-Platonism.—It is at this point that the discussion of Neo-Platonism (*q.v.*) is most relevant. Can it truly be regarded as either philosophically or religiously pantheistic? It does not affirm the identity of God and the world, but that the world of sense is the lowest of a series of emanations from God, each possessing a lower degree of perfection, and God Himself is an absolute unity excluding all determinations and relations. This is clearly an inconsistent position, as God is related to the world as His emanation. God cannot be reached by thought; only in the subjective condition of ecstasy is the soul absorbed into divinity. Neo-Platonism is the typical mysticism; but can a system which does not identify God and the world, but relates the world to God as an emanation, be properly called pantheism? J. Allanson Picton, a modern representative of pantheism as religious, in expounding his faith, declares:

'I only wish to premise plainly that I am not concerned with any view of the world such as implies or admits that, whether by process of creation, or emanation, or self-division, or evolution, the oneness of the Eternal has ever been marred, or anything other than the being of God has been or can be produced' (*Pantheism: its Story and Significance*, London, 1905, p. 13).

If pantheism is the theory, as he maintains, 'that there is nothing but God,' Neo-Platonism, which allows reality to the series of emanations, is not pantheistic. For the same reason Picton denies the pantheism of the Christian mystics.

'Their favourite comparison of creature life to the ray of a candle is not really a Pantheistic conception; because to the true Pantheist the creature is not an emanation external to God, but a finite mode of infinite Being' (p. 16).

The distinction between creation as a free act of God and emanation as a necessary process, important as it is, does not justify our describing systems of emanationism as pantheistic so long as so great a distinction is made between God and the world which emanates from Him as is made by Neo-Platonism. If we describe them as pantheism, we should recognize that we are stretching the meaning of the word to include them.

4. Brāhmanism.—Most imposing of all the systems of pantheism which can claim a religious origin is the Brāhmanic in India. P. Deussen's account of Indian thought on the relation of God and the world is worth reproducing. He calls realism the view which regards matter as eternal, and independent of God, and God as only a world-

¹ 'In a word,' says Schwegler, summing up the discussion of this point, 'the two attributes are but empirically derived determinations that are incommensurate besides with the nature of substance. Substance stands behind them as the absolute Infinite which cannot be comprehended in any such special notions. The attributes explain not what substance really is; and in its regard consequently appear contingent. Spinoza fails to supply any principle of union between the notion of absolute substance and the particular manner in which it manifests itself in the two attributes' (*Hist. of Philosophy*, tr. and ed. J. H. Stirling, Edinburgh, 1879, p. 171f.).

In this aspect of it Spinoza's pantheism may be shown to have affinities with Spencer's agnosticism (*q.v.*). Although epigrams are perilous, one may venture to say that Spinoza knows either too much of the substance or too little of the attributes. If the only attributes known to us are extension and thought or the finite modes of things and persons, how does Spinoza know that there is an infinitude of attributes? With all his parade of reasoning on the lines of mathematical demonstration, it is not by his logic that he gets the conception of God which gives his teaching such religious influence as it possesses. The 'God-intoxicated man' did not get his inspiration from his system; that has its source in a plety of which the philosophy gives quite an inadequate interpretation.

fashioner (*δημιουργός*) if His existence is not altogether denied, as in the Sāṅkhya philosophy. According to theism as he defines it, 'God creates the universe out of nothing, and the latter then has a real existence independently of God' (this, it must be said in passing, is not a true or fair representation of theism as it is understood in Christian faith). His description of pantheism as found in the *Upaniṣads* must be fully given:

'God creates the universe by transforming himself into the universe. The latter confessedly has become God. Since it is real and also infinite, there is no room for God independently of the universe, but only within it. The terms God and universe become synonymous, and the idea of God is only retained in order not to break with tradition.' It is evident that Picton would not call this pantheism, and that it is rather to be called pancosmism. What is generally regarded as the typical Indian pantheism is, however, described under the title of Idealism. 'God alone and nothing besides him is real. The universe as regards its extension in space and bodily consistence is in truth not real; it is mere illusion, as used to be said, mere appearance, as we say to-day. This appearance is not God as in pantheism, but the reflection of God, and is an aberration from the divine essence. Not as though God were to be sought on the other side of the universe, for he is not at all in space; nor as though he were before or after, for he is not at all in time; nor as though he were the cause of the universe, for the law of causality has no application here. Rather, to the extent to which the universe is regarded as real, God is without reality. That he is real, may the sole reality, we perceive only so far as we succeed in shaking ourselves free theoretically and practically from this entire world of appearance' (*The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, tr. A. S. Geden, Edinburgh, 1909, p. 160f.; cf. also a similar discussion at p. 237f.). A briefer definition of the prevalent doctrine of the *Upaniṣads*, which, he says, 'may conveniently be described as pantheism,' is given at p. 405: 'The universe is real, and yet this Atman remains the sole reality, for the Atman is the universe.'

What Deussen calls 'pantheism' emphasizes immanence as it identifies God and universe; what he calls 'idealism' is pantheism of the type which, while identifying God and reality, yet so distinguishes the world as appearance from reality (acosmism) that God as He is transcends the world as known, and thus cannot be known in or through the world, but remains incomprehensible, undefined. This Indian pantheism was a movement of religious thought away from the popular polytheism; and yet here as elsewhere pantheism was ever ready to compromise with polytheism.

'The anthropomorphic form of the gods, especially the multiplicity of the gods with their imperfections, awakens criticism, which springs out of moral demands and advanced thinking. A many-coloured and manifold world of gods is resolved into the all-working power, which stands behind the worship' (T. Steinmann, *RGG* iv. [1912] 1121 f.).

Brahman becomes the sole reality, and yet a place is found for the multitude of gods as manifestations of *Brahman*. An instance of this compromise is the Hindu trinity, or the Trimurti.

'Brahman [neuter], the Absolute, manifests himself in three persons of equal rank—Brahma, the creator, Vishnu, the preserver, and Śiva, the destroyer. Kalidasa sings:

"In those Three Persons the one God was shown—
Each first in place, each last—not one alone;
Of Śiva, Vishnu, Brahma, each may be
First, second, third, among the Blessed Three"

(G. F. Moore, *Hist. of Religions*, Edinburgh, 1914, l. 344).

Into this scheme of thought the popular heroes Kṛṣṇa and Rama are fitted as incarnations (*avatāras*) of Viṣṇu. All the gods may even be represented as such incarnations. Pantheism thus becomes the speculative justification of polytheism. See, further, PANTHEISM (Hindu).

5. Egypt.—This relation is found in other religions also, although reached in another way. Syncretism (*q.v.*) in Egypt leads to pantheism.

'Let the gods once lose the individual character that keeps them separate from each other, and it is possible for one god, who grows strong and great enough, to swallow up all the rest, till they appear only as his forms. . . . The god who did most in the way of swallowing up the rest was Ra, the great sun-god of Thebes. The Litany of Ra (*Records of the Past*, viii. 105) represents that god as eternal and self-begotten, and sings in seventy-five successive verses seventy-five forms which he assumes; they are the forms of the gods and of all the great elements and parts of the world' (A. Menzies, *Hist. of Religion*, London, 1895, p. 145f.).

A similar movement took place in regard to Isis (q.v.). In the mysteries of Isis, as described by Apuleius (*Met.* xi.), 'Isis is all the goddesses,' but at a later initiation she gives place to Osiris as supreme god.¹

6. **Babylonia.**—The Babylonian texts sometimes represent the many gods as only names of Marduk; but behind this liturgical self-glorification there is no speculative thought deserving the title of pantheism.

7. **Zoroastrianism.**—One school of Zoroastrian thinkers, the Zervanites, placed before and above Ormazd and Ahriman a first principle, space or time; but this speculation had no religious influence.

8. **China.**—A Chinese thinker Chu Hi (A.D. 1130-1200) developed a theory of the universe resembling Stoic pantheism (see Moore, i. 45 f.).

9. **Greece.**—When we turn to Greece, we find a pantheism which had religious roots, and yet for the most part bore philosophical fruits. The earliest Greek thinkers found the explanation in a material principle—Thales in water or moisture, Anaximenes in air, but Anaximander in τὸ ἀπειρον, the undifferentiated primal matter. More abstract conceptions are advanced by the Pythagoreans (number), Eleatics (being), and Heraclitus (becoming). It is the Eleatic school that is of special interest for our purpose. Xenophanes thought that there could be only one god, and that he was one with the world. This view is expressed in the phrase ἐν καὶ πᾶν. Of him Aristotle says:

Ἐνὸς ἄνθρωπος δὲ πρῶτος . . . εἰς τὸν ἕλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβάλλας τὸ ἐν εἰναι φησὶ τὸν θεόν (*Met.* i. v. 980b 24).

Parmenides no less taught the unity of all. Xenophanes was a critic of the prevalent anthropomorphism; he pointed out not only that all peoples pictured the gods in likeness of men, but even that they ascribed to them national or individual traits. The Thracians thought of them as red-haired, the Ethiopians as black; had the oxen and asses gods, they would represent them like themselves. His attitude to the prevalent polytheism was tolerant; but in Greece there was not the close connexion of pantheism with polytheism. Heraclitus also reduced the universe to a primal divine fire. Here pantheism comes in close contact with naturalism. Stoicism developed this conception. According to Diog. Laert. vii. 139, the Stoics taught τὸν ἕλον κόσμον ἴδωον ὅντα καὶ ἐμψύχον καὶ λογικόν and οὐσίαν δὲ θεοῦ Ζήνων μὲν φησὶ τὸν ἕλον κόσμον (148). The world is the σῶμα, and God the πνεῦμα. Plutarch explains this relation as follows:

'It is one and the same being which presents itself now as individual unity (God), now as divided multiplicity (world)' (*de Stoic.* 41).

And Cicero testifies that 'Cleanthes ipsum mundum deum dicit esse' (*de Nat. Deor.* i. 14). It may be pointed out, however, that, while the identity of God and the world is affirmed, a distinction is recognized: the world is the multiplicity or body, but God is the unity or spirit. This type of pantheism would lie between the religious pantheism which so emphasizes the transcendence of God as to regard the world as illusion (*māya* [q.v.]) and the philosophical pantheism which so emphasizes immanence as absolutely to identify God and world. There is a divine mystery behind all, and yet a divine manifestation in all. It should be noted as a third type; it is so far religious as to make some distinction between God and world; it is so far philosophical as to think of God as identical with the world. It touches closely the type of thought, to which the pantheistic name should not be given, which represents the world as an emanation of God. The history of pantheism shows that it is not so clear-cut a system as at first we might be

¹ According to Plutarch (*de Is. et Osir.* ix.), a temple of Isis bears the inscription, 'I am all that hath been, is, or shall be; and no mortal hath lifted my veil.'

led to assume that it would prove to be. See, further, PANTHEISM (Greek and Roman).

10. **Scholasticism.**—Under the influence of pseudo-Dionysius, John Scotus Erigena shows a pantheistic tendency. The language is, however, not quite consistent; for he affirms, on the one hand, that God is the essence of all things, and, on the other, that God is the totality of things.

'In Deo enim immutabiliter et essentialiter sunt omnia, et ipse est divisio et collectio universalis creaturae' (*de Div. Nat.* iii. 1).

This, according to Rudolf Eisler (*Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe und Ausdrücke*, Berlin, 1899, p. 556), is equivalent to the other statement,

'Deum in omnibus esse, i.e. essentiam omnium subsistere' (i. 72).

This does not necessarily mean quite the same as his description of God as the *universitas* (ii. 2). He surely departs from pantheism altogether in this statement:

'Nam et creatura in Deo est subsistens, et Deus in creatura mirabiliter et ineffabiliter modo creatur, seipsum manifestans' (iii. 17).

Pantheism does not and cannot consistently speak of the creature. An exact anticipation of Spinoza's system is ascribed by Albertus Magnus to David of Dinant:

'Ponit . . . talem conclusionem, sic dicens: Manifestum est unam solam substantiam esse, non tantum omnium corporum sed etiam omnium animalium, et hanc nihil aliud esse quam ipsum Deum, quia substantia, de qua sunt corpora, dicitur hyle, substantia vero, de qua omnes sunt animae, dicitur ratio vel mens. Manifestum est igitur Deum esse substantiam omnium corporum et omnium animalium. Patet igitur, quod Deus et hyle et mens una sola substantia est' (*ap. Eisler*, p. 556).

11. In spite of the deism of Islam, the system of Averroës has a pantheistic tinge, and the Sufi mysticism also tends to pantheism; even in Judaism in the speculation of the Kabbālā is this influence felt. While mediæval mysticism showed the same tendency, it is not in the strict sense of the term pantheism.

12. **Bruno, Spinoza, etc.**—The revived interest in nature at the Renaissance issued in Giordano Bruno (q.v.) in an explicit pantheism.

'God is everywhere, and whole in all, as a voice is heard in all parts of the hall' (*De la Causa*, dial. ii.). 'Accordingly you see how all things are a Universe, and the Universe is in all things, we in it, it in us, and thus all issues in a complete unity' (dial. v.).

He warns us against a common misunderstanding of pantheism, the distribution of God throughout the universe.

God is 'whole in all and whole in every part, so that we speak of parts in the Infinite, not of parts of the Infinite.'

He approaches acosmism in declaring that these parts are only passing appearances of the One. But the distinction of God as unity from the world as multiplicity already noted reappears.

'The one highest Being in whom capacity and reality are un-separated, which in an absolute way can be all and is all that it can be, is as not unfolded a Single, Immeasurable, Endless, which embraces all being; as unfolded on the contrary is it in the sensibly perceived bodies' (dial. v.).

As Spinoza is treated separately in another article, his system need not at this stage be discussed. What needs to be said about him in the general treatment of pantheism has already been said. J. Toland, in his book *Socinianism truly Stated* (1705), openly avowed himself a 'pantheist' (the first use of the term). In 1720 he published a book with the title *Pantheisticon*. According to Eucken, his opponent Fay was the first to use the term 'pantheism' (1709). E. Benoist, in his *Me-langes* (Delft, 1712, pp. 252-265), uses both terms *panthiste* and *panthisme*. In the 18th cent. orthodox controversialists treated pantheism as no better than atheism (see *OED* vii. 430).

13. **German philosophy.**—At the beginning of the 19th cent. there was a reaction from the deistic tendency of orthodox and heretical thought alike. Schleiermacher (q.v.), who revived Christian theology, and set it on the path which it followed in

that age, considered that it was a matter of indifference to piety whether God was conceived personally or impersonally, and speculatively he was a pantheist.

'Each single being is as such a definite form of the Being of the Absolute Identity, but not its very Being, which is only in the Totality' (*Werke*, Berlin, 1834-64, i. iv. 131).

This speculative Spinozism was modified, however, by his inheritance of Moravian piety, although his theology was affected by it. While the position of Kant was deistic, the idealist philosophy which was after him developed in Germany had a distinctly pantheistic character.

'The idealist systems of a Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, make the whole content of existence the nature of the Divine (Absolute)' (Eisler, p. 557).

Fichte regards God as 'a moral order immanent in and also transcendent of the world.' Schelling's indifference to the ideal and the real recalls the God above all determination of Brāhmanism, Neo-Platonism, and Spinozism, and resembles von Hartmann's 'the Unconscious.' Of these systems the most important and interesting is Hegel's. For the static deity of Spinoza or substance he substitutes the dynamic deity or spirit. Spirit he conceives as reason, as a logical process. Accordingly his pantheism has been described as 'panlogism' (*πᾶν λόγος*). A modern disciple of Spinoza insists on the static view of God:

'The processes called evolution, though everywhere operative, affect, each of them, only parts of the infinite whole of things; and experience cannot possibly afford any justification for supposing that they affect the Universe itself' (Picton, p. 12).

Hegel (*q.v.*) with speculative daring takes the dynamic view and presents to us, on what seems the more probable interpretation of his system, an evolving God. That he has taken up the idea of evolution into his interpretation of the world is his merit as a philosopher; that he has treated that evolution from too exclusively intellectual a standpoint is his defect.

'That he apprehends the world as development, in which reason is the ground, law, and object of all becoming, this is Hegel's strength: his weakness is that he apprehends this development only as an ideal, logical one, which accordingly is to be built up by pure notional dialectic' (O. Pfleiderer, *Philosophy of Religion*, tr. A. Menzies, London, 1887, ii. 791.).

It is impossible in this article to discuss the question whether Hegel's system is or is not pantheism, an identification of God and the world or not. Does he or does he not identify the human apprehension, the cosmic manifestation, and the divine reality in his Absolute? Is the world's evolution a logical process? And is this logical process God's coming to self-consciousness? Hegel claimed to be a sound Lutheran, and maintained the consistency of his philosophy with the Christian doctrine of God, but the system itself appears pantheistic. For Hegel the world-process was logical; in it reason was manifested, and purpose fulfilled. The challenge and contradiction of the philosophy which affirmed that the real is the rational (panlogism) is the affirmation that the real is irrational (a blind will, pantheism [*πᾶν ἐθέλω*]) in Schopenhauer's pessimism, which has affinity with the Indian conception of *karma* (*q.v.*).

14. Pantheism and panentheism. — Since the beginning of the 19th cent. the divine immanence in the world has been emphasized. Instead of a creation by a series of divine acts at the very beginning, men think of a gradual evolution not yet completed, in which God is continuously active.

'If, then, the history of man be the continuation of the record of creation, it follows that the creative energy has not ceased to operate, and that its character, qualities, tendencies, modes of working and relation to the forms developed, can be better studied here than in the field of nature. This position is fundamental to our argument, and follows from the parallel between the immanence of God in nature and in man. He dwells in both and He works through both, though always in methods agreeable to the medium employed. What is energy in nature is reason and will in man, but they are no less ours that they are inspired by Him, and no less His that they

appear in us as conscious and voluntary activities' (A. M. Fairbairn, *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, London, 1902, p. 171.).

A position such as this is not pantheistic. It might be called 'panentheism' (*πᾶν ἐν θεῷ*), the name which C. Krause gave to his system, in which God is a unity enclosing the world, but superior to it. In one place Plotinus corrects pantheism by panentheism:

'The perfect Being consists of all beings, rather it embraces in itself all beings' (*Enn.* vi. vi. 7).

The term might also be applied to the teaching of Malebranche:

'Toutes les créatures, mêmes les plus matérielles et les plus terrestres, sont en Dieu quoique d'une manière toute spirituelle' (*Rech.* il. 5; see Eisler, p. 555.).

Lotze (*q.v.*), in his doctrine of causality, lays himself open to the charge of pantheism; but his most valuable discussion of personality in God and man rebuts the charge. To regard natural forces as the finite exercise of infinite power, or natural laws as the finite expression of infinite wisdom, is only to assert such a dependence of the world on God and such an immanence of God in the world as are consistent with Christian theism. To emphasize immanence, so long as transcendence is recognized, is not to be regarded as an acceptance of pantheism. We must not call pantheism the sense which poets have had of God's presence in nature—*e.g.*, Wordsworth's *Lines composed a few Miles above Tintern Abbey*:

'And I have felt

A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply intertused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man;
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.'

Tennyson's *The Higher Pantheism* is misnamed, as the poet's exhortation to personal communion with God shows:

'Speak to Him thou for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet,

Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.'

A pantheist could not speak thus. Yet a vivid sense of God in nature may lead to a poetic pantheism.

15. Modern pantheism. — Before offering some criticism on pantheism as a mode of religious faith or philosophical thought, there are a few questions about it which a modern exponent, J. A. Picton, may be allowed to answer.

'If Pantheism affirms God to be All in All, it does not follow that Pantheism must hold a man, or a tree, or a tiger to be God.' While God is the whole, no part by itself can be regarded as God, but as part of the whole it can be nothing else. For pantheism, 'so far from tolerating any doubt as to the being of God, denies that there is anything else.' God is not, however, merely the sum of things. 'That Unity is not merely the sum of the finite objects which we observe or infer, but it is itself in infinite variety' (p. 10).

... refuses to regard as properly pantheistic every theory of emanation of the world from God; and maintains that evolution can be true only of the parts, not of the whole. From the point of view of pantheism, 'all change, evolution, progress, retrogression, sin, pain, or any other good or evil is local, finite, partial; while the infinite co-ordination of such infinitesimal movements makes one eternal peace' (p. 33). Avowing himself a disciple of Spinoza, of whom he says that he 'was the first Pantheist who was also a prophet, in the sense of speaking out the divine voice of the infinite Universe to its human constituent parts' (p. 56 f.), he suggests a modification of Spinoza's pantheism, which would purge it of all the taint of materialism, which gives Haeckel the pretext for claiming to be also a Spinozist. 'The whole trend of philosophy during the nineteenth century was towards a view of Extension itself as a mode of Thought, and therefore toward the absorption of one of Spinoza's theoretical divine attributes in the other' (p. 63). The 'it, as known to us, might then be conceived as thought. For the pantheistic tendencies of modern thought Picton finds two reasons: (1) 'Science has made unthinkable the old-world conception of a three-storied Universe, constructed by an artificer God, who suddenly awoke from an eternity of idleness to make Heaven, Earth, and Hell' (p. 88). Here Picton stoops to a rhetorical device unworthy of a thinker. He first caricatures what he then rejects. Modern theism can meet modern

science on more equal terms than this statement allows. (2) But faith protests against materialism as the conclusion of science: 'All the hints given us by science of the ultimate oneness of all things, converges in the faith that All is God, and God is All' (p. 88). In opposition to the theist's view that religion and morality must be a personal relation to a personal God, the caricature of which on p. 91 need not be quoted, he asserts that pantheism 'regards obedience and devotion to God as the ultimate and most inspiring application of that principle of the loyalty of the part to the whole which runs through all morality' (p. 91), and yet the illustrations which he gives of that loyalty are all in the personal relations of family, school, club, municipality, and nationality, although he gives a show of reason to his argument by making the object of loyalty or devotion the abstraction 'the law of the whole.' This modern pantheist is as tolerant as the old ancient pantheism of polytheism and idolatry. 'If we can attain to that intellectual love of God in which Spinoza was absorbed, we have no quarrel with any mode of sincere devotion. Pious Catholic, Protestant, Vedantist, Mohammedan—all, by the implicit, though unrecognized necessities of their faith, worship the same God as ourselves' (p. 92f.). But actually and practically the explicit creed or code makes a very great difference in religion and morality.

16. Criticism.—Pantheism is so impressed with the vastness of the universe that it rejects any explanation of its origin, whether by necessary emanation from or by free creation by God; it simply cuts the Gordian knot by identifying God and world. It is so impressed by the infinitude and absoluteness of God that it not only rejects the extreme anthropomorphism of popular religion, but even refuses to consider seriously such an argument as Lotze's for the personality of God as not contradictory of, but even harmonious with, the attributes of infinitude and absoluteness. It is at these two points that it must be speculatively met. If God is not to be absorbed in the world (pancosmism), or the world in God (acosmism), such a difference of world and God must be recognized as demands some explanation of their relation. Whether the explanation that theism offers is or is not adequate, it at least faces a problem which pantheism simply shirks. Common thought and life assume, and cannot but assume, the difference which pantheism merely ignores. To deny personality to God as pantheism does is to offer to thought and life not a higher object of worship and service, but a lower, a sub-personal unity or whole, even if described as living. Should pantheism, following Picton's modification of Spinoza, speak of that unity or whole as infinite thought, can thought be conceived without the subject thinking? We can now think of personality without the anthropomorphism of popular religion; and so pantheism, in opposing itself to anthropomorphism, is avoiding the real issue for modern thinking.

Practically pantheism refuses to regard morality and religion as the relation of the 'I' of man to the 'Thou' of God, and substitutes for it that of the part to the whole. Accordingly its ideal is not self-realization of the 'I' in distinction from, and yet in relation to, the 'Thou,' but the self-losing of the part in the whole, which may of course be represented as the self-recovery, since the whole is, as it were, the essence of the part. As an escape from the egoistic and the egocentric standpoint, pantheism has a relative value for morality and religion; but self-realization in distinction from, and yet in the relation of dependence on, communion with and submission to God is neither egoistic nor egocentric. Pantheism so identifies the part with the whole, and so subjects the part to the whole, that the human personality loses its sense of freedom and assurance of immortality. Contemplation tends to take the place of action, and a quietistic disposition is encouraged. As the distinction between right and wrong becomes relative, the nerve of moral effort and conflict is severed; and the belief in and hope of progress are lessened, if not altogether lost. The sense of sin, the feeling of penitence, and the effort of amendment become, and must become, to the consistent

pantheistic thinker illusive. As there is no necessity for, so there is no reality in, the Christian redemption for a thorough-going pantheist: Christ's work for man must be dismissed as mythology. Does what pantheism offers to the moral conscience and religious consciousness compensate for what it takes away, and must take away, if consistent? This question the writer leaves the reader of this article to answer for himself. There is much pantheism which is not consistent—a tendency rather than a system; and it has some value as a corrective of a crude anthropomorphism, or hard deism, and as an emphasis, if exaggerated, on God's affinity with and immanence in man, on the truth that in Him we live and move and have our being, for we also are His offspring.

LITERATURE.—Besides the books referred to throughout the article, and those given under POLYTHEISM, etc., the standard Histories of Philosophy or of religions and works of Christian apologetics may be consulted; and the following works may be added from Picton's bibliography: *SBE* i. [1893]; J. Allanson Picton, *Christian Pantheism*, London, 1873, *The Religion of the Universe*, do. 1904; P. H. Hengenoltz, *Ethisch Pantheismus*, Amsterdam, 1903 (not translated). T. Steinmann (*RGG* iv. [1912] 1125) also recommends W. Diltz, 'Der entwicklungsgeschichtl. Pantheismus,' in *AGPh* xiii. [1900] 307-390, 445-482; H. Scholz, 'Der Pantheismus in seinem Verhältnis zum Gottesglauben des Christentums,' *PJB* cxli. [1910] 439-464; M. Scheide, 'Pantheismus und Persönlichkeit Gottes,' *Protestantische Monatshefte*, xvi. [1912] 361-378.

A. E. GARVIE.

PANTHEISM (Greek and Roman).—The definitions of pantheism generally agree in identifying God with the world: God and the universe are one and inseparable; all is God and God is all; nature and God are identical. So far as the terms go, such statements are acceptable, emphasizing, as they do, the oneness and the divineness of reality. Everything, however, depends upon the meaning of the notion of God employed in these definitions, and on this point authorities differ. Recent naturalistic systems like Haeckel's, which call themselves pantheistic, conceive of God as the universal substance which obeys the physical law of energy, and the ancient naturalistic philosopher Strato is frequently characterized as a pantheist, although his God is, in Cicero's words, 'without sense and form.'¹ To call the world God in such cases is, however, as Schopenhauer justly declares, merely to increase the language with a superfluous synonym for the word 'God.' If we mean by deity nothing more than the ultimate independent substance, whatever may be its nature, then every monistic theory of the universe is pantheistic, and we should have to include materialistic monism among the pantheistic systems. This we are not ready to do in the following account. Nor shall we consider as pantheistic those world-views which reduce deity to the sum of all things, even when these things are regarded as having each its separate psychic life: panpsychism is not necessarily pantheism, although it often accompanies it and may be a preparation for it. By pantheism we mean that doctrine which conceives of reality as one in essence and form, and thinks of this unity as somehow rational and divine. Hence, according to this teaching, God is an entity not separate from the world and remote from it, but in it and of it—immanent, not transcendent; everything partakes of the nature of God. The particular objects and individuals have no absolute existence of their own, but are either modes of the universal substance or parts of the divine whole. Moreover, all things arise from God by necessity; they follow inevitably from His infinite being.

The development of pantheistic theories goes hand in hand with the development of monism, which springs from the intellectual craving for unity; with the development of the notion of law and order in the world; and with the evolution of the conception of mind. We find the monistic

¹ *de Nat. Deor.* i. 13, 25.

idea consciously realized and the notion of uniformity at least dimly recognized among the Greek physicists or physiologists of the 6th and early 5th century B.C. Here, therefore, we may look for the beginnings of, or perhaps it would be better to say preparations for, pantheism: all things spring from an original stuff which is vaguely conceived as alive or animated (hylozoism). All that we know of the teaching of the Milesian Thales is that he called this primary substance water. But the fact that Ætius later understood him to mean that the god in all things is the divine energy of water shows the pantheistic possibilities of this simple theory. Pantheistic tendencies become more pronounced in Anaximander, the fellow-townsmen of Thales, whose principle, the *ἀπειρον*, is the one boundless uncreated and indestructible being. It is indeterminate, and yet everything specific, every quality, lies embedded in it and is differentiated from it only to be merged again in its infinite source. Aristotle tells us that Anaximander's *ἀπειρον* embraces everything and rules everything, and that it is divine. Whether Anaximander himself taught the divinity of his principle or it is merely inferred by Aristotle we cannot say, but that such a conclusion could have been drawn at all is evidence of the pantheistic possibilities of the view. We find similar tendencies in Anaximenes of Miletus. All things are transformations of the primary substance, air, which is hylozoistically conceived: air is an ensouled matter.

¹ Just as our soul which is air holds us together (*συνκρατέει*), so it is breath (*πνεῦμα*) and air that encompasses the whole world (*περιέχει*)' (*Plac.* I. 3 f., *Doz.* 278 [Ritter and Preller, *Hist. philosophiæ Græcæ*, p. 20]).

A later follower of Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia, a contemporary of Anaxagoras, who lived at a time when the notion of mind had been made somewhat more definite in Greek thought, carries the idea of his teacher still further in the direction of pantheism:

¹ Air is the being in which reason dwells, which guides and rules all things, for it lies in its nature to extend everywhere and to be in everything' (*Simpl. phys.* 33r. 162, 21 D [Ritter and Preller, p. 174]).

The thinkers whom we have been considering centred their attention upon the problem of substance; the Pythagoreans began to speculate upon the problem of form, law, and order, and sought the explanation of things in their numerical and geometrical relations; for them numbers constitute the essence of things and the cause of all the harmonies in the world. Numbers are odd and even, i.e. limited and unlimited; hence the universe is a harmony of the limited and unlimited. And, since unity is the product of the odd and even numbers, it would have been easy to infer that the universe is comprehended in unity. The notions of unity and order are suggestive of pantheism, and it is not surprising that this philosophy should have been developed into pantheism in the 1st cent. B.C., after Stoic pantheism had become popular in the Roman world. Some of the Neo-Pythagoreans derived all numbers from the universal *monas* and, under the influence of Platonism, identified them with the Platonic ideas.

The traces of pantheistic speculation appear in still more marked form in the younger contemporary of Pythagoras, Xenophanes of Elea, who approaches the world-problem from the religious side. God is for him the changeless and imperishable, timeless being, and is conceived as a unity endowed with intelligence: 'the whole of him sees, the whole of him thinks, the whole of him hears,' and He rules all things by the power of His mind. Aristotle informs us that he taught the unity of the all and called this unity God. He evidently looked upon the world of plurality and change as

the manifestation of the changeless God, without becoming aware of any contradiction in his thought. Parmenides, the pupil of Xenophanes, develops the theory of his teacher in metaphysical form, omitting, as A. Fischer has said,¹ the theological flourishes. Being is for him one, timeless, unchangeable, indestructible, always the same. Like the God of his predecessor, the being of Parmenides is intelligent: thought and being are identical. Since there can be neither change nor differentiation in being, the world of plurality and change is but an illusion, a mere appearance, a world of falsehood. We have in this teaching of Parmenides a static pantheism, which, however, fails to account for our world of experience, the world of plurality and change. The name of pantheism is frequently denied to it on the ground that being does not manifest itself in the world of change, that nature or the phenomenal order is not exhausted in God. This would be a valid objection to including this doctrine among the pantheistic systems had not Parmenides ruled out the entire sense-world as mere appearance.

According to Parmenides, motion, change, becoming, are unthinkable and therefore cannot be real. It is for this reason that he does not know what to do with our world of experience and treats it as an illusion. Heraclitus (*q.v.*), on the other hand, finds in change and becoming the very essence of reality: all things are fundamentally forms of one and the same (hylozoistic) principle, the ever-living fire. There can be no world without change: everything is transformed into its opposite; fire becomes air, water, earth, and then passes upwards again through the same stages and returns to fire. Reality is a union of opposites, and war is the father of all things. Moreover, the fire-principle acts according to law and measure; it is therefore a rational principle (*λόγος*)—rational in the sense that law is immanent in the cosmic order. Everything happens according to the *λόγος*, according to the law of opposites; *λόγος* and fate or necessity (*ἐναγκή*) are identical. It is rational also in the sense of guiding the universe; it is the wisdom steering all things through all things. This philosophy is a well-developed dynamic pantheism: the universe is the expression of an all-pervading active reason; indeed, it is the universal reason in ceaseless action. It is true that Heraclitus did not describe the fire-*λόγος* as acting with conscious deliberation, but neither did he conceive it merely as objective reason, as the indwelling law or order of the universe, as some interpreters hold. The pre-Socratics had not reached a clear-cut conception of mind—they were too much interested in the external side of reality for that—but it is reasonable to suppose that all except the materialistic atomists placed in nature something akin to the human soul, and that Heraclitus as well as the Eleatics recognized the logical aspect of mind as of primary importance in the universe. The particular human soul, too, is a part of the universal fire-*λόγος*, according to our pantheist; indeed, it is a spark of the divine fire itself and remains in constant living touch with it. If this is so, all men ought to know the truth and act in accordance with it. Heraclitus, however, does not draw the full consequences of his pantheism here: according to him, the individual persists in his subjective opinions (*ἰδίᾳ φρονήσει*); men do not know the eternal *λόγος*; it is in them, but they do not see it; nor do they order their conduct in conformity to it. Yet, if everything real is rational, how does it happen that man alone can oppose the *λόγος* or the law of the world? It has been suggested that Heraclitus introduced

¹ 'Die Grundlehren der vorsokratischen Philosophie' in *Grosse Denker*, I., Leipzig, 1911, p. 42.

the notion of free will at this point, as did nearly all the later pantheists—in utter disregard of the logic of their systems. There is, however, no evidence of such a teaching or that he was at all aware of any inconsistency in his thinking here.

The notion of a universal mind (*νοῦς*) acting with deliberation and design appears in the teaching of Anaxagoras (*q.v.*), an elder contemporary of Socrates. Mind is ruler over all; it holds sway over the whole revolving universe; it knows all things and it regulates all things. Anaxagoras, however, is not a pantheist, but teaches a vague dualism; his countless substances or elements of specific quality are distinct from mind, the nature of which seems to be immaterial, but is not clearly defined. Moreover, as the beginner of the world-process, his *νοῦς* is transcendent. It is true that mind is also present in the world, in organic forms, and even in minerals, and therefore immanent, but it is always brought in as the cause of motion only where mechanical explanations do not avail.

In Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, who dominated Greek thought during the latter part of the 5th and the whole of the 4th cent. B.C., the conception of mind as a principle different from matter is sharply defined, and philosophy enters upon its dualistic stage. There are, however, lines of thought in the Platonic theory which easily lend themselves to pantheistic interpretation and were later turned to pantheistic account by the Neo-Platonists. Thus, Plato speaks of nature as *ἐμφρων*, of the world as *ἄνθρωπος ἐμψυχον ἐννοον τε*, and calls the world a blessed God. Or God is the supreme Idea which embraces all the others in itself, the Unity which comprehends in itself the true essences of things. Since each idea is a unity which comprehends the many in itself, and all ideas are comprehended in the supreme idea of the Good, as the species are contained in the genus, the world is a manifestation of the Good, of the divine purpose, of beauty, truth, and goodness. The ideas are conceived by Plato as active, forming forces of nature, hence as purposive or final causes. In spite of these pantheistic leanings, however, the Platonic system remains dualistic: opposed to mind stands an obdurate element, non-being (*μὴ ὂν*), whether it be conceived as space or as matter.

Basing itself upon the philosophy of Heraclitus and aided by Platonic-Aristotelian conceptions, Stoicism worked out a thoroughgoing system of pantheism, a system that has influenced nearly all the pantheistic philosophies which have appeared in the Western world since its birth at the beginning of the 3rd century B.C. According to it, God and nature are one; the world is the manifestation of the universal λόγος. Λόγος τῆς φύσεως or κοινὸς τῆς φύσεως λόγος and κοινὴ φύσις are one and the same. The universe is the evolution of the λόγος; this is the 'germinative reason' of things (λόγος σπερματικός). With Heraclitus the Stoics regard this λόγος as fire or breath and therefore material; but it is an intelligent, purposeful matter. The Stoic substance is spirit and matter in absolute union; it is spiritual matter or material spirit; reason is not a property of the corporeal. This teaching is no more materialistic than is the Spinozistic view that thought and extension are different attributes or aspects of the one substance. God is *σῶμα νοερόν, πῦρ νοερόν, πνεῦμα νοερόν*. Nor is the doctrine dualistic, even though the λόγος is said to fashion matter (*θελῆ*), and God is called the soul of the world (*ἡ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχή*). It is monistic: both the soul and the body of God are the same in principle; all the elements in the world are transformations of the original divine fire, even that part of matter which seems devoid

of all life and motion. From the fire-λόγος everything has evolved and to it everything will again return, only to be produced again in all its details (*παλιγγενεσία*) time without end. The so-called passive stuff, too, is divine, even though only in a lower degree. The term 'God,' it is true, is sometimes applied only to the primary substance with its qualities or to the active principle as opposed to the passive, but that is because the Stoics looked upon fire or ether as the purest phase of deity, the more remote transformations or emanations of the divine fire being less divine. For the same reason they often called the ruling part of the universe (*τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*) God and placed it in heaven. It is also true that the later Roman Stoics, more deeply interested in ethics than in metaphysics, sometimes identify God with the soul of the world (the universe, says Seneca,¹ consists of matter and God), but in doing this they are weakening, if not abandoning, the old Stoic doctrine.

The universal fire-λόγος contains within itself the rational germs which act in inorganic things and in plants, animals, and man; they take the place of the Aristotelian forms and are the final or purposive causes of the particular things. Everything in the world is determined, subject to necessity or fate (*ἐμπαμένη*). Yet this necessity is not blind; it is the law of the λόγος, rational; and everything is arranged by Providence for the best, God being the Father of all, beneficent and kind. Hence physical evil is not evil at all, but helps to realize the divine purpose; the Stoics offer a complete theodicy. The human soul, like everything else, is a part of the divine λόγος; indeed, it is a spark of the divine fire. If man, too, falls under the law of necessity, as he must according to the logic of the system, then God and not man is responsible for moral evil. This conclusion, however, the Stoics were not always willing to draw, holding that the soul is free and that the realization of the ethical good depends on ourselves. We have the power over our judgments and impulses (indeed, our passions are reducible to judgments); we are self-determining and can free ourselves from the contingencies of life. In other words, the Stoics, while teaching determinism in their metaphysics, make an exception in favour of man in their ethics; they are reluctant to deny the autonomy of the human will. Their philosophy is therefore not consistently pantheistic: the human individual is not a link in the universal chain of causality.

Stoicism, which was itself a synthesis of many Greek systems, exercised a great influence upon all the schools of philosophy that continued in the Græco-Roman world after the golden age of thought. Indeed, a kind of eclecticism arose which represented an amalgamation, and often a mere conglomeration, of Platonic, Peripatetic, Pythagorean, and Stoic elements and led to a sad confusion of philosophical conceptions and to a misunderstanding of the great schools. A shining example of such confused thinking is furnished by Antiochus, the teacher of Cicero; according to him, the teachings of the Academy, the Lyceum, and the Stoa are all pantheistic. The unknown author of the Peripatetic treatise *περὶ κόσμον* fuses the transcendent *νοῦς* of Aristotle with the immanent God of the Stoics, holding that the *νοῦς* is separate from the world, but that his power, like the Stoic λόγος, pervades the universe. Here we have an anticipation of the hypostatic λόγος which appears in the later Jewish-Greek and Neo-Platonic systems; but the doctrine is neither clearly developed nor consistently carried out. The writer vacillates between transcendence and

¹ *Epp.* lxx. 22.

immanence; sometimes God and His power are separate; sometimes God is the all-pervading principle. Theism and pantheism are here contending for the mastery. We find a similar conflict and a similar tendency to compromise between theism and pantheism in all the philosophies of the centuries immediately preceding and following the birth of Christ.

The Jewish-Greek philosophy of Alexandria makes the *lógos*-idea the centre of its teaching and develops it along theosophical lines. It is a kind of Jewish scholasticism, combining Greek thought and the theology of the OT, making copious use of allegorical interpretations, after the manner of the Stoics, in order to harmonize philosophy and religion. Aristobolus, a Peripatetic Jew who lived in the reign of Ptolemy Philometor (181-145 B.C.), lays the foundation of this theology by fusing Peripatetic and Stoic elements in such a way as to make them square with Jewish ideas. He inclines to Stoic pantheism, but cannot give up the transcendent Jewish God. The power of God (*δύναμις τοῦ θεοῦ*) is placed between God and the world; the divine wisdom is also introduced, but whether as a property of God or as a separate hypostasis is not made clear. The creative word of God, another Jewish idea, is likewise brought in. Not unlike the teachings of Aristobolus are those of the pseudo-Solomon's book of Wisdom, in which a modified pantheism is taught. We discover in all these works the same vacillation between the pantheistic doctrine of immanence and the theistic doctrine of transcendence which we noticed above. The influence of Stoicism prevented these thinkers from conceiving the universe as not sharing in deity, while the Jewish notion of the exalted God, supported by Aristotle's theism, would not let them bring God down from heaven and place Him in the world. God is therefore separated from nature, but the chasm is bridged by intermediate entities—*lógos*, wisdom, power.

Philo, the Alexandrian Jew (born c. 25 B.C.), attempts a complete synthesis of pagan philosophy and orthodox Judaism. Platonic and Stoic conceptions preponderate in his system, but they are regarded, in the Jewish fashion, as derived from the OT. Influenced by Stoic thought, Philo sometimes softens the doctrine of the transcendent God (according to which the absolutely perfect, changeless, and inconceivable being cannot come in contact with an imperfect and changing world), and speaks in the pantheistic strain. Without divine action the universe could not be what it is, nor could it continue in existence; hence God must be the all-pervading being, comprehending the world in Himself. For the most part, however, Philo is unwilling to let his pure God be contaminated by contact with the impure world. Moreover, pantheism makes God responsible for evil—a view which the Jewish thinker likewise hesitates to accept. Here the *lógos*-doctrine, with which his predecessors had been experimenting, offers itself as a means of reconciling the Jewish doctrine of transcendence with the Stoic doctrine of immanence. God's power of thought, of creating ideas, is substantialized and made a separate organ; the *lógos* is the unity of archetypes, *ἰδέα ἰδεῶν*, the intelligible pattern of the sense-world. The divine ideas or thoughts of God (*λόγοι*), which have their place in the *lógos*, fashion and preserve the world; the world is therefore a copy of the divine reason and pervaded throughout by divine reason. Philo, however, is vacillating in his conception of the relation of the *lógos* to God; sometimes the *lógos* is conceived as separate from God, sometimes as identical with Him. God is called *ψυχὴ τῶν ὄντων*, or *νοῦς τῶν ὄντων*, in true pantheistic fashion; then, again, the *lógos* is a living active unity of ideas,

created by God but working outside of God; and functions are ascribed to it which are not in keeping with the nature of the deity. He also tells us that God is beyond the world and outside of His work, but that He has filled the world with Himself, i.e. by means of His power which He has stretched to the outermost limits of the world, and that thus He has woven everything into a beautiful harmony. The *lógos* is sometimes also identified with the Jewish creative word of God, by which Philo means reason as well as speech, here making use of the Stoic distinction between the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and the *λόγος προφορικός*. The Jewish doctrine of wisdom is likewise connected with the *lógos*-teaching; indeed, wisdom is identified with *lógos*. The *lógos* is also called the servant, messenger, and interpreter of God, the image or shadow of God, the son of God, the oldest or the first-born son of God, the universe being *νεώτερος*.

All these doctrines have a pantheistic ring and might easily be fashioned into a pantheistic system, were it not for the fact that Philo also teaches the pre-existence of matter.

Another Stoic note in the Philonic world-view is the doctrine of necessity (*ἐμπαρμένη*), an exception, however, being made in favour of man, who is free from necessity. No effort is made to reconcile the doctrine of human freedom with this teaching, or with the view that the human understanding is an emanation of the divine mind or a kind of extension from it, or with the view of man's original bent for matter, which is a fetter of the soul and the cause of sin, or with the view that virtue depends upon man's participation in the divine *lógos*. We find a similar inconsistency in the Stoic system, and again in Neo-Platonism.

Philo's philosophy culminates in a religious mysticism: God is beyond all knowledge; hence, in order to reach Him, man must transcend both the world of sense and the *lógos*, lose his individuality in a state of ecstasy, and become merged in the divine Being.

Philo's philosophy may be regarded as the forerunner of Neo-Platonism (*q.v.*); indeed, the latter might be described as a development and systematization of the thoughts of the Jewish thinker. It exhibits the same tendency to eclecticism: Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and Neo-Pythagorean teachings are used and fashioned into a great philosophic edifice—the last of which Greek culture can boast. Other precursors are the Pythagorean Platonists—Plutarch, Maximus, Apuleius, Galen, Celsus, and Numenius. These thinkers, like the early Alexandrians, oscillate between the doctrine of transcendence and the doctrine of immanence; they make concessions to pantheism, but the thought of the absolute, indivisible, and changeless being keeps them from completely identifying God and world. Plotinus, the chief figure in the Neo-Platonic school, conceives God as the absolute unity, of which nothing can be predicated: He is higher than being, thought, goodness, beauty, and activity. And yet, in spite of the exalted nature of his absolute, Plotinus derives the world of plurality and change from Him: He is the fountain-head of everything that is; out of the fullness of His being flows the world, proceeding by gradual stages or degrees of worthiness until matter—the lowest of His emanations and the principle of evil—is reached. God is too pure and exalted to soil His being by contact with the world, but the *νοῦς*, which is both thought and being, is His copy and product, receiving from the absolute the power of creation. This *νοῦς* produces the ideas or the *κόσμος νοητός*—an ideal unity in diversity, embracing everything in itself as the whole comprehends the parts or the genus the species, even to the ideas of individual things. Only the evil is not

included among the ideas of the *νοῦς*. The *νοῦς* has a yearning for the transcendent—it contemplates God; but it has also an earthward bent and so creates a world-soul, or *λόγος*; or, rather, the world-soul flows from it as it itself flows from the transcendent God. The *λόγος* is a copy of the *νοῦς*; its contents, the *λόγοι*, received from the ideas contained in the *νοῦς*, are copies of these ideas. The world-soul, or *λόγος*, contemplates the *νοῦς* above it; it contemplates itself; and it contemplates that which is below it. It reflects and deliberates, possesses life and motion (*ἐξ αὐτῆς κινουμένη*), and produces the visible universe. Matter proceeds from the world-soul; it is as such absolute privation, *ὄλη*, formless, without quality. Through the *λόγοι* the *λόγος* forms or fashions matter, matter really never being without form. Every particular body consists of matter and has its own particular *λόγος* in it, which does not act mechanically upon matter, but through the concept—organically, one might say. Nevertheless, the *λόγοι* do not act consciously and with deliberation. It is these active *λόγοι* that constitute the essential elements of the seed and account for the differences among the various organisms. We have here a teleological explanation of organic life which goes back to the Stoic *λόγοι σπερματικοί* and Aristotle's forms. The *λόγοι* are copies of the ideas in the *νοῦς*; the *νοῦς* is a copy or emanation of God; hence the ultimate source of order and harmony is God.

It follows that the entire universe is fashioned and sustained by the all-pervading *λόγος* and is under the governance of reason; everywhere the world reveals traces of the beautiful and the good, which have their source in the *νοῦς* and ultimately in God. Hence matter cannot be altogether evil, as Plotinus held; indeed, it turns out to be evil only in the sense that it is an obstruction to the pure ideas, that it is the cause of plurality and imperfection. It is hard to see how it can be evil at all when we remember that matter is an emanation from God, that the *λόγος* is predisposed to it, that the *λόγος* fashions it according to the beautiful and good ideas of the intelligible order, that in the visible harmony everything—even the seeming evil—is in place. God is really responsible for the physical evil in the world, as the Stoics had taught. But Plotinus refuses to burden Him with the responsibility for moral evil or to explain it away; this he attributes to man's free will. His freedom, however, is only an intelligible freedom, each individual having chosen his particular character in a pre-existent state. We have here a similar difficulty to that which confronted us in the systems of the Stoics and of Philo. The causal nexus is broken by man's power to choose his own character; an element seems to be introduced into the universe over which the divine *λόγος* has no control.

The Stoics, basing themselves on Heraclitus, offered the first clearly developed system of dynamic pantheism in Greek thought, while Plotinus made the most thoroughgoing attempt to reconcile pantheism with theism. In spite of the transcendence of the Neo-Platonic God, the world proceeds from Him; the *νοῦς* springs from Him; the *λόγος* springs from the *νοῦς*, and expresses itself in the visible garment of matter, which is itself a remote product of God. Nature is impregnated with the divine ideas, with the ideal forces which have their ultimate source in the absolutely good being. But God does not exhaust Himself in His product, according to Plotinus; He loses nothing by giving birth to a world. Plotinus's teaching here resembles the German philosopher Krause's 'panentheism' (cf. above, p. 612), in which, however, God is a self-conscious and free personality—a con-

ception which was foreign to the thought of the Greeks or at any rate not clearly defined and consistently carried out by any one of their thinkers. And yet it must not be forgotten that even the Stoics attributed something like personality to God when they identified Him with providence (*πρόνοια*), and that Plotinus himself conceived God not as an irrational being, but as a superrational being.

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PANTHEISM (Hindu).—I. Introductory.—It has frequently been affirmed, by none more emphatically than by A. Barth, who has done so much for the elucidation of Indian thought, that the tone and tendency of Indian conviction and belief are as a whole pantheistic. It may fairly be questioned, however, whether any wide generalization upon the set of the many cross-currents of Indian thinking is justified. With at least equal truth the assertion might be made that India reasons upon theistic presumptions, and that her favourite philosophy reaches idealistic conclusions. Under other skies and in other lands it might appear difficult to induce harmonious working of principles and theories so diverse. In the Indian mind they coalesce, or, if the figure be preferred, occupy different compartments without impairing the unity of the whole. The Indian merchant or peasant is a philosopher, who is generally ready to

give a reason for the faith that is in him, and always eager for a debate thereon. In most instances his views of God and the universe will be found to be pantheistic, dominated in the ultimate issue by idealistic traditions and teaching. But he is far too practical to allow these to modify or impair the sagacity and determination with which he takes his part in the competition of daily life. Religiously he is an earnest theist, and usually a monotheist, if the term be allowed to cover a creed which recognizes in all the gods manifestations of the one and only God. Historically and in the past in India a monotheism of this character has been hardly distinguishable from a rich and riotous polytheism. More recently Christian and other influences have strengthened the ideal element. The pantheistic tendency, however, maintains its position, and as an undercurrent continues to exercise an influence upon the outlook and life as a whole which is little if at all impaired.

Indian pantheism, moreover, originated in different conceptions, and aimed at satisfying different types and preconceptions of thought from the European. Historically also it has run a different course. Perhaps the identity of name has led to an exaggerated conception of the strength of the influence which pantheistic ideas have exercised upon the outlook and character of the Indian peoples. In reality, for all practical purposes, it has been slight. Except in the case of a few mystics, pantheism has never been the most forceful motive of action or belief; nor is it at all likely to strengthen its hold in the future.

Within the limits of an article it is not possible to do more than give the briefest survey of Indian pantheistic doctrine, as exhibited in the earliest and succeeding strata of the literature, and of its importance for the creed and life of the people themselves. In its main stream the development is not difficult to trace, but the ramifications and cross-currents are often obscure in their direction and source. A few words will serve to indicate the general tendencies and conclusions which experience and the evidence appear to justify.

2. The Vedic period.—In the hymns of the Rigveda a pantheistic strain of thought is discernible from the beginning, but becomes most marked in the tenth and latest book. The rude and superficial polytheism of the popular faith failed to content the more earnest thinkers among the poets; and the response which in some instances at least was given to the search for a more satisfying creed was in the direction of unifying all gods, all existences, into one. Agni especially was the centre of this assimilating movement. The essence of fire appeared to pervade all things, and to give them warmth and being; when Agni withdrew himself, the life also vanished. All the gods accordingly are identified with Agni, and Agni himself is all the gods.¹ In not a few of the hymns a knowledge of the inner reality of things appears to be the goal of the poet's thought and desire. Three general conceptions or theories of the constitution of the universe are present to the minds of the writers—monotheism, polytheism, and pantheism—and of these the pantheistic view ultimately overshadows and controls the others. Speculative inquiry with regard to the reality that may be supposed to underlie all phenomena is answered in a pantheistic sense. *Ka* ('who?') is not only a name for the unknown, but an indication of the direction which thought is prepared to take. Other suggestive titles for the source or universal principle that comprehends all, and from which the all originates, are *īd*, 'this,' *hiranya-*

garbha, 'the golden germ,' *nārāyaṇa*, 'the primitive man,' *virāj*, 'the shining or illustrious one.' In the ultimate systematization these were all merged in the one *Brahman*. Within the limits of the Rigveda the tendency to pantheism culminates in the hymn to the Unknown God (x. cxxi.). In the hymns, however, there are expressed pantheistic strivings and imaginings rather than a formal and definite system.

3. Upaniṣads.—The culminating point of Indian speculation was reached in the thought of the *Upaniṣads*, and in the system of the Vedānta founded on them. That system assumed finally a pantheistic shape, and, thus formulated, secured the assent and conviction of the great majority of the Indian people. Having failed to establish in intelligible form the mystical and metaphysical doctrine of the *ātman*, the thinkers of the *Upaniṣads* fell back upon a modified pantheism. The universe was the created work of *Brahman*, who (or which) then took possession of it as pervading principle or soul (*ātman*). The postulate of the sole reality of *Brahman* or the *ātman* remained, however, inviolable—one only without a second; and pantheistic speculation therefore regarded the universe as immanent as it were in God, not conversely God immanent in the universe. The doctrine thus formulated was in direct succession with the thought of the *Brāhmaṇas* and the Rigveda. In the latter the framework of presumption and belief is still essentially solar; the human spirit becomes united with the spirit of the sun. The theorizings of the *Brāhmaṇas*, dull and matter-of-fact as these treatises are on the practical and ritualistic side, are freer and more far-reaching, but remain true to the same presuppositions. In the *Upaniṣads* and the Vedānta the endeavour to frame acceptable conclusions came to full fruition. The solution offered, however, was based essentially upon a compromise, the reconciliation of distinct and conflicting lines of thought, of which the idealistic did in fact predominate over the other. The universe was asserted to be fundamentally and altogether unreal, and to have no existence apart from *Brahman*, who is all and in all. The pantheistic strain of thought, therefore, of India is of a type differing from the European, and has sometimes been described as 'idealistic' pantheism. The latter does not assume the presence of God in the universe, informing all, but definitely affirms that the universe does not in reality exist at all, for God alone is. So abstract a theory, and one so far removed from the postulates of ordinary life, remained probably for some considerable time the property of the more metaphysically inclined among Indian thinkers and teachers. It was only slowly and gradually that it took possession of the mind and thought of the people as a whole.¹

4. Epic period.—In the *Mahābhārata* and the epic literature generally the substratum of thought and belief which the writers presuppose, and on which they fall back, is pantheistic, after the manner of the *Upaniṣads*. The divine actors and heroes, however—Kṛṣṇa in the *Mahābhārata* and Rāma in the *Rāmāyaṇa*—are the objects of an intense theistic reverence and devotion; and the cross-currents of popular theism and philosophic pantheism run deep and strong. In general, in the thought and exposition of the poems as a whole the former appears to be in retreat before the vigour and persistence of pantheistic ideas. The theism, however, whether or not it is really the older stratum in this literature, is in no danger of dissolution. The conflict is most apparent in the episode of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, where the dignity and authority of the divine Kṛṣṇa have attracted to his person a fervour of monotheistic worship

¹ Rigveda, v. iii. 1; cf. the similar statement concerning Aditi (i. lxxxix. 10).

¹ See, further, art. UPANIṢADS.

unequalled elsewhere in the history of India. Yet even here the interwoven strands of pantheism are so intrusive and continuous that the nature of the primitive basis upon which the poem has been built up is still regarded by scholars as doubtful. Unquestionably, however, in the epic period pantheism as a reasoned explanation of the constitution of the universe is gaining ground and commending itself to the thought and acceptance of the people.

5. *Brāhmanism and the Vedānta.*—Hence it is in what is known as Brāhmanism and the philosophic Vedānta that the stronghold of pantheistic thought in India is to be found. And it is a tribute to the energy and conviction of its adherents that their doctrine has so entirely taken possession of the Indian mind. The process of the extension of a teaching, from the point of view of the ordinary man both recondite and unnatural, was certainly gradual and prolonged. Equally certainly in any realized or intelligible sense it was a possession of the philosophers alone. By others it was accepted and professed as a constructive interpretation of themselves and of the phenomenal universe, which they held in theory but made no attempt to bring into relation to daily life; and of the significance of which in most instances they had little real appreciation. Nevertheless there lies behind the speculative doctrine a strength of conviction, which has driven it through the inertia of the minds of the common people, and has made it philosophically the dominant belief of all classes. Barth's assertion is then justified that 'India is radically pantheistic.' It would nevertheless be equally correct to affirm that India is radically mystical or radically theistic. All three statements are true, but need qualification. The pantheism of India is of an essentially mystical and visionary type, and lends itself to dreamy aspirations, far removed from the hard and uncompromising theorizings of the West. If carried to a logical conclusion, it finds itself in conflict both with the practical necessities of life and with ancient theistic beliefs. It compromises with both, and succeeds in living in harmony with habits and deep-seated convictions which to minds differently constituted from the Indian would appear to be fatal to its existence.¹

6. *Sectarian faiths.*—India's popular religious systems, on the other hand, are essentially theistic in character, and contribute little to the significance or thought of pantheism. This is true for the most part of the two greatest of these faiths, Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism, which in their varied forms share between them the allegiance of the great majority of the people. Their philosophy, however, and doctrine of the nature of the universe (cosmology) they have borrowed or adapted from the speculative conclusions of the *Upaniṣads*. The Vaiṣṇavite is a professed Vedāntist, and holds the latter doctrine with its pantheistic implications as a sort of metaphysical counterpoise to the living theistic faith with which his religious craving is met and satisfied. The Śaivite is usually, in name at least, a follower of the Sāṅkhyan philosophy of the universe and of life. In practice, however, his theoretic belief is largely overborne by pantheistic tendencies. In a broad sense it is true of both Vaiṣṇavite and Śaivite that they are theist and pantheist in one, but that in the urgency of daily life the latter creed is, with rare exceptions, subservient to the former. Whatever his theory may be, the Indian regulates his conduct by the desire to propitiate the gods and to receive help from them, not by a pantheistic doctrine which confines his personality and merges him in the great unknown.

¹ See art. *VEDĀNTA*.

The mystical and devotional Śaivism of the south of India is essentially opposed to the Vedānta, but is nevertheless permeated to a considerable extent by pantheistic conceptions. These would seem, again, to represent an encroachment upon an original monotheism, successfully effected, in part at least, by virtue of a claim to offer to the thoughtful mind a higher and more exalted degree of religious attainment, of which the ordinary man was supposed to be incapable. It was right for him to content himself with an external worship and a rudely conceived personal god. Early Śaivism appears to have been altogether monotheistic; but the emotional Śaivite literature of the south, the religious hymns and lyrics of the Tamil bards, which are certainly for the most part if not entirely of comparatively recent date, although they lay claim to the authority of ancient names, is pantheistic in tone and in spirit, and probably owes something to the influence of Śāfiistic thought. In its more recent history at least, the tendency of this form of Śaivism has been towards a pantheistic philosophy; and, while never ceasing to profess a theistic creed, it has been in the Deccan among the most powerful agencies in spreading and recommending a mystical and vaguely defined pantheism.

7. *Reformed sects.*—Of the reformed faiths of the north also, the Brāhma Samāj and others, it may be asserted that, while in creed and profession they have maintained a monotheistic belief which is affirmed to be the true original faith of India, they have been unable altogether to discard mystical ideas, or to reject conceptions of worship in which the pantheistic strain, so characteristic of India, is readily discerned. They have thrown themselves effectively and for the most part wholeheartedly into practical and social work, which, especially by the Ārya Samāj, has been admirably conceived and carried out on the lines of European example; and speculation of a metaphysical nature has not been to any great extent within their province. Doctrinally their influence has been conservative; and the practical issues of religion and life have generally occupied much more of their attention than the speculative or mystical.

8. *Pantheism and ethics.*—Nor has it been true generally in India that pantheism has opposed itself to the claims of ethics, even in the form or forms in which the moral scheme is understood in the West. The fatalistic doctrines to which Indian thinking and life, in common with the greater part of the East, have been responsive are, of course, inconsistent with ethical principles in any real sense. Pantheistic conceptions, however, have in India accommodated themselves to morals, except in the extreme but logically justified forms in which they have exhibited themselves in some of the Yogin and kindred sects of both north and south, and in some of the higher Brāhman castes. With these men definitions and principles that are ultimately pantheistic have been made the support and justification of unmoral practice. The majority of the people, however, accept the theory on philosophic grounds, but make no attempt to bring it into any sort of harmony with their moral behaviour or allow it to control their ethical habit or belief. The ruling thought and inclination of a people by nature intensely religious is to seek intercourse with a personal God, to enlist His interest and good-will on their behalf, and to satisfy what they conceive to be His moral demand. The abstract pantheism which they profess is for the most part entirely without effect on daily conduct and life.

9. *Summary.*—Historically, therefore, Indian pantheism as a philosophic and religious principle is based upon two conceptions—that of the *ātman*, the soul or spirit, the sole reality on which all

things depend and in which they subsist, and the cosmological thought of the Creator, immanent in the universe which He has fashioned. In the mutual influence of these, and their ultimate more or less satisfactory accommodation to one another, is to be found the real key to Indian thinking, and upon them is made to rest the foundation of Indian constructive theory with regard to the universe and God. In some directions, as in the final views of the *Upaniṣads*, these principles have been thought out to their ultimate conclusions with a remorseless logic that has never been surpassed; but from these conclusions even the thinkers of the *Upaniṣads* fell back upon a more tolerable and practical theory of life, and the majority of those who received their teaching made little if any endeavour to reduce it to practice. As an abstract and philosophic belief, however, the theory gained a strong and permanent hold upon a people naturally inclined to metaphysical speculation.

LITERATURE.—The general Histories of Indian thought and literature by A. Barth (*The Religions of India*, Eng. tr., London, 1882), E. W. Hopkins (*The Religions of India*, do. 1896), and others, discuss the subject incidentally. The art. on pantheism in the encyclopædias are for the most part brief and offer little of interest. For the original sources see esp. *SBE* i. [1900], xv. [1900] (*Upaniṣads*), xxxiv. [1890], xxxviii. [1896], xlviii. [1904] (*Vedānta-Sūtras*), vii. [1898] (*Bhagavad-Gītā*). Cf. Max Müller, *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1899; P. Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upaniṣads*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1906; R. W. Frazer, *Indian Thought Past and Present*, London, 1915, ch. iv. f.; art. HINDUISM, VEDĀNTA, UPANISADS. For the Śaiva-Siddhānta doctrines of the south of India see, further, Frazer, pp. 219 ff., 257 ff.; H. W. Schomerus, *Der Śaiva-Siddhānta*, Leipzig, 1912; and art. DRAVIDIANS, vol. v. p. 23 ff.

A. S. GEDEN.

PAPACY.—1. The papacy is theologically the formal completion of the hierarchical conception of Christianity; politically it is the survival of the Roman conception of universal sovereignty. The world on which Christianity entered was Roman; the world-religion which was to leaven it was necessarily cast in the mould and bore the stamp of Rome. First this religion projected the idea of empire into the other world; then, as it were, going back upon itself, it attempted to realize the projection in this. The result was the imposing structure of Roman Catholicism, culminating in the papacy; only so is it formally and actually complete.

2. The hierarchy developed out of the earlier charismatic ministry, (1) when, with the diffusion of Christianity, the spiritual gifts of the first age disappeared; (2) when the breakdown of the belief in the Parousia reacted on the enthusiasm of believers; (3) in self-defence, when heresy and moral relaxation threatened the unity and life of the community; nor (4) can such causes as the ambition of the official class and the infiltration of pagan culture and ideas be overlooked. The 2nd and 3rd centuries of our era, which witnessed the Church's struggle with the various forms of Gnosticism, witnessed also the rise and growth of the hierarchy:

'In defending itself against Gnosticism the Christianity of the primitive age was transformed into the Catholicism of the next' (R. Sohm, *Outlines of Church History*, p. 31).

3. Up to a certain point the process of institutionalizing was common to Eastern and Western Christendom; but, from the first, causes were at work which in the one case arrested and in the other promoted its fuller development. The Eastern Churches have never either in theory or in fact recognized the papacy; in the West the papacy has absorbed into itself all other ecclesiastical institutions, and has become the Church. The Greek mind, even in its decadence, retained its distinctive qualities—curiosity, love of speculation, subtlety. These qualities found an ample, if a barren, field in theology, which has been described as the 'last great offspring of the Hellenic spirit' (Sohm, p. 50). 'The East enacted creeds, the

West discipline' (Milman, *Latin Christianity*, i. 72). And on the latter head the Greek mind was recalcitrant; to this day it conceives the unity of the Church as resting not on hierarchical considerations—these it relegates to the department of canon law rather than to that of dogma—but on the doctrine of the communion of saints. And the temper of the race was, and is, democratic—intolerant of the assumption of superiority, take what shape it may. Its ideal was the small city-State, civil or ecclesiastical. Byzantine Caesarism was a foreign importation, a yoke resting on force and tempered by assassination. The conception of authority embodied in Rome, imperial or papal, is Western, and alien to the Greek mind.

4. The West was frankly unspeculative; it had neither interest in nor the faculty of dealing with ideas. It construed dogma as law and belief as obedience; and the Church, in which this conception had taken shape, was the one living force in a world of decay. Hence its deep root in the European mind. Its mysterious claims and the magic of the name of the traditional seat of empire inspired even the barbarians with awe. 'Tu regere imperio populos'—this was the task of Rome, Christian as well as pagan; the world-empire was the foundation of and is the key to the world-Church.

'From every cause, either of a civil or of an ecclesiastical nature, it was easy to foresee that Rome must enjoy the respect, and would soon claim the obedience, of the provinces,' says Gibbon (*Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. J. B. Bury, London, 1901-06, ii. 45);

and Hobbes has concentrated the history of Latin Christendom into an epigrammatic sentence:

'If a man consider the original of this great Ecclesiastical Dominion, he will easily perceive that the Papacy is no other than the Ghost of the deceased Romane Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof. For so did the Papacy start up on a sudden out of the Ruines of that Heathen Power' (*Leviathan*, ch. 47, ed. W. G. Pogeon Smith, Oxford, 1909, p. 544).

Like other human institutions, it was the creature of circumstances; nor is there anything in either its earlier or its later developments which, given a knowledge of these circumstances, need surprise us. The sufficient reason of the papacy is 'Roma caput mundi'—the imperial tradition of Rome.

5. The exegetical and historical questions of which the papacy is the centre are best approached by regarding the alleged evidence not as the cause but as the effect of the institution, as an afterthought—the object of which was to account for an existing state of things. It is on these lines that Roman Catholic writers explain the forged Decretals; and, up to a certain point, the argument must be allowed. The Decretals consolidated and extended the power of the popes, but did not establish it; rather it is only on the hypothesis of its existence that they can be explained. The Petrine texts, and the undoubted prominence of the Roman community in the 2nd cent., have been useful weapons in the hands of controversialists. But the papacy rests on other foundations. Neither the texts nor the facts gave rise to the Roman primacy; rather it was the primacy that gave rise, if not to the texts, at least to their interpretation—to the facts, and to the perspective in which the facts are seen.

6. The earliest sources are theologically colourless. Clement bases the intervention of the Roman community, from which the bishop had not yet emerged, in the Corinthian troubles, not on any special prerogative of Rome, but on the suggestion of the Spirit—an obviously primitive touch; and Ignatius accounts for the consideration enjoyed by this Church by its good works and its local prestige. Before the end of the 2nd cent. a disposition to emphasize this consideration shows

itself; the Petrine legend appears. Neither the disposition nor the legend made its way without opposition; but each was part of a larger movement which fell in with the needs and temper of the age. In numbers and wealth the Roman community soon took the first place. At the time of the Decian persecution it had more than 20,000 members; and through its constitution, which had developed on hierarchical lines, it rivalled the State as a social power. The monarchical episcopate was now in the ascendant. Its apostolic origin and obligation once recognized, the metropolitanate and patriarchate were stages on the road to a higher unity; the papacy was the logical completion of the theory and the inevitable goal.

7. While secondary, however, as sources, the Petrine texts and the Petrine tradition have played a part in the history of Christian beliefs and institutions the importance of which it would be difficult to overstate. The tradition is older than the texts, to which it probably gave rise; but both have made for the legal and ecclesiastical, as opposed to the religious, element in Christianity. From an early date Peter was taken as the representative of this element, because it was desired to oppose an original 'central party' to the larger, more spiritual Paulinism, and because Peter's outstanding personality made him the most conspicuous among the immediate followers of Christ. This tradition gathered content and volume till all proportion was lost, and everything else in religion, even religion itself, became subordinate to it; in the Middle Ages we find it the primary fact in Christendom and the central doctrine of the Church. The development was continuous and consistent—system has from the first been the strength of Ultramontane theology; and the doctrine was brought to formal completeness by the definition of papal infallibility at the Vatican Council of 1870. Imposing as the structure is, its foundations are inadequate; Peter's prominence in the Gospel narrative is an insufficient ground for the belief in a personal or official privilege bestowed upon him by Christ. It can be accounted for by circumstances, by temperament, by the easy intercourse of friends. And that this is the true explanation is indicated by the absence of anything like one-man rule in the Christian community after the Ascension. Paul was beyond question the foremost figure in the Apostolic period:

'If there was any primacy at this time, it was the primacy not of Peter, but of Paul' (J. B. Lightfoot, *The Apostolic Fathers*, London, 1889-90, pt. i. vol. ii. p. 490).

It is conceivable that, had things taken another course, 'a caliphate in the family of Jesus' might have been established. As it was, Peter was a middle term between Pauline and Palestinian Christianity: the former, left to itself, might well have become a theosophy; the latter would almost certainly have narrowed into a sect. And with the disappearance of the Apostles a new age set in. They left no successors; and Peter was no exception to the rule.

8. The ministry of the first age was charismatic and universal; there was no clerical class. As the numbers of the community increased, specialization was inevitable; but the rise of an order of professional clergy was the most momentous change that has ever taken place in the Church. The attempt to account for it by the direct appointment of Christ was natural; traces of this attempt are to be found in what has been described as 'the most important book ever written, the Gospel according to Matthew' (B. W. Bacon, *The Making of the NT*, London, 1912, p. 145). This may be called the anti-Pauline Gospel; the issue is between a closed Palestinian tradition—modified,

indeed, from its extreme Jewish form, but still a tradition—and the onward moving sweep and swing of Pauline thought. The confession of Peter (Mt 16¹⁸.) occurs, though in a simpler form, in the two other Synoptic Gospels; but the famous gloss (vv. 17-19) is found in Matthew alone. That this, even if we retain the passage as it stands, will not bear the interpretation put upon it is matter of fact rather than of opinion. It is inconceivable that a saying of Christ so central as the mediæval theory of the papacy makes this should have been left unrecorded by three out of the four evangelists; that it should have been omitted by two (one of them the Petrine evangelist Mark) of the three who narrate the incident out of which it is said to have arisen; and that no reference should have been made to it by any other NT writer, in particular by Paul. Paul's references to the Twelve are those of a man with a grievance; he goes out of his way to proclaim his independence of them, and in particular of Peter (Gal 2¹¹⁻²¹). The hostile note is unmistakable; the Tübingen school had more to say for itself on this head than its immediate successors allow. It is probable that the passage is an interpolation made in the interests of the rapidly developing official ministry, the origin of which it was desired to throw back into the first age. In any case it is clear that the papacy has its roots not in Scripture, but in history; it is history that must pass judgment on its claims. And the historian will ask, not Does the Petrine tradition justify the papacy? but How was it that people came to believe that it did?

9. The answer is that, shadowy as this Petrine tradition was, it was opposed by no rival. This could not be said of the earlier titles to pre-eminence advanced by Rome. Was Rome, as Tertullian urged, one of a group of apostolic churches? There were other apostolic churches. Was it the seat of a patriarchate? So were Alexandria and Antioch. Was it the metropolis of the world? When Constantine transferred the seat of empire to the East, Byzantium claimed this prerogative. And it was not till then that the Petrine legend was accentuated, and the prerogative of Rome placed on a singular and incommunicable foundation—the succession of the Christian Dioscuri, Peter and Paul. It is one of the ironies of history that it is in a Gnostic source—the pseudo-Clementine *Homilies*—that this tradition is found in its most explicit form. Thus was the organization of the world-Church, modelled, in fact, upon that of the world-State, referred to a divine sanction. The detail was filled in later; and the broad lines of the fabric stand to this day. The diocese represents the *civitas*; the archiepiscopal province the Roman *provincia*; and the Catholic Church under the absolute rule of the pope, the vice-gerent of God, the empire under the *Divus Cæsar*.

'In its old age,' says Sohm (p. 47), 'the Roman Empire bequeathed its constitution to the young Church. . . . It was its last great legacy to the future.'

It was also its most important; for in the Church it rose from the grave to a new and more enduring life.

10. The advance of this organized Church system was not unchequered: in Montanism and other separatist movements the old spiritual liberty resisted the new ecclesiastical law. But, in doing so, it became fanaticism and licence. The Roman conception of Christianity had no serious competitor; and the highest social and religious forces then at work in the world were on its side. The circumstances of the time hastened its development, both by removing possible rivals and by emphasizing the need of stability—of fixed institutions

and beliefs. The walls of the world were falling. Africa was overrun; a torrent of barbaric invasion threatened the Eastern Churches; the West was the prey of rude tribes whose training was the condition of the survival of civilization; the secret of the power of the Roman bishop was the fact that he embodied the best spirit of the age. The story of Attila retiring, overawed by Leo the Great, is legend, but true legend. The papacy represented those forces, not of religion only, but of reason and social order, to which men, cultured and uncultured, recognize their subjection; the pope was heir by default of the Cæsars, and could not escape their function of rule. The national Churches which came into being north of the Alps became rapidly and acutely secularized, while Celtic Christianity, admirable as a pioneer force, was capable only of group organization and unable either to found or to compete with a world-polity. The panegyric of the papacy, familiar in Catholic apologetic, is not without foundation; but it errs when it is transferred from a period of history to history as a whole. Were it limited to the age lying between the fall of the old civilization and the birth of the new, it would be justified. The popes could not save the old world; but they could and did prevent the forces of barbarism from laying waste the ground out of which the new world was in due time to arise. Hence the debt of gratitude which civilization owes to the papacy. It was our pedagogue; and it was assuredly lighter than darkness, if it was darker than light.

11. The memory of the Roman empire haunted the mediæval world. In the darkest age man remembered that there had once been such things as law, knowledge, and civilization. Remnants of the old order had survived among the provincials. Was it possible that the august fabric as a whole should be revived? To effect such a revival the co-operation of the secular and the spiritual power, both in sufficient strength, was needed; and, when, in 800, Charles the Great received the imperial crown from Leo III., the occasion and the man arrived. 'Ab omnibus constitutus est Imperator Romanorum'; the empire was re-born.

12. Great, however, as the idea was, the structure contained from the first the seeds of dissolution. Each of the concurrent powers claimed the supremacy; but, from the nature of the case, neither could either effectually or permanently retain it. It was impossible either for the spiritual power to acknowledge subjection to the temporal or for the temporal to abdicate in favour of the spiritual; they were, and remained, two. Nor was either, as it professed to be, universal. There were kingdoms beyond the empire; there were Christian communities outside the Church. The facts were larger than the frame; and an age of conflict opened. A strong pope was necessarily the enemy of a strong emperor, and a strong emperor of a strong pope. Charles the Great was as truly supreme head of the Church as Henry Tudor; but the older Erastianism was on the larger scale: the control claimed by Henry over a local and national Church was exercised by Charles over the Church as a whole. All the great creations of the Middle Ages—the empire, the Church, scholasticism, feudalism—bear this stamp of universality; hence the dream of unity which to this day haunts Latin religion and the Latin world. It could not—it is probable that it never can—be realized. The mind of the time was dualistic, and could not escape from the charmed circle. An Erigena was suspect; his time was not yet. A more pedestrian philosophy was to provide a speculative foundation for the idealism, the aspirations, and the ethics of the age.

13. The Carolingian empire did not survive

its founder; and on its fall the shadowy but imposing inheritance of universal power fell a second time to the papacy. It at once seduced and strengthened; it misled, but it inspired. Fear of the encroachments of the civil ruler, the desire to place the Church above the vicissitudes of secular governments, in conjunction with the invariable tendency of authority to extend its jurisdiction, led to a notable advance of the Roman claims. The germs of this development were already in existence—the dispensing power, the right to confer privilege and exemption, and to act as universal metropolitan and court of appeal. The wish to place these and similar prerogatives beyond question gave rise to an elaborate series of fabrications and forgeries which, in an uncritical age, silenced objections and were admitted as evidence. They began in the 6th cent. with the *Liber Pontificalis*, and continued with the Decretals of the pseudo-Isidore and Gratian to the end of the Middle Ages. The memorable change of front by which, on the transference of the seat of empire to the East, the Roman bishop met the pretensions put forward by the new patriarch of Constantinople led, in particular, to a deliberate and wholesale falsification of ecclesiastical literature. The endeavour to represent the claims advanced by later popes as already asserted and admitted in earlier times poisoned the sources; suppressions were made, interpolations inserted, documents forged. Hence the obscurity in which much of the history of the papacy is involved. It must be remembered, however, that the advocates of the papal claims were not the first and have not been the last Churchmen to pursue pious ends by dubious means. From an early date theologians have been unable to resist the temptation to exploit popular credulity and pass counterfeit coin for true. The so-called Athanasian Creed and the famous text of the Three Witnesses (1 Jn 5⁷) are evidence of the power of a false tradition over more enlightened Churches and in more critical days.

14. The purpose of the Decretals was twofold: to exempt the clergy from the secular courts, setting up spiritual over against the civil and criminal tribunals in every country, and to establish the immediate jurisdiction of the pope over the whole Church. Thus the easily abused power of the metropolitans, which excited the jealousy of Rome, was broken; and, as the patriarchates were extinct, Rome remained the only source of authority. Nicholas I. (858–867) challenged Hincmar, Lothair, and Photius with equal vigour—in the West with success; but in the East the smouldering rivalries of generations burst into flame. The Western and Eastern Churches were finally separated; the seamless robe was torn.

15. The period which followed the fall of the Carolingians was one of decline for the papacy; internal corruption undermined what external attack had failed to destroy. Before the century closed it had become the prey of local faction; its deliverance came from a foreign and secular power, that of the German Ottonides, who had succeeded to the diminished but still mighty inheritance of Charles the Great. The structure of the mediæval State was loose; the feudal system had shifted and divided the basis of sovereignty. The aim of Otto I. was to strengthen it, and to establish his own power by the elevation of that of the Church. He placed more reliance on his spiritual than on his temporal vassals, and did not foresee that, once conscious of their strength, they might prove more formidable enemies to the empire than the disorganized forces of the feudal lords. Under Henry III. (1039–56) the empire reached its high-water mark; four popes owed their elevation to him; the pontiffs

were elected in Germany and imposed on Rome. But the particularist tendencies of feudalism combined with the needs of the time and the traditional policy of the Roman Church to hinder this state of things from becoming permanent. Had the papacy not been reformed by the emperor—and only the emperor could have reformed it—it would have fallen under the weight of its own vices. But no sooner was it restored to vigour than it turned upon its preserver, upon whom it waged a parricidal war.

16. This forward ecclesiastical movement was powerfully seconded by the reform of Cluny, with which a wave of enthusiasm such as had not been seen since the first ages invaded the Church. From the first Western monasticism had avoided the follies and the fanaticism of Eastern. The monk of the West was neither a *faqir*, like the Syrian pillar-saints, nor a dervish, like the illiterate hordes who swarmed from the Thebaid into Alexandria with riot and destruction in their train. The Benedictine Order, in particular, was a hive of busy workers, sending out a succession of tillers of the soil and pioneers of industry, of scholars and artists, of saints and rulers of men. But decline set in. The primary purpose of the religious life was lost sight of; the setting overlaid the gem. The reform of Cluny over-reached itself; but it met both a religious and a temperamental need of the time. It expressed the dualism of Western thought in its crudest form: spirit and flesh, the supernatural and the natural, the religious and the secular, were sharply contrasted; it was not only that they never met—they diverged. It was impossible to extirpate the lower element; but it was possible, it was believed, to subdue it; the means were asceticism in the interior, and sacerdotal absolutism in the exterior, sphere. The Cluniac movement was a turning-point in the history of the papacy. Till then circumstances had played the greater part in its development, now the prominent factor was design; till then it had been, on the whole, an element of progress, now it became one of reaction; till then there had been no persistent spiritual force behind its growth, now such a force was supplied by the ascetic idea. This was reinforced by the dream of the theocracy. In the secular as in the religious province the pope was king of kings and lord of lords. Asceticism was a protest against much that was ignoble; the theocracy was often an assertion of law against lawless violence and of right against might. This is why both commanded the support of many excellent men. Celibacy was better than promiscuous licence; one distant pontiff was to be preferred to a hundred lesser but no less tyrannous popes nearer home. Unhappily, in neither case was the ideal even approached. Laxity made its way into the most austere communities. The wrong way to meet the evils of the time, the way of law, had been chosen; not so can spiritual forces be guided or controlled.

17. In the person of Gregory VII. (1073-85) the monasticism of Cluny reached its highest point. 'I have loved justice and hated iniquity, therefore I die in exile,' were his last words. It would be truer to say that ambition and unscrupulousness over-reach themselves, and that they that take the sword shall perish by the sword. For the moment the forces at his disposal broke the loose fabric of the empire. But their success was partial and passing; the claims of the Hildebrandine papacy remained in the illusive category of claims. But they captured the religious aspirations of the age. Mediæval pietism was, on a larger scale and under more favourable conditions, what the Romanticism of the post-revolution period was—a protest against the secular spirit. As such, each had its justifica-

tion; but each was exploited by the Church and the clergy for their own ends. In the 12th cent. the Church and the world were fused into one, the Church being the predominant factor. Each suffered in the process; and, though in each there was an undercurrent, it ran too far below the surface waters to be easily perceived. The movement culminated in the Crusades. These wars of religion present points of contact with the *jihād* of Islām; they display the same chivalry, the same fanaticism, the same subservience of spiritual forces to secular ends. But, if they served to fix the yoke of papal rule on Western Christendom, they served also to forge the weapon by which this rule was in the end overthrown. For they gave occasion to the rivalries in which the sentiment of nationality had its origin; and they opened up the forgotten East in which Greek civilization lay buried, but from which, in the shape of the Renaissance, it was to rise.

18. Meanwhile, however, the adroitness of the popes and the mystical tendencies of the time, which the popes were quick to use for their own purposes, combined to exalt the papacy. It bore no rival near the throne.

'Jacobus frater Domini . . . Petro non solum universam Ecclesiam sed totum reliquum gubernandum' (Innocent III., *Epistola ad Acerbum* [in *Mirbt, Quellen zur Gesch. des Papsttums*, p. 130]).

There were two swords, the spiritual and the temporal:

'Uterque est in potestate ecclesie spiritualis scilicet et materialis; sed is quidem pro ecclesia, illa vero ab ecclesia exercendus; ille sacerdotis, is manu regum et militum, sed ad nutum et patientiam sacerdotis' (Boniface VIII., *Unam Sanctam* [in *Mirbt*, p. 140]).

The whole was a strange medley of good and evil. The mystic fervour of a Bernard, the seraphic fire of a Francis of Assisi—both subversed the one end. The papacy has never wanted saints, and they have always bulked large in its foreground; but it is not by saints that the springs of its action have been manipulated.

19. The 13th cent. witnessed the victory of the papacy and of the forces which it controlled over the Hohenstauffen dynasty. It witnessed also a stirring of the life force of Europe. The age was still mediæval; but it could no longer be described as dark. Everywhere there was stir and movement; the day was at hand. The pope, it was felt, had grown in power and influence at the expense of the Church. The episcopate had become weakened by his immediate and universal jurisdiction; the mendicant orders formed an international force at his disposal—an inner Church within the Church. The allegiance of the bishops, often great officers of State in their respective countries, was divided; and it was not to Rome that the balance inclined. Now that its power had become omnipotence, the papacy, once a guiding and organizing force, had become a factor of disintegration. The Curia was a *sentina gentium*; Simon Magus, it was said, had replaced Peter in Peter's see. When the lofty theocracy planned by Hildebrand degenerated into a secular dominion exercised by worldly men for worldly ends, the conscience of mankind revolted. The ideal sovereign of Dante's *De Monarchia* is Henry of Luxemburg; to the spiritual Franciscans the Church was Babylon and the pope Antichrist; before the invective of Oliva and Gerard of Parma that of the Reformers pales. These impassioned protests took legal shape in the *Defensio Pacis* of Marsilio of Padua, and speculative in the nominalism of William of Ockham. The Great Schism emphasized the contrast between idea and fact. The Councils of Constance and Basel attempted to find a remedy. But conciliarism meant anarchy; men of affairs like Æneas Silvius (Pius II.) fell back in despair

upon the papacy, not as good, but as the lesser evil, since, after all, in one fashion or another the government of the Church had to be carried on. No one respected it; the mediæval dream of universal sovereignty had broken down. But it was, relatively and provisionally, a necessity of the situation; it divided Europe less than any alternative that could be proposed. And for another half century the crumbling structure hung together till with Luther the final shock came. It was final in this sense, that the Reformation once for all abolished both the theory and the fact of the mediæval papacy. Philip II. or Louis XIV. would have made as short work of the pretensions of an Innocent III. or a Boniface VIII. as any Protestant sovereign; the supremacy in temporal matters claimed by modern popes is disguised and indirect. The sphere of the Church's *magisterium* is now restricted to faith and morals—though the casuist would be a poor one who could not bring a controverted question, in whatever order, under one or other head. But the mediæval papacy took with a high hand what the modern takes surreptitiously: the latter frames syllogisms—sophistical ones, but still syllogisms; the former laid down and enforced law.

20. Compelled by the growth of the secular State-system, and still more by that of the secular consciousness, to abandon the visionary conception of a theocratic world-monarchy, the papacy fell back upon its position as an Italian principality. This became the key to its policy, the aim of which was the material extension and the political predominance of the Papal State. If the pope could control Italy, directly or indirectly, the rivalries of the powers, aided by the prestige of the Church, would do the rest.

'Was it not profoundly significant,' says Ranke (*Hist. of the Popes*, i. 54), 'that a pope should himself resolve to demolish the ancient basilica of St. Peter . . . and determine to erect a temple, planned after those of antiquity, on its site?'

It was the opening of a new order; the old had passed away. A notable lowering of aim and outlook accompanied it: an Innocent III. would have regarded the vices of Alexander VI. and the triumphs of Julius II. with equal disdain. The Renaissance afforded a diversion which fitted in both with the political designs and with the artistic tastes of the popes of the period, who were princes rather than pontiffs; but it was prematurely crushed by what F. X. Kraus calls 'die brutale Hispanisierung Italiens.'

'Hier fließt die Quelle des trüben Wassers, welche sich über das Land ausgoss, und hier ist der eigentliche Ausgangspunkt des modernen Dissidiums zwischen Papsttum und Italien' (*Cavour*, Mainz, 1902, p. 6).

As regarded Spain and France, the papacy lay between hammer and anvil. The choice fell on Spain; but the Spaniard was a hard master, and remained for generations the evil genius of Rome. For the Roman temper is not that of the enthusiast; it has a certain ease and lightness of touch. While Spain was the Prussia of the 16th cent.—fanatical, pedantic, heavy of hand—Spanish religion had the seriousness which Italian lacked. But the Spanish God was a Moloch; the fire without was kindled by the fire within. It was Spain that inspired the Counter-Reformation, and furnished its weapons of predilection—the rack, the stake, the cord.

21. The Reformation was a spiritual rather than an intellectual movement; it was the greatest moral and religious emancipation that the world has yet seen, or perhaps will ever see. It overthrew false gods—the false conscience of asceticism, and the false authority of the priesthood. Men's fetters were broken; what use they would make of their liberty they only could decide. The watchword of the counteracting movement was

repression, its aim the re-establishment of the captivity of mankind. Open scandals were discouraged; the Rome of the Counter-Reformation was outwardly decorous; the Council of Trent strengthened authority; what had been opinion became dogma; questions which had been open were closed. In the beginning there had been a desire on both sides—a desire of which Charles V. was representative—to avoid schism; the break-up of the historical Church was a misfortune to be avoided at all costs. Now policy and passion dictated another attitude; the object was not to comprehend, but to exclude. The Jesuits gave a veneer of scholarship to the movement; but it was a thin veneer. Petavius, who came a century later (1583–1652), was their one man of real learning.

22. The Inquisition (*q.v.*) was reorganized, the Index (*q.v.*, 1571) established. 'Sica destructa in omnes scriptores' was the judgment of Antonio Paleario, a contemporary. A net of falsehood was thrown over antiquity: the works even of Catholic writers were freely 'edited':

'Ita quidem ut in posterum non liceat affirmare ex lectione istorum auctorum quid illi senserint, sed quænam sit sententia Curiae Romanae, quæ omnia depravit . . . denique possumus certe statuere non dari librum integrum aut non fucatum' (Friedrich, *Gesch. des vatikanischen Konzils*, i. 17).

Orthodoxy itself was suspect; Baronius and Belarmine worked in chains. The period has been variously estimated. Such a life as that of Philip Neri, the 'Apostle of Rome,' shows that genuine spiritual work was done. But this good man was in no way representative of the religious world of the time; neither its temper nor its methods were his. More typical figures were Ignatius Loyola and Charles Borromeo—men of the letter, of rule, of organization, of the ecclesiastical machine. This was the element on which reliance was placed. The external was emphasized; even the better men of the reaction took it for granted that the interior accompanied, or would accompany, it; spirit was ignored. The Inquisition was the distinctive creation of the period.

It was 'peculiarly the weapon and peculiarly the work of the Popes. . . . It is the principal thing with which the papacy is identified,' says Lord Acton, 'and by which it must be judged.' Its principle, he holds, 'is murderous, and a man's opinion of the papacy is regulated and determined by his opinion about religious assassination' (*Letters of Lord Acton to Mary Gladstone*, ed. H. Paul, London, 1913, p. 147 f.).

Acton conceived the content of morality as less changing than in fact it is. We judge of actions by their relation not to an absolute standard, but to the best morality of their time. This, however, will not affect our judgment of the popes of this or any other age. For a divine teacher stands, as such, outside the category of relativity. Nor did either the best or even the average morality of the time sanction their cruelties.

23. This moral declension must be taken in connexion with the sectionalism of the post-Reformation Church. Pre- and post-Reformation Catholicism differ fundamentally. The former, in the West at least, was the Church; the latter is one of the Churches—one of the fragments into which the imposing structure of mediæval Christianity was shattered in the 16th cent.; and there is all the difference in the world between the two things. The mediæval Church contained many and conflicting elements in a state of imperfect equilibrium. At the Reformation the freer and more active escaped, those that were left entering into new combinations and taking on new forms. Post-Reformation Catholicism is Latin, not European; and, as the Latinizing process has become more acute, even the remains of the older freedom have been extruded: Jansenism, Gallicanism, Febronianism, in our own time Modernism—the iron uniformity of Rome has crushed them out, and they have disappeared. The continuity between

the Catholicism of the 13th cent. and that of the 20th is exterior—a thing of ritual, polity, and formula; the spiritual kinship of the great figures of the Middle Ages follows other and larger lines.

24. By 1630 the Counter-Reformation had spent itself; the papacy could reckon up its gains. These were considerable; not a little of the soil on which the Reformed doctrines had fallen was stony ground. Northern, or non-Romance, Europe was from the first Protestant; Southern, or Romance, Catholic; but there had been a debatable land between the two. In the middle of the 16th cent. this was to a great extent Protestant; early in the 17th it had been regained for the popes. This success was due partly to the superstition, more to the indifference, of the nations concerned, partly to the zeal and ability of the Jesuits, most of all to the persistent and ruthless persecution adopted as a policy by Church and State—the spiritual and the civil powers working in close alliance for a common end. But Catholicism was unable to extract the full profit from its victories; other motives, other interests, other combinations, came into play. In 1631 the two great Roman Catholic powers were in league with Protestants; Urban VIII's opposition to Gustavus Adolphus was lukewarm; Innocent XI. was the enemy of the House of Bourbon, and looked with at least mixed feelings on the English Revolution of 1688. The popes were secular princes, and concerned with the balance of power. Policy masqueraded in the cast-off clothes of religion; the world influenced the Church more than the Church the world.

25. The middle years of the 18th cent. witnessed a certain lowering of the temperature; the reasonableness, not to say the rationalism, of the age filtered into the Church. It was the age of Muratori, of Febronius, of Scipio de Ricci. Benedict XIV. (1740-58) and Clement XIV. (1769-75) were moderate rulers and enlightened pontiffs; and, though in Clement XIII. and Pius VI. the tide set in another direction, it is probable that, but for the French Revolution, an era of at least comparative conciliation would have begun. But violence breeds violence: with the Legitimist restoration which followed the fall of Napoleon a new era of the papacy, one of definite political and religious reaction, set in. De Maistre was its prophet, Lamennais its orator, Pius IX. its pope.

26. Pius VII. was personally moderate, and his minister Consalvi shared his temper. But, after the Restoration, the influence of the bigoted Paccia prevailed; and the next three popes were tools of Bourbon and Hapsburg absolutism, enemies of civil and religious liberty under every form. The *Mirari vos* of Gregory XVI. gave no uncertain sounds:

'Ex hoc putidissimo indifferetismo fonte absurda illa sicut ac erronea sententia seu potius deliramentum, asserendam esse ac vindicandam cuiuslibet libertatem conscientiae.'

The note of the modern papacy is here. This reaction reached its climax in Pius IX. (1846-78), under whom the temporal power disappeared. Its disappearance marked the end of an old and the beginning of a new order. The papacy was left free to develop itself as an ecclesiastical institution unhampered by the territorial considerations which limit secular sovereignty, however small its scale; and it is significant that the same year 1870 witnessed at once the definition of papal infallibility and the Italian occupation of Rome. Politically, the pope was influenced by stronger men than himself, in particular by Antonelli; but, on the religious side, his epileptic tendency was the key to the pontificate, during which the reputation of the Church and the papacy sank to its lowest ebb.

27. His theological aspirations were, however, more successful than his political. The triumph of Ultramontanism was complete, though those who

looked below the surface of things saw clearly enough that it was evanescent. What was gained in intension was lost in extension; but the centralizing and acute Romanizing of Catholicism was attained. It was no longer safe to express the Febronian or Gallican principles so commonly held, even in high places, in the preceding century. A series of condemnations directed against independent writers, culminating in a sharp attack on the historical school of Munich, warned thought off the territory of religion and its ill-defined hinterland. Local usages were suppressed, and Italian ritual and devotions introduced into the Cisalpine countries; from the shape of an arch to the cut of a vestment conformity to Roman usage was enforced. But under this surface of uniformity the ground was shifting; a conflict between the Church and the historical conscience of Europe was preparing, in which the latter, defeated for the moment, retired to sharpen its weapons and to plan a more dangerous and radical assault.

28. Resistance from within was crushed by sheer terrorism. The thought of being called to account by the Roman tribunals haunted Newman like an evil dream. It meant, he believed, his death. 'Others,' he wrote, 'have been killed before me' (W. Ward, *Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman*, London, 1912, i. 588). For, over and above the moral power of Rome over a timorous conscience, its administrative pressure is enormous; and the increasing separation between Church and State in the modern world enables this pressure to be persistently and ruthlessly applied. By a stroke of the pen a layman can be deprived of the use of the sacraments, a priest of his functions, a bishop of the special 'faculties' without which the administration of his diocese is impossible. There is a curious ingratitude in the attitude taken by the popes to what they call the Revolution; for only under the conditions brought about by this movement could their present despotism exist. Not for a moment would it have been tolerated by the old legitimist monarchies; these were 'in all causes and over all persons whether ecclesiastical or civil within their dominions supreme' (Bidding Prayer).

29. The most important acts of the pontificate, because, being dogmatic, they bound the Church to permanent and interior assent, were the definition of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin (1854), the Syllabus (1864), and the Vatican definition of papal infallibility (1870). The first was rhetoric crystallized into dogma; the second was a declaration of war against modern society; the third was the formal completion of the theory of the papacy, the last stone of a fabric on which the labours of generations had been spent. The first met with little opposition; devotion silenced controversy. The second divided the Church into two opposing camps; and, while reason was on the Liberal, consistency was on the Ultramontane side. The logic of the ideas embodied in the Syllabus was beyond question; and these ideas were contained in premisses which the Liberal Catholics either admitted or were not prepared to dispute. The wisest and best men in the Church were on their side; but their attempts to explain away the papal pronouncements were thin, and left an impression of insincerity. The plea, e.g., that the document referred to an abstract and non-existent state of things cannot be taken seriously; the Syllabus was put forward as 'completens præcipuos nostrae ætatis errores.' A later theory maintained that papal utterances of this sort, though dogmatic in form, are disciplinary in substance, and call for exterior submission rather than interior assent. They express, i.e., the existing opinion of the governing body, and are to

a great extent matter of policy; in time they will in all probability be tacitly, if not avowedly, withdrawn. This theory gives a correct account of what, in many cases, actually happens; but its value is historical, not theological. It is impossible to reconcile it either with the terms of the documents or with any intelligible view of the authority of the pope or of the Church.

30. Both the name and, in its modern sense, the idea of infallibility were foreign to the primitive Church. In the first days believers spoke as they were moved by the Spirit, whose power attested the genuineness of their utterances. As time went on, the *charisma veritatis* was held to reside in the office-holders, and, after the rise of the monarchical episcopate, in the bishop, rather than in the community as a whole. Usage tends to harden into ritual, and opinion into dogma; the predominant position early acquired by the Roman Church caused a peculiar weight to be attached to its decisions, in matters both of discipline and of faith. The infallibility of the Roman bishop stood in close connexion with his supremacy; from the notion of a final court of appeal in matters of doctrine it was an easy step to that of the inerrancy of this court. The key to the controversy between the two schools which divided the Vatican Council was that they looked at the question from radically different points of view. To the one papal infallibility was an evident, almost a self-evident, theological conclusion; to the other it was in palpable contradiction with historical fact. The dispute, therefore, resolved itself into one concerning the relation of theology to history, and involved controversies unforeseen, far-reaching, and even now but partially solved. The position of the Munich divines was not always consistent. While refusing to consider the papacy and the Church as convertible terms, they admitted that the former rested on divine appointment. 'The Church from the first was founded upon it; and the Head of the Church ordained its type in the person of Peter.' This admission was their weak point. To the rising critical school, in and outside of Germany, it seemed unwarranted, while the Ultramontanes, stronger in logic than in history, argued that the notions of supremacy and infallibility were contained in that of the primacy, and that, being necessary to make it effective, they had been realized more and more clearly in the Church's consciousness as time went on. The forgeries, which they could not deny, had but stereotyped existing usage; and the plausible, if fallacious, argument that at least till the 16th cent. every considerable reform of the Church had been associated with an advance of the authority of Rome was on their side. See, further, art. INFALLIBILITY, vol. vii. p. 256.

31. The position of the minority bishops was difficult. They were men of greater distinction than their opponents; they had on their side the goodwill of their respective governments and the sympathies of the educated class. But, if history was with them, logic was against them. If Rome was what the current Catholic teaching, which they admitted and by which they were bound, made her, the proposed dogma followed. Again, whatever weight they carried as individuals, as a party they had neither discipline nor cohesion. Some were timid and half-hearted; others were open to the influence and intimidation which the Vatican had at its disposal, and used unscrupulously. Pius IX. had become the object of a more than Byzantine cultus. His flatterers adapted the Breviary hymns in his honour, substituting his name for that of the Deity; Louis Venillot classed him as an object of devotion with the Virgin and the consecrated Host ('Quirinus,'

Letters from Rome, Eng. tr., London, 1870, p. 14). On the other hand, Gratry denounced the dominant 'école d'erreurs et de mensonge' (F. Nielsen, *The Hist. of the Papacy in the sixteenth Century*, Eng. tr., London, 1906, ii. 334); Montalembert spoke of 'the idol in the Vatican' (*ib.*); Newman stigmatized the party identified with the *Univers* and the *Civiltà* as 'an aggressive and insolent faction,' and declared that, 'if it is God's Will that the Pope's Infallibility should be defined, then it is His blessed Will to throw back the times and moments of that triumph He has destined for His Kingdom' (Ward, *Life*, ii. 288 f.). But the opposition collapsed with the definition. Hefele frankly acknowledged himself unable to endure the consequences of resistance; Hohenlohe argued that, while a formula could be explained away or might become obsolete, an act of schism was irreparable, and of two evils chose what seemed to him the less (*Memoir of Prince Hohenlohe*, Eng. tr., London, 1906, ii. 10, 16, 49). It was by such reasonings as these that theologians reluctantly reconciled themselves to what had taken place. The weakness of the position had translated itself into weakness of moral fibre; 'inopportunism' was not inspiring; and did not inspire. To the world, even the Catholic world, at large the quarrel seemed one of the sacristy. The professionalizing of religion had been fatal to its actuality, and removed it from the cognizance and interest of the ordinary man. But, in the improbable event of a theological revision of the definition, it is probable that canonists would find a sufficient reason for holding the acts of the Council null and void in the pressure, moral and even material, exerted by the Vatican over its proceedings. The Council was not free.

32. The weapon forged in 1870 has not so far been used in the manner feared by some and hoped by others. No further positive definitions have been made, and no indisputably infallible pronouncements put forth by the Holy See. Rome has taught rather as if it were infallible than infallibly, though its dogmatic utterances have been more frequent and more detailed than before. When, however, it is asked whether these utterances are or are not infallible, it must be remembered that there are other ways of teaching infallibly than that laid down by the Vatican Council. In opening a new channel for infallibility the bishops did not block up those already existing; these remain as they were before. And, in connexion with such questions, e.g., as those raised by the Pontifical Acts of 1907, if the pope can speak infallibly and does not, it is difficult to reconcile this taciturn infallibility with the function of a divine teacher, while, if he cannot, both the old and the new infallibility—i.e. that existing before 1870 and that defined by the Council—are useless and illusory, names not things. There can be no doubt that, whatever Cisalpine theologians may object to the view, Rome regards such pronouncements as infallible; and that, given the premisses, Rome is right.

33. Leo XIII. (1878-1903) started with this great advantage: he succeeded Pius IX. He was no less impregnated with the Roman spirit; by temperament he was even more imperious; but he was a wise, a wary, and a strong man. From the first he made this felt. Caricaturists had represented Pius IX. as a querulous, scolding old woman. No one—and the fact is significant—ever represented Leo XIII. in this way; the personality of the pope imposed itself and carried weight. For a man of his years and calling, he possessed in an exceptional degree the instinct for fact. He was of the old order, and democracy was temperamentally uncongenial to him; but in his encyclicals on the

labour question, as in the encouragement given to the *Sillon* in France and the *Democrazia Cristiana* in Italy, he recognized and made advances to democracy. The critical movement lay beyond his personal horizon, but he would not condemn Modernism; he can scarcely have loved the French Republic, but only a few days before his death he assured the French ambassador that nothing, nothing (he repeated it emphatically), should make him break with France.

34. He could not change the course of events or direct their development on other than their own lines. But he made the best where others before and after him made the worst of the situation; he arrested the forces that made for dissolution; he encouraged the higher and repressed the lower elements in the vast and complex society with which he had to deal. He left the Church respected. Under his predecessor it had been, under his successor it was to become, a negligible quantity. While Leo lived, it was a power to be reckoned with, not only politically—that it must be for long under whatever government—but in thought and life. It attracted not only the static elements of the body politic, men—of whom Brunetière was a type—who valued unity and action more than speculation, but not a few of the progressives; it was thought possible to graft the methods and conclusions of modern science upon the venerable traditions of Catholicism, and so to make the centuries one. These aspirations took shape in Modernism (*q.v.*)—an attempt to naturalize criticism, scientific history, and the philosophy of spirit in the Church. It overlooked the distinctive feature of Catholicism—i.e. the peculiar development of the notion of authority embodied in the papacy, and the consequent relation of the Roman Church to the modern mind movement, which is that of a residuum left behind when the freer and saner elements of life have broken away. Were Catholicism to lose this character, it would no longer appeal to the social and cultural levels to which it is now so uniquely adapted; its sufficient reason would be gone. Leo XIII. saw this as clearly as his successor; but he saw what his successor did not see—that a Church incapable of movement or adaptation must be left behind by the advancing world, and that Modernism was a development of the human spirit which it was equally impossible for the papacy either to encourage or to suppress. He temporized, trusting to events, to the weight of custom, and to the preponderance of the fixed over the volatile elements in ecclesiastical Christianity—which perhaps was the wisest thing that a pope could do.

35. Pius X. (1903–14) was a man of another type. A peasant by birth, a country priest by training, he possessed at once the virtues and the defects of his order—its simplicity and its narrowness, its piety and its guile. Imposed by the Austrian veto on the Conclave, he was the pope of a reaction, which, like most reactions, carried those concerned in it very much farther than they wished or intended. The temper of Rome is not fanatical. Rather it is that of the permanent staff of a great public department. The men who compose the Curia are officials—cautious, painstaking, unimaginative. They distrusted Modernism, but they would have met it with other weapons than the *Lamentabili* and the encyclical *Pascendi*; they resented the policy of the French Republic, but they would not have lost France. Their disapproval of the pope and of his advisers was undisguised; and Benedict XV. (1914) is not only by temperament and by training unlike his predecessor; he was chosen with the express intention on the part of the electors of ensuring a pontificate which should be the antithesis of the last. His

distinctive virtue, it has been said, is silence. It is a relative virtue. For these are times when speech is called for; in the crisis of a world's history the infallible cannot with impunity be dumb. In the technical province of theology it may be otherwise; he may be silent because he has nothing to say. It is not to be expected that the acts of his predecessor will be reversed or his policy disavowed. But there will probably be less friction, things will be done with greater intelligence and decorum; Roman rather than Spanish methods will prevail. The laws by which the situation is governed are invariable. But they will now work normally. Their operation was abnormally stimulated under Pius X.

36. The history of the Roman Commonwealth is reproduced with singular fidelity in that of the Roman Church. In each we see a body of men strong rather than either intelligent or spiritually minded, indifferent to ideas, bent on material ends, prudent, tenacious, capable of the sacrifice of a present to a future good, and of private to public interest, rising first to prominence, then to domination, and founding a universal State. In each religion was employed as an instrument of policy. Its sanctions were not wanting to the empire; the imperial city and the Cæsars received divine honours; the Church covered secular designs under the disguise of piety; her aims, her weapons, were material; her wisdom was that of this world. Here, as there, decline followed close upon maturity. Some secret poison, it seemed, entered into the system. The governing class, on which the institution as a whole depended, lost the qualities of an oligarchy. Its tenacity became stubbornness, its distaste for ideas ignorance and ineptitude, its caution craft. And the world changed. New forces came into play; new elements made their appearance in society; success called for other qualities—intelligence, quickness, adaptability—than those which had been demanded in the past. The centre of gravity shifted from the empire to the new nations, and from the Church to the Churches. In each case the older body lingered, *informe, ingens*—in that of the Church it still lingers, and may linger long. But it lingers as a survival of a past world in a new order. Slowly detrition works upon it; slowly disintegration advances and cohesion decreases. It may disappear in the short agony of revolution; it may perish, more probably, in the long process of secular decay. In either case its destiny is the same.

* Venit summa dies et ineluctabile tempus
Dardaniæ: fuimus Troes: fuit Ilium, et Ingens
Gloria Teucorum' (Verg. *Æn.* ii. 324 ff.).

37. The Latin genius has great qualities—form, order, unity; but they are discounted by one radical incapacity—the incapacity for dealing with ideas. It conceives belief and religion in general primarily as regulation or enactment; its attitude to dogma is that of the State to law. 'Ecclesia non iudicat de internis': 'I do not ask you what you think; but you must obey.' This position is not, indeed, that of the pietist or of the theologian; but it is that of official Rome. And it is probable that the inevitable loosening of the dogmatic principle among Latin Christians will be brought about less by criticism—for which they have in general neither aptitude, equipment, nor inclination—than by the relaxation of the political and governmental tendencies of the Church under the pressure of the rising democracy, by the conception of the Church as spirit taking the place of that of the Church as law.

38. Meanwhile the papacy remains the most complete and consistent expression of the mediæval outlook on life. Hence its unflinching attraction to

the mediæval mind, where this survives, as it does on a larger scale than we suppose, among men and women of to-day. For it is possible to live in a period without being of it; the modern mind is exceptional even in the modern age. To how many the conceptions on which the life of our time is based—evidence, sequence, causality—are strange and unintelligible! The scientific foundation is wanting; they live fragmentarily, and, as it were, piecemeal, in a connected world. This accounts for the strange reversions to type, the fantastic religious and moral aberrations, differing little in form and less in substance from those of the Lower Empire, which crop up from time to time among us; much more for a reaction, passing indeed but, for the time being, noticeable, in favour of an institution so closely bound up with the past, so intimately associated with religion, founded on so long an experience and so close an observation of human nature as the papacy.

39. Round the dome of the Vatican basilica, where, it is believed, all that is mortal of the Prince of the Apostles rests, the words stand in golden letters, 'TU ES PETRUS ET SUPER HANC PETRAM AEDIFICABO ECCLESIAM MEAM.' It is not without significance that the title-deeds of the greatest of the Christian Churches should rest on a doubtful tradition, an uncertain relic, and words which in all probability were not spoken by Christ. So in human affairs truth and falsehood are mingled; so the colours of good and evil are mixed. But the connexion of religion with external things, however close, is accidental. They pass; it remains. The papacy is a fragment of the Middle Ages surviving in a later generation; and this is its refutation. For life is a stream; and, in religion as elsewhere, a return to the past is impossible; the past is a stage in the process that has been definitely left behind. Those who urge that this applies not only to Catholicism but to Christianity may be met with Richard Rothe's summing up of Church history (*Ausgewählte Schriften*, new ed., Halle, 1900, p. 137): 'Das Christentum ist das Allerveränderlichste; das ist sein besonderer Ruhm.' The papacy has, Christianity has not, arrested and excluded change.

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PAPUANS.—It is generally accepted that the term 'Papuan' is derived from the Moluccan word *papúa* ('frizzly' or 'cnrly'), the word being used by the Moluccans to designate people with nlotrichous hair. Outside of Africa this type of hair is found among the Negritos, and among the inhabitants of New Guinea, the neighbouring islands, and Melanesia. Excluding the Negritos, we may regard the ulotrichi to have been the first inhabitants of western Oceania together with Australia and Tasmania, but other stocks have entered into this area and more or less hybridized the population, perhaps with the sole exception of Tasmania. The languages of New Guinea (which is sometimes termed Papua) fall into two groups—the more ancient and mostly un-related Papuan languages, and the Austronesian languages which belong to the great Austric linguistic family. The most primitive of these closely related languages are the Melanesian languages, which are spoken in

Melanesia and various parts of New Guinea, where, from other evidence, we can confidently assert that they are intrusive. The culture of the Papuan-speaking inhabitants of New Guinea is on the whole of lower grade than that of the Melanesian-speaking peoples. We may therefore take it for granted that, as a rule, the Papuan-speaking peoples more nearly represent the original stock, but they need not necessarily be assumed to be of pure 'Papuan' stock. Melanesian-speaking peoples may, in the same way, be regarded as of mixed origin. For the religion of the Papuan-speaking peoples of New Guinea see NEW GUINEA.

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PARABLE (Introductory and Biblical).—1. Definition and general use.—The word 'parable' (*παραβολή*, from *παραβάλλειν*, 'to place alongside of') implies comparison, the placing of one thing alongside of another. As a figure of speech it is the assertion of similarity (in some respect) between an object or conception and some concrete object, action, or scene. When comparison is very simple—e.g., 'that man is like a lion'—it is called a simile. In a simile the likeness is openly asserted (by 'as' or 'like,' etc.). When the word denoting the comparison is omitted, the figure is called a metaphor—e.g., 'that man is a lion.' Metaphor is more complete when the subject as well as the predicate is metaphor (e.g., Nah 2¹¹). A sustained metaphor, i.e. an extended statement in which the significant terms all stand for something else, is an allegory. In this case the hearer or reader must make the proper substitutions in order to get its meaning. A simile may also be extended in various ways. Proverbs frequently imply comparison, often explicitly (e.g., Pr 10²³), more often, probably, implicitly. The concrete picture suggested in the proverb is mentally compared with the thought expressed, making it more real or impressive. Or the simile may be expanded into a story. If the action, in addition to being imagined, is unreal (animals conversing, etc.), it is usually called a fable. If the action is possible—if we can say that it might have happened—the story is usually called a parable. Usage in regard to these terms is not, however, strictly uniform. Parable is, etymologically, the generic term, and was so used in the LXX and consequently in the Gospels (see below).

In practice the distinction between simile and metaphor is easily disregarded (e.g., Dt 33²²), and it is very common for metaphor and plain speech to interchange in the same statement (e.g., Nah 2¹¹). Fable and parable, when told to apply to particular circumstances, often fall just short of being allegories, because the metaphorical meaning of the terms used is so plainly indicated. The famous fable of Stesichorus (Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, ii. 20) is a case in point. While it is useful and necessary to distinguish between simile and metaphor and to construct rhetorical rules against mixing figures, it is over-refinement to hold that, because an explanation of a simple simile is useless, therefore an explanation of an extended simile (the parable) is not to be allowed, although in the case of metaphor and allegory it is quite proper. In actual practice such rules are more often disregarded than known or obeyed. The use of simile and metaphor in all hortatory and argumentative discourse is so common and necessary as to need no remark. While the proverb, fable, parable, and allegory are especially adapted to moral and religious instruction, they hold a recognized place in world literature. Aristotle discusses example, parable,

and fable as *κοινὰ πλάττειν*, 'means of persuasion' (*Rhet.* ii. 20). Cicero recognizes allegory, and Quintilian praises speech in which similitudes, allegories, and metaphors (*translationes*) are mingled (see the ref. in La Grange, *RE* xviii. [1909] 202f.). The book of Proverbs, Æsop's *Fables*, Spenser's *Facrie Queene*, and Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* are conspicuous examples of the universal use of this general type of discourse. Of the parable the one acknowledged master is Jesus of Nazareth, although Rabbinical tradition assigns that place to Hillel (c. 20 B.C.-A.D. 20).

2. The parable as used by Jesus.—The Gospel record of Jesus' teaching shows that He made an abundant, and in some respects remarkable, use of the parable (in the broad sense of the term). In doing this, however, He was not employing a new or only rarely used method involving a radical departure from the practices common to the Jewish schools of His day. Jesus was a Jew. His audience was composed almost exclusively of Jews. His and their culture was mainly, if not solely, that of Palestinian Judaism. It should be self-evident, therefore, that any conclusive study of Jesus' use of the parable must be based upon a knowledge of its use in contemporary Judaism and not upon the rules or practice of classical writers or authorities on rhetoric such as Aristotle, Quintilian, etc., with whose views there is not the slightest probability that Jesus had any acquaintance. The almost total neglect of this all-important principle on the part of Jülicher constitutes the very serious defect in his learned and suggestive work, the most influential of modern discussions of the subject.

1. HEBREW AND JEWISH USE.—(a) *The 'concrete' character of Hebrew and Jewish modes of expression.*—Every reader of the OT or of the later Jewish literature knows how rarely abstract terms are employed. The language is almost always figurative, and the terms concrete. Semitic discourse, as illustrated by the Hebrew and Jewish literature, abounds in suggestive or figurative use of the ordinary words for common objects. The concrete term suggests the more general or abstract idea. Argument is carried on by a succession of concrete pictures. There is frequent use of rhetorical questions. Personification is easy. Discourse developed in an orderly, logical fashion is almost unknown. To a Western mind, or judged by Greek standards, all this is rhetorically faulty, but evidently it was not so to the Semitic mind. The vivid, almost conversational, style of Semitic discourse easily allowed for 'mixed figures' to an extent intolerable to our standards.

(b) *The OT māsāl.*—The antecedent of the NT parable was undoubtedly the OT *māsāl*, usually rendered 'proverb.' The Heb. *מָשָׁל* expresses the idea of comparison, likeness, similitude (see F. H. W. Gesenius and F. Buhl, *Hebräisches und chaldäisches Handwörterbuch*, Leipzig, 1899; or F. Brown, S. R. Driver, and C. A. Briggs, *Hebrew and English Lexicon of OT*, Oxford, 1915, s.v.). The concrete act implied is the same as that of the Gr. *παράβολή* (the placing of one thing alongside of another, the concrete image or picture placed alongside of an idea).

In OT usage *māsāl* designates (1) a by-word (e.g., Dt 28³⁷, 1 K 9⁷); (2) a popular proverbial saying (e.g., 1 S 10¹², Ezk 12²²); (3) a type of prophetic utterance, such as Balaam's oracles (Nu 23 and 24, or Is 14¹²; cf. Mic 2¹, where 'lamentation' is a parallel term, or Hab 2⁶; 'taunt' or 'satire' and 'riddle' are parallel terms); (4) a poetic composition (e.g., Nu 21²⁷, Ps 49¹², 78²; cf. Job 27¹, 29¹); (5) sentences of wisdom such as abound in the book of Proverbs; the fundamental form of these is the couplet, but in chs. 1-9 and in the

latter part of the book a more extended application of the form occurs; (6) a similitude or parable (Ezk 17¹⁻¹⁰, 22³⁻⁴). In this case *hīdā* (הִידָא), 'riddle' or 'enigma,' is used conjointly with *māsāl*, probably to indicate that the parable needed explanation. In the light of this passage the omission of any special designation for Jotham's fable (Jg 9¹²), Nathan's parable (2 S 12¹⁻⁶), the parable in 2 S 14⁷⁻¹⁷, or that in Ec 9¹⁴⁻¹⁵ seems only accidental. *Māsāl* would be the proper term in such cases. Evidently *māsāl* was the generic term, designating various ways of making use of the fundamental principle of comparison which is always (explicitly or implicitly) involved. The frequent association of *māsāl* with *hīdā* ('riddle') shows that the *māsāl* was not always perfectly clear or easy of interpretation (cf. Pr 1⁶). Long study, mental discipline, and close application were necessary in order to grasp the full significance of a *māsāl*. The cases cited also show that the framer of a *māsāl*, or parable, did not hesitate about furnishing its explanation. In every case but one of the parables cited above the explanation or application is pointed out. Finally, it is evident that the theoretical distinction between parable or fable and allegory was a matter of little concern, if indeed known. Jotham's fable, Nathan's parable, Isaiah's vineyard *šēṭr* (Is 5¹⁻⁷), Ezekiel's parable-riddle—all have allegorical aspects. To employ a rhetorical form only in the strictest or purest manner was a rule unknown, apparently, to the OT speakers or writers.

(c) *The use of the parable in the apocryphal, apocalyptic, and early Rabbinical literature.*—In the extant apocryphal and apocalyptic literature (dating c. 200 B.C.-A.D. 100) the *māsāl* is well represented in Ecclesiasticus, which is modelled largely on Proverbs. Incidentally, the original Hebrew of this work, with its frequent anticipations of the later Rabbinical Hebrew, seems to indicate that the cultivation of this form of 'wisdom' was being continued by the *šōphērīm* (the early 'scribes') and their successors, the Rabbis of the NT period (note the suggestive words in 39²² and cf. Wis 8⁹). Since the *māsāl* in general and the parable in particular belong more naturally to oral than to written discourse, it is not surprising that the bulk of the apocryphal and apocalyptic literature, except Ecclesiasticus, consisting of books whose contents are anything but representative of oral instruction, conversation, or oratory, presents very few examples of the parable. 2 Es 4¹²⁻¹³, 9³⁵⁻³⁶ are interesting exceptions. The so-called parables or similitudes of *Éth. Enoch* (chs. 37-71) are hardly such in any real sense.

On the other hand, in the early Rabbinical literature, which, like the Gospels, represents oral instruction and discussion, the use of simile or comparison for purposes of illustration, proof, or otherwise is, as might be expected, very common. The number of similitudes and parables preserved in the Talmud as spoken by the Rabbis of the period approximately contemporary with the NT is much larger than is commonly supposed. Only recently have the Rabbinic parables been made the subject of scientific investigation. But sufficient has been done by Baggé, La Grange, and especially Fiebig to make it certain that hereafter the exegesis of the parables of Jesus must be based upon and start from a knowledge of the significance and use of the parable in the Rabbinical schools. The examples collected by Fiebig include similitudes, parables proper, fables, and partial allegories, as is the case with the Gospels. The use of the *māsāl* was so common that the full formula for introducing one, such as 'I will speak unto you a *māsāl* (מָשָׁל לָכֶם); unto what is the matter like? Unto—' was often abbreviated to a mere phrase, 'A parable (*māsāl*); like—,' or

even to the mere particle *le* ('to,' i.e. 'like unto'). The Rabbis were oblivious to the distinction between similitude, or parable, and metaphor, or allegory. In many Rabbinical parables parable and allegory are blended. The Rabbis also frequently, possibly usually, made the application or explained the meaning of their parables (as did the OT speakers and also Jesus, according to the Gospels). In this connexion it should be noted that in Rabbinic parables certain frequently-used terms had a well-understood metaphorical meaning—e.g., king=God, servants or workmen=men, feast=the future blessedness, etc. (cf. Fiebig, *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu*, p. 231 f.). Parables were commonly used by the Rabbis to explain OT texts. In general they were intended to illustrate or to make the meaning clear, but in many cases they were in themselves somewhat enigmatic and needed explanation. Very frequently Rabbinic parables are somewhat artificial, i.e. the pictures are not drawn from simple, actual, and common experience, but are artificially constructed and lack naturalness. They smack of the schoolroom rather than of the open air or of the experiences of everyday life. Finally, the Rabbinical parables often show the effects of transmission through oral tradition before being committed to writing. Variations as to form, substance, and circumstances are sometimes so great as almost to result in two parables instead of one.

ii. JESUS' OWN USE.—(a) *Extent and variety*.—In the Gospels the Gr. term *παραβολή* connotes (1) a popular proverb (e.g., Lk 4²³); (2) a simile somewhat extended (e.g., Mk 3^{23a}); (3) a teaching stated enigmatically (e.g., Mk 7¹⁵⁻¹⁷; cf. Mt 15¹¹⁻¹³, Lk 6³⁹); (4) a story or parable commonly so called (e.g., Mt 13, and often). Some of these are so perfectly complete that they can be taken out of their context and stand alone without altering a word (e.g., Lk 7⁴¹⁻⁴², or 15¹¹⁻³²). In other cases only a slight change would give the story perfect independence (e.g., Lk 15^{4a} or Mk 4^{31c}). In many cases the brief similitudes (2) might easily have been made into stories, but Jesus did not develop them to that extent.

There can be no doubt that *παραβολή* in our Greek Gospels represents (through the influence of the LXX) the Heb. *māshāl* or the Aramaic *mathlā* in the speech familiar to and used by Jesus. Its use for several forms of illustrative discourse was in perfect accord with Palestinian-Jewish usage.

The number of Jesus' sayings (in the Synoptics) that should be considered *παραβολαί* is variously estimated.

Jülicher's list comprises 53, which he divides into three classes: (a) *Gleichnisse* ('similitudes'), 28; (b) *Parabeln*, 21; and (c) *Beispielerszählungen* ('example-stories'), 4. Examples of class (a) are Mt 11¹⁶⁻¹⁹ or Mk 4²¹, and to class (c) he gives Lk 10²⁹⁻³⁷, 18¹⁴, 12¹⁶⁻²¹ and 16¹⁹⁻³¹. Bugge counts 71, divided into two classes: (a) *Parabelembleme* (short parabolic utterances), 36; and (b) *Parabeln*, 35. In addition he distinguishes 16 'paradoxes,' which he rightly considers a form of *māshāl* (e.g., Mt 5²⁰⁻³⁰, Lk 14²⁶, etc.). Fiebig makes four classes: (a) short proverbial sayings (e.g., Lk 4²³); (b) allegories (e.g., Mk 12¹⁵); (c) pure similitudes (*Gleichnisse*—e.g., Mk 13²⁴); and (d) a mixed form (allegory and similitude) which rests upon familiar metaphor. This class includes most of the parables commonly so called. Fiebig gives no enumeration. The widespread but less accurate enumeration of between 30 and 40 restricts the parable largely to the story form. Trench's list comprises 30.

In general Jesus used the parable in the same way as did the Rabbis, and what has been noted above as characteristic of their usage is, in the main, illustrative of His. With respect to all that was purely formal or technical in this matter, He was not original, but simply worked along very familiar lines. On the other hand, so far as our evidence goes, no Jewish Rabbi ever equalled Jesus in skill with the parable. The naturalness, lucidity, and the aptness of His parables place

them in a class by themselves—the perfect examples of their kind.

(b) *The problem as to Jesus' parables*.—Do the evangelists give us an accurate report regarding this matter? According to the Gospels, Jesus' parables were often but thinly veiled allegories: they were frequently explained by Him, and so as to indicate that they might contain several distinct teachings; they were not always clear, but sometimes purposely enigmatic; and, finally, in choosing to use parables, Jesus at times purposely veiled the naked truth from His hearers (cf. Mk 4¹⁰⁻¹²). Jülicher, adopting Aristotle's definition of a parable, that it is primarily a 'proof' and must be clear, has subjected the Gospels to a severe criticism with the result that their testimony is rejected as contrary to Jesus' mind and practice. He claims that in Jesus' actual use of them the parables were always clear, needed and received no extended explanation (*Deutung*), contained no allegorical element, and, in particular, the view stated in Mk 4¹⁰⁻¹² is the evangelist's, not that of Jesus. While Jülicher's view is admitted by many liberal critics to need some modification, it represents the generally prevalent 'critical' position. Lack of space forbids any extended discussion of this theory. Suffice it to say that the remarkably close agreement between the evangelists' representation of Jesus' use of the parable and that now known to have been the familiar and ordinary Rabbinic usage makes strongly for the credibility of the Gospel statements. In fact, Jülicher's theory is against all historical probability; it is simply impossible. Mk 4¹⁰⁻¹² (and parallels) is admittedly a difficult passage, but it cannot be explained away as an invention of the evangelist (whose own view was really different; cf. Mk 4^{31c}). It rests on sound tradition and is limited to the parables of 'the mystery of the kingdom.' It expresses Jesus' consciousness that His message of the Kingdom would not be understood, as was indicated long before in the experience of Isaiah.

(c) *The general purpose*.—Bugge suggests that Jesus told His parables in some cases as illustrations, in others as proving an argument. In general this is satisfactory, but, whether illustrative or argumentative, there was frequently a distinctively didactic purpose, so that the parable contained a positive teaching. Jülicher claims that a parable has properly but one idea—it must illustrate but one thought; its figures are parts of one picture which represents but one truth. This really useful rule, which operates to do away with the abuse of the parables through excessive allegorizing, is, however, contrary both to the well-known use of the parable in Jewish circles and to the Gospel report of Jesus' own interpretation of His parables (e.g., Mt 13^{35c}). While it is true that the main purpose of a parable is to convey one general idea, subordinate ideas may easily be suggested. The fact is, the purpose of each parable must be ascertained by itself, without the application of theoretical rhetorical principles, with which Jesus had no concern. The old question, whether the parables may be used as sources for doctrine, should then be answered affirmatively, but the interpretation should avoid all allegorical excess and should not go beyond the limits imposed by the *māshāl* itself and its legitimate use in the OT and early Judaism.

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defending Jülicher's main position); P. La Grange, in *RB* xviii. (1909) 198-212, 342-387, xix. (1910) 5-35 (a comprehensive and judicious criticism of the position of Jülicher and Loisy); F. Fiebig, *Altjüdische Gleichnisse und die Gleichnisse Jesu*, Tübingen, 1904, *Die Gleichniserzählungen Jesu im Lichte der rabbinischen Gleichnisse des NT Zeitalters*, do. 1912 (a collection of Rabbinic parables together with a severe criticism of Jülicher and a defence of the genuineness of Jesus' parables against Arthur Drews); L. E. Browne, *The Parables of the Gospels in the Light of Modern Criticism* (Hulsean Prize Essay, 1912), Cambridge, 1913 (an able and helpful discussion); G. Murray, *Jesus and His Parables*, Edinburgh, 1914.

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PARABLE (Ethnic).—The parable as such is not found in the lower culture, but analogies to it are not uncommon. Among the folk-tales of savages are many in which animals or inanimate things act and talk exactly like human beings. In this large class of tales no moral is drawn, but it was quite easy for such stories to become moral apologues with reference to human life and its conduct. Stories describing the wisdom of one animal or the folly of another were made to serve as warnings to men and women, the moral being either implied or expressed. Examples of this are found in many groups of savage *Märchen*—Hottentot, Zulu, American Indian, etc. In others some other moral is taught—e.g., kindness and the danger of ingratitude, as in some versions of the Puss in Boots story.¹ Other examples of savage stories told of human beings may quite probably have been told with some moral purpose. Indeed, many savage tales may have had no other purpose primarily. Examples of this might be found in stories of broken tabus and of the punishment involved to the tabu-breaker. They supported a custom and pointed a warning—'See what happened to So-and-so!'²

Many *Märchen* thus are or may become moral apologues or a kind of parable. Following the savage beast-stories into higher levels of culture, we find that, as in Buddhism, they have become actual parables, even 'literal incidents of sacred history.'³ The Buddhist *Jātakas* (lit. previous births of Buddha, but also stories about these) compose a sacred volume in which earlier Indian beast-stories have become moral tales of incidents in Buddha's previous existences—e.g., as an animal.⁴ These parabolic stories became so real to his followers that relics of these beast-existences survive. Other great collections of similar moral apologues, unconnected, however, with a theory of rebirth, are found in Indian collections—e.g., that of the *Pañchatantra*⁵—or in other Oriental or Arabic groups. In Europe similar collections are those of the Greek *Æsop* and the Roman *Phædrus*, and in later times the mediæval collections, bestiaries, and beast-epics.

T. Benfey traced all such Western tales to Buddhist sources. Later writers have shown that they might have wandered westwards from India in pre-Buddhist, perhaps even prehistoric, days, and there is always a possibility that many of them sprang from existing European beast-*Märchen*. No question is more debatable than the origin and transmission of popular tales.

Examples of the moral apologue are found in Jotham's story of the trees and their king in *Jg* 9¹⁷ and in Jehoshaphat's story of the thistle and the cedar (2 K 14⁹).

Strictly speaking, the apologue has for its characters animals or inanimate things acting as if they were human. The parable deals mainly with human characters, and the moral or spiritual lesson is drawn from their words or actions. It has thus in itself a probability in reality which the apologue has not, and the narrative of an actual incident

might easily become a parable. It was natural enough, however, for both apologue and parable to be commonly used by peoples fond of illustration, of 'truth embodied in a tale.' They show the power of a story, for moral teaching is always of more effect when thus illustrated, as preachers, ancient and modern, know well. Herodotus (i. 141) describes how Cyrus told the parabolic story of the piper and the fish to the suppliant Ionians and Æolians. Buddhism has always been fond of parables or similes, and many of these were used by Gautama himself. He taught by parables, 'for men of good understanding will generally readily enough catch the meaning of what is taught under the shape of a parable.'⁶ This is exemplified by the case of a blind man who denies the existence of things seen by others. The physician traces his blindness to former sinful actions, and, when he heals the man, the latter admits his mistake but learns that he is far from being wise. This illustrates spiritual blindness regarding the true law. The effect of Buddha's preaching is depicted by a variety of parabolic similes; e.g., the falling of rotten-stalked fruits when a tree is shaken, while those full of sap and strongly attached remain fixed, illustrates the wrong or right reception of the law.⁷ The Buddhist life is parabolically described. As an acrobat clears the ground before he shows his tricks, so good conduct is the basis of all good qualities.⁸ *Karma* is illustrated by the parable of various seeds producing all sorts of fruits.⁹ A parable resembling that of the Sower is found in the *Samyutta Nikāya* (xlii. 7). Generally Buddhist parables draw their lessons from incidents of agricultural life, from the life of kings, or from the stories of animals or plants.

An interesting parable is that of the king who rewarded his warriors in various ways, at last giving to the most deserving his crown jewel. So Buddha rewards those who struggle for him, keeping the gift of omniscience to the last.¹⁰

Buddha's disciples are said to have gained his forgiveness by quoting to him the parables which he himself had taught.¹¹

Some have traced the source of Christ's parabolic teaching to the Buddhist use of parables,¹² but, in view of the fact that parables might arise anywhere and already existed on Jewish soil, while the alleged resemblances, even in the case of the Parable of the Sower, are never too close, this is unlikely.

Taoist teachers also made use of parables or parabolic stories. Kwang-tze represents the opposition between Taoism and knowledge by the story of the rulers of the southern and northern oceans who wished to reward the ruler of chaos by equipping him with an equal number of orifices to those of man, since he possessed but one. The result was his death and passing away. So the nameless simplicity of the *Tao* passes away before knowledge. Other instances are found here and there in Taoist writings.¹³ Confucius also used parables, and is said to have illustrated the idea that where the will is not diverted from its object the spirit is concentrated by the story of a hunchback catching cicadas by means of intense application.¹⁴

Several parables occur in the *Qur'ān*, where it is said that 'God strikes out parables for men that haply they may be mindful.'¹⁵ Some of these, however, are more of the nature of similes. Somewhat nearer the true parable, though in an inverted sense, is the teaching that those who expend wealth in God's way are like a grain which produces seven ears, in each of which are a hundred

¹ *Saddharma Puṇḍarīka*, v. 44.

² *Questions of King Milinda*, iv. 7 ff.

³ *Ib.* ii. 1. 9.

⁴ *Saddharma Puṇḍarīka*, xlii. 44.

⁵ E. Havet, *Le Christianisme et ses origines*, 4 vols., Paris, 1972-84, iv. 631; R. Seydel, *Das Evangelium von Jesu in seinen Verhältnissen zu Buddha-Sage und Buddha-Lehre*, Leipzig, 1882, p. 223 ff.

⁶ *SBH* xxxix. [1891] 30.

⁷ *Qur'ān*, xiv. 30, 46; cf. xiii. 15.

⁸ *Ib.* iii. 4. 11.

⁹ *Milinda*, iv. 4. 46.

¹⁰ *Ib.* xl. [1891] 14.

¹ E. S. Hartland, *Mythology and Folktales*, London, 1900, p. 9; MacGulloch, *CF*, p. 225 ff.

² *CF*, p. 336.

³ Tylor, *PC* i. 414.

⁴ The *Jātakas* have been ed. by V. Fausbøll and tr. by T. W. Rhys Davids, 7 vols., London, 1877-91; see also the ed. by E. B. Cowell, 6 vols., Cambridge, 1895-1907.

⁵ Ed. and tr. into German by T. Benfey, Leipzig, 1859.

grains. Those who expend it, craving the goodwill of God because of their generosity, are like a hill garden on which heavy showers fall so that it brings forth twofold.

'If no shower falls, the dew doth, and God on what ye do doth look.'¹

See also the preceding art. and art. FICTION.

LITERATURE.—Besides the works mentioned in the article see W. A. Clouston, *Popular Tales and Fictions: their Migrations and Transformations*, 2 vol., Edinburgh, 1887; G. A. van den Bergh van Eysinga, *Indische Einflüsse auf evangelische Erzählungen*, Göttingen, 1909; P. Fiebig, *Altjüdische Gleichnisse und die Gleichnisse Jesu*, Tübingen, 1904; *SBE*, Index vol. [1910], s.v. 'Parable.'

J. A. MACCULLOCH.

PARADISE.—See BLEST, ABODE OF THE.

PARADOX.—Analysis of the connotation of this term brings us into contact with some of the main conditions affecting human beliefs—ethical, religious, and scientific. A paradox is a statement or proposition which on the face of it is (a) apparently self-contradictory, or (b) apparently incredible or absurd, or at least marvellous, because contrary to common sense in some wider or narrower sense, or (especially) because contrary to 'generally received belief' on the subject in question. In all these usages the implication is not necessarily that the 'paradoxical' proposition is true—'true though it sounds false' (J. R. Seeley, *Introd. to Political Science*, London, 1896, p. 3)—but that the proposition is not necessarily false because of its 'paradoxical' character. Many times in the history of human thought a bold and happy paradox has been able to overthrow an old and accredited but erroneous belief, and in the course of time has become a universally accepted truth—'sometime a paradox, but now the time gives it proof' (*Hamlet*, III. i. 115). In this sense Hobbes defined a paradox as 'an opinion not yet generally received.'²

As a rhetorical figure, a paradox is a device for illuminating as with a sudden flash a neglected aspect of the subject or for clinching an argument with a memorable phrase. Some of the most instructive examples in literature occur in the NT;³ it is sufficient to refer to Mt 5²⁹ 10³⁹ 18⁹, Jn 12²⁴, 2 Co 6⁹.¹⁰ On the other hand, ethical and spiritual principles may become paradoxes of perpetual freshness because, while admitted as theoretically or ideally valid, they are never acted upon.

(a) A paradox, as an apparent self-contradiction, may have almost any degree of significance and value, from a mere statement of antithetical or conflicting qualities conjoined in the same instance up to a statement involving one or more of the ultimate 'antinomies' of human thought. At the former extreme stands such a merely suggestive statement as that of Leslie Stephen, 'While no man sets a higher value on truthfulness . . . than Johnson, no man could care less for the foundations of speculative truth' (*Hist. of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, London, 1881, II. 375), or that of J. S. Mill, 'The conscious ability to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realising such happiness as is attainable' (*Utilitarianism*, London, 1895, p. 23). At the other extreme we find that in certain ultimate problems we may have an apparent logical contradiction between two accepted principles or between conclusions drawn rightly from premisses which have equal claim to objective validity.⁴ The solution of such an antinomy, if solution is possible, consists in the discovery of a still more fundamental principle embracing and harmonizing the truths involved in the original antithetical propositions, which therefore are shown to have been one-sided and partial statements (cf. art. MEAN). The solution of the Kantian antinomies consists in showing that they are due to the tendency to view as absolutely true of things-in-themselves principles which apply only to phenomena.⁵

(b) By 'generally received belief' we mean the body of belief on a given subject held in a particular country or a particular age, or even by most men, always and everywhere. A. de Morgan (*A Budget of Paradoxes*, London, 1872, p. 4 ff.) observes

that in every age of the world there has been an established system opposed from time to time by isolated and dissenting reformers. The established system has sometimes fallen slowly and gradually; it has been either upset by the rising influence of some one man or sapped by gradual change of opinion in the many. It must be admitted, however, as R. Whately (*Rhetoric*, London, 1846, pt. I. ch. III. § 2) pointed out, that the fact of an opinion being 'generally received' implies a pre-occupation of the ground which must hold good until sufficient reason is adduced against it. To this extent there is a presumption against anything 'paradoxical'. The burden of proof lies with him who maintains it; an unsupported paradox can claim no attention. 'If a paradox is false, it should be censured on that ground, not for being new; if true, it is the more important for being a truth not generally admitted' (*ib.* p. 116). The history of science is partly the history of paradoxes becoming commonplaces—e.g., the motion of the earth, the possibility of the antipodes, the pressure of the atmosphere (as against the dogma, 'Nature abhors a vacuum'), the circulation of the blood, the facts of hypnotism, the electrical phenomena produced by Galvani's experiments. Contemporary science is enlarging indefinitely its conception of natural possibility; and hitherto unsuspected and unknown phenomena have emerged in regions of reality which might have been supposed exhaustively explored—e.g., the constituent gases of the atmosphere. Hence extreme caution is needed in deciding whether an alleged phenomenon hitherto unknown is possible or not. We have then 'paradoxes' which, notwithstanding their opposition to prevalent opinions, or even because of that opposition, express truths more or less important. But we have also paradoxical opinions, false or at least doubtful, imagined by their advocates in order to separate themselves from the rest of men, through vanity, ignorance, or a spirit of contradiction. Many of the 'paradoxes' put forward in the history of mathematics, pure and applied, and discussed by de Morgan (*op. cit.*), are of the latter kind.

Philosophers have for long disowned the authority of popular beliefs, even when wearing the imposing name of common sense. The significance of Plato's allegory of the cave¹ has a perpetual relevance from the point of view of speculative reason; the ideals which seem, at the best, unreal are the fundamental realities; and the 'hard facts,' when nothing else is seen, are of the nature of illusion. The source of the paradoxical character which speculative philosophy presents has its origin, in part, in the opposition between unity and multiplicity. Reason aspires to unity, and seeks to unify the obvious multiplicity and variety of the facts of experience, which none the less persist in their mutual differences and oppositions. The satisfaction of this speculative impulse requires more than analysis of the given facts; it requires their co-ordination under a type of higher unity given by pure reason. Involved in this is another source of paradox both in philosophical and in religious thought. For finite thinkers the interpretation of experience, and its rational unification, lead in certain cases to antinomies (see above) due to the conflict of partial truths whose reconciling principle is not yet discerned. Those who embrace both sides of the apparent contradiction are sometimes nearer the whole truth than those who sacrifice comprehensiveness to a one-sided consistency.

Truth may be—perhaps even in the end must be—paradoxical; but not every paradox is true. A healthy intellect may welcome and defend a paradox, not because it is contrary to current opinion, but because in spite of that it reveals an aspect of truth.

LITERATURE.—See references given in the course of the article.

S. H. MELLONE.

PARAGUAY.—The Indians of Paraguay are of heterogeneous stock, by far the most important element being the Guarani tribes of the Tupi-Guarani family. Most of these tribes have long been nominally Christianized, and it is only by research into the customs of the more remote peoples of the Chaco region, such as the Lengua, that any information can be gleaned regarding aboriginal religion. An important addition to our knowledge of the customs of the Indian tribes in times past is Dobrizhoffer's *Account of the Abipones*, which was written in Latin in 1784 and translated into English by a daughter of Samuel Taylor Coleridge in 1822.

¹ Rep. 515-517.

¹ Qur'ān, II. 283 ff.

² *Liberty, Necessity, and Chance* (English Works, ed. W. Molesworth, London, 1839-45, v. 804).

³ Cf. DCG II. 319, art. 'Paradox.'

⁴ Cf. J. M. Baldwin, *DPhilP*, art. 'Antinomy.'

⁵ Cf. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 'Transcendental Dialectic,' bk. II. ch. 2; E. Caird, *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Glasgow, 1889, II. 40 ff.

Since then contributions regarding native religion have been scanty.

1. *Cosmogony*.—The Gnarani anciently held that in the beginning all nations were separately created 'just as they are now' and distributed in their present territories. When all other peoples had been formed, it occurred to the creator to make a Guarani man and woman, and, as he had already given away all the earth to the other nations, he ordered the *carcara* bird to tell them that for his part he was sorry that he had no more land to distribute, and commanded that the Guarani should always wander through the territory of other nations, killing all adult men, and adopting the women and children to augment their number. The Lengua of the Chaco believe that the creator is symbolized by a beetle which first made the material universe and then sent out from its hole in the earth a race of powerful supernatural beings who for a time ruled the universe. Afterwards he formed man and woman, who were sent into the world joined together like the Siamese twins. These were persecuted by their powerful predecessors, and appealed to the creative beetle to free them from their tyranny. He separated them and gave them power to propagate their species so that they might become numerous enough to withstand their enemies. The supernatural beings shortly afterwards became disembodied and constitute the race of spirits which torments mankind. After granting the request of the first progenitors of the race, the creative insect withdrew and left them to their own devices. It is remarkable that the Lengua Indians (who are cognate with the Gnarani) should regard the beetle as the creative agency, as did the Egyptians, who employed it as the symbol of Rā, the creative god. The fact that this insect dwells in the earth and throws up excretions of soil may account for the Paraguayan myth. The Lengua draw figures of the beetle on their gourds, as well as those of the *kilyikhama*, or evil agencies, of whom they live in constant fear.

2. *The hereafter*.—The Lengua Indians regard the soul as immortal. To them the hereafter (*pischischi*) is merely a shadowy extension of this life—a continuation of the present in a disembodied condition, which they consider will be dull and featureless. But they also believe that physical pain as well as physical pleasure will be absent from it. The shade of the departed (*aphangak*) closely resembles the man while alive. The clan and tribal life continue after death. On awaking to post-mortem conditions, the soul is dumbfounded, and for a month or so wanders about its village, until the funeral feast is held, after which it passes to the realms of the dead. As among other savages, the personal belongings and even the animals of the deceased are destroyed at his death, in order that they may prove useful to him in the after life. Certain of the Lengua Indians—and those the more intelligent—believe that the souls of the departed pass over in a north-westerly direction to what they term 'the cities of the dead.' Those cities are described as of large size with brick-built houses and regular streets. W. Brooke Grubb thinks that this points to an ancient Peruvian Incan connexion. Other Indians seem to hold the view that the dead inhabit a subterranean country—a view usually associated with or evolved from ideas connected with the custom of interment.

3. *The kilyikhama*.—There are various classes of *kilyikhama*, or evil spirits. There is a white *kilyikhama* who is supposed to be seen sailing over the waters of the river Chaco, and who is, perhaps, the most malignant of all. To protect themselves against him, the Indians wear a special head-dress

made of the feathers of a rare bird. A thieving spirit is regarded with some contempt. Hunting and agricultural *kilyikhamas* naturally exist and must be placated. Perhaps the most terrific form is that met with in forests, of a gigantic height and ghastly leanness, and with eyeballs flaming like firebrands. To meet him is supposed to herald instant death. The great desire of a *kilyikhama*, according to the natives, is to obtain possession of a human body into which he can materialize. For a further account of Guarani beliefs see art. BRAZIL.

LITERATURE.—M. Dobrizhoffer, *Account of the Abipones, an Equestrian People of Paraguay*, tr. Sara Coleridge, 3 vols., London, 1822; W. B. Grubb, *Among the Indians of the Paraguayan Chaco*, do. 1904, *An Unknown People in an Unknown Land*, do. 1918.

LEWIS SPENCE.

PARASITISM.—When an organism lives in or on another of a different kind, derives its subsistence from the living material, digested food, secretions, or other products of its host, is inextricably bound up with its host or hosts in the continuance of its life, and is rather injurious than beneficial in its influence, we call it a parasite. Parasitism is a relation of dependence—always nutritive, often more—between the parasite and the host, but the inter-relation takes so many forms that absolutely precise definition is impossible, and it is not easy to separate off parasitism from other vital associations. A living creature habitually growing on a plant is called an epiphyte; it is not a parasite unless it gets its food in whole or in part from its bearer, as dodder and mistletoe do. A living creature growing on an animal is called epizotic, like a barnacle on a whale; it is not a parasite unless it gets its food in whole or in part from its bearer, as is the case with many 'fishlice' that are borne about by fishes. Symbiosis is a mutually beneficial internal partnership between two organisms of different kinds, such as is illustrated by the unicellular Algae which live within Radiolarians, some polyps, and a few worms. Commensalism is a mutually beneficial external partnership between two organisms of different kinds, such as is illustrated by some hermit-crabs which are always accompanied by sea-anemones. As parasites are occasionally of some use to their hosts, the difficulty of rigidly separating parasitism from symbiosis and commensalism is obvious. The unborn mammalian offspring within the womb of the mother is sometimes spoken of as though it were a parasite, but this is an unfortunate usage. Apart from the fact that the concept of parasitism is clearer when it is not applied to creatures of the same flesh and blood, it is the normal function of the mother to nourish and foster her unborn offspring; she is adapted to it as no host ever is to its parasite; and, though the offspring is often a severe drain on the mother, there is good reason to believe that the benefit is not altogether one-sided.

It is not the purpose of this article to enter into a general discussion of parasitism, but rather to suggest how it may be seen in its proper perspective in our outlook on animate nature. First of all, however, a number of general facts must be briefly stated.

(1) Most animals and most of the higher plants have their parasites, but some types, such as omnivorous animals, are much more abundantly parasitized than others. The dog has over forty parasites, and both man and the pig have more. One of the European oaks harbours no fewer than ninety-nine different kinds of gall-flies. In many cases the association of parasite and host is very specific, that is to say, many a parasite is known to occur in only one definite kind of host, and many hosts are unsusceptible to parasites not very

different from those which they harbour. There are, however, some very cosmopolitan parasites that occur in many hosts.

(2) While the number of different kinds of parasites is enormous, there are evidently some types of organization which are not compatible with a parasitic mode of life. Thus among backboneed animals the only parasites are the hags (*Myxinoids*), and they are not thoroughgoing. There are very few parasitic Molluscs or Coelenterates, and there are no parasitic Echinoderms. Similarly, in the vegetable kingdom the great majority of parasites are members of the class of Fungi and relatively few are flowering plants.

(3) There are many grades of parasites, from superficial ectoparasites, which often retain great activity, to intimate endoparasites, which sometimes become almost part of their host. There are partial parasites, which retain independence during a portion of their life, and total parasites, which pass from host to host and are never free.

(4) Corresponding to the degree of the parasitism is the degeneration of the parasite, which is sometimes witnessed in the individual lifetime—*e.g.*, in many crustaceans where the young stages are free-living—and is sometimes inferred by comparing the parasite with related types. The retrogression affects especially the nervous, sensory, muscular, and alimentary systems. The reproductive system is often highly developed, and the multiplication very prolific, which may be associated with the fact that the parasite is often living without much exertion, with abundance of stimulating food at its disposal, and also with the fact that the chances of death are often enormous. The life-histories are frequently intricate and full of risks, and those types which varied in the direction of prolific reproduction have survived. In a number of cases, such as the liver-fluke and some tapeworms, there is self-fertilization, or autogamy, which is of very rare occurrence among animals.

(5) Thoroughgoing parasites are often very effectively adapted to the conditions of their life. Thus a tapeworm in the intestine of its host absorbs food by the whole surface of its body; it has muscular adhesive suckers and sometimes attaching hooks; it can thrive with a minimum of oxygen; it has a mysterious 'anti-body' which preserves it from being digested by its host; and it is exceedingly prolific.

(6) The effect of the parasite on the host is of course very varied. It may be quite trivial or even slightly beneficial; it may mean the disablement and death of the host. Some parasitic worms give off toxic substances and some give rise to serious disturbance by straying from their usual habitat—*e.g.*, by getting into the vermiform appendix. Of an unusual type is the life-history of the sturdy-worm of the sheep, which develops in the brain and spinal cord; and still more remarkable are those parasitic crustaceans, such as *Sacculina*, which infest crabs and destroy the reproductive organs. The constitution of the castrated male crab is profoundly changed towards the female type, a small ovary may develop, the shape of the abdomen approximates to that of the female, and the protruding parasite is actually guarded by its bearer as if it were a bunch of eggs. In general it may be said that, unless the host be weakly and the parasites become very numerous, the effect of the parasite upon the host is relatively unimportant, partly because of the defensive adaptability of the living organism, and partly because very aggressive parasites have probably eliminated themselves from time to time by killing their hosts, which it is not the parasites' interest to do. Occasionally there are striking structural reactions

of the host in response to the stimulus of the parasites. Thus galls grow round about many parasites and sometimes restrict their injuriousness, and some kinds of pearls of fine quality are deposited in various bivalve molluscs around the larvæ of parasitic flukes and tapeworms.

(7) We are inclined to place by themselves cases like virulent bacteria (*e.g.*, the plague bacillus) and virulent Protozoa (*e.g.*, the trypanosome of sleeping-sickness), which are rapidly fatal when transferred to a new kind of host, such as man, which has no constitutional defences against them. These microbes are not in any special way adapted to parasitic life; they might as well be called predatory. Similarly, it does not seem to us that parasitism is well illustrated by cases like that of the ichneumon-larvæ which destroy so many caterpillars. The larvæ develop from eggs which the mother ichneumon-fly has laid in the caterpillar; they feed on the tissues of the caterpillar and pass into a new phase of life after they have killed their host. It does not seem to matter much whether a caterpillar is devoured from the inside or from the outside, and the ichneumon-larvæ are as much beasts of prey as parasites. In any case, such instances illustrate the difficulty already referred to of defining off parasitism in a hard and fast way from some of the other vital inter-organismal associations. Massart and Vandervelde, in their essay on *Parasitism, Organic and Social*, have distinguished nutritive, exploitative or predatory, and mimetic parasitism, and this exceedingly wide conception of the inter-relation has enabled them to suggest a series of very interesting parallels between parasitism in the realm of organisms and in human society. The ideal is plainly the replacement of parasitism by symbiosis.

The number of parasites is legion, and parasitism, though not usually obtrusive, is a common fact of life. To many minds it seems an ugly blot on the fine script of nature, and its repulsiveness must be considered. To begin with, we must see parasitism in its most general setting.

(a) In many cases, probably, it is initiated as one of the responses which living creatures make to environing limitations and difficulties. Individual organisms hard beset may try to survive within a larger organism which has swallowed them, or may discover in their searchings what is to them simply a new world—inside or upon the surface of another organism. When a parasitic relationship has been thoroughly established, it is no longer part of the struggle for existence, but the endeavours which led to its being initiated and perfected were; and, though the parasitism may be spoken of as an evasion of the struggle for existence, it cannot be separated off from any other condition of safety and abundance which organisms may secure.

(b) We have already referred to the difficulty of drawing a dividing line between some parasites and some symbions, and parasitism must be looked upon as an expression of the wide-spread tendency in animate nature to establish inter-relations between organisms, to link lives together, to weave a web of life. It may sometimes be repulsive, but it is to be seen as part of a complex systematization or correlation that has been evolved in the course of ages and is of great importance in the process of natural selection.

(c) A third general fact is that parasites often play a part as eliminative agents, and may work towards conservation as well as wastefully. When a parasite enters or attacks a new kind of host—neither being in any way accustomed to the other—one of three things may happen: the parasite may die, being, for instance, digested, as often

happens with small nematode worms which are swallowed by man in carelessly prepared or imperfectly cooked food; or the host may die, having no adaptive resistance to the intruder, as is very likely to happen when man is infected by the trypanosome of sleeping-sickness and is out of reach of medical aid; or the parasite and the host may establish a viable inter-relation. On the one hand, there is often wasteful elimination of newcomers who come within the range of a parasite which does not do much harm to its wonted hosts, as when horses and cattle enter the tsetse fly belt in Africa and are killed off by the disease called 'nagana,' or when an old population of men or animals has introduced into its midst a parasite to which they are physiologically non-resistant: witness the dire effects of the introduction of some microbic diseases, such as syphilis, among uncivilized peoples. On the other hand, parasites exert another kind of eliminating influence which is apt to be overlooked, namely that they often kill off weakly individuals among their wonted hosts. It must be clearly understood that in an enormous number of cases the parasites do not greatly prejudice their hosts—a *modus vivendi* has been established. The thousands of nematode worms in the food-canal of many a healthy grouse seem to be unimportant. But, if the host be of a weakly constitution or enfeebled by lack of food, the parasites hitherto trivial may get the upper hand and bring about the death of the host. In some cases, we submit, this sifting will tend to conserve racial health. Thus grouse-disease may be the nemesis of an antecedent toleration of weakly birds. Similarly it should be noticed that an exaggerated parasitoid infestation not infrequently occurring on or in organisms of which man has taken charge may be due to the removal of the cultivated plants or domesticated animals from localities where their parasites find some natural check, or may be the result of over-feeding, over-crowding, and the like. Thus, to give one example, a scale insect of trees may be rare in natural conditions and very common under cultivation, the close setting of the trees favouring its increase. But this is man's affair, not nature's.

Certain less important considerations may be briefly stated.

(d) Some parasites are in part beneficial, and approximate to symbions. Thus there are beautiful infusorians in the stomach of herbivores like horse and cow, which seem to help in the breaking down of the food. Many external parasites assist in keeping the surface of the body clean.

(e) In not a few cases—e.g., among crustaceans—the parasitism is connected with the continuance of the race, for it is confined to the mother-animals, the males and young females being free-living.

(f) While many parasites exhibit degeneration and simply lie or float in the food afforded by the host, there are many others, such as trypanosomes in the blood, which live an exceedingly active life, exerting themselves as much as many a free-living creature. Moreover, the frequently passive adult stage may be preceded by a very energetic free-living juvenile stage.

(g) The moral and æsthetic repulsion to a parasitic mode of life is in part justified by the fact that the parasite may cease to do anything for itself, may become a passively absorbent mass of tissue, may lose by degeneration all that makes life worth living (nervous, sensory, and muscular functions), and may become positively ugly. But it should be remembered that there is reason to be repelled by the extremes in other modes of life—e.g., by animals which kill much more than they can eat; that parasites are not always sluggish or

degenerate; and that their host is not to them what it is to us, but must often be simply a vast moving territory which admits of convenient exploitation.

LITERATURE.—J. Massart and E. Vandervelde, *Parasitism, Organic and Social*, Eng. tr., London, 1895; P. J. van Beneden, *Animal Parasites and Messmates*, Eng. tr., do. 1878; R. Leuckart, *Parasites of Man*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1896; M. Braun, *Animal Parasites of Man*, Eng. tr., London, 1906; M. Braun and M. Lube, *Handbook of Practical Parasitology*, Eng. tr., do. 1910; E. Brumpt, *Précis de parasitologie*, Paris, 1910; J. Arthur Thomson, *The Wonder of Life*, London, 1914.

J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

PĀRASNĀTH.—Pārasnāth is the name of a hill and sacred place of Jain pilgrimage, situated in the Hazāribāgh District of Chotā Nāgpur in the province of Bihār and Orissa; lat. 23° 58' N.; long. 86° 8' E. The mountain consists of a central narrow ridge, with many rocky peaks, irregular in shape, but assuming the general configuration of a crescent, rising abruptly to the height of 4480 feet. It is one of the sacred places (*ṭirtha*) of the Jains, known to them as Sameta Sikhiara, 'conjoined peak,' and ranking with their other sacred places, Sātruñjaya, Gīrnār, Chāndrapurī, and Pāwā. Here twenty of the Jinās are said to have attained *nirvāṇa*. It takes its name from Pārsvanātha, the 23rd *ṭirthakara*, and was doubtless, according to the custom of the Jains, selected by them as one of their holy places on account of its isolated situation, which commended itself to the retiring habits of the sect, and the beauty of the scenery.

When we ascend about three miles from Madhuban, a sudden turn in the road brings the Jain temples into view.

'Seen from this point, three tiers of temples rise one above the other, showing some fifteen shining white domes, each surmounted by bright brass pinnacles, and in the case of the Svetāmbara [the white-robed section] temples, by red and yellow flags. The whole forms a dazzling white mass of masonry, set against the huge bulk of Pārasnāth dark in shadow' (Risley, in *Statistical Account of Bengal*, xvi. 219).

There are three important temples, each consisting of an inner and an outer quadrangle, the outer built like a cloister with cells for pilgrims and out-houses. Over the gate of the inner quadrangle is a musicians' gallery, where flutes and drums are played at daybreak, 8 a.m., noon, and sunset. The rest of the inner enclosure is occupied by various shrines with foliated domes, containing images of the *ṭirthakaras*. On the summit of these domes the Svetāmbara sect erect a pole with a short cross-bar, surmounted by three brass knobs, and also fly a red or yellow flag to indicate that Pārsvanātha is at home. No such symbol is used by the Digambara, or 'sky-clad,' section. In recent times no European has been allowed to enter the temples; but a visitor who examined them in 1827 found the image of Pārsvanātha to represent the saint sitting naked in the attitude of meditation, his head shielded by the snake which is his special emblem. The whole mountain is covered with other shrines, which the pilgrim, at some risk to life and limb, must visit. This rite is followed by adoration at the temple of Pārsvanātha, and by the circuit (*pradakṣina*) of the holy site, involving a journey of about 30 miles.

LITERATURE.—H. H. Risley, in *Statistical Account of Bengal*, London, 1877, xvi. 207 ff., in which older authorities are quoted; J. D. Hooker, *Himalayan Journals*, do. 1891, p. 12 ff.; F. E. Bradley-Birt, *Chota Nagpore*, do. 1903, p. 187 ff.; 167 xix. 409.

W. CROOKE.

PARDON.—See FORGIVENESS.

PARENTS.—See CHILDREN, ABANDONMENT, OLD AGE, FAMILY.

PARIAH.—Pariah, properly Paraiyan, is the name of a low caste in S. India which has obtained some celebrity owing to its being considered typical

of the depressed castes in India. The mistaken use of the term 'Pariah' as being applicable to the whole body of the lowest castes, or even to out-castes, became generally known in Europe through P. Sonnerat's *Voyage* (Paris, 1782), G. T. F. Raynal's *Hist. des établissements et du commerce des Européens dans les deux Indes* (Geneva, 1780), and other French works of the last quarter of the 18th century. The natives of India never designate the low castes of other parts of the country as Pariahs, nor are the Paraiyans of the present day in Madras regarded as the lowest of the low. They constitute the great agricultural labourer caste of the Tamil country, their number amounting to 2,448,295, according to the last census (1911); and they are not lacking in natural intelligence, as is shown by the fact that most of the domestic servants of Europeans in the Madras Presidency are recruited from this caste. It is from their coming into contact with Europeans more habitually than any similar caste that the name Pariah has been held to apply to low castes in general; but there are several castes in the Tamil country lower than Pariahs—e.g., the caste of shoemakers. Moreover, all traditions represent the Pariahs or Paraiyans as a caste which has come down in the world, and they have retained some old privileges. Thus the lower village offices are, in the majority of Madras villages, held by persons of the Paraiyan caste. At the annual festival of the goddess of the Black Town of Madras a Paraiyan is chosen to represent the bridegroom of the goddess. The Paraiyans seem to be of Dravidian origin, and their name is derived (according to R. Caldwell, *A Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian Languages*, London, 1895) from the Tamil word *parai*, 'a drum,' the Paraiyans being the class which furnishes the drummers, especially at festivals. Paraiyans bury their dead; they do not burn them like most other Hindus.

In the times of native rule in S. India the Pariahs used to be treated with great harshness. J. A. Dubois (in India from 1792 to 1823) observes that the Pariahs 'are looked upon as slaves by other castes. . . . Hardly anywhere are they allowed to cultivate the soil for their own benefit, but are obliged to hire themselves out to the other castes, who in return for a minimum wage exact the hardest tasks from them. Furthermore, their masters may beat them at pleasure. . . . They live in hopeless poverty, and the greater number lack sufficient means to procure even the coarsest clothing. They go about almost naked, or at best clothed in the most hideous rags. . . . The contempt and aversion with which the other castes—and particularly the Brahmins—regard these unfortunate people are carried to such an excess that in many places their presence, or even their foot-prints, are considered sufficient to defile the whole neighbourhood. They are forbidden to cross a street in which Brahmins are living. . . . Any one who has been touched, whether inadvertently or purposely, by a Pariah is defiled by that single act, and may hold no communication with any person whatsoever until he has been purified by bathing. . . . It would be contamination to eat with any members of this class; to touch food prepared by them, or even to drink water which they have drawn; to use an earthen vessel which they have held in their hands; to set foot inside one of their houses, or to allow them to enter houses other than their own' (*Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*, pp. 49-51). Though the use of the name Pariah is confined to the Tamil country in S. India, the depressed castes whose touch causes pollution are, no doubt, a highly characteristic feature of the caste system all over India. Thus in Kashmir the Meghis, Doms, and other low

castes are still compelled as of old to reside out of the village. They have wells of their own, and must make a sign when they happen to meet Hindus of high caste, or entirely shun their presence. In the N.W. Provinces a number of castes, such as the Dhobi, or washerman caste, the Rangrez, or dyer caste, and the Raysaz, or painter caste, are considered untouchable—i.e., if a member of one of the castes included in this group touches a man of high caste, the latter is bound to wash himself. The depressed races of Gujarāt used to wear a horn as their distinguishing mark. In the ancient caste system of Manu the most degraded out-castes were men called Chandālas. They were not allowed to live in villages and towns or to have any fixed abode. They could possess no other wealth than dogs and donkeys, the two most despicable animals, and had to eat their food from broken dishes, and to wear the garments of the dead. Their transactions had to be among themselves only, and their marriages with their equals. The execution of criminals was assigned to them as their special function, and they were to be distinguished by marks at the king's command, such as branding on the forehead, so as to be recognizable from a distance. At the present day the name Chandāl is throughout India used only in abuse, and is not acknowledged by any caste as its peculiar designation. There exists, however, in Eastern Bengal a non-Aryan caste, engaged for the most part in boating and cultivation, who are generally called Chandāls. At village festivals the Chandāl is obliged to put off his shoes before he sits down in the assembly, and the ordinary washermen and barbers decline to serve him. The Śūdras, the serfs of Indian antiquity, were also a depressed race, of alien origin probably, and are still excluded from the privilege of wearing the sacred thread of the higher castes; but they were at least allowed to enter the outer circles of the Aryan system, and include many highly respectable castes nowadays.

LITERATURE.—H. Yule and A. C. Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson*, ed. W. Crooke, London, 1903, *Census of India, 1911*, Madras Report, N.W. Provinces Report, and General Report; J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*, tr. H. K. Beauchamp, Oxford, 1906; H. H. Risley, *The Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, 2 vols., Calcutta, 1891; *The Laws of Manu*, tr. G. Bühler, in *SBE* xxv. [1896]. J. JOLLY.

PAROUSIA.—Parousia is the transliteration of a Greek noun (*παρουσία*) which has become a technical term in Christian eschatology (*ERE* v. 383^a) for the second coming or the return of Jesus Christ. The Greek word meant both 'arrival' and 'presence,' and in the papyri it denotes especially the visit of an official or a monarch.¹ In neither sense does it occur in the Greek Bible as a religious term; even the later Jewish writings hardly ever use it of God or of Messiah, preferring *ἐπισκοπή* when they had occasion to speak of the Second Coming for judgment. The primitive Christians avoided *ἐπισκοπή*.² It occurs as a later variant in the eschatological text of 1 P 5⁶ (the allusion in 1 P 2¹² is probably not eschatological), but *παρουσία* was the favourite term for the reappearance of Christ at the end. Paul uses it once (2 Th 2⁹) even of the appearance of Christ's supernatural rival—so fixed had the eschatological sense of the word become (cf. the epistle of the churches of Lyons and Vienne [Eus. *HE* v. 1. 5]). Yet it is absent from the pages of the most eschatological book in the NT, the Apocalypse of John, and it

¹ Cf. G. Milligan, *St. Paul's Epistles to the Thessalonians*, London, 1903, pp. 145-148.

² As a rule. There were exceptions, however; Polykrates (Eus. *HE* v. 24), e.g., writes that Melito of Sardis lies 'waiting for the visitation from heaven' (*ἡνὶ καὶ τῶν οὐρανῶν ἐπισκοπῇ*), possibly with a slight play on the term *ἐπισκοπὴ*. He has just used *παρουσία* in the same eschatological sense.

appears within the Gospels only in Matthew's version of the small apocalypse (Mt 24^{27, 28, 29}), where it denotes the final catastrophe at the return of the Son of Man. Paul's employment of it (cf. *ERE* v. 386) appears to have popularized it in the Christian vocabulary, however. The term *ἔσχατος* never flourished in this connexion (cf. *Iren.* i. 10; *Acta Thomæ*, 28); *παρουσία* became more and more the technical religious word for the Second Coming.

The early Christian use of the Second Coming differed from the Jewish in two respects: it was applied to Christ, not to God,¹ and it was 'second' as opposed to the 'first' coming at the Incarnation, whereas for Judaism the 'first' coming meant the creation of the world.² On the lips of the Greek-speaking Christians in the primitive Church *παρουσία* was almost exclusively applied to the return of Christ in glory, in order to complete the Messianic work and usher in the Final Judgment. But by the time of Ignatius (cf. *Phil.* 9) it was being used of the first coming³ of the Lord at the Incarnation (cf. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* i. 5, etc.), and half a century later Justin Martyr explicitly mentions the two Parousias, in the past and in the future (*Dial.* 14, 40, 49, *Apol.* i. 52, etc.). The more general sense of *παρουσία*, as equivalent to the presence of God in life, was not forgotten, however, and the twofold sense of the term from this point of view may be illustrated from the 2nd (3rd?) cent. *Epistle to Diognetus* (7):

'He [God] will send him [Christ] in judgment, and who shall endure his presence [a reminiscence of Mal 3?]. . . . You see them [Christians] thrown to the wild beasts, that they may deny their Lord, and yet not overcome. Do you not see that the more of them are punished, as many others abound? This does not look like human work; it is God's power, proofs of His presence.'

Here the eschatological sense of *παρουσία* is at once followed by the usage of the term as an equivalent for the divine presence; God's presence is visibly shown in the heroic endurance of the martyrs, and the end is to bring a judgment which is Christ's *παρουσία*, or visitation.

The latter conviction was enshrined in the creeds and confessions, but its influence on life varied. History shows how the relative position of the eschatological hope (cf. *ERE* v. 387 ff.), which either receded or assumed special prominence from time to time, helped to accentuate the present or the future aspect of the divine Parousia in the theology of the later Church. The influence of the Fourth Gospel, accelerated by the emphasis upon the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist or in the heart of the individual believer, laid stress upon the conception of the Parousia as the immanent presence of the divine being; both the sacramental and the mystical phases of doctrine, which often combine, forwarded this tendency. On the other hand, from Montanism (*q.v.*) onwards (cf. *ERE* v. 317 ff.), throughout the history of the Church there has been a succession of more or less eccentric (cf. *ERE* i. 177*, iii. 781) outbreaks of the eschatological belief in an imminent Parousia of Christ, which have generally fixed the end within their own generation,⁴ arguing as a rule from Biblical passages (see *ESCHATOLOGY*, § 15), literally interpreted.⁵

An eloquent, daring expression of this faith will be found in George Giffillan's peroration to his *Bards of the Bible* (3 Edinburgh, 1852, p. 336 f.), where he declares that the immediate advent of Christ, God's Son, is the only hope for the preservation of the Bible, God's Word. 'We are fast approaching the position of the Grecians on the plains of Troy. Our enemies are pressing us hard on the field, or from the Ida of the ideal philosophy throwing out incessant volleys. There are discussions, distrust, disaffection among ourselves. Our standard still floats intact, but our standard-bearers are fainting. Meanwhile our Achilles is retired from us. But just as when the Grecian distress deepened to its darkest, when Patroclus the "forerunner" had fallen, when men and gods had driven them to the very verge of the sea, Achilles knew his time was come, started up, sent before him his terrible voice, and his more terrible eye, and turned straightway the tide of battle; so do we expect that our increasing dangers and multiplying foes, that the thousand-fold might that seems rushing on us, is a token that aid is coming, and that our Achilles shall "no more be silent but speak out," shall lift his "bow, his thunder, his almighty arm"—"shall take unto him his great power and reign."

The term naturally enters even into modern religious speculations which attempt to reconcile the Biblical language of the eschatological sections in the NT with the course of history and the present situation. These (cf. the literature quoted in *HDB* iii. 674-680; S. D. F. Salmond, *The Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, Edinburgh, 1901, p. 244 f.) either define the Parousia as having occurred at Pentecost or the fall of Jerusalem or identify it not with any event in the past or the future, but with the general dispensation of the divine presence among men.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the references in the article, the following studies may be noted: W. P. Lyon, in J. Kitt's *Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature*, Edinburgh, 1870, i. 75-77; H. T. Grieron, in *ExpT* xix. [1907] 165 f.; F. W. Worsley, *The Apocalypse of Jesus*, London, 1912, pp. 142-157; J. Agar Beet, *The Last Things*, do. 1913; J. Davidson, *The Second Coming*, do. 1913; R. W. B. Moore, *The Nearness of our Lord's Return*, do. 1913; G. E. Hill, *Apocalyptic Problems*, do. 1916. JAMES MOFFATT.

PARRICIDE.—See *CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS*.

PARSIISM IN JUDAISM.—The relation between Parsiism and Judaism has been the subject of investigation and acute controversy for at least fifty years. The date of compilation of the most important Avesta documents is more uncertain than that assumed by so-called higher criticism for the documents of the Bible. Much depends upon this aspect of dates; for, if it can be shown, as is the conviction of the present writer, that the Jewish records are much older than the Avestan or Mazdean documents, especially those containing similar practices and beliefs, then there can be no longer a question of Persian influence on the Judaism of the Bible, and that of the post-Biblical period, till long after the final dispersion, could still be the object of investigation. On these points scholars are most sharply divided. Yet it is obvious that from the time of Cyrus down to Alexander, when the Achaemenian kings ruled over Palestine, nothing positive is known of the existence of Zoroastrianism and its doctrines and practices. And, even if that form of Zoroastrianism had already been evolved which we find in the time of the Arsacids (Parthians), more is required than a mere exercise of suzerain distant power so to influence the faith of the people as to introduce new conceptions of life and death, a new eschatology, and even new laws of purity and defilement in daily life, especially when one nation possessed a sacred book and the others had none as yet. Such changes are the result of long, intimate intercourse between the followers of different religions, during which sufficient appreciation has been gained of the merits of such doctrines as to allow the one religious body access to the inner

Church History is 'delight in the vision which it opens to us of the second coming of the Lord, and of His reign in truth and peace.'

¹ The unusual expression in 2 P 812 (*τὴν παρουσίαν τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ παρουσίας*) is not an exception.

² Cf. *Slav. En.* xxxii. 1, where God says to Adam as he is expelled from paradise: 'Earth thou art and into the earth whence I take thee thou shalt go, and I will not ruin thee, but send thee whence I took thee. Then I can again take thee at my second coming.'

³ Origen, in *de Princip.* iv. 6, uses ὁ ἰσχυρὸς ἐπιδησία.

⁴ It used to be thought that medieval Europe was shaken by terror at the approach of the year 1000 A.D., as though the end of the world were at hand. The so-called evidence for this idea has been completely disproved (cf. R. Flint, *The Philosophy of History*, Edinburgh, 1893, i. 101).

⁵ In *The Ministry of Grace* (London, 1901), p. 2, J. Wordsworth declares that one of the delights offered by the study of

sanctuary of the life of the other. Nothing of the kind has happened in Palestine. No Persian followers of Zoroastrianism lived in compact masses in Palestine, nor is there any trace of intimate intercourse between the Jewish doctors and the Persian *mobeds*. The reverse, however, has happened in Persia and Media. The whole ancient Babylonian empire was honeycombed with Jewish settlements. They spread from the northern frontier of Palestine to the northern frontier of India and possibly beyond, as far as China. They lived there for centuries together, before and during the Achaemenian period, down to the end of the Sasanian period and the Arab conquest—down to this very day. The possibilities are much greater, therefore, that Jewish influences which permeated the inhabitants of these countries should have contributed to the evolution of the new faith propounded by Zoroaster. It is erroneous to imagine that the Jews did not develop an intense missionary activity among the nations with which they came into contact. The reverse is the case. They also lived in compact masses and preserved the knowledge of Hebrew, and still more of the Aramaic tongue, down to the 10th cent. and later. The question of the date of the Avesta, however, has still to be settled. The legend of the burning by Alexander of the Zoroastrian sacred books stands in contrast with the fact that Alexander burned neither the sacred books of the Jews and Samaritans nor those of the Tyrians or the Egyptians. The collection and piecing together of the old fragments in the time of the Arsacids may refer to the literary collection of the *Gāthās* and the publication of the Avesta by the Magi, the priests and the exclusive exponents of the new faith. As Darmesteter has shown in his introduction to the Avesta (*SBE* iv.² [1895] p. lvii ff.), undoubted traces of the Pentateuch in form and contents are to be seen in the Avesta.

Not even after that period (i.e. from the middle of the 3rd cent. to the destruction of the Temple) has there been so intimate a *convivium*, or even a political unity, between the Palestinian and the Parthian kingdoms as to allow for intense influence of Zoroastrianism on the Jews of Palestine. The Jews were separated even more than before from the kingdom across the Euphrates. They gravitated towards Egypt. The only country in which Jews were brought into close contact with Zoroastrianism, in a geographical sense, was ancient Babylon with its teeming Jewish population; but it would be a mistake to imagine that the Jews of Babylon exercised any appreciable influence upon the shaping of the Jewish beliefs and practices which had their centre in Palestine and found expression in the literature of the time. The affinities between the two, however, as well as the possible relation between Parsiism and the post-Biblical and Talmudic literature, would still be worth examining.

The extent of the Aramaic influence is best seen in that extraordinary bilingual Pahlavi literature in which the text is written in Aramaic and read in Persian. No doubt those who wrote it first read it also in the language in which it was written, viz. Aramaic, but then it was read by the Persian Magi in the language of the Avesta. The predominant influence, therefore, in Babylon was that of the Aramaic-speaking population, among them the Jews.

Three periods have to be distinguished in which Parsiism might have influenced Judaism and *vice versa*, viz. Achaemenian, Arsacid, and Sasanian, corresponding roughly to the Biblical, post-Biblical, and Talmudic periods. In these, references will have to be made to the eschatology, angelology, and demonology. Before entering upon this

investigation, it is necessary to establish a fact of fundamental importance. The views and beliefs found scattered through the post-Biblical literature do not form any essential part of Judaism, nor have they any dogmatic value, except the mere vague mention of the existence of angels, immortality and resurrection, and punishment and guilt, as abstract theories only, without any detail or any concrete shape and form. These are Midrashim—legendary embellishments of no binding character. The descriptions, e.g., of a heavenly hierarchy or of the divisions of Gehinnom are left to individual believers, just like so many other eschatological legends found in the Rabbinical literature. Judaism as a faith lays no stress upon them. They are part of the religious folk-lore and no more. But even among this Midrashic matter we must seek for traces of Parsi theories which may have influenced the Judaism of Palestine in the first place.

(1) *Achaemenian*.—As already remarked, the existence of the Parsi dualistic faith with its celestial hierarchy, its hell, the *drujs* and *divs*, and all the other ceremonial, lustral and sacrificial details, worship of fire, etc., cannot be traced positively as far back as the Achaemenian rule and the time of Cyrus and Darius. No trace of this teaching can be found explicitly in the books of the OT (the allusion in Is 45⁷ to God as creator of light and darkness cannot be strained to express a view polemical to Zoroastrian dualism; it rests purely on the beginning of Genesis). Nor have traces of immortality been found corresponding to those of Zoroastrianism. This belief in immortality in Judaism has not yet been sufficiently elucidated (see below).

We can now follow up a systematic development of angelology and divine hierarchy in Ezk 1st, and especially in Dn 8¹⁶ 9²¹ 10¹³⁻²¹ 12¹¹, to which may be added 1 K 22¹⁹, Is 6^{1st}, Ps 89² 103²⁰. None of these shows the slightest similarity to the Zoroastrian hierarchy, to the Amesha Spentas (which are mere shadows), or even to the Fravashis—all probably ancient natural gods reduced to ghosts, whilst the angel in the Jewish literature is conceived as a concrete being. In the introduction to Job Satan differs fundamentally from the Zoroastrian Angra Mainyu with his hosts of *drujs* and his hell. The attempts made to find in Proverbs and the Psalter reflexes of Zoroastrian influence and the theory of creative 'Wisdom' have been shown not to be well-founded.

(2) *Arsacid*.—More important is the period of the Arsacids from c. 260 B.C. to A.D. 260, the period of the Apocrypha and the Pseudepigrapha, as well as the NT writings. During this whole period of close on 500 years, except for a few years of Parthian domination, the Jews of Palestine had practically no communication with the Parthian kingdom and with the Zoroastrian fire-worshippers. Yet the Jewish literature contains a fully-developed angelology, demonology, and eschatology. There are, no doubt, various points of contact, especially in the last-named, with Parsiism, but a careful examination reveals the fact that the similarity is only in general principles and beliefs, and, if we descend to details, the differences are as numerous as they are profound. Tobit shows exactly how different the product is under Zoroastrian influence. This book was written in the Parthian kingdom, among the ten tribes. Rhage, the centre of that worship, is mentioned; the danger which Tobit incurs when burying the dead is understood only when one remembers the Zoroastrian horror of burial. The angel Raphael acts like a Fravashi, but his name is a typological and symbolical Hebrew name. The demon who possesses Sarah is Ashmedai,

1 T. K. Cheyne, in *Semitic Studies in Memory of Dr. A. Kohut*, p. 111 ff.

not Angra Mainyn, a simple *div*, Aēshmadaeva.¹ There is no further reference to any of these incidents in the other apocryphal and pseudepigraphical literature. The heavens through which Enoch, Moses, Baruch, and Isaiah pass as well as that of the heavenly halls, Hehloth, differ in every detail from the Zoroastrian heaven, and not one of the Amesha Spentas or Fravashis is mentioned by name. All the names are pure Hebrew.

The heavenly economy is built up on a different basis. It is the astrological, with the fundamental principle of seven—seven heavens, seven angels, seven planets.

Herein lies the key to the explanation of the relation between Judaism and Parsiism, especially at the time when Babylonian beliefs and traditions were still all-powerful. The Babylonian system of mythology has, unfortunately, not been preserved in the cuneiform literature as a definite system. Everything seems to be in a fluid state, and the true relation between the manifold divinities is rather vague and subject to local influences. Out of the mass of gods, however, a heavenly hierarchy could easily have become crystallized under the prevalent astrological influences. Some of the ancient minor gods could have been turned into no less vague Amesha Spentas to correspond to the more pronounced Jewish angels. It is Judaism that works up the Babylonian material and makes it acceptable in a more concrete form to the founders and shapers of Zoroastrianism also. This agrees with the tradition recorded in the Rabbinical writings (Jer. *Rōsh Hashānāh*, i. 4; *Gen. Rabbāh*, 48), that the names, not the principle, of the angels had been brought from Babylon and not from Persia. Even Metatron, who has been compared with Mithra, cannot be identified with the latter either philologically or functionally. There is no resemblance whatever to Mithra in the position assigned to Metatron in Jewish mysticism, where he is the substitute for Enoch. The direct mediator between God and man, he stands near the throne of God, and it is therefore likely that we have here a hybrid combination of the name Mithra with a Greek work like *μεταθρόνος*, due to popular etymology; in any case he is neither the counterpart of Mithra nor derived from him.

The demonology of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha is still farther away from that of the Avesta. Satan is not like Angra Mainyu in any detail. There is no real dualism to be found—no conscious rebellious and antagonistic power opposed directly and independently to the other power, almost equal in strength, which will have to be broken at the end of days to ensure the final decisive victory of the good over the evil principle. This point must be retained, for it is the only really characteristic principle of Parsiism, although it is not at all improbable, as H. Gunkel,² W. Bousset,³ and others have shown, that it goes back to the ancient Babylonian dragon myth, which, as snēh, and not in the Zoroastrian form, reappears in some allusions in the OT, especially the dragon in Revelation. The dualistic conception appears more pronounced in the Gnostic, and more definite still in the Manichean doctrines. But not a trace of it can be found in the ancient Jewish literature of the period under consideration. The Jewish demonology resembles the Babylonian more closely. The names of evil spirits are Shiddim and Lilith. There is no opposition to God, only the desire of hurting man because of his innate wickedness and because of sin. Satan is originally an angel who has fallen from heaven,

¹ If the form 'Ashmedai' is the primitive form, then we have here a late form, just as it occurs in the Talmud, or this late form may be due to a late copyist.

² *Israel und Babylonien*, Göttingen, 1903.

³ *Rel. des Judentums*², Berlin, 1906.

and the evil spirits are also angels who have followed their leader. Pride caused their downfall—a rash act of disobedience—and nowhere are they considered as in real opposition to God. In the NT teaching the power of Satan is broken by the Messiah.

In the Jewish eschatology the fundamental principle is the immortality of the soul and then the economy of the world. Various references in the OT show that the belief in the life of the soul after its departure from this world was known from ancient times. The references to Sheol, however shadowy they may be, suffice to prove it. The researches of N. Söderblom¹ and E. Böklen² have shown how slight the similarity is between Parsiism and Judaism even in those points where the greatest affinity apparently exists. Except for a few details, which may have been taken over directly by one from the other, in all important points there is profound divergence of view. The very nature of a hell inhabited by *drujs*—a cold, dark abode without hope of salvation—differs in every detail from the Jewish popular conception of a hell filled with fire and brimstone; and the divisions of hell, the names of the evil spirits, etc., have no similarity. Here the present writer ventures to point not only to Babylonian beliefs, which seem to be the direct source for the Zoroastrian hell in the Avestan writings, and to some extent for the old Jewish conceptions of Sheol, but also to what has not hitherto been considered in that connexion, viz. the fully-developed Egyptian eschatology with its beliefs in life after death, accompanying gods (or spirits, or angels), the judgment of the soul after death, and the final decision as to salvation and perdition. It was this fatal decision that every worshipper of Osiris wished to escape, and this is the ultimate source of so many ceremonies and practices, and even religious movements—the desire to avoid complete annihilation after death and to obtain guarantees in this life of everlasting salvation, the salvation after death from hell and destruction, from punishment and purgatory, which is the secret teaching of many Greek mysteries, Orphic, Ophitic, etc. (see G. Anrich, *Das antike Mysterienwesen*, Göttingen, 1893; W. Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, do. 1907).

How much of this is Jewish, how much Egyptian, how much can be traced to Thracian W. Asiatic traditions anterior to Parsiism, has not yet been decided, though the investigations are moving in that direction. Mention may be made here also of the Sibylline literature akin to the Jewish Apocalyptic and yet independent of Zoroastrian influences. It is remarkable, however, that these notions appear in Judaea after Alexander, and practically for the first time in the apocryphal literature shortly before the Christian era. There is now one factor, the importance of which cannot be gainsaid, which the present writer is able to add, as he believes, more fully, for the first time—the Samaritan angelology, demonology, and eschatology. The information hitherto has been so scanty that it is not to be wondered at that scholars from A. Reiland downwards have gone totally astray on the subject. By the aid of the material in the present writer's possession, it can be stated that the Samaritans and Jews agree most closely in all essentials. The Samaritans believe in angels, even mentioning some by name: at the birth of Moses angels surround the place and sing hymns, very much as the angels did at the birth of Jesus; Balaam worships seven angels who preside over the phenomena of nature, like the

¹ *La Vie future d'après le Mazdéisme*.

² *Die Veranschaulichung der jüdisch-christl. mit der parssisch. Eschatologie*.

angels in Enoch; the angels meet Moses before his death. The Samaritans know also of the evil influences of wizards and demons (*shedim* of the Pentateuch).

Still more interesting is their eschatology. Gaster's Codd. 872 and 1156, especially the latter, contain an elaborate description of the fate of the soul after death, of paradise and Gehinnom, of the joys of the former and the fire and brimstone in the latter, of the resurrection of the dead, of the Day of Judgment, of punishment and reward, and of the advent of the Tabeb (Messiah), who plays as colourless a part as the Messiah in the *Test. of Twelve Patriarchs* and in the *Apoc. Baruch*. We are moving here in the same atmosphere as were the contemporaries of the Second Temple and the beginnings of Christianity. The source of these beliefs must be sought in Palestine and in the beliefs then shared by Jews, Samaritans, and Judaizing mystics. At that time there was no connexion between the Jews in Palestine and the Parthian kingdom, and it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the body of practices and beliefs which Jews and Samaritans held in common are very ancient. They go back to a primitive common source. Neither Jew nor Samaritan has borrowed consciously from the other. Egyptian and other heathen mysteries may have contributed to fashion older beliefs of a Judæo-Babylonian origin. We are dealing, of course, primarily with those beliefs which are held by all the Jews. Local influences have produced some particular beliefs and practices, but these cannot be put down as Jewish in the wider sense of the word. This refers especially to the third or Sasanian period, when there was close contact in Babylon between Jews and the Zendiks, or Magi, as they were then called.

(3) *Sasanian*.—Zoroastrianism, as soon as it became the State religion and enjoyed the special support of the kings, became as intolerant as every victorious Church has been. The Parthian kings were very tolerant. Greek and Mithraic cults flourished side by side with Jewish worship and Buddhist faith. Not so the first Sasanian king, Ardashir, who succeeded in ousting the Parthians and founded a new dynasty thoroughly and fanatically devoted to Zoroastrianism. A period of persecution began against the numerous Jewish population in Babylon, to be followed soon by a similar fanatical outbreak against Christians and Manichæans—in fact, against every heterodox worship. The relation, however, became gradually less strained until the Arab conquest put an end to Zoroastrianism. Traces of the conflict and of the relaxation of persecution are found in the Talmud.¹

Friendly relations existed between Shabur (Saporas) the king and Jewish sages like Samuel, and during that period many old Persian (Pahlavi) words entered the popular language of the Jews in Babylon.² In the popular development of angelology and demonology some traits borrowed from Zoroastrianism have been added to the more primitive conceptions of the angels and demons, of their attributes of good and evil. Ashmedai becomes the king, and Lilith the queen, of the male and female demons. Many legends connected with life and death have been more embellished in conformity with Zoroastrian popular beliefs, but nothing fundamental has been added to those notions found in older literature, and even here it is difficult to distinguish how much of it is originally Babylonian or known to us only from the Zoroastrian counterpart. Extreme views have

been expressed by O. H. Schorr¹ on the dependence of Talmudic practices, but most of them have since been discarded and the rest greatly modified by the researches of Kohnt, Darmesteter, and others. What influence Zoroastrian literature may have had on Jewish legendary literature, such as the Targum of Esther, and other Haggadic stories, like the Nimrod legend, must be the subject of special investigations on the part of students. Possibly through Gnostic mediation, a more marked dualism is noticeable in those mystical ideas which found their fullest expression in the Zoharistic literature (see ZOHAR). On the religious side, however, with but few exceptions, the Jews preserved their original independence. Though willing to adopt and assimilate collateral details and embellish their primitive creations with elements borrowed from elsewhere, they did not owe anything vital to Parsism and Zoroastrianism. Indeed, the contrary can be asserted with more plausibility. Principles which are common to the whole of Jewry, held also by the Samaritan and found in the oldest Apocrypha, may have been communicated to the nascent faith of Zoroaster and have contributed to lift the latter to the higher position of a modified monotheism, far above the polytheism of India and Babylon or Greece and Egypt. The historical and geographical evidence points in that direction.

See also JEWS IN ZOROASTRIANISM.

LITERATURE.—In addition to the Avesta, Fr. and Eng. tr. by J. Darmesteter, and the other Pahlavi texts translated principally by E. W. West and M. Haug, *SBE* v. [1880], xviii. [1882], xxiv. [1885], xxxvii. [1892], xlvii. [1897], the following are the most important publications bearing on the relation between Parsism and Judaism: A. Kohut, *Über die jüdische Angelologie und Dämonologie in ihrer Abhängigkeit vom Parsismus*, Leipzig, 1866 (see bibliography of his Persian writings on Parsism in the Kohut Memorial Volume, also 'Memor of Dr. Alexander Kohut's Literary Activity,' by his son, in *Proceedings of the Fourth Biennial Convention of the Jewish Theological Seminary Association*, New York, 1894, reprinted in *Tributes to the Memory of Rev. Dr. Alexander Kohut*, do. 1894, pp. 49-64); T. K. Cheyne, 'Book of Psalms, its Origin, and its Relation to Zoroastrianism,' in *Semite Studies in Memory of Rev. Dr. Alexander Kohut*, Berlin, 1897; N. Söderblom, *Les Fravashis*, Paris, 1899; E. Stave, *Über den Einfluss des Parsismus auf das Judentum*, Haarlem, 1898; M. Flügel, *The Zend-Avesta and Eastern Religions*, Baltimore, 1898; N. Söderblom, *La Vie future d'après le Mazdaïsme*, Angers, 1901; E. Böklen, *Die Verwandtschaft der jüdisch-christlichen mit der persischen Eschatologie*, Göttingen, 1902; F. Cumont, *The Mysteries of Mithra*, tr. T. J. McCormack, Chicago, 1903; L. H. Mills, *Zarathushtra and the Greeks*, do. 1905, *Zarathushtra, Philo, the Achæmenids and Israel*, do. 1906, *Avesta Eschatology compared with the Books of Daniel and Revelation*, do. 1908; M. N. Dhalla, *Zoroastrian Theology*, New York, 1914.

M. GASTER.

PARSIS.—'Parsi' is derived from *Pars*, which is identified with the modern *Fars*, one of the provinces of the ancient *Pârça*, the *Persis* of the Greeks. It is the name under which the Persian Zoroastrians, who landed on the shores of Gujarrât in the 8th cent. A.D., are known. No trace is left of the different bodies of Persian settlers who are supposed to have come to other parts of India. The refugees were successively called by European travellers *Parseos*, *Perseos*, *Persees*, *Parsees*, *Parsis*, etc. The Parsis are still found in Gujarrât (Bombay Presidency), and the largest population is in the city of Bombay.

I. *STATISTICS*.—It is extremely difficult to form an approximate notion of the number of the Parsi population under the different rulers of Gujarrât—Hindus, Muhammadans, Portuguese, Maráthas. The numbers of the first immigrants are totally unknown, and the later estimates of European travellers, based on personal or second-hand evidence, are most uncertain, so that there is no need to record them. From the history of the refugees themselves we can derive more useful information. When they landed in India, it is probable that they were not very numerous; for, if they had been,

¹ See H. Grätz, *Gesch. der Juden*, Leipzig, 1866-78, iv. 291 f., Eng. tr., London, 1891-92, ii. 629 ff.

² See Aruk. *Hashalem*, ed. A. Kohut, Vienna, 1878-92, *passim*.

¹ *He-Hatuf*, i.-iii., Lemberg, 1852-56, iv., Breslau, 1859

seeing that they came from Hormuz and Kāthiāwār by sea, it would have required a large fleet to convey them. But, being of a prolific race, they increased rapidly, and, after spreading into villages, they settled in larger localities, and at last in the great town of Surat, the emporium of the East in the 18th century. A new start was made with the beginning of the 19th century, when they deserted Surat, being attracted by Bombay, the centre of European commercial activity. Bombay is at present the headquarters of the community.

The censuses taken by order of the British Government are, in fact, the only reliable documents for the 19th century. The *Account-book of the Parsi Panchayet*, Bombay, A.Y. 1281-82, A.D. 1912 (Gujarātī), gives most accurate statistics of the Parsi population. It contains the results of those different censuses and such available information as it has been possible to collect in foreign countries (see Appendix, pp. i-xviii).

According to the last census (1911), the number of Parsis in India, including Aden, the Andaman Islands and Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, China, and Japan amounted to 100,499, of whom 80,980 belonged to the Bombay Presidency (*Account-book*, App. pp. i, xvii f.). The distribution of the population is as follows:

I. BRITISH PROVINCES.			
Localities.	Males.	Females.	Total.
1. Ajmer-Merwāra	134	123	262
2. Andaman and Nicobar
3. Assam	5	...	5
4. Baluchistān	93	73	166
5. Bengal	402	208	610
6. Behār and Orissa	25	10	35
including Behār	15	8	23
" Orissa
" Chotā Nāgpur	10	2	12
7. Bombay Presidency	41,470	39,510	80,980
including Bombay
" Zillās	39,943	38,242	78,185
" Sind	1,259	1,152	2,411
" Aden	263	116	384
"	195	105	300
8. Burma
9. Central Provinces and Berār	1,031	697	1,728
including Central Provinces	710	487	1,197
" Berār	321	210	531
10. Coorg	16	18	34
11. Madras	249	239	488
12. N.-W. Provinces	41	8	49
13. Panjāb	376	250	626
14. United Provinces	504	363	872
including Agra	394	295	689
" Oudh	110	93	183
Total	44,541	41,614	86,155
II. NATIVE STATES AND AGENCIES.			
15. Assam (Manipur)
16. Baluchistān	3	1	4
17. Baroda	3,420	4,535	7,955
18. Bengal	1	...	1
19. Behār and Orissa
20. Bombay	1,833	1,252	2,585
21. Central India Agency	689	641	1,330
22. Central Provinces	21	8	29
23. Hyderabad	822	707	1,529
24. Kashmir	22	9	31
25. Madras	4	2	6
26. Mysore	55	46	101
27. N.-W. Provinces Agencies and tribal areas
28. Panjāb	20	7	27
29. Rājputāna	191	151	342
30. Sikkim	1	...	1
31. United Provinces
Total	6,532	7,350	13,941

III.

Localities.	Males.	Females.	Total.
Ceylon	108	75	183
Straits Settlements	12	2	14
China	132	23	177 ¹
Japan	20	4	29 ²
Total	272	104	408 ³
Total for whole of India	51,123	48,973	100,096
Total for other countries	272	104	408
Total Parsi population	51,395	49,077	100,499

The above is completed by another exhaustive table (see App. pp. i-xviii), in which the Parsi population of the towns contained in the above localities is given. The largest total is in Bombay, numbering 50,931 Parsis (26,764 males, 24,167 females [p. xvi—see the census of the Bombay Parsis, according to the wards or districts]); then comes Surat, with its small community of 5458 souls (2404 m., 3054 f.); and, in the Baroda State, which comprises 7955 Parsis (3420 m., 4535 f.), Nansari with its 4221 Parsis (1630 m., 2591 f.). The trustees of the Parsi Panchayat have given in the Appendices of their *Account-books* of 1900-01 and 1913 the result of the different censuses 1811, 1816, 1829, 1849, 1864, 1872, 1881, 1891, either from the *Parsi Prakash* of B. B. Patell or from information derived from various sources, official and private.

Since the middle of the 18th cent. the Parsis have been divided into two religious sects, Shahenshāhīs, or Rasmīs, and Qadīmīs. The former adhere to the era accepted by their forefathers, the first emigrants from Khorāsān, whereas the latter have adopted the old Persian year observed by the present-day Zoroastrians in Persia.

In 1872 there were in Bombay 40,809 Shahenshāhīs and 3232 Qadīmīs, and in the Bombay Presidency and the whole of India⁴ 29,833 Shahenshāhīs and 1770 Qadīmīs, forming a total of 70,647 Shahenshāhīs and 5052 Qadīmīs. In 1881 there were in Bombay 43,292 Shahenshāhīs and 5305 Qadīmīs, and in the Bombay Presidency and the whole of India 24,001 Shahenshāhīs and 548 Qadīmīs, forming a total of 67,293 Shahenshāhīs and 5853 Qadīmīs. But the distinction is not of great importance, and the figures are not sufficiently comprehensive to be worth publishing, so that we need not investigate this point. A census of the two sects was made in the Baroda State in 1911, and of the total of 7955 Parsis the Shahenshāhīs number 7778, and the Qadīmīs number 177.

II. *ETHNOGRAPHY*.—The Parsis, as a race, have preserved some of the qualities of their ancestors, the Persians, but have undergone changes, due to climate, food, and surroundings. Early travellers always noted them as different from the other natives. The men, in general, are described as well-proportioned; their stature, says Mandelslo (*Voyages*, p. 186), is not among the tallest, but their complexion is fairer than that of the other Indosthans, and their women are far fairer and handsomer than the natives and the Muhammadans. La Boullaye le Gouz (*Voyages*, p. 189) insists on the whiteness of the complexion of the Parsis, while Stavorinus (*Voyages*, ii. 495 f.) finds it little different from that of the Spaniards. Fryer (*E. India and Persia*, ii. 115, letter iv. ch. vi.;

¹ Including 22 children.

² Including 5 children.

³ Including 27 children.

⁴ Exclusive of Bombay.

cf. i. 294, letter iii. ch. iii.) had already given to it the epithet of 'straw-colour.' According to Stavorinus, the women, fairer even than the men, had a slender figure, large black eyes, and finely-arched ebony eyebrows, placed at some distance from the eyes, as if to enhance their beauty. Their forehead was high, their nose slightly aquiline, their mouth small with shining teeth, their breast well shaped, and their gait easy. Forbes (*Oriental Memoirs*², i. 112) says that the Parsis are a comely race, athletic and well formed. He praises the beauty of their women, but deprecates the precocious and almost masculine stoutness which disfigures them after the age of twenty. The travellers add that the Parsis abstained from marrying outside of their community in order to preserve their purity of blood. Nowadays their characteristics are easily summed up as follows: 'They are, in feature, in the main, of a high-Aryan type, somewhat intermixed, perhaps after a very long residence in India, and somewhat blunted and thickened as compared to the sharper and more chiselled northern faces; but still there is generally the prominence of feature which we might expect from an extraction originally Persian' (M. Justice Campbell, *JASBe*, supplementary number, vol. xxxv. pt. ii. [1866], 'Ethnology of India,' p. 140).

III. HISTORY.—The sole document that we possess on the events of the early history of the Parsis and their arrival in India is the *Kissah-i-Sanjân* ('History or Story of Sanjân'), a Persian book written in verse in A.Y. 969 (A.D. 1600). The author is one Bahman Kaikobad of Nausari. He says that he wrote the book on the authority of older traditions and accounts, and of what he had heard from his elders (see E. B. Eastwick, *JRASB* i. [1842] 167-191; and J. J. Modi, 'A few Events in the Early History of the Parsis and their Dates,' in *Zarhosti*, i. [1273 A.Y.], ii. [1274 A.Y.]). The first MSS of the *Kissah-i-Sanjân* were brought to Europe by Anquetil du Perron, who gave an account of them in his *Zend-Avesta*, vol. i. pt. ii. pp. xxxiv-xxxv, and a résumé in the 'Disc. prélim.' pp. ccxviii-cccxliii.

The *Kissah* starts with the loss of the sovereignty of Yazdagird. On the fall and death of the king (A.D. 651) a number of Zoroastrians 'abandoned their houses and gardens and palaces for the sake of their religion, and lived in Kohistan for one hundred years.' There they also became 'anxious for their religion,' and went to the city of Hormuz (A.D. 751), where they resided for fifteen years; but, being harassed by the Darvands (the Arabs), they left for India. They landed on the shores of Kâthiawâr, at Div (A.D. 766). After a stay of nineteen years they sailed for Gujarât, and reached Sanjân (A.D. 785). The local ruler (Jâi Rânâ or Jâdi Rânâ) allowed them to settle and found a colony of their own, with liberty to follow their religion, on condition that they would adopt the language and customs of the country. After a time (A.D. 790) they obtained permission to build a fire-temple (*âdash-bahrâm*). Three hundred years after this event (A.D. 1090) the Parsis began to disperse in different directions, and went to Vânkâner, Broach, Variav, Ankleswar, Cambay, and Nausari.

Four hundred years after this dispersion the Muhammadans invaded the land, and Sanjân fell into the hands of Alaf Khan, a general of Sultan Mahmud Bigarah. The Parsis, after having assisted the Hindus in the defence of Sanjân, in which they lost many of their followers, fled with the sacred fire to the adjoining mountain of Bârhût, and took refuge there (1490). We know very little of the life of the Parsis during the centuries which elapsed after their arrival in India. The *Kissah*

shows that they were active, hard workers, and had brought industries with them from Khorâsân. They seem to have been contented, and were apparently Hinduized, having become intermingled with the surrounding populations, whose dress, language, and social customs they assumed, simply forming a new caste among the numerous family sections of the Hindûs.

The Parsis were divided into two classes: the *behdîns*, or laymen, and the *athornans*, or priests.

1. Laymen (*behdîns*).—At the end of the 15th cent. the *Kissah* mentions the name of a layman, Chângâh Asâ, of Nausari, who, as far as is known, was the first rich man of the community, and who was appointed *desai*, i.e. farmer of large territories, a position which was held henceforth by Parsi families under the successive Muhammadan and Marâthâ governments (see Pallonji Burjorji Desai, *Hist. of the Nausari Desais*, Bombay, 1887 [Gujarâti]). He was a pious man, and leader, or *dâvar*, of the community. He renewed and spread the true religion, and gave to the needy Parsis the sacred shirt and girdle, the symbols of their faith, by which they were distinguished. He brought to Nausari the sacred fire which had been transferred from the Bârhût mountain to Bansdah, and caused a building to be built at Nausari (1516) for its installation. He sent emissaries to Persia in order to refer doubtful religious and social questions to the opinion of the learned Irani priests—a custom which prevailed till the 18th century. Nausari at the end of the 16th cent. was a prosperous place among the 31 *mahals* of the *sarkar* of Surat, being 19th in point of area as well as in point of the revenue that it brought to the State. Its area was 17,353 *bighas*, and its revenue 297,720 *dâms* (about £740). It was noted for 'a manufactory of perfumed oil found nowhere else' (*Ain-i-Akbari*, ed. H. Blochmann, Calcutta, 1873, vol. i. p. 498, l. 13, col. 1, tr. H. S. Jarrett, ii. 257).

The Parsis in Gujarât were engaged in agricultural pursuits; most of them were farmers and also toddy-drawers. They appear at Surat as early as the 15th century. They are known there by European travellers as carpenters, cabinet-makers, ship-builders, and, lastly, brokers to the European factories. From that time dates the true era of Parsi prosperity and importance. In the 18th cent. the Parsi community at Surat was flourishing. The old wards inhabited by them still bear testimony that they were numerous (see M. Edalji Burjorji Patel, *Hist. of Surat*, Bombay, 1890 [Gujarâti]). Forbes (i. 110) gives an approximate total of the population at the beginning of the 19th cent., stating it at 20,000 families. Several Parsis enjoyed honour and influence at the court of Delhi, and some of them received grants of land, *khilats* (dress of honour), and other marks of distinction. They were the first to venture to China and Burma and to open branches and firms there. The famines which desolated Gujarât and the commercial decline at Surat were the sources of the increase in the Parsi population of Bombay. The Parsis had settled there even under the Portuguese rule (17th cent.), and, after the arrival of the English, they seem to have been associated with the fortunes of the latter; so much so that it can be said without exaggeration that Bombay owes much of her present greatness to the industry and enterprising spirit of the Parsis (see S. M. Edwardes, *Census of India, 1901*, vol. x., 'Bombay [Town and Island], pt. iv., 'History'). White marble statues in the squares and public halls perpetuate the memory of some of the leading men of the community. The Parsis gradually increased in number and importance, and their co-religionists of the Mofussil came to them for support. The

same had happened in the case of Snrat, whither the surrounding populations had flocked in fear of the inroads of the Maráthas and Pindáris.

At the beginning of the 19th cent. they were rich and influential, and were praised for their honesty and benevolence. An example of the best type of Parsi merchant-prince was Jamshedji Jijibhai of Nansari, who in 1842 received the honour of knighthood, and in 1857 was raised to the dignity of Baronet of the United Kingdom—a title which had never before been conferred upon any native of India. Later other members of the community were similarly honoured by the British Government: Sir D. M. Petit, Sir K. J. Readymoney, Sir M. M. Bhownagree, M.P., and others. The late Jamshedji N. Tata represented the mingling of the old energetic spirit of the ancient Parsis and the new methods of commercial and industrial enterprise.

In 1852 Briggs (*The Parsis*, p. 25) could truly say that 'the bent of the Parsi community was purely commercial'; but a great change was to take place. The Parsis were the first among the natives to avail themselves of Western education. At first they attended the schools conducted in Bombay by Eurasians, but gradually a large section frequented those established by the Government, such as the Elphinstone Institution, and aimed at university degrees. The first schools for the exclusive benefit of the community founded by Sir Jamshedji Jijibhai (Parsi Benevolent Institution) were opened in Bombay in 1849. He had bitterly resented 'the hopeless ignorance' in which the Parsi children were permitted to grow up, and had invested the sum of 300,000 rupees for the carrying out of a scheme to relieve and educate his co-religionists, men and women. At the dawn of the 20th cent. the intellectual status of the Parsis is eloquently witnessed to by figures.

If we take the term 'educated' as designating one who can read and write in one language, we find that in 1901 the number of educated Parsis in the Bombay Presidency, including the Native States, was 51,000 out of 78,552, while in 1911 it was 60,005 out of 83,565, which gives an increase of 34.5 per cent in favour of education in the last decade (*Account-book*, 1901, App. p. 14, 1912, App. p. xii). Now a study of the statistics dealing with the literacy of the leading religions of the Presidency in 1891 and 1901 discloses the following movement, which can be summarized: number of literates per 1000—Parsis, 650; Christians, 292; Jains, 269; Hindus, 59; Muhammadans, 41 (*Census of India*, 1901, vol. ix. pt. i. p. 123). Christians and Parsis in the first instance are rivals for the first place in the literary contest, but the former are easily outdistanced by the Parsis when it comes to be a question of the proportion of literates to the total population.

Of the Parsis in the Baroda State 4946 persons are literate, of whom 2367 are males and 2579 females. The illiterates are numerically fewer than the literates—a state of things not to be met with in any other religion. They number 3009 persons, 1053 males and 1956 females; i.e., the illiterates are 60.8 per cent of the literates. In no other religion, again, is the proportion of female literates so large; almost one-third of the literate females in the State are Parsis (*ib.* 'Report of Baroda State,' pt. ii. p. 38). Female education is, of course, in great favour among the Parsis, and some Parsi women have B.A., M.A., B.Sc., LL.B., and M.D. degrees.

By this system of education the Parsis were soon fitted for entering such professions as medicine, law, and engineering, as also for Government employments and political life. They have secured seats in the corporations, in legislative and vice-regal

councils, and even in Parliament. The first Indian returned to the House of Commons was a Parsi, Dadabhai Naorozi (1892). In the Native States the Parsis are usefully employed as *divans* (ministers) and officials. The same Dadabhai Naorozi was the first Parsi *divan* appointed to a Native State, the Baroda State (1874).

The change in the social customs has been no less remarkable. Through contact with the English, European life and habits gradually took the place among the higher classes of the Hindu customs which had been adopted by the first settlers. A split ensued, and the community was divided into two classes—the orthodox party, steeped in pure social conservatism, causing a confusion between their own religious prescriptions and the ways of their new countrymen, and the liberal party, bent on introducing the Western spirit. Associations and newspapers were started on both sides. The history of social reform among the Parsis has yet to be written. The materials are contained in the *Reports* of those associations and papers—among the latter, the *Rast Gofstar*, which, for half a century, fought in favour of social reform. All the changes advocated in its columns by the spirited editor, K. N. Kabraji, have been realized. The results—every one can see them in the actual *modus vivendi* of the Parsis—are due to the energetic efforts of men like Naorozi, Furdunji, Sorabji Shapurji Bengali, Dadabhai Naorozi, Behramji K. Ghandhi, K. N. Kabraji, K. N. Cama, K. R. Cama, and others. The same spirit had incited the Parsis to support the Hindu reformers, and it was a Parsi, B. M. Malabari, who took the lead in the great campaign in favour of the abolition of infant-marriages, and was successful enough to have the Age of Consent Act promulgated in 1891, which is expected to put an end to them.

In the field of literary activity the Parsis are equally distinguished. An absolute command of English has taken the place of 'the mediocrity of the English tongue' noticed by H. Lord (*Religion of the Perses*, London, 1630, *Introd.* p. ii) in the 17th century. A study of figures shows that in 1901 the number of literates in English in the Bombay Presidency was 163,000, of whom the Parsis numbered 20,252. Comparing the proportions of the various religions, we have for literates in English per 1000 of the population: Parsis, 258; Christians, 209; Jains, 9; Hindus, 4; Muhammadans, 2. Thus one Parsi out of every four (of every three in 1911) is able to read and write the English language (*Census of India*, 1901, vol. ix., 'Bombay,' pt. i., 'Report,' p. 134).

Gujarati, which the Parsis, in common with the Hindus of Gujarat, may be said to have implanted in Bombay, is still the familiar, domestic, and commercial language of the community, and is taught in their own schools. The Gujarati local press is mostly in the hands of the Parsis; it was a Parsi, Furdunji Mnrzbanji, who started the first native paper in the Bombay Presidency (1822), the second in the whole of India. We may mention, as a remarkable speaker and debater, the Hon. Sir P. Mehta, and, as an eminent publicist and journalist, and also a powerful English writer and Gujarati poet, the reformer B. M. Malabari, proprietor and editor of the now defunct *Indian Spectator* and *Voice of India*, and of the magazine *East and West*.

(a) *Panchayat*.—The Parsis adopted for their internal government the system of the *Panchayat*, which commits to a certain number of leading men the management of the affairs of the community. European travellers always noticed that they submitted their differences to the elders of their own nation, and never applied to the judges of the ruling Power (Mandelslo, p. 184). Anquetil

du Perron gives few particulars regarding the civil organization of the community. He simply states that the headman was called *dāvar*, and that the power of the *dastūr dastūrān* was above all spiritual and only nominal. But Stavorinus, in a very accurate account of the social life of the Surat Parsis in the 18th cent., explains how the chiefs were entrusted with the settling of quarrels without going to law. Robbery, murder, and other crimes were punished by the *nawab*, or governor, of the town; but the latter was obliged to be careful, the Parsi population being numerous and powerful, almost independent in their wards (bk. i. ch. xxviii. p. 362). A single glance at these old quarters is a good illustration of Stavorinus's account. If the Parsis boasted of a low proportion of crime, this must be attributed to the fact that no stranger was allowed to penetrate into their premises, and no one could control the accuracy of this assertion, inasmuch as the executions through poison, cudgel, or drowning were always kept secret.

The historian of the Parsi Panchāyat has to grope in the dark. There are gaps and mysterious periods due to lack of materials. The first mention of a meeting of a Panchāyat held in 1642 at Nausari is to be found in *Parsi Prakāśh*, p. 14. As regards Surat, the records of the Panchāyat are lost, if anything like written accounts ever existed. The headman was named *dāvar* (in Persian, from Pahlavi *dāto-bar*, 'bearer of justice'). [The family of the *dāvar* of Surat still exists. The numerous *firman*s and *parwanas* issued to them by the Mogul emperor and *nawabs* are unfortunately destroyed; but there remain sufficient proofs to establish the identity of that family, recognized by the British Government.] The *dāvar* possessed plenary jurisdiction over the Parsis, and could inflict any punishment except death. As with the Hindus, excommunication, which deprived the out-caste of any intercourse with his co-religionists, of any share in the religious ceremonies, was a terrible weapon in the hands of the elders. The meetings were held in open courts in the house of the *dāvar*; there was no limit to the number of Parsis who were permitted to attend; the *dāvar*, after consulting the leading men, pronounced judgment. The sentence was carried out by the corpse-bearers (*nasā-sdār*); as there was no prison, the culprit was confined in the *nasākhāna*, a place where biers are kept.

It seems that before and during 'the divided rule' the *dāvar* had support from the English and the people of their factory; but, as the British rule gained ground and supplanted that of the *nawab*, by a strange irony of fate the rights and prestige of the *dāvar* declined. The power of imprisonment was declared incompatible with some Government regulations; and so with corporal punishment, which had to make way before another regulation. But in many cases—in civil matters—the courts used to transfer them to the cognizance of the *dāvar*, who is always styled *Modi*. This Hindu surname ('supplier of provisions') was due to the help given by the *dāvar* to the British factory staff in their struggles with the Portuguese and the Muhammadans, and even with the people of the Dutch factories.

It seems that the Bombay Parsi Panchāyat was constituted as early as the coming of the English to the island in the 17th cent., and till 1778 its power was strong; but at that time a contest arose about the custom of 'beating' the delinquent 'with a shoe'—a punishment which till then had met with no opposition. A petition to the Government was drawn up asking for full permission to resort to it. The request was granted; it was the first

time that the Government gave to the power of the Panchāyat a regular sanction, which, later on, was renewed. In 1786–87 the regulations invested the Bombay Panchāyat, formed of its elected members, with full powers to promote the welfare of the community, as is the custom among the natives, subject to the British rule. This continued till 1818, when a meeting at the Dadyseth fire-temple elected 18 members (12 laymen, 6 priests), and made useful reforms. The laws and regulations enacted by the Panchāyat were called *bundobusts* ('agreements'), and, though signed by only some of the members, were binding on the whole community. Any sort of affair was submitted to and discussed by the Panchāyat: the salary of the priests, the expenses of funeral and marriage parties, the evils and consequences of infant-marriage, private quarrels in houses, cases of divorce, bigamy, etc. As regards the morality of the women, they were particularly strict. They took care that the Parsi women should not be seen at dusk alone in the streets or the country, that they should not mix with Hindu and Muhammadan religious ceremonies, or attend their shrines and *dargahs*; travellers, in fact, testify that it was extremely difficult to seduce a Zoroastrian; and the Parsis can boast that, up to the present time, very few Parsi women have anywhere been reckoned among the victims of vice and debauchery.

The power of the Bombay Panchāyat, like that of the Surat Panchāyat, gradually decreased as the rule of the English became stronger, and also on account of a slight spirit of favouritism which prevailed and blunted the sense of justice. In 1823 there was a sort of dislocation, and in 1836 a firm and detailed letter from a strong-minded and impulsive man, Framji Kavasji Banaji, depicted the former high standing and the wane of the Panchāyat. Schism commenced. In 1838 the members made a new attempt to recover their authority, and asked for a formal investiture by the Government Council; but it had no effect. The Parsis having neither codes nor written customs of their own, like the Hindus, the time had come when a new organization was needed. The Parsi Law Association, established in 1855, took in hand the pioneering work of investigating the old texts and actual requirements. The English authorities co-operated in the work, which ended in 1865 with the passing of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act and Parsi Succession Act, followed by the establishment of the Parsi Matrimonial Courts. Henceforth the Panchāyat was deprived of its authority—cases being decided by the English courts, litigations settled by the new enactments—but it did not disappear. The members became trustees of a charitable association. The chairman is regarded as the headman of the community, and has no other influence than that which belongs to a philanthropic and cultured gentleman. The funds are managed by the trustees, who, since 1841, have even the custody, though not the direct administration, of those of Surat. The money is destined to minister to the wants of destitute Parsi families, to maintain schools, fire-temples, and *dakhmas*, to provide for the expenses of the *gāhānbārs* and other religious feasts. In the territory of the Gaekwar of Baroda disputes regarding marriages are still settled by the local councils. At Nausari the council, or *anjuman*, is composed of the high priest, or *dastūr*, and the leading priestly families of the *desais* as chief members, and other people of mark as members.

(b) *Social customs*.—The social customs of the Parsis have been more or less accurately described by European travellers (see Literature below). Anquetil du Perron has given an account of them

(*Zend-Avesta*, ii. 527-591), which is useful both as showing the conservatism of the Parsis and as offering a comparison with their new *modus vivendi*. Later the Parsis made their customs known and explained them to non-Zoroastrians.

(c) *Dress*.—According to Herodotus (i. 135), no nation so readily adopted foreign customs as the Persians, who assumed the dress of the Medes, considering it superior to their own. This faculty of adopting foreign dress is still one of the characteristics of the Parsis of India. On their arrival in Gujarāt, one of the conditions imposed on them by the local ruler was that the women were to discard their national dress and assume the Hindu fashions. 'The next condition,' says the *Kissah-i-Sanjān*, 'regards the dress of women, which must resemble that of the women of this land. . . . These weapons and this armour must be laid aside and discontinued. . . . To European travellers the Parsis were distinguished from the surrounding populations only by the *sudrah* and *kusti* (sacred shirt and girdle) (Mandelslo, p. 183). In the 18th cent. Anquetil du Perron found them at Surat intermingled with the Banians, and wearing the same dress, turban, and tunic as the people of that caste, but adding to the *sudrah* and *kusti* the *penom* (*padān*), a sort of veil which the Parsi priests and laymen had to wear, the priests always, the laymen on special occasions, such as reciting prayers or taking meals—a custom now totally discarded by the laity. The Parsis are still faithful to the Banian dress, and have introduced few changes in it; the men wear the *angarakha*, but, instead of the Hindu *dhoti*, large trousers, and on their head they put a dark turban (*pagri*) worn over a skull cap. At funeral and wedding parties they array themselves in a large cotton double-breasted coat (*jama*), with a muslin waistband (*pichori*), very becoming and distinguished-looking. The use of European leather shoes instead of curved slippers has been gradually adopted. The women wear the Banian *sari*, and cover their heads with a thin white cloth (*mathabana*) tied behind the chignon, according to the religious injunction which forbids a Zoroastrian to have his head uncovered by day or night. The *mathabana* is cast off by almost all the young generation. We must notice that the archaic style still prevails in the Mofussil (out of Bombay), and that many Western refinements have been introduced among the Parsi women, and again that any change in the old ways has created a regular battle in the newspapers of the orthodox and liberal classes—the names of the women who put aside the *mathabana* or adopted English shoes are still remembered. Parsis, when in Europe or America, generally dress like Europeans; and their wives and daughters are beginning to give up their *sari* and Hindu finery, which is quite out of place in colder climates.

(d) *Ceremonies*.—The chief ceremonial occasions in a Parsi family are pregnancy, birth, sacred cord-girding, marriage, and death. They are all fully treated under separate headings; see BIRTH (Parsi), INITIATION (Parsi), MARRIAGE (Iranian), and DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Parsi).

2. *Priests (athornans)*.—The priests play a prominent part in the history of the community. According to the *Kissah-i-Sanjān*, the exiles had been guided by *dastūrs* in all their peregrinations. There seem to have been several priestly families, though the Parsi tradition ascribes to the priests in India a common origin. The priests followed the *behātins* in their various settlements in Gñjarāt. In 1142 Kamdin Zarthost came from Sanjān to Nausari, and in 1215 the sons of the same Kamdin, Rana and Movad, summoned a priest of Sanjān, Hom Bahmanyar, who brought with him his son Fredan; the latter had three sons, who

divided the work and the fees, and thus, with the two sons of the first comer, Kamin, formed the five *pols* (families) of Nausari. Later the name of *bhagarias* ('dividers') was given to the priests of the five *pols*, because they divided the work and the fees. In the 13th cent., according to a Persian poem written by Dastūr Shapurjī Sanjāna (18th cent.), the *Kissah-i Zartushtiān-i Hindustān*, the Parsi population of Gujarāt was divided into five *panthaks*, or spheres of influence and ecclesiastical office and jurisdiction, from Sanjān in the south to Cambay in the north, including Nausari, Broach, and the villages of the Sñrat District (Godāvrēh) (1290). The records of the communities are not well preserved. Those of Cambay and the Godāvrēh are apparently lost; at Broach they have been dispersed on account of a lawsuit, which is much to be regretted, for Broach was formerly a seat of Zoroastrian knowledge and faith (see *A Genealogical Remembrancer of the Broach Dastur Family*, Bombay, 1878 [Gñjarāt]). Nausari can boast of its records, and from the *valis* (registers) and *fihrists* (lists) much light can be obtained on the priestly class (see Ervad R. J. Dastūr Meherjirān, *The Genealogy of the Bhagarsath Section of the Parsee Priests*, Nausari, A.Y. 1268, A.D. 1899 [Gñjarāt]). The history of Nausari is interesting: it shows how troubles and disputes arose among the priestly class, and how the presence of the Sanjāna priests who accompanied the *ātash-bahrām* on its removal from Bānsdāh, by Chāngāh Asā, was the cause of a rivalry which ended in murders. The Sanjāna priests were even obliged finally to remove to Udāda with the sacred fire, after two escapes to Bulsar and to Surat, to avoid the raids of the Malrattas (M. S. M. Desai, *Hist. of Nausari*, Nausari, 1897 [Gñjarāt]). Several religious controversies disturbed the community at Surat; two of these turned upon whether the legs of a corpse should be stretched or folded, and whether the face of the deceased should or should not be covered with a cloth (*padān*). These questions have not yet been settled. The third dispute was about the proper reckoning of the year, which ended in the split of the Parsis into Shahenshāhīs and Qadīmīs. It had its origin in the discovery made first by a *mōbed* named Jāmāsp Vilāyātī, who came to Surat from Persia in 1721, and then by Jamshid, who came from Persia in 1736, of the difference of one month between the Persian and Indian Zoroastrians in the matter of their *rōz-māh* reckoning (calendar). It is called the *Kabīsāh* controversy. The town of Broach was the scene of deadly riots (1783) (see Dastūr Aspandiyārjī Kāmīnījī, *The Historical Account of the Ancient Leap Year of the Parsis*, 1826 [Gñjarāt]), and K. R. Cama, *The Yezdardi Tarikh*, 1870 [Gñjarāt]). The feud between the two sects is almost settled, and the old passions are not likely to be aroused again; but still the Shahenshāhīs and Qadīmīs continue to have their separate temples and priests; and, if the Parsis do not do away with the difference, this is simply because 'the change would create so much confusion in the dates of old events and records that they prefer to do as they have hitherto done' (Karaka, *Hist. of the Parsis*, i. 113 f.). Ill-feelings have completely abated, and intermarriage takes place between families belonging to the two sects.

For the organization and special functions of the priesthood see separate art. PRIEST (Iranian).

IV. *MODERN PARSISM*.—1. Religion.—Modern Parsism is considered as the transmitter of the tenets of Zoroastrianism, as it was understood and practised at the time of the Sasanian princes, themselves the restorers of the antique Mazdean creed (see SASANIANS and ZOROASTER).

After the destruction of the Persian empire the religion of the great prophet of Irân was enveloped in oblivion for centuries. The faithful in Persia had to submit to the hardships of a foreign and intolerant rule (see GABARS); in Gujarât they were lost among the Hindu populations, and in both countries they were considered by the European travellers who came into contact with them as a down-trodden people, supposed still to possess some remnants of the teachings of Zoroaster. The Western scholars who took an interest in the religion and philosophy of the Iranians had only the classical authors for reference. The large work of B. Brisson, *de Regio Persarum principatu libri tres*, Paris, 1590, is the best compilation from that point of view. H. Lord, chaplain to the British factory at Surat, had the privilege of conversing with a *mobed*, and was able to give a more or less accurate account of the religion of the Parsis (17th cent.). Fragments of their sacred books, *Vendidad*, *Yasna*, *Visparad*, brought to Europe, soon excited the curiosity of the learned few who cared for such study, but these remained undeciphered, and their language a complete enigma. The last work before the Avesta was made known to Europe and translated was T. Hyde's exhaustive history, *Veterum Persarum et Parthorum et Medorum religionis Historia* (Oxford, 1700). The conquest of the Avesta was due to a Frenchman, Anquetil du Perron, who brought a copy of the precious MSS to the Bibliothèque du Roi on 15th March 1762 (see account of the discovery of the Avesta in art. AVESTA, vol. ii. p. 271 f.). Henceforward Parsis and Parsiism made their reappearance, as it were, in the modern world, and reassumed their position as a people and a religion. As regards Anquetil du Perron's stay at Surat, it left no trace. The community was totally ignorant of the consequences of the sale of a few MSS to a poor wayfarer. The Parsis continued to keep aloof from the non-Zoroastrians, even from men like R. C. Rask (1820) and N. L. Westergaard (1841). At last the *dastûrs* were obliged to come forward and to disclose the precious treasure of their faith on account of the attempts at conversion made by the missionary John Wilson (1839). From that time the leading principles of Parsiism were openly discussed by Parsi priests even in scientific meetings and congresses. The catechisms are easily obtained by non-Zoroastrians (see J. J. Modi, *Catechism of Zoroastrian Religion*, Bombay, 1911).

Parsiism has a claim to rank among the great religions of the world, for the reason that we find in it the essence of any dogma, i.e. immutability in the union of the dogma itself and the liturgical prescriptions—a union that still exists in spite of the vicissitudes that it has experienced. Its most striking feature is its traditional character. In fact, it is almost incredible that a community lost among foreign sects should have been able to preserve the integrity of its creed, without holding councils or synods, simply grouped round the living symbol of its faith, hidden in the recesses of humble sanctuaries, its priests chanting hymns in a language which could not be understood, and the bulk of the faithful steeped in religious routine.

After the renewal of the intercourse with Persia (15th cent.) a regular infiltration of Pahlavi literature made its way to Gujarât through emissaries, and a certain activity reigned in the priestly class and the elders or leaders of the *anjumans*. The *Rivâyats*, i.e. the collections of questions and answers, are most precious and eloquent. They are in some measure the mouth-piece of the indigenous Parsi religion, and show that the interest turned exclusively on ritualism or discipline, never on dogmas.

Darmesteter says that modern Parsiism is partly derived from the essential ideas expressed in the *Gâthâs*, according to that sentence of Neriosangh Dhaval, that 'all the laws and deeds contained in Avesta were revealed to Zoroaster in the *gâthâs*' (*Zend-Avesta*, Paris, 1892-93, i. [= *AMG* xxi.], Introd. vii. 'The *Gâthâs*,' p. cv). The enumeration of 'the laws and deeds' would carry us too far; we have simply to point out the leading beliefs of the Parsis; they are: (a) revelation, (b) monotheism, (c) immortality of the soul, (d) future life, and (e) resurrection of the dead.

(a) *Revelation; sacred books.*—Zoroastrianism is a religion based on the revelation of the deity, Ahura Mazda, to men, through the medium of the holy Zarathushtra Spitama, the son of Pourushaspa, of the royal family of the Peshdâdian kings. He unites in himself the threefold character of philosopher, poet, and prophet. He is elevated to the rank of *aokhtondmano yazata*, i.e. one whose name is mentioned among the worshipful beings—a distinction never conferred upon another man throughout the Avesta (see ZOROASTER).

Zarathushtra's life, date, and mission are the subject of much controversy among scholars. The data are derived not only from the pure Zoroastrian tradition, but also from Armenian and Muhammadan authors. According to A. V. Williams Jackson, following to some extent the Parsi tradition: (1) Zoroaster was a perfectly historical personage, belonging to the Median tribe of the Magi; (2) he flourished about the middle of the 7th cent. B.C., and died in 583 B.C.; (3) he was a native of Western Persia (Atropatene or Media) and went to Bactria (Balkh), where he succeeded in converting King Gushtasp; (4) the *Gâthâs* are the oldest portion of the Avesta, and are to be considered as the real substance of Zoroaster's preaching at Balkh; (5) the religion of Zoroaster spread from Bactria throughout Persia, and became dominant in Pars under the late Achemenians; but it is impossible to fix the date of its introduction or of its adoption by the people or rulers of Pars.

Outside of the Avesta, the Parsis derive their information about Zoroaster from Pahlavi books and from a Persian poem of the 13th cent., the *Zartusht-nâmah* (see Anquetil du Perron, vol. i. pt. ii. pp. 1-70, 'Vie de Zoroastre'; E. B. Eastwick, *Parsi Religion*, Bombay, 1843, pp. 417 ff., 477 ff.; J. Menant, *Zoroastre: Essai sur la philosophie religieuse de la Perse*, Paris, 1857; F. Rosenberg, *Le Livre de Zoroastre*, Petrograd, 1904; E. W. West, *SBE* xlvii. [1897], Introd. pp. xx-xxiv). It seems to have been written, according to the author, after Pahlavi books. In fact, some fragments of old MSS handed down to us contain glimpses of the history of the prophet; two of the old *nasks* of the Avesta apparently referred to Zarathushtra.

For the Parsi traditions regarding the Avesta see art. AVESTA. The books now in possession of the Parsis are: the *Vendidad*, the *Yasna*, the *Visparad*, and the *Khorda-Avesta*. The same are to be found in the hands of the Gabars in Persia.

For the Avesta and Pahlavi literature see art. AVESTA and LITERATURE (Pahlavi).

There exists also an exhaustive Gujarâtî and Persian literature, which was developed as the community felt the need of having translations or transcriptions of their sacred books, and also of communicating with the brethren of Persia. This is also treated in art. LITERATURE (Pahlavi).

(b) *Monotheism.*—The Parsis claim to be monotheists. Is that monotheism of theirs in keeping with the old texts or the beliefs current under the Sasanians, when the primitive teaching of the

prophet was disfigured by the numerous sects which undermined Zoroastrianism? We do not know which doctrines were brought to India by the refugees. To whatever sect they belonged, the modern Parsi very properly claims the appellation of *mazda yasno*, 'worshipper of Mazda,' and believes in one God. That God has all power, all knowledge; He is Ahura, the Lord, Mazda, the All-Wise. His body is the Infinite Light; His abode the Supreme Heaven.

Ahura Mazda, besides having many other attributes, is spoken of in the *Gāthās* as having chief attributes personified as the Ameshā-spentās (the holyimmortals). Including Ahura Mazda, there are seven Ameshā-spentās: Ahura Mazda, the living wise or all-giving Lord; Vohu Manō, the good-mind; Asa-vahista, the best order or the excellent holiness; Kshathra Vairya, the absolute power; Spenta-Armaiti, the beneficent piety; Haurvatāt, the wholeness; Amêrētāt, the immortality. The last six abstract notions have sometimes been considered as archangels, or celestial beings, at the head of whom Ahura Mazda is placed. It is the same with the *yazatas*, genii or natural deities or existences to whom men pay homage. Ahura Mazda is the first of the heavenly *yazatas*; Zarathushtra, the first of the earthly *yazatas*. The explanation of this hierarchy is extremely difficult, and includes the real essence of Zoroastrianism on which scholars and *dastūrs* do not agree. Ahura Mazda created two spirits: good comes from the spirit Spenta Mainyu; evil comes from a destructive spirit, Angra Mainyu or Ahriman.

Zoroastrianism has been considered by Muhammadan and Christian authors as the perfect expression of religious dualism, and scholars have by turns accepted or rejected the doctrine of duality. The modern Parsis absolutely deny that their Prophet Zarathushtra preached dualism, and they try to restore to Ahura Mazda the character of unity and eternity of which misunderstood dualism deprives him. We need not enter into the discussion here, as the subject is fully dealt with in art. DUALISM (Iranian).

The Parsis, pure monotheists as they claim to be, indignantly repudiate the appellation of 'fire-worshippers,' with which they have been branded for ages. Travellers in India always recorded their reverence for fire, and gave them the name of *ātash-parastan*. The Parsis are not fire-worshippers; they are the worshippers of God only. Such is the answer made by Parsi children, according to their catechisms. Fire, of course, plays a conspicuous part in the ceremonies of the Parsis. It claims homage from the modern Parsis as it did from the ancient Iranians. It is seen on the Achæmenian sculptures and on the Sasanian coins, and is still kept in the Indian *dar-i-mihr*, as Strabo (*Hist.* xv.) describes it: 'in sacred places, fed with barkless pieces of wood,' etc. And Pausanias (v. xxvii. 3) places it 'in a room . . . where a priest repairs to put dry wood upon the altar, the tiara on his head, singing sacred hymns . . . from a book in a language utterly unintelligible.' The modern Parsis offer the explanation that, if the Iranians regarded fire as the symbol of divinity, and as such worthy of respect and reverence, they never professed themselves to be worshippers of fire. Zoroaster, in his *Gāthās*, speaks of fire as a bright and powerful creation of Ahura Mazda, and prefers it as a symbol of divinity to idols or other objects; but nowhere does he enjoin the worship of fire.

(c) *Immortality of the soul*.—Man is represented as a compound of physical and psychological parts. His nature is double—material and spiritual, body and soul. His spiritual parts are immortal, and were created before his material parts. Of his spir-

itual parts the principal is the *urvan*, the soul, with its faculties, and the *fravashi*, a notion perhaps of post-Zoroastrian belief. The *urvan*, or the soul, is responsible, and, according to its acts, receives reward or punishment. On the morning of the fourth day after death the *urvan* enters into the spiritual world, and never returns to the material world. There is no trace of metempsychosis. As regards *fravashi*, it is a peculiar inner power of *urvan*—a most interesting notion, and very much like the Platonic *idéa*. The *fravashi* of the holy soul is honoured as a holy spirit, and its help is invoked as a sort of guardian-spirit of the soul. The soul is endowed, during its earthly career, with such helps as may enable it to fight against the evil influence of Ahriman. These helps are knowledge, wisdom, sense, thought, speech, the religious conscience, revealed religion, etc. It cannot look for any other help; there is no vicarious salvation in Parsiism. Cf. art. FRAYASHI.

(d) *Future life*.—Such a struggle deserves a reward. The Parsis, according to the Zoroastrian creed, believe in a life to come. The Avesta writings of the *Hâtôxt Nask*, the 19th chapter of the *Vendidad*, and the Pahlavi books *Dindî-Mainôgî-Xrat* and *Arîstî-Vîrâf Nâmak* treat of the fate of the soul after death. Even in the *Gāthās* we find general hints about it. The soul of the virtuous crosses the Chinvat bridge, and is admitted into the house of purity and eternal light and song (*garô demâna*), where it enjoys the company of holy souls. The soul of the wicked goes to the house of impurity and darkness, reproached by its conscience, bemoans its state, and utters cries of lamentation. The state of reward or punishment is to continue till *Frashô-kereti* or *Farshogard*, i.e. the renovation of the world, when the whole creation is to start afresh. The notion of the immortality of the soul and a future life, distinctly expressed in the *Gāthās*, pervades the whole of the later Avesta literature, and is entirely accepted by the Parsis. See, further, BLEST, ABODE OF THE (Persian).

(e) *Resurrection of the dead*.—The resurrection, or *Ristâkhêz*, will take place at the end of the present cycle; then will come the last of the Saoshyants (see ZOROASTER), who will consummate the work of purifying and regenerating the world and removing all evil effects of the work of Ahriman. All the souls of the wicked will be brought out from hell, and will be purified through the supreme ordeal; the souls of the righteous, too, will rise, and they also will pass through the *Ristâkhêz* and be submitted to the same trial; but the flames will not burn them—they will cross them as a sea of milk. Henceforth the world will enter upon a new cycle, free from all evil and misery, ever young and rejoicing. All souls will be furnished with new bodies, and will commence a life of ineffable bliss. Hell itself will be purified. The Parsi theories of the resurrection, the last judgment, and the fate of Ahriman are found in the *Bundahishn*.

2. *Ethics*.—'The Zoroastrian religion,' as has been pointed out by Darmesteter (*Parsiism*, p. 11f.), 'was a religion of life in the noblest sense of the word; it brought two things of which the old Aryan religions, in the midst of which it rose, had no idea, or only a dim apprehension; those two things were *moral* and *hope*'; so that 'the Zoroastrian faith not only gives its follower a moral rule through life; not only directs his heart, his tongue, his hand, teaching him *good thought, good word, and good deed*; but it tells him that the good will prevail at last if he does his duty; that a son of the prophet Saoshyant will come and open the eternal reign of Ormazd, and exterminate the evil from the world. The poorest, the meanest

Zoroastrian in the world knows that he is born a soldier of Saoshyant, and that Ormazd will conquer through him.' The development of activity—free and voluntary—introduces a quite modern factor into Parsiism, and enables it to stand on a level with the contemporary systems of philosophy through the triumph of effort. One is even justified in wondering how Zoroastrianism arrived at the low ebb which caused the final success of the Arabs and Islām; but, in studying attentively that portion of history, we see that it can be fully explained by the fact that, having become a State religion, it perished miserably, stifled by the priesthood and weakened by the struggles among the sects. In any case, as it appeals at the present day to a small number of followers, it divests itself of any sacerdotal or sectarian character in order to speak only to the reason of the individual. Zoroastrianism—become Parsiism—appears to us, above all, a system of moral philosophy, and it is in that direction that it will probably develop more and more. Though the Pahlavi writers have handed down copious materials on Zoroastrian ethics, no special treatise has ever summed them up. Strange to say, the sublime precepts of morality enjoined by the Zoroastrian religion have never been codified. According to the sacred books, all morality is divided into three great classes: *humata*, good thoughts; *hūkhta*, good words; *huvarshata*, good deeds. Similarly, there are three categories of immorality: *duzhmata*, evil thoughts; *duzhukhta*, evil words; and *duzhvarshata*, evil deeds. All good thoughts, words, and works are done with wisdom. All evil thoughts, words, and works are done without wisdom. All good thoughts, words, and works lead to paradise. All evil thoughts, words, and works lead to hell. To all good thoughts, words, and works (belongs) paradise. So (is it) manifest to the pure. Of all Zoroastrian virtues, the first, holiness, or *asha*—a very comprehensive term—embraces all sorts of purity, truthfulness, and beneficence. The *ashem vohd*, the prayer-formula that every Zoroastrian learns, teaches that 'Holiness is the best good and happiness; happiness to Him who is the Holy one for the sake of the best Holiness.' Cf. art. ETHICS AND MORALITY (Parsi).

The list of Zoroastrian virtues would be too long to reproduce here. Most of them are common to the great religions of the world—Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity; but some of them have, so to speak, expanded in the modern development of Parsiism. Charity, for example, formerly restricted to the Zoroastrian brethren, is now extended to every caste, race, and religion. Again, as a deviation from certain ideas, the modern Parsis repulse converts, and seem to have totally forgotten that it was through preaching and proselytism that their religion was established, and that the admission of the adherents of a false religion to the true religion was allowed. The question of investing non-Zoroastrians with *sudrah* and *kusti* was a pressing one, and was settled lately; the community as a body is averse to proselytism. The Parsis do not admit conversions to Christianity, and Parsi converts are very few. Moreover, the Parsis have never sacrificed themselves for their religious ideas; they may have suffered, from the storming of their old centre Sanjān, the ordinary evils of war, and under the Portuguese from the strict regulations of the Damaun and Bassein authorities; but their faith was never at stake in India. Hence they have no occasion to boast of their modern views of toleration, when they enjoy equality of protection under an enlightened Government. Those views are quite opposed to the spirit of the Sasanian kings, who were ardent persecutors of

alien worships. For them there was only one good religion. All others, especially those of the Jews, Manichæans, and Christians, were attacked. Any communication with unbelievers was a cause of impurity; to eat with them was sinful. The same view is found in the *Rivâyats*, and, among the modern Parsis, the adherents of old customs clung to it as late as the early fifties. At that time the prejudice was still so strong that even men like Sir Jamshedji Jijibhai declined to dine with the Governor of Bombay.

It is a most important fact that the Parsis, since their arrival in India, may have submitted to some Hindu customs in order to please the Rana of Sanjān; but they never felt the moral or religious influence of Hinduism. Whatever common origin the two branches of the Aryan family may have, each has separately achieved its own evolution. The Parsis borrowed neither the fasts of asceticism nor the ecstasy of mysticism—both opposed to pure Zoroastrianism. Indian philosophy also they ignored. The great Brāhmanical schools were not meant for alien races, and not open to the Persian refugees, who, even at Nansari, did not attempt to start a school of their own. Now, in contact with European thought, active, living, communicative as it is, what will become of the community? Neither the Roman Catholic saints nor the religious reformers of Christianity will gain influence over the Parsi youths; but Darwin, Huxley, Stnart Mill, Comte, may perhaps do so, and the future of Parsi ethics and philosophy depends on the way in which they are understood and adapted. See art. PHILOSOPHY (Iranian).

3. Liturgy: worship and ceremonies. —(a) *Temples*.—The Parsi temples for a long time did not differ in outward appearance from the better-class houses. Now the fronts of some of them, at Udvada and Bombay, are decorated in the neo-Persepolitan style. The word for temple is *dar-i-mihr*, 'door or palace of Mithra.' In India they are commonly called *āgārīs* (from *āg*, the Sanskrit *agni*, 'fire'). They are of three grades, *ātash-dādgāh*, *ātash-ādarān*, *ātash-bahrām*, according to the quality of the fire kept in them. (1) The *ātash-dādgāh* may be touched both by priests and by laymen; never by non-Zoroastrians. It is the ordinary fire preserved in a fire-temple, or even in the houses of Zoroastrians, and used in sacred ceremonies; (2) the *ātash-ādarān* may not be touched by any one but priests; its consecration requires great ceremonies; the utmost care is taken in watching it and keeping it perpetually burning; (3) the *ātash-bahrām* is the highest of all; its consecration entails heavy expenses and a long series of ritual—for a year or more. The sacred fire is constantly watched by priests who have undergone the highest purifications. Its extinction would be regarded by the Parsis as a calamity. Non-Zoroastrians are not admitted into the *dar-i-mihr*. The chief feature of the temples is the absence of statues or representations of divinities. The temple is divided into two parts: the *ādarān*, or place for fire, and the *izishn-gāh*, in which the ceremonies are recited. (i.) *Ādarān*. In a small domed room the fire is kept burning in a silver or copper-brass urn resting on a stone stool, or *ādōsh*, with a metallic tray hanging from the dome (*tāj*); five times a day (at each watch, or *gāh*) a priest, his month covered with a *padān*, or piece of cloth, to prevent the effluvia from defiling it, cleans the room, washes the stool, arranges the cinders, and puts fresh sandal or other wood on the fire. The ceremony is called *bōi dēvi*. (ii.) *Izishn-gāh*. This is a large quadrangular room, divided by *pāvis* (small channels), and is used for the celebration of the ceremonies. There is space enough for a stone stool (*ādōsh*) for

The daily obligations of the orthodox Parsi are numerous: the untying and retying of the sacred girdle (*kusti*) on the sacred shirt (*sudrah*) is performed several times after the washing of the hands, face, and feet with pure water, and is called *padyāb*. The custom of saying grace before and after meals still subsists.

III. RELIGION.—Anquetil du Perron, *Zend-Avesta*, 'Usages civils et religieux des Parses,' pp. 587-591, and 'Système théo-

logique, cérémoniel et moral,' pp. 592-618; J. Wilson, *Parsee Religion, as contained in the Zend-Avesta*, etc., Bombay, 1843; M. Haug, *Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsis*², London, 1878; J. Darmesteter, *Parsiism—its Place in History*, a Lecture delivered at Bombay, 2nd Feb. 1887; S. Laing, *A Modern Zoroastrian*³, London, 1888; J. J. Modi, *The Religious System of the Parsis*, Bombay, 1885; S. D. Bharucha, *A Brief Sketch of the Zoroastrian Religion and Customs*, do. 1893.

D. MENANT.

PARTHENOGENESIS.—Parthenogenesis is the development of an egg-cell which has not been fertilized. It is of frequent occurrence (1) in many of the lower crustaceans, such as the brine-shrimp *Artemia*, the large freshwater *Apus*, and some water-fleas—*e.g.*, *Daphnia*, *Moina*, *Cypris*, and *Candona*; (2) in some insects, notably among the gall-wasps (*Cynipidæ*), in certain species of which males have not been found, and among saw-flies (*Tenthredinidæ*); and (3) in most of the rotifers or wheel-animalcules. In most rotifers parthenogenesis is the rule; in some cases males have never been found. In most of the cases of parthenogenesis among crustaceans and insects males are absent for months or years, but reappear at intervals. Among plants there are few examples of normal parthenogenesis in the strict sense, for we cannot include cases, like many of the lower fungi, where the whole sexual reproduction is degenerate. An undoubted parthenogenesis obtains in *Chara crinita*, one of the water-stoneworts. For in N. Europe only the female plants are represented. It should be noted that there is no reason whatever to associate the dominance of parthenogenesis with any loss of racial vigour. A hundred successive parthenogenetic generations have been carefully observed in the case of *Daphnia*, and there was no suggestion of any degeneration. In a few cases the occurrence of variation in parthenogenesis has been demonstrated.

It may be useful to distinguish several different grades of parthenogenesis. (a) What may be called *pathological* parthenogenesis is illustrated when the egg-cell, say, of a hen, exhibits without fertilization a number of divisions. In none of these cases has the development been known to go far. (b) The term *casual* parthenogenesis may be applied to cases where the occurrence is observed as a rare exception—*e.g.*, in silk-moths. It occasionally happens that worker-ants, not normally reproductive at all, produce ova which develop parthenogenetically. Since the discovery of what is called 'artificial parthenogenesis' (see below) these instances of pathological and occasional parthenogenesis have become more intelligible. (c) *Partial* parthenogenesis is well illustrated by hive-bees. The queen receives from the drone a store of male elements or spermatozoa, and it rests with her, in laying the eggs, to fertilize them or not. Those eggs that are fertilized from the store of spermatozoa develop into workers or queens (according to the nurture); those that are not fertilized develop into drones. The same is true of some other Hymenoptera, such as ants. (d) The term *seasonal* parthenogenesis may be applied to cases like green-flies or Aphides, where one parthenogenetic generation succeeds another all through the summer, but males reappear in the autumn and fertilization occurs. This is also illustrated by some of the water-fleas. (e) The term *juvenile* parthenogenesis may be applied to some curious cases (*e.g.*, in the midge *Miasmor*) where larval forms exhibit precocious reproductivity without any fertilization. It becomes difficult, however, to draw a line between such cases and multiplication by means of spores, such as is seen in the larval stages of the liver-fluke and in many plants. Spores are specialized reproductive cells which develop without fertilization; they are familiar to every one on the fronds of ferns. The formation of spores is a primitive mode of re-

production, but the parthenogenetic development of ova is probably in all cases secondary and derivative—a relapse from the normal spermic development. None the less it seems to work well in certain kinds of organisms and in certain conditions of life.

It may be asked whether egg-cells which normally develop without being fertilized are in any way different from ordinary ova. But the answer is not at present very clear. In some cases (ants, bees, and wasps) the ova go through the ordinary process of maturation, involving a reduction of the number of nuclear rods or chromosomes to half the normal number. In some other cases (rotifers, some water-fleas, and green-flies) there is no reduction when the conditions of life are favourable, though there may be when they are unpropitious.

Of great interest and importance is the establishment of the fact that in a variety of cases the ovum may be artificially induced to develop parthenogenetically. The demonstration of this has been mainly due to Jacques Loeb and Yves Delage. If the unfertilized eggs of a sea-urchin be left for a couple of hours in sea-water the composition of which has been altered (*e.g.*, by adding magnesium chloride), and be then restored to ordinary sea-water, many of them develop into normal larvæ. A mixture that Delage found to be very effective for sea-urchin ova consisted of 300 c.cm. of sea-water, 700 c.cm. of an isotonic solution of saccharose, 15 centigrams of tannin dissolved in distilled water, and 3 c.cm. of normal ammoniacal solution. It works equally well if the volume of the sea-water or of the saccharose be doubled. The ova were left for an hour in the mixture, then washed several times, and then placed in sea-water, where they soon developed. In a few cases fully-formed sea-urchins have been reared. There are two points of special importance: first, that the artificial parthenogenesis has been induced in a great variety of types (*e.g.*, sea-urchin, starfish, marine worm, mollusc, fish, and even amphibian); and, second, that the artificial stimuli effectively used are very varied—chemical, physical, and mechanical. Artificial parthenogenesis has been induced by altering the chemical composition of the water by adding or removing certain salts, or by altering the concentration by adding salt and sugar, or by subjecting the ova to various influences, such as superabundance of carbon dioxide, vapour of chloroform, ether, benzol and toluol, the presence of butyric acid, blood, serum, and extracts of foreign cells, or by exposing the ova to electric currents or to mechanical stimulation. Frog's eggs pricked with a needle and washed with blood may proceed to develop rapidly and normally. In a few cases the parthenogenetic development has been successfully carried beyond the completion of the tadpole metamorphosis. The effective stimuli, such as have been enumerated above, differ for different kinds of eggs, and even for eggs of the same kind at different stages of ripeness. There is probably some common factor in all the effective stimuli, but what it is remains uncertain.

It is too soon to make more than a tentative statement as to what happens in artificial parthenogenesis. According to some, the artificial changes in the medium do not in themselves directly induce segmentation, but modify the intimate constitution of the egg in such a way that, when it is returned to its natural medium, it becomes auto-parthenogenetic. According to Loeb, the physico-chemical agency induces the formation of a 'fertilization membrane' by a change in the surface of the egg comparable to that which follows the entrance of a spermatozoon. The first step is a cytolysis or partial solution of the cortical layer of the ovum, perhaps a liquefaction of fatty substances in the cellular emulsion. The result is the formation of the 'stabilizing envelope' or 'fertilization membrane.' But the appearance of this membrane seems to lead to an acceleration of the oxidations

going on in the egg; the egg is activated, and segmentation begins. But this may simply lead to disintegration, if there is not also a corrective factor, and it has been possible to devise experimental conditions that induce activation only and others that induce activation and stable development. Thus the presence of a fatty acid, such as butyric, may bring about membrane-formation and the activation of the egg, while the presence of a hypertonic solution (i.e. with increased osmotic pressure) may serve as the essential corrective. The life of the activated egg may also be saved by putting it after the membrane-formation for about three hours into sea-water practically free from oxygen or containing a trace of potassium cyanide. In either way the over-active oxidations in the egg may be suppressed. If the eggs are thereafter transferred into ordinary sea-water containing free oxygen, they often develop normally. Similarly, pricking the ovum of frog or toad with a platinum needle and the entrance of some blood corpuscles may serve to activate, while the return to the normal medium may serve as the necessary counteractive of disintegration.

One must not conclude that the rôle of the complex living spermatozoon is exhaustively replaced by the chemico-physical agencies referred to, for normal fertilization implies more than activation and a regulation of the subsequent cleavage. It implies a mingling of the heritable qualities of the two parents. What the experiments show is that the ovum is quite complete in itself, that certain factors involved in what the spermatozoon effects may be artificially mimicked, and that perfectly normal larvæ may be reared from various unfertilized eggs which are not known ever to develop parthenogenetically in natural conditions. The remarkable facts that have come to light since 1899 show that one cannot set limits to the possibility of the occurrence of parthenogenesis. Some of the experimental conditions which are effective in inducing parthenogenetic development might find a parallel in natural conditions. As yet, no instance of either artificial or natural parthenogenesis has been observed in the animal kingdom above the level of amphibians.

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J. ARTHUR THOMSON.

PARTHIANS.—1. The country.—The position of Parthia was south and a little east of the Caspian Sea. It was bounded on the north by Hyrcania and the Turanian desert, on the south by the great salt desert of central Irân, on the east by Ariana, and on the west by Media. Roughly, it corresponded with the northern part of Khorâsân. The name of the country, Parthia, is regarded as having been derived from that of its south-west province, Parthyene.

2. The people.—The Parthians were an Iranian tribe named in the inscriptions of Darius *Parthava*, called by the Greeks *Παρθαίοι*. Justin (xli.) describes them as Scythian exiles, their name being explained as meaning 'refugee' in that language. It is doubtful whether any of the stories as to the origin of the Parthians are trustworthy. Moses of Chorene calls them descendants of Abraham by Keturah, whilst Strabo and others regard them as Scythians sent by Sesostris from Scythia when he returned from that country. The first authentic information concerning them, however, is that of Darius, who represents them as inhabiting the tract with which they have always been associated. It is therefore probable that they were added to the Persian empire by Cyrus, the conqueror of Babylon, about 550 B.C. Herodotus

(iii. 93) speaks of them as belonging to the 16th division, or satrapy, of Darius, and as paying, with the Chorasmians, Sogdians, and Areians, a tribute of 300 talents of silver.

3. History.—However faithful the Parthians may have been to their overlord in the years preceding the accession of Darius Hystaspes, there seems to be no doubt that, while he was at Babylon, they revolted, with other tribes or nationalities, in favour of one of the pretenders with whom he had to contend. Their sympathies were evidently with Phraortes the Mede, and in this they had the support of Hyrcania. As Darius's father, Hystaspes, was the general who defeated the allied rebel armies there, it seems probable that they were in the province which he governed. The first battle took place in Vispanzatis (*Hyspaostisa*), in Parthia, but, notwithstanding the success which Darius claims for his father on that occasion, it is clear that he had not troops enough, and reinforcements had to be sent from Persia. The second battle, in which Hystaspes was entirely victorious, took place near the city of Patigrabana, also in Parthia. In the war of Xerxes against the Greeks the Parthians were in the same division as the Bactrians, and were commanded by Artabazos (Herod. vii. 66). To all appearance they remained faithful to Persia to the end, serving in the army at Arbela against Alexander, to whom, however, they made but a feeble resistance when he passed through their country on his way to Bactria.

4. Rise to power.—Very scanty materials for the early history of the Parthian kingdom exist, and only fabulous legends concerning it are given by Arrian in his *Parthica* (Photius, cod. 63; Syncellus, p. 539 f.). Hero Arsaces, the founder of the great Parthian dynasty, with his brother Tiridates, originates in the royal house of the Achæmenians. The young Tiridates having been insulted by the prefect Agathocles or Pherecles, the brothers, with five companions (like the seven Persian supporters of Darius), slay him, and Arsaces mounts the throne. There is nothing improbable in all this, but the statement that Arsaces died after two years and was succeeded by Tiridates seems impossible, in view of the fact that the former reigned about 37 years. Arsaces I. maintained himself not only in Parthia, but also in Hyrcania, though constantly threatened by Diodotus of Bactria (Justin, xli. 4). Arsaces is said to have fled, about 233 B.C., to the nomadic tribe of the Aspasians, owing to the march of Seleucus II. eastwards (Strabo, xi. 513). A rebellion in Syria, however, soon compelled Seleucus to retire, and Arsaces returned victorious to Parthia. According to Justin (xli. 4), the day of this victory was celebrated as that of Parthian independence. Arsaces was proclaimed king at Asnak (Kuchan in the upper Atrec valley) and founded Dara in Apavartikine, now Kelat, farther to the east. His son, Arsaces II., was attacked by Antiochus III. (the Great) in 209 B.C., and certain Parthian and Hyrcanian towns were captured by him. The successor of Arsaces II., Priapatius (Justin), ruled 15 years (190–175 B.C.), and Phraates, who followed on the throne (175–170 B.C.), subjugated the Mardi in the Elburz. This ruler, notwithstanding that he had many sons, left his throne (following an old Elamite custom) to his brother, Mithridates I. (170–138 B.C.). Having subdued the Medes, the Elymeans, the Persians, and the Bactrians, Mithridates extended his conquests in India beyond those of Alexander, subjugated Syria, and added Babylonia (see § 9) and Mesopotamia to his empire, which now had the Ganges as its eastern and the Euphrates as its western boundary. Among other great rulers of Parthia may be mentioned Phraates II. (133–127 B.C.), who defeated Antiochus Sidetes,

but was himself slain in a battle with the Scythians who had helped Antiochus; and Phraates III. (70-57 B.C.), who supported the younger Tigranes of Armenia against his father, and re-obtained possession of Mesopotamia in consequence. He was murdered about 57 B.C. by his two sons. The dynasty of Arsaces lasted until A.D. 229, when it was ended by the native Sasanian dynasty of Persia, under Artaxerxes I., son of its founder.

5. Character.—An active mountainous race, the Parthians were very warlike and courageous. They early learned the value of accurate shooting, and attained renown as archers, owing to their skill with the bow on horseback. Their fame as horsemen was for this same reason equally great. Even whilst going at full speed, they discharged their arrows with such precision that they could prevent an enemy from following them in their flight. The cavalry formed the strength of the Parthian army; as for the infantry, this was composed mainly of slaves who had been bought and trained for military service.

6. Civilization and language.—It is doubtful whether the Parthians were of Scythian origin or not (§ 2), but it is known that certain Scythian nomads became the ruling race in the State. Extensive landed property was given to them, and they formed the king's council, which appointed the successor. These Scythians, however, ultimately became, as was to be expected, one with the Parthian nation. Such an amalgamation was rendered all the easier because of the likeness of their language, for Parthian was looked upon as a mixture of Scythian and Median (according to E. Meyer=Iranian). Being, however, 'philhellenes' and altogether under the influence of Greek art and civilization, the kings, on their coins, and probably also in official documents, used the Greek language, so that no specimens of ancient Parthian have come down to us. That their language should have been the original of that strange jargon, Pahlavi, as contended by some (Meyer regards the word as a corruption of *Parthava*, 'Parthian'), is in the highest degree improbable. The tongue which, mingled with Pahlavi, made it a 'jargon' was not Greek, but Aramaean. The Iranian element of Pahlavi was Persian.

7. Religion.—As the early history of the Parthians is practically unknown, the religion which they professed is still a hidden detail. The Scythian element in the country is said to have adopted the religion of Zoroaster, and this probably became its official creed—an 'everlasting fire' was maintained in the royal town of Asnak.

8. Personal characteristics.—The Parthian coins show, on the obverse, the king's head in profile. He is bearded, and his hair, combed down on to his forehead, is confined by a fillet. The later kings have tiaras and shorter beards than the earlier. On the reverse of some of the coins is a representation of a soldier seated. He is beardless, and wears a hat with a brim, tight-fitting breeches, and a short cloak. In his outstretched hand he holds the national weapon, the bow. This apparently gives the costume of their renowned archer-cavalry.

9. The Parthians in the late Babylonian inscriptions.—There is hardly any doubt that more information concerning the Parthians will come to light from excavations and explorations in the nearer East. Several large Babylonian tablets, giving very minute details of the history of the Arsacidean period, are preserved in the British Museum. So far, however, the distinguishing names of the individual kings of the dynasty are rarely obtainable from this source, as they all bear the dynastic appellation *Arsakaa* or *Arsakam*, i.e. Arsaces.

One of these tablets states that the Babylonians of Seleucia on the Tigris opposed Antiochus, and refers to a conflict with the Elamites, led, apparently, by a general named Parsō. Antiochus fled with a few soldiers. Another fragment refers to the people having fled from certain plunderers (*Arbāya*, 'Arabs'), who then infested the country. Later on (seemingly) fighting took place between the Babylonians (people and leaders) and 'the son of the king and his army.' After a gap an announcement follows in which (the king of Parthia?) refers to some one (who belonged [?] to Artabanus, his brother) having been killed. He fought with (the enemy) and effected a great slaughter, and those who saved themselves by flight (including the son of the king) were pursued into the mountain-fastnesses. The 'Arabs' thereupon began plundering again, as in former days, but the writer notes that Arsaces (*Arsakaa*), the king, proceeded in that month 'into the remote cities of the land of Gutium' (Media), to make battle. It may, from this, be conjectured that the ordered rule of the Parthians was a welcome relief from the anarchy which seems previously to have prevailed in some of the lands which they conquered. As Artabanus was brother of Arsaces vi. (Mithridates I., 170-138 B.C.), some or all of the above details probably refer to his reign.

The Babylonian inscriptions of the Parthian period were written with the object of furnishing astrological data for historical forecasts. In addition to these, tablets of the nature of contracts have also been found. Their dates generally combine the Greek equivalent era with that of the Arsacide. As far as can be judged from the records handed down, the national life of Babylonia, as well as the religious institutions, went on much the same as during the reigns of their own kings, and it is probable that the same liberal rule prevailed in all the provinces under Parthian sway.

LITERATURE.—G. Rawlinson, *The Sixth Great Oriental Monarchy; Parthia*, London, 1873; A. von Gutschmid, *Gesch. Irans und seiner Nachbarländer von Alexander dem Grossen bis zum Untergange der Arsaciden*, Tübingen, 1883; Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Geography*, London, 1872, s.v. 'Parthia'; Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology*, do. 1880, s.v. 'Arsaces', etc. (very detailed); *HDB*, s.v. 'Parthians'; *EB*, s.v. 'Parthians', 'Arsaces', 'Phraates', 'Mithridates', 'Orodes', 'Gotarzes', 'Facoruz', etc.

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PASCAL.—Blaise Pascal was born at Clermont-Ferrand on 19th June 1623, and died in Paris on 17th Aug. 1662. His father, Étienne Pascal, was president of the Court of Aids at Clermont when Blaise was born. The earliest anecdote told of the child recounts that, when he was a year old, he was cured by magical means of an illness which was supposed to have been superinduced by a witch. In 1626 Pascal's mother, née Antoinette Bégon, died; in 1631 his father, with his family, consisting of Blaise, Gilberte (born in 1620, afterwards married to M. Périer), and Jacqueline (born in 1625, afterwards Sœur de Sainte Euphémie in Port-Royal), moved to Paris in order to devote himself to the education of his son, whose precociousness was remarkable. There he fell into disgrace with Richelieu for having protested against an administrative reduction of the *rentes* of the hôtel-de-ville, some of which he had purchased. Being, however, restored to favour, he was appointed intendant of Rouen by the cardinal in 1639. After nine years' residence in Rouen there followed a stay of two years in Clermont, and in 1650 the Pascal family returned to Paris. Shortly afterwards Jacqueline joined Port-Royal (she was professed on 5th June 1653)—Gilberte had already married Périer—and Étienne, the father, died in Sept. 1651.

Such is the bare outline of the history of the family in which Pascal was brought up, and, as we shall see, what little light it throws on the origin or development of the genius which illuminates it comes from the father and the sister Jacqueline. We are, nevertheless, forced, perhaps not without advantage, to rely for an estimate of Pascal's place in history mainly on the events of his own life as illustrated by his literary remains. And that place will be found to be determined by three principal factors: his aptitude for mathematics, his writings on religion, and his psychology.

1. His mathematical aptitude.—Pascal's sister, Madame Périer, is our authority for the statement that, the study of geometry being withheld from him by his father, he was found one day by the latter with the figures of the first 32 propositions of the first book of Euclid worked out independently, and this while still a boy. He was now encouraged to study mathematics and was admitted to the weekly meetings of a small body of scientists who formed the nucleus of the future Royal Academy of Sciences. When only sixteen years old, he drew up a treatise on conic sections under six heads, entitled (1) 'Generatio conic sectionum tangentium et secantium,' (2) 'De hexagrammate mystico et conico,' (3) 'De quatuor tangentibus et rectis puncta tactuum junctibus, unde rectarum harmonicæ sectarum et diametrorum proprietates oriuntur,' (4) 'De proportionibus segmentorum secantium et tangentium,' (5) 'De tractionibus conicis,' (6) 'De loco solido.' This treatise was found among Pascal's papers after his death and was communicated to Leibniz, who, in 1676, urged its instant publication on account of its importance and originality. A *résumé*, however, of its results had been published by Pascal himself in 1640. The keystone of his theory was what he called the mystic hexagram, as to which he proved that the intersections of the three pairs of opposite sides of a hexagon inscribed in a conic are collinear. From this he deduced more than 400 corollaries.

While assisting his father in the collection of taxes at Ronen, Pascal found that long and tedious calculations were frequently necessary. His impatient spirit and fertile brain hit accordingly on the idea of making a machine which should automatically work out these troublesome arithmetical problems. He was so hampered by difficulties in the manipulation of the necessary material that, though he conceived the idea in 1643, it being, as he said, 'the effort of a man of twenty years old,' he did not secure the royal privilege for it till 1649, and it was not till 1652 that he was able to show that final form of his machine which is now deposited in the Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers.

From pure mathematics Pascal now turned to physics, after this excursion into mechanics. In the 17th cent. the dispute whether Nature abhorred a vacuum or not was unsettled. An intermolecular vacuum was admitted on both sides, but it was doubtful if any other kind of vacuum were possible in Nature. Descartes affirmed such a vacuum impossible and inconceivable. The atomists affirmed the contrary. The experiments of Torricelli (1608-47) under the inspiration of Galileo had resulted in the proof of the weight of the air and in the record of this fact in the barometer (the 'Torricellian vacuum') which was manufactured in 1643. Pascal interested himself in the subject, and in 1647 published his *Nouvelles expériences sur le vide*, followed by experiments in the next year in the Puy-de-Dôme and in Paris to determine whether the weight of the air was identical at all heights above sea-level.

'It,' as he said, 'is found that the height of the quick-silver is less at the top than at the bottom of the mountain, we must necessarily conclude that the weight or pressure of the air is the sole cause, and not any horror of a vacuum, since it is quite certain that there is more air at the bottom than at the top, for nobody could hold that nature abhors a vacuum more at the foot than at the top of the mountain' (*Œuvres*, iii. 265).

It is not too much to say that modern physics dates from the conclusions of Pascal come to in 1648. He broke with reluctance, he tells us, from the dogmas of the schools.

'From the first of these principles, that nature has an invincible horror of a vacuum, I have passed to the second, that she has a horror but not an invincible horror, and lastly, from that to a third belief that nature has no horror of a vacuum at all' (*ib.* ii. 371).

Pure mathematics still held Pascal, however, as is shown by his exercises on the cycloid, which date from 1658. Roberval had defined the area of the curve and the volume described by its revolution round its axis and round its base. Pascal then determined the segments of the area and the volumes as well as their centres of gravity, and, under the pseudonym of Dettonville, invited the leading mathematicians of the day to contend for a prize for the solution of such problems. Though Wallis of Oxford and others sent in essays, the proposal came to nothing, and Pascal finally published his own conclusions. These give Pascal high rank among the professors of the infinitesimal and differential calculus. It is worthy of note that, while engaged on this laborious work, Pascal was continuously under bodily suffering, and that his ideas on the properties of the cycloid came to him while sleepless through violent toothache.

It is not possible to fix precisely the date of another work of Pascal's which was concerned with the theory of probabilities. In that period of his life which preceded his 'second conversion' and followed the death of his father, he was familiar with sundry young men of fashion such as the Duc de Roannez and the Chevalier de Méré, and out of their experience of the gaming table rose a desire that he should treat mathematically the laws of chance. On this ensued a correspondence of Pascal with Fermat (see I. Todhunter, *Hist. of the Mathematical Theory of Probability*, Cambridge, 1865, pp. 7-21), but Pascal, though he seems to have contemplated a larger work, printed in 1654 only a fragment on the arithmetical triangle, which, however, was not published till 1665.

2. Writings on religion.—Though Pascal occupies an honorable place among the leaders of mathematical thought, he will always be most widely known for his writings on religion, especially the *Pensées* and, above all, the *Provinciales*. To appreciate these duly, however, we must first understand the ground and consequence of Pascal's religious outlook.

The first factor, in order of time, which falls to be considered is the atmosphere of the home of Pascal's early days. It might be too severe to think of it as darkened by any Puritanical gloom. The words, 'We only think of Aristotle and Plato as clad in the philosopher's toga. But they were good fellows and like the rest they laughed with their friends' (*Pensées*, no. 55 [vol. i. p. 150]), seem to describe accurately the two sides of Étienne Pascal's home. It was the home at once of a Stoic philosopher, a grave man of affairs, and a cultured man of the world to whom a wise gaiety was not unknown. Moreover, the greater part of Blaise Pascal's life was spent in Paris, and the nine years spent in the capital of Normandy—a province where culture was specially developed—were dignified by the friendship of the illustrious Corneille. In any case, whether in Paris or in Ronen, Pascal was thrown into a society whose polish and refinement would effectually open to him whatever joys the 'morale des honnêtes gens' might give.

On the other hand, Pascal's father was of an aristocratic Stoicism, with strong views about the education of his family and belief in his power to supply it. He had his 'system,' and this demanded the study of languages and literature before that of mathematics. It also insisted that the pupil should take nothing for granted, but in all things abandon prejudice and think for himself. This enabled us to understand partly why Pascal stood forth in all that he did as original, whether as discoverer or inventor or as the champion of religion. But at the last it is to the imperious genius of Pascal himself that we must attribute

that character of masterfulness, self-assuredness, and readiness to follow the argument whithersoever it might lead which we find in all that he set his hand to.

Two authors have been singled out as having contributed beyond others to the development of Pascal's mind—Epictetus and Montaigne—and not only because of the 'entretien sur Epictète et Montaigne' held by him with Isaac Lemaistre de Saci soon after his entrance into Port-Royal. There Pascal maintained against his friendly opponent that those two authors were neither dangerous nor useless. Of Epictetus he said:

'Behold the light of this great spirit who has so well known the duty of man. I dare to say that he would deserve to be worshipped if he had known equally well his impotence, since one must be God to teach man both. Also, as he was earth and ashes, after having so well understood what we ought to do, see how he loses himself in the presumption of what we can' ('Entretien de Pascal avec M. Saci,' *Œuvres*, iv. 85).

For man to count on himself is to Pascal the sign 'd'une superbe diabolique' (*ib.* iv. 36), and it was this, he said, that led Epictetus to believe that the soul is part of the divine substance, and that pain and death are not evils. Instinctively Pascal felt that the humility of Epictetus (though it might be the humility of Jean Jacques Rousseau) was not the humility of the Christian.

If Epictetus attracted Pascal by his insistence that man was but an actor in a comedy whose length depended on the will of the Master, it was Montaigne among the critics of 'le moi haïssable' who most deeply affected him. And he did this because of a certain affinity of scepticism which drew the bold intellect of Pascal irresistibly to the mocking humanist who went to Mass because Cicero bade him go. Sainte-Beuve has finely said that Montaigne can be studied in the bosom of Pascal.

'He was for him at certain times the fox of the Spartan boy concealed under his cloak. Pascal was frequently laid hold of by him, bitten and devoured. In vain he overthrows and rejects him; the wily one returns. He is disturbed by him, he quotes and transcribes him. . . . We might sum it all up in saying that Pascal in all his life and work has only done and only wanted to do two things: to fight to the death the Jesuits in the *Provinciales*, to ruin and annihilate Montaigne in the *Pensées*' (*Port-Royal*, ii. 387f.).

But Pascal could neither be content with the sceptical indifference of Montaigne nor do more than justice to the rational Stoicism of Epictetus. On the other hand, he was still less attracted by sceptical Epicureanism, if only because its ultimate moral effect is a general relaxation of the will to good. He was sufficiently conscious of man's unworthiness to draw upon himself the appellation of 'ce sublime misanthrope' (Voltaire, *Lettres philosoph.* xxv.). He testifies to his sense of man's weakness apart from grace when he says that 'man is neither angel nor beast, and the evil is that he who would make the angel makes the beast' (*Pensées*, no. 358 [ii. 271]). Again, though a bold, keen, and original thinker, he was deeply convinced of the limitations of reason and of human culture in general. This conviction led him to say that 'to mock at philosophy is true philosophy,' that 'true eloquence mocks at eloquence, true morality at morality; that is to say, that the morality of judgment mocks at the morality of feeling, for this is under no rule' (*ib.* no. 4 [i. 17]). He sees clearly enough that philosophy can do something, but that it cannot do all. A higher principle is required to carry on the work of philosophy, and he finds this in faith. Pascal saw that 'there are reasons which transcend our reason'; that, though 'all our dignity consists in thought,' yet that that thought is folly; man's thought never attains to satisfaction, for 'nature confounds the sceptics and reason the dogmatists.' Even from this misery of a nature hopelessly divided against itself Pascal draws the consolation

that, though 'to know one's self miserable is misery indeed, yet this misery is a mark of our greatness since we are conscious of it. It is the misery of a grand Seigneur, of a dispossessed King' (*ib.* no. 398 [ii. 303]). Pascal's indomitable spirit preserved him from all pessimism of the heart. He refused to rest in impotence as the last word about man. Impotent though in himself he might be, yet he was not left to himself. With him and above him was God, and the bridge by which God was reached was called faith. The radical contradictions in man's nature did not for him point to religious indifference, or to a 'religion de coutume,' but they drove him to that religion which promised to show how they could be got rid of or be reconciled.

In Jan. 1646 Étienne Pascal fell on the ice and dislocated his thigh. Then followed a period of retirement, during which he and his family studied works by Jansenius, Arnauld, and Saint Cyran, from which resulted what is called the 'first conversion' of Pascal, the nature of the Port-Royal appeal and its effect on him being somewhat similar to those of the *Serious Call* on Dr. Johnson. This did not lead him to surrender his scientific interests, for in the same year he was engaged on his researches on the question of a vacuum referred to above. Meanwhile his sister Jacqueline, with his sympathy, was being drawn towards Port-Royal, though she did not take the vows till 5th June 1653. At the same time (1647) Pascal was attending sermons preached by Antoine Singlin, confessor to Port-Royal. There ensued a period of worldliness broken by the death of his father on 24th Sept. 1651. Soon after he wrote his short *Discours sur les passions de l'amour*. Much has been made of a carriage accident which happened as Pascal was being driven over the Pont de Neuilly, when the horses ran away, and two out of the four (or six?) fell into the Seine. Whether this had anything to do with Pascal's second and definite conversion is doubtful. What is certain is that towards the end of 1653 he was the recipient of an extraordinary spiritual illumination by which he was raised above all the interests that had before occupied him, or, to be more accurate, was enabled for the rest of his life to approach them as merely affording materials for heavenly contemplation. This ecstasy is dated 23rd Nov. (1653 or) 1654, and an enigmatic record of it was found in two copies, one of parchment and one of paper, stitched up in his doublet after his death. It ran:

'The year of grace 1654,
Monday 23rd November, day of St. Clement,
pope and martyr, and others of the martyrologium;
Eve of St. Chrysogonus, martyr, and others,
from about ten at night
to half past twelve.

FIRE.

God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob,
Not of philosophers and savants.
Certainty, joy, certainty, feeling, peace, joy.
God of Jesus Christ.

My God and thy God (Joh. 20¹⁷)
Thy God shall be my God (Ruth).
Forgetfulness of the world, and of everything save God.
He is only found by the ways taught
In the Gospel. Greatness of the human soul.
Righteous Father, the world has not
Known thee, but I have known thee (Joh. 17).
Joy, joy, joy, and tears of joy.
I have separated myself from it.
Dereliquerunt me fontem.
My God, wilt thou leave me?
That I may not be separated from thee eternally.
This is life eternal that they may know thee
The only true God and him whom thou hast sent,
Jesus Christ.

JESUS CHRIST.

I have separated myself from it, I have renounced it, and
fed it
That I may not be separated from him for ever.
He is only to be kept by the ways taught
In the Gospel.

Renunciation Total and Sweet.

Total submission to Jesus Christ and to my director.
Eternally in joy for one day of trial on earth.
Non obliviscar sermones tuos. Amen.'

Of the two copies of this memorial (sometimes perversely called 'amulet') the paper copy in Pascal's own handwriting seems to be a rough draft for the other, which in the present form is a *copie figurée* made by Louis Périér from the now lost parchment. Along its left side is written at right angles to the text:

'Here is the *copie figurée* of a parchment found after the death of Mr. Pascal, my uncle, written by his hand and sewn in the lining of his doublet—Périér L., Priest and Canon of the Cathedral Church of Clermont.'

This memorial is a decisive landmark in the history of Pascal, and serves to mark the transfer of his interest from the worldly life and the life of reason to the religious and ascetic mode of living. He had received the call of the living God, and all things else henceforth were to his taste but Dead Sea apples. He had before tried what reason and custom—i.e., what the conscious mind (*l'esprit*) and the unconscious—could do. By custom he means those blind, automatic forces which are stronger than all merely conscious activities, and it is this that he had in mind when he gave the advice that we should follow what the converted do, 'for in doing what they believed in, in taking holy water, hearing Mass, etc., you will naturally come to believe and you will stupefy yourself (*et vous abêtira*)' (*Pensées*, no. 252 [ii. 185]), where *abêtir* means only that the mind will enjoy the immediacy of feeling of the lower animals undisturbed by ideal constructions of the intellect. Now, Pascal has learned what can be done by a new and higher power—inspiration. Before, he would have said that the heart is creative in us; now, he discovers that it is God Himself who immediately acts in us and through us. The direct result of the experience of this presence and power of God in him was the decision to join the Port-Royal recluses, which he did in Jan. 1655. There he found the solitude and ascetic mode of living which had now become necessary to him, and there, too, he found himself amid kindred spirits. He did not, however, definitely enrol himself as a member of the community, and did not consider himself as really belonging to it. To use a familiar distinction, he was an adherent rather than a member of Port-Royal, and he often left the lay convent to live for a time in Paris.

On Friday, 24th March 1656, an event occurred at Port-Royal which had a remarkable effect on the now prepared mind of Pascal—the miracle of the holy thorn.

An abbé, Roi de la Porterie, had lent from his private chapel to the convent of Port-Royal of Paris a thorn from the holy crown of our Saviour. The relic was placed for adoration in the middle of the choir. Among the worshippers came Marguerite Périér, the ten-year-old niece of Pascal, who was suffering from an ulcer of the eye which had affected the bone of the nose. When her turn came, she applied the thorn to her eye and prayed that it might be cured. It was cured, and the cure was proved to be complete. Other miracles of healing took place, and the holy thorn refused to do cures outside Port-Royal.

So much was Pascal impressed that he took for his emblem an eye surrounded by a crown of thorns with the motto: 'Scio eui credidi.' And the certitude which he now felt could hardly be increased by the remarkable conversion of Charlotte Gouffier de Roannez, sister of his old friend, the Duc de Roannez. Pascal became for a time her director, and in that capacity wrote her a series of letters of which only a few fragments remain. Mlle. de Roannez was received into Port-Royal in July 1657, and as long as Pascal lived she resisted all efforts to get her back to the world. Afterwards, however, she left Port-Royal, married the

Duc de la Feuillade, and died in 1683 after having for twelve years repented her apostasy.

Les Provinciales.—But a far more important work was begun by Pascal before Mlle. de Roannez demanded his care. In 1656 he began the series of attacks on the Jesuits on which his literary fame chiefly rests. The outer history of the *Provincial Letters* belongs to the history of Port-Royal (see JANSENISM); we are concerned here only with Pascal's contribution to it.

On 14th Jan. 1656 Arnauld was condemned by a packed court of the Sorbonne for false doctrine on the point of sufficient as distinct from effectual grace. Port-Royal appealed to another court—the court of the public—and Pascal was chosen as their advocate. He was no theologian and had little taste for theological subtleties. On the other hand, he felt deeply the gravity of all that affected morality, and with a sure instinct he struck at the weak point in the armoury of the enemies of his Jansenist friends—the system of casuistry of the Jesuits. He wrote in the name of an imaginary man of position, Louis de Montalte, to a friend living in the country who was figured as desirous of knowing what was the meaning of the disputes going on in the Sorbonne. The first of these *Petites Lettres*, as they were commonly called, appeared on 23rd Jan. 1656, and the eighteenth and last is dated 24th March 1657. In the first three Letters he was content to stand on the defensive and discuss with his own peculiar irony the questions of sufficient and effectual grace and of proximate power. Thus he made play with the distinction between words and the ideas for which words stand, and inquired how grace could be sufficient and not effectual in fact. Was not this as good as saying that grace is at once sufficient and insufficient? Pascal illustrates the condition of the Church by comparing it to a man who is left half-dead by robbers, and sends for three physicians. The first, on seeing him, declares his wounds mortal and God alone able to cure him. The second flatters him and assures him that he has sufficient strength to get home. The third, after examining him, agrees with the second and combines with the second to chase away the first. On this the sufferer turns to the third doctor, who tells him that he has sufficient strength for the journey because he has legs, and legs are the instrument made for walking. 'But,' inquires the sick man, 'have I strength enough to use them?' 'Certainly not,' says the doctor, 'and you will not walk unless God gives you supernatural strength.' 'Then you are not of the same opinion as your colleague as to my real condition,' and the doctor admits that he is not. It would be difficult to put more concisely the hollowness of the league formed by the Dominicans and Jesuits against the Jansenists. Similarly, Pascal, in discussing the meaning of 'proximate power,' asks whether a man would have the proximate power of crossing a river if he had a boat and oars and whatever might be necessary, or whether a man with eyes had the proximate power of seeing in the dark. On being told that a man with the power of sight and in the daylight had this proximate power, he inquires whether the righteous have always the proximate power of keeping the Commandments of God, and is told that they have, but that they might not have effectual grace to enable them to pray to God for that purpose. It came to this, then, that the righteous have the proximate power when the phrase is abstracted from all meaning; that the phrase had no authority from the Scriptures, councils, or popes, but that, it being adopted by the majority of the court, Arnauld must adopt it also or be pronounced heretical.

In his fourth Letter, which opens like a Catiline

oration ('There is nothing like the Jesuits') Pascal turns his guns with a magnificent offensive on the Jesuits, but contents himself in this Letter with drawing on his Jesuit interlocutor the consequences of his assertion that 'an action cannot be considered sinful if God does not give us, before we commit it, knowledge of its evil and an inspiration which stirs us up to avoid it.'

In his fifth Letter Pascal addresses himself to an examination of what it was that the Jesuits actually taught, and attacks the basis of their system, which he finds in their underlying determination to substitute their own dominion for the dominion of God. From this followed as a practical corollary that, as the average man is incapable of a high degree of saintliness, religion must be made easy for him. And this the Jesuits carried out by their doctrine of probabilism. On this doctrine and the practical use made of the 'direction of the intention' Pascal pours out the vials of his scorn and derision in this and the next five Letters.

On the day when the fifth *Provincial* appeared (20th March 1656) the recluses of Port-Royal were obliged to disperse as a consequence of Arnauld's condemnation. Four days later occurred the miracle of the holy thorn—a matter of rejoicing to the Jansenists, of confusion to the Jesuits. Pascal in particular was rejoiced, for God had Himself plainly spoken. Moreover, the recluses were allowed to return to Port-Royal, and Pascal continued his assaults till 2nd Aug., when the tenth Letter appeared.

After this he drops the fiction of the provincial friend and addresses himself explicitly to the 'reverend Jesuit fathers,' in the eleventh onward to the eighteenth Letter. Nor was he to be turned from his purpose of attacking the moral maxims of the Society of Jesus by the appearance of Alexander VII.'s bull of 16th Oct. 1656, which condemned the famous five propositions alleged to be extracted from the *Augustinus* of Jansenius. This appeared a fortnight after the publication of the thirteenth Letter. The seventeenth and eighteenth Letters are addressed to François Annat (a Latinized form of his original name Canard), a provincial of his order, and for sixteen years confessor to Louis XIV. Pascal writes to him as the representative of the French Jesuits.

It is not surprising that in so heated a controversy as the *Provincial Letters* aroused Pascal should have been charged with heresy, inaccurate quotation, ridiculing sacred things, attributing to the Jesuit Society as a whole the eccentric opinions of obscure members, and appealing to pruriency. But the only charge which is even plausibly serious is that he spoke falsely when he declared that he was not of Port-Royal. In the seventeenth Letter he refers his opponents to his previous Letters, in which he had declared that 'he was alone' and that he was 'not of Port-Royal.' The passages to which he refers are in the twelfth and sixteenth Letters. In the former he is alluding to the impostures of the Jesuits, and he says:

'Indeed, fathers, you are more suspect in this matter than I; for it is not likely that being alone as I am, without power and without any human support against so powerful a body, being sustained only by truth and sincerity I should have exposed myself to lose all in exposing myself to be convicted of imposture.'

And in the sixteenth Letter, in rebutting the accusation of being a heretic of Port-Royal, he says:

'I know, fathers, the merit of those pious solitaries who have retired thither and how much the Church owes to their edifying and solid labours. I know their piety and their lights; for although I have never been admitted to their establishment (en établissement avec eux), as you would fain believe without knowing who I am, yet I have unbroken acquaintance with some of them, and I honour the virtue of them all.'

As a matter of fact, Port-Royal was a home of recluses, and Pascal was not one of them. Some of the *Provincials*, indeed, were written at the Roi David Inn, where Pascal frequently lodged under the name of M. de Mons, so that Pascal's assertions on this head are abundantly justified.

On the merits of the dispute it is enough to say that Pascal was a champion of the genuine morality of the gospel which is founded on a life that is indeterminate, and, therefore, not as such patient of formulation in treatises of casuistry. Love, while it remains love, meets each case as it arises and decides by its own intuitions. The weakness of the Jesuits' position lay in the very success of their logic. Having begun by legalizing, i.e. externalizing, the freedom which is at the heart of all morality, they were driven farther and farther from life into the intellectual analysis of propositions. Nor was it of any avail for them to plead that much of what they taught they had inherited, or that every man is forced from time to time to distinguish, qualify, or even explain away a precept of ethics. Their original sin was not that they invented, but that they perfected, a casuistry which was a substitute for life and love—not their living and ever-changing expression. Since Pascal's tremendous indictment of ecclesiastical ethics, that science has passed more and more into lay hands, and Pascal may be said to have done for morality what Luther did for religion—freed it from the perversities of experts and made it the business of everybody.

The Pensées.—In attacking the Jesuits Pascal conceived that he was attacking men inside the Church who were driving out Beelzebub to enthroned Lucifer. But he was also concerned with another set of free-thinkers who were outside the Church, and wielded a great influence, especially on the educated classes and on society. To bring these back to a saving knowledge of God through faith was his second principal desire as a Christian, and he determined to write a constructive plea against atheism. In preparation for this he studied diligently the Scriptures, the Fathers, and especially St. Augustine, and in particular an anti-Jewish polemic of the 13th cent., the *Pugio fidei* of Raimond Martin, which had been discovered by François Bousquet and reprinted in Paris in 1651 with notes by Joseph de Voisin. He also re-read and annotated Epictetus and Montaigne, especially the latter. Accordingly, he laid before some of his friends at Port-Royal about 1658, in a discourse lasting two or three hours, the aim and plan of his proposed treatise. They were delighted with what they heard, but Pascal's love of perfection caused delay in the elaboration of his thesis, and death supervened before he had set himself to the labour of writing his *Apologia* of the Christian religion. After his death a considerable body of rough notes was found, which were developed by different hands and in different forms into the famous *Pensées*. Some guidance in the arranging of these notes was derived from the recollections of Étienne Périer, Filleau de la Chaise, and Mme. Périer of Pascal's sketch of his *Apologia*.

Pascal died in 1662, and it was not till 1669 that Port-Royal put forth the first edition of his *Pensées*, with a preface by his nephew, Étienne Périer. Their text, however, was incomplete and was in some respects 'edited,' as to some extent was the edition of Condorcet in 1776, and of Bossuet in 1779. The subsequent editions of P. Fangère (1844), A. Molinier (1877), G. Michaut (1896-99), and L. Brunschwig (1897) have succeeded in elucidating the text. But no finality has been, or perhaps ever will be, reached in determining the order of the fragments. The Port-Royal editions were content to arrange them according to their

subject-matter. The result of this procedure was often to join discordant and to separate concordant notes. Molinier's plan was to group fragments which seemed determined by the line of the *Apologia* and to relegate the remainder to an appendix as illustrative notes. Michaut preferred to reproduce the MSS with critical notes by Brunschvicg. This method has the inestimable advantage of letting us into the mind of Pascal, and of allowing us to see him at work, jotting down his thoughts, erasing, adding, and giving alternative readings.

The thoroughness with which the *Apology* would have been treated appears clearly from the pains which Pascal took to lay down its appropriate method. He rejects for his purpose the 'geometrical' method as incompetent to touch the heart, and he insists that the eloquence of the heart is superior to rhetoric. It is the heart that has to be touched—the human heart which is at once infinite and empty. How then to escape from this ever-present sense of failure and discord? Justice, as we find it, is a matter determined by the boundaries of rivers and mountains; morality, whether in its Stoic or in its sceptical form, is uncertain. Reason argues well, but depends on principles beyond reason. Dogmatism and pyrrhonism are each unable to carry us more than a short way. Man, then, as a being conscious of great powers and needs which he can neither get rid of nor satisfy, must have recourse to something above himself. God alone can help him; religion must do what philosophy and science are unable to do.

From this Pascal goes on to survey the religions of the world, and ends by referring us to that religion which began with Judaism and is consummated in Jesus Christ. In Him the contradictions of human nature are reconciled, and with Him we are united by love, and then we are able to see things from the inside, instead of travelling on the outside by the way of reason through the ever-present contradictions of natural life.

'All the law is contained in Jesus Christ and Adam' (*Pensées*, no. 523 [ii. 418]). Therefore it is that 'the only religion which runs counter alike to nature, to common-sense and to pleasure is after all the only one which has always held its own' (*ib.* no. 604 [iii. 41]).

3. The psychology of Pascal.—So rich and complex a character as Pascal's was certain to draw on it, not only the hatred of those to whom his ideals were abhorrent, but also the misunderstanding which comes from the partial views taken by lesser intelligences. To the rationalism of the 18th cent. the claim to superiority made by Pascal for faith was particularly obnoxious. Leibniz regretted that Pascal's scientific genius was obscured by his prejudices for the Roman religion. To Voltaire he was a sublime madman born a century too soon, and his inspirations were but 'ægri somnia.' Condorcet, as a true Encyclopædist, regarded him as a tool of superstition, and a writer in 1846, L. F. Lélut, reached the highest point of absurdity in a work entitled *L'Amulette de Pascal, pour servir à l'histoire des hallucinations*. Even the story of the Pont de Neuilly, of which Voltaire (following Boileau) made so much, is of doubtful authenticity, and is not found in the accounts of Pascal's conversion given by Jacqueline and Mme. Périer.

Nor is there any good ground for Victor Cousin's theory (1830) of the scepticism of Pascal, according to which his faith was an unbelief only half-conquered. That in one sense Pascal was a sceptic is undoubted. He at one time found fault with the philosophy of Descartes as 'being useless, uncertain, and troublesome'—nay, as ridiculous' (*Pensées*, no. 79 [i. 98]). Yet he often quotes Montaigne and apparently identifies himself with

his cynical maxims. He writes that 'all men naturally hate one another,' and 'men are necessarily such fools that it would be folly of another kind not to be a fool' (*ib.* no. 414 [ii. 313]). But such intellectual or moral scepticism occupies only a corner of Pascal's ample mind, as is shown by such passages as the following:

'It is necessary to have three qualities, those of the pyrrhonist, of the geometrician and of the humble Christian. These unite with and attemper one another, so that we doubt when we should, we aim at certainty when we should, and we submit when we should' (*Œuvres*, iv. 53; cf. *Pensées*, no. 245 [ii. 170]).

Two excesses—to exclude reason, to admit reason alone' (*Pensées*, no. 253 [i. 186]).

'Faith tells us what the senses do not tell us, but not the contrary of what they see: it is above and not in opposition to them' (*ib.* no. 265 [ii. 195]).

He is quite ready to accept Montaigne's triumphant proof of the insufficiency of reason to explain the whole man, and is yet ready to maintain also that reason within its limits is trustworthy. But the certainty which neither the senses nor conscious thought supply is not unattainable by man if he will but submit himself to God and trust to the 'reasons of the heart' which are given by inspiration. Here he parts company with Montaigne, who would have had man acquiesce as an 'Epicuri de grege porcus' in his helplessness, whereas Pascal would bid him rise out of his rational helplessness into the higher region of faith.

Too much stress has been laid by his critics on Pascal's life-long ill-health as a proof of an unbalanced nature. The 'amulet' is quoted as proof that he suffered from hallucinations—he who two years afterwards began that series of powerful and solidly reasoned Letters which have made him immortal. In fact there is nothing to surprise our psychology in his famous vision. It bears every mark of being the natural climax of an acute mental struggle to find solid ground for belief in man's natural greatness on which to find refuge from his vileness and impotence. As is usual, the solution was given, and was accompanied by what is also customary after such effort, a state of super-excited feelings which may seem almost to certify to the subject the genuineness of the revelation. The only word in the whole 'memorial' which might perhaps cause doubt is the one which has a line all to itself, the word FIRE; and yet illumination as an accompaniment of conversion has been remarked on frequently from the case of St. Paul onwards. But Lélut, of the Salpêtrière, will have it that Pascal's autopsy showed softening of the brain, while P. Just-Navarre, of the Lyons Academy, pronounces for tuberculosis. It would seem, however, on the whole sounder to rely on what appears to be good medical testimony, according to which Pascal's sufferings were due to atony and disorders of the alimentary canal, affecting to some extent the whole nervous system, including the brain. There is nothing, however, to show that Pascal's brain was affected to a degree sufficient to cloud his mind or disable his judgment, unless, indeed, we are to declare all thoroughgoing asceticism, such as that of Suso and that of Pascal's iron barbed belt, to be marks of incipient insanity. His writings remain, and their testimony is incontestable to the soundness and unimpaired strength of his mind. As man, as scientist, and as Christian his place is among the heroes of mankind.

LITERATURE.—The *Provinciales* have been translated into every civilized language. A convenient ed. in French is that of John de Soyres, *The Provincial Letters of Pascal*, Cambridge, 1880. The *Pensées* also (as is noted in the text) have gone through many editions. Of those mentioned the *Pensées de Blaise Pascal* by Léon Brunschvicg, 3 vols., in the series of 'Les Grands Écrivains de la France', Paris, 1901, will supply a comprehensive study; the references in the text are to this edition. Of complete works the best ed. is in the same series, *Œuvres de Blaise Pascal*, 11 vols., do. 1904-14.

Other works which may be found useful are: E. Boutroux,

Pascal, Paris, 1900, tr. Ellen Margaret Creak, Manchester, 1902; F. Strowski, *Pascal et son temps*, 3 vols., Paris, 1907-08; R. F. A. Sully-Prudhomme, *La vraie Religion selon Pascal*, do. 1905; J. Tulloch, *Pascal*, in 'Foreign Classics for English Readers,' Edinburgh, 1898; E. Jovy, *Pascal inédit: Notes pathologiques sur Pascal et son entourage*, Vitry-le-François, 1912; C. A. Sainte-Beuve, *Port-Royal*, 5 vols., Paris, 1840-59, vols. iii. and iv.; art. in *Edinburgh Review*, lxxxv. [1847] 178 ff.; art. in *Quarterly Review*, ccvii. [1906] 526 ff.; H. F. Stewart, *The Holiness of Pascal*, Cambridge, 1916.

W. F. COBB.

PASSIBILITY AND IMPASSIBILITY.—

We may begin with a definition of passion from Baldwin's *DPHP*, s.v.:

'Generally passion is the condition of being acted upon, of being affected, receptive.'

In Christian theology the question of passibility and impassibility, or, in other words, according to the above definition, of the capacity or incapacity of being acted upon, comes up in the first place with regard to God Himself, and secondly with reference to the incarnate Christ. In so far as action is associated with change, the question referred to is closely connected with the other question of God's mutability or immutability.

The Biblical idea of God is religious, not philosophical, and as such is, especially in the OT, frankly anthropomorphic. Hence God is represented as both mutable and passible (Gn 6⁶, Is 63⁹, Hos 11⁸). Even in the NT, though a certain contact with the atmosphere of Hellenistic culture has led to the absence of the same vivid anthropomorphisms, we are yet far from a philosophic doctrine of God's immutability, not to say His impassibility. It is noteworthy that C. Hodge (*Systematic Theology*, London and Edinburgh, 1872, i. 390) takes only one proof text for the divine immutability from the NT, viz. Ja 1¹⁷. On the other hand, the fundamental NT doctrine of God's Fatherhood suggests the very reverse of His impassibility. We have, moreover, a fresh point of contact established between God and passibility in so far as the man Jesus Christ is regarded as the incarnation of God (He 1³, Jn 1¹⁸). That passibility is ascribed to Him needs no proof; the whole gospel story is evidence. Moreover, the largest part of it is concerned with His passion and death. It may, however, be observed that one of the books in the NT which go furthest in stating a metaphysical doctrine of Christ's divinity also lays peculiar stress on Christ's passible nature (He 2^{9, 14, 17, 41, 57}).

Such, then, was the original position of the Christian religion with regard to the passibility of God and Christ. Christianity, however, in passing into the world of Graeco-Roman culture, necessarily came into contact with the idea of God as elaborated by Greek philosophy. One of the chief features of this idea was the conception of the divine immutability and impassibility. The protest against the anthropomorphisms of religion goes back as far as Xenophanes. It is strongly developed by both Plato and Aristotle.

Plato explains that the gods 'are exalted above pleasure and pain, and are untouched of all evils: he opposes in moral indignation the opinion that they can be propitiated, or rather corrupted, by prayers and sacrifices' (E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*⁴, Leipzig, 1876-1909, ii. 1. 929).

Aristotle, the great Greek theist, is yet stronger in his inculcation of similar views.

'The Deity stands, according to Aristotle, in lonely self-contemplation outside the world: it is for man the object of admiration and reverence, the knowledge of it is the highest task for his intellect, in it lies the aim towards which he with all finite beings strives, whose perfection calls forth his love; but so little as he can expect love in return from it, so little does he experience also from it in general any operation, which is distinct from that of the order of nature, and his intellect is the only thing through which he stands in immediate contact with it' (ib. ii. 791; cf. Eng. tr., *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics*, London, 1897, ii. 329 f.).

It is no wonder, consequently, that the contact of Christianity with the Greek philosophical tradition should have produced difficulties with regard

to the passibility or impassibility of God and Christ. Gnosticism, which Harnack has called the acute Hellenization of Christianity, was led to Docetic views of the Person of Christ. Either His humanity was regarded as merely apparitional (Satornil, the Valentinians), or else there was held to be no real union between the heavenly Christ and the man Jesus (Basilides). In opposition to such views, Ignatius, on the other hand, dwells on the paradox of the Incarnation. Christ is 'the Impassible, who was passible for our sakes' (*ad Polyc.* iii. 2). So also Irenæus says that in the Incarnation the impassible became passible (*adv. Hær.* iii. xvi. 6).

An attempt to carry through the religious idea of God, in opposition to all Greek philosophy, was the Patripassianism of the 2nd century. Noetus said that Christ Himself was the Father, and that the Father Himself was born and suffered. He maintained that there was only one God, impassible and invisible when He does not suffer and die, passible and visible when He suffers and dies (F. Loofs, *Dogmengeschichte*⁴, Halle, 1906, p. 185).

Tertullian, on the other hand, the great opponent of Patripassianism, was inclined to distribute impassibility and passibility between the Father on the one hand and the Logos on the other.

'Whatever attributes therefore you require as worthy of God, must be found in the Father, who is invisible and unapproachable, and placid, and (so to speak) the God of the philosophers; whereas those qualities which you censure as unworthy must be supposed to be in the Son, who has been seen, and heard, and encountered, the Witness and Servant of the Father, uniting in Himself man and God' (*adv. Marc.* ii. 27).

The concluding words of this quotation might lead us to suppose that Tertullian has in mind only the incarnate Logos, but the previous context shows that he is thinking of the pre-incarnate Logos also. To the same effect he says with regard to certain OT narratives (Gn 3⁸ 7¹⁶ 18⁸, Ex 3², etc.):

'These things would not have been believed of the Son of God, if they had not been written: perhaps they are not to be believed of the Father, even though written' (*adv. Prax.* 16).

It was a further development of the same idea when Arius taught that the Logos was by nature a creature, and as such *τρεπτός*. At Nicæa, however (A.D. 325), the doctrine that the Logos was created, or *τρεπτός*, or *ἀλλοιωτός*, was condemned. Henceforward the orthodox doctrine ascribed all passibility of every kind only to the human nature in Christ. The reality of Christ's human sufferings was a matter of faith inasmuch as redemption was connected with them. Nevertheless, as the sufferings of the Logos, they were held to have been voluntarily assumed, along with all other human conditions.

Thus Cyril of Alexandria 'considered that the Logos in becoming man by a voluntary act, gave to physical laws a certain dominion over Himself: took humanity, on the understanding that its laws, conditions, or measures, were to be respected. In this very act of voluntary self-subjection to the laws of humanity did the kenosis consist. By this principle Cyril explained the facts of birth, growth in stature, and experience of sinless infirmities, such as hunger, thirst, sleep, weariness, etc., in the earthly history of the Saviour' (A. P. Bruce, *The Humiliation of Christ*, Edinburgh, 1876 p. 70).

From this view it was only a short step back to Docetism, from which Cyril was by no means free, inasmuch as he held the kenosis to be real only in the physical, not in the intellectual and moral, spheres (ib. p. 71 f.). The Latin theologian, Hilary of Poitiers, had before Cyril gone even farther in the direction of Docetism, holding that the human nature of Christ can undergo work and pain of body only because Christ has subjected Himself to them; His human nature can suffer pains as little as air can be transpierced (*de Trin.* x. 23). It has been said that there is in the orthodox doctrine of the Person of Christ, inasmuch as it makes His humanity impersonal, an incorrigible tendency to Docetism; it must, however, be observed that this

tendency was not according to the intention of the doctrine.

We may fitly sum up this historical series by referring to the classical treatment by Thomas Aquinas of the divine impassibility and the passibility of Christ in His humanity. God Himself is absolutely impassible. There is in Him no potentiality; as Aristotle teaches, He is pure act.

'God, therefore, to whom potentiality does not belong, is immutable. It can also be concluded that God is immutable "as regards the several species of mutation, as, for instance, He cannot be increased or diminished, or altered, or generated, or corrupted. . . . Moreover, He cannot be conquered, or suffer violence," for these only belong to one who can be moved' (*Summa c. Gentiles*, ii. 25).

As regards Christ, Thomas teaches (*Summa Theol.* III. xiv. 1) that it was convenient that the body assumed by the Lord God should be subject to human infirmities and defects, for three reasons: (1) that Christ might be able to bear the penalty of sin, (2) that men might believe in the truth of the Incarnation, (3) that Christ might be an example to us in bearing bravely the passions and defects of human nature. Further, Thomas teaches (III. xv. 4) that Christ's soul also, as the 'form' of His body, suffered in His bodily sufferings; it also suffered in a way proper to itself, that being a mark of human nature.

Modern theology, beginning from the human Christ as the revealer of God, instead of from a philosophical conception of deity, has shown in some of its most distinguished representatives a tendency to return to the idea of the divine passibility. Thus A. M. Fairbairn finds a passibility in God to be implied in Christ's representation of Him as Father. He says:

'Theology has no false idea than that of the impassibility of God. If He is capable of sorrow, He is capable of suffering; and were He without the capacity for either, He would be without any feeling of the evil of sin or the misery of man. The very truth that came by Jesus Christ may be said to be summed up in the passibility of God. But to be passible is to be capable of sacrifice; and in the presence of sin the capability could not but become the reality. To confine the idea of sacrifice to the Son is to be unjust to His representation of the Father. There is a sense in which the Patripassian theory is right; the Father did suffer, though it was not as the Son that He suffered, but in modes distinct and different. . . . The humiliation of the Son involved the visible passion and death, but the surrender by the Father involved the sorrow that was the invisible sacrifice' (*The Place of Christ in Modern Theology*³, London, 1893, p. 483 f.).

It may finally be observed that philosophy itself has in modern times shown an important movement towards a doctrine of God which admits an element of passibility in His being. The beginning of this movement is associated above all with C. H. Weisse, who distinctly represents his philosophy as rising out of the heart of the Christian religion (*Philosophie des Christenthums*, Leipzig, 1855-62). The greatest modern representative of the tendency is, however, Weisse's disciple, H. Lotze, who teaches that God is not to be thought of simply as an eternal truth, not even a truth not merely valid, but conscious of itself.

'We have a direct feeling of the wide difference there is between this personification of a thought and living personality: not only do we find art fictions when it expects us to admire allegorical statues of Justice or of Love, but even speculation rouses our opposition forthwith, when it offers to us some self-conscious Principle of Identity, or some self-conscious Idea of God, as completely expressing personality. Either of these is obviously lacking in an essential condition of all true reality in the capacity of suffering' (*Microcosmus*, Eng. tr. 4, Edinburgh, 1894, ii. 632).

The Infinite Being must therefore be thought of as eternally possessing in its infinite life that which corresponds to the non-ego in a finite personality.

'When we characterize the inner life of the Personal God, the current of His thoughts, His feelings, and His will, as everlasting and without beginning, as having never known rest, and having never been roused to movement from some state of quiescence, we call upon imagination to perform a task no other and no greater than that which is required from it by every materialistic or pantheistic view' (*ib. ii.* 631 f.).

The ideas of this school of philosophy have not been without an echo in theology. K. Rothe, in

his *Theologische Ethik*² (Wittenberg, 1867-71), developed a doctrine of God very similar to that of Weisse, while A. Ritschl has definitely attached himself to the teaching of Lotze in order to justify the religious view of God derived from the revelation made in Christ (*The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, iii., Eng. tr., Edinburgh, 1900, p. 228 ff.).

LITERATURE.—This has been sufficiently indicated throughout the article.

ROBERT S. FRANKS.

PASSIVE RESISTANCE.—See RESISTANCE.

PASSIVITY.—J. S. Mill has said:

'Christian morality (so-called) has all the characters of a reaction; it is, in great part, a protest against Paganism. Its ideal is negative rather than positive; passive rather than active; Innocence rather than Nobleness; Abstinence from Evil rather than energetic Pursuit of Good. . . . It is essentially a doctrine of passive obedience' (*On Liberty*, London, 1859, p. 29).

This passage is perhaps typical; it embodies a very common misconception touching the true genius of Christ's religion. The promised gift of Christ was 'life more abundantly' (Jn 10¹⁰), and the aim and scope of the gospel are the heightening of life—the lifting of human nature to nobler levels of thought and conduct than it could attain in its unassisted strength, the supplying of new motives and new springs of action. Thus Christianity brings an element of intensity into the ordinary pursuits and activities of men (Ro 12¹, Eph 6⁶, Col 3²³). It is essentially a religion of heroisms, of ventures of faith. Men of violence take the Kingdom by force (Mt 11¹²).

Yet the capacity of man to use his strength for the achievement of this moral and spiritual victory is a divine endowment and has its origin in a divine act. The life of union with God in Christ, which is the sole principle of moral fruitfulness and power, is regarded by the NT writers as a mystical or sacramental fact before it becomes a moral fact. In other words, it depends on the divine action, yet is realized in human nature through the persistent effort of the personal will. We have to 'work out' our own salvation, even while 'it is God which worketh in us both to will and to work, for his good pleasure' (Ph 2¹²⁻¹³).

As a mystical fact, redemption implies a mighty exertion of divine power, of which mankind is the passive subject. The heathen world lay in its helplessness and misery, 'dead in trespasses and sins' (Eph 2¹), tossed to and fro by every gust of wayward passion, carried away to 'dumb idols, howsoever it might be led' (1 Co 12²), when God Himself intervened and put forth the fullness of His redemptive might. This is the theme of such passages as Eph 2¹⁻¹⁰, Col 1⁸⁻²³. The same thought lies behind St. Paul's massive argument in Ro 5. It is implied in our Lord's teaching recorded in Mt 12²⁸ (= Lk 11²⁴).¹ The moral helplessness of man leaves him utterly dependent on the grace and power of God. As Chrysostom says (on μετασχησεν in Col 1¹³): τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅλον τοῦ μεταθνήσκειν ἡμῶν, οὐ τοῦ μεταθνήσκειν. Redemption is in the first instance wholly and solely the act of God. And even the consummation of redemption—its completeness—implies the exertion of power by God Himself. He is all, the creature nothing. This is implied in the NT thought of the divine indwelling. To be united to God is to be possessed by God, indwelt by Him, sustained and securely upheld by Him (Jn 10²⁸⁻²⁹).

This, then, is one side or aspect of the life of union with God. In St. Paul, however, the pre-

¹ ἡμεῖς in this passage (Lk 11²⁷) may be taken to mean 'human souls,' as by Bernard, *de Error. Abailardi*, vi. 16: 'Utinam ego inveniar in his spoliis, quibus spoliatae sunt contrariae potestates, traductus et ipse in possessionem Domini!'; cf. Chrys. in *Matth.* hom. xli. 447 D.

sentation of this mystical side of theology is compatible with assertions, not less emphatic, of the moral aspect of the new life—its dependence on the persevering exertion of man's will, the cleaving of human personality to God. We look to God for all that is needed to sustain the life of the soul as of the body; we are wholly 'in the hand of God,' but, as Augustine says, 'ut permanens in manu artificis, bona voluntas facit' (in *Ps* 39 [40]²⁷). There are means of grace of which an energetic and persistent use is necessary if the life of union with God is to be sustained. So the gospel inculcates 'the religious view of the will.' It is the will to which Christ always appeals; the will is a man's self. It has been said that to Christ what is most valuable and vital is what the man does for himself (cf. H. Latham, *Pastor Pastorum*, Cambridge, 1890, p. 6). Nevertheless, the fact implied in the words of He 6¹, ἐπὶ τὴν τελειότητα φερώμεθα, remains fundamentally true. Progress in the life of grace depends upon a continuous self-surrender to a divine influence; the yielding up of self to be 'filled with all the fulness of God' (Eph 3¹⁹).

A question thus arises as to the true meaning and importance of passivity in man's spiritual life. The idea and, to some extent, the word play a prominent part in the writings of the Quietists. Molinos, Madame Guyon and Archbishop Fénelon in the 17th cent., lay much stress on the quietness or passivity needed to enable God to work His will freely in the soul of the Christian. The doctrine of Molinos (1640-97, see QUIETISM) was rapidly distorted by his immediate followers, and tended to encourage a dangerous and even immoral apathy. Since Christian perfection (*q.v.*) consisted in the utmost possible passivity of soul, all human co-operation in the work of salvation was futile and valueless. It was easy to draw the further inference that all things that might 'happen' to the body, even bodily sins, were indifferent and could not affect the state of the soul. Thus, the doctrine of moral responsibility and even the place of repentance in the Christian life were apt to be undermined. Fénelon (1651-1715) was fully aware of the tendencies of Molinism, and in the defence of his book, *The Maxims of the Saints*, he endeavours to reconcile the doctrine of passivity with the free action of the will.

'Tous les Chrétiens,' he says, 'sont appelés à la passivité, mais ils ne seront pas tous appelés à la contemplation passive. . . . Etre passif n'est autre chose que retrancher l'activité, c'est-à-dire les actes inquiets et empressés de l'intérêt propre.'¹

What Fénelon feared was anything like the intrusion of self-love into the religious life. The disinterested love of God, indifference to self and freedom from self-love—these would, he thought, be best secured by a 'passive obedience' to the impulses of divine grace. Fénelon is perhaps open to the criticism that he lays too little stress on the duties of active love and of personal co-operation with grace. There are passages of this type in his letters, insisting on the need of 'a will supple in God's hand, neither asking nor refusing anything; accepting all He sends unreservedly and never seeking what He refuses under any pretext whatever.'² But, on the whole, the state of soul which he commends is one of tranquil and serene submission to the leadings of grace—a state of dependence on God which excludes restless anxiety, scrupulousness, and self-love. He stops short of the extravagance of that type of mysticism of which the only prayer is 'Thy will be done,' and the only virtue an unbounded 'passivity' which is

virtually indistinguishable from complete spiritual 'indolence and nothingness'³ (see QUIETISM).

It is natural in this connexion to mention the leading principle of Quaker worship, viz. the duty of waiting patiently upon God and listening for the inward voice of the Holy Spirit. This duty of passivity follows from the doctrine of the inward light, and the consequent rejection of all symbols and external forms in worship.

'As to the outward signification [of worship] in prayers, praises and preaching, we ought not to do it where and when we will, but where and when we are moved thereunto by the secret inspiration of His Spirit in our hearts' (*Apology for the Quakers*, ed. 1869, prop. xv.).

On this point see further artt. QUIETISM, FRIENDS, SOCIETY OF.

In the life of practical religion the duty of passivity may be said to imply two things: (1) the duty of *submissiveness*, or passive endurance under the pressure of the hostility and hatred of the world. The virtues of patience and long-suffering (*q.q.v.*) are a constant theme of the NT writers. They are commended repeatedly as the Christian's way of sharing the experience and following the example of our Lord. Indeed, one of the cardinal virtues of the Christian character is a patience which is practically identical with fortitude (cf. Aug. *de Mor. Eccl.* 40-43, *de Patientia*, 2). But it is noticeable that 'patience' in the gospel is transfigured. It becomes itself the highest exhibition of victorious strength. The humiliation of Christ, *c.g.*, is a display not of weakness but of strength. It exhibits the triumph of an unswerving will under the utmost pressure of trial. He was 'crucified through weakness,' but His cross was the scene of a mighty victory over the powers of evil (Col 2¹⁴), of a redemptive work accomplished under circumstances of inconceivable difficulty and pain. Thus, Hilary maintains that even the sufferings of Christ were triumphs of love and power (*de Trin.* x. 48), and Chrysostom that the Passion was itself an action, 'for through His sufferings He wrought that mighty and wondrous work of bringing death to naught' (*Hom. in Act.* i. 3). In the same way the submission of Christians to the hostility of an evil world, the 'world-resisting' element in character viewed on its passive side, is in itself a display of supernatural might (Col 1¹¹). Passiveness is the spirit which recognizes that suffering is an indispensable law of the spiritual life, is that which must be—is God's agent in the heightening and purifying of character. At the same time we must be careful to guard the distinction between Christian quietude, which checks the instinct of revenge for a personal injury, and Christian resentment, which avenges wrong done to another or to the community. The Christian may renounce his own rights, but not his brother's; and the absence of moral resentment, in presence of oppression or lawless wrongdoing which tramples on the rights of others, is a sinful defect in character. In a larger sphere the law of Christian meekness (*q.v.*) is sometimes supposed to exclude the authoritative resistance of evil by law or by armed force (see Tolstoi, *The Kingdom of God is within you*, London, 1894); but St. Paul, who forbids private revenge (Ro 12¹⁹), also insists that the duty of rulers and States is to act as avengers 'to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil' (Ro 13⁴). In other words, the very end of organized government is resistance to evil. Mere passivity on the part of a nation whose just rights and liberties were imperilled would mean the abdication of its true place and function. According to the doctrine of the NT, the ruler is God's minister, and his office is exactly that of exercising retributive and coercive power (see

¹ Œuvres, ii. 365, quoted by Viscount St. Cyres, *François de Fénelon*, London, 1901, p. 112, note.

² Letter on 'Christian Perfection,' in Fénelon's *Spiritual Letters: to Men*, Eng. tr., London, 1880, p. 247.

³ The phrase 'holy indolence and nothingness' is used by Molinos (see St. Cyres, p. 100).

Martineau, *National Duties*, London, 1903, serm. v.).

(2) On the other hand, we may think of passivity as the attitude of *receptivity* which lies at the foundation of all growth in grace—that quiet expectancy of soul, that calm abiding in Christ which is the necessary condition of moral fruitfulness (Jn 15¹²). This receptiveness of spirit is akin to the teachableness of mind which Christ requires in His disciples, and which He commends by pointing to the little child as the true type of the inheritor of His Kingdom (Mt 18³). Entrance into the Kingdom means, before all else, the sense of insufficiency, trustful self-surrender, openness to divine influence and divine leading. From this point of view passivity is identical with meekness.

'To be a Christian is not merely to be a believer in Christian doctrine or a doer of Christian duty, but to adopt the receptive attitude of one who lives not by his own power, but by that of the grace or free gift of the Spirit of God . . . the receptive atti-

those who, but for effort, had it not. There is indeed Christian effort. And there is imitation of Christ. But these are rather the necessary outcome, than the producing cause, of the Spirit of Christ. It is by His initiation rather than ours, and by the acts of His power rather than ours, that we were first brought into relation with Him, and that His Spirit is progressively imparted to us. . . . Essentially we are throughout receivers, not workers. The Pentecostal Spirit is bestowed in grace, bestowed on faith, bestowed through sacraments, anyway bestowed, not earned' (R. O. Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*, London, 1901, p. 320 f.).

In religion, then, as in the study of nature, Wordsworth's maxim holds good,

'We can feed this mind of ours
In a wise passiveness'

(*Expostulation and Reply*, 23 f.).

For all progress in insight, all growth in character, a certain calmness, meditateness, and passivity of the soul are necessary; 'a heart,' in Wordsworth's phrase, 'that watches and receives.' Our human destiny is fulfilled, not merely by the putting forth of effort in sheer reliance on our own unaided strength. This was the delusion of Pelagianism. It is fulfilled as much by bearing as by doing; by being acted upon not less than by acting; by patience not less than by effort; by yielding ourselves to God not less than by seizing opportunities; in a word, by cultivating that temper of mind which, before it says, 'Lo, I come to do thy will,' breathes the petition, 'Be it unto me according to thy word' (see J. H. Skrine, *Saints and Worthies*, London, 1901, no. 10, 'Ancilla Domini').

LITERATURE.—H. Martensen, *Christian Ethics* (General), Edinburgh, 1873, §§ 85-88, 107-110: the works of F. de Fénelon, St. François de Sales, Mme. Guyon, Molinos, and other mystical writers may be consulted. See, further, literature at art. MYSTICISM.

R. L. OTTLEY.

PASSOVER.—See FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Hebrew).

PASTORAL PEOPLES.—I. Scope and definition of term; position of pastoral peoples in primitive economics.—A typical pastoral tribe, such as the patriarchal Israelites of the OT, is one whose mode of life is entirely dependent upon and conditioned by the possession of flocks and herds of domesticated animals—oxen, sheep, goats, and horses—or, in particular areas, of such specialized animals as the camel, reindeer, or yak. In such a tribe these are not only the principal means of subsistence; they are also the chief or only form of wealth; upon them the position and dignity of the individual depend; they provide him with food and clothing; their acquisition, care, and well-being are the occupation of his life; and they or their products are the medium of exchange by which he obtains from peoples of different culture

such commodities not produced by his own people as he may require.

Considered schematically, the pastoral life marks an advance both psychologically and socially in the history of man. By the acquisition of flocks and herds of domesticated animals the shepherd and the herdsman have advanced beyond the day-to-day existence of the huntsman. Notwithstanding the intellectual alertness and ingenuity required from the individual who depends upon his skill in capturing his prey, the possession of a permanent source of livelihood gives the pastoral tribe as a social unit the advantage in opportunities for development and for advancement in solidarity. On the other hand, the constant care of the cattle and the more or less impermanent character of pastoral settlements due to the constant search for pasture place pastoral peoples at a disadvantage relatively to the peoples of settled agricultural habits. The latter are also less exposed to disaster from excessive or exceptional meteorological variations. Consequently, tribes which are pastoral in the strict sense make comparatively slight advance in material culture. There is an absence of specialization in the production of the simple utensils and implements which meet their needs, and any extension of interest in material culture by contact with outside influences is met by barter rather than by internal adaptation of productive powers. It may be noted, however, that this applies only to strictly pastoral tribes, many agricultural tribes being also cattle-keepers on a large scale. On the other hand, a few pastoral peoples practise agriculture as a secondary occupation usually entrusted to the women, the needs of the herds still determining the nomad life of the tribe, while others have in subjection under them a population whose special function is an industry or agriculture—e.g., the Gallas, Somalis, Masai, and other pastoral peoples of E. Africa, among whom despised peoples act as agriculturists, hunters, and smiths.

2. The pastoral life and the influence of environment.—In few types of the human community is the influence of environment so susceptible of analysis as in that of the pastoral tribe. The needs of the animals being paramount, such a community can develop only in a district where climate and soil combine to produce ample food-stuffs at all seasons of the year without the necessity of too rapid transit from one feeding-ground to another. Exception to this rule is found in the case of the horse and the camel. The one by its speed, the other by its constitution, is able to overcome the difficulty of distance, and consequently pastoralists who depend upon these animals can occupy desert areas, migrating from one oasis to another. The Arab populations occupying the fringes of the Arabian desert and the W. Sahara are cases in point. Apart from these cases, however, what is practically a continuous pasturage is required. Such regions are to be found in the tropics, where the equatorial forest land gives place to the grass lands, as, e.g., in Africa north and south of the equatorial region, and on mountain plateaux like those of W. and C. Asia, on the higher lands of the mountain valleys, or of the river valleys at the edge of the plateaux where altitude makes the land unsuitable for agriculture, or on the steppes of the temperate, and the tundras of the colder, latitudes. In these areas the strictly seasonal character of the vegetation is responsible for the nomadic life of the inhabitants. In the tropics the advance of the season burns off the grass with the increasing heat, necessitating movement either north or south, according to the situation as regards the equator, or to relatively higher ground where springs and grass are to be found in rifts in

the hills. In mountainous regions the melting of the snows with the advancing season opens up the higher valleys with their rich grass, and the cattle and sheep follow the snow-line as it recedes. Owing to the seasonal character of the vegetation and the absence of water without more elaborate irrigation than is available, these lands are not suited to agriculture, at any rate on the primitive scale.

The absence of pastoral tribes from America, except where this mode of life was undoubtedly due to civilized influence through the introduction of European animals, shows that it is necessary that a region, even if, from geographical considerations, suitable for pastoral purposes, should provide animals adaptable to domestication, before pastoral tribes can develop their particular form of organization and culture.

3. Distribution.—In tracing the distribution of pastoral tribes on the lines suggested by the influence of geographical environment, two disturbing factors have to be taken into account. (1) Outside influence, especially the introduction of European civilization, has a modifying effect. In S. Africa both the Hottentots and the Bantu were at one time extensive breeders of cattle. The more or less constant migrations of the Bantu peoples before the advent of the European as settler and ruler were possibly due to pastoral habits, or an earlier mode of life, but, at present, notwithstanding the continued importance of cattle, economically and socially, as the chief form of wealth, the restriction of the natives of S. Africa to locations and the introduction of the mining industry have made them, with the possible exception of the Bechuana, sedentary cattle-keeping agriculturists. Further, the introduction of the ox-drawn plough, acting through the tabu on oxen for women, has tended to transfer agriculture from the women, in whose entire charge it formerly was, to the men, whose duties previously were confined to the care of the cattle. On the other hand, slow development may leave under pastoral conditions land suitable for agriculture. Much of the area in the Russian empire now under pasture may come under cultivation with the increase of the resources available for its development. In S. Africa the Boers remained in the main a pastoral people owing to lack of economic pressure to induce them to put their land to more profitable uses.

(2) In some cases disturbance in economic equilibrium by an epidemic among the cattle or persistent raiding by more powerful neighbours may produce an entire change in the mode of life. The Masai of the Laikipia plateau, whose cattle were visited by an epidemic about 1890, and who were themselves subject to constant attacks by the Masai of German E. Africa, were forced by their loss of stock—a loss from which they never recovered—to abandon pastoral life and to become agriculturists (see C. Eliot, *ap.* A. C. Hollis, *The Masai*, Oxford, 1905, p. xiv). In C. Asia there are traces of the reverse process, in the course of which agriculture gave place to the nomad. The evidence of abandoned settlements and of the irrigation works in the Turfan depression has been interpreted as an indication that a prosperous agricultural and industrial community in this district, owing to climatic changes and a consequent reduction in the amount of water available, was at some period overwhelmed by marauding tribes of pastoral Mongols from the neighbouring hills. Owing to the continued desiccation these were in turn forced to withdraw, leaving the land again open for agricultural settlement. At the present day no Mongol nomads live within 150 miles of this depression (E. Huntington, *The Pulse of Asia*, p. 312f.).

The pastoral mode of life might be described as being a marginal type for two reasons: (a) it is imposed upon the inhabitants of lands occupying a marginal position in relation to cultivability, whether these are found on the edge of agricultural land, on the fringes of a desert, or at the snow-line of a hill-country; and (b), as these areas are for the most part those of climatic extremes of heat or cold, sometimes of both, the conditions which make the pastoral life possible at all are so nicely balanced that any meteorological change to still greater extremes, whether of heat, cold, drought, or moisture, is liable to upset the equilibrium and to drive the people further afield or compel them to modify their mode of life fundamentally. Study of the climatic conditions of C. Asia shows that the great racial migrations and conquests which have originated in this region have depended ultimately upon more or less serious changes in precipitation leading to a decrease in the pasture-land available as a source of livelihood for nomad tribes.

Regions which offer such conditions extend over a fairly well defined area. Speaking broadly, they run in a belt stretching from N.W. Africa, across the north of that continent, except the lower Nile valley, down the E. African plateau into German E. Africa (about lat. 7° N.). In the Euro-Asiatic continent they lie along the steppe-lands of the Russian empire, the mountain valleys and highlands of the Balkans and Asia Minor, the elevated plateaux and basins of C. Asia, including, to the south, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Tibet, and possibly at one time Kashmir, though, owing to slight changes in climatic conditions, it is now an agricultural country, and extending to the north-eastern edge of the Asiatic mainland.

The relative distribution of the pastoral peoples by whom these areas are occupied is broadly as follows. In Africa they fall into four main groups. (a) In the north-west and north, on the fringes of the Sahara desert, and in the highlands of the coastal region flanking the cultivable valleys of Mauretania and the Tripolitaine, where live agricultural and industrial Berber populations, Kabyles, and others, are nomad tribes. These are either Tuareg, Arabized Berbers who have become pastoral, and are grouped in confederacies such as the Beni M'zab, Askars, and others, or Arab tribes, more or less mixed in blood, descended from the invaders of the 11th century. (b) That part of the Sudan which lies west of the Nile, moderately fertile in the south, but decreasing in fertility towards the north till it shades off into the Bayuda steppe and the Libyan desert, is the home of the 'Sudanese Arabs,' negroid tribes containing varying and in some cases considerable admixture of Negro blood, but predominantly Arab in culture. It is a level country dotted with hills, in which the earlier Negro population has been able to maintain itself in the south but has been absorbed in the north. The most powerful tribes in the northern parts of this area are the Kababish and Kawahla, who, where the country is sufficiently fertile to support a sedentary population, use the lands of this population as their grazing ground. Further south the camel gives place to the ox in the country of the cattle-owning Baggara. The Fulah, who now range from Senegambia to Lake Chad and were at one time pastoral in the full sense, as a modified negroid type, probably had their origin in some part of the Sudan. (c) East of the Nile extending to the Red Sea are the Hamitic Beja tribes, of which the chief divisions are the Hadenodoa, the Bisharin, and the Beni Amer, the two first-named speaking a Hamitic, the last a Semitic language. (d) The fourth group of pastorals consists of the Nilotic tribes and those closely related

groups of peoples for whom the name of 'half-Hamitic' has been suggested. It includes the Shilluk, Nuer, Bari, and Dinkas, and such tribes as the Turkana, Suk, Nandi, Latuka, and Masai, the Bahima, and the Banyoro, some agricultural, some pastoral, who inhabit the plateau lands of E. Africa and Uganda and extend into German E. Africa as far as about lat. 7° N. The Nilotic tribes are sedentary and have a highly organized and centralized social system, and would perhaps be more correctly described as farmers owning large herds than as true pastoralists. The same applies to the Bantu, many of whom, like the Akamba and the Bantu tribes of S. Africa, are great breeders of cattle. But, notwithstanding the value and importance which they attach to the cattle, their mode of life now belongs to the agricultural rather than the pastoral type, although at the time of their migrations they may have conformed to the latter. The Hottentots, on the other hand, were a pastoral people when first they came into contact with Europeans. It is in Asia, however, especially on the central plateau, along the axial ridge, and at the edge of the northern plains where they begin to slope down from the highlands to the north, that conditions have been most conducive to the development of the pastoral life. The history of this region, so far as it has been possible to disentangle it from obscure and scanty records, has been one of almost constant tribal and racial migration, apparently brought about by climatic changes which by long-continued drought rendered the normal seasonal migrations from plains to hills inadequate to meet the requirements of flocks and herds. Evidence of these movements is to be seen in the incursions of Asiatic peoples into Europe, of which the present inhabitants of the Balkans, the Finns, and the Lapps are survivals, and in the Arab invasions of Africa. In Asia itself the extensions of Semitic influence, which so profoundly affected the history of W. Asia, and the Tatar and Mongol conquests were due to a similar cause.

The geographical distribution of pastoral peoples in Asia may perhaps best be considered in relation to their principal racial groups. The Mongols proper of the east fall into three groups: (1) the Kalmyks, (2) the Kazaks, and (3) the Buriats of Lake Baikal. In the N. Mongolic group are the Tunguses, who inhabit the Amur basin and most of E. Siberia. These peoples on the coastal area and in the river basin are hunters, fishers, and agriculturists, but in the Amur valley they follow pastoral occupations. The Turki or western division of the Mongolo-Tatars were at one time a widely-spread group of pastoralists, now represented by the Turks in Europe (no longer pastoralists), the Yuraks, and the Anatolian Turks in Asia Minor, and by the Yakuts of the Lena basin in S.W. Siberia, who, as is shown by their traditions, were at one time a horse-breeding people inhabiting wide, open plains (Keane, *The World's Peoples*, pp. 156 ff., 172 ff.). In the Turfan basin the Turki were followed by the Uigurs, and near them were the Ughuz, now represented by the Uzbeks of Russian Turkestan, the Turkomans of W. Turkestan, and the Osmanli in Asia Minor. In the Pamir region the Kara Kirghiz and the Kirghiz Kazaks (Cossacks), inhabiting the greater part of W. Siberia and extending from Lake Balkash to the Lower Volga, belong to the group, as do the W. Turkomans, who combined with their pastoral pursuits raids upon the Persian caravans. In Tibet, belonging to the Indo-Chinese group, are the Tanguts, a nomad predatory tribe of the north-east borderland, and

the Dru-pa, a peaceful pastoral semi-nomadic tribe of the central highlands. In S. India are the Todas, who inhabit the plateau of the Nilgiri hills. Another important group is that of the Ugro-Finns descended from proto-Finns who migrated from the Irish and Obi to the Urals, whence they dispersed to form the Samoyeds, Ostyaks, Votyaks, and Cheremiss tribes of W. Siberia and Russia, the Lapps of N. Scandinavia, and the Volga Finns, Bulgars, Avars, Magyars, Baltic Finns, Letts, and Livonians. The Semitic peoples, who spread over Arabia, Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, were pastoral nomads when first they appear in history. A trace of this is seen in the word *du* = 'city,' originally = 'tent' (Keane, p. 324). Many, as, e.g., the Jews, have long settled down to agriculture, but the modern representatives of the Ishmaelites, the Arabs proper of N. Arabia and the Sinaitic desert, still preserve much of their primitive pastoral habits, customs, and beliefs.

In the central area of the continent horses, oxen, goats, sheep (the fat-tailed variety), and camels are the means of subsistence of the pastoral peoples. In the north, on the tundras of Siberia, where grass gives way to reindeer-moss, they depend upon the reindeer. Among the reindeer peoples a distinction must be made, however, between those who are truly pastoral, such as the Lapps, Samoyeds, Votyaks, and others, among whom the reindeer is a domesticated animal, and those, like the Chukchis and Koryaks, who keep large herds of untamed reindeer, which they use for purposes of trade, and of which they eat the flesh but do not use the milk. A third class, which includes some of the Tungus tribes, owing to political restriction by the Russian Government, live in a much impoverished condition, and, their reindeer being insufficient in number to support them, they are compelled to eke out their existence by hunting, fishing, and trading.

4. Material culture.—The conditions imposed by the mode of life of nomadic pastoral tribes, which arise out of the necessity for more or less constant movement to provide food for their stock and to find a new site for the camp owing to the fouling of the ground in the pens and near the dwelling-places, have had a marked effect upon their material culture. In this respect the line of development has avoided anything fragile, such as pottery, and anything heavy and bulky, or at least not readily reducible to a size and weight suitable for transport. Further, the fact that wealth consists almost exclusively in cattle leaves little opportunity for ostentation, except in personal ornament, while the preoccupation of the men with their cattle and their attitude towards manual labour have precluded any substantial progress in the material arts.

(a) *Habitation*.—The dwelling is a striking example of the subordination of material and structure to the requirements of mobility. It must be of such a character as to be readily dismantled and packed to form a load for one or more of the beasts of burden, whether horse, camel, mule, donkey, or ox. The typical dwelling of a nomad pastoral people is the tent.

Among the Arabs its traditional form is rectangular; in C. Asia it is round and conical. It is usually built on a light framework, fastened by ropes of camel-hair, wool, or leather thongs, according to the material afforded by the stock, and its covering may be of linen, skins, felt, or woollen cloths, according to circumstances. The Kirghiz tent is very simple in form and has no partition. It is made of woollen cloths stretched on a light frame of willow poles, fastened together, as indicated, without the use of metal. Outside it is covered with large felts protected by a number of rush mats. In the centre of the top is a round hole for the egress of the smoke, protected against inclement weather by a felt cap manipulated by a string which hangs near the doorway (Huntington, p. 111). The Yuraks of Asia Minor use similar tents of black goat's hair. The tent in use among the Tatars is slightly more elaborate, having an

interior division providing two compartments, one of which is devoted to the women and their culinary operations (E. R. Huc, *Travels in Tartary, Thibet, and China*, Chicago, 1898, i. 47). The early Yakuts carried their tents with them, but left the frame-work for the next comer (W. G. Sumner, 'The Yakuts,' *JAI* xxxi. [1901] 70). The tents of the Si-Fan of Tibet were hexagonal, the black linen covering being stretched on a framework of ropes attached to poles some little distance from the tent proper. A more permanent character was given to them by the erection around each group of tents of a wall 4 to 5 ft. high. The tendency to permanence suggested by this practice was not strong; the tribes abandoned their settlements at the slightest provocation, taking the larger stones of the walls with them (Huc, ii. 48). The small group of huts which form the Toda village is also surrounded by a wall (W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, p. 24).

In the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan among Bisharin, Hadendoa, and Beni Amer tribes, in which it is customary at certain seasons of the year for groups to split up in order that the men may drive the camels to suitable feeding-grounds, while the women and boys remain behind to pasture the cattle up and down the country, the character of the dwelling varies with the duration of the stay which it is proposed to make at any one place. If it is to be a few days only, the tent may consist of only three or four mats, or may be a mere shelter of dried euphorbia boughs set in a ring, with a domed roof, a shelter of similar character being provided for the young sheep and goats (C. G. Seligmann, 'Some Aspects of the Hamitic Problem in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan,' *JRAI* xliii. [1913] 597). A shelter of boughs is also used at certain seasons by the Kurds and the Yuruks instead of their goat-skin tents. The Yuruk shelter has the peculiarity that the doorway is so low as only to permit entrance on hands and knees (Keane, p. 176). The Masai, though never staying very long in one place, also adapt their dwellings to the length of sojourn offered by the pasture. The more substantial form of dwelling is a long low structure of poles and grass containing several compartments; but, when in the course of its wanderings a tribe makes a stay at a pasturage which affords insufficient provision for any length of time, a temporary habitation of poles and skins is set up (Hollis, p. 292). The Suk, on the other hand, practically live in the open air. The young unmarried men sleep on the ground wrapped in skins, while the married men sleep under rude shelters consisting of a few sticks with a little grass kept down by a covering of cow-dung over which a skin is flung in wet weather (M. W. H. Beech, *The Suk: their Language and Folklore*, Oxford, 1911, p. 7).

The temporary character of the dwelling or its ready adaptation for transport is not, however, essential to mobility. Where the character of the land or its occupation by agricultural peoples restricts the area available for grazing, occupation of the various pastures becomes a more or less regular seasonal routine. Settlements may then be permanent, but only in occasional occupation at certain seasons of the year. The population migrates from one ground to another as the year advances.

Such is the procedure among many of the Kurdish tribes of the Armenian table-lands. They live in villages from October to February, migrate to higher ground and live in their tents from March to June, and in the hot season live in bowers of green wood, returning to their villages in the autumn (M. Sykes, 'The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire,' *JRAI* xxxviii. [1908] 454). The Toda villages consist of permanent huts, half-barrel shaped structures of wood surrounded by a wall. These are dotted here and there on the plateaux of the Nilgiri hills. Each community, usually one family, has several villages to which the cattle and those concerned with them migrate in the course of the year, not all at once (p. 36 f.). The Dinkas, on the other hand, are an example of a cattle-keeping people which, possibly influenced by agricultural conditions, is sedentary and has dwellings of a permanent character. The family groups of huts are scattered over the country in farmsteads, but for grazing purposes the cattle of a whole district are herded together (G. Schweinfurth, *Heart of Africa*, Eng. tr., London, 1873-74, i. 2 159 f.).

(b) *Industrial arts.*—It has already been indicated that the conditions of pastoral life, coupled with the attitude of the male members of the community towards manual labour, are not conducive to progress in the industrial arts; they are left to the women, or their products are obtained by barter from neighbouring peoples.

Clothing naturally varies in quantity according to climate. Except when contact with European civilization has introduced other fabrics, the community depends upon the produce of its cattle or flocks. The heavy garments of C. Asia necessary to resist the cold are of skin, leather, or felt, and the scanty attire of the Masai and other tribes of E. Africa is entirely of leather or skin. In the raid which follows the election of a chief the Masai wear a cotton cloth called 'the vow.' Before the intro-

duction of American cotton fabrics this was made of skins (Hollis, p. 301). The Suk dress is mostly goat-skin, but the men's capes are sometimes of leopard's skin (Beech, p. 12). The making of these garments as well as the preparation of the material usually falls upon the women. Among the Kirghizes the women prepare the skin, leather, or felt, and cut out and sew the garments,¹ including the high skin boots and the typical conical black felt caps. They also make screens, boxes, bags, and other receptacles of leather, and weave gaily-coloured rugs and screens. The leather articles and the gorgeous robes and head-dresses of the women are also embroidered with considerable skill in bright colours, of which they are very fond (Huntington, p. 111). The Si-Fan weave a coarse linen used for clothing and tents. Among the Fur of the Sudan the chief industry of the men is the weaving of cotton cloth, which is used as currency (Keane, p. 104). These people, however, are stock-breeders and keepers rather than pastoralists, and the field operations are undertaken by women and slaves. The Baban Kurds are also expert weavers and tent-makers.

(c) *Utensils, etc.*—The domestic utensils of pastoral tribes are not numerous. Pottery is not made as a rule. The usual receptacles for liquids are gourds, calabashes, baskets (in Africa), and vessels of wood, such as the hollowed trunk of a tree, and of skin or leather.

Although the Masai women, possibly owing to outside influence, can make pots, as a rule pottery, if in use by pastoral peoples, is imported. The pastoral Suk obtain pottery from the agricultural Suk; the Todas, who use bamboo receptacles of native manufacture for their milking-vessels, obtain the earthenware vessels used for churns from the neighbouring Kotas. For cups and platters they use leaves (Rivers, p. 50 ff.). Among the Kirghizes the milking-vessels are of wood, but water is sometimes stored in earthen pots.

(d) *Weapons.*—The same disinclination to engage in industrial occupations is apparent even in such an important matter as the making of weapons.

None of the pastoral tribes of E. Africa make their own weapons. Among both Sonalis and Masai there are special tribes (Tumalods and El Kunono respectively) who do the smiths' work. These peoples are not allowed to internarry with the pastoralists, and no free Somali would enter a smithy of shake hands with a smith, while a Masai would not take a sword or other weapon from the hand of a smith without first wiping his band. The Todas have no weapons, although they retain the use of the bow and arrow and club for their ceremonies. Their only implements are axes and knives, which they obtain from the Kotas.

(e) *Food.*—The original diet of all pastoral tribes was no doubt derived entirely, or mainly, from their flocks and herds. This is in many instances still the case, and where modifications have taken place there are proofs of the earlier practice.

The Bedawib of the Sudan do not cultivate at all; they live on milk and flesh, and it is said that, if they were given grain, they would not eat it (Seligmann, p. 599). Among the O. Asiatic groups of peoples, who in this as in other matters show much uniformity, milk, curds, and cheese are the staple of diet, kermis (curdled milk, especially mares' milk) in particular being held in high esteem. Bread is very scarce, in most districts almost unknown (Huntington, p. 117 f.). The fat-tailed sheep, of which the tail is esteemed the greatest delicacy, oxen, and the yak are also eaten. The Kirghizes consider a young colt a great delicacy, and Yakut tradition clearly indicates that the horse was eaten at the time when it was their chief stock animal (Sumner, p. 68). In E. Africa cattle disease has greatly reduced the size of the Masai herds, and it is not now possible for the tribes to eat the meat of their cattle to any great extent. They live on what they significantly call 'savage food'—maize, bananas, rice, etc. Meat is eaten, though usually under restriction. Women, children, and old men (whose usual diet is milk) are allowed to eat meat only when a beast dies or a sacrifice has been made at a funeral or other ceremonial. The warriors are allowed to slaughter cattle for food, but not in the kraal. At least once in two months cattle are driven into the wood and slaughtered and eaten there. The Masai never eat the flesh of a wild animal or bird (Hollis, p. 317 f.). The Suk, on the other hand, eat any kind of wild animal except beasts of prey and the flesh of a certain kind of wild pig. Their staple diet, however, is a porridge of millet; but that this is an innovation on their original custom is suggested by the fact that any one who chews raw millet cannot drink milk for seven days (Beech, p. 9). All the tribes of their region are very fond of raw blood, which they draw in a peculiar manner from the neck of the living animal and mix with milk. This fondness for blood is also found among the Asiatic peoples. It is probably to be attributed to the desire for salt in the diet. The diet of the Todas consists of milk, butter-milk, ghee, grains, rice, and sugar, but there is a tradition among them that at one time they lived on roots, herbs, fruits and honey (Rivers, p. 550). The pastoralists of Tibet are nomads.

¹ The principal outer garment of the Kirghizes is a long quilted cotton gown with long sleeves serving the purpose of gloves, of which the material is, of course, imported (see Huntington, p. 114).

nally Buddhists, but all supplement the diet of milk, butter, barley-meal, and fruit imposed by their religion by the flesh of game, yak, and mutton. They are also very fond of blood, and the children are fed on a diet of cheese, butter, and blood (Keane, p. 180).

(f) *Agriculture*.—As has been stated, pastoral tribes do not invariably subsist on the produce of their flocks and herds alone, and among many a large amount of cereals is consumed. Nomadic pastorals do not take readily to agriculture even when they have the opportunity. The Arab proverb, 'The ploughshare and shame entered hand in hand into the family,' is typical of their attitude (Keane, p. 321 f.). Among the Kurds, it is true, some tribes have settled down to a semi-sedentary life, part of which is given up to the care of crops, while others—e.g., the Baban Kurds, who are extensive agriculturists and wine-growers—employ outside labour. This has commended itself to other and more primitive peoples, and it is usual to find living in the midst of the pastorals of E. Africa not only the smiths and craftsmen already mentioned but also agriculturists, either of a different race or a branch of the same race much impoverished. The Masai of the Laikipia plateau are an example of a people who have taken to agriculture since the loss of their cattle. The Suk, on the other hand, regard themselves as being a prosperous offshoot of the agricultural Suk, whose aim is to prosper sufficiently to secure cattle and join their more highly esteemed pastoral neighbors. The Todas, who are not flesh-eaters, obtain the grain which forms a large part of their diet from the Badagas, whom they regard as a subject race (Rivers, p. 580). The influence of civilization is, however, perceptible in some cases. Around Suakim and in the neighbourhood of Sinkat the strongest and most advanced divisions of the Amara and Hadendwa, who have long been subject to foreign influence, practise cultivation (Seligmann, p. 599).

5. *Psychology*.—In their mental characters pastoral tribes present considerable uniformity, which is reflected both in moral qualities and in their social institutions. Their normal attitude towards manual labour, which is sometimes, possibly with justice, attributed to laziness, is in many cases only one side of an aristocratic temper which finds expression in their relations with neighbouring tribes whose mode of life may differ from their own. Not only is there a sharp line of cleavage between the African pastoral tribes and the adjacent agricultural and industrial populations, but the former arrogate to themselves the position of a superior people. The Bahima of Enkole regard the Bahera, by whom all the agricultural and industrial work of the community is performed, as their serfs. To call a man a Dorobo, a member of the people among whom they live by hunting, is, among the Masai, a term of grave reproach, while they hold that in the beginning of the world they were given the right over all cattle (Hollis, pp. 317, 269). The nomad Arab of Mauretania despises the Kabyle and other tribes engaged in agriculture or other forms of industry (Keane, p. 321 f.), and among the Asiatic peoples the same attitude prevails—e.g., in the pastoral Kurds towards the sedentary agricultural tribes. 'To be a nomad is considered noble' (Sykes, p. 455). The Zeibeks of the Misoghli highlands, like the Masai, believe that all the cattle in the world are theirs by right (Keane, p. 176). This attitude, together with the intrepidity, spirit of freedom, enterprise, and self-reliance of the pastorals, has endowed them with an aggressive character which, among the more primitive, has found expression in constant raids and intertribal wars. Before their subjection to British rule the Masai were constantly engaged in raiding and cattle-lifting. Where greater mobility was secured by the use of the horse, in the management of which

the horse-keeping pastorals excel, the more aggressive tribes were able to extend the radius of their operations and conduct them in an organized manner. The great trade-routes of Asia were infested by brigands—Kurds, Turkomans, Tatars, and Mongols—who swooped down on and plundered the caravans and then retired to their mountain fastnesses with their booty. This restless spirit not only resulted in the great racial migrations of the early ages, but, where exploited and utilized by leaders of ability and ambition, found its full expression in the great Tatar, Mongol, and Turki conquests which extended over Asia, and of which the effects were and are still felt in Europe. On the other hand, to the individual the pastoral generally shows an upright, courteous, and kindly disposition; Arab hospitality is proverbial, but not singular, and even a Masai, notwithstanding the doubtful reputation of the people, was bound under penalty of being cursed by members of the tribe of like age with himself to receive and entertain a stranger of his own class (Hollis, p. 288). The duty of hospitality was laid upon the pastoral peoples to some extent by self-interest, the scattered population and the necessity for distant travel, whether in search of strayed stock or for other reasons, making it desirable that shelter and food should be offered to all comers in hope of a return in kind. In E. Asia this assistance was extended to providing fresh beasts for the continuation of a journey (Huntington, p. 122).

Nomadic life and the primitive plan of the dwelling have also had their effect in other directions, notably in the modification of the Muhammadan attitude towards women. Among the Yurks of Asia Minor the women go unveiled and salute the wayfarer on the road (Keane, p. 176). Where the tent has no dividing partition, as among the Kirghizes, it is obviously impossible to keep up the custom of seclusion; and frequent absences of the men with their flocks not only lay greater responsibility on the women left behind to look after the homestead, but also give them a strong voice in the affairs of the community and greater freedom in the duty of entertaining any travelling stranger (Huntington, p. 128 f.). In other cases, especially in E. Africa, the inferior position of women among pastorals is as general as it is among neighbouring agricultural tribes.

Not only are animals prized and consequently reared for as a source of wealth, but considerable affection is shown to them. The African pastorals especially are extremely fond of their cattle. They give them pet names and sometimes go into mourning for them, and cases have occurred in which a man has committed suicide through grief at the death of a favourite beast. The preoccupation of the Suk with their cattle is indicated by the fact that the whole of their language revolves round them; when an adjective is used without a substantive, 'cow' is naturally understood; and they have a special name for every variety of cow, expressing colour, shape, type, special malformations of horns, and the like (Beech, p. 8).

6. *Sociology*.—Among pastoral tribes the social unit is, as a rule, small and consists of the family group, over which the head is absolute ruler. Several groups may be combined to form a tribal unit. The Kurdish tribes sometimes consist of as many as 2000 families, but for economic purposes the unit is the family. The more plentiful and accessible the cattle-feed, the smaller and more elastic will be the organization. In N. Kordeistan, where conditions of life are difficult owing to the scarcity of water and the seasonal character of the vegetation, the unit is comparatively large, social organization is more rigid, and migration takes place in a strictly regulated manner towards a

definite objective. Where pasture and water are plentiful, as in the provinces between the Nile and the Red Sea, the units are smaller, consisting at most of three or four tents, and migration takes the form of a more or less haphazard wandering in search of pasture wherever it may be found (Seligmann, pp. 597, 627). In the case of the Yakuts, now a much impoverished people, the unit consists of four or five people, who require as a minimum fifteen head of cattle for their subsistence. It has been conjectured, however, from the custom which admits as a matter of right all neighbours to partake of the food at any ceremonial family feast, that at one time, when the Yakuts in their earlier home were horse-breeders, the social unit consisted of a larger number, large enough, in fact, to eat a horse at one sitting. This would make for superior mobility by obviating the necessity for carrying the unconsumed portions of the carcass. The conditions of horse-herding must also have required a larger unit (Sumner, p. 68). Among the Suk, at a feast held as a means of preventing the approach of an epidemic, the bullock which is sacrificed must be consumed at one sitting (Beech, p. 9). Among the Todas each village is the property of one family, and the Dinka village is supposed to consist of one family. In the latter case, should the numbers be too small, several families may combine, but then each family has its separate quarters (H. O'Sullivan, 'Dinka Laws and Customs,' *JRAI* xl. [1910] 177). Among the Suk several adjacent villages may enter into a loose form of allegiance to a village headman of wealth, influence, or wisdom, who is known as an 'adviser' (Beech, p. 6). The Suk have no chiefs, nor are they under the control of medicine-men as are the Masai, Turkana, and other allied tribes of this region, among whom this functionary virtually usurps the power of chief. The institution of the 'adviser,' however, is a step towards attaining a position corresponding to that of the 'elder' in these tribes. But even in these cases, notwithstanding their advisory functions, the elders and chiefs have little real power, which for practical purposes rests with the warrior class and the medicine-men. This predominance of the younger men in a pastoral tribe may be paralleled among the Yakuts, where a man or woman past the prime is neglected and loses all influence and respect (Sumner, p. 76).

Not only does the pastoral mode of life act directly on the size of the group, but it determines the character of its internal organization. A mode of life which is based upon more or less continual movement demands a more systematic control than either hunting, in which co-ordination of action is intermittent, or a sedentary occupation such as agriculture or industry in its primitive forms. Consequently pastoral tribes are usually organized upon a strict patriarchal and patrilineal basis, although in many cases, as among the Nilotic and Hamitic groups, they show evidence of having at one time been matrilineal. The head of the family is the absolute ruler, the supreme judge, and the owner of the stock and other possessions of the group. The value of the individual member is recognized in the exaction of the bride-price, and in some cases in the practice of Labanism. Among the Hadendoa, Amara, and related tribes the husband must reside with the bride's people for a time and the first child must be born among them (Seligmann, p. 650). The bride-price takes the form of stock, and among the Masai father-in-law and mother-in-law are known as the 'receiver of a bullock' and the 'receiver of a sheep' respectively, from the custom of presenting these animals to them during the betrothal and marriage ceremonies. Relatives of the Masai bridegroom present a beast

to the bride, and henceforth giver and receiver address one another invariably by the name of the beast with the prefix *pa-*. Blood-brotherhood is contracted by the ceremonial eating of bullock's flesh dipped in the blood of the parties concerned (Hollis, pp. 302 f., 322; see also his 'Note on the Masai System of Relationship,' *JRAI* xl. 477 f.). Cattle are an important element in the judicial system, fines or compensation for murder and other crimes taking this form. Any one guilty of assault among the Suk must provide the injured party with sheep for food until he recovers (Beech, p. 30). The Masai may disregard a small theft, but never the theft of cattle. At the making of peace the sides exchange a cow (Hollis, pp. 310, 322). Among the Fur all contracts are carried out in cattle, although the usual currency is cotton cloth (Keane, p. 104).

Pastoral tribes, with few exceptions, are polygamous, and this custom is closely connected with cattle-keeping in more than one way. Not only is it affected by the bride-price, the number of wives depending upon a man's ability to provide the requisite cattle for the bride-price, as well as upon his means of supporting his wives, but the care of the cattle may demand a plurality of homesteads. Among the Yakuts, *e.g.*, a wealthy man may have his cattle in scattered herds, and, before monogamy was introduced under the influence of Christianity, it was customary for each herd to be under the care of one wife (Sumner, p. 94). The Chukchis also herd their reindeer in divisions, over each of which a wife presides.

Private property in cattle is fully recognized, and it is usual for each group, in some cases each individual, to brand his cattle. The Kordofan tribes have an elaborate system of brands for their camels, and among E. African tribes the oxen, cows, and goats all have their ears clipped in a distinctive fashion, indicating both tribal and individual ownership (Hollis, p. 290). The Bahima of Ankole, however, do not recognize absolute private ownership of cattle. All the cattle belong to the king; the chiefs are responsible for the well-being of the cattle in their respective districts; the individual owner may eat a limited number of his cattle, may use them for the bride-price, or may exercise a certain freedom in selling or exchanging them within the nation, but he may not sell to any one outside; cattle taken in war also belong to the king (J. Roscoe, 'The Bahima . . . of Enkole,' *JRAI* xxxvii. [1907] 95).

Land is usually common property, but, as a rule, each group has its recognized limits for grazing. In the more fertile parts of the Sūdān these tend to be ignored, but in more barren regions trespass is a frequent cause of tribal fights. Among the Yakuts private property hardly exists, and even the house tends to be regarded as common property (Sumner, p. 70).

7. Religious beliefs.—Among the pastorals of both Africa and Asia Islām and Buddhism have to a great extent overwhelmed primitive beliefs. These survive, however, in the form of superstitions and practices to propitiate evil spirits. The Tuaregs, *e.g.*, believe in *jins* who live under the desert and cause camels to sink in the soft sand by pulling down their feet (Keane, p. 323). In N. and C. Asia, the home of shamanism, Muhammadanism, Buddhism, and Christianity have had little more than a superficial effect, and shamans and shamanistic beliefs continue to exert considerable influence. The pastorals of E. Africa for the most part agree in recognizing a supreme deity whose home is the sky, and it has been suggested that this belief represents a survival of a religious system in which the rain-god, a deity of obvious importance to both pastoral and agricultural

peoples, was the chief element (Seligmann, p. 664f.). It follows that, the religious practices and beliefs which are more specifically characteristic of pastoral peoples are, as a rule, of a subsidiary character. It may be noted, however, that among the Todas the conception of the gods is vague and shadowy, and their religion has become almost completely absorbed in the ritual of the dairy. There is, however, no indication of the worship of the sacred cattle.

The object of the religious and magical practices peculiar to pastoral peoples is to secure the health, fertility, and productive power of herds and flocks. Their character suggests that some degree of sanctity is generally recognized both in the stock and in its products, and that any breach of this sanctity by the performance of forbidden actions would react on the animals to their detriment.

A significant instance is the attitude of the Masai, and to some extent of the Suk, to grass. 'Cattle feed on grass, and the Masai love grass on this account.' The women fasten grass on their clothes when they pray for rain. If a warrior beats a boy on the grazing-ground, he must stop if the boy tears up a handful of grass. Grass held in the hand is a sign of a desire for peace. When warriors return from a raid, girls sprinkle milk from a small gourd covered with grass over those who have killed an enemy. When they move from one kraal to another, grass is tied on their gourds (Hollis, p. 289 f.). If the Suk, on a hostile raid, meet a man with grass on his head, he must not be killed, and, if when they enter a kraal a woman succeeds in sprinkling milk on them, no one in that kraal can be killed (Beech, p. 25).

Among the En-Jemusi, a tribe more or less closely associated with the Suk, if there is a dispute as to stolen property, the parties to the quarrel drink the blood of a goat (drawn from the neck) mixed with milk. The one who swears falsely will die. The same penalty for false witness follows if the dispute concerns cattle. Blood is drawn from the cattle in question and thrown at accuser and accused (Beech, p. 28 f.).

The highly elaborate ritual of the Toda dairy, with its grades of priests strictly segregated from the people and its regulations for milking, collecting, and dealing with the milk, is undoubtedly based on a belief in the sacred character of milk and desire to preserve it from pollution by the profane. The Todas are not alone in regarding milk as of special sanctity. Both in E. Africa and in the Sūdān many precautions are observed in dealing with it.

It is usual for milk to be milked only into certain kinds of vessels, commonly gourds, basket vessels, sometimes vessels of skin, never pots of clay or the modern tin vessel. The milker should not himself taste the milk first, but should give some, if only a few drops, to a bystander or to all the bystanders. Among the Bahima a boy who has been set aside to drink the milk of a dedicated cow may not drink or eat anything else

of some antiquity. Special regulations must affect the milker. Among the Dinkas cows are milked by a boy or girl before puberty; a man may not touch a cow, but this is not desirable. The cooking vessels, but leave them to be licked by their dogs. If they washed them, the cows would run dry (Keane, p. 138). The Suk drive their cattle to salt licks once a month, but the cows would run dry if this were done at a time when the moon was not visible (Beech, p. 9). Most African tribes avoid bringing milk and meat as food into contact—an interval of 24 hours at least should elapse; a Suk who chews raw millet must abstain from milk for seven days, while a Nandi who eats a forbidden animal must abstain from milk for four months. The Bahima are more strict and will not eat even vegetables and milk together. Great care is taken that women who approach or touch the cattle should be ceremonially pure. No menstruous woman must milk or even touch the cattle. The Bedawib say that, if a woman in this condition drank milk, both she and the cow from which the milk was drawn would become sterile (Seligmann, p. 655). These regulations do not appear to extend to pregnancy (for detailed references to regulations affecting milk among the pastoralists of Africa and the Sūdān see Seligmann, p. 654 ff.).

Among some Bantu peoples women are not allowed to touch cattle at all, and it may be that this was the original attitude of all pastoral

peoples and has only been gradually relaxed, in some cases possibly owing to lack of adequate labour. The Artega, Ashraf, and Hasa allow only men to milk camels and sheep and despise the Arab Zebediya, recent immigrants from Arabia, because they allow their women to milk. These tribes have few cattle. Generally in the S. Beja country cattle are not held in much esteem. No Artega man would milk a cow. It is probable, therefore, that cattle have been only recently introduced (ib. p. 655). Among the Asiatic tribes there is little evidence of any great disability of women in connexion with stock. Among the Khalkas, a horse-keeping people of the Sharras, not only milking but the care of the stock at foaling time devolved upon the women. The Todas, however, are stringent in regulating the contact of women with cattle. The paths over which the sacred herds pass are tabu to women; women are allowed to approach the dairy only by a certain path and at a stated hour when they come to fetch butter-milk. The floor of the Toda hut is divided into two parts marked by the hole in which rice is pounded. In the front part the churning is done, and with this part of the house women have nothing to do. Further, the characteristic women's implements—the broom and rice-pounders and sifters—have to be removed from the village when the priest (*wursol*) sleeps there, and the women take these implements with them when they leave the village at the time when the sacred herds pass through (Rivers, pp. 27, 29, 585).

Reference has already been made to the sacrifice and eating, after a death, of cattle and sheep belonging to the deceased. Among the Yakuts a beast was killed in order to accompany the soul of its former owner after death. The Bahima, after the death of a king or queen, continued to pay them a tribute of cattle.

The body of the dead king, after being washed in milk, was wrapped in the skin of a cow which had been killed by having its neck twisted. It was then taken to Ussanzi, and after a certain number of days was said to have become pregnant and brought forth a lion cub. This incarnation of the king was kept by the priests and then turned into the forest, cattle being provided for it from time to time. The lions of this forest were never killed. A similar custom obtained in the case of queens, but they became leopards, while princes and princesses became snakes (Roscoe, p. 101 f.).

Among the Suk a very special relationship exists between men and cattle.

Every warrior must have a *kamar*, an ox with one horn pointing backward and one forward, or he is made the subject of taunts. When the warriors start on a raiding expedition, the *kamar* are brought together, bedecked with feathers, and sent to the river where warriors collect. The warriors dance around, clap their hands, and shout the war-cry to excite the faint-hearted. A captured *kamar* is a great prize, and is slaughtered and eaten at once (Beech, p. 8).

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E. N. FALLAIZE.

PATAGONIANS.—I. General description.—The Patagonians inhabit the extreme south of S. America, between the Atlantic Ocean and the advanced foot-hills on the east side of the Andes, from 41° or 42° S. lat. to the Strait of Magellan; a section of them have even spread beyond the Strait, and, under the name of Ona or Aona, occupy the eastern part of the large island of Tierra del Fuego. The real name of the Patagonians—the one most frequently used by themselves—is Aoniken, which is very like the word Aona. The name Patagonians was given them by Magellan, the first European who saw the natives at Port San Julian. According to some etymologies,

this word comes from the Spanish *patagones* ('large feet'); but modern explorers, like Spegazzini and Ramon Lista, think that it is a combination of two words: *patak* ('hundred')—a name given to the Patagonians by their former Quichua rulers—and a native word *Aoniken*. The Patak-Aoniken, contracted to Patagons, would therefore mean a hundred (an administrative division imposed by the Quichua) of the natives (who call themselves Aoniken). The name Tehuelches, by which the Patagonians are also known, comes from the Araucanians, their eastern neighbours. Some writers call them Tshon or Tsoneka (derived from Aoniken?).

Scattered over an immense area, including the provinces of Santa Cruz and Chubut, half or three-quarters of the province of Rio Negro in the Argentine Republic, and some territories in the south of Chile, the Patagonians were at one time very numerous. About 1828 d'Orbigny estimates them at 8000 or 10,000; but in 1869-70 Musters reckons only 1500. In 1892 Ramon Lista calculates that they are scarcely 500 (not counting the Ona), distributed among the four following localities: in the province of Santa Cruz, the valley of Coy Inlet and at Karpenk-aiki on the Rio Chico; in the province of Chubut, on the banks of the river Senguerr; and near the Laguna Blanca lake, to the north of Punta Arenas, on Chilean territory. More recently, in 1900, H. H. Prichard speaks of five encampments including altogether 'a few hundreds of individuals.' But it must not be imagined that so many Patagonians have completely disappeared: a great many of them (especially in the province of Rio Negro) live among their neighbours—Araucanians on the west, and Puelches and Whites (colonists and Gauchos) on the north; they bear the names of those ethnic groups, which are, as a rule, more civilized than they. Mixtures of these races—e.g., between Patagonians and Argentine colonists, all speaking Spanish—are also very numerous.

The first travellers who explored Patagonia gave most exaggerated reports of the stature of the natives, describing them as positively gigantic. Later estimates and some measurements—unfortunately very few—enable us to state that, although the Patagonians were very tall (average probably about 6 ft.), they were no more so than several other races of the world—e.g., Scots, Serbs, Nilotic Negroes, the Sara of the Shari-Chad district. They are, as a rule, very robust and muscular; they have long faces, straight or aquiline noses, reddish-yellow skin, and smooth, straight hair. They are hospitable, very good to their children, of a calm disposition, and rather inclined to sadness. They are very taciturn and seldom laugh. Under the influence of alcohol, however, they become irritable and quarrelsome, and many of their feasts, which are accompanied by libations, end in sanguinary battles.

The language of the Patagonians and the Ona, like that of almost all the natives of America, is agglutinative in structure and polysynthetic; phonetically it is characterized by the abundance of its guttural sounds. In contrast with what is found in the majority of S. American races, the Patagonians have a highly developed system of numeration: they count up to 100 and even 1000. But this system has been borrowed from the Quichua, for the Ona, who have never been in contact with the Quichua, cannot count beyond three.

As a rule, the Ona represent at the present time what the Patagonians were before the introduction of the horse among them, i.e. before the first half of the 17th century. They are nomad hunters, armed with slings and bows and arrows. Clothed

in guanaco-skins, they move from place to place in search of game; their only shelters are huts of branches, and sometimes they simply lie down on the ground, squeezed close together, and covered on the wind side with some guanaco skins. Since the introduction of the horse the Patagonians have improved their material life, although they have remained nomad hunters; they have given up the bow and arrow, and have adopted the *bollas* as their chief weapon.

The *bollas* consists of three round stones attached to three strings, which are knotted together at the other end. They swing these *bollas* round their heads and then throw them, while pursuing the hunted animal on horseback. The animal—generally the guanaco or the ostrich—is strangled by one of the strings of the *bollas* winding round its neck.

The Patagonians live in large tents (*kau*), composed of three rows of posts, diminishing in height from front to rear, and covered with guanaco-skins. They have learned from the Araucanians how to make ornaments of silver and to weave cloth. In place of the primitive tinder-box (two pieces of pyrites, which were struck against each other), still in use among the Ona, the Patagonians have for a long time used the European tinder-box and matches. They even have a musical instrument—the *koolo*; it is a small bow, one end of which is held in the mouth and the other in the left hand, while with the right hand the player strikes the string with a bone (the humerus of the condor) in which there are several holes. The sound of this instrument is weak; it imitates the wind or the gallop of horses. The tambourine is a Spanish importation; it is used to accompany their only dance, called the 'ostrich dance,' in which the men imitate the movements of that bird, while the women, seated in a circle round the dancers, make music and beat time with their hands.

The Patagonians are skilled in the preparation of guanaco-skins, which they sell to the Argentine traders. They also manufacture the saddles and harness for their horses; these are ornamented with silver and are often their most valuable possession. The dress of the men is almost the same as that of the women: a long mantle of guanaco-hide, a band of leather or wool confining their hair like a crown, and sometimes boots made from the skin of any animal. The Patagonians paint their bodies with red, black, or white according to circumstances, and practise tattooing, with very simple figures—parallel lines, triangles, circles, etc.

2. God and spirits.—Our information regarding the religion of the Patagonians is neither abundant nor very accurate. According to the evidence of Viedma, who wrote about 1781, the Patagonians of that time believed in two supernatural entities, the one good, who governs the celestial regions and has no power over men, the other sometimes good, sometimes wicked, who takes an active interest in human actions. Further, each family-group had its patron, its tutelary god, with whom men came into contact through the intermediation of a kind of shaman. Outès, one of the best ethnologists of the Argentine, suggested the idea that this was a survival of the clan-totemism which prevailed among the primitive Patagonians. He bases the idea on the evidence of Falkner, a contemporary of Viedma, who says that each family-group of the Patagonians regarded itself as belonging to a species of animal—ostrich, puma, guanaco, etc. He also sees the confirmation of these ideas in certain myths, which tell, e.g., of the war between two clans in consequence of the fact that the members of one of the clans had eaten the flesh of the ostrich (a totemic animal); but this may have been simply a dispute concerning an encroachment on a hunting-ground. Moreover, even towards the end of the 18th cent. the Patagonians

believed in the existence of zoomorphic beings, who dwelt in caverns near lakes and hills, and who created men, gave them weapons—slings, bows and arrows—and taught them how to use them.

A century later, about 1885, Ramon Lista gives a description of the religious ideas of the Patagonians which shows some resemblance to the foregoing. The supreme being is called El-lal; he is a strong spirit, clever, and kind; he is the creator of the world and of the Patagonians. After having cleared the world of the wild animals which infested it, he taught men the secrets of obtaining fire and of building a shelter for themselves. The myths relating to El-lal were still well known to the old men of the end of the 19th century. The following is a résumé of them:

El-lal came into the world in a strange way. His father Nosthej (a kind of Saturn), wishing to devour him, had snatched him from his mother's womb. He owed his rescue to the intervention of the *terguerr*, a rodent animal, which carried him away to its cave; this his father tried in vain to enter. From the mother's horrible wound, inflicted by her husband, sprang a river of crystal-clear water, which still exists in the neighbourhood of Teckel, near the sources of the river Senguer. After having learned from the famous rodent the properties of different plants and the directions of the mountain-paths, El-lal himself invented the bow and arrow, and with these weapons began the struggle against the wild animals—puma, fox, condor—and conquered them all. But the father returned. Forgetting the past, El-lal taught him how to manipulate the bow and the sling, and joyfully showed him the trophies of the chase—tortoise shells, condors' wings, etc. Nosthej took up his abode in the cave and soon acted as master of it. Faithful to his fierce instincts, he wanted to kill his son; he followed him across the Andes, hut, when on the point of reaching him, he saw a dense forest arise between him and his son. El-lal was saved; he descended to the plain, which meanwhile had become peopled with men. Among them was a giant, Goshy-e, who devoured children; El-lal tried to fight him, but he was invulnerable; the arrows broke against his body. Then El-lal transformed himself into a gad-fly, entered the giant's stomach, and wounded him fatally with his sting. It was not until he had accomplished all those feats, and had proved himself a clever huntsman, that El-lal thought of marrying. He asked the hand of the daughter of the sun, but she did not think him worthy of her and escaped from him by a subterfuge. Disenchanted, El-lal decided to leave the earth, where, he considered, his mission was at an end, since men, who had in the meantime appeared in the plain and in the mountain-valleys, had learned from him the use of fire, weapons, etc. Borne on the wings of a swan across the ocean towards the east, he found eternal rest in the verdant islands which rose among the waves at the places where the arrows shot by him had fallen on the surface of the waters.

The myth of El-lal shows the condition of the Patagonians in pre-historic times and their struggles with their conquerors, and gives a glimpse into religious thought in evolution.

Alongside of this superior creative being, who, as soon as his work was accomplished, went to rest and had no more to do with human affairs, the Patagonians believe in the spirit of good who protects men, especially in cases of illness; and in the spirit of evil, represented by several invisible beings gifted with supernatural powers. One of these is Maïpe, always associated with the darkness of night, the violent wind of the desert, and other phenomena that trouble the minds of primitive men; another is Keron-kenken, a monster who devours newly-born children and drinks the tears of their broken-hearted mothers. The name *kere*n is often given to all wicked spirits. The word *wallishen* or *qualicho*, which we find used by certain writers to denote an evil spirit, is of Araucanian origin.

3. Sacrifices, witchcraft, and disease.—As was said above, each Patagonian family used to have a special shaman, who had charge of the religious ceremonies, and who went for this purpose to the summit of a hill near the encampment. At the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th cent. these ceremonies took place in the shaman's tent. At the present day they seem to be abandoned,

¹ This is the case with the young Patagonians to the present day.

but the shamans still exist. Their special duty is to cure the sick.

After having exhausted the meagre resources of his medical art—*e.g.*, lotions of cold water, blood-letting, and massage—the shaman has recourse to the great methods: he sings incantations beside the invalid, then proceeds to suck the part of the body through which he intends to extract the spirit who is causing the illness. He then shows the relatives who surround the patient this spirit in the form of an arrow, an insect, etc. The sacrifice of an animal, usually a mare, is also practised to cure invalids. All the relatives and friends of the sick man meet near the camp, to which the youths and boys lead the mare to be sacrificed. Some men of the clan fall upon it, and the most skilled of them strikes the fatal blow in the chest with a very sharp knife; he then extracts the heart, and, holding it in his hand, walks several times round the animal, which dies in convulsions. Its flesh is then divided among those present and consumed on the spot. The head and hoofs are fixed to a pole painted with yellow ochre, which is planted on the top of a neighbouring hill by a group of horsemen.

The profession of shaman is hereditary, and may be exercised by either men or women. Female shamans are even more numerous than male. It is a profession in which certain risks are run, for, if the patient treated by the shaman dies, the shaman himself is often put to death.

Shamans are also sorcerers. Usually they are taciturn, suspicious persons, who keep aloof from the rest of the people. Their magic power resides in some small rough perforated stones, which are handed from father or mother to son and are jealously guarded, for their loss entails the loss of the shamans' magic power. The Patagonians believe that the smallest particle detached from the body—nails, hair, and even the rugs of their clothes—may become transformed into an evil spirit, possessing magical power; they therefore burn these things as quickly as possible. Sorcery is called *shoik'n*, and every man can practise it, though to a less degree than the shaman. Thus they sometimes try to cure an illness without the help of the shaman; the whole family gather round the invalid and shout and yell fiercely; then some of the men go out on horseback and pursue to a great distance the spirit which has left the body. Sometimes they send the invalid out on horseback quite naked, in intense cold, for, according to the Patagonians, the best remedy for all ills is great noise and great cold (Prichard, *Through the Heart of Patagonia*, n. 86 f.).

continues to live after the man's death and prowls about the abode of his relatives. The fear inspired by these ghosts is so great that the Patagonians must not pronounce the name of the dead man, lest they should attract the attention of the 'double.' This is sometimes the cause of changes in the Tehuelche language; e.g., not long ago fat was called *ham* in that language, but, when a Patagonian who had this word as a proper name was on the point of death, his relatives and friends replaced the name by *golosjku*; nowadays *ham* is forgotten. The dead are usually buried under a heap of stones, sometimes painted red (*tchenke*). At the present time the bones are exhumed after a certain period (a custom borrowed from the Araucanians) to be painted red.

5. Marriage customs.—Marriage is endogamous; but even at the end of the 18th cent. chiefs had to take their wives from another tribe (Viedma). This was probably a survival of primitive exogamy. Marriage does not require any religious ceremony. In early times, however, the shaman recited some invocations and gave advice to the newly-wedded pair. The basis of marriage is the purchase of the woman from her parents. Perhaps the scarcity of women explains the long maintenance of this custom. It is said that there are three men for every woman among the Patagonians, probably on account of the hard conditions of life for the woman, on whom devolves a number of laborious tasks—the setting up and taking down of the tents, the gathering of berries and roots, preparation of food, weaving, etc. A marriage takes place as follows:

After acquiring renown as a skilled huntsman, the young man goes to the tent of his future wife's parents and makes his proposal, mentioning the number of horses or pieces of silver that he offers for her. Usually he offers two horses to each of the future wife's brothers. If the parents accept this 'gift,' the matter is settled; they then give presents to the suitor in exchange. Next day the newly-wedded couple take up their abode in a tent which they build with the relatives on both sides, and there they receive and entertain their friends. The whole affair ends in a great feast, with dancing and immoderate use of *llama* (brandy). On that day dogs are not allowed to touch food—not even the leavings of the feast.

Polygamy is allowed, but seldom practised. In former times chiefs had as many as twelve wives. After the death of the husband, when the period of mourning is over, the wife, especially if she is no longer young, may cohabit with any man of her tribe for any length of time. We must not conclude from this that the morals of Patagonian women are loose, for young girls are virtuous as a rule, and adultery is rare among the married.

The birth of a child is celebrated with feasting and dancing. It is also accompanied by the following ceremony:

The child is placed for a moment in the inside of an animal which has just been sacrificed by being slit from head to tail and having its entrails removed. They believe that by means of this operation the child will become a good horseman (Prichard, p. 96). The child is then measured, and on the following day the whole encampment knows how many *horres* (a native measure equal to the length of the hand) he is in height.

6. Social organization.—The immediate members of a family all live in the same tent (*kaw*); but each couple is separated from the others in the tent by curtains of skins. They have food in common. Property is individual, and is transmitted from father to son. If there is no son, the inheritance goes to the nearest relatives—first to the women, then to the men. Consanguinity is recognized to the fourth generation.

The Patagonians have no chiefs of the ordinary kind, although they recognize the superiority of certain men who are richer, more eloquent, or more skilful huntsmen than the others. The powers of the chiefs in former times were more extensive: they conducted warlike expeditions, and acted as supreme judges in disputes between people of the

same encampment. Nowadays they act as intermediaries between the Whites and their compatriots on various occasions; they also conduct collective hunts—battues organized by several bands of hunters accompanied by their half-wild dogs.

The Patagonians possess slaves, usually women, whom they have captured, after victorious battles, as a result of incursions on neighbouring territories. Hence we come across Fuegian slaves in their tents (Spegazzini, *Anales de la sociedad científica Argentina*, xvii. 236).

LITERATURE.—T. Falkner, *Description of Patagonia*, Hereford, 1774; F. de Viedma, *Descripcion de la costa meridional . . . patagonica*, in P. de Angelis, *Colection de obras y documentos . . . Rio de la Plata*, Buenos Aires, 1836-40, v.; G. C. Masters, *At Home with the Patagonians*, London, 1871; C. Spegazzini, 'Costumbres de los Patagones,' *Anales de la sociedad científica Argentina*, xvii. [Buenos Aires, 1884] 221 ff.; Ramon Lista, *Viaje al pais de los Onas*, do. 1887; P. A. Segers, 'Habitos y costumbres de los indios Aonas (Onas),' *Boletin del Instituto geografico Argentina*, xii. [1891] 56 ff.; Lista, *Los Indios Tehuelches*, Buenos Aires, 1894; H. H. Prichard, *Through the Heart of Patagonia*, London, 1902; F. Outés, 'La edad de la piedra en Patagonia,' *Anales del Museo nacional de Buenos Aires*, iii. v. [1905] 203; Lehmann-Nietsche, 'El grupo linguistico Tshon,' *Revista del Museo de La Plata*, xii. [1913] 217. J. DENIKER.

PATALIPUTRA.—See PATNA.

PATAÑJALI.—Patañjali is regarded in India as the founder of the Yoga system. Since, however, Patañjali, who is celebrated also as a grammarian, lived in the 2nd cent. B.C., and the doctrines of the Yoga, both theoretical and practical, can be shown to have existed in India several hundreds of years earlier, this tradition must be understood to imply merely that Patañjali in the *Yogasūtras* for the first time gave literary form to the Yoga doctrines. The scanty information that we possess on the life of Patañjali is full of legends and contradictions.

LITERATURE.—Rājendralāla Mitra, *Yoga Aphorisms*, Calcutta, 1883, Pref. p. lxi ff.; F. Max Müller, *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, London, 1899, pp. 156 f., 410 ff.

R. GARBE.

PATARINI (also Paterini, Patrini, Pathariste, Patarelli).—This is the name by which the Cathari, or Albigenses (*q.v.*), were frequently designated in the 13th and 14th centuries, but, after that time, it was more vaguely employed to denote heretics in general. The etymology of the term has been much disputed (see C. Schmidt, *Histoire et doctrine des Cathares*, Paris, 1848-49, ii. 278-279). Its earliest use, as applied to the Cathari, is perhaps that in a canon of the Lateran Council of 1178, where it occurs, along with Publicani (*q.v.*), as an alternative designation for Cathari (C. de Vic and J. Vaissette, *Hist. générale de Languedoc*, Paris, 1872-90, vi.² 86; see also 222). The best authenticated etymology associates the term with the Pataria in Milan, a democratic party in that city, in the 11th cent., whom their aristocratic rivals contemptuously designated as Paterini, or 'ragamuffins'; 'eisque paupertatem impropertantes Paterinos, id est pannosos vocabant' (Bonizo, in *PL* cl. 825); cf. 'les Gueux' in the Low Countries in the 16th century. The Paterins largely followed the teaching of Ariald, the fanatical denouncer of a married clergy in the 11th century. As the Cathari also decried marriage on the part of ecclesiastics, and, partly on account of their poverty and still more, perhaps, from their desire to escape observation in their assemblies for worship, also sought out obscure localities, their defamers naturally availed themselves of these features to transfer to them the epithet which had formerly been applied to the followers of Ariald, while the quarter in which they resided also became known as Pataria, and in more recent times as Contrada de' Patari.

J. BASS MULLINGER.

PATETS.—See CREEDS AND ARTICLES (Parsi), EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Parsi).

PATH (of the gods or of the soul).—The word 'path' and its synonyms, it is obvious, lend themselves readily to specifically religious and ethical applications; but the most highly developed technical employment of this nature is found in the literatures of India and of Persia.

1. India.—In the *Rigveda* and the *Atharvaveda* the word 'path' (Skr. *panthā*-, *pathi*-, *path*-, *adhvan*-, *gātu*-, and derivatives) has the usual literal meanings as applied to ways on earth and to the courses of the heavenly bodies either as such or as deities, and figurative meanings such as the way unto sleep and the path of man's life. In addition, it has two main religious significations: (a) the path of the gods, and (b) the path of the fathers.

(a) *The path of the gods* is the way between the world of the gods and the world of men; it was created and is kept in repair by the fire-sacrifice with the drinking of the *soma*-juice, and by the devout thought or meditation of the pious worshippers. Even more definitely, this path or these paths (for there is no consistency in the number) are said to have been first made by Atharvan, the mythical first fire-priest, through his institution and practice of the fire-sacrifice, though at other times other ancient seers, and the gods Bṛhaspati, Agni, Indra, and Soma, are severally called 'path-makers.' Agni, the fire, both as physical fire and as god of the fire, is termed the 'knower of the ways,' for by them he comes down to earth to the sacrifice and kindles the holy fuel, and by them he hastens back to heaven to invite the gods to come down to earth to the sacrifice, where they may sit on the *kūśa*-grass round the holy fire. With or without this formal invitation of Agni, the gods (Indra, Varuṇa, Aryaman, Savitr, Pūṣan, Aramati, the *āsvins*, the *maruts*, the *ṛbhus*, etc., are mentioned in this connexion) come down by these paths to the sacrifice, where they vicariously, through the priest, enjoy the drinking of the *soma*. Elsewhere Agni is spoken of as bringing to the gods by the paths the viands and the *soma*-drink, or other offerings; by them either the *āsvins* or the eagle conveys to Indra the *soma*; by them, before the sacrifice, the prayers ascend to Agni and Indra; the *soma* is appealed to, to put them into fit condition for the ascent of a new song of praise and petition. This is the path of *amṛta*, or immortality, by which the *ṛbhus*, after drinking the *soma*, were able to attain places among the gods; it was by songs, however, that the *angirases* built their way to immortality. But death is warned to keep away from this path that the gods tread. At other times as well as at the time of the sacrifice the gods come to the earth by these paths, which extend from the seat of the highest god, far beyond the vision of man; yet man is thought of as wandering along the path of the gods, during the sacrifice, though arrival at the abode of the gods is felt to be beyond attainment. These paths are characterized as bathed in light, straight, ancient, dustless, easy to go, thornless, god-trodden.

(b) *The path of the fathers*, or *pitṛs* (the spirits of the ancestors), is the path leading from the world of the living to the world of the dead. It was originally discovered by Yama, the first of men to die, and hence is called 'the path of Yama.' Others followed in his path, and made their way to the abode of the dead, so that it is occasionally called 'the path of the ancient ones.' This path is dark, fearful, frightful, forward-going, descending; Agni, in his manifestation as the fire which consumes the corpse, is directed to go this way and

not upon the god-trodden path. As the soul of the dead man makes his way to his new abode, he must pass the 'two dogs of Saramā,' the sun and the moon, which are represented now as guarding the path and driving away the wolf, and now as dangerous obstacles to the passage of the soul. Pūṣan is implored to protect this road. Those who have gone this path cannot come back—a Vedic idea, uttered before the origin of the belief in metempsychosis; but, though they cannot return to resume life in this world, still the *pitṛs* may return by this path for a brief space to partake of the offerings at the sacrifices which are made to the souls of the dead.

The path of the *pitṛs* is not infrequently confused with the path of the gods, and is described as made by the ancient seers or by the *pitṛs*, and extending to heaven or to the lofty sky, bringing us into association with day and light, with sun and moon.

In the *Upaniṣads* there are four different ways or paths for the soul after death: (1) the soul arrives at its new home at once after death, without intervening travel or experiences; (2) the soul returns into the universe; (3) the soul travels on the way of the fathers, through muck and night, in the days of the waning moon, to the moon as the place of the dead; (4) the soul goes by the path of the gods to the regions of light, whence there is no return; this last is for those who have earned their final release from the trammels of the fleshly body, and go to the sun as final abode, nevermore to be reincarnated.

Certain other specialized uses of the word 'path' in the Vedic texts deserve mention.

(c) *The path of the soma-juice*.—When the plant *soma* is pressed for the extraction of the juice to be used in the ritual, the juice is spoken of as flowing through the sieve into the pail by a splendid path, or by straightest paths, which it makes for itself, dustless, hundredfold or thousandfold; it flows, trickles, hastens, or rushes roaring along them; the streams of the juice cover the path as by a wagon. The mode of expression is the effect of the exaggerated Hindu imagery, tending here as elsewhere to predicate the most exalted attributes for that which is being glorified.

(d) *The path of ṛta, or righteousness*, is a term which may be applied to any path, literal or figurative, which is not inconsistent with good morality. While at times used almost as we may use 'the path of right conduct,' it is both a vaguer and a more inclusive term, sometimes synonymous with the path of the gods, sometimes with the conduct of the sacrifice, sometimes with proper behaviour, and is used even of the course of the waters which Indra released (see below (f)). By following the path of *ṛta* man passes unscathed through evil or through sorrow and suffering.

The *aryāṣṭāṅgamārga* (Pāli, *ariyō aṭṭhaṅgikō maggō*), or 'noble eightfold path,' of Buddhism is a somewhat similar idea to this, and is the way pointed out by Buddha for escape from the misery of existence, consisting of right views, right thoughts, right words, right actions, right living, right exertion, right recollection, right meditations.

(e) *The path to fortune, to welfare, to power, to the winning of riches, etc.*, is constantly mentioned in the Vedas; and Indra, Viṣṇu, Agni, Soma, Pūṣan, Bhaga, the dawn, the *āsvins*, the *maruts*, the *ṛbhus*, etc., are implored to prepare it for men, or to lead men to it. This path is not sharply distinguished from the path of *ṛta*, nor from the path of the gods, but at times they merge into one another.

(f) *The path of the waters*.—Indra is said to have slain the dragon or demon which restrained the

waters, and then, by bursting open the clouds, or the mountains, in which the waters were confined, to have set them free to run in their paths over the earth. Less often it is Varuna who builds the paths by which the waters flow to the sea. The myth is, of course, derived from the phenomenon of seasonal droughts and rains in India.

2. Persia.—In the religion of Zoroaster the word 'path' (Avestan *pantay-, path-, patha-*) has much the same development as in the Veda. In the oldest Zoroastrian texts, the *Gāthās* of the Avesta, we find the path of *asha* (identical etymologically with Skr. *ṛta*), or righteousness, which is straight, profitable, and easily traversable, and leads the faithful follower of the religion to paradise (*garō demāna*, 'the home of song'). This path is revealed to the pious by Ahura Mazdāh and his archangels; it is spoken of also as the 'path of Vohu Manah' ('good thought', one of the Avestan archangels), founded by Ahura Mazdāh and Asha (personified as an archangel), and taught by Asha; it is the path to Asha; it is the path of the religion, or of the right teaching.

The picture of the journey of the soul upon this path is given in some detail in the later writings of the religion.

For three days after death the soul hovers near the body, but on the morning of the fourth day flies away, wafted by a fragrant breeze or suffocated by a stinking wind, according to his deserts. Presently he is met by a beautiful maiden or by a frightful hag, who also typify his previous life and religion. He arrives finally at the tribunal of the judges, Mithra, Sraosha, and Rashnu, and his good deeds are weighed against his bad deeds. If the good deeds prevail, he sets out across the bridge of the Chinvat, or 'divider,' which passes across the abyss of hell to heaven, and he finds the bridge broad and easy to ascend, until he arrives in paradise. But the soul whose evil deeds outweigh his good deeds finds the bridge growing narrower and narrower and more difficult to mount, until he plunges off and down into hell for his everlasting punishment.

3. General.—In other lands there is hardly the same definite use of specific words in these specialized meanings, though every religion naturally has its own version or versions of the way traversed by the soul after death; among the American Indians, e.g., the soul is generally represented as travelling to the westward, supplied with provisions, and as reaching the land of his spirit-ancestors after passing successfully some obstacle.

LITERATURE.—1. The passages of the *Rigveda* and *Atharvaveda* may be traced by H. Grassmann's *Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda*, Leipzig, 1873, and W. D. Whitney's 'Index Verborum to the Atharva-Veda,' in *JAOS* xli. [1881] (both of which are complete word-concordances), under the appropriate words. See also R. G. Kent, 'The Vedic Path of the Gods and the Roman Pontifex,' in *Classical Philology*, viii. [1913] 318-326; and esp. H. Oldenberg, *Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus*, Göttingen, 1915, pp. 106 f., 145, 344 f. On the 'two dogs of Sarana' see M. Bloomfield, *Cerberus the Dog of Hades*, Chicago and London, 1905.

2. The Gāthica passages are *Yasna*, xxxi. 9, xxxiii. 5, xxxiv. 12, xliii. 3, xlv. 4, 1, 4, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.

traced by means of C. B. Strassburg, 1906, pp. 8

described, with references to the sources, by A. V. Williams Jackson, 'Die iranische Religion,' §§ 82-84, in W. Geiger and E. Kuhn, *Grundriss der iranischen Philologie*, do. 1895-1904, ii. 384 f.

3. See E. B. Tylor, *PO*, London, 1913, i. 348-350, 359 f.; A. L. Kroeber, 'Indian Myths of South Central California,' in the *Univ. of California Publications: American Archaeology and Ethnology*, vol. iv. no. 4 [1906-07], p. 217; F. G. Speck, 'Notes on Chickasaw Ethnology and Folk-Lore,' in *JAF* lx. [1907] 58.

R. G. KENT.

PATĤĀNS.—See AFGHANISTAN.

PATICCA-SAMUPPĀDA.—Paticca-samup-pāda ('causally continuous' or 'collective up-rising') is the name of a central doctrine in early Buddhism and in all Theravāda Buddhism. It is also called the Nidāna ('basis' or 'ground,' i.e. cause) doctrine, or the Paccayākāra ('related conditions'), and is referred to in the Pāli *Suttas* as Ariya-Nāya ('the noble [or Ariyan=Buddhist] method or system'). The first, second, and fourth

names are canonical, but the third occurs only as a (late) title in the third and more recent section, the *Abhidhamma-Piṭaka*. European Indianists call the doctrine 'causal genesis,' 'dependent origination,' or 'theory of the twelve causes.'

The doctrine so designated is a formulated series of terms (1) expressing the interrelated or mutually dependent order obtaining throughout the sphere of sentient phenomena in the life of creatures, (2) considered from the point of view of sentience. In other words, it states that the salient features of sentient life reveal an order of mutually dependent occurrences, throwing off, as they evolve, an ever-recurring outcrop of painful feeling.

This is the burden of the formula stated and applied in detail. But there is also a concise and abstract version of the formula, in which the application to sentient phenomena is eliminated, and which is therefore nothing less than a formula of causation in general. Sometimes this universal statement is prefixed to the fuller formula; sometimes it represents it in brief; once or twice it is used independently. It runs: 'This being present, that becomes (or happens); from the arising of this, that arises. This being absent, that does not become; from the cessation of this, that ceases.'

In the Pāli only one and the same demonstrative adjective, 'this' (*idam*), is used, and not the pair 'this, that' (*idam, asu*). But this should not lead the reader to see in the formula a set of merely identical propositions. Pāli diction does not distinguish between two terms in our way; but the context invariably shows that there are two terms and not one.

This abstract version does not occur in either the *Sutta* or the *Vinaya* Buddha-legend; nevertheless in certain *Suttas* the Buddha is represented as teaching it, and also as calling it *Dhamma*, and Ariyan method (*Majjhima*, ii. 32; *Samyutta*, v. 388; *Anguttara*, v. 184). It is used in discussions with persons of education, lay and religious, but is obviously not suited to the theme of a saviour of his fellow-men wrestling in thought how to find a way of escape for the world, nor to the language of deep religious emotion and romance in which that theme is embodied, and through which the *Mahāpadāna*, or 'sublime legend,' appealed so widely and powerfully to all sorts and conditions of men.

The applied and expanded formula is also termed *Dhamma* and identified with it (*Majjhima*, i. 191). It constitutes, in fact, an expansion of the second and third of the so-called 'four Ariyan truths or facts' put forward in the Buddha's first sermon, and considered as the nucleus of his teaching, viz. the truth as to the genesis or cause of ill, and the truth as to the cessation or suspension of the cause of ill. As expressing a cosmic truth, it was considered as valid eternally and from eternity, independently of the advent of a Tathāgata (or Buddha), not to mention any action by a deity. As a truth that became buried and forgotten for ages at a time, under mythologies and theologies, the function of a Buddha was to re-discover and revive it.

'Whether Tathāgatas arise or not, this elemental datum (*dhatu*) stands as the establishing of things as effects . . . as the cause of this and that. Concerning this . . . a Tathāgata becomes enlightened and penetrates it . . . and he declares . . . makes it manifest, and behold! he saith! (here follows the formula in detail). Thus these stable, constant, immutable elements are each called a causal term (*paticca-samuppāda*)' (*Samyutta*, ii. 25, 3; cf. *Kathāvatthu*, vi. 2, tr. in *Points of Controversy*, London, 1915, pp. 187, 337).

Hence this re-discovery plays a great part in the Buddha-legend—the creed as to the process by which each Buddha in turn grasps the principle governing the series of terms as a fundamental truth of sentient life.

The oldest account of the re-discovery of the causal order in its application to the facts of sentient life is probably that contained in the *Mahā-*

dāna of the *Digha-Nikāya* (ii. 1; tr. T. W. and A. F. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, 1). The scene is the shade beneath a tree famed ereafter as the Bodhi- (or Bo-) tree ('tree of enlightenment'). Hither, after years of unsatisfying study under teachers, and of independent self-inflicted austerities, equally sterile (*Majjhima*, 163-167, 242-249), the Buddha-about-to-be comes, fat and emaciated, but in restored health, to apple, not with systems or abstractions, but with the order and tendency of sentient facts as they appear to him. The fact of ageing, or decay and disease, the fact of death insurmountable by any sentient being whatever in earth or heaven—cause inseparable from the essence of life itself—induced a passionate pity for all sentient life in helpless subjugation to their sway still hold his thoughts: "And for this suffering no one knows of any way of escape, even from decay and death. O, when shall a way of escape from this suffering be made known? . . . Then to him it occurred: "What now being present, is decay-and-dying also present? Conditioned by what is decay-and-dying? Then to him thinking as to means arose penetration of insight: "Where birth is present, decay-and-dying must be; decay-and-dying are conditioned by birth" (*Dialogues*, ii. 231.).

The thinker is now started on the method of his argument, and the exposition of how, by conditioned sequence, sentient life proceeds on its doomed career from one birth to another is given in the same terms. The formula for each linked stage gives more concise expression than the fuller text of the legend. It is couched, not in propositions, but in a string of qualified terms, as follows:

'Conditioned-by-birth, decay-death (with its accompaniment of pain and sorrow). Conditioned-by-becoming, birth. Conditioned-by-attachment, becoming. Conditioned-by-natural desires (or cravings), attachment. Conditioned-by-feeling, natural desires. Conditioned-by-contact, feeling. Conditioned-by-sense, contact. Conditioned-by-composite organism, sense. Conditioned-by-consciousness, the composite organism.'

(This is the formula of ten 'bases' only, and in backward order, for the order of re-discovery, as given in this ancient legend or creed, the thinker pushing his way from consequent to antecedent.)

"Then to the Bodhisat this occurred: "Consciousness turns back from the composite organism; it goes not beyond it." (In other words, we encounter, in *sentience*, no new fact to adduce. As a man's composite organism—mind and body—dissolves at death, the resultant consciousness of his last mental force springs up in a new embryo, human, bestial, infernal, or celestial. And the result of that embryo so informed is a composite organism, or *nāma-rūpa*. Hence the mutual conditioning of these two terms, as in the case of seed-fruit, seed, egg-hen-egg.)

"Only thus can one be born, grow old, die, fall (from one sphere), spring up (in another), namely, conditioned-by-composite organism, consciousness. Conditioned-by-consciousness, composite organism. Conditioned-by-composite organism, sense. Conditioned-by-sense, contact. Conditioned-by-contact, feeling. Conditioned-by-feeling, natural desire. Conditioned-by-natural-desire, attachment. Conditioned-by-attachment, becoming. Conditioned-by-becoming, birth. Conditioned-by-birth, decay-and-dying, with sorrow and suffering. Such is the coming to be of this entire body of ill."

"Coming to be! coming to be! (*samudayo*)"—at that thought there arose to the Bodhisat a vision into things not called before to mind, and knowledge arose, and insight and wisdom and light. Then to him it occurred: "What now being absent, is decay-and-dying also absent; by the ceasing of what does decay-and-dying also cease?" Then to him thinking as to means arose penetration of insight: "Where birth is absent, decay-and-dying is absent; when birth ceases, decay-and-dying ceases. . . . Where becoming, etc., . . . [and so on to] consciousness ceases." Then to him this occurred: "Lo! I have won to this, the intuition-way to enlightenment, namely, that from the composite organism ceasing, consciousness ceases, and conversely; that from the composite organism ceasing, sense ceases. . . . Such is the ceasing of this entire body of ill. Ceasing! Ceasing!" At that thought there arose to him a vision into things not called before to mind, and knowledge arose, and insight and wisdom and light. And thereafter he dwelt in the discernment of the rising and passing away of the five attachment groups (of the composite organism). Such is the material group, such the mental groups, such is their coming to be, such is their ceasing. And for him, abiding in that discernment, not long was it before his heart, void of attachment, was set free from the intoxicants (of sense-desires, of renewed life, of wrong views, of ignorance).

This is the version of the legend giving the fullest context. But it lacks the eleventh and

twelfth links, or, taking the formula in its usual or forward or time-order, the first and second links. These two complete the traditional or doctrinaire presentment of the formula, and appear also in the other canonical versions of the legend. These occur in the *Samyutta-Nikāya*, ii. 5 (or fourth *Sutta* of the *Nidāna-Samyutta*), where the narrative is also generalized as experience of all Buddhas, and in the *Vinaya*, *Mahāvagga*, 1st section (cf. *Vinaya Texts* [SBE xiii. (1881)], i. 73 f.). In the latter account the exposition of the doctrine is given, not as being re-discovered, but as being meditated upon after enlightenment was won, and as constituting, so to speak, the spoils of victory. The account as compared with the other two is referred to Gotama Buddha only, and is relatively curt, as if, when the rules of the order were being completely 'edited,' this doctrinally important portion was inserted with the other legends prefacing the books of rules, as a memorandum. Internal evidence is thus rather against its being the oldest version.

The two links in question, taking the order of re-discovery as in the *Samyutta* narrative, are: 'Conditioned-by-consciousness, actions. Conditioned-by-actions, ignorance.' These may or may not be an addendum for the sake of completeness. Theravāda exegesis sees in them a linking up with the previous life or lives of the sentient subject, just as, at the other end, the next life is outlined by the other two extremes. We thus get:

Previous life.	{ ignorance . . . actions (transmitting results).	Present life.	{ consciousness . . . to . . . becoming.	Future life.	{ birth (in earth or heavens, etc.) decay-and-dying.
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Thus enlarged and envisaged, the scheme becomes more interesting in perspective than if the past and future of the three lives had been represented as groups of terms identical with those of the present life. It was open to the compilers so to represent it. But the table as compiled shows a greater pre-occupation with the working of causation than if there had been offered mere repetition. In the central group we have the working out of the process of *sentience*, culminating in the central links—sense, feeling, desire—and representing a fresh ebullition, a new source of causal force reaching on into the next birth. There its resultant is renewed *sentience*, eventually again to be darkened by the inevitable disease-decay-death. But the present is also itself a resultant—a centre of effects in *sentience* due to causes in the past. Simplifying that past, the compilers presented it in abstract as causal only. The causes are generalized as two: the limited and imperfect knowledge which is called ignorance (*a-vijjā*)—ignorance of how the life of sense-desires makes in the long run for *dukkha*, 'ill'; and activities of deed, word, and thought, conditioned by that ignorance, and constituting the *karma*-forces which result in the sentient effects of the next (*i.e.* the present) life.

It is very necessary for the reader to keep in mind this view of the two past-life terms as a simplified, abstract aspect. Western critics, ignoring the Theravāda tradition, have speculated on how 'ignorance' (*i.e.* knowledge of a sort, just as cold is, scientifically, heat of a sort) can be the primal source (!) of these sentient phenomena.

'Ignorance,' wrote Buddhaghosa, 'is here chosen only as a starting-point for the exposition, not because it is itself causeless' (*Visuddhi-Magga*, xvii.).

Another difficulty, met by the commentators, is the distinction between 'becoming' (*bhava*) and 'birth.' They explain 'becoming' under two aspects: (a) when it conditions birth, the fruition or results of past actions is meant (*kammabhava*); (b) in the phrase, 'becoming is conditioned by

attachment,' the general result in future life is meant (*upapatti-bhava*) (cf. Aung, *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 262). Thus 'grasping leads to becoming,' i.e. (b) to renewed life (a) through the working of action's results.

The Theravāda tradition has, unlike the Mahāyānist schools, consistently kept the Paṭicca-samuppāda to the fore in its teaching, and has held as authoritative, in exegesis of the doctrine, the dissertation contained in Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhi-Magga*, xvii. Hence a few notes from that dissertation are here added.

Buddhaghosa, whose erudition was built upon the traditional culture of his age, often refers to the doctrine by the post-canonical name *bhava-chakka*, 'wheel of becoming.' He is throughout emphatic as to the formula being no mere enumeration of a series, but a doctrine of certain states conditioning the one the other—in other words, a scientific doctrine of causation in sentient phenomena. There were views current that the formula was only a list of happenings (*uppādamattam*), and he insists at length on the full significance of the old *Sutta*-title, *paṭicca*, 'because of,' 'on account of,' and *samuppādo*, as well as on the word *paccayo*, rendered above 'conditioned by.' These terms expressed a procedure (*pavatta*) of conditions up-rising, contrasting with the views of those who denied causation, who advocated chance or irregular causation (*visama-hetu*) (on these cf. the *Adhicca-samuppannikā's* [= *akāraṇa-samuppannikā*, 'believers in things arisen without a cause'] of *Digha-Nikāya*, i. 30) or who believed in over-ruling disposers. *Paccayo*, 'condition,' he defines, after the fashion of mediæval commentators, as '*paṭicca etasmā etī ti paccayo*.' Condition means 'on account of, from that, it makes go' (*pacc-* is *paṭi* before *ay*, the causative of *i*, 'to go'). Now, he goes on:

'The essential feature in "condition" is furtherance [or 'aid,' *upa-kāraka*].¹ Thus: is there anything the persistence, or the arising of which is a furtherance, that thing is a condition of what is aided. Condition, cause [*hetu*], reason [*kāraṇa*, lit. 'causing-to-make'], basis, ground [*nidāna*], and such terms are one in meaning, diverse in form.'

The shortened abstract form he does not take into account in this chapter, but in his commentaries on it, when it occurs, both with and without the fuller formula, in the *Majjhima* and *Samyutta-Nikāyas*, he refers to it as the *Paccayākāra*, or method of conditions, namely, that 'given the condition, the fruit (consequent) comes to pass.'

Whether the formula in its detailed form and the doctrine of causation applied to sentient phenomena were entirely and originally Buddhist or were annexed from pre-existing systems is a matter of controversy. The difficulty in deciding lies largely in the uncertainty as to which systems, as expounded in the earliest records preserved of them, are pre-Buddhist. There are fragments of the linked form of exposition, used in the formula, surviving in the aphorisms known as *Yoga* and *Sāṅkhya sūtras*, but, whereas these *sūtras* are reputed to be ancient, the compilation of them in commentarial works is, as regards the Buddhist canon, relatively quite modern. No originality, however, is claimed either by Buddhists or by European exponents for the *method*—a method which may have its roots away back in the primitive folk-lore of our race. In the *sūtras* the emphasis on the natural law of cause and effect in sentient phenomena remains practically sterile; it was the work of Buddhism, whether it anticipated or annexed, to render insight into natural laws a fruitful religious doctrine. Theories of first causes and *primum mobile* reach back, in Indian Vedas, far beyond the date of Thales of the Levant. But, if we compare the primitive notions

¹ See art. RELATION (Buddhist).

of cause itself, anthropomorphically conceived as akin to a fiat of will, or to a manual effort, with the earliest Buddhist resolution of cause into necessary antecedent conditions, each ancillary to a 'fruit,' or consequent coming to be, if we remember that this conception of causation was substituted, in the process bringing about sentience, for chance or divine fiat, and viewed as natural law which man might modify by adapting his actions thereto, it may then be that the force of the words, 'arose a vision into things not called before to mind,' may cause to arise for the historian of human ideas a vision not less interesting.

LITERATURE.—*Dialogues of the Buddha*, tr. T. W. and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, London, 1910, ii. 23-61; H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1900, pp. 163-179; C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, London, 1912, ch. iv.; H. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, Stuttgart, 1914, div. ii. ch. ii., where references to controversial literature are given; L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Théorie des douze causes*, Ghent, 1913, giving Sanskrit and Tibetan literature on the subject; P. Oltramare, *La Formule bouddhique des douze causes*, Geneva, 1909; P. Masson-Oursel, 'Théorie bouddhique des douze conditions,' *RHR* lxxi. [1915] 30 ff. The two last named do not give the view of the Theravāda tradition, followed in this article. That view is best set out by S. Z. Aung, in *A Compendium of Philosophy*, London, 1910, pp. 259-264, note on *Paccaya* and *Paṭicca-Samuppāda*. C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

PATIENCE.—Patience, the *ῥασιλις τῶν ἀρετῶν*, as Chrysostom calls it, is a distinctly Christian virtue. In each of the great religious systems of history we find that which is related more or less closely to it, and a study of these reveals that contribution to the religious thought of the world which must be assigned to Christianity. In the East patience is near akin to the *ἀπάθεια* which played so prominent a part in the Stoic conception of life. It consists of complete indifference to circumstance induced by mental discipline; it ignores both pleasure and pain. Later expositions of this virtue approximate to that power to endure which is indicated in the Latin word *patientia*, and which is prominent in popular and superficial ideas of patience. The Yoga system of Patañjali finds its modern exponents in the *ṣaḍgirs* who endure privations and self-inflicted torture sometimes of quite revolting forms. This, it is evident, is mere passivity (*q.v.*), and, when accepted in order to acquire merit, so far from creating nobility of character, it has a distinctly selfish and degrading relation. The Greek idea seems rather inclined to the side of courage. In the *Theaetetus* (177 B) Plato speaks of *ἀνδρικός ὑπομεῖναι* ('patience' = *ὑπομονή*) as the true antithesis to *ἀνδρὸς φεύγειν*. This is a great advance upon both the *ἀπάθεια* of the Stoic and the passivity of the Indian Yogi. But it is not until we come to Christian teaching that we see how patience can be a positive and ennobling force in human life and character. In turning to Christian teachers we are met at once with the definition given by Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* ii. 18), *ἐπιστήμη ἐμμενέων καὶ οὐκ ἐμμενέων*, 'the knowledge of the things which we may bear, and of the things which we may not bear.' Coccoineus, on Ja 1¹², quoted by Trench (*Synonyms of the NT*, London, 1876, p. 190 f.), comes nearer still to the true Christian conception of the word. He says:

'ὑπομονή versatur in contentu bonorum hujus mundi, et in cum gratiarum actione; imprimis caritatis, ut neutro modo quassari . . . it impediri quominus opus suum et

It is in this 'constantia fidei et caritatis' that we come upon the germinal truth which has so developed in the thought of the Christian Church as to result in that fuller connotation of patience which is our heritage. There are two ideas which go to make up the complete conception, and, most markedly, they are both shown in the beautiful Greek name for the virtue. *ὑπομονή* suggests in its two component parts the submission which

accepts the will of God and the waiting which rests upon both faith and hope. As against the indifference of the Stoics, the NT lays stress upon hope (g.v.) as the quality of true patience. St. Paul speaks of a patience which through the medium of 'experience' or 'probation' (δοκιμή) issues in hope (Ro 5⁴ ἡ δὲ ὑπομονὴ δοκιμῇ, ἡ δὲ δοκιμὴ ἐλπίδα). But perhaps the most striking passage in this connexion is that which we find in 1 Th 1², where St. Paul speaks of hope as the characteristic quality (for this is the true interpretation of the genitive) of patience, *μνημονεύοντες τῆς ὑπομονῆς τῆς ἐλπίδος*. As against the mere passivity of the Hindu, on the other hand, St. Paul places 'steady persistence in a life-work of good' (Sanday and Headlam, on καθ' ὑπομονὴν ἔργου ἀγαθοῦ, Ro 2⁷ [*The Epistle to the Romans*], ICC, Edinburgh, 1902, p. 53)), and the element of hope or expectation is supplied in *δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν ᾧτινός* of the same passage. For endurance may be dogged, peevish, or cynical; it will in such case fail to be formative of Christian character. It even becomes destructive by the familiar law which says 'corruptio optimi pessima.' But Christian patience is both positive and effective of good in character, for it is by patience that man wins his life (Lk 21¹⁹).

There is no true patience apart from that submission of spirit which gladly accepts the will of God, and which waits on in sure and certain hope that life 'means intensely and means good.'

It is a travesty of Patience that describes her as 'sitting on a monument smiling at grief.' She is found in no selfish isolation; there is no artificiality of joy upon her face. She comes down into all the pain and sorrow of life; she looks with steadfast eyes at all the hideousness of evil; but she is strong, for she rests upon the unfailing love of a divine Person. It is when the love of God comes into human courage and endurance that His life becomes a part of our human experience, and human pain becomes illumined and beautified as it throws into relief the 'far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory.' The type of such patience was found in our Lord Himself (2 Th 3³), and it is through such patience that man is 'made perfect by the things which he suffers.'

LITERATURE.—There is no special work on the subject, but references abound in homiletical literature, such as John Smith, *Select Discourses*, Cambridge, 1859, p. 420f.; J. T. Jacob, *Christ the Indweller*, London, 1902, ch. xi. See also J. McCosh, *The Emotions*, London, 1880, p. 131; and H. F. Amiel, *Journal*, Eng. tr., do. 1889, p. 116.

W. W. HOLDSWORTH.

PĀTIMOKKHA.—This is the name for a collection of 227 rules to be observed by members of the Buddhist order of mendicants. A few of them relate to matters that may, in a sense, be called ethical. But the rules themselves are not at all ethical. They determine only what steps are to be taken in each case by the order; and the cases are matters of the restrictions as to dress, food, clothing, medicine, etiquette, manners, and so on, to be observed by the members. In four cases out of the 227 the punishment, if it can be called punishment, is exclusion from the order. In all the other cases it is merely suspension for a period of time.

There had been other orders before the Buddhist order was founded, and no doubt some of the rules were based upon rules already existing in those. There is nothing exclusively Buddhist about any one of them. On the other hand, each of the different orders had, no doubt, some rules which the others had not. It would be very interesting if we could ascertain whether any, and if so which, of the 227 rules were followed by the Buddhist order alone. But this is not yet possible. The Jain order is older; but the rules observed in it before the Buddha's time, even if they are still extant,

are not published. We have also a few rules laid down in the priestly law-books as obligatory on Brāhman mendicants (*bhikkhus*). These are, however, extant only in law-books centuries later than the period in question. And, though the rules were probably in force before the date of the law books, it is not possible to say whether or not they were valid in the Buddha's time. Such evidence as is available tends to show that they were not.¹ And it is most probable that the particular rules in question were meant to be supplied to individuals as such, not to members of an order or community. The very fact of the small number of rules that it was considered advisable to record shows how slight was the importance attached by the compilers of these law manuals to the matter of the organization of a religious order.

In the absence of detailed knowledge of the rules of other previously existing Indian orders, European writers have so far assumed a similarity between the Buddhist order and the European orders more familiar to them that they have applied to the Buddhist community the technical terms in use in Europe. These organizations are really very different—as different, in fact, as any two such orders could possibly be. To give a few instances only: the Buddhist order in India had no monasteries, no establishments hidden behind walls and inaccessible to the public, presided over by an abbot or superior; there was no hierarchy at all, no authority to which the members of the order had to submit, no power in any one member of the order over any other member, and no vow of obedience; at meetings of the chapter the senior member present, reckoning not by age but by the date on which he had been admitted into the order, took the chair; the decisions were by vote of the majority, and the votes of all members, whatever their seniority, were equal; no member of the order was a priest who could in any way intervene between any god and any man, or offer any sacrifice, or declare any forgiveness of sin, or give absolution; no one of the 227 rules inculcates any creed or dogma or demands any sort of belief; any member of the order could give up his association with it whenever he liked; there is a special set of rules regulating the manner in which he could do so,² but he could also leave the order, without any formality, simply by putting on a layman's dress;³ this was no empty form of words, it was (and is) constantly done. To translate the word *bhikkhu* by 'priest' or 'monk' is therefore a *suggestio falsi* in respect of one or more of these matters, all of them of the first importance. The word means, literally, mendicant, but not mendicant in our sense of the word. With us the word is associated with the false pretences, the lies, and the trickery habitually used by mendicants to trade upon the sentimentality of the kind-hearted. And, while there doubtless have been periods when some members of the order may have laid themselves open to some such imputation, yet to charge all the members, at all times, with mendicancy is neither fair nor correct. Quite a number of the rules of the *Pātimokkha* are especially designed to prevent even the very appearance of evil in this respect.

A further misconception should here be noticed. The rules of the *Pātimokkha* are not a list of sins. No such conception as that of the European notion of sin enters even remotely into the Buddhist view of life. The rules of the *Pātimokkha* are mainly economic; they regulate the behaviour of members of an order to one another in respect of clothes, dwellings, furniture, etc., held in common. They

¹ The evidence is collected in Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, I. 212-220.

² *Sutta Vibhanga* (Vin. III.), I. 8. 2 ff.

³ E.g., *Vinaya Texts*, I. 275.

were originally established in accordance with the customs of the time. As the customs changed, or as convenience dictated, the rules were changed. A number of such changes even in the very earliest time have been pointed out in the introductions to H. Oldenberg's edition of the *Vinaya*, and to his and the present writer's translation of the *Vinaya Texts*. These changes have also gone on in later times, until to-day a large majority of the rules have become obsolete. Notwithstanding this, the 227 rules have been recited every fortnight by the followers of the ancient tradition from the Buddha's time until to-day. The institution of this ceremony is recorded in the *Sutta Vibhanga*.¹

There had been observed from ancient times a festival on new and full moon days. The orders older than the rise of Buddhism had kept up this observance, utilizing the recurring sacred days for the exposition of their doctrines. The early Buddhists followed this precedent; and once in every fortnight on the sacred day, called the *uposatha* day, the order met in its various districts in chapter, and all the rules were recited. There has been considerable difference of opinion as to the exact date of the month on which this ceremony should be held. The Buddhists have disputed on the point as frequently (though without violence) as Christians have on the date of Easter. And they still differ. There is, indeed, a certain ambiguity in the oldest wording of the rule on the point;² and we know too little about the actual practice as followed in India in the early days of Buddhism to be able to reach a conclusion as to which of the later schools was right in its contention.

The word *pātimokkha* occurs in one of the rules—the 73rd *pācittiya*—and also in the introductory phrase to be used at the monthly recitation of the rules.³ It would seem, therefore, to be older than the rules themselves. The manner in which the word is used in the old passage first enjoining the recitation of it upon the *bhikkhus*⁴ confirms this supposition. We need not, therefore, be surprised to find that the early Buddhists ascribed the institution, not of the *uposatha* ceremony, but of the *Pātimokkha* itself, to a date long antecedent to that of the Buddha.⁵ If that be correct, the word *pātimokkha* must have been current in Kosala when Buddhism arose, and, to be more exact, no doubt among the members of the previous orders. What it means exactly and what is its derivation are both uncertain. The Old Commentary (on which see below) explains it as follows:

Pātimokkham. This is the beginning, it is the face (*mukham*), it is the principal (*pamukham*) of good qualities. Therefore it is called *Pātimokkham*.

This as a piece of edifying exegesis is to the point, and it has the advantage of that sort of pun fashionable in ancient folklore and exegesis. India can claim no monopoly in this department of primitive literary art. Some fine specimens of it might be culled from the classic and sacred books most admired in Europe. It was supremely indifferent to accuracy. And to take it *au grand sérieux* as scientific etymology is not only to miss the point, but to forget the somewhat important fact that scientific etymology was not yet born. When the Buddhists, centuries afterwards, began to write in Sanskrit, they (evidently not understanding the word) Sanskritized it by *prātimokṣa*,⁶ apparently supposing that it had something to do with *mokṣa* (*q.v.*). This is of course impossible. To have complied with the economic regulations of an order is a

very different thing from having attained to the mental state deemed, in that order, to be ideal. *Mokṣa* would mean from the Buddhist point of view the latter, not the former. In Buddhism at least, though it did not use the technical term *mokṣa*, the regulations of the *Pātimokkha* were quite subsidiary. A man might have observed them all his life, and yet not have even entered upon the first stage of the path towards *arahant*-ship or *nirvāṇa* (the Buddhist *mokṣa*).¹ In some one of the pre-Buddhist orders *pātimokkha* may possibly have had some such sense—'disburdenment,' *e.g.*, or 'repudiation,'² or 'obligation.'³ In the Buddhist canon *pātimokkha* is used, quite frankly and simply, in the sense of 'code'—code of rules for members of their order; thus in the constantly repeated phrase *Pātimokkha-samvara-samvuto*, 'restrained according to the restraint of the code';⁴ or, again, in *ubhayāni Pātimokkhāni*, 'both the codes' (the one for men, the other for women).⁵

The *Pātimokkha* is not one of the books in the Buddhist canon. This is not because it is later, but because it is older, than the canon. And every word of it, though not as a continuous book, is contained in the canon, in the book entitled *Sutta Vibhanga*, 'Exposition of the Suttas' (the word 'Suttas' meaning, in this title, the 227 rules above referred to). First there was the code itself, handed down by memory. Then there arose a word-for-word commentary on each of the 227 rules; we call this the Old Commentary. Then both these were encased in a new commentary with supplementary chapters. It is this third edition, so to speak, that we have in the extant canon.⁶

It is in the supplementary chapters that we find evidence of those changes referred to above. One is of especial importance for the question of the *Pātimokkha*. The rules are arranged in seven sections corresponding very roughly to the degree of weight attached to their observance. At the end of each section, on the *uposatha* day, at the time of recitation, the reciter goes on:

'Venerable sirs, the ninety-two rules [here comes the name of the rules in the particular section] have been recited. In respect of them I ask the venerable ones, "Are you pure in this matter?" A second time I ask, "Are you pure in this matter?" A third time I ask, "Are you pure in this matter?"' [There follows an interval of time.]

'The venerable ones are pure herein. Therefore do they keep silence. Thus I understand.'⁷

It is evident that the original intention was that any brother who had been guilty of a breach of any of the regulations laid down in the section recited—*e.g.*, that the legs of his chair or bed had exceeded eight inches in height (*pācittiya* 87), or that he had left his chair or stool lying about in a hut occupied in common (*pācittiya* 15)—should then and there acknowledge that he had broken the regulation in that respect.

But in one of the supplementary chapters (the *Khandakas*)⁸ it is expressly laid down that this shall not be done. The brother who feels himself guilty shall acknowledge the fact beforehand. And, if he recollects only on the *uposatha* day itself that he has broken a rule, still he is to go (we are informed in another chapter, the *Upasatha Khandaka*)⁹ to a fellow-member and say: 'I have committed, friend, such and such an offence; I confess that offence.' Let the other say: 'Do you

¹ See the passages collected by Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 2, 63.

² See Oldenberg, *Buddha*, Berlin, 1914, p. 381.

³ *Prati-muc*, in pre-Buddhist works, means 'to bind on.'

⁴ *Digha*, iii. 77, 267, 285; *Majjhima*, i. 33, iii. 11.

⁵ *Anguttara*, ii. 14; cf. *Vin.* i. 65 and *Ang.* iv. 140, v. 80, 201.

⁶ See the masterly discussion of this history by Oldenberg in the introd. to his ed. of the text.

⁷ Rhys Davids and Oldenberg, *Vinaya Texts*, i. 51.

⁸ *Chullavagga*, ix. 2; tr. in *Vinaya Texts*, iii. 306.

⁹ *Ib.* i. 282.

¹ In bk. ii. the *Upasatha Khandaka*, tr. in Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, *Vinaya Texts*, i. 239 ff.

² Cf. *Vin.* i. 102 with 104.

³ See *Vinaya Texts*, i. 1.

⁴ *Vin.* i. 102, tr. in *Vinaya Texts*, i. 241 f.

⁵ *Digha*, ii. 46-49. The verse there given, containing the word *pātimokkha*, is included in the *Dhammapadam* anthology as verse 185.

⁶ See, *e.g.*, *Mahāvastu*, iii. 51. 17.

see it?' 'Yes, I see it.' 'Refrain from it in future.'¹

The members discovered, no doubt, that any such interruption of the proceedings as was involved in a confession at the meeting was inconvenient; that it distracted the attention of the other members from the main object of the recitation; and that it might lead, if several such cases arose, to a very serious prolongation of the formal meeting of the chapter. So the practice was changed. The offending member had to 'disburden' his conscience before the ceremony took place. And in any case the recitation of the *Pātimokkha* was never interrupted in any way. This is still the case in Ceylon and Burma. But the old formula, appealing to the members present to speak, is still part of the recitation.

The subsequent history of the *Pātimokkha* in India is very obscure. It is probable that it was preserved and recited regularly by all the differing early schools of Buddhism. Afterwards, when, some six or seven centuries after the birth of the Buddha, there arose Buddhists who abandoned the use of Pāli, and adopted Sanskrit, it is probable that they abandoned also the use of the *Pātimokkha*. But we do not really know. It is not used, so far as we have any evidence, by any of the numerous sects in China or Japan who follow the doctrines of one or the other of these later Indian schools. The fragmentary remarks of Burnouf² are sufficient only to point out the lines on which a future investigation of this problem may be made.

LITERATURE.—E. Burnouf, *Introd. à l'hist. du Bouddhisme indien*, Paris, 1844; H. Oldenberg, *The Vinaya Pitaka*, 5 vols., London, 1879-83; T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg, *Vinaya Texts*, 3 vols. (SBE), Oxford 1881-85; T. W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha* (SBE), do. 1889-1910; *Digha Nikāya*, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter (PTS), do. 1890-1913; *Dhammapadam*, ed. Suriyagoda Thera (PTS), do. 1914; *Mahāvastu*, ed. E. Senart, Paris, 1882-97.

T. W. RHYS DAVIDS.

PATNA (PĀTALIPUTRA).—Patna is the capital of the modern province of Bihār, the ancient Magadha (*q.v.*), in Gangetic India, and stands on the right bank of the Ganges in lat. 25° 26' N., long. 85° 21' E. It owes its historical and religious importance chiefly to the fact that it was the capital of Aśoka, the first emperor of India, and the great propagator of Buddhism in 273-232 B.C. (see AŚOKA). It was at that time known as Pātaliputta, the source of the Greek corrupt form Pali-bothra, as it was named in the records of Megasthenes, the Greek ambassador of Alexander's successor, Seleucus Nikator, to the court of Aśoka's grandfather Chandragupta, the Sandrakottos of the Greeks.³ It was only in process of being built in the last year of Buddha's life (c. 482 B.C.), according to an incidental reference in the itinerary of Buddha's last journey in the Buddhist canon. The city continued to be the capital under the same name during the greater part of the reign of the imperial Gupta dynasty from the 4th to the 6th century A.D.

The traditional etymology of the name from the Aśokan period onwards is the rather fanciful one of 'the son of the *pātali*-tree,' i.e. 'the trumpet-flower tree' (*Dignonia suaveolens*); and a legend

therewith states that there was on the site a tree of that species sacred to a goddess. No special sacred character now attaches to this shrub. In the opinion of the present writer, the name probably meant 'son of Patala,' a famous ancient seaport near the mouth of the Indus from which the bulk of Alexander's troops sailed on their return journey from India. This presumes that a colony of Aryans from Patala settled in this part of Gangetic India and transferred to their new port the cherished name of the far-distant old one. There is considerable evidence in support of this conjecture which cannot be detailed here. It was also called 'the city of flowers' (Kusum-puri and Pushpa). The modern name Patna is the English form of the vernacular Patana, 'a city,' in the sense of 'the city,' or capital.

So magnificent were the buildings of the ancient city in cyclopean carved stones that the early traditions ascribed its erection to giants. These traditions are recorded by the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims, Fa-Hian and Hiuen Tsiang, who visited the city and its monuments in the 5th and 7th centuries A.D.⁴ The city was also known in the 1st cent. B.C., for Diodorus Siculus says:

'Hercules was the founder of no small number of cities, the most renowned and greatest of which he called Palibothra' (*Hist.* ii. 39).

But after the 7th cent. A.D. the site of this famous city was so completely forgotten that, when, towards the end of the 18th cent., European inquirers began to try to unearth the past history of India, none of the learned Brāhmins could give any clue to its whereabouts. The geographical details in the accounts of the Chinese pilgrims' routes clearly showed that the lost city must have been situated at or near the modern Patna. When the staff of the Government Archaeological Survey were deputed to search for it, they reported:

'Modern Patna consequently does not stand on the site of old Pataliputra, but very close to it, the old city having occupied what is now the bed of the Ganges. . . . All or almost all traces of the ancient city must long since have been swept away by the Ganges.'⁵

This continued to be the opinion of local British officials at Patna until 1892. In that year the present writer, impressed with the importance of recovering the lost site for early Indian history and especially for Buddhism, of which this city was the greatest stronghold, took advantage of a short visit to Patna to explore that neighbourhood, with the Chinese pilgrims' narratives in hand as a guide. As a result he found that not only was the ancient site not washed away, but most of the leading landmarks of Aśoka's palaces, monasteries, and other monuments remained so obvious that they could be located without much difficulty, and several pieces of Aśokan sculptures were found on the surface. Exploratory incisions then revealed the presence of several of the well-known Aśokan monoliths, and also one of the huge sculptured stones which had excited the admiration of the Greeks and early Chinese visitors, in the form of a colossal capital in quasi-Persepolitan style, which proved to be one of the earliest sculptures yet found in India.⁶ But this and the other remains were so deeply overlaid by the alluvial deposits of the Ganges valley that they were all buried to the extent of 14 ft. or more beneath the surface, rendering excavation impossible on the

¹ *Records of Buddhist Kingdoms* (Fa-Hian), ed. J. Legge, Oxford, 1890, p. 77 l. 1; S. Beal, *Si-yu-ki*, London, 1884, i. p. lv f. (Fa-Hian), ii. 83 f. (Hiuen Tsiang); T. Watters, *On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India*, do. 1904-05, ii. 87-100.

² *Arch. Survey of India Report*, viii. [1878] 24.

³ A 'Persian' or Persepolitan influence was remarked over half a century ago by James Fergusson, by A. Grünwedel in 1893 (*Buddhistische Kunst in Indien*, Berlin, 1893, pp. 14-17), and by James Kennedy in 1893 (*J.R.A.S.*, 1893, p. 284 f.), as noticeable in the details of the capitals of the Aśokan pillars and in small pilasters of the same age found in several parts of India. Another fine Persepolitan capital was found at Benares in 1914.

¹ He is to squat on his heels over against the *bhikkhu* to whom he is confessing. Now, 'in front of,' 'over against' would in post-Buddhist Sanskrit be *pāti-mukha*. If this word could be traced in pre-Buddhist times, it would be possible to suggest a derivation of *pātimokkha* (from this practice) in the sense of 'confession,' viz. that which pertains to crouching in front of another *bhikkhu* (cf. *upanigada*, that which pertains to sitting down towards, hence 'a secret doctrine').

² *Introduction*, p. 300 ff.

³ The identity of Sandrakottos with Chandragupta was first shown by W. Jones (*Asiatic Researches*, iv. [1795] 11); and Wilford noticed that the form used by Athenæus was even closer, namely Sandrakoptus (*ib. v.* [1793] 262). The Androkottus of Plutarch is the same person.

score of expense. Through the enlightened liberality of Mr. Tata, a Parsi merchant, the Indian Government has been able to undertake during the past three years systematic excavation of the sites thus indicated, and D. B. Spooner of the Archaeological Survey has already recovered structural remains of stone buildings on a vast scale. One of these is a replica of the throne-room of Darius Hystaspes, the celebrated 'Hall of a Hundred Columns' at Persepolis.

The discovery of the existence of such intimate Persian art-influence at the heart of Aśoka's empire, confirming the evidence of the colossal capital cited above, is of great importance, as indicating unsuspected sources for Indian civilization and to some extent for Buddhism. For Aśoka was the greatest propagator of Buddhism, without whose active patronage that religion probably would not have survived. Before Aśoka's time there is no independent evidence for the existence of Buddhism. Adopting that faith himself, he made it the State religion of his empire, and he zealously lavished all the resources and wealth of his vast empire in building and endowing monasteries and covering the countries with monuments to mark sites alleged to have been visited by Buddha, or containing relics; these visible traces of Śākya-muni were distributed by Aśoka over India within great towers. Pāṭaliputra was the centre of all Aśoka's active religious propaganda; here was held the so-called 'Third Buddhist Council' during Aśoka's reign, and from here that ardent emperor sent swarms of Buddhist missionaries all over India and beyond its frontiers to propagate the new faith of his adoption. There is a presumption that Aśoka's Buddhism was more developed than that of Buddha's day, while it differs in many important essentials from that of the Buddhist Pāli canon, the earliest book of which was not compiled, as the present writer has shown, before the 2nd cent. B.C.¹ It is significant, therefore, to find the presence of Persian influence at Aśoka's headquarters in such unsuspected strength.

On the strength of that great building of Aśokan age which is virtually a replica of the famous Persepolitan palace-hall, Spooner propounds the theory that the authors, who were presumably of Aśoka's dynasty, were really Persian or Parsi in nationality and Zoroastrian in religion; and he proposes to call the era of the Mauryas (Aśoka's dynastic title) the 'Zoroastrian' period of Indian history. In support of this hypothesis he recalls the conjecture of Bühler that, although no monumental evidence has been found to substantiate the claim of Darius Hystaspes to suzerainty over India, it is not impossible that the northern script used by Aśoka in his northern edicts was introduced by the Syrian clerks of that Achæmenian conqueror. F. W. Thomas has also shown that the Mathura lion-sculpture requires for its interpretation a reference to the façade on Darius's tomb. J. Marshall, the present director of the Indian Archaeological Survey, finds from the excavations at Benares that Aśoka presumably employed Greco-Persian masons there. And Darius made use of rocks and pillars for ethico-religious inscriptions some centuries before Aśoka. Spooner disbelieves in any Greek influence having contributed to the Indian civilization of the early Mauryan period; for, had it been operative in Chandragupta's reign, it would doubtless have been referred to, he thinks, by Megasthenes the ambassador, who described the customs at Patna as if they had nothing in common with the Grecian. For Chandragupta the evidence, he thinks, points to Persia only. It will require, however, further new and more positive material-proofs before this theory can be definitely accepted;

and doubtless fresh evidence and inscriptions will be forthcoming from the excavations now in progress. Darius's claim to the possession of 'India' as a 'province' has never been regarded as implying more than the temporary possession probably of the Indus valley only, of which even there is no inscriptional evidence.

Pāṭaliputra was also a Jain centre in the days of Aśoka, who is claimed by the Jains as one of their patrons. While Buddhism has been extinct there for over six centuries, Jainism is still active, and in one of the picturesque many-turreted white-washed temples of that cult the inscription dated in the year corresponding to 1848 of our era was discovered by the present writer in which was preserved the ancient name in the form of Pāṭalipura, 'the city of Pāṭali.'

LITERATURE.—D. B. Spooner, 'The Zoroastrian Period of Indian History,' *JRAS*, 1915, pp. 63 f., 405 f.; L. A. Waddell, *Discovery of the Lost Site of Pataliputra, the Palibothra of the Greeks*, Calcutta, 1892, *Report on the Excavations of Pataliputra (Patna)*, do. 1903. The other references are given in the footnotes.

L. A. WADDELL.

PATRIOTISM.—Patriotism is the sentiment in which consciousness of nationality normally expresses itself. The qualification of the word 'normally' is required; it sometimes happens that a person is conscious of himself as belonging to a nation against his will. This is shown by the absence of any desire in him either to identify himself with the life of his countrymen or to bring their life into accordance with his ideals. Patriotism may be shown in either of these desires. A man may complain much of his people, but show his unity with them by labouring to improve them; it is never, indeed, so much by indiscriminate admiration as by unfailing attachment that the genuine patriot may be known. Persons, however, who are unwilling to be nationally what they know they are, who have a clear consciousness of nationality without a set of the will to develop it further, who may, indeed, be called anti-patriots, are obviously abnormal. They are abnormal, because the development of national consciousness takes place by means of just that set of the will to identify self with the national life the absence of which is the mark of the anti-patriot. It may happen that there are, or have been in the nation's history, circumstances favourable to the development of this self-contradictory type. It goes with the cultivation of the servile will in the weaker members of a subjugated or struggling nation. One of its most repulsive manifestations is the attitude of snobbery, as towards the race-type of the dominant foreign State, with which every class of such a nation may become infected. Anti-patriotism thus defined must, of course, be distinguished from the mere absence of national sentiment in undeveloped members of the nation, and still more from opposition to it in alien persons associated with the community politically or otherwise. Every nation, whether prosperous or the reverse, has many of the two last types within its borders.

Patriotism, then, may be precisely defined as consciousness of nationality together with the will to realize such nationality further. It is essentially an active force in a man's mind, whether it spends itself on the development of thoughts, feelings, or deeds. Each man's individuality in this respect colours his character as patriot. Moreover, the racial type of each nation colours the prevailing type of patriotism in her children. All patriots are idealists, imaginative, sentimental, and practical more or less, but many are characterized by one or other of these qualities in dominance over the other two. Racial character with its average tendencies is here involved. The Latin races are

¹ *Asiatic Review*, new ser., vii. [1916] 339 f.

more imaginative, the German more sentimental; and perhaps the truest thing to say about that mixed European race, often erroneously called Anglo-Saxon, which attains to its maximum of mixture in the United States, is that, not being conspicuously imaginative or conspicuously sentimental in its patriotism, it is extraordinarily successful in realizing its type and extending its borders as a matter of fact. It may be that the strongest kind of capacity for acting together is apt to be developed as a national quality side by side with a habit of subordinating individual imagination and sentiment to executive needs so energetically as to check the growth of romantic patriotism. The very practical man pretends to himself—at least in quiet prosperous times—that it is absurd. This pose, however, used to be more common than it is to-day.

Since patriotism is the normal expression of nationality, its analysis is, for the most part, contained in the analysis of nationality already set forth (above, p. 191 ff.). A nation is a community of persons profoundly conscious of organic unity and bent on the preservation of that unity. It becomes a self-conscious nation—a nation in the more perfect sense—when it is also bent on the preservation and development of its own type. Throughout, but especially in the later stage, the association of the race with the land plays a large part in the consciousness of nationality. Attachment to the home-land and attachment to the home-race are a twin birth and grow together, however they may differ in strength. The beauty of the home-land, its sweet familiarity, its historic associations, its glamour and indefinable charm, supply natural images in which the opening mind enshrines its vague generalized instincts of racial attachment. The home-land is the concrete thing chosen in the natural course as symbol of that dimly conceived ideal, the home-race, a nation. So patriotic songs are sung and patriotic speeches made to the father-land or mother-land as fancy chooses, or—tenderest of all, and with deeper truth, as in the passionate love-song of Irish penal times—to the dear young girl, oppressed it may be but ever fair, the immortal sweetheart of the race. It is an interesting point, worthy of some note, that, whereas all lands have something of this influence upon their people, in some it has played a much larger part than in others. Probably the most favourable combination is a land of soft and varied natural beauty, in which an early settlement has been made by a race of accurate observation, lively imagination, and literary gift. Such a land, so inhabited, becomes clothed over and over with story and legend at every point; historical tradition clings with the persistence of truth and good memory to different places; the race is aware of itself and of its history localized in detail. All new settlers who come after inherit the tradition; it has them in a solution out of which crystallizes a nation passionately attached to its land.

Three grades of national life have been distinguished (see NATIONALITY), and each is reflected in the kind of patriotism corresponding to it. The complexity of a modern society is heightened by the co-existence in it of patriots in every grade. The national life as a whole may be lived by those in the highest grade, consciously set on the realization of their own ideals in the minds and characters of all its members; yet there will be found among these members many whose national sense is of the crudest primitive type. Thus we have, in the first place, the quiet, patient, unreflective worker, who takes his world as he finds it, 'is no politician,' but clings to his own people and his own country as against all foreigners and the allurements of other climes. The force of this instinctive adhe-

sion to our own is, in almost all of us, tremendous; it is perhaps the chief element in the patriotism of most. Next to the mere instinctive, we have the crude political patriot: he is conscious of his nation chiefly as a political State among other States, each State being conceived as a group of persons bound to stand loyally by one another in case of dispute. 'My country right or wrong' suffices to him for the patriot's creed. He has little idea of a national character to be maintained or an inner national life to be developed. In his worst form he is a hard competitive nationalist with a lively conception of the national life as a continual getting the better of other nations. He appears, however, more normally in several less developed and more humane forms—e.g., as the responsible militant patriot of the warrior class and as the irresponsible war-promoter who takes no risk himself. In questions of international commerce he tends to be anti-foreign, even more than pro-native, in his sympathies. These antipathies run away with him altogether, of course, in case of a war in which the national enemy is engaged, even if not the native country itself.

The higher patriotism in any person may or may not be free from association with instincts of hostility to other races; but it is characterized by such a centring of interest in the spiritual life of the nation as must tend to make these instincts inoperative, at least in times of peace. In times of national danger, no doubt, the primitive instincts would assert themselves in force. At other times they are submerged beneath peaceful manifestations of the civic spirit at home and reasonable humanitarian sentiment towards the foreigner. The patriot of the developed type is, however, something more than a public-spirited citizen. An alien who feels himself to be an alien can, nevertheless, be a pattern of civic virtue by the exercise of the human qualities which bind him to his fellow-men. A good patriot at home will probably be a good citizen in any foreign community to which he attaches himself, because the moral nature required in both cases is the same and the practice which flows from it not dissimilar. But the patriot in the home community has, in his consciousness of organic unity with his people, a source of happiness, energy, and understanding which is of surpassing value both to him and to it. The national history, the national literature, the national institutions, the language, customs, manners—all are his own; he helps to make them, he has been made by them, attachment to the type of them is deep in his nature, and his desire for their perfection has the passion of personal love. There is always, therefore, a certain waste of human energy when the services of a good citizen are transferred from the home to the foreign sphere. As regards persons of mediocre or deficient public spirit, it is obvious that the special stimulus of national sentiment is almost necessary to make them realize their citizenship sufficiently.

The centre of consciousness in the higher patriotism is awareness of, affection for, and determination to cherish the national type, guarding it from decay within even more anxiously than from attack without. In a nation threatened with political extinction there will be a jealous zeal for the national language, literature, and traditions, with anxiety as to the education of the young accordingly. In a prosperous nation, on the other hand, high patriotism will direct itself rather to the development of intellectual and spiritual life in all forms, to the neutralization of luxury, the redress of excessive inequalities, and the whole vast work of internal reform in the complex body politic. For, it should be noted, increase of prosperity goes with increase of complexity, and,

apart from counteraction on the part of the reformer, this carries increase of luxury, poverty, and desperate helplessness in its train. In either case there is no lack of matter for the labour and interest of the patriot in home affairs. The real political distinction in this respect is between the patriot, on the one hand, and the seekers after self or class interest, on the other.

In foreign affairs the higher patriot is concerned to maintain the honour of his nation in the sense in which he realizes it as having a national character to maintain. His ideas of policy will, therefore, vary according to his ideal of national character as between nations. This involves the whole question of international morality, but to the ordinary citizen it does not seem very complex. Courage is the primitive element in national honour. Good faith is almost, if not quite, as primitive, but in actual weight of estimation has too often lagged a long way behind; it is also a virtue the possession or non-possession of which admits of a good deal of argument either way. The advance is great and difficult from an ideal based on much courage and some good faith to one in which justice is conceived as an essential of international virtue. Nevertheless, there has always been something corresponding to it in the ideas of fair play between tribes or nations of which there is evidence at a very early stage. The developed conception is, however, much more than this. It is the product of personal reason and personal sympathy as applied to other national communities. In so far as the human race is making moral progress at all, there is, from generation to generation, an increase in ability to see and be moved by things as the others most nearly concerned in them see and are moved. No human need or sentiment can be excluded from its operation, nor can any limit be placed to keep outside of it the races distant from us in type, habit, and blood. The Golden Rule that men should do unto others as they would that others, in like case, should do unto them is no rule of external discipline imposed on a humanity alien to it, but springs out of the depths of human nature itself. The more a man is man, the more certainly is he an organ of reason and sympathy, and so, the more men as a whole, and the leading races especially, become man-like, the more firmly does the Christian ideal of justice dominate them in all things, including their sense of what is due from the members of one nation to those of another. Hence for the patriot, intent on the maintenance of the national character as the expression of what his nation unanimously ought to be, the honour of his country means that her conduct among the nations shall be free from taint of aggressive greed, inordinate love of power, disregard of nationality in others, as well as from sins of individual cruelty, bad faith, and cowardice.

Thus there are patriots and patriots in every advanced political community; and, under democratic government, settled distinctions of party and of sections within parties are accordingly apt to arise, though disguised, confused, and, to some extent, counteracted by the historical causes out of which the original distinctions of party sprang. The two chief grounds of patriotic variety to be borne in mind are (1) the development of the idea of internal reform as the healthy life of the nation within itself, and (2) the transformation of the ideal of national honour with the growth of reason and sympathy in relation to it.

The higher patriotism, as has been pointed out, is not dependent on the political condition called national independence. A nation, if it has reached the stage of national determination to preserve itself, may exist as a nation scattered through a

number of alien political communities. The most striking example is that of the Jews with their marvellous vitality of race and type. Their early history is in this respect even more remarkable than that of Christian times. Empire after empire rose and fell. Of the conquering races hardly a trace is left. The Hebrew people, subject in turn to Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Greece, and Rome, has survived them all, and has, moreover, maintained for hundreds of years a deep national unity with no loss of type in the face of a hostile dominant Christendom. The means has been simple enough—steady persistence in religion, customs, literature, and language, the things which pertain to the innermost manifestations of the common life. The binding force of a great literature should be specially noticed. The founders of the literary movement in Hezekiah's time and the leaders of the literary renaissance among the exiles in Babylon undoubtedly did more for the preservation of a nation—apart from higher aims and subtler problems—than has ever been achieved by States and armaments. It is, of course, another question whether it is a good thing that a strong nation should remain permanently without a national country and a political State.

Another familiar example is interesting. The individuality preserved by the three smaller nations within the United Kingdom turns upon a sense of national distinctness in history, literature, traditional ideals, and racial ways of thought. Round all these a sentiment grows up which may be the minor or the major or the exclusive patriotism as compared with the sentiment towards the United Kingdom as a whole. The Irish demand for Home Rule within the Kingdom is the expression of this sentiment on its political side. The remarkable movement, however, of the Gaelic League in Ireland, Great Britain, and the United States is essentially national in the non-political sense. Its aim is to maintain and develop the national consciousness through knowledge of Irish history, literature, music, and art, and by study of the Irish language with the valuable literature which it contains. The practical claim advanced by it is, as in the similar case of Wales, that the humanities used in the education of Irish persons should be, in the first place, though by no means exclusively, Irish. The genuinely non-political character of the movement is shown by the adherence to it of many who take the anti-popular view in politics. In the United States, moreover, there is no question of Irish national existence except in the more subtle inner sense.

In all movements for the revival or development of national literature as national we see the patriotic sentiment asserting itself in this subtle sense. Such movements occur in the history of all nations. They are of the same nature psychologically as the individual's claim to that sincerity of self-expression in his work which, as Carlyle says, is the merit of originality. A group of young poets or artists thus stirred by a common national sense inspiring them, and in the presence of an established literature which does not express the native spirit, will, either of purpose or without it, create a literary revival on national lines. Great outbursts of fresh literary genius are apt to occur in this way.

LITERATURE.—See Literature at art. NATIONALITY.

S. BRYANT.

PATRIPASSIANISM.—See MONARCHIANISM.

PAUL.—I. Sources.—This account of Paul proceeds on sources of two kinds: (1) his own letters, nine of which may now be regarded as genuine, viz. 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Galatians,

1 and 2 Corinthians, Romans, Philippians, Colossians, Philemon (Ephesians and the Pastoral Epistles contain much that Paul might say, but mixed with elements certainly later); and (2) the Acts of the Apostles. This perplexing work was written partly from good sources, but cannot be used without thorough criticism. The speeches in it are the work of the editor and represent what might be heard in various quarters in his day, and various theories which must be accounted for are spread over the work.

The 'We'-pieces (16¹⁰⁻¹⁷ 20⁵⁻¹⁸ 21¹⁻¹⁸ 27¹⁻²⁸¹⁶) and the narrative of Paul's arrest, appeal to Cæsar, and journey to Rome are in the main to be relied on. The book as a whole belongs to the end of the 1st century. The uncertainty resting on the subject, from the frequent and serious disagreement of the letters with the history of Paul himself as related by his biographer, is now yielding to a large extent to the light shed by the study of ancient religions: he is not so nebulous that he and all his works must be pronounced unreal, as the 'modern' Dutch school, with its followers in other countries, declared; it is possible to put together a fairly adequate account of Paul, his writings, and his teaching.

2. Outlook and early training.—Paul is made to declare himself (Ac 21³⁹) to be a Jew of Tarsus in Cilicia; that explains in this passage his being able to speak Greek. His phrase (Ph 3⁵), 'a Hebrew of the Hebrews,' need not imply that his parents spoke Aramaic, though that may have been the case; Paul himself uses Aramaic words, and is said (Ac 21⁴⁰) to have addressed his audience at Jerusalem in that tongue. He belonged at any rate to the Diaspora, and we may now point out what that implied in his religious experience.

The Jews living in Greek cities had a different outlook on the world from those in Palestine; they were not oppressed, but held for the most part a good position; the Gentiles around them respected them on account of their pure religion, and many of them frequented the synagogue and strengthened it by their wealth and character. The Jews in such towns were in a manner missionaries to the Gentiles, and all the considerations that are still weighed in missionary circles as to the attraction of the true religion for those outside, and as to the hindrances which kept them from joining it, would be discussed among them and made familiar to the sharp wits among their children. Paul could not fail to learn at Tarsus what Gentile religion was, how much of natural goodness lived in heathen minds, how they were led (1 Co 12²) to follow dumb idols which could not satisfy them, and, more, how Jewish practices hindered the spread of Jewish religion, what an incubus the Law was to missionary effort, how the demand of circumcision was a special barrier.

Paul was not of the class of operatives; the two franchises which he possessed show this sufficiently. His citizenship of Tarsus implies that his father (to go no farther back) was enrolled in the tribe, or *φυλῆς*, of Jews in that city and had some part at least in the public affairs of the town; his Roman citizenship, which he had from his birth (Ac 22²⁸) and which entitled him to carry his case to the emperor (25¹¹ 26³²), proves that his father, perhaps his grandfather, held that rank, being recognized by one Roman potentate or another as loyal and trustworthy. As Roman citizen Paul would have a Roman name, and in the family a Jewish one; hence 'Saul who is also called Paul' of Ac 13⁹. There can be no doubt that he was educated first at home in Tarsus, and that, if he proceeded to Jerusalem to sit at the feet of Gamaliel, it was later, when the language had been learned and all the life of a Greek town made thoroughly familiar to the boy.

The language of the Epistles is the ordinary Greek then spoken throughout the empire; the Scripture quoted is, with one or two exceptions, the Septuagint, which was read in the Greek synagogue; the method of composition is not that of the rabbis of Palestine but that of the preachers and savers of souls of Stoicism and Cynicism. Paul does not call himself a rabbi; he calls himself a preacher, a steward of the word, a father of his churches.

His expressions in Ph 3⁴⁻⁶ show him to have been the child of a very strict Jewish home. He would be well exercised in the Greek Bible; he would be taken to the synagogue when he was old enough and made acquainted with the history and the hopes and destiny of Israel; he would see Gentiles sitting beside Jews at the religious exercises and would learn to regard them with a liberal eye, while still remembering that his own people were called out of the Gentiles and in many ways distinguished from them. He would hear Stoic and Cynic doctrine preached at the street corners and would pick up their tricks of rhetoric. There was also a university at Tarsus—not on the scale of Athens or Alexandria, yet a notable seat of Stoic doctrine—in which men of world-wide reputation maintained a blend of physics and ethics. He would not attend the university; for him there was a different learning from that taught there; but he would pick up a tincture of what was taught and valued there and pervaded the whole spirit of the city. He would take note of the religious rites of heathenism, not only the stated official worship of the city, but also the irregular sporadic outbursts of a more popular religion which drew people in processions out to the country and kept them there until their god, who had died, rose again and changed their mood from sorrow to joy. The principal god of Tarsus, Sandan, was a figure of this type of dying and reviving deity. In his native city also Paul might learn to distinguish deities of two kinds or ranks—the deity who dwelt aloft and, without being very active, ruled all things, and the more familiar being, the working god, who gave himself for those who believed in him and to whom they addressed their prayers (cf. 1 Co 8⁴). There are many traces of the Gentile atmosphere in which Paul's early days were spent. Of a Jewish training at Jerusalem it is harder to find traces in his works. The national pride and consciousness of superiority which mark them strongly were to be found in the Jews of the Dispersion as well as at Jerusalem, and of rabbinic method there is little trace in Paul. Did he go to Jerusalem to be under a famous teacher? In his own works he does not speak of it; he could 'advance in Judaism beyond many contemporaries, and surpass them in zeal for the traditions of the fathers' (Gal 1¹⁴) at Tarsus as well as at Jerusalem; his persecuting of the Church, too, might be done in either region.

3. Persecution of Christians.—Whether or not he sat at the feet of Gamaliel, Paul left Tarsus early in life and gave himself with his whole energy to the work of persecuting the sect of Christians which was spreading in Syria (Gal 1^{12, 23}, 1 Co 15⁹). He turned his back on the career which Tarsus no doubt offered him, that he should tread in the footsteps of his father and become a leader of the Jews in his native city, in order to persecute the Christians. How he was brought to take up this work we do not know. The evidence of the Epistles forbids us to believe that he had any personal acquaintance with Jesus. 2 Co 5¹⁶ speaks of unworthy views of the Messiah which Paul might or might not have held, but which he now refuses to entertain. And the knowledge which the Epistles show of Jesus is too scanty to serve as evidence that Paul knew Jesus or was in

Jerusalem at the time of the Crucifixion. On the other hand, the spread of the belief in Jesus might well appear dangerous to one passionately devoted to the Law and regarding it as the one heaven-appointed means of salvation. If a Messiah established His authority, that of the Law must come to an end. In Ro 10⁴ Paul declares that this has happened; it may be believed that at an earlier time he saw that it might happen, and felt the great bulwark of his faith, the foundation of all Jewish religion, to be in danger. This was true of any Messiah; and a crucified Messiah was an offence which a true Jew could not get over; he says so later (1 Co 1²³), and he knew it from his own experience. No wonder that, being what he was, in earnest about religion with his whole soul, he threw himself with the utmost energy into the task of persecuting the followers of Jesus. If he was at Jerusalem at the time of the death of Stephen, his convictions which would lead him to taking a hand in that murder might be accounted for.

The high-priest had no power to order the arrest and the bringing to Jerusalem of people in distant towns; and this part of the story in Acts cannot be accepted. But we have Paul's own authority for it (Gal 1⁷) that he came to Damascus as a persecutor and left it as a Christian; and we may take it that those whom he came there to molest were not of the Hebrew, but of the Greek part of the Church who had fled from Jerusalem at the persecution which arose about Stephen. He must have proceeded against them in the regular way, laying information against them before the synagogue and asking for their punishment. He had no vote to give against them either at Jerusalem or at Damascus. In his persecutions, which may have been carried on not only at Damascus but elsewhere, he would certainly come to know something about Jesus, and would learn some of His words and the general story of His life, as these followers knew it, and His resurrection and expected coming to judgment, as they believed in these articles of their faith.

4. Conversion.—With regard to the conversion of Paul, the three narratives of the event in Ac 9, 22, and 26 contradict each other in details, as is to be expected in the versions of a narrative orally transmitted, but the variations are not in the interest of any tendency, and the three versions of the story may be traceable to one which Paul himself may have communicated to friends, with whom he could not but talk on the subject. Other intimations are found in the Epistles. It pleased God to reveal His Son in him (Gal 1¹⁶), i.e. to make him know Jesus in His true nature as God's Son, not only as the preacher and wonder-worker of Galilee, and not only as the Jewish Messiah, but as a Divine Being, in whom God pleased to make Himself known to man, as one of the same nature with Himself, and carrying out in an intimate way His purpose for mankind. From the context of this passage, 'that I might preach him among the Gentiles' (1¹⁶), it appears that this revelation had a universal scope; the Person revealed to Paul was of interest not to the Jews only, but to the Gentiles as well. In other passages it is intimated that Paul considered the Lord Jesus to have appeared to him as a risen and a glorious Being. In 1 Co 15⁸⁻⁹ he places his vision of Christ in the same line with those that the older apostles had had; it was the last vision of the kind to take place, but it was not different from the rest. 1 Co 9¹, 'Am I not an apostle? have I not seen Jesus the Lord?' is to the same effect. In 2 Co 4⁶ he describes the experience through which he came, evidently that of the same event, as the sudden and irresistible shining within him of a bright light comparable to the first shining of light on the

world, and flashing upon him the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. The irresistibility of the communication appears also in the phrases in Ph 3¹³, where he speaks of having been 'laid hold of' by Jesus Christ. In this passage too he speaks of all the advantages that he had at a former period, and how he cast them all away, 'like dung,' in order to win Christ and be found in Him. Taking together all these passages from the Epistles, we have a picture not unlike that of the stories in Acts, of an instantaneous and utter change brought about by a luminous appearance which was held to be Christ Himself. Considering Paul's lifelong susceptibility to visions and ecstasies (Gal 2², 2 Co 12¹⁻⁹ 5¹³, Ac 16⁹⁻¹⁰), it seems vain to speculate as to what actually took place outside of Damascus. That there was suggestion of what he held that he saw is plain; those whom he had persecuted based their belief in the risen Christ on the visions of their fellow-believers; Paul too had beliefs as to the form of heavenly beings—their luminous quality, their spiritual substance—which prepared him for what was coming. A touch, and all things passed away with him and all things were made new.

Some great scholars have constructed out of this vision of Paul the whole of his beliefs as set before us in the great Epistles. Here it will be sufficient briefly to indicate the beliefs which his vision at once fixed for him, whatever additions might be made to them afterwards. He saw Christ as a Divine Being, radiant, all-powerful, with full knowledge of the secrets of the heart, not merely as a Jewish Messiah. This implied that God had raised Him from the dead, so that the Cross was no longer a stumbling-block, since God had taken the part of the Crucified One and exalted Him beyond the reach of death and accident to dwell with Himself and share His power and glory. He was therefore a Being who concerned not only the Jews as their Messiah, but all men; He was a deity; He was the Son of God, and all could be called to know and worship Him. And His crucifixion was not only an incident of His past career, but an attribute of His person for ever; He was always and for all men Christ crucified and Christ raised from the dead. And Christ, thus conceived, was singularly fitted to be an object of faith to the Gentiles. The living and effective cults which Paul knew from his boyhood at Tarsus were much occupied with divine beings who had died and had risen again, who were, in fact, for ever dying, for ever rising again, to the joy of their worshippers. The faith which Paul's vision enabled him to preach was in form one more cult of this nature, though in its ethical contents it infinitely transcended all the others, carrying with it, as it did, all the strict morals and all the glorious faith and hope of Jewish theism.

Paul was therefore warranted in regarding the revelation of the Son of God which had been given to him as being at the same time a call to him to preach Christ to the Gentiles (Gal 1¹⁰). Perhaps he was not the first to preach Christ to them; there was, about the same time as Paul was at Damascus, preaching to the Hellenists (Ac 11²⁰; RV 'to the Greeks'; but the reading 'Grecians' is better supported, and, standing as it does in opposition to Jews, it must mean uncircumcised persons; see Westcott and Hort, *The NT in Greek*, Camb. and London, 1881, note), and the mixed church at Antioch (the first of which we read) was not founded by Paul. We cannot tell what views were held of the nature and position of Christ by those other preachers of Him to the Gentiles, but in the case of Paul this all lies clear before us. It was his new knowledge of Jesus as Son of God that qualified him to call the Gentiles to the Christian fold. He called them to believe in a Divine Being who not only had died, but had died for them, to effect their deliverance from the ills that oppressed them (Gal 1⁴), who had left His heavenly glory, and in the counsel of the Father had come down to the earth in order to bear the trials that weighed on them, that they through His suffering might be saved and made free. It may not be correct to see the whole of Paul's doctrine present in nuce at a later time; especially as it belongs to the conflict of which the Galatian Epistle tells us. But his doctrine of the person of Christ and the object of His sufferings is explained to us only by his vision, and Paul must be considered to have received it in the revelation of the Son of God which was then made to him. It was his warrant for preaching to the Gentiles, and this implies that he did so at once and constantly afterwards.

5. Sojourn in Arabia.—The next part of the narrative must be taken from Gal 1. The story of this period in Acts places Paul in a different light from that of his own Epistle and shows him as an obedient and willing subordinate of the Jerusalem leaders. Paul's own account is directed to prove how little he came in contact with them

or was indebted to them for any teaching or doctrine. After his vision, Paul tells us, he did not act in what might be thought the natural way for a new convert bent on being a teacher of the faith; he did not go at once to the centre of Christian teaching to get himself instructed and directed to the part of the field that he was to occupy. The phrase, 'I conferred not with flesh and blood' (v.¹⁶), must not be taken too absolutely. Some one must have baptized him and introduced him to the brethren, and the story of Ananias may be accepted in the main. Acts, however, does not mention Arabia, where Paul says (v.¹⁷) he was for three years, and, the foregoing verse compels us to suppose, as a missionary to the Arabs. At Damascus he could not at once preach; even when he came back after such an interval, it was an impossible place for him. In Acts it is the Jews, in 2 Co 11³² it is the representative of Aretas, by whom his safety was threatened, so that he had to make a precipitate retreat.

A date is here found for the history of Paul, as the imperial coinage ceases at Damascus in A.D. 33-34, so that Paul's escape from the ethnarch of Aretas would not occur before that date, and his conversion would be three years earlier. His visit to Jerusalem is attributed by Loisy to the unsuccessful nature of his mission to the Arabs, and to the desire to connect himself with the mother church, so that he might not run in vain. This is merely a conjecture. The visit was a private one, to make acquaintance with Peter, whom he recognizes as the principal person in the Jerusalem community. Besides Peter, he saw James, the brother of the Lord, who joined the community in its earliest days and naturally had great influence in it. He is called an 'apostle'—a title which was not confined to the Twelve. He represented the most Jewish position within the Church, and could not be expected to favour the mission to the Gentiles. He is not said to have objected to it at this time, but the two heads made little of Paul; he belonged to Stephen's way of thinking, of which the persecution had rid the Church some years before. He was not publicly introduced to the church, and was so much in the background that he could say that the members of the church did not know him by sight. His visit, he seems to indicate, was too short to admit of a course of instruction, and he made no application to the apostles to define his duties or assign to him a sphere. His apostleship was not in these respects 'of man or by man.' His field obviously was not to be at Jerusalem, where Peter and James were at the head; but, on the other hand, nothing of an unfriendly nature occurred, and he was free to carry on a mission elsewhere.

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there be in the latter certain elements which belong to history. As to the date of the journey, the two accounts agree that it was made when Paul had been carrying on missionary work for some time in Syria and Cilicia, and before he engaged in such work in other provinces (cf. Gal 1²¹ with 2¹⁴, and Ae 15^{23, 30, 35}). The journey, then, is to be placed before the travels in Pisidia and Lyconia, which are detailed in Ae 13 and 14; and these two chapters are to be regarded as misplaced. They come after the report of a journey of Paul and Barnabas from Antioch to Jerusalem (11²⁷⁻³⁰), which is just in the right place for a journey about Jewish observances, though the object of it is otherwise stated. The result, then, is that the three accounts of a journey to Jerusalem all refer to the same historical event.

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But Paul met John at Jerusalem on his visit (Gal 2⁹); the visit therefore was before John's death, which took place shortly before the death of Herod, who is known to have died in A.D. 44. Paul's dating of it agrees with this; he says that it was after the lapse of fourteen years, and we know that the date of that event was A.D. 30. Ae 11 places it quite in the right position.

There are few facts to fill up the space of ten years between the two visits to Jerusalem. If the statement of Acts about the period stood alone, we should be led to think that Paul was sent straight to Tarsus after his first visit (9³⁰), and stayed there till Barnabas brought him to Antioch a year or so before the second. But in Gal 1²¹ he speaks of himself in this period as preaching in Syria and Cilicia, which would imply free movement; and in Ro 15¹⁹ he speaks as having had a career as a preacher which began at Jerusalem and extended to Illyria. He would be at this time in the current of the mission to the Hellenists, which is spoken of (Ac 11¹⁹.) and with which Barnabas was fully in sympathy. He would be one of the juniors among the missionaries; Ae 13¹ gives a list of the prophets and teachers at Antioch, in which Barnabas has the first place and Paul the last. Views would be opening at this time as to the new lands which might be visited; the work to which Barnabas and Paul were called may have been already present to their minds.

The second visit to Jerusalem was occasioned, Paul says, by a revelation—to whom he does not say. Certain persons of less liberal views had been visiting Antioch, spying on the liberty which prevailed there, which Peter liked at first, till he felt upon him the eye of those who came from James. Paul went with Barnabas, who was the head of the party, and took with him Titus, an uncircumcised Christian; Titus was not compelled to be circumcised; the demand made previously at Antioch, and now again (if Acts is to be believed) at Jerusalem, was not approved of by the church at Jerusalem.

Jerusalem at the time of the Crucifixion. On the other hand, the spread of the belief in Jesus might well appear dangerous to one passionately devoted to the Law and regarding it as the one heaven-appointed means of salvation. If a Messiah established His authority, that of the Law must come to an end. In Ro 10⁴ Paul declares that this has happened; it may be believed that at an earlier time he saw that it might happen, and felt the great bulwark of his faith, the foundation of all Jewish religion, to be in danger. This was true of any Messiah; and a crucified Messiah was an offence which a true Jew could not get over; he says so later (1 Co 1²³), and he knew it from his own experience. No wonder that, being what he was, in earnest about religion with his whole soul, he threw himself with the utmost energy into the task of persecuting the followers of Jesus. If he was at Jerusalem at the time of the death of Stephen, his convictions which would lead him to taking a hand in that murder might be accounted for.

The high-priest had no power to order the arrest and the bringing to Jerusalem of people in distant towns; and this part of the story in Acts cannot be accepted. But we have Paul's own authority for it (Gal 1¹⁷) that he came to Damascus as a persecutor and left it as a Christian; and we may take it that those whom he came there to molest were not of the Hebrew, but of the Greek part of the Church who had fled from Jerusalem at the persecution which arose about Stephen. He must have proceeded against them in the regular way, laying information against them before the synagogue and asking for their punishment. He had no vote to give against them either at Jerusalem or at Damascus. In his persecutions, which may have been carried on not only at Damascus but elsewhere, he would certainly come to know something about Jesus, and would learn some of His words and the general story of His life, as these followers knew it, and His resurrection and expected coming to judgment, as they believed in these articles of their faith.

4. Conversion.—With regard to the conversion of Paul, the three narratives of the event in Ac 9, 22, and 26 contradict each other in details, as is to be expected in the versions of a narrative orally transmitted, but the variations are not in the interest of any tendency, and the three versions of the story may be traceable to one which Paul himself may have communicated to friends, with whom he could not but talk on the subject. Other intimations are found in the Epistles. It pleased God to reveal His Son in him (Gal 1^{15a}), i.e. to make him know Jesus in His true nature as God's Son, not only as the preacher and wonder-worker of Galilee, and not only as the Jewish Messiah, but as a Divine Being, in whom God pleased to make Himself known to man, as one of the same nature with Himself, and carrying out in an intimate way His purpose for mankind. From the context of this passage, 'that I might preach him among the Gentiles' (1^{15b}), it appears that this revelation had a universal scope; the Person revealed to Paul was of interest not to the Jews only, but to the Gentiles as well. In other passages it is intimated that Paul considered the Lord Jesus to have appeared to him as a risen and a glorious Being. In 1 Co 15⁸⁻⁹ he places his vision of Christ in the same line with those that the older apostles had had; it was the last vision of the kind to take place, but it was not different from the rest. 1 Co 9¹, 'Am I not an apostle? have I not seen Jesus the Lord?' is to the same effect. In 2 Co 4⁶ he describes the experience through which he came, evidently that of the same event, as the sudden and irresistible shining within him of a bright light comparable to the first shining of light on the

world, and flashing upon him the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. The irresistibility of the communication appears also in the phrases in Ph 3¹³, where he speaks of having been 'laid hold of' by Jesus Christ. In this passage too he speaks of all the advantages that he had at a former period, and how he cast them all away, 'like dung,' in order to win Christ and be found in Him. Taking together all these passages from the Epistles, we have a picture not unlike that of the stories in Acts, of an instantaneous and utter change brought about by a luminous appearance which was held to be Christ Himself. Considering Paul's lifelong susceptibility to visions and ecstasies (Gal 2¹, 2 Co 12¹⁻⁹ 5¹³, Ac 16^{9c}), it seems vain to speculate as to what actually took place outside of Damascus. That there was suggestion of what he held that he saw is plain; those whom he had persecuted based their belief in the risen Christ on the visions of their fellow-believers; Paul too had beliefs as to the form of heavenly beings—their luminous quality, their spiritual substance—which prepared him for what was coming. A touch, and all things passed away with him and all things were made new.

Some great scholars have constructed out of this vision of Paul the whole of his beliefs as set before us in the great Epistles. Here it will be sufficient briefly to indicate the beliefs which his vision at once fixed for him, whatever additions might be made to them afterwards. He saw Christ as a Divine Being, radiant, all-powerful, with 'full knowledge of the secrets of the heart, not merely as a Jewish Messiah. This implied that God had raised Him from the dead, so that the Cross was no longer a stumbling-block, since God had taken the part of the Crucified One and exalted Him beyond the reach of death and accident to dwell with Himself and share His power and glory. He was therefore a Being who concerned not only the Jews as their Messiah, but all men; He was a deity; He was the Son of God, and all could be called to know and worship Him. And His crucifixion was not only an incident of His past career, but an attribute of His person for ever; He was always and for all men Christ crucified and Christ raised from the dead. And Christ, thus conceived, was singularly fitted to be an object of faith to the Gentiles. The living and effective cults which Paul knew from his boyhood at Tarsus were much occupied with divine beings who had died and had risen again, who were, in fact, for ever dying, for ever rising again, to the joy of their worshippers. The faith which Paul's vision enabled him to preach was in form one more cult of this nature, though in its ethical contents it infinitely transcended all the others, carrying with it, as it did, all the strict morals and all the glorious faith and hope of Jewish theism.

Paul was therefore warranted in regarding the revelation of the Son of God which had been given to him as being at the same time a call to him to preach Christ to the Gentiles (Gal 1^{15b}). Perhaps he was not the first to preach Christ to them; there was, about the same time as Paul was at Damascus, preaching to the Hellenists (Ac 11²⁰; RV 'to the Greeks'; but the reading 'Grecians' is better supported, and, standing as it does in opposition to Jews, it must mean uncircumcised persons; see Westcott and Hort, *The NT in Greek*, Camb. and London, 1881, note), and the mixed church at Antioch (the first of which we read) was not founded by Paul. We cannot tell what views were held of the nature and position of Christ by those other preachers of Him to the Gentiles, but in the case of Paul this all lies clear before us. It was his new knowledge of Jesus as Son of God that qualified him to call the Gentiles to the Christian fold. He called them to believe in a Divine Being who not only had died, but had died for them, to effect their deliverance from the ills that oppressed them (Gal 1⁴), who had left His heavenly glory, and in the counsel of the Father had come down to the earth in order to bear the trials that weighed on them, that they through His suffering might be saved and made free. It may not be correct to see the whole of Paul's doctrine in this vision; but it is clear that it was the basis of his teaching, especially his teaching about the Law. But his doctrine of which the Galatian Epistle tells us. But his doctrine of the person of Christ and the object of His sufferings is explained to us only by his vision, and Paul must be considered to have received it in the revelation of the Son of God which was then made to him. It was his warrant for preaching to the Gentiles, and this implies that he did so at once and constantly afterwards.

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No objection was raised to the gospel that Paul preached among the Gentiles, though based on such different experiences; if there was anything wrong about it, they were to tell him; no new limitations were laid on him or, he might have said, on Barnabas; but, when Galatians was written, Paul was already separated from Barnabas, and so speaks of himself alone. In spite of the differences, in both teaching and practice, between the churches of Syria and Cilicia and the church at Jerusalem, each was recognized as essential to the Church, and no schism took place. It was agreed that, as Judaism had its scattered members throughout the cities of the empire, many of them Gentiles, all recognizing Jerusalem as the centre, and all contributing to keep up the Temple and the sacrifices, so it should be also with the new Israel. This was what the new agreement came to. The success of Paul and his friends in Gentile lands could not be denied; the great church of the uncircumcised was a plain fact and had to be recognized; but the financial link was to remain, as in the case of the Jewish religion and its Temple; the Gentile churches were to assist the finances of the brethren at Jerusalem. Paul says nothing of what is so prominent in Acts—the regulations laid down at Jerusalem as to the extent of observance of the Jewish Law on the part of the Gentile Christians. And he not only does not mention here any such feature of his visit to Jerusalem; he mentions it nowhere in his Epistles, not even in discussing with the Corinthians the use by Christians of meat offered to idols, and we are driven to conclude that no such conditions as Acts speaks of were laid down for Paul's acceptance. They were very likely laid down on another occasion, for some particular church or set of churches; the wide-ranging controversy which has recently sprung up about them does not concern the history of Paul.

Thus we see that a new combination had so early come to pass, and was accepted by the old apostles of Jewish and Gentile believers, who agreed to regard what had formerly separated them as of no moment compared with the faith of Christ which united them. It had come about quietly, and the result which the Jewish mission to the Gentiles had arrived at, but failed to secure, stood accomplished. The signs and watchwords of this union ring through the Epistles. Paul was not the first nor the only agent in bringing this change about, but he, more than any one else, realized the principles on which it was based, and the conflict to secure and establish it fell mainly to him.

Those on the Jewish side had a good deal to suffer from the change; we have a good example of this in Peter. A generous man, but easily frightened in dangerous circumstances, he gave his full approval to the continuance of the Gentile churches as they were, Jew and Gentile sitting at the same table and eating the Eucharist together; and he showed his approval by himself sitting at such a table. But he was not strong enough to shake off the influence of James, brought to bear on him through his emissaries, and he withdrew from the common table, taking his fellow-Jews and even Barnabas with him. Thus they did what they could to make the Gentile members think that the new communion of Jew and Gentile in Christ was a mistake and should be given up, and that the Jewish standard of living should still be upheld. The speech of Paul which follows is meant for the Galatians rather than for Peter. It may be doubted whether Paul had so thoroughly matured his doctrine of justification by faith at the time of the Antioch incident as he here makes it appear, or whether Peter had then arrived at the conviction, with which he is credited, of the total insufficiency of the Law for salvation. The doctrine of the Thessalonian Epistles, written a few years before Galatians, is much less developed on this point, and it is probable that Paul's teaching at this part of his career was not yet so angular. The Jewish attack on him had not yet taken place, and we must think that, with Barnabas and other missionaries with whom he was associated, he preached at this time as he did at Thessalonica, without arguments from the OT or attacks on the Jewish Law, warning the Gentiles of the coming judgment and pointing to Christ as the Saviour from its terrors, dwelling on the requirements of the Christian life in various relations, and seeking to build up out of the Gentiles whom he had awakened a people who should be ready to meet the Lord at His appearing.

7. First missionary journey.—We come now to the detailed history of the missions in which Paul was engaged. The next fixed date in his history, the coming of Gallio to the province of Achaia, will

be discussed when we deal with that part of the narrative. Gallio arrived in A.D. 51, and Paul had been there eighteen months before that; he came to Corinth therefore in the early part of the year 50. This gives a space of six years after the Jerusalem meeting, which we saw was in A.D. 44. In this period we have the incident with Peter at Antioch; then a space of time, which is undefined, at Antioch before Barnabas and Paul set out on their missionary tour in the interior of Asia Minor; then, after that tour, another period, also undetermined, at Antioch; and then the second journey, with Silas, over the same ground across the Aegean to Macedonia and as far as Corinth. Broadly speaking, the chronology is satisfactory. The detail is well worked out by C. H. Turner, *HDB*, s.v. 'Chronology.'

A point lying at the threshold of the history of Paul's missionary work is his relations to the Jewish synagogue, and the position given to him in Acts, of turning his back on the synagogue to devote himself to the Gentiles. If he felt himself, as he often declares, to be the apostle of the Gentiles, and if the Jerusalem apostles, as he tells us, recognized him in that character, then why should he address himself to the Jews at all; and, if he went to them, is it possible that he turned his back on them, as is repeatedly stated in Acts (13⁴⁶, 18⁶ 28²³⁻²⁵), with the declaration that it is owing to their obstinate unbelief that he does so?

Two facts are to be noted as bearing on this question.

(1) Paul probably did not create the missionary procedure that he followed, but inherited it. Barnabas was an older missionary than he, and so were others of whom it is told us (Ac 11²⁰) that at Antioch they carried on a mission to Hellenists (this is a better supported reading than 'Greeks' [see above, § 4]). Paul was initiated at Antioch into the procedure of a mission that he did not found, and his first journey was in company with Barnabas. The Hellenists, or Greek-speaking Jews, who were sought at Antioch were to be found in the synagogues there, and could, if necessary, be called out of the synagogue to meet by themselves elsewhere, as by Paul at Corinth (Ac 18⁷) and at Ephesus (19⁹). The missionaries were all Jews, full of the new light which in Christ shone on the Jewish hope, and they naturally carried the tidings of it first to the synagogue in the hope that their fellow-Jews would open their hearts to it. This was the natural procedure, and Paul kept it.

(2) The synagogue did, as a fact of history, turn away from the gospel, Paul himself seeing on many occasions the evidences of this separation, which was to him most grievous. He never gave up the hope that Israel would accept the gospel, and, though he does not call himself debtor to the Jews, as he is to Greeks and barbarians (Ro 1¹⁴), he no doubt did for them all that he could, even though he felt himself less and less a Jew as life went on.

The author of Acts looks on the question of the Jews and their rejection of the gospel from another point of view. That rejection is, when he writes, an accomplished fact, and he gives an account of how it came about and how Paul was unable to prevent it. The explanation that he gives may be compared with that given, not by Luke indeed, but by Mark and Matthew, in connexion with the teaching of Christ in parables. The passing of the gospel from the Jews to the Gentiles is according to a divine decree, and is announced in OT prophecy. And Paul is made to declare on several occasions that it is so. Paul's own view of the situation was very different; he believed that Israel turned away from the gospel in order that the Gentiles might accept it, and that, when the

fullness of the Gentiles had come in, Israel would come in too (Ro 11).

We see, then, that Paul's procedure in going first to the synagogue in every new place to which he came arose naturally out of the circumstances, and that the speeches put in his mouth in Acts, explaining his turning from the Jews to the Gentiles with his message, belong to the editor of Acts, not to Paul, whose thoughts on the subject were very different. When we come to the narrative of Paul's missions in Ac 13^f, it contributes little to our knowledge of his person. Barnabas is often named before Paul, and this has led to the hypothesis of a Barnabas-source, which the editor here used. One does not look for much originality in a young missionary travelling with an older one. On the other hand, if Barnabas is the Zeus of the party, Paul is the Hermes—the chief speaker; it is he who is tried at Lystra. His change of name is explained; instead of Saul he is henceforth called Paul; that also was his name before (see § 2). That his name is first mentioned in connexion with the interview with the pro-consul of Cyprus, Sergius Paulus, may not have much significance; the missionary, now a traveller, not in the East but in lands more immediately connected with Rome, has a Roman name.

Paul takes the lead in dealing with the magician Barjesus or Elymas or Elolmas, who has attached himself to the pro-consul, and he shows himself not inferior to Peter in dealing with such a character (cf. Ac 8¹⁴⁻²⁴), inflicting on him a temporary blindness, like that from which he had himself suffered before Damascus (Ac 9^{8f}). Such were the signs and portents expected of an apostle (Ac 6¹⁻¹¹, 1 Co 5⁵⁻⁶; cf. 2 Co 12¹² etc.).

It cannot be said that the speeches placed in Paul's mouth in these two chapters reveal much of his character. The first is delivered in the synagogue at Antioch in Pisidia, in a scene which exhibits well the nature of the audience to be found in such a building and, according to Acts, the normal course of the missions in such circumstances. The audience is a twofold one; Paul addresses first (Ac 13¹⁶) the men of Israel, i.e. the born Jews who formed the backbone of the synagogue, and then 'those who feared God,' i.e. the Gentile adherents. Paul knew from his youth the situation that had to be faced. But the sermon is wanting in anything distinctively Pauline, and closely resembles in its arguments that of Peter in Ac 2, being mainly a proof of the resurrection of Jesus from the experience of those who accompanied Him from Galilee to Jerusalem and who saw the visions of Him after the Crucifixion. The Pauline touch attempted (13^{38f}) is not very happy; the Jews and the Gentile adherents are assured that he who believes in Jesus is justified from all from which they could not be justified by the Law of Moses, which implies that the Law of Moses did possess some power to justify, but that it required to be supplemented by faith in Christ—a doctrine radically different from Paul's, who to the Galatians (Gal 3) and the Corinthians (2 Co 2) held up the crucified Christ as the Being in whom they should believe and to whom alone they were to look for justification. (On this representation of Paul as turning his back on the Jews and making their unbelief his excuse for devoting himself to the Gentiles see above.)

The sermon at Lystra is for heathens, and forms a prelude to the speech at Athens (Ac 17^{22f}). Such theistic arguments must have been common in Jewish missions to Gentiles, and in Christian polemics they occur frequently; here, however, we have rather the lesson from God's kindness in making the world so suitable for man's needs; in Ro 1 Paul argues God's power and divinity and worthiness to be served and worshipped.

The whole narrative of this journey produces an impression of reality, and the elders who are elected in each city need not be premature; something of the kind was needed if churches were to continue. The geographical and political details are correct (see W. M. Ramsay, *St. Paul the Traveller*, London, 1895, and *The Cities of St. Paul*, do. 1907). The apostles act with great courage and determination; driven from one city, they go straight to another and go through the same processes; their message has to be carried everywhere, and nothing can stop them. Many of the hardships and dangers which Paul enumerates in 2 Co 11^{32f} may have been met with at this time. Persecution proceeds mainly from the Jews, who follow him from one city to another, as Paul himself had formerly followed the Christians; they work on Greek women and on the Gentile population generally; and sometimes the magistrates are induced to lend a hand in the work of persecuting. The result is that a number of churches of the new kind are founded, and that Paul and Barnabas return to Antioch with a good account of the blessing which has rested on their labours (Ac 14^{27f}).

8. Second missionary journey.—Omitting in this place the account of the Jerusalem meeting which is in the wrong place in Acts and is full of difficulty and unreality, we come to another story at Antioch

(15³⁶) which appears to be taken from a different source; Paul invites Barnabas to revisit the brethren in every city where they have preached, they agree to do so, but disagree about their travelling companions, Barnabas wishing to take Mark, and Paul declaring that he will take any one rather than that person who deserted them on their former journey. Paul chooses Silas as his adjutant—a man of consideration in the mother church, but evidently with liberal sentiments. Barnabas takes the former route through Cyprus with Mark, while Paul goes through Syria and Cilicia, his old mission-field, and is said to have arrived at Derbe and Lystra also, as if he had not intended to visit these towns. Nor is anything said of his former stay in them. Evidently another hand furnished the account of the journey. It is a marked feature of the narrative that nothing is said of Peter's visit to Antioch, and that the breach with Barnabas appears to be a personal matter and not a difference of principle, as in Gal 2.

In his journey with Silas Paul acts with more freedom; his companion is a Jew, but Paul is distinctly the leading mind of the party. His first recorded action at this point, however, appears at first sight reactionary. He finds Timothy at Lystra, a young believer, his mother being a Christian Jewess and his father a Greek, who had an excellent reputation both at Lystra and at Iconium. Paul wishes to have him as his companion along with Silas, and with that view thinks it necessary to have him circumcised. Is Timothy introduced as a foil to Titus, who, Paul tells us (Gal 2³), was not compelled to be circumcised? And was Paul's act inconsistent with his principles as stated to the Galatians (Gal 5²⁵)? It is not necessary to think either of these things. Paul is feeling his way to his later position, but in the meantime he has a Jew as his associate and he looks forward to standing in many a synagogue. This he could not do with a man in his company who was known to be the son of a heathen father and himself uncircumcised. This would have scandalized the Jews wherever he went (cf. the incident of Trophimus [Ac 21^{29f}]), and Paul could not afford to do so.

As we saw it to be unlikely that Paul ever was a party to such an agreement with the Jerusalem pillars as Ac 15 speaks of, we must regard it as equally unlikely that he carried the decrees with him and handed them to the believers in each town that he visited.

The following verses (16^{6f}) are important for their bearing on the Galatians question, and also for what they reveal to us of the plans of travel with which Paul set out on this journey. As for the first point, we have the statement that, after visiting Lystra and Derbe (and also Iconium), the party traversed the Phrygian and Galatic land. This at once makes it impossible to regard the churches of these cities as belonging in the geography of the writer of Acts to the Galatic land. W. M. Ramsay has expended a great deal of learning and ingenuity in the attempt to prove the S. Galatian theory, that these are the churches addressed in the Epistle. But the verdict of antiquity is against his contention, as are the words of the text before us, which says that it was after touching at the cities of Lycaonia and Pisidia that Paul entered Galatia. The Galatians proper, the descendants of the Gauls who entered Asia Minor in 280 B.C., dwelt farther to the north, and after visiting these cities one had to pass through Phrygia to reach them. It is true that the towns of N. Galatia were less considerable than those of Lycaonia; still there were towns. And Acts recognizes that Paul did visit parts of Asia Minor of which little is known. After leaving Antioch for Ephesus (15⁴²), he is again said to have visited the Galatic land and Phrygia (confirming all the disciples in these regions), in a different order this time, and (19¹) he is said to have passed through the 'upper parts' before he came to Ephesus. There is accordingly room in the narrative, and room in the chronology, for visits to the N. Galatians.

Ac 16⁷ gives the reason why Paul visited Galatia on the journey with Silas. It was not his original intention to do so; he wished after Derbe and Lystra and Iconium to go to 'Asia,' i.e. the region in which Ephesus was, on the shores of the Aegean. This plan might appear to him, when he first conceived it, to be a bold one; the number of Jews at Ephesus was

very large, and the town was in communication by road and by sea with every part of the world. But the missionaries were prevented by the Holy Ghost from preaching the word in Asia. In which of the party the will of the Holy Ghost declared itself we are not told, nor whether the divine voice coincided with any positive obstacle. The route was changed and the party went northwards as far as the latitude of Mysia, their idea being now to enter Bithynia on the southern shore of the Euxine. But this plan also was disapproved of by the Spirit, which clearly declared itself and could not be disobeyed (v. 7). The only thing left was to make for the coast, not as at Ephesus, where one was still among a multitude of Jews, but at a point where Europe was close at hand and everything spoke of a purely Gentile mission. This part of the journey is reported in a very different way from that which comes afterwards in Europe, and, we must presume, by one who did not make it along with Paul; but what we seem to apprehend in the enigmatic sentences is a desire on Paul's part, which he identified with the principle inspiring him, to press forward to see what could be done in new lands. The conviction was no doubt already stirring within him to which in his Epistles he gives such forcible expression, that the world of the Gentiles was his province, and the desire to traverse the whole of it before the Master should descend from the skies. He must not build on another man's foundation. He tells the Corinthians that he feels bound to spread the gospel even beyond Corinth (2 Co 10:14-16). He tells the Romans that he has often proposed to come to them, but has always been prevented (Ro 1:13), that the desire has been with him for many years to come to them, when he travels to Spain (Ro 15:23^c). This desire may have been in his mind, at least in germ, since he left Antioch, no longer as a junior missionary travelling with a senior, but as the leader of a party and free to choose his own route, debtor now not to the Jews, but to Greeks and barbarians (Ro 1:14).

9. The gospel in Europe.—From the point of the crossing into Europe we feel that we are on more solid historical ground. Here we come to a piece of the journal that one of his companions kept, and of which four fragments are preserved in Acts. It happened to the author of Acts, as to other historians of antiquity, that he found his work made easier by a document drawn up at the time by a companion of his hero, which gave a bare sketch of the marked features of the hero's career to be filled in afterwards. This document, which announces itself where the narrative is in the first person plural, and may also underlie other portions of Acts, was for the most part a bald précis of routes and dates, but sometimes tells an interesting story of the journey, or even broadens out into a connected narrative. The writer shows little perception of Paul's great character or of the features of his thought which were to work so powerfully in the world in after times, and he seems to have known nothing of any of the Epistles or of the attacks and persecutions that called them forth. His name is hidden from us; there are fewer difficulties about Luke than about any other of Paul's companions, but about him too there are difficulties. The author of Acts uses this work as he used the Gospel of Mark for the Third Gospel, with the utmost skill, bringing it into his own style and his own vocabulary (see J. C. Hawkins, *Horæ Synopticae*, Oxford, 1909, and A. Harnack, *Luke the Physician*, Eng. tr., London, 1907, for the proof of this). For the skeleton which he provided of Paul's route, chronology, and work, from the time of his entering Europe, no thanks are too great.

The party had a fair wind to carry them over to Europe, and were only one night on board their vessel. In Europe their programme is the same as in Asia. A party of Jews, they announce themselves in every town where they arrive to the Jewish synagogue, if there is one; and in several of the Macedonian towns they are warmly received and succeed in founding a church with which Paul remains long afterwards on terms of intimacy and affection. He desires to visit them again (1 Th 2:17^a); he does visit them again (Ac 20:1-6); he sends trusted friends to encourage them and to bring him reports of them; they on their side take a warm interest in him, send contributions to help him with his expenses (Ph 4:15-18), and back him up with material aid and by sending delegates to help in his charitable schemes (2 Co 8:1).

The letters which he wrote to the Macedonian churches are more charming than any others; these churches were not torn by controversy or scandal, nor did they ask a multitude of questions; they were happy in their attachment to Christ and His apostle, and willing to be led in the path of duty. These Macedonian Gentile Christians (they were nearly all Gentiles) were the right material to make Christian churches—free from intellectual conceit, earnest, simple-minded, yet capable of great enthusiasm and ready for practical sacrifices. From the time of his arrival in Europe light is shed on the Apostle's history from his own Epistles as well as from the Acts; we hear from himself what he preached in this and that place, how his message was received, what he had to congratulate himself on about his converts, and what obstacles he met.

Acts gives a satisfactory account of the journey. Paul followed the great

way from Asia to Rome, and we may conjecture that Rome was already in his eye. In Ro 1:13 he tells us that he had often, before he wrote that great Epistle, cherished the intention of going there, and been prevented from doing so. His going to Athens and Corinth may have been outside of his original plan. He stayed at Philippi and at Thessalonica, where there were colonies of Jews; at Amphipolis and Apollonia he did not linger; they may have had no synagogue. At Philippi there seems to have been only a small number of Jews, and the Jews were not popular; Paul had to suffer for the unpopularity of his countrymen. The only person named of those who adhered to him is Lydia, a lady with a business in expensive goods and occupying a large house, a Gentile adherent of the humble Jewish community which held its meetings at the riverside. The Jews do not appear to have made any trouble; and Lydia pressed the whole party of the missionaries to stay in her house. The trouble which arose at Philippi was due to Paul's interference with an industry connected with heathenism. A girl who believed herself to be possessed by a spirit (and was perhaps a ventriloquist) which enabled her to answer inquiries made to her noticed Paul coming and going between the town and the place of prayer, and had a glimmer of the meaning of the movement that he carried on; and, in the exercise of her calling, took to shouting it out after the party. A Gentile could speak of the most high God and of the way of salvation as well as a Jew. Paul treated her as possessed and pronounced the Christian exorcism on the spirit that haunted her, and she immediately lost faith in herself (Ramsay, *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 216) and ceased to utter any more oracles. Her enraged owners at once brought the missionaries before the magistrates, accusing them of preaching an illicit doctrine. They were Jews and the accusers were Romans; a strange religious practice thus charged against the at Thessalonica (Ac 17:1) in competition with the emperor—a charge often brought against the Christians afterwards when they refused to burn incense to the image of the emperor as Lord, and said that they had another Lord, Jesus Christ (see G. A. Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East*, pp. 353-363). The magistrates acted at once and ordered a beating and imprisonment. The story of the escape from prison is to a large extent credible (cf. Ramsay, *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 220^f); the jailer's question is just what he would ask if he believed what the possessed girl said about the apostles. Codex D ascribes the sudden resolution of the magistrates in the morning to release Paul and Silas to their having heard about the earthquake. But they might feel that they had acted hastily. They had not heard the accused in their own defence, and had made no proper inquiry as to their status. Paul, always master of his situation, showed them how wrong they had been, but could not refuse to leave the town. For the impression that the ill-treatment made on his mind see 1 Th 2:15. But a work had been done at Philippi from which he was to have much satisfaction; a church of Gentiles had been founded, which never forgot him.

10. Paul's earliest Epistle.—At Thessalonica there was also a synagogue, and Paul is said to have preached there for three weeks. The first Epistle suggests a longer stay.

We follow Acts in the narrative of the external facts of the mission in this place now, in a new way, so famous. Paul was here to find persecution at the hands of Jews, already so well known to him in Asia Minor. His work in the synagogue met at first with some success; a limited number of Jews were converted, a larger number of Greek 'God-fearers,' and many of the leading women of the place. Of the Gentiles who came straight from heathenism to Christianity (1 Th 1:9) there is no mention in Acts. The flourishing work ended

abruptly. The Jews, enraged at the acceptance by so many leading Gentile supporters of a doctrine that they profoundly distrusted, collected a number of idlers in the street and stirred up a tumult as they well knew how. As they could not lay hold of the missionaries to place them before the town meeting (Thessalonica was a Greek town with its own magistrates), they seized Jason (the name is Greek, but was borne by many Jews), their host, and some other believers (cf. Ro 16²¹) and took them to the magistrates, to whom they represented the Christian movement as a political crime, a disorderly treason against the emperor, which had been engineered, they said, all over the world, and was now brought to Thessalonica. The magistrates took up the charge, but refused to help the work of persecution; all that they did was to take bail of Jason and the other persons accused. But the apostles could not remain in the place; their converts sent them away by night to Berea, which was not on the Egnatian road. Paul's route may have been deflected by this adventure. At Berea the apostles were well received in the synagogue, the members of which were set on a course of study of the books of the OT to satisfy themselves that the message brought them had a foundation in these venerable writings. There were Jews who believed and 'not a few Greek women of distinction and men.' But the persecution of Thessalonica came after them to Berea, using the same procedure and making it impossible for Paul at least to remain there. Silas and Timothy stayed, but Paul was conducted by some of his converts as far as Athens, whether by sea or by land is doubtful, the conveying party taking back a message to Silas and Timothy to follow him as soon as possible.

The First Epistle to the Thessalonians (the earliest Christian writing) was written in the name of Paul and Silas and Timothy, united again at Corinth after various journeyings (1 Th 3¹⁻⁶, Ae 18⁵). Timothy had joined Paul at Athens, but had been dispatched again to Thessalonica before the reunion of the party at Corinth. The Thessalonian church was composed as a whole of Gentiles who came straight from the service of idols to the gospel (1 Th 1⁹). These Gentiles felt Paul's summons irresistible and threw themselves with enthusiasm into the service of the living God, arrested by the tidings that the Divine Judgment was on the point of taking place, and by the hope that those who believed in Jesus Christ would find Him a Saviour from the judgment and the destruction of that awful hour. Christ was to descend from heaven; His coming would be sudden, and those who sought to be saved by Him must keep themselves prepared, since all depended on their being ready for Him when He came. The Spirit which had come to them must be diligently fostered and obeyed; they must be full of faith, of hope, and of active clarity. They must be prepared for persecution, of which they had already had some experience; they must aim at the strictest purity and the most irreproachable conduct. Only in that way could they make sure of the bright prospect that shone on them and enable the Apostle to look forward to presenting them as his glory and joy to the Saviour when He came. At Thessalonica for the first time we make acquaintance with Paul as a craftsman, refusing to take advantage of the convention according to which the apostles of the Christian community were entitled to be supported by the churches. The rule is broken in favour of the Philippians (Ph 4¹⁰), who send him help. . . . lee, but with this exception it is . . . 117-10). No one is to charge either . . . g with-out a sound financial basis. He seems to have sat at his bench or at his loom (it is impossible to say which) talking to all who came, and urging them individually to keep themselves ready for the coming of the Saviour and free from all reproach in the eyes of a hostile world. He was a nurse to the converts, encouraging and comforting them and guiding their halting steps in the practices of the Christian life; he was a pattern to them of all that they had to do, and he finds much good to say of their enthusiasm and constancy.

II. The speech at Athens. — Timothy did at last join Paul at Athens, and was sent by him back to Thessalonica (1 Th 3¹⁻⁶), where he himself was forbidden to appear (3¹¹). Silas also joined him before 1 Thessalonians was dispatched (1¹); according to Ae 18⁵, they both rejoined him at Corinth. The letter, written when Paul was no longer at Athens, is in the name of all the three. It is when both his associates are absent that he encounters the philosophers at Athens, and before the Arco-

pagus, the highest court and one specially attending to the affairs of religion, delivers the famous speech of Ae 17, which it is our duty to examine. According to E. Norden, whose most interesting book, *Agnostos Theos* (Leipzig, 1913), places every feature of the story and the speech in a clear light as to its relation to the general religious movement of that age, there is little that can be regarded as belonging authentically to Paul either in the situation or in the speech. The inscription of an altar is often used in Greek antiquity as the text of a philosophical or religious discussion or address. Athens is praised for its religiousness by Apollonius (Philostratus, vi. 3) as by Paul, and for a similar reason, that altars are erected there to unknown gods. This striking similarity of expression is taken by Norden to establish a literary relation between Apollonius and Acts; Apollonius is a travelling missionary whose aim it is to draw men away from idolatry and fix their thoughts on the true God; he also visited Athens; though the date of his visit cannot be fixed, it would certainly fall before the writing of Acts. The type of the speech bears analogies also with other religious utterances of that day. It is in line with other appeals to the heathen to open their minds to the true knowledge of God and to forsake idolatry. Norden places before us a speech from Poinandres to this effect, an *Ode of Solomon*, a piece of the *Preaching of Peter*, and a piece of the *Preaching of Barnabas*, and contends that the speech to the Areopagus is an address placed in Paul's mouth such as was customary in that age in the mouth of the missionary of monotheism, whether Jew, Greek, or Christian. In all these appeals Stoical notions appear—that God is not in need of anything, that God is not to be worshipped in the way of sacrifice, that God's goodness and care of man are evident in the works of creation, in the provision made to supply the wants of His creatures, and in His creation of man with such a nature that he should feel constrained to seek after his Maker. The blending of Jewish with Stoic thought was singularly effective in this whole argument, and meets us in all the philosophical and religious thought of the period (cf. Ro 1, Ae 14). But what of the inscription that Paul is said to have seen at Athens, 'to the Unknown God'? Philostratus speaks of altars at Athens to 'unknown gods' in the plural. Pausanias attests a similar inscription in the neighbourhood of Athens, and Jerome thinks that the inscription to which Paul refers was not in the words that he gives, but 'to the gods of Asia and Europe and Africa, gods unknown and foreign.' The inscription in the singular is found only in this passage in Acts. The unknown God spoken of is not simply the God of Judaism. That being was spoken of in the Greek and Roman philosophical circles not as unknown, but as mysterious, unrepresented, ἀσπλῆς. In Gnostic writings the unknown God is frequently addressed as the highest being of the various systems. The term was well-known in the time of Paul, though it did not appear as the inscription of an altar.

If Norden is right in this, the writer of Acts supplied the inscription as a text for Paul's address, which consists largely of the sentiments of Stoicism and is furnished with a quotation from a Stoic poet. The idea of a trial is not very closely adhered to, though a charge is mentioned, similar to that brought against Socrates, that he introduced new deities. These are Jesus and Resurrection, which in Acts is Paul's main doctrine. Paul does not mention any charge, but delivers himself, as other missionaries did, of a discourse against idolatry, and ends with a Christian conclusion on the Judgment and the Messiah. The speech is kept admirably in the required tone and setting,

as are all the speeches in Acts. Yet only a small success is claimed for Paul in this city of dilettantes and idlers. Only a few converts were made, and the Apostle went, after an unsatisfactory visit, to a very different scene of labour—the busy harbour town of Corinth, where also (this may have been in his thoughts) there was abundant opportunity of travelling to Rome, and the call of the metropolis grew in insistence.

12. Hostility of the Jews.—We have come to the point at which Paul's own letters begin to shed abundant light on his history. Those to Thessalonica were written from Corinth in his early days there, and afford important suggestions as to what he felt his position to be at this time. As we saw above, 1 Thessalonians gives a satisfactory account of his missionary aims and practice; but it also affords hints as to his inner history which are not to be neglected. Up to this time he had stayed only a short time in any one place, and the reason was that the hostility of the Jews everywhere broke out against him and compelled his removal. In the following part of his career he spent years instead of weeks with a newly-founded church, detaching himself early from the synagogue and devoting himself in some other building to his work in a community composed chiefly of Gentiles. The reason of this change is not far to seek. In 1 Th 2¹⁴⁻¹⁶, a passage which many scholars have regarded with suspicion as being alien to Paul's temper and probably an interpolation, but which can be amply justified on historical grounds, Paul considers the inveterate hostility with which the Jews regard and treat him. The Jews, who killed the Lord Jesus and the prophets, have also persecuted him and forced him away from what he was trying to do for the Gentiles. They do not wish him to preach to the Gentiles; they do not wish the Gentiles to be saved. It all proves the contrariness of their nature; they are contrary to all men. It proves that they are filling up their cup, and that the day of vengeance must soon come for them, since they set themselves to oppose the clear will of God for the salvation of the Gentiles.

The hatred of the Jews for Paul was one of the most powerful, external, determining causes bearing on his history. It had already deflected his journey and made it impossible for him to go back, at least meanwhile, to Thessalonica, though Silas and Timothy were still free to go there; and, as Acts shows, it was to pursue him to the end. What was the cause of their secking in him their arch-enemy? The accusations which they brought against him to the magistrates at Thessalonica and Corinth do not make this clear. It was not as an insurrectionary against the Roman power that they hated him, though that charge was made against him, as it had been against Christ. Nor was it that he preached Jesus as the Messiah; his fellow-missionaries did that too. Nor was it in the first place that he drew away from them the rich and influential adherents of their synagogues, though that was no doubt a bitter experience for them. They bore him a special personal hatred; and the reason why they did so is revealed to us afterwards when we come to his last visit to Jerusalem. They saw in him the enemy of their Law, who was seeking to draw the Jews away from their national observances, bidding them give up circumcising their children and abjure the religious practices of Judaism (Ac 21²¹, 23 24¹⁴ 25⁸). This is what underlies the charge (Ac 17^{6a}) in which Paul already bears the character, reported about him from synagogue to synagogue, of a deliberately subversive and dangerous teacher. We do not now inquire how much of this was true; the consequences to Paul of its being made were very serious and made it difficult for him to carry on his mission

as before. He began his work both at Corinth and at Ephesus in the Jewish synagogue, but he was inevitably thrust more and more into the arms of the Gentiles, who heard him readily and with whom he felt himself at home. He was confirmed in his apostleship to them; his absences from the East grew longer. As his own nation thrust him away from them, and his work among the Gentiles was full of interest, he must have felt himself less and less a Jew. When he counts up in Ro 1¹⁴ his obligations to his fellowmen, it is of the Gentiles that he thinks; he is debtor to Gentiles of every class, but he does not say that he is debtor to the Jews.

13. Order of the Epistles.—We may here say a word as to the order of the Epistles which are chiefly to direct us in the rest of this article. 1 Corinthians was written from Ephesus in the spring of the year 54, after Paul had been there nearly two years and three months, besides making a journey to the East and very likely other journeys.

Now, 1 Corinthians has a subject in common with Galatians, 2 Corinthians, and Romans—a practical subject which it appears unlikely that Paul would leave in suspense for a number of years, viz. the collection that he instituted in Galatia, Macedonia, and Greece on behalf of the poor saints at Jerusalem. In Galatians he intimates that he is bound to do something of this kind. He does not in that Epistle suggest the practical steps that the Galatians are to take in that direction, but in 1 Corinthians he tells us that he has made the suggestion in Galatia which he now makes at Corinth. In 2 Corinthians there is much more on the subject, and Romans is written when he is just about to start for Jerusalem, carrying the money with him. Galatians appears to have been written before 2 Corinthians. In both the Apostle deals with attacks made on him and with designs made on his church in his absence; of these attacks there is little evidence in 1 Corinthians, and it seems reasonable to think that Galatians was written between the two Corinthian Epistles; the doctrine of all three is closely similar. In Romans that doctrine is set forth in a more developed and calmer statement. We go on to look at the history as set before us in these Epistles and in the relevant statements in Acts.

14. The Corinthian Epistles.—Acts 18 shows us Paul at Corinth, with its predominantly Greek population, its tendency to talk, its love of poetry, its quick-witted application of principles even to extremes, its susceptibility to religious impressions. He lives with a Jewish family who follow the same trade as he does, and he goes, as he scarcely could do otherwise, to the synagogue to make a beginning. He has some success at first, but on the arrival of Silas and Timothy he comes to closer quarters with the Jews, and a breach soon takes place, Paul forsaking the synagogue as his place for preaching, and opening another locale close to it in the house of Titus Justus, a 'God-fearer.' His preaching goes on for eighteen months, till a new proconsul arrives at Corinth, before whom the Jews accuse him of preaching an illicit religion. Gallio sees that no crime is charged against Paul, that the dispute is entirely one of the Jewish religion, and declines to interfere, considering the matter, quite rightly, outside his jurisdiction.

The First Epistle to the Corinthians was written four years after the foundation of the church and gives few details of its outward circumstances, being entirely occupied with questions which had newly arisen. A few facts of the early days of the foundation do, however, appear. Paul came to Corinth somewhat depressed, but with a definite idea in his mind of what he had to preach to such a community and of the standards that he had to put before them. Among the first things that he stated to them were the great facts about Christ

(1 Co 15): that He died for our sins according to the Scriptures, that He was buried, and that He was raised up on the third day, according to the Scriptures. This shows Paul's method; he took his stand on the books of the Old Covenant, and brought forward the texts which showed the death of Christ for our sins, and His resurrection, to have been foretold in these old writings. The faith of Christ is not a thing of yesterday; it is the continuation and the culminating point of the dealings of God with man which began in Abraham and were continued in the prophets. So far is the faith of Christ from being merely a mystery-religion—one in which the suggestive acts done were everything—that it was from the first a religion of a book, based on the promises of God, to be found in its main features in the prophets. This is the secret of what appears at first sight to be Paul's immense self-confidence. It is the momentum of the OT religion that carries him forward; it is the system of God's promises, of the prophetic declarations that he administers, in a career that nothing can withstand. If the Apostle is asked what is his principal doctrine, his answer is ready; he came to Corinth determined 'to know nothing but Jesus Christ and him crucified' (2^o)—to preach Jesus as the Messiah, as all the apostles did, but a Messiah crucified, who, by a supreme act of love, gives Himself up for the salvation of men and now calls on them to take advantage of the surrender made for them. This is the way of salvation that Paul placed before the Corinthians, knowing well that it had no philosophy to recommend it, and that Jews must regard it with prompt aversion. God, however, had chosen this way to save men, and it had virtue in it; the divine purpose was accomplished in it in spite of every objection and of the absence of rhetoric on the part of the preacher. No show of wisdom or ornament of words was wanted when this weapon was employed. It was a power of God, a miracle, and the use of it was promptly followed by miraculous effects on the hearers; the Spirit at once came to them, with His gifts.

Paul no doubt appeared to those who heard him at Corinth as one of the company of those who at this time were bringing Eastern religions to the West, and proclaiming not only a Supreme Deity but a Deity of the second rank as well, a being who had died and risen again. The Apostle's preaching, however, was immediately successful. Once separated from the numbing influence of the synagogue, and placed on its own independent basis, the church quickly realized itself and became conscious of its powers. It numbered few persons of distinction; but among the few names preserved of the first believers are those of people in good station. Aquila and Priscilla are especially to be mentioned; Crispus had been a head of the synagogue and was baptized by Paul's own hands (11⁴) along with his family (Ac 18³), as also were Gaius, a prominent Christian (Ro 16²³), and Stephanas, whose house was the firstfruits of Achaia (1 Co 16¹⁵). Erastus, the town-chamberlain, may be added (Ro 16²³). Most of the members were of the class of shop-keepers and artisans, whose income varied from week to week. Paul, it is true, says that more might be expected of them financially than of the brethren of Macedonia (2 Co 8¹). Most were Greeks, but there were also Jews among them, and slaves too in their number. And, as the church was composed of very different elements, it developed what appear to us to be strange freaks of opinion and conduct. Of any settled constitution there is little trace. Baptism is into the name of Christ; any one apparently could administer it. The Lord's Supper, as the Corinthians at first took it, was equally formless. It resembled the common meal of a Greek club, each member bringing to it his own provisions. It is held, indeed, by O. F. G. Heinrici¹ that the Greek club provided the form on which the Greek churches were at first constituted, and it seems very natural that a body that was a revolt from the synagogue should avail itself of the easy and flexible arrangements usual in the country. Office-bearers do not appear in the Corinthian Epistles. The nearest approach to them is in the case of Stephanas and his household, whose services to the church are held up by the Apostle as entitling them to consideration and influence in it (1 Co 16¹⁵). The church is a pure democracy with the Apostle, its father, founder, planter, above it and connecting it in an informal way with other churches. When any serious question arises, it is to him that they turn, there being no constituted authority short of him. Every matter is brought to him; when absent, he is still watching them and informed about them by many a chance comer or messenger, writing to them and receiving letters from them. (For the occasion that called forth the Second Epistle see § 18.)

15. Third missionary journey.—Paul remained at Corinth for some time after the attack on him before Gallio and then set sail for Syria, in the company of Aquila and Priscilla; we are not told on what errand this journey was undertaken. Ephesus, where he landed, was the capital of that Asia where he had formerly desired to preach (Ac 16⁵). This time the desire was gratified, but nothing is told us except that in the synagogue, where he began his work, he was asked to return and said he would do so. Of the further journey to Syria also little is heard. Jerusalem is not spoken of, though it may be inferred from the phrase 'he went up' (Ac 18²²), nor is any object for going

there; and Codex D says at 19¹ that he wished to go to Jerusalem but was specially prevented by the Spirit from doing so. He landed at Cæsarea and stayed, after a visit to Jerusalem (if there was one), some time at Antioch, from which city he set out, probably in spring, on the return journey, passing through the Galatian country and Phrygia, which are mentioned in a different order from that in ch. 16, where the same journey was made before. He is also said (19¹) to have traversed 'the upper regions' before arriving at Ephesus again. The writer of Acts has not much information about this journey; there is room for the surmise of those who hold the N. Galatian theory, that it may have included the second visit to the churches of Galatia (Gal 4¹³).

After Paul's return to Ephesus from the East he went to the synagogue again and continued preaching there for three months (Ac 19⁸). The accustomed Jewish hostility was longer in breaking out here than in other places, but break forth it did; 'the way'—the new plan of cultivating the Gentiles without asking them to live as Jews—aroused here also bitter animosity, which was expressed even to the heathen crowds in the street. Paul therefore 'separated the disciples,' as he had done at Corinth, and gave daily lectures in the school of Tyrannus (Cod. D adds, 'from the fifth to the tenth hour,' i.e. after the hours of business). The anecdotes of Ephesus which follow in Acts need not detain us; Paul claims (2 Co 12¹²) that the signs of an apostle are not wanting in his ministry, and there is humour in the overthrow of the heathen exorcists who try to use the name of Christ as an instrument, and in the ruin of Ephesian magic and the burning of the magical books that takes place in the great stronghold of magic in contact with the gospel (Ac 19¹²⁻¹⁷).

When the soul-shaking experiences at Ephesus took place, to which reference is made in both the Corinthian Epistles, cannot be made out. Paul 'fought with beasts at Ephesus' (1 Co 15³²). Were this to be taken literally, he could scarcely have been alive afterwards to speak of it. In 2 Co 1⁸⁻¹¹ he speaks of a situation in which he despaired of life and was compelled to set his trust in God who raises the dead. Acts contains nothing to justify these phrases. In the story of the tumult about the silver images of Diana (19²³⁻⁴¹) Paul is dissuaded by his friends, the Asiarchs, from going to the theatre and facing the mob; and the end of 1 Cor. is written in a calm atmosphere, and by one who is able to determine his movements a long way ahead. Timothy is to be sent back to him at Ephesus. And the perilous passage of which he speaks must have been behind him when he wrote 1 Cor., which was written at the same time as the dispatch of Timothy, but was not carried by him, for it gives instructions as to his reception.

16. New Judaizing opposition.—The dispatch of the first Epistle did not make an end of the troubles in the Corinthian church, but the new troubles were different from the old. From Ephesus Paul paid a second visit to Corinth (2 Co 13¹⁰), which did not end happily; it was followed by another letter, described in 2 Co 2 and 7, and said to have been written with tears. Trouble sprang up for the Apostle at this period in another part of his missionary field. It was a trouble that was bound to come; the false brethren, of whom Paul speaks in connexion with the Jerusalem meeting, found their opportunity in the mixed churches; of these there were now more, and the desire to make mischief in them had not ceased. The Apostle now came to be confronted with adversaries who were not Jews but Christian believers; but they believed in Christ as the Messiah of the Jews, who had been a Jew, and

¹ Erklärung der Korintherbriefe, Berlin, 1880-87.

they wished the Law to continue in honour. They desired the promises to be confined to Abraham's children, and one was not in their eyes fully a child of Abraham without circumcision and observance of the religious customs of the Jews; they would not eat with Gentiles; they required that the Gentile who became a Christian should become a Jew at the same time. On these terms the Christian mission would have been condemned, like the Jewish mission which preceded it, to perpetual sterility. They went great lengths in their controversy; at Ephesus we read of their denouncing Paul to the Gentiles, as if it were better not to be a Christian at all than to be a Christian on his terms.

In Ac 17⁶¹, 18¹³ we have the character represented to us that Paul had in the eyes of the Jews, in Ac 21²¹ the character that he bore in the eyes of the Jewish Christians a year or two later. The persecution which he had to endure from the Jewish Christians was as hard to bear as that of the Jews, and has left a distinct trace on his writings. They could not beat him or stone him, but they had access to his churches and could poison the minds of his converts against him and could urge them to desert him. As a fact, they did belittle his authority, his work, his preaching—both the style and the substance of it—his personal appearance, his motives. They denied his apostleship, which, it is true, rested on no formal nomination by other apostles; they said that he set himself up as an apostle and had no right to do so. They did not directly controvert his teaching, not even his Christology, so much as place in competition with it their own simpler doctrine, which had no Cross in it and called for practical obedience to an ancient system rather than a mere faith and receptiveness.

This aversion to Paul must have been growing since the time of his mission at Antioch, and it broke out in serious attempts in two of his churches about the same time. A number of indications combine to lead us to regard the Galatian and the second Corinthian Epistles as written almost at the same time. In both the collection is urged; Gal 6^{9, 10} urges liberality to Christian teachers, but goes on to urge liberality to all one's fellow-Christians. And, if Gal 4¹³ is to be taken in its natural sense, 'I preached to you the former time,' i.e. on the earlier of two occasions of his preaching to them, and not, as Kirsopp Lake proposes, on only one former occasion, then the Epistle must come after the visit to Galatia of Ac 18²³, and belong to the residence at Ephesus. In both Epistles we hear of 'another gospel' which is preached by intruders; in both the two Covenants are contrasted with each other, one making for freedom, the other (evidently that favoured by the intruders) for servitude. Of the agents of this invasion the Corinthian Epistle gives the clearer picture. The intruders at Corinth are men who pride themselves, as Paul himself does, on their pure Jewish lineage; yet they are good speakers to a Greek audience. They belong therefore, it seems probable, like Paul himself, to the Diaspora, and have laid themselves out, as he has, for a mission to the Greeks. There is no reason to think that they came from Jerusalem or were countenanced by the apostles there. There is plenty of evidence that the Jews of the Diaspora were as narrow and bigoted as those of Palestine, and the Diaspora Christians could show on occasion the same character.

17. The Epistle to the Galatians.—The beginning of the Epistle to the Galatians is austere. Paul's apostleship is impugned and he writes himself down in his opening words as apostle by special divine arrangement, 'not of man nor through man but by revelation of Jesus Christ.' The writer then goes into a historical statement to show how independent he is of any human authority. It was not man that instructed him, but God that revealed His Son in him; he kept away from Jerusalem for three years after his conversion; neither the apostles nor the churches of Judea were much concerned with him at that time.² His visit to Jerusalem after fourteen years

(this must be dating from his conversion) made no important change in his methods or his position. He appeared there to plead for the freedom of the Gentile churches, and his plea was successful. No objection was made to Paul's doctrine when he stated it, and no additional burden or observances were imposed upon him. Each side recognized the other as borne forward by God in its mission, and the right hand of fellowship was exchanged on the understanding that the work should go on as before, James, Peter, and John going to the Jews, Paul to the Gentiles, with the link between the two provinces of the Church, that the Gentiles should do something for the poor at Jerusalem, as the Diaspora had always sent gifts to the Temple. Paul's independence of the older apostles was also signally shown on the occasion of Peter's visit to Antioch, when he withdrew from the common meals where Jew and Gentile sat together, not because he thought them wrong, but in order to stand well with the people at Jerusalem. The speech which Paul says he addressed to Peter before all the members at Antioch, broadening out into a moving statement of his own personal ground of hope, is very difficult if we attempt connexion of each verse with that preceding it; in this Epistle in general the expression is far from adequate to the rushing fullness of thought.

The Apostle reminds the Galatians that their Christian life began with Christ crucified, whom Paul in his preaching held up clear before them (31). It was from that exhibition that the Spirit came to them, and now they are on the point of turning from the Spirit to the flesh, to trifling observances, to the keeping of a code of laws, to seeking their salvation in them! The Law had no power to give life; it was a constraint imposed on sinful mankind until the day should come when the promise should be given to those who believed. In baptism the Galatians have 'put on Christ,' who has made them free from the Law, made them God's children and heirs, placed them in a region where the difference between Jew and Gentile disappears; and they are all one, the true seed of Abraham, in actual possession of the promise made to them.

From a masterly appeal on the ground of the history of religion the Apostle passes to a moving personal appeal on the ground of what he remembers of the Galatians and they of him. How kind was their treatment of him at his first visit! How they treated the illness which then overtook him (what it was we know not), not with disgust, but with the most affectionate solicitude to find something that would help him! They cannot feel for those who are now courting them as they did for him; they are aiming at nothing but a personal triumph; he wishes to win them wholly for Christ, that the form of Christ may be fully produced in them. Seeing that Christ has freed us for freedom, what have the Galatians to do? No summary of this passage is possible; it is a passionate outburst taking up one feature after another of the situation and dealing with each in trenchant words. It was scarcely true that circumcision obliged one to keep the whole Law. Paul himself, it is true, had felt the whole weight of the obligation. Nor was it quite true that to be justified by the Law was to fall away from grace. The Pauline Christian did look for the hope of righteousness, in the spirit and from faith, without any thought of contributing to it by any performance of his own. Freedom from the Law did not imply, as opponents said, that . . . he liked. The Spirit must be the . . . individual has power to make it s . . . feel the pressure of the Law. With 611 the Apostle begins to bring the letter to a close. He contrasts the motives of their new leaders, should they prove so, with his own. The new leaders will be able to point to this person and to that and say, 'A Gentile, circumcised, and he owes it to me!' Paul's boast is different. He looks not to small personal triumphs, but to the great world-triumph of the Cross in which he too is taken up into his right position. Looking to it, he forgets the great debate of circumcision, and thinks only of the new creation that the Cross has brought. This is his canon, his great rule, enunciated thrice in his Epistles—Gal 6¹⁵, and 1 Co 7¹⁹. Those who think thus are to him the true Israel. The 'marks of the Lord Jesus,' to which Paul appeals in conclusion to guard himself against further troubles, might be spoken of in analogy to the marks of a god borne by his votaries, or of a master by his slave; but the phrase is intelligible without this.

18. Troubles at Corinth.—Of the Galatians we hear no more in the NT, and what was the effect of the letter to them we can only surmise. Paul's thoughts at Ephesus were in another direction. He was proposing a journey to Macedonia and Greece, then to Jerusalem, and then to Rome, and was in correspondence with Corinth on this subject (Ac

¹ *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, p. 2631.

² A. Loisy suggests (*L'Épître aux Galates*) that the three years in Arabia were spent in preaching to the Arabs, and that the mission was not successful; we know nothing about that period of his life.

19²¹, 2 Co 1⁶⁵). He thought now of the sea-route to Greece, then of the land; the Corinthians thought that he changed his mind too easily. He ultimately chose the northern route through Macedonia; but something had to be done before he could present himself. He had paid a visit to Corinth which had turned out very unpleasant for him; he had been grossly insulted or injured by a member of the church there (2 Co 2³⁻¹¹). He could not go to Corinth till the church made some expression of regret for the treatment which he had suffered and had dealt with the offender. To secure this, Titus was sent with a letter which Paul says he wrote with tears. Can this refer to 1 Corinthians? It evidently was not composed in a tearful mood. Or can 2 Co 10-13 be meant? It also is scarcely in such a key. It is the opinion of most scholars that the letter written with tears is lost. Titus was to present this letter and to return to Paul with the account of its reception, so that Paul might know with what confidence he could present himself at Corinth, and he was to hurry on the financial business as to the collection (2 Co 1²⁷⁻¹⁶ 8⁶).

To judge from 2 Cor., Paul set out for Greece weighed down by anxiety about Corinth. Acts gives a different impression, connecting the departure from Ephesus with the trade disturbances engineered by Demetrius. Paul was face to face with death at Ephesus, but some time earlier, in fact before writing 1 Cor.; and in the Demetrius story Paul's life is not in danger. The story in 2 Cor. places us on firm ground when it tells us that his anxiety about Corinth was banished only when he met Titus and received his favourable report. The letter had been well received; the Corinthians were loyal (2 Co 7¹⁶). On this follows the great burst of praise and exultation for the triumphs of the gospel which God brings about through him, and the alternation of mood from humiliation and depression to the highest triumph and joy returns again and again in the Epistle and may be regarded as its characteristic movement.

The principal question that criticism has to consider about 2 Cor. is whether there are two Epistles in it, or three, or only one. The theory no is that chs. 10-13 are to be taken as has lost its beginning, and that chs. Epistle, the end of which is wanting. In Germany, the birthplace of this theory, it is all but extinct, while in Britain some of the arguments by which it was at first supported are no longer relied on. The transition at 10¹ is certainly abrupt, but there are in Paul other such transitions which are not held to warrant the conclusion that we are passing to a different work of the Apostle (cf. Ph 3¹). The passage 6^{14-7¹} is also taken by many commentators to be a late addition to the Epistle, but here too the reasons for that opinion are in course of fading away; the plea certainly interrupts the sense of the passage, but the Apostle is likely to have put it there himself; a later hand would have been more careful. The Epistle can be fairly well understood as it stands, as Marcon read it, and as all the ancient authorities have it; there is no MS evidence whatever to the contrary. Thus read, the Epistle opens on a theme which is pursued to the end, viz. an approaching visit of the Apostle to Corinth. The questions of his credentials and of the forthcoming collections having been dealt with, Paul makes an attack upon the intruding preachers who deal in another gospel than the true one, which is his; their claims are set formally over against his own; he has been weak, but will now, though it is a foolish thing to do, draw up the account on both sides. In point of pure Jewish lineage he is on a level with them. Yet they give a better address in Greek than he (11⁶), which shows where they come from. Their afflictions for the gospel are not to be compared with his, which he sets forth in full detail, ending with all the cares that he has to bear for his various churches; he feels with every weak brother in them all; his heart is set on fire with every offence with which they meet. His visions and revelations have been of a distinguished order; he has been carried to paradise and has heard unspeakable words; but along with this he has had very painful experiences which keep him from boasting of his spiritual distinctions—the thorn in the flesh, the messenger of Satan to buffet him, lest he should grow too great in his own eyes. That he was not an epileptic is clearly shown by A. Seeligmüller, *War Paulus Epileptiker?*, Leipzig, 1910 (see also Ramsay, *The Teaching of Paul*, p. 306 ff.). This experience was the crowning expression of the conviction which we find so often in his writings, that strength always comes to

him from a higher source out of his many humiliations and depressions—'When I am weak, then am I strong.' The Epistle ends with words of hearty encouragement and affectionate greeting, and the writer appends the salutation, or it may be called the benediction, invoking on his converts the grace or kindness of Christ, the love of God, the communion of the Holy Spirit, which are the sum of all his teaching.

19. Epistle to the Philippians.—The Epistle to the Philippians, though generally treated as belonging to the captivity of Paul at Rome, is thought to have its place and time fixed by 1¹³, where the 'palace' (παλατίον) is taken to be the barracks of the imperial praetorian guard at Rome, and by 4²², where 'Caesar's household' is also taken to imply the neighbourhood of the imperial family. In Lightfoot's commentary the arguments for these positions are fully stated. The great accumulation of inscriptions in recent times has seriously weakened these arguments; any building is called 'praetorian' in which an official might dwell even for a short time, the term being applied even to private houses; or the term might designate the persons connected with a court of justice, 'a judicial authority with its assistants and subalterns.' 'Caesar's household,' again, was a term used of any collection of slaves of the emperor, and these were to be found anywhere in the empire. Neither term limits us at all to Rome. The Apostle often suffered imprisonment, as he tells us in 2 Co 11²³. There are substantial reasons in the contents of the Epistle why we should think of some other captivity than that at Rome. To place it in the Roman captivity would bring it close to the Colossian Epistle, which deals in doctrine of quite a different stamp. It has been suggested that the captivity was at Ephesus, and the many journeys and messages spoken of would agree with this.

The Epistle to the Philippians is very affectionate and gentle, and doctrine is introduced only for purposes of edification. It is called for by a simple incident: the Philippians have sent Paul a present by the hands of Epaphroditus, who fell ill beside Paul and was now sent back to his friends at Philippi (4¹⁸ 2²⁵⁻²⁷). The first part of the Epistle is about Paul's position in his imprisonment. He is looking death in the face and taking the view that it will at once unite him to Christ, not, as in 1 Th 4 or 1 Co 15, that the union with Christ will take place only at the Parousia. He no doubt had a way of reconciling the two views in his own mind (cf. 2 Co 5¹⁻⁹). In the great Christological passage, Ph 2³⁻¹¹, his view of the history of Christ's person appears more clearly than anywhere else, and he seems to be contrasted with other great spiritual beings, one of whom did 'think equality with God a thing to grasp at,' and who had great names, which His great name, Jesus Christ Lord, given Him by God after His earthly career, cast into the shade. There are adversaries, both without the church, Jews, the thought of whom leads the Apostle to restate his claims (3¹⁻¹¹), and within (3¹⁷⁻²¹). The grateful acknowledgment of the Philippians' present concludes the Epistle: he does not need it; he has learned to be without wants, yet is thankful for it, as for former attentions at Thessalonica and at Corinth (see also § 22).

There is no direct information as to the effect produced by 2 Cor.; in that the Epistle is not singular. Acts tells us (20²) that the journey there spoken of through Macedonia was accomplished, and that Paul stayed three months in Greece; but nothing is said of his thoughts or of his correspondence. It passes over the time when, if all indications do not deceive us, Paul wrote his great Epistle to the Romans, without mentioning that Epistle or that church, and goes on to tell of his journey to the East.

20. Epistle to the Romans.—There is almost complete historical certainty that Romans was written, as we have it, during the three months' stay in Greece mentioned in Ac 20². The critical difficulties in the way are not very serious. They are the omission of ἐν Ῥώμῃ in some early MSS at 17¹³; the various conclusions which the piece appears to have after 14²³ and at the end of the work; and the alleged likelihood that ch. 16 was addressed to Ephesus rather than to Rome. To this may be added the disjointed arrangement of certain chapters which look like old essays on this and that topic, loosely put together.

The omission of ἐν Πώμῃ in ch. 1 was known to Origen, and suggests that the Epistle existed early in a form from which the geographical indications had been removed, making the Epistle a general one like Ephesians. As for the various conclusions, there is a good deal of evidence that Marcion cut out the last two chapters, and this procedure may have led, in the transmission of the text, to the insertion of the conclusion after 14²³. But 15 is certainly continuous with 14, and contains nothing that Paul may not have written.

Ch. 16, which Renan considers to have been addressed to Ephesus rather than to Rome, has been ably defended, from a study of the names that it contains, by Lightfoot and other Bible scholars as possibly addressed to Rome. The whole question of the integrity of the Epistle is thoroughly discussed in the introduction of W. Sanday and A. C. Headlam's great commentary on *Romans*⁵ (ICC, Edinburgh, 1902).

In Romans we find the Apostle writing to a church that he himself had not founded; in 18¹⁵ and 15²²⁻³² he describes his position towards that church. He regards it as in his sphere of missionary labour, has thought of it much, and has often wished to visit it, though he has been often prevented. Now he sees a near prospect of carrying out his wish. He is on the point of travelling to Jerusalem, to carry there what has been collected for the poor saints. The Romans are to pray that he may be delivered from the dangers which he clearly sees will threaten him there; and after that duty is discharged he will come with joy to profit by their sympathy, perhaps to do something for them. He is to go to Spain, and will see them on the way. This explains to some extent the difference between Romans and the Epistles that we already have had from him. These were all to churches that he knew, and were occupied with questions which arose in them, with advice, encouragement, often with painful controversy. That controversy is now past, and he is not intimately acquainted with the domestic matters of the Roman church. The discussions in this Epistle are therefore impersonal and general; he can discuss the great matters which interest all Christians alike; he is now at liberty to do so. His tone is serene and open; we gain the impression that he has reached 'a season of calm weather,' that he feels his position assured and can forget asperities and set forth the truths of the gospel which he has attained through many a struggle, as if there were no doubt about them now. He wishes the Christians at Rome to understand clearly where he stands, and we have the same arguments as in Gal. and Cor., varied with new arguments and with new quotations from the Jewish books, and rising at times to great power and eloquence. We have the same historical proof that God's new mode of saving men is by faith, not by works; the same definition of the place of the Law in God's dealings with man, only that in Romans we have "I, 7, that the Law does so act as to schoolmaster for Adam all died, so in Christ shall all be made alive," swells in Romans to a massive section, chs. 5 and 6 showing how much more to be expected it is that grace and forgiveness should increase than that sin and condemnation should; and the action of the Spirit in the inner Christian life, touched on in all the earlier Epistles, is the main theme of Ro 8. The blessedness of the Christian salvation is movingly set forth, both in ch. 6 and in ch. 8, each of which forms the climax of a profound ascending argument; and the triumph of the Christian over all the unseen powers which rule over this world and threaten to crush them sums up all that the earlier letters contain as to those shadowy foes of human welfare.

With ch. 9 the Apostle enters on a theme comparatively new, how the unbelief of the Jews in the Christian gospel is to be accounted for and reconciled with the divine promises. Various solutions are propounded to this dark riddle, the obvious one that the believing Gentiles are now to be regarded as the seed of Abraham, whom God has preferred to the Jews, and the harsh one that God is entitled to have mercy on whom He will, as the potter has power over the clay. The Apostle's argument is that the unbelief of Israel is brought about by an act of God and has a definite intention—viz. that, while the Jews thus hold back, the fullness of the Gentiles may enter. When this has happened, then the salvation of Israel will take place. The object of their being shut up into unbelief is that God may have mercy on all, and the whole discussion closes with a great doxology to God for His unsearchable wisdom. Chs. 12-14 are the practical working out of the principles stated in ch. 6, that the Christian is not to continue in sin, but to yield his members instruments of righteousness for sanctification. A fuller catalogue of Christian duties is given than Paul has hitherto attempted; the duty to the State is not forgotten, nor the proper limits to be placed on social enjoyment, while the rules for the use of indifferent things and as to the regard to be paid to the weak brother in one's attitude towards them, are to the same effect as in 1 Co 8. The last chapters of Romans have already been spoken of.

21. Arrest and imprisonment.—The rest of the

story of Paul, after the writing of Romans, is to be found in Ac 20³⁻²⁸. The plot on the part of the Jews which made Paul alter the route of his journey eastward was probably to have him assassinated on a vessel carrying pilgrims for Jerusalem, or on another ship on which he was likely to travel. The route through Macedonia avoided that danger; the party appear to have chartered a vessel for themselves for the coasting voyage to Patara or Myra. The narrative appears trustworthy for its facts, to the end of the book. The speeches are skilfully conceived for the various situations; the views of the writer appear in the repeated assertion of the Apostle that his preaching the Resurrection was the cause of his persecution by the Jews (23⁶ 26⁷), which does not agree with 21²¹. The Gentiles who were his fellow-travellers no doubt wondered to see him defray the considerable expense of a sacrifice for the four men with a vow, which both showed him now to be in easy circumstances and proved him still a Jew in spite of all that he had said against the Law, and minded to do more rather than less than the Law required of the faithful child of Abraham. The charitable mission which brought him to Jerusalem is mentioned only once in a late speech (24¹⁷); it did nothing to placate the Jews, as he had prayed that it might (Ro 15³¹); they plotted again and again to kill him, and forced him to regard the Roman magistrates with whom he came in contact as his true defenders and the powerful guarantee of the growth of the infant religion. The account of the trials before Felix and Festus is said by Mommson to be, in spite of editorial touches, quite in accordance with Roman legal form, and he says that in this report alone is a case of appeal to the emperor placed before us in living reality. In the story of the voyage and shipwreck the Apostle appears as a skilled navigator and a man of sufficient courage to continue to hope for himself in a desperate predicament, and to sustain the spirits of the whole ship's company. When he reaches Italy, the brethren are ready to welcome him, though we hear nothing of the great Epistle of three years before; and the fact of his imprisonment is stated. But, before the statement on this subject is concluded, Paul's attitude towards the Jews, as it has been repeatedly declared in Acts, is finally made plain. Two interviews take place with the leading Jews at Rome, the soldier to whom he was chained standing by Paul's side; and the negotiations are summed up by him in the words of Isaiah (6⁹), in which the hardening and the rejection of Israel are prophesied. The gospel is for the Gentiles; they will hear it. Acts concludes with the statement, which may be implicitly believed, that Paul remained two complete years in his own lodging or inn, and that all had free access to him. The editor sums up the subject of the preaching of this period in his own way (cf. 1³ 19³ 20²⁵). What happened at the end of these two years we are not told. The persecution of Nero was in A.D. 64, and Paul may have fallen a victim to it. Those who ascribe to Paul some of the later and shorter Epistles know what he was doing in this period, and see him at a later time escaped from Rome and carrying on a renewed missionary activity. It seems certain at least that the author of Acts knew no sequel to the statement with which he closes his book.

22. Genuineness of remaining Epistles.—In the silence of Acts as to the subsequent fortunes of Paul we are left to gather what we can from the remaining Epistles which bear his name, viz. Philippians, Colossians, Ephesians, Philemon, 1 and 2 Timothy, and Titus. But, before they can be used as evidence, the preliminary question of their genuineness has to be settled. It is outside

the scope of this article to discuss in detail the critical questions involved; but it may be said in general that a place can be found in the known life of the Apostle for the first four. They are all Epistles of the Captivity, and, while it is possible to assign them to the Cæsarean imprisonment, during which Paul cannot be supposed to have been altogether idle with his pen, they may with greater probability be referred to the two years' imprisonment at Rome (Ac 28^{30f.}). Of these, Philippians and Philemon are all but universally accepted; Colossians by a considerable number; Ephesians by fewer. The Pastoral Epistles to Timothy and Titus are in a different category; they fall outside the period covered by Acts; they presuppose Paul's release from the Roman imprisonment, and, at least in their present form, are to be regarded as having least claim to be the work of the Apostle.¹

23. *Epistles of the Captivity.*—The situation implied in these Epistles is consistent with that described in Ac 28^{30f.}. Paul is a prisoner, but not entirely cut off from intercourse with the outside world. His friends have liberty of access to him; they can visit him; they bring reports and early letters. Names already known to us from Acts recur in the salutations (Aristarchus, who is a 'fellow-prisoner,' Luke, Mark, Timothy, Tychicus); others are new (Jesus Justus, Demas, Onesimus). Paul in prison has still the care of the churches; his authority is recognized even in places that he has not visited.

(a) *The Epistle to the Philippians* is included in the former part of this article (§ 19), where the reasons are given for placing it in the earlier imprisonment at Cæsarea. The reasons, however, are not conclusive. Granting that doctrinally Philippians stands nearer to Romans than to Colossians, it does not follow that the three Epistles stand to each other in the same relative position as regards date of composition. The circumstances of Colosse were peculiar; the heresy which made its appearance there did not touch Philippi; the two churches were far apart, and the absence of doctrinal similarity need occasion no difficulty. The references in Ph 1¹³ 4²² are most naturally understood of Rome. Philippians is written in a tranquil spirit. The Apostle is already reconciled to the irksome interruption of his missionary activity and recognizes that there are compensations (1¹²⁻¹⁸). He has not given up hope of being released, but he is prepared for death (1²⁰⁻²⁵).

(b) *Epistles to Philemon and Colossians.*—The Epistles to Philemon and to the Colossians are very closely connected. The situation is the same; the greetings are from the same persons; and the two Epistles are linked together by the statement in Col 4⁹ that Onesimus, who is the subject of the letter to Philemon, is being sent to Colosse in the company of Tychicus, who is the bearer of the Colossian Epistle.

Philemon is a charming little private letter to a Christian at Colosse, pleading with him to receive kindly his slave Onesimus, who, after running away from his master, had in some way come under Paul's influence at Rome and had embraced the Christian faith. The Epistle contains no specific statement of doctrine; its value lies in the sidelight which it casts on the Apostle's personality and the bearing of Christianity on the social conditions of the time. Slavery is not condemned; Onesimus is sent back to his master; but the new spirit of Christian brotherhood (v. 16) has already

gone far to change the relationship of master and slave, and to prepare the way at least for a social order in which slavery will be impossible (v. 21). As in Philippians, Paul expresses a hope that he will be released (v. 22).

The Epistle to the Colossians, like that to the Romans, is addressed to a church that was not founded by Paul, though individuals in it may have owed their conversion to him. He knows the Colossian church only by report (1⁴), but he is greatly interested in it; he has friends with him in his captivity belonging to that part of Asia, of whom Epaphras is one (4¹²); and he has friends there to whom he can send greetings. He also knows of the church at Laodicea, and has written a letter to it which he wishes the Colossians to read in exchange for the one he is sending to them.¹ The occasion of his writing to the church at Colosse is the appearance there of a new form of teaching which Paul recognizes to be subversive of the sovereignty of Christ and His sufficiency as Saviour. It is not defined, but seems to have been of a semi-Gnostic character, having its roots in the popular religions of Phrygia, but exhibiting Jewish elements also (2^{11, 16}). At an earlier period Paul appears to have had a presentiment of the danger to which the churches in Asia were exposed from this quarter (Ac 20¹⁷⁻²³), and recent report has confirmed his fears. The worst feature of the new doctrine is the worship of the *στοιχία τοῦ κόσμου*, best understood as cosmic angels, occupying the position of intermediaries between the supreme deity and humanity, and presented in a mystery. Paul's way of dealing with this heresy is to exalt Christ to the utmost, above all 'thrones, dominions, principalities and powers' (Col 1^{16f.} 2^{10, 15}), as the Head of creation, containing in Himself the whole fullness of God and all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, and as having by His Cross brought a sufficient and universal reconciliation of all things in heaven and in earth. To the mystery into which the false teachers would initiate the Colossian Christians by their philosophy and ascetic practices Paul opposes the true mystery of Christ (1^{26f.}), into union with whom they have been brought, in whom they are already complete, and by whom they are delivered from moral evil. Throughout the Epistle characteristically Pauline doctrine is repeated. Christ has made peace through the blood of His Cross (1²⁰ 2¹⁴); Christians are buried with Him in baptism, and also rise with Him, and will appear with Him in glory (2¹² 3^{1, 3f.}); the true circumcision is that not made with hands (2¹¹); and there is neither Greek nor Jew in Him (3¹¹).

(c) *Epistle to the Ephesians.*—When the genuineness of Colossians is accepted, it becomes difficult not to accept that of the kindred Epistle to the Ephesians. The two are connected by the identity of much of the matter. The order of presentation is not the same, but most of the phrases used in Colossians are to be found also in the other Epistle, and the phenomena of likeness and difference can be accounted for on the supposition that the two Epistles were written about the same time, when the Apostle's mind was full of the same ideas. Ephesians does not, however, reflect so clear a situation as Colossians; there is less to lay hold of; and the name of Tychicus is the only one mentioned alongside that of Paul. It is certainly a difficulty that, in writing to a church with which Paul had so long and so familiar intercourse, there should be an entire absence of reminiscence and personal greetings, and that the whole Epistle should be written in a manner so impersonal and detached. The expressions, 'I heard of your

¹ The Pauline authorship of the Epistle to the Hebrews, disputed from early times, is now for the most part abandoned. It has been ascribed in turn to each of the great figures associated in Acts with Paul or Timothy (He 13²³), to Luke, Barnabas, Silas, Apollos, and Priscilla; but the truth of the question still remains where Origen left it, as being known to God alone.

¹ The Laodicean letter has not been preserved; the so-called 'ad Laodiceenses' is a later forgery.

faith' (1¹⁵), 'if ye have heard of the dispensation given unto me' (3²), sound strange on the lips of one who has spent such a long time at Ephesus. This difficulty is lessened if the supposition is accepted that Ephesians is a general Epistle intended to be circulated among a number of churches of which Ephesus was one—a supposition supported by the omission of the words ἐν Ἐφέσῳ by the best textual authorities. Was the Epistle to the Laodiceans (Col 4¹⁶) another copy of the same letter? The theory of a circular letter does not remove all the objections based on the style; and the references to 'the holy apostles and prophets' (3⁵; cf. 2²⁰) look like the 'water-marks of a later age' (J. Moffatt, *Introd. to Lit. of NT*, p. 386). Ephesians, unlike Colossians, does not directly combat false teaching; but stress is laid on the exaltation of Christ and His superiority to all other spiritual beings. The great theme is the union in Christ of Jew and Gentile (1¹⁰, 24-25, 32-12).

24. The Pastoral Epistles.—While it is possible to find a place for the Epistles of the Captivity within the two years of the Roman imprisonment (Ac 28³⁰), it is otherwise in the case of the Pastoral Epistles. They form a closely connected group, marked off from all the rest by differences of language, aim, and historical situation. It is impossible to believe that they were composed during the time that Paul was writing the other Epistles; they must at least be later than all the rest, and, if genuine, they presuppose Paul's release and subsequent missionary activity. 1 Tim. implies that Paul has been at Ephesus, where he has left Timothy, himself proceeding to Macedonia (1³), and he has hopes of returning to Ephesus (3¹⁴ 4¹³). According to 2 Tim., Paul has been at Troas, Corinth, and Miletus (4¹³ 20). At present he is a prisoner (1¹⁶ 18), and apparently at Rome (1¹⁷). He has made a 'first defence' (4¹⁶). He has none of his friends beside him save Luke (4¹¹), though others are associated with him in sending greetings (4²¹). Some have forsaken him (1¹⁵ 4¹¹), others have been sent by him on various missions (4¹⁰ 12). Timothy is urged to come to him before winter and to bring Mark (4⁹ 11, 21). The Epistle to Titus implies that Paul has been in Crete and has left Titus there to regulate church affairs. The letter is carried apparently by Zenas and Apollos, who are travelling to Crete and beyond (3¹³); and Paul asks Titus to meet him at Nicopolis, where he intends to pass the winter, as soon as he can send either Artemas or Tychicus to relieve him. Attempts have been made to fit these historical notices into the known life of Paul, but unsuccessfully, and this quite apart from the difficulties connected with the marked divergencies of language and doctrine exhibited by the Pastorals as compared with the earlier Epistles. Accordingly, the defenders of the Pauline authorship are obliged to postulate for the Apostle a period of freedom after the Roman imprisonment, during which he visited Ephesus, Macedonia, Epirus, and Crete, followed by a second imprisonment and martyrdom. The evidence for this, apart from that of the Pastorals such as it is, is very scanty. Clement of Rome, in a highly rhetorical passage, after saying that Paul suffered bonds seven times, says that, "having taught the whole world righteousness, and having gone to the limit of the West (ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς οὐσῶς), and having borne witness before rulers (μαρτυρήσας ἐπὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων), thus was he released from the world and went to the holy place."¹ The 'limit of the West' may mean either Rome or Spain, according to the standpoint of the speaker; but the way in which the arrival in the West and the μαρτυρία are connected with his release from the world suggests one locality for all

three events, viz. Rome. The Muratorian Canon speaks of Paul 'setting out from the city to Spain'; but there is nowhere else any mention of such a journey, or any evidence that the hope expressed in Ro 15²⁴ was ever fulfilled. To the statements of the romancing *Acts of Peter and Paul* no importance can be attached.

25. The martyrdom of Paul.—It has been urged that the abrupt ending of the book of Acts implies that Paul was released at the end of the two years. But, if that was the case, it is strange that the writer did not, even in a few sentences, add what would have been a fine climax for his book and a strong apology for Christianity in the Roman empire, viz. Paul's triumph over his adversaries in Rome. If Luke knew of Paul's further activity, his silence remains a mystery. There is no reason to believe that he meant to write a third book for Theophilus.

The close of Paul's life, therefore, like its beginning, is enveloped in obscurity. That he suffered martyrdom at Rome there can be no doubt. That it was by beheading, and that the place of execution was three miles outside the city on the Ostian Way, is the consistent tradition of the Roman Church. The date will lie between A.D. 64 and 67, most probably nearer the former than the latter limit.

LITERATURE.—Full bibliographies are given in *HDB*, *DCG*, *DAC*, *EBI*, *PRE³*, and other Biblical dictionaries and encyclopaedias. The following is a selection from earlier works that are still worth consulting, with a somewhat fuller list of more recent books (see also the bibliographies in the NT Introductions and in the commentaries on the separate Epistles):

i. *LIFE AND WORK*.—A. Neander, *Hist. of the Planting and Training of the Church*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, 1851; F. C. Baur, *Paulus*, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1866-67, Eng. tr., London, 1873-75; M. Krenkel, *Paulus der Apostel der Heiden*, Leipzig, 1869; E. Renan, *Saint Paul* (forming vol. iii. of *Hist. des origines du Christianisme*), Paris, 1869, Eng. tr., London, 1869; T. Lewin, *The Life and Epistles of St. Paul*, 2 vols., London, 1890; W. J. Conybeare and J. S. Howson, *Life and Epistles of St. Paul*, 2 vols., new ed., do. 1877; F. W. Farrar, *The Life and Work of St. Paul*, 2 vols., do. 1879; G. V. Leclerc, *The Apostolic and Post-Apostolic Times*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1886; E. Schürer, *A Hist. of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ*, Eng. tr., 5 vols., do. 1888-90 (a tr. of the 2nd German ed.; a 3rd German ed. was published at Leipzig in 1901); A. Hausrath, *A Hist. of the NT Times: the Time of the Apostles*, Eng. tr., 4 vols., London, 1895; W. M. Ramsay, *St. Paul the Traveller and the Roman Citizen*, do. 1895; A. C. McGiffert, *A Hist. of Christianity in the Apostolic Age*, Edinburgh, 1897; C. von Weizsäcker, *The Apostolic Age of the Christian Church*, Eng. tr., 1, 2, London, 1897; O. Cone, *Paul, the Man, the Missionary, and the Teacher*, do. 1898; C. Clemen, *Paulus: sein Leben und Wirken*, Giessen, 1901; B. W. Bacon, *The Story of St. Paul*, London, 1905; R. J. Knowling, *The Testimony of St. Paul to Christ*, do. 1905; W. M. Ramsay, *Pauline and other Studies*, do. 1906; A. Sabatier, *The Apostle Paul*, Eng. tr., do. 1906; H. Weinel, *St. Paul: the Man and his Work*, Eng. tr., do. 1906; W. M. Ramsay, *The Cities of St. Paul*, do. 1907; W. Wrede, *Paul, Eng. tr.*, do. 1907; E. de W. Burton, *A Handbook of the Life of the Apostle Paul*, Chicago, 1909; T. Mommesen, *The Provinces of the Roman Empire*, Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, 1909 (a reprint, with corrections, of W. E. Dickson's tr. of the fifth vol. of the *Hist. of Rome*, London, 1886); A. E. Garvie, *Life and Teaching of St. Paul*, do. 1910; J. Drummond, *Paul: his Life and Teaching*, do. 1911; G. A. Deissmann, *St. Paul: a Study in Social and Religious History*, Eng. tr., do. 1912; A. Schweitzer, *Paul and his Interpreters*, Eng. tr., do. 1912; A. C. Headlam, *St. Paul and Christianity*, do. 1913; Maurice Jones, *The NT in the Twentieth Century*, do. 1914; C. G. Montefiore, *Judaism and St. Paul*, do. 1914; R. H. Strachan, *The Individuality of Saint Paul*, do. 1916.

ii. *WRITINGS*.—R. H. Strachan, *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Apostolic Age*, do. 1892; J. B. ... *St. Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians, and Romans*, do. 1894; G. G. Findlay, *The Epistles of Paul the Apostle*, do. 1895; G. B. Stevens, *The Messages of Paul*, do. 1900; J. Moffatt, *The Historical NT*, Edinburgh, 1901; F. H. Chase, *The Credibility of the Book of the Acts of the Apostles*, London, 1902; T. H. Stokoe, *Life and Letters of St. Paul*, pt. ii., Oxford, 1902; R. D. Shaw, *The Pauline Epistles*, Edinburgh, 1903; E. Vischer, *Die Paulusbriefe*, Halle, 1904; T. Nägeli, *Der Wortschatz des Apostels Paulus*, Göttingen, 1905; D. Völter, *Paulus und seine Briefe*, Strassburg, 1905; H. von Soden, *Hist. of Early Christian Literature*, London, 1906; A. S. Way, *The Letters of St. Paul*, do. 1906; W. P. Du Bos, *The Gospel according to Saint Paul*, New York, 1907; E. Jaquier,

¹ Ep. ad Cor. 5.

Hist. of the Books of the NT: i. St. Paul and his Epistles, Eng. tr., London, 1907; R. Scott, *The Pauline Epistles*, Edinburgh, 1909; T. Zahn, *Introduct. to the NT*, Eng. tr., i., do. 1909; Kirsopp Lake, *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, London, 1911; J. Moffatt, *An Introduct. to the Literature of the NT*, Edinburgh, 1911.

iii. *THEOLOGY AND ETHICS*.—L. Usteri, *Die Entwicklung des paulinischen Lehrbegriffs*, Zürich, 1851; A. Ritschl, *Die Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche*, Bonn, 1857; E. Reuss, *Hist. de la théologie chrétienne au siècle apostolique*, 2 vols., Paris, 1864, Eng. tr., London, 1872-74; C. Holsten, *Zum Evangelium des Paulus und des Petrus*, Rostock, 1868; O. Pfleiderer, *Der Paulinismus*, Leipzig, 1873, Eng. tr., 2 vols., London, 1877; E. Ménégoz, *Le Pêche et la Rédemption d'après saint Paul*, Paris, 1882; G. B. Stevens, *The Pauline Theology*, London, 1892; C. C. Everett, *The Gospel of Paul*, Boston, 1893; A. B. Bruce, *St. Paul's Conception of Christianity*, Edinburgh, 1894; F. J. A. Hort, *Judaistic Christianity*, Cambridge, 1894; *The Christian Ecclesia*, London, 1897; P. Feine, *Das gesetzfreie Evangelium des Paulus*, Leipzig, 1899; H. St. J. Thackeray, *The Relation of St. Paul to contemporary Jewish Thought*, London, 1900; W. E. Ball, *St. Paul and Roman Law*, Edinburgh, 1901; P. Feine, *Jesus Christus und Paulus*, Leipzig, 1902; M. Goguel, *L'Apôtre Paul et Jésus-Christ*, Paris, 1904; H. A. A. Kennedy, *St. Paul's Conception of the Last Things*, London, 1904; W. E. Chadwick, *The Social Teaching of St. Paul*, Cambridge, 1906; *The Pastoral Teaching of St. Paul*, Edinburgh, 1908; A. B. D. Alexander, *The Ethics of St. Paul*, Glasgow, 1910; J. Moffatt, *Paul and Paulinism*, London, 1910; F. Gardner, *The Religious Experience of Saint Paul*, do. 1911; A. E. Garvie, *Studies of Paul and his Gospel*, do. 1911; H. L. Goudge, *The Mind of St. Paul*, do. 1911; S. N. Rostrom, *The Christology of St. Paul*, do. 1912; H. A. A. Kennedy, *St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions*, do. 1913; W. M. Ramsay, *The Teaching of Paul in Terms of the Present Day*, do. 1913.

ALLAN MENZIES.

WILLIAM EDIE.

PAULICIANS.—The Paulicians, of whom Gibbon says that they shook the East and enlightened the West,¹ were an anti-Catholic sect which originated in the 7th cent. (possibly earlier), experienced many alternations of imperial favour and ruthless persecution, remained influential till the 12th cent., and is not without descendants in Eastern Europe to-day. Making its appearance first on the eastern borders of the empire, and having its natural home in Armenia, Mesopotamia, and N. Syria, it spread, partly through propaganda and partly through the transplantation of its votaries, westwards through Asia Minor, then into Eastern Europe to establish new centres in the Balkan Peninsula. The specific opinions which have been ascribed to it include a dualistic conception of the world, if not of the origin, of the Person of Christ, a vehement and stubborn rejection of Mariolatry and the worship of saints and images, a similar rejection of sacramental symbolism, and a special emphasis on adult baptism as the only valid form. The basis of these opinions is found in a concentration on Scripture as the sole and sufficient authority to the exclusion of tradition and the 'teaching of the Church.' In view of these commonly accepted characteristics of Paulicianism, both its history and its tenets have naturally been subjects of heated controversy. The Paulicians have been celebrated uncritically as early Protestants against 'Catholic' abuses, or they have been condemned unheard as deadly heretics. A just and critical estimate will be arrived at only when all such presuppositions have been laid aside, and when to the Greek sources, on which alone until lately historians have relied, have been added the Armenian, and, further, when the literary relations between the Greek sources have been thoroughly sifted and established.

i. **Sources.**—It cannot be said that this task has yet been accomplished, but it is plain that considerable caution must be used in handling those sources from which most information as to the early history of the sect has hitherto been drawn. These are Photius, in his four books *Against the Manichæans*, and what purports to be his contemporary, Petrus Siculus, *History of*

the Manichæans. As to the first, C. Krumbacher¹ notes that his work presents a problem not yet fully solved. The second book of this work, in which Manichæan and Paulician doctrines are controverted, does not correspond to what the close of the first book would lead us to expect, and the two parts of the first book itself have no constructive relation to one another (1-9, 10-27), while they contain much repetition and not a little mutual divergence. As to Petrus Siculus, who reproduces the contents of Photius almost verbatim, Mikrttschian has shown that he is dependent upon Photius, and also that the personal narrative of a sojourn in Tephrike, which provides a setting for the argument, presents a tissue of improbabilities. 'Petrus Siculus' is, in fact, a tract against Paulicians, written at a time when they were already active in Bulgaria, thrown into the form of a pseudo-historical writing—a fact which is not obscurely suggested in the opening words.² But Photius is not itself original, for it is pretty clear that the document bearing the name of Petrus Hegumenus, which was edited by Gieseler in 1849, is not, as Gieseler supposed, a copy from Photius or Siculus, but, as Mikrttschian has shown (p. 9 f.), the source from which both Photius and Siculus and also Georgius Monachus have drawn their information. The situation was further complicated, or possibly simplified, through the publication in 1896 of a document which is incorporated in the MS of Georgius Monachus in the Library of the Escorial, and probably represents the earliest source of the material common to all the foregoing; it adds to the common material one important paragraph, and also a fully detailed method of confuting the Paulicians which throws further light upon their views. This document (*Codex Scorialensis*), with the valuable commentary of its editor, J. Friedrich, must in future take the first place among the Greek authorities.

The Armenian sources, with one possible exception, proceed, as do the Greek, from hostile writers who are more anxious to overwhelm their Paulician opponents than to give an account either of their opinions or of their history. The possible exception is *The Key of Truth*, which was discovered by F. C. Conybeare, translated from the Armenian, and edited by him in 1898, with an exhaustive introduction and valuable appendices.³

The Key of Truth, now preserved in the archives of the Holy Synod at Eichmadsin, was found in 1897 in the possession of a group of 'Paulician' or 'new Manichæan' families in the Russian Caucasus. It bears a subscription to the effect that it was 'written' in 1782, meaning, according to Conybeare, that it was copied then, the work itself being of much older date, belonging indeed (apart from the catechism at the end, which is later) to the 10th cent., and probably incorporating material that is considerably older still. It is a manual of 'Thondrakian' or Paulician teaching and practice, mutilated unfortunately by the removal of almost a quarter of its leaves, and these among the most important, as they must have contained the Paulician criticism of Catholic doctrine and practice, and probably also an exposition of Paulician Christology. Conybeare, in his introduction, exhibits 'the detailed agreement of *The Key of Truth* on the one hand with the Armenian writers of the tenth and eleventh centuries, and on the other hand with the Greek notices of an earlier date,' and he concludes that this is 'proof enough that in it we have recovered an early and authoritative exposition of Paulician tenets' (p. xlv). It is no valid objection to this position (though one of Conybeare's critics has called it 'the clearest sign' of a late date) that the writer shows 'entire dependence upon the New Testament both for his doctrines and for his representation of what he calls the Universal and Apostolic Church.'⁴ For it is plain from the Greek authori-

¹ *Gesch. der byzantinischen Literatur*, Munich, 1897, p. 75; see also Friedrich, *SMA*, 1896, p. 861, and Mikrttschian, *Die Paulicianer*, p. 8.

² Πέτρος Σικελιώτου ιστορία . . . προσωποποιήσια ἐς τὸν τὸν Ἀρχιεπίσκοπον Βουλγαρίας.

³ Important reviews in *The Guardian*, 12th Oct. 1898, p. 100; *The Times*, 10th Oct. 1898, 16th Nov., 1898, 1899, 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1918, 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 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ties¹ that precisely this sole dependence on the NT was recognized as a characteristic of the Paulicians. Conybeare conjectures that the author may have been Smbat (i.e. Sindbad) Bagratuni, the founder of one of the Armenian dynasties and one of the creative forces of the Paulician Church.

2. Doctrine.—The Greek authorities from *Cod. Scor.* downwards are practically unanimous in classifying the Paulicians as 'Manichæans,' and the description has generally been accepted by historians. It is, however, very doubtful whether the classification is not at least misleading. Controversialists of the 7th and following centuries were only too ready to use the term 'Manichæan,' quite uncritically as an opprobrious description of almost any sect which deviated from orthodoxy. Photius, e.g., charges the Western Church with practical surrender to Manichæism because of its doctrine of the double procession of the Spirit, and the Bulgarian bishop Clement on the same ground charges the Westerns roundly with the same heresy.² There is no doubt that the term was loosely applied to cover various gradations of dualistic theory ranging from a dualism which is absolute and non-Christian to that which is found within the NT itself. And the Paulicians themselves neither claimed nor admitted any connexion with Mani and his teaching. On the contrary, it is plainly stated in the Greek sources that they anathematized Manes, and also 'Paul and John,' sons of a Manichæan woman, in whom the Greeks see the founders of the sect. This is confirmed by Gregory Magistros, the chief Armenian authority (in *The Key of Truth*, pp. 142, 147). The latest investigators (Mkrtschian, Friedrich, Conybeare) are disposed to set aside the elaborations of the charge of Manichæism as the natural development of a mistaken classification, and connect the Paulicians with either the Marcionites (Mkrtschian) or the Adoptianists (Conybeare), or with no well-marked earlier form of heretical teaching (Friedrich).

The presence and importance of an Adoptianist element in the Paulician system have been forcibly maintained by Conybeare on the evidence of *The Key*. But it does not depend on that alone. In that part of *Cod. Scor.* which has not been excerpted by the subsequent chroniclers (ed. Friedrich, xix.-xxii.) the Paulician view of the Incarnation is clearly indicated. According to *Scor.* xix., God out of love to men commanded an angel to go down to earth and be born of a woman, and on this angel He bestowed the title of Son. The same assertion is repeated and expanded in the instructions for controverting the heresy which follow.³ With this accords the teaching of *The Key*, where the Baptism is definitely marked as the beginning of the Sonship:

'It was then he became chief of beings heavenly and earthly, then he became the light of the world, . . . then he was filled with the Godhead' (p. 75).

Everything of importance that is authoritatively reported by the Paulicians grows naturally out of this Christology, the rejection of the worship of the Virgin with the denial that she was θεοτόκος (*Scor.* vii. 15), the keeping of a feast of the Baptism, followed by a forty days' fast, the insistence on adult baptism as the only valid form of the rite ('church and church ordinances they utterly reject—its baptism,' etc. [Aristaces, *ap.* Conybeare, p. 140]), and the equating of the 'elect' with Christ according to the formula of the Spanish Adoptianists, 'Et ille Christus et nos Christi.' They were further said to 'blaspheme both the Eucharist and the Cross,' but it would appear that they gave a spiritual interpretation to both, finding the

Eucharist in the words of Christ and the Cross in Christ Himself (*Scor.* viii. 1). This is consistent with the general principle that the function of Christ was to save men by instructing them, while the charge on which the Greek authorities dwell with horror, that the leaders of the Paulicians offered themselves for adoration as Christs, probably arose from a misunderstood exaggeration of the sanctity of the πνευματικοί as members of the Body of Christ. They rejected the Catholic priesthood and hierarchy, and with special emphasis image-worship and the monastic life. Their own clergy were known as συνέκδημοι (cf. *Ac* 19²⁹), and there was no distinction in dress or in habits between them and the rest of the sect (*Scor.* xiv.).

In all these matters they made their appeal exclusively to Scripture, which they were in the habit of describing as τὸ εὐαγγέλιον καὶ ὁ ἀπόστολος. Interpreting this to refer to the Gospel of Luke and the Epistles of Paul alone, Mkrtschian (taking up a suggestion made by Gibbon and by Ncander) finds in it a proof that the Paulicians derived from the Marcionites. But Friedrich has shown (pp. 93-98) that there is no good ground for so limiting the Paulician canon (though they probably rejected the Epistles of Peter¹ and the Acts of the Apostles), and that Paulicianism has nothing in common with Marcionism beyond a general emphasis on dualism. With all these material divergences from orthodox faith and practice, the Paulicians claimed to be the true Catholic Church, 'holy, universal and apostolic,' emphasizing therein the internal quality against institutional continuity.²

3. History.—The earliest extant reference to the Paulicians by name occurs in A.D. 719, when John of Oztun, catholicos of Armenia, warns the orthodox against mixing with the sect 'of obscene men who are called Paulicians' (Conybeare, p. 152; Mkrtschian, p. 62). The name itself is commonly understood to point to some connexion, real or alleged, between the sect and some Paul, who was influential either in its founding or in its reformation. And this eponymous Paul has been variously identified with the apostle Paul (so pseudo-Photius, *PG* cii. 109), with an unknown Paul, belonging to Samosata, brother of John, who, according to the first paragraph of *Cod. Scor.*, learnt the Manichæan heresy from his mother Callinike, and propagated it in Armenia, and finally with Paul of Samosata himself, as was asserted by Gregory Magistros:

'Here then you see the Paulicians, who got their poison from Paul of Samosata.'

The last is the filiation which has commanded itself to Conybeare (*Key*, p. cv). But the report of the Paulician view itself given in *Cod. Scor.* ii. is probably to be preferred to the theory advanced in section i., viz. that the founder of the sect was Constantine Silvanus.³ The form of the word 'Paulician,' as Mkrtschian has pointed out (p. 63), indicates a name not claimed by the sect but imposed upon them by their opponents, the suffix -ic or -ik in Armenian having the force of a depreciatory diminutive. It is probable that, in the absence of any specific name, this was bestowed upon them either because of an assumed connexion between their teaching and that of Paul of Samosata or because, as *Cod. Scor.* infers, the name of the apostle was constantly on their lips.⁴ The same authority states definitely that they repudi-

¹ On the question of the Paulician attitude to Peter there is discrepancy between *Cod. Scor.* (ed. Friedrich, p. 78: ὁ σοὶ τὴ μαρτὶ ἀποτρίβεις Πέτρος) and *The Key* (pp. 92, 93; cf. cxxx).

² *The Key*, pp. 73, 80, 87, etc.; Greg. Mag., *ap.* Conybeare, p. 147; cf. Verses (c. 1160) (ib. p. 155): 'dicentes, Ecclesia non est illa, quae ab hominibus aedificata est, sed nos tantum.'

³ *Cod. Scor.* ii.: τοῦτον οὖν ἔχουσιν ἀρχηγὸν τῶν διδασκάλων αὐτῶν, οὐχὶ τὸν Παῦλον. οὗτος γὰρ αὐτοῖς παρέδωκε τὰς αἰρέσεις αὐτοῦ.

⁴ *Id.* xx.: ὁ ἀπόστολος Παῦλος ὃν ἐπὶ στόματος φέρεις.

¹ E.g., *Cod. Scor.* ii.: μὴ δεῖν ἑτέραν βίβλον τὴν οἰανοῦν ἀναγνώσκειν εἰ μὴ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον καὶ τὸν ἀπόστολον.

² Photius, *de S. Spir.* *Mystagogia* (p. 92); Clement, ed. F. Miklosich, p. 13, *ap.* Friedrich, p. 92.

³ *Cod. Scor.*, ed. Friedrich, p. 76: εἶτα φῆς ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ Ὀκταβίου Καίσαρος . . . γενέσθαι χάριτι ἢ ἀμοιβῇ τῶν πόρων καὶ τοῦ τελέσαι τὴν ἐντολὴν τὸν Χριστὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ.

ated Paul, the son of Callinike, together with John his brother and Manes (iii.).

This Constantine, for whom a probable date is c. 640 (though Friedrich, p. 111, puts it two centuries earlier), left no writings of his own, but sought to concentrate attention on 'the gospel and the apostle,' maintaining that men ought not to read any other book whatever besides these (*Cod. Scor.* ii.). His propaganda met with success among 'the Armenians' (*ib.* i.), where the township of Phanarea-Episparris became the headquarters of the sect. The Greek authorities record the names of six leaders who succeeded him, each of whom adopted the name of one of St. Paul's companions, and also the names of the centres where they established churches (Cibossa, Mananalis, Argæum, Mopsuestia, and Cynochoritzæ), to each of which they gave the name of a Pauline field of labour. The outline which is given by the Escorial document may be supplemented from such later writers as pseudo-Photius and Petrus Siculus. According to these, Constantine Silvannus, after twenty-seven years of leadership, was stoned to death by order of an envoy sent by the emperor Constantine Pogonatus (668-685). The like fate, however, befell the persecutor, who, having been converted, succeeded his victim in the leadership of the sect. The sons of Paul, who followed, strove for the succession, and one of them, Gegnesius, summoned to Constantinople, was able to give an account of his views that satisfied the patriarch. Under Baanes the sect suffered through a lowering of the moral standard, but it was restored under Sergius Tycheus, whose labours, extending over thirty years, qualified him to be regarded as the reformer or even second founder of the Paulicians. Quotations from his Epistles are found in Petrus Siculus.

'I have run from East to West, and from North to South, preaching the Gospel of Christ until my knees were weary' (p. 36).

The charge specially levelled against Sergius is that of inordinate exaltation of himself, as 'the porter, and the good shepherd and the leader of the body of Christ, and the light of the house of God,' to the point of identifying himself with the Holy Spirit and offering himself to be worshipped. But even his opponents admitted the purity of his character and the sincerity of his beneficence (*ib.* p. 44), and the charge, like others of a similar character, may have grown out of a misunderstanding of an emphasized doctrine of the Church as the Body of Christ.

Probably under the influence of Sergius, the Paulicians increased greatly in numbers and importance. They were found chiefly among the hardy mountain peoples of the Taurus, and, alike as defenders of the empire and as objects of imperial persecution, they showed the greatest stubbornness and courage. By one emperor (Constantine Copronymus [741-775], himself probably a Paulician) they were protected and invited to settle in Thrace; by Nicephorus (802-811) they were employed in the protection of the empire on its eastern frontier; by Michael and Leo v. they were ruthlessly persecuted. But the Paulicians were too numerous, too warlike, and too well-organized to be dragged into orthodoxy. They resisted, revolted, and even retaliated by raiding Asia Minor from their mountain fastnesses. After twenty years of comparative tranquillity they were exposed to still more violent persecution under Theodora (842-857), which under Basil developed into a war of extermination (see Krumpholtz, p. 1075). The Paulicians were driven into the arms of the Saracens, and with some assistance from them, under the leadership of an able ruler Chrysocheir, they not only successfully resisted the imperial forces, but forced them back and pillaged Asia Minor up to its western shores.

Their success, however, was shortlived. Chrysocheir was defeated and murdered; his chief stronghold, Tephrike, was taken and destroyed; his followers were decimated and dispersed.

Though their political organization thus came to an end, the Paulicians continued to exist in scattered communities in Armenia, in Asia Minor, and especially in the Balkan Peninsula, to which considerable bodies of them had been transplanted. In Armenia they again experienced revival and expansion under Smbat (middle of 9th cent.), who, according to Conybeare, may have been the author of *The Key of Truth*. From the town of Thondrak, where he had his headquarters, his followers received the name of 'Thondrakians.' Another branch from the same root is probably to be found in the sect known as 'Athingani' referred to by Theophanes (*Chronographia*, 413), and yet another in the 'Selikians.' The biographer of the patriarch Methodius claims for him the credit of having converted to orthodoxy one Selix and his followers, who held 'Manichean' opinions—opinions which in detail correspond with those charged against the Paulicians in *Cod. Scor.*¹

A second deportation of Paulicians on a large scale from Armenia to Thrace was carried out by John Tzimiskes (970), and, while the Latin writers found the sect in Syria in the 11th cent., Lady Mary Wortley Montagu found them in the neighbourhood of Philippopolis in the 18th. In Europe they developed into or amalgamated with the Bogomils (*q.v.*), and their views and influence were propagated throughout the Middle Ages by various anti-Catholic sects—*e.g.*, Cathari, Albigenses—whose filiation with the Paulicians is probable though difficult to trace. Their name, like 'Manichean,' became in turn a generic description for any of these movements which opposed the dogmas of Catholic hierarchy and doctrine. This makes it impossible to decide whether the 'Pipiles,' the 'Piphles' of Flanders, or the 'Pipiles' who were condemned and branded at Oxford in 1160 (because 'they detested Holy Baptism, the Eucharist and marriage')² were directly descended from the Paulicians or bore their name as a term of reproach.

The Paulicians are best understood as a section in that continuous stream of anti-Catholic and anti-hierarchical thought and life which runs parallel with the stream of 'orthodox' doctrine and organization of the Church.³

sisted on three sacraments and three only, viz. repentance, baptism, and the Body and Blood of Christ; declared infant baptism invalid, laying great stress on the necessity of following the example of Christ in being baptized at the age of thirty; denied the perpetual virginity of Mary; and rejected the doctrines of Purgatory and the intercession of saints, and the use of pictures, crosses, and incense. In the obscure and singular teaching about the Eucharist which we find in the catechism (Conybeare, p. 124) there is probably an underlying survival of the early (? primitive) conception of the actual oneness of the Church with Christ, in consequence of which the self-offering of the Church is the equivalent or the re-presentation of the offering of Christ. They incurred the danger to which all such movements are exposed in cutting themselves off from creed and learning as well as from tradition, laying themselves open to the infection of non-Christian ideas in the atmosphere around them. The spread and the tenacity of the Paulician system were due in the first place to the racial characteristics of those who formed the nucleus of its adherents, and, further, to elements of simplicity in its teaching combined with directness in the moral demand which it made which have always made a strong appeal to the popular mind.

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iii. **MODERN.**—E. Gibbon, *Hist. of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. J. B. Bury, London, 1899-1900, vol. vi. ch. liv. appendix 8; J. A. W. Neander, *Hist. of the Chr. Rel. and Church*, Eng. tr., do. 1850-52, v. 337-370; Gieseler, *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, Hamburg, 1829, pp. 79-124; J. J. von Döllinger, *Beiträge zur Sektengesch. des Mittelalters*, Munich, 1890, pp. 1-31; Karapet Ter-Mikrttschian, *Die Paulicianer*, Leipzig, 1893, and in *ZKG* xvi. [1895] 253-276; Friedrich, in *SMA*, 1896, pp. 67-111; A. J. Evans, *Through Bosnia and Herzegovina on Foot*, London, 1876; *PRE³* s.v. 'Paulicianer' (G. N. Bonwetsch), 'Neumanichäer' (O. Zöckler).

C. A. SCOTT.

PAUPERISM.—See POVERTY.

PAWNEE.—Strictly speaking, the Pawnee were not a single tribe but a confederacy of four minor tribes, held together by two forces: (1) belief in a common cult, and (2) a governing council in which all the minor tribes were officially represented.

1. **Name.**—The term 'Pawnee' belongs to the nickname class. It is probably derived from *pariki*, 'horn,' and referred to the manner in which the people adjusted the scalp-lock; the braid of hair was stiffened with a mixture of paint and fat so that it could be made to stand erect and be curved like a horn.

2. **Language.**—The Pawnee language belongs to the Caddoan linguistic stock, and the people call themselves *Charhiks-i-charhiks*, 'men of men.'

3. **History and organization.**—The first recorded meeting of the Pawnee with the white race was during Coronado's expedition of 1541, when it was joined by a native, who, it is now thought, was probably a Pawnee. The Spaniards jestingly named this man 'Turk.' It was he who induced the expedition to follow him out on the plains of W. Kansas in a search for gold. At that time the Pawnee were living in the vicinity of the river Platte in the present State of Nebraska. They remained in

that region until 1876, when they ceded their right of occupancy on the land to the United States Government and moved to a reservation in the northern part of the present State of Oklahoma. Later, under the Severalty Act of 1887, every Pawnee man, woman, and child was allotted an individual portion of land within the reservation, given a trust-patent, and made subject to the laws of the State. At the present time, through the influence of missionary work and changed environments, the ancient customs, vocations, and religious rites of the Pawnee are rapidly disappearing, and they will soon be forgotten.

The minor tribes of the Pawnee confederacy were organized similarly to the confederacy itself. Each tribe was made up of a number of kinship groups, or villages, each village being officially represented in the tribal council. Each village had its shrine and attendant rites in charge of a hereditary keeper.

4. Cosmological beliefs; rites and ceremonies.

—The Pawnee shared the common belief of the Plains Indians of the United States concerning nature and its relation to man, as well as the general anthropomorphic view of the dual forces of sky and earth (see PLAINS INDIANS). Among the Pawnee the latter aspect was elaborated in a peculiar manner and exercised a controlling influence on their religious beliefs expressed in their rites, vocations, and social organization.

The Skidi, one of the four minor tribes of the Pawnee confederacy, seem to have held to their ancient rites more tenaciously than the others, and to have offered greater resistance to the influence of the white race; we may use them, therefore, to show an ancient Pawnee type.

The Skidi tribe was composed of thirteen villages, each having its portable shrine ('bundle') with ceremonies consisting of ritualistic movements, recitations, and songs that referred to the sacred symbolic articles within the shrine. The shrine, it was believed, had been bestowed upon the village by a particular star, which gave its name to the shrine and became the name of the village. If the village received another name, it referred to some incident connected with the shrine or was descriptive of the place where the village was located. The villages of the Skidi were placed in a certain order: four villages formed a central group, as if placed at the corners of a great square; at the western end of an imaginary line running through the centre of the square was the village that had the shrine of the star of the west, or evening star; at the opposite end of this imaginary line was the village that had the shrine of the star of the east, or morning star. Round the six villages thus grouped were placed the other seven villages of the Skidi, each one in a position corresponding to that occupied by the star that gave the shrine to the village; consequently, to the Skidi their villages on the earth reflected the picture of their stars in the heavens.

The order and the teachings of the ceremonies connected with these shrines predicate a duality throughout nature. The heavens were divided; the east was regarded as male, the west as female, and the stars partook of the sex attributed to the region where they were. Again, the stars of the six leading villages were in pairs; the masculine star at the north-east corner of the great central square was mate to the feminine star at the south-west corner; the masculine star at the south-east corner was mate to the feminine star at the north-west corner; the feminine evening star, in the west, was the mysterious mate of the masculine morning star, in the east. Detailed explanation of this singular interlacing of the parts of the heavens and the influence thus exerted upon tribal welfare

is not necessary here. Speaking generally, the shrines and ceremonies of the four central villages pertained to tribal vocations—hunting, planting, harvesting, the installation of war-leaders, the conferring of honours on warriors. The shrine and ceremonies of the evening star and the shrine of the morning star had nothing to do with secular affairs, unless the people fell into sudden and dire distress; they dealt with cosmic forces, with man's dependence upon the supernatural for life, food, and happiness.

The ceremonies of the various shrines took place in a yearly sequence and followed a definite order, with certain changes, so that a full circuit was made every four years. The general movement of the yearly sequence was from west to east. The ceremonies of the shrine of the star of the west always led, and a part of this rite was repeated so as to form the opening of all the other ceremonies, making them, as was explained, branches of that shrine. The rites of the shrine of the star of the west were long and elaborate; in them was recounted the advent of the human race, together with the assignment of vocations; to the man belonged the duty of being the provider and the protector of the family; to the woman was shown a vision of a garden, where life-giving plants grew—"the corn was there"—this vision and its song forecasting the woman's duty to be the conservator of the life of the family. To this teaching of the obligations laid upon the sexes was added the inauguration of rites by which the people were to be continually reminded of their dependence upon Tirawa.

The time for the beginning of the yearly sequence of ceremonies was determined by a natural phenomenon. As soon as the sound of rolling thunder was heard after the 'silent sleep of winter,' the keepers of the shrines of the different villages rushed to the keeper of the shrine of the star of the west to tell him that the people were alert and ready to respond to the summons of Tirawa and to begin their ceremonial appeal to that power for protection and for the gifts of life. The rites began with the ceremonies of the shrine of the star of the west, and culminated in the ceremonies of the shrine of the star of the east, which included a human sacrifice, typifying the conjunction of the west and the east, the above and the below, thus ensuring the productivity and the perpetuation of all forms of life.

This ceremony affords the only instance of human sacrifice among the native tribes living within the limits of the United States. It bears a resemblance, in some of its details, to the sacrificial rites of the Aztecs, and it may be a trace of a former influence exercised upon the Pawnee when living in their earlier, southern home.

The victim was a captive. After being set apart for sacrifice, she was well fed and cared for, given a name, meaning 'belonging to the morning star,' and treated as sacred. Her fate was kept secret from her. At the ceremony she was led to a sort of short ladder and, while her feet rested on a rung, her ankles were tied to the upright posts by consecrated thongs, and her arms extended above her head and tied at the wrists to the posts in the same manner as her ankles. At the appointed time a priest shot the fatal arrow and the heart was cut out of the body and burned. All weapons and implements were passed through the consecrating smoke, and the ashes strewn on the fields. Thus were success and abundance secured to the people and the conservation of life everywhere.

If the other tribes of the Pawnee confederacy ever practised this rite, it had been lost as the tribes moved northward and came under other influences. The Chaui, one of the four Pawnee tribes, protested against its practice, but without avail.

In 1817 a Comanche girl was taken captive by the Skidi and dedicated to the morning star. A young Chaui warrior, named Pitalesharu, conceived the daring plan of rescuing the victim. He dashed into the midst of the assembled throng, cut the con-

secrated thongs from the hands and feet of the girl, mounted with her on his fleet horse, rode to where another horse was awaiting him, and hurried with her to her father's tribe. The Skidi were dumbfounded by the act; but, when Pitalesharu returned to his home soon after, no one challenged his deed.

The recounting of this brave action led to other attempts at rescue, not all of which were successful, but the rite has been obsolete for over eighty years.

The Pawnee sequence of ceremonies reveals how the native mind tried to explain to itself the means necessary to the perpetuation of living forms and man's duty in assuring their stability. The modern mind has become so accustomed to regard all phenomena as controlled by natural laws that the Pawnee explanation seems far-fetched and inconclusive. A thoughtful study of these ceremonies shows the working of the native mind, and opens up a broad vista in the mental history of the human race, revealing how abstract ideas struggled for expression through symbolism, and that among these efforts was the personification of those unseen forces that are ever bringing about new life and growth, with its incident changes. Our own and all other languages bear witness to this early form of expression. Following similar lines, a supposed truth was promulgated and taught through its dramatization. The realistic Pawnee drama representing the joining of the two potent forces supposed to be dominant in the west and in the east should not conceal from us the earnest and even reverent teaching, hidden beneath the repellent act of human sacrifice, that man cannot be exempt from co-operating with the order established for the benefit of all the people by Tirawa.

The Pawnee shared with other tribes living within the drainage of the Mississippi River in the observance of a religious and intertribal ceremony having for its purpose the establishment of peaceful relations between unrelated groups of people. Fragments of objects belonging to this ceremony have been found in the caves of Kentucky and in ancient burial sites, bearing witness to the antiquity of the rite and to its observance over a wide area and among tribes belonging to different linguistic stocks. J. Marquette witnessed the ceremony among an Algonquian tribe, and, when about to descend the Mississippi in 1672, he was given one of the peculiarly decorated pipes belonging to this rite by a friendly tribe, and the reverent respect shown this sacred object enabled him to journey in safety down the unknown river.

During the latter part of last century the present writer was fortunate enough to secure a complete version of this rite from an old priest of the Chaui tribe of the Pawnee confederacy, which has been published under the title 'The Hako.' The ceremony, being intertribal, was not the exclusive property of any one tribe. The writer has witnessed it among four tribes, not all of one linguistic stock. Its ritualistic songs and teaching are of a high order and touch the most advanced thought of the native race.

The rites of the Pawnee are replete with symbolism and contain much that is poetic in character and ethical in teaching. Quite distinct from these rites were the practices of the secret societies, which were concerned with occult powers, charms, and devices to work one's will on others. Some of these societies were noted for their skill in tricks by sleight of hand, performed apparently without any means for concealment.

5. Medicine.—The Pawnee were noted for their successful treatment of wounds; instances of their skill have been recorded by various travellers when passing through their country. Disease was frequently treated by herbs and other simple remedies, although the appeal to occult powers was not uncommon.

6. Ethics.—The general ethics of the Pawnee are those common to the other tribes of the Plains. Hospitality was enjoined as something never to be avoided. Literal truthfulness was inculcated and was very generally observed. Honesty was demanded and practised. Murder was severely punished. The duty of the chiefs was to preserve social order, adjust grievances, effect restitutions if property was disturbed, and secure tranquillity within the tribe. A family was accountable for the action of any of its members, and had to pay the penalty of wrongdoing and defend in case of attack. A sense of justice was observable in the tribal government and family life. Warfare was regulated according to tribal custom, and honours were won only through personal bravery; the men were apt to fight to the finish and not ask or give quarter. They were capable of friendship and generosity and practised both, but they were high-spirited and brooked no insult. The Pawnee have never been at war with the United States, and have faithfully and courageously served the United States army as scouts during periods of Indian hostilities.

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ALICE C. FLETCHER.

PEACE.—In proclaiming peace as the highest good and as an actual present possibility for man, the gospel at once transcends the limits of ancient thought and fulfils the visions of the OT. For that which is a dream, a promise, an aspiration in the OT is a gift and actual possession in the religion of the NT. The ancients indulged in sentimental dreams of an age of universal peace, a *pacatus orbis*, which seemed to be brought within reach by the establishment of the empire. The *Pax Romana* was not, indeed, merely a dream of enthusiasts. It represented an ideal; it was an element in the settled policy of the imperial government, and it became a factor in the extension of Christianity. The prophets of Israel, again, had spoken of peace as a characteristic blessing of the Messianic age; but it was the gospel that first set peace before men as a blessing to be 'sought and ensued' (1 P 3¹=Ps 34⁴), and made the peaceful temper an essential feature in the Christlike character (Mt 5⁹, Mk 9⁵⁰). The 'blessing of peace' is implied in the very name of the city, 'new Jerusalem,' the establishment of which is the end of the ways of God:

'Nam et ipsius civitatis [Dei] mysticum nomen, id est Hierusalem, . . . visio pacis interpretatur' (Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, xix. 11).

The work wrought by Christ for man's redemption is summed up in the single phrase, 'He is our peace' (Eph 2¹⁴); His gospel was a 'gospel of peace' (Eph 6¹⁵); His parting gift to His disciples was peace (Jn 14²⁷); the God whom He revealed bears in the NT the characteristic title 'the God of peace' (Ro 15³³ etc.). The ultimate blessing which Christianity promises is peace (He 4⁹).¹

1. The nature of the peace proclaimed and promised by Christ.—(1) This peace is *bound up with Jesus Christ* and with the issues of His redemptive work (Jn 16³³). It is the outcome of all that He wrought and suffered for man's salvation; it is bound up with the mystery of His passion and with the glory that followed. The peace of the Christian arises from the conscious-

¹ Aquinas, *Summa*, ii. i. qu. c. art. 5. ad 2: 'Inter omnia futura beneficia . . . praeceptum et finale erat quies mentis in Deo, vel in praesenti per gratiam, vel in futuro per gloriam; quae etiam figurabatur per observantiam sabbati.'

ness that Christ has won a victory over the world and over all that mars or hinders the spiritual well-being of man (Ro 5¹).

(2) This peace is also *the gift of God* (Ro 15¹³, 2 Th 3¹⁶) and is attainable in this life ('in via,' as Aquinas says). We must, however, distinguish between that perfect peace which consists in the unhindered fruition of the chief good—the vision of God hereafter—and that imperfect state of peace which is possible in this life, i.e. a relative freedom from outward hindrances and disturbances—a relative freedom from the importunity of conflicting impulses and desires. In any case, however, the statement of Aquinas is true:

'Sine gratia gratum faciente non potest esse vera pax' (*Summa*, ii. ii. qu. xxix. art. 3).¹

(3) Peace regarded as a personal endowment, a blessing vouchsafed to the individual soul, implies a *condition of inward wholeness*, soundness, or well-being² which depends upon the acceptance of the gospel, regarded as a law of life and an explanation of the universe. A petition in the Liturgy of St. James implies that peace is synonymous with salvation:

Ἦνερ τῆς ἀνθρώπων εἰρήνης καὶ τῆς σωτηρίας τῶν ψυχῶν ἡμῶν τοῦ Κυρίου δεηθῶμεν (F. E. Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*, Oxford, 1896, p. 36).

This blessing of peace includes such elements as the following: (a) freedom from personal anxiety, care, and foreboding in respect of the future. The truth of the nearness and providence of God was set by Jesus in the very forefront of His message (Mt 6²⁵⁻³⁴, Lk 12²²⁻³²; cf. Ph 4⁶, 1 P 5⁷). In Christ the love of God was made manifest, His discriminating tenderness and watchful care for the individual, His power to control or overrule all things in furtherance of His purpose of grace (Ro 8²⁸⁻³⁵). Care is, indeed, represented by Christ as one of the great enemies of the soul, as a conspicuous sign of faithlessness, and even a cause of ruin to the soul (cf. A. Harnack, *What is Christianity?*, Eng. tr.³, 1904, p. 87 f.). (b) Deliverance from perplexity of mind—intellectual repose, the temper which St. Paul describes by the phrase 'peace in believing' (Ro 15¹³). In the light of the cross and the empty tomb of Christ the enigmas of life no longer seem insoluble, the anomalies no longer inexplicable. Christ's victory over sin and death, and the exaltation of human nature in Him to the throne of God, are a pledge that the promised destiny of man will ultimately be fulfilled (He 2¹⁶); the sorrows of humanity are not vain and purposeless; the apparent victory of evil and the failure of good causes are not final and irreversible. There is hope of redemption for the creation which 'groans and travails in pain together until now' (Ro 8²²; cf. B. F. Westcott, *Christus Consummator*, London, 1886, no. ii.). (c) The satisfaction of affection. In every age the changes and chances of human life and the instability of human affection drive man to echo Augustine's cry:

'Inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te' (*Conf.* i. 1).

¹ 'Peace,' says Aquinas, 'implies two things: first, that we should not be disturbed by external things; second, that our desires should find rest in One' (*Summa*, ii. i. qu. lxx. art. 3).

For peace is the perfection of joy, and the supreme joy is the fruition of God. It is in this respect that the Christian conception of peace stands farthest removed from the 'tranquillity' commended by the Stoic. For peace implies, not the mere negative absence of disturbing desires and passions nor even merely the masterful control of them, but chiefly the right direction of them. The Stoic ideal was ἀραξία or ἀράθεια, a soul emptied

¹ Cf. Hor. *Ep.* i. xviii. 111 f.:

'Sed satis est orare Jovem, quae donat et aufert:
Det vitam, det opes, aequum mihi animum ipse parabo.'

² See the Lexicons, s.v. *נָחַם*.

of passion and desire.¹ The Christian peace is a positive principle; it is the effect and reward of a love which has found its only true and enduring object, and has so 'overcome all inner unrest' (cf. Gal 5¹⁷) because it rests in God. So Augustine bears witness:

'Sero te amavi, pulchritudo tam antiqua et tam nova! sero te amavi! . . . Gustavi, et esurio, et sitio. Tectigisti me, et exarsi in pacem tuam. Cum inhaesero tibi ex omni me, nusquam erit mihi dolor et labor; et viva erit vita mea, tota plena te' (Conf. x. 27.1.).

(d) The restfulness of a surrendered will. The misery of the heathen world was largely the consequence of that aimlessness which the Bible calls 'vanity.' The Gentiles walked *ἐν παραθρηνη τοῦ νοῦς αὐτῶν* (Eph 4¹⁷)—no faultily being directed aright, no unifying principle controlling the life of thought, action, or desire. We may contrast this restless state of mind with that which Dante describes:

'Frate, la nostra volontà quieta
Virtù di carità, che fa volerne
Sol quel ch'avemo, e d'altro non ci asseta.

E la sua volontà è nostra pace;
Ella è quel inare al qual tutto si move
Ch'è ella creata, e che natura face'

(Parad. iii. 70-72, 85-87).

In the same spirit Irenæus has written: 'Subjectio Dei requietio est aeterna' (Hær. iv. xxxix. 4); and T. Wilson's book, *Maxims of Piety and Morality* (Oxford, 1870), opens with the words 'In Deo quies' (cf. maxim 615). (e) The chief ingredient, however, in that 'peace with God' (Ro 5¹) which is also the 'peace of God' is a quiet conscience—pardoned, cleansed, and reconciled to God. When the complaint, 'There is no rest in my bones by reason of my sin' (Ps 38³), yields to the certainty of forgiveness through the blood of Christ (Eph 1⁷, 1 Jn 1⁷), the soul is at peace and 'turns again' to its rest (cf. Jerome, on Ps 116).

The peace, then, that the gospel promises is a blessing which Christ has won through His sufferings and Himself imparts to man. It is the fruit of redemption. It is synonymous with the Kingdom of Heaven within us. So Augustine says of the peacemakers:

'Pacifisci autem in semetipsis sunt, qui omnes animi sui motus componentes et subicientes rationi, id est menti et spiritui, carnalesque concupiscentias habentes edomitas, sunt regnum Dei' (de Serm. Dom. in monte, l. 2 (9)).

Peace is no negative absence of disturbance.

Rather 'it is the highest and most strenuous action of the soul, but an entirely harmonious action, in which all our powers and affections are blended in a beautiful proportion, and sustain and perfect one another. It is more than silence after storms. It is as the concord of all melodious sounds. . . . It is a conscious harmony with God and the creation [cf. Job 52³], an alliance of love with all beings, a sympathy with all that is pure and happy, a surrender of every separate will and interest, a participation of the spirit and life of the universe, an entire concord of purpose with its Infinite Original. This is peace, and the true happiness of man' (W. E. Channing, 'Remarks on the Character and Writings of Fénelon,' in *Works*, London, 1884, p. 416f.).

Further, 'the fruit of the Spirit is . . . peace' (Gal 5²²). It follows that peace in the heart of the individual Christian issues directly in peacefulness of temper—that habit of self-restraint which is the safeguard of peace between a man and his neighbour. This peaceful temper is in fact enjoined as a duty (Mk 9⁵⁰, Ro 14¹⁹, Ph 2¹³, 2 Ti 2²², He 12¹⁴). It is the spirit of love working for the well-being of the community—reconciling opposites, inspiring forbearance, making due allowance for inevitable contrarieties of temperament and conflicts of

¹ Cf. Cic. *Tusc. Quest.* iv. 17: 'Ergo is, quisquis est, qui moderatione et constantia quietus animo est, sibi que ipse placatus, ut nec tabescat molestiis, nec frangatur timore, nec sitienter quid expetens ardeat desiderio, nec alacritate futili gestiens deliquescat, is est sapiens, quem quaerimus, is est beatus . . . Illis [perturbationibus] vacuus animus perfecte atque absolute beatus efficit.' Cf. Aquinas, *Summa*, ii. l. qu. v. art. 2, ad 3: 'Nulli beato deest aliquod bonum desiderandum, cum habeat ipsum bonum infinitum, quod est bonum omnis boni.'

opinion,¹ overcoming evil with good. The teaching of our Lord Himself and of St. Paul (Ro 12¹⁸) implies that other virtues besides those of peace find a scope in the life of any human community. There are occasions when conflict and resistance to evil are inevitable, not only in international relationships, but also in ordinary social intercourse and even in matters of faith and religion. The peaceful temper, however, is that which is ever on the watch against the personal or national vanities and jealousies which endanger peace; against the spirit of faction (*ἐπιθετία*), inordinate notions of personal importance, the implacable temper, the absence of the sense of humour and of the sense of proportion, which usually engender and perpetuate strife (see Gal 5²⁰⁻²⁵, Ph 2³⁻⁴, Eph 4³¹, Col 3¹⁸⁻¹⁵, Ja 4¹). And in the seventh Beatitude (Mt 5⁹) our Lord pronounces a benediction on the self-restraint which makes for peace. Cf. Bernard, *Serm. de Divers.* xvi. 3 (*Opera*, i. 2350 D):

'Quia sociale animal sumus, ex his quae in nobis sunt, ad ea quae circa nos sunt transeamus; ut, si fieri potest, quod ex nobis est, pacem habeamus cum omnibus hominibus. Haec enim est lex naturalis societatis, ut omnia quaecumque nobis fieri volumus, aliis non faciamus. . . . Sicut ergo debemus sanitatem corpori, puritatem cordi; sic et fratri pacem.'

2. Peace between nations. — This is not the place for any discussion of the principles involved in the Christian sanction of war (see J. B. Mozley, *Univ. Sermons*, London, 1876, no. 5; J. Martineau, *National Duties*, do. 1903, serm. 5 and 6); but we may usefully recall the observation of Augustine that, even when they wage war, men are aiming at peace (*de Civ. Dei*, xix. 12), and, while war itself in the modern world has been more and more completely brought under the control of international law, it has also yielded in a measure to the practice of arbitration. In this region also the Christian spirit is a force that makes for international unity and concord.

'We can check in ourselves and in others every temper which makes for war, all ungenerous judgments, all presumptuous claims, all promptings of self-assertion, the noxious growths of isolation and arrogance and passion' (Westcott on 'International Concord,' in *Lessons from Work*, p. 838; cf. Church, *The Message of Peace*, p. 21 f.).

See, further, artt. ARBITRATION, WAR.

LITERATURE.—Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, xix. 11-13; Aquinas, *Summa*, ii. ii. qu. xxix.; John Smith, *Select Discourses*, London, 1660, ch. vi.; 'The Excellency and Nobleness of True Religion,' pp. 412-423; H. P. Liddon, *Easter in St. Paul's*, do. 1885, li. 1 ff.; R. W. Church, *The Message of Peace*, do. 1895, serm. i.; *Cathedral and University Sermons*, do. 1892, serm. xi.; Phillips Brooks, *The Law of Growth*, do. 1902, serm. xlii.; B. F. Westcott, *Lessons from Work*, do. 1901, p. 327 ff.; G. Salmon, *Cathedral and University Sermons*, do. 1900, serm. xvii. (this sermon, like Liddon's, deals with the meaning and history of our Lord's salutation in Jn 20¹⁹); J. B. Mayor, *The Epistle of St. Jude and the Second Epistle of St. Peter*, do. 1907, pp. 183-187; W. P. Du Bose, *The Gospel in the Gospels*, New York and London, 1906, pp. 114-117.

R. L. OTTLEY.

PECULIAR PEOPLE.—1. The term.—The Latin word *peculium* (from *pecus*, 'cattle') meant a person's private purse, what was especially or exclusively one's own. Jerome used this word and its adjective *peculiaris* to translate many, though not all, of the Biblical passages which refer in the OT to Israel as a chosen people (Heb. *'am segullāh*) and in the NT to the Church for Christ as God's new Israel (see especially Ex 19⁵, Dt 7⁶ 14² 26¹⁸, Ps 135⁴, Tit 2¹⁴, 1 P 2⁹). Tindale, in his translation of the NT in 1526, put into current use the English phrase 'a peculiar people,' which has ever since been a familiar term. The Revisers changed the phrase 'a peculiar people,' in Tit 2¹⁴ and 1 P 2⁹, into the words 'a people for his own possession.' The English Revisers of the OT inclined towards the retention of 'a peculiar people' ('a peculiar treasure' in Ex 19⁵), while the American Revisers

¹ *Summa*, ii. ii. qu. xxix. art. 3, ad 2: 'Nihil prohibet aliquos charitatem habentes in opinionibus dissentire. Nec hoc repugnat paci,' etc.

used the phrases 'a people for his own possession' and 'mine own possession.' The word 'peculiar' in present-day popular usage refers to something distinctive in character, uncommon, singular, odd, or strange, and for that reason the American Revisers avoided it.

2. The Hebrew ideal.—The original idea in the mind of the OT writers was that the Lord had chosen Israel out of all the peoples of the earth to be His very own possession, His precious treasure, and to be, in a special exalted sense, the instrument of His inscrutable purposes. Israel was, in the Deuteronomic passages, 'peculiar' only in the sense that it belonged to God as His possession in a way unparalleled by any other nation. But after the return from the Exile the Deuteronomic ideal steadily grew into a fixed idea that the Jewish nation was to be 'peculiar' in a double sense—(1) God's elect, and (2) a people distinctly marked off and separated from all other peoples by special badges and special tokens of favour. The efforts of the spiritual leaders of the nation to resist the encroachments of Hellenic culture after the conquests of Alexander did much to give this national ideal its special content, and in its most highly developed form we have the Pharisaic ideal of 'a peculiar people.' This ideal embodied the following distinct points of belief: (1) the true Israel was God's one treasure in the whole world, His precious jewel, the apple of His eye; for their sake all other peoples existed; (2) those who constituted this 'true Israel' alone were heirs of salvation and alone would inherit the Kingdom of Heaven; (3) in order to ensure the consummation of this divine event, God in His ineffable mercy had given them His holy word, His law, to be their sure guide; this was the supreme mark of His favour to them, for apart from it as the instrument of grace no one could be saved, *i.e.* could inherit the Kingdom; (4) special badges or tokens of their peculiar relation to God and of their separation from the rest of the world had been divinely conferred upon them. Foremost among these badges was the mark of circumcision. The holy sabbath was another mysterious mark of their peculiar relation to God. The sacred temple, with its holy of holies and its divinely ordained priests, was another, and eventually in their minds the possession of the holy land of Palestine was thought of as another badge of special favour.

3. Greek and Gnostic societies.—It was, however, not only among the Hebrews in pre-Christian times that the idea of 'a peculiar people' found place. The Pythagorean society, originally founded in Magna Græcia by Pythagoras (born c. 575 B.C.), was also a heroic attempt to prepare 'a peculiar people.' It was a religious fraternity which cultivated asceticism for the moral life and mathematics for the mental, which believed itself to be in possession of special divine secrets, leading to the deliverance of the soul, and which had an elaborate system of sacred badges separating it from the common world. The 'Orphic circles' were other attempts among many that might be mentioned to prepare 'a peculiar people,' possessed of a special way of deliverance from the evils of this world. The Gnostic sects in the 2nd and 3rd centuries were again all possessed of the idea that they were 'peculiar peoples.'

4. Primitive Church usage.—The early Christians felt themselves, even more emphatically than had the inner circle of the Jewish nation, to be 'a peculiar people.' Two NT writers explicitly adopted the Jewish ideal as the ideal for the Church of Christ, who, the Epistle to Titus (2¹⁴) says, 'gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people' (RV 'a people for his own posses-

sion'). And the First Epistle of Peter takes over *en bloc* the ancient Jewish claim and transfers it to the new Church (1 P 2⁴⁻⁷). But it is not only in sporadic texts that this idea of 'a peculiar people' appears. It is embedded in the very structure of the primitive Church. Its members, its 'saints,' are 'chosen' out of the world; they are given special 'gifts'; they only know 'the way of life,' and are the 'saved'; they are God's people; they live a 'new' life; they possess an access to God which others do not have; and they have their special marks and badges which make them separate from the world and in the modern sense 'peculiar.' As the Roman Catholic Church came into being, with the slow unfolding of history, it again put forward, in the most emphatic fashion, the claim to contain in its fold God's own exclusive people. Out of all the world it was *elect*. It possessed, and it alone, the miraculous means of grace. It had the only true and efficacious priesthood. It alone held the key to the invisible Kingdom of the future, and only through its mediation could any soul be saved. All and more than all that any pious Jew had claimed for his holy nation the Roman Catholic believer claimed for his peculiarly divine Church—'extra ecclesiam nulla salus.'

5. Pre-Reformation sects.—Each of the pre-Reformation sects which showed an anti-ecclesiastical bias took over to itself the claim, which the Church made, to be God's own special instrument. In one age the Montanists, with their immediate possession of the Holy Spirit, were 'the peculiar people.' In another age the Waldenses, by their stricter moral life and by their assumption of unbroken connexion with apostolic Christianity, claimed to be 'the peculiar people' of the Lord, as did later also 'the spiritual Franciscans.' The mystics, too, of the 14th cent., though not explicitly separatists, believed intensely that they were God's 'peculiar people,' and that they by the secret 'inner way' had found an absolute union with Him denied to all others.

6. Post-Reformation sects.—With the Reformation the idea of 'the peculiar people' remained a dominating concept. All the reformed State, or established, churches were built round the absolute idea that this particular church was the Church, exclusively God's own and the only means of salvation. Its dogma constituted the truth; its sacraments were alone efficacious; its ministry was the only authoritative ministry. So, too, all the dissenting sects came forward with a similar claim. Every Protestant denomination has claimed at least in its beginning to have possession of a special means of grace, and has believed itself to be in a peculiar way an instrument of the Lord for ministering salvation to men. No other modern denomination has perhaps made its claim to be 'a peculiar people' so explicit as did the Society of Friends in the 18th and early 19th centuries. Friends, from their first origin in the mid-17th cent., believed that they were divinely chosen, inspired, enlightened, equipped, and guided to be 'the restorers of apostolic Christianity.' They expected that the inward light which they had re-discovered as the basis of religion would in time be accepted as the principle of authority of world Christianity (see Thomas Hancock, *The Peculium*, London, 1859). As this hope faded, the Quaker leaders of the 18th cent. set themselves to the task of perfecting the Society of Friends as 'a holy Zion of the Lord,' a faithful 'remnant' in the midst of the world, 'a peculiar people,' apart not only from the world but also from all other forms of Christianity as well, and *elect* especially to be God's people in a crooked and perverse generation. They believed that they alone were

'apostolic' and that a special mission had been given to them. Like the members of the Jewish model nation, they made much of their distinguishing marks: a special garb, a special form of address (the 'thee' and 'thou'), a special group of 'testimonies,' refusal to pay tithes, refusal to fight or take life for any reason, refusal to take an oath, refusal to remove the hat before a magistrate or in a public place, the maintenance of free gospel ministry and of a special form of marriage. The faithful Friend of this period gloried in these badges of a peculiar faith, not for their own sake, but because he believed that through separation from all other peoples and through 'testimonies' which cost suffering and sacrifice God could best form and perfect the people of His own possession, which, in His wisdom, they were to be. The *Quaker Journals* of the hundred years from 1750 to 1850 are full of interesting concrete material for an appreciation of what this strange ideal of 'a peculiar people' once vividly meant.

7. Other uses of the name.—The word 'Peculiar' was often used in the early period of the Oxford Movement as a nickname for the members of the 'Evangelical' party. E. S. Purcell, in his *Life of Cardinal Manning* (London, 1895), refers to 'Puseyites and Peculiar,' and London is said, in H. P. Liddon's *Life of E. B. Pusey* (London, 1893), to be overrun with 'peculiarism.'

A small sect which appeared in London in 1838 was called 'Plumstead Peculiar.' The members of this sect refused to use medical aid for the relief or cure of disease, and put their entire trust in the divine power and in prayer. They were called indiscriminately 'Faith Healers' or 'Peculiar.'

LITERATURE.—There are no special works on the subject. Cf. *HDB*, s.v. 'Peculiar'; *EBI*, s.v. 'Peculiar Treasure, Peculiar People'; *JE*, s.v. 'Chosen People.'

RUFUS M. JONES.

PEEVISHNESS.—There are two forms of excess in that emotional tendency which, whether as a natural disposition or as an acquired habit, is variously spoken of as irascibility, irritability, temper, anger, etc. One form is commonly described as 'quick temper,' that is, a tendency to sudden explosions of angry passion, which for the most part suddenly subside. The other, known as 'peevishness' or 'fretfulness,' is a chronic irritability which may not in general burst into violent expression, but is readily provoked by any trivial annoyance. On its physical side peevishness may often be traced to hyperæsthesia, a morbid excess of sensibility which makes every nervous stimulation, even the most ordinary sensible impression, exceed the limit of healthy agreeable excitement. In such cases moral culture calls for a physical culture which may reinstate the sensibility in normal vigour. But, from whatever cause peevishness may arise, moral neglect may leave the natural excess of sensibility free play to develop into a tyrannous habit of the moral life. Then it creates the common illusion of irritable temperament. Instead of charging himself with the fault of his irritation, the irritated man throws the blame of it upon any other who may be associated with it in the most incidental way. It is thus that peevishness often becomes a formidable impediment to the growth of sympathy and the gentler virtues, while it offers a fruitful soil for all types of malice. See, further, art. **ANGER**.

LITERATURE.—All the great works on psychology give more or less adequate analyses of the various forms of anger, but an unusually exhaustive treatment of the subject is given in A. Bain, *The Emotions and the Will*, London, 1880. On the ethical as well as the psychological aspect of the subject a prominent place has always been assigned to Seneca's monograph, *de Ira*, in ancient literature, and, in modern, to J. Butler's sermons 'Upon Resentment' and 'Upon Forgiveness of Injuries,' Works, ed. W. E. Gladstone, Oxford, 1896, ff. 126-167.

J. CLARK MURRAY.

PELAGIANISM AND SEMI-PELAGIANISM.—I. Introductory.—(a) *Its fundamental interest.*—Few of the controversies which distracted the early Church are so full of perennial interest as that which raged round the teaching of the British monk Pelagius. The principles at issue were of more than purely Christian interest, for they were concerned with the very elements of human character and raised fundamental problems as to the nature of man's ethical and religious relation to the divine which are of lasting and world-wide significance. The controversy did not itself create the two great types of thought which in its course were ranged in sharp antithesis; rather it was the occasion of the first open clash within the Christian Church of two irreconcilable tendencies, which had not only long existed side by side both within and without Christendom, but are destined to reassert themselves periodically throughout the subsequent development of moral and religious theory. For at bottom the controversy was concerned with the age-long problem of free will and determinism, and its dramatic interest consists in the opposition which always asserts itself between an essentially rational and naturalistic morality and the profoundest convictions of a vital and first-hand religious experience. In the study of no other controversy can we learn so much about the connexion and the distinction between morality and religion.

(b) *Its place in the development of dogma.*—As was but natural in the development of a religion which had its origin and centre in a definite historical personality, Christianity in its effort to realize and define the contents of its tradition was concerned first with the objective side of its doctrine, the nature of God and of the person of Jesus Christ. So long as men's thoughts were primarily exercised by theological and Christological problems, questions concerning the more subjective and anthropological side of Christian teaching remained in the background. Concerning human nature and its relation to God the Church had instinctively maintained from the first that man had free will and was accountable for his actions, that human nature was corrupted and in a fallen and evil state, and that for its restoration and salvation the assistance of God, afforded through Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, was an absolute necessity. But, while none of these propositions had been seriously called in question, no attempt to weld them into a coherent system of doctrine had as yet received formal authorization from the Church, and teachers and schools of thought differed considerably as to the stress which they laid upon them; on the whole it may be said that Eastern theologians had been chiefly interested in affirming the freedom of the will, while those of the West had emphasized the necessity for divine assistance, or 'grace.' As to the sinfulness of human nature as it actually existed, there was little room for doubt, but various theories had been propounded by teachers of repute as to the origin and working of this general corruption and its connexion with what Scripture related concerning the 'fall' of Adam.

(c) *Its relation to Nestorianism.*—Such was the general condition of Christian thought on these matters towards the close of the 4th cent.; the Arian controversy had worked itself out; the dogma of the Holy Trinity had just been reaffirmed at the Council of Constantinople (381), which had also marked the first stage of the Christological controversies by condemning Apollinarianism. The completeness of the human nature of the Incarnate having thus been asserted, its relation to the divine Logos was already engaging the interest of the theologians, and notably of the famous Antiochene

expositor, Theodore of Mopsuestia. It is obvious that theories concerning the relation of the humanity of Christ to His divinity must have an intimate bearing on theories concerning the relation of humanity in general to God; and it is here that we find the ground of the close connexion between Nestorianism, of which Theodore was undoubtedly the father, and Pelagianism, which has also been derived from his paternity.¹ If 'the thought that Christ possessed a free will was the lode-star' of Antiochene theology,² the thought that every man possessed a free will was the lode-star of the Pelagian. The progress of the controversies revealed so many affinities between the two systems that they may well be regarded as constituting together a great consistent scheme of thought, of which the Eastern (Nestorian) expression was mainly speculative and theological, and the Western (Pelagian) mainly practical and moral. It has been justly said that 'the Nestorian Christ is the fitting saviour of the Pelagian man,' and it was no accident that the Church condemned both systems together at the Council of Ephesus in 431.³

The Pelagian controversy proper was fought out between the years 411 and 418, the Council of Ephesus merely giving official sanction to a judgment which had been for all practical purposes complete and final thirteen years earlier. But difficult problems arising out of the condemnation of Pelagianism remained unsolved, and these constituted the subject of the long-drawn-out Semi-Pelagian controversies, which found an ecclesiastical settlement only at the Council of Orange in 529. Though the whole process of thought from 411 to 529 is closely connected, it will be best to trace separately the history of the Pelagian controversy and to appreciate the issues involved, before passing on to give an account of Semi-Pelagianism.

2. The course of the Pelagian controversy.—(a) *Pelagianism in Rome (c. 400-409).*—At some time in the episcopate of Anastasius (398-402), if not earlier, there had arrived in Rome a British monk of mature age named Pelagius. Of his former life we know little: his character shows no signs of having passed through any serious moral crisis in its development. We have it on the authority of his bitterest opponent, Orosius, that he was of too humble origin to have had a liberal education; we have no evidence that he had ever studied in the East;⁴ but before he became famous as a heretic he had shown himself possessed of sufficient ability and learning to write three books of unquestioned orthodoxy upon the Trinity, which were recognized as useful text-books for students. He was a layman and never sought orders. Among his friends he numbered Paulinus of Nola,⁵ and also one Rufinus, a Syrian,⁶ who first introduced him, so Mercator informs us, to the characteristic tenets of Antiochene theology.

Appalled by the lax morality of the great mass of nominal Christians in Rome, he set himself to rouse them to a sense of their responsibility to God for their actions. He was already held in great honour in Rome for his rigorous and ascetic life,⁷ but he used his influence cautiously and quietly, avoiding public controversy, from which he was averse. He prepared a book of *Eulogia*, or ex-

tracts from Scripture selected to emphasize the strength and freedom of the will, and especially set himself to counteract what he considered the enervating effects of Augustine's *Confessions*, which, written about 400, were soon after widely read in Rome. Augustine's famous prayer, 'Da quod jubes, et jube quod vis,' particularly aroused his anger, as conducing to a passive and listless frame of mind.¹ Pelagius preached the need of moral effort and the sufficiency of man's natural free will to achieve its duty without relying on supernatural grace; from this he was led on to call in question any idea of inherited sinfulness which might serve as an excuse for moral slackness. He circulated privately a commentary on St. Paul's Epistles, in which, in the guise of objections raised by critics of current teaching, he indirectly set forth his own chief tenets.

Associated with him was another layman, Coelestius, a keen-witted dialectician, who had practised at the Roman bar, but under the influence of Pelagius had given up his worldly career to become a monk. In character this outspoken young man was a great contrast to his elderly and cautious master: an agitator 'incredibili loquacitate,' as Augustine tells us, his method was 'fortiter scandalizare'; he quickly attracted attention and was regarded by many as the real leader of the movement.²

(b) *In Africa (411-412).*—Alaric's invasion led the two friends to leave Rome in 409 and to travel by way of Sicily to Africa, where they arrived in 411. Pelagius did not come into personal contact with Augustine,³ though the latter, busied as he then was with the settlement of the Donatist schism, remembers that he was disturbed by rumours of his teaching about the baptism of infants. Pelagius, however, soon after set out for Palestine. But Coelestius stayed behind and applied for ordination as a presbyter at Carthage; his candidature was opposed in 412 by Paulinus, a deacon of Milan, on the ground of false doctrine, at a synod presided over by Bishop Aurelius. The *libellus*, or formal indictment, attributed to Coelestius seven heretical propositions:

(1) Adam was created mortal and would have died whether he had sinned or not; (2) Adam's sin injured himself only, and not the human race; (3) children at birth are in that state in which Adam was before his sin; (4) the whole human race does not die through Adam's death and transgression, nor does the whole human race rise through Christ's resurrection; (5) the law sends men to the Kingdom of Heaven just as the gospel does; (6) even before Christ's coming there were men without sin; (7) man can be without sin, and keep God's commandments easily if he will.

Coelestius refused to condemn these propositions: he claimed that he had heard Catholic presbyters deny the transmission of sin, which ought to be treated as an open question; moreover, since he did not deny that infants need baptism to be redeemed, he was no heretic. The synod nevertheless excommunicated him. He thereupon wrote his *Libellus brevissimus*, explaining that in his view infants were in no wise baptized for any remission of sin, but received actual benefit through baptism and a share in Christ's redemption; unbaptized infants forfeited 'eternal life,' but were admitted into 'the Kingdom of Heaven.' This tract occasioned Augustine's first anti-Pelagian treatise, *de Peccatorum meritis et remissione* (412), notable as containing the first use of *original peccatum*, that 'infelicitous phrase' which was to play so prominent a part in the controversy. Coelestius left for Ephesus, where he was ordained presbyter, and thence proceeded to Constantinople.

¹ *De Dono Persever.* 53.

² Cf. Aug. *de Pecc. Orig.* 18, for a contrast between the methods of Coelestius and Pelagius.

³ *De Gest. Pelag.* 46.

¹ By Marius Mercator, *Commonitorium adv. Hæresim Pelagii* (*Liber Sub-Notantianus in Verba Juliani*, præf. I, in *PL* xlviii. 109).

² Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, iv. 165; cf. v. 170, note.

³ Yet there was a marked contrast between the Pelagian conception of grace and Theodore's; the latter came closer to Augustine, in so far as he regarded it as an inward inspiration.

⁴ Chronology forbids us to identify him with a Pelagius mentioned by Chrysostom (*Ep.* 4).

⁵ Aug. *Ep.* 186.

⁶ To be distinguished from Rufinus of Aquileia.

⁷ He spent 'a very long time there' (Aug. *de Pecc. Orig.* 24; cf. *de Gest. Pelag.* 40).

(c) *In Palestine (411-415).*—Meanwhile Pelagius had settled quietly in Palestine. But his friendship with Bishop John of Jerusalem, combined with reports of his teaching, attracted the unfavourable notice of Jerome, who wrote against him his letter to Ctesiphon¹ and his *Dialogus adversus Pelagianos*, styled by Harnack² 'a model of irrational polemics.' Pelagius replied with his *de Natura*, but his cause was considerably damaged by the circulation of Cœlestius's rash *Libellus*. The arrival in Palestine in 415 of a devoted disciple of Augustine, the hot-headed Spanish priest Orosius, brought matters to a climax. He brought a letter from Augustine to Jerome, and was invited to attend a synod of Jerusalem clergy convened by Bishop John to consider the Pelagian difficulty. He there related what the Carthaginian synod had done with Cœlestius, and read aloud a letter from Augustine to the Sicilian Hilarius on the possibility of human sinlessness and the need of divine grace. Pelagius was thereupon introduced to the meeting; he evaded the charges brought against him, and, when pressed, cried 'Anathema to him who teaches that man can become sinless without God's aid'; but the crucial question, as to whether by 'God's aid' Pelagius meant merely the example and teaching of Christ accepted by man's natural free will or a direct inward working of God on the spirit 'transcending both natural capacities and opportunities of moral instruction,'³ was not discussed. John knew no Latin and Pelagius no Greek, and the synod, failing to grasp the true significance of the dispute, agreed to the suggestion of Orosius that the matter, being of Western origin, should be referred to Bishop Innocent of Rome.

(d) *The Synod of Diospolis (415).*—Before the end of the year, however, Pelagius found himself once more face to face with Western accusers before an Eastern court. Two Gallic bishops, Heros of Arles and Lazarus of Aix, expelled from their own sees for obscure reasons and sojourning in Palestine, brought a formal accusation against Pelagius and Cœlestius before a synod of fourteen bishops which met at Diospolis (Lydda) in Dec. 415 under the metropolitan of Palestine, Eulogius of Caesarea. Illness prevented the accusers from appearing in person, and Pelagius made skilful use of his opportunity: the *Libellus*, drawn up in Latin, was translated by sections; Pelagius ingeniously contrived satisfactory explanations of most of the phrases complained of, and disowned the rest; he denied responsibility for certain opinions attributed to Cœlestius, and professed himself ready to condemn them 'according to the judgment of the Holy Church' and to anathematize every one who held or had held them, though he protested that the dispute did not concern matters of dogma.⁴ The synod not unnaturally declared him innocent; but it is clear that he 'stole his acquittal' by prevarications as faithless to his friend as they were dishonourable to himself; and, however cunningly he may have subsequently explained away his denial of other Pelagian tenets, he cannot escape from the fact that he denied a proposition which both previously and subsequently was cardinal for his system—'that God's grace is given in proportion to our deserts, to such as are worthy.'⁵ Jerome was furious at the decision of the 'miserable synod,'⁶ but Augustine judged it more fairly when he explained it as acquitting not the heresy but the man who denied the heresy. Nevertheless, the Synod of Diospolis proved clearly

that 'the Eastern church had not embraced in its entirety the doctrine of grace as formulated by Augustine in the West, and that, provided free will and grace were recognized as joint factors in the production of human goodness, it was not anxious to define by precise distinctions the exact limits of each agency.'¹ The Easterns also probably sympathized with Pelagius's own unwillingness to extend the sphere of authoritative dogma.²

(e) *In the West (415-418).*—Pelagius and his friends immediately made all possible use of their success. News of the acquittal was promptly spread abroad, especially in the West, whither carefully edited accounts of the synod were dispatched. Pelagius answered Jerome with four books, *de Libero Arbitrio*, showing clearly that by 'grace' he still meant the natural influence of Christ's teaching, helping men 'more easily' to obey the divine commands, and that he still held that 'we are precreated as without virtue, so without vice'—which shows the value that was to be set on his protestations at Diospolis.³

Augustine realized that its ecclesiastical triumph was the moral defeat of the Pelagian cause.⁴ The African bishops, nothing daunted, reaffirmed most emphatically their previous condemnation at two largely-attended synods which met in Carthage and Milan in 416. Both synods sent letters to Pope Innocent, desiring to secure the support of the Apostolic See to reinforce their own decisions. Augustine, Aurelius, and three other bishops further wrote to the pope a personal letter urging him to examine carefully Pelagius's teaching. All these letters⁵ contain careful explanations of the issues at stake, which are represented as essential to the entire Christian position as the Church had received it: it was not only that Pelagian teaching made the practice of infant baptism superfluous, but it made the whole redemptive work of the Saviour Himself unnecessary; if human nature be indeed what the Pelagians say it is, it must be capable of working out its own salvation unassisted, depending solely on 'the results of its original creation'; no need therefore for any divine deliverer, to afford supernatural assistance to men's inward wills, no need for any grace or means of grace. The letters were accompanied by an earlier treatise of Pelagius (?), *de Natura*, together with Augustine's reply, *de Natura et Gratia*, composed in 415.

Innocent consulted his clergy and replied in Jan. 417,⁶ in a sense wholly favourable to the Africans, asserting man's continual dependence on God's inward grace not only at baptism but throughout life; in Pelagius's treatise he found nothing that pleased him, but he refrained from commenting on the action of the Synod of Diospolis until he should receive an authentic account of its proceedings. A few weeks afterwards he died. His successor was a Greek, Zosimus, and hardly had he been installed when Cœlestius, recently expelled from Constantinople, appeared in Rome, to appeal against both this recent indignity and his earlier condemnation in Carthage. Zosimus's interests were Eastern, and he had probably but little understanding of the real issues of this Western controversy. Cœlestius secured a hearing, at which it was evident that he still continued to deny 'transmitted' or 'original' sin; but he avoided either condemning his own tenets or hearing them condemned. Zosimus wrote to the Africans, asserting that Cœlestius had abundantly indicated the soundness of his faith, and that those who still desired to impugn it must appear in Rome

¹ Ep. 133 (132).

² v. 173.

³ Cf. Bright, *Age of the Fathers*, II. 178.

⁴ *De Gest. Pelag.* 571. 'Anathematizo quasi stultos, non quasi haereticos, siquidem non est dogma' (ib. 16).

⁵ Cf. Ang. *de Gest. Pelag.* 89 (xiv.) and 40 (xvii.).

⁶ Ep. 143. 2.

¹ DCB, s.v. 'Pelagius', iv. 287.

² Cf. Harnack, v. 169, note 3, 179, note 4.

³ His *de Natura* appeared about the same time.

⁴ 'Ibi omnino cecidit haeresis vestra' (see Bright, II. 189).

⁵ Aug. Ep. 175, 177.

⁶ Ib. 181-184.

within two months or else give up all doubts on the subject. Shortly afterwards he received under cover of a letter of commendation from Praxylus, the new bishop of Jerusalem, a statement of faith from Pelagius. This is a treatise of 'luminous orthodoxy' as regards the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, but on the real points at issue artfully vague: all men had free will, all had need of help from God,¹ but as to the nature of this help nothing was said; the statement concluded deferentially: Pelagius was ready to receive correction from him 'who held the faith and see of Peter.' Zosimus rehearsed it to his admiring ecclesiastics and wrote once more to the African bishops, declaring that the statement of Pelagius had cleared him of all suspicion, and sternly rebuking them for their hasty and uncharitable credulity in admitting unfounded charges against men of 'perfect orthodoxy' ('absolutae fidei').

Meanwhile Augustine had received the official minutes of the Synod of Diospolis, and immediately wrote his *de Gestis Pelagii*, comparing them with Pelagius's misrepresentations of what had taken place. Upon the reception of Zosimus's letters the African bishops, assembled in a great synod of over 200 members, indignantly determined to stand by their condemnation of both Pelagius and Coelestius, and to uphold Pope Innocent's sentence against them, until they should explicitly acknowledge that 'God's grace aids us through Jesus Christ, not only to know but to do what is right, in every single act, so that without grace we cannot have, think, speak or do anything that pertains to true and holy religion.'

This firm and diplomatic action aroused Zosimus to the need of caution; with much grandiloquence as to the prerogatives of Peter he replied (21st March, 418) that he had not come to a final decision or given entire credence to Coelestius; the case stood where it was when he last wrote. But the cause was decided both in Italy and in Africa without further consideration for Zosimus: the emperor Honorius on 30th April issued an edict to Palladius, the praetorian prefect, denouncing Pelagius's opinions as contrary to the Catholic law, exiling the two leaders of his heresy, and permitting the persecution of their followers; and on 1st May (two days after Zosimus's pitiable letter reached Africa) a great council of the African Church in Carthage, without reference to any doctrinal pronouncements of Roman bishops, anathematized Pelagianism in a series of nine uncompromising canons.² No direct connexion between these practically simultaneous imperial and ecclesiastical actions can be proved; the former was possibly due to Italian opposition to Pelagianism emanating from Milan;³ Augustine, however, expressed his hearty approval.

Zosimus effected a complete change of front; there is some ambiguity as to dates, and it remains doubtful whether he contrived his *volte face* before or after the promulgation of the imperial edict, which in any case shows no signs of having been affected by the remarkable *Epistula Tractoria* issued by the pope. In this memorable document Zosimus condemns Pelagius, Coelestius, and their opinions, and affirms the doctrines for which the Africans contended, with an explicitness equalled only by that with which he had but a few months previously acquitted the heretics and rebuked their accusers. The incident has more than a merely

historical interest, in view of the claims of his successors in the see to infallibility. Zosimus acted throughout in his official capacity, and the matter was doctrinally of the greatest importance.

The subsequent history of the controversy may be briefly stated: Zosimus required subscription to his letter as a test of orthodoxy; eighteen Italian bishops refused, of whom one, Julian, the youthful prelate of Eclanum, was to prove himself the ablest advocate of a cause already lost; Pelagius himself disappeared from view; Coelestius was banished from Italy; Julian, with a group of sympathizers, betook himself to Theodore of Mopsuestia, and later joined Coelestius in Constantinople, when in 429 the patriarch Nestorius interceded for them with Pope Coelestine, to his own hurt no less than theirs, for Rome thought the worse of Nestorius for consorting with Pelagians, and the East thought the worse of the Pelagians for consorting with Nestorius; and so it came about that at the third general council at Ephesus in 431 the 'Pelagians and Coelestians' as well as the Nestorians were finally condemned.⁴

3. Appreciation of the principles at issue.—(a) *Julian and Augustine*.—The real theologian of Pelagianism was Julian of Eclanum, who, conscious though he was that he was the champion of a lost cause, continued systematically to work out his principles with admirable completeness. Pelagius and Coelestius had been primarily concerned to arouse men's wills to worthier moral effort; they were missionaries rather than theologians, with a practical object in view, to induce men to practise monastic asceticism. But Julian was no ascetic; his ideal of conduct was essentially naturalistic; as a man of the world he frankly admired the moderate and reasonable self-control inculcated by philosophers, and above all desired clear and rational thinking about God and morality. Harnack fitly describes him as 'the first, and up to the sixteenth century, the unsurpassed, unabashed representative of a self-satisfied Christianity.'⁵ His theology adds nothing in principle to that of Pelagius and Coelestius, but he expresses with greater force and lucidity their chief contentions. He maintained a vigorous and voluminous controversy with Augustine, who always treated him with respect, and often answered him sentence by sentence. It is possible, therefore, to reconstruct his system fairly accurately from Augustine's works. The two men were diametrically opposed both as to the form and as to the matter of their theology. As to form, Julian was a rationalist, Augustine an authoritarian; Julian denied that authority could strengthen what reason proves: 'we ought to weigh and not count opinions';⁶ Augustine, as a result of the experiences which led up to his conversion, was profoundly conscious that he had received the very gospel itself on the authority of the Church,⁷ after reason had led him through countless aberrations. Julian claimed to have the philosophic few on his side, and despised as a blind rabble the majority which he could not deny sided with Augustine. And the content of his theology was as essentially the gospel of free will as that of Augustine was the gospel of irresistible grace.

(b) *The Pelagian system summarized*.—The Pelagian system as presented by him may be summarized as follows:⁸

(1) God is above all just; therefore everything that He creates is essentially good, and cannot be in its nature convertible;

¹ 'Liberum sic confitemur arbitrium, ut dicamus nos indigere dei semper auxilio' (Pelagius's Confession of Faith, given in full in Hahn, *Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln*, p. 233).

² Cf. Harnack, v. 185. The canons anathematize those, among others, who derive death from natural necessity, who deny the presence of original sin in children, who assign any form of salvation to infants dying unbaptized, and who do not see in grace the indispensable condition of virtue.

³ So Harnack suggests (v. 185, note 7).

⁴ Cf. the synodal letter of Pope Coelestine, confirming their condemnation by Rome (C. J. von Hefele, *Hist. of the Church Councils*, Eng. tr., 5 vols., Edinburgh, 1894-96, iii. 60; G. D. Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima Collectio*, Florence, 1759, iv. 1830-1838).

⁵ v. 171.

⁶ C. *Epist. Manich.* 5.

⁷ Aug. c. *Julian.* II. 35.

⁸ Cf. Harnack, v. 191-203.

consequently human nature remains indestructibly good, and so there can be no such thing as a sinful nature, or 'natural' (i.e. 'original') sin.

(2) The chief glories of man's constitution are his reason and his free will; the latter is an absolute and indefectible freedom of choice ('mera capacitas [possibilitas] utriusque'), which momentarily determines itself and remains unimpaired by previous choices. Sin is choosing that which is contrary to what reason tells us is righteous; every man is at every moment of his career perfectly free to avoid choosing it ('Liberum arbitrium et post peccata tam plenum est quam fuit ante peccata'). By virtue of this free will man is rendered independent of God.³

(3) The desires of the flesh are not as such evil, seeing they are part of God's creation; therefore sin consists not in desire (*libido*) itself as such, but in its excess, which is due solely to the free choice of each individual will. Marriage is not *per se* in any way sinful.

(4) Every man created by birth is in precisely the same condition morally as Adam was before he sinned, i.e. endowed inalienably by divine grace (*gratia*) with 'natural holiness' (=reason and free will). These are sufficient to enable men to remain sinless; hence there can be (and Pelagius asserted that there had been) sinless men.

(5) Adam sinned through free will; his descendants also sin through free will; neither in his case nor in theirs is physical death a consequence of sin, but spiritual death (damnation) is; this is in no sense inherited from Adam, but is acquired by each man through his own sins.

(6) The idea of inherited sin (*tradux peccati, peccatum originis*) and of inherited guilt is both unthinkable and blasphemous, for not only is it inconsistent with the notion of sin, which implies the exercise of free will, but it also suggests that God's good creation has become radically evil, and that He either unjustly regards as sinful natures which have not yet themselves committed sin or else is responsible for creating evil natures. The only difference between the condition of children born now and that of Adam before the Fall is one not of nature but of environment: the former are born into a society in which evil customs and habits prevail.⁴

(7) By divine grace or aid (*gratia, adiutorium*) is meant either man's natural constitution ('the grace of creation'), by virtue of which some heathen have been perfect men, as good in every respect as perfect Jews or perfect Christians, or the law of God (an *augmentum beneficiorum Dei*) by which He has revealed to man what he ought to do, to aid man's reason darkened by sin, or else the grace of Christ, which, no less than the law, is essentially enlightenment and teaching (*illuminatio et doctrina*), working through Christ's own example, through His authoritative assurance of forgiveness to all who are baptized, and through the dogmas and mysteries of the Church. Grace, of whatever kind, is emphatically not an inward power enabling the will, for 'homo libero arbitrio emancipatus a Deo' is rather something external, which the will may grasp if it chooses to. Law and gospel are alike in operation, and men can enter the Kingdom of Heaven as well through the one as through the other.

(8) Grace is given according to men's merits; it would not be consistent with God's justice to give it to sinners.

(c) *Criticism of the system.*—Such in brief outline was the system which the Church rejected as a mischievous innovation, endangering the very essentials of the Christian religion.

How far was it an innovation?⁵ In temper and spirit it was undoubtedly in marked contrast with the instinctive religious attitude reflected in every writing of the NT and in the traditional piety of the Catholic Church. Its whole conception of human nature and of virtue was more akin to Stoicism than to the gospel; but for some of its propositions it would be difficult to find definite refutations in the writings of many of the earlier Church Fathers of repute, and the system which Augustine opposed to it may in some important respects be as justly accused of innovation. Pelagianism may be defined as Christian Stoicism, and as such it is probably to this day the undefined theology of the great majority of 'plain men,' especially perhaps in the busy, competitive conditions of modern Western civilization. 'God

¹ Pelagius taught a *possibilitas boni* as distinguished from the *possibilitas utriusque* of Julian (*de Grat. Christi*, 5, *Op. Imp.* 1, 78-81).

² *Op. Imp.* 1, 91.

³ *Ib.* 1, 78: 'Libertas arbitrii, quia a Deo emancipatus homo est.'

⁴ For infant baptism Julian had no real rationale; he accepted it as implying a certain consecration of the infant, with a reference to his future sins. Children dying unbaptized did not forfeit 'eternal life,' though they would fall to enter its fullest blessedness, the 'Kingdom of Heaven.'

⁵ For a full consideration of the previous development of the doctrine of original sin see art. ORIGINAL SIN and F. R. Tennant, *The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin*.

helps those who help themselves' is a favourite proverb of the English, and expresses in rough and ready form the Pelagian doctrine of grace.

But, if it be true that genuine Christian ethics are superior to all others 'not so much through the presence or absence of particular articles, as through a view of life which substitutes submission for independence, humility for self-content,'¹ then 'Christian Stoicism' is a contradiction in terms, and Pelagianism is more pagan than Christian. Yet we must remember that Pelagianism does assert that the possibility of human righteousness and perfection originates in 'the grace of creation,' that bounty of God which endowed men with 'free will,' and so it is not fair to say that it makes righteousness a matter of human merit entirely independent of God. In practice, however, it issued in a frame of mind which set God and man over against each other as independent parties, and tended to reduce religion to the levels of merit and reward and to make of morality simply a question of copying good or bad examples.

Certain individual propositions of the Pelagian system the subsequent development of Christian thought has tended to confirm; its unwillingness to consign unbaptized infants to perdition, its readiness to recognize the possibility of good and Christlike characters being found outside the direct influences of the gospel and the Church, its insistence that the natural desires and functions of the body are in themselves in no way evil, its recognition of the fact that physical death cannot be regarded simply and solely as a lamentable outcome of human sin, but is an inevitable (and indeed beneficent) element in the general process of nature, are all points on which later thought and wider experience cannot but recognize that the Pelagians were nearer the truth than their opponents.

On the other hand, the whole Pelagian psychology of the will must be judged superficial and inadequate; its conception of sin is 'atomistic'; it ignores the phenomena of habit, and treats the growth of character as a mere succession of wholly independent and uncorrelated decisions of an abstract faculty of choice which remains quite unaffected by its choosing; it leaves the whole problem of the nature of personality unexplored, and so fails entirely to explain the possibility of temptation, and above all the reality of man's responsibility for his actions, the very thing that it set out to maintain. It is essentially self-contradictory, for, by treating personality as a bare series of states of mind, it leaves us in the last resort sceptical as to the reality and persistence of that very will the indestructible freedom of which is of the very essence of its contentions.

(d) *Augustine's doctrine of sin and grace.*—The ground of the difference between the Pelagians and Augustine is to be found in their views of the actual condition of human nature: the former thought of it as still morally sound, the latter as utterly corrupt; the former held that the faculty of choice remained unimpaired, and that men could be good if they wished, the latter insisted that the will itself was perverted and depraved at its very root, and incapable in its own strength of choosing and doing even what it knew to be good; and there can be little doubt that, with all his over-statements, Augustine was truer not only to the traditions of Christianity, but to the facts of human experience. It is when we come to consider the theory by which Augustine sought to explain the fact of this universal perversion of the will that we find that not only modern thinkers, but his predecessors among the theologians of the

¹ Cf. H. Kelly, *Hist. of the Church of Christ*, London, 1901-02, II, 296.

Church, are far from unanimous in his support. It is not merely that Augustine is the originator of the famous term 'original sin' (*peccatum originis*), or that this term is infelicitous, in so far as by 'sin' we mean an evil for which the individual who 'sins' is himself responsible, in a manner in which he cannot possibly be for anything which he simply inherits; nor is it that for the Scriptural foundation of his theory he relies on an indefensible Latin rendering of the Greek of St. Paul;¹ it is not merely that in his explanation of the universality of human sinfulness he asserts that the nature with which an infant finds itself endowed at birth is a perverted nature, inclined to sin, and that this perverted inclination—no less real because merely potential—is due to heredity, for others before Augustine had taught this, though with less lucidity;² it is that Augustine is obsessed with the idea that this inherited sinfulness consists chiefly and almost entirely in that very 'concupiscence' by which the race is propagated and increased. Such is the form in which Augustine presented his theory of original sin to Julian, and Julian naturally accented him of Manichæism. The idea was not in itself novel, it was a commonplace of Gnostic heresy; what was novel was its presence at the heart of a system which claimed to be Catholic and orthodox. Augustine, indeed, explained in reply that he did not regard marriage in itself as sin, but insisted that as things actually are it is invariably attended with passions which have the nature of sinfulness and that this is due to the radical corruption of all human nature; the general impression made by his arguments is that he himself is convinced that both in its origin and in its subsequent propagation the sinfulness now inherent in human nature manifests itself principally in this connexion.³ There can be no doubt that Augustine's personal history coloured his presentation of the character of inherited sinfulness, which practically, if not theoretically, involved him in Manichæan dualism. His contention had wide-spread and lasting influence in the development of monastic asceticism, which from his day till the Reformation was to be both officially and popularly regarded as the highest ideal of Christian conduct.

Yet it is clear that this conception of the nature of 'original sin' is not essential to the idea of an 'inherited sinfulness' as such; and, if there are weighty reasons for rejecting Augustine's theory of concupiscence, there are weightier ones for supporting his doctrine of original sin—reasons which can be adduced not only from the earlier traditions of the Church, but from the general study of human nature; and, as J. B. Mozley has pointed out, not only has it been maintained by orthodox theologians,

¹ Aug. c. duas Ep. Pelag. iv. 4, where Ro 5:12, ὅτι ὅς πάντες ἥμαρτον, is translated 'in quo omnes peccaverunt,' an impossible rendering. Ro 5:12-21 is the Scriptural locus classicus for the doctrine of original sin; but a strict exegesis, though it shows that St. Paul certainly deduced the universal prevalence of death from the effect of the sin of man's common ancestor Adam, does not show that he clearly stated any inheritance of sinful tendency from Adam, though it may be held that his argument implies this. Cf. W. Sanday and A. O. Headlam, *ICC*, 'Ep. to the Romans,'⁶ Edinburgh, 1902, pp. 130-147; Tennant, *The Fall and Original Sin*, ch. xl.; J. F. Bethune-Baker, *An Intro. to the Early Hist. of Chr. Doctrine*, London, 1903, p. 309, note 2.

² Notably Tertullian (*vitium originis, tradux peccati*), Cyprian, Ambrose in the West, and in the East Origen (in his later works) and the Cappadocians. Irenæus, Athanasius, and Cyril of Jerusalem recognize the universality of sin and the fallen state of the race as a whole, without definitely teaching inherited sinfulness; the Antiochenes, including even John Chrysostom, can be quoted as opposing this conception. None of his predecessors insisted on the utter depravity and corruption of human nature so strongly as Augustine (see Tennant, pp. 273-345).

³ Cf. his own statement of the purpose of his *de Nuptiis et concupiscentia* (l. 1): 'to distinguish between the evil of carnal concupiscence, from which man who is born therefrom contracts original sin, and the good of marriage.'

gians, but it is asserted by 'worldly philosophers and poets.'¹ Spirits so contrasted as Kant² and Shelley³ can be quoted in its support, and it is the common assumption of the thought of plain men about themselves. For who would dare say that the will of any human being was at any stage of its moral development all that it ought to be? Even those who maintain the doctrine of man's 'perfectibility' here on earth hold that it consists in the elimination of previous imperfection. And, if the will of man be thus universally perverted, what other explanation of its perversion will satisfy the facts except that which says that it is innate? The thought of the present day, fascinated with the spectacle of the marvellous ascent and progress of mankind from crude beginnings towards all that makes for a richer civilization, is indeed apt to express itself impatiently on the doctrine of the Fall; but the experience of the present day is at one with that of previous ages as to the universal prevalence of opportunities missed, of faculties misused, and of that fatal facility with which even the greatest and best of men fall short of their ideals. 'The good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do' (Ro 7:19) is still the cry of candid self-criticism. How this 'radical evil' originated who shall confidently say? But that it is woven into the very texture of that human nature which every child inherits at its birth who will deny? The modern investigation of heredity leads us to understand more clearly than was possible for the men of the 5th Christian century the intricate solidarity of mankind, and to perceive how

'In the fatal sequence of this world
An evil thought may soil our children's blood.'⁴

It was precisely the presence of this formidable perversion of the will at work throughout the mass of humanity that led Augustine to call it *massa perditionis*,⁵ and to believe that God could be in any way responsible for or satisfied with such a state of things was rank blasphemy. Human nature as such—as it actually exists—is deserving of His displeasure: to the human race as a universal entity guilt attaches, and every particular individual sharing human nature shares in its guilt; he is born in sin, his very origin is tainted, and it is not merely a matter of legal status before the bar of divine perfection, but a matter of positive wrongness of life. The 'results of the original creation' of human nature have been so weakened and degraded that it is helpless of itself to help itself, from the very nature of the case. Hence the whole Pelagian conception of grace is hopelessly inadequate to describe what man needs if he is to escape from himself as he actually is to that perfection for which he was made. It is not enough that in Christ the ideal be displayed with all imaginable distinctness; man may see it, and may love it, but remains powerless to realize it; what

¹ *Lectures and other Theological Papers*, London, 1883, pp. 148-162.

² 'The perfect accordance of the will with the moral law is holiness, a perfection of which no natural being in the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence' (*Crit. of Pract. Reason*, tr. T. K. Abbott⁵, London, 1909, bk. ii. ch. ii. § 4, p. 218); Kant, while rejecting the traditional conception of 'original sin,' insisted on a 'radical badness' innate in human nature (cf. *Religion within the Limits of Pure Reason*, pt. I, tr. T. E. Abbott⁶, London, 1909, ii. 335 f., iii. 339).

³ *Prometheus*, act I. opening speech, act II. sc. 4; and cf. Byron, *Childe Harold*, canto iv. 128.

⁴ Tennyson, *The Ancient Sage*. On the vexed question of the origin of the soul—which has obviously a very direct bearing on the subject of 'original sin'—Augustine maintained an attitude of uncertainty, between 'Traducianism,' to which he rather inclines, not unnaturally, and 'Creationism,' which was the general assumption of the Pelagians; see his letter to Opatius (Ep. 202 bis), and his four books to Vincentius Victor (*de Anima et eius origine*). Augustine had appealed in vain to Jerome for his views on the subject (Ep. 166).

⁵ *De Pecc. Orig.* 31, *de Corrept. & Grat.* 7.

he needs is a transforming force within, at the very root of his personality, directly strengthening his will, not only putting into his mind good desires, but enabling him to bring them to good effect. And it was just such an inward transforming force that Augustine, like Paul before him, had experienced. He knew it not as issuing out of his own natural will, but as entering into it from beyond; and in his experience it was derived solely from that spiritual contact with Christ which had led him at last in spite of himself to feel it at its fullest within the fellowship of the Catholic Church.

Such were the convictions of Augustine, and, so long as Christian religious experience remains confident of the activity of a grace such as that which made all the difference to him, so long will the Christian Church reject Pelagianism.

4. The transition to Semi-Pelagianism. — (a) *Incipient criticism of Augustine.* — The Church, however, proved readier to reject Pelagianism than to accept in its entirety the system which Augustine constructed to oppose it. It recognized instinctively that Augustine's description of individual religious experience, with its unequivocal derivation of all human goodness from divine grace, was what Christian piety demanded; but, when he proceeded to elevate 'the necessary self-criticism of the advanced Christian into a doctrine, which should form the sole standard by which to judge the whole sphere of God's dealings with men,'¹ it hesitated to accept his conclusions. For Augustine's basal conviction that he had been converted and saved in spite of himself by a divine love that overwhelmed all opposition and forced him to surrender led him to assert that God's grace was irresistible, and that the human will was simply passive in the working out of its salvation. He recognized indeed a 'free will' in men, in that he held that there remained in them, perverted though they were, a faculty of choosing, itself 'poised in indifference,' a mere capacity for either part;² but he regarded this not as the core of personality, but merely as an instrument of which the personality makes use, a good personality using it well, an evil badly.³ It is not the instrument but its user that has been changed and corrupted by the Fall. The user's power of controlling his faculty of choice is what Augustine really means by 'will'; and this 'will,' he believed, could be a good will only through the operation of the irresistible grace of God;⁴ consequently the all too obvious fact that some men are being moulded by grace into Christian perfection, while others are not, was only to be accounted for in the last resort by postulating a divine choice and predestination, in the absolute and inscrutable exercise of which God extends His sovereign and irresistible grace to some, but withholds it from others.

The implications of this doctrine were as great a stumbling-block to Christian piety as were the tenets of the Pelagians, and before Augustine's death this aspect of his teaching caused many searchings of heart. Criticism first became articulate in the monasteries; at Hadrumetum the monks began to question the use of good works or of reprimanding the sinful, seeing that free will, if what Augustine taught were true, was unreal. Augustine replied in 426 or 427 with two treatises, *de Gratia et Libero Arbitrio* and *de Correptione et Gratia*, in which he endeavoured to maintain the reality of free choice and the moral effectiveness of rebuke, along with the sovereignty of gratuitous

grace; both free choice and rebuke, he argued, were means employed by grace for its redemptive purposes, and therefore as means included under God's predestination of the end; the text 'God willeth that all men should be saved' (1 Ti 2⁴) he explained by interpreting 'all men' as 'all sorts of men.'

Shortly afterwards there appeared in Carthago itself the contention which was soon to be recognized as the characteristic tenet of what its opponents later came to call 'Semi-Pelagianism.' One Vitalis was accused of teaching that the first beginning of faith was due not to the grace of God, but to man's own free choice; in other respects he was, apparently, no Pelagian. Augustine addressed to him a weighty letter (*Ep.* 217), but the same proposition was destined to call forth a fuller refutation from the great doctor before his death. Two of his most devoted disciples, the laymen Hilary and Prosper (of Riez in Provence), wrote to tell him of the state of theology in S. Gaul, especially among the monks of Marseilles, under the presidency of their founder, the well-known teacher John Cassian, formerly a deacon of John Chrysostom.

(b) *John Cassian's doctrine of grace.* — John Cassian held Augustine in great veneration; he believed in original sin and in the universal need of grace, as Augustine did; on these crucial matters he was no Pelagian. But he held:¹

(1) That the first movement of faith by which man grasps grace and profits by it is the effort of man's native capacity unaided; (2) that grace is not irresistible; man can of his own free choice reject, just as he can accept, it, though, unless he accepts it, he remains powerless to be or do good; (3) that God offers His grace freely to all men, and genuinely and literally wills all men to be saved; that all men do not profit by grace is due solely to their own rejection of it; (4) that, consequently, God's predestination, of which Scripture certainly speaks, is grounded on His foreknowledge of those who would accept or reject His grace, not on any arbitrary selection of His sovereign choice.

Cassian opposed Augustine's teaching on election and irresistible grace as tending to fatalism and dangerous to morality. It is clear that his protest had little in common with Pelagianism proper; Cassian himself had indeed been nurtured in Eastern rather than Western theology; but the principles which he formulated were also maintained by men such as Hilary of Arles, whose thought was built up with characteristically Augustinian ideas. The whole movement was occasioned by Augustine's teaching, and is not unjustly described by Harnack as 'popular Catholicism made more definite and profound by Augustine's doctrines.'²

The weak spot in the theory was its unwillingness to allow that even in the first movement of the soul towards faith the prime mover is God; Christian instinct, no less than Christian logic, insists that for this, very often its hardest task, the will needs and finds divine assistance no less than in the effort to continue faithful, and Christian piety recognizes as the outstanding element of its experience the grace of God presiding at its very inception.

It is not surprising that Augustine would have none of it; just before his death he composed a work in two parts to refute his Gallic critics, *de Predestinatione Sanctorum* and *de Dono Perseverantiae* (428-429). The writings add little of force or clarity to what he had already written; they contain the interesting confession that he had himself earlier held the views which he now rejects,³ while they deal adequately enough with the illogical nature of Semi-Pelagianism, in that, while it insists on the need of 'co-operating' grace, it denies the need of 'prevenient' or 'origin-

¹ Cassian's teaching is formulated in his *Collationes Patrum*, xiii.; cf. Harnack, v. 248, note 2.

² v. 245, note 8.

³ *De Dono Persev.* 55.

¹ Harnack, v. 240.

² *De Pecc. Meritis*, II. 50, c. duas Pelag. *Ep.* I. 5, 7.

³ *De Gratia Christi*, 41.

⁴ Cf. his famous distinction between the 'posse non peccare' of natural free will, and the 'non posse peccare' of the free will assisted by supernatural grace (*de Corrupt. et Gratia*, 23 [xli.]).

ating' grace. They do not soften the rigours of his own theory of the irresistibility of grace, and of the absoluteness of God's predestination. Still busy with his 'unfinished work' in refutation of Julian, Augustine died on 28th Aug. 430.

(c) *The controversy after Augustine's death.*—Prosper continued the campaign against the monks of Gaul, but without convincing them, although he allowed that Augustine spoke 'too harshly,' and distinguished between 'predestination' as to salvation and 'prescience' as to reprobation. He was supported by a letter from Pope Coelestine, insisting on the need of prevenient grace, and containing a panegyric of Augustine, yet the opposition did not languish, and among the critics of predestinarianism with whom Prosper tried to deal was a certain Vincent, not without reason identified by many scholars with the famous Vincent of Lerins, author of the *Commonitorium*. This writer cannot be accused of maintaining the characteristic 'Semi-Pelagian' theory as to grace; he concentrated his criticism on the inferences which were to be drawn from a strict application of Augustine's theory of predestination and irresistible grace; here, throughout the controversy, was the real rock of offence, and we may well believe that, 'if grace had not been called irresistible, Semi-Pelagianism might never have been heard of.'¹

The controversy was continued for close on a century. About 450 two remarkable anonymous writers made their contribution to it, the conciliatory Augustinian author of the *de Vocazione Gentium* and the bitter anti-predestinarian author of the *Prædestinatus*, a cruel parody of Augustinianism. Semi-Pelagianism held its own in S. Gaul, and found its most influential champion in Faustus, bishop of Riez and formerly abbot of Lerins, a great patron of monasticism. Around his opinions the controversy revived; he insisted that original sin and free will were not mutually exclusive; that the latter, though weakened, was yet able always to co-operate with grace, which, indeed, he thought of mainly as external aid, concentrated in the doctrine and ordinances of the Church; he taught a rudimentary doctrine of merit, which was by now becoming one of the implicit conceptions of theology. He was every whit as strong in his support of original sin as he was in his antipathy to predestination.

Faustus's teaching came, after his death (c. 500), to the notice of the authorities at Rome, and of certain African bishops living exiled in Sardinia; one of these, Fulgentius of Ruspe, wrote replies to Faustus, upholding Augustinianism out and out, and in 520 Pope Hormisdas, while declining officially to condemn Faustus's writings, declared that the doctrines of the Roman Church as to sin and grace could be seen from the writings of Augustine.

(d) *The Synod of Orange (529).*—In S. Gaul the Semi-Pelagian party still maintained itself, but the ablest and most respected bishop of the times, Cæsarius of Arles, though himself a pupil of the monks of Lerins, spoke out as a vigorous champion of Augustine.² Under his presidency an important synod assembled at Orange in 529,³ composed not only of clergy but of laity; 25 canons were promulgated, and these were subsequently invested with more than local importance by the official approval accorded them by Pope Boniface II., which has caused them to be accepted by Latin orthodoxy as embodying its final decisions on the subject.⁴

The canons were based on selections made for the use of the synod by Pope Felix IV. from the writings of Augustine and Prosper. They emphatically exclude Semi-Pelagianism, in so far as they repeatedly insist on the need of prevenient grace.

E.g., 'The grace of God is not granted in response to prayer, but itself causes prayer to be offered for it' (3); 'that we may be cleansed from sin, God does not wait upon, but prepares, our will' (4); 'the beginning of faith is not due to us, but to God' (5); 'undeserved grace precedes meritorious works . . . Grace is not nature' (21); 'to love God is the gift of God' (25).

But no less significant is the absence of any definition of grace as irresistible, and of all reference to predestination and election, except an anathema against any, 'if any there were,' who should maintain a predestination to evil.¹

The Fathers of Orange cannot be held to have solved the problems of free will and determinism, but theirs is at least the credit of excluding from the traditions of Christian orthodoxy a demoralizing fatalism which did violence to men's most sacred instincts concerning the justice and all-embracing love of God, while the dictates of piety and humility were generously obeyed in their clear insistence on the supremacy of grace. The definite though modified Augustinianism of Orange became the accepted theology of Western Christendom as to sin and grace; history has proved that it can be combined all too easily with those tendencies which developed the mediæval doctrines of merit and good works and produced a type of religion which, for all the difference in its external expression, was for all practical purposes Pelagian rather than Augustinian in its effects, in that it sought to earn by acts of piety that grace which in theory it professed was freely given.

5. *Conclusion.*—Predestinarianism, like Pelagianism, dies hard; if the 'common-sense logic' of the latter still satisfies the 'plain man' so far as he concerns himself with such things, the pro-founder and more imposing coherence of the former has continued to attract ardent supporters, more especially in times of religious and intellectual stress. After an acute recrudescence in the Carolingian renaissance of the 9th cent., when Gottschalk's crude Augustinianism was combated by Rabanus and Hincmar (848-853), the controversy was quiescent for centuries. The Schoolmen were content to systematize the doctrine of grace on the basis of a recognized 'mystery'; it was enough for faith that 'God "knew" how efficaciously to incline the will, without infringing on its liberty.'² But in the turmoil of the 16th cent. the great problem of grace once more became vital: for Luther, and overwhelmingly for Calvin, predestination emerged as a foundation principle, while the Roman Catholic Church was faced with the difficulties raised by the systems of Molinos, Baius, and Jansen. In England the conflict between Calvinist and Arminian became more than academic, and in the great Evangelical Revival of the 18th cent. proved real enough to cause the separation between Wesley and Whitefield. In the 19th cent. the amazing progress of natural science seemed for a while to ensure the triumph of determinism, and suggested to the theologians affected by it strange combinations of a naturalistic conception of 'grace' with an equally naturalistic idea of predetermining 'Providence'; but Pelagius and Augustine were not thus easily to be reconciled. Meanwhile evolutionary systems of ethics and theology, no less than the scientific study of religion itself by the anthropologist, the historian, and the psychologist, are necessitating a radical reconsideration of those traditional conceptions of sin and grace and free will which were the lingua franca of the

¹ Bright, *Age of the Fathers*, ii. 400.

² His most important work was the *de Gratia et Libero Arbitrio*, now lost.

³ Known officially as the Second Synod at Orange, Arausicanæ Secunda (see Hefele, iv. sect. 242).

⁴ Boniface's confirmation is in a letter wrongly dated 'Jan. 25. 530,' but written in Nov. or Dec. of that year.

¹ A further synod at Valence in 529 or 530 served only to reiterate the conclusions reached at Orange

² Cf. *ERE* vi. 363^b.

earlier controversies. Yet the problem which the study of the Pelagian controversies raises remains the same, and its solution must continue to be of the most vital interest to morality and religion; for it is concerned with the discovery of an ultimate synthesis between three basal and undying convictions—the responsibility of the individual, the solidarity of the race, and the supremacy of God.

See also artt. **AUGUSTINE, BAPTISM, CALVIN, FREE WILL, GRACE, ORIGINAL SIN, PERFECTION, PREDESTINATION.**

LITERATURE.—The extant writings of Pelagius, included in Jerome's works, viz. *Expositiones in Ep. Pauli, Epist. ad Demetr.*, and *Libellus Fidei ad Innocent.*; various Pelagian Confessions of Faith collected in A. Hahn, *Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln*³, Breslau, 1897, pp. 288-293; the Anti-Pelagian treatises of Augustine (collected and translated in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, 1st ser., vol. v., New York, 1887), with a valuable introduction by B. B. Warfield; W. Bright, *Introduct. to Select Anti-Pelagian Treatises of Augustine*, Oxford, 1880, *Age of the Fathers*, London, 1903, vol. II. ch. xxxiii. f.; Marius Mercator, *Opera*, pars I. in *PL* xlviii.; A. Brückner, 'Julian von Eclanum,' in *TU* xv. 8 (1897); G. P. Fisher, *Hist. of Christian Doctrine*, Edinburgh, 1890, pp. 183-197; A. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*, Eng. tr., 7 vols., London, 1894-99, v.; F. J. Hall, *Evolution and the Fall*, New York, 1910; J. B. Mozley, *Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination*², London, 1878, ch. III.; F. R. Tennant, *The Origin and Propagation of Sin*², Cambridge, 1906, *The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin*, do. 1903; G. F. Wiggers, *Versuch einer pragmatischen Darstellung des Augustinismus und Pelagianismus*, Hamburg, 1821-33.

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PENANCE (Roman Catholic).—Penance designates (1) a sacrament of the Roman Catholic Church, (2) a punishment inflicted for sins committed, and, more particularly, (3) an ecclesiastical or canonical punishment.

The most satisfactory method of investigating the nature and character of penance, as understood and practised in the Church, is to follow its historical development from its origin.

The very idea of the religion of Christ is that of a redemption from sin, through the sufferings of Jesus, the salutary effects of whose vicarious expiation are imparted to each individual soul at its conversion to the faith, as accompanied and evidenced by baptism and admission into the Church. As a consequence, some uncertainty in doctrine and practice was bound to result as to the attitude which the Church should observe towards those who, once regenerated through baptism, fell into sin again and applied for reconciliation.

In the Roman Catholic view the emphatic statement of Jesus bestowing on His apostles without any restriction authority to forgive sins (Mt 16¹⁹ 18¹⁸, Jn 20²¹⁻²³) left no doubt in the minds of the early Christians as to the general power vested in the Church to forgive all manner of sins. Such is at least the Roman Catholic belief reasserted in the decree *Lamentabili* (3rd July 1907), in which are condemned two modernistic propositions (46, 47) which assert that 'in the primitive Church there was no idea of the reconciliation of the Christian sinner by the authority of the Church,' and that, 'even after it came to be recognized as an institution of the Church, it was not called by the name of sacrament.'

Nevertheless in the earliest times there were three kinds of crimes considered so atrocious that they were punished by perpetual excommunication: idolatry, homicide, and adultery or fornication. This did not imply that such sins were considered unforgivable, but merely that the Church did not want to assume the responsibility of pronouncing on them, leaving them to be settled between the conscience of the sinner and God Himself. Very early, however, it came to be realized that such a rigorous attitude was more detrimental than beneficial, and already the *Pastor* of Hermas (c. 140-154) contains assurances of forgiveness for all sins except blasphemy of the Name and betrayal

of the brethren (*Sim.* ix. 19). Hermas clearly expresses at the same time that the forgiveness which he announces is in the nature of a unique concession, to be had once only and for the time being, and that those who sin afterwards will be unworthy of the grace, for 'there is but one repentance for the servants of God' (*Mand.* iv. i. 8)—a restriction which Roman Catholic authors understand of public reconciliation only.

Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* ii. 13), Denys of Corinth (in Eus. *HE* iv. 23), and the *Didache* of the Apostles do not seem to admit of so many restrictions, and Tertullian (*de Pen.* v.-xi.) distinguishes two kinds of penance, one as a preparation to baptism and the other to obtain forgiveness of some grievous sin after baptism. In his 'peremptory edict' Pope Callistus (218-222) declares: 'I forgive the sins both of adultery and fornication to those who have done penance'—whereupon Tertullian, now become a Montanist, protests in his *de Pudicitia* against Callistus's error, that the Church could forgive all sins, and likewise takes Hermas to task for favouring the pardon of adulterers. Much rigour was still exhibited in practice; in most cases reconciliation was deferred to the moment of death, and Cyprian (*Ep.* lv. [li.] 21) expressly alludes to the 'ancient bishops' who kept adulterers for ever excluded from the Church. It seems, however, that forgiveness was everywhere granted to the sinners who had obtained the intercession of the martyrs in the shape of a *Libellus pacis*, although Cyprian at Carthage refused to recognize such an indulgence. In Spain, as late as 300, the Council of Elvira pronounced perpetual exclusion against the idolaters.

But the old time rigour began gradually to be mitigated at the example and lead of the Church of Rome. Pope Cornelius (251-253) extends forgiveness to the *lapsi* of the persecution, and reconciliation is denied only to those who have deferred asking for it until at the point of death. Against the concessions of Callistus and Cornelius, Hippolytus and Novatian (condemned in a Synod of Rome in 251) formed schisms, the latter originating a sect which lasted two centuries (see **NOVATIANISTS**). Yet Cyprian (*de Lapsis* [251]), while rebuking the *lapsi*, exhorts them to penance; for the 'forgiveness granted by the priests is acceptable to God.'

z. Public penance.—Public penance, which was necessary for the re-admission of the sinner within the pale of the Christian community, was preceded by a confession (*ἐξομολογησις*), public or private, according to the cases (Origen, *Hom. in Lev.* ii. 4 [PG xii. 418]; Augustine, *Sermo* cli.; Tertullian, *de Pen.* ix.). The confession was followed by penitential practices exercised under the supervision of the proper authority, who was in the West the bishop, and in the East a special penitentiary appointed by the bishop.

The nature of those penitential exercises varied; according to Tertullian (*de Pen.*), they consisted in prayer, fasting, prostration at the feet of the priests of the Church, dressing in sackcloth and rags, lying in ashes, using the plainest food and drink for the sole purpose of sustaining life, and harsh treatment of the body.

In the East, according to Gregory Thaumaturgus (263) and Basil (*Ep.* cxcix. 22, ccxvii. 56), a classification of penitents into four groups was observed: the *ἀκροώμενοι*, assimilated to the catechumens, and excluded from all participation in the mysteries; the *ὑποπίπτοντες*, or *γόνυ κλίνοντες*, who were permitted to attend the services kneeling; and the *συστάτες*, who attended the services, but were debarred from communion; each of those groups had its special place assigned in the Church; the fourth class was added later, the *προσκαλόντες*,

who remained outside the Church door. These distinctions seem to have been ignored in the West, where all penitents were assimilated to the catechumens. The whole penitential process was closed by a solemn function held on Holy Thursday, when, after a consultation (*concilium*) of the bishop and the clergy, the penitents received a solemn absolution from the bishop or even, in case of necessity, from a deacon (Cyprian, *Ep.* xviii.); this fact showed that such reconciliation was understood to be 'in foro externo' only, and not sacramental, although some writers hold the opposite view.

At the point of death such reconciliation, at that period, was never refused even for the most grievous sins, although sometimes communion was even then denied to apostates (cf. Leo I. [442], *Ep.* cviii. 4 [*PL* liv. 1012 f.]; also Cœlestine [428], *Ep.* iv., 'To the bishops of Vienne and Narbonne,' 2; and Nicæa [325], can. 13; Arles [314], can. 22).

Public penance could be permitted only once, as is evident from Hermas, Tertullian, Origen (*Hom. in Lev.* xv. 2), and Ambrose (*de Pæn.* ii. 10 [95]), the reason being, according to Augustine, 'lest the remedy become common' (*Ep.* cliii. 'ad Maced.' 7). The principle was renewed as late as 589 by the Council of Toledo.

The primitive discipline was severe, even extreme in some cases (Innocent, *Ep.* vi. 2 [405]), but was gradually mitigated through the subsequent period and throughout the Middle Ages. In 390 a public scandal in Constantinople induced the patriarch Nectarius to suppress the charge of penitentiary, which was followed by the abolition of public penance throughout the East. The practice was kept up in the West, but not extended to the newly-converted peoples like the Anglo-Saxons. Among those, as well as in the Eastern Church, the exomologesis is henceforth always secret.

From contemporary documents we see that the career of penance was inaugurated by the imposition of the hands and the bestowal of a hair shirt. The penitent must shave his head, wear mourning, abstain from the management of business, lawsuits, and military service, and practise perpetual continence (if married, only with the consent of his consort). Clerics guilty of a capital crime had formerly been subjected to the same penance as laymen; in the 4th cent. the custom was established of deposing them without excommunication, thereby reducing them to the lay communion (*Can. Apost.* 25). In the Roman (not, however, in the Gallican) Church they were not allowed to submit to public penance.

In the West public confession was finally suppressed by ordinance of Pope Leo I. († 461; *Ep.* clxviii. 2); but public penance was maintained.

During the contemporary period the texts of the Fathers became both numerous and explicit in the assertion of the power existing in the Church to forgive all sins; Augustine (*de Agon. Christ.* xxxi.) states that 'the Church of God has power to forgive all sins'; Ambrose († 392), rebuking the Novatians (*de Pæn.* i. ii. 6, ii. ii. 12), claims for the priests of the Church the authority 'to pardon without any exception'; Pacian of Barcelona († 390) maintained that the forgiving of sins done by the priest is 'the doing of God's own power' (*ad Sympron.* [*PL* xiii. 1057]). In the East St. Cyril of Alexandria († 447; in *Joan.* xii., on 20th [*PG* lxxiv. 722]), Chrysostom († 407; *de Sacerdot.* iii. 5 f.), and Athanasius († 373; *Frag. c. Novat.* [*PG* xxvi. 1315]) inculcate the same notion. The idea of transmission of the power of forgiving sins is clearly expressed in the *Canons of Hippolytus* (xvii.) and the *Apostolic Constitutions* (viii. 5 [*PG* i. 1073]).

2. Penitential books.—The period which wit-

nesses the gradual diminution of public penance and its supersession by the private exomologesis is also characterized by the appearance and diffusion, in both the Eastern and the Western Church, mostly from the 7th cent., of the Penitentials, or penitential books, which held sway in the practice and administration of penance until the codification known under the name of the *Decree of Gratian* (1140), and the rise of the Scholastic theology which superseded them.

Those books, the nucleus of which was the penitential canons laid down by councils and bishops, were compilations of regulations and decisions intended to guide the confessors in the practice and administration of penance. While granting the part that they played in educating the barbarian races in Ireland, England, and Frankland, we must admit that they represented no real progress, but a growing complication of the penitential discipline, and grew so numerous, sometimes conflicting and often tending to a relaxation of moral rules, that they caused in the 9th cent. a sort of reaction and hostile revulsion. Some of them had been published with the sanction of the Church and followed the ancient canonical decrees and the statutes of St. Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and others; others were merely private works which found wide circulation, while some called for reprehension and condemnation at the hands of the ecclesiastical authorities.

Among the most important of the Penitentials may be mentioned, in the East, those of John the Faster and John the Monk, in the West the *Liber de Pœnitentia* of St. Columbanus († 615), partly based on the earlier 'canons of St. Patrick' and of St. Finian († 552), and the Penitentials of St. David († 544) and Gildas († 583). The work of St. Columbanus had considerable influence on the Continent. The *Penitentie* of Theodore, archbishop of Canterbury († 690), was of great authority in the Anglo-Saxon Church and throughout the West during the next four centuries. The Penitential of St. Cummian (8th cent.) and the *Liber Pœnitentium* of Rabanus Maurus (841) also exercised considerable influence at the time. There is no proof, so far, that there existed any real papal Penitential.

It is interesting to gather from those books some definite notions as to the rules and practice of penance throughout the period in the Celtic and Saxon Churches in England. In two so-called 'Synods of St. Patrick' it is prescribed that he who commits any of the capital sins shall perform a year's penance for each offence, at the end of which he shall come with witnesses to be absolved by the priests, and 'let penance be short, rather than long, and tempered with relaxation' (D. Wilkins, *Concilia*, London, 1737, i. 3 f.). In the Irish Church the confessor was called *anmchara*, 'soul's friend' (*animæ carus*).

The *Leabhar Breac* states that 'the soul is healed by confession and declaration of the sins, with sorrow, and by the prayers of the Church, and a determination henceforth to observe the laws . . . because Christ left to His Apostles and Church, to the end of the world, the power of loosing and binding.'

The necessity of confession before communion is expressly recommended (can. xxx.) in the Penitential of St. Columbanus, and the practice of public penance is also regulated in detail in the Penitentials. In the Anglo-Saxon Church penance was called *behreowsung*, the confessor was the *scrift*, confession the *scrift spræc*, the parish the *scrift scire*, and the Penitential the *scrift boc*. In the Penitential of Theodore it is stated that 'there is no public penance in this province'; that not the deacon but the bishop shall impose penance on the laymen; and that, while communion should be deferred to the end of the penance, it may be allowed after a year or six months. The Peniten-

tial of Egbert of York († 266) says that the bishop shall not refuse confession to those who desire it, though they be guilty of many sins (Wilkins, i. 126). For stealing Cummian prescribes that a layman shall do one year of penance, a cleric two, a subdeacon three, a deacon four, a priest five, a bishop six. For murder or perjury penance lasted from three to twelve years according to the rank of the penitent. For perjury over the gospel or holy relics Egbert enjoins seven or eleven years of penance. Usury was punished by three years, infanticide by fifteen, idolatry by ten; for violations of the sixth commandment from three to fifteen years were enjoined, and from three to twenty-five years for incest. During that period, or a specified portion of the time, the penitent was to fast on bread and water, or, if unable, to recite daily a certain number of psalms; he was, moreover, to scourge himself or perform some other penitential exercise as determined by the confessor.

During the period which extends to the end of the 11th cent. the penitential discipline was steadily mitigated, and public penance was inflicted only for public sins. On the other hand, the number of sins to be publicly expiated was notably increased, while public penance was not merely offered but enjoined and imposed by means of ecclesiastical censures and often enforced by reconre to the 'secular arm.' It took the form of fasting, exile, distant pilgrimages, scourging, claustration, etc. The Synod of Worms (868) removed the prohibition for penitents to live in the state of marriage.

The habit had been gradually introduced to redeem with alms, after the fashion of the Teutonic *Wergeld*, the various penalties. The Penitentials, from the 8th cent., enumerate the sins considered equivalent to the fasts or other austerities which the penitent could not observe. The first authentic instance of the partial redemption of public penance occurs at the Synod of Tribur (895); but soon abuses crept in, and the Council of Rouen (1048) forbade arbitrary changes in the pecuniary compensation required.

On the other hand, excommunication had grown into a general interdiction from all intercourse with the Christian world. The interdict, extended to entire districts for the first time in the 9th cent. (Gregory of Tours, *Hist. Franc.* viii. 31, ix. 15), and consisting in the suspension of all religious functions within the territory affected, is now being applied to considerable regions (Limoges, 1031); at the same time it is rendered less rigorous and absolute, private reception of baptism and of the last rites and even private celebration of the services being permitted.

In the Middle Ages the practice of redeeming penance had become general. A penitent would be excused from the prescribed works of penance at the cost, e.g., of equipping a soldier for the crusade, of building a bridge or a road, etc. The consequent diminution of the practice and spirit of personal penance resulted in the Church imposing at the Fourth Council of Lateran, on all the faithful without exception, the obligation to confess, at least once a year, to an authorized priest during Easter time, and to fulfil the penance enjoined by him. As a consequence, in the 14th cent. general public penance practically disappears, and in the 16th cent. it occurs only exceptionally.

3. The Scholastic doctrine.—The rise of the Scholastic philosophy, with its sustained effort to organize the Catholic beliefs and practices into a systematic doctrinal whole on the basis of the Aristotelian philosophy, resulted in an interpretation of the subject of penance which was received without opposition. It is to-day held by all Roman Catholics. As, however, the subsequent

rise of the Protestant Reformation with its doctrine of justification by faith alone brought into question all the theological development of the past ages, three centuries afterwards the Church saw herself forced to re-state her own beliefs and practices in answer to the new doctrine. She did this by practically defining as her own at Trent (1551) the principal conclusions of the Scholastic doctors, the definitive expression of which is found principally in the works of Thomas Aquinas, especially in the *Summa Theol.* III. qu. 84-90, supplement. qu. 1-23; and in *Sent.* IV., dist. xvii., xviii., xix. To avoid repetitions, we shall, therefore, while giving a summary of the Scholastic doctrine, indicate in parenthesis the sessions and canons of the councils which raised each individual conclusion to the dignity of a dogma of the Catholic faith.

Penance is a virtue, more probably a special virtue. It was at all times necessary for the remission of sins (Trent, sess. xiv. can. 1). In the Christian dispensation sins committed after baptism are actually and judicially forgiven by the Church in virtue of the power of the keys in a rite which is truly a sacrament of the new law, and based on the words of Christ in Jn 20²¹⁻²³:

'Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose soever sins ye forgive, they are forgiven unto them; whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained' (ib.).

Like all conceivable things in this material world, that sacrament has its matter or quasi-matter (Florence, 1439; Trent, xiv. 2), consisting of the three acts of the penitent—contrition, confession, and satisfaction—and its form, the absolution (*q.v.*). The effect of that sacrament is deliverance from sin (Florence; Trent, *loc. cit.*), which implies remission of the guilt and the eternal punishment due to sin, but requires satisfaction for the temporal punishment into which it is commuted (Trent, xiv. 3). That sacrament is distinct from baptism (ib. 2), against the Protestant contention that it was at most a statement and declaration of the forgiveness already obtained once for all, through faith alone. While the sacrament is indispensable for the remission of mortal sins, it is not for that of venial sins which can be forgiven otherwise, but which are rightly declared in confession (Leo X., in the bull *Exsurge* against Luther's contention [H. Denzinger, *Enchiridion*¹, Freiburg, 1911, no. 753]). The only minister of that sacrament is the priest and not the laity (Martin V., against Wyclif and Hus, 1418, in bull *Inter cunctas* [Denzinger, 670]; Leo X., against Luther in bull *Exsurge* [ib. 753]; Trent, xiv. 6). The valid administration of that sacrament requires a double power (or 'key'), that of order, conferred in the sacerdotal ordination, and that of jurisdiction over the faithful, dependent on the delegation of the ecclesiastical authority, so that absolution pronounced by those not having ordinary or delegated jurisdiction was invalid and of no effect (Trent, xiv. 7). The ecclesiastical authority may limit or restrict the exercise of the said delegated jurisdiction over the faithful by reservation of cases, except at the point of death.

Being a sacrament, penance can have no effect on the unbaptized; on the baptized themselves it can have no effect of reconciliation unless accompanied by repentance. Of this there are two kinds: perfect contrition and imperfect contrition, or attrition (Trent, xiv. 4); the former is a repentance consisting in the hatred of sin as an offence to God, the latter is based on the fear of everlasting punishment. Even perfect contrition, while in itself sufficient to reconcile the soul with God, cannot do so without the actual reception of the sacrament, or, in case of impossibility, 'apart from the desire of the sacrament which it includes'

(ib.). In line with this canon is the condemnation in 1571 by Pius v. of the proposition of Baius, that, except in case of martyrdom or necessity, perfect contrition does not remit sin without the actual reception of the sacrament (Denzinger, 724), and of the proposition of Peter Martinez of Osma (by Sixtus IV. in 1479) that mortal sins are blotted out by contrition alone without reference to the power of the keys.

Imperfect contrition, while in itself insufficient to reconcile the soul with God, becomes so in the sacrament by virtue of the absolution, but never without it, even in case of necessity.

The sacrament of penance is not an institution the use of which is left to the option of the penitent; it is as necessary to baptized sinners for salvation as is baptism to those who have not yet been regenerated (Trent, xiv. 2); for confession, or the declaration of one's sins specifically and in detail (ib. 5), is indispensable for the remission of sins. There is no necessity for such confession to be public rather than private or auricular; private confession is sufficient in all cases; for public confession is neither of divine institution nor commanded of God (ib.). To obtain forgiveness it is therefore indispensable to confess at least all mortal sins, and none can be forgiven separately, so that the wilful concealment of a single mortal sin is a sacrilege that invalidates the entire confession; grievous sins inadvertently omitted must be accused in the next confession (ib. 8). The same sins can be appropriately confessed over again, each new accusation, in the view of Aquinas, resulting in a diminution of the temporal punishment due to sin.

Inviolable secrecy (except by express permission of the penitent), even at the cost of life or honour, is enjoined on the priest and on any one, interpreter or the like, who has in any manner become informed of the contents of a confession (4th Council of Lateran, ch. xxi.; Denzinger, 438). The penalty of deposition, confinement, and perpetual penance is pronounced on any transgressing confessor, be the revelation direct or indirect, and neither the care of public safety nor that of securing the fulfilment of legal justice, nor any cause whatsoever, excuses from that strict obligation. It is not even permitted to make use of any knowledge so obtained (decree of the Holy Office, 18th Nov. 1602).

Sacramental confession 'by divine right necessary and established' is not therefore a human invention devised by the Fathers of the Lateran; they only prescribed 'that the precept of confessing at least once a year should be complied with by all and every one when they reach the age of discretion' (Lateran, ch. 21).

Sins forgiven by absolution, while pardoned as to the guilt and the everlasting punishment due to them, must nevertheless be expiated by satisfaction for the temporal punishment which they leave after them; this obligation is fulfilled by the sacramental penance imposed by the priest, as well as by private good works, prayers, alms, fasting, works of merit, indulgences (q.v.), etc. Accordingly, the Council of Trent (cans. 12 and 15) expressly condemned the Protestant doctrine that the entire punishment due to sin is always forgiven with the guilt, and that it is a fiction to say that there remains to be paid a temporal penalty; for 'of all of the parts of penance, satisfaction was constantly recommended to the people by our Fathers.'

Such is, in succinct outline, the doctrine of the sacrament of penance, as elaborated by the Schoolmen and adopted by the Council of Trent. It had been in quiet possession of the whole Church for 300 years, on the admission of Calvin, before

the doctrine of justification by (fiduciary) faith alone was proclaimed by the Reformers. For supplementary information on the subject of the various parts of the sacrament see the special articles on ABSOLUTION, EXPIATION AND ATONEMENT (Christian), INDULGENCES, etc. We may, however, give here a somewhat more complete account of its most characteristic feature, viz. confession.

4. Confession. — Confession is considered by Roman Catholics (cf. Trent, *loc. cit.*) as of divine institution. That it should be a logical consequence of the interpretation of Jn 20²², in the sense defined by Trent, is admitted even by such unsympathetic historians as Lea (*Hist. of Auricular Confession*, i. 181 f.), since no judge can authoritatively loose or bind without a knowledge of the case, so that general confession without a detailed statement of sins would not answer the idea. The practice of confessing one's sins is already inculcated in Ja 5¹⁶ and 1 Jn 1⁹, and has therefore its foundation in the NT. An examination of the various texts of the Fathers which we have mentioned above will show that they understood the power of penance as distinct from that of conferring baptism, the latter being conceived and described as a spiritual rebirth, the former as a second plank after shipwreck.

The *Didache* commands individual confession in the congregation (iv. 14, xiv. 1). Irenæus (180-204) mentions the fact that some sinners 'perform their exomologesis openly also' (*adv. Hær.* i. xiii. 7 [PG vii. 591]), and Clement of Rome says: 'It is better for a man to confess his sins, than to harden his heart' (*ad Cor.* i. li. 3). Origen († 254) says: 'If they accuse themselves and confess, they at the same time vomit the sin and cast off every cause of disease' (*Hom. iv. in Ps. xxviii. 6* [PG xii. 1386]). Cyprian recommends mercy to the sinner 'because in hell there is no confession and exomologesis cannot be made there' (*Ep. li. [lv.] 'ad Antonian.'* 29), and he praises those 'who confess in sorrow and simplicity to the priests of God' (*de Lapsis*, xxviii.).

Lactantius († 330) states: 'that is the true Church in which there is confession or penance' (*Div. Inst.* iv. 80). Exhortations to confession are found in Augustinus (*in Ps. lxxvi. 6*), in Jerome, in his sermon on penance, and in Ambrose (*de Pern. i. li. 7*), and Basil (*Reg. brev. tract.* 229) refers to the priests as the only fit recipients of the avowal of the penitents.

The idea of confessing to God alone, afterwards revived by the Protestants, is swept aside by Augustine (*Sermo cccxlii. 3* [PL xxxix. 1711]): 'Was it for nothing that the keys were given to the Church?'

Leo the Great (440-461), who has often been credited with this institution of the practice, calls it an apostolic rule (*Ep. clxviii. cviii. [PL] li. 1210, 1011*). It is, moreover, to be noticed that Gregory the Great († 604, in *I. Reg. iii. 13* [PL lxxix. 207]) expressly refers to it as a well-established practice. According to Lea (i. 228), the decree of the Lateran made of the necessity of confession a new article of faith; this, however, is contradicted expressly by the Council of Trent, and by the practice of the Oriental Church, which separated from the Western as early as the 10th cent., and in which the practice of confession is both habitual and obligatory. The only doctor of the Middle Ages who does not pronounce decisively for the necessity of confession is Gratian (*Decret. ii. 'de Pœn.'* dist. 1. [PL clxxxvii. 1519-63]); with the other doctors the only question is about the origin and sanction of the obligation and the value of the Scriptural texts. That question is settled definitely by Aquinas (*c. Gentis*, iv. 72). He also interprets the decree of the Lateran as meaning that the obligation of confessing mortal sins urges, not as soon as possible after sinning (Albertus Magnus), but only during Easter time.

Such are some of the principal authorities on which the Roman Catholics base their doctrine and practice and which induced the Council of Trent to define penance as a dogma of the Church.

For the convenient and public regular exercise of penance there have been introduced, not earlier than the 16th cent., among the furniture of the Roman Catholic churches confessionals, either movable or immovable (sometimes pieces of real artistic value in woodwork). They consist essentially of seats or stalls affording a central lodge with a seat for the confessor and kneeling accommodation at the sides for the penitents, with the view and purpose of securing enough publicity and, at the same time, enough privacy for both safeguard and convenience. The canonical regu-

lations insist that they must be established 'in loco patenti' and provided with a wooden or metal partition or grate between the seat of the confessor and that of the penitents.

Their use is practically enjoined everywhere, except in the case of necessity, when hearing the confessions at least of women; and, if there may still be found churches where they are not in use, and where, *e.g.*, confessions are heard at the communion railing, these conditions must be considered as irregular and uncanonical.

With the proclamation of the principle of justification through faith alone, consisting in the external imputation of the merits of Christ, it followed as a logical consequence that justification, once obtained, was certain (according to Calvin, for the predestined alone); equal in all, and inamissible except by loss of faith (for Luther, and not even by that for Calvin); so, therefore, there could be no real wiping off of sin by any sanctifying grace as taught by the Schoolmen, nor any sacrament of penance, nor, consequently, any necessity for confession.

The Lutherans, accordingly, soon dropped the obligation of private confession altogether, through various ordinances, as in 1657 in Saxony and in Brandenburg in 1698, although the private practice was not prohibited. Since the beginning of the 19th cent. it has been somewhat revived among orthodox Lutherans.

In England the Wesleyans have Church discipline, and so had, as is well known, the Calvinistic and Presbyterian bodies, but no confession, while the Salvation Army practises and recommends public confession. The Anglicans do not prescribe auricular confession; they merely advise it, when necessary to satisfy one's conscience, and to the sick if they feel their conscience troubled. The Oxford Movement revived it to a considerable extent, and Pusey in 1878 published an adapted translation of J. J. Gaume's *Manual for Confessors*; moreover, efforts were made in 1873 to obtain from convocation the licensing of confessors, but without success; for the view 'that post-baptismal sin of a grave sort can receive forgiveness in no other way [than through confession] . . . cannot be found within the covers of the English Prayer-Book' (W. O. Burrows, *s.v.* 'Confession,' in *EB*¹¹ vi. 904^b).

When one recalls the severities of the public penance of bygone ages and contrasts with them the comparative insignificance of the sacramental penance usually inflicted nowadays, one cannot help wondering how such an extraordinary mitigation can harmonize with the theory and practice of the past. It must be remembered, however, that, if the sacramental penance has been immensely lightened, the purpose of that leniency is 'not to repel' the sinner, since repentance here on earth is much more essential than satisfaction, and since all 'unpaid debts,' in the Roman Catholic belief, will be fully discharged in the life hereafter in the purifying flames of purgatory.

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PENANCE (Anglican).—The words *penitentia* and *μετάνοια* are both used in each of three distinct senses: (1) the emotion or sentiment of penitence; (2) the penance, penalty, or course of humiliation assigned or undertaken; (3) the institution, ordinance, or sacrament of penance. This article is mainly concerned with penance as an institution, ordinance of grace, or sacrament of the Christian Church.

The commission of our Lord to the Apostles on which the practice of penance is based is recorded in Jn 20²¹⁻²³. The Lord breathed on them, and said:

'Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained.'

This commission might be applied in two ways (Cyril Alex. *in loco*): by baptism, for those who were not yet members of the Christian Church; and by penance, for the children of the Church who had sinned and fallen from grace. Penance, which is here under consideration, has to do only with baptized Christians who have sinned after baptism.

In the history of the Church there have been extraordinary variations alike in the scope and in the methods of penance. As regards scope, there may be contrasted the prevalent conviction in the 2nd and 3rd centuries that the Church could not reconcile in this life offenders in the three capital sins of apostasy, adultery, and bloodshed; and the teaching of St. Pacian of Barcelona at the end of the 4th cent. that it was for these three capital forms of offence and only for these that penance was needed (*Paranesis ad Penitentiam*). As regards methods, the publicity of the course of penance or humiliation in the early centuries may be contrasted with the privacy of later methods as already shown in the practice of the priest penitentiary at Constantinople in the 5th cent., but not universal in the West till 1000 years of Christianity had passed. A brief survey of this varied history will be the best exposition of the subject.

In the apostolic period St. Paul exercises the commission of retaining in the case of the incestuous Corinthian. He does so with some circumstance.

'For I verily, being absent in body but present in spirit, have already, as though I were present, judged him that hath so wrought this thing, in the name of our Lord Jesus, ye being gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus, to deliver such a one unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus' (1 Co 5⁴⁻⁵).

St. Paul also exercises the commission of remit-

ting, whether the person forgiven is the incestuous Corinthian or another offender:

'For what I also have forgiven, if I have forgiven anything, for your sakes have I forgiven it in the person of Christ' (2 Co 2:10).

The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews appears already to take the rigorist view as regards apostates:

'It is impossible to renew them again unto repentance' (*μετανοίας*) (He 6:8).

The story of St. John and the robber shows the Apostle ready to reconcile a bandit guilty of repeated bloodshed (Clem. Alex. *Quis dives salvetur?*, 42).

In the sub-apostolic period the first authority to notice is Hermas. In the *Shepherd* Hermas, addressing the angel of penitence (the Shepherd), says:

'I have heard, Sir, from certain teachers that there is no other *μετανοία*, but that when we went down into the water, and received remission of our former sins' (*Mand.* iv. 3). The angel replies: 'Thou hast well heard for so it is.'

The attitude taken up is that normally there is no remission of capital sins after baptism in this life. But the message to be given is that, under the exceptional circumstances of (a) an impending persecution, and (b) the approaching end of the age, one *μετανοία* after baptism may be admitted, except in the case of the more wilful apostates. This is the inception of the Church rule that only one penance after baptism might be admitted.

In the period A.D. 150-250 the principal writers—Clement of Alexandria, Hippolytus, Tertullian, and Origen—all favour rigorism. Clement holds with Hermas that the normal situation is to admit only the penitence preceding baptism, but that after baptism penance may be admitted once for sins not properly wilful (*Strom.* ii. 13). In Rome Hippolytus strongly condemns the new policy of Callistus which throws open the gate of reconciliation to offenders in the matter of purity (*Refut.* ix. 7). In Carthage Tertullian, now a Montanist, makes an attack on the same policy in his *de Pudicitia*. Origen, who may be taken as representative at once of the Churches of Syria and of Egypt, is similarly severe.

He writes of those who 'overstep the bounds of the priestly dignity in assuming to condone idolatry, and to commit adulteries and fornication' (*de Orat.* 23).

Such sins to Origen are sins incurable (*ἀνίατα*).

While the great writers are thus at one in the rigorist attitude, there was evidently at the same time a body of opinion which made for leniency or mercy. One bishop who showed the lenient temper was Dionysius of Corinth (c. A.D. 171; *Eus. HE* iv. 23). The outstanding champion of the present mercy of the Lord to the penitent offender in fleshly sin was Callistus, bishop of Rome. He admitted such offenders to reconciliation after due penance performed; and his action carried with it the mind of the Church for all future ages. The next class of capital offenders to be admitted to reconciliation was that of the apostates. It was after the Decian persecution (A.D. 250) that the question became urgent. The First Council of Carthage under Cyprian (251) ruled (a) that *libellatici* might in approved cases be restored after considerable penance, and (b) that *sacrificati* might be restored on the approach of death. The Second Council of Carthage under Cyprian (252), in view of the impending persecution under Gallus II., agreed to reconcile without delay all the penitent lapsed. At Antioch in the same year a council under Demetrianus appears to have united the East in the same policy of mercy. At Alexandria the case of Serapion shows St. Dionysius ready to restore on the approach of death (*Eus. HE* vi. 44). The homicide also was in time admitted to reconciliation before death. The Council of Ancyra (314)

regulates the penances for these offenders (canons 22, 23). Finally, the Council of Nicæa (325) ruled by canon 13 for all capital sins that reconciliation was open to penitent offenders before death.

Meanwhile the procedure of penance had been developed in much detail. The *de Penitentia* of Tertullian (ch. 9) shows a discipline in use in Carthage, and evidently also at Rome, which included (1) a sordid garb, sackcloth and ashes; (2) dietary restrictions; (3) public lamentation; (4) prostration before the presbyters; and (5) kneeling before the faithful. This course of ordered public humiliation was styled *exomologesis*. There must have been a confession of offence in words in connexion with this *exomologesis*; but there is no evidence of any public confession in detail. Half a century later, again in Carthage, the system of procedure is spoken of by St. Cyprian as *ordo* (*Ep.* 11), as *ordo disciplinae* (*Ep.* 9), as *disciplina Domini* (*Ep.* 11). It was admissible in the ordinary course 'in minoribus peccatis' (*Ep.* 9), such sins being minor as compared with the capital sins of apostasy and bloodshed, though probably including sins of impurity. It involved (a) *penitentia*, (b) *exomologesis*, and (c) the imposition of the hands of the bishop and clergy (*Ep.* 9) for the admission of the persons to communion. Confession was not made publicly, but 'apud sacerdotes,' the word *sacerdos* being at this time used of bishops only (*de Lapsis*, 23).

A few years after the Decian persecution a great missionary bishop of Pontus, St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, organized in his diocese (*τὸν ἐνθάδε τόπον*) a system of penitential discipline by grades (*Canonica Epistola*, can. 5). Five grades are commonly enumerated: (1) mourners (*ἡ πρόσκλαυσις*), (2) hearers (*ἡ ἀκοασις*), (3) fallers (*ἡ ὑπόπτωσις*), (4) bystanders (*ἡ σὺστασις*), and (5) the restored to communion (*ἡ μεθεξις τῶν ἀγιασμάτων*) (can. 11). Of these, two are not grades of penitents. The mourners are supplicants for penance, who are as yet altogether outside the Church. The final grade of restored communion is the grade of those whose penance is done. The grades which are in fact grades of penitents are those of hearers, fallers, and bystanders. The distinction of hearers and fallers may have already been in use for catechumens (Origen, *c. Cels.* iii. 51; *Council of Neo-Cæsarea*, can. 5), the provision thus made for catechumens being now utilized for penitents. The grade of bystanders seems to have been created to meet the case of advanced penitents.

The system of graded penance spread from Pontus to the neighbouring provinces of the Asian peninsula, and finds recognition in the canons of Nicæa. But it was not in force in Antioch, in Rome, or, indeed, anywhere outside of the Asian provinces. As introduced by Gregory, the terms of penance in each grade for particular sins are not yet fixed. In the *Canonical Epistles* of St. Basil a customary scale of terms of penance is shown in force. Some of the terms are of great length. Thus penance for thirty years is imposed for certain sins of impurity (can. 7). The discretion of the bishop, however, tempered this severity in practice (can. 74).

The conversion of the empire would make the application of this severe system impracticable except in limited areas. Thus, in Antioch, of 200,000 inhabitants in the time of St. Chrysostom 100,000 were Christians. St. Chrysostom repudiates the Asian system as an 'intolerable publication' (*de Incomprehensibili Dei Natura*, hom. 5). Similarly its long terms of penance have in his judgment no hidden virtue. Five days of contrition are worth years of wooden penalty (*de Beato Philogonio*, 4). The distinctive teaching of St. Chrysostom is that penance may take many forms,

and that they all reach up to heaven. Thus (1) confession, (2) contrition, (3) humility, (4) almsgiving, (5) prayer, and (6) forgiveness of others are all efficacious for the forgiveness of our sins (*de Diabolo Tentatore*, hom. 2, *de Penitentia*, hom. 2, *In Ep. ii. ad Corinthios*, hom. 4). In an enumeration employed after his advancement to Constantinople he specifies as one such means 'recourse without reserve to the priests' (*τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἱερεῖς ἔχειν ὁκλῶς*), where the word *oklōs* appears to signify intimate or confidential intercourse. It may be noted that this was after the abolition of the priest penitentiary by Nectarius (*In Epistolam ad Hebræos*, hom. 6).

According to Socrates (*HE* v. 19), it was following on the Decian persecution that priests penitentiary came to be appointed in various churches. Up to this time the ministry of penance had been mainly in the hands of the bishops. Now a priest is empowered to hear the confessions of penitents, to assign their penances, and to give absolution. All this is seen in operation in the scandalous case related by Socrates (*HE* v. 19) and Sozomen (*HE* vii. 16), which led to the suppression of the priest penitentiary in Constantinople by Nectarius in 391. It is to be noted of the administration of the penitentiaries that not only was the confession private, but the penance and the reconciliation were also withdrawn from publicity.

These features, taken with the ministry of the priest in reconciliation, show already in use all the characteristics of the private system which in the West was not adopted till several centuries had passed. The ready acceptance of the action of Nectarius would seem to indicate that in Constantinople in 391 the penitentiary was already only a survival. From this time recourse to penance in ordinary cases was left to the conscience of the person. The words of Chrysostom imply that, though there was henceforth no penitentiary, recourse might be had to any priest.

In Rome, and in the West generally, the use of penance developed on different lines. From the days of Marcellus (A.D. 308-309) there were in Rome 25 priests of the titles of the city, and their functions included the administration of penance (*Liber Pontificalis*, ed. L. Duchesne, Paris, 1886, i. 164). They had much in common with the priest penitentiary of the East. The priest heard the confession of the offender; he admitted him to the status of the penitent; he assigned him his penance, which included both private exercises and public humiliations; and he indicated a definite duration for such penance (St. Innocent I., *Ep.* 25, 'ad Decentium'). It was, however, the bishop who on the Thursday before Easter gave effect to the judgment of the priest, and reconciled the penitent in a public function of much solemnity (*ib.*; *The Gelasian Sacramentary*, ed. H. A. Wilson, Oxford, 1874, p. xxxviii).

The distinctive features of the Roman usage were employed throughout the West for centuries to come. The confession was private, as, indeed, always and everywhere except in the case of bishops of Campania and Samnium condemned by St. Leo (*Ep.* 167. 2). But the penance was publicly performed, the penitents having their place assigned at the solemnization of the liturgy; and not only was the penance public, but the reconciliation also was a public and solemn function. The officiant in the reconciliation was throughout the West the bishop.

To the Western practice a necessary exception had to be made in the case of persons in peril of death: the works of penance had to be dispensed with, the absolution was given in the sick-room, and the minister was not commonly the bishop, but a priest. The difficulties attending public

penance in time of health had the effect that comparatively few persons came under it. Some sought it voluntarily, and on some it was imposed by authority. But the general tendency was to put off penance till death was in sight (St. Cæsarius of Arles, *Sermo* 256, in App. to St. Augustine, *PL* xxxix. 2217). It thus came about over the whole of Western Christendom that people became familiar with a system in which not only the confession, but also the penance and the absolution, were privately exercised, and in which the ministrant was a priest.

Meanwhile in the Celtic churches of the British Isles there had sprung up a procedure widely differing from the public penance of the Continental churches. It found its inception in the Celtic monastic system, which had peculiar features. The Irish monastery was a community at once of monks, students, and penitents, under the rule of an abbat, who was within the monastery supreme. The penitential books, or schedules of penances, which were first issued from these monasteries, contemplate private performance without counterpart in the public liturgy, and reconciliation by admission to communion on the completion of the penance. There is no provision for a public and solemn reconciliation, nor any recourse to the bishop. Passing over the earliest fragmentary documents, we come to the *Penitential of St. Finian* (c. A.D. 550), which shows this system at work (F. W. H. Wasserschleben, *Die Bussordnungen der abendländischen Kirche*, Halle, 1851, p. 109); and the *Penitential of Columbanus*, which is largely based on Finian, is a further development of it which, through the monasteries of the foundation of Columbanus, introduced the system on the continent of Europe (*ib.* p. 355).

Archbishop Theodore states that in the English churches of his time there was no public penance (*Penit.* i. 13). The British churches had never practised it; and it appears that the Continental missions had not introduced it. Theodore, himself of Eastern origin, frankly accepts the private procedure which he finds in use; and in the *Penitential* he puts forth an ordered system of penances superior to any penitential yet produced. The *Penitential of Theodore* is stated to contain the archbishop's replies to a series of questions addressed to him, mainly by the priest Eoda, who framed his questions from a Celtic penitential ('ex Scotorum libello') in his hands.

The significance of all these penitential books, alike the Celtic and that of Theodore, is that they are handbooks of the priest in the administration of the Celtic or private system of penance. On the continent of Europe the normal minister of reconciliation was the bishop, whose public and solemn service of reconciliation was held on the *Cena Domini*. Under the system accepted by Theodore for the whole of England there was nothing of all this. Not only was the confession private as elsewhere, but the penance and the reconciliation were private too, and the minister was not the bishop, but a priest.

The gradual extension of this system over the whole of Western Christendom may be traced in the following centuries. That an impulse of the kind should spread from the north southwards may appear *prima facie* unlikely; and scholars like Bishop Schmitz have been at much pains to show a Roman origin for the Penitentials (H. J. Schmitz, *Die Bussbücher und die Bussdisciplin der Kirche*, i., Mainz, 1883, ii., Düsseldorf, 1895). The evidence to the contrary is, however, hardly to be refuted. It will be found at length in O. D. Watkins, *A History of Penance* (in the press). The beginnings of the private system on the Continent came from the monasteries of Celtic type which,

starting with the foundations of Columbanus, were extraordinarily multiplied in the Frankish lands in the 7th century. The penitential books of these houses were extensively copied and also variously adapted, and Penitentials now came into wider use in the hands of priests outside. The so-called *Penitential Romanum* is a penitential mainly of Celtic origin, to which are appended two Roman offices of the public system. When the *Penitential of Theodore* was later on introduced from England, it obtained a great vogue, and was copied or modified as suited those who used it. Thus a variety of Penitentials based upon Theodore, but compiled in the Frankish lands, were now introduced. Next to be noted is the widespread influence of the English missionaries in the Germanic countries. Such were St. Boniface, or Winfried of Crediton, the apostle of Germany; St. Willibald, bishop of Eichstätt; St. Willehad, bishop of Bremen; St. Willibrord, archbishop of Utrecht. All these represented and gave extension to the English system of penance. Not less important is the influence of Alcuin and his little band of English scholars, who from the palace school of Aachen, or later from St. Martin's abbey at Tours, are strong supporters of the English system. The times of Charles the Great show the conflict of the two systems in the dioceses. Everywhere on the Continent the public system survives. The confession is private, but public penance is imposed in an ordered course which assigns to the penitents their place in the solemnization of the public liturgy, and the reconciliation is in every diocese an annual solemn office which takes place on the Thursday before Easter, or *Cena Domini*, and of which the bishop is the ministrant. By the side of this has grown up in the various monasteries the new system in which not only the confession, but also the penance and the reconciliation, are private, and the ministrant is a priest. The penances imposed by the penitential books tend to be much less exacting than those of the ancient public system. In the 9th cent. there comes an angry clash of the two systems. The reform councils of Charlemagne in 813 show it in course. The Council of Châlons holds that penances should be based upon (1) canons, (2) Scripture, and (3) custom, 'the books which they call penitentials being repudiated and altogether banished.' The Council of Tours, noting the variety of penances in use, recommends that the imperial assembly about to meet at Aachen shall indicate which of the penitentials is to be preferred. A little later the Council of Paris (829) rules that the bishops should 'diligently make enquiry for these same faulty documents, and should deliver them when found to the flames, so that in future unskilled priests should not by their means deceive men.' Such was the conflict of the two systems in the first half of the 9th century. But the triumph of the private system was only a matter of time and extension. So far, indeed, it was unknown in the southern lands. In Lombardy outside Bobbio and in the Italy of the popes the public system ruled. So, too, in S. Gaul, and in what remained to Christendom of Spain. But by the time of Gratian (c. 1150) the private system is in general use even in Italy, though not of obligation. Putting forward the question whether confession of sin to a priest is required, or whether contrition and secret satisfaction without oral confession will attain forgiveness, Gratian cites a long array of 89 authorities pronouncing on either side, and sums up that both opinions are well supported (*Decretum*, II., causa xxxiii. qu. 3). It is, however, only three-quarters of a century later than this that at the Fourth Council of the Lateran (1215) the edict goes forth to the whole of Western

Christendom that every Christian who has attained discretion must confess his sins at least once in every year.

Attention has now to be given to the growth of the practice of recurring or habitual confession. Penance proper, in the sense of an ordinance or sacrament for the remission of sin, is concerned only with such capital or mortal offences as have placed the sinner in a condition of sin or death from which he needs to be rescued by sacramental grace. It is to be expected that such grave sin, if it occurs at all in the case of a Christian after baptism, will be exceptional; and in the early centuries penance was admitted only once in the lifetime. In the 4th and 5th centuries this was the rule throughout the West, as at an earlier period it had been also in the East. As late as the Third Council of Toledo (589) the prohibition of a second penance is re-affirmed for Spain. While, however, in the earlier ages the mind of the Church was against the admission of repeated penance, there had grown up in the monastic societies the practice of recurring confession of offence as a habit of the devout life (Cassian, *de Cen. Inst.* iv. 9; St. Benedict of Nursia, *Regula*, 7). This was not the penance of the Church. It did not contemplate in ordinary cases the sacramental forgiveness of mortal offence. In the rule given by Donatus, bishop of Besançon, to the nuns of Joussamontier (592-651) confession is to be made to the abbess ('matri spirituali nihil occultetur'). The first notice of the extension to the lay people of the practice of confession as a habit of the devout life comes from these islands. In the *Dialogue* of Egbert, archbishop of York (between 732 and 736), the following statement is made:

'Since the times of pope Vitalian and Theodore archbishop of Canterbury a custom has obtained in the Church of the English, and has come to be held as having the force of law, that not only the clergy in monasteries, but also the laymen with their wives and families should betake themselves to their confessors' (Hadden and Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents*, iii. 413).

This was to be in the twelve days before Christmas. It will be understood that under the private system of penance the old prohibitions against repetition no longer maintained their ground. Confession could be admitted as often as priest and penitent were agreed in admitting it. Such confession should not ordinarily be concerned with mortal offence; and, when it was not so concerned, even though the words of absolution were employed, it was not in the strict sense to be regarded as an exercise of the sacrament of penance. It was a practice of the devout life. But, if grave sin had in fact been committed, the priest was prepared to exercise the commission of forgiveness, and his absolution was understood to convey the grace of the Church ordinance or sacrament of penance. The spread of the private system of penance on the continent of Europe has already been adverted to. With it followed the practice of recurring confession. In the period 950-1215 the private system is found to strengthen its hold of the regions north of the Alps, and also to enter into possession of the southern lands. The partial use of it becomes a general use. Its voluntary character gives place to a sense of obligation, though without positive enactment. And this sense of duty has come to bear not only on the soul conscious of deadly offence, and in need of the loosing of the Lord; it is becoming a recognized duty for every adult Christian to confess again and again at intervals, the interval which by ecclesiastical custom should not be exceeded being the year from Easter to Easter. At last in the Fourth Council of the Lateran (1215) all this is embodied in a definite decree for the whole of Western Christendom:

'Every *fidelis* of either sex shall after the attainment of years of discretion confess his sins with all fidelity to his own priest at least once in the year.'

It was soon found necessary to relax this rule as to the requirement that the confession of the *fidelis* must be made to 'his own priest'; but the requirement of an annual confession from every *fidelis* is still the rule of the Roman Catholic Church.

In England at the Reformation the position taken up was very much that of the Church of Constantinople after the action of Nectarius in suppressing the priest penitentiary. The use of confession was left to the conscience of the Christian, and he was free to make his confession to any priest whom he might choose. The prerogative of the priest is affirmed without hesitation. The formula of the ordination of a priest has the words:

'Whose sins thou dost forgive, they are forgiven: and whose sins thou dost retain, they are retained.'

In the exhortation to be read on notice of Holy Communion the final paragraph runs:

'And because it is requisite, that no man should come to the holy Communion, but with a full trust in God's mercy, and with a quiet conscience: therefore if there be any of you, who by this means cannot quiet his own conscience herein, but requireth further comfort or counsel, let him come to me, or to some other discreet and learned Minister of God's Word, and open his grief; that by the ministry of God's holy Word he may receive the benefit of absolution, together with ghostly counsel and advice, to the quieting of his conscience, and avoiding of all scruple and doubtfulness.'

The form of absolution after private confession given in the Order for the Visitation of the Sick is one of the forms partly precatory, partly declaratory, which had come into use from the 13th century.

'Our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath left power to his Church to absolve all sinners who truly repent and believe in him, of his great mercy forgive thee thine offences: And by his authority committed to me, I absolve thee from all thy sins. In the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Amen.'

On a point of much dispute in the Reformation period no pronouncement is made. It is not ruled whether a person guilty of mortal offence *ought* to have his conscience troubled till he has betaken himself to the penance of the Church. This point, which St. Augustine in the early years of the 5th cent. would answer in the stricter sense (*Sermo* 392), and which is shown by Gratian as variously answered through the centuries in his long catena of citations, is in fact dealt with by the Church of England as Nectarius had dealt with it in Constantinople. The matter is left to the conscience of the offender. In other words, if he approaches the Holy Communion, he does so at his own risk. But the Church does not bar his access. In the history of the Church of England after the Reformation confession to a priest with a view to absolution was for three centuries not greatly used, though it may be said that it never fell entirely out of use. Since the Oxford Movement there has been a considerable use of such confession.

Confession.—It has been repeatedly stated for centuries that in early times confessions were made publicly. The statement is already found in Sozomen (*HE* vii. 16), who regards such public confession as supplying the reason for the introduction of the priest penitentiary. Sozomen wrote about 200 years after the period to which he refers. He speaks of such confession as made *ἐν θρόνῳ*—the phrase of St. Chrysostom. St. Chrysostom had in view the public penance of the Asian churches; and it is to the confusion of this exomologesis with verbal confession that the long series of misunderstandings must be mainly attributed. To later writers the very word 'exomologesis' ('confession forth') seemed to imply that a confession in words was at least part of this public exercise. But by the time of Tertullian's *de*

Penitentia (c. A.D. 198) exomologesis was already even in the Latin churches the technical word for the public course of penance; and it cannot be shown that a detailed confession in words was ever part of this. The references to actual confessions are to confessions privately made. Origen (*in Lev.* hom. 2) speaks of the sinner 'who does not shrink from showing his sin to the priest of the Lord' (*sacerdoti*) in the Latin of Rufinus—not necessarily a bishop). In Cyprian's environment confessions are 'apud sacerdotes,' *sacerdos* here meaning a bishop. St. Basil (*Ep. Can.* ii. 34) states that the admitted practice in the case of 'adulteresses who had made confession through pity or whose sin was otherwise proved' was to permit the penance to be commenced in the grade of bystanders, so that the offence should not become matter of public knowledge. St. Gregory of Nyssa (*Ep. Can.* 6 [*PG* xlv. 233]) deals with the case of secret theft when the offender has confessed to the priest (*δι' ἐξαγορεύσεως τὸ πλημμέλημα αὐτοῦ τῷ πρεβι φανερώσας*). St. Innocent I. (*Ep.* xxv. 10) says that it is the office of the priest to attend to the confession of the penitent. In Africa St. Augustine states that those doing public penance must have committed grave offences, as adultery, homicide, or sacrilege, from which it may be inferred that mere was unknown to him (*Sermo* 252). There is one exception. St. Leo Magnus, writing to the bishops of Campania, Samnium, and Picenum, states (*Ep.* 168) that he has heard of the practice by some in those districts of public confession. He rules that it must be brought to an end:

'I mean that in the matter of the penance which is demanded of the faithful there should be no public recitation of the nature of particular sins, such profession being written in a statement (*libellus*). For it suffices that the accusation of conscience be indicated to the priests (*sacerdotibus*) alone in secret confession.'

With Leo *sacerdos* is not confined to bishops.

From this time onwards, so far as is known, confessions have always been private whether they were made (1) as a preliminary to public penance and episcopal absolution, (2) on the sick-bed, or (3) in connexion with the system of private penance and absolution by a priest. When, under the private system of penance, confession to a priest became largely used, some preparation for this ministry on the part of the clergy was seen to be called for. Thus in the 9th cent. it is repeatedly laid down that the clergy should be prepared to distinguish the eight principal vices (*c.g.*, Council of Rheims, A.D. 813)—an enumeration which had come down from Cassian. An early directory for the penitent is that of Othmar, abbat of St. Gall (A.D. 759). This is published in *Wasserschleben*, p. 437.

Absolution.—The absolution of the penitent has in history been conveyed externally in four modes, used separately or in combination: (1) by the laying on of hands, (2) by precatory forms of words, (3) by declaratory forms of words, and (4) by admission to communion.

(1) The laying on of hands by the bishop was used (c. A.D. 260) in the Syrian Church of the *Didascalia* (ch. 10 [tr. from the Syriac by Margaret Dunlop Gibson, London, 1903]), and is found in the *Apostolic Constitutions* (ii. 41), reproducing the *Didascalia*. No other evidence is forthcoming of its use for absolution in the churches of the East. In the churches of the Asian provinces, while there was an elaborate ceremonial for the imposition of hands upon penitents in the course of the liturgy (Council of Laodicea, can. 19), there is no indication of the use of such imposition or of any other outward symbol or expression for the purpose of effecting reconciliation. Nor has any mention been found of the laying on of hands for absolution at Antioch or at Constantinople. In

the West the African churches employed the laying on of hands for absolution in a public and solemn function alike in the times of St. Cyprian and in those of St. Augustine. In S. Gaul the first Council of Orange (A.D. 441) knows of a 'reconciliatory imposition of the hand' which should be given in a public function, after the fulfilment of penance, to a penitent who had already been admitted to communion in time of sickness. The usage of Rome is not easily determined. There is repeated evidence of some imposition of hands in the course of penance, and also of the employment of such imposition in the reconciliation of heretics, but there is no mention found of the imposition of hands as used in the public and solemn reconciliation of ordinary penitents by the bishop on the Thursday before Easter.

(2) The verbal expression of absolution or reconciliation was in the early centuries usually made in the form of prayer. No verbal absolution in any form but that of prayer is known to have been preserved. The reconciliatory prayers employed in Rome are given in the *Gelasian Sacramentary*. In the Eastern churches the supplicatory forms of absolution have been retained to modern times (J. Goar, *Euchologion*, Paris, 1647, p. 666).

(3) No indicative form of absolution as 'Ego te absolvo' is known to have come down from the early centuries. It cannot, however, be certainly affirmed that no such form was ever used. St. Ambrose writes:

'For neither do they remit sins in their own name, but in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. They ask, the Godhead grants: the service is human, but the munificence is of supernal power' (*de Spiritu Sancto*, lii. 18).

The asking is the prayer of remission; but, if the clergy remitted sins in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, it is difficult to see how this could be done except in some form of direct pronouncement. The description given by St. Ambrose would apply exactly to the composite forms of absolution—half prayer and half pronouncement—which have been generally used since the first half of the 13th century. St. Thomas Aquinas, in his 22nd *Opusculum*—a short treatise addressed to the master-general of the Dominicans on the subject of the form of absolution, in which he defends and indeed requires the indicative form—mentions the statement made by some of those with whom he is arguing that only thirty years had passed since all used the precatory form beginning 'Absolutionem et remissionem.' St. Thomas does not deny this, but merely notes that none could speak for all. It may be understood that precatory forms were in general use in W. Europe till about the middle of the 13th century.

(4) It was not in every case that any formal expression of absolution found place before the admission of the person to communion. Thus in Egypt the viaticum was sent to the dying Serapion by means of a messenger lad. Serapion thereupon proceeded to make his communion. Dionysius of Alexandria, the bishop, remarks that Serapion had been kept alive till he was absolved (ἔως λυθῆναι [Eusebius, *HE* vi. 44]). How was the absolution conveyed? Certainly not by imposition of hands, or by a prayer of reconciliation said over him by the priest, or by any pronouncement of absolution in his presence. Serapion's was the extreme case of a lapsed person who had been debarred from communion till death should be imminent. When at last he is absolved, the procedure in fact adopted is simply admission to communion. Again, when in the 13th canon of the Nicene Council it is ruled that on the approach of death all persons in penance may be admitted to communion, there is no suggestion of formal absolution before such

communion. Again, in the Asian provinces penances were severe and prolonged; but, when the penance was fulfilled, the person was to 'proceed to communion,' to 'partake of the sacred things,' to undertake 'the communion of the good' (St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Ep. Can.* [PG xiv. 229. 232]). The impression conveyed is that, when the person had fulfilled his penance, he simply stood no longer bound. Communion was open to him. The same may have been originally the practice of the Irish monasteries (cf. *Penitential Vinniai*, §6: 'altario reconciliatur,' §§ 15, 21, 35: 'jungatur altario,' §14: 'restituatur altario,' §53: 'intradum ad altare' [Wasserschleben, p. 108 ff.]).

It should, however, be stated with all clearness that nowhere and at no time in the history of the Church has the Holy Eucharist been regarded as the actual means of absolution. It was not open to any person who had not found forgiveness to approach Communion in order that the Holy Eucharist, coming into touch with the unabsolved sinner, might thereby absolve him. Of the cleansing power of the Eucharist to wash the forgiven sinner 'more and more,' of the yearning that so 'our sinful bodies may be made clean by His Body, and our souls washed through His most precious Blood,' the Church is ever conscious. For the unreconciled is the warning that 'the danger is great if we receive the same unworthily. For then we are guilty of the Body and Blood of Christ our Saviour; we eat and drink our own damnation, not considering the Lord's Body' (*English Prayer Book*).

LITERATURE.—See list under PENANCE (Roman Catholic). J. Morin, *Comment. hist. de disciplina Penitentia*, Paris, 1651, a monument of learning, remains the most complete treatise on the subject; N. Marshall, *The Penitential Discipline of the Primitive Church for the first four hundred Years after Christ*, London, 1714, interesting as representing the Anglican position in the time of Queen Anne, is largely indebted to Morin (reprint in Library of Anglo-Catholic Theology, Oxford, 1844); P. Batiffol, 'Les Origines de la pénitence,' in *Études d'histoire et de théologie positive*, i., Paris, 1902, pp. 45-222, is an excellent presentation of modern historical results. On exomologesis see E. B. Pusey, note L in the Tertullian vol. of the Library of the Fathers, London, 1854, p. 377. On the penitentials, F. W. H. Wasserschleben and H. J. Schmitz as in Literature of preceding art.; for English and British penitentials, A. W. Haddan and W. Stubbs, *Councils and Ecclesiastical Documents*, 3 vols., Oxford, 1869-78; for St. Columbanus, A. Malnory, *Quid Luxovienses monachi discipuli sancti Columbani ad regulam monasteriorum atque ad communem Ecclesiam profectum contulerint*, Paris, 1894. For Anglican practice, E. B. Pusey, *Advice on Hearing Confession* (adapted from J. J. Gaume), with Preface embodying English Authorities on Confession, Oxford, 1877-80; O. D. Watkins, *A Hist. of Penance*, now in the press, is a series of studies of primary authorities, of which a full collection will be found printed in the original languages.

OSCAR D. WATKINS.

PENITENCE.—Penitence is a sorrow for sin as an offence against God, and involves a purpose of amendment. A regret for sin not based on its intrinsic sinful character, viz. its offensiveness towards God, would not be penitence; and a regret not involving the purpose of amendment, or a resolve of amendment without hatred of sin, would not be penitence. On the other hand, a purpose of expiation or satisfaction does not seem to be of the essence of true penitence, except in so far as such satisfaction is inseparable from the process of amendment itself. Thus, a murderer may sincerely repent for homicide, be firmly resolved not to commit it again, and yet endeavour to evade the punishment if he can.

Accordingly, the common Protestant view of penance or repentance for sins is that, as a conversion of a soul to God, it involves, by the mercy of God, complete forgiveness both of sin and of the penalty due to sin, without the necessity of works of penance or expiation, for which the satisfaction of Christ is considered fully sufficient.

In the Roman Catholic doctrine penitence is considered a distinct virtue or disposition of the

soul. The Council of Trent (1551) defines (sess. xiv. can. 1) that it was at all times before Christ necessary for the remission of grievous sins, and that in the Christian dispensation sins committed after baptism are actually and judicially forgiven by the Church, in virtue of the power of the keys, through a rite which is truly a sacrament of the New Law, and based on the words of Christ (Jn 20²¹⁻²³):

'Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose soever sins ye forgive, they are forgiven unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained.'

Cf. Penance.

E. L. VAN BECELAERE.

PENTECOST.—See FESTIVALS AND FASTS (Christian).

PERCEPTION.—Simple as perception may appear as set forth in a psychological system, yet in the history of speculation its discussion has raised the deepest questions in philosophy. We need not recall the answers to the question of the possibility of knowledge, on the supposition that mind and matter were separated by the whole diameter of being. It would mean writing a history of philosophy—at all events from the time of Descartes. It would mean writing the story of Scottish philosophy, and an account of the Scottish answers to Hume, especially the answer of Reid. For these answers relate to the question, What do I perceive? What is the object before me when I perceive? Is it always a state of my consciousness, an idea, which is not external to me, but only somehow related to an external reality? Materialism, idealism, and realism give their answers to the question each in its own way.

Science in its speculative moods has been busy with the question. Those who approach it from without, and are mainly concerned with the natural and physiological processes which precede and influence the act of perception, seek to show that perception is conditioned by the constitution of the whole world. The simplest act of perception, they say, involves for sight all the properties of the ether and all the laws of optics; and for hearing they indicate what are the laws of sound, and how these condition the act of hearing. After showing the conditions imposed by the constitution of the external world on the process which issues in perception, they proceed to investigate and describe the conditions imposed by what may be called the physiological procedure of the body. This usually describes the sense-organs, the afferent and efferent nerves, and the connexions of the surface of the body with the central nervous system and the brain. It is not usually contended that the subject is conscious of the strains and stresses of the nervous system or of the movements in the brain which accompany sensation and perception. But it is often implied that consciousness results from and is conditioned by those nervous movements. On the whole, it may be said that, taking into consideration the material conditions imposed by the external world and those imposed by the constitution of the sense-organs, the outcome is to regard consciousness as an effect, and an effect to be explained by the convergence of physical and physiological antecedents to the possibility of having a sensation. It may be admitted that sensation is impossible apart from these physical and physiological conditions. Sight needs both the ethereal vibrations which we call light and the nervous system with all its complications. But, while these are necessary conditions of vision, vision itself implies something more.

It is necessary to make another preliminary remark. After we have studied, as far as we may, the external conditions of the possibility of sensa-

tion and the physiological processes which issue in having a sensation, it is necessary to look at sensation as a conscious experience of the subject. This is another inquiry, to be conducted under other conditions and with other modes of investigation. The machinery that we use is introspection, and the method is by the interrogation of consciousness. Introspection has its difficulties. There is the difficulty arising from the swift movement of states of consciousness and the fact that, when we fix attention on a state, it has already passed into the background. Each movement has its content, and it is difficult to arrest its progress without changing it. Indeed, it is a question whether we can fix our attention on a state of consciousness without influencing that state in some way. This difficulty has been discussed by F. H. Bradley:

'We all, when our attention is directed to our extremities or to some internal organ, may become aware of sensations which previously we did not notice. And with regard to these sensations there may be a doubt whether they were actually there before, or have on the other hand been made by our attending. And though this question may seem simple, it really is difficult. Can we directly compare attention's object with something to which we do not at all attend? To answer in the affirmative appears not easy. Can we then recall what we have not noticed, and, now attending to this, compare it with some other object? If reproduction necessarily depended on attention, any such process would seem impossible. But, since in any case this view of reproduction must be rejected as erroneous, we may reply confidently that the above comparison is a thing which actually happens. Still asserting the possibility and the general principle, we have not removed all doubt as to the special fact. For how do I know in a given case that my present attending has not vitally transformed the result? Am I to postulate that in principle attention does not and cannot alter its object? Such an assumption, so far as I can see, could hardly be justified. Certainly, apart from such an assumption, we may argue that any effect of attention requires time, and that hence, if the sensation appears as soon as we attend, the sensation must have preceded. And this inference is strengthened when we are able to pass thus repeatedly and with the same result from inattention to its opposite. Still, at its strongest, an argument of this kind seems far from conclusive. And in any case I cannot think that no more than this is the actual ground of our confidence when we refuse to believe that attention has made the thing that we feel. I agree that in some cases we recollect our state before attention supervened, though such a recollection in most cases, I should say, is absent. And, again usually, and if you please always, we have the persisting after-sensation or after-feeling of our previous condition. But, all this being admitted, the question as to the actual ground of our confidence remains. In order to compare our previous state we *ex hypothesi* are now forced to attend to it, and there is a doubt, whether we can assume generally that attention does not alter. We have therefore to ask whether we are in a maze with no legitimate exit, and whether such a result, if accepted, does not throw doubt on the whole subject [of immediate experience]' (*Essays on Truth and Reality*, Oxford, 1914, pp. 161-163).

Whether there has been a time in the history of life in which immediate experience was possible is a question not easily determined; it is also impossible to say that there will be a time in which immediacy is altogether transcended. For life has never been a matter of pure feeling or immediacy, and for the most developed human intelligence the immediacy of feeling is a fact that is never transcended. Perception is something different from feeling and from sensation. It is at least the cognition or the recognition of something related to the feeling in some way or other. It is an activity of the subject, in which it seeks to determine and interpret, or at least to recognize something in sensation which is more than the sensation.

At this stage it is expedient to deal with a new term—'presentation'—which seems to avoid the difficulty elaborated by Bradley regarding the intervention of attention and the result of that intervention. This word plays a great part in the psychology of Ward and Stout.

'All that variety of mental facts which we speak of as sensations, perceptions, images, intuitions, concepts, notions, have two characteristics in common:—(1) they admit of being more or less attended to, and (2) can be reproduced and associated together. It is here proposed to use the term presentation to connote such a mental fact, and as the best English equivalent

for what Locke meant by idea and what Kant and Herbart called a *Vorstellung*.

A presentation has then a twofold relation,—first, directly to the subject, and secondly, to other presentations. By the first is meant the fact that the presentation is attended to, that the subject is more or less conscious of it: it is "in his mind" or presented. As presented to a subject a presentation might with advantage be called an object, or perhaps a psychical object, to distinguish it from what are called objects apart from presentation, i.e., conceived as independent of any particular subject. Locke, as we have seen, did so call it; still, to avoid possible confusion, it may turn out best to dispense with the frequent use of object in this sense. But on one account, at least, it is desirable not to lose sight altogether of this which is after all the stricter as well as the older signification of object, namely, because it enables us to express definitely, without implicating any ontological theory, what we have so far seen reason to think is the fundamental fact in psychology. Instead of depending mainly on that vague and treacherous word "consciousness," or committing ourselves to the position that ideas are modifications of a certain mental substance and identical with the subject to which they are presented, we may leave all this on one side, and say that ideas are objects, and the relation of objects to subjects—that whereby the one is object and the other subject—is presentation (J. Ward, art. 'Psychology,' in *EB* xx. 41).

It is well to have a term to fulfil the useful function described. We carry with us the fact that presentations admit of being more or less attended to. But, as we read on, we find:

'As to the subjective relation of objects, the relation of presentation itself, we have merely to note that on the side of the subject it implies what, for want of a better word, may be called *attention*, extending the denotation of this term so as to include even what we ordinarily call *inattention*.'

This adds to the difficulties expressed by Bradley as to the effect of attention on that to which we attend. If we extend the meaning of attention to include inattention, what becomes of the rôle which attention plays, according to Ward, in our mental experience? The relation of a presentation to a subject is the fact that it is attended to, he says, but then it appears that it is still a presentation, even if it is not attended to. If the meaning of attention is extended to include inattention, then it is wholly indistinguishable from consciousness—that 'vague and treacherous word' on which Ward refuses to depend. Presentation in the language of Ward seems to mean anything of which the subject is aware, whether attended to or not.

On the other hand, Stout, while keeping the term 'presentation,' uses it in a sense and according to a definition of his own. He writes:

'I have endeavoured to bring out clearly the special nature and function of Presentation. It will be seen that I do not here follow Dr. Ward in his comprehensive use of this word as covering "whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks." I cannot do this because the term is the only convenient one which I can find for a certain special kind of object, possessing a distinctive character and function of the utmost importance. . . . It is convenient to have a common name to cover all the varieties of immediate experience which have an objective character. We may agree to call all immediate experiences which are primarily objective "Presentations"' (*Manual of Psychology*³, London, 1913, pp. v, 101).

The term, whether in the sense of Ward or in the more limited sense of Stout, enables them to set forth a large part of our experience without any attempt to delineate that side of experience which involves the activity of the subject, and without forcing them at that early stage to grapple with the difficulties of subjective experience. When they come to deal with cognitive process, whether perceptual or conceptual, they have the advantage of all that they have formulated under the name of 'presentations.' Presentations are largely treated as if they went by themselves, and under that treatment hardly anything is said about the subject for which the presentations are. It may be that for purposes of exposition psychologists are compelled to isolate certain problems, to treat them as if they were in fact isolated, and to try to solve them with the means which they have in hand at the stage at which they have arrived in their exposition. But, when we look at the solution, we find that they have, unconsciously perhaps, assumed

the resources of the mind, and brought in for use all the higher categories which they have not yet reached.

We submit that the function ascribed to presentations is one which they are unfitted to discharge. Presentations are retained, associated, and reproduced not from any virtue in themselves, but because these are the ways which the mind has of arranging its experiences or of recognizing ways in which order has to be won.

We have made this caveat because it seems of importance in relation to the question of perception with which we more immediately deal. Here, too, we have to complain of the way in which problems are isolated by psychologists. Perception is treated in isolation, and its processes as if it was a process by itself. 'Conceptions without perceptions are empty, and perceptions without conceptions are blind.' It may be well to have this oft-quoted maxim in the words of Kant himself, 'Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind' (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, original ed., Riga, 1781, p. 51, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Berlin, 1900-13, I. iv. 48). The maxim has been translated by Max Müller as follows: 'Thoughts without contents are empty, and intuitions without concepts are blind.' *Anschauungen*, here translated 'intuitions,' is translated by almost all English commentators 'perceptions.' It is so used by Edward Caird in his great work on Kant, and by John Watson (*The Philosophy of Kant Explained*, Glasgow, 1908), who invariably translates it by 'perceptions.' Thus, when describing Kant's 'Axiomen der Anschauung,' he writes:

'These fundamental judgments, or principles of understanding, he classifies as (1) axioms of perception, (2) anticipations of observation, (3) analogies of experience, and (4) postulates of empirical thought' (p. 179).

It is to be observed that Watson translates *Anschauung* by 'perception,' and *Wahrnehmung* by 'observation.' Now, *Wahrnehmung* is the usual word for 'perception' and is mostly used so in German philosophical literature; e.g., in F. Kirchner's *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Grundbegriffe* (Leipzig, 1911), s.v. 'Wahrnehmung,' it is written:

'Im wesentlichen deckt sich also der Begriff der Wahrnehmung mit dem der Anschauung. Will man beide unterscheiden, so kann dies mit Wundt so geschehen, dass man bei dem Ausdruck Wahrnehmung mehr die Auffassung des Gegenstandes nach seiner wirklichen Beschaffenheit, bei dem Ausdruck Anschauung dagegen vorzugsweise die dabei vorhandene Tätigkeit unseres Bewusstseins im Auge hat' (p. 1035).

Something like this distinction must have been in the mind of Kant when he wrote 'Axiomen der Anschauung' and 'Anticipationen der Wahrnehmung,' the latter of which Watson renders 'anticipations of observation.' It is not a happy rendering. There is no doubt that Kant's language lays stress on the activity of the mind when he deliberately and consistently uses the word which Max Müller translates 'intuition.' We may use the translation 'perception,' if we remember that stress is laid on the activity of the mind in perceiving.

Kant nowhere formally dealt with perception in itself, nor did he give an account of it from the psychological or metaphysical point of view. In fact, the reference to *Anschauung* in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' is not consistent with that in the 'Transcendental Analytic.'

According to Kant, the process from perception to knowledge is possible because of our continued consciousness in time. It is governed by certain principles and determined in certain ways.

'These principles depend upon the part played by space and time in all our perception, and the manner in which we employ time and space in placing together our discontinuous perceptions. Now, obviously it is quite possible to hold this position without having thought out what is implied in being present to the mind in perception. This is what Kant did. He describes perception in different and inconsistent ways. The reason for this lac-

sistency is that Kant is not concerned with the nature of perception, but with the relation of what is immediately perceived to what is not but may be immediately perceived, and be therefore never worked out any consistent account of perception. He sometimes talks of perception reaching objects directly, and refutes the view that we perceive only what is in our mind. . . . But usually he takes the ordinary idealist view that we do not perceive things, but affections produced in us by things. Owing to this inconsistency, Kant constantly seems to be stating very much more than he has any right to. This is specially true in all that he says about knowledge being confined to phenomena and not extending to things in themselves. When he talks of our knowing only phenomena, he sometimes seems to mean that we know objects, things in themselves, only in part, in so far as they appear to us. That would make the distinction between the phenomenon and the thing in itself a distinction between the same thing imperfectly and perfectly understood. He sometimes, and this is the more usual view, seems to mean that we are aware of appearances, entities separate and distinguishable from the objects which produce them in our minds. But if we work out in any of Kant's arguments the point of his appeal to the fact that knowledge is only of phenomena, we shall find that in every case the difference between a subjective idealist and a realist view of perception, of what "being present to the mind" means, is irrelevant, and that his argument holds on either theory' (A. D. Lindsay, *The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, London, 1918, p. 48 f.).

As we are not concerned with the main argument of the Kantian philosophy, but only with perception, we may accept Lindsay's statement as sufficient. Yet it must be said that Kant's treatment of perception is not satisfactory. At one time perception seems to be purely passive, as when he says:

'Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of our soul; the first receives representations (receptivity of impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object by these representations (spontaneity of concepts). By the first an object is *given* us, by the second the object is *thought*, in relation to that representation which is a mere determination of the soul. Intuition, therefore, and concepts constitute the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition corresponding to them, nor intuition without concepts can yield any real knowledge' (*Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. F. Max Müller, London, 1881, p. 44).

Immediately Kant is met with the difficulty of showing that representations which are passively received can become elements in the activity which makes knowledge. Generally he so separates the understanding from the perceptive experience that he has great difficulty in finding any point of contact between them. But, as he goes on, we find that he is constrained to discover a very close connexion, though only at the cost of attributing an intellectual activity of a sort to perception. In the 'Transcendental Analytic' he seeks to connect the working of the understanding with perception. This he accomplishes through the synthetic power of imagination.

He begins with the phenomenon, 'which, if connected with consciousness, is called *perception*'. Without its relation to an at least possible consciousness, the phenomenon could never become to us an object of knowledge. It would therefore be nothing to us; and because it has no objective reality in itself, but exists only in its being known, it would be nothing at

tion, and the function of which as applied to perceptions I call *apprehension*. This imagination is meant to change the manifold of intuition into an image; it must therefore first receive the impressions by its own activity, which I call to *apprehend*' (ib. p. 105 f.).

This is not the only place in which Kant emphasizes the activity of the mind in relation to perceptions. But, if there is an activity of thought manifest in sensuous perception—and Kant's account of what is meant by 'apprehension' is decisive in this relation—then perception cannot be the merely passive process on which he lays so much stress in the foregoing quotation. Perception and thought cannot be two wholly distinct activities of consciousness. Passive perception is meaningless, and, if perception be an activity, it cannot be shut out from thought in the way postulated by Kant.

The present writer's contention is that perception is an activity, that it is part of the cognitive process, and is at least the active reaction of the mind

against what has been presented to it. Nor can we refuse to the perceptive activity of the mind the help of those categories which appear in all their activity at a further stage of the evolution of knowledge. It is not at all certain that what is presented to us as given is a manifold. Sensuous presentations are sifted in the act of being presented. They are not a 'big buzzing confusion'; they are so far ordered in the very presentation of them. It is not necessary to enter on a description of the senses from the physiological side. All that we need here is to mention that it is an ordered sensibility that is described. The relation of light to vision, the relation of atmospheric vibrations to hearing, and the relation of odours to smelling do not give one the impression that he is reading of a mere manifold, into which order is to be introduced by the categories of the understanding. The eye may be said to select out of the external universe those manifestations to which it is adapted. The same may be said of all the other senses. Kant, it must be said in fairness, does not dwell on this aspect of the inquiry. He is concerned with the problem of how the universality and the necessity which are essential for a valid judgment can be introduced into our sensations and perceptions. From the fact that he has denied to perception the power of apodictic judgment, and from his doctrine that a concept is necessary for a universal judgment, we conclude that he has forgotten that in the given there is already a principle which consciousness does not make, but only recognizes. He has with fullness discussed the question of the way in which we effect necessary synthesis in sense-perceptions. He deals with such propositions as 'The room is warm,' 'Sugar is sweet,' and insists that these are only references to the same subject, and only to the actual state of the subject at the moment. They are not judgments of experience; they are only judgments of sense-perception. When he deals with sense-perceptions which are to have universal validity, he introduces the additional fact that they are referred not only to the same subject but also to one another. But, if they are referred to one another, there are plainly recognized elements which do not depend on the mere sensibility or the idiosyncrasy of the subject, but are common to all subjects. Kant, however, always insists on the view that judgment proper belongs to the understanding alone, and that necessity and universality do not belong to sense; it is the characteristic of the understanding.

Perception, therefore, is more than Kant allows to it. It is already intelligent, active, and synthetic. And the relation between perception and conception has to be considered afresh and on their merits. Take the view of Herbert Spencer, which is also that of Höffding:

'In all cases we have found that Perception is an establishment of specific relations among states of consciousness; and is thus distinguished from the establishment of these states of consciousness themselves. . . . The mind is occupied by classes as such or by something producing it, the mind is occupied with the relations between that affection and others, either past or present, which it classes with like relations' (Spencer, *The Principles of Psychology*³, London, 1890, II. 251).

Clearly in this passage, and, indeed, in his whole treatment of perception, Spencer attributes to perception functions which, according to Kant, belong to the understanding alone. We may also quote Höffding on this important point:

'The complex nature of perception affords an important contribution to the determination of the relation between sensuous perception and thought. Since perception rests on a process which may be described as involuntary comparison, it manifests itself as an activity of thought, by means of which we appropriate what is given in the sensation, incorporate the sensation into the content of our consciousness. If, then, an activity of thought is manifested in sensuous perception, it is evident that sensuous perception and thought cannot be two

wholly distinct activities of consciousness. There is no such thing as absolutely passive sensuous perception. What is received into consciousness is at once worked up in accordance with the laws of consciousness' (*Outlines of Psychology*, Eng. tr., London, 1891, p. 130).

It may be well, at this stage, to assert boldly that the cognitive process is one from beginning to end. It is no more possible to divide it into separate phases than it is to partition off the mind into separate faculties. It may be valuable to distinguish various stages of it, and indicate what seem to be points of departure, but these distinctions are not to be pressed as if they were absolute. For a rational being perception is not possible without thought, and the first act of cognition achieved by the infant mind involves thinking, and thinking of the same kind as is manifested in grasping the formula of the law of gravitation. Thus we are unable to follow in the steps of James or Stout when they deal with the perceptive process as if it could go along without the guiding power of thought. James quotes with approval the following definition of perception from Sully's *Outlines*:

'Perception may be defined as that process by which the mind "supplements a sense-impression by an accompaniment or escort of revived sensations, the whole aggregate of actual and revived sensations being solidified or 'integrated' into the form of a percept, that is, an apparently immediate apprehension or cognition of an object now present in a particular locality or region of space'" (*Principles of Psychology*, London, 1905, ii. 79).

Or, as James says in his usual picturesque and incisive fashion, and in italics, 'Every perception is an acquired perception.' Every percept is so far built up by the mind itself, in accordance with its own nature and disposition. Thus a presentation, if we call it so, is an object of which the subject is aware, but, whether it is a percept or a concept, it has been constituted as an object by the activity of the mind. In other words, we utterly disagree with the view that speaks of presentations as if they can exist for the mind without representations. Sully's definition and James's maxim alike involve the fact that presentations imply representations, that cognition even in its most elementary form implies recognition.

With Stout let us take it that 'perceptual intelligence, in its pure form, is exclusively concerned with the guidance and control of motor activity in relation to an immediately present situation and to its acquired meaning as conveyed by implicit ideas inseparably coalescing with actual sensations. Thus, the perceptual consciousness cannot deal with past, future, and absent objects except in the act of dealing with what is given to it here and now. In the pursuit of ends it is circumscribed by the necessity of always working forward step by step from the actually given situation through a series of others until the goal is reached. It is limited in a way comparable to actual motion; just as in actual motion we cannot transport ourselves from one place to another except by passing through the series of intermediate places, so in perceptual process we cannot transport ourselves in thought into the future except through an immediate series of presents' (p. 365).

Stout has limited his description of perceptual intelligence by postulating that it is 'in its pure form.' He seems to find the realization of that pure form in the picture of the kitten at play. He grants that perceptions 'form series having a certain unity and continuity similar to trains of ideas or trains of thought.' But all these are dominated by the present situation, and continue to be so dominated, for apparently in the perceptual process we never get beyond the present situation. But one asks, How is the present situation constituted? Confessedly it is a complex situation, for it has an acquired meaning as conveyed by implicit ideas. That is curious in a situation which cannot deal with past, future, and absent objects except in the act of dealing with them here and now. What of the acquired meaning? Is there no consciousness of how that meaning arose? Stout describes an impossible situation. It is not possible so to delimit the perceptual attitude as to confine it to a present situation. Even if we grant

that it is possible in merely animal intelligence, it is out of the question in beings who are implicitly rational from the beginning of their existence. The presence of rationality transforms all intelligence, such as intelligence in beings who are irrational through and through, and to isolate perceptive intelligence from thought in general is an illegitimate procedure. It does not help us to limit perceptual intelligence to a situation described as present, for it has elements which are not present in what is actually in the situation, and the perceptive intelligence is aware of them.

Perception has in it all the characteristics which belong to intellectual activity at its highest. Organized perception succinctly describes all the activity of the intelligence. Instead of dividing the substance of mental action into successive planes or grades of sensibility and understanding, it would be more to the purpose to recognize in perception an implicit mental activity which has only to be made explicit in order to give us all that we need to know regarding the procedure of the mind in the acquisition of knowledge. If every perception is acquired, and if the process of acquisition is as prolonged and as complex as psychologists describe, how are we to shut off from the process of modification and growth of percepts that process of evolution which is subsequently described as conception? May not conception be an element in the formation of a percept? Psychologists do not limit the perceptual process to a description of the simple reaction of the mind against a sensation. Nor do they limit it to what is actually present to the mind in that reaction. For they postulate retentiveness and reproduction, and they also prove that attention is involved. As is observed by Stout, 'attention is always in some manner expectant or prospective' (p. 367). If attention is an element in our appreciation of the present situation, then the present situation is not altogether present, nor can the past be shut out from the present situation, for there are the phenomena of retentiveness and reproduction to be taken into account. What Stout has given with the one hand he seems to take away with the other.

If we work out any situation which is the object of perception, we find it inextricably connected with the past and the future. Ought we not to extend the meaning of perception to make it correspond to the facts? Looking at the facts, we find that there is no presentation which is not also a representation, and no cognition which is not also a recognition. We cannot find an object which is not complex, and which is not an object until somehow it is differentiated and discriminated from other objects. It is vain to seek to make distinctions the aim of which is to shut out all reference to those principles which we set forth explicitly when we have so far completed the analysis of the mental processes. For the principles which have come to clear consciousness through analysis are there in every act of knowledge, and we simply delude ourselves by calling them by names which seem to involve less than the whole action of the mind, and yet do involve all that action. It is not possible to keep, as Stout seems to try to do, the action of thought at the perceptual level, for at every step of the description the power of thought is present, intrusive, and active.

We may observe here that the ordinary use of language is against such a limitation as is presented in these treatises of psychology. We may take two illustrations of the meaning of the word 'perceive' from the AV of the Bible. We need not refer to the fact that the word 'perceive' is the translation of two different Greek words, for our purpose is simply to illustrate the usage of the English language.

'Sir, I perceive that thou art a prophet' (Jn 4⁹), says the woman of Samaria, and the perception was the outcome of the whole previous conversation, and of all that she had learned and understood of the character and function of a prophet. It is a conclusion drawn from a long process of thought and reflection, and she puts it as a 'perception.' Was she wrong, from a psychological point of view? If so, she errs in good company. The other Scripture passage we take from the speech of Peter to Cornelius: 'Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons' (Ao 10³⁴). But this perception was the result of a long and complicated process of persuasion through which Peter was led to overcome many prejudices, and to make a new departure of the greatest significance to himself and others. We need not detail the steps by which Peter was led to this conclusion. The significant thing is that he can call the conclusion to a long and complicated series of experiences by the name 'perception.' In this we plead that he was psychologically correct. It is consistent with ordinary experience. And a perception may be the justifiable outcome of an experience in which all the factors of intelligence have been obviously at work.

We quote an instance from another writer, which illustrates another aspect of the problem. Hort, speaking of the Western Text of the NT and of its rejection by many critics, says:

'This all but universal rejection is doubtless partly owing to the persistent influence of a whimsical theory of the last century, which, ignoring all Non-Latin Western documentary evidence except the handful of extant bilingual uncials, maintained that the Western Greek text owed its peculiarities to translation from the Latin; partly to an imperfect apprehension of the antiquity and extension of the Western text as revealed by patristic quotations and by versions. Yet, even with the aid of a true perception of the facts of Ante-Nicene textual history, it would have been strange if this text as a whole had found much favour' (B. F. Westcott and F. J. A. Hort, *The NT in the Original Greek*, Cambridge and London, 1881-82, II., 'Introduction', p. 120).

We quote the passage simply for its use of the word 'perception.' It is good English. Is it also good psychology? Is Hort justified in his use of the word 'perception' to describe the result of a long process of observation of the manifold facts and phenomena of MSS, versions, Patristic quotations, and so on? It is as complex a series of facts as ever was presented to the human mind, and yet Hort called the outcome of it all a 'perception.' If he is justified, then we may rightly call the outcome of all experience in any sphere a 'perception'—all our investigations, all our conceptions, all our generalizations, may go to form a perception.

If this is psychologically justifiable, as well as consonant with the usage of the English language, it will be necessary to revise our psychology. It will be necessary to look at perception as a final term, recapitulative of a long process of experience in which all the resources of the mind have been at work. At present, mainly under the influence of Kant, percepts are regarded as raw material waiting to be gathered up into a unity by means of rules brought to bear on them by the understanding. This view is partial and has some justification, in so far as percepts have to be organized and brought under rule. But what is the source of the rule? Are we to pass into a country foreign to the perceptual powers and wait for a rule to be given by something outside of the perceptual process? Is not the rule given already in the very description of the perceptual process? At all events, the perceptual process cannot be described without the rules which are supposed to be brought to it by the higher faculty.

It is to be observed that there is no recognition in our text-books of psychology of the reverse process, which issues in a perception as the outcome of a long experience. And this is a real experience, familiar in every department of human activity. It is indeed a commonplace of literature. Experience does attain to a prophetic strain and culminates in insight into a situation of the most complex order. Illustrations of the fact abound, and are so obvious that they hardly need be mentioned. It may be useful, however, to refer to the part which language plays in the evolution of the mind of a child. It has been contended by some

(e.g., J. T. Merz, *Religion and Science*, Edinburgh, 1915) that the first impression on the mind of a child is made through persons. This, at all events, is true, that a child begins very early to speak and to understand speech. This fact must have a great influence on our view of perception; for crude perception, if there ever is such a thing, is certainly modified by it. All language is abstract, and one part of the education of a child is to attach meanings more or less definite to the words that he has learned—to find concrete illustrations of them. This is true of the ordinary intercourse in a family; it is still more so when the child begins to read, and to use language more abstract than that used in the family. In fact, a great part of the education of a man is to translate out of the books that he has read into the language of common life the words that he happens to come across. General ideas are only pale ghosts until they are touched with the vividness of a perception. As the knowledge of the mind grows, and the words become more technical and more abstract, the necessity of translation into perceptions becomes more urgent. But, as knowledge grows, so the perceptions grow until a man learns to perceive a whole situation as the immediate thing to be grasped by the mind in an intuition or a perception, as the case may be, for from this point of view perception and intuition mean the same thing. We can never be sure that we have grasped the essential meaning of a situation until we have gathered it into a perception which enables us to come to a decision or to take appropriate action.

Instances of the way in which the whole experience of a lifetime may be gathered into a view of the situation present at a given moment that will enable a man to make a decision adequate to the circumstances, and fit to initiate or to terminate a course of action, are of everyday occurrence. Whatever a man's trade, occupation, or profession may be, his success in it will depend on how much of his experience he may be able to gather up in view of a situation with which he has to deal.

From Schopenhauer, who, whatever we may think of his philosophy in general or of his personal attitude towards life, has flashes of insight and apprehension worthy of all admiration, we learn something which we cannot find in any other thinker:

'Strictly speaking, all thinking, i.e. combining of abstract conceptions, has at the most the recollections of earlier perceptions for its material, and this material is not a mere substitute for the original perceptions, but is the very perception itself. Now the concepts which the reason has framed and the memory has preserved cannot all be present to consciousness at once, but only a very small number of them at a time. On the other hand, the energy with which we apprehend what is present in perception, in which really all that is essential in all things generally is virtually contained and represented, is apprehended, fills the consciousness in one moment with its whole power. Upon this depends the infinite superiority of genius to learning; they stand to each other as the text of an ancient classic to its commentary. All truth and all wisdom really lies ultimately in perception. But this unfortunately can neither be retained nor communicated. The objective conditions of such communication can certainly be presented to others purified and illustrated through plastic and pictorial art, and even much more directly through poetry; but it depends so much upon subjective conditions, which are not at the command of every one, and of no one at all times, nay, indeed, in the higher degrees of perfection, are only the gift of the favoured few' (*The World as Will and Idea*, tr. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, London, 1883-86, II. 247 f.).

Again, a little later on, he says:

'Perception is not only the source of all knowledge, but is itself knowledge *κατ' εἶδος*, is the only unconditionally true, genuine knowledge completely worthy of the name. For it alone imparts insight properly so called, it alone is actually assimilated by man, passes into his nature, and can with full reason be called his; while the conceptions merely cling to him. In the fourth book we see indeed that true virtue proceeds from knowledge of perception or intuitive knowledge; for only those actions which are directly called forth by this, and therefore are performed purely from the impulse of our own nature, are properly symptoms of our true and unalterable character; not so those which, resulting from reflection and its dogmas, are

often extorted from the character, and therefore have no unalterable ground in us. But *wisdom* also, the true view of life, the correct eye, and the soaring judgment, proceeds from the way in which this man apprehends the perceptible world, but not from his mere abstract knowledge, that is, not from abstract conceptions. The basis or ultimate content of every science consists not in proofs, nor in what is proved, but in the unproved foundations of the proofs, which can finally be apprehended only through perception. So also the basis of the true wisdom and real insight of each man does not consist in conceptions and in abstract rational knowledge, but in what is perceived, and in the degree of acuteness, accuracy and profundity with which he has apprehended it' (p. 252).

Schopenhauer's doctrine of perception is helpful, but must be amended in two respects: (1) in relation to his contention that perception is personal only and incommunicable; and (2) there is no recognition of what we regard as true and essential, namely the fact that conceptions, and abstract reasoning generally, may add to the contents, extent, and validity of a perception. Schopenhauer says:

'If perceptions were communicable, that would be a communication worth the trouble: but at last every one must remain in his own skin and skull, and no one can help another. To enrich the conception from perception is the unceasing endeavour of poetry and philosophy' (p. 248).

In this Schopenhauer approaches very near to a contradiction in terms. He asserts that perceptions are incommunicable, and yet adds that poetry and philosophy are striving unceasingly to enrich conceptions from perception. Are philosophy and poetry incommunicable? Are not poets and philosophers incessantly striving to communicate their perceptions to their readers? Are they unsuccessful in this endeavour? Let the popularity of poets—the popular appreciation of poets from Homer downwards—give the answer. The man in the street may not be able to see the poet's vision in all its splendour, but he sees something of it, sufficient at least to discern that the poet has had a vision, and by diligence he also may have some share in it. For all humanity is in every man, and all the gains of humanity may become his portion. But the second assumption is, after all, the more important. Our contention is that, as perceptions enrich conceptions, so conceptions may enrich perceptions. We are aware that the possibility of this has been ignored altogether by most thinkers on this subject, and yet we believe that it is true. Here again illustrations abound in every department of human activity. Let us select one which may be regarded as typical.

Before us is a picture of the Forth Bridge. I have a clear perception of its form, and I see that it is stretched across the Firth at a sufficient height to allow ships to pass beneath it. I see also that it is of sufficient strength to bear all the trains which need to cross it on their way from south to north or from north to south. I can also see how much it shortens the railway journey, and how greatly it facilitates traffic. These thoughts arise within me as I look at the bridge, and all are part of its meaning to me. That is the perception which this bridge presents to an ordinary traveller. But the perception of this bridge varies with the experience and culture of this traveller; it may mean much or little, but it does mean something for everybody. Every one sees that it is something which can afford communication from one shore to another, and every one understands something of its usefulness. But the range of this perception varies with the culture of the individual, and the perception will grow from more to more according to the particular interest, knowledge, and experience which the spectator carries with him towards the mere appearance, which is the same for every one. There the bridge stands, stretching from shore to shore, and across it trains speed night and day. It has some meaning for all, but to each the meaning is greater or less according to the number of concepts which he can pack into the perception.

Let us lay aside for the moment the perception of the bridge as it appears to the ordinary traveller, and consider how it became what it is. The outcome of the whole process of its becoming is that it stands there visible to the eye, and men can perceive it. But before it became a visible and tangible fact it was present to the mind of some man, or men, as a hope and an aspiration. The hope was to complete the bridge and to afford a shorter and easier way for traffic to be carried. But this purpose needed realization, and the engineer set himself to design the bridge. He had to study profoundly all that mathematics and mechanics could tell him of curves, strains, wind-pressure, climatic conditions, the allowance for expansion, if this bridge was to be made of steel, and also the height to which

it must be raised in order to leave a fair sea-way and to afford an easy gradient for trains to ascend from this level of the neighbouring land. Then he had to calculate the strength of material, and the mathematical form of the curves which would give at once the greatest strength and the greatest economy of material. A thousand other qualifications were also necessary, but we have enumerated a sufficient number to explain our meaning. The engineer had the benefit of all the experience of engineers since engineering began, and that has been condensed for him into hooks and formulae. He had his own experience also, and he had to use them all if his work was to be successfully done. This is our point—all this experience of engineers, all the experience of this particular engineer, all the formulae of mathematics, all the achievements of physics, and all the conceptions available for this purpose have to be used to produce the design of the bridge, and to condense it into a perception, which may become a picture for the eyes of this ordinary man. All these conceptions have been constrained into this service of this perception. Nor is this perception incommunicable, as Schopenhauer asserts. The plans and specifications are drawn out and are set before the contractors. There are drawings of the most specific and detailed order; there are specifications dealing with every part of the bridge; and the contractors must master these before they offer to construct the bridge. The work of the engineer is communicated to the contractor. What the engineer has condensed into the picture of the bridge in his design the contractor must translate into the material of which the bridge is to be built. Thus the perception of the bridge can be communicated, and it can be realized. We do not see any reason why we should not call the thought that we have of this bridge a perception (it has all the marks of a perception) and the knowledge which we have of it, or rather the knowledge which the engineer had of it, when his design was complete.

Direct, immediate knowledge of a situation may be the outcome of long meditation, of endeavours which have employed all the resources of science, all the powers of reflexion, and even all the powers of thought, in order to understand all the forces and characters which have entered into the situation and made it what it is. Not until we have thus defined the situation can we be said to have it under our control and be in a position to form a resolution and pass it into action.

But in truth this power of gathering up into a present whole the experience of a life and bringing it to bear on any given situation is one which is characteristic of every master of men—admiral, general, or political leader. If he is unable to see a situation, or if he is unable to avail himself of his knowledge and experience, if he cannot focus them all into a living whole and perceive them as present, he will break down at the moment when a decision has to be made, and action which ought to be inevitable will become vague, indefinite, and confused. This power is, so far, present in every man, and the perceptions of every successful man may be seen to be of gradual growth and of growing intensity. There is no difference in kind between the perceptions of one man and those of another; the difference lies in the power which a man acquires of utilizing his experience and of focusing it into a perception which is the necessary presupposition of intelligent action.

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JAMES IVERACH.

PERFECTI (or Boni Homines).—The Perfecti were the pastors or teachers of the Cathari, or Albigenses, who, in recognition of the spiritual perfection to which they were supposed to have attained by virtue of their approved practice of the ascetic doctrine of the sect, had been admitted to the number of the 'Consolati,' i.e. those who had received the *Consolamentum* (see ALBIGENSES). They were also generally distinguished by their

superior learning and intimate knowledge of the Scriptures, which they studied in a different version from the Vulgate. George Carleton, bishop of Chichester, as late as 1626 refers to what he characterizes as 'the Pharisaical prides and dreams of the Cathari and Perfectionists' (*An Examination*, London, 1626, p. 135). The Perfecti, generally speaking, abstained from intercourse with mixed society and often passed several days together in complete isolation from the world, but, when called upon to defend their peculiar tenets against the Catholics, exhibited the utmost readiness to meet their antagonists in a formal disputation. An early instance of this occurs in the year 1165, in connexion with the Council of Lombards in the diocese of Albi (Mansi, *Concilia*, Venice, 1759-98, Paris, 1901 ff., xii. 167; C. de Vic and J. Vaissette, *Hist. générale de Languedoc*, Paris, 1872-90, iii. 4, vi. 3-5; C. Schmidt, *Hist. et doctrine des Cathares*, do. 1848-49, ii. ch. iii.).

J. BASS MULLINGER.

PERFECTION (Buddhist).—Broadly speaking, perfection relates either to the nature or state of a given unit of thought or to achievement by such a unit. In the light of mankind's imperfect and fluid knowledge, evolving or degenerating in its ideals, the former meaning is usually expressed either in negative terms or in terms of bare superlativeness. Thus the Buddhist books also speak of a perfect nature or state as *an-uttara*, 'beyondless,' or as *parama*, *sammā*, 'supreme,' or *brahma*, *seṭṭha*, 'best,' or *agga*, 'the highest.'

'So Kassapa . . . ere long attained to that supreme goal of the religious life (*anuttaram brahmachariyapariyosānam*)' (*Dialogues of the Buddha*, i. 240; cf. *Sutta-Nipāta* (SBE x. 2 (1898) 15, rendered 'highest perfection of a religious life').

'One that is pure, perfect (*paramam*) and sane, I see . . .

Who here below hath known the best as best (*paramam*)' (*Sutta-Nipāta*, 783, 87 (in tr. 88)).

This perfect or ideal state was spoken of by the negative term *ni-bbāna* (*nirvāṇa*), or extinction (interpreted by commentators as 'going away from')—extinction referring to the elimination of all sinful qualities and painful conditions. Since the latter were wholly and permanently expugnable only with the extinction of life itself, earthly or heavenly, the permanently perfect state was incompatible with life. But, since thought and language are limited by life, the perfect state was both inconceivable and inexpressible. Hence no Buddhist tries to describe any such state, but confines himself (1) to maintaining the aspiration to such a supreme goal both during life and at final death (*sa-upādisesa-anupādisesaṃ nibbānam*), and (2) to depicting in positive terms the former, or relative, *nibbāna* attainable in this life, despite its brevity and hindrances, by the perfected man, or *arahant*.

In the characteristics ascribed to the perfected man or woman two salient features may be noted: (1) in no religion is the perfection of the saint as something won and realized during life so emphatically conceded and insisted upon as it is in early Buddhism; (2) but it is a perfection of achievement, the completion of a strenuous career, the attainment of an end. It is akin to the *telos* of the utterance in Matthew's Gospel (5⁴³): 'Be ye perfect,' 'Be ye such as have attained a *telos*, an end.' It is true that, in the Buddhist canon, groups of qualities, intellectually and ethically desirable, are predicated of the *arahant*. The *Sutta-Nipāta*, e.g., and the *Psalms of the Brethren* (*Theragāthā*) abound with such descriptions. But the staple formularized description of *arahant*-ship and the *arahant*, repeated throughout the *Suttas*, is a rosary of epithets relating to an end accomplished, a goal won, a task finished, a *summum bonum* secured. The *arahant* is he 'who has destroyed

the intoxicants (*āsava*), has lived the life, has done the task, has laid down the burden, has won the good supreme, has broken away the fetter of becoming, is emancipated through perfect knowledge.'¹ To be perfect was to round off the line of life by maturing certain potentialities in it, and thus to attain a certain attitude regarding it. To this line of life there had been no beginning—beginnings are anthropomorphic conceptions, to a Buddhist mere conventional notions—but there might, in one way only, be an ending. This was in the maturity, the fruition, the dying out, as a living unit, of the 'fulfilled' life of the *arahant*. Beyond that dying out neither thought nor language could follow any further development:

'In whom the intoxicants are dried up,
Whose range is in the Void and the Unmarked
And Liberty:—as flight of birds in air
So hard is it to track the trail of him'

(*Psalms of the Brethren*, 82).

It is in the terms 'fulfilled,' 'fulfilment' (*paripūṇa*, *pāripūri*), and 'maturity' (*paripakka*)² that Buddhist thought comes nearest to the Latin term 'perfected.' The figure of the rounded orb of the moon is frequently used to illustrate the former notion. *Pūṇṇa* and *Punnā* were personal names, and sister *Punnā* was admonished:

'Fill up, Pūṇṇā (*Pūṇṇā* / *pūrasu*) the orb of holy life,
Even as on fifteenth day the full-orbed moon.
Fill full the perfect knowledge (*paripūṇā paññā*) of the Path'

(*Psalms of the Sisters*, 3).

Again:

'Lo! I am he whose purpose is fulfilled (*paripūṇa-samkappo*)
And rounded as the moon on fifteenth day'

(*Psalms of the Brethren*, 546).

Arahant (*arāḥat*) means, it is true, neither 'perfect' nor 'saint,' but 'he who is worthy' (from the root *arh*). But it was the beneficent example and influence of perfected lives that made such subjects the worthy and 'perfect field' (*anuttaram khettaṃ*), wherein the faithful should sow their homage and fostering care.

So organically conceived was this maturity of the perfected that it was judged heterodox to suppose that they could revert to immature stages (*Kāthāvatthu*, i. 2, tr. in *Points of Controversy*, PTS, London, 1915, p. 64 f.).

The fulfilled quest of the *arahant* is well brought out by the scriptures cited (*ib.*) to support this verdict.

'Not twice they fare who reach the further shore . . .

For whom no work on self is still unwrought . . .

. . . there is no building up again,

Nor yet remaineth aught for him to do.'

This absolute completeness of achievement along a certain line of effort came to be confused with competence in general. Thus in *Points of Controversy*, ii. 2-4, xxi. 3, it is asked whether, in worldly matters, such as finding his way in a new district, or in arts and crafts, the *arahant* may not show less knowledge, more doubt, than others, whether also, if he overcomes ignorance as the last barrier at the threshold of *arahant*-ship, he is to rank as omniscient.

The specific nescience there and then overcome was lack of that perfect insight into the relation between life and suffering, cause and effect, summarized as the 'four true things'—the 'one thing needful' for the earnest Buddhist. His quest of this insight was held to have led him clear of the nine 'fettlers' in succession, of soul-theory, doubt, belief in rite- and rule-efficacy, clear of all residual desires of sense, enmity, desire for prolonged life in any lower or higher spheres, conceit, and distraction.

¹ See, e.g., the writer's Index vol. to *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, London, 1904, pp. vii, 12.

² Cf. *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, v. 35, 103 f., 200 f., iv. 105; *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, iv. 314 f., 336 f., etc.

Then, as the mists of ignorance rolled away, there burst on him the supernal clarity of vision that revealed the lonely pinnacle on which he stood—the climax of a life to which there had been no first birth, but of which there was to be, here and now, the last end.

'And glad is he, for he hath won the top (*agga-patto pamodati*).

Whoso hath all his training perfected (*paripurna*),
And cannot fall away, who hath insight
Supreme, and doth behold the fading out,
The end of births—lo! him I call a seer,
"Last-body-bearer," and "abandoner
Of all illusions," "crossed-beyond-decay"

(*Iti-vuttaka*, 90, 46).

To become perfected, in this sense of completed achievement, was for the earnest disciple the positive motive or spring of religious life, complementary to, and supervening on, the negative motive of escape from *dukkha*, or misery. Conviction of his liability at all times to suffering spurred him to turn from worldly interests; the realization of a perfection, a goal or fruition to be attained, gradually replaced that *vim a tergo* (cf. *Points of Controversy*, p. 230 f.).

LITERATURE.—See the sources quoted throughout.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

PERFECTION (Christian).—I. **NT CONCEPTION.**—Some phase of the idea and ideal of perfection has a place in the Christian thought of every generation. The term itself, however perverted in the history of fanatical sects, is of too frequent occurrence in the NT to be overlooked. It stands for a conception of the completeness and blessedness of Christian experience which has attracted the wistful desire of orthodox and sectarian alike. As Christian it is to be distinguished from the metaphysical perfection of speculative thought and from the ideal or *summum bonum* of philosophical or naturalistic ethics. Its more direct lineage is discernible in the OT. But from that conception also it is differentiated by definite characteristics—e.g., by being evangelical rather than legal, positive rather than negative (Mt 7^{12.21.24}, Jn 14¹⁵⁻²³ etc.); by taking account of inward disposition as well as of outward act (Mt 5^{22.28}, Jn 3^{3.6} etc.); and especially by setting forth the perfect love of God and man as the fulfilling and fulfilment of the divine law, thus raising the righteousness of the law to its highest power in the perfection of obedience through faith and love (Mt 5⁴³⁻⁴⁸, Ro 13¹⁰, Ja 2⁸, 1 Jn 3^{18.23} etc.). It is also distinguished in Christian thought from holiness (*q.v.*) and from sanctification (*q.v.*) as a question of degree, or as the specific from the generic. Many Christians who urge the possibility of holiness plead the impossibility of perfection.

The essential significance of 'perfect' (τέλειος) in the NT is that of an ideal relation of the Christian to the divine end, or τέλος, in regard to his character and service. But, as this ideal is progressively realized, every τέλος, both in revelation and in experience, is also an ἀρχή—a beginning. Hence 'perfect' is a relative term. Christian perfection is never identical with absolute perfection. That belongs to God only (Lk 18¹⁹). In the measure of the human that is perfect which is complete in all its parts and powers, which possesses all that is necessary to the integrity of its nature, and reaches its divinely designed end. Thus, as a possibility and an obligation, Christian perfection signifies the full cluster and maturity of the specifically Christian graces which give the Christian character its completeness for life and service within the conditions of its earthly environment. The NT term 'perfect,' itself general and abstract, only materializes its meaning in organic relation to its context. This varies according to the immediate conception of the nature of the divine law

which reveals the ideal end for the perfect man in any particular age or circumstance.

'The τέλειος is one who has attained his moral end, that for which he was intended, namely, to be a man in Christ' (R. C. Trench, *Synonyms of the NT*, London, 1876, p. 74).

It is of primary importance to bear in mind that the context in which 'perfect' occurs in the NT varies very considerably (cf. Mt 5⁴⁸, 1 Co 13^{10.28}, He 7¹⁹ 12²³). There is a perfection, possible and obligatory, recognized as crowning each stage of the Christian life. (1) At the beginning of Christian discipleship there is the perfection that constitutes a perfect conversion: 'If thou wouldest be perfect, go, sell that thou hast . . . and come follow me' (Mt 19²¹). This perfection refers to the completion of a preparatory state, which is initial to a discipline for further perfection more truly Christlike. (2) The estate of justification has its perfection in a redemption perfect as regards evangelical status and privilege: 'For by one offering he hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified' (He 10¹⁴). (3) A perfection attaches to the state of obedient faith which 'knows the things which are freely given to us of God,' 'Howbeit we speak wisdom among the perfect' (1 Co 2⁶; cf. Ritschl, *Justification and Reconciliation*, p. 647). (4) A perfection attends the religious status marked by the attainment of the end of a ritual of privilege (He 7¹⁹ 9⁹ 10¹), or the perfection for leadership and official ministry reached through long discipline (He 2¹⁰ 7¹¹ 9¹¹). (5) There is a perfection realized only in the consummation of another order of life—'the spirits of just men made perfect' (He 12²³)—and with this may be associated that perfection of eternal spiritual progress anticipated in the words, 'When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away' (1 Co 13¹⁰).

But the sense in which 'perfect' is usually understood in Christian thought has reference to that ethical and spiritual completeness of Christian character which crowns the faith and discipline of the religious life. In this sense Jesus used it in what may be regarded as the great charter for the Christian ideal: 'Ye therefore shall be perfect [imperative future], as your heavenly Father is perfect' (Mt 5⁴⁸). He states perfection in ethical, not in legal, ritual, or eschatological terms; it consists in moral likeness to God, in perfect sonship to the perfect Father; it is a quality of character, an ethical achievement resulting in the 'Christianizing of the Christian,' rather than a privilege of Christian status or imputation. This is the ideal towards which all NT teaching looks and moves. It is stated most fully in the profound and daring petitions of the apostolic prayers for Christian believers (Eph 1¹⁶⁻¹⁹ 3¹⁴⁻¹⁹, Col 1⁹⁻¹¹, 1 Th 5², 2 Co 13⁹). These find their all-comprehending unity in a supreme exposition of the law of love; they unfold an ideal of ethical and spiritual excellence that cannot be surpassed: 'May your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire, without blame at the presence of our Lord Jesus Christ' (1 Th 5²³), that ye may 'know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, that ye may be filled unto all the fulness of God' (Eph 3¹⁹). The aspiration of the Christian soul can go no further. No limit is set to Christian privilege. The main question before which faith and practice have halted throughout the Christian centuries is whether St. Paul here prays for such perfection as a spiritual blessing obtainable in the present life. He appears, however, to have anticipated this natural hesitation and forestalled it in the doxology that follows one of these prayers: 'Now unto him that is able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us,' etc. (Eph 3²⁰), and in the sure note of confi-

dence that closes the other: 'Faithful is he that calleth you, who will also do it' (1 Th 5²⁴). These passages indicate the possibility of a state of Christian experience that can be described as 'unblameable in holiness' (1 Th 3¹³), in which in this life Christians may stand hallowed through and through (*δολοκλειῆς*), in every part of their nature (*δολοκλήρον*), subsisting by grace in a spiritual condition able to hear the scrutiny of their Lord's presence without rebuke. It is to this achievement that the fidelity of God to His purpose in calling men to be Christians is pledged. The obligation, moreover, to be 'sincere and void of offence unto the day of Christ; being filled with the fruits of righteousness' (Ph 1¹⁰) rests upon all Christians and is not regarded in the apostolic ideal as a 'counsel of perfection' for a privileged few; for the acknowledged end of the apostles' labour was 'admonishing every man and teaching every man in all wisdom, that we may present every man perfect in Christ' (Col 1²⁸), 'always striving for you in his prayers, that ye may stand perfect and fully assured in all the will of God' (4¹²).

(a) The closer definition of Christian perfection is almost invariably stated in the NT in terms of love. The injunction, 'Become ye imitators of God, as beloved children; and walk in love' (Eph 5¹⁶), which compresses the ideal of perfection into a phrase echoing Mt 5⁴⁸, arose from the contemplation of God's tireless tenderness in merciful dealing with the evil and the good, the just and the unjust. God's perfection is perfect love; man's is in being like Him. Love with all the heart and soul and mind is the last sign of the perfect (Mt 22³⁷⁻⁴⁰); for every relationship, human and divine, 'love is the bond of perfectness' (Col 3¹⁴), and 'he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him. Herein is our love made perfect. . . . There is no fear in love; but perfect love casteth out fear' (1 Jn 4^{16a}). The boldest and most beautiful interpretation of Christian perfection in sacred literature is St. Paul's great hymn to love in 1 Co 13 (cf. also 2 P 1⁴⁻⁷, Ja 1²⁵); for, 'if we love one another, God abideth in us, and his love is perfected in us' (1 Jn 4¹²). Obedience to 'the royal law according to the scripture,' 'the perfect law, the law of liberty,' 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself' (Ja 1²⁵ 2⁸), becomes the vanishing point of every prophecy, precept, promise, and privilege in the NT; for on this 'hangeeth the whole law, and the prophets' (Mt 22⁴⁰). Such love is the harmonious expression and completion of the whole human personality—mind, will, and feeling—not of feeling alone (1 Th 5²³). But this love is always set forth as dependent upon the recognition and reception of 'the love which God hath in us' (1 Jn 4¹⁸); 'We love, because he first loved us' (4¹⁹). God's love towards us is first 'perfected in us' (4¹²), 'emptied forth in our hearts through the Holy Ghost which was given unto us' (Ro 5⁵), in order that, by 'the expulsive power of a new affection,' 'fear that hath punishment' may be cast out, and the soul energized in all its activities Godward and manward by a human love made perfect through the divine. Only thus may we 'have boldness in the day of judgement; because as he is, even so are we in this world' (1 Jn 4¹⁷).

(b) Hence Christian perfection is constantly declared to be wrought by the grace of God through Christ who dwells in our hearts by faith, 'to the end that, . . . being rooted and grounded in love,' we 'may be strong to apprehend with all the saints what is the breadth and length and height and depth, and to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge,' that we 'may be filled unto all the fulness of God' (Eph 3^{17a}), 'being confident of this very thing, that he who began a good work in you will perfect it until the day of Jesus

Christ' (Ph 1⁶; cf. He 13²¹, Ph 2¹³). This peculiar quality of perfection as Christian is basal in the NT teaching: 'perfect in Christ' (Col 1²⁸); 'for in him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily, and in him ye are made full' (2¹⁰; cf. 1 Co 1³⁰); it is realizable only in Christ, and this in every aspect of its origin, progress, and end. Something in His life and death is regarded as essential to its inception and hope: 'The law made nothing perfect' (Ho 7¹⁹); 'For by one offering he hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified' (10¹⁴); the ethical discipline by which perfection is attained finds its centre and sanction in Him: 'Having been made perfect, he became unto all them that obey him the author of eternal salvation' (He 5⁹; cf. 12²). Moreover, He is Himself the only perfect man—the complete type to which all human perfection must conform; we are 'foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the firstborn among many brethren' (Ro 8²⁹), so that 'the perfecting of the saints' tarries 'till we all attain . . . unto a fullgrown man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ' (Eph 4¹³; cf. v. 3² 5¹, Ph 2⁵).

(c) Nevertheless, perfection is considered to be dependent upon the effort of man in co-operating with the grace of God: 'But whoso keepeth his word, in him verily hath the love of God been perfected' (1 Jn 2⁵); 'If we love one another, God abideth in us, and his love is perfected in us' (4¹²; cf. Ph 2¹², 2 Co 7¹, Ja 5⁸). In order to be Christian, perfection must also be the perfection of the pure intent, the single eye (1 Co 10³¹, 1 P 4¹¹, Mt 6²³), of the entire renunciation of self (Lk 14²⁸), the complete discipline of the tongue (Ja 2¹²), as well as the full cluster of the fruits of the Spirit (Gal 5^{22a}).

(d) The lofty ideal of Christian perfection thus presented in the NT raises two questions of great importance and of equal difficulty, which have been the chief grounds of controversy in the history of the doctrine within the Church. To these the NT gives no categorical answer; such answers as are available, while valuable as far as they go, are at best equivocal or inferential. (a) Does Christian perfection imply a state of sinlessness? The Johannine writer asserts plainly concerning the children of God: 'Whosoever abideth in him sinneth not. . . . Whosoever is begotten of God doeth no sin, because his seed abideth in him; and he cannot sin, because he is begotten of God' (1 Jn 3⁶). And yet the same writer asserts with equal plainness: 'If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, he is faithful and righteous to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness. If we say that we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and his word is not in us' (1^{8a}). It is obvious that these assertions present an exceedingly difficult exegetical problem. Taken at their face value, they are contradictory. Considered in the light of the doctrine of perfection, they depend much for their meaning upon the significance attached to the common term 'sin,' and upon the nature of the qualifying words chosen to express its closer definition. Some relief has been sought in distinctions between sin as outward or indwelling, voluntary or involuntary, momentary or habitual. The issue is too fine for discussion here. Cogent reasons for regarding Christian perfection in the NT as the destruction of all sin are given by John Fletcher ('Essay on Christian Perfection,' *Works*, v. 40-50), and for the opposite view by P. T. Forsyth (*Christian Perfection*, pp. 1-49). Commentaries (*in loc.*) should also be consulted. But, whichever view is adopted, there can be little doubt that Christian perfection is regarded in Scripture as compatible with infirmity of knowledge and with other natural and inevitable human limitations consistent with

the persistence to the end of life of a state of ethical and spiritual probation (Jn 17¹⁵, Ro 8^{10, 23}, 1 Co 15⁴⁵ 9⁷, 1 Jn 2¹). This implies a constant need of the grace of the atoning work of Christ (1 Jn 1⁷) and the continued possibility of further progress in spiritual attainment (Ph 3¹⁰⁻¹⁵).

(8) Is the attainment of Christian perfection possible in the present life? The answer to this depends largely upon that given to the previous question. While it is extremely doubtful whether any specific NT passage gives an answer in the affirmative, it may fairly be said that the general tenor of the NT teaching forbids a negative reply. This may be gathered from the passages already quoted in this exposition. But it must be acknowledged that the use made of these for this end frequently depends upon whether their exposition proceeds upon lines determined by antecedent Calvinistic or Arminian tendencies. Moreover, it should be noticed that the great ethical and spiritual experiences that constitute finality in the Christian life are mostly presented in timeless relations in the NT. Nevertheless the obligation to regard perfection as the attainable goal of the Christian estate is undeniable (Mt 5⁴³⁻⁴⁸, 2 Co 7¹, Ph 3¹⁵, He 6¹). The privilege, possibility, and promise of reaching this blessedness are not, however, declared chiefly in definite textual statements; they are too deep for words. What the NT here reveals is not so much a doctrine as a consciousness—and a consciousness of indescribable wealth and power—that He who hath begun a good work in us will also perfect it. In this vital and vitalizing consciousness the expectation of Christian perfection lived, moved, and had its being in the Apostolic Church.

II. HISTORICAL.—Each of the main theological systems has preserved, in the form of doctrine, experience, or tradition, one or other of the aspects of Christian perfection presented in the NT; but there is no consecutive history of the doctrine. It will be more satisfactory, therefore, to consider the types of theory exhibited than to attempt any chronological arrangement of the material available.

I. Patristic.—This type appears in fragments mostly continuing the strain of thought and phraseology of the NT; Christian perfection is the perfection of love achieving through grace the righteousness of faith.

'By love were all the elect of God made perfect. . . . Those who have been perfected in love through the grace of God attain to the place of the godly. . . . Blessed were we, dearly beloved, if we should be doing the commandments of God in concord of love. . . . Blessed is the man to whom the Lord shall impute no sin, neither is guile in his mouth' (Clement of Rome, *ad Cor.* 49 f.).

Speaking of faith, hope, and love, Polycarp writes: 'If any man be in these, he has fulfilled the law of righteousness, for he that hath love is far from all sin' (*ad Phil.* 9).

Ignatius repeats this testimony: 'Faith is the beginning of life and love the end; and the two being found in unity are God, while all things else follow in their train unto true nobility. No man professing faith sinneth, and no man possessing love hateth' (*ad Eph.* 14). 'Seeing ye are perfect, let your counsels also be perfect; for, if ye desire to do well, God is ready to grant the means' (*ad Smyrn.* 11).

Irenaeus understands that the apostle Paul 'declares that those are "the perfect" who present unto the Lord body, soul and spirit without offence; who not only have the Holy Spirit abiding in them, but also preserve faultless their souls and bodies, keeping their fidelity to God, and maintaining righteous dealings with their neighbours' (*adv. Haer.* v. vi. 1; cf. also *Didache*, i. vi., x., xvi.).

Clement of Alexandria, influenced by Gnostic tendencies, illustrates how early the wavering faith of Christian thinkers was drawn in two ways respecting Christian perfection: 'A man may be perfected, whether as godly, or as patient, or in chastity, or in labours, or as a martyr, or in knowledge. But to be perfected in all these together I know not if this may be said of any who is yet man, save only of Him who put on humanity for us' (*Strom.* iv. 21). Yet he writes again: 'It is a thing impossible that man should be perfect as God is perfect; but it is the Father's will that we, living according to the Gospel in blameless or unfailling obedience, should become perfect' (*ib.* vii. 14).

Jerome may serve to illustrate a later phase of Patristic

thought when Pelagian views of perfection found currency: 'We maintain also that, considering our time, place and bodily weakness, we can avoid sinning, if we will, as long as our mind is bent upon it, and the string of our harp is not slackened by any wilful fault' (*Dial. against the Pelagians*, iii. 4).

2. Methodist.—This type is considered at this stage because (a) the doctrine of Christian perfection is pre-eminently the distinctive doctrine of this community, which at present constitutes the largest Protestant Church; (b) it presents the fullest and most definitely articulated statement of the doctrine, and claims to be a direct continuation in modern times of the apostolic teaching; (c) it is claimed by J. A. Faulkner, of the Drew Theological Seminary, that 'the Methodists were the first Christians who officially, and as a united body, without deviation, and with the power of a church behind them to make it effective, taught the NT doctrine of Christian perfection' (O. A. Curtis, *The Christian Faith*, p. 525); they also embodied it in their standards and expounded and defended it as 'the grand depositum which God has lodged with the people called Methodists, and for the sake of propagating this chiefly He appeared to have raised us up' (J. Wesley, *Letters*, 15th Sept., 26th Nov. 1790); (d) it is claimed that the state of Christian perfection has been attained and enjoyed in living experience. The doctrine is stated in 'A Plain Account of Christian Perfection, as believed and taught by the Reverend Mr. John Wesley, from the Year 1725 to the Year 1777,' and 'Brief Thoughts on Christian Perfection' (*The Works of the Rev. John Wesley*, London, 1840, xi. 351-423). The spiritual values of the doctrine find their highest expression in *The Methodist Hymn Book*, particularly in the unique section 'For Believers seeking for Full Redemption.' W. B. Pope (*A Compendium of Christian Theology*, iii. 27-100) gives a careful dogmatic and historical review of the doctrine. From the days of the Holy Club at Oxford (1730) the Wesleys persistently sought perfection. Their earliest conceptions of it were mystical and ascetic, but intensely ethical. The influence of these characteristics remained even when, after their conversion, their conception of perfection had become strictly evangelical; their theory progressed from a preparatory ethical discipline, whose elements were but imperfectly understood, to a clearly apprehended and, as they profoundly believed, Scriptural conviction of the privilege open to every Christian believer of being perfected in the love of God and man, and of being wholly delivered from indwelling sin. The doctrine formed the natural sequel to the joyous assurance of acceptance with God that was the seal of justifying faith; Christian perfection was the further seal of the Holy Spirit set upon the earnest striving of the regenerate will accompanied by a faith working by love; such faith made this blessing its direct object, received it as a gift of grace, and retained it by the obedience of faith which became fruitful and effective through an abiding union with the crucified and risen Redeemer. Indeed, the doctrine of a complete deliverance from all sin was regarded as the logical and experimental outcome of the proclamation of a free, full, present salvation as the gift of grace to every penitent sinner. The exposition of the doctrine is marked by reasonableness and moderation, by great frankness and spiritual daring. Definitions often state what it is not. The main features of the Methodist doctrine are as follows: (1) it is not absolute, nor Adamic, nor angelic perfection, nor is any one 'infallible while he remains in the body' (Wesley, *Works*, xi. 400); nor is it a perfection of justification (p. 424); it is not legal, yet it is relative to a given law—the law of love; hence (2) it is perfect love:

'By perfection I mean the humble, gentle, patient love of God and our neighbour, ruling our tempers, words and actions'

(p. 428). 'Pure love reigning alone in the heart and life—this is the whole of Scriptural perfection' (p. 335). 'There is nothing higher in religion; there is, in effect, nothing else' (p. 413).

(3) Perfect love is the one law stated in the gospel to which we are now subject in the Christian dispensation; this is not a mitigated law, but a higher law than that contained in ordinances; it is the only law possible for us to obey and by which we can be judged. Because it is the royal law, the law of Christ, obedience to it constitutes Christian perfection in the Methodist sense (cf. p. 399). This is the plain doctrine found in varying words throughout John Wesley's writings (cf. *Journal*, 27th Aug. 1768). While mystical and ascetic teachers of perfection, who make love its essence, have seldom related it to the ethical obedience of faith, he boldly declares that the righteousness of the law is fulfilled in those in whom faith working by love is reckoned for perfection. Hence, as his critics admit (cf. C. Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, iii. 258), there is no tolerance of antinomianism in Wesley's doctrine. Moreover, 'this law of faith working by love is plainly different from the law of works' (Wesley, *Works*, xi. 400). Only in obedience to the law of love can Wesley's doctrine be regarded as (4) sinless perfection. He writes:

'I do not contend for the term "sinless," though I do not object against it' (p. 428). 'Is it sinless? It is not worth while to contend for a term. It is salvation from sin' (p. 424). Yet in answer to the question, Does being made perfect in love imply that all inward sin is taken away?, he says:

'Undoubtedly; or how can we be said to be saved from all our uncleanness?' (p. 371f.; cf. p. 360ff.).

'The Methodist doctrine is the only one that has consistently and boldly maintained the destruction of the carnal mind, or the inbred sin of our fallen nature' (Pope, iii. 97). It goes further than certain mystics and the Pietists of the school of Spener in asserting that the newness of life imparted by perfect love depends for its full exercise upon a perfect death to sin.

'The combination of the two elements, the negative annihilation of the principle of sin and the positive effusion of perfect love is, it may be said, peculiar to Methodist theology as such' (ib.; cf. also A. Lowrey, *Possibilities of Grace*, New York, 1884; R. S. Foster, *Christian Purity*).

Nevertheless Wesley frankly admits that, while those who are perfected in love are freed from all unholy tempers, pride, anger, self-will, and sinful desires, they are not free from mistakes, infirmities of judgment, involuntary negligences, and ignorances. These, however, though they are indeed deviations from the perfect law, are not, strictly speaking, sins. He recognizes the difficulty of accurately discriminating between sinful and sinless faults (cf. xi. 381), but nothing is sin properly speaking save 'a voluntary transgression of a known law.'

'I believe there is no such perfection in this life as excludes these involuntary transgressions which I apprehend to be naturally consequent on the ignorance and mistakes inseparable from mortality. Therefore "sinless perfection" is a phrase I never use, lest I should seem to contradict myself. I believe a person filled with the love of God is still liable to these involuntary transgressions. Such transgressions you may call sins, if you please; I do not, for the reasons above mentioned' (xi. 390; cf. also p. 363).

Still such faults, though not properly sins, cannot bear the rigour of God's justice, and therefore 'the best of men need Christ as their Priest, their Atonement, their Advocate with the Father; not only as the continuance of their every blessing depends on His death and intercession, but on account of their coming short of the law of love. For every man living does so. . . . The most perfect may properly for themselves, as well as for their brethren, say, "Forgive us our trespasses." . . . For want of duly considering this, some deny that they need the atonement of Christ. Indeed, exceeding few; I do not remember to have found five of them in England. Of the two I would sooner give up perfection; but we need not give up either one or the other. The perfection I hold, "love rejoicing evermore, praying without ceasing, and in everything giving thanks," is well consistent with it; if any hold a perfection which is not, they must look to it' (xi. 401; cf. p. 379).

(5) Perfection is received instantaneously by faith.

'As to the manner. I believe this perfection is always wrought in the soul by a simple act of faith; consequently in an instant. But I believe a gradual work, both preceding and following that instant' (xi. 423). 'But God does not, will not, give that faith unless we seek it with all diligence in the way which He hath ordained,' namely 'in vigorous, universal obedience, in a zealous keeping of all the commandments, in watchfulness and painfulness, in denying ourselves, and taking up our cross daily; as well as in earnest prayer and fasting, and a close attendance on all the ordinances of God' (p. 356). 'Yet these are not necessary in the same sense or same degree as faith. . . . they are remotely necessary; faith is immediately and directly necessary' (vi. 60).

(6) Perfection is possible in this life. Wesley frequently urges this, but admits that it is a rare experience, though 'several persons have enjoyed the blessing without interruption for many years.' 'I know many that love God with all their heart' (xi. 402; cf. pp. 393, 389, iii. 96-100). His mature judgment was:

'As to the time. I believe this instant generally is the instant of death, the moment before the soul leaves the body. But I believe it may be ten, twenty, or forty years before. I believe it is usually many years after justification; but that it may be within five years or five months after it, I know no conclusive argument to the contrary' (xi. 429; cf. p. 373). Yet, as it is given instantaneously, in one moment, 'we are to expect it, not at death, but every moment; now is the accepted time' (p. 367; cf. p. 378f.). Still 'I believe that in the case of most they gradually die to sin and grow in grace, till at, or perhaps a little before, death God perfects them in love, but not all; sometimes He "cuts short His work"; He does the work of many years in a few weeks, perhaps in a week, a day, an hour' (p. 406); 'so that one may affirm the work is gradual, another, it is instantaneous, without any manner of contradiction' (p. 407). 'But those who are perfect can undoubtedly grow in grace, and that not only while they are in the body, but to all eternity' (p. 409).

(7) *Assurance and profession.*—Wesley applied his doctrine of assurance to the attainment of Christian perfection as he did to the clear consciousness of justification. The Spirit of God bore witness to the reality and certainty of each of these spiritual states. This witness and the 'marks' in experience of a total death to sin and an entire renewal in the love and image of God were essential to the human confidence that the state of perfection had been reached (pp. 385f., 404). This interior evidence was not always equally clear; it was susceptible of intermission and of increasing degrees of certainty (p. 403). As to the profession of Christian perfection, his statements are characterized by great caution and a sane reserve; he is at pains to admonish professors against the presumption of pride and the perils of enthusiasm, yet he favours a humble confession of enjoyment of the blessing to the glory of God.

'Be particularly careful in speaking of yourself; you may not indeed deny the work of God; but speak of it when you are called thereto, in the most inoffensive manner possible. . . . Indeed, you need give it no general name; neither perfection, sanctification, the second blessing, nor the having attained. Rather speak of the particulars which God hath wrought for you. You may say, "At such a time I felt a change which I am not able to express; and since that time, I have not felt pride, or self-will, or anger, or unbelief; nor anything but a fineness of love to God and all mankind" (xi. 417; cf. pp. 382, 390).

It seems doubtful whether Wesley himself ever professed to have reached this state (for the opposite view cf. Curtis, p. 374 ff.). Later Methodists have been extremely shy of profession.

'As employed by the individual Christian concerning himself, perfection is a term more appropriate to his aspiration than his professed attainment' (W. B. Pope, *A Higher Catechism of Theology*, London, 1883, p. 276). 'There is no consciousness more unconscious of self than that of perfect holiness and love' (Pope, *Comp. of Chr. Theol.* 3 ill. 56).

(8) *Amissibility.*—Wesley's later judgment, contrary to some of his earlier statements, was that Christian perfection as a state of grace might be lost by unfaithfulness; it was never beyond the reach and reality of temptation.

'I do not include an impossibility of falling from it, either in part or in whole. Therefore I retract several expressions in our Hymns, which partly express, partly imply such an im-

possibility' (xi. 428). 'We are surrounded with instances of those who lately experienced all that I mean by perfection. They had both the fruit of the Spirit, and the witness; but they have now lost both' (p. 409 f.; cf. pp. 402, 425, also *Journal*, 25th July 1774, and *Letters*, 27th Jan. and 12th Feb. 1767).

3. **Arminian.**—Methodist doctrine generally was Arminian in type, and its doctrine of Christian perfection found a starting-point in the teaching of the Remonstrant divines. The early Arminians wrote much on this doctrine; it was a consequent of their primary theological principles; but their views lacked clear definition. It was exhibited rather in its opposition to the Roman doctrine of works of supererogation and the Calvinist tendencies to antinomianism than as the clear obligation and privilege of evangelical religion. For the views of Arminius himself, who died early (1609), which are less sharply defined than those of his followers, see *Works of Arminius*, tr. J. Nichols, London, 1825-29, i. 608, ii. 408. Charged with Pelagian tendencies because he asserted that it was possible for the regenerate perfectly to keep God's precepts, he repudiated the Pelagian position by basing this possibility wholly upon the grace of God, and therein claimed affinity with the teaching of Augustine. His followers dwelt upon a perfection of three degrees: (1) that of beginners; (2) that of proficient—the perfection of unimpeded progress in the regenerate life; and (3) that of the truly perfect—the perfection of an established maturity of grace in which the sinful habit is subdued. Of the last stage little is positively taught concerning its limitations, means, or certitude. Episcopus says:

'The commandments of God may he kept with what He regards as a perfect fulfilment, in the supreme love which the Gospel requires according to the covenant of grace, and in the utmost exertion of human strength assisted by Divine help. This consummation includes two things, (1) A perfection proportioned to the powers of each individual; (2) A pursuit of always higher perfection' (ap. Pope, *Comp. of Chr. Theol.* iii. 84; cf. Hodge, iii. 253). P. van Limborch describes it as 'perfect, in being correspondent to the provisions and terms of the Divine covenant. It is not sinless or an absolutely perfect obedience, but such as consists in a sincere love of piety, absolutely excluding every habit of sin' (*Institutiones Theologiae Christianae*, Amsterdam, 1716, pp. 658a, 659b, 661a [tr. W. Jones, London, 1702]).

Similar positions were regarded sympathetically by the Cambridge Platonists; their exposition and enforcement of Christian perfection formed a transition stage between the Arminian doctrine and its more definite and evangelical development in Methodism. It was natural that the Arminian type as elaborated and deepened by Methodism should be met antagonistically by the type of thought characteristic of Calvinism.

4. **Lutheran and Calvinistic.**—In general this offers a direct negative to most of the positive claims regarding Christian perfection: perfection is never realized in the present life; in no case is sin entirely subdued; the most advanced believer daily needs to pray for the forgiveness of sins to which guilt attaches. It is admitted that a direct obligation lies upon the Christian to be 'perfect even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect'; that the gospel provision for Christian perfection is all-sufficient; that a perfection involving ultimately a complete deliverance from all sin is the sure promise of God in Christ. The essential question, however, is whether this promise of perfection is intended by God to be fulfilled in this life, and whether cases are known in which the promise has been actually fulfilled.

Whilst 'all admit that God can render His people perfect before death as well as after it, . . . the answer given to these questions by the Church universal is in the negative' (Hodge, iii. 246).

The grounds for this view are: (i.) the spirituality of the divine law with the absoluteness and immutability of its demands; for it condemns as sinful any want of conformity to the standard of

absolute perfection as exhibited in the Bible; (ii.) the express declaration of Scripture that all men are sinners—and this not in the sense that all men have sinned and all are guilty, but that all men have sin constantly clinging to them;¹ (iii.) passages of Scripture which describe the reality of the conflict between the flesh and the spirit—e.g., the fragment of Paul's autobiography in Ro 7, the confession of persistent imperfection (Ph 3¹²⁻¹⁴), the lusting of flesh and spirit in Christian living (Gal 5¹⁶⁻²⁰); (iv.) the unceasing testimony of Christian experience, corporate and personal, in the confession of sin and the prayer for forgiveness.

A Christian 'never is in a state which satisfies his own conviction of what he ought to be. He may call his deficiencies infirmities, weaknesses, and errors, and may refuse to call them sins. But this does not alter the case. Whatever they are called, it is admitted that they need God's pardoning mercy' (Hodge, iii. 250). 'Nothing which the law does not condemn can need expiation. If these transgressions, therefore, need atonement, they are sins in the sight of God' (ib. p. 255).

The one sense in which Christian perfection is acknowledged in the standards of the Reformation—Lutheran and Reformed, and particularly in modern Calvinism—is perfection by imputation. This assumes that his status as perfect as well as his status as justified is for the Christian believer completed in Christ, and applied to him as a free gift in the covenant of grace. His perfection is the imputed righteousness of Christ. Col 2¹⁰, 1 Co 1³⁰, and He 10¹⁴ are quoted in support. It is the perfection of Another reckoned to the elect believer, 'given to them for whom it is appointed' (cf. *Conf. Aug.* xxvii.; Calvin, *Inst.* iii. xxii. 2, iv. i, 17, viii. 12; art. 'Vollkommenheit,' in *PREF* xx. 733 ff.). A modified form of this view appears to be taken by Forsyth (*Christian Perfection*², chs. i. and ii.). Perfection thus tends to become a subject for dogmatics rather than ethics in the Christian system; for moral character is not transferable. In the keen controversy on Christian perfection at the time of the Evangelical Revival the Calvinistic arguments were met by John Fletcher, vicar of Madeley, himself not only an authoritative exponent of the Methodist position, but a beautiful example of its grace. His *Last Check to Antinomianism* (London, 1787), written in reply to a polemical pamphlet, *A Creed for Arminians and Perfectionists*, by Richard Hill, Fellow of Clare Hall, Cambridge, seeks to show the Scriptural character of the Methodist doctrine, and that it was sanctioned by the best theological writers (*Works*, iv. 406-v. 226). Whilst the doctrine of the Wesleys has been generally condemned by the Churches, it is not difficult to establish sympathetic relations between it and the higher spiritual aspiration and teaching of the Church of England, of which the Wesleys and Fletcher were clergymen.

5. **Anglican.**—Here the strong desire for comprehension in doctrine and devotion made room in the articles and offices of the Book of Common Prayer for both Calvinistic and Arminian tendencies. The former tendency is seen chiefly in the doctrinal colouring of the articles, the latter in the devotional wealth of the liturgies of the Church. The Arminian positions were favoured by High Churchmen of the Nonjuror type. The Wesleys came by ancestry from that stock, and strong spiritual sympathy with its traditions deeply influenced their teaching. In this atmosphere their doctrine of Christian perfection was born, and its development was nourished by these traditions. John Wesley declares that the doctrine of Christian perfection, which he held until the close of his life, was essentially identical in principle with that

¹ Luther is quoted as saying: 'The sins of a Christian are for his good; and if he had no sin, he would not be so well off, neither would prayer flow so well' (K. H. Bogatzky, *Golden Treasury*, London, 1778, p. 828).

which he preached in a University sermon, in St. Mary's, Oxford, on 1st Jan. 1733, five years before his evangelical conversion; he also traces its starting-point to the reading of Jeremy Taylor's *Rule and Exercises of Holy Living and Holy Dying*; he acknowledges the influence of a Kempis upon it, and expresses his great indebtedness to the writings on Christian perfection of the fearless Nonjuror, William Law (*Works*, xi. 351 ff.). He considered that the type of Christian perfection which he expounded was in harmony with the spiritual ideals and devotional formularies of the English Church; it was not forbidden by her articles and was sanctioned by the language of her offices, collects, and homilies.¹ Fletcher shows how 'this vein of godly desire after Christian perfection runs through her daily services' (iv. 436-453). Attention may be called to the confirmation of the view that (i.) Christian perfection consists in perfect love; the words of the collect in the ante-communion service, 'Cleanse the thoughts of our hearts by the inspiration of thy Holy Spirit, that we may perfectly love thee, and worthily magnify thy holy Name, through Christ our Lord'—in themselves stating a doctrine of Christian perfection satisfying every evangelical claim—find echo in other collects and exposition in certain of the homilies (e.g., the collect for Quinquagesima, the homily on 'Charity,' and 'for Good Friday'); Wesley quotes Archbishop Usher as confirming his conception of being perfect:

'To have a heart so all-flaming with the love of God, as continually to offer up every thought, word, and work, as a spiritual sacrifice, acceptable to God through Christ' (*Works*, xi. 369).

(ii.) Christian perfection implies cleansing from all actual and inbred sin; this is a burden of desire and expectation in several parts of the liturgy; e.g., in the ancient liturgical creed of the Church, the 'To Deum': 'Vouchsafe, O Lord, to keep us this day without sin'; it is the refrain of many of the collects (cf. those for the Circumcision, the first Sunday after Easter, the first, ninth, eighteenth, nineteenth Sundays after Trinity, Innocent's day, St. Luke's day, etc.); the baptismal office definitely contemplates and desires a death to all inbred sin, that the baptized 'may crucify the old man, and utterly abolish the whole body of sin'; the proper preface for Christmas day in the communion office regards the end of the Incarnation as 'without spot of sin, to make us clean from all sin'; lest these should be regarded as aspirations for the unattainable, the faith of the Church is directed to God who is 'wont to give more than we desire or deserve' (twelfth Sunday after Trinity).

6. Earlier views.—Behind Protestant theories of Christian perfection lay the influential systems of philosophical and psychological theology—Gnostic, Pelagian, Augustinian—which never wholly pass out of sight. Each of these had its doctrine of perfection.

(a) *Gnostic*.—Influenced both by Platonic and by Stoic philosophy, the Gnostic regarded perfection as the prerogative of the 'spiritual'—those redeemed from the bondage of matter and the flesh—for it was assumed that sin was an inseparable association of matter. Consequently a metaphysical perfection took the place of the ethical and evangelical privilege of the NT; it was attained by way of knowledge possessed only by the initiated, and as a gift independent of the exercise of faith and the ethical grace of love; it was an esoteric state entered through theosophic insight and had no living connexion with Christ through obedience to His perfect law of love (cf. Clem. Alex. *Pæd.* i. 6).

¹ 'The power of the Church of England lay not so much in its formal theology as in its liturgy' (A. V. G. Allen, *The Continuity of Christian Thought*, London, 1891, p. 324).

(b) *Pelagian*.—Perfection here was the crown of natural processes—the supreme effort of the inherent power of the human will; God required nothing unattainable by the exercise of native faculties succoured by natural means of grace; perfection was in the wise adjustment of the human organism to its appointed environment; no inherent tendency to evil interfered with complete obedience to the divine law; education was the means and instrument of perfection; the revelation and example of Jesus, together with favourable circumstances, were aids of the highest order to its achievement; by their means a self-disciplined spirit might, and in some cases did, attain, without the specific help of the grace of the Holy Spirit, to the perfection of character which satisfied the merciful Judge of mankind; the same merciful regard covered the inevitable faults of imperfect adjustment; the grace of God was original in human nature, and perfection was its instinctive quest and attainable goal; grace merely enabled the recipient to reach it more easily. Hence the Johannine saying, 'If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves,' is, for such as 'attain,' the hyperbolism of humility, and the petition of the Lord's Prayer, 'Forgive us our trespasses,' is a corporate confession used only as expressing the desire and need of others (cf. Pelagius, *ap. Augustine, de Perf. Justif.* 2 f., 6). Obviously perfection of this type is naturalistic rather than distinctively Christian; it was on this account condemned at the Council of Carthage (A.D. 418).

(c) *Augustinian*.—Excessive dread of Pelagianism fettered the mind of Augustine, its great antagonist, in his judgment as to the possibility of attaining Christian perfection. Hesitation in accepting the full implications of his doctrine of grace is a marked feature of his teaching. Perfection is possible; for divine grace is irresistible; the human will might be so constrained by the divine that perfect concurrence with the good and acceptable and perfect will of God would be effected. Moreover, he connects such a concurrence directly with perfect love—a supreme delight in God which overcomes every opposite tendency. It may not be asserted that God cannot so make Himself present to the soul that, the old nature being entirely abolished ('*tota penitus vetustate consumpta*' [*de Spir. et Lit.* xxxvi. 66]), a life should be lived in this world such as will be lived in the eternal contemplation of Him in the world to come. But, in the inscrutable wisdom of the divine sovereignty, God has restrained His grace so that no soul may reach perfection on earth:

'Et ideo ejus perfectionem etiam in hac vita esse possibilem, negare non possumus, quia omnia possibilia sunt Deo, siue quae facit sola sua voluntate, siue quae co-operantibus creaturae suae voluntatibus a se fieri posse constituit. Ac per hoc quicquid eorum non facit, sine exemplo est quidem in ejus operibus factis; sed apud Deum et in ejus virtute habet causam qua fieri possit, et in ejus sapientia quare non factum sit' (ib. v. 7).

In a word, Augustine dismisses the hope of perfection in this life, while acknowledging that it is possible, because the will of God permits and appoints that sin should persist in the most perfect Christians as essential to true humility; this view harmonizes with his theory that sin is a defect that in the divine scheme works a greater good. Hence all saints confess themselves sinners, though he hesitates about including the Blessed Virgin.

These earlier views entered as determining factors into the conceptions of perfection prevalent in Roman Catholic teaching and practice. From Gnostic sources came the ascetic tendencies, Pelagianism contributed the element of human ability which lay in the doctrine of merit, while the doctrine of concupiscence and the power of sacramental grace are closely allied with Augustinianism.

7. Ascetic and Roman.—(a) *Asceticism* in some

form has been a popular and persistent variant for perfection in Christian history (cf. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma*³, i. 238 f.). For its self-discipline apostolic authority is claimed (cf. 1 Ti 4⁷, Ac 24¹⁸). Perfection is possible only as the fruit of long, lone vigilance, ever-deepening humility, and ceaseless self-mortification. Macarius of Egypt († 391) is a typical exponent.

Perfection is to burn with 'ardent and inextinguishable love to the Lord' (*Hom.* x. 2), to reach perfect freedom and purity, 'the perfect cleansing from sin, and freedom from base passions, and the attainment of the highest reach of virtue, that is, the sanctification of the heart, which takes place through the indwelling of the Divine and perfect Spirit of God in perfect joy' (*Hom.* ii. 2). But, while 'every one of us must attain blessedness through the gift of the Holy Spirit, he may in faith and love and the struggle of the determination of his free will reach a perfect degree of virtue, that so he may both by grace and by righteousness win eternal life' (*de Perfect. in Spir.* ii. 1; cf. *Hom.* xix.).

Stress is laid upon the co-ordination of human merit and divine grace, in winning perfection; this is a tendency of ascetic writers generally. A further typical movement regards concupiscence as remaining in the soul for its discipline in humility, even when desire for the extirpation of sin had become a ruling passion. Hence Christian perfection never becomes more than aspiration and approximation in religious experience. Macarius confesses:

'Never have I seen a Christian man perfect and entirely free. . . . I myself may have reached that point sometimes, but have learned still that no man is perfect' (*Hom.* viii. 6).

It is common testimony that the perfect destruction of sin in the heart lies beyond human experience—e.g., Nilus († c. 440), a typical representative of Greek asceticism (*de Temper.* ii., *de Octo Vitiis*), Marcus Eremita, a 5th cent. Egyptian hermit (*de Temper.* 27), Maximus Confessor († 662; *Cent.* iv. 'de Charitate,' *Cent.* iii. 46, 79), and especially Cassian († c. 450; *Conferences, passim*). Reference should here be made to the association of Christian perfection with the obligations of a 'religious' vocation; it was not the calling of the many, but of the few; it implied 'counsels of perfection'—chastity, poverty, and obedience—which only the elect could receive. The resultant idea of a two-fold standard of perfection, which arose in the early history of the Church (cf. *Didache*; Cyprian, *de Opere et Eleemos.*; Ambrose, *de Officiis Cler.*, etc.), deepened into a fundamental principle in the ascetic quest for perfection.

'The Church resolutely declared war on all these attempts to elevate evangelical perfection as an inflexible law for all, and overthrew her opponents. She pressed on in her world-wide mission and appeased her conscience by allowing a two-fold mortality within her bounds' (Harnack, ii. 123; cf. a discussion of 'The Two Lives,' in C. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*², Oxford, 1913, pp. 46, 115-122; E. Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas*, London, 1890, p. 164 f.).

This doctrine lay at the root of the mediæval theory of Christian perfection. Thomas Aquinas, adopting the distinction in the Christian life between 'beginners, progressing, and perfect,' held that the highest perfection attainable by the 'beginners' and those 'progressing' is that which excludes mortal sins, which oppose the love of God, and all that hinders the soul from turning wholly to God. Ascetic practices were the means, though only the means, of true perfection (*Summa*, ii. ii. 184).

(b) *Roman Catholicism*.—In practice this was ascetic; only the discipline of the monastic life secured an ordering of temporal circumstances sufficiently favourable for its pursuit. In doctrine the most important stress lies upon the recognition of the distinction between mortal and venial sin. This distinction depends, in turn, upon the conception held of the nature, scope, and obligation of the moral law to which those enjoying the Christian estate are amenable. Consequently the possibility of perfection in this life was favoured by

Franciscans, Jesuits, and Molinists, and deprecated by Dominicans and Jansenists, the last-named modifying the doctrine in the spirit of Augustine and modern Calvinism. Indeed, interpretations of Christian perfection conforming more or less closely to most of the theories mentioned in this article may be traced in the history of Roman Catholic thought. Perfection, exhibited in the sanctity which has received the Church's seal in canonization, reveals considerable variety in specific doctrine and practice. Attention here must be confined to sanctioned dogmatic standards and to their approved exponents. These make a clear distinction between 'Christian' and 'religious' perfection. The former is attainable by 'seculars'; the latter is the privilege of the devout who bind themselves to obey the 'counsels of perfection' which are the means and instrument of attaining the higher state.

(a) '*Christian*' perfection.—The Council of Trent determined that to those infused with the grace conveyed in baptism, by which all of the nature of sin is removed from the soul, perfect obedience is possible; nothing need hinder their full conformity to the divine law; they may avoid all sin; good works performed in this state of grace are perfect from taint of sin:

'Si quis in quolibet bono opere justum saltem venialiter peccare dixerit . . . anathema esto' (*Canon and Decrees of Council of Trent*, sess. vi. cap. 25).

But this law, to which the regenerate may, and often do, render perfect obedience, must be specifically defined; it is not the absolute moral law, but the law so modified as to be accommodated to the fallen estate of men—'pro hujus vitæ statu'; it is to be distinguished from the perfect law of love. Only the law in its accommodated form is binding upon all; justice cannot demand more from man in his present state; this relaxed law may be and ought to be obeyed. When this obedience is accomplished, the Christian man is perfect. But this perfection does not imply the highest degree of moral excellence. An obedience beyond the demands of the law may be offered; this, however, is a work of supererogation and constitutes the merit of the saints. Perfection, therefore, in the Roman sense is perfect justification rather than a further and distinctive Christian experience; it is compatible not only with the absence of beatitude, but also with the presence of human miseries and rebellious passions. Those who attain it are not free from venial sins; these may be committed without prejudice to their perfect state; for such are only condemned by the highest law of love; indeed, these defects are not properly sins, judged by the law to which obligation is now due, for they do not forfeit grace; they are rather signs of concupiscence—the remains of original sin, tendencies that are not removed by baptism, but for which the perfect are no longer accountable. On the ethical qualities of venial sins the Council of Trent did not dwell. The expositions of Bellarmine and, later, of J. A. Möhler should be consulted.

'The defect of charity, for instance, our not performing good works with as much fervour as we shall exhibit in heaven, is indeed a defect, but not a fault, and is not sin. Whence indeed our charity, although imperfect in comparison with the charity of the Blessed, yet may absolutely be called perfect. . . . If the precepts of God were impossible they would oblige no man, and therefore would not be precepts' (Bellarmine, *de Justificatione*, iv. 10 [*Disputationes*, Paris, 1603, iv. 933b]).

Möhler indicates that this position is still held: 'In modern times some men have endeavored to come to the aid of the old orthodox Lutheran doctrine by assuring us that the moral law proposes to men an ideal standard, which, like everything ideal, necessarily remains unattained. If such really be the case with the moral law, then he who comes not up to it, can as little incur responsibility as an epic poet for not equalling Homer's *Iliad*' (*Symbolism*, Eng. tr., London, 1894, sect. xxiii. p. 172; cf. also sect. xxi.).

(β) '*Religious*' perfection.—Obedience to the law of love may 'by the will of God and His gratuitous

liberality' achieve the merit of a state rising above the law; the saints are more than perfect. Nevertheless even within them the *some peccati* remains; there is no provision for destruction of sinful desire, and therefore no guarantee of the soul's final ethical perfection; even purgatorial discipline removes only the stain, not the principle, of sin. Further, both ability and disposition to seek perfection are the gift of grace conveyed only sacramentally. Yet 'Christian' and 'religious' perfection spring from and are sustained and tested by the act, pursuit, and practice of charity. Suarez explains the necessity of charity in three ways: (i.) essentially, because the essence of union with God consists in charity; (ii.) principally, because it has the chief share in the process of perfection; (iii.) entirely, because all other virtues necessarily accompany charity and are ordained by it to the supreme end. Faith and hope are prerequisites for perfection, but they do not constitute it; for in heaven, where perfection is complete and absolute, faith and hope no longer remain. The other virtues belong to perfection in a secondary and accidental manner, because charity cannot exist without them, but they without charity do not unite the soul supernaturally to God (*de Statu Perfectionis*, i. iii.; cf. also H. R. Buckler, *The Perfection of Man by Charity*², p. 68 ff.).

8. Mystical.—Tendencies towards this type were associated with the several theories of Christian perfection already mentioned and pervaded almost every stage of their expression. These have common religious characteristics, which should be carefully traced in the rapidly growing literature dealing with mystical religion in general (see MYSTICISM). Their chief feature is that perfection is realized in the entire detachment from the creature and in perfect union with the absolute Creator, the all-perfect All. Conceptions of this type of perfection originated mostly in the pantheistic systems of the East (see PERFECTION [Buddhist]). They came to permeate the atmosphere of Christian thought largely as the result of the doctrines of Neo-Platonism (*q.v.*), which overflowed into the ways of mediæval religion, quickening a wistful desire to seek perfection in identification with the nameless, uncreated Essence of whom no attribute can be predicated. They tended towards the exclusion or suppression of the religious and ethical consciousness of the individual, and therefore to the confusion of the distinction between God and the creature. Neglecting the historical processes of the Christian redemption through the Incarnate Word, the mystical views of perfection in the Church have often lost any essentially Christian features that they claimed to possess. *E.g.*, the German phases of mystical perfection leaned decidedly towards pantheism, the French and Italian issued in Quietism, and the Spanish ran into a type of antinomian Illuminism (cf. Pope, *Comp. of Chr. Theol.*² iii. 77). In each the method of attaining perfection may be comprehended within the three stages of the mystical way—the way of purification, of illumination, and of union (cf. Bigg, *Christian Platonists*; W. R. Inge, *Christian Mysticism*, London, 1899; R. M. Jones, *Studies in Mystical Religion*; E. Underhill, *Mysticism*², do. 1912, and *The Mystic Way*, do. 1913; F. von Hügel, *The Mystical Element of Religion*, Eng. tr., do. 1909; W. K. Fleming, *Mysticism in Christianity*, do. 1913). The more distinctively Christian type of mystical perfection may be illustrated by the teaching of the Society of Friends (*q.v.*), which holds a mediating position between the opinions tending to antinomian indifference and those associated with ascetic discipline. The Quaker view is evangelical: conformity with the law of God in the obedience of good works is not

possible to man in his own strength and of his own will.

'Yet we believe that such works as naturally proceed from this spiritual birth and formation of Christ in us are pure and holy, even as the root from whence they come; and therefore God accepts them. . . . Wherefore their judgment is false and against the truth who say that the holiest works of the saints are defiled and sinful in the sight of God' (R. Barclay, *Apology*¹², Manchester, 1869 [1st ed. 1678], prop. vii. 3). 'In whom this pure and holy birth is fully brought forth, the body of death and sin comes to be crucified and removed; and their hearts united and subjected to the truth; so as not to obey any suggestions or temptations of the Evil One, and to be free from actual sinning and transgressing the law of God, and in that respect perfect. Yet doth this perfection still admit of a growth; and there remaineth always in some part a possibility of sinning, where the mind doth not most diligently and watchfully attend unto the Lord' (ib. prop. viii.).

9. Fanatical.—Most theories of Christian perfection have suffered from the teaching or practice of extremists whose exaggeration or caricature of leading features has issued in foolish or hurtful excesses. Historically these have mainly been associated with claims for abnormal effusions of the Holy Spirit deeper and richer than the experiences of His descent at Pentecost. Montanism (*q.v.*) in the 2nd cent. favoured the assumption that the Paraclete was not given to the apostles, but was reserved for a third dispensation. This fuller gift of the Holy Ghost, of which Montanus declared himself the prophet, raised its recipients to a higher perfection, such as elevated them to the rank of *spirituales* or *πνευματικοί*, whereas before they were merely *ψυχικοί*, or 'earnal.'

'They will say that the Paraclete has revealed greater things through Montanus than Christ revealed through the Gospel' (pseudo-Tertullian, *de Præscr.* 62 [PL II. 91]).

Perfection was possible, but only to those who had received this ecstatic gift of the Holy Spirit. The boast of a plenary, but exclusive, outpouring of the Holy Spirit has appeared also in several fanatical sects which have claimed perfection in mediæval and modern times. On this ground the Novatianists (*q.v.*) of the 3rd cent. and some of the Catharists (see ALBIGENSES) of the 12th and 13th appropriated to themselves the term *τελειοί*, or Perfecti (*q.v.*), in contradistinction from the general body of *Credentes*, or believers, who were depreciated as persons to whom had been vouchsafed only the ordinary gift of the Spirit in the grace of regeneration (cf. Harnack, ii. 121; and Reinerus, 'Liber contra Waldenses,' in *Bibl. Max.* xxv. [1677] 266, 269). Frequently those who have thus appropriated the term 'perfect' exclusively to themselves have assumed in teaching and practice that their spiritual privileges and prerogatives have lifted them to a state beyond the obligations of the moral law. This unethical perfection has been illustrated not only by the Fraticelli, the Brethren of the Free Spirit in the Middle Ages, the Anabaptists at the Reformation, and certain fanatical Perfectionists of the Puritan period, but also in recent times, chiefly in America, by Bible Communists, Free Lovers, and other fanatical sects (cf. J. H. Noyes, *Salvation from Sin the End of Faith*, Oneida, 1869, *The Perfectionist*, Putney, Vermont, 1843-46, and *Hist. of American Socialisms*, Philadelphia, 1870; W. Hepworth Dixon, *New America*, London, 1867; C. Nordhoff, *Communitistic Societies of the United States*, do. 1875). While, however, in no serious degree depreciating the ethical values inseparable from Christian perfection, some of its evangelical advocates also regard it as consisting in a new and distinct dispensation of the Spirit. The gift of the Spirit for perfection in sanctification and service of love is distinguishable in kind from and superadded to that received already by the regenerate rather than a richer degree of His grace previously bestowed. In this sense Christian perfection is frequently referred to as the 'second blessing' (cf. A. Mahan, *The Baptism of the Holy*

Ghost; also the literature of the Pentecostal League, and, in criticism, Forsyth, p. 7). Although this teaching has doctrinal affinities with the characteristic principle of Montanism, it would be unfair to class it with fanatical types.

10. Present-day tendencies.—Most of these are simply heirs of the past whose inheritance is modified by eclectic or syncretistic methods characteristic of modern doctrinal teaching and ethical systems. But some fresh features emerge, particularly as a result of a renewed social emphasis in the conception of religious idealism.

(a) The more recent interpretations of Christian perfection in regard to the individual have been much influenced by psychological and ethical principles underlying the theology of the Oberlin school—an American type of teaching in affinity with the Pelagian or Semi-Pelagian theories of human nature (cf. A. Mahan, *The Scripture Doctrine of Christian Perfection*; C. G. Finney, *Systematic Theology*; J. H. Fairchild, *Moral Philosophy and Elements of Theology*, Oberlin, 1892).

According to this school, perfection is 'a full and perfect discharge of our entire duty, of all existing obligations to God, and all other beings' (Mahan, *Christian Perfection*, p. 7). 'Nothing more nor less can possibly be perfection or entire sanctification than obedience to the law. . . . Nothing can possibly be perfection in any being short of this: nor can there possibly be anything above it' (Finney, *Oberlin Evangelist*, II. [1840]).

The perfect law of God consists in disinterested benevolence; happiness is the only ultimate good; the highest virtue is that which seeks voluntarily the well-being or blessedness of the whole sentient universe including God. But the principle of love, the only virtue, resides in the will. Good will is the *summum bonum*; all responsible character pertains to the will in its voluntary attitude and action; this action of the moral agent is free; hence moral obligation is limited by the agent's power; sin is a voluntary failure to meet obligation, and nothing else is sin; anything which lies beyond the range of voluntary action is not a matter of immediate obligation, and can be neither holiness nor sin. Consequently, when a man's generic choice or purpose is at any moment to promote the happiness of the universe, he is perfect; the sincere man is the perfect man. But the law does not assume that our powers are in a perfect state, as if we had never sinned; the service required is regulated by our ability and condition. The principle of perfect obedience is our own natural ability, though divine grace may of sovereign choice aid our effort at every point through the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless a free moral agent must be able to be and to do all that the law can justly demand.

'It is a first truth of reason that moral obligation implies the possession of every kind of ability which is required to render the required act possible' (Finney, *Sermons*, New York, 1839, vol. IV. no. 18).

As God, therefore, expects from every man, at any given moment, only the best that he can do with his impaired faculties, perfection is simply doing one's best. In other words, perfection is in full consecration, in an entirely surrendered will. This may be regarded as a sinless state, because nothing outside the will—no motive or tendency to evil resident in the nature of man as such—is sinful; feeling, e.g., has no moral character. Hence perfection resides in free volition alone, not in the complete personality; it is wholly relative and subjective also—a goodness limited by present ability, which marks the boundary of present responsibility. The moral law has been superseded by the law of faith. Thus the life of faith is the perfect life, and, when perfectly maintained, excludes the presence and power of sin. Moreover, this gift of faith which makes perfect is a distinct bestowment of the Holy Spirit—a 'second blessing' following the primary gift of faith (cf. 'Have ye

received the Holy Ghost since ye believed?' [Ac 19⁷], and Mahan, *The Baptism of the Holy Ghost*, p. 34 ff.). The prevailing teaching among those who to-day advocate the possibility in the present world of a perfect Christian life is to regard it as thus realized, i.e. in an entire surrender of the will to God, issuing in the power and joy of full consecration to His service and in the sustained habit of the life of faith. What is known as the Keswick school may be considered here as typical.

This 'sets before men a life of faith and victory, of peace and rest as the rightful heritage of the child of God, into which he may step not by the laborious ascent of some "Scala Sancta," not by long prayers and laborious effort, but by a deliberate and decisive act of faith' (C. F. Hartford, *The Keswick Convention*, London, 1907, p. 51.).

The 'Scriptural possibilities of faith in the daily life of a Christian,' particularly in attaining 'victory over all known sin' in distinction from the eradication of inbred sinfulness of nature, which is characteristic of the Keswick movement, applies also as their main feature to similar modern movements in America and in Europe generally.

(b) The difficulties emphasized by the modern mind in respect of current views of individual Christian perfection are such as relate to (a) the extent to which the Scriptural support claimed for the doctrine can be acknowledged in face of the scientific method of using Scriptural proofs now considered essential in Biblical theology (cf. Curtis, p. 385); (b) the fact that they generally assume an original ethical and spiritual perfection of the human race rather than accept the evolutionary view of the persistent progress of the race towards a goal of perfection never yet attained; (c) the degree to which the sharp distinctions made between actual and original, voluntary and involuntary, sin are admissible, and how far the whole problem of human nature and sin is modified by the acceptance of modern views regarding the relation of man to his animal ancestry, the doctrine of divine immanence, the evidence adduced by the psychology of religion, and the social implications of personality; and (d) the strong desire of the modern mind to state the ideal of moral and spiritual perfection in terms of practical ethics rather than in the doctrinal values of theology and metaphysics (cf. Ritschl, pp. 171, 333 f.).

(c) The defects frequently exhibited in practice by most theories of Christian perfection have been an exaggerated individualism and a preference for the unsocial habit of life; separateness has often entered as an essential constituent into their ideals. The present-day authority of social obligations and the recognition of the principle of solidarity in ethical and spiritual relations encourage the interpretation of Christian perfection in terms harmonious with the inseparable connexion of personal religion with the social organism. The conception of the Kingdom of God is now set in the forefront of theological thought. Frequently obscured in earlier Protestant conceptions of perfection, it is at present the all-comprehending theological ideal of finality. The individual and the community cannot be severed in thought. Perfect personality can be realized only in perfect fellowship. This clearer insight into the social nature of personality, characteristic of modern psychology, contributes a distinctive feature to the modern view of perfection. The tenor of NT teaching is that the perfection of the individual Christian is not something apart from his relation to the Christian community, but is realized in it and through it.¹ Perfection as the end of personal religion can never be divorced from the coming of the Kingdom; for the Christian

¹ Cf. the use of *καταργισμός* (a medical term) to denote Christian perfection in the NT as the setting of each man in his right moral relation to the social whole—the body of Christ (Eph 4¹², He 13²⁴, Gal 6¹, 1 P 5¹⁰, 2 Co 13⁹).

ideal of perfection is a social order constituted by an organized body of individuals standing in definite religious relations to one another as well as to God. Hence Christian perfection excludes all forms of ethical idealism which state the goal of human perfection in terms of the relation of the individual soul to God. The Christian's relation to his fellows is not simply a means to an end; it does not fall away as a transition stage when perfection is ultimately attained, so that his relation to God alone remains. 'That is the mystic ideal, but it is not Christian' (W. Adams Brown, *Christian Theology in Outline*, p. 194). In Christian perfection 'the relation of man to his fellows remains as an integral element in his relation to God now and forever' (*ib.*). Christian perfection, therefore, is not individual or social alone, but the full self-realization of the individual in society; the perfection of these is reciprocal; Christlikeness is their common goal; only the complete attainment of this characteristic achieves the ideal of Christian perfection. Moreover, its attainment is obviously synonymous with entering into the life of perfect love, which is the social bond of perfectness. The law of the Kingdom of God is as the nature of God; it is holy love; this also constitutes the fellowship of the life eternal, and, as he who dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, he who loveth God loveth his brother also (cf. 1 Jn 4:12-21). Such an interpretation of Christian perfection obviously goes much beyond the meaning which Ritschl attributes to it when he uses the term in harmony with the Augsburg Confession merely in the sense of life in the Kingdom of God lived in the conscious assurance of God's fatherly providence and personal reconciliation 'together with humility and the moral activity proper to one's vocation,' and in the spirit of prayer (p. 647; cf. *Augsburg Conf.* xx. 24, xxvii. 49). If, then, the modern exponent of Christian perfection means by it not simply 'that victory over deliberate and wilful sin which ought to characterize the normal Christian experience,' but also mastery over 'the subtler forms of selfishness from which God would set us free,' and such complete subordination of self to God in each new social situation in life as characterized the experience of Jesus, the question recurs to him as to the older advocates of perfection: Is it possible? Can we, within the limits set by our finiteness, our individuality, and environment, live in the spirit of submissive trust, complete obedience, and self-sacrificing love which exhibited His perfection on earth?

To answer this in the negative would be to set a gulf between Jesus and other men which would not only imperil the genuineness of his humanity, but would render impossible of accomplishment the end for which he gave his life' (W. Adams Brown, p. 415).

A similar reply constitutes the main point of an able plea for co-ordinating the eschatological perfecting of the Kingdom of God on earth with the perfected faith and love of the personal Christian life presented by A. G. Hogg, *Christ's Message of the Kingdom* (cf. also R. Mackintosh, *Christianity and Sin*, London, 1913, pp. 202-205). Nevertheless the modern tendency to bind up the attainment of individual perfection with the realization of the social ideal of the Kingdom of God demands as its complement faith in that unbroken continuity of spiritual life which is characteristic of the gospel of the Kingdom and constitutes the Christian hope of immortality.

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FREDERIC PLATT

PERFECTIONIST COMMUNITY OF ONEIDA.—See COMMUNISTIC SOCIETIES OF AMERICA.

PERFUMES.—The use of perfumes may have first been suggested to man by the scent of flowers and of various vegetable substances, while some animal substances had also a fragrant odour—civet, musk, castor, and ambergris. The prepara-

tion of them attained great perfection in early times in Egypt and Arabia, and the East generally has always been famed for the manufacture and use of perfumes. Without detailing the processes of manufacture, it is sufficient to say that they were obtained easily from gums and resins exuding from trees, by pouring boiling fat or oil over odoriferous substances, by distillation, intincture, or infusion of flower-petals, leaves, woods, barks, seeds, and the rind of fruits, as well as from the animal substances mentioned.

While a generally recognized distinction between pleasant and disagreeable odours can be made, and while classifications of the various kinds of odours have been attempted,¹ it is certain that savages can endure and apparently enjoy odours which revolt civilized men. There is a varying perception of and liking for odours both among different races and among different individuals.

1. Flowers.—Odoriferous flowers are worn by some savage races—e.g., the natives of Torres Straits and the Polynesians.² They were also worn by members of higher races—Nahuas, Mayas, Chinese women, Tibetans,³ Hindus (see art. FLOWERS), ancient Egyptians, Greeks, Romans (see art. CROWN [Greek and Roman]), and modern Europeans. Hence, as flowers were pleasing to men for their fragrance, they were used ritually, as part of the offerings to the dead and to spirits and gods.

The Polynesians presented flowers to the embalmed body of the dead.⁴ Flowers and sweet-scented gums were included among the sacrifices of the ancient Peruvians.⁵ The Egyptians made daily offerings of flowers on the altars in the cult of Aten, as well as in other cults, either loosely or made into bouquets, garlands, and wreaths, while the mummy was also adorned with flowers.⁶ Flowers were placed in the graves of Babylonian women and girls, and offered to the gods.⁷ In the rituals of the Northern Dravidians of India the offering of flowers has a conspicuous place, and in Hindu cult one of the stages of adoration includes a floral gift to the gods, while in the *Institutes of Vishnu* (xvi. 5 ff.) an odourless or evil-smelling flower is forbidden as an offering, but one with a sweet smell is approved. This has passed into the ritual of Tibetan Buddhism, in which flowers for decking the hair of the god are offered, but the offering of flowers in Buddhism is general and dates from early times.⁸ In India the *Bhagavad-Gītā* speaks of offering flowers with devotion, and Krishna is himself said to wear celestial flowers (ix. 17, 32). In the domestic rites of Shintō vases of flowers invariably stand on the 'god-shelf' or shrine.⁹ The Aztecs offered flowers on graves during the four years in which souls were passing their preparatory stages in heaven.¹⁰ Flowers were also offered in ancient Ægean cult, and the sacrifices in Greek and Roman rituals wore or carried garlands; victim and altar were also thus adorned. Flowers were offered to the gods or placed as chaplets on their heads.¹¹ Among Muhammadans sweet basil or other flowers are placed on tombs during the two great 'ids, or festivals of the year.¹² The early Christians retained the pagan custom of strewing flowers on graves,¹³ and the decking of altars and churches with flowers has been customary for many centuries.

2. Anointing with perfumes.—The practice of rubbing fat or oil on the skin was extensively followed among savages, as an ordinary or ceremonial custom. The substances used were often fragrant, though by no means always so. The practice was also followed by higher peoples—Egyptians, Greeks, Romans—either to render the

limbs supple or for hygienic reasons, the fat or oils used being often perfumed with the products of various plants.

This custom became so luxurious and the substances used so costly that laws were passed against the sale or use of them both in Greece and in Rome. Still the custom increased, both native perfumes and fragrant oils and those of Egypt and the East being used in anointing the hair and body, and in other ways. Many of these were costly, and a street in Capua consisted of shops devoted to their sale. The peoples of Egypt and India made similar use of perfumed oils, ointments (made of strong-scented woods and herbs pounded and mixed with oil), scents, and powders. Among the Hebrews anointing with fragrant oils and unguents was customary (cf. Ca 38), the method used in making the latter being to mix the fragrant ingredients in boiling oil or fat. Fragrant substances were strewn on beds, placed among the clothing, or carried in bags or boxes (Pr 717, Ps 458, Ca 113, Is 320). Among the more civilized peoples of ancient America similar customs existed. Zapotec women mixed liquid amber with their pigments, and when these were rubbed on the body, they emitted perfume. The people of Tehuantepec washed their bodies and clothes in water scented with the root of an aromatic plant. Among the Mosquitos a bride was washed and perfumed during three days. The Mayas carried sweet-smelling barks, herbs, and flowers for the sake of their odour, and used perfumes in the toilet.¹ Perfumed water for anointing or washing the body is also used in the East, and forms part of the offering to the gods for their use.² In Egypt images of the gods were anointed with fragrant ointments by the king or priest, and the mummy was ritually anointed.³ In Polynesia petals and leaflets of fragrant flowers were fastened to the stalk of the coco-nut leaf which was anointed with scented oil and placed in each ear or in the native bonnet. Body and hair were smeared with fragrant oil, as were also the images of the gods.⁴ The use of fragrant oils in Hindu cult is illustrated by the fact that Krishna is said to have 'anointment of celestial perfumes.'⁵

Divine beings and places are often said to possess a fragrant odour (see INCENSE, § 2).

3. Embalming.—The use of fragrant substances in connexion with embalming or other death ritual found its greatest vogue in ancient Egypt, and has been described under DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD (Egyptian). But it is found elsewhere either to aid in the preservation of the body or as a seemly action towards the dead.

In Polynesia the eviscerated body was filled with cloth saturated with perfumed oils.⁶ The Aztecs washed the body with aromatic water and sometimes used embalming with aromatic substances.⁷ Homer describes the washing and anointing with rich oil and unguents nine years old of the body of Patroclus,⁸ and a similar custom was followed in later times. Anointing the corpse with oil and perfumes was usual among the Romans. Flowers and burning incense were also placed in the chamber where the dead lay. Among the Hebrews and later Jews anointing and wrapping the body in fragrant ointments, perfumes, and spices was usual (2 Ch 1614, Mk 161, Lk 2336, Jn 1939; cf. 1237). 'Burning' for the dead—probably the burning of aromatic spices—is referred to in 2 Ch 1614 2119, Jer 345. Muhammadans, after washing the body, sprinkle it with rose-water, and with water mixed with pounded camphor and leaves of the lotus-tree.⁹

4. Perfumes in social observances.—The burning of aromatic woods in houses for the sake of their fragrance was common in Greece in Homeric times. Hippocrates is said to have delivered Athens from plague by burning such wood in the streets and hanging up packets of perfumed flowers. At banquets, after the first course was finished, perfumes and garlands were distributed to the guests. In ancient Mexico the royal palace was perfumed with the odour from numerous censers in which spices and perfumes were burned, and at banquets among the Nahuas guests were given reeds filled with aromatic herbs, which were burned to diffuse fragrance, the smoke being inhaled. Tobacco mixed with liquid amber and aromatic herbs was also burned.¹⁰ In Eastern countries—e.g., in Egypt—ambergris, benzoin, aloes-wood, or other substances are burned on braziers in houses, especially at feasts, and the beard and moustache are perfumed with civet, or rose-water is sprinkled on the guests. Perfumes

¹ O. Stoll, *Das Geschlechtsleben in der Völkerpsychologie*, Leipzig, 1903, p. 804 f.

² A. C. Haddon, *JAI* xix. [1890] 369; W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*², London, 1831, i. 135.

³ *NR* ii. 256, 734; J. Doolittle, *Social Life of the Chinese*, London, 1866, ii. 375; L. A. Waddell, *The Buddhism of Tibet*, do. 1895, p. 425.

⁴ Ellis, i. 401.

⁵ W. H. Prescott, *Hist. of the Conquest of Peru*, London, 1890, p. 50.

⁶ E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Gods of the Egyptians*, London, 1904, ii. 80; J. G. Wilkinson, *The Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians*, do. 1878, iii. 417; H. M. Tirard, *The Book of the Dead*, do. 1910, p. 14; *ERE* v. 239^a.

⁷ G. Maspero, *The Dawn of Civilization*, Eng. tr., London, 1894, pp. 631, 636.

⁸ See *DRACONIS*, *BEZOAL*, *passim*; Waddell, p. 424 f.

⁹ G. F. Moore, *Hist. of Religions*, Edinburgh, 1914, i. 112.

¹⁰ *NR* ii. 618.

¹¹ *ÆGEAN RELIGION*, vol. i. p. 146^a; *CROWN* (Greek and Roman), vol. iv. p. 342 f.

¹² E. W. Lane, *Arabian Society in the Middle Ages*, London, 1883, p. 23 f.

¹³ J. Bingham, *Origines Ecclesiasticæ*, London, 1825-29, vii. 352.

¹ *NR* i. 651, 654, 730, ii. 734.

² Wilkinson, iii. 419, 423.

³ *Bhagavad-Gītā*, xi. 17.

⁴ *NR* ii. 603.

⁵ Lane, *Arab. Society*, p. 259, *Modern Egyptians*, London, 1846, iii. 154.

⁶ *NR* ii. 161, 287.

⁷ Waddell, p. 424 f.

⁸ Ellis, i. 135, 301, 351.

⁹ Ellis, i. 401.

¹⁰ *II*, xviii. 345 f.

are sprinkled on the persons composing a wedding procession, and their use is very common, especially among women.¹

5. **Perfumes in ritual use.**—Thus used in daily life, perfumes were naturally employed in the worship of the gods and spirits and also in magic. The burning of substances agreeable to the smell in the cult of the gods has already been considered under INCENSE. Here we shall discuss their use apart from such an offering. As already seen (§3), the images of gods were sometimes anointed. But offerings of perfumes in various other forms were made.

The Aztecs offered reeds of perfume on the graves of the dead during the four years' period already referred to.² In ancient Egypt oils and fragrant ointment were offered to the gods in large quantities, as many as 'a thousand boxes of ointment' being mentioned.³ Perfume vases were sometimes made of turquoise, as in the mysteries of Osiris at Denderah.⁴ Flasks of fragrant oil, perfume, and unguents were buried with the mummy for his use in the other world. Previous to burial the dead man was anointed, perfumed, and crowned with flowers, perfumes being supposed to give him the vigour of renewed life, and as many as seven different kinds were used. The ceremony concluded with a prayer in which the perfume of Horus was desired to place itself on the dead man that he might receive virtue from the god. The ceremony of purification by incense consisted of presenting five grains of incense to mouth, eye, and hand.⁵ In Babylonia fragrant herbs, oils, and incense were offered to the gods, and bottles of perfume were placed in the tombs of women as part of the grave-goods.⁶ The fragrant substances which were used as incense by the Greeks were also offered to the gods without being burned, and aromatic cakes were presented as a separate rite in the cult of various divinities.⁷ An essential part of Hindu worship is the offering of perfumed water for washing the body of the god, as well as sandal-wood, saffron, and holi powder. The *Institutes of Vishnu* (xvi. 2) say that the householder must not make an oblation with any other fragrant substance than sandal, musk, or fragrant wood of the odoriferous *devadāru*-tree, or camphor, or saffron, or the wood of the *gātiphala*-tree. Sandal-wood paste is also used as an offering. In the funeral rites perfumes and flowers are set out for the dead man, and during the *śrāddha* the gods are honoured with fragrant garlands and sweet odours. In Tibetan worship perfumes (*gandhe*) form one of the 'five sensuous qualities' offered on the altar.⁸ In ancient Persia there are frequent references to the perfume of the wood-billets used in the sacred fire. 'I offer the wood-billets with the perfume for thy propitiation, the Fire's'; 'this wood and perfume, even thine, O Fire.' The ground was sprinkled with water and: *... ..* or nine nights' purification. *... ..* Knu dynasty began with *... ..* attract the divinities or spirits worshipped and to secure their presence at the rite. A vase contained the spirit, in which fragrant herbs were infused, and 'the fragrance partaking of the nature of the receding influence penetrates to the deep springs below.'¹⁰

In magical ceremonies perfumes have their part to play.

Thus in Muhammadan methods of consulting the future the burning of perfumes is used, perhaps by way of affecting the vision. The diviner is said to obtain 'the services of the Shēytān . . . by the burning of perfumes.'¹¹

Fumigations by burning either pleasant or, more usually, obnoxious substances are common, especially to drive away evil spirits. See art. INCENSE, §2, and *ERE* iii. 437, 445, vii. 250^b.

LITERATURE.—Pliny, *HN* xiii.; Petrus Servius, *de Odoribus*; O. Schrader, *Reallexikon*, Strassburg, 1901, s.v. 'Aromata', 'Narde', 'Galbanum', etc.; R. Sigismund, *Die Aromata in ihrer Bedeutung für Religion . . . des Alterthums*, Leipzig, 1884; Theophrastus, *de Odoribus*; H. Zwaardemaker, *Die Physiologie des Geruchs*, Leipzig, 1895. See also AFOINTINO, FLOWERS, INCENSE. J. A. MACCULLOCH.

PERIPATETICS.—The Peripatetics were the followers of Aristotle, the name probably being

¹ Lane, *Arab Society*, p. 167, *Modern Egyptians*, i. 186, 217, 245.

² *NR* II. 618. ³ Wilkinson, iii. 416 f.

⁴ Budge, *Osiris and the Egyptian Resurrection*, London, 1911, ii. 40.

⁵ Tizard, p. 31 f.

⁶ M. Jastrow, *Rel. of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1898, p. 661; Maspero, p. 656.

⁷ L. F. A. Maury, *Hist. des religions de la Grèce antique*, Paris, 1857-59, ii. 116 f.

⁸ Waddell, pp. 394, 424.

⁹ Yasna, iii. 2, 21, iv. 1, vii. 21, xxii. 20 (*SBE* xxxi. [1887] 208 ff.); *Vendidad*, ix. (*SBE* iv. [1895] 122 ff.).

¹⁰ *Shih King*, ode i. (*SBE* iii. [1879] 304, note 2); *Li Ki*, ix. i. 2 ff., iii. 16 f. (*SBE* xxvii. [1885] 147 ff., 443 ff.).

¹¹ Lane, *Arab. Society*, p. 65.

derived from the fact that he at one time lectured in a shady walk (*peripatos*) of the Lyceum, for his school is loosely styled at one time the Lyceum and at another the Peripatos. The history of the school falls into three periods: (1) that of the earlier Peripatetics to the death of Strato (322-270 B.C.); (2) the long decline from Strato to Andronicius (270-70 B.C.); (3) the last three centuries (c. 70 B.C.-A.D. 230), when Andronicius and his successors devoted their energies mainly to editing and commenting on the Aristotelian writings.

1. **Earlier Peripatetics.**—Scientific research and original thought are to be sought only in the first period, while the impulse given by Aristotle to his immediate circle was still a living force. Their starting-point was of course their master's nature system, which has been elsewhere dealt with (see ARISTOTLE). A few leading tenets, however, may be recapitulated here. Viewed on one side, the system is empirical realism. Particulars exist, but genera and species are abstractions. The natural world is eternal in its present order and works out its own salvation like a physician prescribing for himself. The leading thought is an orderly process of determination, or (if the term could be freed from modern associations) development, envisaged as motion. On the other hand, to Aristotle, the pupil of Plato, knowledge is impossible through sense alone. If the concrete particular claims reality, it is the universal that is the object of knowledge. We must go behind facts to the laws and causes which they presuppose: from motion we necessarily infer a prime mover, from the natural world a transcendent deity whose eternal life is self-thinking thought. So, too, in man creative reason enters from without (*θεῖον*), pure and impassive, free from states or emotions (*πάθος*), such as love, hate, memory, and discursive thinking, which form the texture of individual life. Many difficulties remain unsolved, for as to the relation of God to Nature, of the rational soul in man to the divine reason, or, indeed, of particular to universal, nothing is stated explicitly in the writings of the Stagirate. There is no doubt that his pupils drank deep of their master's spirit and from the first endeavoured to carry on his work by fresh researches in philosophy and science. While content as a rule to amplify and expound with few innovations, they came gradually to show unmistakable signs of a leaning to naturalism. From this tendency Eudemus of Rhodes, a favourite pupil, to whom Aristotle is said to have submitted the text of his *Metaphysics*, was wholly free. Besides courses on physics, ethics, and the categories based upon corresponding Aristotelian treatises, he wrote a history of arithmetic, a history of astronomy, and a history of geometry. Of the last-named work Proclus has preserved a summary, and it is also cited by Simplicius and Eutocius in a way which proves it to have been for centuries the standard work on the subject. In his treatise on ethics (for we have no hesitation in ascribing at least four books of the *Eudemian Ethics* to him), while following Aristotle in all the main positions, he yet displays a certain freedom and independence. He connects human action, which is successful without being due to the intellectual virtue of prudence, with a natural uprightness of will and inclination, a gift from God who is the source of movement in the world. Indeed, prudence itself (*φρόνησις*), being a rational quality, must ultimately be referred to God. Still more striking is his identification of the ethical end with the contemplation and knowledge of God. Hence he can formulate the standard of conduct by saying that everything is a good in proportion as it promotes, or an evil in proportion as it hinders, the know-

ledge of God. This defines right conduct more exactly than Aristotle's mean.

It was not, however, Eudemus, but Theophrastus of Lesbian Eresos, who succeeded Aristotle in the headship of the school, which he held for over thirty eventful years (322-288 B.C.), during which the two new schools of Stoics and Epicureans sprang up. His numerous works served to develop his master's doctrine, increasing its utility as completely as possible on every side. In logic, it is true, he refused to admit that all contraries fall under the same genus and denied that every assertion of possibility implies the opposite possibility. Further, he added to the four moods which Aristotle had assigned to the first figure of the syllogism five new ones out of which the fourth figure was afterwards constructed. Along with Eudemus he introduced the theory of hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms. His metaphysical problems (*ἀπορίας*), which have come down to us in a series of excerpts, prove that he possessed an acute and subtle intellect and unusual skill in discerning all kinds of objections.

E.g., how, he asks, is the supra-sensible object of first philosophy related to the sensible things with which physics deals? How is a common bond between them possible? The higher principle necessary for the solution of this problem can be found only in God. Thus we are led to a cause of motion acting as an object of desire, the precise doctrine of Aristotle (*Met.* xii. 6.1.). But, continues Theophrastus, if there be only one moving cause, why have not all the spheres the same movement? If several, how are their movements harmonized? Why are there many spheres, and why should they desire motion rather than rest? Does not desire (*ἔφεσις*) presuppose a soul, and therefore motion? Are motion and desire accidental or essential attributes of the heavenly spheres? Another set of objections turns on the necessity of deducing not merely some but all reality from first principles. Can design be attributed to everything, however insignificant? Or, if not, how far does order extend in the world, and why does it cease at that point (*cf.* *Arist. Met.* xii. 10 *ad init.*)? New difficulties surround the conceptions of rest and matter. Is matter endowed with potential reality while non-existent, or does it exist, though void of determinate form? And so forth, as a consideration of knowledge in its varying degrees or again of the chain of causation or the assumption of design in nature raises at each turn its peculiar perplexities.

But we get no hint of any departure from his master's system and are forced to conclude that the purpose of this elaboration of conceivable objections, like that of Aristotle in *Met.* iii., is purely didactic. But it is in physics rather than in logic or metaphysics that Theophrastus shines. As a historian of science he won by his *Physical Opinions* even greater fame than Eudemus by his *Geometry*. This great work, of which only a priceless fragment has been preserved, was the storehouse from which generation after generation drew information in the form of summaries, epitomes, and excerpts respecting the speculation of the past until we trace its last diluted perversions in the Christian writers Epiphanius and Hermias. His two extant botanical treatises, *Historiæ Plantarum* and *de Causis Plantarum*, afford a striking proof of his attainments as a naturalist, of his powers of observation, and of his wise caution in using the testimony of informants. The two treatises so far superseded previous works that later critics even deny that Aristotle ever wrote on the subject, though he certainly does refer to a treatise of his own as already written in *Hist. An.* v. 1, 539^a 20, *de Gen. An.* i. 23, 731^a 29. The eternity of the world in its present order was of course hotly controverted by the Stoics, and the acuteness of Bernays has brought to light from Philo, *de Incorrumpibilitate Mundi*, some of the arguments used by Theophrastus and Zeno respectively. The same scholar has also drawn from Porphyry, *de Abstinētia* (*περί ἀποχρῆς ἐμβόλων*), a defence of vegetarianism which undoubtedly comes from Theophrastus and embodies his views on animal-sacrifice. On the nature of life and the human soul he shows some degree of independence. Thus, while agree-

ing that the lower activities of the soul should be referred to the body (even as to imagination he doubted whether it was not irrational), he differs when he comes to the activity of thought, which he does not hesitate to describe as physical motion. If so, the soul is no longer an unmoved cause of bodily movements. On the relation of the passive to the active reason he unfolds as usual a series of most acute and formidable difficulties, but here again there is no hint of reconstruction, and it seems probable that he quieted his scruples by assuming that various terms, when applied to reason (active, passive, potency, act, form, matter, and evolution or development), bear a different sense from their ordinary acceptation. Yet we are also told that he regarded the souls as well as the bodies of all animals as made up of like elements (*ἀδιδόχοποι*) — sensations, desires, passions, and reasonings — though in some (namely, man) these elements attain a higher perfection. In ethics he was a true follower of Aristotle and refused any concessions to the Stoic doctrine that virtue alone was sufficient for happiness. Indeed, he emphasized the utility and importance of external goods as means and indispensable instruments of virtuous activity in a manner which has led him to be accused, most unjustly, of differing from his master on this head. For the rest, the *Characters* sufficiently attest his study and assimilation of the Aristotelian account of the virtues as well as the keenness of his observation.

Aristoxenus of Tarentum and Dicaearchus of Messene were Peripatetics of the first generation who attained a high reputation, the former as an authority on music, the latter as a writer on politics. Aristoxenus, who had been a Pythagorean, revived the theory combated in the *Phædo*, that the soul is a blending or adjustment (*ἀρμολογία*) of bodily elements, and Dicaearchus not only agreed with him in this but argued against the immortality of the soul. This open breach with the master's teaching (see *de Anima* i. 4) is significant. Strato of Lampsacus followed Theophrastus, and was head of the school from 288 to 270 B.C. His predilection for physics gained him the title of 'the physicist,' and under him a transformation of the system was attempted. He made natural forces suffice for the evolution of the world, thus dispensing altogether with the hypothesis of a transcendent deity. How he carried out his assumption in detail we do not know, except that he was no convert to the atomism which Epicurus had again brought into fashion. On the contrary, he took properties (*συρρέουσιν*), corporeal forces, heat and cold, as his elements, like Empedocles and Zeno the Stoic, with whom Plutarch classes him. It is true that, instead of dividing bodies into light and heavy, Strato as well as Epicurus made all bodies heavy: they press towards the centre, and this pressure explains an occasional upward movement. From Simplicius, in *Physica*, iv. 9 (693. 13 ff., Diels), Strato seems to have argued that without empty interstices the passage of light or heat or any other corporeal property through air, water, or body in general would be inexplicable. Yet he is also cited by Simplicius as refuting the accepted arguments for the existence of empty space (*ib.* 663. 4 ff., Diels). He rejected Aristotle's definition of time as counting of motion (*ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως*), remarking that time and motion are continuous and cannot therefore be counted like discontinuous quantities. Time is continually beginning and ending, whereas parts of number exist simultaneously. Why, again, should not the 'measure of earlier and later' apply as much to rest as to motion? By his own definition (*τὸ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι ποσόν*) he seeks to distinguish between time (duration of events) and the events which are

in time (*ib.* 789. 34, Diels). As regards motion, again, he confirmed the assumption of its acceleration by simple observation of falling bodies. We have mere information respecting his psychological innovations. He sharply criticized the doctrine of *ἀνδρυνος* in Plato's *Phædo*: Why can there be no knowledge without demonstration? Why can you not play the flute without practice and without instruction (Olympiodorus, 126. 31)? Other Platonic arguments are also rejected. Strato demands that in considering the soul we must adhere to the same conditions as when we are dealing with what is corporeal: if the body needs a substratum, so also does the soul. Following Theophrastus, he defined all mental activity, thought and perception alike, as movement. We cannot think without a sense-image, Aristotle had said (*de An.* iii. 7), and Strato went further by denying any separation between sense and reason. On the other hand, sensation is conditioned by thought, since often when we are thinking of something else we do not attend to impressions of sense. Here he struck out a new path; propounding views on sensation which even now are deserving of respect. Reason or consciousness, which, like the Stoics, he called the ruling power (*τὸ ἡγεμονικόν*), alone had feeling (*ἀνάλωστα γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ πλὴν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ* [Plat. *Utrum An. an Corp. sit libido*, frag. i. 4. 2, p. 697]). In the central organ, then, objective bodily change is converted into subjective feeling, the rest of the frame, even the sense-organs, having only the capacity of receiving an impression. When we believe ourselves to feel a pain in the part affected, this is merely the same delusion as when we think we hear sounds at a distance outside us. The carrier of the impression and its intermediary with the central organ (which he placed between the eyebrows) is a current of breath or 'spirit' (*πνεῦμα*). If this connexion be broken, we never feel the pain or whatever else the impression was. Aristotle had only spoken of the impression travelling from the periphery to the centre, but Strato also called attention to the fact that the impression is reflected from the centre back to the periphery or the outside world. These positions seem to require that reason should not be confined to man but extended to other animals and that all activities should be held to cease at death.

If, however, we wish to obtain a just view of the early Peripatetics and their scientific activities, there is additional evidence which should not be overlooked. Various portions of the Aristotelian *Corpus* as it has come down to us are proved by internal evidence to be the work of his pupils. Such are the treatises *de Motu Animalium*, *de Coloribus*, *de Audibilibus*, *de Plantis*, and *Mechanica*. In the *Organon* the *Postprædicamenta* (*Categ.* 10 ff.) are a later addition. The second book of the *Metaphysics* was ascribed to Pasicles, the nephew of Eudemus. A collection of *Problems*, relating to a variety of subjects and arranged in 38 books, is of very unequal merit. This collection, undoubtedly the work of numerous authors, has been compared to papers read before some learned academy or the Royal Society. The short tract *de Lineis Insecabilibus* is of great interest to the mathematician, while that entitled incorrectly *de Xenophane, Zenone, Gorgia* is an example of the class of writing called hypomnematic, analogous to memoirs read before the historical department of an academy. Here also it may be mentioned that two most important discoveries, one of the nerves by Herophilus and Erasistratus, one of the electric properties of amber by Theophrastus, fall within the period considered, but bore no fruit at the time. So much error still clung to the 'science' of the ancient world. The taste for antiquarian research produced, besides the histories of science

mentioned above, the Menonian work on the progress of medicine (*Ἱατρικὰ Μενονεία*), brought to light in 1891.

2. The decline.—The school which had staggered on for a time as best it could under the lead bequeathed by its founder seems after the death of Strato to have come to a dead stop. The headship passed successively to Lyco of Troas and Aristotle of Ceos, both eminent for their style, and to Critolaus, who in 155 B.C. accompanied Carneades and Diogenes on the famous embassy which incidentally introduced philosophy to the unphilosophic Romans. After them Diodorus of Tyre and Erymnus were heads. Other Peripatetics of eminence were Hieronymus of Rhodes, who adopted the conception of painlessness, net pleasure, for his *summum bonum*; Prytanis, a trusted agent of Antigonus Doson in State affairs; Phormio, who had the audacity to lecture to Hannibal on the art of war; Heraclides Lembus; Agatharchides, the historian; and Antisthenes of Rhodes. Of all these it is safe to say that they did not rise above mediocrity. For two hundred years there was no Peripatetic who was a thinker of note or even capable of carrying on the scientific researches of his predecessors. In the Alexandrian age, it is true, the various sciences had grown more and more independent of philosophy, but still this school trained no Eratosthenes, no Archimedes. Among its scholars it boasts no name to rival a Chrysippus, a Carneades, or a Posidonius. Instead of science or metaphysics its professors cultivated rhetoric and devoted themselves to grammatical, historical, and literary studies, not excluding popular ethics. Thus Sotion wrote a valuable history of philosophy, and Hermippus and Satyrus collections of biographies (*Bioi*) no less important. The school remained one of the chief centres of the learning of the time and in ethics taught a moderate doctrine, opposing to Stoic apathy a sane indulgence of emotion (*μετρωπάθεια*) and assigning to goods of body and intellect or to external advantages generally a due place beside virtue in the scheme of an ideal life (see Stob. *Ecl. Eth.* vii. 13-26 [pp. 242-334, Heeren; p. 116. 19 ff., Wachsmuth]), an epitome which justifies and explains many references of Cicero and later writers. The *Magna Moralia* in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* is a tolerably faithful summary of what the master and Eudemus had written, whereas the *de Virtutibus et Vitiis*, sometimes attributed to Andronicus of Rhodes, betrays signs of eclecticism, a tendency which invaded all schools in the 1st cent. B.C. The spirit of compromise, coming after the weariness of endless polemics, had produced indifference as to the distinctive doctrines of conflicting sects. It must have been in the air when the spurious work *de Mundo* was written and published in Aristotle's name with a dedication to Alexander prefixed. Its date is certainly after Posidonius, for it combines a large admixture of Stoicism in the form in which he cast it with the genuine tenets of Aristotle.

3. The later Peripatetics.—Strabo (xiii. 608 f.), in his well-known story of the fortunes of Aristotle's library buried in a cellar at Scepsis, distinctly connects the barrenness of the school under the successors of Theophrastus with the loss of these autograph rolls. This cannot be, for even Strabo would not have maintained that the Aristotelian writings remained all this time unpublished; but indirectly the recovery of the originals by Apellico of Teos, who conveyed them to Athens, brought about a momentous change in the aims and studies of the later Peripatetics. Henceforth the task of editing, expounding, and commenting upon the Aristotelian writings absorbed their best energies. Authority circumscribed, where it did not altogether check,

original speculation. In the middle of the 1st cent. B.C. Andronicus of Rhodes was the head of the school, the tenth after the founder. When Sulla brought the library of Apellico to Rome, Andronicus and a grammarian named Tyrannio obtained access to it, arranged the works of Aristotle anew, and did their best to render the edition of them which they caused to be made as correct as possible. It is all but certain that our MSS derive from this edition. From this start Andronicus went on to write commentaries on the *Physics*, *Ethics*, and *Categories*. The impulse thus given to the study, criticism, and exegesis of the founder's works was shared by other members of the school, pupils and contemporaries of Andronicus. Among them may be mentioned Boethus of Sidon, Strabo's instructor in philosophy, who thought that the student of Aristotle should begin with physics and not (as Andronicus held) with logic; Aristo of Alexandria, a convert from the contemporary Academy of Antiochus; Eudorus of Alexandria, who wrote on the *Metaphysics* and the *Categories*; Nicolaus of Damascus, the contemporary and fellow-student of Herod the Great, for whom he compiled a universal history in 144 books; and Xenarchus of Cilician Seleucia, who controverted Aristotle's assumption of a fifth element (*αἰθήρ*)—a remarkable proof of philosophic independence at this epoch. So, too, we are told that Boethus denied that the universal is by nature prior to the particular, and by substance in the strict sense (*πρῶτη οὐσία*) he understood not form but only matter or at best the concrete thing made up of form and matter. In the time of Nero Alexander of Aegæ commented upon the *Categories* and *de Cælo*. In the 2nd cent. A.D. Adrastus of Aphrodisias in Caria wrote a work on the arrangement of the Aristotelian writings, while Aspasius was the author of an extant commentary on the *Ethics* and of other commentaries, now lost, on *Physics*, *Metaphysics*, and *de Interpretatione*. Aristocles of Messene wrote a complete history of philosophy. His fame was eclipsed by his pupil, Alexander Aphrodisiensis, who became head of the school in the reign of Septimius Severus (A.D. 195-211); he dedicated his *de Fato* to that emperor and Caracalla (A.D. 198). Besides Aristocles, Herminius and Sosigenes had been his instructors and he soon won such distinction that the surname of *ὁ ἐξηγητής*, the expositor *par excellence*, was bestowed upon him. His numerous writings included treatises, still extant, entitled *de Anima*, *de Fato*, *de Mixtione*, and *Quæstiones* (*ἀποραι καὶ λύσεις*), as well as the various commentaries on which his fame chiefly rests. That on the *Metaphysics* is the most valuable of what has come down to us, though five books of it alone have retained their original form. His works were a rich mine for later commentators who, like Themistius and Simplicius, name him only when they dissent from him, and pass over their huge obligation to him in silence. He was respected by Plotinus, who mentioned him in his Canon, while Syrianus, another Neo-Platonist, borrowed largely from him. Alexander, however, stood aloof from

the mystical tendency of the age which swept away Plotinus and his successors, and, except Aristocles, he scarcely names any of his contemporaries. In spite of a dry scholastic formalism and divergence in detail, he really wished to follow Aristotle and defend his doctrine, not to set up philosophical principles of his own. He shows his independence when he holds, with Boethus, that the individual is prior to the universal not only for us but also in itself. Even the deity must be regarded as individual substance. He denies the reality of time. Form is everywhere inseparable from matter and reason is bound up with the other faculties in indissoluble unity. At first it exists in man as a disposition or capacity merely (*νοῦς ὑλικὸς καὶ φυσικὸς*) and is afterwards developed into actual intelligence (*νοῦς ἐπικτητός*). This transition is effected by active reason (*νοῦς ποιητικός*), which is no part of the human soul but simply the divine reason acting upon it. The influence of God upon Nature is reduced as far as possible to a mechanical process, a diffusion of force to the first heaven and thence through the different spheres to the earth at the centre, each receiving less the farther it is removed from the source. This identification of *νοῦς* in man with the divine reason involves the denial of individual immortality, although the eternity of one immortal impersonal reason is still tenable. Shortly after Alexander the Peripatetics were absorbed, like all their contemporaries, in the Neo-Platonist school, but the work of exposition and commenting went on briskly for the next three centuries under Porphyry, Iamblichus, Themistius, Dexippus, Syrianus, Ammonius, Simplicius, and Philoponus. Thence it passed to the Arabian philosophers and lastly to the mediæval scholastics. Thus it comes about that Alexander's version of Aristotle was followed in due course by those of Averroes and Aquinas.

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PERJURY.—See OATH.

PERSECUTION.

Christian—

Early Church (H. M. GWATKIN), p. 742.

Roman Catholic (A. FAWKES), p. 749.

Modern (W. T. WHITLEY), p. 755.

Indian (A. S. GEDEN), p. 762.

Jewish.—See ANTI-SEMITISM.

Muhammadan (T. W. ARNOLD), p. 765.

Zoroastrian.—See MISSIONS (Zoroastrian).

PERSECUTION (Early Church).—I. Introductory.—Persecution consists in making an offence of certain religious beliefs, or of their natural expression in speech, writing, or religious observances. The word may be loosely used of

mob violence, which is sometimes encouraged or connived at by the authorities; but on the whole it is better to take account only of legal action. The sanction may be either positive, in the form of definite penalties, or negative, consisting of dis-

abilities; and it may be imposed only on overt acts, or it may extend to words, or even make inquisition into unspoken thoughts.

Persecution is sometimes defended on principle, on the ground that misbelief is of itself offensive to God and abominable, or that it is a moral pestilence which must not be allowed to infect the faithful. More commonly, however, political reasons are given, as that the heretics are enemies of the State, that the existence of heresy imperils its unity, or that certain doctrines or practices are contrary to its welfare and good order. As there may sometimes be more or less of truth in some of these charges, there may also be some doubt of the exact point where political precaution passes into religious persecution. The principle seems to be that punishment of religious belief is always persecution, and that interference with religious action is also persecution, except so far as it can be justified by real public danger or by gross and public scandal or disorder; also that it is not to be presumed without evidence that the guilt of an individual is shared by others who hold the same religious beliefs.

But the principle is not always of easy application. Take the case of a public speaker. He may be using insult instead of argument, inciting to disorder, or preaching immorality, while his opponents may be endeavouring to suppress by violence opinions differing from their own. At what precise point must the duty of protecting free speech give place to that of preventing scandal and violence? Circumstances will vary; but a wise government will not act till that point has clearly been passed. Again, if the government does well to suppress widow-burning in India and polygamy in Britain, the reason is not simply that the government declares them crimes, for any government might treat the most innocent religious observances as an intolerable outrage on the feelings of orthodox persons, but that these particular practices are considered abominations by the civilized world, not simply by the immediate opponents of the sects incriminated in them.

All this was not thought out in ancient times, or in modern times till fairly recently; and even now it is hard to say how far the professed principles of toleration are fully understood even in the most civilized countries. Ancient society was essentially intolerant. Israel and Persia had gods whom they believed to be lords of all the earth, so that others were not merely gods of their enemies, but enemies of their gods. So the Jews spoke of them as shames, dungs, nothings, or abominations, and were commanded¹ to destroy their altars, images, etc., while the Persians, when they came to Greece, rifled the statues of the gods and burned their temples, and utterly destroyed the shrines of the local deities. The Greek looked with horror and amazement on these 'shameless' outrages.² Deeply religious as he was, zeal for the gods was not his inspiration. Unpopular opinions might be dangerous, as Anaxagoras and Socrates experienced, but even Antiochus Epiphanes contended rather for Greek civilization than for Greek religion.

As Rome was more strongly organized than Athens, so Roman religion was stronger than Greek. Its strength was not intrinsic. Its gods were formless *numina*, of whom nobody cared to know anything but the proper formula of prayer to the particular god required, and there is little trace of hearty worship, except in the ancient rustic festivals. Nor had it a strong hierarchy, for it was a layman's religion, and the punishment of offences came straight from the magistrate. The change to a clerical religion, rather than the

adoption of Christianity, is the greatest change that it has undergone from Numa's time to our own. Nor had it any definite creed, and least of all was it a teacher of morality. The State, the philosophers, the Eastern worships, might be schools of virtue; the old Roman religion was not. Its strength was that it formed part of the discipline of the State. No man was required to believe in the gods, but no man was allowed to refuse 'the Roman ceremonies,' as the emperor Valerian calls them.¹ And not only were these ceremonies fixed in detail, but they referred only to a definite list of gods formally recognized by the State. The law is laid down by the Twelve Tables:

'Nemo privatum habessit deos, neve novos sive advenas nisi publice adscitos privatum colunto.'

And this law was never deliberately ignored till well on in the time of the empire. True, pagan Rome admitted new gods as freely as papal Rome manufactures saints; but they had to be admitted before they could lawfully be worshipped. First came Greek gods in the time of the Tarquins, then the Magna Mater (205 B.C.), and Rome made a practice of worshipping the gods of the conquered peoples, and even boasted that she had won the dominion of the world by bringing into her vast pantheon all the gods of all the peoples of the world.

There was one exception: the Jews were licensed noneonformists. Unpopular and politically dangerous as they were, the operations of Titus were war rather than persecution; and, if so, the only real persecution was under Hadrian after the war of Bar Cochba, when for a short time (135-138) Rabbis were burned along with the rolls of the law. In general, however, Judaism was officially respected as an old national religion, and it could safely be left alone when it ceased to be missionary. There was not much more persecution, except of Christians, under the heathen empire. The druids of Gaul were not persecuted, though some of their practices were forbidden and Tiberius put to death a Roman knight for using a druidical charm. Nor were the Manichæans molested till the edict of Diocletian in 297.

The Christians were first of all unpopular. Their monotheism was barbarous, their 'moroseness' offensive, their secrecy suspicious. They would have nothing to do with the public amusements, and their own secret rites were a cover for the foulest abominations. Worst of all, they were very Jesuits for slipping into houses and perverting their inmates. There was a real bitterness in the family divisions which they caused, and a real panic was often created by the uncertainty as to who was Christian and who was not. They were already unpopular in Nero's time, and scandal imputed to them the foulest orgies; and thenceforward is a long record of mob violence. The riots at Lyons under Marcus and at Alexandria in Philip's time are fair samples, even if they were worse than usual. But in course of time there were no more riots. The last of which we read were under Gallus (251-253), and the later persecutions were purely official. When the Christians became better known, they were found to be decent neighbours, with a few Quakerish scruples, and in ordinary times Christians and heathens lived peaceably together, as they did at Emmeia till the massacre of Diocletian's time.

The Christians were at first a Jewish sect, and as such the Roman government protected them through the greater part of the Apostolic Age. Gallio and Festus refused to decide 'questions of their law.'² But, when the Apostolic Conference decided that Christians need not become Jews,

¹ Dt 12st.

² *Arch. Persæ*, 805-816.

¹ *Acta Proc. S. Cypriani*.

² *Ac 18:15-25:19*.

and Paul taught that they must not become Jews, they ceased to be a sect of a national religion, and sank to the position of an unlawful cult (*religio non licita*). This, however, was perceived only in course of time; but Titus, in 70, was aware¹ that Christians were not Jews, and the difference must have been clear to the next generation. It could not be more than affected ignorance if Christianity in high places was described as 'Jewish superstition.'²

Once the difference was recognized, the Christians became in many ways obnoxious to the law. In the first place, they formed unlawful societies (*hetæriæ, collegia illicita*), and of such societies the empire was always jealous. Next, these societies practised a new and unlawful worship (*religio nova et illicita*), for the Galilæan was neither a national god nor recognized by public authority; and they were also secret societies, and lay under suspicion of magic (*religio malefica*), for which the punishment of burning prescribed by the *Lex Cornelia* was never mitigated by the emperors. Worse than this, they refused the ceremonies which the State required, and reviled its gods. If the Jews would not endure Cæsar's image in the Temple, the Christians were ready to pull down Jupiter's from the Capitol. Hence arose a double charge—of atheism and treason. Atheism, however, was not what we mean by atheism; it meant a denial of the gods of the State. But the real god of the State was the emperor, who was more terrible to his blasphemers than any of the gods. As Tertullian says, 'men forswear themselves more willingly by all the gods than by Cæsar's genius.'³ The Christian might occasionally be called on to worship the gods, but he was far more commonly brought before an image of the emperor and commanded to offer incense. He came into court as a suspected person, and the readiest test was to make him clear himself by sacrifice, incense, or the oath by Cæsar's genius. If he refused, he was guilty of treason (*maiestas*, in the form of *impietas circa principes*), and committed his crime in open court, so that he could be sent straight to execution.

This was the full process, used chiefly for Roman citizens; and even this left a considerable discretion to the magistrate. He might encourage accusations, or he might refuse to receive them, or nullify the usual test of loyalty by allowing the accused to swear by Cæsar's safety—an oath which the Christians were willing to take. His discretion was still freer in the more usual case of *cognitio*, or summary jurisdiction. The Christians were an unlawful society, and might be punished like brigands or any other disturbers of the peace. Then the only question would be whether the accused was a Christian. If he confessed it, he might be executed or tortured either by way of punishment or to make him renounce it.

The number of the persecutions is indefinite. The traditional figure is ten. Orosius counts Nero, Domitian, Trajan, Marcus, Severus, Maximin, Decius, Valerian, Aurelian, Diocletian. But this number is too high for general persecutions, too low for local. Aurelian hardly reached an actual persecution, and (given a Neronian date of the Apocalypse) there is no reason to suppose that Domitian's action extended to the provinces. Others spread farther, but of general persecution known to have been actively carried on throughout the empire we cannot safely count any but those of Decius and Diocletian, and perhaps Valerian. On the other hand, local persecutions were continually breaking out. A governor might be hostile, and almost any accident might start the

cry, 'Christianos ad leonem!' Private malice and trade jealousy would come in, though in the 3rd cent. Christians and friendly heathens could make things unpleasant for an informer. But of fanaticism—genuine enthusiasm for the gods—there is hardly a trace. The priests were not zealous persecutors. They were commonly magnates, like the Asiarchs who warned Paul to keep away from the theatre,¹ and cared more for the dignity of their office than for vindicating the honour of the gods. If a story makes them the prime movers of persecution, it may almost be summarily set aside as a legend. Thus there might be a fierce persecution in one province and perfect quiet in the next. It would therefore be very unsafe to assume that the accounts which have come down to us represent anything like the whole of the persecution which went on. For instance, scores at least must have perished in Bithynia in 112; yet no Christian writer seems to know anything of the matter, except from Pliny's letter.² There may have been any number of similar local persecutions which have left no trace behind.

2. History.—As to the persecutions themselves, we do not need a formal history of them. Our business is not to count up their illustrious victims, or to detail their shames and horrors, but to trace from reign to reign the changes in the character of persecution made by successive emperors in accordance with changes in the state of the empire and the trend of heathen and Christian opinion. For a long time it is almost incidental. Christians are put to death when they turn up in court, and sometimes they are brought into court by mobs, but on the whole the officials are not very zealous in searching for them. The empire is seriously alarmed only by the conversions in high society at the end of the 2nd cent., and by the rapid growth and consolidation of the churches in the 3rd. So from Severus onward we see a series of laws against special classes of Christians or necessities of Christian worship. There is more or less peace in the first half of the 3rd cent., when the Syrian emperors were willing to tolerate, and again in the second, when the Illyrian emperors were too busy to persecute, with a ten years' interval of active persecution. Thus Decius and Valerian link up Severus and Maximin (Thrax) before them with Diocletian and Maximin (Daza) after them, and the whole history becomes a mighty drama, leading up in ordered sequence to the last great struggle (303-313) which left Christianity the religion of the future.

(a) *The 2nd century.*—After the great fire in Rome (July, 64) Nero had to recover the favour of the populace. As the Christians were already odious, they were the most convenient victims. First, individuals were charged with arson, and confessions were obtained by the usual tortures. These implicated a large number of others, and the charge of arson was gradually changed for one of 'hatred of mankind,' by which Tacitus³ means disaffection to the empire and to society generally. The evidence of this would be the practice of magic and secret crimes; but it cannot have been long before the avowal of Christianity was taken summarily as a confession of the abominations ascribed to the Christians, and an administrative order was made against Christians as such. The victims were worried by dogs, or crucified, or burned as lights for the performances in Nero's gardens, with Nero himself in a jockey's dress mixing with the crowd or driving a chariot. The worst of the matter in the eyes of Roman society was that disgust at these vulgar theatricals led to some commiseration for miscreants who richly deserved their punishment.⁴

¹ Tacitus, *ap. Sulpicius Severus*, *Chron.* ii. 30.

² Dio Cass. lxxvii. 14.

³ *Apol.* 23.

¹ *Ac* 1931.

² *Ann.* xv. 44.

² *Ep.* xcvi. [xcvii.], 'de Christianis.'

⁴ *Id.*

There must have been many victims, but we can name for certain only two—the two great apostles. Clement of Rome¹ significantly joins the names of Peter and Paul, and Caius² refers to their tombs on the Vatican and the Ostian Way, while Dionysius of Corinth³ (c. 170) says that they suffered martyrdom at the same time. As regards Peter, the date is not clear. As he does not seem to have come to Rome till late, perhaps not till the persecution was in full course, we can hardly account for the impression which his work made without putting his death considerably later, or even among the occasional executions which went on after Nero's fall (June, 68).

Did the persecution extend to the provinces? The 1st Epistle of Peter is full of allusions to persecution; and, even if the Babylon from which it is dated means Rome, its address to Christians of Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia shows that they were sufferers. If the Apocalypse is of Neronian date, as to the present writer it seems to be, we find patience at Ephesus, tribulation at Smyrna, Antipas a martyr at Pergamus, the saints slain with the axe for refusing to worship the emperor, and Rome drunk with their blood.

Vespasian cannot have been friendly to the Christians, and there may have been executions in his time, though none is recorded, but there is no serious evidence that he troubled himself much about them. The next active persecutor was Domitian (81–96) towards the end of his reign. His action differed widely from that of Nero. Domitian was always jealous, and had now come to a pass when he kept his power only by a series of sudden blows, striking down one suspected person after another. He was never so dangerous as when he seemed most friendly. As the Christians were many in the palace, they were likely to attract his notice, and, as he was a religious man in the heathen sense and a restorer of religion, they would get their full share of his attentions. There must have been a number of victims, for Clement looks back on 'the sudden and repeated calamities which befel us';⁴ but they seem to have been (at least in general) persons of importance. When the grandsons of Jude the Lord's brother were brought before him and he found that they were only humble farmers, he scornfully dismissed them. The only victims known to us by name are his niece Domitilla, who was exiled to Pandateria, and her husband Flavius Clemens, Domitian's cousin and colleague in the consulship of 95, whom he put to death as soon as he was out of office. Domitilla was certainly a Christian, and we may safely read as Christianity the charges against her husband of atheism and Jewish practices, and of contemptible inactivity. To these we may perhaps add Glabrio; but there is no sign of wholesale execution as in Nero's time, and we have no reason to suppose that the persecution extended to the provinces, unless the Apocalypse be assigned to a Domitianic date.

The curtain rises again in Trajan's time, about 112. Christians were brought before the younger Pliny, then governor of Bithynia. Without troubling himself about any particular charges, he simply asked them whether they were Christians, and sent straight to execution those who persistently avowed it, of course reserving Roman citizens for trial at Rome. Whatever their worship might be, obstinacy and unbending perversity deserved punishment. Pliny has no doubt at all that Christianity is worthy of death, apart from the crimes ascribed to the Christians. Difficulties arose only when further anonymous charges were laid before

him, implicating numbers of all ranks in town and country. Some of those cleared themselves by proper worship of the gods and the emperor's image, and by further cursing Christ. Others admitted the offence, but said that they had given it up for three, ten, or even twenty years, and were quite ready now to worship the gods in proper form. They did not seem to have committed any crimes beyond their unlawful worship, and the examination of two deaconesses by torture elicited nothing further. No abominations came to light; only a perverse and arrogant superstition. So Pliny hastened to consult the emperor. Was it good to go on punishing as many Christians as might be found? Might not youth or sex or frank abandonment of Christianity be allowed to mitigate an offence not complicated by further crime? In any case a milder policy might be worth trial, especially in view of the numbers implicated.

Trajan replies that Pliny must use his discretion. The Christians are not to be sought out, but must be punished if accused and convicted; but anonymous accusations are not to be received; and any one who says that he is no longer a Christian, and proves it by worshipping our gods, must be pardoned.

The Christian is here acquitted of abominable charges; but he is none the less a criminal, though he need not be noticed till some accuser brings him into court. Trajan's chief care is to protect the heathen who went wrong in past years and is now in danger from informers. But the Christian incidentally gets some protection too. If his life does not cease to be at the mercy of an informer, the informer is forced to come forward publicly; and the heathens themselves in ordinary times had no great liking for this business. Tertullian is not far wrong when he says that Trajan 'partly frustrated' the persecution.¹

Hadrian (117–138) carried Trajan's policy a step further. When informers renewed their activity in Asia (c. 124), he instructed the proconsul Minnucius Fundanus that accusers must prove some crime in open court, and not try to force a conviction by prayers or clamours. The case was to be tried summarily (*cognitio*) and the offender punished as he deserved; but Fundanus was to take great care that, if the charge proved to be vexatious, the accuser was severely punished (*supplicis severioribus*). Hadrian, like Trajan, was thinking chiefly of protecting good heathens from false charges; but, like Trajan, he gave incidentally some shelter to the Christians. As Trajan forbade Pliny to receive anonymous charges, so Hadrian forbade Fundanus to listen to mobs. The accuser must come forward in open court; if he made good his charge, he was a marked man; if he failed, severe punishment awaited him. This placed the Christians in the most favourable position which they had yet reached; but it was by no means one of tolerable security. If the rescript was strictly enforced, they were still almost at the mercy of any one who ventured to accuse them; and, if it was not, the mobs would have their victims, and hostile governors could encourage accusations.

Titus Antoninus Pius (138–161) merely continued the policy of Trajan and Hadrian; but, as his reign marks a senatorial reaction, the administration of the law was more hostile to the Christians, and the number of martyrs seems greater. But there is no change of general policy till we come to Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (161–180). As a conscientious Stoic, and as a zealous observer of the ceremonies, Marcus had a double dislike of the Christians. He must have known a good deal more of them than he tells us, for his only reference to them is a contemptuous phrase about the

¹ ad Cor. 5.
² Ib. II. xxv. 8.

³ Ap. Eus. HE II. xxv. 6.
⁴ ad Cor. 1.

¹ Apol. 5.

bravado (ψιλή παράδειξις) of the martyrs.¹ So the administration became more hostile than ever, and now the Christians were sought out for punishment. Thus the persecution at Lyons and Vienne in 177 began with lawless outrages, was taken up in form by the magistrates and sanctioned by the emperor, and ended with insults to the dead which are rare in Roman history.

So far Tertullian was not entirely wrong in his theory—the fond belief of many Christians—that only bad emperors persecuted them. Nero and Domitian were certainly bad, while the good emperors Trajan and Hadrian were made out to be more friendly than they really were. The policy of Marcus was a difficulty, and Tertullian gets over it by telling the story of the Thundering Legion—how the prayers of a Christian legion obtained rain for the army in its great distress in Germany, and thereupon Marcus stopped the persecution.² In point of fact, he never relaxed it, and it only died out gradually in the early years of his unworthy son *Commodus* (180–192). Now *Commodus* had neither his father's philosophy nor his father's regard for Roman religion. So far as his beast-fights left him leisure for religion, his devotions went to Serapis rather than to Jupiter; and he was further much influenced by his 'devout concubine' Marcia, who was friendly to the Christians. So after a while they had peace for the rest of his reign—excepting only the occasional executions which never ceased till the time of Constantine.

(b) *The Oriental emperors (193–249).*—With *Septimius Severus* (193–211) we enter on the 3rd cent., and with it comes a new phase of persecution. Christianity does not cease to be a crime by what we may call the common law of the empire; and under this there is always some persecution, and often a good deal. It was not without cause that Tertullian wrote his *Apology* in 197, or remonstrated with the proconsul Scapula some years later for burning the Christians instead of beheading them. But now the emperors began to supplement the common law by special enactments against converts or clergy, against Christian worship, or against officials who were Christians. *Severus* himself was no fanatic for the gods of Rome. His belief was rather given to the stars, and he was influenced by his Syrian empress Julia Domna, who was interested in Eastern worships. So for a time he was almost friendly, and even went out of his way to protect people of high rank whom he knew to be Christians. It was not till 202 that he took alarm at the growth of un-Roman worships among the ruling classes. If Christians of high rank were not many, there had always been some since the days of Pomponia Græcina and Flavius Clemens. Ignatius had influential friends who might possibly have saved him from the beasts; the Pomponii, and perhaps the Acilii Glabrones, were Christians in the 2nd cent., and in the time of *Commodus* the senator Apollonius. Christianity had always been strong among the lower officials of the palace, and it was now spreading rapidly in the highest circles. It was time to check that growth, and *Severus* forbade conversion to Christianity—the confession before men in baptism without which no man could be more than a friendly heathen. Hence the distinctive feature of his persecution is that, alike at Carthage and at Alexandria, the stress of it fell on converts like Perpetua and Herais. It was not that older Christians escaped, but that converts were singled out as they had never been singled out before.

The persecution died out after the great emperor

was gone (211), and there was 'peace' for more than thirty years. We catch glimpses of local troubles, but many Christian circles almost forgot that persecution might return. *Caracalla* and *Macrinus* (211–218) were busy with the army, but *El Gabal* (218–222) was a genuinely religious emperor, a fanatic of the foul worships of Syria. He was one who sought first the kingdom of Baal, and strove to bring all the gods of the empire into subordination to the Baal of Emesa. The one thing that connects him with the Christians is his remark that they ought to transfer their worship to the temple of the sun-god. This may have been meant for a friendly invitation; but it was as well for the Christians that *El Gabal* never got further.

His cousin *Severus Alexander* (222–235) sent back the black stone to Emesa, and settled down into what we may call a 'liberal eclecticism.' Christianity could no longer be ignored as *Marcus* had ignored it, and as some of the literary circles managed to ignore it long after *Constantine's* time. *Alexander* felt something of its attraction. A statue of Christ adorned his private chapel, along with the statues of Orpheus, Abraham, Apollonius, and the deified emperors. He commended the Christian custom of *probatii seniores*, and adjudged a piece of waste ground to the Christians rather than the cooks, on the ground that any worship whatever of a god was better than a cook-shop.

With *Maximin* (235–238) we come to a short interval of persecution, though we hear of no executions. So rude a soldier may have had no deliberate policy beyond dislike of *Alexander's* friends; yet he began a new policy of aiming at the officials of the churches. Hitherto they had run no greater risk than others, except in so far as they were likely to be better known than others. Henceforth they were deliberately singled out for attack by *Maximin* and his successors.

Passing over the obscure reign of *Gordian* (238–244), we come to *Philip* (244–249), the last of the Syrian emperors. *Philip* was rumoured to be a Christian, and, though this is certainly false, we may take it that he was as friendly as *Alexander*.

(c) *The interval of persecution (249–258).*—Christianity had now reached the steps of the throne, and a Christian Caesar was no longer an impossible idea. The literary victory had long since been won, for no heathen writer after *Tacitus* (*Plotinus* excepted) will for a moment compare with the Christians, and the political triumph might seem not far off. Yet the hardest of the struggle was still to come. The Syrian emperors had not been a success, and there was now a reaction to old Roman ideals, and therefore against the Christians, who seemed the worst of traitors to the good old customs of their ancestors.

The reaction was heralded in *Philip's* time by savage riots at Alexandria, and the new emperor *Decius* (249–251) began his reign in full determination to stamp out Christianity. Hitherto persecution had been generally local, but now an edict was issued requiring all persons to sacrifice—all persons, for women and boys were not spared. This was systematic and thorough work, and produced more apostates than even the later persecution. At first the object was to avoid martyrs; so some of the earlier victims (not bishops) were set free after all tortures had been exhausted on them; afterwards they were left to die of famine in prison. Thus the *Decian* persecution resumed *Maximin's* attack on the bishops, and assailed Christians with a definite policy throughout the empire. But it does not seem to have had much popular support, for it ceased as soon as *Decius* left Rome for the army in the autumn of 250, and a few riots under his successor *Gallus* (251–253) were the last outbreaks of the old mob violence.

¹ *Comm.* xi. 3. See also art. MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS, vol. viii. p. 410 f.

² *Apol.* 5.

Valerian (253-258) was an old senator, and a model of Roman virtue like *Decius*. But he was still more soldier than senator, and began his reign with marked favour to the Christians. It was not till 257 that he turned against them. The change was ascribed to the influence of his general *Maerianus*; but there was much to which *Maerianus* might appeal. In the midst of calamities which threatened ruin to the empire and civilization the Christians stood aloof, and some of them were half inclined to welcome Goths and Persians as avengers of the saints. Apart from this treasonous isolation, the growth of the episcopate was forming an *imperium in imperio* which might have alarmed the most tolerant of heathen sovereigns. *Valerian's* first rescript (257) is lost, but it followed the lines of *Decius* in ordering all persons to conform to 'the Roman ceremonies,' and in striking at the bishops. But there were two important changes. For the first time the penalty was not death—only banishment even for great bishops like *Dionysius* and *Cyprian*—and for the first time the Christians were expressly forbidden to hold assemblies or to enter the catacombs.

Xystus of Rome replied with a defiance, in the solemn transference (29th June, 258) of the remains of the two great apostles from the Vatican and the Ostian Way to the forbidden catacombs. Thereupon *Valerian* issued a second rescript.¹ The clergy were to be executed forthwith; senators, *egregii viri*, and knights were to lose their rank and property, and their lives too if they still persisted in Christianity; the great ladies were to be deprived of property and banished; *Cæsariani* (almost certainly 'Cæsar's household,' the lower officials) who were or ever had been Christians were to lose their property and to be sent in chains into slavery. This is a new development. The penalty of death is limited (so far as the rescript goes) to clergy and persons of rank, and non-official Christians escape unpunished. The idea is to destroy the Christian corporations and root out Christianity from the higher classes, leaving it a floating superstition among the vulgar.

(d) *The long peace (260-303)*.—*Valerian* perished in the East, and his son *Gallienus* (258-268) cancelled the rescripts, and more than cancelled them, by a public edict. This is lost; but we have the rescript which enforced it in Egypt in 261. It is addressed 'To the bishops,' and the restitution, first of places of worship, then of burial-places, can have been made only to the Christian corporations. Here at last was practical toleration; and, if the common law of the empire was not repealed, there seemed little reason to fear that it would ever again be seriously enforced.

The empire sank to its lowest in the days of *Gallienus*, and the great soldiers who reigned after him were fully occupied with its restoration. Only *Aurelian* (270-275) had any dealings with the Christians. Unfriendly as he was—perhaps only his death prevented active persecution—he had to deal with them as lawful corporations. When a council deposed *Paul* of *Samosata* from the see of *Antioch*, he refused to give up the church property, and the bishops appealed to the emperor. *Aurelian* decided that it belonged to that bishop who was in communion with the bishops of *Rome* and *Italy*. Later ages might have demurred to this 'very reasonable decision'² of a heathen emperor; but the fact remains that, if a church is not put outside the law, questions of property must necessarily be decided by the State; and this means that the State must necessarily determine for itself what it will recognize as orthodoxy.

(e) *The Great Persecution (303-313)*.—It was a work of nearly thirty years, from the election of

¹ *Cyprian*, Ep. 60.

² *Eus. HE VII. xxx. 19.*

Claudius to the peace with *Persia* (268-297), to restore some tolerable order in the empire, and for more than forty (260-303) the Christians had peace, broken only by the threats of *Aurelian* and an occasional military execution, due sometimes to the brutality of a heathen officer, sometimes to the fanaticism of a Christian soldier. So they flourished as they never had flourished before, built stately churches, and overflowed the palace. *Diocletian's* chamberlains were Christians, and his wife and daughter were supposed to be Christians. So, when he took up the sword of persecution, he had a harder task before him than *Decius* or *Valerian*, and it was nearly twenty years before he made up his mind to undertake it. As *Diocletian* was a man of serious religion, and that religion was of the old Roman type, he must always have been hostile to the Christians, even if he was genuinely attached to individuals. But he was too wise to attack hastily their great and strongly organized corporations, even after he was freed from his worst troubles by the peace with *Persia* in 297. There was no want of incitement, for *Maximian* and *Galerius* hated the Christians, and the court was full of soothsayers and philosophers. About 300, when *Diocletian* was in the East, the sacrifice one day was a failure—which the chief *haruspex* ascribed to the presence of profane persons. *Diocletian* at once ordered all persons in the palace to sacrifice on pain of scourging and disgrace, and all soldiers similarly to be dismissed from the service. But this, however ominous, was only a burst of superstitious terror, and seems to have been very imperfectly carried out. Christians continued to hold high office, and it was not till the winter of 302-303 that *Diocletian* decided to persecute in earnest. *Lactantius's* reports that he was worried into it by *Galerius*, who was no doubt importunate; but *Diocletian* was a statesman, and never adopted the ruthless policy of *Galerius*.

The first edict³ (24th Feb. 303) ordered all churches to be destroyed and the Scriptures to be burned. Officials were to lose all civil rights, and *Cæsariani* (of *ex* *officio*) to be reduced to slavery. This is a careful revision of the rescript of *Valerian*. The clergy are not summarily executed, nor the great ladies exiled, nor *Cæsariani* who had ceased to be Christians reduced to slavery. On the other hand, the churches are not only closed, but destroyed, and there is a new clause for the burning of the Scriptures. *Hadrian* had burned the rolls of the law, *Diocletian* himself the books of the *Manichæans* in 297, and now the same measure is dealt to the Christians. Destroy their books, stop their meetings, and root them out of the public service; they will soon be put down, and that without bloodshed.

Then came disturbances and two fires in the palace, which of course were attributed to the Christians. The government was in a panic, and put down the riots in Turkish style. To this period probably belong the great massacre at *Eumeneia* and the wholesale burnings mentioned by *Lactantius*⁴ and *Eusebius*.⁴ A second edict ordered the imprisonment of all Christian clergy, but still no bloodshed. When things quieted down, *Diocletian* issued (about Nov.) a third edict as an act of grace. It allowed the imprisoned clergy to go free if they sacrificed, but it also allowed the use of torture to compel them. Those who refused remained in prison, some till the end of the persecution, like *Donatus*, who was tortured nine times in the interval.

This is as far as *Diocletian* himself went; and it will be noted that no man could lose his life under these edicts, unless it were for refusing to

¹ *De Mort. Pers.* 101.

² *De Mort. Pers.* 15.

³ *Eus. HE VII. II.*

⁴ *HE VII. xl.*

give up the books. There were to be no martyrs, though the punishment of Christians who committed any further offence (such as a sancey answer in court) was atrocious. Then, while Diocletian was laid aside by fourteen months of illness, *Maximian* in Rome (April, 304) issued a fourth edict, commanding all persons without exception in their respective cities to offer sacrifice. This was a new policy. Diocletian had aimed skilful blows at the churches, the books, the clergy; *Maximian's* only idea was to force on every private Christian a plain choice between sacrifice and death.

Cruelty overreached itself, as usual. The heathens themselves were shocked at the horrible scenes which followed. They voted the persecution 'vulgar, and very much overdone,'¹ and at Alexandria they ended by hiding Christians in their houses.² Even the Roman mob which howled for blood when the fourth edict came out was glad to see it abolished a couple of years later. Thus the persecution was very far from being steadily carried out for ten years throughout the empire. In Gaul and Britain *Constantius* pulled down a few churches, but did nothing more. *Maximian* was zealous enough in Italy, but his son *Maxentius* (no friend of the Christians) found in 307 that he could gain popularity by stopping the persecution. Even *Galerius*, who controlled the lands from the Hadriatic to the Taurus, grew slack in course of time, and turned to more innocent occupations. But for ten long years (303-313) the full fury of the persecution fell on Egypt and Syria, which came under *Maximin Daza* after Diocletian's abdication in 305. *Daza* was as cruel as his uncle *Galerius*, even more malicious, and much more shrewd. By 308 he came to the conclusion that public burnings were better avoided, and of his clemency issued a fifth edict, that the Christians were to have the left leg disabled and the right eye cut out and seared, and so to be sent to slavery in the mines, where further cruelty could be used without attracting too much notice. Once thirty-nine were put to death in one day. But public executions did not cease, for the fourth edict was renewed, though they grew rarer, and the last of the recorded Palestinian martyrs was given to the beasts on 3rd March 310.

Of the number of the victims we can only say that it must have been large. Some statements of *Lactantius* and *Eusebius* may be too sweeping, though we have seen one of the worst of them—the wholesale burnings—confirmed by the independent evidence of the inscriptions at *Eumeneia*; but it would be very uncritical to suppose that they have recorded anything like the whole number of martyrs. We know very little of what was going on except in Palestine, and even there we do not seem to have full information. Meanwhile the inscriptions and other incidental hints leave no reasonable doubt that the general impression of murderous ferocity given by *Eusebius* and *Lactantius* is substantially true. But the horrors enacted in open court are a very small part of the mischiefs of persecution. We must take account of imprisonments and hardships from which even death is sometimes a relief, and of the sufferings of those who live in fear of death or yield to fear of death. Worse than this is the brutalizing of the persecutors, and worst of all the demoralization of the persecuted. The strong grow hard, the weak despair, church government is thrown into confusion, and every discord is inflamed to fever heat. There is no more odious chapter of Church history than the inquest which the survivors of the persecution hold upon their fallen brethren.

(f) *The Edicts of Toleration.*—The deliverance was near. *Galerius* was stricken with a mortal sickness, and issued the first Edict of Toleration in April 311.

He tells us how he had formerly endeavoured to bring back the Christians to the old laws and discipline of the Romans, for they had been foolish and self-willed enough to forsake the institutes of perhaps their own ancestors, and were making themselves laws at their own pleasure and gathering congregations from various peoples. 'When, therefore, we commanded them to return to the institutes of the ancients, some had to be overcome by hardship, while others were utterly ruined in resistance, and there was the further evil that, while they would not worship our gods, they could not worship their own. So we extend to them our usual clemency, that Christians may exist again and hold assemblies, provided they do nothing contrary to the discipline. Particular instructions for our officials will follow. And for this indulgence the Christians will make the prayers of loyal subjects to their god.'

Let us put this intensely heathen thought in other words.

We never quarrelled with the Christians for worshipping their God; we quarrelled with them for not worshipping our gods also; and our endeavour to compel them was well meant. But we forgot that our persecution made it impossible for them to worship their own God; and in this we did him wrong. We still regret their undutiful conduct; but, even so, it is better to let them worship their God in their own way than to prevent him from being worshipped at all.

This is quite straightforward, and, from the heathen point of view, quite true. *Galerius* is confessing a serious mistake, and frankly asking the prayers of the Christians. He is not now unfriendly, and the further instructions to officials are not likely to have contained 'many hard conditions.' Christianity is now definitely recognized as a *religio licita*, with all the rights therein implicit.

After the death of *Galerius* there were four emperors. *Constantine* had Gaul and Britain, *Maxentius* governed Italy and Africa, *Licinius* ruled from the frontiers of Italy to the Black Sea, while the Asiatic provinces and Egypt fell to *Maximin*. So the natural alliance was of *Constantine* and *Licinius* against *Maxentius* and *Maximin*; and this corresponded to the religious position. All four, of course, were heathens, but *Constantine* favoured the Christians, while *Maximin* was a bitter enemy; and, though neither of the others had been persecutors, *Maxentius*, standing for Rome and the senate, was hostile, while *Licinius* leaned the other way.

As *Maximin* could not entirely disregard the edict of *Galerius*, he issued it as a mere instruction to the officials that they need not go further in the matter. This was not toleration; and, though it stopped the persecution for the moment, *Maximin* resumed on a new plan less than six months later. Brute slaughter having failed, executions were limited to men of note, and a more subtle policy was adopted for the rest. The municipalities were stirred up to petition for the expulsion of Christians from their cities. Then the strong organization of the Church was copied, and a pagan hierarchy was established with regular services to confront the Christian. It remained to give education a polemical turn by ordering that a slanderous forgery called *Acts of Pilate* should be diligently taught and studied in the schools. These were skilful measures, and they were new; and *Maximin* must have the credit of them.

Meanwhile, after the defeat of *Maxentius* at *Saxa Rubra* (28th Oct. 312), *Constantine* and *Licinius* met at *Milan* (Jan. 313) and issued an edict which is a landmark in history. The original is lost, but *Licinius* recites the substance of it a few months later.

They say that they had long given liberty in religion to all men, but the rescript (of *Maximin*) issued in pursuance of this edict (of *Galerius*) had encumbered it with so many detailed conditions that it was practically useless. Then *Licinius* goes on to say that all these conditions are utterly abolished, so that on every one who desires to observe the Christian religion may do so without trouble or annoyance. The same liberty of confession

¹ *Eus. Mart. Pal.* ix. 3.

² *Atbanasius, Hist. Africanorum*, 64, p. 302.

and of worship is extended to other religions, so that every one may freely practise the worship which he personally prefers. Churches formerly belonging to the Christians shall be restored without delay to the corporation of the Christians, present owners to be compensated from imperial bounty. So also all other possessions which belonged of right to the Christians.

Maximin was in a difficulty now that he had lost his ally, and felt that he must keep the Christians quiet while he made his attack on Licinius. So before the end of 312 he issued another rescript to his prefect Sabinus. It is a strange document, alternately justifying the persecution and apologizing for it, and actually denying that there had ever been any persecution since 305. He showed little of his usual cleverness if he fancied that the Christians could be conciliated by such a mystification as this. But, when the attack had failed, and Maximin was not only expelled from Europe but driven behind Mount Taurus, he had no choice but a real reconciliation with the Christians; and this time there was no fooling. He issued a public edict to all his subjects.

Its purport is that under pretence of the edict of Diocletian forbidding assemblies of the Christians many spoliations and oppressions had been perpetrated by the officials. 'When these abuses (so painful to all good rulers) came to our knowledge, we sent out letters (the rescript to Sabinus) that, if any one wished to follow such a nation or worship, he might do so without hindrance. But even now we cannot help seeing that some of our judges have mistaken our meaning, so that our subjects hesitate to use the liberty we have granted them. In order then to remove all doubt, we publish this decree, that it may be plain to all, that such as wish to follow this sect and worship are at liberty to do so—namely, to adopt and practise this religion. They are also allowed to build Lord's Houses; and, if houses or lands belonging to the Christians have been confiscated by our treasury or by the cities, they shall be restored to them.'

There are lies enough here, but Maximin is quite straightforward, now that he has no choice. He died very soon after, however (c. June, 313), and his death closes the age of persecution. The Christians suffered some vexation from Licinius (before 323) and a good deal from Julian (361-363), but these fall outside our limits, and it must be noted that neither Licinius nor Julian repealed the Edict of Milan, so that the Christians experienced in their time rather a hostile administration than direct persecution.

Comparing the three Edicts of Toleration, we find them agreed in frank allowance of Christian worship. But Galerius allows it on the heathen principle that every god is entitled to the worship of his own people, while Maximin states no principle at all. Only Constantine and Licinius lay down the new principle that every man is entitled to choose his own religion and to practise it in his own way. True, neither of them carried it out consistently; but the principle was declared, the omnipotent State for the first time recognized a reserved domain of conscience, and there was a good deal of toleration in the age which followed. It died out with Theodoric the Ostrogoth, to reappear only in William the Silent.

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PERSECUTION (Roman Catholic).—I. Conditions and causes.—The conditions which gave rise to religious persecution lie far back in and even beyond history. It would be too much to say that they are extinct; but they have to so great a degree ceased to be operative that it is only by an effort of imagination that we can throw ourselves back into them and realize what their force once was. Cohesion was the first need of primitive societies; it was more important that the group should cohere than that it should progress. Innovation, therefore, was put down with a strong hand: it introduced disunion and dissipated energy—the argument is not unknown in our own time. The earliest religions, like the earliest civilizations, were tribal and local; the deity could be worshipped only by his tribesmen and on the tribal soil (1 S 26¹⁰). And their demands were ceremonial, not ethical or dogmatic; religion resolved itself into the observance of a traditional ritual which was refused by few. In cases of revolt—such as the mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens in 415 B.C.—the penalty was sharp. But such cases were exceptional, and on a small, i.e. a civic or class, scale.

The Roman empire was tolerant of customary usage. The rulers knew how to make this usage subserve their policy, and, with regard to religion in particular, to employ and even exploit it for secular ends. The cosmopolitanism of the Stoics, which conceived mankind as a unity, accentuated the social bond. Like Positivism, it subordinated the individual to the community. The emperors who were most under Stoic influences were the most hostile to Christianity, which they regarded as a violation of both natural and established order. Judaism, separatist as its tendencies were, had an ancient nationality behind it; the Church was of yesterday, yet Tertullian's rhetoric is scarcely an exaggeration—it had leavened the world. The conception of the supreme and all-inclusive State survived in the Christian empire. The genius of Constantine discerned in the hierarchy of the 4th cent. a unique instrument for the unification of the nations and for the realization of the ruler's political aims. The unity of the Church was the keystone of the unity of the empire and of society; the Trinitarian and Christological controversies of the period were engineered by secular politicians for secular ends. Heresy was the equivalent of what a later age styled 'incivism'; the sporadic persecutions of the past gave way to a settled policy of repression. Constantine, a cool calculator rather than a fanatic, destroyed the images of the gods; Theodosius excluded worshippers from the temples and forbade sacrifice;

Justinian closed the schools of Athens; the shadow of the coming night of the Middle Ages fell upon the world.

Scarcely second to the tradition of the empire in its bearing on the development of intolerance was the authoritative position assumed by the Hebrew Scriptures in the Church. From the beginning the OT had been a stumbling-block. The conceptions of comparative religion and scientific history were unknown; and to Gentile converts much of its content was meaningless and offensive—the barbarous record of a barbarous tribe and age. Marcion and the Gnostics were the outcome of this sense of contrast. They simplified the situation by throwing the OT and the OT God, or Demiurge, overboard; and thus, though they involved themselves in difficulties of another order, they lightened the ship. But, as Græco-Roman civilization declined, the opposition between the Hebrew records and the actual conditions of life was felt less acutely; and by the end of the 2nd cent. the terminology common to Jewish and pagan worship, hitherto studiously avoided by Christian writers, had become naturalized among them; we read of temples, altars, sacrifices, and priests. Originally metaphor, the rhetoric hardened imperceptibly into dogma; the climate changed. This lowering of the temperature did not take place without opposition. But the externalizing process was too consonant with the circumstances and temper of the age to miscarry; the belief in the divine right of the hierarchy and in the duty of imposing submission to it by force—a belief destined to deluge Europe with blood for centuries—was taken over from Hebrew antiquity by the Christian world. The downfall of the empire gave impetus to the movement. The times were rude; a darkness that might be felt descended on the nations; the method of the Church was violence, not persuasion; her rule rested on the two swords of the Apostle rather than on the Cross of Christ. It may be urged that the difference did not go beyond that which separates applied from pure science; it will not be denied that the fall from primitive standards was great.

This fall was brought about by the transformation of primitive Christianity into Catholicism, of the little company of enthusiastic believers into the mixed multitude of a world-Church. Its causes were: (1) what seemed the increasing need of authority in the Christian community; (2) the natural conservatism of the official class; (3) the superstition of the multitude, which feared the indiscriminate vengeance of the outraged deities; (4) the policy of the magistrate, which regarded religious unity as the guarantee of public order; (5) the appeal to OT precedent; and (6), above all, the belief in the exclusiveness of salvation, which was to be had, it was held, only in the Church.

(1) In the dawn of Christianity relapse, or, in general, post-baptismal sin, was not contemplated. The venial faults inseparable from human frailty were met by the instinctive resipiscence of the offender, by the reception of the Eucharist, or by alms and prayer; and, when graver transgressions appeared, they were dealt with either by what was believed to be supernatural intervention (Ac 5) or by the mysterious delivery 'unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh' (1 Co 5², 1 Ti 1²⁰). Later, when the age of marvels had ceased, the treatment of offenders, and especially of the lapsed, became a problem. The good sense of the community solved it on lines which, while in themselves reasonable and moderate, increased the growing power of the official ministry. Mt 18¹⁷—with which may be taken 2 Jn¹⁰ and Tit 3¹⁰—indicates what we may suppose to have been the primitive practice; but, in proportion as society became Christian, this

discipline ceased to be purely spiritual; it passed over into the temporal sphere. The Edict of Constantine (325) makes the possession of the writings of Arius a capital offence; and that of the Three Emperors (380) denounces heretics as 'divina primum vindicta, post etiam motus nostri, quam ex caelesti arbitrio sumpserimus, ultione plectendos.'

(2) An official class is instinctively conservative, and slow to admit reform. This is so in every department of life, and the Church is no exception. Material inducements co-operate with professional jealousy—they which wait at the altar are partakers with the altar' (1 Co 9¹³); and the *esprit de corps* of a privileged class is strong. 'No salvation without the Church' is an abstract proposition; the concrete equivalent, which is seldom far distant, is 'No salvation without the priest.' That higher motives were also at work need not be questioned; the springs of conduct are various. But men do not easily destroy that by which they live.

(3) The populace is and has always been an incalculable element. Its intelligence is low, its knowledge small, its self-control weak; it is easily moved by superstition, by suggestion, by passion, and, above all, by fear. Under Nero the mob of Rome was roused by sheer terror against the Christians; that of Paris in 1792 against the aristocrats; that of Constantinople in our own time against the Armenians; and the distinctive psychology of the Middle Ages, with its emotionalism and its unique openness to suggestion, made the crowd an easy prey not only to designing persons who worked upon its susceptibilities for their own purposes but to its own unreasoning fears. The popularity of the Inquisition has been overstated, but there is reason to think that it was not generally condemned by popular feeling. Heresy was regarded as a danger to the community, and the heretic as a public enemy to be restrained for the public good.

(4) The conception of the State elaborated by Roman law, while it led those who held it to an extreme suspicion of corporations as infringing on its own sovereignty and self-sufficiency—a private society was, as such, an *imperium in imperio*—led them also to be content with an external homage on the part of the citizens to the State gods. The Christian empire was more exacting: it demanded interior conformity to the State worship and interior assent to the State creed. This demand, made professedly in the interests of orthodoxy, was in fact dictated by regard for the public peace. It is difficult to put ourselves in the place of the Byzantine Cæsars. But we are mistaken if we set them down as fanatics; they were for the most part skilful and unscrupulous men of affairs. To us the quarrels of the school and the sacristy which inflamed the dregs of Constantinople and of Alexandria are meaningless. But the thoughts of men vary:

'A latent and almost invisible spark still lurked among the embers of controversy; by the breath of prejudice and passion, it was quickly kindled to a mighty flame, and the verbal disputes of the Oriental sects have shaken the pillars of the church and state' (E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. J. B. Bury, London, 1901-03, v2, 100).

And mental climates change slowly. From the impartial standpoint of the magistrate, concerned in the first place for the maintenance of order, there was little to choose between Catholic and heretic, papist and Protestant. The Reformation, beneficent in so many respects, was a leaven of civil dissension. All were for supremacy, none for toleration; nor was freedom of conscience, as we now understand it, possible till the keen air of rationalism had cooled the ardours of religious zeal.

(5) The Church was heir by default of the Syna

gogue; and the inheritance of the OT was a condition of her fulfilment of her mission. But these sacred books steeled the heart of the persecutor; they sharpened his sword and kindled his unholy fires. They were an obstacle to moral and intellectual progress, because, as they were understood and could not but be understood at this period, they stereotyped and canonized the ideas and customs of a semi-civilized age. They contained, indeed, their own criticism: 'The times of this ignorance God overlooked' (Ac 17³⁰). But till yesterday the theologian would have been suspect who attempted to explain them in this way.

(6) The belief in exclusive salvation covered less specious motives with the ægis of piety; under its shelter they worked unsuspected and undisturbed. To this day religious intolerance finds its firmest foundation in the belief that there is no salvation outside the Church. Where this belief is sincerely held, intolerance haunts it as its shadow, though circumstances may determine its method and its degree. In the eyes of the theocratic hierarchy heresy is rebellion, and rebellion of a peculiarly heinous character, being directly against God. The conviction that all who do not accept a particular creed will perish everlastingly, and that God punishes a theological error as if it were the most atrocious of crimes, has two results. (a) It lowers the standard of veracity. If a slight departure from truth—the suppression of an inconvenient fact, the manufacture of testimony, the suggestion or assertion of falsehood, the manipulation of documents or sources—will save souls, promote the cause of religion, and further the highest interests of mankind, the temptation is too great for human nature, and the most fervent are the first to fall. Here is the origin of the Donation of Constantine, of the Isidorian Decretals, of the accumulation of forgeries and fictions which plays so great a part in the history of religion. (b) It leads naturally and inevitably to persecution. Zealots are slow to admit the axiom 'Deorum injuriæ deis curæ'; another maxim, 'Compelle intrare' (Lk 14²³) comes in. It becomes a duty to impose orthodoxy, seeing that men's eternal destiny depends on their professing it; and to hinder error from spreading, because error is the death of the soul. Heretics are more mischievous than ordinary criminals; and to rid the earth of them is a just, beneficent, and necessary work. Their virtues, such as they are, are no defence. 'Splendida vitia' the Fathers of the Church characterized them; an echo of what was once the universal belief of Christians survives in the Anglican Article XIII., which declares of works done before justification that 'we doubt not that they have the nature of sin.'

The earliest Christian apologists urged the rights of conscience. Every sect, when it is in a minority, clamours for toleration; and the language of circumstance is easily confused with that of principle. The Christians of the first two centuries, if not always persecuted, were always liable to persecution; they advanced, naturally enough, the plea of conscience, and argued for the futility of compulsion as a means of ensuring belief. Tertullian's words, which suggest the philosophy of the 18th cent., might have come from Locke:

'Humani juris et naturalis potestatis est unicuique quod putaverit colere; nec alii obest aut prodest alterius religio. Sed nec religionis est cogere religionem, quæ sponte suscipi debet, non vi: cum et hostiæ ab animo libenti expostulantur. Ita etsi nos compuleritis ad sacrificandum, nihil præstabitis diis vestris: ab invitis enim sacrificia non desiderabunt, nisi si contentiosi sunt; contentiosus autem deus non est' (ad Scapulam, II.).

So also Lactantius:

'Religio sola est, in qua libertas domicilium collocavit. Res est enim præter cæternas voluntaria, nec imponi cuiquam

necessitas potest, ut colat quod non vult. Potest aliquis forsitan simulare; non potest velle' (Epitome Div. Inst. liv.).

And again:

'Defendenda religio est non occidendo sed moriendo, non sævitia sed patientia, non scelere sed fide. . . . Nihil est enim tam voluntarium quam religio, in qua si animus sacrificantis averus est, jam sublata, jam nulla est' (Div. Inst. v. 20).

It would be unjust to question the sincerity of such protestations; the content of the legal and dogmatic conceptions destined to take shape in ecclesiastical Christianity was as yet implicit. But the martyrs died for conscience rather than for liberty of conscience; the notion of religion as a fixed quantity incapable of variation—a *depositum* (1 Ti 6²⁰ Vulg.)—led inevitably to its defence, where the State could be enlisted in its service, by the civil sword. 'Quæ pejor mors animæ quam libertas erroris?' asked Augustine (Ep. cv. 10 [PL xxxiii. 400]); in such subject-matter no risks could be run. As time went on, both belief and practice were systematized; and in this process of systematizing the papacy, the greatest systematizing force that the world has known, played a decisive part. But from Constantine to Philip II., and from St. Augustine to Torquemada, the succession is unbroken. At every step of the blood-stained way the advance was necessitated by the logic both of thought and of things. Only when men were sick of slaughter did it dawn upon them that they had taken the wrong turning, and that, till the road had been retraced, those who followed it found themselves in every generation farther astray.

The theological motive of persecution was a conception of religion common to the Christianity of the time and held by orthodox and heterodox alike. This is shown by the fierce intolerance of the heretical sects—in particular of the Arians, who planted in Spain the seeds of that bigotry which found its first fruit in the execution of Priscillian (385) and its most recent in that of Francesco Ferrer (1909). It was in self-defence that Athanasius, Gregory Nazianzen, and Hilary argued for that 'dulcissima libertas' which the last-named (*ad Constantium*, ii. 4 f.) declares to be the one remedy for religious strife. Salvian (430) writes of the heretics of his time:

'Errant, sed bono animo errant, non odio, sed affectu Dei, honorare se Dominum atque amare credentes. . . . Qualiter pro hoc ipso falsæ opinionis errore in die iudicii puniendi sint, nullus potest scire nisi iudex' (*de Gubernatione Dei*, v. 2).

Policy, however, was stronger than piety, logic than philosophy. Scarcely had the Edict of Milan (313), which relieved the Christians from persecution by recognizing Christianity as a *religio licita*, been published when the drift of the new age declared itself. The best and wisest men in the empire—a Symmachus, a Themistius—protested:

'Non uno illicere perveniri potest ad tam grande secretum' (Symmachus, *Relationes*, iii. [Ep. x. 3], in *MGH*, 'Auctores antiquissimi,' vi. 1 [Berlin, 1853], p. 252).

No nobler words ever came from a religious teacher, but protest was in vain. Constantine, whose motive was political in each case, exiled first Arius and then Athanasius, under the pretext—not, it must be confessed, an unreasonable one—of danger to the public peace. His successors, with few exceptions, followed his example, enforcing conformity to the various standards of popular orthodoxy. The more mysterious the tenet, the more embittered, it seemed, was the controversy; at the Council of Chalcedon 'an invisible line was drawn between the heresy of Apollinaris and the faith of St. Cyril'; and it was declared by 500 bishops that its decrees might lawfully be enforced 'even with blood.'

2. History.—The most authoritative name in the black record of intolerance is that of the great Augustine. Both for good and for evil his influence over Christianity has been more powerful

than that of any one man between St. Paul and Luther; few have more emphatically asserted the inwardness of religion; yet, paradox as it is, few have done more to fasten the fetters of ecclesiastical and dogmatic system upon mankind than he. As long as the Donatists had the upper hand in Africa, he stood for the rights of conscience; when the position was reversed, and the balance of material force was with Catholicism, he changed his ground.

'Mea primitus sententia non erat nisi neminem ad unitatem Christi esse cogendum; verbo esse agendum, disputatione pugnandum, ratione vincendum, ne fictos catholicos haberemus, quos apertos haereticos noveramus. Sed haec opinio mea, non contradicentium verbis, sed demonstrantium superabatur exemplis. Nam primo mihi opponebatur civitas mea quae cum tota esset in parte Donati, ad unitatem catholicam timore legum imperialium conversa est; quam nunc videmus ita hujus vestrae animositatis perniciem detestari, ut in ea nunquam fuisse credatur' (*Ep. xciii. 17*).

He proceeds to lay down as a general principle, 'multis profuit prius timore vel dolore cogi, ut postea possent doceri,' and to compare the laws against heretics to the restraint imposed upon lunatics or persons suffering under delirium, who would otherwise destroy themselves and others. The exegesis of the time permitted the 'Compelle intrare' of the parable to be used as an argument for coercion; it was in the premisses, not in the conclusion, that the fallacy lay. His teaching has been summarized by J. C. Bluntschli as follows:

'When error prevails, it is right to invoke liberty of conscience; but when, on the contrary, truth predominates, it is proper to use coercion' (*Allgem. Staatsrecht*⁶, Stuttgart, 1835, vi. 391);

and by Macaulay thus in his essay on Sir James Mackintosh:

'I am in the right, and you are in the wrong. When you are the stronger, you ought to tolerate me; for it is your duty to tolerate truth. But when I am the stronger, I shall persecute you; for it is my duty to persecute error' (*Critical and Historical Essays*, London, 1870, p. 330).

This is the dilemma presented in every age to the mixed State by Catholicism. Logically it is insoluble; and practically in certain states of society it has made Catholic disabilities inevitable. It could be escaped only when the presuppositions on which it is based had ceased to carry conviction. We can afford to-day to smile at them; our ancestors could not.

Meanwhile the enactments of Theodosius II. and Valentinian III., which punished the slightest deviation from the received orthodoxy as a *crimen publicum*, gave the Augustinian theory the force of law, and laid the foundation of the Inquisition (*q.v.*); Europe went back into darkness for more than a thousand years.

The Code of Justinian (529) collects, co-ordinates, and completes all previous enactments against heretics, schismatics, apostates, blasphemers, pagans, and Jews; and Isidore of Seville (636) imposes on the ruler the duty of repressing error in religion. The barbarian invaders of the empire brought with them from their native wilds a high conception of personal liberty. This acted as a check upon the imperial legislation, the use made of which in the earlier Middle Ages was moderate. 'Religionem imponere non possumus, quia nemo cogitur ut credat invitatus,' was the answer of Theodoricus when the Jews of Genoa asked permission to rebuild their synagogue; and Cassiodorus (480) puts into the mouth of the Gothic king Theodatus the fine words, 'Cum divinitas patiatur diversas religiones esse, nos unam non audemus imponere' (*Variae*, x. 26). But the evil root was there; it needed only a favourable season to put forth its fatal growth.

'Entre temps avait commencé la série des meurtres juridiques pour délit d'opinion' (S. Reinach, *Orpheus*, Paris, 1909, p. 383).

The moderation of a Gregory the Great was due to circumstances rather than to principle; paganism was extinct, heresy infrequent—the Latin mind

was not speculative, and the ecclesiastical beliefs and institutions of the period met its needs.

The close of the 10th cent. brought the dawn of a new age. Oriental infiltrations disturbed the slumbers of Western orthodoxy; the wide-spread corruption of the clergy was felt to be intolerable; the Crusades enlarged the horizon and also stirred the passions of Europe. The embers of sectarian hatred were kindled, as in modern anti-Semitism, by the prosperity of the Jews and Saracens; cupidity inflamed religious zeal.

'L'Église ne fut pas si tyrannique pour le plaisir de l'être, mais parce qu'elle avait ses finances à ménager' (*ib.* p. 427).

And on this head there was little to choose between the spiritual and the secular power. Here, as there, the economic motive, if unavowed, was invariable; it lit the brand of the inquisitor; it sharpened the axe of kings. The end in view was submission rather than orthodoxy:

'Disobedience to the Church was sufficient; resistance to its claims was heresy, punishable here and hereafter with all the penalties of the temporal and spiritual swords' (H. C. Lea, *Hist. of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*, iii. 189).

Of the bloody crusade against the Stedingers (1229-36) a contemporary writes:

'Principalior causa fuit inobedientia, quae scelere idololatriae non est inferior' (*ib.* note).

The duty of inquiring into offences whether against faith or morals was originally part of the episcopal office. But episcopal zeal was fitful. The Capitularies of Charles the Great instruct the bishops 'to make the visitation of their dioceses, to teach truth, to correct morals, to ensure the orthodoxy of the clergy, and, on the Saxon border, to prohibit the celebration of Pagan rites.' Charles the Bald (844) adds the injunction 'ut populi errata inquirant et corrigant.' But this inquiry was superficial; the warrior prelates of the period had little interest in the subtleties of theology, and were not extreme to mark what was amiss in morals. An emergency beyond the powers of the local hierarchy was at hand. Languedoc was an oasis of civilization in a desert of barbarism; and with civilization had come expansion of thought. Intercourse with the Spanish Moors was frequent and easy; Greek travellers and traders had naturalized the speculations of the East on Western soil. The clergy were held in general contempt; the papacy had lost credit and authority; the menace to the Catholic theocracy was imminent and extreme. From this period dates the technical use of the terms 'Inquisition' and 'Inquisitor.' From an episcopal the Inquisition became a papal tribunal. Innocent III. commissioned certain Cistercians to exercise legatine powers in the suspected territories: the result was that carnival of sheer wickedness of which Milman writes:

'Never in the history of man were the great eternal principles of justice, the faith of treaties, and common humanity so trampled under foot as in the Albigenian war' (*Hist. of Latin Christianity*, London, 1872, v. 426).

Arnould of Cîteaux, writing to Innocent, thus describes the sack of Béziers:

'Nostri non parentes ordini, sexui, vel aetati, tere viginti millia hominum in ore gladii peremerunt; factaque hominum strage permaxima spoliata est tota civitas et successa, ultione divina in eam mirabiliter sacvie' (see Lea, i. 154).

Cæsarius of Heisterbach adds that, when the invaders drew back, fearing that certain of their own faction might be involved in the common massacre, the legate urged them on to finish the bloody work.

'Caedite eos: novit enim Dominus qui sunt ejus; eloque innumerabiles occisi sunt in civitate ista' (*Dialogus Miraculorum*, v. 21).

By the middle of the 13th cent. the Inquisition had fallen into the hands of the newly-founded Dominican order, the appeal being only to Rome. This pontifical Inquisition was even more merciless and more atrocious than its better known Spanish counterpart (see INQUISITION and OFFICE, THE

HOLY). It sent to the flames Albigenses, Waldenses, Spiritual Franciscans, Hussites, and so-called sorcerers by the thousand; it was the instrument of political intrigue and of private vengeance; terror and desolation followed in its train. And it was as hypocritical as it was cruel and corrupt. Joseph de Maistre has the effrontery to plead that it shed no blood. No, it left the last penalty to the magistrates, who incurred excommunication if they refused or delayed to inflict it. The form of death by burning was introduced in 1231; indulgences being granted to those who contributed fuel. 'O sancta simplicitas!', said Hus, when a countrywoman threw her faggot on his pyre.

Its procedure was, if possible, more odious than its penalties. The *Directorium Inquisitorum* of Nicolas Eymerich (Rome, 1585) gives a detailed account of the methods employed—the spy system, delation, secrecy, torture, the union in one person of judge and accuser, the hindrances put in the way of the victim's defence, the direct interest of the tribunal in a condemnation which secured the confiscation of the property of the accused. This procedure exercised a corrupting influence on the criminal jurisprudence of the Continent which has not been wholly exorcized even in our own day. Lea, the historian of the Inquisition, writes:

'Of all the curses which [it] brought in its train this, perhaps, was the greatest—that, until the closing years of the eighteenth century, throughout the greater part of Europe, the inquisitorial process, as developed for the destruction of heresy, became the customary method of dealing with all who were under accusation' (l. 560).

England escaped the contagion: its laws reflect the lay, not the clerical, mind.

A relative toleration was extended to Jews—partly from historical, more from economic motives: financial necessity set bounds to religious zeal. And pagans were technically exempt from ecclesiastical jurisdiction, though the exemption was less real than nominal, few, if any, pagans being found where it prevailed. In each case two conflicting theories lay side by side unreconciled. Neither Jews nor pagans, being unbaptized, were subjects of the Church; yet, on the other hand, 'Compelle intrare' applied with no less force to aliens without than to wanderers from within. The inconsistency was solved in practice. The arm of the Church was long, and neither Jew nor pagan who came within its reach had reason to boast that his lot was more tolerable than that of the heretic, though the latter was its more legitimate prey.

In the Middle Ages, as at other times, an undercurrent of rationality ran under the tide of ignorance and fanaticism. In his *Defensor Pacis* (1324) Marsilius of Padua repudiates the dominant OT, or theocratic, interpretation of Christianity.

'Moyse legem Deus tradidit observandam in statu vite presentis, ad contentiones humanas dirimendas, precepta talium specialiter continentem; et ad hoc proportionaliter se habentem humane legis quantum ad aliquam sui partem. Verum hujusmodi precepta in Evangelica lege non tradidit Christus, sed tradita vel tradenda supposit in humanis legibus, quae observari et principantibus secundum eas omnem animam humanam obedire precepit, in his saltem quod non adversaretur legi salutis' (ll. 215; cf. Millman, vii. 408).

The gospel, he says, is the only authoritative law of Christianity; it gives no coercive power or secular jurisdiction to pope, bishop, or priest. The Church is the whole assembly of the faithful. With regard to the clergy, the question is not what power was possessed by Christ, but what He conferred on the apostles, what descended from them to the bishops and presbyters, what He forbade them to assume, what is meant by the power of the keys. The clergy, then, have no coercive power over heretics, Jews, or infidels. Judgment on them is by Christ alone, and in the other world, though they may be punished by the temporal ruler if they offend against the civil law. He remarks acutely that the observance of the divine precepts is by no means invariably enforced by the human legislator, and draws the conclusion that the heretic is punished because he transgresses not divine but human law.

It is a short step from this to the reflexion that liberty of conscience is not properly open to any

restrictions except such as are imposed in the interests of public order and for the safety of the State.

Such speculations, however, were for the few; the many were not ripe for radical solutions; they took, as their custom is, the middle way. The popular mind is liable, generally under the pressure of fear, to sudden accessions of fanaticism; but, at least in the later Middle Ages, while accepting the principle that the heretic was an offender, it resented the execution of the laws against heresy where this execution was exceptionally cruel or on a large scale. Our own attitude to capital punishment is not dissimilar. We acquiesce in the death penalty in extreme cases; but with the proviso, 'odiosa restringenda sunt.' We are ready to find reasons for not inflicting it, and we should resent its being indiscriminately or lightly applied. This temper gained ground, though slowly; and its growth explains the discredit into which, except in Spain, the Inquisition had fallen in the 16th century. This discredit was a condition of the Reformation. Had the Reformers found themselves opposed by the resistless forces disposed of by Innocent III. and Simon de Montfort, the movement would in all probability have gone down in blood and fire.

In Spain, where the unity of the monarchy was of recent date, patriotism and zeal for Catholicism went hand in hand. Three main causes led to the hold obtained by the Inquisition over the Peninsula: (1) the distrust with which the forced converts from Judaism and Muhammadanism were generally regarded; (2) the desire to strengthen the monarchy against separatist tendencies; (3) rapacity—the victims were rich, and the confiscations on a large scale. The tribunal began its work in 1481. Before the year was out, 293 victims had been burned in Seville; and the Jesuit Mariana computes the victims in the two dioceses of Seville and Cadiz at 2000. Llorente gives a total of some 32,000 (Reinach, writing in 1906, more than trebles the figures) sent to the flames between 1481 and 1809, when the last heretics suffered, a Jew being burned and a Quaker hanged. But the executions represent a fraction only of the injury inflicted on the nation. Jews, Moors, and Moriscos, or Christianized Moors, were banished to the number of about 3,000,000; and, as they were the most prosperous and intelligent members of the community, the loss to trade, industry, and agriculture was incalculable; in seventy years the population sank from 10,000,000 to 6,000,000. Spain, once the rival of France and Britain, fell to the rank of a power of the third class.

Both in Madrid and in Rome the Inquisition struck high. An archbishop of Toledo died under a capital sentence, the last Catholic archbishop of Canterbury, Pole—'Carnifex et Flagellum Ecclesiae Anglicanae'—under a charge of heresy. And it had the courage of its opinions. The condemnation of Galileo,

'reo d'aver veduto
La terra volgersi intorno al sole,'

placed the Church in a dilemma from which she suffers to this day. Either the condemnation was infallible, in which case infallibility is shattered, or it was fallible, in which case (for it was not till 1835 that the Copernican teaching was tolerated) for more than 200 years Catholics were bound to give interior assent to what was untrue. A recent apologist urges that one error is an insufficient ground for questioning the competence of so august a tribunal as the Inquisition. He adds, however:

'Malgré tout les "gens de peu de foi" dont parle l'Evangile—et ils sont nombreux—craignent encore instinctivement que ce qui est arrivé une fois ne se renouvelle. Et cette frayeur, cette tentation de doute, qu'on le veuille ou non, est une conséquence

lointaine et durable de la condamnation de Gaïllée' (E. Vacandard, *Études de critique*, 1st ser., Paris, 1906, p. 386).

The historian will hesitate to endorse Vacandard's praise of the 'prudence bien connue des congrégations romaines.' The Inquisition has been as impotent for good as it has been potent for evil.

'It introduced a system of jurisprudence which infected the criminal law of all the lands subjected to its influence, and rendered the administration of penal justice a cruel mockery for centuries. It furnished the Holy See with a powerful weapon in aid of political aggrandizement, it tempted secular sovereigns to imitate the example, and it prostituted the name of religion to the vilest temporal ends. It stimulated the morbid sensitiveness to doctrinal aberrations until the most trifling dissidence was capable of rousing insane fury, and of convulsing Europe from end to end. On the other hand, when atheism became fashionable in high places, its thunders were mute. Energetic only in evil, when its powers might have been used on the side of virtue, it held its hand' (Lea, *iii.* 650).

3. Modern attitude.—When the question of the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church of to-day towards persecution is raised, a distinction must be made. The members of this Church, being men, are involved in the human movement; and, as this is humanitarian, it is natural that they should resent the charge of intolerance, and endeavour to shift the inconvenient burden from the Church to mediæval society and the mediæval State. So argue not only popular writers, but scholars such as Hergenröther (*Catholic Church and Christian State*, Eng. tr., London, 1876, essays xvi. and xvii.). But the Church is precluded by her principles from taking this position: the Decree *Lamentabili*, 1907 (prop. 53 f.), excludes the notion of development or process from religion; and, as the Church stands or falls with the papacy, so the papacy stands or falls with the principle of persecution. The Syllabus of 1864 condemns the proposition, 'Ecclesia vim inferendi potestatem non habet'; and Leo X. condemned among the errors of Luther the proposition, 'Haereticos comburi est contra voluntatem Spiritus'—from which, says Hergenröther, with a certain naïveté, 'it only follows that it is not contrary to the spirit of Christianity to punish heretics with death by fire' (ii. 309). In the words of Lord Acton,

'The Inquisition is peculiarly the weapon and peculiarly the work of the Popes. It stands out from all those things in which they co-operated, followed, or assented as the distinctive feature of papal Rome. It was set up, renewed, and perfected by a long series of acts emanating from the supreme authority in the Church. No other institution, no doctrine, no ceremony is so distinctly the creation of the papacy, except the Dispensing powers. It is the principal thing with which the papacy is identified, and by which it must be judged.

The principle of the Inquisition is murderous, and a man's opinion of the papacy is regulated and determined by his opinion about religious assassination.

If he honestly looks on it as an abomination, he can only accept the Primacy with a drawback, with precaution, suspicion, and aversion for its acts.

If he accepts the Primacy with confidence, admiration, unconditional obedience, he must have made terms with murder' (*Letters to Mary Gladstone*, ed. H. Paul, London, 1913, p. 1471.).

The greatest names of the Counter-Reformation are not free from this stain; the hands of its saints are red with blood. And to argue that these men acted in accordance with their principles and the principles of their religion, as no doubt they did, only throws the difficulty farther back.

The catena of authorities is unbroken. Pius v. and Gregory XIII. were privy to conspiracies against the life of Elizabeth, and Gregory applauded the massacre of St. Bartholomew; Clement VII. denounced the Edict of Nantes; Innocent X. the Peace of Westphalia; Pius VII. protested against the freedom of conscience clauses in the Bavarian Constitution of 1800 and the French Charter of 1814. In the Encyclical *Mirari vos* (1832) Gregory XVI. proclaims:

'Ex hoc putidissimo indifferentismi fonte, absurda illa fuit ac erronea sententia, seu potius deliramentum, asserendam esse ac vindicandam cuilibet libertatem conscientiae';

and the ideas of Leo XIII., though expressed in milder form, do not emerge from the iron circle of necessity in which the Catholic theory of revelation and the doctrine of exclusive salvation compel the received teaching to move. The good faith of the popes—even the popes of the Albigensian Crusade and the Counter-Reformation—need not be questioned; they thought to do God service, by stake, axe, and cord. But, says P. von Hoensbroech (*Das Papsttum in seiner sozial-kulturellen Wirksamkeit*, Leipzig, 1906-07, p. 180), there can be no more conclusive disproof of the divine origin of the papacy than the good faith of the popes in their age-long work of blood.

It is probably safe to say that the Church will never again be able to reduce these principles to practice. The world's tide runs strongly in the opposite direction; and, this being so, the question of what would be her policy under circumstances which are in fact excluded does not arise. But domestic tyranny is more than a possibility. The saner and more moderate elements in Roman Catholicism have suffered, even in our own time, under the tyranny of the hierarchy; and the Church is, and will be for long, so important a social and political factor in European life that this cannot be a matter of indifference either to the civil power or to the community at large. A sect may administer its own affairs unchecked—'de minimis non curat praetor'—but a Church which is a world force cannot be entrusted with unlimited autonomy; the pre-Revolution absolutisms, taught by long experience, saw this more clearly than the new democracies of to-day. Ruffini (*Religious Liberty*, ch. xxi.) gives the modern State the alternatives of separation—as in the United States and in France since the abolition of the concordat of 1801—or what he calls 'jurisdictionalism,' under which, as in England, and in France before 1906, the Church of the majority, while enjoying certain official privileges, is kept under a certain State control. If the former is better adapted to communities in which no religious body possesses a decided preponderance in numbers or influence, there is much to be said for the latter, where the majority of the citizens belong to one communion and profess, or at least accept, one creed. Here 'a free Church in a free State' may be a doubtful benefit: majorities need restraint; and the conscience of the community as a whole is more to be trusted than that of any section of it, clerical or lay. Where the control of the community is absent or ineffective, the clerical caste, experience shows, magnifies its office unduly. The clergy are good servants, but bad masters; the wisest ruler is he who distrusts ecclesiastical liberties most profoundly, and proclaims the sovereign as 'in all causes and over all persons whether ecclesiastical or civil within these his dominions supreme.' But it is less to external circumstances or political arrangements than to the slow growth of the reason and conscience of mankind that we may look for the solution of the problems—many of which, it will be admitted, are still open—which an older world than ours cut by the sword of persecution. The unity of religion, as in general of all that falls under the head of spirit, is a unity not of content, but of idea, of direction, of movement.

LITERATURE.—H. C. Lea, *Hist. of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*, New York and London, 1903-11, *The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies*, New York, 1903; F. Ruffini, *Religious Liberty*, Eng. tr., London, 1912; J. B. Barry, *A Hist. of the Inquisition*, Eng. tr., do. 1913; W. Faley, *The Principles of Religious Liberty*, do. 1913; J. Locke, *Letters on Toleration*, do. 1689-92; W. Warburton, *Alliance between Church and State*, do. 1738. ALFRED FAWKES.

PERSECUTION (Modern Christian).—At the close of the 15th cent. Christendom was at a low ebb, geographically and numerically. The once flourishing churches of the Far East had been almost destroyed by the Mongols, those of the Near East subjugated by the Turks. But the northern States of Scandinavia and Britain were in communion with Rome, the kings of France had adjusted their quarrel with the popes, and the Holy Roman Empire seemed again a reality when the vast possessions of Spain were under the same ruler. Western Christendom was compact, united in doctrine and in organization. The Fifth Lateran Council sat without realizing that the whole system was undermined, and that within eight months of its rising the match would be lit.

Two theories which led to persecution as a duty held the field. The one was that a body of truths existed, some still latent, some explicitly stated in dogmas, necessary and vital; so vital that, unless a man accepted them, he would without doubt perish everlastingly. The other was that Christendom formed a single body, with a spiritual arm and a secular; when the former had done its best to reclaim an erring member and had failed, the latter must punish.¹ There was room for discussion as to the precise inter-relation of the two arms, but there was no room to doubt the duty of suppressing every book and person challenging received truth.

The characteristic of the last four centuries is that these theories have been emphatically traversed, that their corollary of persecution has been repudiated, that a counter-theory is now widely held, asserting the soul's direct responsibility to God and the freedom of conscience from the dominion of man. Thus the history of persecution in this period will show it regarded (1) as a religious duty, (2) as a political expedient, (3) as a political blunder, and (4) as a sin against God.

1. A religious duty.—For centuries it had been seen that it was needful not to wait for onward manifestation of error, but to probe into possible sources, and for this purpose there had been many forms of the Inquisition (*q.v.*). As episcopal independence had lessened, diocesan inquisitors had become unimportant, and the Roman Curia had its own agents. Thanks to the zeal of the Spaniard Dominic, the Black Friars were usually the papal inquisitors. In the 16th cent. others came to the front, but, however agents and methods varied, the theories and policy of the Curia remained, with only natural growth.

Hadrian VI. had served an apprenticeship as inquisitor in Aragon before he became pope.

He brought to Rome 'the Spanish idea of rigorous discipline within the Church'—a system of discipline by which the head of the Church was to be guided by the way, head.²

Spain, indeed, had worked out a most effective form of Inquisition, as will be seen; after experience with it Caraffa reorganized the papal Inquisition on its lines. Thus in 1542 a special Congregation of the Holy Office was founded in Rome. Six cardinals—their number was afterwards increased to thirteen—were empowered to arrest and imprison all suspected heretics, and to try all cases of heresy, on both sides of the Alps. They might institute minor tribunals, and thus create a world-wide organization. Within the papal States there was no conflict with civil authorities, and the inquisitors began at once; by negotiation with Italian princes they soon acted more widely; but most rulers declined to admit their jurisdiction, and preferred to deal with heresy by other machi-

nery. The Congregation was quite successful in Italy; eight or nine Protestant congregations were dispersed, and persecution ceased because uniformity was restored.

The Holy Office saw that to deal only with man was futile, and it systematized the censorship of books (see OFFICE, THE HOLY). Caraffa, now Pope Paul IV., drew up an 'Index Librorum Prohibitorum,' which forbade the use of any book from any one of 61 printers, or written by any one of a much longer list of authors, including even Erasmus. This was so drastic that it was discussed at Trent, and a commission framed ten rules to be observed in revising it; the Tridentine Index came out under Pius IV. in 1564. The work proved so great that Pius V. created a special Congregation of the Index (see INDEX).

Spain furnished Rome with another great agency; Ignatius Loyola brought his military ideas to the service of the Church, and the Jesuits (*q.v.*) soon surpassed the Dominicans in zeal and ability. An early instance of their success may be given from Upper Austria, where most of the nobles had accepted Lutheranism.³

Ferdinand gave the Jesuits permission to settle in Vienna, and in a few years they had rejuvenated the universities. In 1592 one of their pupils was made vicar-general of Styria; under instructions from Clement VII., and with the aid of Ferdinand given contrary to his guarantee, the entire Protestant population was forcibly converted or expelled within 24 years.

The Jesuits were the soul of the Counter-Reformation; their methods in Bohemia were of the same type, and equally successful; the Anabaptists were driven into Hungary at a month's notice; the Moravian Church was almost obliterated, and the name of John Hus passed into oblivion.

To trace the activities of these two Congregations and of the Jesuits were needless; their principles are unchanged. Even such mystics as the Spaniard Molinos and the French Fénelon were condemned, and the Jansenist movement was stopped. But, when Jesuit influence became paramount in Rome, the papal assertions deserve record.

Bible societies were in 1816 termed by Pius VII. a 'fiendish instrument for the undermining of the foundation of religion.'⁴ Leo XII. said ten years later:

'Every one separated from the Roman Catholic Church, however unblamable in other respects his life may be, because of this sole offence, that he is sundered from the unity of Christ, has no part in eternal life; God's wrath hangs over him.'⁵

Pius VIII. began his pontificate by denouncing liberty of conscience. Gregory XVI. in 1832, considering the Belgian declaration in favour of religious liberty, pronounced this a mere 'deliramentum.' Pius IX. in 1864 codified many papal principles in his *Syllabus of Errors*:

Error 21 is: 'The Church has not the power of defining dogmatically that the religion of the Catholic Church is the only true religion'; error 24 is: 'The Church has not the power of availing herself of force, nor any temporal power direct or indirect'; error 28 is: 'In certain Catholic countries it is rightly provided by law that immigrants thither shall enjoy public exercise of their own religion.'⁶

Six years later the Vatican Council acknowledged that the authority of the Roman pontiff is immune from error; and in 1878 Leo XIII. declared that the utterances of the *Syllabus* are clothed with that authority. Modernism is denounced; modernists are excommunicated. Pius X. reorganized the Roman Curia into eleven congregations, of which the Holy Office is first and the Index seventh, and they are closely related.

The former, says Benedetto Ojetti, 'judges heresy, and the offences that lead to suspicion of heresy; it applies the canonical punishments incurred by heretics, schismatics, and the like. In this the Holy Office differs from all the other congregations.'⁷

¹ See *Trans. Royal Hist. Soc.*, 3rd ser., v. [1911] 63.

² A. H. Newman, *A Manual of Church History*, Philadelphia, 1903, II. 533.

³ Newman, II. 234.

⁴ *Ib.* II. 446.

⁵ *Ib.* II. 448-9.

⁶ *Acta Sanctæ Sedis*, Rome, 1865; Newman, II. 607.

⁷ *CF.* XIII. 135-4.

And it is the only congregation of which there is no other president than the pope himself.

The Jesuits, thanks especially to J. P. Roothaan and P. J. Beckx, have won almost complete control of the Curial thought, policy, and machinery. One illustration of summary action may suffice.

Henri Lasserre translated the Gospels into French, and published the version in 1887 with the imprimatur of the archbishop of Paris and the approval of the pope. On 10th Dec. the Congregation of the Index forbade it to be published, and ordered all copies to be surrendered; next day the pope approved this decree, without comment or explanation, in the most solemn form.

Joseph Blötzer¹ justifies such action on the grounds that religious belief is 'something objective, the gift of God, and therefore outside the realm of free private judgment'; that the Church is 'a society . . . whose first and most important duty must naturally be to retain unsullied this original deposit of faith.' James Bridge² states that, 'though the Church exercises that right [of coercing all Christians] for the most part by spiritual sanctions, she has never relinquished the right to use other means.' To a Roman Catholic such action is not technically 'persecution'—this can be inflicted only on the Church, not by the Church; it is simply the lawful and necessary exercise of discipline.

Hitherto we have dealt only with proceedings initiated or approved by the court of Rome, where its responsibility is not denied. Its principles may now be considered as applied by the Hapsburgs in Spain and the Netherlands.

(a) Spain.—Ferdinand and Isabella obtained a bull in 1478 empowering them to establish a royal inquisition to investigate the genuineness of the religion of the 'New Christians' of Jewish descent; the scope of this was soon enlarged to enable those of Muslim descent to be dealt with also. Under Torquemada the Holy Office was allowed to frame its own rules. Soon it became independent of the bishops, entitled to call in the aid of all civil authorities, able to disobey even the pope. Thirty-two years after its foundation an inscription was placed on its headquarters at Seville to the effect that about 1000 people had been burned, and about 20,000 had been condemned to penances. In 1609 Philip III. was persuaded to banish all the Moriscos, or Christians descended from the Muslim Moors; the measure was carried out so thoroughly that more than 2,000,000 are supposed to have been exiled. Thenceforward the Inquisition turned its energies in other directions. It spread throughout all the Spanish possessions, except where special arrangements were made, as in Naples, Sicily, and the Netherlands. Thus all the New World allotted to Spain by the Roman See was under its jurisdiction, and any native who relapsed from Christianity to his ancestral faith was at its mercy.

More dubious were the rights of the Inquisition over foreigners, and an illustration may be given which displays the normal procedure, without any sensational features.³

Hugh Wingfield of Rotherham, with five other soldiers from the 'Gabriel', was captured in the ordinary course of war during 1592, and was put in the royal prison of Tenerife. The promoter fiscal of the Holy Office appeared before the inquisitor, denouncing him as a pirate, heretic, and apostate; a *prima facie* case was established, and he was removed to the cells of the Inquisition. These were so far from being places of torment that the prisoners used to open them after dark and spend the evening together. Within a week Wingfield was examined, and he acknowledged that he had 'never heard Mass, as it is not said, out only the service used by the Protestants of England; and that this is the religion instituted by Calvin.'⁴ Further, he declared that he could not abandon a religion that he knew, and promise to follow one that he did not know; but he desired to know the truth. After instruction for a fortnight, he acknowledged that the new religion of his country was bad, that in her

and all her opinions lay the soul's perdition, and he asked to be received into the Holy Catholic Church. He was then taught the prayers; as he fell ill, he was taken to hospital and nursed; in June 1593 he was released on parole. This he broke, and escaped, and it is recorded sadly that this usually happened. The incident elicited orders from Seville not to deal with such cases, but to take proceedings against foreigners only when they offended against the faith within the dominions of the Spanish crown, or while the ships were anchored in the ports. The local inquisitor disobeyed these orders, and on 21st Dec. 1597 some of Wingfield's companions were among eleven Englishmen dealt with at a public *auto de fé* by imprisonment, confiscation of goods, etc.

The Spanish Inquisition came to be detested by orthodox Spaniards.¹ A young priest named Padron was admitted about 1790 to discussions with Protestant ministers at the house of George Washington in Philadelphia (the date and place are highly significant). Being asked how he could defend a Church that had invented the Inquisition, he attacked the Spanish Inquisition, declaring it to be the work not of the Church, but of the royal power, and to be contrary to the spirit of the gospel. Franklin invited him to preach this publicly, which he did in the Roman Catholic church of Philadelphia. The sermon was translated into English, and repeated by a parish priest to an enormous audience. Padron then toured the States with the same theory. Such was the story told by Padron in 1813, when he was deputy from the Canaries to the Cortes of Cadiz, met to discuss the suppression of the Inquisition. He denounced it there as a spurious growth, a clog upon the Church, an insult to Spanish loyalty to Catholicism, and a usurpation of episcopal authority. Such attention did his speech attract that it was translated by the English admiral and published.²

Meanwhile Joseph Bonaparte, who had suppressed the Inquisition in 1808, turned over the archives to Llorente, its former secretary, that its history might be written. The results were published in Paris, 1815-17, much to the subsequent discomfort of the author. His accuracy was challenged but never disproved, and an English abridgment appeared in 1826. Meanwhile Ferdinand VII. had restored the Inquisition, but it was again abolished in 1820.

The theory propounded by Padron was elaborated and defended by Joseph de Maistre, a Savoyard whose works include a treatise on the Spanish Inquisition, and a book entitled *The Pope; considered in his Relation with the Church, Temporal Sovereignities*, etc.³ The latter work, originally published in 1815, is a classic for Ultramontanes, and the modern starting-point of the development culminating with the Vatican Council. His theory has the great advantage for orthodox Roman Catholics that they can lay the blame of the excesses of the Inquisition on royal shoulders, not on papal. To American readers they can protest:

'The authority of the Inquisition began and ended with the crown. . . . When I denounce the cruelties of the Inquisition, I am not standing aloof from the Church, but I am treading in her footsteps. Bloodshed and persecution form no part of the creed of the Catholic Church.'⁴

It is further possible to praise the pope for 'preventing the Spanish Government from establishing its Inquisition in Naples or Milan, which then belonged to Spain, so great was his abhorrence of its cruelties.'⁵ This appears to imply that the Inquisition in Calabria was not the Spanish, but the papal, as T. M. Lindsay also implies; so that the treatment of the Waldenses at Cosenza from 1555 to 1561 was the work of the Holy Office more directly.

'They were exterminated by sword, by hurling from the summits of cliffs, by prolonged confinement in deadly prisons,

¹ English Merchants and the Spanish Inquisition in the Canaries, *Royal Hist. Soc.*, 1912, p. xi.

² British Museum, 4071. b. 37.

³ Eng. tr., London, 1850.

⁴ James Cardinal Gibbons, *The Faith of our Fathers*, Baltimore, 1893, pp. 293, 295.

⁵ *Ib.* p. 296.

¹ CE viii. 28.

² *Ib.* xi. 703.

³ English Merchants and the Spanish Inquisition in the Canaries, *Royal Hist. Soc.*, 1912, pp. 33-52.

⁴ *Ib.* p. 41.

at the stake, in the mines, in the Spanish galleys. One hundred elderly women were first tortured and then slaughtered at Montalto. The survivors among the women and children were sold into slavery.¹

It is regrettable that the sword was used for the effusion of blood, for 'the Popes denounced and laboured hard to abolish its sanguinary features,' says Gibbons.² On the whole theory of de Maistre, be it noted that the Spanish Inquisition was based on a papal bull, and was enlarged by a papal brief of 1571, that popes heard appeals from the Inquisition, exempted whole classes from its scope, and intervened often in its doings. As in 1816 torture had been abolished in all the tribunals of the Inquisition, it is hard to see why the popes had not exercised their authority, which had availed to suppress Templars and Jesuits, to curb the Spanish Inquisition.

(b) *The Netherlands*.—Motley has told in detail how Charles V. and his son Philip of Spain dealt with the Low Countries. In April 1522 Charles appointed Van den Hulst as inquisitor-general, and by brief in June next year Hadrian VI. commissioned him to act concurrently with the episcopal inquisitors. Emperor and pope acted most harmoniously; Clement VII. and Paul III. confirming the successive heads, Charles issuing their instructions. Philip confirmed these instructions before he had been a month on the throne, besides appointing fourteen new bishops, each with two special inquisitors. It was asked why the Spanish Inquisition was not introduced, and Philip explained to his half-sister, 'L'Inquisition des Pays-Bas est plus impitoyable que celle d'Espagne.'³ A few illustrations of his statement may be given; details will be found in T. J. van Braght, *Het Bloedigh Tooneel*, Dort, 1660, Eng. tr., Lancaster, Pa., 1837; and Gorrit Brandt, *Historie der Reformatie*, Amsterdam, 1677, Eng. tr., London, 1720-23.

The town-clerk of Antwerp was obliged to stand on a platform, to retract certain opinions said to be set forth in a preface that he had written, and to burn the book; he was then imprisoned and banished. Jan Walen of Krommenledijk and two friends were bound to stakes with chains, and, a fire being laid round them, they were slowly roasted to death. This form of capital punishment was reserved for Anabaptist men, the women being drowned. When the Anabaptists tried to emigrate, five vessels on which they were sailing were sunk with all on board; the others were taken back, and the heads of the leaders were exposed on poles. After eight years of this the Anabaptists began to defend themselves, and the fall of Münster was the signal for a special edict against them. Men who made converts were to be burnt to death; men who were re-baptized but recanted were to be slain with the sword, women were 'only to be buried alive.'⁴

The papal-imperial Inquisition of the Netherlands must not be confounded with the ancient episcopal Inquisition, nor with the secular Council of Tumults created by Alva in 1567. This dealt not with heretics, but with traitors;⁵ treason was defined so as to include signing petitions against the Inquisition and tolerating field-preaching. By this time there were other heretics than Anabaptists, and these were more defiant. Alva wrote to the king saying that early one Ash Wednesday he had arrested 1500 in bed, and adding, 'I have ordered all of them to be executed.' Before long there was an insurrection, which did not, and does not, seem to be regarded with such horror as the defence of Münster. By 1607 the Spaniards had to own themselves beaten so far that the northern provinces were treated as independent. From that day the Netherlands has been the home of religious freedom, where the new theory assailing the foundations of persecution took shape and whence it was spread abroad.

¹ T. M. Lindsay, *History of the Reformation*, Edinburgh, 1807, II. 601 f.

² P. 226.

³ J. L. Motley, *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, new ed., London, 1878, pp. 168-174.

⁴ Lindsay, II. 235.

⁵ *Ib.* II. 256.

2. A political expedient.—In the cases considered thus far the impelling motive was religious, the emphasis being laid on the peril to the soul. But persecution has often sprung from another motive—the desire to unify and consolidate the State. This may be illustrated from the history of Germany, England, New England, Russia, France, and Portugal.

(a) *Germany*.—The precedent was set here by the Elector of Saxony in 1528, when he sent Melancthon and other visitors round his domains with instructions to deprive nonconforming priests and to banish dissenting laymen.

'For the prevention of mischievous tumult and other inconveniences, we will suffer neither sect nor separation in our territory.'¹

Three years later Melancthon considered the fate of Mantz, drowned at Zurich by the Zwinglians, and he wrote to Myconius that the Anabaptists were diabolical and not to be tolerated; their leaders everywhere ought to suffer the utmost punishment.² He and Zwingli based their views on the political need of unity, for no Anabaptist had given sign of active resistance. The policy was crystallized into the maxim for Germany, 'Cujus regio, illius et religio.' This was applied against Lutherans in 1731, when some 300 representatives assembled in Salzburg to consider the danger in which they stood. They entered into a salt-covenant to hold fast to the evangelical faith. This was treated as rebellion; soldiers were quartered on all evangelical families; and on 31st October all were ordered to be banished because of the covenant. Most went to Lithuania, and a few to Georgia in America, which was founded for their benefit by Oglethorpe.

(b) *England*.—The Tudors laid stress upon uniformity, which was almost unknown before, as they believed that it was necessary to make and keep England great. Henry VII. applied the method in secular departments, his son in ecclesiastical affairs. A dramatic exhibition was given when on 30th July 1540 six preachers were drawn from the Tower of London to Smithfield, where three were burned for heresy and three were hanged and quartered for treason in denying Henry's supremacy over the Church. Three Acts of Uniformity were passed under Edward and Elizabeth; similar enactments were frequent for half a century after 1640. Ejectments of clergy who failed to change quickly enough were common till the reign of William and Mary. Persecution was most violent under Mary Tudor and Elizabeth. The former acted on the advice of Spaniards, and doubtless from religious motives. S. R. Gardiner³ reckons that in three years 277 persons were burned to death for their religion. Elizabeth reverted to her father's ideal, and aimed at a united England; as she sought a *via media*, she had to deal with two parties. The Roman Catholics, who reckon 253 martyrs from Cardinal Fisher in 1535 to Archbishop Plunket in 1681, claim 189 in the reign of Elizabeth, who must be allowed the benefit of the plea of her father and Alva, that these men were executed for treason; and, further, that most of them came to England knowing the law and intending to defy it; that the pope had by bull deposed her and absolved all persons from allegiance; that most of the accused could be pardoned on taking the oath of allegiance. On the other side, Dutch Anabaptists were burned; English Separatists were hanged, imprisoned, fined, or banished. The legislation of 1593 typifies the Tudor position. Popish recusants were confined to a circle of five miles round their birth-place. The balancing Act

¹ C. Beard, *The Reformation in its Relation to Modern Thought* (H.L., 1888), London, 1888, p. 177.

² *Ib.* p. 180, quoting Corp. Ref. II. 542.

³ *Student's History of England*, London, 1892, p. 427.

against Protestants decreed that any person refusing to come to his parish church had the option of forfeiting all his property and going abroad permanently or of being executed. Under this Act six Baptists were condemned to death as late as 1664; it was to avert the scandal of such an execution that Bunyan was illegally detained in prison for twelve years.

The distinction between spiritual and secular was retained. An ecclesiastical court only excommunicated, but, if an accused person did not make his peace within forty days, the fact was signified to Chancery, whence a writ went to the sheriff to arrest and imprison until the ecclesiastical court was satisfied. The last case of burning for heresy occurred in the reign of James I., and it gave such scandal that no later writ of *significavit* is extant. From that time the High Commissions became the favourite courts. Penalties now seldom amounted to death. Roman Catholics were either fined £20 a month or, if that did not affect them seriously, deprived of two-thirds of their lands. For Protestants prison and branding were preferred. Dorothy Trask died in 1645 after having been fifteen years in jail for the crime of regarding Saturday as the Sabbath.

The period 1640-60 must be separately studied. After that the reign of Charles II. showed the intensified difficulty of the situation, which again was met by violent persecution, always under the forms of law. Charles had the task of trying to restore unity, when Dissenters plotted with Holland and Roman Catholics with France, when the navy yard struck if the new Conventicle Act was enforced, and Parliament voted no money till it was carried out. The jails were crowded: in December 1661 there were 289 Baptists in Newgate alone; a year later there were 214 Baptists and Quakers. Even in 1672, on the intercession of a Quaker who had assisted his escape from England twenty years before, Charles found 491 men to deliver from prison, whose sole offence was peaceable worship outside the parish churches. Fearing that his crown was in danger if the persecution continued, the king issued a declaration of indulgence, and licensed 4215 dissenting teachers or houses. Next year, on financial threats from Parliament, he withdrew the declaration. As it was supposed to have been prompted by favour to the Roman Catholics, popular fury turned towards them, and a series of judicial murders took place on the initiative of some perjurers. Then the saw dipped on the other side; more ministers died in jail; and after the abortive invasion of Monmouth the progress of Jeffreys gave rise to a new Western martyrology.

Peace was restored to England only by the compromise of 1689, which conceded a limited freedom of worship at the cost of civil disability. Since then persecution has been either sporadic or illegal, or of the privative kind which confines franchise, office, and emoluments to certain favoured classes.

(c) *New England*.—Much less known is the action of the Pilgrim Fathers. In 1650 they passed a law forbidding people to meet on the Lord's Day from house to house in Plymouth.¹ On 2nd October nine men and women were presented for so doing. There was no suggestion of any riot; they were worshipping quietly. Governor William Bradford, who signed that law, had four years before described the early experience of himself and his friends, keeping 'their meetings every Sabbath in one place or another, exercising the worship of God among themselves.'² He must

have had a very strong sense of the need of keeping his little colony homogeneous. Under his successor the Pilgrims used the stocks, the cage, the jail; they fined, confiscated, whipped, banished, till the Restoration ended their scandalous doings.¹ When such things were done in the green tree of Plymouth, the state of affairs may be readily imagined in the dry tree of Boston. There the persecution culminated in hanging four Quakers on the common early in 1660. But the Puritans at least were thoroughly consistent, and acted from loftier motives. With them the desire for a unified territory was accessory to a genuinely religious feeling, as with Calvin, whose conduct in the case of Servetus had set them the example.

(d) *Russia*.—In few lands is there such close blending between Church and State as in Russia. It arises out of the circumstances in which Muscovy achieved independence. The clergy did much to promote the organization by which the rule of the Muslim Mongols was ended, and the invasion of the Roman Catholic Poles was repelled. Before the 15th cent. ended, a grandson of the Kaiser at Constantinople had as Tsar transplanted the Byzantine traditions to Moscow, whose archbishop he caused to be recognized by the four Eastern patriarchs as a fifth colleague. The royal house soon died out, and a grand national assembly chose a son of the patriarch to be Tsar. In the middle of the 17th cent. the patriarch Nikon instituted many reforms with the support of the Tsar and of all the bishops but one, who was deposed, flogged, and kept in prison till he died mad. The laity and many clergy resisted; persecution led to civil war. In 1667 Nikon was deposed by an ecclesiastical council, but the schism continued; even to-day, after constant oppression, the Old Believers are supposed to number 12,000,000. Peter the Great averted the risks arising from future pretensions of any patriarch by abolishing the office and instituting a holy governing synod, composed chiefly of bishops nominated by himself, and presided over by himself or a lay deputy—very like a Tudor High Commission with Thomas Cromwell at its head. This change was enforced by more persecution, and a new rebellion was subdued.

Two generations later Catherine II. took over all the capital of ecclesiastical property, paying the clergy and monks regular salaries; it was a good precedent for the French National Assembly, though the Ecclesiastical Commission of 1836 applied the principle in England only to the bishops. But Catherine's extension of boundary brought under her sceptre Lutherans of the Baltic and Roman Catholics of Poland, so that the homogeneous province of 1600 has swollen to a heterogeneous empire, with new ecclesiastical problems. To-day in a population of 125,000,000 there are 14,000,000 Muslims and 5,000,000 Jews, the persecution of whom is not here dealt with; in the Christian population Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Old Believers, and Armenians are large factors, though altogether they are not a quarter of the number of the State Church. In theory there is a general toleration; in practice there is nothing of the kind.² Propaganda is forbidden; at the best of times a minister of a sect can be registered only for one building and one congregation, while police frequently attend to watch. Prison, flogging, removal to the Caucasus or Siberia, and exile are the constant experience of such ministers, and also of many lay Dissenters.

(e) *France*.—The religious wars of the 16th cent. resulted in the Edict of Nantes securing a certain privileged position of toleration to the Huguenots

¹ *Journal of the Friends' Hist. Soc.* xiii. [1916] 87.

² Bradford MS, folio 81; printed by E. Arber, *The Story of the Pilgrim Fathers*, London, 1897, p. 70.

¹ *Journal of the Friends' Hist. Soc.* xiii. [1916] 87.

² R. S. Latimer, *Under Three Tsars: Liberty of Conscience in Russia*, London, 1909.

(g.v.). Louis XIV. could not brook such division, and, prompted by others with different motives from his, he set to work to unify his realm. Bitter persecution led up to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, the expulsion of all ministers, and the most strenuous measures for the conformity of the laity. The reaction came with the French Revolution a century later, but the proclamation of 'liberty, equality, and fraternity' on 14th July 1789 proved illusory. The National Assembly adopted Catherine's plan with ecclesiastical property, and went farther. The monastic orders were abolished, and a new civil constitution was framed for the Church. Of 136 bishops only four took the oaths, and 79 new prelates had to be found; the parish clergy resisted, and 600 are said to have been massacred at Avignon alone. The Legislative Assembly was anti-Christian. It ordered Paris to be cleared of priests, and three weeks later 300 clergy were massacred in prison, thus ushering in the Reign of Terror. This culminated in November 1793, when Christianity was formally abolished, and the existence of God was denied.

(f) *Portugal*.—This country affords an earlier case when a great Roman Catholic corporation suffered persecution. In 1750 the kingdom was under clerical influence, especially that of the Society of Jesus.¹ A series of economic reforms, the organization of trading companies, and the development of the colonies brought the State and the Jesuits into sharp collision. If Richelieu would not tolerate an ecclesiastical *imperium in imperio*, no more would Pombal. In 1759 the Society was expelled from all the Portuguese dominions, and its funds were sequestered. In extenuation of this action, it may be pointed out that the governments of France and Spain, also staunchly Roman Catholic, felt obliged to take similar steps eight years later, that the pope refused to permit the Spanish Jesuits to land in Italy, that even the Austrians withdrew support, and that the next pope suppressed the whole order for ever. He set in the forefront of his reasons that the Jesuits ruined souls by their quarrels and their compromises with heathen usages. The bull has never been withdrawn. Another pope, equally infallible, reconstituted the order, which silently re-established itself in Portugal, and was a second time expelled in 1834, and a third time in 1910. On neither occasion was any action taken against the Roman Catholic hierarchy and parochial organization or against public worship. The State has thrice been obliged to defend itself against a powerful international organization, whose character was declared by the papacy to be bad. Roman Catholicism is still the religion of Portugal. The constitution both permits the Protestant religion and lays it down that no one can be persecuted for religious reasons so long as he respects the religion of the State and commits no offence against public morals. Nor is this a dead letter; a priest who in 1904 caused a Protestant worker to be assaulted and robbed was sent to prison for 35 days.

3. A political blunder.—When different religious parties were more evenly balanced, the rulers sometimes saw that the only chance of internal peace was a wide toleration, and that persecution would be a mistake. An early example is found in Poland, where, to avert civil war, Calvinists and Lutherans were tolerated from 1552, and Mennonites were invited by the king to come and settle, with the promise of religious freedom. On his death a compact of Warsaw during the interregnum assured on 28th Jan. 1573 absolute religious liberty to all 'dissenters from the religion.' So also in

the Netherlands, where William of Orange, himself successively Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, had to insist that there must be mutual concessions as the price of bare existence in the face of Spanish troops. He carried his point first in 1576 with a Pacification of Ghent and again in the Union of Utrecht.

Rulers were assisted to see their way to this, by the wide acceptance of a new political theory originated by Calvin,² published in his *Institutes*, and thus spread over the whole Western world. It reached English readers first in the *Politike Power* of Bishop John Ponet, 1556:

'Men ought not to obey their superior that shall commaunde them to doo anything against Goddes Word. . . . Princes abusing their office may be deposed by the body of the whole congregacion or commonwealth.'

Five years later all could read Calvin's closing words:

'If they [the three estates in every realme] winke at kinges wilfully raging over and treading down the poor communalitie . . . they deceitfully betray the libertie of the people, whereof they know themselves to bee appointed protectors by the ordinance of God.'³

Acting on Knox's exposition of this theory, the Scots deposed the queen regent in 1559, and the parliament ratified the Revolution on that ground. Beza's *Droit des magistrats* (1573) and Philippe de Mornay's *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos* (1579) gave full scope to the theory; and in 1581 the Estates of the Netherlands solemnly deposed Philip, justifying the act in their declaration of independence.

The Italian jurist Hieron Zanehius, teaching in Germany, added to Aquinas's doctrine of passive resistance the obligation to active resistance.

'If for the sake of religion you oppose yourself to the king, you oppose yourself not to power but to tyranny, and unless you do so oppose yourself, you act contrary to divine and human law.'⁴

The doctrine was repeated at Heidelberg by the German David Pareus:

'Inferior magistrates may justly, even by arms, defend the commonwealth and church or religion against a superior magistrate.'⁵

His book had the honour of being burned by James I., who blinded himself to the fact that most of his thinking subjects accepted this theory.

These books were chiefly political, many by lawyers and statesmen; they were widely circulated and translated. England demanded new editions after 1640, and the dogma that persecution for the sake of religion justifies armed resistance and deposition led again to appropriate action. And, whereas the Continental thinkers were from the upper ranks, it was a representative council of the army which in August 1647 drew out sixteen proposals as the basis of a treaty with the king. One proposed to abolish all coercive power in ecclesiastical officers, another to repeal the Uniformity and Conventicle Acts, a third to make the recent Covenant voluntary rather than obligatory. Two months later a body of democrats presented to this council a manifesto styled 'the Agreement of the People,' which they considered and amended. After an interlude of a second war the army presented it formally to the House of Commons in January 1648-49.

The ninth clause deals with religion, and provides 'that, to the public profession so held forth, none be compelled by penalties or otherwise; . . . that such as profess faith in God by Jesus Christ, however differing in judgment from the doctrine, worship, or discipline publicly set forth, as aforesaid, shall not be restrained from, but shall be protected in, the profession of their faith and exercise of religion, according to their consciences, in any place except such as shall be set apart for the public worship.'⁶

¹ H. D. Foster, 'The Political Theory of Calvinists before the Puritan Emigration to America,' in *Amer. Hist. Rev.* xxi. [1916] 451.

² *Institutes*, iv. xx. 31 (Norton's tr.).

³ *Op. Theol.*, Heidelberg, 1613, iv. 792.

⁴ *Conn. on Romans*, Heidelberg, 1617, p. 1023.

⁵ Gardiner, p. 570.

⁶ A. Weid, *The Suppression of the Society of Jesus in the Portuguese Dominions*, London, 1877.

This document is the careful definition of 'the Good Old Cause' for which the army declared itself to have fought. In the Instrument of Government (16th Dec. 1653), defining the constitution under which the Commonwealth was governed, the above provisions were incorporated word for word.

The nation was by no means ripe for such ideas, and the six years of the Protectorate did not educate it as the forty-five years of Elizabeth had done. Moreover, from the beginning Cromwell was recreant. When he confined recusants within their radius of five miles, he was only continuing Elizabeth's plan, and availing himself of a special exception in the Instrument. When he heavily fined prelatists who rebelled, he again applied Elizabeth's plan, and might say that rebels came off lightly with only fines. But he forbade ejected ministers to teach in schools, and set new precedents of persecution destined to be used against his supporters. And he turned on them also; orders went to Scotland to see that no Baptist should teach in a school or hold any office of trust. Faithless to his own express announcement a few years earlier that the State regarded efficiency and not opinions, Cromwell did the very thing that he had forbidden Crawford to do, and weeded the army of Baptist officers. Before his death he was persecuting many parties, and was fiercely denounced by the leaders of 1647, some of whom republished the Calvinist doctrine in the pamphlet *Killing no Murder*, in May 1657. After his death 'the Good Old Cause' revived, but its leaders were in a minority, and, with the restoration of the Presbyterians to power in 1659, persecution was both legalized and practised freely for a generation.

The literary campaign continued, dealing with the political aspects of the matter; and it called forth writers of very different types. Sidney and Locke were of the Christian school; the essay *Concerning Toleration* was drafted at Oxford during the cruelties of 1666, but was completed and was first published most appropriately in Holland.¹ Almost immediately Parliament accepted the view that persecution had failed to secure unity and was a political blunder. The Toleration Act was passed in 1689. The Rainbow Club of the Huguenots discussed the matter, and P. Bayle's *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (4 vols., Rotterdam, 1697) leavened Continental thought. Voltaire, after an English sojourn of 1726-29, returned to ring the changes for half a century on the motto 'Ecrasez l'infame!' 'Down with persecution!' The deists and the unitarians took up the cause. It found champions such as Mill, Buckle, and Lecky. A statement from an agnostic standpoint was republished in 1893 by Leslie Stephen in his essay on 'poisonous opinions.'²

4. A sin against God.—There was a momentary glimpse of this view by Luther at Worms, but he soon lost sight of it; and the familiar confessions of the Reformation admit the right of the civil authority to coerce in matters of religion. Specially noteworthy is the general unanimity of Calvinist theologians in affirming not only the absolute independence of the spiritual courts in matters spiritual, but also 'the duty of the civil authorities to carry out their spiritual sentences to their appointed civil consequences.'³ Against such a doctrine the continuous, direct, and elaborate Biblical indictment of persecution begins with Englishmen, enjoying the actual liberty secured at Amsterdam by the wisdom of William in the teeth of the Calvinist ministers.

A group of exiles from Gainsborough set down twenty short propositions in 1609, one stating that excommunicated persons are not to be avoided in what pertains to civil affairs. This was soon complemented by this statement:

'The magistrate is not by virtue of his office to meddle with religion, or matters of conscience, to force and compel men to this or that form of religion, or doctrine; but to leave Christian religion free, to every mans conscience . . . for Christ owleth is the king, and lawgiuer of the church and conscience.'¹

In 1614 a citizen of London residing in Holland presented to King James a small book called *Religious Peace: or a plea for liberty of conscience. Wherein is contained certain reasons against persecution for religion*. Next year appeared another little work, *Objections answered by way of dialogue, wherein is proved . . . that no man ought to be persecuted for his religion, so he testifie his allegiance by the oath appointed by law*. In 1620 another pamphlet came from the same group, *A most humble supplication of many of the king's majesty's loyal subjects . . . who are persecuted only for differing in religion, etc.* Eight editions appeared of these three works, quite apart from antiquarian reprints.²

The next assertion of the principle of liberty was made, not against the Stuarts, but against refugees from them who reproduced their policy on Calvin's principles. Anne Hutchinson arrived in Boston in 1634, was refused admission as a member of John Cotton's church, and so began a conventicle in her home. As Cotton tried to stop it, Roger Williams copied out some extracts from the 1620 book and sent them to him, initiating a war of pamphlets. The Company formally forbade new churches to organize without consent of the officers and of the elders in existing churches; whereupon the elections turned on this prohibition. The sitting governor was defeated, and Henry Vane, the champion of freedom, was chosen; but with 1637 the persecutors returned to power. They secured their victory by expelling Mrs. Hutchinson, Williams, and many other opponents. Others left in disgust, some going to Connecticut, but Vane to England, where he continued his championship against the Scots commissioners in the Westminster Assembly, breaking with Cromwell in 1650 largely on the same issue, and being imprisoned by him in 1656 because he protested against the Protector's persecution of the Episcopalian clergy.

Meanwhile the victorious ministers and elders on Massachusetts Bay followed up many refugees, and tried to assert authority over the Island of Rhodes. Williams was sent to London to secure exemption from the Company's jurisdiction. There he published in 1644 a long criticism dedicated to Parliament and entitled, *The Bloody Tenent of Persecution, for Cause of Conscience, discussed*. This is a standard work, examining the question on a Biblical basis. It led to a long debate in New England.

Old England also was roused to the question. Christopher Blackwood proclaimed that compulsion of conscience was a pillar of Antichrist. Seven London Calvinistic Baptist churches, issuing a confession of faith, were equally clear, and, as the confession was keenly criticized, they revised it, and dedicated it to Parliament, which was about to enforce uniformity. They declared that they would willingly submit to all civil laws, but could not submit to some ecclesiastical laws; therefore they would accept the consequences in persecution.

One of the signatories took stronger ground next year, propounding 50 questions to the Assembly of Divines on the subject of compulsion. Obtaining no answer, he expanded them into a book on the

¹ John Smyth, *Works*, Cambridge, 1915, II. 682-684, 748.
² *Tracts on Liberty of Conscience and Persecution* (Harvard Knollys Society), London, 1846.

¹ *Epistola de Tolerantia*, Gouda, 1639.

² *An Agnostic's Apology and other Essays*, London, 1893, 'Toleration,' p. 242 ff.

³ *KRE* III. 86²⁸.

necessity of toleration, with a long title defying the Assembly and Parliament. This he printed and published without the censor's imprimatur.¹ The same year Rhode Island codified the laws passed hitherto without legal authority. On 10th May 1647, summing up what had been already stated and acted upon for nine years, the four towns enacted under their charter that 'all men may walk as their consciences persuade them, every one in the name of his God.'²

Two years later Lord Baltimore, Roman Catholic proprietor of the colony of Maryland, sanctioned a Toleration Act which drew the line only at two points: reproachful words against the Virgin Mary were punishable with fine, whipping, and banishment; denial of the Godhead of any of the three persons of the Trinity entailed confiscation of goods and death. This law, however, was repealed five years later after a revolution, when the Puritans from Virginia obtained the upper hand; they banned 'popery, prelacy, and licentiousness of opinion.'³ The policy and practice of Rhode Island remained unchanged. Jews were welcomed as settlers, and enjoyed the right of public worship as early as 1658. Five years later a charter was obtained from Charles, with a provision that 'no person within said colony at any time hereafter shall be in any wise molested, punished, disquieted or called in question for any differences of opinion in matters of religion.'⁴ Thus the theories adopted and expounded by Englishmen fifty years earlier had won their way to permanent embodiment under the auspices of the same religious communion. Freedom was won, and was not used selfishly to enslave others, but was held for all as a trust from God.

5. The antithesis in practice.—Issues were now fairly joined, and the results exhibited. Persecution was either a duty to God or a sin against God. The results in a few countries may be glanced at.

The Provincial Congress of Massachusetts on 9th Dec. 1774 resolved in words 'that the establishment of civil and religious liberty to each denomination is the sincere wish of this congress';⁵ but no deeds followed. In August 1789 a committee of the Baptist churches in Virginia memorialized Washington, and next month the first amendment to the draft constitution of the United States declared that Congress should 'make no law respecting any establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.'⁶ In 1832 even Massachusetts, the earliest and the latest home of intolerance and persecution, gave up the relics of the union of one favoured Church with the State.

Progress was slower in England. Money penalties were exacted regularly in the city of London till a legal decision of 1767. Tithes are even yet payable throughout Great Britain to the Established Churches. Freedom of the press came almost by an oversight, not because of Milton's *Areopagitica*. Persecution under legal forms continued till after the Napoleonic wars, when, at the cost of acquiescing in large money grants to the Church of England, Dissenters obtained the repeal of the Conventicle Act; the Test and Corporation Acts also disappeared in 1823. Only within living memory have the grammar-schools and universities in England been opened again to all, or offices

been made technically available. Still there is a social boycott in many respects; in some towns no one need hope for the mayoralty, whatever eminent services he may have rendered, unless he will be at least an Occasional Conformist.

Latin America was long governed by men imbued with Roman Catholic ideals. After the political revolts last century the opposition was headed by men largely indifferent to religion, if not actively hostile. A typical case is Mexico; the issues were clearly stated, and literally fought out between 1857 and 1867. The *Plan de Tacubaya* upheld the special rights of the Roman Catholic Church, Roman Catholicism as the sole religion, and censorship of the press. The liberals fought for freedom of religion, freedom of the press, nationalization of Church property, and abolition of special tribunals for ecclesiastics. They won, but the temper of the clericals remains. In 1887 the *Defensa Catolica* declared that 'true charity consists in opposing one's neighbour, in injuring him in his material interests, in insulting him and in taking his life, always supposing that it is done for love of God.'¹ This is not empty talk. At Atzala in 1876 a Protestant church was set on fire during service, and, as the worshippers came out, they were hewn down by a fanatical mob. Even in 1898, at Irapuato, a Protestant girl was dragged to the public square and threatened with burning.

Some other States have not yet reached the Mexican position even in theory. The fourth article of the Peruvian Constitution declares that 'the nation professes the apostolic Roman Catholic religion; the State protects it, and does not permit the public worship of any other.'² The penalty is no longer death, but there are severe disabilities. In practice every one doing Protestant work must be prepared to risk his life. In 1909 a colporteur was mobbed at Dorces do Turvo in Brazil, the priest calling on the people to burn him. In Paraguay a priest stirred up the people to kill the heretic if he did not leave, and he was restrained only on an appeal to the government. Nor are such incidents peculiar to the other side of the world. Tales like these are constantly being reported as to Roman Catholic priests on the Continent. In the diocese of Trier a worker finds a priest walking beside him all day and every day, warning the people; in Styria, Italy, and Brittany workers are boycotted, food is refused, and any one who heeds them is threatened with eviction; mobs are raised against them in Carniola and Posen; they are arrested illegally in Lemberg, Spain, and Portugal. So strong is Roman Catholic influence in these countries that protection can seldom be obtained, redress hardly ever. Such conduct is the logical issue of the Roman Catholic theory. Under necessity a Roman Catholic may indeed abstain from molesting a heretic; only, as one of themselves states it, 'if expedient, he would imprison you, fine you, possibly he might even hang you. But be assured of one thing, he would never tolerate you for the sake of the "glorious principles" of civil and religious liberty.'³

Against such dangers the counter-measures of Portugal in 1910 have already been noted. Very similar measures had been constitutionally taken by France between 1901 and 1905. Religious orders were forbidden to teach in school; then they were dissolved; Napoleon's concordat with the Vatican was formally abrogated; liberty of conscience and

¹ Robert Walsh, *An Appeal from the Judgments of Great Britain respecting the U.S.*, Philadelphia, 1819, pp. 429-435.

² *Records of the Colony, etc.*, 10 vols., Providence, 1856-65.

³ Gibbons, p. 275.

⁴ *The Charters of . . . Maryland . . . Rhode Island, etc.*, 1766, Original, Patent Roll, 15 Charles II. pt. 16, no. 3, at the Public Record Office.

⁵ T. F. Curtis, *The Progress of Baptist Principles*, Boston, 1855, p. 54 f.

⁶ *Ib.* p. 56.

¹ H. W. Brown, *Latin America*, New York, 1901, p. 247. The whole book is relevant.

² *Ib.* pp. 148, 173; see also Geraldine Guin: *ess*, Peru, London, 1903, p. 77.

³ H. W. Brown, p. 247. The incidents in this paragraph are in the reports of the British and Foreign Bible Society for 1898 and 1909.

the free practice of public worship were guaranteed to all.

But, when a State finds itself confronted by a great international organization like the Roman Catholic Church, powerful enough to defeat Bismarck in fourteen years and make him come to Canossa despite his defiance, then even ordinary legislation seems sometimes insufficient. It is no small tribute to the insight of the Rhode Islanders that in 1638 they drew the line between freedom of worship, assured to all, and the franchise, granted only to those who upheld that principle as fundamental. They were careful to have the distinction made again in their charter of 1663, which guarantees absolute religious liberty to all settlers, whether freemen or not. And substantially the same point is made in the Constitution of 1789; freedom of worship is promised to all, but no one can become a citizen of the United States without acceding to that constitution which promises it. Americans discern that an unlimited toleration risks suicide; those who would persecute, had they the power, are not admitted to power. Roman Catholics therefore try to minimize their principles in the United States. Gibbons has a chapter glorifying civil and religious liberty, which opens thus:

'A man enjoys religious liberty when he possesses the free right of worshipping God according to the dictates of a right conscience, and of practising a form of religion most in accordance with his duties to God. . . . The Catholic Church has always been the zealous promoter of religious and civil liberty.'¹

But two years later the pope declared:

'That kind of civilization which conflicts with the doctrine and laws of Holy Church is nothing but a worthless imitation and a meaningless name.'²

He blamed severely every State which grants 'equal rights to every creed, so that public order may not be disturbed by any particular form of religious belief.' In his encyclical on catholicity in the United States it gave him pleasure to acknowledge that this was exactly the state of affairs there. In another on allegiance to the French Republic in 1892 he declared that the separation of State and Church was equivalent to the separation of human legislation from Christian and divine legislation, an absurdity. Writing on the chief duties of Christians as citizens, he stigmatized it as an act of consummate wickedness to ignore the rights of the Church under pretext of keeping the civil law; in contrast he required 'complete submission and obedience of will to the Church and to the Roman Pontiff as to God Himself.'

American statesmen realize the issues. One vice-president wrote:

'The immigrant . . . must learn that we exact full religious toleration and the complete separation of Church and State.'³

Grover Cleveland declared at his inauguration:

'He who takes the oath to-day to preserve, protect and defend the constitution of the United States, only assumes the solemn obligation which every patriotic citizen . . . should share with him.'⁴

No Roman Catholic has ever been faced with the conscientious problem involved in taking that oath, but every alien who desires naturalization shares the obligation to the extent of swearing to support the constitution. An official message of another president states plainly that against all who come to war upon free speech, a free press, free thought, free schools, the free and unmolested right of religious liberty and worship, the gates must be promptly and tightly closed.⁵

Such utterances of statesmen are based only on

¹ P. xvii.

² *Great Encyclical Letters of Leo XIII.*, New York, 1902, pp. 12, 121, 323 f., 261, 185-193.

³ T. Roosevelt, *American Ideals and other Essays*, New York and London, 1897, p. 63.

⁴ *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, viii. 301.

⁵ *Ib.* x. 14-16.

political grounds of expediency. It is well to recur to the fundamental religious differences.

'The true Church,' says Joseph Pöhl of Breslau, 'can tolerate no strange Churches beside herself. . . . She regards dogmatic intolerance not alone as her incontestable right, but also as a sacred duty.'¹

G. H. Joyce states that 'the right of the Church to invoke the aid of the civil power to execute her sentences is expressly asserted by Boniface viii.' This, he adds, is theologically certain, but practically impossible at present.²

The counter-theory was lucidly expressed more than 300 years ago by Leonard Basher:

'It is sin for kings and governors to destroy their subjects for difference of religion, at the persuasion of their bishops.'³

LITERATURE.—This is indicated in the article.

W. T. WHITLEY.

PERSECUTION (Indian).—In the indigenous literature of India, whether Vedic or classical Sanskrit or of more recent date, there is little that would suggest the existence of a state of religious persecution. References are abundant to the rivalry of creeds and systems, giving evidence of conflicting beliefs and the worship of many gods, whose spheres and authority are not always reconcilable. Previous, however, to the irruption of Muhammadanism, whose fierce and intolerant character is reflected in its records, Indian literature shows little trace of religious differences composing themselves by other than peaceful means. This result is perhaps to be anticipated on the basis of two considerations at least. (1) On the one hand are the nature and contents of the literature itself, wanting as it is for the most part in the historical element. The motive power of the persecution may be religious bigotry or zeal, but its conduct and execution are within the domain of history, and, where the records fail, deeds of persecution may also pass unnoticed. Moreover, the early literature is the creation of Brāhman writers, and has been preserved almost entirely in the hands of the dominant caste, and gives expression to their point of view. They would be little likely perhaps to record deeds of violence and wrong done to others whom they regarded as inferiors, especially where religious prejudice entered into the account. Such acts would either be unheeded, as in the natural order of things, or be as speedily as possible consigned to oblivion, as occasion not for boasting but for silence. That the latter argument does not in all instances hold good the example of Muhammadan historians serves to prove.

(2) Indians also, like all Orientals, are naturally tolerant of variant belief. Differences appeal to them ordinarily as basis for discussion and controversy, not for violent repression; and the victory at which they aim is dialectic, and relies upon argument and persuasion, not upon brute force. It is only under the influence of excitement, as at the great festivals, or of pressure from without that they endeavour to put down religious differences with a strong hand, and to enlist authority and the social order in the service of creed and the rights and privileges of an established faith. In this respect the change in Indian feeling and practice within the last half century has been most marked (see below). Under such circumstances all Orientals are liable to passions of frenzy, which exhibits itself in deeds that have little relation to the ordinary rules of conduct and life.

Although the early and successive invasions of the Aryans brought into the Panjāb and N. India a cult differing from and superior to the crude animism of the aboriginal tribes of Dravidian or other origin, in the course of which the latter were either destroyed or more usually became the bondmen and slaves of their conquerors, there is

¹ CE xiv. 766.

² CE xii. 266.

³ *Tracts on Liberty of Conscience*, p. 41.

no indication of religious animosity or persecution. If the *Atharvaveda*, as is probable, gives expression to the thought and religious habit of these primitive peoples, the contact inspired contempt and abhorrence in the minds of the ruling caste, but the ultimate issue was stringent non-intercourse, not forceful repression of distasteful opinions and practices. A broad and simple animism, whether of a more or less advanced character, is indeed little likely to persecute in the name of religion. Neither are its convictions sufficiently deep and strong, nor are they differentiated in sufficiently marked a degree from the beliefs and usages of the surrounding animistic tribes of lower culture. It is the higher religions, with more definite conceptions and securely held creeds, that deliberately adopt a policy of compulsion towards those whose cherished beliefs differ from their own.

There is therefore little or no real evidence of persecution in India even on a limited and local scale prior to the advent of Islām. In the Hindu law-books and elsewhere references are to be found to atheists and heretics, but they hardly convey the impression of an active intolerance, nor do they enjoin repression or interference in any way with heterodox custom or belief. The high-born Snātaka, *e.g.*, is not to honour heretics, even by a greeting.¹ On the other hand, he is not to dispute with them.² Elsewhere atheism is declared to be a minor offence, involving loss of caste.³ The Brāhmana who is an atheist is unworthy to partake of the oblations to the gods and ancestral spirits;⁴ and a kingdom where these prevail or hold rule is speedily ruined;⁵ in such a land the Snātaka should not dwell.⁶ Perhaps the nearest approach to a suggestion of persecution is where the king is enjoined to banish heretics together with gamblers and others from his realm.⁷ There is little indication of ill-feeling, much of the claim to or consciousness of superiority, so familiar in later times. The contact also of ancient Hinduism with the daughter or separatist forms of faith, Buddhism, Jainism, and others, cannot be shown to have been generally, or except accidentally and under unwonted conditions, associated with violence. Orthodox Hinduism has usually been a kindly parent to the numerous rival or reformed sects which have originated from within its broad and tolerant creed during the course of its long history; and most of these after a brief and troubled career have returned into the communion of the faith or church from which they sprang. The mutual relations have been characterized by dispute and controversy, but rarely by active measures of repression, unless these have been provoked by aggressive conduct on the part of the heterodox teachers or communities themselves. Its missionary work also in the days when Hinduism was an expanding force was accomplished, as far as we know, by peaceable means, not by compulsion.

This is essentially true of the relations and intercourse between Hinduism and its greatest rival in India, Buddhism. The causes and history of the disappearance of the latter from Indian soil are obscure. There is no real evidence, however, that it was hastened by persecution from the side of Hinduism. Natural and perhaps inevitable decay, on the one hand, a revival and rekindling of the national faith, on the other, contributed to a result which was consummated by the destructive and persecuting zeal of the Muhammadan invader. The witness of the Chinese pilgrims, especially of Hsien Tsiang in the earlier part of the 7th cent., is the most instructive in this respect. Their testimony to the wide-spread influence and very numerous

adherents of both faiths in India is unequivocal; but the decline in the numbers and prestige of the Buddhist schools in the experience of the later traveller in comparison with the increasing ascendancy of Hinduism is marked. The rivalry of the two faiths, however, was maintained by keen discussion and argument, and the victories won were victories of persuasion, not of authority and force. It is possible, perhaps probable, that sporadic instances occurred of the use of persecuting methods to secure the downfall of a despised or dangerous heresy or heretical teacher. These were of local and transient importance, and do not invalidate the general rule and practice; and, apart from vague tradition, there are no instances on record where the evidence is sufficient to command assent. In the 9th cent. the great constructive teacher and dialectician Śaṅkarācārya, in the course of his extended travels in the north of India, is said on occasion to have used his influence and success in controversy for the forcible silencing of his adversaries; and of an earlier thinker and philosopher, Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, there is a tradition preserved that he promoted a persecution of the Buddhists. It is doubtful whether in either case the tradition has any firmer basis than the natural desire of later times to glorify the zeal and ascendancy of a famous teacher. A more normal and typical example of the relations between the sects is certainly afforded by Hsien Tsiang's account of the great assembly convened at Allahābād by the emperor Harshavardhana (A.D. 643), when friendly discussions took place between the leaders of the different sects and statues were erected on successive days of the festival in honour of the supreme divinities of the several faiths represented.

With the coming of Muhammadanism all was changed; and the various religious faiths, which hitherto had existed amicably side by side, bent and suffered together before the torrent of fanaticism and lust of conquest that swept over the land. Islām made no distinction between the differing forms of belief and creed that it encountered on its onward march. The adherents of all alike were infidels and idolaters, whose conversion by forcible means, if others failed, was a religious obligation; and death was the penalty of refusing to accept the creed of the conqueror. When the early waves of invasion had spent themselves, and fanatic zeal and hatred ceased to be stimulated by the experience of actual warfare against the infidel, there was a gradual relaxation of the tension. Except when a revival of persecution took place under the influence or at the instigation of a stern and fanatic ruler like Aurangzib, the mutual antipathy of conqueror and conquered learned to accommodate itself to the necessities of a common life. And only at the religious festivals or when the people were carried away by extraordinary excitement was there any manifestation of angry feeling or recrudescence of persecuting zeal. It remained true, however, that, in spite of a not inconsiderable degree of reciprocal borrowing of tenet and observance, the fanatic spirit was and is always present, though latent, and an apparently trivial circumstance may at any time precipitate an outbreak. In the early centuries of conflict and persecution Buddhism seems to have suffered most and very many of its adherents were put to death. Thus the final blow to a faith already decadent, and in process apparently of passing away, was administered by Muhammadan persecuting zeal. The cessation of the more active forms of repression came too late to save the Buddhist faith for India. It lives in Bengal and elsewhere only in the permanent mark which it has left on Hindu usage and belief, and in the borrowed figures and names of Hindu gods.

¹ Manu, iv. 30.² *Ib.* 159.³ *Ib.* xl. 67.⁴ *Ib.* iii. 150.⁵ *Ib.* viii. 22.⁶ *Ib.* iv. 61.⁷ *Ib.* ix. 225.

Towards Hinduism the attitude of the conquerors ultimately became changed. To crush and eradicate the Hindu faith proved impossible. Violent persecutions and massacres were ineffective to bring about an alteration either in the spirit or in the passive endurance of an entire people. Very many, however, suffered death for their religion in many parts of India; and the desolation caused, even if the numbers of the slain have been exaggerated in the somewhat boastful records of the Musalmāns themselves, extended over wide areas, and was with difficulty repaired in the course of centuries. More peaceable relations were brought about when the governing race found its need of the assistance of Hindu ministers and officers of State to control the country and to gather in the revenue. Muhammadan usage and law proved to be inapplicable, and could neither be enforced nor made fruitful of good results in the presence of immemorial prescriptive right and custom tenaciously held. Native administrators, judges, and collectors provided the necessary intermediaries; and the asperity of religious prejudice and dislike on either side was softened by mutual intercourse and the felt need of mutual aid. Thus the two creeds learned to live together for the most part in peace, the dominant faith out of self-interest abandoning its weapon of violence and persecution, and the leaders of the subject peoples lending their aid in the establishment of order and the maintenance of civil right. Fanatical manifestations of the dormant spirit with their accompaniment of strife and murder were never entirely checked. On both sides, however, men of influence were found sufficiently wise and strong to see the evil and discourage the use of force against religious belief. The occasional rioting and outrage which harassed and hindered the growth of tolerance and mutual understanding were due to special religious excitement or the sinister promptings of self-interested and bigoted men. With the extension of inter-communication and with a wider sympathy and knowledge such dissensions will become more rare, and will finally altogether cease. It is probable that the influence of wise and far-seeing leaders of both parties is already sufficiently strong to frustrate other than merely local expression of the persecuting spirit and the lust to destroy.

It is remarkable that the Muhammadan aggression, which completed the ruin of the Buddhist faith upon Indian soil and its expulsion from India, although it took full effect upon the kindred community of the Jains, left the latter with greatly impaired vigour and diminished numbers, but in possession of a religious life and organization which have endured to the present day. Mrs. Sinclair Stevenson, in her recent book,¹ makes the interesting suggestion that the Jain survival and the effective if passive resistance which the community offered to the creed and power of the conqueror were due in part at least to the provision made by them for the participation of the laity in the recognized order and life of the church. Official Buddhism took cognizance only of the monastic rule and estate, and found no place for those who did not feel themselves called upon to assume the monastic vow, or to undertake the duties and share the privileges and hopes of the monk. Jainism recognized and made legal the position of the layman in the ecclesiastical scheme equally with the monk, and thus entered into the national life and secured such a hold upon the affections of the people that it survived the onslaught when less firmly founded Buddhism was overthrown.

Perhaps the most striking example in India of the effect of a cruel persecution in consolidating and defining the religious life of a community is

that of the Sikhs in the Panjāb. Originating in the 15th cent. in a protest against Hindu laxity in morals and idolatry in worship, they found themselves ultimately brought into conflict with the dominant power of the Mughal emperors, and were forced in self-defence to take up arms to maintain their existence and religious liberty. With definite and fixed convictions which they had learned partly from Islām itself and partly from a reformed and purified Hinduism, they were confronted with the alternative of acceptance of the formula and creed of the ruling faith or destruction. They refused to submit to either, but endeavoured rather to maintain their freedom and rights with the sword. The persecution which ensued had the effect of welding a community and organization in its origin purely religious into a militant order and a nation of soldiers, tenacious of military right and norm no less than of creed and faith, who proved their prowess later against the British themselves and in warfare in many lands.

Thus Islām is responsible for the introduction into India of the conception of persecution for the faith, and of its application in the most terrible form of fire and slaughter. When these methods proved ineffective to break the spirit of Hinduism or destroy a national religion, a practical truce was made, due in part to the discovered need for mutual help and support, and the two faiths learned to live more or less amicably together and to tolerate differences of belief and observance. The history of the other great monotheistic religion which found its way to India was altogether different. Christianity in India has never been in a position to persecute, even had the will been present. A weak and scattered minority of the population, insignificant in numbers, the Christians were of necessity apologetic in attitude, and their complete civil and political aloofness left them no choice but to profess and practise toleration of all alien faiths. That this was consonant with their wishes and ideals, and in harmony with their truest interests, is, of course, correct. Nevertheless the aggressive spirit and action of the new religion, and its denunciation of popular religious customs and festivals when these were contrary to true morals and purity of worship, provoked a counter persecution, which in many instances was carried out with the utmost concentration of bitterness and dislike. Moreover, the Indian Christian from the lower castes, whence the great majority of the converts were derived, learned to assert his rights, and refused to render that abject deference to the Brāhman priest or high-caste landowner which for centuries these men had been accustomed to exact. His principles also, the conception of duty with which he had been imbued, and the obligations of his faith, if realized and consistently discharged, forbade him to rest satisfied with freedom to worship God in his own way, but urged him to press upon others with all the force and insistence at his command the acceptance of his own creed and submission to all the rules which his code of faith and morality affirmed. Thus in two respects especially the Indian convert to Christianity found himself in conflict with the usages and beliefs of the people among whom he lived: he refused to recognize the gods whom they revered, but claimed, on the other hand, to have learned the better way of worship of the one true God; and in regard to social relations it was impracticable for him to take part in a family and village life which in nearly all its ramifications was so intimately associated with idolatrous conceptions and practices, or to share the burdens, financial or other, which custom required of the community. His new status, moreover, entailed various civil and legal disabilities, especially in

¹ *The Heart of Jainism*, Oxford, 1915.

regard to marriage and to funeral ceremonies; and these were generally found to press upon him most heavily in the Native States, where the legal code had not yet been advanced to the degree of religious tolerance and strict impartiality enforced in the parts of the empire directly administered by the Crown. These disabilities were the result of loss of caste. The Christian convert was *ipso facto* out-casted, and thereby became unable to fulfil the duties and obligations which were or seemed to be essential to the maintenance of the fabric of Hindu society. In all these instances the initiative in persecution and in a social boycott which entailed very serious consequences and was frequently accompanied by violence was taken by the Hindu leaders themselves. The Muhammadans as a rule stood aloof, and regarded the movement towards Christianity with indifference; they at least took no overt part in opposition or persecution, unless a co-religionist were involved, when the vitality and strength of the old fanatic spirit quickly reasserted themselves. Thus the rôle of the religious persecutor seemed, curiously enough, to have been transferred from the hands of the one community to the other. The Hindu actively resented his neighbour's change of faith, and exerted all the power which custom or a defective law or administration put into his hands to make the convert feel the weight of his resentment. The Musalmân was more in sympathy with the Christian standpoint and belief, and saw no need for forcible intervention or repression, unless the prestige of his own creed or the loyalty of a member of his own faith seemed to be endangered.

Most of the records of this persecuting movement, which is practically co-extensive with the entire Indian peninsula, are contained in the published literature and reports of the Christian missionary societies. The experience of every missionary includes instances of attempts to deprive native Christians of village rights, of unjust oppression and eviction by high-caste Hindu landlords, of fictitious charges in the law-courts sustained on ingeniously concocted evidence and sworn to by false oaths, and of violence and cruelty employed towards young converts to induce them to recant. Where these attempts are successful, restoration to caste and Hindu society is gained only by way of degrading ceremonies.¹ In the principal towns the force of public opinion is already sufficiently strong and enlightened to discountenance such methods. In the country districts, however, remote from European influence, where ancient prejudice and custom reign supreme, and where Christianity has endeavoured to obtain a footing, incidents of this character are of common occurrence. In part at least the persecuting action of the dominant religion is prompted by the instinct of self-preservation. The Christian faith is aggressive; and a true instinct warns the loyal adherent of Hinduism that between his own system and creed and the new religion which lays claim to universal acceptance no compromise is possible. A similar claim had been made, it is true, in the past by Islâm, and supported with even greater insistence and vehemence. But Islâm was too powerful to be resisted, and the persecuted Hindu suffered for the most part in silence and resignation. Christianity, weak in numbers and social prestige, lay open to reprisals, and it seemed that religious animosity might with impunity gratify itself in the oppression of its adherents. Moreover, the rapidly growing influence and popularity of

the latter faith did appear to threaten Hinduism with disaster. But the persecuting spirit is not natural to the Hindu, nor in accord with the precepts of his faith. In all probability, however, it will be only by degrees, and coincidently with the spread of enlightenment and the growth of a better understanding and public spirit, that a barrier will be raised against open manifestations of fear and dislike. The ancient fanatical and persecuting tendencies of Muhammadanism may then wake again in the presence of a powerful and progressive rival, and a new chapter in the strangely one-sided history of Indian persecution be written. For the present the Indian Christian is the only sufferer from the spirit which he has himself by his attitude and convictions of necessity evoked in the ancient Indian faiths.

LITERATURE.—The Muhammadan historians themselves furnish the evidence for the relations of victorious Islâm to the subjected Indian peoples. For the rest the relevant literature is to be found almost exclusively in the reports, etc., of the missionary societies. See also Julius Richter, *A Hist. of Missions in India*, Eng. tr., Edinburgh and London, 1903.

A. S. GEDEN.

PERSECUTION (Muhammadan). — The theory of the Muslim State draws a clear distinction between the true believers who accept Islâm and the protected communities (*ahl al-dhimma*, *dhimmî*) who follow other faiths. This twofold division is employed in the following article.

x. **Muhammadans.**—The early Arab conquerors appear to have been satisfied with a formal acceptance of Islâm and to have made no inquisition into private opinions; but, as their empire became more firmly established and sectarian divisions made their appearance, the bitterness of controversy evoked a fanatical spirit, and open hostilities broke out between the adherents of differing theological opinions; and, as these often denied the validity of established authority, the history of Muhammadan sectarianism became largely political in character, and in some cases, especially in those of heresies arising within the boundaries of the old Persian empire, represented a revolt against Arab domination. The vicissitudes of such movements thus belong rather to political history, and the conflict of the ruling power with the Khawârij (*q.v.*), the various 'Alid factions, etc., can hardly be described as persecution. The effort to suppress religious opinion as such, apart from political opinion, would seem to have begun with the persecution of the Mu'tazilah. Hishâm (724-743) put to death Ghaylân al-Dimashqî for maintaining the doctrine of the freedom of the will; first his hands and feet were cut off, and, when he continued to inveigh against his persecutors, his tongue was cut out (Tabarî, *Annals*, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leyden, 1879-1901, ii. 1733; Ahmad b. Yahyâ b. al-Murtadâ, *Al-Mu'tazilah*, Leipzig, 1902, pp. 15-17). The same *khalifah* ordered the execution of Ja'd b. Dirham for teaching that the Qur'ân was created (Ibn al-Athîr, *Kâmil*, ed. C. J. Tornberg, Leyden, 1851-76, v. 196 f.). Hârûn (786-809) sought to check freedom of theological speculation by throwing into prison the Mutakallims, or scholastic theologians (Ahmad b. Yahyâ, p. 32). But the first systematic inquisition into heresy was the *mi'hnah* ('test') instituted by Ma'mûn in 833 for the conviction of those who denied the doctrine of the creation of the Qur'ân. Ahmad b. Hanbal and other learned theologians were subjected to cruel sufferings to induce them to give assent to the doctrines accepted by the *khalifah*. Ma'mûn defended his position in a letter to the governor of Baghdâd (Tabarî, iii. 1117), by maintaining that God expects a ruler whom He has entrusted with the care of His servants to instruct his subjects in the way of salvation, define for them the limits of their faith,

¹ A Sûdra community in the Deccan has, within the last few months (1916), led the way in a formal declaration that no one of their members shall be penalized or in any way made to suffer for becoming a Christian, or be debarred from re-entrance into caste and the full exercise of caste rights should he return to the Hindu faith.

remove their doubts and explain their difficulties, and bring back to the truth those who have gone astray. This persecution of those who denied the creation of the Qur'an was continued by his successors until 848, when Mutawakkil forbade the holding of this doctrine on pain of death, and the Mu'tazilah in their turn became the victims of the persecution of the State; in 1029 Qādir-billāh summoned all the 'ulamā to his palace and made them sign a confession of faith, especially condemning Mu'tazilite doctrines. A rigorous persecution was also carried on against the Zindīqs (or crypto-Manicheans), who appear to have been numerous in cultivated circles under the early 'Abbāsids (Al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, p. 338, gives a list of them). Mahdī crucified a number of them in the city of Aleppo in 780 (Tabari, iii. 499), and during the last two years of his reign instituted an inquisition in Baghdad and other towns, under the direction of 'Umar al-Kalwādhi, who hunted down many victims (*ib.* 519-522, 538); his successor, Hādī, continued the persecution during his brief reign of thirteen months (*ib.* 548 f.).

As the political power of the 'Abbāsids declined, the fanaticism of the 'ulamā appears to have increased. Abū Ḥanīfah († 767) had already declared that death was the penalty for the Muslim who apostatized from the faith as taught by Muḥammad, and later theologians spread the net wider, demanding the blood of any Muslim who denied the prophetic mission of Muḥammad or even doubted a single letter of the Qur'an, or maintained that God did not speak with Moses ('Iyād, *al-Shifā*, Cairo, 1272, ii. 259 f., 337). Under Mutawakkil (847-861) the orthodox 'ulamā had the support of the government in the persecution of every form of heresy, as well as the sympathy of the fanatical mob; in his reign a certain Ibn 'Asim, accused of reviling the companions of the Prophet, was scourged with 500 stripes and left in the sun until he died, his body being afterwards thrown into the Tigris (Tabari, iii. 1424 ff.); he also put to death a man named Maḥmūd b. al-Faraj, who claimed to be a prophet and maintained that the angel Gabriel had revealed to him a Qur'an (*ib.* 1349). But, apart from such individual cases of heresy, the zeal of Mutawakkil was directed against whole sects, such as the Shī'ahs, whom he persecuted throughout his reign; he destroyed the graves of 'Alī and Ḥusain, and forbade pilgrimage to their site.

This persecution is typical of the treatment that Shī'ahs have from time to time had to suffer at the hands of a Sunnī government (for a summary of such persecutions see Hammer, *Gesch. des osmanischen Reiches*, i. 706-708). In 1029 Qādir-billāh drove the Shī'ahs out of the mosques and installed Sunnī preachers in their place, and put Shī'ahs to death for heresy on several occasions in his reign. Two centuries later Musta'sim instituted another persecution against them. The general recognition by Shī'ah theologians of *taqiyyah* (lit. 'fear', 'foresight'), i.e. concealment of a man's real beliefs through fear of the consequences of an open profession of faith, and their approval of such a practice, are evidence of the dread which the Shī'ahs had of being persecuted by the Sunnis (I. Goldziher, 'Das Prinzip der Takijja im Islam,' *ZDMG* lx. [1906] 219-222). Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli, a Shī'ah controversialist († 1326), maintains that in most periods the Shī'ahs have hidden themselves 'in the corner of *taqiyyah*' in terror of the rulers of their time (Goldziher, *Beiträge zur Literaturgesch. der S'ā*, Vienna, 1874, p. 469). But the most appalling persecution of the Shī'ahs was that organized by Sultān Salīm I., who made a search for them throughout the Turkish dominions, and had 40,000 either

massacred or imprisoned for life (Hammer, i. 709; de la Jonquière, *Hist. de l'empire ottoman*, i. 139).

After their triumph over the Mu'tazilah the followers of al-Ash'ari (*q.v.*) had themselves to suffer persecution. In 1046 the Seljūq sultān Tughril Beg was persuaded by his *vazīr*, Abū Naṣr Maṣnūr al-Kundurī, to forbid the Ash'arites to preach in the mosques or to teach their distinctive doctrines; many learned men of this sect fled from the sultān's dominions, but some were captured and imprisoned (Schreiner, *ZDMG* lii. 488).

The orthodox reaction of the 11th cent. fostered a spirit that was as dangerous to philosophers as to heterodox theologians. Mu'tadid (in 892) had forbidden the sale of all philosophical books, and Qādir-billāh (in 1018) issued an edict against all free-thinkers and heretics (A. von Kremer, *Culturgesch. des Orients*, Vienna, 1875-77, ii. 465 f.). Under the Almohads in Spain a storm of persecution burst upon the philosophers, particularly in the reign of Ya'qūb al-Manṣūr (1184-99), who banished Ibn Rushd from Cordova.

Several of the Sūfī mystics under Muhammadan rule suffered martyrdom under the charge of heterodoxy. Hallāj was cruelly put to death in 922, after having been scourged with a thousand stripes and having his hands and feet cut off (E. G. Browne, *A Literary Hist. of Persia*, London, 1902-06, i. 430). Abū'l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī, the author of an important treatise on Sūfism, was imprisoned during the persecution under Tughril Beg (1046). Shihāb al-Dīn Yahyā al-Suhrawardī, reputed to be the most learned man of his time, was imprisoned and then strangled by order of Malik al-Zāhir, son of Saladin, in 1191, though this prince had at first extended to him his patronage; but the orthodox clergy in Aleppo succeeded in convicting him of heresy (A. von Kremer, *Gesch. der herrschenden Ideen des Islams*, Leipzig, 1868, p. 89 ff.). The founder of one of the Sūfī sects, the Ḥurūfīs, Faḫr-ullāh Tabrizī, was put to death by Mirān Shāh, son of Timūr, in 1393; one of his disciples, the Turkish poet, Nasīmī, was condemned to be flayed alive in 820 (1417-18), having been found guilty of blasphemy by the 'ulamā of Aleppo, and a few years later some Ḥurūfīs were burnt alive in Adrianople (E. J. W. Gibb, *Hist. of Ottoman Poetry*, London, 1900-09, i. 346, 381-383, 387).

It is not possible here to give an account of the numerous individuals put to death for heresy—e.g., Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Shalmaghānī, who taught the transmigration of the soul and was considered by his followers to be an incarnation of the divine, and other false prophets (Schreiner, p. 472 f.)—nor of the many claimants to be the promised Mahdī (*q.v.*) at various periods of Muhammadan history (for instances of such persons put to death in Turkey see Hammer, i. 798, ii. 694, 639, iii. 172; J. Darmesteter, *Le Mahdi*, Paris, 1885).

2. Protected communities.—(a) *Christians*.—The Qur'an, and the prescriptions of Muslim jurists based upon it and the practice of the Prophet, granted to the followers of other faiths a certain measure of freedom of religious life and practice; but Muhammadan history is full of examples of persecution, especially of the various Christian sects. One of the earliest instances¹ of such persecution is that of the Banū Taghlib. The members of this Arab tribe who remained Christian had been treated with special consideration and allowed to pay tribute in such a form as to make them appear as equals of the converted Arabs and not as a subject people. But it seems to have irked the Muslims that any members of one

¹ The expulsion of the Christians of Najrān by 'Umar I. appears to have been prompted by purely political considerations (L. Cestani, *Annali dell'Islām*, Milan, 1895-14, iv. 253 ff.; H. Lammens, *Le Califat de Yazīd I^{er}*, Beirut, 1913, p. 251 ff.).

of the great Arab tribes should continue to stand aloof from what had become the national faith of the Arab people, and tradition attributes to 'All the expression of a savage wish to put all the males of the tribe to death and enslave the rest of the population (Cætani, iv. 228). Even the tolerant 'Umar is said to have ordered Ziyād b. Hudayr to deal roughly with them (Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-Kharāj*, p. 69), and Walid put Shamālāh, the chief of the tribe, to death because he refused to accept Islām (JA IX. iv. [1894] 438 f.).

With this exception the Christians enjoyed an ample toleration under the early Umayyads, but severe measures began to be taken against them by 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Aziz, induced either by zeal for his own faith or out of umbrage for the failure of the assault on Constantinople in 717. He decreed that no Christians should be appointed as magistrates or allowed to ride on saddles; that, if a Muhammadan killed a Christian, the penalty should be not death, but a fine; that Christians should not be allowed to bear witness against Muslims in the courts;¹ nor were they to uplift their voices in prayer; at the same time he abolished the tax levied on houses, land-rents, etc., for the benefit of churches and monasteries, ordered all crosses in public places to be pulled down or effaced, and forbade the Christians to wear silk or fine linen (Michael the Elder, *Chronique*, ii. 489; Abū Yūsuf, p. 73; Theophanes, in PG cviii. 808).

But hatred of the Christians appears first to have taken a popular form under the theocratic rule of the 'Abbāsids, who looked upon the State as a religious community and themselves as invested with spiritual as well as temporal power. To the later period of this dynasty belongs the compilation of the so-called Pact of 'Umar, which was often appealed to when restrictive measures were imposed upon the *dhimmīs*; in accordance with this document, no new churches were to be built, and no proselytism attempted; outward respect was to be shown to the Muslims, and their dress, etc., was not to be imitated; the Christians were not to ride on saddles, bear arms, display their crosses on the churches or in the streets, or celebrate religious worship in a loud voice; a distinctive dress, particularly a girdle round the waist, was to be worn, and so on (Gottheil, in *OT and Semitic Studies in Memory of William Rainey Harper*, ii. 382-384, where references are given to the various versions of this document). These regulations certainly did not exist in the time of the ruler whose name they bear, nor were they put into force rigidly or consistently; they represent the more intolerant practice of a later age, and some outburst of fanaticism was generally needed for any demand to be made for their application. In a period of persecution even more vexatious measures were sometimes enforced, as in the reign of Mutawakkil (in 850 and 854), who ordered the *dhimmīs* to affix wooden images of devils to their houses, to distinguish them from the houses of the Muslims; their graves were to be levelled with the ground; their children were not to be taught in Muslim schools, nor by any Muslim teacher; as well as the girdle, they were to wear yellow scarves, and have two patches of cloth, each of a different colour, sewn on the back and front of their dress; they were to ride only on mules and asses, with wooden stirrups, etc. (Tabari, iii. 1389 f., 1419).

In such periods of persecution there was generally some destruction of churches, especially of such as had been erected since the Muslim con-

quest. Walid (705-715) appears to have been one of the first *khalīfahs* to order churches to be pulled down (Michael the Elder, ii. 481); but under the 'Abbāsids such instances became more common, beginning with Hārūn (Tabari, iii. 712) and culminating in the violent persecution set on foot by Mutawakkil (847-861). Numerous instances are found scattered throughout the pages of Christian and Muslim historians; but for no country do we find so long a series as for Egypt, beginning with the 2nd cent. of the Hijrah down to the troubled days of Mamluk rule (*Hist. of the Patriarchs of the Coptic Church of Alexandria*, ed. B. Evetts, Paris, 1904 f.; Magrizi, *Khitat*, Bulāq, 1853, ii. 492-500).

Forceful conversion to Islām was frequently the accompaniment of such persecution. One of the earliest instances was that of the Christian Arabs of the tribe of the Banū Tanūkh in the reign of Mahdī (775-785); seeing a number of them who lived near Aleppo and learning that they were Christians, he angrily ordered them to accept Islām; under compulsion they complied, to the number of 5000, but one of them suffered martyrdom rather than apostatize (Gregorius Abulpharagius, *Chronicon Syriacum*, ed. P. J. Bruns and G. G. Kirsch, Leipzig, 1789, p. 134 f.). A long series of such compulsory conversions might be given from the history of various parts of the Muhammadan world; as the power of Muhammadan governments declined, so such compulsion tended to assume a character of greater ferocity; e.g., during the persecution of the Christians of Crete in 1670, 15,000 Christian boys are said to have been circumcised in a single day, and most of them died in consequence (A. D. Kyriakos, *Gesch. der orientalischen Kirchen, 1455-1855*, Leipzig, 1902, p. 12).

The death penalty for apostasy (see APOSTASY [Muhammadan]) was often imposed in a cruel manner, in the case of Christians who had promised to become Muhammadans in a moment of weakness or despondency, or even in jest, or under the influence of drink, or through some misunderstanding (Dozy, *Hist. des Musulmans d'Espagne*, ii. 51; de la Jonquière, i. 34; M. Febvre, *La Turchia*, Venice, 1684, p. 39 f.). The martyr, Elias, was held to have become a Muslim merely because he had thrown away his pipe when dancing to amuse his master's guests, and was put to death because he refused to abandon the Christian faith (F. Combefis, *Christi martyres lecta trias*, Paris, 1666, pp. 156-192).

The persecution of the Christians was connected with economic conditions—of the prosperity and wealth of individual Christians (E. Renaudot, *Hist. Patriarchatus Antiocheni et Andrinorum Jacobitarum*, Paris, 1722, p. 607; Nāsir-i-Khusran, *Safar-nāma*, I. C. Schefer, Paris, 1881, p. 155 f.; M. Febvre, ii. 498; Shedd, *Islam and the Orient*, pp. 117 ff., 247 f.), or resentment at the high offices of state were given to Muslims (Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*). From the earliest days of the Arab conquest new rulers had found it impossible to dispense with the complicated machinery of government, and, in spite of frequent protestations, have been similarly employed. But, in deference to popular feeling, of theologians, such non-Muslims were removed from the administration. Mansūr (754-775) issued decrees to the effect that the Mamluk *sultāns* of administrative changes by much suffering for the

¹ Dionysius of Tell Mahrē (*Chronique syriaque*, ed. J. B. Chabot, Paris, 1896, p. 18) attributes this regulation to the son of 'Umar, Yazid II. (720-724), who decreed that the testimony of a Syrian should not be accepted against that of an Arab.

In some cases (but these the less frequent) the persecution originated in a decree of the Muhammadan government; in others it was stirred up by the fanaticism of the mob (Shedd, pp. 244-246) or the bigotry of the 'ulamā. Some of the later Muslim theologians went so far as to ascribe to the Prophet forged traditions, expressly contradicted by his own conduct and by his authentic utterances; e.g., an Egyptian jurist of the 14th cent. puts forward as sayings of the Prophet the following intolerant principles:

'No church shall be built in a Muslim land, nor shall those that have fallen in ruins be repaired,' and 'No churches (are to be permitted) in Islam' (JA iv. xviii. [1851] 513).

Similarly, they sometimes attempted in vain to force the hands of the government that protected the tolerated communities; e.g., a theologian of the 18th cent., after enumerating the enormities of the Christians, exclaims:

'The 'ulamā consider this state of things; they weep and groan in silence, while the rulers who have the power of checking these criminal abuses only shut their eyes to them' (ib. xix. [1852] 109).

It is not possible here to give in detail the annals of the sufferings of the Christians under Muhammadan rule, but certain epochs may be referred to as signalized by special severity of persecution. One of these was the period of the conversion of the Mongol princes to Islām; the Muhammadans remembered their sufferings during the Crusades and the overbearing conduct of the Christians after the destruction of 'Abbāsid rule by the Mongols in 1258; e.g., when the city of Damascus surrendered to Hūlāgū in 1260, the Christians destroyed the mosques in the neighbourhood of their churches, made the Muslims bow to the cross carried in procession, and sprinkled with holy water the clothes of the Muslims and the doors of the mosques that were spared (H. H. Howorth, *Hist. of the Mongols*, London, 1876-88, i. 210). Such behaviour stirred up a resentment that led to terrible reprisals when the reins of power again passed into Muslim hands. Consequently we find that, as the Mongol princes adopted Islām, the condition of the Christians under their rule tended to grow worse; e.g., the conversion of Ghāzān, the Ilkhān, in 1295 was marked by a cruel persecution of the Christians (ib. iii. 396-398).

In the Turkish dominions the various revolutionary movements among the subject races, which began early in the 19th cent. with the struggle for Greek independence, were largely stimulated by a feeling of exasperation at the religious repression from which they suffered under the corrupt Turkish administration of the time, and the reprisals and the administrative measures taken by the ruling power were acerbated by religious fanaticism, and often took the form of religious persecution, as in Serbia, Bulgaria, and Armenia (see Parliamentary Papers on the conditions of Christians in Turkey from 1854 onwards).

(b) *Jews*.—Despite the opposition of the Jews to the mission of Muhammad and the severe references to them in the Qur'an (ii. 70-73, v. 64-69, etc.), their condition under Muhammadan rule appears to have been generally more tolerable than that of the Christians. But in periods of persecution they ran the risk of sharing the sufferings of the other *dhimmīs*; the restrictive regulations of the Pact of 'Umar were applicable also to them. Along with the Christians they were victims of the bigotry of Mutawakkil and Hākim.

In Spain they were tolerated until the arrival of the Almoravids, when Yūsuf b. Tāshfin threatened to compel the Jews of Lucena to become Muhammadans, but was persuaded by rich gifts to let them retain their old faith (Dozy, iv. 254 f.). The Almohad 'Abd al-Mu'min, after his capture of Morocco in 1146, gave the Jews the choice

between Islām and death, but was afterwards persuaded to let those who wished to remain Jews go into exile; he promulgated a similar edict and destroyed the synagogues in all the cities of N. Africa conquered by the Almohads, and, when he extended his dominion over Spain, meted out the same treatment to the Jews there (Graetz, iii. 367 f.).

In Persia the Jews had enjoyed a brief prosperity under the Mongol Arghūn (1284-91). On his death the Muhammadans wreaked their vengeance upon the Jews for the humiliations which they had suffered from the Mongol conquerors (ib. iii. 672); and, when Arghūn's son, Ghāzān, was converted to Islām, the Jews suffered as much as the Christians (see above). They were persecuted also in the reigns of Shāh 'Abbās († 1629) and his great-grandson, 'Abbās II. († 1667), and under the rule of the Afghan conquerors (1722-29). Persecutions occurred also during the 19th cent., in Hamadan (1892), Kirmanshah (1896), and Tihiran (1897).

In N. Africa they had to suffer arbitrary treatment and frequent persecution from the barbarous Moorish population (ib. iv. 417). Mulai Yazid, in 1790, ordered their houses to be pillaged (*REJ* xxxvii. [1898] 120; Budgett Meakin, *The Moors*, London, 1902, pp. 431 f., 451 ff.). In 1840 a fierce persecution broke out in Damascus, as the result of the Jews being accused of a ritual murder, and spread into a number of towns of Syria and Turkey (Graetz, v. 677 f.).

(c) Among the religions that were tolerated as having been mentioned in the Qur'an (ii. 59, v. 73) was that of the Šābians; but they too were exposed to persecution: at the beginning of the reign of Mahdī, in 775, the great temple at Edessa in which they met for religious worship was destroyed, and many Arabs practising Šābiism were put to death (JA viii. xix. [1892] 84).

Although the Zoroastrians are not expressly mentioned in the Qur'an, the Muslim legists included them among the *dhimmīs*, and granted them the same degree of toleration (q.v.). Persecution seems to have been rare up to the close of the 'Abbāsid period; but they fell upon evil days in the 18th cent., under the rule of the degenerate descendants of Shāh 'Abbās (who had himself been generally tolerant to his non-Muslim subjects), and many of the Zoroastrians of Isfahan were forced to embrace Islām (Cornille Le Bruyn, *Voyages*, Paris, 1725, v. 170 f.); those of Kirman and Yazd who welcomed the Afghan invaders suffered cruel reprisals when the Afghans were expelled from Persia in 1730. Fresh troubles befell them under Nādir Shāh, and in the terrible sack of Kirman in 1794 by Agā Muhammad Khān (the founder of the present dynasty) their quarter of the city was entirely destroyed. By the 19th cent. the condition of the Zoroastrians in Persia was very low, and they were almost exclusively confined to Yazd and its neighborhood. The extortionate manner in which the *jizyah* was collected led to great suffering, and some Zoroastrians apostatized to save themselves from torture, until this tax was abolished in 1882 (D. F. Karaka, *Hist. of the Parsis*, London, 1884, i. 55 ff.; D. Menant, 'Les Zoroastriens de Perse,' *RMN* iii. [1907] 205 ff., 421 ff.; and art. GABARS). In 1888 the Zoroastrians were still subjected to many petty annoyances: they had to wear a yellow raiment to distinguish them from true believers; 'they are not permitted to wear socks, or to wind their turbans tightly and neatly, or to ride a horse; and if, when riding even a donkey, they should chance to meet a Muslim, they must dismount while he passes, and that without regard to his age or rank' (E. G. Browne, *A Year amongst the Persians*, London, 1893, p. 370 ff.).

There were some other non-Muslim religious

bodies, numerically of less importance, who suffered persecution on account of their faith. The Yazidis of Mesopotamia were subjected to a series of persecutions during the 19th cent. with the object of compelling them to conform to the faith of their Turkish rulers (O. H. Parry, *Six Months in a Syrian Monastery*, London, 1895, pp. 256 ff., 358; J. Menant, *Les Yézidis*, Paris, 1892, p. 164 ff.; *Al-Mashriq*, ii. [1899] 834 f.). For the persecution of the Bábis, Druses, and Manichæans, see artt. BĀB, SECTS (Christian), MANICHÆANS.

The severe condemnation of idolatry in the Qur'ān (iv. 115-120, xxi. 98-100, lxvi. 9, etc.) seems to make it impossible for any Muslim ruler to grant toleration to idol-worshippers, and Ma'mūn once stated very clearly that idolaters must choose between the acceptance of Islām or one of the religions recognized by the Qur'ān and death (Al-Nadīm, p. 320); and it was a commonly accepted principle that war should be waged against the people of the Book until they paid *jizyah*, but against idolaters until they accepted Islām (Yahyā b. Ādam, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, ed. T. W. Juynboll, Leyden, 1896, p. 12). Consequently the heathen races that have come under Muhammadan rule have generally suffered harsh treatment, and, even when political policy has prompted a more considerate treatment of their religious observances, they have been constantly exposed to outbursts of fanaticism.

The political and social disabilities from which the non-Muslims suffered were directly connected with the fact that their creed was different from that of their rulers, and, when the Muhammadan government was weak or corrupt, religious intolerance found easy victims. When money was to be extorted, the *dhimmī* had the least power of resistance, and justice could be denied him, since his evidence was not accepted in a Muslim court of law. Some fanatical theologians interpreted in a brutal spirit the last word of the verse in the Qur'ān (ix. 29):

'Fight against such of those to whom the Scripture has been given, as believe not in God nor in the last day, nor declare unlawful what God and His apostle have declared unlawful, nor profess the religion of the truth, until they pay *jizyah* out of hand, being humbled.'

The *dhimmī* must be kept standing a long time when he comes to pay the *jizyah*, he must bend his head and back low, and the Muslim official who receives it must seize him by the beard and strike him on both cheeks, so that his humiliation may be complete. This contemptuous attitude towards the non-Muslim reaches its culmination in the offensive burial permits which were issued in the 18th and 19th centuries when a Christian died (Denton, *The Christians of Turkey*, p. 117; H. C. Lukach, *The City of Dancing Dervishes*, London, 1914, p. 181; G. B. Chirkov, *Dva Lyubopytnykh arabskikh dokumenta k istorii vnutrennyaya byta vostochnykh christian*, Moscow, 1900, p. 2).

The non-Muslim has thus run the risk of being exposed to a constant series of petty annoyances, reminding him of his inferior status, at the hands of unjust officials and vicious persons of all kinds, throughout most periods of Muhammadan history, though organized persecution by the government has been rare (see art. TOLERATION [Muslim]).

LITERATURE.—No separate work has been devoted to the subject of Muhammadan persecution; the facts are to be found scattered throughout the annals of Muhammadan historians (e.g., Tabari, Ibn al-Athir, etc.) and the Christian historians (e.g., who have lived under Muhammadan rule (e.g., Barhebraeus, Eusebius, Māri b. Sulaymān, Severus, etc.). The following works may also be consulted: Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-Kharāj*, Cairo 1302 A.H.; Al-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist*, ed. G. Flügel, Leipzig, 1871; Michael the Elder, *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, 4 vols., ed. J. B. Chabot, Paris, 1900-10; Ahmad b. Yahyā b. al-Murtadā, *Al-Miftāḥ ila' al-haqiqah*, ed. T. W. Arnold, Leipzig, 1902; 'Iyād b. Mūsā al-Yahsubi, *Al-Shifā fi ta'rif huquq al-murtafa'a*, Cairo, 1922; M. Belin, 'Fetoua relatif à la condition

des Zimmis' (tr. from Arab., in *JA* xv. xviii. [1851] 418 ff.); W. M. Patton, *Ahmed ibn Hanbal and the Miḥna*, Leyden, 1897; R. J. H. Gotthein, 'Dhimmis and Moslems in Egypt,' *OT and Semitic Studies in Memory of William Rainey Harper*, Chicago, 1903, ii.; R. P. A. Dozy, *Hist. des Musulmans d'Espagne*, Leyden, 1861; J. von Hammer, *Gesch. des osmanischen Reiches*, 4 vols., Pesth, 1834-35; A. de la Jonquière, *Hist. de l'empire ottoman*, new ed., Paris, 1914; T. W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, London, 1913; M. Schreiner, 'Beiträge zur Gesch. der theologischen Bewegungen in Islam,' *ZDMG* lii. [1898] 403 ff.; H. Graetz, *Hist. of the Jews*, 5 vols., London, 1891-92; C. H. Churchill, *The Druses and the Maronites under the Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860*, do. 1862; W. Denton, *The Christians of Turkey*, do. 1876; Malcolm McColl, *The Eastern Question*, do. 1877; W. A. Shedd, *Islam and the Oriental Churches*, Philadelphia, 1904; Mikā'il Mashāqa, *Mashhad al-'Iyān li' hawādith Suriyā wa Libnān*, Cairo, 1903; A. Fortescue, *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, London, 1907, p. 233 ff., *The Lesser Eastern Churches*, do. 1918; Martin Hartmann, *Die islamische Verfassung und Verwaltung (Die Kultur der Gegenwart, i. il. 1)*, Leipzig, 1911, p. 65.

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PERSEVERANCE.—The subject of perseverance may be treated either (1) from the doctrinal point of view as an element in a system of theology, for which a basis may be sought in the teaching of Scripture confirmed by reason and experience; or (2) from the practical and ethical point of view, as a virtue to be striven after by the Christian, the ethical conditions of which may be inquired into and set forth.

1. Doctrinal.—From the doctrinal point of view, the assertion of the perseverance of the saints is the affirmation that those who have become once truly regenerate, or united to Christ by genuine faith, 'can neither totally nor finally fall away from the state of grace; but shall certainly persevere therein to the end, and be eternally saved' (*Westminster Confession*, ch. xvii.; *Larger Catechism*, 79; cf. *Canons of Synod of Dort*, ch. v. can. 3). This is a characteristic doctrine of the Augustinian and Calvinistic theology, flowing logically as it does from the Augustinian and Calvinistic conception of the salvation of sinners as due to unconditional election and irresistible divine grace. This doctrine is rejected by the Roman Catholic Church, which teaches the possibility of a man once justified falling away from grace.

'If any one maintain that a man once justified cannot lose grace and therefore that he who falls and sins never was truly justified, let him be accursed' (Council of Trent, sess. vi. ch. xv. can. 23).

Similarly, the Arminians and the Lutherans teach that those who were once justified and regenerated may, by neglecting grace and grieving the Holy Spirit, fall into such sins as are inconsistent with true justifying faith, and, continuing and dying in the same, may finally fall into perdition (*Confession of the Remonstrants*, xi. 7; *Formula Concordiæ*, p. 705). In support of the doctrine of the certain final perseverance of the saints various passages of Scripture are adduced:

Jn 10:27-29 'My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me; and I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, and no one shall snatch them out of my hand. My Father, which hath given them unto me, is greater than all; and no one is able to snatch them out of the Father's hand'; Ro 8:35-39 'Who shall separate us from the love of Christ, etc.; 11:29 'The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance'; Ph 1:6 'Being confident of this very thing, that he which began a good work in you will perfect it until the day of Jesus Christ.'

The doctrine is inferred also from the nature of regeneration and renewal as a work of divine grace. All those passages of Scripture which lay emphasis on the working of the Holy Spirit, or on divine grace, as the cause to which the spiritual life in individual human persons, alike in its beginning and in its progressive continuance, is due, seem to lead logically to the doctrine of certain final perseverance as guaranteed by the steadfastness of the Spirit's working and the victorious power of divine grace (e.g., Eph 1:12-14, 1 P 1:12, Jn 14:16, 2 Co 1:12 etc.).

If the beginning of Christian life in the indi-

vidual is due solely to unconditional divine election (Ac 13⁴⁸, Ro 8³⁰) and its continuance is due entirely to the inward working of the Holy Spirit (Ph 2¹³), then it stands to reason that perseverance unto the end is certain in the case of all who have become regenerate, because no room seems to be left for any possible falling away or any failure to attain. But the responsibility of the individual for the development of his character and the issue of his life seems also to be done away with on this conception of the matter. The free exercise of will power by the individual as a morally responsible agent seems to be ignored or left out of account.

So argue the Romanists, Arminians, and others, who are so anxious to safeguard human freedom as a factor in determining the issues of life for individuals that they feel constrained, not only to deny unconditional election and irresistible grace as the determining factors in regeneration and conversion, but also to leave room for a possible final falling away from grace, through subsequent perversity, of those who were once justified and regenerated. They are wont to charge those who advocate the doctrine of the certain final perseverance of the saints with thereby fostering a dangerous and unwarrantable sense of security in Christians, in place of that 'fear and trembling' with which it becomes them to 'work out their salvation' as persons liable to fall away and therefore needing to exercise continual watchfulness (Ph 2¹²). Besides the exhortations to diligence (such as 2 P 1¹⁰) and the warnings of danger in case of carelessness (such as Rev 3², 1 Co 10¹²) addressed in the Scriptures to believers, apparently implying the possibility of their falling away from grace, those who reject the doctrine of certain final perseverance are wont to quote such passages as Lk 14³⁰, Mt 13^{20L}, Jn 15⁶, 2 P 2^{20L}, and especially He 6⁴⁻⁶ 10^{26L}, in favour of their view, and to point to experience as furnishing examples of those who once were professing Christian believers but have fallen away into unbelief or ungodliness (Jn 17¹², 2 Ti 4⁹, Rev 2⁴). The issue in dispute, in so far as it is of a psychological character, turns on the question whether a man's will, in order to be and to remain free, must always remain unstable or uncertain as to its choices; or whether it is possible that the human will may become established in goodness without ceasing to be free, so that its free choice of good will become a certainty. The will of God is conceived of as free, yet as invariably choosing with certainty the right and the good and rejecting the evil. If the will of man can, in any way, attain to a similar stability in goodness, while still remaining free, the certainty of his final perseverance is assured; so that certainty of final perseverance is not inconsistent in idea with the retention of freedom of will. It is psychologically possible. The question then comes to be whether, and by what means, a man's will may become permanently established in goodness in this life, so as to guarantee his final perseverance.

Calvinists affirm that this is effected when the individual becomes truly united to Christ through freely yielding to the Spirit's gracious influence in regeneration and conversion; for thereby the individual becomes a member of Christ's Body, linked to Him by a vital bond of union, and the whole power of Christ and of the Spirit becomes pledged to ensure his perseverance (1 Co 6¹⁷). The remnants of indwelling sin in the believer may lead to temporary lapses or backslidings; but the dominion of sin over that individual has been finally broken (Ro 6¹⁴), and his ultimate perseverance in choice of right is assured. This seems theoretically sound and conclusive. But, in practice, an overweening

confidence or a careless security is excluded by two considerations of a practical kind. (a) Even if final perseverance is assured through God's working in us, care and watchfulness are needed to prevent temporary lapses or backslidings, which are deplorable and hurtful to the soul. Many exhortations to watchfulness and prayer and earnest moral effort addressed in Scripture to believers may be taken as counteractive warnings against such lapses and backslidings to which Christians are liable (e.g., Mt 24⁴² 25¹³ 26⁴¹, Ph 2^{12L} etc.). (b) Further, the conditions of true regeneration and union with God through Christ are such that it is possible for individuals to be self-deceived as to their true standing, and to assume a security which is not warranted by their real condition. Hence the need for the exhortation given to professing Christians to 'give diligence to make your calling and election sure' (2 P 1¹⁰). The falling away of some who at one time had a place among professing Christians is explained in various passages of Scripture as due to the fact that, notwithstanding the fair appearance of spiritual life in the sight of their fellow-men, they were from the beginning without that real power of godliness which comes from vital union with Christ (1 Jn 2¹⁹, Rev 3¹). Where 'regeneration' is minimized or robbed of its true ethical significance and transformed into something of a magical or mechanical nature effected through an external rite, it is easy to understand why the possibility of the 'regenerate' falling away should have to be insisted on as borne witness to by experience. The possibility of men being self-deceived as to their real standing, through being content with what is merely formal and ritual or external, and failing to realize the high ethical and spiritual significance of regeneration and all that it implies, should serve to counteract any danger of a too easy security in connexion with a doctrine of final perseverance.

In view of these possibilities of self-deception, as well as the possibilities of deplorable and hurtful temporary backslidings on the part of the truly regenerate, the apostolic exhortations and warnings addressed to professing believers are not without justification, even though the doctrine of the certain final perseverance of the truly regenerate be a sound doctrine. Even such solemn warnings as we find in He 6⁴⁻⁶ 10²⁶ (which furnish the strongest Scriptural support of those who contend for the amissibility of grace and deny the doctrine of certain final perseverance) may be interpreted as needful warnings addressed to a concrete practical situation and not necessarily involving any theological implication inconsistent with a doctrine which seems to be well founded in Scripture and in reason, and from which many bumble Christians have derived comfort and help in fighting the good fight of faith. The doctrine of the certain final perseverance of those whose wills become established in goodness through freely yielding to the Holy Spirit's gracious influence in regeneration and renewal is usually held in conjunction with the Calvinistic doctrines of particular and unconditional election and the irresistibility of divine grace in conversion. It may, however, be held by those who reject these other doctrines as unethical and inconsistent with human freedom and responsibility. Thus Martensen, though he accepted the Lutheran position on most points of doctrine, professes his adherence to the Reformed, in opposition to the Lutheran, doctrine on this question of final perseverance (*Christian Dogmatics*, §235). It is in the free act of yielding to the drawings of the Spirit and the influences of divine grace in regeneration and renewal, which leads up to the gradual establishing of the will in goodness, that place is found for human responsibility and for human

freedom as an important factor in determining the issues of life (Mt 23³⁷, Jn 5⁴⁰, Ro 2⁴).

2. Ethical.—Regarded from the more purely practical point of view as a virtue or grace to be aimed at by earnest moral endeavour, perseverance is a duty to which Christian believers are urged in Scripture by many and varied considerations. Thus our standing as sons of God, together with the assured hope of being like Christ when He appears, is adduced by St. John as a stimulus to the Christian to 'purify himself, even as he is pure' (1 Jn 3³). St. Peter also adduces the believer's position as 'purified' in soul by 'obedience to the truth' through the Spirit as a reason why we should 'love one another with a pure heart fervently' (1 P 1²²). St. Paul, too, frequently bases his exhortations to believers to perseverance in holy living on a consideration of the believer's position as justified by faith and in union with Christ (Ro 6⁶⁻¹¹ 12¹¹ 13⁸ 10¹⁴ etc.), while he urges the consideration that 'God is working in us' to ensure the success of our efforts, not as a reason for sloth or easy security, but rather as a stimulus and incentive to earnest moral endeavour (Ph 2¹²).

The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews also makes strong appeal to those to whom he writes, because of their past experiences of gospel grace and privilege, and the indications which they have shown of true spiritual life, to 'shew the same diligence unto the fulness of hope even to the end' (6¹¹), while he enforces his appeal by a solemn warning as to the danger of those who fall away after having gone a certain length and gained some experience of the influences of prevenient grace (6⁴⁻⁶; cf. 1 Co 10¹²). Earnest moral endeavour, therefore, grounded in faith, and stimulated by hope and love, is one of the ethical conditions of perseverance unto the end, viewed as a Christian virtue. But it is not the sole or main condition. Indeed, moral struggle and effort are apt sometimes to beget a spirit of independence and self-reliance which is alien to the true spirit of the Christian life. For that is essentially a life of conscious dependence on a power greater than ourselves which is working for us and in us—the power of God as manifested in the crucified and risen Christ, and in the Holy Spirit who applies the Christian redemption to us. Hence the main ethical condition of perseverance as a Christian grace is represented in Scripture as being 'abiding in Christ' through steadfast and continuous exercise of the will in faith and self-surrender (Jn 15⁴). Or, inasmuch as the function of the Holy Spirit is to take of the things of Christ and show them unto us (Jn 16¹³), the main condition of perseverance in holy living is represented as being a continuous yielding of ourselves in believing self-surrender to the motions and promptings of the Holy Spirit given to us by God as an 'earnest' of our salvation (2 Co 5⁵, Ro 8¹⁴). Perseverance in holiness may call for moral effort and striving, but it is not the effort of self-reliant independence or self-sufficiency, but rather the effort to keep ourselves in touch with Christ through faith (Ph 3¹⁰, Gal 2²⁰), to 'walk in the Spirit' (Gal 5¹⁶) and allow ourselves to be 'led by the Spirit' (Ro 8¹⁴). The main condition of perseverance as a Christian virtue is indicated by St. Paul in 2 Co 3¹⁸:

'We all, with unveiled face reflecting as a mirror the glory of the Lord, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, even as from the Lord the Spirit.'

With a view to thus keeping themselves in the 'fellowship' of Christ (Ph 3¹⁰) and in 'the love of God' (Jude 21), and so making their 'calling and election sure' (2 P 1¹⁰) and securing their perseverance unto the end, believers are exhorted to make a diligent use of the means of grace—the Word (Eph 6¹⁷), the sacraments (1 Co 11²³), and prayer

(Eph 6¹⁸)—and not to forsake the assembling of themselves together for common worship (Ho 10²⁵). Thus abiding in Christ, and having Him abiding in them through constant faith and watchfulness and willing self-surrender to the Holy Spirit's leadings, believers are enabled to bring forth the fruit of the Spirit and are 'guarded by the power of God through faith unto a salvation ready to be revealed in the last time' (1 P 1⁵).

LITERATURE.—*Westminster Confession of Faith*, ch. xvii. § 11.; *Canons of Synod of Dort*, ch. v. can. 3; Council of Trent, sess. vi. chs. 13, 15, can. 23; *Confession of the Remonstrants*, xl. 7; *Formula Concordiæ*, pp. 591, 705; *Apol. Aug. Conf.*, pp. 71, 80; Augustine, *de Correctione et Gratia*, 8; Bellarmine, *de Amicitia. Gratia*, sess. xiv. ch. 5; Calvin, *Institutes*, bk. ii. ch. iii. 11-14; F. Turretin, *Opera*, Edinburgh, 1847, loc. xv. qu. xvi.; H. Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, Eng. tr., do. 1860, § 235; J. J. van Oosterzee, *Christian Dogmatics*, Eng. tr., London, 1886, sect. 121.

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PERSIA.—See ACHÆMENIANS, AVESTA, GABARS, IRANIANS, PARSIS, SASANIANS, ZOROASTER.

PERSONAL IDEALISM.—See PLURALISM.

PERSONALISM.—1. History and definition.—The earliest suggestion of the relationship between personality and nature was made by Anaxagoras, whose 'thought-stuff' was conceived as the self-moving purposive force in natural phenomena. Aristotle laid the foundation for personalism by affirming self-consciousness as the highest being, but Hollenism generally considered personality limiting and not to be predicated of the supreme being. Augustine first held fast to the experience which personality has of itself as its highest principle. The uniqueness and individuality of the human soul or the inner experience were to him vital to any true theory of God and the world. Descartes found in personality alone the basis of union between thought and thing. Up to this point personality had been considered in the light of fundamental truth rather than of fundamental reality.

The idea of personality as the foundation of knowledge was further developed by Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Lotze. They agree that the immediateness of self-consciousness is the starting-point of philosophy. In this sense Eucken, Howison, Bergson, James, F. C. S. Schiller, Ward, Royce, and others of the modern school may be called personalists.

From the metaphysical point of view, we may distinguish between those personalists of pluralistic turn to whom the ultimate reality is a system of related selves and those of monistic temper to whom the ultimate reality is a single person which differentiates itself into the many personalities and objects of the world. Neither of these types of thought leads to a consistent personalism. The latter tends towards pantheism, and the former leaves us in an impossible pluralism.

Personalism, in the proper sense of the term, asserts a system of selves related through a supreme personality. It conceives of the supreme person as existing in and through the concrete continuous exercise of his personality, thinking, willing, and sustaining all things. This personality, far from being subject to analysis, is the ultimate fact which alone makes the world as a whole intelligible. Lotze affirmed personality of the divine being, but neglected to carry out the implication to its deeper theistic conclusions. Renouvier, who first employed the term 'personalism,' thought it necessary to escape pantheism by assigning the world of being to a single primary creative act. Bowne, however, insisted upon a supreme personality creatively present in the on-going of the world.

Personalism in this stricter sense is closely allied

with the thought of Augustine, and accords with the Christian demand for a personal relationship of man to the infinite world-ground which is a person.

Personalism may then be defined as that system of philosophy which views personality as the active ground of the world, and as containing in the mystery of its own unique being the key to all the antinomies of metaphysics. It is the latest form of theism and has been most completely worked out in the writings of the American philosopher, Borden Parker Bowne. It occupies a mediating position between pure empiricism and pure idealism, and is to be judged by its definition of reality, its doctrine of knowledge, and its conception of space and time.

2. The personalistic definition of reality.—The real is that which can act or be acted upon. The materialist, assuming that the seat of reality is in the atom, negates the validity of all mental processes. He is faced by the double problem of how the atom can produce mistaken perceptions and how it is possible to account for reflective knowledge. Pure idealism, approaching the question from the opposite direction, encounters difficulty with the problem of evil. If all that we see is the manifestation of the divine, whence comes evil in the world?

The personalistic interpretation of reality is designed to meet these difficulties. The world of things is not a mere succession of phenomena, but depends upon the causal activity of a divine personality. The mutual relations and interactions of the world spring from the unity of the supreme will. The mind grasps a true world because both thinker and thing are included in the one creative harmony. This truth is foreshadowed in the experience of causal efficiency by the human personality.

Out of this definition of reality flows the personalistic definition of being. Being is neither abstract supreme idea nor unknowable substance lying behind phenomena. Being is implied in the capacity for intelligent causal action, or in the capacity for being acted upon. All that exists is the result or manifestation of a supreme, active, purposive intelligence which creates and sustains the world of lesser intelligences and things. It has no meaning apart from this purpose which is its ground. Mind can understand the movement of matter because both proceed from the same source. The mind grasps the meaning of the world because it owns kinship with the intelligence which creates the world. It is itself purposive, self-directive, and causal within the world-order. By this definition personalism escapes the pantheistic conclusions of absolutism and the mechanical determinism of empiricism.

Personalism is saved from the vagueness of most forms of idealism by its pragmatic requirements. *E.g.*, the purposive causal intelligence is not taken as pure abstraction existing independently of the world. As the very essence of human personality lies in its self-directive freedom and causal efficiency, so these qualities are affirmed of the divine personality. The divine being exists in, and not apart from, his activity.

If the question is raised how, on such an assumption, we escape the dilemma of a fore-ordered universe, or a fatal dualism raised by man's freedom to do evil, it may be replied that human freedom is a part of the divine purpose within certain limits allotted to man. If it be asked what then becomes of the divine purpose and foreknowledge when man acts contrary to the will of God, it may be answered that foreknowledge does not include those individual facts which lie within the range of human action, but applies rather to that larger purpose, the development of character, which

would be impossible apart from freedom. It may well be that from the eternal view-point an eventual world of voluntary righteousness is of vaster importance than a world of involuntary sinfulness. The thing desired seems to be a growing moral personality in man like that which exists in God. Personality, then, which we must believe to be the supreme treasure of the eternal consciousness, is likewise the supreme gift and task of man.

3. The personalistic definition of thought.—Thought is that form of mental activity the aim of which is knowledge or truth. Its fundamental conditions are an enduring self-conscious thinker, the possibility of common understanding of terms used, and a sure correspondence between the thinker, the thought, and the thing.

Continuing the thought of the mediating character of personalism, let us apply the definition of knowledge. Empiricism endeavours to trace mental images to movement in nerve-cells. But, when the perception of roughness has been traced from the resistance of matter to the cells of the brain, we are forced to explain how the shocking of nerve-cells becomes an idea of roughness. It is no answer to assume a 'double face' to nervous action; for then each nerve-cell must be endowed with all the magic powers of brain and personality. The only way to bridge the gap is to assume an enduring personality which interprets the nervous shock as roughness in the object. Were the movement of nerve-cells to cover the whole process, there would be no place for error, for one man's sensation of the fundamental reality would be as good as another's. But empiricism meets its greatest difficulty in the problem of reflective knowledge. If we try to think of nerve-shocks stored in the cells of the brain to be called forth by sensation or association, we are forced to explain how reflective knowledge can be more than a hodge-podge of sensational memories. What power is present to produce a new result in reflective knowledge? Would a physical mixing of the cells of old sensations produce reflective knowledge? If, on the other hand, there be a self-identifying personality interpreting impressions according to a growing knowledge, misled often, but coming by repeated experience to enlarging conceptions, we have the crucible in which matter and mentality may come together.

This interpretation is also far removed from the view of the absolutist to whom the fundamental in thought is an abstract divine idea. To the personalist knowledge exists only in the concrete. Thought is not the mere replica of the divine idea. It is a self-realized result of individual action and freedom. It may be tinged with error or ignorance, but its distortion cannot be laid to the charge of the supreme thinker.

How may we know that there is a reality corresponding to our knowledge? We succeed only as we assume that the world of things and persons is created and upheld by a purposive intelligence. In this supreme personality, source of thinker and thing, lies the final unity.

4. Personalism and other philosophical problems.—(a) *Space and time*.—Until the days of Kant space and time had been generally conceived as fundamental realities existing independently of all intelligence. It was Kant who set them forth as merely the forms under which the thinking mind relates the world of things and events to itself and to each other. Personalism agrees with Kant in his view of the subjective nature of space and time, but goes on to assert an objective validity as well. I may say that time and space are only the forms under which I think, but are they peculiar to me? If purely subjective, as Kant taught, there is no way of granting them

general validity and no assurance that our calendars or geographies will agree. Both time and space must be given objective validity to free them from the disjunctive caprice of the individual and make possible a world united in space and time relations. The forms of time and space gain a validity universal for intelligent beings through a supreme personal intelligence who creates and upholds all.

(b) *Causality*.—With materialism the mind can never grasp the real thing, but only its phenomena. Hence, in dealing with causality materialism is for ever hiding its processes under a figure of speech. Reality is shifted from mass to molecule, from molecule to atom, from atom to æon, from æon to electron, and always that which is invisible. Out of these imagined actions and reactions all causation is said to spring.

Idealism sweeps this whole world of phenomena into subjectivity. But by subjective we may mean either one of two things. We may mean that which is peculiar to the individual alone or that which is true for intelligence anywhere and which has no existence apart from it. Failure to make this distinction is fatal to idealism. Unless it is made, the system of experience becomes the fiction of the individual.

In describing causality personalism makes a distinction between phenomenal and efficient causality. Phenomenal causality has reference to the true order or succession of events. We name this succession 'cause and effect.' We say that the effect can be traced to its cause, which is correct enough for practical purposes; if we speak of efficient causation, it is not adequate. Retracing from effect to cause in the phenomenal world, we are committed to the infinite regress. Moreover, we have a closed system, as all effects are potentially present always. There is no place for the new. We are finally forced back upon the assertion of the unknowable. We might be satisfied with this affirmation of nescience, did not two considerations arise to disturb us: (1) that the human spirit revolts against such a conclusion, and (2) that our own experience of personality gives an example of efficient, uncaused causality. Human laws are founded upon this fact. The human personality is not the prey of driving molecules and brain-storms. In the recesses of personality lies the possibility of starting new successions of cause and effect. If, then, we are to have efficient causation, we must find it not in unthinking atoms, nor in their combination, nor in impersonal laws of succession, but, rather, bound up with the purpose and intelligence of a personality.

Phenomenal causation is the succession of appearances common to all. We can mark the pre-existences and successions which hold universally in the world of experience, and we can formulate their laws without granting them causal efficiency or assuming anything concerning their metaphysical ground. Efficient causation, on the other hand, deals not with the order of succession but with the ground of being itself.

Causal explanation must be in terms of personality or it must vanish altogether. Any world-ground capable of real causation, not itself involved in the atomic flux, must be both personal and intelligent.

(c) *Change and identity*.—With materialism change is impossible. What we call change is a re-arrangement of atoms. Even thought can be no more than that. We have a static universe with its prescribed number of atoms, and all possibilities lie in their permutations and combinations. With absolutism change is a mere appearance. In the ultimate reality, the divine thought, all is static.

Entertaining a lively sense of this problem, Bergson posits duration as the abiding element in change. Change can mean something only to that which retains its identity through all changes. But abstract terms have no way of relating events. This can be done only by an abiding personality. If, then, the human personality is to locate itself in the universe or to image that which survives the passing world of events, it is driven to affirm a supreme enduring personality, in which the world and all lesser personalities find a common unity.

(d) *Unity and plurality*.—Driven by criticism to acknowledge the dualism that exists between thought and thing, and with no basis of mediation, some minds are turning to the affirmation of pluralism (*q.v.*). But a disjunctive universe is as much an impossibility for thought as a world predetermined by a divine idea. The pluralist cannot make his world disjunctive enough to be consistent. Unless he preserves a certain amount of unity—the unity of a mind able to grasp the fleeting events of time and the baffling appearance of change—knowledge is meaningless.

Personalism affirms that the only real unity of which we are directly aware is the unity of the free and conscious self. The self survives the passing events of experience, relates them to itself under the forms of time and space, and makes itself the centre of its changing world. That there is any higher unity is due to the fact that one is not alone, but is surrounded by a world of self-conscious intelligences, themselves comprehended in synthesis by a supreme personal intelligence. Through self-conscious and self-acting personality alone can the world be brought into substantial unity.

Thus are we rid of the conflict between mind and matter, noumena and phenomena, and the disjointed world of pluralism. This is done also without resort to an idealism which, though grand in conception, is death to the maintenance of freedom.

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R. T. FLEWELLING.

PERSONALITY.—What is a self, and how are we conscious of it? The words 'self' and 'person' may be taken as equivalent, and, as 'personality' is a more familiar term than 'selfness,' we may put our question in this form, What is personality, and how do we know it?

The quality of personality is known to me because I have perception—in the strict sense of the word—of one being which possesses the quality, namely, myself. The view that I perceive myself is not a very common one, especially in recent philosophic thought, but a discussion of it is absolutely essential for the comprehension of the nature of spirit.

In this article the word 'perception' is used to denote that species of awareness which we have of the existent—awareness being a mental state which is not a belief, though it is knowledge. It is of great importance to be clear as to what is meant by 'awareness' and 'perception.' The present writer uses both terms in the manner introduced by Bertrand A. W. Russell, and explained by him in his paper on *Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description*.

I am aware of an object, or am acquainted with an object—the phrases are used as synonymous—when 'I have a direct cognitive relation to that object. . . . In fact, I think the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation. That is, to say that S has acquaintance with O is essentially the same thing as to say that O is

presented to S. . . . When we ask what are the kinds of objects with which we are acquainted, the first and most obvious example is *sense-data*.¹ When I see a colour or hear a noise, I have direct acquaintance with the colour or the noise. We are also acquainted, in introspection, with 'objects in various cognitive and conative relations to ourselves. When I see the sun, it often happens that I am aware of my seeing the sun, in addition to being aware of the sun, and when I desire food, it often happens that I am aware of my desire for food. . . . The awarenesses we have considered so far have all been awarenesses of particular existents, and might all in a larger sense be called *sense-data*. For, from the point of view of theory of knowledge, introspective knowledge is exactly on a level with knowledge derived from sight or hearing. But, in addition to awareness of the above kind of objects, which may be called awareness of *particulars*, we have also what may be called awareness of *universals*. . . . Not only are we aware of particular yellows, but if we have seen a sufficient number of yellows and have sufficient intelligence, we are aware of the universal *yellow*; this universal is the subject in such judgments as "yellow differs from blue" or "yellow resembles blue less than green does." And the universal *yellow* is the predicate in such judgments as "this is yellow," when "this" is a particular *sense-datum*. And universal relations, too, are objects of awarenesses; up and down, before and after, resemblance, desire, awareness itself, and so on, would seem to be all of them objects of which we can be aware.¹

This, then, is what 'awareness' means. By 'perception' is meant the awareness of what Russell calls 'particulars,' or *sense-data* in a large sense. All of these are substances. And we can, of course, be aware of them only when they exist. Perception, therefore, is always awareness of the existent. But awareness which is not perception need not be of the existent. If I know what any simple characteristic means, I am aware of it. But my awareness, *e.g.*, of yellow, does not prove that there is any existent thing which has the characteristic of yellow.

Perception, however, is not limited to the perception of substances. There is, indeed, no perception except when a substance is perceived, but, along with the substance, we are able to perceive some particular characteristic of the substance. This is proved by the fact that we make judgments, which no one would assert were in all cases incorrect, that a substance has certain characteristics, for which our only evidence is our awareness. And, since the judgment is that a particular existent substance has the characteristic, the awareness on which it is based must be perception. Since the characteristics of the existent themselves exist, the best definition of perception will be that it is awareness of the existent.

What existent things do we perceive? It is clear that I do not perceive physical objects (as opposed to *sense-data*) or other people's minds. My only ground for believing in them is by an inference from the *sense-data* which I do perceive. This does not mean that every belief in them is a deliberate and conscious inference from a premiss about *sense-data*. On the contrary, I often judge that there is a table in the room, or that I have met a friend, without making any judgment whatever that I have perceived any *sense-data*. But, although my judgment that there is a table in the room is not an inference from *sense-data*, it will not be a judgment which I have any right to make unless I have experienced *sense-data* such that the existence of the table in the room could be legitimately inferred from them. And, if any doubt is thrown, by myself or others, upon the correctness of my judgment as to the table, the only way in which it can be justified is by an inference from *sense-data*.²

¹ Russell, pp. 1-4. The present writer cannot accept, without some reservation, the account of what objects it is that we are aware of by introspection, but this does not affect the meaning of awareness.

² In the same way the only way of justifying my belief that another person exists will be by an inference from *sense-data* which (except for a Berkeleyan) will lead first to a belief in his body (or a reality appearing as his body) and then to himself. Of course the *sense-data* which are the basis of such an inference need not be as closely connected with the object inferred as to be a case of what is commonly called seeing, touching, etc., the

We do perceive, then, *sense-data* (using this word in the larger sense, to include our perception of mental events by introspection). We do not perceive physical objects or other people's minds. But one question still remains. Does each of us perceive himself?

The present writer believes that this is the case. The reasons which have led him to this view were suggested by a passage in Russell's paper already quoted above.¹

I am certainly aware of certain characteristics—*e.g.*, the characteristic of equality. I know, then, the proposition, 'I am aware of equality.' If I know this proposition, I must know each constituent of it. I must therefore know 'I.' Whatever we know must be known by acquaintance or by description. If, therefore, 'I' cannot be known by description, it must be known by acquaintance, and I must be aware of it.

Now, how can 'I' be described in this case? The description must be an exclusive description, *i.e.* one which applies to nothing but 'I,' since I do not know what 'I' means unless I know enough about it to distinguish it from everything else. I am aware, as already said, of equality, and I am aware, by introspection, that there is an awareness of equality. Can I, by means of these, describe 'I' as that which is aware of equality? But it is obvious that this is not an exclusive description of 'I,' for it could not be that unless it were certain that I was the only person who ever possessed awareness of equality. It is obvious that this is not certain, and that it is possible that some one else besides me was, is, or will be aware of equality. (In point of fact, I have overwhelming empirical evidence for the conclusion that some other persons *are* aware of equality.) Thus we cannot get an exclusive description of 'I' in this way.

It may be thought that an exclusive description could be reached by going a step further. I am not only aware, it may be said, that there is an awareness of equality, but I am also aware that there is *this* awareness of equality, the particular mental act which is my awareness of equality here and now. Now, if 'I' were described as that which is aware of *this* awareness of equality, should we not have reached an exclusive description? For no one else, it may be argued, could be aware of *this* awareness of equality except 'I' myself who have it. Of course, in order that this may be an exclusive description of 'I,' I must know what I mean by *this* awareness of equality. But this would be a case of knowledge by awareness. This awareness of equality would be a *sense-datum*, of which we could be aware by introspection, since no one denies that *sense-data* can be known by awareness. Thus, it is said, we can dispense with the necessity for awareness of self, and hold that the only awareness of the existent—the only perception—is of *sense-data*.

This argument, as has been seen, has, as one of its steps, the assertion that no one can be aware of an awareness of equality except the person who has that awareness. To this point we shall return later. But first we must point out that, even if this step were correct, the argument would not be valid.

The judgment which we are now considering is the judgment, 'I am aware of *this* awareness.' Now this is [not merely a judgment that some person, however identified, is aware of the awareness. It also asserts that the person who is aware of the awareness is the person who is making the object itself. I never saw the Andes or the death of Caesar, but my belief in them is an inference from visual *sense-data* in reading books about them.

¹ Russell did not, however, work out his contention in detail which was not essential for the main design of his paper.

judgment. And how can I be entitled to assert this identity if 'I' can be known only by description? In that case I am aware of this awareness, and of making a judgment, and I may be entitled to conclude that there is some one who is aware of the awareness, and that some one is making the judgment, since both awarenesses and judgments require persons to make them. And it may be the case that 'the person who is aware of this awareness' is an exclusive description of the person to whom it applies. But how do I know that the person thus described is the person who makes the judgment? If I am not aware of my self, the only thing I know about the person who makes the judgment is just the description, 'the person who makes this judgment.' And, granting that this is an exclusive description, I am still not entitled to say, 'I am aware of this awareness,' unless I know that the two exclusive descriptions apply to the same person. If the person is known only by these descriptions, or by other descriptions, it does not seem to me possible to know anything of the sort. Thus, if 'I' can be known only by description, it seems impossible that we can know that I am aware of this awareness, or of anything else, since the judgment, 'I am aware of X,' always means that the person who is aware of X is also the person who is making the judgment.

On the other hand, if I do perceive my self, there is no difficulty in justifying either the judgment, 'I am aware of this awareness,' or the judgment, 'I am aware of equality.' There is no need now to find an exclusive description of 'I,' because I am aware of it, i.e. know it by acquaintance, and therefore do not require to know it by description. And I can now justify the assertion, implied in the use of 'I,' that the person who is aware (whether of *this* awareness or of equality) is the person who makes the judgment. For in perceiving my self I perceive also, as was said above, some of the characteristics of my self. And, if I perceive it to have the character of being aware, of equality, or of an awareness, and also perceive it to have the characteristic of making this judgment, I am justified in holding that it is the same person who is aware and who makes the judgment.¹

We have thus good reason to assert that I can perceive my self—i.e., if I can know my self at all. For it would be impossible for anyone who believed that the self could be known to deny the truth of some proposition which takes the form 'I am aware of X.' And we have seen that such propositions cannot be justifiably accepted unless I can be aware of—i.e. perceive—my self.

Thus the attempt to describe the self which is aware of equality by its identity with the self which is aware of *this* awareness of equality has broken down, even if we grant the premiss which it assured—that 'that which is aware of *this* awareness of equality' is an exclusive description of the substance to which it applies. But we must now examine into the truth of this premiss, for, although the argument would not hold even if it were valid, the question of its validity is important in itself.

It is very commonly held that it is impossible for any person to be aware of any mental state except the person who has the state, and, therefore, that only one person can be aware of it. With regard to awareness which is not perception, it is universally admitted that more than one person can be

aware of the same thing. It is only by awareness that we can know what any simple characteristic means—since, being simple, it cannot be defined—and the meaning of compound characteristics depends on the meaning of simple characteristics. If, therefore, two people could not be aware of the same simple characteristic, it would be impossible for one person ever to communicate his thoughts to another.

Opinions differ with regard to sense-data in the narrower sense of the word—excluding those admittedly gained by introspection, and including only those which come, or appear to come, from the external senses. Some thinkers regard them as such that two people can perceive the same sense-datum. Others, however, hold that each sense-datum can be perceived only by one person, although sense-data perceived by different people may be caused by the same object and may justify inferences as to the existence of that object.

But that which falls wholly within a mind is usually denied to be perceptible by any mind except that in which it falls, whether it be a state of the mind, a relation between two states of the mind, or a relation between the mind and one of its own states. Thus those thinkers who hold, as some do, that sense-data in the narrower sense are states of the mind are invariably to be found among those who hold that each sense-datum can be perceived only by one person—who is, of course, the person of whom they are states. And, in the case of the remainder of sense-data in the wider sense—those which are admittedly mental, and reached by introspection—it is generally held, or, rather, tacitly assumed, that they can have no other perceiver than the mind within which they fall. Among these, of course, are all awarenesses.

Now it does not seem that we are justified in asserting this as an absolute necessity. No doubt it is the case that I do not perceive any state of mind of any person but myself. I have good reason to believe that none of the persons whom I know, or who have recorded their experiences in any way which is accessible to me, has ever perceived the states of mind of any other person than himself. Nor have I any reason to believe that any other self in the universe has done so. But the fact that there is no reason to suppose that it does happen is very far from being a proof that it could not happen. Is there any reason for supposing that it could not happen? Even if it is asserted that we have no reason to suppose that any self does perceive anything but its own states (a view which involves that sense-data in the narrower sense are states of the self), there is no impossibility in its doing so. That relative isolation of a self (of course it is not complete isolation) which would prevent it from entering into a relation of perception with anything outside itself need not be essential to the self because it is true of it throughout our experience. If, on the other hand, sense-data in the narrower sense are not parts of the self, then I can perceive something which is outside me, which is one step towards perceiving what is inside another self. The fact that in our experience this second step is never taken does not prove that it is impossible.

It must be remembered that, if A should perceive a state of B's, that would not make it a state of A's or any less exclusively a state of B's. To have a state and to perceive it are two utterly different things. In our present experience, as we have just said, no one does the second who does not do the first. But the first often occurs without the second. I often have a state, even a conscious state, without being aware of that state,¹ and this does not

¹ If this were not so, every conscious state would start an infinite series of perceptions, since a perception is itself a state,

¹ It may possibly be said that the awareness is never simultaneous with the judgment asserting the awareness. The present writer would be inclined to doubt this. But at any rate it is clear that the judgment can succeed the awareness very rapidly, and in that case we are probably justified in asserting that the self which is aware and the self which judges the awareness are the same self. This point will be discussed later.

make it any the less my state. Since the two are so distinct, A might perceive a state of B's, which perhaps B himself did not perceive, and yet it would be B's state and not A's. Confusion on this point has had a good deal to do with the prevailing belief that one self cannot perceive a state of another self.

It is, therefore, not intrinsically impossible that one self should be aware of a state of another self (or that more than one self should be so), and, as a self can be aware of its own state, it is not intrinsically impossible that two selves should be aware of the same awareness. We cannot, therefore, be certain that 'the person who is aware of *this* awareness' is an exclusive description of a person of whom it is true. And, if 'I' can be known only by means of this description, I cannot be certain who 'I' is, and cannot be certain that I know the meaning of the proposition, 'I am aware of *this* awareness,' or of the proposition, 'I am aware of equality' (since the 'I' in the latter was to be described by means of the former). But it is certain that I know the meaning of these propositions, and it is certain that I am certain of their truth. Thus, for a second reason, the attempt to show that 'I' can be known by description in this manner has broken down.

An attempt might be made to know 'I' by description which would not be liable to the second objection. For it might be said—and truly—that, while it is not impossible for more than one self to be aware of a particular awareness, it is impossible for more than one self to *have* the same particular awareness. If I am aware of X, it is not impossible that you, as well as I, should be aware of my awareness of X, but it is impossible that my particular awareness of X should also be your awareness of X, or anybody else's, since what is a state—i.e. a part—of one self can in no case be a state of another self.

This view the present writer believes to be correct. It has been denied, both on the ground that my awareness of X is not a part of me and on the ground that two selves might possibly have a common part. But it is not necessary to decide these points here, as it can be shown that, even if the view is correct and no two selves can have the same awareness, it will still be impossible to know 'I' by description.

The attempt to know it by description on this basis would be as follows. If we start from 'I am aware of equality,' and wish to describe the 'I,' we must proceed to the further proposition, 'I have *this* acquaintance with equality,' which will always be true if the other is. Then the 'I' in the latter proposition can be described as the self which has *this* acquaintance with equality. This description cannot apply to more than one thing, and is therefore an exclusive description of it. And the thing so described is the 'I' in both propositions. And in this way we do avoid the second objection. But our new attempt is still open to the first objection—that it involves that two descriptions apply to the same self, and that we have no right to make this assumption. For, when I assert the proposition, 'I have this awareness,' it means that the self who has this awareness is the same as the self who asserts the proposition. Now, I can only describe the one—if it is to be described at all—as the self which has this awareness, and the second as the self which makes this judgment. Both of these are exclusive descriptions. (Of course, by 'this judgment' is meant the psychological fact of judgment, not the proposition which is asserted.) and I should have to be again aware of that, and so on. We know that this is not the case. We do not very often perceive a perception, and perception of a perception scarcely ever happens except when we are engaged on epistemological or psychological investigation.

But I have no reason to suppose that they refer to the same self, and therefore I am not entitled to say, 'I have this awareness,' or, consequently, 'I am aware of equality.'

If, on the other hand, I am aware of my self, I am entitled to say, 'I have this awareness,' because I am aware of my self with the two characteristics of having the awareness and of making the judgment. Once more, then, we are brought back to the conclusion that, if I am entitled to make any assertion about my awareness of anything, I must be aware of my self.

Nor is this all. The same line of argument will show that, unless 'I' is known by awareness, I am not justified in making *any* statement about my self, whether it deals with awareness or not. If I start with the proposition, 'I am angry,' and then, on the same principle as before, describe 'I' as that which has *this* state of anger, my assertion will involve the assertion that it is the same self which has this state of anger and which is making this proposition. And, if 'I' can be known only by description, there is no reason to hold that it is the same self which both has the state and makes the assertion.

It is not, of course, impossible for us to have good reasons for believing that two descriptions both apply to some substance which we know only by description. I know other people only by description, but I may have good reason to believe of my friend X that he is both a socialist and a post-impressionist. But the case now before us is not analogous to this. My beliefs about X depend for their correctness on the correctness of various inferences from sense-data of which I am aware—perhaps auditory sense-data which I hear, and which I infer to be due to his desire to communicate his opinions to me. But, when I judge that I am angry, the conclusion that it is I who am angry is not an inference from my awareness of a state of anger whose characteristics are such that it can only belong to a particular person. I am as directly certain that it is I who am angry as I am that the state of anger exists. And, if 'I' is not known by awareness, the only alternative is that 'I' should be described as that which is involved in the simple fact of the existence of the state of anger—the only element in the proposition of which, on this hypothesis, we are aware. That is, it must be described simply as the self which has this state of anger. And in this description there is nothing from which we can legitimately conclude that this is the same self as that which makes the assertion.

Our conclusion, then, is that, if 'I' can be known at all, it must be known by awareness, and that, if it cannot be known by awareness, we are not justified in asserting any proposition in which the term 'I' occurs. Unless we take this extremely sceptical alternative, we must admit that 'I' is known by awareness.

It may be asked why this result has not been accepted by so many—perhaps most—recent philosophers. The explanation may be partly that they saw that 'the self which has this state' is an exclusive description of a self, when this state is known by awareness, and that they did not see the further point that this description gave us no ground to identify the self which has the state with the self making the assertion, and that this identity is implied in the use of 'I.' But probably the chief reason is that they looked for the awareness of the self in the wrong way. They tried to find a consciousness of self which had the same *positive* evidence for being an awareness as is found in an awareness of equality or in an awareness of some particular sense-datum. And this attempt failed. For the 'I' is much more elusive

than the other realities of which we are aware. It is divided into parts which are not themselves selves (unlike the parts of sense-data, which, if perceptible, are also sense-data); and of these parts we can be aware, and generally are, or can be, when we are aware of the 'I.' It is easy, therefore, to suppose that it is only the parts—the actual states—of which we are aware, while the 'I' is known only by description, and the belief in it can be justified only by inference from the states. This view also gains plausibility from the fact that 'I' has no content except parts of this sort. For it is natural, though erroneous, to argue that, if all the parts of the 'I' can be perceived separately, it is impossible to perceive the 'I' as a whole except by perceiving all those parts. And, of course, in perceiving the 'I' we do not perceive all its parts.

Thus, if we merely inspect our experience, the awareness of the 'I' is far from obvious. The only way of making it obvious is that suggested by Russell and employed in this article. We must take propositions containing the 'I,' and, to test the view that 'I' is known by description, endeavour to replace 'I' with its description. Only then does the impossibility of knowing 'I' except by awareness become clear.

Our conclusion is that 'I' must be known by awareness, if it is to be known at all. The alternative remains that it is not known at all, and that no statements which contain 'I' as a constituent are justifiable.

Of those philosophies which, without falling into complete scepticism, deny the reality of the self the two most important are Hume's and Bradley's. Hume (*Treatise of Human Nature*, 1. iv. 6, ed. T. H. Green and T. H. Grose, 2 vols., London, 1909, i. 533 ff.) seems to take the view that we must be aware of the self if we know it at all, since he contents himself with proving to his own satisfaction that we can have no 'impression' of it, and does not discuss the possibility that I might have a 'compound idea' of it, as I have of the death of Cæsar, which I did not see. He offers two arguments against the possibility of an impression of the self. The first is that the impression, if there were one, must be the same throughout life.

'But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv'd; and consequently there is no such idea.'

In answer to this we may say, in the first place, that it is not necessary that the impression should be the same throughout life. If I had it for a minute, it would be enough ground to believe in the self then. Whether there was any reason to suppose that the same self existed before and afterwards would be a matter for further argument. But, whether it did or did not, a self that lasted for a minute would still be a self. As for the passage quoted, no one would deny that no impression of 'pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations' could be an impression of the self. But to conclude at once, as he does, that no other impression can be an impression of self is entirely unjustified.

His grounds for making this illegitimate step are probably the fact that, if there is a self, it has parts, all of which are pains, pleasures, griefs, joys, passions, sensations, or something else which is not a self, and his supposition that, in that case, there can be no impression of the self which is not an aggregate of these. And this becomes explicit in his second argument.

Mankind, he says, 'are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.'

Without accepting the detail of this, we may agree that all the content of a self falls within various mental states, not selves, and that—at any rate, within certain limits—these change while the self remains the same self. But it does not follow from this that the self is not an existent reality, any more than it follows that a college is not an existent reality, because it is made up of men who are not colleges, and who join and leave the college while it remains the same college.

Moreover, Hume's attempt to account for the arrangement of the mental states without accepting the reality of the self, when looked at more closely, seems to involve the very reality that it was meant to exclude. For what is meant by saying that the perceptions which exist form different 'bundles or collections'? It does not mean that those which form the same bundle are connected in space with one another more closely than they are with those in other bundles, for Hume does not regard the perceptions as being in space. Nor can it be that they are connected more closely in time, or by resemblance. For, if there is really a bundle wherever there is, on the ordinary theory, a self, then similar and simultaneous perceptions are found in different bundles, and dissimilar and non-simultaneous sensations in the same bundle. It seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that the contents of each bundle must be determined to be parts of that bundle by their relation to, or inclusion in, some reality which is not any one of the contents, nor the aggregate of these taken as a plurality, but is something as ultimate as, say, one of the contents. If we reach this, we have reached the self.

It is not necessary to consider in detail all the stages in Bradley's searching and brilliant analysis of the various possible meanings of the self, on which he founds his conclusion that the self is not absolutely real. It is clear that, if the view which we have taken is to be refuted in consequence of any of his criticisms, it will be by those which he offers in respect of the sixth sense of the word which he discusses—that in which the self is a subject which becomes an object (*Appearance and Reality*, London, 1908, ch. ix.). For the self which, as we have decided, each of us knows by awareness as his 'I' is, as we saw, that which is the subject which perceives and judges. We do not say that it is only that, that it does nothing else. On the contrary, it is that which loves when my judgment, 'I love,' is true, and which is angry when my judgment, 'I am angry,' is true. But it is also that which is the subject in all knowledge. If Bradley has succeeded in disproving the reality of a self which is the subject of knowledge, he has disproved our conclusion. But, if he has not done this, he has not weakened our conclusion at all, since none of the other senses of self which he discusses is such that its validity is involved in the validity of self in our sense.

The self, Bradley says, is a concrete group. With this we may agree, since Bradley apparently means by it only that there is a plurality of parts in the self. He then points out that most, if not all, of the content of the self can become an object, and from this he concludes that very little, if any, of the content of the self can belong to it essentially. His view is that what becomes an object becomes *ipso facto* part of the not-self, and that what is not-self cannot be the self, or part of it. If Bradley is right in holding that whatever becomes an object must be removed from the self, then it is clear that no self can know its own existence. For no self could know its own existence without being an object of knowledge to itself, and a self cannot be its own object if the object *ipso facto* ceases to be self. Thus not only must we abandon

the view that I know my self by awareness—which we had found reason to think was the only way in which I could know myself—but, more generally, all knowledge of my self by my self is directly shown to be impossible.

But what reason is there for holding that a self cannot be its own object, remaining all the time the self which has the object? There appears to be no reason whatever. The presumption is certainly that it can be its own object, for, if it could not, I could never know my self (whether by awareness or by description), and consequently could never know any proposition in which 'I' occurs. Now, there are propositions in which 'I' occurs which I do assert, and which are *prima facie* true. The present writer can see no ground why this presumption should be rejected. It cannot be denied that there are certain relations in which a substance can stand to itself, and what is there in the case of the relation of knowledge which should make us reject the *prima facie* view that this is one of them? So far from that being the case, the more we contemplate our experience, the more reason we find for holding that it is impossible to reject knowledge of self. If we are right in this, Bradley's objection to the reality of the self, in the sense in which we have taken self, falls to the ground.

I am, then, aware of my own self. We now pass to a question of considerable importance—the relation of the self to time, or to that real series which appears as a time-series. It is a common view that the definition of substance should include permanence in time, or, at least, persistence through a certain amount of time.¹ But it is better to adopt a different definition, by which that which existed at a single and indivisible point of time would also be a substance. With regard to selves, the view that nothing is a self unless it is persistent through time is still stronger. Indeed, many refutations of the reality of selves confine themselves to showing, or attempting to show, that a self, defined in whatever way is being criticized, could not persist for the period covered by the life of a human body.

What can we say, on our theory, as to the persistence of the self? I know my self by awareness, and I can therefore be certain only of those of its characteristics of which I am aware, or which are involved in those of which I am aware. Am I aware of the persistence of my self through time? It seems to me that I am. For awareness lasts through the specious present. At any point of time, then, I may perceive my self at that point of time, and also my self at any previous point of time within the limits of a specious present. And if, between these points, I begin or cease to perceive something else, I shall, if I attend to the relation between the two perceptions, be aware of my self as persisting while other things change, and so as persisting in time.²

This period of time is, of course, very short relatively to the life of a human body. Have we any reason to suppose that the self which we perceive through a specious present persists itself through any longer time? It has been held by some writers that, for past periods which are earlier than any part of the specious present, but yet relatively near, our memory gives us absolute

certainly that the things which we remember did occur. If that is the case—it is not necessary for us to discuss whether it is or not—I can have absolute certainty that I existed at a time which falls within the limits where memory is absolutely trustworthy. If, at the present moment, I remember that I was aware of myself in the past, then the 'I' who now remembers and the 'I' who was then aware must be the same 'I,' unless the memory is erroneous—which it cannot be, by the hypothesis, within these limits—and therefore the same 'I' must have persisted from the moment of the remembered awareness to the moment of the remembrance.

Beyond this, there is no *certainty* of the persistence of self. If, outside the limits of certain memory, I remember that I did or was certain things in the past, that professed memory may be deceptive in two ways: It may, in the ordinary sense, be false, as when, in a dream, I remember that I committed a murder ten years ago. In the second place, even if the events which I now remember did happen to some one in my body, I may be in error in thinking that I experienced them. There may then have been another self related to my body, whose experience I now know and mistakenly judge to have been my own. The latter alternative is not at all probable, but it is not impossible. But, although there is no absolute certainty that my present self has lasted longer than the specious present and the short preceding period of certain memory—if there is such a period—yet there may be very good reason for holding that it is extremely probable that it has done so. There is very little reason to doubt that the feelings with which I now remember that I saw Benares really did occur more than twenty years ago, and the self which experienced them was the same one which is now remembering them. And there is very little reason to doubt that the same 'I' of which I am now aware did have various experiences ever since the birth of my present body, although I have no memory whatever of most of them. On similar grounds there is very little reason to doubt that, unless my body dies within the next week, the 'I' of which I am now aware will still exist at the end of this week.

The grounds on which we come to such conclusions will, of course, be empirical. But the results which we have reached as to the nature of the self, and as to my absolute certainty of my own existence within certain temporal limits, will have an important bearing on the validity of the conclusions as to further persistence. For, when objections have been offered to the common-sense view that each self—at any rate under usual circumstances—persists through the whole life of a living body, they have generally been made on the ground either that we do not know what the self is which is said to persist or that its persistence is incompatible with the changes in the 'bundle' of mental events. But we are now able to say that by the self we mean something of which the 'I' of which I am aware is an example. And so the question of any self existing to-day, whether it existed twenty years ago, is a perfectly definite question, whatever may be held about the true answer. We are also now able to say that, within the specious present, we are aware of a self which remains the same while changes occur among the mental events.

We have thus justified the statement at the beginning of this article. The quality of being a person is known to me because I perceive one being which possesses the quality, namely, myself. To be a person is a quality which I perceive in 'I,' when I perceive 'I,' and which I do not perceive in anything else which I do perceive, though I believe,

¹ For the sake of brevity, 'time' is used as an equivalent to 'time, or that real series which appears as a time-series,' whenever the context removes any danger of ambiguity.

² It does not, of course, follow that a thing begins or ceases to exist because I begin or cease to perceive it, but at any rate the perceptions will begin and cease. Since the perceptions are parts of the self, it follows that the same self can contain parts which exist at different times. It is also obvious that it can contain parts which exist simultaneously. If I know that I am angry, my self contains simultaneously a state of anger and a state of awareness (of the anger). Again, I am sometimes aware that I am both hot and happy.

rightly or wrongly, that it is possessed by other substances which I do not perceive. But is it a compound of various other qualities, or is it simple and indefinable? It would appear that it is the latter. There is a quality of personality, which, like redness, is made known to us by our perception of substances which have it, and, like redness, is simple and indefinable.

What is the relation of consciousness to personality? When we say that a self is conscious, we mean that it is conscious of something, i.e. it knows something. It would be a difficult question to decide whether the possession of personality necessarily involved the possession of consciousness, and, if so, whether a self had to be conscious at all times when it was a self, or whether its personality could continue during intervals when it had not consciousness.

A self-conscious self is one which knows itself, which, by our previous results, involves that it is aware of itself. Must a self be self-conscious? It has been maintained that it must be so. Sometimes it is said that consciousness is essential to the self, and that no being could be conscious unless it were self-conscious. Sometimes it is admitted that a being might be conscious without being self-conscious, but then, it is said, it ought not to be called a self. The present writer disagrees with both these views. It seems to him quite possible for a being to be conscious without being self-conscious. It is true that the only conscious being of whom I am ever aware is necessarily self-conscious, since it is myself. But I am not always self-conscious when I am conscious. Memory gives me positive reason to believe in states when I am not aware of myself at all—not states that are either abnormal, on the one hand, or mystic, on the other, nor states in which in any sense I am not a self, or am less a self than at other times, but a perfectly normal and frequent state in which I am conscious of other objects and am not conscious of myself, because my attention does not happen to be turned that way. I seem to remember such states. And, even if I did not remember them, it would still be perfectly possible that there should be such states, though there might be no reason for supposing that there were. And there is no reason why there should not be beings who are always in the condition in which I am sometimes, of being conscious without being self-conscious.

In answer to such considerations as these, it is sometimes said that self-consciousness is always found when consciousness is found, but that the self-consciousness is so faint that it escapes observation when we try to describe the experience which we remember. If there were any impossibility in the existence of consciousness without self-consciousness, it is doubtless to this hypothesis that we should be driven. But there seems no reason whatever why I should not be conscious of something else without being conscious of myself, and therefore no reason why we should conclude to the existence of this faint self-consciousness, of which, by the hypothesis, we can have no direct evidence.

Again, it is said that there is always implicit or potential self-consciousness. By this is meant that a conscious self could always be self-conscious if circumstances turned its attention to itself, instead of away from itself, that there is no intrinsic impossibility of self-consciousness. This is doubtless the case with me, and selves like me, at the times when we are not self-conscious. But it does not alter the fact that, at those times, we are just as really not self-conscious as at other times we are really self-conscious. Why should there not be beings who were conscious but whose nature was such that they could never be self-conscious?

It has also been maintained, as we said above, that, even if there could be beings who were conscious without being self-conscious, the name of self should be reserved for those who are self-conscious. This usage, it seems, would not be so convenient as the one which we have adopted. To call a conscious being a self only when it was self-conscious would involve that each of us would gain and lose the right to the name many times a day. It would be less inconvenient if the name of self were given to those conscious beings which are ever self-conscious, even at the times when they were not so. But there is a more serious difficulty. We are invited to define personality as being conscious of self. And consciousness of self is a complex characteristic which can be defined only when it is known what we mean by a self. Therefore, if self means the same on the two occasions when it enters into the statement, 'a self is that which is self-conscious,' we have a circular and unmeaning definition of selfness. But, if we avoid this by self not meaning the same on each occasion, it is obvious that we are using the word in a very inconvenient manner. On the whole, therefore, it seems better to say that selfness does not involve self-consciousness.

We have now determined what is meant by self, and how it is that we have the characteristic of personality. Spirituality may be defined as the quality of having substantial content all of which is the content of one or more selves. From this it follows that all selves are spiritual substances, but that they are not the only spiritual substances. Parts of selves, such as thoughts and volitions, or the parts of thoughts and volitions, would be spiritual. And so would groups of selves, whether those groups are important, such as a nation, or trivial, such as a bridge-party, or purely arbitrary, such as the group made up of Louis XIV., Sir Nathaniel Wraxall, and Sir Isaac Newton. (So, also, we may note for the sake of completeness, would be a group made up of some selves and some parts of selves. But this has no practical importance.) These are all spiritual substances, but they would not all be called spirits, since usage confines the phrase 'a spirit' to what is also called a self.

It would sometimes be maintained that our definition of spirit is too narrow. Whatever falls within the substantial content of any self, it would be said, is certainly spiritual, but spirit also includes content which is not part of any self. There is, or may be, knowledge, volition, emotion—in a word, experience—which does not fall within any self, and is not the experience of any self, and all this, it would be said, falls within spirit.

It might perhaps be admitted that, if there were such non-personal experience, it would have a good claim to be called spiritual. But the present writer submits that it is impossible that there should be. This is not a question about names. The assertion is that we mean the same thing by the names 'knowledge,' 'volition,' and 'experience' as is meant by the advocates of this view, and that we mean the same thing by the term 'self.' (At any rate, any slight difference that there might be in the meanings of the words would not account for the difference of opinion about impersonal experience.) The assertion is that there cannot be experience which is not experienced by a self because it seems evident, not as part of the meaning of the terms, but as a synthetic truth about experience. This truth is ultimate. It cannot be defended against attacks, but it seems beyond doubt. The more clearly we realize the nature of experience, or of knowledge, volition, and emotion, the more clearly, it is submitted, does it appear that any of them are impossible except as the experience of a self.

Nor are we led to doubt this conclusion by finding that it leads us into any difficulties. For nothing that we know suggests to us in the least the existence of impersonal experience. We never perceive it, since each of us perceives only himself and his own sense-data—and none of the facts that we do perceive is better explained on the hypothesis that there is non-personal experience than on the hypothesis that there is not.

All substantial content of spirit, then, must fall within some self. But now another point arises. Can any substantial content fall within more than one self? In that case either one self would form part of another or two selves would overlap, having a part common to both. Is this possible? It seems impossible that any part should be common to two or more selves. When I contemplate, to begin with, what is meant by an act of knowledge, a volition, or any other part of my experience, it seems as impossible to me that such a state should belong to more than one self as it is that it should not belong to a self at all. It may be said that this still leaves open the possibility that there should be parts of a self of which that self is not and cannot be aware—which are, in the ordinary phrase, unconscious parts of the self—and that these may be common to more than one self, though conscious parts could not be.

It is doubtful whether this view, that unconscious parts can be common to two selves though conscious parts cannot, has ever been maintained. Whenever it has been held that two selves could have a common part, it has always been held that one self could be part of another. And, since all selves are always held to have some conscious parts, this would involve that some conscious parts were parts of two selves. But, whether the view has been maintained or not, it seems false. From the nature of the case I cannot observe an unconscious state of a self, and all that I could know about it would be that it was a state of a self, and an unconscious state. But this is enough. For, when I consider what is meant by a self, it seems to me clear that a self is something which cannot have a part in common with another self. The peculiar unity which a self has puts it into a relation with its parts which is such that a part could not have it to two selves. Or, to put it the other way round, any relation which a substance could have to two wholes, of each of which it is a part, cannot be the relation of the state of a self to the self.

Since selves persist through time, each self is divided into parts persisting through the parts of the self's persistence. (And these parts it would have, even if we were wrong in our view that acts, of knowledge, volition, and the like, are parts of the self who knows and wills.) It seems equally impossible that any part in this dimension should be common to two or more selves.

The impossibility of any part of any self belonging also to any other self is, we may say, an ultimate truth, and cannot be proved. But it can be indirectly supported by discussing various ways in which it has been said that it is possible that one part should belong to more than one self. In the first place, it is often said that one self (and so the parts of it) can be part of another, if the included self is a manifestation of the inclusive self. This view has always been popular, because one of the chief grounds for wishing to show that one self can be part of another has been to make it possible for man to be part of God. For various religious motives many people have been anxious that a personal God—a God who is a self—should be the whole of what exists, or the whole in which all spiritual life falls. And, if man is to be part of God, it is a natural and attractive view to regard man as manifesting God's nature. If a self could

be part of another on condition of its being its manifestation, it would cover those cases in which people are generally most desirous to show that one self is part of another. Now, it is no doubt true that a self can manifest the nature of a whole of which it is a part. Thus we may say that Dante manifested the nature of the society of the Middle Ages, and that Chatham manifested the nature of England. But England and the society of the Middle Ages are not selves. Again, one self can manifest the nature of another. Thus a theist, who was not a pantheist, might say of a good man that he manifested the nature of God. But the manifestant is not part of the self whose nature he manifests. It seems that in many cases in which it is said that one self can be part of another the assertion is based on a confusion about manifestation. It is said that the inclusion can take place, if the included self manifests the other. And, because a self can be conceived to manifest the nature of a whole of which it is a part, and can be conceived to manifest the nature of another self, it is confusedly held that it can be conceived to manifest the nature of something which is *both* a whole of which it is a part and another self. But this, of course, is an illogical inference.

In the second place, it is suggested that, if a self A perceived a self B, and all its parts, and had other contents besides those perceptions, then B would be a part of A, and the parts of B would also be parts of A. This suggestion also applies chiefly to the inclusion of man in God. For we know of no case where a man can perceive another man, or his parts, and it is generally said (though, as said above, probably erroneously) that this would be impossible. But in the case of God it is often thought that this limitation need not apply. It is possible, no doubt, that B and its parts might be perceived by A, whether A was God or not. But this will not make B and its parts into parts of A. B perceives its own parts, or some of them, but the relation of having them as parts and the relation of perceiving them are quite different relations, and, if A should have the second, it does not follow that it will have the first. The confusion is probably due to the fact that, in our ordinary experience, no one perceives the part of a self except the self of which it is a part, and it is therefore mistakenly assumed that anything which did perceive it must be a self of which it is a part.

These considerations diminish any doubt which might fall on the truth of our position that the inclusion in selves of other selves or their parts is impossible. If it really is an ultimate truth, it may be said, why have so many thinkers believed that it is not true at all? But any force that there might be in this objection is diminished when we see that many of the people who asserted that the inclusion was not impossible had confused it with one of various other things which are quite possible, but are not the inclusion in question.

It is sometimes asserted, not only that such an inclusion is possible, but that we have empirical evidence that it does occur in those comparatively rare instances usually known as cases of 'multiple personality.' The most striking of these, and the one best adapted to prove the contention, if any of them could do so, is the case recorded by Morton Prince in his well-known work, *The Dissociation of a Personality* (New York, 1906). It does not seem to the present writer that any of the most interesting facts recorded in this book, or any other facts of the same class of which he has read, are incompatible with the view that only one self is, in each case, concerned with all the events happening in connexion with any one body, the characters, and the events remembered by that

self, suffering rapid oscillations, due to causes not completely ascertained. That such oscillations do take place has been certain since the time of the first man who became quarrelsome or maudlin when drunk, and reverted to his ordinary character when sober. The oscillations in such a case as we are now considering differ in degree, no doubt, from those seen in every-day life, but they introduce no qualitative difference.

Whether all the facts recorded of multiple personality can be explained in this way is a question into which we cannot now enter. But, if there were any of such a nature as to be incompatible with the theory that a single self was concerned in them, they would necessarily be of such a nature as to be compatible with the theory that they were caused by two selves, neither of them including the other, or any part of the other, which happened to be connected with the same body—

a connexion which we do not come across in any other part of our experience, but which has no intrinsic impossibility.¹ Thus any fact of multiple personality, whether the divergence of personality were slight or great, could be accounted for without requiring the hypothesis of inclusion, and no doubt can arise from these facts as to the correctness of our view that the impossibility of the hypothesis of inclusion is an ultimate truth.

Since such inclusion is an impossibility, it follows that, unless I am the whole universe, the universe cannot be a self. For I am aware of myself as a self, and, if I am not the whole universe, I am part of it. And the whole of which a self is part cannot be a self. This result is the same whether, of that part of the universe which is not me, all, some, or none consists of other selves.

LITERATURE.—See the authorities cited throughout.

J. ELLIS McTAGGART.

PERSONIFICATION.

Introductory and Primitive (G. FOUCART), p. 781.

American.—See NATURE (American).

Egyptian (A. H. GARDNER), p. 787.

Greek (E. A. GARDNER), p. 792.

Indian.—See NATURE (Hindu).

Roman (J. B. CARTER), p. 794.

Semitic (W. H. BENNETT), p. 800.

PERSONIFICATION (Introductory and Primitive).—Personification may be defined as the act of attributing a living, conscious, and active personality to inanimate natural objects (from the smallest object to complete portions of the physical world, and even the whole world itself), to forces and phenomena, to manufactured objects, or to abstract ideas and words.

There are two great difficulties in studying a subject like personification: (1) to discover the exact significance to primitive man (or, failing him, uncivilized man) of what we call 'personality'; and (2) to reconstruct, as far as possible, the psychological mechanism behind the process of personification. The first of these problems need not be treated here (see LIFE AND DEATH [Primitive], PERSONALITY). With regard to the second, there are so many examples of personification collected by modern bibliography that our only practicable plan here seems to be to arrange the facts roughly in classes and, noting as we go along the partial explanations that they suggest, try to come to a general conclusion. The examples in each class are so numerous that only a few can be mentioned. For further details see the literature at the end of the article.

I. **CLASSIFICATION.**—1. Inanimate natural objects.—The forces of nature and portions of the physical world (as primitive man imagines them) everywhere form the most important subdivision of the first class of personifications. It is impossible to draw up a complete list of all the varieties in use among the extinct primitive religions, and of those of which present-day uncivilized races give us a poor and distorted idea. But we may present a list in which the order followed is that corresponding, roughly, to the principal divisions of the universe as conceived by the most typical of those religions.

First there are the elements themselves, or, rather, what primitive man imagines to be the principal elements forming this universe. Water, fire, and earth we find universally conceived as persons. But this generalization presupposes an effort of fairly far advanced synthetic conception. A rougher or more childish subdivision is usual, the more elementary naturism generally resulting in the following classes:

(a) The sky, or (much more frequently) the

different skies or portions of the world that is conceived as above the earth and separated from it by the world of air. These are sometimes superimposed regions and sometimes real separate worlds. For the process of personifications of this class see art. SKY-GODS.

(b) The intermediary space between the sky, conceived as a solid world, and the terrestrial world is formed by air or airs. See art. AIR AND GODS OF THE AIR.

(c) The terrestrial waters form one of the commonest classes of personification. The sea or the different seas (e.g., the ocean of Dahomey, the glacial sea of the Eskimos, the Onajit Orit of the Egyptians) are wide-spread types. These personified waters are quite different from the waters of lakes and rivers (see below, I. 2 (c)). They are maritime waters. A point to be noticed is the general predominance of a special personification for the water which forms the boundary of the inhabited world—e.g., the old *Ὠκεανός* of Homeric Greece. In most cases it serves to connect the mass of terrestrial waters with those held up by the sky or those of the 'abyss' on which the earth rests. This notion throws light on primitive cosmogony, and on the primordial water of so many mythologies, from which every thing and every personified spirit, even the Supreme Being, came forth in the beginning (cf. art. WATER-GODS).

(d) The personified earth (not as an element, but as an expanse) has a place in most ancient myths; it appears at the very dawn of cosmogony in its creator rôle. Almost all the religions which reached the stage of outlining a world-history show the earth in this rôle, either alone or, more frequently, with the co-operation of the personified sky (see SKY-GODS). Usually the earth is conceived as female and consequently as a mother (cf. EARTH-GODS), but in exceptional cases (e.g., in Egypt) it is personified as a man. He engenders, and the rôle of giving birth to the world is reserved for a female sky. The necessary concurrence of the two elements is identical; but the maternal rôle of the sky shows a more philosophic idea of origins.

¹ No great difficulty is represented by the fact that, on this theory, one self would sometimes 'remember' what had happened to the other. Two such selves would have an important and unusual connexion, in the occupation of the same body, which might well be sufficient to account for this.

(e) Quite distinct from the person of the earth are the chthonic personifications of the under world. They correspond to various conceptions among primitive peoples, and concern not the superficial living layer of the soil, but a region quite different from the earth, about whose structure and extent races have had very different ideas (see DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD, STATE OF THE DEAD). It is sometimes regarded as a single division, sometimes as a series of divisions of the organized world. For these underground regions see UNDER WORLD.

(f) At the foundation of the series of personifications created by naturism we find the 'abyss,' or the primordial mass, usually imagined as liquid. In some cosmogonies it is the oldest of all persons, before the sky and the earth, which are only its emanations or persons sprung from it (see SKY-GODS)—e.g., the Egyptian *nun* and the Sumero-Chaldean abyss in advanced religions, and 'the waters' of the Bushongo and of the myths of S. Africa at the earlier stage.

Such a series of personifications is the product of an advanced naturism. It presupposes a complete view of the supposed subdivisions of the world, and, consequently, quite a power of generalization. We may therefore reasonably suppose that it is far from representing the primitive stage of the personification of nature. Much more ancient, to all appearance, are the fragmentary personifications found in every part of the universe. Before the sky was personified as the one universal sky, man personified separately, and as so many distinct entities, the different parts of the firmament, the various regions of the different skies (not to mention their inhabitants [see below, I. 2 (a)]); he imagined and personified the 'lower sky,' the 'upper sky' (as still seen in the Pyramid Texts at a much later date), the sunset sky and that of the sunrise, the 'skies of the horizons,' etc.; in the same way the spaces of the air were divided into quarters and domains, each of which was a person. As for the waters which sleep or roll on the surface of our planet, the enumeration of their personifications would be endless—springs, fountains, brooks, streams, rivers, ponds, lakes, marshes, etc. Their characteristic traits also suggested other personifications, viz. cascades, torrents, rapids, and cataracts. It should be noticed that the pre-historic religions of the valley of the Nile and those which we find to-day on the Black Continent or in Polynesia point towards the same conclusion: it is in springs and especially in remarkable irregularities of surface (rapids, cataracts, etc.) that the most ancient personifications of water seem to occur; i.e., the notion of force or energy superseded that of expanse. The phenomena peculiar to an aquatic region, like Morbihan in Brittany or the lagoons on the west coast of Africa (cf. R. E. Dennett, *At the Back of the Black Man's Mind*, London, 1906, and *Nigerian Studies*, do. 1910), reveal a similar mechanism for the particular cases.

The same infinite variety of persons is found for the solid element. The whole book of Nature is included, from the great peaks and high mountain-summits and the promontories and headlands on the coast to isolated rocks, from forests to isolated clusters of trees, from the great Arctic iceberg to isolated islands of ice.

The personifications of the chthonian domain have less numerous manifestations: grottoes, caverns, and especially passages supposed to be entrances to the other world. The *akir* and *amentit* of ancient Egypt have their equivalents in many a semi-civilized race in Africa at the present day, just as the various 'passages' in the subterranean domains of ancient Chaldaea or of

Homeric Greece have theirs in the remains of uncivilized religions.

2. Natural forces and phenomena.—The long list of personifications of physical nature shows us a constantly-recurring fact: among the objects most frequently personified we always find in the first rank those which attract man's attention either by their characteristic, exceptional, or abnormal appearance or by their apparent activity and its direct effects on man for good or ill. And if, as is probable, the understanding of the first causes and of the general manifestations of physical phenomena is beyond the intellectual power of primitive man, we again reach the hypothesis that personification originated not in the great divisions of the material universe, but in its very small fragments or portions when they seem to attract attention by an exceptional activity or power. It is therefore by isolated things, or small portions of space, of the earth or of the waters, and especially by manifestations of their energy apparent to the senses, harmful or beneficent, that personification must have arisen. This seems to be proved by an examination of the various personified natural forces, which we shall class, for convenience' sake, in the same purely artificial order as before.

(a) Thus, in the domain of the celestial we find personified alongside of regions of the heavens having no apparent rôle, like the Milky Way, all bodies whose movements and courses attract attention, and especially those whose activity seems to influence terrestrial phenomena or the state of human beings. This process of personification seems anterior to real deification and to any astrological system (see SUN, MOON, AND STARS). The personification of the solar or lunar eclipse as a hostile monster is a universal religious phenomenon and is everywhere of first importance. As a general rule we notice the pre-eminence of comets over fixed stars in their normal aspect, that of planets over the constellations, and that of the moon over the sun (generally found among uncivilized races). Here we get fresh light on the origins of personification. We also see the importance attached to the personified thunder-bolt, lightning-flash, or thunder-peal, as to all fragments of meteorites and fire-balls, and especially to the rainbow, to which so many primitive religions give an important place among sacred personifications. It is only at the second stage of religious evolution (e.g., in N. Africa, in Nigeria, among the Gallas, among the Hereros, in Ethiopia, and in Egypt—to mention only the African region) that these manifestations of the world above are connected with the personal activity of the sky-god; they become his voice, his appearance, or his material fragments (cf., e.g., the thunder-god or the ram-god of Dahomey).

(b) In the personification of air phenomena we find the same state of affairs, sometimes with more definiteness. *Æolus* in classical mythology and the Chaldean Demon of the South Wind are only two among many survivals of a great number of persons who, before being gods or spirits, in the proper sense of the word, were the 'animation' (see ANIMISM) of the most violent and remarkable phenomena of the air. The north winds of the savages in northern regions, the tempests of the Ainus, the winds of the whole of pre-Columbian America, the storms, great rains, hurricanes, cyclones, and water-spouts of so many savage races throughout the world did not become real gods until a much later stage (China, Kandhs, Melanesia, New Zealand, W. and S. Africa). Later still they became the attributes or the manifestations of great gods. But that is not to say that they were always directly personified for their own sakes. A careful examination of cases shows that these activities are usually connected with a fixed and

visible point of the material world; it is with a peak, a summit, an iceberg, or a headland that the gusts of wind, storms, and hurricanes are connected (e.g., Lake Tanganyika and Lake Victoria Nyanza, the Cameroon summits and the Ruwenzori mountains), and not with the spirit dwelling on these peaks or headlands, but, on closer examination, with the personified peaks or headlands. The problem is more difficult in personifications of phenomena such as the *aurora borealis* among races of cold countries, the St. Elmo fire, and the zodiacal light; and great caution is necessary here.

(c) But the region of 'persons' of the water (torrents, rapids, cascades, cataracts, etc.) shows the same facts (see above, I. 1 (c)), as do also the chthonian manifestations. Points where earthquakes are frequent, the volcanoes of Kilimanjaro in Africa and those of Mexico, Fujiyama in Japan, and the Icelandic geysers were personified for their own sakes, and as distinct persons, from the very fact of their activity, before becoming simply the habitat of a spirit or a god who shows his particular energy through them.

This review of the inanimate physical world and its chief manifestations of power seems to lead to the conclusion that personification (without considering yet whether it proceeds from pure animism or from a kind of dynamism) originated in man's encounter with a series of objects, and in phenomena attributed to those objects, and supposed to be endowed with will and intelligence, or at least passions, and consequently forming a personality, as primitive man understands it. But this explanation is only partial, and, as a matter of fact, the process of formation of the personality is much more complex. The naturistic world is only one part of the domain of personification.

In the very undeveloped stages of non-civilized societies we find a complete group of personifications which apparently cannot be explained in this simple way. Such an abstraction as time, e.g., seems *a priori* likely to escape personification, in the concrete sense of the word (the only acceptable sense in the case of primitive or non-civilized man). But we find that this personification is of general occurrence, in pre-Columbian America (e.g., Aztecs and Mayas) as well as in proto-historic Africa (the Nile Valley) or non-civilized Africa (Yorubas, Ashantis, Dahomans, etc.), where the 'persons' of the chief seasons or divisions of the meteorological year, of the type of the American Nipumukho and the Pipunikhe, the Egyptian *taru*, etc., play an important part. And these are real personifications, not rôles or 'appearances' assumed by the spirits or gods, of whom these divisions of time would be simple emanations.

The problem thus becomes very complex. At first there may have been the conception of persons whose activity shows itself in a group of regular phenomena, classified by the human mind under such simple terms as 'months,' 'seasons,' etc. From this a generalization would take place in time and space of those more humble personifications which we find in the forms of personifications of germination and maturity, of the return in spring of certain vegetable or cereal species, or more commonly in the form of the 'grain-spirit' or the spirit of the crops or harvest. These minute personifications, arising partly from animism and partly from dynamism (see below, I. 4), would proceed, as in the cases mentioned above, by more and more extensive generalizations up to an elaborate series of phenomena considered in their complete evolution. But the explanation becomes very doubtful in a case of personification of larger divisions of time, such as the year (cf. PERSONIFICATION [Egyptian]), cycle, period, etc. The stellar explanation is not sufficient, for it is evident that

these 'persons' have a real existence, independent of the stars and the celestial movements to which they ultimately adapted themselves.

Taking time-divisions in descending order, we find personifications of the divisions of the season; of the month and its subdivisions into four weeks or shorter periods; then of the day and its parts, hours or their equivalents. The complicated systems of the non-civilized Far East, of Central America, and of W. Africa show independent (and sometimes ingenious) types of these groups of personifications. But here we must notice: (1) the purely conventional and artificial character of many of them, and (2) their dependence, real though often difficult to prove, on spirits or deities; these pseudo-persons are in reality dependences or 'virtues' of deities or spirits far offener than entities with an existence of their own.

A similar reservation must be made with regard to the divisions of space, not the natural divisions which are enumerated above (I. 2 (a)), but the symmetrical ones invented by the half-knowledge of savage races or those of a proto-historic stage—e.g., the four cardinal points of the compass, or 'celestial houses' personified. Careful inquiry shows that, in the cases studied up to the present, these divisions are always 'functions' of some spirit or deity. It may be held, on the contrary, that the spirit or god assumed the personifications, or that he was originally subordinate and became detached from them. But closer examination shows that, as a general rule, he is anterior to them. The personifications, then, always slightly artificial, depend on the god from the very beginning, and not the god on them.

3. Manufactured objects.—We now reach a new set of personifications, which cannot be entirely explained by dynamism any more than by direct animism—artificial divisions of the earth made by man himself, or inanimate things which man has produced or shaped with his own hands. The most characteristic examples of the former are the personified State, province, or domain; of the latter the personified human constructions (city, town, village, fortress, isolated buildings, and, most naturally, temple or chapel). Another important group of 'persons' is the vast crowd of objects worked on or manufactured by man, from the gathered sheaf of grain or bunch of plants to implements, weapons, machines, and instruments of all kinds. The most remarkable group of personifications of this type consists of constructions such as bridges, or cult-objects such as tabernacles, altars, etc. (cf., e.g., art. ALTAR, BRIDGE), in which the distinct personality is clearly seen. We must reserve the examination of the mechanism controlling the formation of this class in the meantime; the following groups may help to explain it.

4. Abstract ideas.—Perhaps we may find new light in another class of personifications, which seem at first sight to proceed from a kind of animism grammatically applied by human language to pure abstractions. The personification of good or evil forces and of harmful qualities or powers, such as will, force, justice, order (e.g., the Egyptian *Mâ'et*), health, illness, death—in a word, abstractions—is a religious phenomenon not only of universal occurrence but also of the greatest antiquity. Although our data have been enriched by hundreds of excellent new examples since the facts and arguments of Max Müller and E. B. Tylor were advanced, the theory itself does not seem to have made corresponding progress. It is wise to regard as a kind of 'disease of language' a great many personifications, which in any case do not appear to be primitive—e.g., functions or functional qualities of an intellectual kind (calculation, architecture; e.g., the Sakkhet-abui of Egypt) or of a physical kind (hunting, fishing)—and to consider many of these personified activities or characters as detached *apart*, so to speak, of certain demons, spirits, or gods, with whom they are constantly associated in all religions; and, lastly, we must reject as artificial and purely conventional all that is comprised to-day under the very vague name of 'allegory'—vices, virtues, arts, sciences, commerce, industry, etc.—as these are late inventions to which a real personality has never been seriously accorded outside of rhetoric or poetry.

But, even after these eliminations, there remains an imposing number of abstract persons who defy any single interpretation. Is time, considered in *abstracto*, a person? The Greek *Χρόνος* points to an affirmative. Space and Destiny figure as personalities in more than a hundred religions, from the most humble to the classical systems of antiquity, and not only distinct from all the divine persons, but often superior to them or hostile towards them. Matter (Egyp. *nun*) exists in several non-civilized systems. Neither pure and simple animism nor animism working through language can explain these abstract entities satisfactorily.

Some light, however, is thrown on them by the present-day religions of some savage races. If, *e.g.*, we look at the personification of the idea of disease, we find that abstract generalization is beyond the conception of primitive man. There are diseases, but not disease in the abstract. Every affection or pain is either the definite work of a spirit or demon or a definite person. The wealth of amulets, fetishes, and attempts at images (painted, carved, and sculptured) establishes this fact beyond all doubt. Now, fetishism proceeds from dynamism as much as from animism; *e.g.*, in W. Africa malaria, sleeping sickness, abscesses, gastric derangements, and smallpox have special representations or separate fetishes and form persons having no connexion with each other. Similarly, Oro, the Dahoman disease-god, is originally the personification not of disease in general, but of internal bodily pain (probably lumbar or intercostal pain). There were as many real personifications as there were localized diseases and pangs, including hunger and thirst, which are real beings. It is only at a much more advanced stage that we find the personification of disease or pain in general; and still later (needless to say) that of beings such as Evil, etc. We may say that such fictions as Death holding in her hand Anxiety, Pain, and Misery (*e.g.*, the Hel of N. European myths) are purely literary and belong to the period of the creation of myth and folklore.

Here also we apparently come to the same conclusion as in the case of the cosmographic and cosmogonic personalities: the earliest personifications were not inclusive or general, but myriads of small personalities born from objects, events, or fragmentary experiences. More thorough research into the metaphysics of the non-civilized will probably lead to the same conclusions for personalities such as Force, Health, Knowledge, etc. The religious texts of proto-historic and pre-historic Egypt are valuable here as the only written evidence of primitive thought. From them we see that there was not one physical force, but several; more than one kind of health and productiveness; twenty kinds of 'knowledge'—of deceit, of 'cleverness,' of 'magical powers,' etc.—and not one Knowledge. And everywhere the tendency of primitive personification to form separate entities reappears.

This leads us to the very important personification of death. There is hardly a single race among whom Death, under the most diverse forms, has not been a person and had its place in myth. We need not consider the stage during which it is a purely allegorical figure, as in classical and modern literature. Death personified, and a real person, is found almost everywhere. Are we to think that it also is a later generalization, and that originally there were ten or twenty different kinds of death, forming as many personalities? The nature of death among the various races (see DEATH AND DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD) seems to lead to a different conclusion. To primitive man death is not annihilation, but a rupture of several elements, all more or less perishable, but each keeping, at the

moment of what is called death, its own separate life, capable of being prolonged. Death is therefore not a state, but an energy or an act. It is always the act of a person, every kind of death being the result of the evil activity of one of these persons. Death is thus an effect, a consequence, and yet it has become, at the same time, a single personality like each of the other personified energies.

We find in many religions a Death with its kingdom, a Death with its court, ministers, and army; and this at first gives the idea of a power as ancient and as distinctly personal as the oldest gods and spirits. But the Death of so many myths and religious literatures does not belong to primitive soil. The study of African, shamanist, or Australian death shows that the earliest stage had no conception of the huge formidable figures created later by the great semi-civilized mythologies of Polynesia and S. America, the learned religions of the classical world, or the systems of N. Europe. It is even doubtful whether the Death of pre-Columbian Mexico is a distinct personification; it is more probably an attribute, a force belonging to a deity, as is the case with the supreme god of a region of Black Africa. And it should be noted here that ancient Egypt (which kept so closely to the ideas of non-civilized races in many respects) is not acquainted with a personified Death; the monster Tiat is not death, but the destruction which consumes ghosts.

It has seldom been remarked that death has always been personified, while life has not been personified to the same extent. There are few indications so valuable as this fact in reaching by synthesis the conception of death that prevailed among primitive men. Life was not the opposite of death. When death became a personification, it was by the ordinary process of personifying acts and energies. But life defies definition by the savage mind; it seems to be neither a state nor an energy, but, in the majority of the cases examined, a thing inseparable from various fragments of matter, and, consequently, impossible to personify separately. We can only mention this peculiarity in passing; it is common among non-civilized peoples, and may lead to important results in the study of primitive psychology.

II. CONCLUSIONS AS TO ORIGINS AND PROCESS.

—I. Personification forms.—However incomplete our enumeration of the various kinds of personifications may be, its first result is to show the (perhaps preponderating) importance of the notion of force. But how was this notion expressed? The material forms given by man to the various personifications supply important elements for the consideration of the origin and nature of personification. And, while the material classification of so many hundreds of persons is difficult, the bibliography at our disposal gives a sufficient number of distinct types for the various religions.

(1) The first category comprises anthropomorphic forms. The sex of these personifications is determined sometimes by the material objects which are their corporeal essence, sometimes by their activities, and sometimes by language. The Sun, man or woman, the Moon, of male or female sex, the Stars, of different sexes, the Father or Mother Earth, are examples which might be supplemented throughout the whole of the cosmographic series examined above (I. 2 (a)).

(2) Animal forms (apart from the difficult questions of zoolatry and totemism [*q.v.*]) constitute the second of the great classes. The ram-thunderbolt, the serpent-rainbow, the dragon-tornado, the dragon-eclipse, the white-bear-tempest, are among hundreds of examples. As a general rule, animal figures seem to be the form preferred for personifications of awe-inspiring energies, rapid action, and terrible aspect. 'Mixed' forms, *i.e.* half-animal and half-human, do not seem ever to be direct formations, but result from the union of two or more personalities originally distinct.

(3) Lastly, monstrous or fantastic forms, of strange or horrible aspect (*e.g.*, the South Wind in

the Chaldean religion), for very simple psychological reasons, are reserved for wicked personifications. An examination of the chief forms of persons of this category, as represented in the iconography of N. Europe, Polynesia, Africa, and pre-Columbian America, yields abundant facts in support of this.

But do these three forms (anthropomorphic, zoomorphic, and monstrous) represent the really primitive way of expressing personalities? An affirmative answer amounts to admitting that idolatry preceded fetishism. The study of the crudest forms of personification among savages shows a different mechanism, which at the same time gives us a closer view of the manner in which a great many of these personalities are elaborated.

Of course, we must eliminate all the personifications introduced by a later age—the purely poetical, allegorical, conventional, or grammatical—as artificial and without foundation. They are often simple pictographic devices, if we may say so, implying no real belief in a positively existing person. We shall also omit the various personalities that are merely hypostases (see below, II. 4) of deities of superior rank. They are simply linguistic or pictographic means of expression and not truly primitive.

In the first place, then, the process of pure and simple animism, as Tylor defines it (*PC*³ i. 425), and the psychological mechanism by which Keane (*Man, Past and Present*, pp. 279 f., 421, 502 f.) explains anthropomorphism (*q.v.*) are contradicted by an increasing array of facts, and it would be most incorrect to assume here (as has been so improperly done in many other problems) that the mentality of the savage is the same as that of the child. Pure and simple animism is perhaps reconcilable, strictly speaking, with the statement that in nativist personifications the spirit is independent of the object or thing which it personifies (the system of inflexions of the Bantu languages is a striking example of this conception); but it clashes with the personifications of acts, forces, and energies. If it connects them with specifically distinct spirits or gods, it at the same time destroys the real existence of these personifications. If it allows them to exist, it cannot explain, in the majority of cases, either their characteristics or their material appearance. It is undoubtedly true that for primitive man everything lives, and that there is no such thing as an inanimate object. Everything has an *anima* (or several), and each thing manifests by its real or imagined activity the existence of a conscious voluntary principle endowed with instincts, feelings, and passions. But what do we find to be the favourite material means employed to express or fix these personalities and make them real? As a rule the forms have no direct connexion with the forms that we should expect to result from the helioids attached to the personalities. Theriomorphism or zoomorphism, *e.g.*, is proved to be the result of most complicated processes (as is usually the case among savages, because they cannot see the simple, the general, or the synthetic); it is manifestly the product of ultra-conventional, symbolical conceptions, as far removed from the real nature of the personality which they express as, *e.g.*, the Christian representation of the dove is from the theological idea of the nature of the Holy Spirit. The most common and most ancient practice of uncivilized races was to translate and incarnate their personifications in aniconic objects.

The great number of personifications of plants, fruits, stones, pebbles, animal or vegetable debris, and especially the fantastic combinations of them made by the hand of man, are indications of vital importance. It is well known that even in the

fetishes with human or animal form (real semi-idols) the force or virtue—in a word, the soul or the person of the fetish—does not depend on the form or the characteristics of the puppet of wood (or any other material), but on the collection of bones, feathers, hairs, nails, leaves, grasses, or other substances that cover it or are fixed in its head, on its back, or in front of it. Now these medleys are not magically connected with the spirits or demons of the beings from whom they proceed; it is an entirely different personality that is named and fixed in the fetish by such collections. The relation, therefore, is not animistic. It may be objected that the fetish itself is not a person, but the momentary shelter, the abode, of a person. But even this objection (supposing it to be true for all so-called fetishes, which is far from being the case) would tend to confirm the dynamist character of the origin of personification in the instances examined so far.

2. Symbolical representations. — We shall examine briefly the methods of the dynamist expression of personifications. They are extremely varied. Sometimes primitive man proceeds by allusion to the supposed affinities of the entity to be personified with the whole class of substances the separate members of which produce part of the energies belonging to it; this is the origin of fetishes. Sometimes he proceeds in the same way, but by antinomy or antiphrasis. Sometimes he employs the animal or vegetable forms, simple or complex, by means of which the person usually manifests one of his activities (this process is quite different from direct animistic representation of the ordinary habitat of a personality; that has to do with animism properly so called, zoolatry, dendrolatry, and, later, idolatry). In other circumstances he proceeds by symbolism or sympathetic magic, representing the objects whose virtues or characteristics most resemble those of the personalities which he wishes to express (*cf.*, *e.g.*, J. Henry, *L'Ame d'un peuple africain: les Bambara*, Paris, 1909, p. 212 ff.). Sometimes there are allusions (very difficult for us to understand) to the virtues expressed by colours, personifying some superior force, or by lines, strokes, or geometrical combinations, or by stones whose clearness, brilliancy, and texture are the material expression of the qualities of the personality. Easier to understand are the processes which express the conception of the personality in lifelike representations, by association of ideas, the effect for the cause, or *vice versa*—*e.g.*, the effects of inundation, fire, death, or disease—by material allusions or by symbolical parallels, by means of objects that suggest to the mind their first causes or, on the other hand, their results; examples are the personification of thunder by fragments of stone or meteorites (which later become the basis of litholatry), the use of horns to personify strength, and of all kinds of brilliant objects to personify light, etc., or the representation (in Dahomey) of a pole painted blue, with red dots, to personify smallpox (because the body of a black-skinned person suffering from this disease assumes that appearance). In the anthropomorphic class the different personalities of the various pains and physical ills (including hunger and thirst) are translated by the representation of the result of their energy—a man with a twisted neck to personify wryneck, a man as thin as a skeleton to personify consumption, etc. This class is unlimited and includes all kinds of expressions of good and bad personifications. It leads, by extension, to the representation of the personality by the figure of a being who, in character or powers, comes nearest the activity imagined in the personality represented—an important process, as it is the origin of fully half

of the zoomorphic or theriomorphic figures. A still more curious development is the materializing of the personification in the representation of an object which produces effects similar to those produced by the personality to be expressed; the stick, the sword of hard wood, the arrow, the lance, the stone axe, and the imitation of lightning are the most remarkable examples of this class. It has had a most important result, in the much later idea of placing these representations in the hands, on the head, or on the body of images with human features, in order to complete, by gesture or attitude, the manifest expression of the activity displayed, and it has contributed in large measure to anthropomorphism and idolatry.

3. Personification of energy.—These examples are perhaps sufficient to throw a little light on the difficult question of the origins of personification. The originating elements are many, and there is every appearance that all have been active separately and from the very beginning. It cannot be denied that pure and simple animism was first responsible for a large number of the persons believed to exist in the physical world of rocks, mountains, waters, winds, etc.—in a word, of nature broken up into thousands of objects. Direct animism also explains the personality given to the products manufactured by man. The need of concrete images of words, even the most abstract, the need of giving them, so to speak, flesh and bones and visible attributes, was also the source of a number of personifications, and for this grammatical animism the views of Tylor, correcting the exaggerations of Max Müller, are an excellent scientific basis.

But, besides these forms, and at the same time, another feeling led primitive man to personification. Neither the *mana* nor the *orenda* of recent theories seems to define it exactly, any more than the 'feelings of immensity' or of 'incoercible force' of F. B. Jevons's ingenious theory (*Introd. to the Study of Comparative Religion*, p. 114 ff.). Conceptions so strongly synthetic are beyond the mentality of the savage. If we may make an attempt at a more correct explanation, primitive man seems to have confusedly guessed the existence of an impersonal force, united to matter, distinct and different from spirits, demons, or gods, whose existence and activities he also recognized. He never attempted to define this force theoretically; he did not even try to conceive it in its unity any more than he could, in the case of matter itself, do anything but perceive some of its fragments or aspects. But here and there he discerned its manifestations, either in duration (e.g., the seasons) or in space (e.g., the celestial regions or quarters of the sky), or in both at once (e.g., germination), or, lastly, in the encounters with invisible forces which he experienced. Whenever he discerned these more or less fragmentary manifestations, he detached them from the mass of the inaccessible and the unknown, and by this very act he created a personification. It became detached from the whole with the same ease which in developed religions gives so many multiple souls, essences, or attributes to one and the same god.

4. Personification and syncretism.—This capacity of breaking up into different personifications a single force confusedly surmised (but never seen) justifies one of the most noteworthy characteristics of the evolution of the savage's notion of personality.

Such personalities were naturally, and by previous definition, deprived of all moral character. They had, for good or ill, only the qualities which best explained the physical manifestations whose activity had led man to imagine as first causes of

such activity the existence of certain persons. Now, this is something entirely different from anthropomorphism—though many writers (e.g., Jevons) have imagined it to be so originally—viz. that man proceeded by first imagining beings like himself, and then endowing them with passions and manifestations of energy similar to his own. Certainly, when primitive man, in order to define the appearance of these personifications, tried to realize their desires, appetites, instincts, passions, and beneficent or harmful emanations (benevolence, anger, pity, resentment), he had no other resource in his thought, still less in his spoken thought, than to use as models the images and words which he used of himself. We often do the same when our poor terminology forces us to say 'God hears,' 'God sees,' He 'understands,' He 'is grieved,' or He 'pardons,' or even when we say that He 'knows.'

A discussion on this point would be useless, as it is merely a question of terminology. At the bottom the process of ascribing a character to a certain personality has resulted chiefly from the supposed experience and the knowledge claimed of its material manifestations, by observing the most characteristic phenomena of the life of nature—its winds, its waters, its various aspects, and its apparent convulsions. These are the essential characteristics of all these personifications; and the inevitable consequence was that they must have been originally totally indifferent to the human being. They were neither friendly nor hostile to him (these words are devoid of meaning to primitive man). They lived and showed their powers in the direction which satisfied their aptitudes and needs. Where man felt their activity to be helpful or harmful, they were in the end classified as good or bad. But this process was very slow, for the effects of the activity of those persons on the human being determined the relations of reverence and fear, and suggested inveigling them long before men thought of loving or hating them. Such relations, aiming at self-protection or utility, were neither hostile nor friendly; they were utilitarian. They were not measured by the theoretic power of the persons, but by the frequency of the relations with man. A far-off and quasi-inactive personification, like the sky, e.g., may be among many uncivilized races the most ancient, powerful, and remarkable of personifications, while at the same time it is the one with which they are least concerned, and to which they pay only the most meagre of reverential or propitiatory rites.

This simple formation of the characters of personifications from observation explains syncretism—in a way which at first sight is almost paradoxical—much more easily than it could be explained if the question of moral qualities had to play a part. As a matter of fact, the conferring on a certain personification *par excellence* of a separate definite activity, then later of a permanent activity (equally definite), has given rise to specifically functional personifications. But, in proportion as the complexity of an activity of nature was better understood by man, he detached from the first personification separate new personalities, corresponding to the separate new forces which he understood. But such a mechanism, by its very facility, must just as easily work in the opposite direction. For at the same time the advance of thought and research on the principle of causality was constantly connecting with each other successions of activities at first believed to be separate, so that, alongside of the continual multiplication of personifications by more complete knowledge of the complexities of life, there was found in the world a gradual (and not less continuous) uniting

of personifications originally separate. Thus new persons constantly appeared, and the former ones at the same time gradually merged into each other, by the play of the multiple souls of a single being or by the theory of 'aspects' or that of hypostases of one and the same person. In this incessant double process a sort of primitive syncretism tended to evolve. Sprung at one and the same time from the various animisms and from what, for want of a better name, we must call dynamism, primitive personification, having reached this point, enters the sphere of semi-civilized and advanced religions (for which see the following comparative articles).

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GEORGE FOUCART.

PERSONIFICATION (Egyptian).—I. Scope of the article.¹—In this article it is intended to deal only with those deities which can reasonably be called 'personifications'; and these are deities of which we have reason to believe that they were suggested more by inward reflexion than by observation of external things—deities, in fact, in which the conceptual or thought element looms larger than that of sense or perception. The distinction is an artificial one, for the act of deification obviously implies a highly conceptual view of the thing deified; the sun, *e.g.*, though an object of perception, could not have become a god except through certain qualities of power and the like attributed to it. The value of the term 'personifications' as a means of classifying our facts is that it enables us to attack the problem of god-making at its nearer and more easily explorable pole. Starting with gods of a highly abstract character like Hiko, 'magic,' we thence pass on to more concrete deities—*e.g.*, personified geographical terms like Amenet, 'the west.' At the borderline of our subject are certain psychical entities like Bai, 'soul,' Khaibet, 'shadow,' and symbolic deities like Shesmu, the god of the 'oil-press' and 'wine-press,' and Meskhenet, the goddess of the 'birthplace.' Beyond the border we find it convenient to place nature-gods, animal-gods, fetishes, and all classes of gods whose names immediately evoke the image of particular objects or phenomena in the visible world.

The propriety of including symbolic gods under this head might be questioned on the ground that their names, unlike those of other personifications, do not correspond to the precise thing that it is intended to personify, but symbolize it by a connexion with it, to *e.g.*, Hiko, 'magic,' is the god who is, but his name is not 'magic,' but 'press' used in connexion with them. From the Egyptological point of view, however, it would be inadvisable to separate this category of deities from those which can more justly be called personifications; Meskhenet, 'birthplace,' *e.g.*, is usually found associated with Shay, 'fate,' or Renenet, 'nursing.'

The ground to be covered in this article has been demarcated in reference to the psychological notions of perception and conception, but we might equally well have defined personifications in terms of 'things' and 'names.' The Egyptians seem themselves to have regarded the matter in that light, for the following words are put into the mouth of the god Hiko: 'I am that name which the Sole Lord created, when as yet there were no two things upon the earth' (P. Lacau, *Textes religieux égyptiens*, Paris, 1910, no. 73, line 5 f.).

¹ The writer is deeply indebted to Dr. A. Wolf for valuable criticism and advice in the use of terms.

2. Personification and language.—Language is full of metaphor from personal life, and, since the meaning of every name is coloured by the predicates and epithets used in connexion with it, a sort of animatism is involved in all speech, as, indeed, it is in all thought. But, when the Egyptian says that a fire 'gives' warmth, or that right 'brings' its venture safe to port, it is hardly correct to cite this as sufficient evidence of personification; the speaker may have been utterly unaware that his expressions implied the attribution of personality either to fire or to right. A second Egyptian, on the other hand, in the moment of pronouncing the same phrases, may have had a dim mental image of fire and right as persons, in which case personification of a rudimentary and momentary kind would undoubtedly be involved. Language, then, using personal metaphors, does not necessarily attribute personality, though it provides a fertile soil out of which a more real because more conscious and permanent personification springs up almost inevitably.


3. Causes of personification.—(a) *Analogy*.—We are not here seeking the origin of the earliest gods, and are therefore entitled to start our inquiry at a point of time when the Egyptians already possessed a multiplicity of deities. It seems obvious that in such an atmosphere new deities would be created with the utmost ease, if only to sustain the character and style of a mythological passage. When it was related that the sun-god Ré emerged upon a lily from the primeval waters, called Niu or Nūn, it became almost inevitable that those waters should be spoken of as engendering Ré, and the repetition and variation of the same theme would soon convert Nin or Nūnu into a fully-fledged deity, whom Ré addressed as 'my father,' and who was accounted 'the eldest god.' In quite different contexts analogy and close association might work very similar results: thus in one Theban tomb the 'lifetime' (*ahē*) of the deceased owner and the 'false door' (*abē*), where offerings were laid before him, are exceptionally co-ordinated with 'his soul,' 'his fate,' and other entities both here and elsewhere considered divine; and in the next sentence all the substantives thus co-ordinated are referred to as 'these gods' (N. de G. Davies and A. H. Gardiner, *Tomb of Amenemhêt*, London, 1916, p. 99 f.). This is an instructive instance of the way in which gods were artificially multiplied.


(b) *Pictorial art*.—A second highly important cause of personification was the wide extension given to painting and sculpture as a means of recording ideas and facts. The inability of pictorial representation, as such, to meet all the exigencies of expression imposed by thought and language early led to its bifurcation into the two separate branches of illustrative art and hieroglyphic writing (*Journal of Egypt. Archaeology*, ii. [1915] 71-75). These two branches pursued their development *pari passu* and in constant combination with one another, and it not seldom happened that one of them encroached upon the domain of its fellow. There can be little doubt that the actual step involved in personification was often due to an encroachment of this kind; sculpture encouraged personification by usurping the function of writing and by attempting to express pictorially things which in reality rather called for expression in language or writing; *e.g.*, a frequent theme in the adornment of early tombs was the bringing to the deceased of funerary supplies by his country estates; the latter, however, could hardly be depicted otherwise than by allegorical methods; the word for 'estate' (*nēet*) being feminine, it was natural to represent the list of contributing estates as a procession of women with offerings in their hands. The adoption of the pictorial method

thus have been the accidental means by which the image of a personal agent became perpetuated in the minds of the Egyptian in connexion with names of things that had hitherto evoked no very definite or tangible images. In the early temples this procedure was extended. The obvious analogy between the fruitfulness of the provinces and the fertility of the Nile was seized upon by the artists, who depicted the provinces in the image of the Nile-god, giving to them, as to him, the head of a male deity but the milk-laden breasts of a mother. Nor did this artificial multiplication of gods end here; material prosperity could almost equally well be attributed to such abstract causes as 'riches,' 'peace,' or 'health,' or else to general conceptions like 'seed,' 'summer,' or 'creative command'; all of these might accordingly be represented in human shape, their sex being determined by the grammatical gender of their names. It is noteworthy that these wholly artificial beings are apt to be associated in the sculptures with deities of a far less dubious character—a fact which could not fail to assist the legitimization of their existence; by this are meant a readiness to consider them on the same footing as the old, universally-recognized gods, and an absence of any feeling that they were mere inventions of the mind, not to be taken seriously.


For some early and typical representations of this kind see L. Borchardt, *Das Grabdenkmal des Königs Sahu-ré*, Leipzig, 1913, vol. ii. plates 20, 29, 30, with the comments by K. Sethe, pp. 99 f., 108 f.

(c) *Writing*.—Egyptian hieroglyphic writing, being born in the fashion described above (b), never succeeded in purging itself entirely of its original pictorial elements. These survived, in particular, in the class of signs known as 'determinatives,' which are simply picture-signs placed after phonetically written words in such a way as to determine or suggest their meaning. All written


names of gods are followed by the sign , repre-

senting an ordinary male deity, or else by , the

falcon-god Horus, the type of the gods, upon a standard such as was carried in religious processions; the latter was the earlier method. Goddesses similarly were indicated by the presence of

the sign , for which is sometimes substituted

either one of the two determinatives of male deities or else the image of the typical serpent-

goddess, Buto, . Now this very habit of writ-


ing, together with the fact that only few words were allowed to dispense with determinatives, would naturally tend to bring the question of personification or non-personification actively into the field of consciousness. For Egyptologists the presence or absence of such determinatives is the most natural test: when, e.g., we find the word 'life' with this clear meaning and determined with a sign of divinity, then we can hardly refuse to speak of it as personified.

(d) *The fundamental cause*.—The causes of personification considered hitherto are, however, contributory rather than fundamental. At the root of all god-making lies a respectful attitude of mind towards certain phenomena, physical or mental, arising from a consciousness that they are sources of power difficult to control, yet necessarily to be reckoned with. It is in connexion with either the practical or the intellectual interests of mankind that this respectful attitude of mind manifests itself, and a broad survey of the concepts personified will show that they represent either


facts that have a direct bearing upon human welfare or notions that appeared essential to a mythological interpretation of the world. Of course personification did not always necessarily follow immediately upon the realization of the importance of a conception; it is a definite, more or less conscious step taken at a given moment. Psychologically considered, personification appears to be the reaction against the vagueness and consequent elusiveness of conceptions as compared with perceptions—in other words, the tendency, upon realizing the forceful, influential nature of a phenomenon, to form a mental picture of it more vivid and therefore more in accordance with its supposed importance. The method in which this was done will be explained below; meanwhile it must be said that, looking beyond this general statement, we cannot really account for the selection of the concepts personified except as due to chance, i.e. to causes too complex to be summed up in one general formula. Certain points, however, stand out clearly. There is sometimes an alternative to personification: attributes deemed of importance may attain to a sort of personal reality by being made characteristic of one or other of the great gods. Thus Thôth became the god of learning, Ptah the god of handiwork, Min the god of procreation. Personification and attribution may co-exist; e.g., Mā'et, the goddess 'right,' is found beside Ptah, 'the lord of right' (*neb mā'et*). Affiliation often serves as a means of reconciling the two; the sun-god Rē had a clearly-marked ethical aspect, and in consequence Mā'et was described as his daughter. A point of a different kind worth noticing is that, on the whole, the personification of evil things was avoided in Egypt; Sôd, 'fear,' is one of the rare exceptions. This reluctance to attribute power and importance to what is bad speaks volumes for the optimistic outlook of the Egyptians.

4. *Personification and visualized form*.—All personification, by definition, involves a certain change of appearance, visual or other. Let us consider what happens when the sky is personified, though strictly this example lies beyond the scope of the present article. Language and thought being unable to escape from the human analogy, it follows that the more 'meaning' the sky acquires, i.e. the more numerous the attributes and functions ascribed to it, the less able will the perceived physical reality be to do justice to the augmented conception as a whole. Clearly the deliberate positing of a personal agent in place of or beside the perceived reality will provide a much better peg upon which to hang the previous and subsequent conceptual accretions, and will allow of the expression of these in much more vivid, because more personal, language. The visual sense being by far the most important of the senses, personification usually manifests itself in a visual form, whether this be actually externalized (sculpture or painting) or merely implied by verbal imagery. Sometimes one word is kept for the physical reality, like *pet*, 'sky,' while an old synonym is employed for the personified concept, like Nut, the heaven-goddess. In the visual forms that personifications assume the specific characteristics of the things personified tend to be indicated: the Nile-god has the swelling breasts of a mother and a body covered with wavy lines suggesting water; Nut, the heaven-goddess, forms an arch with her body, supporting herself with hands and feet above the recumbent earth-god, Geb; the 'external manifestation,' *bai*, is a bird with human face, the bird-like appearance apparently being intended to symbolize the ease with which the *bai* could ascend to heaven and take a place among the stars; the *ka*, or 'character,' being nothing more than the

spiritual image of a man, follows the changes of his growth, the *ka* of the child being a child, and the *ka* of the grown man being a grown man. Elsewhere cruder methods are used for representing the specific character of a personification: Sokhet, the marsh-goddess, is sometimes shown with a plantation of reeds and flowers placed upon

her human head; Mâ'et, 'right' () wears

the feather which for some unknown reason is the symbol of right; Sin', 'understanding,' either has his name written in hieroglyphs over him or else

has the characteristic phonetic sign  in the


written word *sin'* actually touching his head. Personification, seriously enough, does not always demand that the deities which it forms should be depicted outwardly in the form of a person; all that is demanded is that there shall be some concrete and easily visualized rallying-point round which the attributes of personality can group themselves. The harvest-goddess Ernûtet is represented either as a woman with the head of a cobra or as completely a cobra; this is doubtless because that snake was so frequently found among the ripe corn. The names of certain personifications may suggest concrete symbols of this kind (symbolic gods); thus Shesmu, the god of the wine-press and of the oil-press, really personifies the making of wine and oil, which is symbolized under this mental image; the picture of the wine-press occurs incidentally in the hieroglyphic writing of his name, and it is doubtless mere accident that the god himself was not pictorially represented in that form.

5. Degrees of personification. — In its most rudimentary form personification was, for the Egyptians, little more than a natural mode of emphasis, analogous to our use of capital letters in writing. But between this embryonic form of deification and the most fully developed personifications almost every stage of growth can be observed and exemplified, until at last there is no distinction between them and the principal gods of the pantheon. Indeed, the main interest in the study of personifications is the prominence which it gives to the fact that the vast majority of gods¹ differ from them not in kind but only in degree, that their characteristics are not those of real persons, as the language of the older school of mythologists would often seem to imply, but that, since they are merely concepts decked out in the semblance and trappings of real persons, their individuality is at all times of a very precarious, unstable, and indefinite kind. Their gradual acquisition of substance and externality can nowhere better be seen than in the evolution of a personified abstraction. The metaphors of language, as we have seen (§ 2), give the primary impulse; but it is to sculpture and, in a less degree, to ideographic writing (§ 3 (b) (c)) that is largely due the definite creation of a personality that is visualized with some clearness and even with a certain measure of consistency (§ 4). Around this nucleus the theologians and the myth-makers weave their tissue of legends and adulatory epithets, each new tale and each new title adding to the appearance of objective reality, making the personification more lifelike. At last men may be prevailed upon even to worship it. The history of Hiko', 'magic,' may serve us as an illustration. Originally perhaps a mere descriptive term predicated of individual acts of a certain mysterious

quality, it first becomes a collective term for a number of such acts, and then a designation of the particular quality that they possess in common.¹ As sneh Hiko' is described in the Pyramid Texts as speaking threats against unfriendly gods. Thanks to exaggerated verbal imagery of this kind, Hiko' is next found in the Vth dynasty, depicted upon a temple wall as a male deity at the head of a procession of personified districts. This development marks his definite entrance into the pantheon; henceforth it is easier to describe the functions of magic in reference rather to the vividly remembered image made familiar in sculpture than to the remote and somewhat elusive concept, and mythical traits now tend to be invented which have but little relation to the observed facts that gave rise to the word 'magic.' The process, we must be careful to observe, is one not of substitution, but of differentiation; the old general term *hiko'* continues to exist and have its uses, but side by side with it is the conception of a god Hiko', which comes into play when the mind, so to speak, is differently attuned, when the imaginative, emotional tendencies are being given more rein. In a Middle Kingdom text Hiko' figures as a deity created by the sun-god Rê-Atum 'when as yet no two things existed'; and from his activity as deputy of the sun-god sprang all living things. The fantastic idea now gained currency that dead men might become reincarnate in the likeness of so potent a divinity, and spells having this end in view were invented. Next Hiko' is found escorting Rê through the nether world, as he sails by night underground from west to east; in the temple of Luxor we behold him in attendance at the birth of a new Pharaoh. Lastly, in Græco-Roman times, he is discovered at Esneh as the son of the god Khnum and the goddess Nebun, actually receiving a cult under the name of Hiko'-pe-khrôd, 'magic-the-child'; here doubtless his image, visible and tangible and as living as any god can ever become, was preserved in its own shrine and attended by his own priestly servants. It is not maintained, of course, that Hiko' ever took a place among the highest gods of Egypt, but in the end he appears to be hardly at all more spurious than the best of them.

On Hiko' see an article by the present writer in *PSBA* xxxvii. [1915] 253-262, also *ib.* xxxviii. [1916] 129.

6. Instability of personifications. — (a) *Instability of visual form.* — There was very little stability as regards the outward forms of personifications; nor were human shapes necessarily prior to animal or other shapes. The goddess of the harvest, Ernûtet, was a cobra-goddess from the start. A good instance of a god with secondary and variable animal shapes is Shay, 'fate,' who in his earliest occurrences—e.g., in the papyrus of Ani (ed. E. A. W. Budge, London, 1913, vol. i. pl. 3)—is human-headed. Later, and perhaps through assimilation to the creator-god, Khnum, he is represented as a goat (Budge, *Greenfield Papyrus*, London, 1912, pl. 108); and later still the writing of his name shows him to have been imagined in the form of a serpent, or else in the semblance of the animal of Seth (see G. Möller, *Die beiden Totenpapyrus Rhind*, Leipzig, 1913, p. 54, no. 370). Symbols can likewise be secondary. The spelling of the

god , Sekhem, 'power,' in the

Pyramid Texts shows that he was not at that time invariably considered to manifest himself in the outward appearance of a sceptre (a word for sceptre is *sh̄m*); but in the temple of Abydos we see sculptured upon the walls a sceptre accompanied by the words 'Thôth, *sh̄m* of the gods,'

¹ Some gods, of course, were really persons. The Pharaoh was a god, and a certain number of human beings, both kings and private persons, were deified after their death. See art. *HEROES AND HERO-WORSHIP* (Egyptian).

¹ This is mere hypothesis; see below, § 8, ad finem.

where *sh̄m*, 'sceptre-power,' is the abstraction 'power' visualized in the form of a sceptre, imbued with personality, and finally identified with Thōth.

For references to *sh̄m* see W. Spiegelberg, in *RTAP* xxviii. [1908] 164.

(b) *Singularity and multiplicity*.—The very individuality of personifications was of a dubious quality. We have just seen that Sekhem, 'power,' could be merged into Thōth and so lose its identity and independent existence. Some different examples of a similar variability must now be quoted. Meskhenet, goddess of the birthplace, at some moments appears with a single, distinct personality of her own, as a deity accompanying the other divinities of birth (Khnūn, Heget, etc.) from childbed to childbed, there determining the length of life decreed for the new-born babe. Elsewhere, however, we gather that every man possesses his own Meskhenet (Davies-Gardiner, *loc. cit.*); according to Abydene tradition, there were four goddesses of the name (R. Lepsius, *Todtenbuch der Ägypter*, Leipzig, 1842, ch. cxlii.), who were sometimes identified with Tefenet, Nut, Isis, and Nephthys respectively (e.g., Lepsius, *Denkmäler*, iv. 82a). So too we have Sia, 'the god of understanding, but elsewhere we read of the personified understanding of every god (K. Sethe, *Die altägypt. Pyramidentexte*, Leipzig, 1908, no. 411).¹ Even old-established gods might multiply their personalities in a similar way. Khnūm, e.g., not only acquires a new and separate personality for every new locality in which he was worshipped, but he is also on rare occasions named as a private creator-god of whom every man might possess an example of his own (Davies-Gardiner, pp. 99, 113). In short, the world of deities reflects, on the one hand, the unity, on the other hand, the infinite variability, displayed in the mental world; it can differentiate and identify in the same manner as thought can distinguish and compare. No rule can be set up as to whether a god will first manifest himself as a unique or as a multiple being: in the case of Khnūm we can hardly doubt that Khnūm, absolute, preceded 'his (particular) Khnūm.' On the other hand, personified *ka*, 'character,' clearly started as a general term, innately deified and varying with each individual possessor of a *ka*; nor is it until the New Kingdom, and then only very rarely indeed, that *Ka* is found as an absolute, single deity, equivalent almost to our 'Providence' and apt to be equated with the Nile as the fount of all well-being. About the same time it became usual to attribute to the sun-god Rē and to his descendant the Pharaoh a stereotyped list of fourteen *kas*, or attributes, each of which had its own specific nature and name, such as 'power' or 'brilliance.' They are often depicted, together with a series of female counterparts, in the late temples.

The hitherto unrecognized meaning 'Providence' for *Ka* (e.g., J. F. Champollion, *Monuments de l'Égypte et de la Nubie*, Paris, 1835, pl. 254; H. Brugsch and J. Dümichen, *Recueil des monuments égyptiens*, Leipzig, 1862-85, iii. 92) is due to the same order of ideas as that which connected the *ka* with *shay*, 'fate,' Gr. *ψαίς* or *Ἀγὰθος Δαίμων* (see W. Spiegelberg, in *ZÄ* xlix. [1911] 126). For the fourteen *kas* of Rē see *PSBA* xxxviii. 83-89, 94 f.

Singular personifications were viewed under two aspects: (1) as forces acting at the moment in which they are spoken of, and (2) as historical characters whose existence lay in a far distant past. To these is sometimes implicitly added a third and future aspect—e.g., when we find the hope expressed that a dead man may assume shape as some personified being like Hike' (§ 5).

7. *Personification and cult*.—There is no inherent reason why personifications even of abstract ideas should not become the objects of a cult, but as a matter of fact few of the deities dealt with in this article were ever honoured in that way. The one really important exception is the *ka*, the personified character or individuality of a man; this was

supposed to cleave eternally to the tomb after the death of its owner, and from the earliest times both kings and their subjects possessed 'servants of the *ka*,' or '*ka*-priests,' who administered to their cult. Of Renenet and Meskhenet (§ 9 (a) 5, (2) 1) we read in the XVIIIth dynasty that offerings were made to them among other gods at Speos Artemidos (Sethe, *Urkunden des ägypt. Altertums*, Leipzig, 1906, iv. 389). Hike', as we have seen, was in Greek times worshipped at Esneh (§ 5). Seshat, the goddess of writing, seems to have had a cult even in the earliest periods. When, however, priests of Mā'et and Hike' are mentioned in Old Kingdom tombs, it must not be at once concluded that those deities possessed temples and an organized cult of their own; it is clear from the contexts that the holders of these titles were always judges or doctors respectively, and it may well have been merely the exercise of these secular functions that constituted the ritual of their priesthood.

8. *Personifications and epithets*.—We now return to a subject touched upon already in § 3 (d). In the light of the last paragraphs personifications now appear as conceptions inflated with a new and spurious mode of being, which they enjoy, so to speak, in their own right, not by virtue of a parasitic existence as attributes or epithets. The most perfect examples are infinitives personified, like 'Onekh, 'life,' 'Aut-yeb, 'elation of heart,' 'joy,' for the infinitives are by their very nature abstract and withdrawn from the actual objects, here living creatures and joyful beings, from which they derive their essential characteristics. In Egyptian texts, however, a technical difficulty prevents us from recognizing such personifications as easily as we could wish; no vowels being written, it is seldom possible to discriminate personified infinitives from other personified parts of speech. Hence it is usually necessary to examine the context very carefully in order to decide whether an apparent personification is really such or is an epithet. Epithets may be participles, adjectives, or common nouns, or may be paraphrased by expressions like 'lord of right' instanced above (§ 3 (d)). The important feature of epithets is that they serve to qualify, not the idea inherent in themselves, like personifications, but deities whose existence is quite independent of them, resting upon wholly different postulates. Thus, when we come across the god Sh̄m, the question arises whether this means 'power' in the abstract or 'the powerful one,' referring allusively to Osiris or to some other god. This the context alone can settle.

The above statement must not be read to mean that all personified abstractions are in the infinitive. On the contrary, Egyptian, like other languages, often conveys the idea of the abstract through the concrete; e.g., the name of the goddess Mā'et, 'right,' is probably a feminine participle, 'she or that which is direct,' Gr. *τὸ δίκαιον*, the Egyptian language expressing a neuter sense by means of the feminine gender. Why 'writing' should have been personified as a goddess and not as a god is obscure; the name Seshat possibly, but not certainly, means 'she who writes.' Hike', 'magic,' is a substantive personified; but whether the nominal formation involved in this name is one appropriate to common nouns or to abstractions is beyond our knowledge. On symbols see above, § 4.

9. *The more important personifications*.—Completeness is here out of the question, and the following enumeration is intended merely to give some idea of the field covered, and of the various degrees reached by personification in different cases. The vocalization of the names is usually quite hypothetical, and the classification makes no pretence to have a scientific principle.

(a) *Life, death, fate, etc.*—(1) 'Onekh, 'life,' depicted as a Nile-god (J. E. Gautier and G. Jéquier, *Fouilles de Licht*, Cairo, 1902, p. 25, XIIth dynasty). He is also named on the Turin altar (*TSBA* iii. [1874] 112), a monument of quite late date, not of the VIth dynasty, as sometimes supposed. Elsewhere he appears with head of *crux ansata* and body and limbs of a man, carrying a divine banner (e.g., A. St. G. Caulfield, *The Temple*

¹ Hereafter quoted as *Pyr*.

of the Kings at Abydos, London, 1902, pl. 14, XIXth dynasty); this is a mere decorative device.

(2) Mout, 'death,' only once in a poetical passage of late date; see art. LIFE AND DEATH (Egyptian), § 4.

(3) Sonh, 'health,' as Nile-god (Gautier, *loc. cit.*); in an incantation where parts of the body are identified with various duties, 'thy intestines are health' (A. Erman, 'Zaubersprüche für Mutter und Kind,' verso, 5, 4, in *ABAW*, 1901; see also *Pyr.* 1190).

(4) Shay, 'fate,' Gr. *ψαῖς* and *Ἀγῶς* *δαίμων*, in one place described as *ὁ μέγας δαίμων ὁ φρονεῖς θεός* (see Möller, *loc. cit.*, and, for his various visualized forms, § 4). For the shay of individuals see Davies-Gardiner, *loc. cit.*; 'his shay' is later sometimes substituted for 'his ka.'

(5) Kenehet, 'nursing,' personified as a woman; to be carefully distinguished from Ernēt (I (3)); often coupled with Shay (a (4)) or with Meskhenet (I (1)); at Edfu identified with Seshat, the goddess of writing (Lepsius, iv. 41c). For the *renenet* of individuals see Davies-Gardiner, *loc. cit.*; for her cult, above, § 7.

See also 'Ab'e, 'lifetime' (§ 3 (a)); Meskhenet, 'hirthplace' (below, I (1)); and, for the creator-god Khnum, § 6 (b)).

(6) *Attributes of living beings.*—(1) Ma'a, 'seeing,' and (2) Sözem, 'hearing,' in late times depicted as male deities; there was also a combined deity Ma'a-Sözem, 'seeing-hearing.' Cf. *PSBA* xxxviii. 85, n. 18.

(3) Hu, 'commanding utterance,' and (4) Sia, 'understanding,' two personified abstractions of considerable importance (see *PSBA* xxxviii. 43-54, 83-95). They are represented as male deities in the train of the sun-god, who created them by an act of self-mutilation. According to one fable, it is to them that the universe owes its existence—a Memphite variant of the tale makes out Ptah to be the cosmic god, from whom emanated Horus as 'tongue' and Thöth as 'heart,' i.e. intellect. Among the fourteen *kas*, or attributes, of Rē Hu, as an active agency to whom material prosperity can be ascribed, is coupled with Zefa, 'plenty,' whence Hu has often been misunderstood to signify 'food' or 'taste.' When associated with Zefa, and rarely, too, when associated with Sia, Hu is one of a pair of Nile-gods; hut Sia, as the more passive attribute of the two, is seldom regarded as a source of material prosperity and only once is found named among the *kas* of Rē. Hu and Sia are two of the chief attributes of royalty, and as such are often associated with Mā'et. Lastly, Hu seems to have been one name of the Sphinx—the image in which the power of Pharaoh and that of the sun-god Atum often found expression.

(5) Sekhem, 'power' (see above, § 6 (b), 8).

(6) User, 'influence,' and (7) Nakhṭ, 'victory,' are names of two of the fourteen *kas* of Rē.

(8) 'Aut-ych, 'elation of heart,' 'joy,' as a woman (Borchardt, pl. 30, Vth dynasty); also on the late Turin altar (*TSBA* iii. 112).

(9) Hāb, 'sport' or 'festivity,' as son of Sökhet, 'country' (j (8)) (*Pyr.* 555).

(10) Sond, 'fear,' depicted in human shape on the sarcophagus of Sethos I., hut with lion's head on later monuments (R. V. Lanson, *Dizionario di mitologia egizia*, Turin, 1884, p. 1079f.; *RTAP* xxv. [1903] 30). At the festival of Osiris his image occupied one of the thirty-four illuminated boats used in the ceremonies (*RTAP* iv. [1883] 23).

(c) *Attributes of living persons and their actions.*—(1) Hike, 'magic' (see above, § 5). He is also named as one of the fourteen *kas* of Rē.

(2) Mā'et, 'right,' the most frequently mentioned of all personifications. Her name appears to mean 'that which is straight or direct' (Lat. *rectum*), whether ethically ('right') or intellectually ('truth'); this suggests that this conception of her may have been born in the law-courts, where both aspects come into play at the same time. Sometimes we find the goddess conceived of as double (Mā'ty, 'the two rights' [already in *Pyr.* 317]), perhaps in allusion to the rival claims of two litigants. Mā'et is figured as a goddess, either sitting or standing, with a feather on her head. In mythology she is the daughter of Rē and closely related, probably as spouse, to Thöth, the god of regularity, law, and learning. There are no clear indications that she possessed a real cult in early times (see above, § 7). On Mā'et see A. Wiedemann, in *AMG* x. 561 ff.; Lanson, pp. 278-280; H. Brugsch, *Religion und Mythologie der alten Ägypter*, Leipzig, 1890, pp. 477-482; Budge, *Gods of the Egyptians*, London, 1904, i. 416-421.

(3) Seshat, the goddess of writing. Her name may mean 'she who writes' or 'she who paints' (the verb has both senses), but she was more often referred to by the epithet Sakhket-*abui*, 'she who puts off the two horns.' This epithet would appear to hint that she was originally a cow-goddess, who had taken to a less bovine occupation; hut her identity with Isis-Hathor, though well attested for late times, is not proved for the Old Kingdom. If such were her real origin, she could hardly rank as a personification in the sense of this article. Seshat possessed priests of her own at a very early date, and appears to have been associated with Thöth at Hermopolis Magna, though for this the evidence is not very early. She was the goddess of painting as well as of writing, and presided over the ceremonies connected with the planning of temples and other buildings. She was represented reed in hand and usually sitting. She wears a skin and has on her head a kind of rosette with seven or five rays (*ssk*: can mean 'seven'), above which and separated from which is seen what may be interpreted as the horns rejected by the goddess; the combined head ornament is perhaps a mere *rebus* for the name Sakhket-*abui*. See the very detailed art. 'Seshat' by G. Roeder, in *Pauly-Wissowa*.

(d) *Attributes of the external world.*—(1) Hetpet, 'peace,' depicted as a woman (Borchardt, ii. pl. 80, Vth dynasty).

(2) Zefa, 'plenty,' depicted as a Nile-deity (ib. pls. 25, 23, Vth dynasty; Gautier, p. 24, XIth dynasty; E. Naville, *The Temple of Deir el Bahari*, London, 1901, iv. 110, XVIIIth dynasty); in all three cases together with Hu, 'commanding utterance' (above, b (3)). Hu and Zefa occur later also as two of the fourteen *kas* of Rē (see above, § 6 (b), *ad fin.*). For Zefa as a Nile-god associated with Hāpy, 'this Nile,' see Gautier, p. 34.

(c) *Attributes peculiar to the sun-god.*—Among the fourteen *kas* of Rē enumerated in late times are (1) Khu, 'glory,' (2) Pesd, 'shining,' and (3) Tehen, 'sparkling' (§ 6 (b), *ad fin.*).

(f) *Names connected with generation and growth.*—(1) Muvt, 'seed,' of human beings and animals, depicted as a woman (Borchardt, pl. 29, Vth dynasty).

(2) Nekhet, 'hudding,' depicted as a woman (ib. pl. 30; mentioned also *Pyr.* 4, 1451).

See also the gods of birth above (a (4) (5)) and below (I (1)).

(g) *Products, natural or artificial.*—(1) Nepri, 'corn' (*Pyr.* 1065), frequently depicted as a Nile-god (Borchardt, pls. 25, 26, 30, Vth dynasty; Gautier, p. 34, XIth dynasty), and named as the patron of harvests (e.g., *ZA* xxxiv. [1890] 46; *PSBA* xviii. [1896] 202); failed to be the son of Ernēt, the harvest-goddess (I (3)), and born on the first day in the summer or harvest season (Brugsch, *Recueil des monuments*, i. 67); sometimes identified with Osiris; a spell to enable a dead man to become reincarnate in his image is occasionally found (Lacan, no. 58). A goddess Nepri sometimes takes the place of the god Nepri (see G. Maspero, *Hist. ancienne des peuples d'Orient*, Paris, 1894, i. 81, n. 2, where further references are given).

(2) Nough, 'gold,' occurs as a goddess from the Middle Kingdom onwards. Presumably she must have originated as a separate personification; in our existing sources, however, she is always found identified with Hathor, the goddess of beauty, dance, and ornament (see T. Devéria, *Mémoires et fragments*, Paris, 1890, i. 1-25).

(3) Tayt, 'clothing,' a goddess often named as the maker or giver of clothing or the bandages for mummification (e.g., *Pyr.* 68, 737, 739, 741; *PSBA* xviii. [1896] 202; *RTAP* xxxiii. [1911] 92). The name, which also appears in the more fully developed form Taytet (*Pyr.* 68, 2004), seems to be derived from a word meaning 'garment' (*RTAP* xxxii. [1910] 84) or in a more special sense 'awning' (Budge, *Book of the Dead*, London, 1893, i. [text] 206).

(4) Dua-wēr, 'the great morning-god,' is depicted in human form (Borchardt, pl. 19). His name is written with the symbol



, and Sethe has shown (text *ad loc.*, p. 97) that he is

nothing more or less than the royal headdress personified. In the Pyramid Texts (1820, 1423, 2042) his name is associated not only with this act of shaving hut also with other incidents in the morning toilette—e.g., face-washing—and this royal barber appears to have been called 'priest of Dua-wēr.'


(h) *Cosmic and similar deities.*—Over this topic we shall pass lightly, omitting all reference to the air-god Shu, since our object is to deal rather with the later and more artificial gods whose beginnings are not completely shrouded in darkness.

(1) Eaku, 'darkness' (male), and (2) Kaket, 'darkness' (female), are a pair out of four pairs of frog- and snake-headed divinities that play a part in the cosmogonical legend of Hermopolis Magna (Khmunu, 'eight-town'), where there suddenly emerged from the primeval waters a hill upon which lay the solar egg. The names of the other pairs were: (3) Nūn and (4) Nūnet, 'the primordial waters,' (5) Hehn and (6) Hehnet, 'space' (7), and (7) Nūn and (8) Nūnet, 'negation' (various *Götter* and *Götter*). Some violence has been done to these conceptions by the attempt to make them square with the early Greek cosmogonical ideas; nor has sufficient attention been paid to their negative character, from which point of view they appear to be aspects of a primitive, undifferentiated *chaos*. Offerings were made to these eight gods at *Speos Artemidos* in the XVIIIth dynasty (see Sethe, *Urkunden*, iv. 23). For the detailed discussions of these gods see Lepsius, 'Über die Götter der vier Elemente,' in *ABAW*, 1856; Brugsch, *Ägypten*, pp. 123-146; Budge, *Gods of the Egyptians*, i. 222f.

(3) Ikhekhu, 'dusk,' is occasionally personified—e.g., *Pyr.* 751.

Here a purely mythological goddess must be mentioned; she illustrates in a striking manner the legend that the Egyptians were prepared to go in their artificial manufacture of deities. As cosmogonic god Atum was originally without a wife (cf. *Pyr.* 1065) he created the first pair of gods (the *Te'tnet*) by an obscene action of his hand (*Pyr.* 1065). In the Middle Kingdom a goddess (10) Zaiet, 'his hand,' was introduced as wife of Atum; she was perhaps a personification of the goddess of Lycopolis, and she is merely named for the purpose of providing Atum with a spouse (*Bulletin de l'Association française d'Archéologie orientale*, x. [Calro, 1912] 117).

(i) *Conceptions of time.*—Only direct personifications of time are here considered. The months (*Götter*, ii. 221f.), the deans (ib. p. 221), and the hours (ib. pp. 220-223) had tutelary gods of their own, who were deities familiar in other countries. The names of particular stars, and goddesses, clearly the deities of the *zodiac*, were to be no deity 'day,' month, or year. Unet has been claimed (*Sphinx*, iv. 1904, 1905).

(1) Ronpet, 'year,' represented as a goddess on whose head is seen the shoot , the hieroglyphic symbol for 'year'; not of

very early occurrence, for the Turin altar (TSBA iii. 112) is late, and not early, as Wiedemann (PSBA xxxvi. 203) supposes. This goddess of the year is usually found identified with Isis, Hathor, or Sothis (see Brugsch, *Thesaurus inscriptionum aegyptiacarum*, Leipzig, 1883, pp. 215-230).


(2) Rôkeh, 'burning,' name of the hot period of the year, covering the seventh and eighth months. These are named the 'great burning' and the 'little burning,' respectively, deities depicted in the Ramesseum with human heads, and with hippopotamus heads at Edfu (see E. Meyer, 'Nachträge zur ägypt. Chronologie,' in ABAW, 1907, p. 16).


Of the three seasons (3) 'Akhet, 'inundation,' (4) Prôet, 'spring' (our winter), and (5) Shômu, 'summer' (the harvest-season), the first two are figured as goddesses and the last as a Nile-god in sculptures of the Old Kingdom (ZA xxxviii. [1900] 107) and later (Meir, unpublished, XIIth dynasty; Brugsch, *Recueil*, vi. 180, Ptolemaic), in agreement with the grammatical gender of their names; but sometimes all three are represented as Nile-gods (Brugsch, *Geographische Inschriften altägypt. Denkmäler*, Leipzig, 1857-60, iii. pl. 4; above, § 3 (b)). Shômu, 'summer,' as more fertile than the other seasons, is the one most often represented (e.g., Gautier, p. 25, XIIth dynasty).

(3) *Geographical terms*, merging into nature-gods, which are excluded from this article (see NATURE [Egyptian]).

(1) Ti-mehy, 'Lower Egypt,' and (2) Shema, 'Upper Egypt,' very frequently depicted as Nile-gods (e.g., Borchardt, pls. 24, 29, 30, Vth dynasty; Gautier, pp. 24, 25, 33, XIIth dynasty; Brugsch, *Recueil*, vi. 129, 131, 134, etc., Græco-Roman period).

(3) Sôkhet, 'country,' a goddess with the hieroglyph for field


 upon her head, often seen among the nome-gods shown bringing offerings in procession (§ 3 (b)) (e.g., Brugsch, *Recueil*, vi. 129, 132, Græco-Roman period). In earlier times she is usually named in connexion with scenes of fowling in the marshes (P. E. Newberry, *Beni Hasan*, ii., London, 1894, p. 24), and fowling is called her 'craft' (Borchardt, p. 68). She is already mentioned in Pyr. 555, where Hâb, 'sport' (b (9)), is called her 'son.'

(4) Hâ, an early god whose name is written with the desert-sign upon a standard , and in whom it is tempting to

see a personification of the desert; in this case hâ' would be an obsolete word for 'desert.' The alternative is to regard the desert as merely an attribute or possession of this god, whose origin then might be quite different. Hâ was worshipped in the Xoite nome; for the evidence bearing upon him, together with some theories that cannot here be discussed, see Newberry, in *Annals of Archaeology*, Liverpool, 1903, i. 24-29. A deity whose name is written similarly, and who from his association with Hâ'py, Hu, Ka', and the nome-gods must personify the desert, is named (Brugsch, *Recueil*, iii. 92, XIXth dynasty).

(5) Amentet, 'the west,' a goddess on whose head is seen

the symbol for 'west' (e.g., Borchardt, pls. 1, 29, Vth dynasty; Davies-Gardiner, pls. 10, 27, XVIIIth dynasty; and often). The dead being by preference buried in the west, she early becomes the goddess of the necropolis, and as such is named or depicted as welcoming or protecting the dead, as she does for the sun. She is very frequently identified with Hathor. Plutarch (*de Is. et Osir.* 29) gives Ἀμένθης as the name of the place whither the souls of the dead pass, and his fanciful etymology, 'he who gives and takes,' implies that he believed the corresponding personification to be a male deity, like the Greek Hades.


(6) Yebtet, 'the east,' a goddess with , the sign for 'east,' on her head (Davies-Gardiner, pl. 27, XVIIIth dynasty).

(7) Waz-wêr, 'the great-green,' i.e. the sea, depicted like a Nile-god (Borchardt, pl. 30, Vth dynasty; Gautier, p. 24, XIIth dynasty; Naville, *Deir el Bahari*, v. 128, XVIIIth dynasty).

(8) Hâ py, 'the Nile,' is too ancient and important a god to be dealt with here.


It is hardly necessary to illustrate in detail the personifications of nomes, towns, and villages, which are frequent both in the temples and in the tombs. The existing nome-lists are enumerated by G. Steindorff in ASG xxvii. [1909] 864-868; admirable statues of certain nomes as deities, male or female, were found by G. Reisner in the pyramid-temple of Mycerinus (see Maspero, *Essais sur l'art égyptien*, Paris, 1912, pp. 27, 29, 31, IVth dynasty).

(c) *Psychical entities*.—These are by their very nature multiple, that is to say, deemed to be as numerous as the individuals to whom they belong, though they may also sometimes, like Ka, 'Providence' (§ 6 (b) ad fin.), become single and universal. For a popular account see A. Wiedemann, *The Ancient Egyptian Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul*, Eng. tr., London, 1895. Here only two of the principal kinds of 'soul' will be dealt with, since the present writer dissents from the ordinarily accepted views.

(1) The ka () is usually explained either as the 'double'

(Maspero) or as the 'genius' belonging to a man or a god; for the discussions that have arisen over this question see the literature quoted in Davies-Gardiner, p. 89, n. 7, and RTAP xxxvii. [1915] 78. The view here favoured is that enounced by H. Brugsch (*Hieroglyphisch-demot. Wörterbuch*, supplement, Leipzig, 1882, p. 1230), according to which the ka is a man's individual 'character'—the sum of his attributes. Not only gods but also men are sometimes named as possessing a plurality of kas, their 'attributes' then being meant. These two renderings are naturally too modern and too specific to cover the whole meaning of the term, and in certain contexts it may be better translated 'psychic self,' 'nature,' 'genius,' 'double,' or even 'master'; the best course of all is to retain the original word. The objection to the renderings 'double' and 'genius' is that they lay excessive stress on aspects of the ka which are connected less with the conception which is personified than with the bare fact of personification and its consequences. For the visualized form of the ka see § 4, and for its cult § 7. The prominence of the sepulchral aspect of the ka was perhaps due to the belief in the changeability, after death, of the other principal constituents of a man's personality; for, while his 'incarnation' or 'external manifestation,' namely (2) the *ba*, might assume various new forms, his ka, i.e. his individuality (with which his name was very nearly identical), remained constant, and was believed to persist in the tomb. The *ba* could, by definition, assume many shapes; as a volatile, visible being, capable of ascending to the heavens, its most ordinary form was that of a human-headed bird. Râ possessed seven *ba*, but no man appears to have had more than one at a time. Naturally, the *ba* received no cult, as its essential characteristic was that of a 'living' thing, able to look after itself. On the ka see, further, above, § 6 (b). In connexion with the ritual of the dead it is exceedingly important to bear in mind that this was based on the belief that the man himself continued to live after his physical death; it is he, and not his ka, who is primarily the recipient of the funeral sacrifices. The speculations which hypostatized the ka and the *ba* may, for all we know, be as old as the funerary ritual itself; the latter, however, is comprehensible without it, for it arises, not from any intellectual self-analysis, but simply from the passionate refusal to acknowledge the possibility of death. See art. LIFE AND DEATH (Egyptian).

(2) *Symbolic gods* (see § 1).—(1) Meskenet, 'birthplace,' the name of the brick or pair of bricks upon which women crouched in giving birth, was personified under the form of a goddess with

the sign  (bicornate uterus) on her head. In the texts

she is coupled with Khnum or Renenet (a (5)), and can be either single or multiple (§ 6 (b)); we read of 'thy Meskenet' already in Pyr. 1183 (see W. Spiegelberg, *Aegyptologische Randglossen zum Alten Testament*, Strassburg, 1904, pp. 19-25).

(2) Shesmu, 'press,' whether for the making of oil or for the making of wine; the word is determined by the ideograph sign of the press (e.g., Pyr. 402). As god of wine he appears already in Pyr. 1552: 'Shesmu comes to thee with liquid (?) wine.' For Shesmu as the god who prepares the ointments and oils for embalming see the references given by Möller, p. 80, n. 50; RTAP xxxvii. 76. Shesmu must be carefully distinguished from the god Shesmet and the goddess Shesmetet—forms of Horus and Sekhmet respectively—who derive their names from the land Shesmet, perhaps the region of Kosselr (Sethe, in Borchardt, p. 82).

(3) Ernûet, 'cobra,' in later times exclusively the goddess of the harvest, 'lady of the granary' or 'lady of sustenance,' who gave her name to the ninth (inter eighth) month Pharmuthi (see Lanzoni, pp. 472-477, where, however, there is some confusion with Renenet (a (5)); see, too, under g (1) above). The earliest references to Ernûet (Pyr. 302 and Erman, 'Hymnen an das Diadem,' in SBAW, 1911, col. 7, l. 4) appear to have no reference to the goddess's function in connexion with the harvest; she is there apparently identified rather with the snake-goddess upon the brow of the Pharaoh. If this be her original nature, then she cannot be considered as essentially a symbolic deity on the same footing as Meskenet or Shesmu.

LITERATURE.—This has been given in the body of the article.

ALAN H. GARDINER.

PERSONIFICATION (Greek).—1. Introduction.—The habit of assigning a conscious and active personality to all kinds of natural objects, and even to abstract ideas, seems to be almost universal at a certain stage of human development. The tendency is nowhere, perhaps, more prevalent than among the Greeks, whose intensely anthropomorphic imagination here finds full scope. The word 'personification,' in its narrower sense, is often used to imply a more or less artificial and allegorical invention, such as Apelles' picture of Calumny with her attendants Ignorance, Suspicion, and the rest, or figures such as Peace and Britannia in a modern cartoon; and some even of the earlier Greek personifications may be of similar nature. But it is convenient to use the word here in a wider sense, as referring also to persons who have acquired a definite religious or mythological char-

acter, without, however, losing the direct significance of their names.

2. *Classes of personifications.*—Personifications may be conveniently divided into three classes: they may be (a) of natural objects, localities, etc., (b) of collective bodies, such as cities or peoples, or (c) of abstract ideas, such as Fear, Strife, Justice, etc.

(a) *Natural objects.*—The sun-god (Helios) and the moon-goddess (Selene) are hardly to be regarded as impersonations, since they have a definite mythological character in some regions; but there is a general tendency in Greece for their mythological and religious side to be merged in Apollo and Artemis, while Helios and Selene come to be mere personifications of the sun and moon, often used in art to give a cosmic setting to a scene—as in the east pediment of the Parthenon. A good example is offered by the Blacas vase in the British Museum, where sunrise is depicted by Helios rising out of the sea in his chariot, preceded by Eos (the dawn, Aurora), while Selene rides away on her horse, and the stars, in the form of boys, dive into the sea.

A similar conception occurs in the personification of times and seasons—Day and Night with her children, Death and Sleep; and the hours or seasons (*ῥῆται* [see *HORÆ*]). Later artificial inventions of the Hellenistic age were the Year (Eniautos) as a man and a Four-year Cycle (Penteteris) as a woman. Chronos, too (Time), sometimes confused with Kronos, and Æon were included in some Orphic beliefs later developed by the Gnostics. It is doubtless the result of Greek influence that in Christian times the days of the week come to be personified, especially *Ἁγία Παρασκευή* and *Ἁγία Κυριακή* (St. Friday and St. Sunday), who are represented as richly draped female figures. On later mosaics personifications of the seasons of the year, with their distinctive attributes, are a favourite subject.

Personifications of place are commoner than those of time. Earth (Ge or Gaia), in early times a distinct goddess and the mother of the giants, becomes later a merely allegorical figure or personification. Ocean, as distinguished from various sea-gods, has virtually no mythological character, though Homer calls him the origin of the gods; he appears on the François vase, and on the Pergamene altar. On the Tower of the Winds at Athens the eight winds merely serve to indicate the quarters of the sky. Earlier we find winds personified as winged figures; but none of them, except Boreas, acquires any mythological standing. The clouds in Aristophanes' play are evidently a meteorological personification; the name of Nephelē (Cloud) occurs as that of a mythical character also. In the case of rivers, again, we find two distinct usages. River-gods in early times are important and efficient deities; but figures of rivers come frequently to be used as mere allegorical representations of localities. This was the case, according to Pausanias (v. x. 7), on the east pediment of the temple of Zeus at Olympia, where the recumbent figures of the Alpheus and Cladeus define the boundaries of the Altis at Olympia; the Kephalis (or Ilissus) of the west pediment of the Parthenon offers another similar example; but both identifications have been disputed. Later we often find figures of rivers, such as the Nile with his sixteen cubits playing around him as little children. Similar personifications are common in later art, mountains, springs, meadows, etc., being represented by human figures, often in the form of nymphs. Nymphs or personifications of places are sometimes more individual in locality, when they represent well-known places such as Nemea; and the eponymous hero or heroine of

any place or district is in a certain sense an impersonation, as in the case of Ægina or Corinthos. In some instances the eponymous hero or heroine was really an earlier god or goddess; e.g., Cyreno has a relation to her city more like that of Athene to Athens. But other representatives of cities and peoples fall rather into class (b), collective personifications.

(b) *Collective bodies.*—This class differs from class (a) mainly in the fact that, even when the personification is local in character, the people rather than the actual locality is typified. The Demos of Rhegium, a dignified bearded figure, appears as a personification of the people of the city on its coins early in the 5th cent. B.C., and about the same time the coins of Tarentum represent the Demos of that city 'who is conceived in the likeness of Taras the founder of Tarentum, and so is figured as a youth.'¹ Similar personifications of the Demos of cities are not uncommon in later art; another example of the hero as representing the people is offered by the figure of Corinthos already quoted on a bronze mirror;² he appears seated, while a standing female figure, the colony Leucas, places a wreath on his head. The Demos (of Athens) is introduced as a character in the *Knights* of Aristophanes, and was doubtless represented as a typical citizen. Boule, the Senate, appears as a draped female figure on an Attic relief, and similar representations are very common on late coins. The reliefs heading treaties or decrees often contain figures representing the people concerned; but these are sometimes the deities of the cities; e.g., Athens and Samos are represented by Athene and Hera. In later times a city or country is commonly personified in the form of a female figure, often wearing a mural crown. Sometimes the personification takes a more definite form as the Fortune of the city (*Τύχη πόλεως*); the best known example is the figure of Antioch by the sculptor Eutychides, made at the time of the foundation of the city about 300 B.C.; this is said to have been worshipped with divine honours in the district. The figure of Megalopolis, in a group with Zeus and Artemis in that city, is also a clear instance of personification. It was by Cephisodotus and Xenophon; unfortunately it is not certain whether the Cephisodotus was the elder, of the early 4th cent., or the later, the son of Praxiteles; it cannot be earlier than 370 B.C. Figures of Hellas and of Salamis appeared on the screens of the throne of Zeus at Olympia (c. 430 B.C.). Similarly, Hellas and Asia are seen among gods and other allegorical figures on the well-known vaso at Naples, representing Darius preparing for his war with Greece. Perhaps the most extreme example of such a personification is the (habited) Earth (*Οἰκουμένη*), on the relief of the Apotheosis of Homer in the British Museum, representing 'ecumenical' assent—a conception very far removed from that of Earth (Ge or Gaia) on early monuments. Ætolia, as a warrior-maiden or Amazon, with one breast exposed, appears seated on coins of the Ætolian league; and this or similar figures suggested the type of the goddess Roma on coins. The statuary type of this goddess was based upon that of Athene, which, as we have noticed, was used sometimes as a personification of her chosen city Athens.

(c) *Abstract ideas.*—The third class of personifications is very miscellaneous in character, but is not easy to subdivide either chronologically or by subjects. A distinction might be drawn between such as actually have a place in worship and ritual and such as are merely creations of a poetical or artistic imagination; but among the Greeks we

¹ P. Gardner, *Types of Greek Coins*, Cambridge, 1883, p. 101.

² *Monuments grecs*, I. (Paris, 1878) pl. 8.

find many in the former class which we should rather expect to belong to the latter only. Thus in Athens there were altars to Eleos, Aidōs, Phēmē, and Hormē (Pity, Shame, Rumour, and Impulse); in Sparta were sanctuaries of Gelos (Laughter) and of Phobos (Fear). Again, Cephisodotus's statue of Peace (Eirene) nursing the infant Wealth (Plutos) looks like a transparent allegory, yet both divinities had a share in the State worship of Athens. At the other end of the scale are such deities as Eros (Love) and Nike (Victory), though these are by no means of the same nature. Eros, in some places, notably at Thespizē, was a primitive and independent god; elsewhere he was worshipped mainly with his mother Aphrodite. In these cases, apart from the direct significance of his name, he can hardly be called a personification. But he has practically no mythical character or personality in early times, though in the Hellenistic age tales about him become common; the best known is that in which he is joined with another allegorical personification, Psyche (the soul). This, however, belongs to the region of romantic invention rather than genuine mythology (see LOVE [Greek], I. 3). Nike, on the other hand, has hardly any place in myth, and, when she is worshipped, it is usually as a particular form of another divinity—e.g., Athene Nike in Athens. Several similar personifications occur in apposition to the names of deities, almost as epithets—e.g., (Athene) Pronoia, (Artemis) Enkleia, (Artemis) Eupraxia, (Aphrodite) Euploia; most of these also occur independently. Tyche (Fortune) was in many places worshipped, apart from her impersonation of certain cities mentioned above (b), as a great goddess, sometimes in the form of Ἀγαθή Τύχη. A common class of personifications are those that occur as companions of Aphrodite or of Dionysos. These are common on artistic representations. With Aphrodite, besides Eros, we also find Himeros (Desire) and Pothos (Yearning for the absent), Peitho (Persuasion), who has a more distinct mythical personality, Eunomia, Harmonia, Paidia, Endaimonia, etc. Dionysos is accompanied by several of these, as by Dithyrambos, Tragedia, Komos (Revel Ront), Methe (Drunkenness), and even Kraipale (its after effects). Telete seems to be a personification of the mysteries. Ethical personifications are found not only in worship—e.g., Dike, Dikaiosyne (Justice)—but also in literature and art. In early art Dike smites Adikia, her opposite, in the form of a hideous woman; the symbolism continued into the Christian virtues and corresponding vices. Eris (Strife) plays an important part in early myth, as also does Ate, in the belief 'quem deus vult perdere, prius dementat.' A similar rôle in the drama and in art derived from it is played by Lyssa and Oistros (Madness). Nemesis, also, may in certain cases be regarded as a personification, though at Rhamnus she had a temple where her cult as a goddess was primitive. A well-known Homeric passage (*Il.* ix. 502) describes the *Airai* (Prayers) as daughters of Zeus, who halt after the steps of Ate. *Apai* also (Curses) are often personified; but in this case they tend to be identified with the Eumenides, or Furies, and so to pass from personification to definite mythical personality. Kratos and Bia, Strength and Violence, who fetter Prometheus in Æschylus's play, have their place in systematic genealogy. Even in the case of personifications which appear to be mere inventions of the poet's or artist's imagination we often find some reference to accepted worship or belief. Perhaps the clearest instance of such invention is to be found in a picture like Apelles' Calumny, already mentioned, or a relief such as the Apotheosis of Homer. Here the allegorical figures include the

Iliad and Odyssey, Myth, History, Poetry, Tragedy, Comedy, Nature, Virtue, Memory, Faith, Wisdom, Time, and the World. Another example, of earlier date, is seen in the dedication of Micythos at Olympia, where, besides various gods, were Agon (Contest) with ἀλγῆρες, or jumping-weights, and Ἐκεχειρία (the Sacred Truce of Olympia) crowning Iphitus, the founder of the games; this group was set up early in the 5th cent. B.C. Logos (the Word) and Sophia (Wisdom) are prominent in the mingled Hellenistic and Oriental philosophy which finds expression in apocalyptic writings, and, through their influence, in some forms of early Christianity.

3. Conclusion.—These instances are necessarily somewhat miscellaneous; but they suffice to show the manifold developments of personification in Greece. It is by no means surprising to find the tendency so common in the literature and art of a people endowed with so intensely anthropomorphic an imagination as the Greeks. But, considering the highly developed and systematized polytheism of their religion, the existence and recognition in State worship of so many personifications of places, of communities, of physical or mental conditions, and of moral qualities call for some comment. There even seems at first sight some resemblance to the many *numina* that preside over every action in the Roman *Indigitamenta* (*q.v.*); but there is, on the other hand, the essential distinction that the Greek personifications are thought of as in human form, and have attributed to them a human character. It has been noted how some of them come to be closely associated with the chief gods or goddesses, sometimes as companions or attendants, sometimes, so to speak, as incarnations or manifestations. In this way they found their place in the polytheistic system. Moreover, the anthropomorphic imagination of the Greeks filled every region of earth and sea, rivers and springs, mountains and trees, with beings of human form, Nereids or nymphs or river-gods. These were not originally personifications; but the belief in their existence facilitated the creation of imaginary beings of a similar character to personify the various ideas that have been enumerated. And, in later times, as a belief in the actual existence of these supernatural beings waned, it became easier to invent personifications of all sorts, and to give free scope to a poetical and artistic imagination. Such later examples in Greece are not essentially different from those which we find in more recent literature and art. But the earlier personifications are of a different nature, and arise from the same anthropomorphic tendency that gave so clear and personal a character to the chief Olympian gods.

LITERATURE.—H. Steuding, 'Lokalpersonifikationen,' and L. Deubner, 'Personifikationen,' in Roscher; P. Gardner, 'Countries and Cities in ancient Art,' in *JHS* ix. [1889] 47 ff.
E. A. GARDNER.

PERSONIFICATION (Roman).—Personification is a psychological process which plays an important part in the development of religious concepts. In a general sense it is the process of conceiving of inanimate and even immaterial and abstract objects as possessed of life and soul. This primitive form of personification, which might be called 'vivification,' lies at the base of that early religious stage known as animism. As animism passes over into anthropomorphism, so vivification develops into personification, as we are accustomed to think of it; but the change is quantitative rather than qualitative, and the power which in pre-historic times endows Janus, the physical door, with a heavenly counterpart Janus, the spirit of the door, and the power which develops Janus, the spirit of the door, into Janus, the two-faced bearded god, are one and the same. It is simply a question of development. Owing to

certain tendencies in the psychological constitution of the ancient Roman, personification plays an especially important part in Roman religion. In fact an intimate study of personification is perhaps the best means of obtaining in this latter day a fruitful idea of the essence of ancient Roman religion. It is almost the only road through the thickets of conventionalism and formality which have always hidden the heart of Roman religion from the vision of the moderns.

The earliest concept of the divine among the Romans was in the nature of a function; they believed in divine powers, *numina*, unseen, unknown, unnamed. These powers were possessed of life and soul, and were thus in the primitive sense personified. Gradually out of the thick mist of cosmic forces the Romans began to see gods as men walking, and they straightway equipped these gods made in the fashion of men with all the functions and attributes which had originally belonged to the unknown *numina*. Each god, therefore, had many powers and attributes, and these were expressed by what were called *cognomina*, adjectival (more rarely nominal) addenda to the name itself (on these early *cognomina* cf. J. B. Carter, *De deorum Romanorum cognominibus quaestiones selectae*, Leipzig, 1898). Thus Jupiter as the patron god of freedom was called Jupiter Liber, and as the god of victory Jupiter Victor. The Roman genius from the very beginning was characterized not so much by imagination as by the power of abstract thought. This was characterized in its turn by an extraordinary ability to transfer the abstract into the concrete and back again. The Roman mind found one of its favourite employments in sending ideas, like free balloons, into the void of abstract, and then making them captive and concrete by attaching them to earth again. But there was also a great continuous fermentation in the realm of the gods. The Romans took a pre-eminently practical interest in their gods in spite of the fact that gradually the anthropomorphic concept had won the day; they cared for their gods not so much for what they were as for what they did; hence the adjective attached to the god, describing the function, was so much emphasized, and the god relatively so neglected, that the adjective or noun often took the primary place and in many cases eventually broke off from the god and set up an independent existence of its own (e.g., Portunus as originally Janus Portunus, Mercurius as originally Hermes Mercurius, Discepsiter as originally Jupiter Discepsiter). In certain cases, however, the Roman mind, with its extraordinarily keen development of the philosophical-philological sense, realizing that the adjective was the expression of an abstract idea, changed it into an abstract noun and, personifying the noun, worshipped it as an independent deity.

In all this material, attempts at chronological determination meet with great difficulty. We can only say that certain abstracts seem to go back to pre-historic times, and among these is undoubtedly the goddess Fides. She seems to be the earliest illustration of the process just described. Jupiter as the god of oaths and fealty became very early known as Diouis (or Dios) Fidius (Ζεύς Ἰδίων), and out of the adjective Fidius by constant accentuation came the goddess Fides, who is said to have had her own cult even in the mythical regal period and her own sanctuary on the Capitoline in the immediate neighbourhood of the chapel of Jupiter Lapis (the patron deity of international good faith). This much at least is certain, that in 254 or 250 B.C. a temple was dedicated to her on the Capitoline by Atilius Calatinus.

FIDES.—On the oldest sanctuary cf. Dion. Hal. ii. 75; on the temple dedicated by Calatinus, which was restored in 115 B.C. by M. Aemilius Scaurus, Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. xxiii. 61, de Off. iii. xxix. 114; cf. de Leg. ii. xl. 28; apocryphal temple, Fest. p. 269. 8; festival of Fides, 1st Oct., Fast. Arr. Atil. Paul.; peculiar ritual, Livy, i. xxii. 4; Serv. AEn. i. 292, viii. 639; Hor. Carm. i. xxxv. 21 f.; military records in her temple, CIL iii. 926. 10; dedicatory inscriptions, comparatively rare, Ib. ii. 4497, vi. 148=xiv. 5, ix. 5422, 5845, 5848, x. 8775, 5903; Eph. Ep. iv. 79; head of Fides on republican coins; also frequent on imperial coins.

Apparently younger, but still of very great age, are two other personifications, Libertas and Victoria; like Fides, they both grew out of Jupiter. Jupiter Liber was originally the god of plenty rather than of freedom, but the word *liber* gradually changed its meaning and came finally to express individual freedom and to stand by itself as Libertas. Probably the goddess goes back to the very beginning of the republic, even though our earliest date is the second half of the 3rd cent. B.C., when Ti. Sempronius Gracchus (consul, 238) dedicated a temple to her on the Aventino.

In similar fashion Jupiter Victor seems to go back at least to the early republican times, and has his place in the ritual of the Arvales immediately after the Capitoline triad. As early as 295 B.C. Q. Fabius Maximus vowed him a temple. As for Victoria, we do not know when she began her independent existence, but she has a temple dedicated to her in 294 B.C. on the Clivus Victoriae on the Palatine—a temple which ninety years later served as the first home for the Magna Mater on her arrival in Rome. With the coming of the empire the importance of the worship of Victoria was immensely increased. Each rival claimant for the supreme power thought of her in personal relation to himself, so that the goddess became the 'Victory of Caesar,' or the 'Victory of Vespasian,' etc. Here imperial coins give ample testimony. Finally, the statue which Augustus had caused to be erected in the senate-house in 29 B.C. became the symbol of all that was old and conservative in the religion of the Romans, and the last battles of official paganism against Christianity were fought under its shadow.

LIBERTAS.—On the temple, Paul. p. 121: 'Libertatis templum in Aventino fuerat constructum'; dedicated by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, Livy, xxiv. xvi. 19; festival, 13th April, cf. Ovid, Fasti, iv. 623 f.; sanctuary on the site of Cicero's house, erected by Clodius, Dio Cass. xxxviii. xvii. 6; Plut. Cic. 33; Cic. de Domo, 108 ff., 131; cf. de Leg. ii. 42; in 40 B.C. Julius Caesar decreed a temple, Dio Cass. xum. xlv. 1; statue in the Forum under Tiberius, Ib. lviii. xii. 5; Libertas Restituta and Libertas Publica.

VICTORIA.—On the temple on the Palatine, Livy, i. xxxiii. 9; cf. xxix. xiv. 13; Fest. 262; *Notitia* and *Curiosum*, 10th region; near the temple was a chapel of Victoria Virgo dedicated by M. Porcius Cato in 193 B.C., Livy, xxxv. ix. 6; on the statue in the senate-house, Dio Cass. li. xxii. 1 f.; Fast. Mart.; on the rôle of this statue in the closing years of paganism cf. Ambrose, Ep. i. xvii. 18, xviii. 82, lvi. 4-6; Symm. Rel. iii. 4; many inscriptions from the empire (see indices to CIL); represented on the so-called 'Victoriatii' of the republic, and frequently on imperial coins.

Somewhat similarly the cult of Mars seems to have given birth to the closely connected pair of abstracts, Honos and Virtus. Here, however, we are not able to trace the process with any degree of accuracy, but the connexion is undoubted. Their most important temple was outside the Porta Capena in the immediate neighbourhood of the temple of Mars, and they were so identified with Mars that, e.g., in referring to the starting-point of the parade of the knights, writers refer indifferently to the Mars temple or to the temple of Honos. This temple of Honos was vowed by Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus in 233 B.C., and later dedicated. It was subsequently restored by M. Claudius Marcellus, who wished at the same time to change it into a temple of Honos and Virtus, but the pontiffs objected on technical grounds. He was able, however, to compromise matters by adding a separate temple for Virtus,

which was dedicated by his son in 205 B.C. The two temples were famous for their art collections. Later these two goddesses enjoyed special favour at the hands of Pompey, who gave them shrines at the top of his stone theatre.

HONOS and VIRTUS.—On the temple outside the Porta Capena, *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* ii. xxiii. 61; *Livy*, xxvii. xxv. 7ff., xxix. xl. 13; cf. *Val. Max.* i. i. 8; *Plut. Marc.* 28, *de Fort. Rom.* 5, p. 318 E; restoration under Vespasian, *Pliny*, *HN* xxxv. 120; references to the parade of the knights, *Dion. Hal.* vi. xlii.; *Victor, de Vir. ill.* xxxii. 3; on the art treasures in the temple, *Livy*, xxv. xl. 2, xxvi. xxxii. 4; *Cic. Verr.* iv. 121; *Ascon.* p. 11 (Kießling); *Pliny*, *HN* xxxv. 120; another temple outside the Porta Collina, *Cic. de Leg.* ii. xxlii. 58; cf. *CIL* vi. 3892; still another temple, built by C. Marius, *Fest.* p. 344; *CIL* i. 2 p. 195, xviii. 16; shrines in Pompey's theatre, *Fest. Amit.*, 12th Aug.; shrine of Virtus founded by Scipio Numantinus, *Plut. de Fort. Rom.* 5, p. 318 D; temple of Honos at Puteoli (105 B.C.), *CIL* x. 1781; Collegium Honoris et Virtutis at Narbo, *ib.* xii. 4371; Collegium Virtutis at Nepes, *ib.* xi. 3205; games at Tarracina, *ib.* x. 8260; numerous inscriptions from all parts of the empire, both singly and together, on republican and imperial coins.

It is important to notice that this ability to emphasize a specific side of a deity's activity, by changing the adjective into an abstract noun and making an independent deity of it, was not confined to the earlier and more child-like period of Roman religion, but was still present at the close of the republic. Here we have the following remarkable instance. Sulla's belief in his own fortune and his fondness for the cult of Venus caused him to worship Venus Felix; when Pompey came to power, he in turn preferred Venus Victrix, but he avoided offending Venus Felix by worshipping Venus Victrix and Felicitas; finally Julius Caesar chose to honour Venus Genetrix, but he joined to her Victoria and Felicitas. In this case we are not justified in saying that Felicitas came into being as the result of the breaking off of the cognomen Felix from Venus, for she existed long before this time, having received a temple in the Velabrum at the hands of L. Licinius Lucullus in 146 B.C. Her real prominence began with Sulla, who called himself Sulla Felix. Pompey's temple to Felicitas was connected, as we have seen, with one to Venus Victrix on the top of his stone theatre, and a similar combination occurred on the Capitoline. Julius Caesar influenced M. Aemilius Lepidus to build a temple to Felicitas on the site of the old senate-house, the Curia Hostilia. Under the empire Felicitas was much sought after and was a special favourite of Augustus, and under Tiberius the senate caused a statue of Felicitas to be erected at Tiberius's birthplace, Fundi. In all the subsequent empire she was invoked in behalf of the emperor, both in public and in private.

FELICITAS.—On the temple in the Velabrum, *Strabo*, viii. vi. 23, p. 881; *Dio Cass. frags.* lxxv. 2 (Müller), xlii. 21; cf. *Suet. Ces.* 37; shrine in Pompey's theatre, *Fest. Urbini.*, *CIL* i. 2 p. 339; shrine on the Capitol, *Fest. Ant.*, 1st July and 9th Oct.; temple on the site of the Curia Hostilia, *Dio Cass.* xlii. v. 11.; on the connexion with Augustus, *Cum. Fer.*, *CIL* x. 8375, 16th April; *Fest. Præn.*, 17th Jan.; cf. *Mommsen*, *CIL* i. 2 p. 308; statue at Fundi, *Suet. Tib.* 5; frequent sacrifices by the Arvales, cf. *G. Henzen, Acta Arvalium quæ supersunt*, Berlin, 1874, pp. 71f., 74, 84f., 168.

Thus far we have discussed six abstracts—Fides, Libertas, Victoria, Honos, Virtus, and Felicitas. We have dealt with them first because they illustrate the close connexion of abstract deities and adjectival cognomina. All six go well back into the republic, and certainly one of them (Fides) goes back into the kingdom. In addition to these six, there are thirteen other abstracts which arose certainly before the 2nd cent. B.C., and eight seem to go back into the kingdom.

Of these eight, Ops and Salus occupy a peculiar position. The very great antiquity of Ops is guaranteed by her old cognomen, Consiva, connecting her with the old Roman god Consus, in whose control lay the blessing on the harvest. The existence of Ops is thus proved for the earliest stratum of Roman religion, but Wissowa makes the sugges-

tion that Ops may be there, to be sure, but not as an abstract deity. This point of view the present writer considers incorrect, and merely the result of reading into primitive conditions our sharp distinction between abstract and concrete. Ops as the guardian of plenty and Ops as the idea of plenty—the essence, and so the essential abstract quality of plenty—would be scarcely distinguishable in a world where all inanimate things had life and soul, and soul consisted in the exercise of functions always practical and yet often abstract. In the old calendar Ops had two festivals—the *Opiconsivia* of 25th August and the *Opalia* of 19th December. In those days she had no special sanctuary of her own, but the sacrifice took place in the chapel in the Regia, accessible only to the pontifex maximus and the Vestal virgins. In fact she was such a secret and retired goddess that the legend soon arose that she was the mysterious guardian of the city of Rome, whose name no man dared to betray. Later she received two temples—one on the Capitoline (first mentioned 186 B.C.) and one in the Forum, probably the temple dedicated between 123 and 114 B.C. by the pontifex L. Cæcilius Metellus Dalmaticus. On 10th Aug. A.D. 7 an altar to Ops was dedicated in the Vicus Jugarius. Ops had a temple at Præneste; as Ops Augusta she appears on the coin of Antoninus Pius, and as Ops Divina on the coins of Pertinax.

OPS.—Relation to Consus, *Varro, de Ling. Lat.* vi. 21; *Fest.* p. 180; *Macroh.* iii. ix. 4; sacrifice in the Regia, *Varro* and *Fest. locc. cit.*; *Fest. Arv.*, 25th Aug.; on the secret name, *Macroh. loc. cit.*; temple on the Capitoline, cf. *H. Jordan, Topographie der Stadt Rom im Alterthum*, Berlin, 1871-1907, vol. i. pt. ii. p. 43; *Fest. Vall.*, 25th Aug.; the matrons met at this temple for the Ludi Sæculares of Augustus, *Eph. Ep.* viii. 254; the Arvales met here on 7th Dec. A.D. 80, *CIL* vi. 2059, 11; another temple to Ops, as Ops Oplera, dedicated by Metellus Dalmaticus, *Pliny*, *HN* xl. 174; sacrifice on the Volcanalis, 23rd Aug., *Fest. Arval.*; altar of Ops Augusta la Vicus Jugarius, *Fest. Amit.*; temple at Præneste, *CIL* xiv. 3007.

Salus, like Ops, belongs also to the oldest period, and the proof is similar, the presence of Salus Semonia proving that Salus is the counterpart and companion of the old god 'Semo Sancus dius Fidius.' It is probably no accident, therefore, that dedicatory inscriptions to Semo Sancus have been found on that part of the Quirinal which was commonly called Collis Salutaris, with the Porta Salutaris. Her cult is therefore much older than her temple, founded in 302 B.C. by the dictator C. Junius Bubulcus. This old Roman goddess was doubtless the Salus Publica, the Commonweal, and is to be kept quite distinct from the later identification of Salus with the Greek goddess Hygieia. The old Salus was preserved even into the latest times as the 'Salus publica populi Romani Quiritium' in connexion with emperor-worship, or as Salus Augusta in the same connexion.

SALUS.—Salus Semonia, *Macroh.* i. xvi. 8; cf. *Arch. epigr. Mitt. Oesterr.* xv. [1892] 77ff.; 'Salutes pocolom', *CIL* i. 49, from Horta; votive inscription in the grove of Pisaurum, *ib.* i. 179; old altar at Præneste, *ib.* xiv. 2392, with very ancient *lex aræ*; temple on the Quirinal, *Livy*, ix. xliii. 25, x. i. 9; dedication day, 5th Aug., *Fest. Vall.*; temple founded by Nero after the conspiracy of Piso, *Tac. Ann.* xv. 74; temple at Ferentinum, *ib.* xv. 53; cf. *CIL* x. 5821; many inscriptions from provincial cities; found on both republican and imperial coins.

Two more abstracts, Fas and Fines, the concept of righteousness and the deification of the boundary-line, can lay claim to a venerable age because they are invoked in one of the formulæ of the ancient priesthood of the Fetiales, who gave to the Roman world the primitive concept of international law.

FAS and FINES.—*Livy*, i. xxxii. 8: 'audi Jupiter, inquit, audite Fines—culuscnmq; gentis sunt, nominat—audi Fas!'; cf. the soldier's dedication from Vinxbach near Brohl: 'Finbu(e) et Genio loci et I. O. M.', *CI Rhen.* 649.

Much more difficult to understand is the story of the next two abstracts, Fors Fortuna and Fortuna. They are unquestionably connected, and they are both associated in legend with the name of Servius Tullius.

Fors Fortuna had an old shrine on the right bank of the Tiber in Trastevere. Later, in 293 B.C., the consul Sp. Carvilius vowed a sanctuary to Fors Fortuna; the older sanctuary was situated at the first milestone of the Via Portuensis and the second one at the sixth milestone. Both had a festival on 24th June, in which the lower classes took special part (notice the coincidence of date with the modern popular festival of San Giovanni). Fors Fortuna seems to have been at first an agricultural goddess, the personification of the attendance on chance which characterizes a farmer's life. Gradually the special agricultural relation was forgotten, and she became in general the goddess of blind uncontrollable chance. It is probably in this more general sense that the third temple in Trastevere—that of Tiberinus in the gardens of Caesar—is to be understood.

FORS FORTUNA.—Old temple in Trastevere, Varro, *de Ling. Lat.* vi. 17; Dion. Hal. iv. xxvii. 7; Ovid, *Fasti*, vi. 783 f.; Carvilius's temple, Livy, x. xvi. 14; cf. Mommsen, *CIL* i. 2 p. 326; on the festival of 24th June, *Fast. Amit.*; Ovid, *Fasti*, vi. 775 f.; cf. Cic. de Fin. v. 70; Varro, ap. Non., pp. 144, 425; votive inscriptions found at the sixth milestone, *CIL* vi. 187-189; on Tiberius's temple, Tac. Ann. ii. 41 (Dio Cass. xlii. 28, wrongly sets the temple in 47 B.C.); cf. Plut. *Brut.* 20, de *Fort. Rom.* 5, p. 319 A; 'Schola Fortis Fortunae' from Vell. J. C. von Orelli, *Inscr. Lat.*, Zürich, 1823-50, iii. 5701; altar at Aquileia, *CIL* v. 8219; dedication by a soldier 'nūminali Fortis Fortune', ib. vi. 170.

Akin to and yet distinct from Fors Fortuna is the goddess Fortuna, who seems to have gone through very much the same development, beginning as an agricultural goddess and developing into the representative of the general concept of chance in the world. Her oldest temple stood in the Forum Boarium and was associated with Servius Tullius. Her cult in later times grew to extraordinary proportions, and her functions were specialized and emphasized in a multitude of cognomina. For fuller details the reader is referred to art. FORTUNE (Roman); J. B. Carter, *De deorum Romanorum cognominibus*, and, 'The Cognomina of the Goddess Fortuna,' *Trans. of the Amer. Phil. Assoc.* xxxi. [1900] 60 f.

FORTUNA.—Three temples to Fortuna in the general sense, without special adjectives: (1) in the Forum Boarium, Ovid, *Fasti*, vi. 560 ff.; Dion. Hal. iv. xxvii. 7; Val. Max. i. viii. 11; Pliny, *HN* xxxvi. 163; (2) in the region of the Circus Maximus, *Nefitia*, 11th region; (3) 'ad lacum Aetia', *CIL* vi. 9664.

The following are the more important cult-titles: *anephoros*, sanctuary ascribed to Servius Tullius, Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 74, p. 281 E; *augusta*, frequent dedications and sanctuaries; also frequently on Imperial coins; *balnearis*, *CIL* ii. 2701, 2763; Fronto, de *Orat.* S. 157 (Naber); cf. also *balnearum*, *CIL* vi. 182; *barbata*, Aug. de *Civ. Dei*, iv. 11, vi. 1; Tertull. ad *Nat.* li. 11; *bona*, inscriptions and Imperial coins; *brevis*, sanctuary ascribed to Servius Tullius, Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 74, p. 281 D; *conseratrix*, *CIL* iii. 1033, vii. 211, 954, iii. 4289, 4558; *dubia*, Bas. Capitol., 18th region, 'vico Fortunae dubiae'; *dux*, A.D. 214, sacrifice by the Arvales, *CIL* vi. 2103 b. 71; cf. *CIL* ix. 2194; on Imperial coins; *equestis*, temple near the theatre of Marcellus, vowed in 180 B.C. by Q. Fulvius Flaccus, Livy, xl. xl. 10, xlv. 0; dedicated 173 B.C., Livy, xlii. x. 5; Vitruv. iii. lii. 2; Obseq. 113; templo at Antium, Tac. Ann. iii. 71; *euboea*, sanctuary attributed to Servius Tullius, Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 74, p. 281 E; altar, Plut. de *Fort. Rom.* 10, p. 323 A; *felix*, on Imperial coins; *huiusce diei*, a temple in the Campus Martius, dedication day, 30th July, *Fast. Afric.*; cf. *Fast. Pinc.*; cf. Plut. *Mar.* 26; possibly another temple on the Palatine, Bas. Capitol., 10th region; *malta*, altar on the Esquiline, Cic. de *Nat. Deor.* iii. xxv. 63, de *Leg.* ii. xi. 23; Pliny, *HN* ii. 16; *mammæa*, Bas. Capitol., 12th region, 'vico Fortunae mammæae'; *manens*, coins of Commodus; *memor*, *CIL* vi. 190; *mutabilis*, sanctuary at the fourth milestone of the Via Latina, Val. Max. i. viii. 4; Fest. p. 242; Dion. Hal. vii. lvi. 4; Serv. *En.* iv. 19; Tertull. de *Meneg.* 17; on coins of Faustina; *obsequens*, sanctuary attributed to Servius Tullius, Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 74, p. 281 E, de *Fort. Rom.* 10, p. 322 F; Bas. Capitol., 1st region, 'vico Fortunae obsequens'; *CIL* vi. 191; from Como, ib. v. 5247; from Corn. ib. x. 6309 = i. 1153; on coins of Antoninus Pius; *opifera*, dedication from Tibur, Orelli, 1753; *patrona*, temple by Trajan, dedication day, 1st Jan., *Lyd. de Mens.* iv. 7, p. 70. 14 (Wünsch); *prærens*, *CIL* vi. 181b; *primigenia*, temple on the Quirinal, dedication day, 1st Nov., *Fast. Arval.*; temple on the Quirinal, Plut. de *Fort. Rom.* 10, p. 322 F; from Rome, *CIL* vi. 192-193; 1415 (?); *privata* (Idia), sanctuary on the Palatine, Plut. de *Fort. Rom.* 10, p. 322 F, *Quaest. Rom.* 74, p. 281 E; *publica*, temple on the Quirinal,

dedication day, 5th April, *Fast. Præn.*; Ovid, *Fasti*, iv. 375 f.; cf. Dio Cass. xlii. xxvi. 3; *CIL* ix. 1543, x. 1553; *publica populi Romani Quiritium primigenia*, temple on the Quirinal, vowed 204 B.C. by P. Sempronius Tuditanus, Livy, xxx. xxxvi. 8; dedicated 194 B.C., ib. xxxiv. liii. 5, dedication day, 25th May, *Fast. Car.*; Ovid, *Fasti*, v. 729 f.; dedicatory inscription from Britain, *CIL* vii. 702; on republicana and Imperial coins; *reduz*, dedication of an altar near the Porta Capena in 10 B.C. on the return of Augustus from the East, Dio Cass. liv. x. 8; *Mon. Anc. Gr.* vi. 7 ff.; celebration on 12th Oct., *Fast. Amit.*; regular dedication day, 15th Dec., *Cum. Fer.*; Domitian built a temple in the Campus Martius, Mart. viii. lxx. 11; for sacrifice by the Arvales, cf. Henzen, pp. 86, 122, 124; on Imperial coins; *respicens* (*εὐεργετική*), temple, Dio Cass. xlii. xxvi. 4; Plut. de *Fort. Rom.* 10, p. 323 A, *Quaest. Rom.* 74, p. 281 E; Bas. Capitol., 10th region, 'vico Fortunae respicientis'; cf. *Curies*, and *Notit.*; *salutaris*, *CIL* vi. 184, 2011, iii. 3315; *stabilis*, dedication from Veie in Noricum, ib. iii. 5166a; *virginalis*, Anob. ii. 67; *virgo* (*παρθένος*), sanctuary, Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 74, p. 281 E, de *Fort. Rom.* 10, p. 322 F; cf. Varro, ap. Non., p. 189; *virilis*, sanctuaries ascribed to Servius Tullius, Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 74, p. 281 E; *Fast. Præn.*, 1st April; Plut. de *Fort. Rom.* 10, p. 323 A; *viciata* (*ἡγεμένη*), Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 74, p. 281 E, de *Fort. Rom.* 10, p. 322 F.

Closely connected with Fortuna is Bonus Eventus, a sort of masculine parallel to Felicitas. He seems originally to have been a deity of agriculture, in whose power lay the success or failure of the crop. Hence he is included by Varro in his famous list of the twelve deities of the farmer. But his scope soon broadened and became general, and it is in the general sense that he is the recipient of many inscriptions from the provinces. These inscriptions indicate the private worship of individuals rather than a State cult. But a State cult must also have existed, because Bonus Eventus had a temple in the Campus Martius. The head of the god with inscription occurs on denarii of Caesar's time, and frequently on coins of the empire. The statues of the god represented him somewhat in the type of Triptolemos, as a youth making libation at an altar, and holding in his left hand stalks of wheat or a cornucopia. It is interesting to note that the statue in the symbolism harks back to the primitive agricultural side of his nature.

BONUS EVENTUS.—On the early agricultural character cf. the prayer in Gato, de *Agric.* 141: 'cum divis volentibus quodque bene eveniat, . . . uti tu fruges grandire beneque evenire siris'; Varro, de *Re Rust.* i. 6; provincial inscriptions, *CIL* ii. 1471, 2412, 3095, 4812, iii. 1123, 6223, suppl. 8244, v. 3218, 4208, vii. 77, 97, 425, viii. suppl. 10360, 17213, ix. 1560, xi. 622; *CI Rhen.* 933, 1034; Roman inscription, *CIL* vi. 144, 795; temple in Campus Martius, *Ann. Mare.* xxix. vi. 19; on the statue, Pliny, *HN* xxxiv. 77, xxxvi. 23, and cf. O. Marucchi, *Bull. Arch. Com.* vi. [1878] 205 ff.

There follow three abstracts, which give every appearance of being very old cults, though we have no definite date. Iuventas had a little chapel in the *cella* of Minerva, in the old Capitoline temple of Jupiter. For every boy who came to man's estate and assumed the *toga virilis* a tax was paid into the treasury of Iuventas, while at the same time an offering was brought to Jupiter Optimus Maximus. She was the goddess of incipient manhood, the 'dea novorum togatorum,' patroness of those who had put on the toga for the first time. What was true of all young men was pre-eminently true of the emperor; hence Inventas Augusta and the special imperial festivals in this connexion. This was the old Roman Iuventas, quite distinct, though often difficult to distinguish, from the Greek Hebe, who was present in Rome at least in the time of the Second Punic War and took part in the *lectisternium* of 218 B.C. It was Iuventas, the Greek goddess, to whom M. Livius Salinator vowed in the battle of Sena (207 B.C.) a temple, which was dedicated at the Circus Maximus by C. Licinius Lucullus in 191 B.C.

IUVENTAS.—Chapel in the Capitoline temple, Dion. Hal. iii. lix.; Pliny, *HN* xxxv. 103; cf. Livy, v. lix. 7; Flor. *Epit.* i. 1. 71; Aug. de *Civ. Dei*, iv. 23; tax for all *novi togati*, attributed to Servius Tullius, Dion. Hal. iv. xv. 6; cf. Plut. p. 104; Cic. ad *Att.* i. xviii. 3; supplicatio on 19th Oct., anniversary of the days when Augustus put on the *toga*, *Cum. Fer.* *CIL* x. 8375.

On Iuventas-Hebe: temple by M. Livius Salinator, Livy, xxxvi. xxxvi. 5; Dio Cass. liv. xix. 7; *Mon. Anc.* iv. 8; Pliny, *HN*

xxix. 57; *lectisternium* of 218, Livy, **xxi.** lxii. 9; occasional provincial dedications to Iuventas.

It is open to question whether Pudicitia formed a part of the State religion during the republic; she certainly did during the empire, and was worshipped by private persons during the republic. Under the name of Pudicitia Plebeia she had an old chapel in the Vicus Longus, in connexion with which there arose a legend of the cult of Pudicitia Patricia in the Forum Boarium. It is, however, extremely doubtful whether Pudicitia Patricia ever existed. Pudicitia was the special protectress of the purity of married life, and was worshipped therefore only by married women living in first wedlock (*matronæ univiræ*), or by widows who had married but once. During the empire she naturally became the patroness of the empresses, from Plotina onwards.

PUDICITIA.—Pudicitia Plebeia, Livy, **x.** xxiii. 6ff.; cf. Juv. vi. 308; Prop. ii. ii. 25; the legend of Pudicitia Patricia, Livy, **x.** xxiii. 3; Fest. p. 242; *Matronæ univiræ*, Livy, **x.** xxiii. 9; for connexion with Plotina see her coins with altar and inscription 'ara Pudicitiae'; dedication of a statue of Pudicitia Augusta in a temple of the Dea Caestis in Karpis (Africa) by a 'flaminica divae Plotinae,' *CIL* vii. 993; comparison of Pudicitia and Livia, Val. Max. vi. 1.

Quies is another goddess whose official worship seems to have begun under the empire, but who had a private cult during the republic. We hear of a sanctuary outside the city on the Via Labicana. After they had abdicated, Diocletian and Maximian caused medals to be struck with the inscription 'Quies Augustorum.'

QUIES.—Livy, **iv.** xli. 8: 'iam consul via Labicana ad fanum Quietis erat'; Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, iv. 16: 'Quietem, cum aedem haberet extra portam Collinam, publice illam suscipere noluerunt,' seems to rest on a misunderstanding of the passage in Livy; on the coins cf. J. H. von Eckhel, *Doctrina Numorum veterum*, Vienna, 1792-98, viii. 14.

Another group of abstracts which go back well into the republic consists of Concordia, Spes, and Pietas.

Concordia has an interesting and important history. She makes her first appearance in our records in the year 367 B.C., when the dictator, M. Furius Camillus, founded a temple at the northern end of the Forum in celebration of the cessation of strife between patricians and plebeians. In 121 B.C., at the close of the tumults connected with the Gracchi, L. Opimius restored the temple. On 16th Jan. A.D. 10 Tiberius dedicated this temple anew, under the name of Concordia Augusta; and about this time Livia dedicated a shrine to the goddess in the newly-built Porticus Livia on the Esquiline. In 218 B.C., in connexion with a military revolt in Gaul, the prætor, L. Manlius, vowed a temple to Concordia, which was erected on the Capitoline and dedicated 5th Feb. 216 B.C. Near the main Concord temple in the Forum a small chapel to Concord had been erected nearly a century before (304 B.C.) by the ædile, Cn. Flavius, in gratitude for the ending of the quarrels which the censorship of Appius Claudius had called forth. In 164 B.C. the censor, Q. Marcius Philippus, erected a statue of the goddess in the hope that by her favour his censorship might be a peaceful contrast to the stormy times preceding. At the beginning of the fateful year 44 B.C., when it looked as though civil war had ceased, the senate decreed to build in Cæsar's honour a temple of Concordia Nova. In 10 B.C. Augustus erected an altar to Concordia, and ornamented it with a statue. In A.D. 16, after the suicide of Scribonius Libo, the senate gave thank-offerings to Concordia. Nero sought her favour, and under him Concordia appears in the list of deities to whom the Arvales make sacrifice. From this time onwards Concordia Augusta or Concordia Augustorum figures frequently on imperial coins. Finally, Concordia is the recipient of dedicatory inscriptions in many parts of the

empire, connecting her with collegia, municipalities, provinces, armies, etc.

CONCORDIA.—Camillus's temple, Ovid, *Fasti*, i. 637 ff.; Plut. *Cam.* 42; restoration by Opimius, Plut. *C. Gracchi*, 17; Appian, *de Bell. Civ.* i. 26; Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, iii. 26; rededication by Tiberius, *Fast. Præn.*, *CIL* i.2 p. 308; Ovid, *Fasti*, i. 645 ff.; Dio Cass. *Fast.* viii. 2, lvi. xxv. 1; Livia's chapel, Ovid, *Fasti*, vi. 637; Manlius's temple, Livy, **xxiii.** 7, **xxiii.** 21; *Fast. Præn.*, *CIL* i.2 p. 309; Flavius's chapel, Livy, **ix.** xli. 8; Pliny, *HN* xxiii. 19; Philippus's statue, Cic. *de Dom.* 130 f., 186 f.; temple in Cæsar's honour, Dio Cass. *xlv.* iv. 5; altar by Augustus, *ib.* *xlv.* xxxv. 2; Ovid, *Fasti*, iii. 881 f.; senate's thank-offering (A.D. 16), Tac. *Ann.* ii. 32; Nero and the Arvales, *CIL* vi. 2089, 10, 2041. 17, 2041. 31, 2042. 6; sacristans of the Concordia temple, *ib.* vi. 2204 f., 8703; altar in Syracuse, Livy, **xxv.** xxii. 1; temple in Gales, *CIL* viii. 757; statue in Cora, *ib.* i. 1154=x. 6503; dedication from Casinum, *ib.* x. 5159; frequent dedications to Concordia Augusta or Concordia Augustorum; noticeable are the Concordiales Augustales of Patavium, *ib.* v. 268; on coins of both republic and empire.

Possibly the cult of Spes goes well back into the republic. An indication of this would seem to be the existence of a region called 'ad spem veterem,' outside the city near the later Porta Labicana. The earliest temple, vowed by A. Atilius Calatinus during the battles of the First Punic War, with its dedication day, 1st Aug., stood in the Forum Holitorium. This temple was destroyed by fire in 31 B.C., and dedicated anew by Germanicus in A.D. 17. In addition, we have a reference to the existence of a 'templum Spei novum' in the seventh region. There was a special festival to Spes and Iuventas on the anniversary of the day when Augustus put on the *toga virilis*. In A.D. 63, when Nero and Poppæa returned to Rome from Antium, Spes appears in the list of the goddesses to whom the Arvales make sacrifice. This Spes Augusta occurs frequently in inscriptions and on coins, also as Spes Populi Romani and Spes Publica. See, further, art. HOPE (Greek and Roman).

SPES.—'Ad spem veterem,' Livy, **ii.** li. 2; Dion. Hal. **ix.** xxiv. 4; cf. Frontin. *de Ag. v.* 19 ff., 65; *CIL* xv. 5929; temple in Forum Holitorium, Cic. *de Leg.* ii. xi. 23; Tac. *Ann.* ii. 49; Dio Cass. **i.** x. 3; Livy, **xxi.** lxii. 4, **xxv.** vii. 6; *Fast. Vell.* to 1st Aug.; the *templum novum*, in the supplement to *Notitia*, 7th region; festival to Spes and Iuventas, *Cum. Fer.*, *CIL* x. 8375; sacrifices by Arvales, *CIL* vi. 2043. 2, 10; temple at Ostia, *ib.* xiv. 375. 32 f.; priestess at Gabii, *ib.* xiv. 2804; 'cultores Spei Augustae,' in Antium, *ib.* x. 6645; cult at Aricia, *ib.* xiv. 2158; at Capua, *ib.* x. 3775; statue with inscription, *ib.* vi. 757; cf. T. Schreiber, *Villa Ludovisi*, Leipzig, 1850, no. 292; *simulacra* are mentioned, *CIL* xiv. 2353, 2367, ix. 4663, x. 8295.

Pietas is, strictly speaking, the ideal of the relationship between parents and children. Judging from the great emphasis laid upon the sacredness of this relationship among the Romans, it seems highly probable that Pietas existed in private worship from very early times. In 191 B.C., at the battle of Thermopylæ against Antiochus, the consul, M. Acilius Glabrio, vowed her a temple. Ten years later his son, also M. Acilius Glabrio, carried out this vow and dedicated the temple of Pietas in the Forum Holitorium. We do not know what incident in the battle gave rise to the vow—possibly, as Wissowa suggests (*Religion und Kultus der Römer*², p. 331), an incident similar to that between P. Cornelius Scipio and his son, Scipio Africanus Major, at the battle of Ticinus. In the absence of facts, legend copies a Greek model, telling of a daughter who by the milk of her breast had nourished her mother in prison. The only connexion with the temple was, however, that the prison had formerly stood on the same site. This temple gave place in 44 B.C. to the theatre of Marcellus. Another temple of Pietas, with its dedication day 1st Dec., was situated near the Circus Flaminius. On the coins of M. Antoninus (41 B.C.) and also on those of the empire Pietas is represented accompanied by a stork. This is probably a reference to the cult statue of one of these two temples. In the course of the empire the sharp edge of the meaning of Pietas was worn off, and she came to mean the general harmonious

relationship between the members of the imperial family. Cf. art. FILIAL PIETY, vol. vi. p. 18^a.

PIETAS.—On Acilius Glabrio's temple, Livy, x. xxxiv. 4 ff.; cf. Val. Max. ii. v. 1; destroyed by the coming of the theatre of Marcellus, Dio Cass. xliii. 49; Pliny, HN vii. 121; temple in the Circus Flaminius, Fast. Amit., 1st Dec., CIL i. 2 p. 835; Obsequ. 54 (114); Cic. de Div. i. 98; on the coins of M. Antonius, E. Babelon, Monn. Consul., Paris, 1885, i. 1781; altar vowed by senate on account of the illness of Livia, Tac. Ann. iii. 64; dedicated by Claudius, A.D. 43, CIL vi. 562; Pietas Augusta (or Augustorum) on imperial coins from Antoninus Pius and Faustina on; dedication from Rome, ib. vi. 563; a 'pontifex perpetuus domus Augustae' (in Batia), ib. ii. 1663.

Mens occupies a peculiar and rather interesting place in our list of abstracts. We have seen Roman abstracts influenced by Greek ideas, as, e.g., in the case of Iuventas-Hebe, but we have not met as yet an abstract which arose entirely through Greek influence. This is the case with Mens. In 217 B.C., after the terrible defeat at Lake Trasimennus, the Romans, in addition to other propitiatory acts, vowed two temples, one to the Venus of Mount Eryx in Sicily and the other to Mens. These temples were built close together on the Capitoline, and were dedicated in 215 B.C. One hundred years later M. Aemilius Scaurus restored the temple of Mens. Mens was introduced into Rome at the command of the Sibylline oracles, and this, entirely apart from her close connexion with the Greek goddess, Aphrodite of Mount Eryx, is sufficient proof of Greek origin. A goddess, Bona Mens, occurs on the coins of Praetium, and we have several inscriptions from Central and Southern Italy to Magistri Bonae Mentis. The Bona Mens was what was lacking at Trasimennus, and, interpreted in this sense, she would be the equivalent of Σωφροσύνη.

MENS.—The Capitoline temple, Livy, xxi. ix. 10, x. 10, xxiv. xxxi. 9; Ovid, Fasti, vi. 241 ff.; Lact. Div. Inst. i. xx. 13; restoration by Scaurus, Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. xlii. 61; Plut. de Fort. Rom. 5, p. 818 E; later dedication day, 8th June, Ovid, Fasti, vi. 241 ff.; Fast. Venus., Fast. Maf.; Mens Bona at Praetium, CIL x. 472; at Cora, ib. x. 6512-6514; at Caes., ib. x. 4636; at Puteoli, ib. x. 1550; at Tibur, ib. xiv. 3561; at Alba Fucens, ib. ix. 3910 f.; inscriptions by private persons; Luna, ib. xi. 1827; Aquileia, Arch. epig. Mitt. Oesterr. xix. (1896) 200; Lugdunum, CIL xiii. 1673.

Beginning with Julius Caesar and extending through the empire, we have a large and apparently constantly increasing number of abstracts; but here, as always, we must take account of our general inability to date inscriptions within a century, and of the probability that in many cases the goddess in question may have existed long before, and these by chance may be our first references. Let us consider the more important of these deities in alphabetical order.

Aequitas.—We meet with her first in an archaic inscription from Vulci, 'Acetina pocolom'; her statue is dedicated to Fortuna Primigenia at Praeneste; Arnobius (iv. 1) mentions her as a goddess; and she occurs on coins from Galba to Maximianus Herenles.

Aeternitas.—Her name and a picture of her temple occur on the coins of Augustus and Tiberius. Aeternitas Imperii soon became the official form, and Nero performed special games 'pro aeternitate imperii.' Thus in A.D. 66, after the discovery of the conspiracy of Piso, the Arvales sacrificed to her.

Annona.—The personification of the crops, along with Ceres as the giver of them, and sometimes without her, occurs on coins from Nero onwards. She has a dedicatory inscription from Rome, 'Annonae Sanctae,' and possibly two others, one from Spain and one from Ostia.

Clementia is the personification of mercy and pardon as illustrated in the emperor. She received a temple in honour of Caesar in 44 B.C., and later an altar in honour of Tiberius; in A.D. 39 a regular yearly sacrifice was decreed in honour of Caligula,

and in A.D. 66, when Nero was kind to Tiridates, the Arvales sacrificed to her. On imperial coins she appears as Clementia Augusta, and later as Clementia Temporum, the only form from Gallienus onwards.

Copia is, Wissowa thinks (p. 332), merely the personification of the copia of cornu copiae, and he denies her existence in actual worship; but an inscription from Avignon, and the fact that two Roman deities, one at Thurii (193 B.C.) and one at Lugdunum (43 B.C.), were named Copia, seem to point clearly to a real cult.

Disciplina is at least as old as Hadrian. She occurs on the coins of Hadrian (as Disciplina Augusta) and in inscriptions from Africa and Britain.

Fecunditas appears first in A.D. 63, when the senate ordered a temple to be built in her honour, in gratitude for the successful delivery of Poppaea in childbirth. Probably at the same time the Arvales made sacrifice to her. The name and the representation of the goddess are found on coins beginning with the older Faustina. She is represented as carrying a child in one arm and a sceptre in the other, and sometimes as carrying a child in each arm. Under the name of Fecunditas Temporum, she appears on the coins of Barbia Orbiana and Otacilia.

Gloria is the recipient of a dedicatory inscription from Numidia; she appears as Gloria Exercitus on medallions of Constantius II. and Constantine II., and as simply Gloria on many imperial coins.

Indulgentia seems to come into existence under Hadrian; Marcus Aurelius dedicated a temple to her; she was the recipient of a chapel with a bronze statue in Ciria, Africa; and she appears frequently on imperial coins, usually as Indulgentia Augusta.

Iustitia, as Iustitia Augusta, received a statue in Rome on 8th Jan., A.D. 13; we have mention also in Rome of a 'sacerdos Iustitiae,' a dedicatory inscription from Ancona, and a reference to a statue from Aequiculi.

Pax, a blessing which can best be appreciated after a long period of war, appears on the denarii of L. Aemilius Buca in the year of Caesar's death. After this premature appearance she disappears again, to return under Augustus, when her cult was definitely established. In 13 B.C., when Augustus returned from his expedition to Spain and Gaul, the senate decreed an altar to Pax, which was dedicated on 30th Jan., 9 B.C. In the meantime (10 B.C.) Augustus himself had dedicated altars to Pax Augusta, Salus Publica, and Concordia. Under Caligula the Arvales sacrificed to Pax on the anniversary of the dedication day of the Ara Pacis; and in A.D. 66, when Nero closed the temple of Janus, they made an offering to her. Finally, under the Flavian emperors the great Templum Pacis in Vespasian's Forum was built.

Providentia goes through an interesting development, beginning probably as early as the Augustan age. She is the personification of the foresight of the emperor himself, by means of which perils and disasters are fortunately avoided. Offerings were made to her after the fall of Sejanus, after the murder of Agrippina, after the discovery of the conspiracy of Piso, and after Galba had assured a successor to the throne. Gradually, however, the concept shifted, and Providentia began to be thought of as the protecting power of the gods. It is to Providentia thus thought of that the Arvales sacrificed in A.D. 183 for the health of Commodus. The same Providentia Deorum occurs at intervals on coins from the time of Hadrian onwards.

Securitas, as Augusta, Publica, or Temporum, is the deification of the abiding sense of peace and

security. On 10th Jan., A.D. 69, the Arvales sacrificed to her because Galba, in adopting Piso Licinianus, seemed to guarantee the security of the empire; on another occasion the people of Præneste dedicated an altar to her; and we have an inscription from Cirta, in Africa, recording the erection of a statue. She is, of course, frequent on coins.

Tutela, the goddess who unites in herself all the ideas and concepts of protection, seems to belong to the empire, but to have come into existence in a fashion similar to that in which the oldest abstracts were made. Thus she bears a splendid testimony to the absolute conservatism of all the religious processes of ancient Rome. In a word, she seems to have grown up out of the idea of the *genius loci*—the 'deus in cuius tutela hic locus est'—the *deus tutelæ*, or *genius tutelæ*. Finally, Tutela broke off and became an independent deity, and a rival of the *genius*. The Tutela Augusta thus is equivalent to the Genius Augusti, and is often preferred by the empresses. In the closing years of paganism we meet with Tutela in household worship, in connexion with the *lares*, as a sort of female *genius*.

Valetudo belongs to the circle of Salus. The name appears in republican times on the denarii of M'. Acilius Glabrio, in connexion with a representation of Hygeia (Salus is on the obverse of the same coin). She is also the recipient of several dedicatory inscriptions from the provinces.

ÆQUITAS.—Vulci, *CIL* i. 43; Præneste, *ib.* xiv. 2860; Arnob. iv. 1.

ÆTERNITAS.—On the coins of Augustus and Tiberius cf. H. Cohen, *Médailles impériales*, Paris, 1890-92; on the phrase 'æternitas imperii,' *CIL* vi. 2084. 45, 2065, 2067. 40; cf. Pliny, *Ep. ad Trat.* 69, 83; Nero's games, Suet. Nero, ii. 18; sacrifice of A.D. 66, *CIL* vi. 2044. i. 6.

ANNONA.—Rome, *CIL* vi. 22; Spain, *ib.* ii. 4976. 1; Ostia, *ib.* xiv. 45.

CLEMENTIA.—Temple (44 B.C.), Plut. *Cæs.* 57; Applan, *de Bell. Civ.* ii. 106; Dio Cass. xiv. vi. 4; altar for Tiberius, Tac. *Ann.* iv. 74; yearly sacrifice for Caligula, Dio Cass. lxx. xvi. 10; sacrifice of A.D. 66, *CIL* vi. 2044. 1.

COPIA.—On the cornu copiae, Plaut. *Pseud.* 671, 676; Hor. *Carm. Sæc.* 60, *Epist.* i. xii. 28; inscription from Avignon, *CIL* xii. 1023; for Thuri cf. B. V. Head, *Hist. Numorum*, new ed., Oxford, 1911, p. 88.

DISCIPLINA.—Eckhel, vi. 503; *CIL* viii. 9832, 10657, vii. 896.

ÆCUNDITAS.—The temple of A.D. 63, Tac. *Ann.* xv. 23; cf. Henzen, p. 85; for the coins cf. Cohen², nos. 205 (Faustine Mère), 93-106 (Faustine Jeune), 18-26 (Lucille), 17 (Crispiane), 84-45 (Julie Domne), 39-46 (Salonine), 8 (Orblane), 18 (Otaclie).
GLORIA.—*CIL* viii. 6949: 'Gloria Aug. Sacrum'; W. Fröhner, *Méd. de l'emp. rom.*, Paris, 1878, p. 361; Cohen², nos. 131, 132 (Constantin II. le Jeune).

INDUGENTIA.—Possible connexion with Hadrian, *CIL* viii. 88131; temple of Marcus Aurelius, Dio Cass. lxxi. xxxiv. 3; inscription from Cirta, *CIL* viii. 7095; for the coins cf. Eckhel, vii. 183, 190, 204.

IUSTITIA.—The statue of A.D. 13, *Fast. Præn.*; 'sacerdos Iustitiæ,' *CIL* vi. 2250; Ancona, *ib.* ix. 5890; Æquiculi, *ib.* ix. 4133; the altar from Capua (*ib.* x. 3812) dedicated to 'Iustitiæ, Nemesi, Fatis' belongs to Greek and not Roman religion.

PAX.—Denarii of Emilius Buca, Babelon, ii. 23; on Augustus cf. in general the Augustan poetry, Tibull. i. x. 45; Hor. *Carm. Sæc.* 57; on the Ara Pacis, *CIL* i. 3 p. 320; *Fast. Amit.*, 4th July; cf. *Fast. Ant.*; *Fast. Præn.*, 30th Jan.; cf. *Fast. Cæs.*; *Mon. Ancyr.* ii. 37 ff.; Dio Cass. liv. xxv. 3; Ovid, *Fasti*, i. 709 ff.; on Augustus's dedication (10 B.C.), Dio Cass. liv. xxxv. 2; Ovid, *Fasti*, iii. 881 f.; sacrifice under Caligula, *CIL* vi. 2028 h. 8-10; A.D. 66, *ib.* vi. 2044. i. 12; cf. Henzen, pp. 78, 82; Vespasian's temple, Dio Cass. lxxvi. xv. 1; Suet. *Vesp.* 9.

PROVIDENTIA.—Coin of Augustus with altar and inscription, Eckhel, vi. 12, 128; an 'ara Providentiæ Augustæ' in the *Acta Frat. Arval.*, *CIL* vi. 2028 d. 15, 2033. 5, under Caligula and Claudius; Sejanus, H. Dessau, *Inscr. Lat. selectæ*, Berlin, 1892 ff., i., nos. 157, 158; Agrippina, etc.; cf. *Acta Frat. Arval.*, *CIL* vi. 2042 n. 14, 2044 i. A, 2051 i. 29; Trajan, *ib.* x. 5310; the Severi, *ib.* iii. 1439; 'Providentiæ Augustæ,' *ib.* vii. 1871, viii. 841; offering for Commodus, *ib.* vi. 2099, iii. 18; on Providentiæ Deorum cf. Eckhel, vi. 507; Pliny, *Paneg.* 10.

SECURITAS.—Securitas Publica, Tac. *Agr.* 3; Arval sacrifice (A.D. 60), *CIL* vi. 2051; Præneste, *ib.* xiv. 2899; Cirta, *ib.* viii. 7095, 98; Securitas Perpetua from Viminacium (Serrla), *Oest. Jahreshefte*, iv. [1901], Beiblatt, p. 115.

TUTELA.—Henzen, p. 146: 'deus in cuius tutela hic locus est'; *CIL* ii. 3021, 3377, 4092: 'deus tutelæ'; *ib.* ii. 2991: 'genius tutelæ'; *ib.* iii. 4446, vi. 216: 'Tutela huius loci'; cf.

ib. vi. 777, and Petron. lvi. 105; 'Tutela Tarraconensis,' *CIL* ii. 4091; 'Tutela domus Rupillanæ,' *ib.* v. 3304; 'Tutela Candi-diana,' *ib.* vi. 776; Tutela alone, *ib.* ii. 2533, 3031, 3226, 4090, v. 4932, vi. 774 f.; on Tutela Augusta cf. *CIL* iii. 3349, 4056, v. 4982; Tutela in late household worship, Hieron. in *Esai.* 67; cf. relief, *Annali d. inst.* [1866], Taf. K. 4.

VALETUDO.—Dedication from Noricum, *CIL* iii. 5149; from Lecce, *ib.* ix. 3812 f.; from Mauretania, *ib.* viii. 9810; on republican coins.

There are nine abstracts which seem all to have been the recipients of a cult, for in each case we have either a dedicatory inscription or a reference to an altar. For most of them we have only one reference, but of course this state of affairs is doubtless largely accidental. They are as follows: Amicitia, to whom in A.D. 28 an altar was erected in honour of Tiberius; Civitas (dedicatory inscription from Rome); Dies Bonus (dedicatory inscription from Cæsarea in Mauretania); Fama (dedicatory inscription from Cologne), Fama Augusta from Bætica; Maiestas (dedicatory inscriptions from Rome and from Halicarnassus); Natio, said to have been worshipped in the region of Ardea; Sanctitas (dedicatory inscription from Antiana [Pannonia Inferior]); Ultio (altar under Tiberius in A.D. 20); Vis (dedicatory inscription from Aquileia).

Finally, there are several abstracts which occur only on coins or in the poets, and regarding which we are justified in being very sceptical as to the actual existence of a cult: Abundantia, on coins from Elagabalus to Valerius Maximus; Constantia, on the coins of Claudius and his mother Antonia; Hilaritas, on imperial coins, also as 'Hilaritas Augusta, populi Romani, temporum'; Iucunditas Augusta, on a coin of Alexander Severus; Lætitia, on imperial coins, also as Lætitia Augusti, Augustæ, Augustorum, Fundata, Publica, Temporum; Liberalitas, on imperial coins, also as Liberalitas Augusta; Moderatio, on imperial coins; Patientia, on coins of Hadrian; Tranquillitas, on imperial coins, also as Tranquillitas Aug., Augg., Beata Tranquillitas; Ubertas, on imperial coins, also as Ubertas Sacculi.

In connexion with personification an interesting piece of work remains to be done, namely a study of the various pictorial types, with special attention to the language of symbolism. The basal concept is practically always the same (except in the case of Spes and Virtus), a draped female figure, but the variations in attributes and their permutations and combinations suffice to indicate a multitude of distinct deities. This language of symbolism, which was spoken fairly consistently at least until the time of Hadrian, merits diligent study, and such an investigation will throw much additional light on the history of personification among the Romans.

LITERATURE.—On the general subject cf. W. Warde Fowler, *Roman Ideas of Deity*, London, 1914; G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, Munich, 1902, 21912. These are both most reliable. L. Deubner's art. in Roscher, iii. 2, 2063 ff., needs considerable correction, but contains much valuable material. For individual abstracts consult the separate art. in Daremberg-Saglio, Pauly-Wissowa, and Roscher. R. Engelhard, *De personificationibus quæ in poetis atque arte Romanorum inventuntur*, Göttingen, 1881, is of no value.

JESSE BENEDICT CARTER.

PERSONIFICATION (Semitic).—1. Primitive form.—Animism, the primitive form of religious personification, underlies the Semitic religions. W. Robertson Smith (*Rel. Sem.*², pp. 54, 86 f., 131, 134) is explicit on this point.

Among the Semites, as elsewhere, primitive man 'feels himself to be environed by innumerable dangers which he does not understand, and so personifies as invisible or mysterious enemies of more than human power' (p. 54).

Such men ascribe to all material objects a life akin to their own; an unseen life is supposed to inhabit the heavenly bodies (sun, moon, stars) and natural objects upon earth (animals, trees, stones, wells,

brooks). Thus, these sacred objects come to be thought of as living beings, persons—in other words, they are personified. This process was not confined to objects; it is also found in connexion with forces and activities—e.g., winds and diseases.

'Wherever the spontaneous life of nature was manifested in an emphatic way, the ancient Semite saw something supernatural' (ib. p. 134).

All this, however, is instinctive and unconscious, and so to be distinguished from the deliberate, elaborate personification of later Semitic theology.

(a) *Babylonia and Assyria*.—This primitive form of personification was doubtless found in the early stages of Babylonian religion. Thus A. H. Sayce:

'Deep down in the very core of Babylonian religion lay a belief in what Professor Tylor has called animism. It belonged to the Sumerian element in the faith of the people, and, as we shall see, was never really assimilated by the Semitic settlers.' Sayce, therefore, does not regard this primitive personification as an original element in Babylonian religion—a view not generally held and by no means certain. We need not, however, discuss the point, for, as Sayce says: 'In spite of Semitic influences and official attempts to explain it away, it was never eradicated from the popular creed, and it left a permanent impress upon the folk-lore and superstitions of the nation' (*The Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia*, Edinburgh, 1902, p. 270).

Traces of it abound in Babylonian and Assyrian remains. Many of the innumerable demons are personifications of diseases, winds, etc.—e.g., Namtar, the demon of plague, and Ashakku, the demon of wasting disease (M. Jastrow, *Rel. of Babylonia and Assyria*, p. 260).

(b) *Syria and Palestine*.—There was much in common between the primitive ideas of the Aramaeans, Canaanites, Israelites, and other inhabitants of Syria. Probably our evidence for Israel is wholly derived from a period subsequent to the settlement in Canaan; it is especially difficult to decide which elements of the popular religion are characteristic of Israel and which are borrowed from the Canaanites, but we need not discuss the problem here. What Israel appropriated of this kind was congenial to its religious temper and in accordance with the principles of its primitive faith. The natural objects which we find sacred in Israel had doubtless been sacred earlier to the Canaanites, but Israel had known such while it was still a group of nomad tribes. Among these are the wells, trees, and stones associated with the patriarchs, and the pillars, stone *massēbhāh* and wooden *asherāh*, erected at the sanctuaries, notably Jachin and Boaz that stood before Solomon's temple (1 K 7²¹). A typical instance is the *massēbhāh* at Bethel, associated with Jacob (Gn 28²²). Originally the stone itself is the house of God (*Bēth Elōhim*); the spirit, the *genius loci*, actually dwelt in the stone, was the stone personified. So, again, Robertson Smith:

'The old Hebrew fables of trees that speak and act like human beings (Jg 9⁸, 2 K 14⁹) have their original source in the savage personification of vegetable species' (p. 133).

This ascription of personal qualities to natural objects easily passed to a somewhat higher stage in which spirits were thought of as embodiments of the life supposed to dwell in natural objects and phenomena—the spirit as distinguished from the stone in which it dwelt.

(c) *Arabia*.—Similar forms of thought can be traced in the remains of pre-Muhammadan Arabia, and still survive in the East.

2. Later developments.—So far we have been speaking of the naïve personification of primitive peoples, but by a gradual transition it becomes more conscious and elaborate. We need not commit ourselves to the complicated theories of Winckler, Zimmern, Jeremias, etc., as to the wholesale dependence of the developed religion of Babylonia and Assyria on astronomy, but there can be no question that these systems are largely dependent on the personification of heavenly

bodies and phenomena, of natural objects, processes, and forces. Such personification in some cases originated in the primitive animism; in others it may have been suggested by it. Note, e.g., the fact that the animals that furnish names and imaginary outlines for the constellations of the zodiac appear in mythology as monsters in the train of Tiamāt, the dragon of the abyss. The personifications connected with the greater deities probably represent a more advanced stage of thought.

Tammūz is 'the personification of agricultural activity' (Jastrow, p. 58). Shamash was 'the personification of the sun par excellence and the sun as a whole' (p. 68). Ea was the personification of wisdom. Anu, 'from being merely the personification of the heavens, . . . is raised to the still higher dignity of symbolizing, as Jensen puts it, the abstract principle of which both the heavens and earth are emanations' (p. 165 f.)—obviously not a primitive idea.

Such examples might be multiplied almost indefinitely.

3. Eponymous ancestors, etc.—There is also another species of personification, according to which a deity or legendary hero originates through the personification of a city, tribe, or nation. Possibly the Assyrian deity Ashur is an example of this.

According to Jastrow (p. 195), 'one is bound to confess that the evidence does not warrant us in regarding Ashur as anything but the patron of the city of Ashur. Nowhere do we find any allusion from which we are justified in concluding that he originally represented some elemental power or phenomenon.'

Others, however, regard Ashur as a form of the name of an ancient deity, after whom the city was named. In any case, this kind of personification was common among the Israelites and Arabs, and, indeed, among primitive nations generally. A frequent example is the setting forth of the political, racial, and geographical relations of peoples in the form of genealogies of persons. Gn 10 is a striking illustration; the geographical contiguity, and possibly also the political connexion of Ethiopia, Egypt, and Canaan, are indicated by speaking of them as 'brothers.' In the same way, the narratives of the patriarchs are largely tribal history in the form of accounts of persons; it is impossible now to say how far this method has been carried. According to some, Israel and the Twelve Patriarchs are 'eponymous ancestors.' How this method was understood by the ancients is doubtful. Skinner writes:

'When a writer speaks of Lydians, Lybians, Philistines, etc., as "sons" of Egypt . . . it is difficult to think . . . that he believed the Lydians to be descended from a man named "Lydians" . . . ; and we may begin to suspect that the whole system of eponyms is a conventional symbolism which was as transparent to its authors as it is to us. That, however, would be a hasty and probably mistaken inference. . . . On the whole it is safer to assume that, in the mind of the genealogist, they [the names] stand for real individuals, from whom the different nations were believed to be descended' (JCC, 'Genesis,' Edinburgh, 1910, p. 100).

It is not, however, safe to lay down any general rule; there are instances where it is clear that the writing of tribal history in the form of personal narrative is a mere convention. For instance, when Jg 1² states that 'Judah said unto Simeon his brother,' it is clear, both from the context and from the chronology, that the writer cannot mean that the ancient patriarch Judah said to the ancient patriarch Simeon (see also the present writer [*Chronicles*, London, 1894, p. 876] on 1 Ch 7²²). Possibly Skinner's words are specially applicable to genealogies.

4. Influence on theology, etc.—It is important to recognize that personification, being closely connected with anthropomorphism and anthropopathism, has exercised great influence on both popular religion and official theology. This being a matter where language largely controls thought, the relations between persons and other personal qualities and activities have been automatically transferred to the deities, to their relations with one another,

and to their relations with their worshippers, individual and collective. The various Semitic gods have their wives; the Babylonian Nebo is the son of Merodach. The more important the deities, the more various are the relationships ascribed to them: the Babylonian Ishtar is the daughter, sometimes of Sin, sometimes of Anu; according to Jeremias (*OT in the Light of the Anc. East*, Eng. tr., i. 127), Ishtar is variously the bride, wife, mother, or sister of Tammūz, besides having other lovers. Relationships arise out of political changes; when two cities are connected by conquest, alliance, or amalgamation, the god of the one may become the master, husband, or father of the other. Similar relationships arise between eponymous ancestors: thus, when the tribe of Joseph was divided into Ephraim and Manasseh, Joseph was said to be the father of Ephraim and Manasseh. Similarly, the deity is said to be the father, mother, or husband of the people. So Jahweh is the father (Hos 11¹), or the husband (2¹⁶), of Israel.

5. Personification of divine attributes.—Again, there is the personification in Jewish literature of the attributes, activities, and manifestations of God, and perhaps even of abstract qualities. In the later books there is doubtless pure literary personification, consciously used as a figure of speech and nothing more (see below on 'Wisdom,' etc.). But figures are apt to be popularly understood in a literal instead of a literary sense, and what is merely personified to the man of culture is a person to people generally. The most notable examples are the spirit of Jahweh, the Word, and Wisdom.

The ideas connected with the spirit (*rūah*) of Jahweh would be partly determined by the fact that *rūah* in the concrete meant 'breath' and also 'wind,' and that man had a *rūah* both in the sense of 'breath' and in that of 'principle of life,' etc. These facts would make for understanding the spirit of Jahweh as an emanation or manifestation or even a part of Jahweh. But other passages speak of the spirit of Jahweh in terms commonly used of persons; in the early literature it 'rushes' or 'leaps' upon men; in Gn 1² the spirit of Elohim broods over the waters as a mother-bird over her young. In Is 48¹⁶ RV we have: 'The Lord Jahweh hath sent me, and his spirit,' which is sometimes understood as AV, 'The Lord God, and his spirit, hath sent me'; but both text and meaning are doubtful. On such passages Piepenbring writes:

'It is evident that in these passages the spirit and the word of God are personified, but that these personifications must be placed on the same level with others of the same kind' (*Theol. of the OT*, Eng. tr., p. 251).

The OT passages just referred to dealing with the Word are numerous—e.g., Ps 33⁶: 'By the word of the Lord were the heavens made.' The advance of the Word, through personification, to the status of a person belongs chiefly to post-Biblical Jewish literature, in which the Jewish idea is influenced and ultimately dominated by the Logos of Greek philosophy. Thus in the Targum of Onkelos the action of God is frequently ascribed to the Word (*mēmrā*); e.g., Ex 19¹⁷, Moses at Sinai brought forth the people to meet the Word of God. Again in Philo the Logos is 'Son of God,' 'God,' 'high priest,' 'archetypal man' (B. F. Westcott, *Gospel of St. John*, London, 1908, p. xxxiv). But in these matters Philo, Jew though he was, was the disciple of Plato rather than of the Rabbis.

In the OT and the Apocrypha the tendency to personify is most strongly marked in connexion with Wisdom, *Hokhmāh*, Sophia (Job 28, Pr 8, Wis, *passim*, Sir 24, Bar 3³⁷). In some of these passages Wisdom seems to be spoken of as a person (cf. Marti, *Gesch. der isr. Religion*, p. 328, with

special reference to Wis 7^{25ff.}), as 'Hypostase' representing the aggregate of the divine attributes (cf. also Pr 8³⁰, where Wisdom is made to say of the time when Jahweh created the world: 'Then I was by him, as a master workman'). Similarly, in the *Secrets of Enoch*, xxx. 8, Wisdom is commanded to create man. The identification of Wisdom with the Tōrāh (Sir 19²⁰ etc.) exemplifies a tendency to personify the law which is more marked in later Judaism. Thus W. O. E. Oesterley:

'The idea of imputing personality to the Torah . . . receives actual expression in *Shemoth Rabba*, c. 29, where it says that the Torah stands before the Holy One and intercedes for Israel' (*Jewish Doctrine of Mediation*, London, 1910, p. 69).

In some directions the process upon which we have touched reached its climax in the Chalcedonian doctrine of the Trinity; and, in a very different way, in the Gnostic systems, with their æons, Sophia, Nous, etc.; and the Jewish counterpart of Gnosticism, the Kabbālā, with its *sefirōth*, or emanations, Wisdom, Intelligence, etc.

6. Various examples.—In view of the elasticity of the idea of personification and its frequent use as a literary figure, it would be easy to multiply further examples, but it may be sufficient to mention a few which possess special interest.

We note first various terms for God or for activities or attributes of God which are sometimes spoken of in a quasi-personal fashion: 'the glory of Jahweh' (Ezk 10⁴); 'the divine name' (Ex 23²¹); 'the divine presence,' lit. 'face,' *pānim* (Ex 33¹⁴). In the Rabbinical literature we find 'the Name' (*sh'mā*), 'the Place' (*māqōm*), and 'Heaven' (*shamayim*). In this connexion we may also mention the *sh'khīnāh* and the *bāth qōl*. *Sh'khīnāh*, 'dwelling,' as an abstract noun, is used with great latitude; it is sometimes the radiant manifestation of God in the concrete 'dwelling,' the Tabernacle, *mishkān*, but it is by no means confined to this usage.

It is sometimes practically equivalent to *Menrā*, λόγος, but we may distinguish between the medium of a *passive*, the other one as creative, the other as . . . (C. Taylor, *Sayings of the Jes* . . . p. 44).

The *bāth qōl*, 'the daughter of the voice,' is a name for a species of oracular utterance, supposed to be heard by men:

'Every day Bath Qol goes forth from Mt. Horeb, and makes proclamation and says, Woe to the creatures for contempt of Torah' (*Pirqē Abhōth*, vi. 2).

The voice from heaven in Mk 1¹¹ would have been described by the Rabbis as *bāth qōl* (cf. 'Daughter of Zion,' for the city and its inhabitants [Is 1⁸ etc.]).

The 'angel of the Lord' (*mal'āk Jahweh*) may possibly be regarded as in some sense a personification of a manifestation of Jahweh; perhaps, too, at some stages of thought, angels and demons, together with the Muhammadan *jinn*s, may have been, or been regarded as, personifications of natural objects or forces, like the *numina* of primitive religion whom they replaced. Satan, at any rate, has at times become the personification of the powers of evil, and this view does not seem foreign to some aspects of Semitic thought.

The suggestion is sometimes made that Aaron (*Aharōn*) is simply the personification of the Ark (*Ārōn*), and this is not impossible.

A curious example of personification is found among the Enlilshas, or Abyssinian Jews; they worship the Sabbath as a goddess.

A beautiful example of purely literary personification is Ps 85¹⁰:

'Mercy and truth are met together;
Righteousness and peace have kissed each other.
Truth springeth out of the earth;
And righteousness hath looked down from heaven.'

LITERATURE.—Morris Jastrow, *The Civilization of Babylonia and Assyria*, London, 1915, pp. 190-236, *Hebrew and Babylonian*

Traditions, do. 1914, pp. 26-32, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, Boston, 1893, pp. 46-144, *The Study of Religion*, London, 1901, pp. 101-108; A. Jeremias, *The OT in the Light of the Ancient East*, Eng. tr., do. 1911, pp. 1-141, *KATZ*, pp. 343-457; K. Marti, *Gesch. der isrl. Religion*, Strassburg, 1907, pp. 26-32, 101-105, 146-179, 264-276, 332-336; H. Meinhold, *Die Weisheit Israels*, Leipzig, 1908; C. Piepenbring, *Theol. of the OT*, Eng. tr., New York, 1893, pp. 137-146, 247-262; O. Pfeiderer, *Philosophy and Development of Religion*, Edinburgh, 1894, i. 102-130; W. R. Smith, *Rel. Sem.*, London, 1894, pp. 28-212; B. Stade, *Bibl. Theol. des AT*, Tübingen, 1903, pp. 92-102, 178-190; *HDB*, s.v. 'Holy Spirit', 'Logos', 'Wisdom'; *PRE3*, s.v. 'Geist, heiliger', 'Weisheit', 'Wort Gottes'.

W. H. BENNETT.

PERU.—Our knowledge of the religion and mythology of Peru is gleaned chiefly from the writings of its Spanish conquerors, in whose records we are confronted with a bewildering array of religious types—animism, stone-worship, totemism, and fetishism appearing singly and simultaneously in different areas. A pantheon more or less developed exists side by side with these, and, if certain writers are to be believed, even monotheism and agnosticism made some headway in Incan times.

If it be admitted that the first four classes alluded to all fall to be included under the head of animism, then we may say that at the period of its destruction Incan religion had succeeded in evolving a pantheon possessing at least several anthropomorphic figures from an animism which still flourished side by side with it. This circumstance should render Peruvian religion a study of profound interest to students of comparative religion, as it exhibits a phase of peculiar value to the student. Moreover, there is perhaps no mythology in which compound myths exhibiting definite religious strata are so well exemplified.

At the time of the Spanish conquest Incan animism had reached the agricultural stage. The food compact with the crop-gods was not so well marked as in the case of ancient Mexico, but, although human sacrifice was rare, it is a mistake to consider it as altogether absent from Peruvian ritual. It is only reasonable to suppose that totemism, some relics of which remained, had preceded this agricultural cult, but there is perhaps no progression of existence of type in early religion, and two types may exist side by side and even overlap. Be that as it may, we are informed by Garcilasso de la Vega that in 'the idolatry of the first age' each district, family, village, and house possessed its own god, each different from the others, and that these were generally material objects, such as herbs, plants, trees, mountains, caves, precipices, large stones, small pebbles of different colours, and animals—jaguar, puma, bear, ape, fox, lynx, and cougar. The list includes examples of fetishistic, animistic, and totemistic worship, the first of which certainly survived until late times. Caves and precipices were worshipped as *paccariscas*, or places of origin, plants as the homes of animistic spirits, stones as fetish objects, and animals as totemic eponyms.

All things sacred were known to the Peruvians as *huaca*. The most common visible objects of veneration among the agricultural portion of the population were the *ccompas*, or gods of the irrigation channels to be found in every maize-field. The *ccompa* was sacrificed to at the planting of the seed and earnestly invoked during the growth of the plant, and no type of pagan worship was extirpated with greater difficulty. Others called *huancas* were situated in each plantation and were carved out of stone to represent a gigantic corn-stalk, which was placed there for the purpose of encouraging the plant to grow to the greatest possible size. 'Maize-mothers' were known as *saramama*, 'potato-mothers' as *acumama*, and 'coco-mothers' as *cocamama*. These remained

1 *Historia general del Peru*, Lisbon, 1617, bk. I. ch. ix.

mere rustic fetishes and did not blossom into anthropomorphic gods of vegetation.

This arrestment was probably due to the fact that throughout Peru there existed a definite conception of a universal spirit of animated things (*Pachacamac*) and the close association of this conception with those of a creator-god (*Pacharurac*) and a ruling or directing god (*Pachayachachue*).

The *Pachacamac* was the great spirit from whom proceeded the lesser spirits of animistic type who inhabited the various vegetable plants, whilst his consort *Pachamama* was supposed to have originated all those who haunted larger physical objects such as mountains and rivers. *Pachacamac* came to be identified with the creative agency (*Pacharurac*) from the circumstance that the function of both was regarded as the bestowal of the breath of life. He was represented in the *ccoricancha*, or temple, at Cuzco by a stone statue in the form of a man, and his evolution into the form *Pachayachachue*, in the late Incan period, may safely be ascribed to the growth and stability of Incan rule. Indeed, Inca Pachacamac built for the new god a separate shrine at Cuzco, known as the *Insuareancha*, in which he is said by Molina to have placed a golden statue of the universal deity, thus, perhaps, attempting to further a monotheistic ideal. Older forms died hard. *Viracocha*, a deity representative of water and its powers of fertilization, was sometimes identified with *Pachayachachue*, and is perhaps anterior in origin to the cult of *Pachacamac*, as was *Con*, or *Cun*, the thunder-god of the Collao. Fish deities were also prominent in the coastal districts.

Sun-worship.—It remains only to mention sun-worship in a sketch of a religion which has already been dealt with in art. **ANDEANS**. The name 'Inca' means 'people of the sun.' They gave the sun an anthropomorphic shape, but did not derive racial or royal descent from him, calling themselves 'children of the sun' *honoris causa*; and it was only at a comparatively recent date that this connexion with the sun was embodied in a religious form, having probably been introduced by the great-grandfather of the *Apu-Ccapac-Inca*, who ruled at the conquest. The figure at Cuzco representing the sun was attired in the robes of a monarch, and a special ritual was attached to its worship. The warrior class practised a private and esoteric worship of the sun, totally distinct from the popular form, the idol which they adored being called *Huana-Punchau*, 'the young sun,' representing an infant a year old moulded in solid gold.

LITERATURE.—See literature at art. **ANDEANS**.

LEWIS SPENCE.

PESSIMISM AND OPTIMISM.—These rival interpretations of existence have one circumstance in common: both are designated by superlatives; and the loose employment of the terms in ordinary phraseology renders it needful to point this out. To justify their use in a philosophical sense it is not enough that a given view of things should dwell by preference on their more forbidding or more engaging aspect respectively. The terms are more strictly opposed than this, and each is to be understood in its literal sense. For pessimistic theory this is the worst of worlds; if it were to be a world, it could not have borne to be worse than it is. Some rudiments of order and well-being Schopenhauer himself will allow to it, since otherwise it could not cohere or continue in existence at all. But, so much being granted, the contention is that its irrationality, misery, and worthlessness could not be more than they are. And optimism also expresses itself in the same unqualified way, maintaining that all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds.

The facts on which the former of these views rests are many and undeniable. Whatever a maturer reflexion may suggest, man and his environment do not, superficially regarded, seem to be well fitted to each other. By the essential conditions of his existence man is subjected to hindrance and disappointment, to suffering, decay, and death, and necessarily his awakening consciousness is painfully arrested by such experiences. An anxious and resentful attitude to life may be said to be the natural reaction of the mind's first contact with reality, and spiritual growth thereafter to signify, at least temporarily, a deepening sense of the unsatisfying nature of the world, its instability, its evanescence, and the inconsideration which it manifests for ends humanly felt to be desirable. Hence not only the elegiac note which pervades so much of the world's most moving literature, but also the strain of world-weariness present in the thinking of every people which has risen above the most elementary level of culture. Every age supplies its instances, more especially among the poets, from Homer, who, for all his healthily-mindedness, can find it in his heart to say that 'there is nothing more wretched than man of all things that breathe and are' (*Il.* xvii. 446 f.), and Sophocles, from whom is wrung the cry that 'not to be born is the most to be desired; but, having seen the light, the next best is to go whence one came as soon as may be' (*Ced. Col.* 1225 f.), to our more passionate modern singers of the pitiless sway of wrong and pain and death. And yet such utterances may be expressive merely of a subjective attitude or mood which is transcended in a larger view. The writer, while not fundamentally rebellious, may derive a pensive satisfaction from the indulgence of morbid feeling, and may even find life worth living while he displays before the world the pageant of his bleeding heart. Or, again, his seeming despair may bring otherwise its more express correction with it. The Hebrew teaching on life, e.g., owing to the intensity of the religious belief present throughout, is in the main of a finely robust and hopeful temper, yet in one signal instance it betrays a different character. Koheleth takes rank as one of the classics of the literature of reflective melancholy; nowhere are the bewilderment, dismay, and exhaustion of human nature, baffled by the contradictions of its lot, realized more poignantly. Nevertheless, there is no sign of spiritual collapse in the book. The conclusion reached does not suggest either the despairing or the immoral mind. On the contrary, the ground-tone of the writer's view is furnished by the spiritual tradition which he has inherited. His faith, though semi-paralyzed, holds out, and at least a working solution of the world-riddle is arrived at: if man do not ask too much from life, a sober degree of worthiness may be found in it still. And ultimately his chastened trust in existence expresses itself thus: 'Fear God, and keep his commandments, for this is the whole duty of man; for God will bring every work and every secret thing into judgment, whether it be good or whether it be evil.'

For the most part, then, the instinctive sense of the incongruity between the spirit and its environment, together with the depression of feeling thus occasioned, does not in point of fact give rise to the sceptical view of life, but is, consciously or unconsciously, taken up into a more comprehensive estimate of things. Where, however, this is not the case, the result is pessimism, the doctrine that existence is fundamentally and essentially evil. The theory is found both in Eastern and in Western thought. Optimism, on the other hand, in the proper sense of the term, belongs to one special period in the development of the latter only. It

will be convenient to deal with the various phases of each in the order of their historical appearance.

1. Buddhist pessimism.—In its earliest form pessimism appears, singularly enough, as the characteristic and determinative feature of a popular religion. As a doctrine of redemption Buddhism starts from a comprehensive assertion of the evil and pain inherent in human existence. Life is misery, misery undiluted and unrelieved, from which there is no deliverance so long as personal consciousness persists. This grievous condition is not accounted for by anything external to life itself. It cannot be construed as penal, nor is it consequential upon anything else. Human agents, it is true, may themselves, in some degree, add to its burdensomeness; as, similarly, they may lighten it. But in the main it is life itself that is at fault. Its radical conditions do not permit of happiness, and, if its sorrow is to be cured, these must first be altogether altered or removed.

Little is to be said for the suggestion that would trace this belief to an experience of accumulated distress which had during long ages oppressed the Indian mind, and finally generated so despairing a conviction. Historical evidence is entirely lacking; and, besides, so deeply considered an attitude to existence could scarcely be the outcome of accidental circumstances. Its roots are to be found in that monistic tendency of thought which made its appearance so early, and which is expressed in the *Upanishads* with so rigorous finality. If only the *ātman* (q.v.) is real, it follows that existence otherwise must be illusory and evil. In the language of the Vedānta philosophy it is *avam*, 'emptiness,' 'vanity'; it is *māyā*, 'mirage.' To think otherwise is the supreme error and the source of all further error and sin. On the other hand, to realize this truth is wisdom and salvation. He is a fool who takes the reflexion for the substance, and expends himself on objects essentially shadowy and deceptive. The instructed man knows better. How the world around him came into quasi-existence, indeed, he comprehends no more than another: it is a spectral projection, a shadow cast by the sole divinity, an evil dream which even so is powerless to disturb the blissful repose in which Brahman is wrapped eternally. Yet the wise man is at least aware of its unsubstantial and evanescent character, and, being disillusioned, may cherish the hope of ultimate escape from the meshes of its infinite deception into the unbroken peace of the one-and-all whence he came.

Now from such a doctrine the pessimistic judgment upon life is a direct, if not a necessary, inference. The pantheism which once and again has emerged in the history of European thought has tended for the most part to the enrichment and glorifying of existence. Identifying God with the world, it has greatly quickened the instinctive sense of the wonder and beauty of nature and added a new sacredness to life in its meanest forms. But the Hindu mind—not in all its phases, but prevalently—solved the problem of the one and the many in the more strictly logical or acosmistic fashion. For it the world is pure appearance; it is unreal, phantasmal, wholly lacking in validity and value. The creation, or rather the emanation into being, of nature and man is the fundamental mystery and catastrophe. As making up the varied, ever-perishing scene that offers itself to perception, they must be conceived to be in a state of diremption from that to which they properly belong or in which they inhere. And while, accordingly, essential deep distraction is seated at the heart of the world, pervading its members in every part, this rises into consciousness in man, in whom the phenomenal world pronounces judgment upon itself as altogether worthless and wrong.

It is important to note that to the speculative ideas involved here early Buddhism was professedly indifferent. In the eyes of Gautama, as would appear, all dogmas of the thinkers were vain: for himself he sought only a practical *askesis* by the adoption of which the soul might effect its emancipation from life's ills. Nevertheless, the ultimate presuppositions from which his doctrine is derived are unmistakable; and further, just in so far as he departs from these does its pessimistic character become still more pronounced and thoroughgoing. Thus from the metaphysic of the past he discards entirely that idea of an absolute reality of the world, the inner core or substance of all phenomena, which, indeterminate though it was, had seemed to offer the mind something positive to rest in, and retains only the correlative thought of the instability and evanescence of the finite. The original illumination which broke upon him under the *bo*-tree already betrays this: 'Coming to pass, coming to pass—at that thought there arose in me a vision into things not called before to mind' (*Digha-Nikāya*, ii. 1); and to the same effect is the saying which tradition reports to have been his last, and which summarizes all his teaching: 'That which came into being dissolves into non-being again; work out your own salvation' (*SBE* xi. [1900] 114). That is, the apprehension of the impermanence of things is fundamental in the system. It is indeed the sole philosophical principle on which it is all built up. If earlier reflexion had asserted the being that is behind all becoming, the Buddhist doctrine maintains that the only reality of being is becoming—no sooner has anything begun to be than it has begun to lapse into non-being again. Hence its insistence on the weary round of birth, old age, and death which all life treads perennially. In other words, life is change; mere change or process unqualified, aimless, and endless. Again, if Gautama ignores the conception of man as properly a portion or spark of the infinite, pure spirit therefore, unconditioned and free, and achieving his destiny only in returning to the central fire or focus of being whence he came, all the more does he lay stress upon the view (which also belongs to the psychology of the *Upaniṣads*) that, as the subject of a time-and-space experience, he is 'wholly made up of desire,' with the corollary that peace is to be attained only through its extirpation. This, indeed, is cardinal with Gautama. The 'four excellent truths' are little more than an elaboration of the position, setting forth with the usual Oriental cumbrousness of phrasing that all experience whatsoever, including as it does an element of appetite always, is of the nature of suffering; conscious life is a restless striving, an insatiable thirst or craving, the sole remedy for which lies in 'letting desire go, expelling it, separating oneself from it, giving it no room.' And in one further particular the positive yet free relation of Buddhist teaching to the past, as also the enhanced gloom attaching to it thereby, deserves to be noted. As incorporated in a system otherwise so spiritual and rarefied, the transmigration idea in Hinduism is clearly a survival from a ruder time, its retention probably representing the attempt to do some sort of justice to those indestructible convictions of personal identity and moral retribution which a self-consistent pantheism would contradict too violently. But in the Buddhist doctrine even this accommodation to ordinary human instinct is still further attenuated and reduced. The notion of the self having been surrendered, no use can any longer be made of a conception which suggests, in however illusory a manner, a continuous substrate of consciousness passing on from life to life; that of the transmission of the ethical result or outcome of ex-

perience takes its place; and the prospect that opens before the individual is that of an infinite succession of lives, each determined in character, according to the laws of an inherent necessity, by the quality of the deeds done in the preceding, until the *karma* (*q.v.*) involved is exhausted, and with the breaking of the chain of existences liberation from the burden of being is achieved.

Of the three conceptions just referred to it might be hard to say which is the most fitted to suggest a despairing estimate of life. Plainly there is a close affinity between each and the other two, and together they yield a view of existence the most essentially sad and sceptical that has ever been accepted by mankind. It is true that the Buddhist scheme contains elements of spiritual value and attractiveness, and without these its power and vogue must have been unintelligible. The desires of average human nature are so largely foolish and hurtful that no well-considered method that aims at their repression could fail to rid experience of many ills. In particular, it was nothing less than a moral discovery of the first order that led Gautama to substitute for the senseless austerities of Brāhmanism a regimen of internal purification and self-discipline as the 'path that leads to the extinction of desire.' The ethical is the universally human, and doubtless it was in virtue of the emphasis which it laid on the excellence of the ethical element in experience, especially in certain of its most gracious and winning forms, and on the accessibility of these to the lowest *Sādura* in the land, that the doctrine achieved its astonishing success at the first and has since proved capable, in versions however adulterated, of satisfying the needs of so large a portion of the race. That in the effort to reach his ideal a real measure of happiness is also open to the Buddhist disciple cannot be denied. The way to *arhat*-ship is always pleasant, in the sense that at every step pain is more completely left behind; there are lives to be passed through, especially in one or other of the seven heavens recognized by the system, as the individual fulfils his appointed course, which are full of happy experiences; and *nirvāṇa*, that 'gain which no other gain surpasses,' is hailed from afar as a joy beyond compare. Yet all this cannot conceal the essentially negative character of the conception of existence involved. In truth, it is not, as will be seen later, peculiar to Buddhism to seek to combine a relative optimism with a philosophy of being which is profoundly unbelieving and hopeless. It remains that life is desire, and desire is pain, and only where both are at an end is the craving of the soul at rest. On these terms literally no definable good is left to be the object of pursuit. Condemnation has been passed upon all. Even the morally good is not good absolutely; ultimately it also proves a hindrance, since in its most passive forms a tincture of desire is apparent and life and individuality still assert themselves. Only with their cessation is the goal attained. Of the resultant state, *nirvāṇa* (*q.v.*), all that is really predicable is that it is devoid of those elements of experience which give life content and significance. The last thread which bound the soul to the world of activity and change has been destroyed; and, if it is at peace, the meaning is that it has made good its escape into a region or condition from which consciousness itself has disappeared and where being and non-being are indistinguishable.

So subtle and profound, then, is this Oriental pessimist philosophy. It is a dogmatic pessimism, not so much basing itself upon an inductive survey of experience and a comparison of its pleasures and pains as concluding from its inherent nature that all its conditions are out of joint, and that the

outcome, so long as it shall last, can be only suffering and frustration. The modern version of the creed, being conceived in another milieu, presents necessarily somewhat different features. Nevertheless, in essentials the two do not vary greatly. In certain cardinal features the resemblance is almost startling.

2. The optimism of Leibniz.—European pessimism is preceded historically by its opposite. Optimistic theory represents a phase of 17th and 18th cent. thought, and is found in two main forms. On the Continent its classical exponent is Leibniz, and to him its definition as a doctrine is due. In England it appears in a more diffused shape, characterizing the attitude and spirit especially of the Deistic school and finding a more casual expression in various writers of the age. By Leibniz himself, however, it is not always set forth in the same manner, nor would it be fair to gather his views from the *Théodicée* alone. That treatise, originally composed for the edification of Queen Sophia Charlotte of Prussia in 1710, is essentially popular in character and cannot be rightly understood unless in conjunction with his more expressly philosophical writings. In this connexion the *Système nouveau de la nature et de la communication des substances* (1695), the *Monadologie*, and the *Principes de la nature et de la grâce fondés en raison* (both published in 1714) require to be taken into account.

Leibniz's was essentially a catholic mind, and it has been truly said that harmony is the dominant idea of his philosophy. In early life he had been fascinated by the mechanical doctrines of the current Cartesianism; later he learned from his study of Plato to regard final causes as no mere human imagination projected on things, but as objectively founded; and, in effect, his effort is to combine the ætiological and teleological aspects of existence in a unified scheme. Its formal starting-point is a criticism of Spinoza's notion of substance. Leibniz agrees with Spinoza in regarding substance as that which is independent of all else, so that its characters must be determinable from itself alone; but there agreement between the two thinkers ends. In Leibniz's view the conception of existence as essentially one is a pure abstraction and no more helpful for the understanding of the world than is the atomic hypothesis of Cartesian science itself. Reality is a manifold. It is constituted of particulars or unities of being, each of which is substantial as being independent of the rest and intelligible through its own inner nature, and from each, indeed, could it be understood rightly, the whole of existence might be construed. Further, each is active. For the real is not, as Spinoza taught, essentially passive. Substance, on the contrary, denotes capability of action, and the monads, to use Leibniz's technical term, are centres of living force in which being and work are one. They are to be construed on the analogy of that one among them of which we have the best and most intimate knowledge, namely, human personality, and must be conceived as being all more or less both perceptive and active. These ultimate constituents of things, in short, are so many points of view from which the world may be regarded or so many special forms in which it is mirrored or expressed. And, seeing that, although thus independent of one another, 'having no windows through which aught might come in or go out,' the monads nevertheless make up a coherent whole, it follows that a superior principle of combination must needs have brought this to pass. In the organic unity of experience a 'pre-established harmony' stands revealed; or, in other words, in the constitution of the world as a system of elements connected by physical laws,

together with the fact that all individuals agree in the main in the representation which they form of it, there is already implied the existence of a power of wisdom and goodness on which all depend and in which the various perfections of the creatures are present in an eminent degree. How their relation to this principle is to be understood is nowhere clearly said. If the monads are, indeed, 'simple substances' in the sense described, how can they proceed from a creative power, whose beneficent purposes they are to observe? And if, on the other hand, they are emanations from His being rather, 'the continual out-flashings (*fulgurations*) of His divinity from moment to moment' (*Monadologie*, § 4), do they not at once relapse into mere appearance, as on Spinoza's view? That Leibniz understood himself to have avoided the pantheistic conclusion is plain: he expressly repudiates the doctrine of an *anima mundi* as incompatible with the freedom and worth of the individual. But the ambiguity remains one of the outstanding difficulties of the Leibnizian system, only veiled by a profuse employment of theological language not conducive to speculative clearness.

For present purposes, however, it is more necessary to observe the tendency to self-realization which he finds characterizing existence everywhere. This pertains not only to all actual forms of being, but to those also which never emerge out of the region of mere possibility. Since possibility, in all its infinite variety, is not just nothing, it must be credited with a degree of being, or at least with a *nisus* in that direction. In the case of necessary truths, indeed, the sole test of whose objectivity is the absence of contradiction, to be possible ensures existence; but with contingent truths it is otherwise. The ground of their reality lies elsewhere. The concrete fact or event being finite does not explain itself, and can just as little furnish a true or ultimate explanation of anything else. In itself it may be reckoned arbitrary, and, abstractly considered, it and its opposite are equally possible. But they are not equally possible in conjunction, or 'compossible.' An actual world composed of a multitude of diverse elements must be the result of a selection made among all the conceivable configurations of being according to the law of sufficient reason; or, to express the matter in religious terms, among the infinite number of possible worlds eternally embraced within the divine thought the actual existing world represents that one which has been chosen by the divine will, and brought into being by the divine power, as the most fitting and best ('le plus convenable'). Hence, though the existence of the world constituted as we find it cannot be shown to be a metaphysical necessity, yet not only its non-existence but also its being constituted otherwise is morally unthinkable. God necessarily wills in accordance with His wisdom and goodness; and the universe which we know, though but one of an infinite number conceivable, is nevertheless that one among them which could not but be.

One further feature must be taken account of in order to reach a right understanding of Leibniz's unqualified faith in existence. The monads, it is obvious, differ qualitatively from each other, and especially in respect of their fundamental characteristic, the clearness or obscurity of their perceptions. Highest of all among them are those which are termed minds (*esprits*), although whether, on the general principles of his philosophy, Leibniz is entitled to consider this type of monad generically distinct from every other is more than doubtful. Nevertheless, they are consistently so regarded, no doubt in view of those ethical interests of the individual which he is everywhere so anxious to conserve. To them is ascribed the power of con-

sciously apprehending not merely the world but also the Power whence the world has sprung, so that, if souls in general are living mirrors or images of the universe of created things, human minds are also 'images of the Deity or Author of Nature Himself,' capable of knowing the system of the universe and to some extent of imitating it through spiritual creations and activities of all sorts, each mind being 'a small divinity in its own sphere.' To God, therefore, intelligible natures are related, not as the parts of a machine to its inventor (as is the case with the other constituents of creation), but as subjects to a monarch, or, rather, as children to a parent who seeks to reproduce in them his own perfection. To this under His guidance all things minister. Just as efficient and final causes are found to imply each other, so does there appear a perfect harmony between the physical and moral orders. Nature itself 'leads to grace, and grace by the use it makes of nature brings it to perfection' (*Principes*, § 15). In fine, existence in its deepest interpretation is a City of God, under whose perfect government, as at once architect of the mechanical universe and moral lawgiver and king, good and evil conduct are rewarded with unfailing if not immediate justice, and not merely the advantage of the whole but the absolute well-being of the individual also is secured infallibly. Human shortsightedness, it is true, must often mar the vision.

But 'it,' to quote the conclusion of the *Monadologie*, 'we could sufficiently understand the order of the universe, we should find that it exceeds all the desires of the wisest men, and that it is impossible to make it better than it is, not only as a whole and in general but also for ourselves in particular, if we are attached, as we ought to be, to the Author of all, not only as to the architect and efficient cause of our being, but as to our master and to the final cause which ought to be the whole aim of our will, and which can alone make our happiness' (tr. Latta, p. 271).

There is here, it will be understood, no desire to ignore or minimize the known evils of the world. On the contrary, evil is held to be inevitable. Thus, God alone finds the reason for His existence within Himself, and contains an independent fullness or perfection of being; the created world, consisting of a vast congeries of elements differing in respect of the adequacy with which they express the totality of existence and all inherently craving an ever fuller expression of it, involves imperfection—evil in this sense—in its warp and woof. And this in truth, urges Leibniz, is the whole significance of the conception. Evil is nothing positive or real, nor is there, properly speaking, a principle of evil any more than of cold or darkness. It is a defect or a negation. Such perfection as the creatures exhibit in themselves and in their conduct comes directly from God; their imperfection is merely privative. Even moral evil partakes of this character. The activities of the monads result from their perceptions, and it is because these perceptions are so often at fault that the former go astray. It is not ignorance alone, then, but (moral) error and malice also that 'formally consist in privation': the creature in causing sin is 'une cause déficiente'; while, as for the physical evils with which the world doubtless abounds, they are the necessary penal consequence of sin under a divine government which everywhere makes nature subservient to righteousness, although to our limited vision the immediate connexion of the two may not be always apparent. Evil, that is, as a thing reprehensible in itself and casting a reflexion upon either the power or the goodness of the Creator, disappears. In any case there is a vast overplus of happiness in the world; and, for the rest, the 'evil' to be found in it is justified. Certainly, the non-existence of a creaturely world is conceivable, as involving no

self-contradiction; on the other hand, it would contradict the necessity which an infinite power of wisdom and goodness is under of expressing itself in a world reflecting its own perfections. But of such a world limitation or imperfection is a necessary feature, and that evil in this sense should be eliminated therefrom is inherently impossible. All that can be legitimately asked is that it should be controlled by the good and made to serve its ends, and that the case indeed stands thus there can be no doubt at all. The law of the sufficient reason itself ensures it, and experience 'ordinarily' furnishes confirmation. Evil, in short, is a necessary ingredient in the actual goodness of the world, as the sweet becomes insipid without an admixture of the bitter and discords are necessary to richest harmonies. The existing combination of things is best. Remove any most sinister evil visible in it, and it would no longer be the world which, all things considered, is the most desirable. It might have contained no Judas, but how then should the Saviour have died? In other words, the world is a progressive achievement, in which an element of necessary limitation is always present, and from it the utmost to be expected is that the divine power will at no point suffer real defeat, but will everywhere overcome evil with good.

3. Deism.—To a dogmatic optimism of this kind speculative thought in England has no parallel to show, nor would it be easy to trace there any distinctively Leibnizian influence at work. Nevertheless, contemporary English rationalism exhibits broad affinities with the corresponding Continental tendency, and both alike find the optimistic attitude and temper congenial. In both an unhesitating confidence is placed in human reason; the Cartesian test of logical clearness is erected into a supreme standard of truth, at the expense, as a later age would say, of those deeper intuitions of the soul to which alone final reality is revealed; philosophy is treated with scholastic assurance as the handmaid of religion; and the ultimate truths, whether of the one or of the other—really they are identical—are held for a body of doctrines logically demonstrable. On these terms scant justice is likely to be done to those elements in experience which threaten the reasonableness of the universal scheme, and just this is found to be a prevailing feature in the thinking, whether theological or non-theological, of the age. Deism (*q.v.*) entertains the most complacent views of existence. Of that characteristic phenomenon of the Illumination a crude apriorism may be said to be the foundation. Subsequent writers had learned from Locke to be distrustful of innate ideas, but no more than Locke himself had they attained to a consistent experientialism. No conception is more characteristic of their thinking than that of an all-comprehending harmony in existence which (they will admit) an imperfect experience could never of itself furnish, but for which they claim that it is at least illustrated by experience everywhere. So Shaftesbury speaks throughout of a 'coherent scheme of things,' this 'mighty union' or 'consistent fabric,' whose orderliness is 'abundantly confirmed' by all that we see 'in every rank and order of beings to the remotest spheres,' apparent defects or irregularities being the necessary accompaniments of phenomena which are only parts of a greater whole and disappearing in a larger view, which in its present state, however, the human mind may not always be able to take. Bolingbroke and others follow him here, and detailed support is furnished for the affirmation of the beneficence of nature by the natural theologians, such as Derham and Ray, who handle the argument from final causes in the most naively anthropomorphic manner. So, too, as regards human

nature: the microcosm reflects the symmetry of the macrocosm. Failure to maintain internal harmony, indeed, is a serious and frequent fact; the passions break loose and play havoc with the soul's health and peace. But this represents no schism within the soul itself; it is due to ignorance, which enlightenment will remove. The disorder, then, which we witness, whether in the physical or in the moral world, is in neither case anything positive. In the one it is an illusion arising from our incomplete understanding of what is so vastly beyond us—

'All Nature is but Art, unknown to thee;
All Chance, Direction which thou canst not see'
(Pope, *Essay on Man*, ep. i. l. 289 f.).

And in the other a better understanding of our own being would enable us to avoid that disproportionate indulgence of its various impulses which inevitably entails the hurt and ruin of the whole. Essentially, then, whatever is is right.

'The gen'ral Order, since the whole began,
Is kept in Nature, and is kept in Man' (ib. 171 f.).

Ultimately, the position is scarcely distinguishable from Spinoza's own. Through its doctrine of God as revealed exclusively and sufficiently in nature deism inevitably leaned in this direction; and in Pope's shallow and pretentious piece the creed of the time once for all assumes that semi-mystical, but essentially naturalistic, form in which the ills of life are pantheistically explained away.

4. Transition to modern pessimism.—English deism, however, in the nature of the case proved to be a transient phase of thought. It was in no sense a constructive movement, but represents a traditional orthodoxy with all its more vitalizing truths eliminated; and the century which gave it birth saw also its disappearance. Various circumstances conspired to bring about this result. After all, the watchword of rationalism was a zeal for knowledge ('Sapere aude'), and, as the investigation of nature took a wider range, phenomena disclosed themselves on every side to which the current apologetics were altogether inadequate. The eudæmonism, also, which characterizes in some sort the ethic of all the contemporary schools, orthodox and free-thinking alike, provoked its inevitable reaction, and a deeper analysis of human nature, illustrated in one phase by the cynicism of Mandeville and Swift and in another by the profound seriousness of Butler and William Law, brought to light features of moral experience which could not be ignored. Nor must the historic Lisbon earthquake of 1755 be forgotten—a catastrophe which gave so rude a shock to the easy-going geniality of the age and left its mark upon the thinking of many of its foremost minds—

'Tout est bien, dites-vous, et tout est nécessaire.
Quoi ! l'univers entier, sans ce gouffre infernal,
Sans engloûtir Lisbonne, eût-il été plus mal ?'
(Voltaire, *Poème sur le Désastre de Lisbonne*).

But above all is to be reckoned here the influence of David Hume (q.v.). Against his searching inquiry into the validity of human knowledge the philosophy of the day was powerless, nor from this quarter was any justification forthcoming of the actual ills of life as his dispassionate scrutiny laid them bare. With the *Treatise of Human Nature* and the *Dialogues* a chapter in the history of European thought and feeling about existence definitely closes. The famous 'four evils' passage is fatal to all such vindication as could then be offered for a reasoned contentment with the order of the world. Another explanation, furnished perhaps from the side of 'revelation,' Hume himself professed to be ready to accept, but to the human mind 'unaided' the world-problem was insoluble. We have no line by which to measure it. In the main experience teaches that it does not

work to the production of happiness, and for the rest we must hold our judgment in suspense. It is 'a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery.'

5. The pessimism of Schopenhauer.—It is to this British scepticism that the pessimistic doctrine of later times is, at least indirectly, due. To the Kantian criticism of experience Schopenhauer owed his emancipation from the 'wickedness' of the Leibnizian representation of the world as fair and good, and, when he says this, he refers, of course, to the metaphysical presuppositions on which the representation rests. In the period of his 'dogmatic slumber' Kant had himself leaned in that direction (see the essay on *Optimism* of 1795). In its more characteristic phase also his philosophy had undertaken to preserve for man an apprehension of ultimate truth sufficient to justify faith and hope; and later the Hegelian endeavour had been so to develop the doctrine of the *Critique* that thought is constitutive of experience as to claim for existence a completely rational character and for 'evil' a necessary place in the evolution of the Idea. Nevertheless, the withdrawal of reality from the grasp of reason remains the cornerstone of the critical system, and to this feature of it Schopenhauer attaches himself resolutely. Already in his early *Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (1813) he had maintained that the intelligence, in all its various activity, is inadequate to the attainment of ultimate truth, and in his classic treatise the severance of the two is carried out rigidly. The inner substance of things is hidden from us. We never perceive reality, but only appearance. Space, time, causality itself, belong to the phenomenal region, and to apply such categories—or any others—to the thing-in-itself is to impose upon the matter of knowledge a form which is foreign to it and to distort it fatally. Thus 'life and dreams are leaves of the same book.' The veil of *māyā*—Schopenhauer is fond of the Indian terms—blinds the eyes of mortals, deceiving them with an illusory representation of existence which is no other than a mirage. And yet, it is added, if we will be content with that which is not properly knowledge but rather supra-rational intuition, a certain sense of the very truth of things is not inaccessible to us after all. We are 'let into the citadel by trickery.' In immediate feeling, namely, we realize our innermost self as will, and, could we know other things with a like directness, we should be constrained to conceive them similarly. Not that such a notion can adequately represent the absolute nature of the world. Will suggests causation, and causation is merely subjective. As predicated of the totality of existence, will must be taken for a general concept, construed through its highest species. But, in default of a better—and force, energy, and the like are far less satisfactory—we may legitimately apply it to the determination of the substance of things, and sum up the world accordingly in the formula 'Idea and Will'; i.e. *my* idea, together with the One-and-All of infinite, endless, aimless activity and desire.

Thus Schopenhauer solves the problem which Kant gave up. If it be said that this is not will as commonly understood, the objection cannot be gainsaid. Yet Schopenhauer's system hinges upon its being conceived in just this character. Reality has no part or lot in reason. Intelligibility belongs to the phenomenal alone. The ultimate is 'absolutely groundless'; apprehensible, if at all, by means of this inner volitional faculty through which it most intimately reveals itself; and interpretable, therefore, as an indeterminate craving, a blind, insatiable striving, or hunger for being, which surges up unceasingly in us and in all things, and which we and they truly are. And with this

the essentially deceptive and worthless nature of life is at once given. True, the appearance of a spiritual consciousness, able to pass such a judgment on that which gave it birth, is nowhere accounted for. Admittedly it has enkindled itself in the human brain in a manner quite inexplicable. Here, indeed, is the true 'fall' of man, which has been followed by more than all the unhappy consequences of the Biblical story. With its emergence the entire illusion of existence necessarily arises. Once for all change and multiplicity have arrived, the *principium individuationis* has begun to weave its endless spell, and in the shadowy panorama thus evoked Schopenhauer, curiously enough, recognizes the working of reason freely. For nature's immanent teleology, e.g., he has a frank and appreciative eye. The unity of the will as thing-in-itself secures that the parts of the world shall be thus inter-related, and in particular expresses itself in those successive grades of being which constitute an ordered series culminating in man. Yet this rational quality attaches merely to the shimmering illusion which we take for the world of time and space; behind it reality retains its inherent character, essentially contrary to intelligence, a-logical. The fact is apparent in man, in whom the will's self-objectification is complete and the secret of the world is declared—man whose doom it is to furnish the final illustration of the will's intrinsically nugatory character and to toil and yearn in a shadow-world of mere appearance after that which for ever eludes him.

What function, then, is to be assigned to human intelligence in the economy of things? Schopenhauer's reply is twofold. On the one hand, it serves to discover the sorrowful truth as to the essential character of experience. In the dawn of experience we are deluded by the fancy that existence is desirable and good, but from a belief so shallow the development of reason delivers us. To its wide-opened eye life presents a scene of meaningless monotonous labour, pursued to-day as yesterday and accomplishing mere disappointment and weariness. Not the most favoured can be designated happy; life swings between the poles of desire experienced and desire attained, i.e. between the pain of empty craving and the still more unendurable pain of satiety and ennui, and the bitterest complaints of a Byron or a Leopardi are justified. Nay, psychology demonstrates how well-grounded these are by showing that of the two emotional elements of which our life is made up only pain, not pleasure, is positive. Of pleasure we are aware only in the moment of its gratification; it dies in the birth, and its place is taken by want or yearning. From the nature of the case, accordingly, man is the victim of an unending ache, his pleasures are the alms thrown to the beggar, keeping him alive to-day that his misery may be prolonged till to-morrow. On the other hand, the intelligence which thus lays bare life's inward character avails likewise, in a true degree, to afford deliverance from its restless torture. Once awake to the illusory character of the world and of the satisfactions which it offers, the soul may make shift to effect its escape from the whole *māyā* world, and this it achieves, in the case of the more highly gifted natures, in æsthetic contemplation and enjoyment. The universality of the object with which art confronts the mind opens a way of salvation. In admiration of the beautiful in its ideal forms personal feeling, prejudice, and desire disappear; the individual, losing his individuality, becomes pure subject of knowledge, 'will-less, painless, timeless'—subject and object are one. And with this comes emancipation. Reason, no longer the servant of the will, devising means for the fulfilment of its impulses

and furnishing ever renewed illustration of the wretchedness attending the futile task, has become its vanquisher. The gnawing of desire is allayed. The wheel of Ixion stands still. The nature, if not in bliss, is at peace.

And yet this, happily, does not exhaust the power of reason to effect the soul's release from the misery of which it has rendered it aware. The way of æsthetic appreciation is, as Schopenhauer acknowledges, for the few; and even so it conducts them only to a momentary halting-place in the tread-mill round of experience, the satisfaction which it yields being always the more brief in proportion to its purity. But in morality, a passive and ascetic morality, a more catholic and abiding redemption is attainable. Human nature, indeed, is of itself a mass of egoistic impulses, and the ordinary virtues are only more or less refined forms of selfishness. Nevertheless, all human egos, by right of a common origin, have a latent sense of kinship, and this may be developed and expanded by reflexion. Of a *summum bonum* in the light of which to order life there can on this system be no word at all. Yet metaphysically man is a moral being; on the phenomenal side of his nature subject to necessity and a creature of mere greeds and whims, he is, more truly understood, a part of the great totality of existence, free as constituted properly of will, and fulfilling himself in sympathy, self-sacrifice, and love. The ultimate issue is self-denial in the form of denial of the will to live, and at this point religion comes in to confirm and make finally effective the moralist's teaching. Condemning the world wholly and insisting on the necessity of re-birth, it delivers man finally from his selfhood and unites him with that from which he came. In its fullness such a consummation, it must be allowed, only beckons him from afar. Nor can its very character be truly described by us. To speak of it with the saints under the denomination of ecstacy, trance, illumination, and the like, is to feed the mind with one last illusion: how name an experience from which the whole conditions of intelligent apprehension, including the distinction of subject and object itself, have been removed? The soul has reached *nirvāṇa*, a state to be described only by negatives. It is the region of 'the relative nothing.' And accordingly, as its author acknowledges, this philosophy closes in a universal nihilism.

'If we have recognised the inmost nature of the world as will and all its phenomena as only the objectivity of will . . . we have no desire to evade the consequence that with the will's denial and surrender all those phenomena vanish. That constant struggle and effort, without end and without reason, at all the grades of objectivity, in which and through which the world consists; the multifarious forms succeeding each other in gradation; the whole manifestation of the will; and, finally, the universal forms of this manifestation, time and space, together with its last fundamental form, subject and object—all are abolished. No will; no idea, no world' (*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Eng. tr., l. 530f.).

6. Hartmann.—Fatal as are the metaphysical flaws in the view now sketched, one merit at least must be allowed to it. To Schopenhauer belongs the credit of a resolute attempt to replace the unknown thing-in-itself of the Kantian philosophy by a principle positively revealed in experience, and, had he construed the Will which sustains and informs the world on any tolerable analogy with that of whose working we are aware in ourselves, he might have ranked as one of the founders of that ethical idealism which in modern days has been found the best speculative support to faith. His refusal, however, to concede to this last ground of the world any share in reason necessitated the sceptical conclusion, and proved, indeed, too violent a contradiction to be maintained. On these terms how account, e.g., for the organic

teleology of nature, of which Schopenhauer himself makes so much? Or for those typical forms of things in the contemplation of which he finds for the soul a respite from its unrest? Or for the emergence of reason upon the scene at all? As though, observes Hartmann, the only thought in the universe had arrived there by chance! For himself, most convinced of pessimists as he is, Hartmann sees the clear traces of intelligence at work everywhere. No natural theologian has ransacked the world more thoroughly to discover fresh illustrations of it. In nature, animate and inanimate, instances, he urges, abound; in man himself also, alike on the physical and on the spiritual side of his being; and in the human world of language, custom, polity, and religion which he has slowly built up around him. Above all does the order pervading the world betray itself in history, which for Hartmann is no mere spectacle of meaningless change, but an impressive march of events, not unhindered, yet sure, to a definite goal. Yet reason in all this, it is maintained, does not work self-consciously, but rather after the manner of instinct. In its conscious form in man it proclaims itself a faulty and feeble instrument for the attaining of its ends; in the world—and in the subconscious region of human experience also—it is unaware of its own procedure, and operates the more infallibly on that account. At the heart of existence, in short, is a great Unconscious, which, as universal immanent providence, unwearyingly, without error or hesitation, fashions all phenomena and guides all issues to their predetermined end.

The Leibnizian flavour of such a view seems tolerably pronounced, and indeed Hartmann cordially adopts the position that of all worlds this is the best—could a better have lain in the omniscient Unconscious, it would have come to pass instead of the present one. Much of his ethic, too, is couched in the same paradoxical strain. The ascetic solution of the moral problem has no more contemptuous critic. From Schopenhauer's premisses certain of his disciples had drawn the conclusion that virginity and suicide alone opened a way of escape from life's ills, to which Schopenhauer's reply had been that the denial of the will to live must include the refusal not only of its sorrows but of its joys. Hartmann, however, teaches a more robust doctrine. He would reconcile men with life, and bids them lose themselves in the service of the whole. To make the ends of the Unconscious his own is the individual's all-comprehending duty, and for the toil and sacrifice required of him he is to find support and impulse in mystical communion with the supreme power whose servant he is. Hartmann is very much in earnest about these views, as his various writings on ethics and religion show, and aims professedly at nothing less than the engendering of the resolution to lead a truly divine life, in which each finite task of the earthly course shall be transfigured in the divine light (see the *Phänomenologie*, Berlin, 1879, *passim*).

Nevertheless, although the best that is possible, the world is not on that account necessarily good, and on the basis thus laid down Hartmann endeavours to rest a demonstration, more sweeping than Schopenhauer's own, that life is an essentially undesirable thing. The proof is partly experiential. Happiness is that for which all things strive. Nothing 'so affects the world-essence in its inmost core,' nor is anything else discoverable which could be regarded as a final end. But happiness remains for ever beyond us. Pleasure, it is true, is a positive element in feeling, and only a shallow psychology could have led Schopenhauer to make the contrary assertion. Yet, when the pleasures and pains of life are summed and compared,

the latter predominate vastly. The individual's life on earth is a prolonged disappointment; its fairest flowers and fruits wither as he plucks them. Equally illusory is the notion that satisfaction is attainable in the hereafter, since experience, so long as it remains conceivable at all, always retains this deceptive character. Nor does devotion to the cause of the world avail to bring true contentment, the world itself being doomed to ever-increasing suffering. True, the world advances, but with its advancement come the multiplication of its pains and an enhanced sensitiveness to them. Evolution, therefore, is no cure. We must forward, yet here is our curse. And, if in the acceptance of the end of the Unconscious lies a destiny indeed to be coveted by us, this is because the Unconscious, in His unswerving guidance of the world, is aiming at no positive consummation of its age-long labour, but rather at its redemption from all effort and desire and the infinite frustration to which these necessarily lead.

Just this, Hartmann argues, is the case, and, in support of the dismal estimate of life to which a survey of its facts has led, he adds a metaphysic of his own. Alike in Eastern and in Western pessimism, it will have been observed, the root of the world's sorrow had hitherto been found in the existence of the individual; only with his disappearance may this be healed. And probably this thought is always implied in the pessimistic doctrine. But Hartmann gives it a turn of his own. Individuation for him also is an unsolved problem; the creation of a world of finite things can only be rated a wholly inexplicable blunder. But at least the Unconscious 'foresaw' the possibility of its redemption. Within His nature are embraced both idea and will; in other words, He is all-wise as well as all-powerful, and guides the world which blind will has originated with a skill which never fails. In particular, He brings consciousness upon the scene with a view to the world's salvation. How it is accomplished is again mysterious: the self-contained peace of the Unconscious is interrupted by an idea which 'falls upon it as from the skies.' But with this the critical step has been taken. The more consciousness deepens and expands, the clearer and more commanding becomes the discovery of life's essentially evil and futile character, and with the progress of intelligence and the evolution of mankind the conviction may be expected to spread and take possession of all men, until by a common act of will the race decrees its own extinction, and along with that the disappearance of the world-system of which man is the consummation. So existence should relapse into the Unconscious again. What the unconscious idea never could have attained, to wit, the emancipation of the will, together with the entire creaturely world to which it has given rise, from its unblessed condition, consciousness, when developed to the full, either in humanity or in a race of supermen who will succeed us in this planet, shall have secured, 'hurling back' in this way the total volition of the world into nothingness, so that the world-process ends without a residuum left from which to set out once more. Thus pessimism is reconciled with optimism. This is the best world possible—such a world, namely, as attains salvation, not one whose torture is perpetuated for ever.

7. Critical remarks.—It is not possible to examine separately the various doctrines sketched above; in so far as they represent divers types of philosophical theory their detailed criticism falls beyond the scope of this article, and Leibniz's theistic apologia is dealt with elsewhere (see art. *THEONIC*). There need be no hesitation, however, in asserting that the metaphysic on which the pessimist

view is founded is an impossible one. No coherent account of things can be erected on the presupposition of their inherent irrationality. All that can be meant is that, in the world as known to us, there is much that baffles intelligence and which we never succeed in bringing into line with our desires, and so much may be admitted freely without accepting the pessimistic conclusion. Indeed, neither inference, tho optimistic as little as the pessimistic, is capable of being sustained. It is a mere extravagance of speculation to contend that this is either the best or the worst of conceivable worlds. How shall the human mind, which is but one of its innumerable constituents, rise to a point of view from which to judge the universe as a whole and relatively to anything else? The standard by which to try its worth must necessarily be furnished from within itself; nor may we go further than to say that, tested so, existence is, on the balance perhaps, desirable or the reverse. It must be acknowledged, further, that in the judgment which asserts this there is always a subjective element, with regard to which nothing more can be said. It is a value-judgment, and values can only be asserted, not proved. In the controversy as to the goodness of the world, that is, there comes a point at which discussion is closed. If that which to one disputant is good to the other is merely evil, what can further argument avail? It is always possible to deny the worth of that which the world generally has agreed to hold most worthy, and to consider it to be the aim of all praiseworthy effort to arrest the wheels of progress and to empty life of desire. And to such a contention what answer can be given? Unless, indeed, that the light is sweet and it is a pleasant thing to behold the sun, and that it is just by those interests and ideals which the pessimist despises that men live and in them is the life of the spirit.

At the same time, two general remarks may be offered with regard to this whole mode of appraising existence. It will have been noticed that the standard applied throughout has been broadly the eudemonistic one. On both sides it has been assumed that the supremely desirable thing is happiness. The universe is to be judged by the measure in which it lends itself to its production, and all that remains is to interrogate experience as to this and register the finding reached. But this in itself would seem an impossible task. It may be prosecuted so far, indeed, and the result may not improbably be to furnish the pessimist philosophy with a partial justification. It is at least well to be confronted with the facts of existence, and to the more searching examination of nature and humanity by later times it is due that the flimsy geniality of the deistic mood can never return again. Yet it must always be beyond us to cast up the sum of the pleasures and pains of the universe and weigh them against each other; and in our own human case the inherent futility of the attempt to estimate in this way the worth of life becomes more than ever apparent. Here these elements of emotional experience prove extraordinarily elusive, and even dissolve into one another in the most baffling manner. From pain itself a singular satisfaction is not seldom derived. Effort and labour, hardship and danger, self-abnegation, martyrdom, and death are what prove able most of all to summon forth men's energies and to yield them what they crave, plainly implying that pleasurable feeling is at most only one element in the object of desire. In truth, the pessimist's inventory of life's disadvantages and drawbacks is manifestly at fault. Experience candidly examined discloses compensations of which he fails to take account, and, above all this, that the possession of a 'good will' infinitely outweighs, and is altogether incom-

parable with, the indubitable ills to which he points.

That it should leave no room for the recognition of such a factor in experience, or, in other words, for the appearance of free ethical personality in the world, is a further and final defect in the pessimist view of things. Such a creed is necessarily monistic, and monism is incompatible with all those interests in the light of which alone existence can be rightly judged. It is indifferent whether, as in the case of the doctrines adverted to, the monism be of a spiritualistic order or take the shape of that scientific naturalism which is perhaps still more widely accountable for the despairing strain to be detected in modern thought and literature. In either case the essence of the world permits of no disintegration of its unity, and individuality, human or other, has no reality or rights at all. As against all such metaphysical perversity the soul must ever assert her own supremacy. Free intelligent personality is the highest form of being accessible to us. In it alone is a medium furnished through which to construe the cosmic process, and only when viewed in relation to its perfecting does that process become intelligible or even tolerable. Even so it may be impossible to say why human nature should be fashioned thus—why the whole creation should groan and travail in pain together in order to the manifestation of the sons of God. It is enough that that supreme result is being achieved. Amid the world's evanescence, unreliability, and manifold suffering the production of moral character goes steadily forward, the soul being, as Boehme says, 'bruised and pressed and set to endure much, yet is it the servant in God's vineyard which prepareth the precious wine of righteousness to be drunk in His Kingdom.' Nor is it known what righteousness is unless it be acknowledged that no age-long, heaviest cost should be too great a purchase-price to pay for its realization.

LITERATURE.—For Buddhist pessimism see ASCETICISM (Buddhist). BUDDHISM, and literature there referred to, esp. H. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, Berlin, 1881, Eng. tr., London, 1882. Leibniz's optimistic doctrine appears in his philosophical writings generally, of which there are many edd. (the latest by C. J. Gerhardt, *Die philos. Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, Berlin, 1875-90). The *Monadologie*, with certain shorter pieces, has been translated by R. Latta (Oxford, 1899), who adds a useful exposition and notes. English optimism is most clearly defined in Lord Shaftesbury, *Characteristics*, London, 1711, and Lord Bolingbroke, *Collected Works*, do. 1763-54, and is treated in all histories of philosophical and religious thought dealing with the period (e.g., G. V. Lechler, *Gesch. der philosoph. Theologie*, Stuttgart, 1841, and Leslie, *Thought in the 18th Century*, London, 1891). Modern European pessimism are A. Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Leipzig, 1819, 1859, Eng. tr. by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, London, 1893-80, and C. R. E. von Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten*, Berlin, 1869, 1882, Eng. tr. by W. C. Coupland, London, 1884. Histories of Philosophy and of the Philosophy of Religion devote more or less space to the subject, and monographs on special aspects of it are numerous. Among them may be mentioned J. Sully, *Pessimism, a History and a Criticism*, London, 1877; E. M. Caro, *Le Pessimisme au 19^{ème} siècle*, Paris, 1878; E. Dühring, *Der Werth des Lebens*, Breslau, 1865; W. Gass, *Optimismus und Pessimismus*, Berlin, 1876; J. Volkelt, *Das Unbewusste und der Pessimismus*, do. 1873; A. Dörner, *Pessimismus, Nihilismus und Naturalismus, mit besonderer Beziehung auf die Religion*, Leipzig, 1911. See also art. GOOD AND EVIL, and THEODICY.

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PESSIMISM (Indian).—1. Types of pessimism.—Three types may be distinguished: environmental, temperamental, and philosophical. The first is due to the hardships of one's surroundings, the trying nature of the climate, etc.; the second to the tendency, temperamentally, to look upon the dark side of things; and the third to one's philosophy of life. Three kinds of pressure, then, may weigh down the human spirit and make its mood and outlook pessimistic. Moreover, men may be pessimistic concerning either the life which is or the life which is to come, or concerning both.

The most hopeless pessimism is when neither this world nor the next is regarded as of any value, when 'vanity of vanity' is written upon all that is. Such is the pessimism of the Chārvākas, the Indian analogue of the Cyrenaics.

2. Causes of Indian pessimism.—As to the fact of Indian pessimism there is no doubt; Indian literature is a sufficient proof. But as regards its cause or causes there is much doubt and discussion. Some scholars hold that the cause is environmental.

'India herself, through her climate, her nature, and her economic conditions, furnishes reasonable ground for pessimism' (Bloemfield, *Religion of the Veda*, p. 261).

'When we come . . . to consider the imaginative and intellectual faculties, the influence of environment is no less important. The great majority of the population inhabits the plains. . . . Nature here displays herself in her more ruthless moods—torrential rains at one season, scorching heat in another, hailstorms or earthquakes, outbreaks of disease the dangers of which are intensified by the neglect of sanitary precautions habitual to the people. Congestion of population in many parts involves a struggle for bare existence which begins with childhood and ends only with the grave. This condition of things encourages a pessimistic mode of belief, an apathetic submission to the spirits, mostly malignant, which are believed to control human life. A powerful priesthood and the bondage of caste repress originality of thought and freedom of action. Hence comes the habitual melancholy of the people of the plains which strikes every observer' (W. Crooke, *Natives of Northern India*, p. 141.).

There is some foundation, too, for holding that, as the fusion of the invading Achæans and Dorians with the Minoans of the Mediterranean may have helped to mould the artistic temperament of the Greeks, so the fusion of the invading Aryans with the aboriginal Dravidians may have helped to produce a melancholy temperament. It is certainly true that the history of the Indian Aryans from the beginning of the Vedic age down to the great *Upaniṣads* may be characterized as a movement from optimism to pessimism. And there were other changes scarcely less significant. Phallic worship is scorned in the *Rigveda* (VII. xxi. 5, x. xcix. 3), but later it becomes common. There is no clear trace of transmigration in the *Rigveda*, but by the time of the *Upaniṣads* it is a fundamental article of faith. These changes in mood and worship and doctrine require explanation. The climate and life of India may have gradually affected the temper of the invading Aryans without appreciably diminishing their powers of thought.¹ Some facts of modern India strengthen this possibility: Kipling's *Kim* is a picture (quite true to life in particular instances) of a European lad born in India who so felt the lure of Eastern ways that he became the disciple of a wandering Tibetan monk. The Anglo-Indian population are especially open to such influences and not infrequently dabble in the magic practices of India. In their case not only the influence of environment but also that of blood seems to tell. But Indian pessimism presents itself not primarily as a feeling of world-weariness due to the pressure of an untoward environment, nor as a temperamental tendency to look upon the dark side of things, but rather as an articulated system of thought, the product of Indian metaphysical speculation. Such is the opinion of Oldenberg and Barth, and in fact of most scholars. But such speculation may have had its roots in a trying environment or in a bias towards pessimism due to a melancholy temperament.

3. Psychology of Indian pessimism.—There are three antitheses which are significant for pessimism:

¹ 'Die Trennung der Inder von den Iranern war für die nach Südosten ziehenden der Verzicht oder der letzte abschliessende Schritt zum Verzicht auf die Theilnahme an dem grossen Wettkampf der Völker gewesen, in welchem die gesunde Männlichkeit der westlichen Nationen herangereift ist. In der üppigen Stille ihres neuen Heimathlandes haben jene Arier, die Brüder der vornehmsten Nationen Europas, mit der dunkeln Urbevölkerung Indiens sich vermischend, immer mehr die Charakterzüge des Hinduismus in sich entwickelt' (Oldenberg, *Die Religion des Veda*, p. 2).

mism: (a) false knowledge, or illusion, *versus* true knowledge, or reality; (b) unpleasant feeling, or suffering, *versus* pleasant feeling, or bliss; and (c) wrong volition, or evil, *versus* right volition, or good. The intellectual and the emotional antitheses alone have significance in Hindu thought. Bondage is due to nescience (*avidyā*), and nescience manifests itself in suffering. In other words, what on its intellectual side is false knowledge is on its emotional side suffering. Such is the teaching of virtually all the six systems of Indian philosophy. The same connexion between the intellectual and the emotional is indicated in the famous definition of Brahman as reality, thought, and bliss (*sachchidananda*). The third antithesis, the ethical, is the one emphasized in Hebrew and Christian thought. The doctrine of personality, which is the doctrine of the will, has received scant justice in India. Of the three directions of mental function—cognition, feeling, and willing—the Indian systems of philosophy have to do with cognition and feeling, with the first predominantly, with the second to a less extent, but with volition hardly at all. Volition, the crown of the whole mental process, is largely left out. Hence Indian mental life, being divorced to a considerable extent from healthy volition, has been marked by extravagant thinking and morbid feeling. Volition, while having its roots in knowing and feeling, should react upon them in the way of criticism. Only a strong volitional life, whether individual or national, can prevent thought from being erratic and feeling from being morbid. Now, according to Indian thought, bondage is defined as false thinking and unpleasant feeling, but not (except perhaps in the case of Buddhism) as wrong willing. That is, bondage is defined in intellectual and emotional, but not in ethical, terms. Herein lies the great difference between Indian and Hebrew thought. In harmony with the emphasis in India on knowing and feeling is the fact that Indian thought is in general rationalistic and Indian life not infrequently hedonistic. The poles of Indian experience seem to be the rationalistic calm of the ascetic philosopher, on the one hand, and the hedonistic excess of the wealthy prince, on the other. The pessimism of the ascetic philosopher is due to his feeling of the worthlessness of the phenomenal world as contrasted with the changeless bliss of the *ātman*; that of the wealthy prince, to the feeling of satiety and disgust due to unbridled excess. Bhartṛhari's *Satakas* are a good illustration of the latter. The failure of the Indian mind rightly to estimate the importance of volition may be due partly to the influence of climate. In reference, further, to the relation between knowing and feeling, it is well known that cognition usually precedes feeling, and feeling colours cognition. We see a picture and admire it. We hear a discord and loathe it. But sometimes even prior to cognition there is present a great mass of feeling, whether pleasant or unpleasant, which furnishes the atmosphere in which, so to speak, cognition does its work. Nothing can easily make a man pessimistic who looks at things through the atmosphere constituted by a pleasant feeling tone; and, on the other hand, nothing can easily make a man optimistic who looks at things through the atmosphere of an unpleasant feeling tone. What has apparently taken place in India is this. Cognition, having to do with uncomfortable environmental conditions, has been accompanied by unpleasant feeling; and, on the other hand, a melancholy temperament, possibly the fruit of the fusion of Aryan and Dravidian in India, has been the medium through which the Hindu people have looked at the facts of life. Neither thinking nor feeling has been tested and controlled by willing. The result is that in India we have a reasoned

pessimism, which apparently has its outward source in an untoward environment and its inner source in a melancholy temperament, the thought which elaborated the pessimistic view of life never having been adequately challenged and tested by the activities of the volitional life. The provisional result, then, is that Indian pessimism is at once environmental, temperamental, and speculative. Of course, this is all very tentative and hypothetical.

4. Pessimism as related to the great Brāhmanical doctrines.—Indian pessimism can be understood only as it is related to the great doctrines of Brahman, *karma*, and transmigration—in other words, only as it is set in the context of Indian thought. Thus Bloomfield (p. 212) refers to 'the twin factors of metempsychosis and pessimism' as the doctrinal differentia of any truly Hindu system.

(a) *Brahman and pessimism*.—The watchword of the *advaita* doctrine of Sankarāchārya is identity. The great confession of faith is *ekam evādvitīyam*, 'one only without a second,' and the personal assurance of the emancipated soul is *aham Brahma*, 'I am Brahman.' The theory is that, as soon as I am able to realize this identity, then the whole machinery of multiplicity, of *karma* and transmigration, falls away, and there is nothing left but Brahman, the 'one only without a second,' and 'I am Brahman.' Brahman is declared to be 'reality, thought, and bliss,' and the way of realizing one's identity with this supreme reality is the way of knowledge. This way is theoretically open to all, some time or other, in the course of the process of rebirth—the way into the highest reality, thought, and bliss. Why, then, should not the doctrine of Brahman be regarded as a splendid optimism, a message of good tidings for every soul? It seems to hold out to every one the hope of ultimate union with Brahman—certainly a magnificent goal. Why, then, is pessimism connected with such a splendid conception? One reason may be suggested. The indefinable Brahman, being impersonal and without action, cannot be conceived as a source of comfort and help for needy mortals. He (or it) may be thought of as the sum of all perfections, but the glorious Brahman, perfect in reality, thought, and bliss, is not a god of grace, but only an ultimate reality posited in such a way as to suggest overwhelmingly the worthlessness of the phenomenal world.

'The glorification of the Ātman becomes involuntarily an ever increasingly bitter criticism of this world' (Oldenberg, *Buddha: his Life, his Doctrine, his Order*, Eng. tr., London, 1882, p. 42).

How different might it have been, had the ethical and gracious Varuṇa been the 'one only without a second' in a true theistic devotion on the part of the Indian people! Then, in spite of an unhappy climate and possibly a melancholy temperament, the religious life of the Indian people might have been radiant with hope.

(b) *Pessimism as related to karma and transmigration*.—The psychological explanation of the origin of the doctrine of *karma* (q.v.) is not difficult. It is the experience of all that in the ease of moral merit or demerit there are numerous illustrations of the truth of the saying that 'whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap.' Such facts of experience furnish the starting-point for speculation. That which is true in general of ethical action in this life is extended in several directions, so as to cover not only moral action, but also all action without exception, and not only the deeds done in this life, but also the deeds done in past and future lives.

The twin doctrines of *karma* and transmigration first appear definitely in the *Upaniṣads*. There is no clear trace of either in the hymns of the *Rig-*

veda. It was only when the personal gods of the *Rigveda* had become merged more or less completely into the pantheistic and impersonal one and all of the *Upaniṣads* that the doctrine of an automatic principle of retribution arose. The passing of the Vedic gods left a place for *karma*. *Karma* is the theory of recompense, and transmigration states how the decrees of *karma* are carried out. Now it is highly significant that *karma* and transmigration and a pessimistic view of life arose together in India. Some hold that *karma* is the cause of Indian pessimism. Whether this is so or not, it is by virtue of *karma*, the creative effect of deeds, that, according to Hindu belief, the soul is bound for ever to the round of phenomenal existence, unless some means of release is found. This dreary round of repeated births and deaths constitutes for Hindu thought the tragedy of life. Phenomenal existence is miserable existence, and the two doctrines which govern phenomenal existence are *karma* and transmigration. They are both linked up naturally, then, with a pessimistic view of life. It is true that *karma* and transmigration are, intellectually considered, impressive doctrines. For every soul the 'one far off divine event' is emancipation from the bondage of repeated births and deaths and union with Brahman. The formula is simple: every man the arbiter of his own destiny, and salvation virtually an eternal process. Why should not this profound conception lend itself to an optimistic view of life? One reason may be this: the whole burden of the achievement of emancipation rests upon man, and man knows himself to be needy, sinful, helpless—in fact, too weak to carry such a burden. Hence the prospect of emancipation recedes into the far distant future, and the ordinary Hindu hardly dares to hope for release before he has passed through countless births. Thus he is chained to the phenomenal, and the phenomenal is illusory and sorrowful, and 'hope deferred maketh the heart sick.'

5. Effects of Indian pessimism.—The doctrine of the illusory and worthless character of the world has had its effect upon the mind and life of India. Thought and feeling are consonant with the worthlessness of the world, but volition means adjustment to a real world; and, if great deeds are to be done, the present world must be regarded as real and worthful. This is the explanation of the statement of Macdonell that early India wrote no history, because it never made any.

'The Brahmins . . . had early embraced the doctrine that all action and existence are a positive evil, and could therefore have felt but little inclination to chronicle historical events' (*Hist. of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 11).

Still another effect of the theory of the worthlessness of the world is seen in the tremendous hold which the ascetic life has always had upon the people of India. The worthlessness of the world and the evil of activity logically involve the renunciation of the world and a life of meditation. Again, as Bloomfield points out (p. 264), 'there is in all Hindu thought no expression of hope for the race, no theory of betterment all along the line.' We may find a reflexion of this mood in the retention of the ancient and widely accepted system of the four *yugas*, according to which the golden age is placed in the past rather than in the future, a thing to look back to rather than to look forward to, the direction of things being steadily downward from good to bad and finally to the worst, and the four *yugas* repeating themselves endlessly without making any advance. In this programme is embodied the hopelessness of India's social outlook.

6. Influences qualifying Indian pessimism.—The pessimism of India, however, must not be exagger-

ated. There are many things which tend to break its force. No one can be a pessimist (except in theory) when life is joyous and hopeful; and the people of India have, on the whole, their share of the natural joys of life. Then, too, all theistic and devotional movements tend to be optimistic,¹ such as the various *bhakti* movements and the theisms of modern India—e.g., Islām, Sikhism, Christianity, the Brāhma Samāj, the Arya Samāj, etc. In the case of the Arya Samāj the pessimistic influence of the doctrines of *karma* and transmigration is more or less counteracted by the acceptance of theism. It is the same in the case of Islām, where the belief in fate is robbed to a considerable extent of its sting by a belief in Allāh, the author of fate. In creating an appreciation for things belonging to this world, such as good government, freedom, equality, education, social reform, good bank deposits, etc., the British Government has exercised very great influence. The effect of Christian missions has been equally conspicuous in helping to produce an attitude of optimism.

7. Chronology of Indian pessimism.—One of the most striking contrasts in the history of thought is that between the optimism of the Vedic age and the pessimism which gradually settled down like a pall upon the spirit of India and finally obtained its creedal statement in Buddha's doctrine of suffering. The Rigvedic age was an age of appreciation of the good things of life, and of strenuous effort to secure them. The interesting thing is that the growing appreciation of the value of the present life, now observable in India, marks a kind of return to the spirit of the *Rigveda*.

Thus there are three stages in the history of Indian pessimism: (a) from optimism to pessimism, the movement extending from the *Rigveda* to the great *Upaniṣads* (c. 1400–800 B.C.); (b) pessimism attaining in the 5th cent. B.C. its climax in Buddha's four noble truths (800 B.C.–A.D. 1800); (c) from pessimism to optimism, the British Government and Christian missions (A.D. 1800 to the present time).

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H. D. GRISWOLD.

PETITE EGLISE (ANTICONCORDATAIRES).—When on the point of concluding the concordat with the French Government (see art. CONCORDAT, GALLICANISM), Pope Pius VII. requested the French bishops who had fled the country to resign their sees within ten days. The concordat was signed on 10th Sept. 1801, and on 29th Nov., by the bull *Qui Christi Domini*, Pius VII. abolished 157 archbishoprics and bishoprics and established 50 new ones in place of them. Several of the bishops holding sees resigned as the pope demanded; but others refused to do so. Fourteen of the latter, residing in London, issued on 23rd Dec. 1801 a memorial in which they stated the reasons which prevented them from complying with the pope's demand. They admitted his possession of a primacy derived from St. Peter, which,

however, far from placing him above the canons, was a special reason why he should observe them and cause others to do the like. They added that the bishops are by divine right leaders in the Church; that their connexion with their own Church can be broken only by death, by a legal judgment in conformity with the discipline of the Church, or by a voluntary and canonical resignation; that, speaking for themselves, they had always during their exile cared for their dioceses; and that the new concordat was in their judgment more likely to destroy than to benefit religion. Several other bishops agreed to this memorial. Next, 38 bishops in conference in London addressed a canonical remonstrance to Pius VII. on 6th April 1803. This document is not merely a work of learning and eloquence, but an important official utterance, in which these prelates, appealing to Scripture and tradition, develop the principles set out in the memorial of 1801. These bishops, then, continued to administer their dioceses through priests who shared their convictions in regard to the concordat. It is these 'Anticoncordataires' who were henceforth called the Petite Eglise.

The members of the Petite Eglise, and especially the priests, were subjected to many persecutions and annoyances from the government, both under Napoleon I. and under Louis XVIII. and Charles X. Gradually the clergy of the Petite Eglise diminished in number. It is remarkable that the bishops ordained no priests, believing perhaps that the concordat would not last long. The last survivor of these prelates, Alexandre de Chémines, bishop of Blois, even refused to ordain some candidates who were presented to him, because they held Jansenist opinions. Some groups in the Petite Eglise were imbued with the latter ideas, while others were extremely opposed to them.

After 1830, when the clergy were reduced to the bishop of Blois (de Chémines) and some priests, the question arose whether, in view of the fact that the pre-concordat bishops were dead, the bishops of the concordat ought not to be regarded as lawful. A negative answer was arrived at, on the principle that, the apostolic succession having been broken, the effects of the rupture were enduring. The decisions of ancient councils were also appealed to. One of these, held at Benevento in 1087 by Pope Victor III., had decreed as follows:

'The sacraments of penance and communion are to be received only at the hands of a Catholic priest; if none such is to be found, it is better to remain without communion and to receive it invisibly from our Lord.'

And this soon became the state of the members of the Petite Eglise. By death and defections their numbers gradually diminished, so that towards the end of the 19th cent. there remained no more than a few groups in France, and one in the Belgian diocese of Malins.

The largest group is that of Deux-Sèvres and La Vendée. This has more than 3000 members, and is growing. Its centre is a hamlet of Plaine-lière, a commune of Courlay (Deux-Sèvres). Here there is a large church where laymen sing the offices in Latin, according to the ancient liturgy of Paris, and read instructions in French. Every Sunday 600 or 700 worshippers, and on high festivals as many as 2000, attend service.

The congregation of Lyons has also a place of worship where divine service is held in French, according to the ancient liturgy of Lyons. This group, although greatly reduced, still has some hundreds of members at Lyons and in the neighbourhood. In 1869, when the Vatican Council was sitting, these two congregations petitioned Rome for the recognition of the pre-concordat bishops, as the condition of their own return to the Roman obedience; but the attempt failed; and the

¹ The super-imposition of the Yoga on the atheistic Sāṃkhya lightened the gloom of even that ultra-pessimistic system' (G. F. Moore, *Hist. of Religions*, i. 350).

Council, by declaring the pope to be immediately the bishop of each diocese, laid down a principle the direct contrary of that by which the opponents of the concordat had been guided.

The congregations of the Charollais (Saône-et-Loire) and of Fareins (Ain) contain about 300 persons each; those of the Isère and the Hautes-Alpes contain each scarcely 30 persons; that of the neighbourhood of Fougères (Ille-et-Vilaine) is reduced to a few persons; that of Massat (Ariège) is almost extinct; and the congregation at Mont-Saint-Jean (Sarthe) has joined the Church of the concordat, with the exception of a few old people.

The members of these groups read privately in their own homes, in French, the offices of the Church, generally according to the ancient liturgy of Lyons, and, in addition, the Holy Scriptures and works of piety. Each house has a private chapel, jealously screened from vulgar eyes. It is, indeed, a tradition among the Anticoncordataires, except those of Deux-Sèvres and La Vendée, that their religious practices must be veiled in mystery. This is no doubt a consequence of the persecutions which they had to endure in the first half of the 19th century.

With all of them the only sacrament administered is baptism. This is given by a member of the community chosen for the purpose. The same member conducts funerals, reciting the ancient liturgical prayers of the Church, and also presides at marriages. Children are taught the ancient diocesan catechism by their own parents, who also prepare them for a first (spiritual) communion. They all strictly observe the old festivals abolished by the concordat, as well as the days of fasting and abstinence, according to the usage of the ancient Church. Some of them have desired the re-establishment of the ecclesiastical ministry, but the greater number appear not to feel the want of it, and seem almost to regard their present condition as the normal one.

The members of the Petite Eglise lead an industrious, simple, and peaceable life, which wins the respect of their neighbours. Their morality is generally high. They number in Franco at the present time over 4000 individuals.

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GEORGES VOLET.

PEYOTE RITE.—'Peyote' is the name of a small cactus plant (the *Anhalonium* or *Lophophora* of systematists), found along the lower Rio Grande and southward in Mexico. It resembles a radish in size and shape, only the top being visible above the ground. The white blossom is later superseded by a tuft of white down, which is sliced and dried into the so-called 'button,' which alone is eaten north of the Mexican boundary, while south of it the entire plant is sliced, dried, and used in decoction. The peyote must not be confounded with the mescal or maguey cactus.

Much more widely diffused nowadays than the peyote plant is the peyote cult, which has spread northward so as to reach the Kiowa, Comanche, Arapaho, Cheyenne, Pawnee, Omaha, Winnebago, and Ogihla Dakota. Among the Winnebago it has caused a schism, the peyote-worshippers being sharply distinguished from and even hostile to the believers in the traditional Winnebago religion. The feature that is naturally shared by all the tribes mentioned is the eating of the peyote button, which produces a distinctive sensation of spiritual

exaltation. The Arapaho form of the ceremony may be described as fairly typical.

The ceremony is held in an ordinary lodge at night. One man acts as leader, moulding the rite according to a dream or a vision experienced during some previous performance. In this way individual modifications are introduced though the essential features persist. The number of participants varies; thus, on one occasion there were only three devotees, while on another there were about a dozen, including some Cheyenne visitors. The worshippers enter the lodge after dark and begin by eating four buttons each, the average number for each individual throughout the night being twelve, with a maximum of thirty or forty. The time is spent singing round a small fire, between which and the rear a simple sort of altar is made on the ground. Only one participant sings at a time, to the accompaniment of a gourd rattle shaken by himself and a drum beaten by his neighbour. After four songs the instruments are passed to the next performer, and thus each has his turn. The songs refer to the peyote, the birds regarded as its messengers, and the night, but towards morning they turn to the morning star and the end it brings to the performance. The worshippers eat, leave the tent, and spend the day reclining together in a comfortable spot, with occasional singing and rattling but no drumming. During this day new songs, suggested by the nocturnal experiences, are often composed. At noon a meal is served, at which a single spoon must be used by the entire company. At dark the meeting breaks up. The proceeding is regarded as an occasion of peace and good-will, and possibly for this reason knives and other sharp instruments are barred from the ceremonial lodge. The objects used in the cult have a peculiar decorative character—e.g., yellow is the predominant colour, the feathers used being those of the yellow-hammer and other species of woodpeckers.

The peyote rite has been of special interest to ethnologists because it has spread in so recent a period that the conditions of its diffusion have sometimes come under their direct observation. It has thus been possible to note in this instance the circumstances favouring the assimilation of a new religious practice, the influence of religious leaders, the conflict and harmonization of new and old conceptions. All this has been most suggestive as to the rise and spread of ceremonialism generally. On the whole, it appears that even the boldest ceremonial innovators cannot lift themselves by their bootstraps, but automatically conform to certain pre-existing ceremonial routines current among their people. Thus, a recent Arapaho modification of the peyote cult adapts the rite to a new purpose, that of curing the sick; but the processes adopted are those which the Arapaho ordinarily employ in the treatment of patients. Similarly, the Winnebago have not only adopted the peyote cult but incorporated with it various Christian doctrines and practices; nevertheless the organization of the ceremony conforms closely to the ancient ceremonial system of the tribe. A cult, in other words, may indeed be borrowed, but in the borrowing it is almost invariably cast into a different mould, that of the borrowers.

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R. H. LOWIE.

PHALLISM.—Phallism may be defined as the worship of the reproductive powers of nature symbolized by the organs of sex. A very large share of the worship of relatively primitive and even advanced societies has been claimed for a cult which appears to us, in a high state of civilization, to be strange and repulsive. And all sorts of figures, whether engraved or plastic, have been pressed into the service of the theory as more or less disguised sexual symbols. It is obvious that the mere fact that a cult is remote from our ideas of worship, that it is repugnant to our manners, and that the objects of adoration seem to us to have no element of divinity is no reason for denying its existence or its real importance as a social bond: so many and so various, often so grotesque

and cruel, have been the modes in which human beings have conceived and approached the higher powers.

Worship may be said to be the ritual presentation of offerings supposed to be specially grateful to the divinity, or object of adoration, accompanied by obeisances and other acts designed to express humility and subservience, and usually by the utterance of sacred formulæ—praises, prayers, thanks, or narrative. It is the suitable honouring of a power from which good or evil has been received and may be expected or dreaded in the future. It is addressed not only to what we should call gods or spirits, but to any object which the worshipper may consider to be, or to represent, a power which he has reason to fear, to which he is indebted, or from which he may hope for favours.

In India 'the soldier worships his sword, the cultivator his plough, the moneylender his ledger' (H. H. Risley, *People of India*², London, 1915, p. 235; cf. J. A. Dubois, *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*³, Oxford, 1906, p. 568). Among the Ewe of what was German Togoland the weaver worships his loom, the smith his anvil (J. Spieth, *Die Ewe-stämme*, Berlin, 1906, pp. 309, 448). In ancient Greece 'the sceptre of Hephaestus was worshipped in Lebadea. . . . A legend tells how Aeneas set up a spear in the market-place, and bade the people worship it' (W. H. D. Rouse, *Greek Votive Offerings*, Cambridge, 1902, p. 375).

In these cases the object worshipped seems not to be regarded as a symbol, or as the outward and visible form of any indwelling divinity, but to be honoured for its own sake. The rite is more or less simple. Where it is addressed to any higher power it is analogous in framework, though it may be more splendid and elaborate.

Worship is thus an expression of religion. For religion no satisfactory definition has yet been propounded; no form of words hitherto invented will in all circumstances distinguish it from magic. But for our purpose we may regard religion, in accordance with common usage, as concerned with the relations between men in general, or a tribe or family, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, higher powers which, so far as they are personal, are endowed with free will, and are to be approached with reverence, with offerings, and with prayers which they may or may not grant. Such powers, though frequently capricious and cruel, are amenable to appeal. They are held to prescribe rules of conduct which, beginning in the lower culture as ritual, tend more and more as civilization advances to shed their ritual character and become truly ethical. Magic, on the contrary, conveys the notion of power, however acquired, wielded by the magician as his own, and not as that of a higher being. The co-operation of higher beings, when necessary, is obtained by spell. Compliance with the call is then not dependent on their goodwill; it is compulsory. The tendency of religion is social, of magic anti-social. The one is usually open, public, recognized, and approved by society, and tends to strengthen social bonds. The other is apt to be used for private ends of malice or gain, is usually secret, forbidden, disruptive. This definition, however, cannot be insisted on as a mathematical formula. In practice it is found that no religion is free from magical practices, and that magic often appropriates and adapts the ceremonies of religion. In the higher religions—Christianity and Muhammadanism—it has appeared as an anti-religion, having its own divinities and worship in pronounced hostility to the dominant cult. Indeed, in the form of 'black magic'—i.e. magic hostile to members of the same community—it is everywhere reprobated and repressed (see the present writer's *Ritual and Belief*, London, 1914, p. 66 ff.).

1. Symbols.—Men everywhere have desired and attempted to imitate in art any interesting object, and to represent in a visible and tangible form

ideas either imagined or drawn directly from external nature or from daily intercourse with their kind. It is natural that, when their power over their materials had so far advanced as to delineate even roughly the human form, any member or attribute on which it was intended to fix attention should be exaggerated. This tendency, applied for the purpose of satire, is the essence of the art of caricature. In religious matters it has given to an Indian idol its multiplicity of heads and hands—a clumsy symbol of power that has been taken over and even exaggerated by Tibetan Buddhism—and has produced the Ephesian 'many-breasted Artemis.' The same tendency has emphasized the sexual organs of various divinities in many parts of the world, such as, in ancient times, the images of Priapus, and the Hermæ set up at the boundaries of a territory or of private property. Priapic or ithyphallic figures are, in fact, common to the lower culture. They are found wherever man has attempted to sculpture the human form, whether to represent deities proper or the dead. The size of the phallus in many cases has no special intention, beyond that of expressing the sex represented, and may arise from want of skill on the part of the uncivilized artist. In some instances the intention is declared (though with more than doubtful truth) by the natives to be simply that of causing ridicule and amusement, as a caricature does (K. de Zwaan, *Die Heilkunde der Nisser*, Hague, 1913, p. 65). In general, it has beyond dispute a deeper significance; the exaggerated organs are intended to represent for cultural purposes the powers of reproduction, paternity, fertility, the powers that multiply the people and provide abundance of cattle and crops and all other things necessary for prosperity. Priapus was worshipped as a god of fertility, giving increase of flocks, watching over gardens and fruit-trees, bedewing them with friendly showers, and caring for the bees (Pausanias, ix. xxxi. 2; Vergil, *Ecl.* vii. 34, 26, *Georg.* iv. 110 ff.). He was reckoned the son of Aphrodite. His worship was a late introduction into Greece, perhaps from Lampsacus on the Hellespont, where, according to Pausanias, he was esteemed above all the gods. When it penetrated to Rome, he was identified with Mutunus, an indigenous phallic god; and his statues, in the shape of Hermæ, represented him as bearing fruit and a sickle or cornucopia. The ancient Teutonic deity Frey, or Fricco, was the giver of abundance, presiding over rain, sunshine, and the fruits of the earth. Adam of Bremen, speaking of Upsala, says that he dispensed peace and enjoyment to mortal men, that his image was represented with a very large phallus, and that at marriages sacrifices were offered to him (*Descriptio insularum Aquilonis*, 26, quoted in J. Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, tr. J. S. Stallybrass, London, 1880–88, pp. 212, 1354).

In the E. Indian Archipelago ithyphallic statues are frequently found. Among the Nuforese of New Guinea there is in every village a house that serves the double purpose of a temple of ancestors and the sleeping-place of the youths and unmarried men. From the description of that at Dorei we learn that the posts on which it is supported are adorned with human figures, or with those of crocodiles, snakes, and fishes. All alike are said to represent ancestors, whose respective names they bear. Both the male and female figures have exaggerated pudenda. Moreover, on the eastern and western sides of the building, and outside it, are two pairs of rude wooden statues, each pair representing a man and a woman in the conjugal act. Beside the pair on the western side is the image of a child lying on its back. Other parts of the building also are adorned with suggestive carvings

(G. A. Wilken, *Verspreide Geskriften*, Hague, 1912, iii. 213 f.). The people of Nias, an island off the coast of Sumatra, are in the habit of representing their *adu*, or supernatural beings, by means of wooden images. In many of these the male sex is emphasized in the usual way. When a man dies, such an image is carved in his honour, and is called an *adu catun*. Offerings are made to it; and the Niasese are accustomed to implore it for a numerous offspring. When a child is born, a thank-offering is presented. Before the dwellings of chiefs and persons of rank stones are erected in honour of deceased members of the family. They are called *gure salawa*, and are sometimes in human form, sometimes in that of a phallus. The Battak of Sumatra pray to the images of their long-dead ancestors for offspring. These images are ithyphallic. Among the Bare'e-Toradja in Celebes buildings described as temples for the souls of those who have fallen in war also contain ithyphallic figures, and in almost every temple of importance female breasts and genital parts of both sexes have been found represented on the supporting columns. In the village temple of Langgedoni sexual intercourse was represented by the union of the detached organs. The natives, it is true, declared that such figures had no meaning save to delight the eyes. But they were accompanied by images of crocodiles, the symbol of bravery; and bravery and fecundity are the highest of savage virtues, ensuring as they do the continuance of the stock and the prosperity of the community (de Zwaan, pp. 18, 62 ff., citing Adriani and Kruit, *De Bare'e-spreekende Toradjas*, Hague, 1912). We can have little doubt therefore that all these cases are associated with a cult of fecundity under phallic symbols. This is made very clear in the case of the festival of Upu-lero (see below, p. 822 f.) as it is celebrated in the Babar Archipelago.

An emblem of the generative and creative force of the sun, in whose honour the feast is held, is erected, in the form of a standard flying a pennant of white cotton, almost 5 ft. long. The pennant is cut in the form of a man bearing, fastened to it, a stuffed phallus and testicles—an apt suggestion of the organ enacted below (*A.E.* viii. [1935] 134).

Throughout the Slave Coast of W. Africa the worship of a divinity named Legba or Elegba is prevalent.

Among the Ewe his image 'is made of red clay, and rarely represents the human figure, generally male, rarely female, and always entirely nude. It is always represented as squatting down and looking at the organ of generation, which is enormously disproportionate. . . . When female, the figure is provided with long pointed breasts, and the other necessary adjuncts' (A. B. Ellis, *Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast*, London, 1890, p. 41 f.). Among the neighbouring Yoruba the (masculine) image of Legba 'is found in front of almost every house, protected by a small hut roofed with palm-leaves'. 'He is supposed always to carry a short knotted club, which, originally intended to be a rude representation of the phallus, has, partly through want of skill on the part of the modelers of the images, and partly through the growing belief in Elegba's malevolence, come to be regarded as a weapon of offence.' Ellis further notes: 'In the case of Priapus we find a similar connection between the phallus and a cudgel. See *Catalina*, xx., "The Garden God".' (*Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, London, 1894, p. 65).

Certain of the Shintō gods of Japan are ithyphallic. They are represented in wood and stone, and are the object of offerings and worship (W. G. Aston, *Shintō*, London, 1903, pp. 71, 188 ff.). Whether similar deities were honoured by the ancient Gauls we do not know. It is certain that in the Middle Ages, and since, in various parts of France and Belgium, ithyphallic saints have been worshipped for the purpose of obtaining offspring or curing impotence and sexual disease. Perhaps the most famous of these was St. Foutin (whose name is variously spelt), by tradition the first bishop of Lyons. His cult was wide-spread in the south of France. When, in 1585, the Protestants took the town of Embrun, they found among the sacred relics of the principal church an object said to be

his phallus. Its extremity was reddened by the libations of wine offered to it by women in need of his help. Further north a similar divinity was honoured in the diocese of Bourges under the name of Guericlon or Greliehon, at Brest under the name of Guigoleit, and (without enumerating others) there was one said to be called Ters, whose figure appeared over the gateway to the church of St. Walburga, in the Rue des Pêcheurs at Antwerp (J. A. Dalsure, *Des Divinités gauloises*, Paris, 1903, p. 234 f., ch. xii.; E. S. Hartland, *Primitive Paternity*, 2 vols. London, 1890-10, i. 63; both citing various authorities). In Italy at Trani during the Carnival a priapian figure called *il santo membro* used to be paraded through the town (Dalsure, p. 219). On Trendle Hill, just above the village of Carne Abbas in Dorset, an ancient figure known as the Carne giant, 150 ft. long, is cut in the turf. It is represented as flourishing a club in the right hand (cf. the club of Legba). It is nude, with very distinct and exaggerated sexual organs. Like the White Horse of Berkshire and other effigies cut in the turf of the chalk hills in the south of England, it used to be cleaned and put in order every seven years. This custom exhibits the importance attached to it by the villagers, and seems to point to a religious origin.

Naturally it is less easy to represent the female figure with a corresponding exaggeration. At Ephesus Artemis as the female principle of fertility, the All-mother, was represented with many breasts. The Yoruba on the Slave Coast of W. Africa have a goddess in the form of a pregnant woman, who is invoked against barrenness and difficult labours. She is probably identical with Odunda, the earth-mother, generally depicted as a seated mother holding a child—a common emblem of such a divinity. She is the patroness of love, and many stories are told of her adventures and amours. On the doors of her temples, as well as on those of her male counterpart Otatata, the phallus and *kliri* (the female emblem) in contact are often carved (H. H. Ploss, *Das Weib*, Leipzig, 1891, i. 489, citing, without a reference, Bastian; Ellis, *Yoruba-speaking Peoples*, p. 41 f.). Female figures, however, with the organ of sex exaggerated are by no means unknown in various parts of the world.

On the Congo, e.g., 'in the forests between Mungana and Stanley Pool it is not rare to come upon a little rustic temple, made of palm-fronds and poles, within which male and female figures, nearly or quite life-size, may be seen, with disproportionate genital organs, the figures being intended to represent the male and female principle. . . . Around these carved and painted statues (previously described in similar terms by the author quoted, p. 184) are many offerings of plates, knives and cloth; and frequently also the phallic symbol may be seen dangling from the rafters. There is not the slightest suspicion of obscenity in all this; and any one qualifying this worship of the generative power as obscene does so hastily and ignorantly. It is a solemn mystery to the Congo native, a force but dimly understood; and like all mysterious natural manifestations, . . . it is a power that must be propitiated and personified to his good' (H. H. Johnston, *The River Congo*, London, 1884, p. 43; *J.A.S.* xiii. [1880-81] 473). We are, indeed, expressly told not only that this worship 'is not associated with any rites that might be called particularly obscene,' but also that 'on the coast, where manners and morals are particularly corrupt, the phallic cult is no longer met with' (Johnston, loc. cit.).

Nor are such female effigies confined to the pagan natives of tropical wilds. They were frequently carved on churches in the Middle Ages. Many have been preserved until recently in Ireland, as, e.g., on a doorway of Clorne Cathedral, Co. Cork. The Royal Irish Academy in Dublin possesses a very good specimen removed from a church. They are known to Irish antiquaries by the name of *Shells-na-gig*. Most of them, however, have now been destroyed under ecclesiastical influence. On this side St. George's Channel they are very rare. One remains as a figure in a corbel-table around the beautiful little Norman church at

Kilpeck, in Herefordshire, close to the Welsh border. 'There is said to be another in Cornwall.'

But the representation of the detached organs of both sexes, often called, from their common designation in India, the *lingam* and *yoni*, is very widely distributed. Several examples have already been incidentally mentioned.

Pausanias observes that at Cylene 'the image of Hermes, which the people of the place revere exceedingly, is nothing but the male organ of generation erect on a pedestal' (vi. xxvi. 3).

Similar objects were from remote times common in Italy. Down into the Middle Ages ceremonies appear to have been performed in connexion with them. Ecclesiastical legislation prescribes a penance of bread and water during three Lents for any one who shall perform incantations to the phallus ('*praecantaverit ad fascinum*'), or indeed any spells (*praecantationes*) save the Creed (*symbolum sanctum*) or the Lord's Prayer (anon., *Essay on the Worship of the Generative Powers*, appended to R. Payne Knight, *Le Culte de Priape*, Luxembourg, 1866 [original Eng. ed. 1786], p. 121, citing *Judicia sacerdotalia de criminibus*, vii. 35). This legislation was repeated by councils and synods to the end of the 14th century. Ex-voto stones at Roman settlements and forts in England and Scotland have been dug up, bearing phallic figures (ib. p. 117).

At Isernia, in the Abruzzi, Saints Cosmas and Damian, usually invoked for all sorts of diseases, and being in the official calendar represented more decently than the French saints just mentioned, found their medical practice concentrated almost entirely on the gratification of the feminine desire for lovers or for children.

At their feast on 17th Sept. their relics were carried in procession. The fair which was held on the occasion was attended by people from all the villages round. Maidens, married women, widows, and *donne di piacere* wore each a distinctive dress. Objects in wax representing the parts affected and for which relief was desired were sold at the fair, and were afterwards kissed and reverently presented, together with an offering, in the vestibule of the church. Inside the church the suppliant who suffered from any ill presented himself or herself to a priest at the high altar and then and there uncovered the part of the body afflicted, which the priest anointed ceremonially with consecrated 'oil of Saint Cosmas.' Although the waxen effigies offered for sale represent organs of the body, little trade was done. Women were the chief suppliants, proceeding centred in sexual matters. The ceremonies continued to be performed until the year 1780, when, the attention of the Government having been called to them, they were summarily stopped (letter from Sir William Hamilton to Sir Joseph Banks, enclosing and commenting on a letter from an Italian correspondent, prefixed to Payne Knight's book; the illustration of the votive effigies shows most realistic figures).

It would seem that votive offerings like those of Isernia were not unknown in antiquity; for Payne Knight (pl. iii.) figures a gem from the Townley Collection portraying a scene which is unmistakable. Nor is it only at Isernia that such votive offerings have been known in later times. Models in wax of either sex were offered to St. Foutin at Varailles in Provence in the 16th century. They were suspended from the ceiling of his chapel, and were so numerous that when the wind stirred them they struck against one another, to the disturbance of the devotions of the faithful (Dulaure, p. 205; anon., *Essay*, in Payne Knight, p. 132; both citing *Journal d'Henri III. Confession de Sancerre*, v. i. 22, and the notes of Le Duchat on the chapter in question).

Cakes in phallic form were among the sacred objects carried about in Greece at the Thesmophoria, and in the *Μικρον*, or basket of first-fruits, at the Orphic rite of the Liknophoria, as well as at marriages. They were included in the mystic food partaken of by the women at the Haloa. They were, there can be little doubt, part of the *sacra* presented to the *μύσταις* in the Eleusinian mysteries (J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*², Cambridge, 1908, pp. 122,

518, 522, 530 ff., 148, 151, 154, 157; cf. Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* ii.). At Syracuse, on the day of the Thesmophoria, cakes of sesame and honey representing the female sex, and thence called *μύλλοι*, were carried about and offered to the goddesses—probably Demeter and Kore (Athenæus, xiv. 56; Farnell, *CGS* iii. 99, and the authorities there cited). The Romans made cakes or loaves in the form of either sex (Martial, iv. 69, ix. 3); and similar cakes are said to be still, or to have been within comparatively recent times, made in various parts of France, doubtless on certain festival occasions (Dulaure, p. 195; cf. F. Liebrecht, *Zur Volkskunde*, Heilbronn, 1879, p. 438). Cakes shaped like the female breast were borne by the chorus of women who followed the bride and sang her praise at a wedding in Sparta (Athenæus, xiv. 54).

On the posts of the houses raised in honour of fallen warriors by the Bare'e-Toradja in Celebes representations of women's breasts and sexual organs are found. The case of the village temple at Langgadopi, where the organs of both sexes were shown in the act of union, is probably not singular (de Zwaan, p. 63). In S. Celebes a favourite object of worship is Karaeng lowe (a name signifying 'great lord'), who is not regarded as a god in our sense of the word, but as a powerful spirit. He is figured usually under the form of *lingam* and *yoni*, though there is at least one example of his image in ithyphallic form and made of gold. It has been supposed that he is no other than the Hindu god Siva, imported by way of Java; but this is very doubtful. Incense and candles are burned before him; and he is served by special priestesses, called *pinati*. Once a year a great feast is celebrated in his honour at Gantarang keke, at the first full moon after the end of the fast of Ramadan. Karaeng lowe dispenses good and evil fortune. Life and death are said to be in his disposal. The sick seeking restoration to health, the would-be mother seeking a child, the trader seeking fortune, the gambler luck, the farmer a good harvest, all turn to Karaeng lowe with vows that he may grant their wishes. Nor will they willingly anger him by neglecting to fulfil their vows, lest he should manifest his wrath by sending disease or misfortune upon them (A. C. Kruijt, *Animisme in den indischen Archipel*, Hague, 1906, p. 500; Wilken, iii. 263). He is thus not merely the giver of increase, but a being who holds a general power of good and evil, luck and unluck. And the fact that the name of Karaeng lowe is also applied to the regalia or palladia of a kingdom is possibly significant of the genetic connexions of a mighty, though subordinate, divinity. An ithyphallic god with similarly extensive attributes was formerly worshipped by the Ulisiwa, one of the two tribes of Ambon and Uliasa. It was called Butu-Ulisiwa, 'the phallus of the Ulisiwa,' and was represented by an idol 7 ft. high. Despite the efforts of the Dutch Government at repression of idolatry, it was cherished by the people, as the cause of the fruitfulness of their women and the bestower of good fortune at sea and victory over their enemies, until in 1956 it was discovered in the inaccessible hiding-place to which their pious care had transferred it (Wilken, iii. 236).

Fetishes in phallic form are in use among the Bayanzi, on the eastern bank of the Kwilu in the Congo basin. They are made of clay moulded on wooden cores and adorned with feathers. Female emblems, but of more conventional shape, were also found by E. Torday. Both male and female emblems are propitiated by the sacrifice of a cock. Kola is chewed, and the juice expectorated over them. Torday seems to have witnessed the cere-

mony by a chief, whose prayers were usually for the fertility of his wives and slaves (*JRAI* xxxvii. [1907] 141).

Such fetishes (whose shape, however, is not delineated) were found by Grenfell among the E. Bakongo, of which we are told 'not that the representations of the generative powers, male or female, were worshipped, but that these rude images were the abiding-place of a spirit-force which, if rightly propitiated, would promote fruitful intercourse between men and women' (Johnston, *George Grenfell and the Congo*, London, 1938, ii. 638 n.). In Dahomey, among the true negroes, 'every street from Whydah to the capital is adorned with the symbol, and the old ones are not removed' (H. M. Westropp, and C. S. Wake, *Ancient Symbol Worship*², New York, 1875, p. 46, quoting Burton). East and west from Dahomey along the Slave Coast 'the phallus is seen everywhere, in front of houses, in the streets and public places, sometimes alone, but more frequently in connection with the image of Legba, to whom the organ is sacred, and whose principal attribute is the exciting of sexual desires.' Both the Ewe and the Yoruba 'attribute sexual desires to possession by the god'; and he removes barrenness. The knotted club which among the Yoruba is placed in the hand of his image has already been referred to (Ellis, *Ewe*, pp. 41, 44, *Yoruba*, p. 65; cf. the club of the giant of Cerne Abbas, above, p. 817).

In the old Shintō religion of Japan the use of the detached phallus was frequent. It was set up everywhere along the roadsides (Aston, p. 71 f.; cf. *NATURE* [Japanese], II. 7).

In identifying phallic symbols other than realistic representations, however, the greatest circumspection is required. All sorts of objects have been claimed as phallic by writers whose imagination outpaces proof. Some actual or fancied resemblance has been too often deemed adequate evidence, without showing the beliefs attached to the object, or the rites performed in relation to it. We may begin with some emblems the meaning of which is not in doubt. Around the Mediterranean Sea in antiquity the fig (perhaps from its shape, whether compared with the male organ or the womb, or, like the pomegranate or the fir-cone, from the number of its seeds) was a favorite emblem of fecundity; and artificial phalli were often formed of fig-tree wood.

'The peach is in China and Japan the acknowledged representative of the *kteis*, as the pestle and the mushroom are of the phallus' (Aston, p. 189).

Aston also notes that, though the meaning has now been forgotten, the Japanese term *uo-bashira* ('male pillar'), from its shape, is applied to the terminal post of the railing of a bridge, or of the balustrade of a staircase; and that the same term is applied to the end-tooth of a comb. In India the *lingam* is a common cultual object. It is the emblem of the great god Śiva, and is usually represented united with the *yoni* as 'a smooth round black stone, apparently rising out of another stone, formed like an elongated sancer, though in reality sculptured from one block of basalt' (E. Sellon, *Mem. Anthropol. Soc.* i. [1865] 327). Such a representation is a mere conventional symbol, no more than remotely recalling the creative and reproductive attributes of the god, and can awaken no erotic thoughts in the worshipper's mind. Miniature copies of this emblem are worn by devotees in their hair or round the arm or neck. The followers of Viṣṇu paint on their foreheads the *namam*, or emblem of the god, consisting of three lines, a perpendicular line in the centre and an oblique converging line on either side, sometimes abbreviated to a single red perpendicular line, and sometimes figured as a trident. The *namam* is the sign of the female sex (Dubois, p. 112). The Hindus themselves seem early to have felt the need of explaining the *lingam* as the emblem of Śiva. To this end a not very creditable story of the god is related in various places of the *Purāṇas* (ib. p. 629).

Throughout the northern and eastern shores of the Levant and its islands and neighbouring countries in ancient times a usual sacred symbol was a pillar or pole, called in the Bible respectively

maṣṣēbhāh and *āšhērāh*. These objects do not appear to have been peculiar to any one deity, but to have been an ordinary divine emblem. Originally in all probability a rude stone, or the unshaped trunk of a tree, they were developed in course of time with increasing mastery over materials into conical forms, into obelisks, columns, or masts, and further adorned with sculptures, painting, and draperies. From this aniconic form the Greeks and Romans evolved the statue, the intermediate form of which—a head and bust descending to a merely squared base—is familiar in the representation of many divinities, especially Hermēs and boundary-stones. It has been contended that these pillars and poles are phalli. In aid of the contention are the express words of the author of the *de Dea Syria* (xvi.), who so describes the obelisks or columns in the vestibule of the temple of the goddess at Hierapolis. He adds that they bear the inscription: 'I, Dionysus, dedicated these phalli to Hera, my stepmother.' This only proves that under Greek influence later times identified the objects as phalli, and ascribed their erection to a god in whom they recognized the son of Semele, himself a late adoption into the Greek pantheon. It cannot prove (though it satisfied the author of the treatise) by whom, or with what intention, they were erected. In fact, all the evidence obtainable goes to show that these obelisks or poles were erected indifferently in connexion with the worship of any deity, whether conceived as male or female, not excluding even Jahweh Himself (*EB*, s.v.; art. *MAṢṢĒBHĀH*, vol. viii. p. 487 f.; cf. Robertson Smith, *Rel. Sem.*², London, 1894, p. 188 f.). In the same way our own maypoles have been called phallic emblems upon the slenderest grounds. There is evidence that megalithic monuments, whether shaped by art or not, or even natural rocks and other objects of a suggestive form, have been taken for phalli, or at least thought to have procreative power. But the application to them of the phallic idea is not necessarily primitive. Ancient it may be and sometimes undoubtedly is. It is more likely to be a specific outgrowth of a vague and general sanctity and power once ascribed to them, which has developed all the more fully, since every other attribute of divinity has been lost, and worship in the strict sense of the word has been diverted in other directions. Their frequently gigantic size and the mystery, nameless awe, and surmise that hung about them after their original purpose had been forgotten would be potent aids to such a development.

One emblem of wide currency appears fairly certain. A mode of producing fire early adopted, and widely prevalent even yet among savage races, is that of the drill. Fire is made by rapidly rotating a stick of hard wood upright upon a piece of softer wood lying on the ground and held firmly in its position by the foot. The action is so suggestive, and the result is so analogous to life and so mysterious, that it need not be wondered at that the two sticks have been usually called the male and female sticks respectively, and that their use has almost universally received a sexual interpretation. As the author of the anonymous *Essay* already quoted points out, the use of the fire-drill long survived in W. Europe, where it was applied for the purpose of obtaining need-fire (*g.v.*), as a protection for cattle on the occasion of an epidemic, or for lighting the midsummer and other fires. Need-fire was prohibited by that name in the Capitularies of Karloman, king of the Franks, along with other pagan rites (anon., *Essay*, in Payne Knight, p. 153). It is still used by many peoples when sacred fire is necessary for ritual purposes.

In Egypt the monuments yield many priapic

figures. Osiris as the principle of life is often thus represented. The well-known story told by Plutarch (*de Is. et Osir.*) of the search by Isis for her husband's missing member, when after his murder and the cutting up of his body by Typhon she had collected all the rest, is the mythological form in which the reverence for his phallus is accounted for. Not being able to find it, she caused a wooden surrogate to be made. But, beyond the realistic representations of the phallus, it has been suggested that the Egyptian *tau* cross (like the similarly shaped hammer of Thor) and the symbol known as the *crux ansata* are emblems of the same object. Of this there is no direct or cogent proof. The cross in various forms is a widely distributed symbol in both Eastern and Western hemispheres. It has been claimed to be everywhere phallic; but real evidence in support of the claim is, generally speaking, still to seek. On the other hand, it is the simplest symbol that can be found, and may be (and doubtless has been) made to do duty for many purposes. Likewise the crescent moon, the horse-shoe, and other such figures have been insistently presented as emblems of the corresponding female organ, usually with as little justice. It is true that many things in nature and in art do lend themselves by form or use to such an interpretation, and probably have been sporadically and occasionally accepted. He who is preoccupied with the subject will see phallic emblems everywhere. But a wise scepticism will insist on proof, not merely of sporadic and obscene, but of serious and cultural, or at least magical, employment.

2. Ceremonies.—Phallic ceremonies are very numerous. Some of them have already been incidentally referred to.

The population of Mārwar in Rājputāna fear a *bhūt*, or malignant spirit, called Nathurām. 'This Nathurām is said to have been a scamp from some part of the North-Western Provinces [now called the United Provinces] who settled in Mārwar and seduced many Marwari ladies, until he was detected and put to death. Then he became a malignant ghost, and began to torment wives and children; and now his spirit can be appeased only by the most obscene songs and gestures performed by the Marwari women. . . . No household can be without an image of Nathurām, which is vaguely described as nude and 'of a monstrous and disgusting appearance.' 'On the night the bride first visits her husband an image of Nathurām is placed beside her couch. Barren women and those whose children do not live look to Nathurām for deliverance from their troubles' (*NINQ* iii. [1893] 92). He is, in short, as Orooke observes, 'a phallic fetish.' Nor is he by any means the only one in India. Among others, in Dhārwar women of the Ambig caste carry about an image called Jokamār, 'whose private parts are three times as large as the rest of his body,' and sing his praises in front of each house, getting in return small presents (*BG* xxii. [1884] 183 f.). In Upper Burma at the New Year feast 'an indecent figure' is paraded, and obscene antics are indulged in all along the route (*Gazetteer Upper Burma*, i. pt. ii. [1901], p. 440; the present writer is indebted to Mr. Crooke for these two references). At Roman marriages the bride was required to sit upon the image of Priapus (Augustine, *de Civ. Dei*, vii. 24; Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* i. 20). If we may trust an allusion by Arnobius (*adv. Gentes*, iv. 7), women already married sometimes performed the same rite. In India about Pondicherry, in Canara, and the neighbourhood of Goa, brides are reported actually to sacrifice their virginity to a similar idol of Siva (Dulaure, p. 86, citing Duquesne, *Voyage dans l'Inde*, ii.; Liebrecht, *Folksskunde*, pp. 397, 511, citing Linschoten and Barbosa). On the island of Java, at Batavia, an old and useless cannon, lying in a field, was regarded by the natives as a divinity in phallic form, and daily worshipped with offerings of rice and fruit, miniature sunshades, and coppers. It was held to cure sterility in women, for which purpose it was necessary to sit astride on it for some time. Women might be seen—sometimes two at once—dressed in their best and adorned with flowers, doing this at any period of the day. For years the priests encouraged the practice, to their own pecuniary benefit, until at length the cannon was removed by the Dutch Government (*JAI* vi. [1876-77] 359).

It is clear that practices like these are intended to secure offspring. They are a magical proceeding to obtain fecundity. And it is not unnatural that they should develop into a more effectual proceeding, in which the god is represented by his priest. There is no record of such an evolution in Rome; may be quite sure that the Christian

Fathers would have seized upon it with pious alacrity as a weapon against the heathen if they could have done so. But in India the practice is not unknown. The most famous example is that of the temple of Jagannāth in Orissa (Dubois, p. 602; cf. F. Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire*, London, 1891, p. 305). Elsewhere in India it is enough to subject a barren wife to the embraces of any chance stranger (often more than one), in pursuance of a vow to that effect. The occasion is usually that of some religious festival (Dubois, p. 596; *JES*, new ser., vii. [1869] 264).

In the *Jātaka* we are told how the righteous king Okkāka, in despair because his favourite wife Sīlavatī was childless, sent her, magnificently arrayed, out into the streets on a certain day, as a religious act. There she was met by the great god Sakka, disguised as a Brāhman. With a touch of his thumb he rendered her pregnant of the future Bodhisattva (*Jātaka*, ed. E. B. Cowell, 6 vols., Cambridge, 1895-1907, v. 141).

This story probably gives us the clue to the meaning of a practice described by Herodotus and Strabo as taking place at the temple of Mylitta, in Babylon. Every Babylonian woman was required once in her life to prostitute herself there to the first stranger who threw a silver coin into her lap (Herod. i. 199; Strabo, xvi. l. 20). A stranger was a person of unknown powers; he might even be, as in the tale from the *Jātaka*, a god in disguise. From this quasi-supernatural character generally attributed to him in the lower culture it would follow that intercourse with him might be productive of blessings. The greatest of blessings to women is fecundity. If, as is probable, the rite was a sacrifice of virginity at puberty, the woman was thus consecrated for married life, with its special duty of bearing and rearing offspring. A similar rite, it would seem, was practised in many other places, as far west as the Troad. It has been confounded with two other customs of the voluptuous East. One is that of dedicating girls at the temple of a divinity of fertility as prostitutes, whose gains went to the support of the worship and the priests. This seems, e.g., to have been a feature of the cult of the Armenian goddess Anāitis (Strabo, xi. 14. 16). There are indications that it was not unknown even in worship of Jahweh. It is still largely practised in India, and is preceded by a solemn ceremony in which the new recruit to the service of the deity is 'married' to him (authorities numerous; see Dubois, pp. 310, 584; A. M. T. Jackson and R. E. Enthoven, *FL Notes*, ii. [Konkan], *Mazgaon*, Bombay, 1915, p. 74; *Ethnog. Survey of Mysore*, Bangalore, 1906, ii. 8 [Holey caste]). The other custom was that by which a girl earned her dowry by prostitution. This is said to have been followed in Lydia, on the island of Cyprus, and elsewhere. It was not a religious practice, but was perhaps a survival of the social arrangements of ruder races. Girls among many of such races are before marriage accorded complete liberty, of which they take full advantage, ultimately wedding one or other of their lovers (the subject has been recently fully discussed; see artt. PROSTITUTION; *GB*³, pt. iv., *Adonis*, *Attis*, *Osiris*, London, 1914, i. 37 n., 57 ff., 70 ff.; W. M. Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, Oxford, 1895, pp. 94, 115, 135; L. R. Farnell, *Greece and Babylon*, Edinburgh, 1911, p. 268 ff.; F. Cumont, *Les Religions orientales dans le paganisme romain*, Paris, 1907, pp. 143, 286; *MI* ii. 444; E. S. Hartland, *Ritual and Belief*, p. 266 ff.).

The priapic deity of the Slave Coast, Legba, has, like some of the Eastern gods just referred to, women called his 'wives,' who are dedicated to his service, and give themselves illicitly to his worshippers at the time of the celebration of his mysteries. The excesses committed on these occasions are, we are told, 'of a nature which does not admit of any description.' 'At the commencement of the ceremony the priests cause the worshippers to drink a mystic draught, containing powerful aphrodisiacs. The mysteries invariably take place at night, and mostly in the "harem," at some little distance from the sacred building' (*IBIS*, *Extr.*, p. 44; cf. A. J. N. Trewearne, *The*

Tailed Head-hunters of Nigeria, London, 1912, p. 205). Indeed, the god is held to cause erotic dreams by consorting in his own person, either in male or in female form, with women or men during their sleep. His sacrifices are 'cocks, dogs and he-goats, chosen on account of their amorous propensities; but on very important occasions a human victim is offered' (Ellis, *Yoruba*, pp. 67, 60). When implored to remove barrenness, 'a sacrifice is offered, and the worshipper anoints the organ of the figure with palm-oil, in order that the required fertility may be attained.' On festival occasions the phallus is borne aloft in procession with great pomp, 'fastened to the end of a long pole. The worshippers dance and sing round it, and the image is waved to and fro, and pointed towards the young girls, amidst the laughter and acclamations of the spectators. Sometimes the phallus is concealed by a short skirt, or petticoat, which a man causes to fly up by pulling a string' (Ellis, *Ivra*, p. 44; cf. *Yoruba*, p. 65).

An officer of the French marine reports having witnessed, in 1787, a festival in the kingdom of Congo, when masked men executed a pantomime, carrying an enormous priapic figure worked by means of a spring (Dulaure, p. 41, citing L. de Grandpré, *Voyage à la côte occidentale d'Afrique*, i. 118). Higher up on the river Congo, between Isangila and Manyanga, there is a species of worship reminding us of the cult of Cybele in Greece. Its ministers are eunuchs, and it is intimately connected with a reverence for the moon. 'When the new moon appears, dances are performed by the eunuchs, who sacrifice a white fowl—which must always be male—in its honour. The bird is thrown up into the air and torn to pieces as it falls to earth. I was told that in former days a human victim was offered up on these occasions, but that in later times a white fowl had been substituted' (Johnston, *River Congo*, p. 409). Further details on this cult, which is said to be 'a vague phallic worship,' are much to be desired, in order to arrive at an accurate estimate of its extent and meaning. It would seem, however, to be an orgiastic cult, similar in some respects to that of Attis.

Further north, among the Ekoi of Nigeria, there is a *juju* named Eja, whose festival, celebrated at the time of new yams, is the chief festival of the year. Amaury Talbot, who inquired into it a few years ago, compares it to 'the old Adonis-Attis-Osiris worship.' He says: 'The ecstatic frenzy of the dancers, the trances into which some of them fall, and the jealousy with which all strangers are excluded, show that this ceremony holds a very special significance.' The cult is supposed to produce plentiful harvests, and 'also to protect human beings, farms and cattle from damage by lightning and thunderbolt.' It is said to have been brought from the interior of the continent, and to have been held every two years. To ensure the continued efficacy of the *juju*, however, sacrifices must be offered every two years. For this celebration 'medicine' is necessary—presumably to doctor the worshippers, a very common practice in Africa. Of the medicine the most essential ingredient is the sexual organ of a human being slain for the purpose, or by the act of removing the organ. The Ekoi prefer a female victim. But the rite is known elsewhere; and in the neighbouring Cameroons men are also sacrificed. Eja being a *juju* of fertility, it should be added that one of the chief ceremonies at the festival is the offering of firstfruits; and until it comes round neither *fufu* (yams and other things beaten up into a paste) nor fresh yams may be eaten (P. Amaury Talbot, *In the Shadow of the Bush*, London, 1912, pp. 74-78). The character of the cult leads to the suspicion that it culminates in sexual intercourse; but Talbot reports no evidence of this.

There seem to have been more than one god of fertility in ancient Egypt. This is not to be wondered at. The religion, like the State, was an amalgam. The gods of the petty States absorbed into the kingdom were similarly absorbed into the pantheon. Either they were recognized as identical with those of the State-religion, or, maintaining an independent existence, they became the special divinities of certain nomes. The chief god, in later times at all events, was Osiris, who, whatever else he may have been, was a god of vegetation, a god of creative energy who renewed the life of all living things. To this his myth, his pictorial representations, and his ritual unmistakably point. In all these his phallus was emphasized. Herodotus relates (ii. 48) that on his festival priapian images were carried about the villages by the women. They were each about a cubit in height, with a phallus almost as large as the rest of the figure, and worked by strings. We may assume that the antics performed with them by the bearers were substantially the same as those on the Slave Coast and in the Congo. Osiris was identified by the Greeks with their own divinity Dionysus, a god of similar character, to whom similar rites were performed. These were probably Osirian mysteries; there certainly were mysteries connected with the worship of Dionysus. In the latter, as well as in

his worship outside them, the phallus was carried about and prominently exhibited (Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* ii.; Arnobius, *adv. Gentes*, v. 28, 39). Dionysus was not indigenous to Greek soil. He was an intrusive deity, probably from Thrace, whose cult was accepted in Greece only after considerable opposition. His worship was celebrated at the festivals by men and women with orgiastic rites, in the course of which victims offered in sacrifice were torn in pieces and devoured raw, and the devotees indulged in sexual intercourse. The excitement, heightened by cries, wild dancing, and draughts of wine, was credited to possession by the god himself. Under cover of darkness (for night was the season when the performances culminated) all sorts of excesses were committed. Whatever was done in this mad rout, the votaries acting under the inspiration of the god were held not to have sacrificed their modesty (Euripides, *Bacchæ*, *passim*). Such a cult, it is obvious, was of barbaric origin. In this connexion it must be remembered that the Greeks had themselves emerged from a low state of civilization, and still retained many and startling survivals of that condition. The savage orgies introduced from Thrace and elsewhere found willing and powerful allies in the barbarous elements yet struggling in the midst of a growing culture. Thus reinforced, their victory was inevitable, whatever the better minds thought of them. They held the immense advantage that they provided an outlet for religious excitement, largely wanting in the more staid and regulated worship of Greece. The memory of the conflict passed away into the region of myth, whence it continued to exercise an influence, by no means negligible, in favour of the cult on the superstitious of all classes. It is probable, however, that contact with Greek thought and institutions refined and softened the ritual, purging it of its grosser elements.

A performance much modified, but containing some genuine hints of the barbarous archaic ritual, still takes place in the neighbourhood of Viza, the old Bizye, the capital of the Thracian kings.

Christians of the Greek Church are the actors. It is performed on the Monday of the last week of Carnival. Two *kalogéroi* play the chief parts, disguised with head-dresses made each of an entire goat-skin without the horns, but stuffed with hay and falling down over the face, thus forming a mask, with holes cut for the eyes and mouth. One of them carries a mock-bow, the other (the principal personage) wields a wooden phallus. Two boys dressed as girls are called *κορίτσια*, or in some of the villages *νύφες* ('brides'). There are also *καταβέλοι*, or gypsies, among the performers. Another man personates an old woman, called the Babo (cf. Baubo), carrying a doll (*λίκνιτς*) in a basket on her arm. This part in some places is taken by one of the *καταβέλοι*, who is dressed as a woman. Another of these gypsies, with the assistance of his wife, forges a ploughshare. The play includes the pursuit and marriage by the chief *καλογέρος* of a *κορίτσα*. He is subsequently shot by his male companion, and mourned by his bride and other actors. The preliminaries of burial are gone through; but he suddenly jumps up and comes to life again. The rites of the Greek Church are parodied both in the marriage and in the funeral. A house-to-house collection by the *καλογέροι*, dancing with the *κορίτσια*, begins the masquerade, while on the straw-beaps in front of the houses the *καταβέλοι* and his wife carry out from time to time an obscene pantomime. After the ploughshare is supposed to be finished, ploughing is represented. The plough is drawn contrary to the course of the sun round the village square. When the play was witnessed by R. M. Dawkins in 1906 at Haghios Georgios, two of the *κορίτσια* were harnessed to the plough. They were led by one of the *καλογέροι*; the other *καλογέρος* was at the plough-tail. In front marched the *καταβέλοι* and his wife with long rods; but after the second circuit of the square they were themselves harnessed to the plough. A man scattering seed followed, amid cries of 'May wheat be ten piastres the bushel! Rye five piastres the bushel! Barley three piastres the bushel! Amen, O God, that the poor may eat! Yea, O God, that poor folk be filled!' The evening was spent in feasting on the presents collected during the day (*JHS* xxvi. [1906] 191 ff.).

It can hardly be denied that in this carnival custom we have the survival of an archaic agricultural ritual. Its object evidently is to obtain a plenteous harvest and probably increase of men

and cattle. Of the orgies of which we read in the Dionysiac cult the remains are here decayed, but unmistakable. Dawkins points out that the *καλογέροι* wear padded backs and that the *κατσίβελαι* bear wands suggesting that the victim was originally beaten. The slayer even yet pretends to flay the slain *καλογέρος*. And Dawkins conjectures with probability that the latter represents the Thracian Dionysus, and that the part was once taken by a human victim put to death in downright earnest.

Compared with the Dionysiac rites, those of the Thesmophoria were from our point of view innocent. The Thesmophoria were celebrated by women alone, in honour of Demeter and Kore, in the autumnal month of Pyanepsion. Swine were offered in sacrifice. Phalli and snakes made of dough were carried about and dedicated to the goddesses, together with fir-cones as emblems of fertility and the remains of the sacrificed swine, by being thrown into the *μέγαρα*, or underground vaults appropriate to them as earth-goddesses. Men being excluded, there was no sexual indulgence; but there was flying—coarse and indecent chaff—between the participants. This ribaldry was part of the ceremonies; it was prophylactic, or intended 'to stimulate the fertilizing powers of the earth and the human frame.' Such was indeed the object of the entire ritual. Primarily agricultural, it was connected with the autumnal sowing. And its limitation to women probably relates back to that earliest stage of agriculture when the labour was done entirely by women. But, as elsewhere, the idea of vegetable fecundity was inseparably mixed up with that of human beings. The fasting and abstinence from sexual relations required on the part of the celebrants doubtless were directed to this double end (*CGS* iii. ch. ii.; J. E. Harrison, p. 120 ff.).

Less important than the Thesmophoria were the *Haloa*—like the former, an Attic festival. Their centre was at Eleusis. The festival, we are told, was held on the threshing-floor; and it seems to have been an autumnal celebration which had been displaced to mid-winter. Originally in all probability dedicated to the goddesses Demeter and Kore, as symbolizing the fruits of the earth, it has been conjectured that its displacement was due to the intrusion of Dionysus, who received divine honours together with the goddesses on the occasion. However this may be, men played very little part in it. The offerings were bloodless, therefore consisting of vegetable products, and were presented by the priestess. The sacred symbols of both sexes were handled, the priestesses secretly whispered into the ears of the women present (the men were absent) words that might not be uttered aloud; and the women themselves indulged in jests and flying similar, it would seem, to those of the Thesmophoria. The feast culminated in a banquet set out by the archons, but partaken of by the female celebrants alone. The banquet included cakes shaped like the symbols of sex (Harrison, p. 145 ff.; *CGS* iii. 45 ff.). At Greek marriages the rite of carrying the phallus in the *ἄλκων*, with other emblems of reproduction and plenty, was doubtless a charm to produce these results.

The Eleusinian mysteries were deeply penetrated by Dionysiac influence; and disgraceful things are said to have been done at them, as the Christian Fathers do not fail to remind their opponents. The most recent researches of scholars, however, have failed to discover, among the fragmentary hints supplied by ancient writers, any certain evidence of practices grosser than those of the Thesmophoria and the *Haloa*. In the worship of the Great Mother, introduced from Phrygia, and certain other foreign cults the sexual idea was

prominent, though in the case of Cybele the orgies seem to have taken an ascetic and unnatural development. Aphrodite was one of such alien goddesses; and her cult, in some places at all events, was of a most voluptuous description. But we need not here follow the matter into detail.

In Rome Tutunus or Mutunus, otherwise Fascinus, later identified with the foreign god Priapus, was a very ancient divinity. He was represented under the form of a phallus. His office, it was said, was to avert evil and evil spirits; to this we shall return below. Another god, Liber, was held to preside over fertility, including the cultivation of the vine and the increase of all fruits of the field, as well as of animals. He was worshipped in connexion with Ceres and Libera, feminine deities having a similar office, and, like Tutunus, was represented as a phallus. An indigenous Italian divinity, in course of time he was identified with Bacchus. St. Augustine hints at licentious rites, and quotes Varro as an authority for the celebration of his cult at cross-roads. At his festival his image was mounted on a car and carried round the cross-roads in the country, and thence into the city. At Lavinium the feast lasted for a month, during which a kind of Saturnalia prevailed. The image was then brought through the forum into the temple of the god, and the most honourable matron placed a wreath upon it before the assembled people (*Aug. de Civ. Dei*, vii. 21). Libera was identified with Venus, and represented in the temple by the image of the female organ. The excesses of the Bacchanalia at length compelled the senate to suppress them in Rome (*ib.* vi. 9).

Sexual excesses on such occasions were, no doubt, like those of the archaic Dionysiac worship in Greece, of a ritual character. Rites of this kind betray their origin in savagery. It is probable that they were unknown to few of the European peoples of antiquity; but we have little or no evidence of the fact outside the Balkan Peninsula and Italy. Throughout mediaeval Europe the various spring festivals seem to have been similar. Of some we have definite evidence to this effect. Of others it is only a matter of inference from the remains in modern times. History affords no account of their origin; they dated back to 'a time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary'; and such a time was one of barbarism. They were joyous, mirthful occasions, on which young men and women took a prominent part, mingled and paired off. Though these feasts and merry makings may not have been always directly connected with agriculture, they were celebrated with the effervescence and abandon of renewed life and enjoyment, when all nature was reviving from its wintry death; and they commemorated, if they did not promote, that revival. There can be little doubt that they culminated in orgies generally recognized and tacitly permitted (*W. Mannhardt, Baumkultus*, Berlin, 1875, ch. v.). This was, indeed, one of the charges brought by the English Puritans against the May-day festivals (*anon., Essay*, in Payne Knight, p. 153, quoting P. Stubbes, *Anatomic of Abuses*, London, 1583).

Analogous customs are still or were lately in existence in the south-western islands of the E. Indian Archipelago.

The inhabitants of the islands of Leti, Moa, and Lakor pay divine honours to Upulero, Grandfather Sun, and Upunusa, Grandmother Earth. They are two spirits residing in the sun and earth respectively. Every year at the easterly monsoon the *numu*-tree (a species of *Ficus*) changes its leaves. It is then that Grandfather Sun comes down to fertilize Grandmother Earth. For this purpose he descends into the sacred *numu* of the village-community; and under this tree a great feast is held. The organization of the feast is a weighty matter of State; for it lasts a whole month. Pigs are contributed by the members of the community according to their ability, to be

slain in honour of Upulero, and afterwards eaten by the partakers of the feast. Thrice in varying terms during the feast the village priest calls upon Upulero to come and eat and drink; the pork and the chickens, the cooked rice and the drink, are ready. In return he is asked to give all good things to his expectant children, and to increase the number of the nobles and of the people. He is besought for ivory and gold, he is prayed to fill the fishing-boats, the paddy-baskets, the sago-vessels, to multiply the goats and pigs, to give food and drink, and to cause children to be safely brought into the world. Dances of various kinds (among which one is danced by women alone, and another—the *pisang*-dance, emblem of the *liŋgam*—by men alone) are performed to the accompaniment of drums that hardly cease day or night. The people await with expectation the coming of Upulero to fertilize Upunusa, and share in his enjoyment. Formerly at least, while the feast lasted the men and women had unrestricted access to one another (J. G. F. Riedel, *De sluit- en kroesharige Rassen tusschen Selebes en Papua*, Hague, 1886, p. 372).

Every year when the *sāl*-tree is in blossom the Orāons of Bengal celebrate the marriage of the earth-goddess with Dharme, the sun-god (see ORAONS, § 6).

But not every licentious rite can be accurately described as phallic worship. Many are purely magical.

Among the Nāga tribes of Manipur a month after the paddy is sown, and again before the firstfruits are cut by the village priest, a *genna*, or general tabu, accompanied by a festival, is held, when a 'tug of war' takes place, the women and girls pulling against the men and boys. The object of this is said to be to take the omens for the future of the crop. More probably it is intended to assure its future. The rite is attended by considerable licence (T. O. Hodson, *Nāga Tribes of Manipur*, London, 1911, p. 163).

The licence attending puberty ceremonies in various parts of the world is often great. It is sometimes ceremonial, as among the newly-made adults on emerging from the rites in many Bantu tribes. Even in such cases it cannot be called religious without an abuse of terms. It is rather a first assertion of adult life, a testing of new conditions, physical and social, at the most a magical proceeding to ensure fertility. Some sexual rites are prophylactic in intention, and will be considered later.

The ancient Nicaraguans, in whose ordinary life sexual relations were fairly strict, were reported to hold a yearly festival at which women were permitted to give themselves up to any men they chose (J. G. Müller, *Amer. Urreligionen*, Basel, 1867, p. 663). A hint is given by Dumont in the 18th cent. of a similar practice at the harvest festival of the Natchez, in Louisiana. This, however, seems to have been confined to the youth of both sexes, and may have been no more than an example of the ordinary courting customs (quoted by J. R. Swanton, *43 Bull. B.E.*, 1911, p. 121). In both cases details which would have enabled us to judge of the meaning of the festival are lacking.

The tribes of the N. American Plains, at any rate, had ceremonies, known as the Sun-dance, which were definitely religious. They were lengthy and elaborate, extending over eight days. We possess an excellent account of them by G. A. Dorsey. He witnessed them on more than one occasion.

The Sun-dance is performed by the Arapaho in accordance with a vow made by a member of the tribe at some crisis of his life. The entire community joins in the performance. A great lodge is built, every portion of which with its accessories is symbolic. One of the chief functionaries is the Lodge-maker, and another is his official 'grandfather,' called the Transferrer. At a certain point of the performance the Lodge-maker's wife and the Transferrer leave together the Rabbit-tipi, a lodge where the secret preparations are made for the dance. Deliberately, solemnly, and in ritual order they prepare for this duty. Each is clad in a single robe, all other clothing being removed. While a sacred song is sung and intense emotion prevails in the lodge, they pass out by a sunwise circuit over the fumes of rising incense and proceed to a spot a short distance away. It is midnight. After a few moments' prayer, in which they both emphasize the fact that they are about to do that which had been commanded at the time of the origin of the ceremony, and that what they are about to do is in keeping with the wish of their Father, the woman throws her covering on the ground and lies down on her back. The Transferrer, standing by her side, prays and offers her body

to Man-above, the Grandfather, the Four-Old-Men, and various minor gods. It is difficult to suppose, after this preface, that actual intercourse did not follow in former times; and it is to be gathered from the statement of one of the priests that in fact it took place. But it is averred that it is now prohibited—that abstinence is necessary, else 'the connexion does not benefit the people'; although it is admitted that 'the temptation is great.' During the act of intercourse, whether real or only symbolical, the Transferrer places in the woman's mouth a piece of root, which he has brought from the tipi, and which represents the seed or food given by the All-Powerful (Man-above). On her return to the tipi she transfers it to her husband's mouth directly from her own. Re-entering the tipi, she says, addressing him, 'I have returned, having performed the holy act which was commanded'; whereupon he and the other dancers thank her and pray for her success. The rite is repeated on the second night following with similar formalities. It is a dramatic representation in intimate relation with the myths of the tribe. The Transferrer represents Man-above, while the woman represents the mother of the tribe. 'The issue of their connexion is believed to be the birth of the people hereafter, or an increase in population. It is also a plea to all protective powers for their aid and care.' Thus it has a potent influence on the well-being of the people (*Field Columbian Mus. Pub., Anthropol.* iv. [1903] 173, 101). We are told by another authority that 'at the sun-dance an old man, crying out to the entire camp-circle, told the young people to amuse themselves; he told the women to consent if they were approached by a young man, for this was their opportunity'; and he deprecated jealousy on the part of husbands. The old women, moreover, at such dances encouraged the girls to licence (A. L. Kroeber, *Bull. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.* xviii. [1902] 15). The Cheyenne had an analogous rite at the Sun-dance (G. A. Dorsey, *Field Columbian Mus. Pub., Anthropol.* ix. [1905] 130). It was also comprised in some other of the sacred ceremonies of the Arapaho and other tribes—perhaps taken over from the Sun-dance (Kroeber, pp. 193, 200, 226; *Anthropol. Papers, Am. Mus. Nat. Hist.* i. [1903] 244).

On the other hand, the Buffalo-dance of the Mandans can only be designated as magical. Its object was to obtain a plentiful supply of buffaloes, the mainstay of Indian economy. It was part of a great annual religious celebration, including solemn prayers and offerings to the 'Great Spirit,' and other supernatural powers, and the young men's puberty ordeal of abstinence and tortures.

The entire series lasted for four days, during which the Buffalo-dance by eight men, disguised in buffalo-skins and horns, and imitating in their movements a herd of the animals, was repeatedly performed. On the last day, while they are thus dancing, there enters to them a grotesque and horrible personage, naked and covered with black paint of charcoal and grease, who, careering about, scatters terror and dismay among the spectators. He is provided with a wooden phallus of colossal dimensions, and a buffalo's tail. At first he pursues the women, but is ritually foiled by the intervention of the master of the ceremonies, armed with the sacred medicine-pipe. After repeated onsets of this kind he turns his attention to the eight buffalo-dancers and enacts with four of them as cows the part of a rutting bull. This appears to exhaust him. The women and children, then no longer afraid of him, crowd around and hustle him, the women dancing up to him and challenging him with lascivious attitudes. He is thus driven away, the phallus being intimately wrested by one of the women from his body (to which it was affixed by a thong) and carried in triumph into the village. There from the roof of the medicine-lodge 'she harangued the multitude for some time, claiming that she held the power of creation and of life and death over them, that she was the father of all the buffaloes, and that she could make them come or stay away as she pleased.' This gives the clue to the real meaning of the weird figure, whom Catlin, in describing the scene, takes to be 'the Evil Spirit.' Having possessed herself of his distinguishing implement, she temporarily assumed his character, she claimed his power, she became 'the Father of all the Buffaloes.' In that capacity she stopped the dance and ordered the tortures to be commenced in the medicine-lodge. In exchange for her trophy she received from the master of the ceremonies the handsomest dress in the tribe, and was appointed to 'the envied position of conductress of the Feast of the Buffaloes, to be given that night' (G. Catlin, *N. Amer. Indians*, new ed., London, 1876, l. letter xxii. and *folium reservatum*).

In this extraordinary scene we clearly have a pantomimic representation of a magical nature; for to its strict observance the Mandans attribute the coming of buffaloes to supply them with food during the season. The performance was, in short, believed to ensure the multiplication of the animals so necessary to the life of the tribe. Catlin, preoccupied with the dance and with the horrors of the medicine-lodge, says nothing of a scene during the same festival witnessed by Lewis and Clark some thirty years earlier. Various young married men offered the use of their respective wives to certain elders in place of a doll which

the latter were about to embrace, and regarded their acceptance as a great honour (M. Lewis and W. Clark, *Exped. to the Source of the Missouri*, reprint, London, 1905, i. 210). The account does not fully elucidate the intention of this rite. It is treated as if it were the only rite of importance at the feast. But the writer was not himself an eye-witness; he writes from the report of companions. We may conjecture that its object was similar to that of the Babylonian and Indian customs already mentioned. Such an object in the mind of a savage would not be inappropriate to the Buffalo-dance. Indeed, the proceedings of the women at the corresponding feast among the Hidatsa recall to another writer the women at the temple of Mylitta (Dorsey, *11 RBEW* [1889-90], p. 505, citing Maximilian, Prince of Wied). More obscure is the meaning of the medicine-dance, celebrated by a Mandan desirous of doing honour to his 'medicine' or fetish. A dance by the young unmarried women was part of the ceremonies, in the course of which they challenged and received in public the embraces of the youths (Lewis and Clark, i. 211).

It is thus apparent that what we call licentious rites are by no means always to be described as worship. They are ritual performances, but probably in the vast majority of cases they are intended to serve what may more properly be called magical purposes. Mimicry, either of the procedure or of the result to be attained, is one of the most widely adopted of the processes of magic. It has been fully expounded and abundantly illustrated by Frazer in *The Golden Bough*. Worship, however, has been so widely mixed with magic, especially in the lower culture, that it is not at all times easy to distinguish them. And, where magic relies to any extent, as it often does, on the assistance of supernatural beings, mimicry may be interpreted as an acted prayer, intended to make clear to the being whose aid is sought exactly what services are required. It is especially noteworthy that licentious rites are frequent (if a stronger word may not be used) at agricultural festivals. Nor is it overstating the facts to say that such rites are most fully developed and practised by a settled agricultural community. At agricultural festivals the gladness for the opening spring or the gathered harvest finds overflowing expression, the hopes, the aspirations for future increase of men, cattle, and fruits of the earth are uttered in a crescendo of acts as well as words; dancing and alcohol powerfully contribute to an excitement of growing intensity; and worship becomes an orgy.

Indeed, a recent investigation of the aboriginal tribes of Mexico goes farther, and attributes literally and physically the continuance of the Tarahumare to their agricultural festivals.

The national drink of the tribe is *tesvino*, an intoxicating liquor made from Indian corn. It is 'an integral part of the Tarahumare religion. It is used at all its celebrations, dances, and ceremonies. At the festivals food and drink are offered to the gods, speeches are made, and dances performed. 'While the dancing and singing, sacrificing and speechmaking are going on, the people behave with decorous solemnity and formality. The ceremonies are never interrupted by unseemly conduct; everybody deports himself with grave sobriety, and refrains from loud talking and laughing, and from making any disrespectful noise. But after the gods have been given their share, the people go in, no less energetically, for enjoying themselves.' It is, in fact, the avowed aim and intention of everybody to get drunk; and the drinking ends in a sexual debauch. 'Under the influence of the liquor, men and women rapidly lose that bashfulness and modesty which in ordinary life are such characteristic traits of their deportment. . . . Aside from social and religious considerations, the drinking of *tesvino* is a vital factor in the national life of the tribe. Incredible as it may sound, yet, after prolonged and careful research into this interesting psychological problem, I do not hesitate to state that in the ordinary course of his existence the uncivilised Tarahumare is too bashful and modest to enforce his matrimonial rights and privileges; and that by means of *tesvino*

chiefly the race is kept alive and increasing. It is especially at the feasts connected with the agricultural work that sexual promiscuity takes place' (C. Lunnholtz, *Unknown Mexico*, 2 vols., London, 1903, i. 253, 350 ff.).

But sexual indulgence in a ritual form occurs on other occasions.

Thus at the time of the blossoming of the rice, and for the purpose of increasing the yield, in some districts of Java, the owner of the rice-field and his wife run round it naked, and then and there unite in conjugal embraces (Wilken, iii. 41). Among the Pipiles of Central America, after four days' abstinence, the husband and wife on the night before planting This was 'enjoined default of which it was not lawful to sow the seed.' 'Certain persons are even said to have been appointed to perform the sexual act at the very moment when the first seeds were deposited in the ground' (*GE*, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 98). On the other hand, on the islands of Ambon and Uliase, in order to promote the fertility of the cloves, if a poor crop be threatened, the man goes to the plantation by night, alone and naked, and there simulates coition with one of the trees, crying out 'More cloves!' (Wilken, iii. 45).

These performances are unaided by festival stimulus. They are an obvious application of mimetic magic to agricultural purposes, or are intended, as Wilken suggests, to excite the sexual passions attributed to the growing crops regarded as living things, and so to promote their fecundity (iii. 175). In Java, at the ingathering of the rice, bundles of ears are tied up to represent a bridal pair; and the harvest is carried out with the ceremonies of a marriage (*ib.* 41; cf. 175).

The Egyptian procession of women in honour of Osiris, to which reference has already been made, seems to have been at least tinged with worship. As described by Herodotus, it was led by a flute-player; and the women followed, singing the praises of the god. They carried priapian figures, worked by means of strings. We may suspect from this description that in origin it was a magical rite, which had grown up independent of strictly cultural associations. The influence of such associations may have purified it of its grosser features; for the historian gives us no hint of sexual licence on the occasion. In India, where Siva is worshipped under the form of the *lingam*, the idol has a purely conventional shape, and is not of itself suggestive of sexual ideas. Siva seems to have been a non-Aryan deity, adopted subsequently to Vedic times into the Hindu pantheon. There he has obtained a highly exalted position. His worship has spread more or less throughout India. The Saivas do not connect his symbol with eroticism; indeed, an erotic tendency is markedly absent from his ascetic cult (art. *HINDUISM*, vol. vi. p. 701; cf. Sellon, *Mem. Anthropol. Soc.* i. 327), though it is said that certain sectaries among the worshippers of Viṣṇu, by whom the female emblem is honoured as the manifestation of the power or energy of the god in female form, and the Vama-charis, who worship the female counterpart of Siva, at times indulge in an orgiastic *puya*, comparable to the worst things recorded or imagined of Eskimo feasts or the nocturnal revels of mediæval witches (Dubois, p. 286; *Census of India, 1911*, Report, xvi. 76). These rites may be survivals of an aboriginal practice; they may, on the other hand, be an abuse of comparatively modern date. In this connexion it is not unimportant to mention the fact to which Crooke calls attention, namely, that, if phallic practices—and indeed phallic worship in general—be a non-Aryan cult, it was by no means universal among the aboriginal races of India.

Whatever be the case of the Vaisnavite and Vama-chari practices, phallic rites, as we have seen, were an ancient institution in Rome; but the worst excesses seem to have arisen after the importation of foreign deities, and perhaps as part of the depravation of manners among certain classes of the population at a time of increasing luxury

and leisure. The Roman god *Fascinus* was served by the Vestal Virgins as priestesses (*HN* xxviii. 7), whose rule of chastity was proverbially strict. The rites of the Bona Dea probably had relation to the promotion of fecundity of the earth and of women, as part of the general prosperity. They were celebrated by women alone; and, though we gather that they were more or less orgiastic, it was only after the admission of men in the early days of the empire that disorders resulted (*L. Preller, Röm. Mythologie*³, 2 vols., Berlin, 1881-83, i. 403). We must, however, be on our guard against supposing that all the Roman rites in honour of fertility were originally what we call innocent. We have little or no direct evidence on the subject. But we cannot be far wrong in thinking that, not only in Rome but throughout Italy, the festivals of *Liber* and the *Saturnalia* (held at the completion of the sowing) conformed to similar festivals elsewhere in including sexual relations, which were, in origin at all events, magical in their object. Attention has been already called to the probably similar character of the May-day and other celebrations of mediæval Europe.

Reference has also been made to megalithic monuments. Evidence of their use as phallic representations is particularly abundant in France and the neighbouring countries. On many of these stones, as well as on certain natural rocks, women desirous of children or of being married rub themselves. Sometimes the husbands take part in the ceremony. Nor is it confined to stones and rocks: trees of suggestive appearance or statues of saints and other objects are equally resorted to for this and similar practices, and are doubtless equally effective. Menhirs, indeed, are frequently the centre of rites, such as dancing, singing, and kissing, which can be nothing else but survivals of religious observances. Some of them have been surmounted by a cross, and thus (possibly, too, with other rites) consecrated to Christianity. The legends that have gathered round consecrated and unconsecrated alike bear witness to their pagan origin, and to the enduring devotion of the peasantry, which has here and there conquered the aversion of their spiritual guides and compelled a compromise with the old heathenism. The population was converted only by slow degrees to a higher religion. The ancient sanctity of these objects, the potency once ascribed to them, would linger on, though with decreasing influence. Their shape would alone remain to fix the speculations of generations that had forgotten the religious beliefs and the plenitude of the rites of their forefathers. Round that shape the vague remains of those primitive beliefs would crystallize and be expressed in tale and superstition, sometimes thinly overlaid by Christianity, but more often sturdily independent of it. Elsewhere in Europe and the surrounding islands, and in many other parts of the world, analogous rites for the cure of sterility are, or have been, performed. They frequently exhibit a mixture of magic and religion profoundly interesting to the student of anthropology (*Hartland, Primitive Paternity*, i. 124 ff., and the authorities there referred to). The illustration of the subject belongs to the consideration of sympathetic magic rather than to the present inquiry. It is enough to observe in this place that it is but one application of a wide-spread notion that contact with something to which sacredness or power is for any reason attributed will result in conferring an appropriate benefit. Where in the progress of civilization the practice of endeavouring to secure fertility in this manner has been abandoned, survivals in jest or proverb are often found. Thus at *Cerne Abbas*, if an unmarried girl becomes pregnant, the current ex-

pression is, 'She has been sitting on the giant.' In the same way, in Provence, a girl was said to have offered her virgin robe to St. Foutin (anon., *Essay*, in Payne Knight, p. 134).

Another magical proceeding is the employment of phallic figures as amulets. It was well known in classical antiquity, and many such amulets for personal wear, especially from Italy, are still extant. The priapic form of boundary-stones is probably due to a belief in its prophylactic value. This form, or perhaps the god whom it represented and embodied, was held to have power to avert evils of various kinds, as well as to ensure fertility. Negatively considered, indeed, to ensure fertility is to avert evil. An emblem of fertilizing power, the phallus was the foe of sterility, of death, and of all the ills that flesh is heir to. It protected fields and vineyards alike against birds and human thieves and the subtler influences that withheld the fruit or spoiled the crops. It was sculptured on the walls of buildings, as at *Alatri*, near Rome, where it is still to be seen, but where, by a revulsion of custom, it has long been a semi-religious practice for the inhabitants to go out *en masse* to mutilate the figures on Easter Monday (*A. J. C. Hare and St. C. Baddeley, Days near Rome*, London, 1906, p. 140). Yet the same inhabitants doubtless commonly carry it as a talisman on their own persons. The emblem has also been found scratched on Roman buildings in Britain. The continued belief in its apotropaic power seems to account for its appearance on the doorways of the cathedral at *Toulouse* and other churches in France (anon., *Essay*, in Payne Knight, p. 124) and a corresponding belief for the *Sheilana-gig* in these islands. The same reason possibly accounts for the 'pillars of shamelessness' which *Clement of Alexandria (Protrept. iv.)* twits the heathen with setting up in their houses and guarding with scrupulous care. The passage as it stands appears to extend to other images and mythological pictures; but we must perhaps make allowance for the author's puritanical bias and controversial purpose and for his rhetoric. So the phalli reported to have been brought away by those who were initiated into the mysteries of *Aphrodite* at *Cyprus* were probably amulets securing the protection of the deity (*ib. ii.*; *Arnobius, adv. Gentes*, v. 19). Small medals in lead bearing phallic representations have been found in the *Seine*; they seem to be identifiable as amulets (anon., *Essay*, in Payne Knight, p. 137).

The furniture of ancient tombs frequently includes phalli—perhaps to ward off evil from the dead (a striking example from *Egypt* is mentioned in *Dulaure*, p. 43). Large stones of phallic shape have repeatedly been found in graves of the Viking age, in *Norway*, both on the numerous fiords and inland. Some of them are preserved in the museum at *Christiana*. Their exact purpose is unknown; but it has been conjectured that they were in fact phalli, and were intended to serve a similar purpose to that of the smaller objects in the Mediterranean area (the writer is indebted for this information to the late Dr. *Henry Colley March*, who had examined the stones and discussed their intention with the curator of the museum). On the other hand, it may be that they are to be classed with the 'pillars of white stone' frequently set up on barrows in *Scandinavia*, which were probably connected with ancestor-worship, and may have been, as their shape suggests, phalli (*Goblet d'Alviella, The Migration of Symbols*, Eng. tr., London, 1894, p. 107).

The phallus broke through witchcrafts. Against the evil eye it was potent. Therefore victorious generals had the image of *Fascinus* before their cars in their triumphal processions in *Rome*. From

the use of the symbol at Rome the god *Fascinus* probably acquired that name, and the word *fascinum* ('enchantment,' 'witchcraft') became an ordinary word for the phallus. Even to-day, in Italy and other Mediterranean countries, the figure of a phallus is among the commonest amulets worn by men, women, and children, though often disguised as a closed fist, with the thumb protruding between the first and second fingers. In this form it is called the *fico*, or 'fig'; and the action of forming the *fico* is a customary prophylactic improvised against a suddenly suspected witchcraft, such as an assault of the evil eye (*q.v.*). In Minuhassa (Celibes) the same gesture is made. It is not only a defence from, but also a defiance of, the evil eye. By an extension of the idea it becomes a defiance of a human opponent in a quarrel; on the island of Ambon, when men are quarrelling, one of them will uncover his sexual organ as a challenge to the other (Wilken, iii. 318)—probably, with its innuendo of magic, all the more deadly. In India a tiny plate of gold, called the *tali*, shaped like the leaf of the Indian fig-tree, and representing the phallus, is tied about a woman's neck at her marriage. When, in the 18th cent., Roman Catholic missionaries endeavoured to substitute the cross, they met with such resistance among their converts that they were forced to a compromise: the *tali* was still permitted to be worn, but a cross was engraved upon it (Dulaure, p. 81, citing Sonnerat). On the island of Nias the centre of the panels composing the walls of a house is filled with a sort of rosette; but very often the rosette is replaced by a phallus, more or less disguised, but still recognizable. When an epidemic has broken out in a *kampung* (whence our word 'compound'), or enclosed family settlement, grotesque and horrible figures are set up at the entrances to neighbouring *kampungs* to frighten away the evil spirit causing the sickness. Often these figures are adorned with extraordinarily large organs of sex. In the northern district of the island the sexual organs forming part of the image of the *adu* (which, as we have seen, is ithyphallic) are avowedly emphasized to frighten away the hostile spirits, rather than as a symbol of fecundity or an amulet against the evil eye (de Zwaan, pp. 66, 64).

These purposes, however, are not incompatible with one another.

Just as the phallus came in the ancient world to have a much extended significance, in Japan, from representing the generative or procreative power, 'it has become the symbol of the more abstract conception of lusty animal life, the foe to death and disease. Hence its use as a magical prophylactic appliance. In *Shinto* this latter principle is much the more prominent. It is embodied in the name *Sahe no kami*, which means "preventive deities." The application of this epithet is clear from the circumstance that in a *norito* [liturgical prayer] they are invoked for protection against the "unfriendly and savage beings of the Root Country," that is to say *Yomi* or *Hades*. These by no means imaginary personages . . . represent, or rather are identical with, diseases and other evils associated with death and the grave. Epidemic and contagious diseases are specially intended. Hence the *Sahe no kami* are also called *Yakushin*, or "Pestilence Deities," meaning the Gods who ward off pestilence, a phrase wrongly taken in later times to signify the Gods who produce pestilence" (Aston, p. 187).

We have seen that the peach is in Japan the representative of the *kteis*. In conformity with this symbolism peach-wood staves were used in the demon-expelling ceremony on the last day of the year. At the festival in honour of the *Sahe no kami*, or phallic deities, held at the first full moon of the year, boys used to go about striking the younger women with potsticks employed in the making of gruel on the occasion. This was held to ensure fertility. The sticks were of willow, whittled near the top into a mass of adherent shavings; and it is suggested with probability that they had a phallic significance (Aston, p. 189 f.). The *Ainu*, the *Arunta* of Central Aus-

tralia, and other peoples, it is true, use similar wands in their sacred ceremonies apparently without any phallic meaning. The practice at the Japanese festival, however, coincides with that of the *Luperci*, who pursued and struck women with thongs of goat-skin for a fertilizing purpose. It resembles also that of striking women and girls with willow- or birch-twigs at various modern European festivals. About Roding in the Upper Palatinate the bride is thus struck as she walks up from the church-door to her seat at the marriage service (Hartland, *Prim. Paternity*, i. 103, citing authorities). It is reasonably clear that in all these cases the intention is to promote fertility. This intention is quite certain if we compare with these rites one reported from the Konkan, Bombay Presidency, India.

We are told that the Konkan villagers on the day of an eclipse 'strike barren trees with a pestle, in order that they may bear fruit and flowers. A barren woman is also beaten with the same motive.' Presumably it is meant that the woman is beaten with the same instrument as the trees. The pestle is obviously regarded as a phallus (Jackson-Enthoven, *FL Notes*, ii. 9, recording a report by the schoolmaster, at Kalse, Ratnāgiri).

Phalli were used with ritual significance by the heathen Norsemen. An ancient poem in dialogue still exists in which is delineated a ceremony apparently performed in the family of a *karl*, or peasant-farmer.

The Goodman himself, his wife, son, and daughter, and the thrall and bondmaid take the phallus in turn, each repeating an appropriate stave or spell, and handing it on to the next. Three guests, however, are present; and one of them, unknown to the Goodman, is the king, St. Olaf. When it comes to his turn, he seizes the object and casts it to the dog, to the no small consternation of the goodwife. With the family's recognition of him the poem breaks off abruptly (G. Vigfusson and F. Y. Powell, *Corpus Poet. Boreale*, 2 vols., Oxford, 1888, ii. 350).

Such objects seem to be included in those denounced in the Scandinavian Church law under the name of *bloeti*, 'hallowed thing' or 'talisman' (*ib.* i. 408). Their precise use is, however, uncertain.

The origin of the wide-spread custom of circumcision and of the related mutilations of the sexual organs, both male and female, has often been discussed (see art. CIRCUMCISION), and needs no more than a passing notice here. These rites are unquestionable evidence of the preoccupation of the savage mind with sexual matters. Whatever other motives may have contributed to their institution, there can be no doubt that they are above all a preparation for adult life—that is to say, for the sexual life—and are intended to facilitate the procreation of children. This was, of course, in normal cases quite needless; but the practice had regard not merely to individual convenience and comfort, but also to the wider interests of society. As a social act, it is found connected with religion in very rudimentary grades of civilization. In the lower culture generally it is performed on a number of patients at the same time, at or near adolescence, and avowedly as an initiation into adult life. Instruction in their future duties, and in fact the whole moral code of the tribe, but especially in relation to sexual matters, and in the religious traditions and sanctions which form the tribal belief, is commonly an important part of the proceedings. The religious element, to be sure, in this definite form is not invariably found; but, where the practice survives into a more advanced stage, a distinctly religious motive is usually imputed.

Among the *Ewe* and *Yoruba* of the Slave Coast it seems to be an act of sacrifice to *Elegba* (Ellis, *Ewe*, p. 43, *Yoruba*, p. 66). A similar rite was enacted by the *Totonacs* of E. Mexico on presentation of the infant boy in the temple on the twenty-eighth or twenty-ninth day after birth; and *Acosta* states generally of Mexico (perhaps meaning the city and dominant tribe of the country) that the mother brought the child to the priest in the temple, and that he made a small cut in the ear and in the prepuce (H. H. Ploss, *Das Kind*², Leipzig, 1884, i.

856 f.). But the accounts do not clearly show the extent of the operation. Among the Hebrews it certainly was a religious ceremony; moreover, the importance attached to the male organ was such that oaths were taken upon it, and that admittance to the national religious privileges was debarred to those who were not circumcised, and to those whose organs, on the other hand, were not perfect in every other respect. Among the Muhammadans (as probably among the ancient Arabs) circumcision is likewise a religious rite. In Arabia at the present day it is performed at a festival, formerly, there can be little doubt, of a licentious character, and probably a survival of the spring festival in which the ancient Semitic mother-goddess was honoured (G. A. Barton, *A Sketch of Semitic Origins*, New York, 1902, pp. 99, 110). Circumcision takes place among Muhammadans at an early age, and it is not now, whatever it may have been in 'the times of ignorance,' in strictness a puberty rite. But it may be noted that puberty rites are very commonly the occasion of licentious outbursts and miscellaneous sexual commerce.

3. General considerations.—The various practices, then, commonly and collectively known as phallic worship are a congeries of rites partly cultual and partly magical. While many of them are easily distinguishable into these two classes, many, on the other hand, are on the border-line between cult and magic. Religion and magic alike originate in the emotional nature of mankind, rather than in the reasoning faculties; and only in the highest civilizations, if completely even there, are they separated.

In savage and barbaric stages of culture sexual matters are discussed with more openness than with us. They are taken more as a matter of course. The literature of every country discloses how long this habit may persist into the higher civilization. Greater or less laxity of sexual morality, despite individual jealousies, is likely to be an accompaniment of this freedom of speech. It is notorious, in fact, among a large number of peoples. Races, to be sure, differ in this respect. Some are comparatively cold; among others erotic passion is a prominent characteristic, impelling them to continual gratification and change of object. That it should frequently be encouraged and consecrated by religion is only what we might anticipate. Thus it comes about that religious festivals—prepared for by days or weeks of anxious observances, fasting, and asceticism, during which the emotions are gradually excited and wrought to a high tension—culminate in a recoil of wild indulgence of the pent-up passions. The community comes together in general assembly on such occasions. The social instincts are gratified, and the imagination and the feelings are stimulated, by the dances and other ceremonies performed and witnessed in common. All the physical needs, all the desires previously repressed, are satisfied; and, since sexual impulses are as crude and almost as powerful in primitive humanity as the craving for food, their unrestrained indulgence is parallel with the unlimited eating and drinking on these occasions. This consecration of outbursts of debauchery by religion, when once it has taken place, preserves them for long periods as a physical and social pleasure and, more, as a religious duty, amid the changes of culture and growing refinement of manners.

While a dispassionate view of religion refuses to identify it with sexual and amatory passion (see art. FEMALE PRINCIPLE), these are, notwithstanding, intimately related. Emotion, once excited in any direction, is often either diverted into another or carries with it in its vehemence objects not at first contemplated—nay, even fills and overflows all the channels of life. The very strength of sexual passion, upon which the continuance of the race depends, renders it peculiarly liable to attract and unite with religious emotion. That it has done this in all historical ages is shown not merely by phallic practices and the use of phallic emblems such as we have considered, but equally by the sensual or the ascetic excesses into which

religions fanaticism almost everywhere falls. The crazy votaries of the Mother of the Gods, who in her honour deprived themselves of their manhood, were the subjects of sexual obsession no less than the worshippers of Anaitis or Eleggba. Vowed celibacy, whether solitary or in communities, of all religions is preoccupied with the sexual idea. It leads to nauseous developments, like those of St. Teresa or St. Catharine of Siena; or human nature gives way under the strain to unregulated physical satisfaction of the very passions which it has endeavoured to suppress. Through intense erotic passion in its higher manifestations, as through intense religious passion, there runs a rich vein of mysticism. The religious devotee and the lover are alike impelled to union with the object of devotion—union which is envisaged as more than corporeal, loftier, more intimate, merging the being in that which is so eagerly adored. All others are renounced, contemned. In religion, where the object is by the nature of the case incapable of possession, of appropriation, the worshipper has no means of complete satisfaction of his passion. Especially where the object is conceived as of the opposite sex, his passion in extreme cases becomes monomania. Even where it falls short of that, it often drives him to extravagances and fantastic surrogates for the satisfaction which is denied him. The lives of ancient hermits, the annals of the cloister, as well as the history of many a Christian sect, bear abundant witness to the evil; and Christianity has had no monopoly of it.

Save in a few instances, however, such as the worship of Cybele, the eroto-religious fervour in paganism exhausts itself in occasional orgies. In the intervals the worshippers are sane; the intoxication past, they resume their normal selves. Usually intermittent outbreaks are sufficient to satisfy the human craving for excitement. When sexual passion is crude and easily expended on other objects, and when the religious ideal is child-like and undeveloped, so that the divinity is imagined as quite apart from humanity and without any intimate sympathies with the individual worshipper, but rather as the ruler of a tribe or community, sexual passion does not morbidly and continuously project itself into the religious sphere. The periodical religious orgies afford ample scope for the gratification of the sexual instinct beyond the normal indulgence. In that stage sexual and religious mysticism asks no more than the belief that the orgies are an imitation, a dramatic representation, of the divine procedure, or an assistance to it—in either case a religious duty—and a social enjoyment crowned with the privilege of sharing it in some sense with the god.

For illustrations of the stage in question we may refer to the festivals in honour of Grandfather Sun and Grandmother Earth in various E. Indian islands and to the Sun-dance of the tribes of the N. American Plains. The worship of the old Semitic mother-goddess and of the cognate divinities of S.W. Asia seems to have been not dissimilar. To this type we may probably also refer the ancient Thracian worship of Dionysus. When by a missionary movement he entered Greece, his cult became more individual; it was raised to a higher plane and refined; Orphic influences and speculations, originating perhaps in Crete, gave it a new tone and content.

The divinity associated with these periodical orgies, as soon as he has assumed definite characteristics, is found to be one among whose attributes fertility is prominent. To him the mild and genial sunshine, the rains and revival of nature, all the conditions of the fruitfulness of earth, the increase of food, and the multiplication of the people are

ascribed. His worship is directed to obtain these blessings, without which life is impossible. The rites are not confined to prayer and sacrifice, as to a strictly personal being. What we call magic mingles with these and rivals them in potency. It is, in fact, an essential part of the performance. The social gatherings and the rites are no doubt far older than the divinity, far older than any practical aim beyond that of pleasure and gratification. They were in their rude beginnings an expression of the emotions of the community before the divine personality was dimly imagined. His worship and symbols have grown out of them. The process was probably unconscious. Many generations may have elapsed before a motive less vague than social enjoyment was evolved for the periodical reunions. But, when man's curiosity about himself and his surroundings led him to discover the connexion of sexual passion with the mystery of birth, then the dance, the rhythmical cries, and the sexual indulgence practised in the assemblies of the group would be fitted with a deeper meaning. They would be held to arouse the emotions and kindle the appetites of the animals and the crops, more or less personalized and interpreted in human terms, or to act as spells directly on them; or they would become appeals to, and perchance a species of co-operation with, the higher powers conceived as ruling the course of nature. Social amusement would thus be transfigured into obligation, and the welfare of the community would be held to be dependent on its punctual observance.

A cult like this is apt to become specially developed in a population dependent for the supply of food and other necessities and comforts of life on some form of agriculture, though not, as we have seen, exclusively confined to these. Its rites relate to the immediate needs of the community. Their symbols are drawn from those needs. The festivals are held at periods when the chief labours of the year are about to be undertaken or are just completed—before sowing, in the interval between sowing and harvest, and after the crops have been gathered in. These are the times when the collective emotions are liveliest and the pause in the collective labours gives opportunity for feeling the awakening influences of the spring, the anxiety for the success of the operations of the year, or the satisfaction, gladness, and sense of security of the results. It is no wonder that they overflow in words and actions repressed (it may be sternly) at other times, and regarded with disgust by a civilization that has risen above such coarse and brutal exhibitions. For what an experienced observer says, describing the harvest festival in Borneo, is of wide application:

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A further stage is reached when the god is provided with a permanent wife or wives.

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In such cases the provision of a wife was probably looked upon as an ordinary duty to the god, who was thought of in anthropomorphic terms. Such wife frequently became his priestess. And the relation between the god and his wife may not always have been the direct cause of fertility or other blessings to the worshippers, though doubtless the neglect to provide a wife would have aroused the divine resentment.

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Generally, when from various causes a pantheon develops, the individual divinities become more or less specialized, and the patronage of sexual love and human fecundity is often severed from that of the multiplication of flocks and herds and the seeds of the field. This has been the case with the Negro divinity Legba. In Greece the imported goddess Aphrodite tended in the same way to become the goddess of beauty and human love, obscuring the wider functions that she originally exercised and in many places continued to share with other divinities. In such cases the licentious rites are often emphasized and turned to uses involving more than a disregard—a conscious defiance—of all moral regulations. Societies deeply penetrated with this cancer are on the way to dissolution.

But a much more legitimate motive dictates recourse to these divinities. The desire for offspring, so vital to the species, is deeply imprinted in every normal individual. It is, indeed, limited by the necessity for finding room and subsistence. Where

this condition presses on the community, as among very low races and peoples hemmed in by geographical or political obstacles, it is counteracted by infanticide; but elsewhere it impels to reproduction. Women as well as men, and even more than men, wish for children. Nowhere is the wish more in evidence than among patrilineal peoples, where women are held in esteem according as they are, or are not, blessed with children, and it is a reproach to a married woman to be childless. So strong is the desire for offspring that a man often cares not who has begotten the children reckoned to him. He will marry a woman who has proved her capacity for childbearing, in order to obtain not only the children she may hereafter bear, but those she has already borne. He will subject his wife to other men's embraces with perfect indifference, so long as the children resulting become his, or even for the purpose of thus acquiring children. In such a community, it need hardly be said, the issue of adultery—i.e. the wife's connexion with a man unlicensed by the husband—is usually claimed by the latter, though he may dissolve the marriage or punish the wife even with death. Here, then, resort to divinities of fecundity to procure offspring is natural and, granted their ability to bestow it, reasonable. Wherever the desire for children is strong, such resort is witnessed in custom and told in story. Ancestor-worship lends itself to the practice. An ancestor who founded or continued the family is interested in its permanence. If he be possessed of power, which his worship presumes, he will, when properly approached, exercise that power to grant increase to his seed. It is, therefore, not without significance that his image should be, as in some cases we have seen it to be, represented in ithyphallic form.

The rites employed to attain the object are, as we have learned, very various. Vows, prayers, and offerings to the god are things of course. When he is in phallic form, he is embraced; and for this purpose many objects are deemed phallic that were not so intended. A human representative may play the part of the god. Mere contact with a sacred object is often sufficient. Phallic amulets are everywhere in request. They may be placed in or about the dwelling, or, more likely, are worn on the person, so as to secure continuous contact. Special kinds of food, or food prepared with special rites, may be prescribed, or the drinking of, or bathing in, various liquids (Hartland, *Prim. Paternity*, i. ch. ii. f.). These and other methods are mainly magical, and often have little or nothing directly to do with worship in the strict acceptance of the term. In either case recourse is had to the mysterious—a region in which worship, magic, and medicine are as yet hardly distinguished.

Examples have already been given of the sexual act in relation to agricultural rites. At festivals the object of sexual licence, in the promotion of general fertility, the revival of nature, and the germination of the fruits of the earth, is sometimes obscured by the social character of the occasion. This is not the case where conjugal relations are ordained for the express purpose of assisting the growth of crops. But the magical influence of the sexual act is deemed powerful over a much wider sphere. Many ceremonies must be performed only by virgins, or by persons who have abstained for a period from intercourse with the opposite sex, and who are consequently held to be in a state of ritual purity.

Contrary to this, the Akamba require the head of the village and his wife to cohabit on the second and fourth nights of their preliminary occupation of the new site, when the village is removed (C. W. Hobley, *Ethnology of A-Kamba and other E. African Tribes*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 65)—probably a rite intended to lead to all sorts of good luck. Among the same

people the father and mother must cohabit two days after their child's circumcision; otherwise the father cannot go and drink beer at the feast, and the child's wound will not readily heal (ib. p. 69). In the month of January the Bechuana hold a general assembly of all adult males, on a day fixed by the chief, at the great kraal of the tribe. Certain ceremonies, apparently of a purificatory nature, are performed; and they are repented by each man upon his own family at home. That night every man ritually sleeps with his chief wife. If he is away from home and unable to return, the year will probably be a year of calamity for him, and his chances of surviving it are slight. When he returns, he cannot cohabit with his wife until after the next year's ceremony. The danger rests not only upon him, but also upon her, if the ceremonial cohabitation be omitted. She may, however, call in the assistance of another man, in case of her husband's absence; and she is perfectly free from blame in so doing; but the husband is under a grave interdict until an elaborate ceremony has been performed over him by the medicine-man (*JAI* xxxv. [1905] 311). Nor is a sexual rite of this kind confined to the Bantu race. It is difficult to say whether the Todas of the Nigiri Hills are, like the Bantu and their congeners the true Negroes, specially libidinous. It is certain that their sexual morality is very low, and that there is no word for adultery in their language; the evidence, indeed, points to a total absence of the concept of adultery, despite the fact that there are recognized husbands and wives. The Todas are composed of two non-exogamous divisions—the Tartharol and the Teivaliol. The *ti* is the most sacred institution known to them. It comprises a herd of buffaloes with a number of dairies and grazing districts tended by dairy-man priests. These dairies belong exclusively to one or other Tarthar clan, but the *palol*, or priest, must be a Teivaliol. He must be celibate. If he holds office continuously for eighteen years, he performs ceremonial intercourse completely naked on an appointed day with a Tarthar woman, chosen by himself and brought for the purpose into a neighbouring wood. Intercourse during the day-time is ordinarily accounted immoral, but it does not seem to disqualify him for his priestly duties. That the act has some ritual value seems clear, from the very fact that it is directly contrary to the moral and religious usages, but it is not known exactly what its value is (W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, pp. 520, 53, 103).

When a sexual act which infringes the accepted morality has no ritual value, it is often held to produce evil results on the weather or the harvest, blighting the crops and causing sterility of women and of cattle, and other misfortunes (Frazer, *Psyche's Task*², London, 1913, p. 44 ff.; *GB*³, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 107 ff.). So much importance is attached in the lower culture to the act of sexual union.

Whatever may be the exact import of the Toda rite, the apotropeic intention of the rites just previously cited is manifest. The same is to be said of a certain Australian rite.

When the Kurnai of Gippsland saw the *aurora Australis*, 'they thought it to be *Mungan's* fire, which might burn them up. The old men then told them to exchange wives for the day, and the *Bret* (the dried hand of one of their dead kinsfolk) was swung backwards and forwards with cries of "Send it away!" (A. W. Howitt, *Native Tribes of S.-E. Australia*, London, 1904, p. 277). These are obviously magical proceedings to avert the danger.

In the course of this article we have referred to several dances and other ceremonies in which the actors who were charged with the priapic performances were masked. Possibly our own Jack-in-the Green is a survival of such a figure. In these cases the personages represented appear to be spirits of fertility, and their actions to be intended to bring about by sympathetic magic the impregnation of nature, the reproduction of men and beasts and fruits of the earth.

The *καλογέροι* in the modern Thracian performance are disguised with goat-skins. In the Mandan dance the performers are buffaloes. Among the Karays of Brazil, who live largely by fishing, a man is reported on such an occasion to have been masked as a dolphin with a gigantic phallus (*Anthropos*, vii. [1912] 203, citing P. Ehrenreich, *Beiträge zur Völkerkunde Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1891, p. 35).

In each case the supernatural being represented takes the shape of the creature whose multiplication is of the greatest importance to the community. In this way he embodies the reproductive power and process in general.

Such presentations are not confined to seasonal festivals and rites at the opening or close of agricultural or hunting labours. Perhaps the last connexion in which we should look for them is that of death rites. In various parts of the world,

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festival, a peasant celebration of a similar character, in Gujârât, a mock-marriage is performed between 'two poor stupid persons' dressed as bride and bridegroom (Jackson-Enthoven, *FL Notes*, 'Gujarat', *Maggaon*, Bombay, 1914, p. 158). Whether Frazer's conjecture be correct or not—and it is not unfeasible—we frequently find in such ceremonies the part of the goddess played by a mortal woman. In Athens Dionysus was married every year to the queen, the wife of the king archon. Probably the annual spring festival in Scandinavia, when the image of Frey was drawn round the country in a waggon, accompanied by his young priestess, who was called the god's wife, was a similar rite (Grimm, *Teut. Myth.* i. 213; *GB*, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 143). The Blackfeet of N. America are said to have married the sun every year to the moon, represented by a maiden or a woman who had had only one husband. The Algonquins married their nets to two young girls of six or seven years of age (thus securing that they were virgins); and the Hurons adopted the custom from them (*GB*, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 146 f.). These are evidently rites to secure fertility and plenty. As might be expected, the consummation of the divine union often comes to be enacted. It was so in the case of Dionysus in Athens; 'but whether the part of the god was played by a man or an image we do not know' (*ib.* p. 136). Among the Orôns the priest and his wife represent the divine personages. Jagannâth's bride is put into the god's bed, and a Brâhman is said to join her there, to play the god's part.

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this condition presses on the community, as among very low races and peoples hemmed in by geographical or political obstacles, it is counteracted by infanticide; but elsewhere it impels to reproduction. Women as well as men, and even more than men, wish for children. Nowhere is the wish more in evidence than among patrilineal peoples, where women are held in esteem according as they are, or are not, blessed with children, and it is a reproach to a married woman to be childless. So strong is the desire for offspring that a man often cares not who has begotten the children reckoned to him. He will marry a woman who has proved her capacity for childbearing, in order to obtain not only the children she may hereafter bear, but those she has already borne. He will subject his wife to other men's embraces with perfect indifference, so long as the children resulting become his, or even for the purpose of thus acquiring children. In such a community, it need hardly be said, the issue of adultery—i.e. the wife's connexion with a man unlicensed by the husband—is usually claimed by the latter, though he may dissolve the marriage or punish the wife even with death. Here, then, resort to divinities of fecundity to procure offspring is natural and, granted their ability to bestow it, reasonable. Wherever the desire for children is strong, such resort is witnessed in custom and told in story. Ancestor-worship lends itself to the practice. An ancestor who founded or continued the family is interested in its permanence. If he be possessed of power, which his worship presumes, he will, when properly approached, exercise that power to grant increase to his seed. It is, therefore, not without significance that his image should be, as in some cases we have seen it to be, represented in ithyphallic form.

The rites employed to attain the object are, as we have learned, very various. Vows, prayers, and offerings to the god are things of course. When he is in phallic form, he is embraced; and for this purpose many objects are deemed phallic that were not so intended. A human representative may play the part of the god. Mere contact with a sacred object is often sufficient. Phallic amulets are everywhere in request. They may be placed in or about the dwelling, or, more likely, are worn on the person, so as to secure continuous contact. Special kinds of food, or food prepared with special rites, may be prescribed, or the drinking of, or bathing in, various liquids (Hartland, *Prim. Paternity*, i. ch. ii. f.). These and other methods are mainly magical, and often have little or nothing directly to do with worship in the strict acceptance of the term. In either case recourse is had to the mysterious—a region in which worship, magic, and medicine are as yet hardly distinguished.

Examples have already been given of the sexual act in relation to agricultural rites. At festivals the object of sexual licence, in the promotion of general fertility, the revival of nature, and the germination of the fruits of the earth, is sometimes obscured by the social character of the occasion. This is not the case where conjugal relations are ordained for the express purpose of assisting the growth of crops. But the magical influence of the sexual act is deemed powerful over a much wider sphere. Many ceremonies must be performed only by virgins, or by persons who have abstained for a period from intercourse with the opposite sex, and who are consequently held to be in a state of ritual purity.

Contrary to this, the Akanba require the head of the village and his wife to cohabit on the second and fourth nights of their preliminary occupation of the new site, when the village is removed (C. W. Hobley, *Ethnology of A-Kamba and other E. African Tribes*, Cambridge, 1910, p. 58)—probably a rite intended to lead to all sorts of good luck. Among the same

people the father and mother must cohabit two days after their child's circumcision; otherwise the father cannot go and drink beer at the feast, and the child's wound will not readily heal (ib. p. 69). In the month of January the Bechuana hold a general assembly of all adult males, on a day fixed by the chief, at the great kraal of the tribe. Certain ceremonies, apparently of a purificatory nature, are performed; and they are repeated by each man upon his own family at home. That night every man ritually sleeps with his chief wife. If he is away from home and unable to return, the year will probably be a year of calamity for him, and his chances of surviving it are slight. When he returns, he cannot cohabit with his wife until after the next year's ceremony. The danger rests not only upon him, but also upon her, if the ceremonial cohabitation be omitted. She may, however, call in the assistance of another man, in case of her husband's absence; and she is perfectly free from blame in so doing; but the husband is under a grave interdict until an elaborate ceremony has been performed over him by the medicine-man (*JAI* xxxv. [1905] 311). Nor is a sexual rite of this kind confined to the Bantu race. It is difficult to say whether the Todas of the Nilgiri Hills are, like the Bantu and their congeners the true Negroes, specially libidinous. It is certain that their sexual morality is very low, and that there is no word for adultery in their language; the evidence, indeed, points to a total absence of the concept of adultery, despite the fact that there are recognized husbands and wives. The Todas are composed of two non-exogamous divisions—the Tartharol and the Teivaliol. The *ti* is the most sacred institution known to them. It comprises a herd of buffaloes with a number of dairies and grazing districts tended by dairy-man priests. These dairies belong exclusively to one or other Tartharol clan, but the *paiol*, or priest, must be a Teivaliol. He must be celibate. If he holds office continuously for eighteen years, he performs ceremonial intercourse completely naked on an appointed day with a Tartharol woman, chosen by himself and brought for the purpose into a neighbouring wood. Intercourse during the day-time is ordinarily accounted immoral, but it does not seem to disqualify him for his priestly duties. That the act has some ritual value seems clear, from the very fact that it is directly contrary to the moral and religious usages, but it is not known exactly what its value is (W. H. R. Rivers, *The Todas*, London, 1906, pp. 529, 83, 103).

When a sexual act which infringes the accepted morality has no ritual value, it is often held to produce evil results on the weather or the harvest, blighting the crops and causing sterility of women and of cattle, and other misfortunes (Frazer, *Psyche's Task*, London, 1913, p. 44 ff.; *GB*³, pt. i., *The Magic Art*, ii. 107 ff.). So much importance is attached in the lower culture to the act of sexual union.

Whatever may be the exact import of the Toda rite, the apotropeic intention of the rites just previously cited is manifest. The same is to be said of a certain Australian rite.

When the Kurnai of Gippsland saw the *aurora Australis*, 'they thought it to be *Munana's* fire, which might burn them up. The old men then told them to exchange wives for the day, and the *Bret* (the dried hand of one of their dead kinsfolk) was swung backward and forwards with cries of "Send it away!" (A. W. Howitt, *Native Tribes of S.E. Australia*, London, 1904, p. 277). These are obviously magical proceedings to avert the danger.

In the course of this article we have referred to several dances and other ceremonies in which the actors who were charged with the priapic performances were masked. Possibly our own Jack-in-the Green is a survival of such a figure. In these cases the personages represented appear to be spirits of fertility, and their actions to be intended to bring about by sympathetic magic the impregnation of nature, the reproduction of men and beasts and fruits of the earth.

The *καλογέροι* in the modern Thracian performance are disguised with goat-skins. In the Maudan dance the performers are buffaloes. Among the Karayaz of Brazil, who live largely by fishing, a man is reported on such an occasion to have been masked as a dolphin with a gigantic phallus (*Anthropos*, vii. [1912] 208, citing P. Ehrenreich, *Beiträge zur Völkerkunde Brasiliens*, Berlin, 1891, p. 83).

In each case the supernatural being represented takes the shape of the creature whose multiplication is of the greatest importance to the community. In this way he embodies the reproductive power and process in general.

Such presentations are not confined to seasonal festivals and rites at the opening or close of agricultural or hunting labours. Perhaps the last connexion in which we should look for them is that of death rites. In various parts of the world,

however, the sexual act is associated with the customs observed on the occasion of a death. It is very commonly tabued for a certain period either to the relatives or to the entire neighbourhood. But sometimes ceremonial cohabitation is enjoined.

When a man dies among the Akamba, his father and mother, if living, must on the third day have conjugal relations, prior to their ritual purification and to the resumption of normal relations by the other men and women of the family (H. A. Junod, *op. cit.* p. 67). A missionary, describing a mourning ceremony which he had witnessed among the Barotsi about Delagoa Bay, tells us that at a certain stage an elderly woman came forward singing the plaudits of the deceased.

Of at least seventy years of age followed her, and running with a mincing gait through the place, was uttering words of the same kind. Junod's comment is interesting: 'the period of mourning, he says, is a marginal period, according to van Gennep's significant terminology, between two normal periods of social existence; and these phases of life are marked for the Bantu by this period of sexual intercourse and a shame-words and gesticulations.' The main rites purificatory of the death-pollution include ritual coition between the respective husbands and wives, after which ordinary life is renewed (H. A. Junod, *The Life of a S. African Tribe*, 2 vols., Neuchâtel, 1912-13, i. 160, 152-156). On the Aaru Islands it is customary to exhume the corpse after a certain period, sometimes as long as three years, and to clean and prepare the bones for their permanent deposit in a cave. Until this is done the widow wears mourning garb and may not leave the house. The decayed corpse is brought down to the beach. The inhabitants of the village are there assembled. All the mourning clothes of men and women, together with the corpse, are burned. The men carry a wooden phallus, the women a *kteis*. Singing all sorts of obscene songs, they leap round the flames like demons, thrusting the phallus into the *kteis* and imitating the movements of copulation. The object of this is said to be to incite the widow to cohabitation, or to intimate to her in a forcible manner that she is now at liberty to marry again (Riedel, p. 268). Beyond this, however, it is probable that the ceremony is a formal resumption of the normal life of the village and a spell to stimulate reproduction. On the Upper Alary, in Brazil, a German explorer witnessed a few years ago a mourning dance by masked figures representing spirits, who attacked and stormed the dwelling of the deceased to the no small terror of the women and children. Ultimately the wild scene ended in laughter; and there followed dances by masqueraders disguised as various animals. In one of these all the performers took part. They were provided with disproportionately large phalli, with which they mimicked the act of copulation—a proceeding regarded by both the actors and the spectators in a thoroughly serious fashion. The explorer concludes that it was intended to produce fertility in human beings, animals, and plants alike, in the whole settlement—'an idea,' he says, 'full of deep moral import and quite free from indecency in our sense' (L. Koch-Grünberg, *Zwei Jahre unter den Indianern*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1909-10, i. 133 ff.).

Thus the sexual organs as the great instruments of reproduction are the enemies of sterility and death; and as such they are exhibited and employed, actually or by symbol—that is to say, magically—to counteract the depredations of mortality. For the same reason they are regarded as having prophylactic virtue against all sorts of evil influences. The destructive attacks of evil spirits and the more insidious blasting power of the evil eye are alike subdued by them. This general prophylactic virtue accounts for the common use of priapic figures and ithyphallic statues, whether of gods or of ancestors. Much more than the specific gift of offspring or of abundant harvests was expected of the personages thus represented, whether gods or ancestors. They were often tutelary divinities, warding off all kinds of evils. Here we have, there can be little doubt, an explanation of many rites in various parts of the world to be performed naked.

Pliny tells us that in his time it was believed that storms could be diverted and driven away by a woman simply uncovering herself (*HN* xxviii. 23). In order to secure his seed against the depredations of birds, in some of the Saxon settlements in Transylvania the farmer is recommended to go to the field before sunrise and, stripping naked, walk round the crop, ending by repenting a Paternoster. Then, dressing again, he must take an ear of corn in his mouth, and, without speaking to anybody, elsewhere it is the farmer's wife who performs the ceremony, holding a candle in her hand. Against smut or damage by hail she also walks naked round the field by night at the first full moon after sowing (H. von Wilslock, *Volkglaube der Siebenb. Sachsen*, Berlin, 1893, pp. 127, 129). Among the Tsul tribe in Morocco, when rain is wanted, women go to a retired place where they cannot be seen by men, and play,

completely naked, a certain game of ball with wooden lads. The game itself has a magical effect here and elsewhere; but its virtue is emphasized by the nakedness of the players (E. Westermarck, *Ceremonies and Beliefs in Morocco*, Helsingfors, 1913, p. 121). In the Trichinopoly district of S. India, 'when the tanks and rivers threaten to breach their banks, men stand naked on the bund and beat their drums; and if too much rain falls naked men point firebrands at the sky. Their nudity is supposed to shock the powers that bring the rain, and arrest their farther progress' (ib. p. 130 n., quoting Thurston, *Omens and Superstitions of Southern India*, London, 1912, p. 309). The Orâons and Mûndâs of the Chotâ Nâgpur plateau perform the yearly ceremony of driving away from the village the evil spirits that cause cattle disease. It takes place at night. All the young unmarried men (who, because unmarried, are presumed to be virgin and therefore possessed of 'greater soul-power than married men') are the performers. They are naked, and with sticks in their hands, breaking to pieces the earthen pots which hang in front of the houses, they chase the demon, represented for the nonce by the village cattle-herds, across the boundary to the next village (*JRAI* xlv. [1914] 344). In Russia the peasant girls, clad only in their shifts, with loose hair and barefooted, ward off the cholera from their village, by dragging a plough round it at midnight (an example is recorded in *Daily Chronicle*, 3rd July 1905). Here the one remaining garment left to the girls appears to be a modern concession to decency. In the same way it seems probable that originally the Luperci in Rome ran round the base of the Palatine stark naked, to perform the *lustratio* of the city. Throughout the E. Indies a woman who dies in childbirth is the object of great dread. She becomes a powerful and malicious spirit. She misleads wayfarers, she attacks pregnant women and those in childbed, she seduces and emasculates men. Special precautions are taken against her. In the Philippines a Tagala husband whose wife is in travail mounts on the roof of his hut with his sword, shield, and spear, completely naked or with only a loin-cloth, while sundry friends surround the hut below similarly accoutred. They rage, they lunge, they hew the air, holding that by this fury and their nakedness they will frighten the *patianak*, as this malignant ghost is there called, and drive her away. Wayfarers who have lost the right path, believing that their misfortune is due to the *patianak*, 'strip themselves and uncover their genital organs, whereby the *patianak* is terrified and no longer in a condition to lead them astray' (Wilken, iii. 318). It has been suggested that the *patianak* has a more than ordinary fear of the phallus, because that was the cause of her pregnancy and therefore in the long run of her death. The inference does not seem necessary. The relation to the catastrophe, which the *patianak*, like all ghosts of persons dying violent deaths, so bitterly resents, may have laid stress in popular belief on the terrifying power of the phallus, though there is no direct evidence of this. It is enough that she is a hostile spirit, a spirit of sterility and destruction; against such the phallus is a defence and a countervailing power.

There are, of course, many rites performed in a state of nudity, for which other reasons may be assigned. It is not intended here to suggest that all cases of ritual nudity are to be accounted for by the apotropaic power of the sexual organs, which is manifested in the foregoing illustrations.

To define the geographical limits of phallic symbols and ceremonies is not possible in the present state of our knowledge. Their range is wide. They owe their inception to emotions which are the necessary outcome of the animal part of our nature. The probability is, therefore, that they are well-nigh universal in the lower planes of culture, even where they have not hitherto been recorded. And they are long preserved in spite of the growing refinement of the general advance of civilization. In some cases this is due to the fact that they have become interwoven with a definite religion. In other cases they are an atavistic reversion generated by intense religious emotion. More often they persist in the shape of spells and amulets. Magic, like religion, deals with the fears, the hopes, and the desires of mankind. Religion, becoming more and more sublime, leaves the baser elements of which it has been purged to magic, which, on the other hand, becomes more and more degraded. The worship of the sexual organs, or of deities or nature-powers under their form, is, so far as our information goes, an uncommon phenomenon. Prominence of sexual attributes in an object of worship from whom fertility and plenty are expected by the worshipper is more frequent, whether that object be conceived as god or as ancestor. In such a case phallic rites may or may not be part of the cult, but perhaps are hardly ever unmixed with

magic. Magic, indeed, is the predominant element in phallic rites; in the vast majority of such rites all trace of worship strictly so called is wanting. When magic becomes an outlaw from society, as it does in the higher cultures, one of the chief means by which it maintains its existence is the ministry to sexual impulses. Love-spells and philtres are a large portion of its stock-in-trade; rites and amulets to obtain children are hardly less in request in many communities. These spells, rites, and amulets are generally phallic, and often obscene and repulsive. Their consideration belongs rather to magic and witchcraft than to phallic worship, and it has been possible to give only very few illustrations here.

Wide-spread, however, as are the practices with which this article is concerned, and intimately as they are related to some of the deepest emotions, it is worth while to remind ourselves that they form a portion only of the history of religion. The caution is the more necessary since the subject exercises such fascination upon some minds as to have given occasion to the taunt that no one who studies it remains sane. Concentration of attention is apt to cause any subject to assume an importance which it may not in itself deserve. The sexual element is indigenous in human nature. But it is only one element, and its direct influence on religion may be exaggerated. There are many departments of life, and a variety of human interests, desires, and aspirations, represented by cults in which the sexual element has normally little or no share; and they increase with the progress of civilization and the intellectual expansion of mankind. Religious conservatism may preserve the sexual element for a time in a cult inherited from savagery. In the higher religions it lingers chiefly in the negative form of asceticism, rising at times into delusion and monomania, or in other equally abnormal manifestations of fanaticism.

LITERATURE.—The literature of the subject is voluminous. Some of the most important works have been indicated throughout the article. In addition to them the following may be consulted: Clifford Howard, *Sex Worship*⁴, Chicago, 1902; J. G. R. Forlong, *Rivers of Life*, 2 vols., with separate chart, London, 1883.

Among various German works there is an art. by F. Maurer, in *Globus*, xcii. (1907) 256, entitled 'Der Phallusdienst bei den Israeliten und Babyloniern.' It contains a good summary of what is known or alleged relating to phallic worship among the ancient Babylonians and Israelites.

E. S. HARTLAND.

PHARISEES.—Some difficult problems arise in connexion with the earlier history of Pharisaism which cannot be said yet to have been definitely solved. An attempt will be made in this article to give some indication of these and of the important discussions that have been devoted to their elucidation within recent years. See also art. SADDUCEES.

1. **Origin and name.**—As an active movement Pharisaism emerged from the Maccabæan conflict with surrounding heathenism, and became quiescent only after the annihilation of the Jewish national life in the reign of Hadrian; that is to say, its activity extended over a period of nearly three centuries, from the reign of John Hyrcanus (135–105 B.C.) to A.D. 135. The Pharisees already appear in the reign of Hyrcanus as a powerfully organized party (Josephus, *Ant.* XIII. x. 5–7), and no doubt were in existence even earlier (*ib.* v. 9). Their general aim was to continue and make effective the work which the earlier teachers of the Law had begun, viz. the application of the Tōrah to the practical affairs of everyday life. But Pharisaism, though dominantly legalistic in character, was more than mere legalism. As Elbogen¹ has pointed out,

'The Pharisees are usually described as the party of narrow legalistic tendencies, and it is forgotten how strenuously they laboured against the Hellenizing movement for the maintenance of *monotheism*; it is forgotten that they built up *religious individualism* and purely *spiritual worship*; that it was through them more especially that *belief in a future life* was deepened; and that they carried on a powerful *mission* (propaganda). They are represented as merely the guardians of the Pentateuch, and the fact is overlooked that they no less esteemed the Prophets and Hagiographa, and were not less careful to make it their duty, in the weekly expositions of the Scriptures (in the Synagogues), to preach to the people the *truths and hopes of religion* out of these books.'

In the famous passage of Josephus referred to above the rupture between the Pharisees, already a powerful party, and the governing authority, represented by the ruler, is placed by Josephus in the reign of John Hyrcanus. According to the story, the breach grew out of an incident at a banquet given by the ruler, when a Pharisee was indiscreet enough to suggest that the ruler should divest himself of the high-priestly functions and content himself with the civil government. When pressed to give a reason, the Pharisee is said to have mentioned a rumour (which was in reality baseless) that the mother of Hyrcanus had been a captive.¹ The result was an open rupture, and Hyrcanus is alleged to have withdrawn from the Pharisaic party, of which he had been hitherto a zealous member. In the Talmud, however (*T. B. Qiddushin*, 66a), the story is referred to Alexander Jannai (Jannæus), who reigned 104–78 B.C., and this is probably its correct setting. The reign of Hyrcanus, as Josephus himself says, was peaceful and happy, while that of Alexander Jannai was characterized by war and bloodshed, and also by violent conflicts with the Pharisees. As Israel Friedländer says,²

'The whole story points clearly to the unfortunate conditions as they existed in the time of Jannai and, when looked at in this light, the Talmudic account, though curtailed in some parts, receives its proper historical setting such as we would seek in vain in the version of Josephus.'

We may conclude, then, that the Pharisees first appear as an influential party under that name in the reign of John Hyrcanus; that the latter ruler favoured them throughout his long and prosperous reign, and was under their influence; and that the breach between the party and the ruler took place in the reign of 'King' Alexander Jannæus. We need not follow the later fortunes of the party in detail, their persecution under Jannæus and triumph under his widow, Queen Salome Alexandra (reigned 78–69 B.C.). For a long time they continued to exercise great political power, not always, perhaps, wisely. The separation of the high-priesthood from the kingship may be traced to their influence. In the so-called *Psalms of Solomon* the impression produced by the terrible events that followed the break up of the Hasmonæan dynasty and the intervention of the Romans under Pompey, who massacred thousands of the Jews in Jerusalem, is reflected in a Pharisaic writer. The psalmist evidently regards the bloody chastisement which the Jews had to endure at this time as proceeding from the hand of God. It was the punishment inflicted on the people for having acquiesced in the usurpation by the Hasmonæans of the royal dignity which had been reserved for the Messianic prince of the House of David. The Jewish scholar Moritz Friedländer, in his stimulating and suggestive work, *Die religiösen Bewegungen innerhalb des Judentums im Zeitalter Jesu* (Berlin, 1905), takes a very unfavourable view of the Pharisees of this period and later down to the time of the destruction of Jerusalem (A.D. 70), regarding them as

¹ This would be a legal disqualification for the high-priesthood.

² 'The Rupture between Alexander Jannai and the Pharisees,' in *JQR*, new ser., iv. [1913–14] 444. The whole article is important.

¹ *Die Religionsanschauungen der Pharisäer*, p. 2. The italics are Elbogen's.

a narrow legalistic party, who were corrupted by being mixed up with politics. This is hardly just to the party as a whole. Doubtless there was an extreme element, represented later by the Zealots, who took an active, and sometimes sinister, part in political movements. But there also existed a large section who were truer to the ideals of their spiritual ancestors the *Hasidim*, or 'pious,' who were primarily interested in the maintenance and furtherance of religion as they understood it, and, so long as those interests were not menaced by the political régime, were content to leave politics alone.

The explanation of the name 'Pharisees' is a difficult and unsolved problem. The Hebrew form of the name, *pērāshīm*, apparently means 'separatists,' and, if originally given, as seems probable, by opponents, may have been intended to brand the party as disloyal, those who separated themselves from loyal obedience to the king. Or it may have originally meant 'the expelled' or 'dismissed,' viz. from the Sanhedrin. It seems probable that a division did take place in the Sanhedrin by which it became finally separated into two groups or parties, the Sadducees (=the priestly group) and the Pharisees (=the lay members of that body representing the popular party). Later the Pharisees, accepting the name, seem to have given it a different meaning, viz. those who separated themselves from the wicked Sadducees.¹ Kohler² explains the name as meaning "one who separates himself," or keeps away from persons or things impure, in order to attain the degree of holiness and righteousness required in those who would commune with God. He cites in support of this explanation the term *pērishuth*, which means 'abstinence' or pious self-restraint. But, on the face of it, this meaning has all the appearance of being secondary, and it is to be noted that the Rabbinical literature itself uses the term *pērāshīm* in the sense of 'seceders.'³ Another and most ingenious explanation is that proposed by Leszynsky in his work on the Sadducees.⁴ Leszynsky argues that the Pharisees were in no sense a 'separatist' party, as is commonly assumed, but arose from the ranks of the people as the champions of popular religious custom. So far from separating themselves from ordinary life and affairs, they flung themselves with fierce energy into these. Against them were arrayed the Sadducees, opposing to their oral tradition the written *Tōrah*. The opposition, of course, affected only certain specific points, but on these the Pharisees did not hesitate to exalt their own tradition, even when this was in apparent conflict with the written word of the Law. Leszynsky explains the name 'Pharisee' as connoting originally 'expounder' or 'interpreter' rather than 'separatist.'⁵ It is supposed that the party came to be called 'expounders' or 'interpreters' (*pērāshīm*) as the result of a long dispute. For a long time controversy raged within the Pharisaic party on the issue whether the oral tradition should be adjusted to, and find its justification in, the written Law. At first the section of the Pharisees opposed to this policy triumphed; but after the time of Simeon ben Shetaḥ (flourished before and after 78 B.C.) the policy of linking up the oral tradition

with Scripture prevailed. Leszynsky finds support for this view in an obscure passage of the Mishnāh (*Ḥag. ii. 2*) which he explains in an ingenious manner of his own. The name 'Pharisee,' according to this view, means 'interpreter' (of Scripture) in the interests of the oral traditional Law. It did not originally denote the whole party who championed the oral Law, but only a section of it. Their original name was 'Hasidim,'¹ but in time, when the new policy prevailed, the name 'Pharisees' naturally attached itself to the whole party. A not inconsiderable difficulty attaching to Leszynsky's theory is that the form of the word *pērāshīm*, which is passive, does not lend itself easily to the meaning 'interpreters.' On the whole, the explanation proposed by Lauterbach, that the name = 'seceders' or 'expelled' (viz. from the priestly Sanhedrin), is most probable. It suits admirably the historical circumstances of the time when the Pharisees first emerge into prominence as an active and influential party. According to Lauterbach, the original name of the Pharisees for themselves was 'the wise of Israel' (חכמי ישראל).² Another name, used by the Pharisees among themselves, was *hābēr*, 'colleague' or 'fellow-member.' This connoted membership of a close association, or *hābūrāh*, to which only those were admitted who 'in the presence of three members, pledged themselves to the strict observance of Levitical purity, to the avoidance of closer association with the 'Am ha-Areẓ [i.e. those living outside the standards of the Law], to the scrupulous payment of tithes and other imposts due to the priest, the Levite, and the poor, and to a conscientious regard for vows and for other people's property.'³ But it is doubtful how far, if at all, such an organization existed in Palestine before A.D. 70.

2. Antecedents and development.—It has already been pointed out that the Pharisees carried on, and made effective, the work which the earlier teachers of the Law had begun, the application of the *Tōrah* to the practical affairs of everyday life. This earlier class of teachers of the Law went by the name of 'the *Sōfērim*,' being so called because they taught the people out of 'the book of the Law' (*Sēfer ha-tōrah*). Their teaching was based directly on the simple and plain text of the Law, no doubt with a certain amount of interpretation and explanation, but all of the simplest character. The period of the *Sōfērim* came to an end with Simon the Just (the first of that name), about 300-270 B.C.⁴ It therefore ceased just about the time when Greek influence had begun powerfully to affect Jewish communal life in Palestine, and new conditions had begun to grow up in the life of the people.

The period during which the *Sōfērim* controlled the religious teaching and exercised supreme authority in regulating the religious affairs of the community thus covered the Persian period and the transition period that followed. During this time the circumstances of the Jewish community in Palestine underwent no great changes.

The Book of the Law accepted from Ezra by these early founders and organizers, with the few simple interpretations given to it by the *Sōfērim*, was therefore sufficient for almost all the needs of the community throughout the entire Persian period.⁵

¹ Cf. Lauterbach, in *Studies in Jewish Literature in Honour of Kohler*, p. 196.

² Art. 'Pharisees,' in *JE* ix. 661a.

³ Cf. *T. B. Pes. 70b*, where 'the argument of *seceders*' is referred to, i.e. those who have left the college and established a school of their own.

⁴ *Pharisäer und Sadduzäer*.

⁵ The term פִּרְשֵׁי is constantly used in the Rabbinical literature in the sense of 'explain' or 'make explicit' (cf. פִּרְשֵׁי, 'explanation'). Just as פִּרְשֵׁי = פִּרְשֵׁי and פִּרְשֵׁי = פִּרְשֵׁי, so פִּרְשֵׁי = פִּרְשֵׁי (i.e. 'interpreters'), according to Leszynsky.

¹ The *Hasidim* ('Assideans') appear as an organized party in the early Maccabean period. They are mentioned in 1 Mac. as strict observers of the law (2:12), and abstainers from things unclean (1:62). Possibly these *Hasidim* are referred to in some late Psalms (e.g. 149).

² Cf. also the constantly recurring expression in the early Rabbinical literature תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים, 'the disciples of the wise.'

³ Kohler, in *JE* ix. 661 (Citing *Dem. ii. 3*).

⁴ In *Pirge Abhōth*, i. 2, he is designated as being 'of the last survivors of the men of the Great Synagogue,' i.e. he belonged to the last of the *Sōfērim*.

⁵ Lauterbach, in *JQR*, new ser., vi. 34.

No doubt slight changes did develop in the inner life of the community, and these were reflected in new religious customs. But, as Lauterbach rightly points out,¹

'All these necessary modifications and even the few new laws [required] the Soferim could easily read into the written Law by means of interpretation, or even embody the same in the Book by means of some slight indications in the text itself. Thus they found in the Book of the Law all the teachings they required.'

The Soferim were able to do this because they were also the actual scribes whose business it was to prepare copies of the Book of the Law. If they desired to teach a certain law, custom, or practice, because they considered it as part of the religious teachings, although it could not be found in, or interpreted into, the Book of the Law, they would cause it to be indicated by some slight change in the text. . . . They did not hesitate to do so, because they did not in any way change the law as they understood it. The changes and corrections which they allowed themselves to make in the text were of such a nature that they did not affect the meaning of the passage, but merely gave to it an additional meaning, thus suggesting the law or custom which they desired to teach. In this manner they succeeded in grafting upon the written Law all these newly developed laws and customs which they considered genuinely Jewish.'

Simon the Just, the last of the Soferim († not later than 270 B.C.), was himself high-priest, and no doubt the body of teachers of which he was the head was mainly priestly in character and personnel. But after his death the activity of these teachers as an authoritative body seems to have largely ceased.

'Even the authority of the High-priest was undermined. . . . Laymen arose who had as much influence among the people and with the government as the High-priest, and they became leaders.'²

The old control over popular religious custom by the high-priest and the body of teachers under him—which had been possible while the community was stable and (to a large extent) self-contained—was no longer possible. New customs and practices gradually arose for which there were no precedents in the old tradition, or in the text of the Law itself, and gradually established themselves among the people. Still the need was felt for maintaining the authority of the Law and tradition, and so there arose a body of lay teachers, who privately devoted themselves to the study of the Law, which now became 'a matter of private piety, and as such . . . was not limited to the priests.'³ No doubt there were faithful priests who assisted this movement. Thus for some 70 or 80 years—from about 270 to 190 B.C.—there seems to have been a break in authoritative teaching. The text of the Law and the study of it were preserved during this interval by the piety of individual teachers, both priests and laymen. About 190 B.C., or a few years earlier or later, it is probable that this state of things was brought to an end by the organization of the Sanhedrin, an authoritative body consisting of priests and lay teachers, which was able to regulate officially the religious affairs of the people. It was their task to harmonize the laws of the fathers with the life of their own times; and this task had become exceptionally difficult because the new religious customs that had grown up among the people had now (owing to lapse of time) come to be regarded by them as traditional, and meanwhile, also, the text of the Law had become rigidly fixed—it was no longer possible to introduce slight verbal modifications, as the earlier Soferim had done. How was the problem to be solved? It was apparently in connexion with the issues raised by this difficulty that that division took place in the Sanhedrin which later led to the secession (or dismissal) from that body of those who came to be called 'Pharisees,' i.e., as explained above, 'seceders.' But, before this critical state of affairs was reached, a long period of discussion and controversy seems to

have ensued. The priestly, at that time the most powerful, element in the Sanhedrin wished to maintain the sacred and obligatory character of the written Tōrah, as apart from the new religious customs. According to Lauterbach, they wished to give authoritative recognition to the latter by special decrees, issued and modified from time to time, to suit varying circumstances, by priestly authority in accordance with Dt 17⁸⁻¹². These decrees were not to be put on a level with the sacred text of the written Law, but were to be regarded as authoritative so long as they remained in force. On the other hand, the Hasidim, or members of the 'pious' party, largely represented by the lay teachers, in the Sanhedrin would not accept this solution. They were unwilling to recognize any such extension of purely priestly authority, and contended that their own authority as teachers was equal to that of the priests, and that all authorized religious custom must be based directly upon the Law or its equivalent.

'Acknowledging the Law of the fathers to be the sole authority, these lay teachers now had to find all the decisions and rules necessary for the practical life of their time contained or implied in the Law. They also had to devise methods for connecting with the Law all those new decisions and customs which were now universally observed by the people, thus making them appear as part of the laws of the fathers.'¹

Two methods, according to Lauterbach, were adopted to secure this result. One was to extend, by means of new exegetical methods, the system of Midrāsh, i.e. to deduce from the letter of the Law itself justification for particular rules and customs. This method was, as a matter of fact, adopted on a large scale and developed by the Pharisaic teachers, and has given birth to a vast hermeneutical literature. The methods used were, as is well known, highly artificial and complex.

'The other method was to enlarge the definition of the term "Law of the Fathers," so as to mean more than merely the written Book of the Law with all its possible interpretations. In other words, it meant a declaration of the belief that not all the laws of the fathers were handed down in the written words of the Book, but that some religious laws of the fathers were transmitted orally, independently of any connexion with the Book.'²

This 'oral Law' (הוראה שבעל פה), which later, in an expanded form, was embodied in the official Mishnāh, was regarded as coeval and of equal authority with the written Tōrah. Thus, according to Lauterbach, the oral Law is a figment invented by the Pharisees to lend authority to popular religious customs which had become established. However this may be, Lauterbach's reconstruction, sketched above, gives the best explanation that has yet been proposed to account for the somewhat complicated facts.³ It accounts for the separation of the Pharisees from the Sadducees (in the earlier Sanhedrin), and for their emergence as distinct and bitterly opposed parties at the time when their party names first emerge into the light of history; it also makes plain how this divergence had been prepared for by previous events and by the religious situation that had in consequence arisen.

3. Aims and religious position.—The age-long conflict between the Sadducees and the Pharisees was the most important factor in the development of Judaism. The Pharisees, as we have seen, were the champions of the oral Law which at first was quite independent of the written Tōrah, and was deeply entrenched in old popular custom and usage. On the other hand, the Sadducees mainly represented the old conservative positions of the priesthood, and inherited the tradition of the older scribism. The 'scribe,' as he is depicted in Sirach (c. 190 B.C.), is a judge and man of affairs, a cultivated student of 'wisdom,' well acquainted, of course, with the contents of the written Law, and

¹ Lauterbach, in *JQR*, new ser., vi. 34, 36.

² *Ib.* p. 37.

³ *Ib.* p. 43.

a frequenter of the courts of kings. He belongs to the leisured, aristocratic class, and is poles asunder from the typical Pharisee and teacher of the Law, who was drawn from the ranks of the people. It was in the reaction against Hellenism that Tōrah-study, among the people and in the sense explained above, was born. The public reading and exposition of it in the synagogues probably dates only from the Maccabean period. Both parties were compelled now to devote themselves to Tōrah-study in the new and exacting way demanded by the times, the Sadducees because, on their view, the Law was the only valid standard for fixing juristic and religious practice, and the Pharisees because it was necessary for them to adjust their oral tradition, as far as possible, to the written word. The first result of Pharisaic activity in this direction was the development of a remarkably rich and subtle exegesis. A further result was the evolution of new laws by exegetical methods.¹

The Pharisees were thus essentially a democratic party in the sense that they were themselves mainly drawn from the people and safeguarded the religious rights and privileges of the laity as against the aristocratic and exclusive priesthood. The reaction against the Hellenizing movement was largely strengthened by their work in succession to that of the earlier Hasidim; they democratized religion by making the Scriptures the possession of the people, and expounding these in the weekly assemblages of the Synagogue. In marked contrast with those of the Sadducees, their judgments in questions of law were, as is well known, of a mild and compassionate character. When it is realized how they spent their energies without stint in the work of instructing the people in the Tōrah, and in bringing religion to bear upon popular life, their enormous influence with the people generally, to which Josephus testifies, is explained.

Josephus says that the Pharisees led the people, compelling even the priestly aristocracy to yield to them. 'Practically nothing was done by them [the Sadducees]; for whenever they attain office they follow—albeit unwillingly and of compulsion—what the Pharisees say, because otherwise they would not be endured by the people' (*Ant.* xviii. i. 4).

In manifold ways the influence of the Pharisees made itself felt upon the religious life and institutions of the people. The observance of the Sabbath and holy days was invested with special sanctity in the home. As at the sacrifices in the Temple, wine was used in honour of the day. 'Remember the Sabbath Day to keep it holy' was interpreted: 'Remember it over the wine,' and was embodied in the ceremony of *qiddush*, 'sanctification.'² They made the observance of these days popular, and succeeded in imparting to them a character of domestic joy. Whereas by the conservative priesthood such occasions were regarded mainly as Temple festivals, the Pharisees strove to bring them into the common life of the people. Their influence on the Temple services was also of a democratic character. They introduced the recitation of daily prayers beside the sacrifices (*Tamid*, v. 1), and founded the institution of the *Ma'amadot*, i.e. the deputation of lay Israelites which was present in the Temple at the daily sacrifice.³ They also proclaimed the doctrine that the priests were

but the deputies of the people (cf. *Mishnāh*, *Yōmā*, i.).

'While the Sadducean priesthood,' says Kohler, 'regarded the Temple as its domain and took it to be the privilege of the high priest to offer the daily burnt offering from his own treasury, the Pharisees demanded that it be furnished from the Temple treasury, which contained the contributions of the people.'¹

Further, they secured Temple sanction for certain popular customs which were not enjoined in the Law. Such was the great festival of the water-drawing at the Feast of Tabernacles, when a libation of water was brought in procession from the Pool of Siloam to the Temple and solemnly poured on the altar. It was, perhaps, originally regarded as symbolical of rain. During the feast, which lasted seven days, the libation of water was made each day at the time of the morning sacrifice, and it is to this custom that Christ implicitly refers in Jn 7³⁷ 'If any man thirst, let him come unto me, and drink.' This was one of the most popular of Temple ceremonies, and the *Mishnāh* referring to it and its accompaniments says:

'He who has not seen the joy of the water-drawing has never seen joy in his life.'

The Pharisaic institution of the *tēfillin*, or phylacteries, on the head and arm seems to have been devised as a counterpart of the high-priest's diadem and breast-plate, and to have been regarded as a consecration of head and arm; and in the same way the *mēzūzāh*, or door-post symbol, was regarded as symbolizing the consecration of the home. Both observances were, of course, derived from the text of Scripture (Dt 6⁸ 11¹⁶), and doubtless originally had talismanic associations; but these were, to a large extent, forgotten. The Pharisees strove to make their symbolism really religious. They also infused new and more specifically religious ideas into the observance of the old traditional festivals and solemnities. One of the most significant of these was their doctrine regarding the Day of Atonement. They boldly transferred the atoning power from the high-priest to the day itself, so that atonement might be effected apart from sacrifice and priest. The one indispensable condition was true repentance, on the necessity of which the Rabbinic literature lays the utmost stress. Similarly the New Year Festival (*Rōsh ha-shānāh*) became the annual Day of Judgment; and the Feast of Weeks, or Pentecost (originally a purely agricultural festival), became the Festival of Revelation, or the Giving of the Law. They also improved the status of women, relaxing the rigour of the old laws of purification, and, by the institution of the marriage-document (or settlement), protected the woman against arbitrary divorce. Their general aim, apparently, was to invest the woman in the home with as much dignity as possible. In consequence they enjoyed, as Josephus tells us, great popularity with the Jewish women (*Ant.* xvii. ii. 4). Among their other great achievements they fixed the canon of Scripture, built up the Synagogue service and liturgy, and established a system of religious instruction by means of elementary schools, supplemented by the Synagogue.

The enormous influence of the Pharisaic party on the religious life of the Jewish people in Palestine is thus clear; and it undoubtedly operated in the time of Jesus and the apostles. In the Synagogue and outside the Temple it was supreme. Even within the Temple it made itself seriously felt. Apparently, however, the Pharisees did not secure full control of the Temple ritual till the two decades that preceded the destruction in A.D. 70 (c. A.D. 50-70). Thus in the time of Jesus the Temple services were still mainly conducted in accordance with the old priestly traditions (though

¹ *JE* ix. 662^a.

¹ The thirteen exegetical principles of R. Ishmael (developed from an earlier nucleus attributed to Hillel) are set forth in S. Singer's *Hebrew-English Authorised Daily Prayer Book*, London, 1914, p. 13. They are explained and illustrated in M. Mielziner, *Introd. to the Talmud*, Cincinnati, 1894.

² For a description of this ceremony see W. O. E. Oesterley and G. H. Box, *The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue*, London, 1911, p. 376 ff.

³ Only a deputation was present in the Temple. The other members of the 'course' on duty who had been left behind in the towns and country districts assembled in the local synagogues (at the time when the sacrifice was being offered in the Temple) and engaged in prayer and the reading of Scripture (see *Ta'anith*, iv. 2, and cf. Schürer, *HJP* iii. 275 f.).

not, as we have seen, entirely). Both the Sanhedrin and the Temple were still dominated by the priestly aristocracy. This comes out very clearly in the details of the trial of Jesus, as narrated in the Gospels. The procedure adopted violated the canons of the criminal law accepted by the Pharisees, and embodied in the Mishnāh.¹ It is clear enough from the Gospels, indeed, that the chief actors in the tragedy were the members of the high-priestly party.

The Pharisaic ideal was the exact opposite of what is understood by 'progress' in the modern world. While in modern life the tendency is to secularize ever more and more all departments of human activity, the Pharisees consistently strove to bring life more and more under the dominion of religious observance. But observance—ceremonial—was valued mainly because of its educational worth. By carefully formed habits, by the ceremonial of religious observance, religious ideas could be impressed upon the people's mind and heart. But the outward was, at any rate ideally, subordinated to the inward. Thus in the prescriptions that occur in the Mishnāh and Tōseftā regarding prayer the necessity of conscious direction of the thoughts to the objects of the prayer (*kawwānāh*) is insisted upon. Nor is it clear that the Pharisees put all the requirements of religious observance on exactly the same level, and made no distinctions. The essential marks of their piety are well summed up in a Talmudic passage as follows:

'Three distinguishing characteristics mark the people of Israel—compassion, humility, and the practice of benevolence (acts of kindness).'²

The three purely religious duties which were most emphasized have been combined in a phrase which has become a commonplace in Pharisaic (Rabbinical) literature: 'penitence, prayer, and charity' (חסידה, תפילה, צדקה); these 'avert the evil doom.' 'Charity' (צדקה) is one of the 'good works'—a *miṣvah* in fact—which are a prominent feature in Pharisaic piety.

4. The Pharisees in the NT.—It must not be supposed that Pharisaism, during its active period, was all of one type. It was, as a matter of fact, sharply divided into opposing sections or 'schools.' Probably these divisions are not exhausted by the opposing schools of Hillel and Shammai. There were doubtless apocalyptic Pharisees, as well as others who strove to relegate apocalyptic to the background. Before A.D. 70 Pharisaism of various shades was struggling for supremacy. The later Rabbinism has absorbed its spirit, but breathes a serene atmosphere. It is less polemic in character, and doubtless had itself been to some extent influenced by the elements which opposed the earlier Pharisaism. Among these, as we have seen, one of the most important was the party (or parties) of the Sadducees. But it is necessary also to remember the presence of warring schools among the Pharisees themselves, if we are to estimate the NT evidence rightly. There was certainly an extreme and fanatical section, to be found, it would appear, among the school of Shammai (though not embracing all Shammaites), which was open to the charge of formalism and hypocrisy. Pharisees of this type were severe and exacting in their requirements, and bitterly narrow and exclusive. It seems probable that it was against this section that the polemic in the Gospels was primarily directed. Jesus denounced this hypocritical section of the Pharisees. The Talmud³ also denounces them. But on the other side were the mild and peace-loving disciples of Hillel.

A brief examination of one of the Gospel accounts

¹ See esp. the tractate *Sanhedrin*.

² *T. B. Yebāmōth*, 70a.

³ In the well-known passage in *T. J. Brāk*, ix. 14b, which classifies Pharisees into seven classes, five of which suggest 'suits' (including grave hypocrisy).

will serve to illustrate what has been said. That Jesus came into conflict with the scribes and Pharisees is attested very clearly in the oldest tradition of the Synoptic Gospels. Two specific instances of points of conflict of great importance are given, viz. the question of vows (a son by pronouncing the word *qorban* being permitted to relieve himself of the duty of helping a parent [Mk 7⁶⁻¹³]), and a question of ritual purification, the obligation, viz., to wash the hands before meals (Mk 7¹⁻⁵). To the historicity of both these accounts strong objection has been raised on the Jewish side, it being alleged that the Pharisees could never have tolerated such a breach of the moral law as neglect of duty to parents on the ground of tradition; and, further, that the laws of purification did not apply to the ordinary layman in daily life at all, but only on the rare occasions when he visited the Temple.¹ Otherwise they were obligatory only on the priests.

It is not possible to discuss these points fully here. But something may be said on the question of the ritual hand-washing. It is noticeable that the rebuke by Jesus of the Pharisees as described in Mk 7 is directed against a hypocritical section (v. 6, 'you hypocrites'). These are represented by 'certain of the scribes which had come from Jerusalem,' i.e. probably a deputation of the Shammaite party. The Shammaites were aggressive and exacting, and their influence up to the time of the catastrophe of A.D. 70 seems to have been in the ascendant. Later the milder party of Hillel triumphed, and the oral Law, embodied in the Mishnāh, was revised in accordance with Hillelite views. It is probable that in the time of Jesus the question of ritual hand-washing was a party one, and that Jesus Himself strongly opposed the Shammaite view. In fact, the impression is almost irresistible that the denunciations of the Pharisees occurring in the Gospels are directed primarily against a Shammaite section, and that the incident described in Mk 7 is an episode in the controversy between Jesus and the Shammaites. In confirmation of what has been said of the party-character of the point at the time presupposed in the Gospel account, it is interesting to note that, according to the Talmud (*T. B. Shabbāth*, 14b), the duty of ritual hand-washing formed one of the 'eighteen articles' which the Shammaites forced with such violence on the Sanhedrin in the stormy years that immediately preceded the conflict with Rome in A.D. 66-70.²

The great danger inherent in a legalistic religion is undoubtedly that of formalism, externalism, unreality; and this defect unquestionably manifested itself in certain phases of Pharisaism. But the Pharisaic religion never failed to produce genuine examples of profound piety, while its positive achievements in the domain of religious institutions were astonishing.

Pharisaism was essentially legalistic in character. To the Pharisee the Law and its prescriptions were the supreme embodiment of the divine Will and divine revelation. No doubt Pharisaism by its exegetical methods succeeded in adapting the Law to the requirements of living conditions. But the adaptation and modification were legalistic in character. They multiplied precepts and rules. Jesus, on the other hand, while maintaining the divine character of the Law, and even asserting its

¹ Cf. A. Büchler, *Der galiläische 'Am-ha-'Ares des zweiten Jahrhunderts*, Vienna, 1906, p. 131 ff.

² For a full discussion of both questions see the writer's art. 'Recent Literature on the Pharisees and Sadducees,' in *RThPh* iv. (1903) 139 ff. That the neglect by Jesus' disciples of the practice of ritual hand-washing was not a departure from general lay usage may be inferred from the Gospel account itself. No protest was raised against it, apparently, till a deputation of scribes from Jerusalem arrived on the scene; and what they objected to was that a teacher—a Rabbi—should permit his disciples to neglect the rite.

text against the developments of Pharisaic tradition, adopted a prophetic rather than a legalistic attitude to the Law itself. The Pharisaic attitude, while not deficient in inward strength and religious conviction, was bound to be somewhat unsympathetic to those who remained outside the Law's pale. A Jewish scholar has said:

'Only in regard to intercourse with the unclean and "unwashed" multitude, with the 'am ha-arez' ['people of the land'], the publican, and the sinner, did Jesus differ widely from the Pharisees.'¹

This difference, however, is really fundamental. Such a transcending of the letter of the Law involved ultimately its supersession. In Palestine the hostility of the Pharisaic party, as a whole, seems first to have been aroused only when a section of the Christian sect became avowedly and explicitly antinomian in the person of Stephen; and even then the hostility was not extended to those Christians who wished to remain loyal to the Law.

5. The significance of Pharisaism in the history of Judaism.—As we have seen, Pharisaism was the dominant factor in the development of orthodox Judaism, which assumed a more or less permanent form in the Rabbinical system. Its relations with other parties during the two centuries before A.D. 70 were also of vital importance. What exactly the relation of Pharisaism was to the earlier apocalyptic it is difficult to say. The two types of thought and circles, though distinct and emphasizing the one the Law, and the other eschatological hopes, were not necessarily opposed, and were doubtless often combined in greater or less degree. It is significant that the Pharisees took over from the apocalyptists and made a firm position of orthodox Judaism the doctrine of the future life; they also admitted the apocalyptic book of Daniel into the canon. (On the other hand, there was a certain anti-apocalyptic bias in Pharisaism, which showed itself later (c. A.D. 100) in the rejection of the apocalyptic literature of the earlier Judaism. In fact, Pharisaism was far from other-worldly in its outlook. Its main interest was to bring the sanctions of religion into *this* life. This tendency also appears in its Messianic doctrine, which it has impressed on all parts of the Synagogue liturgy. Its Messiah is not the transcendental and heavenly figure of some of the apocalyptists, but a purely human son of David. Pharisaism was the most vital factor in the development of the Judaism of the Talmud. But Rabbinic Judaism, in the form which it assumed from the 2nd cent. A.D., is not a mere deposit of Pharisaism. It is really a synthesis of the earlier Pharisaism and some of the elements that were in conflict with it. The final product was something richer and more serene than the struggling and confused elements, as they appeared before the process of fusion was complete.

It may be claimed, with some justice, that by Pharisaism 'the element of evolution and progress was injected into the Law. . . . It was due to this progressive tendency of the Pharisees that their interpretation of Judaism continued to develop and remained an ever living force in Jewry.'² Certainly the Pharisees erected a structure which has proved its strength by withstanding the shocks of time, and by its survival, so far as it has survived, in the Jewries of to-day.

LITERATURE.—For the literature generally see Schürer, *GVII*, p. 447 ff.; important recent monographs by I. Elbogen, *Die Religionsanschauungen der Pharisäer mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Begriffe Gott und Mensch*, Berlin, 1904; M. Friedländer, *Die religiösen Bewegungen innerhalb des Judentums im Zeitalter Jesu*, do. 1905; D. Chwolson, *Das letzte Passamahl Christi und der Tag seines Todes, nebst einem Anhang: das Verhältniss der Pharisäer, Sadducäer und der*

Juden überhaupt zu Jesus Christus nach den mit Hilfe christlicher Quellen erläuterten Berichten der Synoptiker, new Leipzig, 1908; R. Travers Herford, *Pharisaism: its Aims and Methods*, London, 1912; R. Leszynsky, *Pharisäer Sadducäer*, Frankfurt, 1912; J. Z. Lauterbach, 'The Sadducees and Pharisees,' in *Studies in Jewish Literature in Honour of Prof. K. Kohler*, London, 1913, and three articles titled 'Midrash and Mishnah,' in *JQR*, new ser., v. (1914) 503 ff., vi. (1915-16) 23 ff., 303 ff.

G. H. BOYD.

PHILADELPHIANS.—The Philadelphia Society was a little group of mystics, in London, Holland, and Germany, who flourished from 1693 to 1819. Dr. John Pordage (1607-81), one of the Cambridge Platonists, and the author of *Theologia Mystica*, followed a temporary fashion and drew together several readers of Jacob Boehme. Commissioners of Berkshire therefore ejected him from the rectory of Bradfield before the end of 1654, on charges of blasphemy, necromancy, scandal in his life; at the Restoration, however, he re-entered. In this circle of followers of Boehme was Jane Lead (1623-1704), a widow of good family who in 1670 began to experience divine openings and revelations, so that she, a living medium, taught by God's eternal virgin wisdom, superseded the dead Boehme. Soon 'The Philadelphia Society for the Advancement of Piety and Divine Philosophy' was organized, apparently on a microscopic scale. Nothing was written till 1681, when Mrs. Lead issued a little tract, *The Heavens Opened now Breaking*, followed in two years by a larger work, *The Revelation of Revelations*. This was published through Sowle, the Quaker bookseller—an obvious sign of a spiritual kinship. Francis Lee of Oxford (1661-1719) heard of the movement at Leyden, where he was studying medicine; he sought out Mrs. Lead on his return, became her adopted son, and, in accordance with revelation, married her daughter. Soon he headed the movement, introducing Mrs. Lead to kindred spirits abroad, so that a sister society arose in Holland. He urged Mrs. Lead to write, and himself edited the *Theosophical Transactions* of the society, which began to appear in 1697.

Mrs. Lead broke new ground in 1694 with another pamphlet, *The Enochian Walks with God*, in which she announced a fresh stage of revelation superseding her former deliverances, and declared that it was possible after spiritual death, a resurrection by the aid of the cherubim, to have direct communion with departed saints as well as with Christ. Next year appeared *The Wonders of God's Creation manifested in the Variety of Eight Worlds*, of which she was only the 'subordinate author,' and in which, on divine authority, it was revealed that there are eight worlds, the visible universe being lowest, and four being sinless—Paradise, Zion, New Jerusalem, and Eternity, the source of all. In 1695 appeared *The Laws of Paradise*, or the Ten Commandments spiritualized. The fourth was interpreted to mean that there was to be no reasoning but implicit belief in the revelation, and no working for a living but acceptance of whatever was provided, while the seventh forbade all conference with any one but Jane Lead. In 1696, when the society was at its zenith, she began *Fountain of Gardens*, which contains her recollections in old age of her spiritual experiences till 1685. This work extended to four volumes, the subsequent instalments appearing in 1696, 1700, and 1701. Two little tracts, *The Tree of Faith* and *The Ark of Faith* (London, 1696), described the flying ark navigated by the apostle John, who gathered the saints fit for transmutation. Mrs. Lead's first *Message to the Philadelphian Society*, also published in 1696, explained the seven churches and the seven sons of Jesse, and showed that Christ rejected Episcopalians, Presbyterian

¹ Kohler, *JE* ix. 665b.

² Lauterbach, in *Studies in Jewish Literature in Honour of Kohler*, p. 198.

Independents, Baptists, Fifth-Monarchists, and Rome, choosing only the Philadelphian Society as free from all forms. The *Message* also enjoined organization, and repeated that to work for a living was wrong; the kings of the earth would send tribute. This bid for publicity won adherents, but attracted hostile comment and brought forth rivals, so that it was necessary to advertise what were the authentic works of Mrs. Lead. Monthly *Memoirs* were published, beginning in 1697.

A formal meeting was held at Westmorland House, when the society agreed not to separate from outward ecclesiastical connexions, but to superadd their own meetings. This was the custom of the religious societies then so familiar, out of which grew the Wesleyans later on; it was Spenser's *ecclesiola in ecclesia*. In this way the growth of a German branch was facilitated; but it was contrary to the revelation to Mrs. Lead, and marks the repudiation of her sole claims. Another constitution, describing the order of worship, enjoined the reading of Scripture, silent meditation, and prophecy; it forbade argument or the stating of doubts in meeting; it was explicit that all members were equal, and that women must be modest if they took part. A pamphlet controversy led to explanations that the discipline of the society was borrowed from the Church of England and the Friends; that Scripture was accepted as the touchstone of alleged revelations, which cannot supersede or add to Scripture, but can only interpret it; that in case of conflict of alleged revelations the common sense of the society judged the genuineness and validity.

The revolt against Mrs. Lead and her son-in-law Lee was disastrous; the *Memoirs* ceased to appear, and the third *Message* shifted ground, declaring that the seven churches were now Jews, Romans, Greeks, Ethiopians, Lutherans, French Reformed, and Vaudois. Two more works by the foundress of the society were published, *The Wars of David* (London, 1700) and *A Living Funeral Testimony* (do. 1702), but the movement was doomed. A confession is said to have been issued in 1703, but the government suppressed the meetings of the society, and no protest was published. The Dutch section formally severed connexion, and the English section collapsed with the death of Jane Lead in 1704. She had been quite consistent in her refusal to work, and her needs had been met by an annuity from Baron Kniphausen. The German connexion had introduced the society to the practical work of Francke at Halle, an account of which appeared in the *Memoirs*. It has been claimed that Lee persuaded Hoare and Nelson to acclimatize that work as the charity schools, but the claim is too high, for these were begun by Presbyterians in Southwark as early as 1687.

LITERATURE.—Sources are named in the article. See also S. Lead, *Biographie der Lead*; *Biographie der Lead*, in *hist. Theologie*, 1865, 1873, p. 181 ff.; M. D. Conway, in *The Open Court*, vii. (1900), 376 ff.; A. Ruegg, in *PRE* xl. 326 ff.; R. M. Jones, *Spiritual Reformers in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, London, 1914. The correspondence of Lee and Dodwell in Christopher Walton's anonymous *Notes and Materials for an Adequate Biography of William Law* (privately printed, 1854) may also be consulted. An ed. of the *Wars of David*, published in 1810, has many notes, extracts, and criticisms. W. T. WHITLEY.

PHILANTHROPY.—I. Introduction.—Philanthropy is defined in *OED* as 'the disposition or active effort to promote the happiness and well-being of one's fellow-men.' It is closely akin to charity (*q.v.*), and may be regarded as charity grown up; i.e., the impulse to help the needy, which may be but a casual and superficial emotion, develops in some minds into a settled disposition and a steady life effort. The typical philanthropist

is a prosperous person who gives up a large share of his life to the work of improving the lot of his fellow-creatures. While charity concerns itself in the main with the present needs of individuals, philanthropy looks further, to the future as well as to the present, and seeks to elevate human life on a larger scale. It is specially characteristic of those societies that are called 'individualistic,' i.e., in which ideals of personal liberty make a strong appeal to the average person. Where the rights of the community over the individual are powerfully felt, as in the ancient Greek cities or in modern Germany, there is less call for philanthropy; it is to the community, organized in the State, rather than to wealthy individuals that men naturally look for the redressing of human wrongs. Further, philanthropy is usually the product of religious faith, and it is therefore affected by the kind of religion that prevails in a community. It is much more characteristic of Christian than of pagan societies, and of Protestant than of Roman Catholic or Orthodox. The reason doubtless is that Protestant societies are usually the more individualistic: where the Church idea is strong, and the sense of personal liberty weak, it is to the Church rather than to individuals that people turn for succour and support.

Philanthropy, then, is the outcome of the charitable impulse, when disciplined by reflective thought, in a strongly individualized society; but philanthropy, in its turn, under the criticism of reason, tends to merge itself in something larger still. The efforts to cope with social evils put forth by individuals, either alone or in voluntary association, are often found to fail; and it is seen that to be effective they must be undertaken by the community. The object is now sought to be attained through changes in the law and improved administration of the forces of society. The philanthropist becomes the reformer.

2. History.—A full outline of the history of the world's philanthropy cannot be attempted here; but we may illustrate a few of its features. It is in the Christian communities of the West, and particularly in the English-speaking countries, that philanthropy has been most highly developed; but it has long existed in the East also, quite apart from Christianity.

(a) *Chinese.*—In China, through the teachings especially of Confucius and Mencius, the virtue of benevolence has been recognized from very early times. They taught that the State exists for the promotion of human happiness; but neither central nor local authorities appear to have done much actively in this direction. There has, however, been much private benevolence, especially during the last two centuries; but this is scarcely noticed in the Chinese histories, which have been written in the main as chronicles of the doings of kings and emperors. Orphans and abandoned children have been cared for, and endeavours made from time to time to put a stop to the practice of desertion. Hospitals and alms-houses have been established. There is a Chinese poor law, which is stated to be on paper admirable but in practice almost a dead-letter, since no funds are provided by the State, apart from the land-tax, the proceeds of which, even under an honest magistracy, are usually required to meet the costs of local administration. In most of the Chinese cities there is a large amount of philanthropic work initiated and controlled by the people apart from, but not in antagonism to, the government; and these local charities are co-ordinated by institutions like the 'Hall of United Benevolence' at Shanghai, which dates from 1805. Some of these are using modern and enlightened methods; how far this is due to a growing acquaintance with Western life, through

the work of missionaries and others, it is not easy to judge.

A native writer says:

'Chinese philanthropy has reached the stage of systematization and institutionalism, and of adequate relief; but not that of the scientific prevention of destitution. . . . But the scientific stage is bound to be reached' (Yu-Yue Tsu, *The Spirit of Chinese Philanthropy*).

This may be true of some parts; in many others it certainly cannot be said that 'relief is adequate.' Beggars, lepers, blind and insane persons, often fail to obtain needed succour, either through the clans or the merchant gilds, which are supposed to care for their members.

That there is a fine philanthropic spirit at work among the Chinese people is clear from their success in putting down the use of opium, and also from the rapid progress of the movement for freeing women from the pernicious practice of foot-binding.

(b) *Indian*.—In regard to India, it is perhaps unnecessary to add to what has already been said under the head of CHARITY, ALMSGIVING (Buddhist) and (Hindu).

(c) *Greek*.—Among the Greeks philanthropy occupied but a minor place, whether in practice or in ethical theory. It was always assumed that the bulk of the hard manual work of the community would be done by slaves, whose fundamental needs were of course provided for; and, if distress came upon the citizens, the Greek mind naturally turned to the city-State, rather than to wealthy individuals, as the organ through which the trouble should be met. In the place of philanthropists we find legislators and statesmen like Solon and Cleisthenes, whose reforms were designed to lift up the poorer citizens and release them from their burdens. We hear, indeed, of rich citizens in Athens fitting out at their own charge vessels for the navy, and helping their poorer neighbours by portioning their daughters and sisters; yet Aristotle in his *Politics* (vi. 5, 1320^a b) commends foreign examples of benevolence, implying that this was not a conspicuous virtue among his fellow-Athenians. What he desired was no ill-considered or spasmodic charity:

'The chief service rendered by Aristotle was to show that unless the purpose of civil and social life was carefully considered and clearly understood by those who desired to improve the conditions, no change for the better could result from individual or associated action' (C. S. Loch, *Charity and Social Life*, p. 34).

Thus the benevolence which he desiderates is the philanthropic rather than the merely charitable spirit.

(d) *Roman*.—What has been said about the Greeks applies in large measure also to the Romans. Philanthropy was not a characteristic Roman virtue, yet it burned with a very pure flame in the breast of Tiberius Gracchus, when he saw great estates in Tuscany cultivated by slaves and barbarians, while Roman citizens were idle and starving; and it drove him to reform of the land laws. His reforms and those of his brother Caius, for which they gave their lives, were in a measure successful; but the *lex frumentaria* of Caius, which gave to Roman citizens the right to purchase corn from the public stores at about half-price, began the demoralization of the Roman *plebs*. This illustrates one of the dangers of philanthropy, even when it takes the form of social legislation. Apparent success at the time may be achieved at the cost of grievous trouble in the future. The process of demoralization went on until the greater part of the Roman populace were enabled to live in idleness, depending on the *annona*, or free distribution of corn at the public charge; and no philanthropist could untie the fatal knot—for the Roman citizen was a voter, and thereby master of the situation. He would

support any one who would offer him plenty of *panem et circenses*.

Under the empire the Stoic faith, which fitted so well the ideal Roman character, drew some of the leading minds towards a wider recognition of the worth of manhood: 'homo sacra res homini,' wrote Seneca (*Ep.* xv. 3). This broadening of the sense of human brotherhood had its outcome in a distinct development of the philanthropic spirit. Hospitals of some kind, probably private infirmaries, appeared in the 1st cent. A.D.; and, with the desire to encourage the growth of population, several of the emperors formed endowments (known as *alimenta*) for the support of selected children of poor parents, entrusting their administration to local municipalities, and encouraging others to do likewise (see, further, CHARITY, ALMSGIVING [Roman]).

(e) *Jewish*.—Among the Jews the duty of kindness to the poor, the widows, and the fatherless was constantly enforced as a thing pleasing to God. But the nearest approach to anything that can be called philanthropy is perhaps to be found in the earlier prophets, who (from the time of Elijah's fearless denunciation of Ahab for his injustice to Naboth) pleaded the cause of the poor against their oppressors. The special contribution of the Jewish spirit (mainly through the prophets) was its insistence on the practice of justice and love as a vital element in religion: what Jahweh required of men was 'to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God' (Mic 6⁸).

After the Exile the rise of the Synagogue was accompanied by the gradual development of a system of organized charity, for which the Jews are still remarkable. It is not surprising, after the treatment which they have received at the hands of Christians, that except to their own people most Jews are not much inclined to liberality.

(f) *Early Christian*.—It was through the ethical teachings of the prophets that a section of the human race was prepared for the coming of Christ, that the spiritual senses of a few were so trained and developed as to be able to appreciate and welcome the manifestation of divine and human love which Christ brought. It is this that makes philanthropy peculiarly a Christian product. Christianity broadened and deepened the spirit of love to man, as nothing else in human history has ever done.

The early Church felt that its Master had revealed both God and man: God as perfect love, stooping to unimaginable depths of humiliation for man's sake, and man, always and everywhere, gifted with the capacity to appreciate and respond to that love. Every man became a brother 'for whom Christ died.' Jesus, by His example even more than by His words, had broadened the bonds of brotherhood to encircle all mankind; He ate with publicans and sinners, disclosed His deepest teaching to sinful women, and taught that our 'neighbour' is the alien and the heretic if they need our help, that a kind act done to one of the least of His brethren is done to Him, that men are called to be 'perfect' by sharing the universal love of the Father of all. Love to man as man, the sense of universal brotherhood, the intuition of the oneness of humanity, became for the first time a guiding principle for ordinary men and women.

What Christ made of His followers is seen most clearly in the career of His great apostle, St. Paul, whose noble hymn in praise of love in 1 Co 13 rings true because he lived it out himself. His whole life after his conversion was one of philanthropy in its best and truest sense—self-dedication to the highest good of men. The early Church was a community of 'inspired' men and

women—inspired, above all, with a new experience and power of love. 'We know that we have passed out of death into life, because we love' (1 Jn 3¹⁴). The new order of relations lifted all human life to a higher level; it gradually made slavery impossible, raised the position of women nearer to equality with men, and led many of the most spiritually-minded Christians, during at least the first two centuries, to refuse to fight in the Roman armies, because they felt that all men were their brothers. Its most conspicuous triumph was won in the amphitheatre, where it put a stop to the gladiatorial games, thus countering the fiercest passion of the ancient world.

But the picture has its flaws. After the first glow had passed away, influences unfavourable to philanthropy began to make themselves felt. One of these was the absorption of the Church in the tasks of defining its creed and settling its organization. Another was the ascetic spirit, which is essentially self-regarding, and which tended to displace the spirit of love. A third was the notion, taken over from Jewish teachers, that almsgiving is a discipline good for the soul, which was so emphasized as to empty charitable deeds of all love, by making them a penance, whose main value was to the giver in the next world rather than to the recipient in this. And so the 'dark ages' do not shine when we search them for philanthropy. The idea that poverty was a divine ordinance—a fixed condition, to be relieved but not removed—robbed the almsgiving of the monasteries to a large extent of a really philanthropic purpose. Yet the spread of public 'hospitals' from the 4th cent. onwards—institutions founded for the help of the sick, the poor, the aged, and the orphans, sometimes with ecclesiastical money and sometimes by private benefactions, but always controlled by the Church—shows the presence of real solicitude for suffering humanity. The ransoming of captives, pagan as well as Christian, was largely practised, some of the bishops even, when their own wealth did not suffice, using the costly plate of their churches for the purpose. Great ecclesiastics frequently, at no little personal risk, interceded with barbarian invaders on behalf of humanity; St. Ambrose compelled Theodosius the emperor to do penance for his massacre of the Thessalonians. And all through the Middle Ages the Church strove, fitfully perhaps and with only partial success, to regulate commerce and industry in the interests of justice and human welfare. The philanthropic spirit is shown in the Christian society, even when we cannot single out the individual philanthropist.

(g) *Modern.*—Modern philanthropy, strictly so called, begins with the Reformation, and is exemplified most in the countries of N. Europe and America, where the Reformation took deepest root. In England the dissolution of the monasteries destroyed the whole organization of society so far as the relief of the destitute was concerned, just at a time when their numbers were increasing fast; and the Elizabethan poor laws mark the failure of private philanthropy to rise to the need. The outbreak of strange sects during the Commonwealth period included schemes of social regeneration, like that of the 'Diggers,' led by Everard and Winstanley, but more important was the rise of the Quakers, just in the middle of the 17th century. Their belief in the 'Light of God in every man' gave them a fresh intuition of human brotherhood, and sent them forth as sober apostles of love and justice among men. William Penn's colony of Pennsylvania was a great philanthropic achievement, specially remarkable, first as an experiment in entire freedom of conscience, and secondly for its security from attack by the Indians, who, as

long as the Colonial Government followed Penn's example of treating them justly, remained its warm friends and supporters. For seventy years the colony was free from attack by the Indians, though unguarded by fort or soldier. Then the 'Holy Experiment' came to an end, at the opening of the Seven Years' War in 1756. Positive orders were received from the British Government to arm the colony in defence against the French, and this drove the Quakers from power.

Remarkable among Quaker philanthropists was John Bellers (1654–1725), who is described by Karl Marx as 'a veritable phenomenon in the history of Political Economy' (*Das Kapital*, Hamburg, 1872–94, i.² 515). He worked out with much shrewdness a scheme for Colleges of Industry, which afterwards influenced Robert Owen. The later Quakers became pioneers in various crusades, notably those against slavery, for the reform of prisons, for the humane treatment of lunatics, and for popular education; and all through its history the society has striven against war.

There is no great work of humanity and mercy in which the Quakers have not had their share, and which finally is not rooted in that which Fox recognised as the power of the "Seed of God" (P. Wernle, *Introd. to Germ. ed. of George Fox's Journal*, Tübingen, 1903).

The close of the 17th cent. and the early years of the 18th marked a new departure in philanthropy: the beginning of 'societies' for carrying on religious and philanthropic work with money jointly provided. Among these were the 'Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge' (1698), the 'Society for the Propagation of the Gospel' (1701), and other missionary bodies. Several of the larger London and provincial hospitals date from this time, though St. Bartholomew's and St. Thomas's are much older. Guy's was founded in 1724, Westminster in 1734, and Winchester, the earliest provincial hospital, in 1736. In this particular matter England was behind several of the continental countries, particularly Holland.

From the 18th cent. onwards the formation of philanthropic societies has continually gone forward with all sorts of objects, among which we may mention as typical the printing and distribution of the Scriptures, popular education, the aftercare of prisoners, the prevention of crime by reformatories and industrial schools, the advocacy of temperance, the prevention of cruelty to children and animals, and the spreading of the principles of international peace.

3. *Philanthropy and the State.*—In most of the fields of philanthropic activity it is not possible to separate by any rigid demarcation the spheres of private and of State responsibility; there has been a constant tendency for work that is attempted by private persons or associations to be eventually undertaken by the State. The most conspicuous example of this is public education, which every one now recognizes to be a legitimate concern of the whole community. This tendency arises mainly from the discovery that private effort rarely accomplishes what is needed—whether through deficient or capricious financial support or because in some cases a power of compulsion is required which only the State can supply. Strong arguments can be adduced, on grounds of efficiency, for the State management, at the national charge, of hospitals, asylums, and the like—just as the government, in Germany and England, has undertaken the task of insuring its poorer members against sickness and old age. The task of philanthropists, in the present day, often is to get the community to shoulder its responsibilities for the weaker members of society; hence, as was said above, philanthropy becomes merged in social reform.

The special case of the reform of prisons, and of

penal administration generally; illustrates well the relation between philanthropy and the State. In the 17th cent. the State took no responsibility for the management of prisons or for the support of prisoners; its task was done when, having convicted them of crime or debt, it handed them over to the jailer for a certain term of safe keeping, leaving him to get out of them or their friends what he could. The investigations of John Howard, which began in 1773, led him at once to advocate changes in the law—payment of salaries to jailers, abolition of fees, cleansing of prisons, classification of prisoners, separation of the sexes, and so forth. Some temporary improvement resulted; yet in 1813, when Elizabeth Fry began her visits to Newgate, the condition of many prisons was as bad as ever. Since that time it has been increasingly recognized, at least in Europe and America, that society itself has a duty to the law-breaker, and that, if it neglects that duty and simply contents itself with punishing him, in most cases he comes out of prison a greater danger to society than before he went in. Hence the demand that prisons shall be made, so far as possible, not merely deterrent but reformatory; that the criminal, after leaving prison, shall be given the chance of a fresh start in life, and shall be upheld and guided by those who have his good at heart; and that similar methods shall be employed with unhardened offenders, instead of sending them to prison at all. Experiments in the use of probation and conditional liberation on parole, under the care of special officers, have been made more freely and successfully in America than in Europe, but both are being cautiously introduced in England. Private philanthropy is not displaced, but is absorbed and directed. The State makes large use of the philanthropic earnestness of individuals, as probation officers and the like; but, unless the philanthropic spirit also animates the administrators of the law, the result is largely failure. The supreme need is the change of the bad will into the good will, and the development of character; and these are things that may be achieved by personal influence, but hardly ever by machinery, however perfect.

This opens up a large question—too large for more than mention here. If the State is compelled, even in its own interests, to care for the lives of those who break the law—to seek to find them suitable employment, and so forth—how can it rightly leave, to sink or swim in the surging sea of competition, the great majority who keep the law? Must not the process end logically in a guarantee that the State will find employment for all? The difficulties that attend such a guarantee have often been pointed out by economists, and we cannot here pursue the matter further. But this we may certainly say: that the State must seek not only to repress crime but to remove those elements in the life of the community that cause and encourage crime; and that in doing this it will continually need the help and guidance of philanthropists.

In various fields of social work there are advantages in experiments being made by private philanthropists before the State steps in. Even if their work is not fully efficient, premature State action may often turn out to have been misguided, and may do more harm than good. If, e.g., all the reformatories for boys had been managed by the State in the days when manacles and armed guards were thought essential for order and discipline, it is very doubtful whether, in spite of more adequate equipment, a military machine of that kind would have achieved even the moderate success which, with all their drawbacks, has been attained by the privately managed reformatories. It is, as has been said above, only through the free play of

personal influence that personality can be rightly developed.

4. **Extra-national philanthropy.**—A word may be added regarding philanthropic action by individuals or societies for the benefit of humanity outside their own country. The great missionary enterprise must be considered here; apart from it nearly all such benefit is necessarily sought through the agency of the State. The anti-slavery agitation is the greatest of these philanthropic movements. In this case the work of philanthropists has been mainly directed to securing the necessary changes in law, and to bringing continual pressure to bear on the government to secure, as far as possible, justice and right treatment for weaker peoples. The exploitation of the resources of the tropical regions of the earth by European and American capital opens up continual dangers of forced labour and other abuses akin to slavery, of which the Congo and Putumayo atrocities have been the most widely known; and there will long be a place for such philanthropy as that of the 'Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society.' Other movements that may be mentioned in this connexion are those for restricting the sale of intoxicating liquor among native races, and for the abolition of the Indian opium trade with China, which is now, happily, almost a thing of the past. In these cases the work of philanthropists has been to enlighten the public and to quicken the demand for legislation and effective government administration.

5. **War.**—The most pressing of all social problems at the present time is that of war, and for long years to come an urgent task for philanthropists and reformers will be to replace the spirit of national egoism by the desire to deal justly with all, and, as the outcome of this desire, to discover means by which mutual trust among nations may be established, and disputes may be prevented from giving rise to war. In this great task statesmen and philanthropists will need one another's help.

At the present day the alternative 'philanthropy or the State' has been transcended, and the problem is to find how the two lines of activity may best support each other.

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EDWARD GRUBB.

PHILIPPINES.—See **INDONESIANS**, **MALAY ARCHIPELAGO**, **MALAY PENINSULA**, **NEGRILLOS** AND **NEGRITOS**.

PHILISTINES.—The Philistines (Heb. פְּלִשְׁתִּים; Gr. Φυλιστινῆς, Ἀλλόφρονες [LXX], Παλαιστῖνοι [Josephus]) were a warlike people, established on the coast of Palestine, and at the zenith of their power during the early years of the Hebrew settlement.

1. **Origin, name, and history.**—We have but little material for a history of the Philistines outside the literature of the Hebrews, who, being their bitterest and most resentful enemies, paint them in the blackest colours. Criticism has therefore to be applied to the statements there contained.

Of the origin of this people the Hebrews had a vague tradition that they came from a place called Caphtor. The 'Caphtorim' (whence went forth the Philistines) and Caphtorim are enumerated among the children of Mizraim, son of Ham, in a passage of the Table of Nations (Gn 10^{6, 13, 14}) attributed to the Jahwistic writer. The words in parentheses are probably a misplaced gloss, which ought to

follow 'Caphtorim.' Am 9⁷ speaks of the Philistines having been brought from Caphtor; Jer 47⁴ refers to them as the remnant of Caphtor, calling the place by a word (כַּפְתֹּר) which implies that it was on the sea-coast, if not an actual island. Dt 2²³ speaks of the Caphtorim, which came out of Caphtor, having destroyed the villagers of the neighbourhood of Gaza, and established themselves in their land—a geographical indication which equates the Caphtorim with the Philistines.

Besides the name Caphtorim, we find others in Hebrew literature that have every appearance of referring to the same people or, at least, to clans or other tribal subdivisions of them. Chief of these is כֶּרֶתִּית, 'Cherēthites' (1 S 30¹⁴, Ezk 25¹⁶, Zeph 2⁹). In the Ezekiel passage the Philistines and the Cherēthites are spoken of together. Elsewhere the Cherēthites are alluded to as part of the bodyguard of the early Hebrew kings, coupled with the name פֶּלֶתִּית, 'Pelēthites,' of which the only reasonable explanation that has been suggested is that it is a modification of the name of the Philistines used for the sake of the assonance. This royal bodyguard is thrice alluded to as the Carians (כָּרִי), namely, in 2 S 20²³ [RVm], 2 K 11^{4, 19}—a fact probably something more than a mere accident.

The question of the origin of the Philistines is thus bound up with that of the identification of Caphtor. There is a place referred to on Egyptian monuments by the name *Keftiu*, *Keftiu*, first mentioned in inscriptions of the XVIIIth dynasty, which it is natural to compare with the Hebrew name. In the *Hymn to Amon*, under the guise of which Thutmose III. vaunts his mighty deeds, he speaks of smiting the west-land and causing terror to the lands of Keftiu and Asi. In the annalistic inscription on the walls of the temple of Karnak we read of ships of Keftiu, showing that it is a place on the sea-coast, like the Caphtor of Jeremiah. More important than these, we find in the tombs of the officials, notably in that of Rekhmara, vizier of Thutmose III., wall-paintings representing messengers from Keftiu and other places bearing tribute to the Pharaoh. This tribute, which *inter alia* takes the form of artistic vases of precious materials, we are now in a position to identify as belonging to the contemporary Minoan civilization, which had its centre in Crete. On this ground it has become generally recognized that Keftiu is to be identified either with Crete itself or with one of the neighbouring countries which enjoyed the benefits of the Minoan civilization. The obvious similarity of the Hebrew Cherēthites with 'Cretans' has long been recognized, even from before the days of scientific archaeological investigation, and has prepared the way for the general acceptance of this identification.

It may be said that the identification is so far certain that other identifications that have been suggested are rendered obsolete—such, *e.g.*, as the attempts made by various writers to find Caphtor in the Delta, or to prove for the Philistines a Semitic origin. On the other hand, there are still some difficulties not yet solved, chief of which is the origin of the *r* in the Hebrew name Caphtor, which does not appear in its apparent Egyptian equivalent Keftiu. Another difficulty is that Keftiu early disappears from Egyptian record, to be revived by would-be archaeologists under the Ptolemys, whereas the name is preserved by the Hebrews after the Egyptians appear to have forgotten it. To explain these points we must await further discovery.

Towards the end of the troubled 14th-12th centuries B.C., a period of great unrest in the E. Mediterranean, we begin to find mention of an indefinite number of small tribes who make their appearance in Egyptian records. These tribes bear

names easily identified with places and peoples in Asia Minor and the neighbouring islands. Thus the Tell el-Amarna letters tell us of the Lukku (Lycians), Shardanu (Sardians), and Danunu (Danaoi?). Ramessu II., in the great battle of Kadesh (1333 B.C.) against the Hittites, had to meet the first two of the above-mentioned peoples, who were leagued with his enemies, as well as the Dardanu (from Dardanus in the Troad), Masa (Mysians), Mawuna (Mæonians, but the reading is uncertain), Pidasa (people of Pedasus in Caria), and Kelekesh (Cilicians). Merneptah (1300 B.C.) was opposed by the Lukku and Shardanu in league with the Libyans, as well as the Ekwesh (Achæans), Turisha (people of Troas), and Shekesh (Sagalassians). And, lastly, in the inscriptions in the temple of Medinet Habn, built by Ramessu III. to commemorate his great victory over the allied tribes who came to invade Egypt, we hear once more of the Shardanu, Danunu, and Shekesh, as well as of the Pulasati (Philistines), Zakkala, and Washasha (the last-named have not been satisfactorily identified). This is the first certain appearance of the Philistines, as such, in history, and is of great importance, as it gives us an explanation of their sudden appearance on the coast of Palestine.

The inscriptions in the temple record that in the eighth year of Ramessu III., the last great warrior-king of Egypt (c. 1192 B.C.), the north was disturbed, and bands of marauders, driven from their homes by troubles, began to raid the east and south, seeking a new dwelling. They flowed over the land of the Hittites, Syria, and Palestine, while at the same time a parallel expedition was advancing by sea, over Cyprus. Egypt was their goal; but Ramessu was ready for them, and in the inscriptions and engraved cartoons on the wall of his temple he describes his successful operations against them—notably the great sea-fight, the first event of the kind of which any pictorial record remains. Driven back from Egypt, the invaders established themselves on the Palestinian coast-line about the same time as (probably shortly after) the arrival of the Hebrews in the Hinterland by the desert route.

It is true, the book of Genesis (chs. 20, 21, 26) records certain events in which Abraham and Isaac are brought into contact with one Abimelech, king of the Philistines. In criticizing this cycle of tales we must bear in mind that the main incident is repeated in ch. 12, where, however, the king of Egypt takes the place of the Philistine king. The use of the word 'Philistine' in these stories is an anachronism, and none of the attempts that have been made to evade this fact is successful. Abimelech is a Semitic chieftain, and he is called a Philistine because his territory was in the region which was actually 'the land of the Philistines' at the time when the stories were first written down in their present form. The popular storyteller, who is responsible for them as we have them, was not troubled by the question of how far back in time the Philistine occupation may or may not have extended. Similar criticisms are applicable to the casual references to the Philistines in Ex 13¹⁷ 23³¹.

Passing over the very obscure story of Shamgar (Jg 3³¹ 5⁶) and the reference to Philistine oppression (Jg 10⁷), we find the first record of the inevitable collision between the Philistines and Hebrews in the epic of Samson. This remarkable series of stories weaves round the person of a single ideal hero the incidents of a guerilla border-warfare. They show the complete domination of the Philistines over the Hebrews, and the internal disunion of the Hebrew clans; for Samson's chief danger is not so much the prowess of his Philistine

enemies as the treachery of his own kinsfolk; the men of Judah would betray him, and he at last is delivered over by his Hebrew wife Delilah—for there is no evidence in support of the popular view that she was a Philistine.

Under the pressure of the Philistine domination the Hebrew tribes gradually became welded into one, and slowly and with many reverses succeeded in ultimately ridding themselves of the domination of the uncircumcised. The first campaign was disastrous for the Hebrews; the Ark was lost at Aphek (1 S 4); but an outbreak of bubonic plague caused the Philistines, in superstitious fear of the Hebrew deity who had plagued the Egyptians, to return it. A more successful engagement, in which the Philistines were discomfited by a great thunderstorm, is recorded in ch. 7. An index of the growing sense of tribal unity—the result of this Philistine pressure—is the Hebrew demand for a king which now began to be expressed. As soon as Saul was elected, his son Jonathan slew the Philistine governor of Gēba; the Philistines came up against the Israelites to quell the revolt and met their rebellious serfs at Michmash, where, but for Jonathan, they would have crushed them. In a later battle, at Ephesdammim (1 S 17, 2 S 23⁹, 1 Ch 11¹³), David first distinguished himself, though the Goliath story is probably here out of place. Notwithstanding these Israelite victories, and the occasional raids carried out by David, the end of Saul's reign saw the Philistines as strong as ever. After Saul's death David reigned as king over the southern tribes at Hebron, doubtless under Philistine vassalage, while Ish-Baal, Saul's son, ruled in the north, presumably in the same subject condition. The assassination of Ish-Baal opened the way for David to add his rival's kingdom to his own, capturing the citadel of Jerusalem that had hitherto stood as a non-Hebrew wedge dividing the two groups of Hebrew tribes. Fearing that David would become too strong, the Philistines came up against him; but vainly. Three battles are recorded as having taken place in David's reign—one at Baal-Perazim (2 S 5¹⁷⁻²¹), one at Gēba (2 S 5²²⁻²³), and one at some unknown place, possibly Gath (2 S 8¹), in which the power of the Philistine people was broken beyond recovery, as is shown by the remarkable fact that they made no effort to recover their lost power during the troubles that darkened the end of David's reign. Nor did they take any conspicuous advantage of the internecine dissensions between Judah and Israel. In fact, they practically drop out of history after the reign of David, and are principally referred to as composing the bodyguard of the king (Cherēthites and Pelēthites, or Carians, as in the passages already cited) or the guards of the Temple (Ezk 44⁷, Zeph 1^{8t}). Almost the only sign of rallying is a temporary revival under Ahaz (2 Ch 28¹⁸), suppressed by Hezekiah (2 K 18⁸).

The annals of the Assyrian kings from Hadad-Nirari III. (812-783) down to Assurbanipal (began to reign 668) give us a few further details of conquest, and of feeble attempts at revolt promptly and ferociously suppressed. It is noteworthy that nearly all the persons mentioned in these documents in connexion with the Philistine cities have Semitic names, the only exception being a king of Ekron of the time of Esarhaddon (681-668), by name Ikausu, evidently the old Philistine name Achish. According to Neh 13²³⁻²⁴, the 'speech of Ashdod' still lingered at the time of the return from the captivities.

2. Land.—Jos 13² limits the Philistine territory to the strip of coast-line from Ekron down to the Shihōr (the modern Wadi el-Arish, on the Egyptian frontier), lying between the sea and the foot-hills

of the Judæan mountains. At the greatest extension of their power, however, they must have held a much wider territory. The Golenischeff Papyrus shows us the Zakkala, probably near kinsmen of the Philistines, established at Dor, just south of Mount Carmel; and yet farther north the Phœnicians display peculiarities which distinguish them from all other Semites (absence of circumcision and a cultivation of maritime enterprise) and which are probably due to the influence of this people. The Philistines at the beginning of Saul's reign have governors at Gibeah and at Gēba, near Jerusalem, and at the end of it are able to set up their trophy at Beth-Shan—which, if it is really the modern Beisan, implies a command of the whole plain of Esdraelon.¹ The command of the sea-coast gave them enormous commercial advantages, especially when we remember that the chief trade-route—from Egypt to Mesopotamia—passed through their territory, and that one of their chief cities (Gaza) was the natural market-place for the Arabian trade. The maritime plain possesses, moreover, natural fertility far beyond the greater part of the Hinterland; the Shunammite sojourned during the seven years' famine in the land of the Philistines (2 K 8²).

3. Organization.—In their political organization the Philistines show peculiarities that distinguish them from all the Semitic tribes to which the OT introduces us. These are governed by kings or chiefs, absolute despots within the limits of the tribes over which they are set. The Philistines, on the other hand, have no king over the whole nation (the Abimelech of Genesis is the *exceptio probans regulam*), but are governed by a council or oligarchy of lords called by the technical term *šeren*, plur. *šerānīm*, each of them dominant in one of the five metropolitan cities Gaza (Ghuzzeh), Ashdod (Esdud), Ashkelon (Askalun), Gath (probably Tell es-Sāfi), and Ekron (commonly identified with 'Akir), but acting in concert for the common good of the nation. The king of Gath seems to have been, at least in the time of David's exile there, in the position of *primus inter pares*, but his colleagues can, and do, overrule his decisions when they consider them undesirable. The people, too, enjoy much more freedom than the slave-subjects of the ordinary Eastern despot. They dare to 'annoy' their lords, when the presence of the Ark leads (as they suppose) to the outbreak of plague, to decide what should be done; and even in the time of the Assyrians we read how the Ekronites deposed and imprisoned their lord, Padi, because he persisted in the unpopular course of submission to Assyria. All this indicates an essentially un-Semitic instinct for liberty which we might well look for in the descendants of those who in the Bronze Age developed the great Cretan civilization.

The nearest parallel to this system of government is to be found in Etruria, where the *lucumones* seem (so far as the materials at our disposal permit us to judge) to have been remarkably similar in their office and functions to the Philistine *šerānīm*. It is one of several links which connect the Philistines and the Etruscans together, and which suggest that they are divergent branches of the same stock or of closely related stocks.

That their military forces were well organized is shown clearly by the Medinet Habu sculptures and by the frequent Biblical references to their war-equipment, especially their chariots (Jg 1¹⁹, 1 S 13²). In 1 S 29² we read of 'hundreds and thousands'—possibly an indication of some kind of regimental or legionary division of their armies.

¹ A place otherwise unknown, called 'Shen,' appears in 1 S 7¹². This is nearer the Philistine territory as usually defined, and might possibly be the Beth-Shan in question.

Of their domestic life nothing is known; but Samson could see and fall in love with his Timnathite wife; and (on the occasion of the death of the hero) the temple at Gaza contained men and women mingling freely together. These facts, so far as they go, indicate that women were not so jealously secluded as in a Semitic community.

4. Language.—Their language is almost totally unknown. The word *seren*, above quoted, is the only common noun that we certainly possess; its apparent relation with the Gr. *τύραννος*, a word of unknown etymology, has often been pointed out. Otherwise we have nothing but (1) an unintelligible magical formula, said to be Keffian, in an Egyptian papyrus—which, supplying the missing vowels, would be something like *senutiukapuwaimantirek*¹—and (2) a number of proper names. An Egyptian school-exercise tablet, now in the British Museum, gives us the following as 'Keffian' names: Aša-hurau, Nasuy, Akašou (=Achish), Adinai, Pina-ruta, Rusa, and Benešasira. The OT names a number of Philistines, but of these only Phicol, Achish, and Maoch seem to bear non-Semitic names. Sisera, king of Harosheth, may perhaps have been of the Zakkala tribe; the name has some similarity, on the one side to Benešasira just quoted, and on the other to Badyra, king of Dor, in the Goleniseheff Papyrus. Of the kings mentioned on the Assyrian tablets only one (Ikausu = Achish) bears a non-Semitic name.

5. Religion.—We read of several deities associated with the Philistines. According to Is 2⁶, they were celebrated (like the Etruscans) for a skill in soothsaying. An ancient oracle of a god Baalzebub (*q.v.*) at Ekron was worked by them, and consulted on occasion even by Israelites (2 K 1²). The Semitic name of the god shows, however, that this was not a Philistine foundation, but that, when they became masters of Ekron, they took over what was probably its most lucrative industry. Another deity is called by the Semitic name Ashoreth (*q.v.*); but, though in name the Philistine goddess is equated to the great Semitic goddess, the assimilation was probably not complete. An inscription exists at Delos, on an altar dedicated by an Ashkelonite, naming as the tutelary deities Zeus, Astarte of Palestine, and Aphrodite Urania, who is mentioned by Herodotus (i. 105) as a deity specially worshipped in Ashkelon. Lucian (*de Dea Syria*, 14) also shows us the two goddesses as kept apart—one of them in human form, the other with the tail of a fish, like a mermaid. The latter was also called Derketo, or Atargatis; and Diodorus Siculus (ii. 4) tells us a legend of her which links her with the Cretan Britomartis, in whom we may see the prototype of the Philistine goddess.

The head of the Philistine pantheon was Dagon (*q.v.*), a god who had temples at Gaza and at Ashdod. In the latter temple was an image of the god (1 S 5¹⁻⁵). There is really no evidence that, like Atargatis, he had a fish-tail, though this is currently believed; it probably rests on a false etymology of the name (Heb. דג, 'fish'). But Dagon (or Dagan) is not an exclusively Semitic god. He existed in Palestine before the coming of the Philistines, as is shown by the name Dagan-takala in the Tell el-Amarna letters, and by the occurrence of the place-name Beth-Dagan in an inscription of Ramessu III.; it also occurs not infrequently in Babylonian monuments. The name of the Etruscan culture-hero Tages suggests the possibility that, as in the case of Atargatis-Aphrodite, the Philistines brought with them a god having a name similar to Dagon, and confused

the two together. This explains why a comparatively obscure Semitic deity should have attained such an importance among the Ἀλλόφυλοι. Dagon continued to be worshipped under his own name down to the time of the Maecabees (1 Mac 10³⁴), and even in the 4th cent. A.D. he was not forgotten, for there can be little doubt that Marna (= 'Our Lord'), the great god of Gaza at that time, was Dagon. The destruction of the temple of Marna is the central incident of that most remarkable little work, the Life of Bishop Porphyrius of Gaza by the deacon Mareus. From this narrative we learn that human sacrifices had been offered to the god (PG lxx. 1240).

6. Culture.—The chief interest of the Philistines and the cognate tribes lies in this, that their history bridges the gap between the ancient civilization of the Bronze Age and the later civilization of the Iron Age. The two hundred years of overlap between the Bronze and the Iron Ages was a period of turmoil and confusion respecting the history of which very little is known. The Philistines and the Zakkala in the east, and the Turisha in the west, carried the Bronze Age traditions across this troubled time, to form the basis of new civilizations. How far they actually developed the iron trade is a question which we have insufficient materials to discuss; they have even been claimed as the inventors of the art of the smith (ZE xxxix. [1907] 334). And it is not impossible that they had a share in the evolution of the alphabet, the cornerstone of modern civilization.

LITERATURE.—F. Hitzig, *Urgeschichte und Mythologie der Philistiner*, Leipzig, 1845; K. B. Stark, *Gaza und die philistische Küste*, Jena, 1852; A. Noordtjij, *De Filistijnen, hun afkomst en geschiedenis*, Kampen, 1905; M. A. Meyer, *Hist. of the City of Gaza*, New York, 1907. In the present writer's *Schweich Lectures on The Philistines: their Hist. and Civilization*, London, 1913, an endeavour has been made to collect an exhaustive account of the facts known concerning this people, and a large number of references to books, papers, etc., will there be found, which need not be repeated here.

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PHILO BYBLIUS.—Philo Byblus (Herennius) received his surname, Byblus, from the fact that he was born at Byblus (Gebal of the OT, modern Jebail), a city on the Phœnician coast north of Beirut. According to Suidas (*s.v.* Φίλων Βύβλιος), he was born in the reign of Nero (A.D. 54-68). Suidas states also that at the age of 78 in the 220th olympiad he assumed the name of his patron, Herennius Severus. By earlier historians this Herennius Severus was identified with L. Catilins Severus, who was consul in Rome in A.D. 119, and Philo's birth was dated A.D. 42, but the researches of B. Niese (*De Stephani Byzantii auctoribus*, Kiel, 1873, p. 26 ff.) have made it probable that Herennius Severus was consul in A.D. 141 and that Philo was born in A.D. 64. The figures for the olympiad are then incorrect. Although born in Phœnicia, he wrote in Greek, and attained eminence as a philologist, grammarian, and historian. Suidas calls him γραμματικός. In the reign of Hadrian (117-138) he was sent to Rome as an ambassador from the Phœnician cities, and succeeded in obtaining for Tyre the rank of 'metropolis' (Suidas, *s.v.* Παῖδος Τύριος). He remained in Rome and won the friendship of the consul Herennius Severus, from whom he received his surname of Herennius (Suidas, *s.v.* Φίλων Βύβλιος; Origen, *c. Celsum*, i. 15). Hermippus of Beirut was a pupil of Philo, and was introduced by him to Herennius (Suidas, *s.v.* Ἑρμιππος).

The names of the *Philistines* concerning the Reign of: work is lost, and in *Marvellous History*, passage preserved by Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* i. 12. *Concerning Cities and the Illustrious Men which* has produced, 80 books (Suidas, *loc. cit.*). Extracts have been preserved by Stephen of Byzantium in his geographical dictionary *Ethnika*. It was epitomized by *Strabo*.

¹ Of course we have no guarantee that this is really 'Keffian'; the Egyptian scribe may possibly use the word to denote something to him meaningless, just as we sometimes use the jocular expression 'double Dutch.'

s.v. *Σεπῆνος*), and extracts from this epitome have been preserved by the *Etymologicum Magnum*. (4) *Concerning the Acquisition and Selection of Books*, 12 books (*Suidas*, s.v. *Φίλων Βύβλιος*). The ninth book apparently was entitled 'Concerning Physicians.' It is cited by Stephen of Byzantium, s.v. *Κύριος* and *Δυσπάχιον*. The treatise *Concerning Things worth Knowing* (*Etym. Mag.* s.v. *γράψας*) was perhaps part of the same work. (5) *Concerning the Language of the Romans* (*Etym. Mag.* s.v. *ἀλτήρ*). (6) *The Choice of Words* (*Etym. Mag.* s.v. *ἀβολήτωρ*, *αἴστος*, *ἀμνηστος*). (7) *Epigrams*, 4 books (*Eudocia*, s.v. *Φίλων Βύβλιος*). (8) By far the most important of Philo's works was his *Phœnician History*, 8 books (*Porphyrus*, *de Abstin.* ii. 56), or 9 books (*Eus. Præp. Evang.* i. ix. 31d). This purported to be a translation of the *Phœnician History* of Sanchuniathon. Extensive extracts from it are given by Eusebius (*Præp. Evang.* i. ix f.). It

is cited also by Origen, c. *Celsum*, i. 16, p. 334 (Ben.), by Johannes Lydus, *de Mens.*, ed. C. B. Hase, Paris, 1823, p. 274, and by Stephen of Byzantium, s.v. *Νίσις* (see *SANCHUNIATHON*). All the fragments of Philo have been collected by G. Müller, *PHG* iii. 560-576.

LITERATURE.—Art. 'Philon von Byblos,' in J. S. Ersch and J. G. Gruber, *Allgemeine Encyclopædie*, Leipzig, 1847, pp. 427-435; art. 'Philo Herennius,' in *EB* xxi. 413; C. Wachsmuth, *Einleitung in das Studium der alten Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1895, p. 406; E. Schürer, *GFV* i. 71 f., iii. 463; and especially the copious literature on *SANCHUNIATHON*.

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PHILO JUDÆUS.—See ALEXANDRIAN THEOLOGY.

PHILOSOPHY.

Primitive (H. B. ALEXANDER), p. 844.

Buddhist (L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN), p. 846.

Celtic.—See CELTS, DRUIDS.

Chinese (A. FORKE), p. 853.

Egyptian (A. H. GARDINER), p. 857.

Greek (P. SHOREY), p. 859.

Indian.—See MĪMAṂSĀ, NYĀYA, SĀṆKHYA,

VAIŚEṢIKA, VEDANTA, YOGA, MATERIALISM (Indian), etc.

Iranian (L. C. CASARTELLI), p. 865.

Japanese (M. ANESAKI), p. 869.

Jewish (H. MALTER), p. 873.

Muslim (T. J. DE BOER), p. 877.

Roman (P. SHOREY), p. 883.

Scottish.—See SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY.

PHILOSOPHY (Primitive).—Philosophy has many definitions, not a few of which would render such a phrase as 'primitive philosophy' contrary to sense; for they consider philosophy as a product of sophistication, consciously critical in character, the last and ripest fruit of studied experience. Certainly this is a just description of the thought of the great historical schools of Europe; but there is, none the less, a sense in which the word 'philosophy' can be justly applied not only to the stream of sophisticated reflexion which was born with Thales, but also to the more naïve, but not less genuine, reflexion with which even the least traditioned of men consider the world about them. As inclusive of this unsophisticated thought, philosophy may be defined as the process and expression of rational reflexion upon experience—a definition which will be found applicable to the speculations of the sophisticated and the primitive man alike.

To be sure, 'system,' the very mark of sophistication, is not to be found in primitive thinking, except here and there by implication; but 'system' is by no means synonymous with 'rationality.' Further, that subdivision into fields or sciences which is the prime token of systemic philosophies is also wanting, though there is a sense in which we may speak of the ethics, psychology, and ontology, and even of the logic and epistemology, of the pre-critical period—viz. from the point of view of an observer who has made and learned the use of these distinctions, and now sees them in embryo in the speculations of men not yet conscious of them.

In the present article (which can no more than indicate a point of view) the various 'leads' of primitive speculation in the directions of the several sciences will be briefly sketched.

1. **Method.**—Consciously developed method is, of course, not found in unconsciously developed thinking, yet the main elements of all rational method—reasoning on the principles of identity and causality, the use of number, and the evaluation of sense-perception—are presented with a kind of elemental perspicuity that makes the study of primitive thinking at once fascinating and instructive.

A main and interesting characteristic of this thinking is its suspicion of sensation. Few things are to the primitive man merely what they appear to the senses; the realities of things are their powers, and these powers are rarely measured in physical terms. There is, indeed, a profound

analogy between a savage's conception of natural bodies and that of physical science: in each case the reality of the object is defined by the sum of its forces, never by its ostensible form; sense-perception is a guide to experience, but not a test of true being.

From this first fact follows the search of the savage after causes, which he is ever seeking to divine. His two great formulæ, 'post hoc ergo propter hoc' and 'similia similibus,' are in substance the same as the laws of causality and of identity; all that is needed to give them logical validity is quantification—the syllogism and the method of trial and error.

Of the weaknesses of primitive thinking the most important is the feeble use of number and mathematical relations generally. Nearly all peoples have some conception of number, both ordinal and cardinal, but their applications of this knowledge are most limited. The oldest of the sciences, that of the calendar, is certainly everywhere somewhat developed, and among barbaric peoples leads to important metaphysical theories; but, apart from this, the application of number-concepts to any body of facts is rare, and without such applications the perspective of science is impossible.

A second weakness is paucity of analogies. Human instincts and desires seem to form the primary group of analogies for savage reasoning, in line with the savage's fundamentally activist interpretation of the 'life of nature,' as we still call it. Along with this comes the immense group of analogies based upon the body and its functions: 'This corn is my heart, and it shall be to my people as milk from my breasts,' says the earth-goddess in a *Sia* myth (M. C. Stevenson, 'The *Sia*,' *IRBEW* [1894], p. 39); and in primitive myth and rites generally it will be found that the head, the heart, the tongue, and the nutritive and sexual functions are the great fountains of similitude by which the world about man is brought within the scope of his understanding. This is no deep derogation, for the modern attraction and repulsion hark back to the primitive love and hate, while energy itself gets its common intelligibility from the human will; only the purifications of mathematics sublimate the human metaphor which is at the core of all science.

There are, of course, differences in the philosophical gift among primitive races and tribes, and between individuals of savage groups, as among civilized people. The Polynesian and the American Indian are clearly more speculative than are the black tribes of Africa. In N. America it is comparatively easy

to single out certain peoples with a marked gift for speculation—the Pawnee, the Navaho, the Bellacoola—and a tendency towards the systematization of thought. James Mooney (*14 REEW* [1896], pt. ii. p. 775 f.), gives an interesting contrast of the philosophical and the practical types, from two associated tribes. "The Cheyenne and Arapaho, although for generations associated in the most intimate manner, are of very different characters. In religious matters it may be said briefly that the Arapaho are devotees and prophets, continually seeing signs and wonders, while the Cheyenne are more skeptical. In talking with Tall Bull, one of the Cheyenne delegates and then captain of the Indian police, he said that before leaving they had asked Wovoka [the ghost-dance prophet] to give them some proof of his supernatural powers. Accordingly he had ranged them in front of him, seated on the ground, he sitting facing them, with his sombrero between and his eagle feathers in his hand. Then with a quick movement he had put his hand into the empty hat and drawn out from it "something black." Tall Bull would not admit that anything more had happened, and did not seem to be very profoundly impressed by the occurrence, saying that he thought there were medicine-men of equal capacity among the Cheyenne. In talking soon afterward with Black Coyote, one of the Arapaho delegates and also a police officer, the same incident came up, but with a very different sequel. Black Coyote told how they had seated themselves on the ground in front of Wovoka, as described by Tall Bull, and went on to tell how the messiah had waved his feathers over his hat, and then, when he withdrew his hand, Black Coyote looked into the hat and there "saw the whole world." It is worthy of remark in passing that maps or charts which show 'the whole world' are not infrequent among the N. Americans, their purpose being, as a rule, to show the 'way' by which the spirit may descend to the powers of the nether, or ascend to the powers of the upper, realm. Such maps are surely in the method of scientific cosmology.

2. Theory of man.—The primitive thinker measures the world about him in terms of his own mind and body: its conduct is actuated by desires and motives such as his, and its physical unities are set by his own bodily dimensions—finger, palm, hand, foot, and pace are all measures still in use, and the decimal system itself is but the mathematical apotheosis of our ten-digit hands. But this *homo mensura* standardization of experience becomes retroactive: when man measures the world in terms of himself, even unconsciously he is already analyzing his own being; he makes the panorama of nature his mirror and reflexion, and so comes eventually to self-revelation. Further, he expands his own nature in assimilating environment to it, and thus finds his inner self not only reflected in the outer world, but coloured by it.

Psychology is a science whose roots run very deep. In reading his motives into nature man has begun already the classification of his powers, and gradually this classification, unconsciously impressed on his mind, becomes assumed as his natural image. Doubtless the first distinction made is that of the 'life' from the body: the life represents feeling and conduct, the body mere form; and, as to savage man forms are always suspect, it is the life that is conceived to be the prime reality. But the life is not incorporeal; it is always associated with some bodily manifestation, of which the most common and elementary is the blood, the blood of life: "But flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat" (Gn 9th). Many American aborigines believe that potent or sacred stones, if broken, will bleed, as a broken body bleeds. After the blood, the breath is the most universal symbol of vital reality: "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul" (Gn 2nd). The belief in a 'breath-body' or 'wind' life is nearly universal, attested, of course, by the outstanding fact that so many words for soul—*nephesh*, *psyche*, *pneuma*, *spiritus*, *anima*—rest their meaning on this metaphor. After blood and breath, the body's heat and its shadow—*flamma*, *umbra*, *simulacrum*—are the commonest images of its separable life.

Psychology is begun with this distinction of the active from the passive in man's being, of soul from body. The fact of death is certainly potent

in enforcing the distinction; and the antiquity of burial attests the depth of this impression. But deeper even than death is that consciousness of the active and impulsive power which man feels in himself and hence imagines in the raging winds and rushing waters of an unquiet world of nature.

With this first distinction made, others become easy. It is no uncommon thing, therefore, to find among primitives theories of man's constitution rivaling the Egyptian in complexity; mummy, genius, bird-soul, heart, form, shadow, soul, strength, and name represent an Egyptian dissection of the personality of the deceased, but the American prophet Keokuk taught his followers to pray for the heart, heart and flesh, life, name, and family souls; the Haida have two names for the embodied and one for the incarnate soul, while mind and ghost are still other entities; and the Iroquois distinguish mind, soul, ghost, life, brain, and strength—a classification which surely constitutes respectable psychology. The further discrimination, not of parts but of faculties, is well begun when bodily organs, especially the heart and the liver, are made seats or symbols of passion and appetite, memory and thought—a symbolism which the speech of civilization still retains (see artt. LIFE AND DEATH, SOUL, SPIRITISM).

3. Theory of the world.—Even Xenophon still speaks contemptuously of 'the thing the Sophists call "the world"' (*Memorabilia*, I. i. 11), and it is hardly to be wondered at that few primitive men attain Sophistic familiarity with the concept. The idea of a cosmos or a universe is a late achievement of reflexion; nevertheless, a conception of what might properly be called a 'world-house,' or perhaps the 'stage of life,' comes into definition far anterior to sophistication. Cosmology and cosmogony are both very primitive in origin; and in truth it may be fairly affirmed that the most advanced philosophies are as subordinate to cosmology as is the most primitive mythology; cosmology is the parent of ontology, and it is altogether probable that the 'scientific' cosmologies of to-day will appear to some future age as visionary as do the mythic world-views of the past to us.

Cosmology is essentially an effort to define the world of space. Its natural and nearly universal first form is of a world-tent or domed house, a circular plane surmounted by a hemispherical roof. But, since the imagination does not stop with the visible, a heaven above the firmament and a hollow beneath the earth are conceived, and may be multiplied into a series of heavens and hells, thus framing a storeyed universe. The plane dimension of the middle earth is itself divided. Man is a four-square animal; and, corresponding with his structure, the place of the rising sun becomes 'the before,' the south is 'the right,' the north 'the left,' the west 'the behind'; and so the four cardinals are established.

'The earliest orientation in space among Indo-Germanic peoples arose from the fact that man turned his face to the rising sun and thereupon designated the East as "the before," the West as "the behind," the South as "the right," the North as "the left"' (O. Schrader, *Indogermanische Altertumskunde*, Strassburg, 1901, p. 371). Evidence from Semitic tongues indicates the early prevalence of a like system, while in America there is an almost universal cult of the quarters implying the same conception; with the Zuñi, who have this cult highly developed, the east is always 'the before' (M. O. Stevenson, 'The Zuñi Indians,' *23 REEW* [1904], p. 63). Determination of the four quarters necessarily involves the fixation of a middle place, or *point*; hence the number of sacred cities which form 'the navel of the world'—Delphi, Delhi, Peking, Cuzco, Zuñi, and doubtless many others.

But the conceptual completion of the frame of the world is only a step to its endowment with moral values. The sky, as the source of light and warmth, becomes the giver of life, strength, goodness, and righteousness; personified, it is the Heavenly Father of all things. The earth, as the

bringer forth of life and nourishment, becomes the Great Mother, spouse of the lord of heaven; while within her dark body are concealed the pre-natal and post-mortem powers of the unborn and the buried—the beginnings and the ends of fate. The dark under world, too, is the source of all that is noxious and deadly, and hence the permanent abode of things evil. This is the primitive symbolism, but it still colours our thought and forms the very substance of our expression in the whole realm of moral philosophy.

Two types of human experience stand as the foundations of cosmogony. One is the sexual procreation of life. When the heaven is conceived as a father and the earth as a mother, the procreation of life from this primordial pair is the most natural of myths, its philosophic residuum being represented by the theory of cosmic evolution, and indeed by every vitalistic interpretation of nature. Again—the second type—the origins of the world are sought on the analogy of manufacture. A primal being is conceived who finds or gives off a substance from which creation is modelled or constructed. This—the rarer form in primitive speculation—is the prototype of mechanistic philosophies of nature; it represents, too, the type of theistic and transcendentalist philosophies, just as the image of the procreative pair stands for the philosophic doctrines of pantheism and immanence. Wide-spread, too, is the occurrence of a bi-sexed creator, signifying, perhaps, the earliest compromise between the eternally conflicting conceptions of the one of being and the many of becoming.

Of the first type of cosmogony Hesiod's *Theogony* is the outstanding example; and it is not unfair to assume that the prevalence of this conception accounts in no small measure for the characteristic evolutionism of Greek philosophy. The Hebrew Genesis illustrates the second form; and the third is perhaps best known in the Chinese doctrine of heaven and earth as proceeding from the T'ien, the father-mother of the world. An American example, analogous to the Chinese, is presented by the Zuñi: 'Awonawilona [He-She] conceived within himself and thought outward in space, whereby mists of increase, steams potent of growth, were evolved and uplifted. Thus, by means of his innate knowledge, the All-container made himself in person and form of the Sun whom we hold to be our father and who thus came to exist and appear' (F. H. Cushing, 'Outlines of Zuñi Creation Myths,' *IS RBEW* [1896], p. 379). A second version (M. C. Stevenson, 'The Zuñi Indians,' *23 RBEW*, p. 23) reads: 'With the breath from his heart Awonawilona created clouds and the great waters of the world.' A Pima myth shows extraordinary powers of conceptualization for a primitive people: 'In the beginning there was nothing where now are earth, sun, moon, stars, and all that we see. Ages long the darkness was gathering, until it formed a great mass in which developed the spirit of Earth Doctor, who, like the fluffy wisp of cotton that floats upon the wind, drifted to and fro without support or place to fix himself. Conscious of his power, he determined to try to build an abiding place, so he took from his breast a little dust and flattened it into a cake. Then he thought within himself, "Come forth, some kind of plant," and there appeared the creosote bush' (Frank Russell, 'The Pima Indians,' *26 RBEW* [1908], p. 206). The story goes on with an account of the creation of the heavenly bodies and earth's inhabitants, and contains the interesting suggestion of antipodes in the account of the departure of a part of earth's inhabitants, through a hole in its centre, to dwell on its nether side. Here we are almost in the realm of Milesian cosmology.

Cosmogony gives us the drama of creation; there is but one further step to complete the conception of the world in time. When to theogonic sons legendary and historic periods are annexed, the conception of ages of the world is attained; and, as most men find their present case sorry and dark, a future and golden regeneration is anticipated. Thus the acts of the cosmic drama are complete, though its measures remain to be set. They become set through the science of the stars. The stars are men's first vision of order, cosmos; and with the discovery of their orderly movements and periodical synchronizations they become, and the whole heaven becomes, the great wheel of destiny which measures out the slow repetitions of the world's recurrent drama. Nearly every people with any astronomy reaches this conception of a self-

repeating universe, passing through cyclic creations and destructions, whose terms are star-measured. That fate is interbound with this cosmic movement is but the inevitable inference of a being such as man, who cannot (and perhaps ought not to) see the world that contains him except as reflecting his moral nature. But, with such a conception reached, we are far on the way to the nebular hypothesis or the not less histrionic cycles of the Hegelian absolute idea (see artt. AGES OF THE WORLD, COSMOGONY AND COSMOLOGY).

4. Theory of conduct.—Our ideas of conduct are inferred from our conception both of man's nature and of the world's nature. The more primitive folk are, the more instinctive and habitual is their action; but there are probably no men who are utterly without some sense of the wherefore of action, and hence unacquainted with speculative morality. Religion might almost be said to represent man's sense of a world-sanction for his own ideals of conduct; certainly this is in some degree the explanation of the intimate union of religion and ethics, and again of the religions and ethical cast which every philosophy assumes. Customary morality explains the great mass of action in every grade of culture; but moral speculation—which to some extent is found everywhere—is the true source of our interest in morals.

Moral philosophy, as has been indicated, is outwardly imaged in cosmology and cosmogony; the light of heaven represents knowledge, justice, and goodness; the changeless stars represent remorseless destiny. But this outward image, just because it is beyond the control of man, becomes an object of reverence, a system of religious sanctions, rather than a problem for the will. That problem is set primarily by men's needs, especially by the great need of conforming human desire to its possible satisfactions. The recognition of this, far more than the blindness of custom and tradition, is the real source of that conservatism for which primitive people are noted; their conservative clinging to the ways of the fathers is a product, not of habit, but of intention, whose warrant is the justification which nature gives in giving life itself.

'We observe our old customs,' said an aged Greenlandic to Knud Rasmussen (*The People of the Polar North*, London, 1903, p. 124), 'in order to hold the world up, for the powers must not be offended. We observe our customs, in order to hold each other up; we are afraid of the great Evil. . . . Men are so helpless in face of illness. The people here do penance, because the dead are strong in their vital sap, and boundless in their might.'

The same sentiment was expressed by a Hopi priest to J. W. Fawkes:

'We cling to the rites of our ancestors because they have been pronounced good by those who know. We erect our altars, sing our traditional songs, and celebrate our sacred dances for rain that our corn may germinate and yield abundant harvest' (*Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution*, 1895, p. 698f.).

Garcilasso says of his fellow Peruvians:

'It was an inviolable law among them never to alter the mode or custom of their province, no matter what example should come from elsewhere. . . . Hence the Indians, rigid in the following of their ancient customs, were astonished to see the Spaniards change almost every year their manner of living, and they attributed this inconstancy to an excess of pride and presumption' (*Hist. des Incas*, Paris, 1830, v. ix.).

Here surely we are already in sight of Heraclitus and the beginnings of Greek ethics:

'Those who speak with understanding hold fast to what is common to all, as a city holds to its law—aye, and more strongly, for all human laws are fed by one law divine, which prevails where it will, and suffices for all, and surpasses all' (frag. 114, in H. Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, I, 2, Berlin, 1906, p. 78).

See artt. ETHICS AND MORALITY.

LITERATURE.—See the literature under artt. referred to throughout the article. H. B. ALEXANDER.

PHILOSOPHY (Buddhist).—I. Introduction: position of philosophy in Buddhism.—Philosophical inquiry was not a purely scientific matter in India. The knowledge of the nature of things was aimed

at, not for its own sake, but for a practical purpose. It was regarded as a factor in the great work of deliverance from transmigration. In Vedantism it is the factor of deliverance, for the very fact of knowing the true nature of the individual self—identical with the universal self—is deliverance. The position of philosophy in Buddhism is different.

At the beginning, at least, metaphysical knowledge was not an essential part of the Buddhist discipline. The True Law was a practical training and nothing more. In short, deliverance from suffering belongs to the saints; sanctity is deliverance from desire; deliverance from desire is to be reached by the life of a monk (*brahmacharya*), by a moderate asceticism coupled with meditations that foster distaste for pleasure; these meditations—on universal impermanence and decay, on death, on loathsomeness (*aśubha*)—are only the realization of the *vanitas vanitatum* of Solomon, a pessimistic view of life and of the world, but not a philosophical system. Sometimes, when questioned on the doctrine of *karma*, Śākyamuni answers: 'My doctrine is: "Do good actions, avoid evil ones"'—an uncompromisingly ethical standpoint, or, so to speak, a 'pure moralism.' Śākyamuni is not agnostic. The so-called 'agnostic texts' (see artt. AGNOSTICISM and NIRVĀṆA) emphasize this characteristic of Buddhism, or rather—as there are many Buddhisms—reveal a Buddhism which is freed from any metaphysical surmise, which even strongly forbids any curiosity concerning the nature of soul and the state of a saint after death. According to these texts, such metaphysical questions, important as they seem to us and undoubtedly seemed to many Buddhists—to the compilers of the Scripture themselves—have no more to do with sanctity than purely cosmological problems and mundane science (*lokāyata*) in general.

A slightly different attitude is illustrated by some texts which we might style 'pragmatist,' texts according to which Śākyamuni purposely answered the philosophical questions in conflicting terms: he spoke sometimes as a believer in permanence (*śāśvata*), sometimes in favour of annihilation (*uchchheda*). The standpoint of the Master is that the training that leads to sanctity does not require truth, but useful statements, statements suited to the various dispositions of the hearers and to the general and conflicting instincts of humanity. In order to crush desire, a man must believe in succession that there is a soul and that there is no soul.

Evidence is not lacking that the teaching of Śākyamuni himself was agnosticism coupled with pragmatism; but it would be rash to make any assertion on this point. So far scholars are concerned, not with Śākyamuni's own teaching, but with the leading ideas embodied in the Scriptures.

And it is fairly evident that, from the earliest time, most probably from the beginning, Buddhism adopted¹ or worked out a philosophy which may be summarized as negation of the existence of a soul (technically, in Sanskrit Buddhism, *pudgalanairātmya*) together with the hypothesis of a composite self (*skandhavadā*). This philosophy is a translation, in terms of metaphysics, of the ideas of impermanence and insubstantiality which, from the point of view of agnosticism, were to remain the topics of moral and emotional meditation. We may state here again that the *māna* to which many *suttas* object is self-love, estimation of the self as good, better, best, bad, worse, worst, not the actual notion of self; that the notions of impermanence and insubstantiality which are essential to the religious training are the conviction of the evanescence of beauty, strength, and life, not the

theory of the composite and momentary character of things. But, notwithstanding the 'moralism' of certain monks and possibly of the Master, the historical circumstances being given, metaphysics could not be avoided. Some metaphysics is an essential feature of Buddhism; for it is admitted by all Buddhists that desire cannot be crushed, that desirable things cannot lose their attractiveness, so long as we admit that there is an 'ego' and a 'mine.'

Buddhists denied the Ego and, in consequence, had to exercise themselves to give an explanation of life and transmigration in terms of impermanence and selflessness. Buddhist philosophy was born, and developed a coherent system of 'phenomenalism' (the doctrine of the *Abhidharmas*). Phenomenalism, by a natural evolution, gave rise to various forms of nihilism or voidness (*śūnyatā*, so-called nihilism, or Madhyamaka; idealism, or Vijnānavāda).

These new doctrines are logically constructed and claim to be justified from the scientific point of view; but their maintainers believe that they are no less useful than true. Their usefulness is perhaps the best proof of their truth. The best reason that a Buddhist has for professing nihilism is that there cannot be real religious life (*bhikṣutā*), sanctity, or deliverance from desire as long as one admits the reality of phenomena (*Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ix. 40). The schools had not forgotten the Master's lesson of pragmatism.

2. *Hīnayāna* or *Abhidharma* philosophy (*pudgalanairātmya* or *phenomenalism*).—The first philosophy of Buddhism, the philosophy of the *Hīnayāna* ('Little Vehicle'), may be shortly described as *phenomenalism*: non-existence of a substance or an individual (*pudgalanairātmya*), absolute existence of the *dharma*s—small and brief realities which, grouped as causes and effects, create the pseudo-individuals.

This philosophy was at first far from perfect. It is the result of a long inquiry.

From the doctrinal point of view, it would perhaps be convenient to contrast (1) the unsystematic views that are expressed in the *sūtras* (*Suttantas*) and which may be described as 'a theory of the *skandhas*' (*skandhavadā*, a fictitious name), with (2) the developed system which is embodied in the *Abhidharmas* of the Sarvāstivādins (Sanskrit books, school of the Vaibhāṅikas, *Abhidharmakośa*) and which is discernible in extra-canonical Pāli works (*Mūlinda*, *Buddhaghosa*, *Abhidhammasaṃgaha*); this system is properly called *Abhidharma*.

From the historical point of view, there are strong objections to such a division. The fully grown phenomenalism is the legitimate offspring of the principles forcibly expressed in the oldest canonical books. No new idea has been discovered, but philosophers see more clearly what they mean; that is nearly all. Here we shall merely call attention to the chief topics of interest.

(a) At first no effort was made to work out a comprehensive and systematic exposition of the ontological or psychological principles; these principles were mere surmises and postulates rather than doctrines; they had not been studied enough to be fully understood; they lacked precision and remained, therefore, to some extent contradictory.

There is no self (*ātman*), person (*pudgala*), living being (*sattva*), or principle of life (*jīva*)—a flat negative not only of an unchangeable self as recognized by the Brāhmanic philosophies, but also of the substantial principle that the popular philosophy considers as a transmigrating entity, a soul different from the body. Man is a complex, composed of five *skandhas*—the material element, *rūpa*, or body, and four intellectual elements, *saṃjñā*, *vedanā*, *samskāras*, *viññāna*. The ego, or 'man,' is described in terms of its constitutive elements, and is compared to a chariot which lacks personality because it is composed. That is a 'static' point of view. In this compound the position of the intellectual elements is a subordinate one; they are given as a resultant of the material

¹ We cannot deal here with the indebtedness of Buddhism to Sāṅkhya and Yoga philosophies. See SĀṆKHYA, YOGA.

elements, viz. the organs: 'The colour blue being given and the organ of the eye being also given, there arises a visual cognition (a blue image). That is 'sensationalism.' The intellectual cognitions (abstract ideas, judgments) are worked out by mind, which is a material organ too.

(b) The obvious and necessary conclusion of this psychology would be the negation of survival. But, as a matter of fact, Buddhists flatly deny the heretical theory of annihilation, destruction at death (*ucchheda*). Individual or personal permanence and responsibility through successive existences in the long journey of transmigration are strongly insisted on (see art. DEATH [Buddhist], KARMA).

(c) A conciliation between the negation of a soul or self, capable of survival, and the negation of annihilation is to be found in a 'dynamic' conception of self. Such a conception was brought about by the study of impermanence (*anityatva*) and causality (*pratityasamutpāda*).

(1) 'Impermanence' is, in some texts, almost a synonym of 'suffering' and 'selflessness.' Existence is suffering because joy does not last; body and mind are impermanent, and therefore are not a self, do not depend upon a self. But from the idea of impermanence issues the idea of momentariness, which leads to far-reaching conclusions. Impermanence, when predicated of things in general, does not mean momentariness. There is origination (*utpāda*), duration (*sthiti*), change or old age (*anyathābhāva*, *jarā*), and destruction (*nirodha*) of impermanent things in general. But the momentary character of a flame—the flame of a lamp is only a succession of flames, each of which lasts only an instant—and of thought (*chitta*) was recognized very soon:

'That, O monks, which is called mind, thought, cognition, keeps up an incessant round by day and by night, of perishing as one thing and springing up as another' (*Majjhima*, i. 256); whereas the body may last for a hundred years and more.¹ When once the notion of momentariness was reached, it inevitably made its way and took the place of the notion of impermanence. Now momentariness is quite naturally associated with causality. Momentariness and causality converge in continuity.

(2) *Causality*.—Buddhists first examined the cause of suffering (rebirth and death again) and expressed their views in the second truth: 'Suffering originates from desire.' They later expressed the principle of causality in the formula known as *pratityasamutpāda*, 'dependent origination,' a formula which seems to have been originally only a commentary on the second Truth (cf. *Sutta-nipāta*), and which, according to the scholastic interpretation, presents a summary of three successive existences of a man (cf. art. PATICCA-SAMUPPĀDA). It is given in the Scripture as an ontological and psychological theory. It is said to open a middle way between the two wrong ideas (or heresies) of permanence of the living being through consecutive existences and annihilation at death: the man who is reborn is not the dead man, but he is not different from this man; because he originates from this man. Coupled with the dogma of momentariness, the dogma of causality leads to the conclusion that the ego is not a static compound like a chariot, but a series (*samtāna*)—a living series of causes and effects. Everything, even material lifeless objects, will be understood as the series of its successive moments of existence. The series does not exist in itself; it is made up of small momentary entities, called *dhammas*. There is no thinker, but only thoughts; no feeler, but only feelings; *dhyāna* partly consists in dis-

cerning the successive ideas that present themselves without any reference to the ego as thinking.¹

'That only exists which is momentary' (*yat sat tat kṣaṇikam*). What is permanent—e.g., space, *nirvāṇa*—does not exist, is a mere name, a mere negation (*abhāva*).

(d) An obvious conclusion to be drawn, and one which was early drawn, from the theory of dependent origination is that the origination of cognition has not been scientifically explained in the *sūtras* (see above, p. 848*). A distinction is to be made between the cause (*hetu*) and the conditions (*pratyaya*). The flame of a lamp is apparently burning during three watches; but it is only a succession of flames. Each of these momentary flames (to put it otherwise, each moment in the existence of this flame that is burning during three watches) has for conditions the oil, the wick, and so on; but its cause is the preceding flame (or the preceding moment in the existence of the flame). To apply this theory to the causation of a cognition, a visual cognition is conditioned by the eye and the exterior object (the colour blue); but it is caused by the preceding cognition. The series of thoughts (*chittasamtāna*) goes on uninterruptedly through the successive existences; the death-consciousness is continued in a conception-consciousness (see art. DEATH [Buddhist]).

Pudgala-vāda.—A small place must be given to the 'heretical' theory of a self—a theory which is much abused in the *sūtras* as well as in the treatises, both Sanskrit and Pāli, but which, nevertheless, was supported by the powerful sects of the *Sammitiyas*. There is a *sūtra*, the '*sūtra* of the bearer of the burden,' which states that the *pudgala* exists independently of the *skandhas*; that it 'shoulders' the *skandhas*, new *skandhas* at every birth, till it lays down the *skandhas*, i.e. obtains liberation. The explanation of the *Sammitiya* school is that the *pudgala* is neither identical with nor different from the *skandhas*; that it is 'not to be expressed' (*anabhilāpya*), that nevertheless it exists and transmigrates. There are in the Scriptures passages where the relations of the feeling with the feeler, and so on, are expressed in the same terms; and the position of the *Sammitiyas* is not an impossible one. But in the light of other passages which state that there is no feeler, no eater, but only feelings, foods, we must admit that this Scripture, on the whole, favours the opinion of the schools who deny altogether the existence of a *pudgala*. We know the partisans of the *pudgala* only from the criticism of the 'orthodox' scholars, both Sanskrit and Pāli.

3. *Mahāyāna* philosophy. — (a) *Sūnyatāvāda* (*Mādhyamaka* system). — (1) The real nature of things (*dharmatā*, *bhūtataṭhatā*, or, shortly, *tathatā*) is their being produced by causes and their being productive of effects (*pratityasamutpannatā*). The *Abhidharmikas* have stated this fact well. But they fail to see that what is produced by causes does not exist in itself, is without 'own nature' (*niḥsvabhāvatā*), is insubstantial or void (*sūnya*). Voidness (*sūnyatā*) is neither a principle immanent in things nor is it nothingness. On the contrary, it is the character of what exists, of the *dhammas*. Things are void because they are originated; voidness = origination, void = originated. Existence (*saṃsāra*) is an intricate succession of momentary things, or *dhammas*, which have not in themselves any *raison d'être*, and which cannot exist substantially by the power of their causes; for these causes are *dhammas* of the same nature, which do not exist in themselves. As it is said, 'From *dhammas* like a magical show (*māyopama*) arise *dhammas* like a magical show.' We should say, 'From contingent phenomena arise contingent phenomena.'

(2) Such is the common view of the *Mādhyamikas*. But there are many texts which would lead us much further: (a) the simile of the monk suffering from ophthalmia, who sees in his almsbowl hairs which do not exist, while a healthy monk sees these hairs as they are, i.e. does not see them; in the same way a saint who is free from illusion ornescience (*avidyā*) does not see the *dhammas*:
1 C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, London, 1914, p. 93.

¹ Cf. *Vibuddhimagga*, viii., ap. H. O. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, Cambridge, Mass., 1900, p. 252, and *Mahāniddesa*, p. 117. See art. IDENTITY (Buddhist)

the correct knowledge—the knowledge of a Buddha—is a non-knowledge; (β) the criticism to which the notions of cause, of knowledge, of motion, etc., are submitted; by the four-branched syllogism it is shown clearly that a thing is not born either from itself or from another, or from both, or without cause. The consequence is that production is logically impossible; production does not support inquiry (*vichārāsaha*); therefore there is no production. Again, thought cannot know itself and cannot know another; and so on. Truth is silence.

(3) *The two truths*.—Phenomenalism is a psychological interpretation of life and consciousness in terms of 'negation of the individual' (*pudgalanairātmya*): life is a series of momentary phenomena originating in dependence one upon another. The Mādhyamika does not reject this doctrine, but claims to explain what phenomenalism really means—to point out its metaphysical aspect. He says that phenomena are only appearances, or, from the subjective point of view, experiences. Phenomenalism is the 'experimental' or 'erroneous' truth (*vyavahāra, samvṛtisatya*); nihilism or voidness, negation of the reality of the *dharma*s (*dharma-nairātmya*), is the metaphysical or absolute truth (*paramārtha*).

But everything happens as if things were composed of real and substantial *dharma*s; the illusion that we have of the happening of the phenomena is due to the very causes that, according to the phenomenalist, give birth to the phenomena. The Path of old remains safe (see art. NIHILISM [Buddhist] and below).

(b) *Vijñānavāda*.—It is difficult to give an account of the system of the idealists, Vijñānavāda, more exactly Vijñānamātravāda, Vijñaptimātravāda, Chittamātravāda, 'theory that there is nothing except cognition or thought,' also Svasaṃvedanavāda or Svasaṃvittivāda, 'theory of self-consciousness.' The philosophers of this system have worked out quite subtle notions, and, moreover, we know from Tibetan authorities that they were divided into many branches and disagreed on important points. These Tibetan authorities are far from clear, while the original treatises, the larger number of which exist only in Tibetan and Chinese translations, have not yet been studied. Sanskrit, Brāhman, and Jain summaries do not touch the points in question. Therefore we must be satisfied with a general outline of the system—an outline which cannot be taken as definite.¹

¹ Sources: i. *Vijñānavāda sūtras* and treatises.—(1) *Laṅkā-tāra*, partly ed. in Buddhist Text Society of India, Calcutta, 1902; (2) *Abhisamayālaṅkāra*, Cambridge, Add., 1629, frag. in *J. A. I.* [1913] 698; (3) *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Camb. Add., 1702; summary in *Museon*, vi. [1905] 33, vii. [1906] 213, xii. [1911] 165; (4) *Sūtrālaṅkāra*, ed. S. Lévi, Paris, 1911; (5-7) Vasubandhu's *Viṃśakakārikā*, ed. and tr. *Museon*, xiii. [1912], 53; (8) *Tr. from Chinese by Mahāyāna, Chicago, Dharmottara's comm.* 190; and an anonymous *tippani*, ed. T. Scherbatskoi, *Bibl. Budd.* viii. and xi., Petrograd, 1904 and 1909; with Vintadeva's comm., *Bibl. Indica*, Calcutta, 1908; (10) *Subhāṣitasamgraha*, ed. G. Bendall, *Museon*, iv. [1903] 375.

ii. Mādhyamika treatises.—(1) *Mādhyamakāvatāra*, ed. *Bibl. Budd.* ix., Petrograd, 1912, Fr. tr. *Museon*, viii. ff. [1907 ff.];

iv. Non-Buddhist treatises.—(1) *The Sarva Dāśana Samgraha*, tr. E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough, London, 1852, ch. ii., *Museon*, ii. [1901] 177; (2) *Saddāśanasamgraha*, ed. L. Suali, *Bibl. Indica*, Calcutta, 1905 ff.; (3) *Vedānta sūtras*, ii. 2, 23 (G. Thibaut, *SBE* xxxiv. [1890]); (4) *Nyāyasūtras*, iv. 2; (5) *Prāśastapāda*, Benares, 1895, p. 114.

v. European sources.—T. Scherbatskoi, *Topica novae in Indiu*, Petrograd, 1902, *Temia novam in Indiu*, do. 1903; L. de la Vallée Poussin, 'Note sur les trois corps,' *Museon*, xiv. [1913] 257, 'Note sur les cent Dharma,' *ib.* vi. [1905] 191; D. T. Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, London, 1907 (useful information, but questionable views).

(1) Some hypotheses may be offered on the origin of the idealist system.

(a) The phrase *manomaya* in the first stanza of the *Dhammapada*, 'All that happens (*dharma*) is the result of thought (*manas*), is made up of thought (*manomaya*),' does not mean 'consisting of thought,' but 'caused by thought, by mental action' (just as the *manomaya* body of the *bodhi-sattva* is not a spiritual body, but a body created by thought [see art. *BODHISATVA*]). That is not technically idealism, but leads to idealism. It was admitted that the new physico-psychical organism which continues after the death of a man is 'created' in the matrix by the 'rebirth consciousness,' itself a product or a sub-product of a mental action; moreover, pleasant and unpleasant sensations during life are chiefly the reward of action (*vipākaphala*, 'fruit of ripening of action'), while the exterior causes of these sensations depend on action as 'fruit of mastery' (*adhipatiphala*); we should style them 'the delegates of the power of action,' just like the tormentors and the trees with swords for leaves in hell. It follows that the existence of exterior objects may be looked upon as a eumbrous hypothesis (see Vasubandhu's *Viṃśakakārikā*).

(β) On the other hand, the Sautrāntikas (a branch of the later Hīnayāna) had studied the character and origin of knowledge. In opposition to the Vaibhāṣikas (= Abhidharmikas) and to the Mādhyamikas, they maintained that a thought can think itself, that thought has self-consciousness (*svasaṃvitti*), for, though the end of a finger cannot touch itself, a lamp illuminates itself and another (*Bodhicharyāvatāra*, ix. 15); further, that the form of representations is given by the mind. This idealist theory of knowledge is compatible with realism; the Vijñānavādins, heirs of the Sautrāntikas, built upon it an idealist metaphysical system.

(γ) This system owes much to the Śūnyatāvāda (nihilism); in fact, it is a branch of nihilism; it differs from the numerous systems of idealism recorded in the history of philosophy both Indian and non-Indian. It is not satisfied with the negation of the exterior object; it denies the self, an individual generator of thoughts, as all Buddhists do; it applies a thorough criticism to the individual thoughts themselves. It maintains that the only *dharma*s (= things) are thoughts (idealism), and that these *dharma*s are not substantial (*dharma-nairātmya*); that they are void. The voidness of the idealists differs from the voidness of the Mādhyamikas, the properly so-called nihilists. For the latter, voidness is the characteristic in things of being produced, while, from the critical point of view, no production is possible.

According to the idealists, 'for voidness to be a justifiable position, we must have, first, existence of that which is void, and, second, non-existence of that in virtue of the absence of which it is void,' i.e. existence of a receptacle, non-existence of a content, 'but, if neither exists, how can there be voidness? We wrongly superimpose the notion of a serpent on a rope: the rope exists, the serpent does not exist, the rope is void of serpent. In the same way, such "notes" or characters as form, etc., are commonly attributed to the things: the denotable properties do not exist, but the substrate of the designations exists' (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, fol. 29^b f.).

The 'notes' wrongly attributed to the things are both what is called *jñeya*, 'knowable,' and *jñāna*, 'cognition'; the thing is an 'undenotable something.'

(2) To realize what the idealists understood by 'knowable,' 'cognition,' and 'undenotable something,' we have to study the three natures (below, β) to which the simile of a dream (below, α) is an easy introduction.

(a) The visions of a dream are independent of any thing 'to be seen.' The elephants which a dreaming monk sees entering his cell do not exist,

or, rather, do not exist as elephants. As far as it is a 'thing to be known' (*jñeya*), a 'thing to be grasped' (*grāhya*) or 'to be named' (*abhidheya*), the thing seen during sleep does not exist; it is only a product of the mind, a mental phenomenon wrongly made objective, the very 'form of elephant' (*ākṛti*) taken by a thought under the influence of the 'impression' (*vāsanā*) left by a visual knowledge.

Now what about the idea that the dreamer has of an elephant—the idea which he considers as a visual knowledge (*jñāna*), which 'grasps' (*grāhaka*) an elephant? This knowledge is in fact the same mental phenomenon, the same form of elephant taken by a thought. During sleep the visual knowledge that grasps an elephant, the mental knowledge that ascertains the qualities of this elephant and names it, cannot have more reality than the elephant itself. There is no knowledge (*jñāna*), since there is no knowable (*jñeya*).

The simile of a dream will help us to realize the nature of things. First, there is no matter (*rūpa*); there is nothing outside (*bahis*, *bāhya*) the thought (*chitta*) and the corollaries of thought (*chaitta*, pleasure, etc.); rather, outside thoughts, for there is not a thinking unity but only series (*saṃtati*, *saṃtāna*) of thoughts; so many series of thoughts, so many living beings (*sattva*).

(β) Secondly, every thought, except the thoughts of a Buddha, is to be looked upon from three points of view; technically it possesses a threefold nature or character (*svabhāva*, *lakṣaṇa*)—imagined nature (*parikalpita*), dependent or caused nature (*paratantra*), and absolute or metaphysical nature (*pariniṣpanna*).

i. *Parikalpita*.—A thought—i.e. an 'actual' or 'conscious' (*pravṛtti*) thought (see below)—presents itself as exterior to itself, as does, in a dream, the notion of elephant; it presents itself as an object of cognition, a knowable (*jñeya*). The wrongly objectified objects of cognition are said to be threefold: body and the organs (*dēha*, *āyatana*), the things (*artha*, *viśaya*) to be known by these organs (*rūpāyatana* . . . *manā-āyatana*), and place (*pratiṣṭhā*, *pada*), the material universe (as a whole, *bhājanaloka*).¹ Inversely, thought appears as cognition (*jñāna*): (1) as visual cognition of a blue object; (2) as auditive cognition . . . ; (6) as mental cognition of the qualities of an object (the first *manovijñāna* of the Vijñānavādin list); (7) as an ego which knows (the second *manovijñāna*—*ahamārṣṭi*—*kṛtsam manas*).

In short, thought presents itself to itself as object (*grāhya*) and, at the same time, becomes cognition (*grāhaka*) of this object. The notions of being, non-being, essence, difference, number, etc.—in a word, what the Western philosophers style categories—originate from this opposition or duality (*dvaya*). Now this duality, which is the characteristic of every state of consciousness (*pravṛttivijñāna*), is real; our thoughts are really taking the double aspect of object and subject; this twofold nature of our thoughts is not an imaginary nature. As a matter of fact, we think dually. But this duality results from the fact that we consider as exterior and existing in themselves the so-called objects which are only forms of the thought, in the same way as a dreamer believes in the reality of the dream-elephants and thinks that he has a visual knowledge of elephants. This duality has no metaphysical *raison d'être*; it is worked out or elaborated by imagination (*parikalpa*, *vikalpa*), which imposes on thought the categories of object and subject, together with the categories of being, essence, etc.

Therefore thoughts (*chitta*), i.e. things, in so far as they are in opposition as object and subject, are said to be imagined (*parikalpita*).

ii. *Paratantrasvabhāva*.—We are now concerned with the question whence thoughts derive their origin, according to what law they appear in succession and in duality. Thoughts are not produced by exterior objects, as the old realist school believed: 'The colour blue being given and the organ of eye being also given . . . there arises an image of blue.' Nor are they produced by a self, as the idealist Vedānta would suggest. Nor are they autonomous (*svatantra*). They are dependent one upon another (*paratantra*); they are produced one from another.

Paratantra is almost synonymous with *pratiṣyusamutpanna*, 'originated in dependence'; but there are conspicuous differences between the classical *pratiṣyusamutpāda*, 'dependent origination,' and the causation which we are studying (sometimes styled 'subtle origination'), and these differences justify the use of a new phrase. The problem is somewhat obscure; but the present writer hopes that the following is a fair solution.

All the Buddhist philosophers—maintainers of the doctrine of *karman*—had to admit that thoughts, although momentary, do not perish altogether, but originate new thoughts, sometimes after a long interval of time (see art. KARMA, *niṣyandaphala* and *avijñapti*). As long as they believed in the existence of matter (*rūpa*) and considered man as a physico-psychical complex, it was not difficult for them to explain the interdependence of thoughts. The six classes of cognitions (sense cognitions, eye, etc., and mental cognitions) had a material support and exterior excitants, and it was possible to explain all the psychological facts, including memory, with these six cognitions. But the idealists had to work out a system of psychology without the hypothesis of any material element. They say that the cognitions acknowledged by the realist schools, visual . . . mental cognitions, create 'seeds' (*bīja*) which will ripen in due time, without any interference except for the power of the *bodhisattvas*, into new visual . . . mental cognitions. Now these seeds are not a part of the visual . . . mental cognitions which arise in succession between the sowing and the ripening of the seeds; e.g., the cognition of blue which will emerge to-morrow in a certain 'series of cognitions' named 'I' depends on yesterday's cognition of blue, but its seed is not to be found in any of the cognitions of which I am conscious to-day. Therefore we must add to the sixfold cognition of the primitive psychology—to the sixfold cognition to be named 'actual cognition,' 'active cognition,' or 'state of consciousness' (*pravṛttivijñāna*)—another group of cognitions which the modern philosopher would style 'unconscious' or 'subliminal images'; these are the seed of actual cognitions; they are created by actual cognitions; beside and below the actual cognitions, they flow as a series of momentary subliminal images which proceed owing to an uninterrupted self-reproduction; this series bears the old supply of seeds, is enlarged by the sowing of new seeds, and will stop when the seeds have borne their fruit and no new seed is sown. It is known as *ālayavijñāna* or *ādānavijñāna*, 'store cognition,' 'receptacle cognition.'

iii. *Pariniṣpannasvabhāva*.—Thoughts are to be considered from a third point of view. The knowable (*jñeya*) does not exist as such, since it is only a subjective idea, an image, a thought that constitutes itself as an object. On the other hand, the fact that thought cognizes, i.e. recognizes itself as visual cognition, as mental cognition, as subject

¹ *Laṅkāvatāra*, p. 78; *Mādhyamakāvatāra*, vi. 93; *Sūtrālamkāra*, xi. 40.

¹ See the writer's 'Note sur les cent Dharmas,' *Muston*, vi. 101.

of cognition, depends on the fact that it constitutes itself as an object. There is cognition because there is a knowable; there is designation because there is an image, i.e. an objectified designation. The two groups of terms, *jñeya-grāhya-abhidheya* and *jñāna-grāhaka-abhidhāna*, stand together, and, as the first is mistaken, the second too is mistaken. The duality object-subject is accidental to the thought, for it is produced by misconception or imagination (*parikalpa* or *vikalpa*).

In order to know what thought is metaphysically—what thought is in itself—we have to ignore, to put aside, duality. Freed from duality, thought is beyond the range of words; it eludes denotation, it is undeniable (*anabhilāpya*); no character (*viśeṣa*) can be predicated of it; it can only be said to exist (*bhavadaty eva*). It is therefore defined as *vastumātra*, 'simply thing,' 'pure thing,' or a 'something' ('chose sans plus,' 'chose tout court'), or as *chittamātra*, 'simply thought,' 'pure thought,' since 'thing' and 'thought' are interchangeable notions.

In a Buddha imagination has come to an end. The thought of a Buddha—a non-cognition—is practically what all thoughts are metaphysically. To use a metaphorical phrase, our thoughts are soiled by cognitions which produce passions (*jñeyāvaraṇa*, *klesāvaraṇa*); we have to purify them (*vyavādāna*).¹

To sum up, a thought—e.g. an image of blue—is imagined in so far as it is both the object blue which we believe we see and a cognition of blue. It is dependent because it is produced by a preceding image of blue. It is a *something* of which nothing may be predicated from the metaphysical point of view, a substance which is accidentally, owing to an eternal illusion, constituting itself as object and subject.

4. Later philosophies: theism, pantheism (doctrines of immanence).—The phrase 'Buddhist pantheism,' like the phrase 'Christian atheism,' associates notions that are conflicting. But, if we are to consider Buddhism not as a doctrine but as a historical fact, there must be a place for the non-Buddhist philosophical views that developed in Buddhism—the more so because such views not only are dressed in Buddhist garb, but are to some extent the natural evolution of truly Buddhist theories.

There was in Mahāyāna an essential antinomy between the experimental and the absolute truth.² While the learned schools carried to their ultimate consequences the philosophical principles of the old creed and worked out systems of dialectical or idealist nihilism, a Buddhist religion has grown: Buddhas and *bodhisattvas* were universally looked upon as gods, almost eternal beings, providences. The learned schools admitted the quasi-divinity of the Buddhas, and the necessity of devotion and charity, as constituting the practical or experimental truth (*samvrtisatyā*); but they maintained that the true religious life had to combine the practice of this truth with the meditation of voidness: voidness is the absolute truth (*paramārthasatyā*). There cannot be true religious life (*brahmacharya*, *bhikṣutā*, *bodhicarya*), there cannot be deliverance, as long as the faithful do not know that Buddhas are mere names; the enlightened devotee adores celestial persons whom he knows to be pure phantasms; the enlightened giver pities beings while knowing that they do not exist (*Vajracchedikā*). Such a position can be saved only by sleight of hand, by sophistical and highly conventional contrivances (see art. NIHILISM [Buddhist]). As a matter of fact, a time comes when it is neces-

sary to make a choice between the two truths: to keep the absolute truth, and practise accordingly silence and apathy, or to admit the experimental truth as 'true' and have recourse to an ontology in accordance with it.

The chief factor in the development of theistic and pantheistic ideas in Buddhism has probably been the Brāhman and Hindu milieu, the influence of the learned monism (Vedānta), and the yet more powerful influence of the popular and Tāntric Saivism. While theism (the worship of Amitābha) is very old, it is in the so-called Buddhist Tāntric literature (*mantranaya*, *vajrayāna*) that we find, together with a mass of theurgic practices, unmistakable affirmations of a system of immanence. Buddhist saints and deities, by an insensible progress or owing to a rapid naturalization, had come to be conceived under the familiar shape of the Hindu gods. But we are here concerned with the doctrinal aspects of the historical evolution and adulteration of Buddhism. Our problem is to elucidate by what doctrinal and verbal development the orthodox nihilism and idealism were apt to be reversed and turned into pantheism.

On the whole, we clearly see how Buddhist monism arose. The post-Vedic inquiry for being, permanent being, real being, had a legitimate conclusion in the absolute monism (*advaita*) of Saṅkara. Brahman is, but its true description is *neti neti*, 'it is not so, it is not so.' There is no relation possible between it and limited beings; i.e. no limited being exists. 'Ontologism' in its last phase is nihilism, for the *ens realissimum* is void. Inversely, the Buddhist theory of a becoming without being is apt to be reversed into monism. As regards details many conjectures may be made, some likely to be more or less justified.

(a) *The Mādhyamika tenets*.—From an absolute point of view (*paramārthasatyā*), there is no difference (*nānābhāva*) among things and among the characters of things. Things are void (*śūnya*), like the daughter of a barren woman; characters are void, like the beauty of this unreal daughter. Things are void because there is no real origination of things—if no origination, no destruction, an eternal inexistence. There is no difference between existence (*saṃsāra*) and *nirvāṇa*: 'Not being produced (*anutpanna*), not being destroyed, things are from the beginning quiescent (*ādīśānta*); they are really, naturally (*prakṛtyā*) in *nirvāṇa* (*parinirvṛta*). The Vedāntists (Saṅkara's school) sometimes use the same phrases to explain the nature of particular things; they borrowed these phrases from the Buddhists; possibly they borrowed also the doctrine of the non-existence of particular things; while the Buddhists—some Buddhists—went so far as to recognize in the *bhūta-tathatā* or *tathatā*, 'real nature of things,' or *dharmadhātu* or *bhūtakoti*, so many synonyms of voidness,² a sort of 'void Brahman.'

(b) *Vijñānavāda; ontology*.—Genuine Vijñānavāda (works of Aśvaghoṣa, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu) is truly Buddhist, since it maintains the momentariness (*kṣanikata*) and the dependent origination (*paratantratva*) of every thought. Nevertheless it is dangerously akin to Vedānta; the Tāntrik school has interpreted it as a monism, and many modern scholars do so too.

The *dayavijñāna* is somewhat like a soul, and we know from Tibetan authorities that the maintainers of the Hīnayāna strongly objected to this 'new' *vijñāna*. It is a series of 'subliminal images'—a store of seeds that give birth to actual cognitions (*pravṛtti vijñāna*);³ it may be looked

¹ On the Vijñānavādin theory of purification see L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Théorie des douze causes*, Ghent and London, 1913, p. 65.

² Many of the Buddhist tenets were lacking in consistency. The idea of *nirvāṇa*, e.g., an 'unqualified deliverance,' was apt to be understood as immortal happiness or as annihilation.

¹ See sources in *JRAS*, new ser., xlii, [1910] 317 ff.

² See *Muston*, xli, [1911] 252.

³ Cf. Buddhaghosa's *bhavaṅga* (S. Z. Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Compendium of Philosophy*, London, 1910, p. 265).

upon as a thinking entity which manifests itself in a succession of thoughts.

On the other hand, to say that the true or meta-physical nature of things is thought, an uncharacterized thought 'which only is,' or, in the Vedāntic phrase, 'which is not so, which is not so' (*neti neti*); that this pure thought is defiled by nescience (*avidyā*) and all the passions that follow nescience; that, owing to defilement, it takes the aspects of knowable and knowledge and generates the whole of the particular cognitions; that it is apt to purify itself (*vyavadāna*) by an inverse process¹—that is pure Vedānta of Śaṅkara's school.

Yamunāchārya, in his *Siddhitrāya*, compares the doctrine of Dharmakīrti, the avowed Buddhist (*prakaṣa buddha*): 'Although the pure intelligence is free from differences, it is characterized (or imagined), owing to erroneous views, as multiple: as knowable, knower and knowledge'—with Śaṅkara's view: 'The pure reality is not the cause of the development [of names and forms], because it ceases not to be [what it is, i.e. it remains pure]: therefore it is illusion which is the mother of this distinction, knower and knowable.' Yamunāchārya concludes that Śaṅkara is a Buddhist in disguise. Vijñānabhikṣu holds the same opinion for the same reason.²

The thought of a Tathāgata is undefiled, purified thought; the thought of a *prthagjana*—a man who has not 'seen' the Truths—and of any living being except the Tathāgata is defiled, unpurified thought; but for the defilement, the thought of a *prthagjana* is the thought of a Tathāgata.

This doctrine is embodied in the theory of the embryo of a Tathāgata (*tathāgatagarbha*), which is explained as follows in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*:

'There is an embryo of a Tathāgata, genuinely radiant and pure, endowed with the thirty-two marks, present in every living being, but, like a gem covered by dirt, covered by the corporeal forms, sensation, etc. (*skandha*, *āyatana*, *dhātu*), defiled by the wrong notions produced by lust, hatred and delusion; nevertheless permanent, firm, blessed, everlasting.'³

The compilers of the *Laṅkāvatāra* are careful to state that the dogma of the *tathāgatagarbha* is not to be understood in a heretical sense, that it is not like the theory of a universal and permanent soul (*ātman*), that it has been preached in order to introduce the heretics who believe in a soul into the Buddhist doctrine of soullessness (*nairātmya*); that the *tathāgatagarbha* really means voidness, *bhūtakoti*, *nirvāṇa*. But is it not a strange method of converting the Vedāntists, to teach them Vedāntism in Buddhist garb? Granted that the true meaning of the *tathāgatagarbha* is that every creature is an embryo of Tathāgata, i.e. a future Buddha, there may be doubt as to its obvious meaning.

(c) *The three bodies of a Tathāgata*.—Like Vijñānavādin ontology (the three natures and the 'pure thought'), with which it has strong analogies, the Vijñānavādin Buddhology has also been understood in a pantheist sense. This Buddhology, the origins of which can be traced in the Hinayāna *Abhidharma* and mythology, is explained in the dogma of the three bodies of a Tathāgata (*trikāya*). We shall deal (1) with the orthodox, or Vijñānavādin, conception of the bodies, and (2) with the pantheist, or Tāntric, evolution of this conception.

(1) Notwithstanding its mythological and de-
volutional features, the Mahāyānist Buddhology is

¹ We know from Tibetan authorities that the Vijñānavādins disagreed as to the defilement: some held it to be real; some taught that it is illusory (cf. *advaita* and *viśiṣṭādvaita*, *māyā* and *avartavāda*).

² See L. de la Vallée Poussin, 'Vedānta and Buddhism,' *JRAS*, new ser., xlii. 129-140; *Siddhitrāya*, Chowkhanba Sanskrit series, no. 36, p. 10; Vijñānabhikṣu's *Śāṅkhyapratyakhyaṇa-bhāṣya* (i. 22), ed. and tr. R. Garbe, Cambridge, Mass., 1895, index, s.v. 'Vijñānavāda,' 'Prachannabuddha'; T. Aufrecht, *Cat. Oxoniensis*, Oxford, 1859, p. 14; Vasudev Anant Suklitanter, *The Teaching of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja*, Vienna, 1908.

³ *Laṅkāvatāra*, ed. Buddhist Text Soc. of India, Calcutta, 1902, p. 80; a correct quotation of the passage in *Museon*, xii. 251; see *JRAS*, new ser., xxxviii. [1906] 954.

not in conflict with the phenomenalist and nihilist principles of Buddhism. Like the *Abhidharma* Buddhology, it is not a theism, but only a hagiology, and a phenomenalist or nihilistic hagiology.

A Tathāgata, like any other living being, is an insubstantial compound and series of *dharma*s. (α) Among these *dharma*s there is a large number of thoughts or intellectual *dharma*s which are only to be found in Tathāgatas: supramundane (*lokottara*) knowledges, i.e. knowledges that are turned towards *nirvāṇa* (*kṣayajñāna*, *anutpāda-jñāna*, *asaikṣi samyagdr̥ṣṭi*); the Tathāgata would disappear into *nirvāṇa*, but he chooses to keep his mundane *dharma*s—omniscience of every mundane thing, all-embracing and all-powerful compassion. (β) Moreover, a Tathāgata has a 'body'; i.e. some material (*rūpin*) *dharma*s are a constituent part of the compound which we call a Tathāgata. (γ) Lastly, he is able to create, in order to save beings, magical appearances—'doubles' of his body.

The phrase *dharma-kāya*, which originally designated (i.) the whole of the Scriptures, and (ii.) Buddha as law or Scripture incarnate, came (in *Abhidharma*) to be used to designate the collection of the spiritual *dharma*s owing to the presence of which a pseudo-individual is named Buddha. Every Buddha possesses the same supramundane *dharma*s; while Buddhas differ in merit, in duration of life, etc., they are endowed with the same *dharma-kāya*. In the same way monks (*bhikṣu*s), while differing one from another in many respects, possess (i.e. have as a constituent part of their pseudo-individuality) the same set of *dharma*s, called *bhikṣutā*, 'that which makes a *bhikṣu* a *bhikṣu*' (morality, the *samvara*, or vows of a *bhikṣu*, etc.).

The material elements in a Buddha were, from of old, styled *rūpakāya*, 'material body.' Mythological Mahāyānism styles them *sambhogakāya*, 'glorious or blessed body,' or *vipākakāya*, 'body of ripening.' The body of a Buddha is glorious, endowed with the thirty-two marks, enthroned in paradises where it is adored by celestial *bodhi-sattvas*. The so-called 'material body' of the man named Śākyamuni was not what we should call, in our phraseology, a 'body,' but only a magical double of the glorious body of a certain Buddha. Side by side with Śākyamuni there is an infinite number of such doubles, some Buddha-like (as Śākyamuni), some endowed with every sort of appearance. These magical creations are styled *nirmāṇakāyas*, 'contrived,' 'created,' or 'magical bodies.'

To sum up: a Buddha is a saint in whom we can, with the scalpel of dialectic, distinguish what Europeans call a 'soul'—a set of sublime *dharma*s, some of which are beneficial to himself (*svārtha*—e.g., wisdom, meditations turned to *nirvāṇa*), some of which are beneficial to others (*parārtha*—e.g., compassion and power corresponding to this compassion)—and a 'body,' the fruit of his merits and former vows (*prāṇidhāna*), which sanctifies and ripens the blessed, while a number of magical appearances convert and save ordinary beings.

(2) An interpretation of the three bodies in terms of monism and immanence was very easy.

(α) The *dharma-kāya*—i.e. this set of *dharma*s that are the special *dharma*s of a Tathāgata—is realized in all the Tathāgatas. A Platonist would say that the Tathāgatas are so many copies of the *dharma-kāya*, that the *dharma-kāya* is an eternal essence which manifests itself in the Tathāgatas.

(β) The *sambhogakāya* depends on the *dharma-kāya*, as it is the fruit of the merit accumulated (*puṇyasambhāra*) by the future Buddha, this merit being in close relations with the accumulation of knowledge (*jñānasambhāra*) which results in the *dharma-kāya*. As a matter of fact, the *sambhoga-*

kāya is described in the Tāntras¹ as 'effluent from the *dharmadhātu*' (*niṣyanda*), i.e. an 'emanation of the *dharmakāya*.'

(γ) The set of *dharma*s which characterize *bodhisattvas* as *bodhisattvas* and their visible bodies are, in the same way, imperfect copies of the bodies of a Buddha. The same process may be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to every being. The *sambhogakāya* is described as the universal matrix, 'the place of origin of all beings' (*utpattisthāna*).²

Several scholars, among them D. T. Suzuki (pp. 61, 73, 231, 245, 255, 261), maintain that such an interpretation was the interpretation of the chiefs of the Vijnānavādin school, Aśvaghōṣa, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and they quote *sūtras* (*Avataniśaka*) which are supposed to embody it. The present writer believes that the only texts which are clear to this effect are Tāntric texts. But it would be a mistake to underestimate their value, as there are evidences of the antiquity of the pantheistic or theistic views (see art. DOCTRINES (Buddhist)).

As observed above, the *tathāgatagarbha* and the 'pure thought' are very like an immanent undefined *dharmakāya*. Asaṅga states that there is not an *Adibuddha* (see art. *ADIBUDDHA*), a primordial and eternal Buddha; every Buddha has been for a time a 'future Buddha' (*bodhisattva*) and, before becoming a future Buddha, was from the beginning an ordinary being. If Buddha is styled *svayambhū*, 'who exists by himself,' the meaning is that he has acquired, by himself, Buddhahood. But the refutation of the theory of a Buddha *per se* proves that such a theist theory had partisans. As a matter of fact, in the *Mahāvihāri* (Wassilieff, p. 112) the Buddha is possessed of a pure self, of a permanent bliss, not of *nirvāṇa*.

For the theists, Buddha would be a Brāhmanic god. His *dharmakāya* (*Amitābha*) is a counterpart of Brahman; his *sambhogakāya* (*Amitāyus*) corresponds to Viṣṇu or to the celestial Kṛṣṇa; his magical apparitions (*Śākyamuni*, etc.) correspond to the *avatārs*.

Tāntrism (*mantrāyāna*, *vajrayāna*) is thoroughly immanentist and Śaivist. It is fond of Mādhyamika formulas, and states, at every opportunity, that things are void. But voidness is the *ens realissimum*, is *ātman*, or *brahman*, and this *ātman* is styled *Vajrasattva*, a Bhagavat united to a Bhagavatī (= *śakti*). *Mantras* (formulas) and *vidhis* (rites) of different classes, especially erotic *vidhis*, quickly transform the devotee into *Vajrasattva*, or rather 'exteriorize' the *Vajrasattva*-nature that is immanent in every being, just as, in *Mahāyāna*, the practice of the 'perfect virtues' (*pāramitās*) develops the 'germ of a Buddha.'

Side by side with the doctrine of immanence, which is chiefly Tāntric, there are several forms of theism (monotheism and polytheism) coupled with doctrines of emanation. They may be styled Brāhmanic or Paurāṇic (*Svayambhū*-*purāṇa*, *Kārandavyūha*, *Mani bka bum*, etc.). Buddha is identified with Brahman; the 'magical bodies' with which he was credited in orthodox *Mahāyāna* are now living beings, born from the rays emitted from his body.

LITERATURE.—This is given throughout the article. See also P. Olttramare, *Les Variations de l'ontologie bouddhique: du phénoménisme au monisme*, Paris, 1916.

L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN.

PHILOSOPHY (Chinese).—Although in philosophy the Chinese cannot vie with the great nations of thinkers—the Greeks, the Hindus, or the Germans—they may well be placed on a level with the Romans, and they surpass the Semitic peoples—the Arabs, Hebrews, and Persians. The Japanese are their disciples. We must bear in mind that they produced their philosophy almost entirely independently of alien influence. The Chinese always took more interest in practical

¹ *Nāmasaṃgīti*, v. 79.

² *Id.* v. 60.

questions concerning the life and welfare of individuals and society than in purely theoretical ones, and in consequence developed fairly complete systems of ethics, whereas they did not advance far in metaphysics. Tradition, authority, and veneration of antiquity were so many chains and fetters impeding the flight of their speculative genius. They trusted too much in the wisdom of sages and worthies and too little in their own mental powers. Satisfied with the knowledge of their predecessors, which they did not dare to challenge, they imagined themselves to be in possession of the whole truth, and never thought of the many problems evolved in the West.

In the history of Chinese philosophy we can distinguish two distinct periods—ancient and modern—separated by an interval of stagnation. The former extends from remote antiquity to the 1st cent. of our era, comprising the Chow and the greater part of the Han dynasty; the latter begins in the 11th cent. and is known as the Sung philosophy, for it originated under the Sung dynasty and was carried on to the Ming epoch, when it stopped in the beginning of the 16th century. No further progress was made after the Sung philosophy had been more or less recognized as the official philosophy. Westerners are better informed on ancient Chinese philosophy than on the modern development of Chinese thought.

We find the first traces of philosophical speculations in the *Shu King*, especially in the chapter entitled 'Hung-fan.' The legendary emperor Yü is believed to have received it from heaven, and in 1122 B.C. the prince of Chi presented it to the founder of the Chow dynasty, Wu-wang. The language of this old document is very archaic, and it may well date from such an early time. During the 12th cent. B.C. the Chinese had already reached a certain height of civilization, and it is not surprising that the highest questions of human life should have presented themselves to their minds. The 'Hung-fan' deals with the five elements, the primary agencies of the universe, natural phenomena supposed to be connected with human fate, chronology based on the observation of the stars, the virtues and duties of the ruler, the various functions of government, and the different kinds of happiness and misfortune. In the short aphorisms of this treatise we have the germs of the later philosophy of nature, ethics, and political philosophy.

Another source of primitive Chinese philosophy is the *Yi King*, the chief text-book of divination, consisting of a series of hexagrams which have been explained in a fanciful way so as to yield a great variety of oracles. But it must be remembered that the passage usually quoted as containing the first reference to the cosmic dual forces, *yin* and *yang*, occurs in a late commentary ascribed to Tse-sse, the grandson of Confucius, not in the text. Nevertheless, it is probable that the dualistic theory of the *yin* and the *yang* was known before Confucius, at least its fundamental outlines. The dual forces precede the five elements, which are evolved from them. The *yang* is regarded as the bright, male, active, generative essence, the *yin* as the dark, female, passive, and receptive one. *Yang* is embodied in heaven and the celestial bodies, *yin* in earth with all her products. There is an interaction of both in thunder and lightning, in wind and rain, heat and cold, in the courses of the sun and the moon.

In ancient Chinese philosophy we have two distinct and opposed schools of thought, the one practical, realistic, and agnostic, the other idealistic and transcendental—Confucianism and Taoism. There are besides quite a number of independent philosophers, who hold views agreeing

with neither the one nor the other of these schools, and whom we may denote as 'heterodox.' The preponderance of Confucianism is, however, so marked that, from a Chinese point of view, only Confucianism would be considered as orthodox philosophy, and Taoism would be heterodox. Foreigners do not accord this pre-eminence to Confucianism, and hold that both schools of thought have contributed equally to the formation of the Chinese mind.

I. Confucianism.—Confucianism may be called a philosophy or a religion, although it just lacks that part of religion which in our opinion is essential—metaphysics. Its founder, Confucius (551–479 B.C.), is neither a great philosopher nor a theorist in ethics, but a practical moralist who has impressed his countrymen by his personal character no less than by his common sense. He did not wish to propound new and original ideas, but to propagate those of the ancients, for whom he felt the greatest reverence, holding that his contemporaries had degenerated from the ideal state of civilization in primitive times. For this purpose he edited the old books supposed to contain the noble thoughts of former sages, which thus became the classical works of Chinese literature. As a teacher he inculcated practical wisdom, philosophizing with his disciples on all questions concerning the moral conduct of the individual and the good government of the State. His disciples took note of his characteristic utterances, which subsequently were published as the *Lun-yü*, or the *Confucian Analects*, and are our chief source of his teachings. He limits himself to ethics, refraining from all metaphysical speculations, in which he does not take the slightest interest. We do not know his reasons for this; he may have thought such speculations useless or transcending the human intellect. As regards popular beliefs and customs, he shows a benevolent neutrality. He advises his adherents to follow the old usages, sacrificing to the spirits and the souls of the departed as though they were present, and he believes in a superior being, whom he calls Heaven, and a just fate, but he positively declines to speak on supernatural things. It is not correct, therefore, to make Confucius responsible for the worship of nature—the old popular religion of China—and to call all these superstitious practices Confucianism. Confucius is merely concerned with ethical problems, as also is his follower, Mencius, and is utterly indifferent to all higher speculations, philosophical as well as religious.

The Confucian ethics are eudæmonistic, for Confucius holds that by good actions one acquires happiness, whereas bad actions rouse the ire of heaven and bring down punishment on the guilty. In this respect he is a convinced optimist, in spite of all the unfortunate experiences which he underwent during his life. Man is in possession of a moral sense sometimes obscured by his passions, but he may overcome these by intelligence. Virtue is the *summum bonum* and the source of all happiness. It may be learned by study and self-culture. Every one should strive to become a *chün-tse*, a superior man who possesses the five cardinal virtues and all the accomplishments of a perfect gentleman. These five virtues are: benevolence, justice, decency, wisdom, and truthfulness. The cornerstone of Confucian ethics is filial piety (*q.v.*)—the love which children owe to their parents even beyond the grave, and on which is based ancestor-worship (*q.v.*). In close relation to this virtue is respect of seniors. Courage and loyalty to one's sovereign are likewise reputed virtues. For the sovereign, the parents, and the teacher one may eventually be obliged to sacrifice one's life. The five relations regulate the duties

between the different classes, which are: ruler and subject, father and son, older and younger brother, husband and wife, friend and friend. As a general principle applicable to all relations, Confucius established the Golden Rule: 'What you do not want done to yourself do not do to others' (*Anal.* xv. 23). That Confucius was not a narrow-minded nationalist may be gathered from his saying that 'All men between the four seas are brethren.' In politics Confucius advocates an enlightened despotism. Recent efforts of young Chinese to represent him as sponsor for republicanism have failed. The possibility of such an institution as democracy was not even thought of in his time. Confucius would have seen in it a subversion of all true relations. The prince has to work for the welfare of his people and to lead them to virtue by his good example. His subjects have to serve him and obey his commands. Government is not their business, but must be left to their ruler, who is appointed by heaven, and to his ministers. In strong contrast to Taoism, Confucius lays great emphasis on culture and study; even virtue can be learned.

In the *Great Learning*, a short ethico-political treatise ascribed to Tse-sse, the grandson of the sage, the self-culture of the individual has to start from an insight into the nature of things, followed by a study of ancient customs and literature. The individual thus having become cultivated, his whole family imitates him, and, when all clans and families are well ordered, the State is well governed. The ultimate aim is universal peace among all the nations.

The third classical text of Confucianism is the *Doctrine of the Mean*. The author, Tse-sse, first takes a somewhat higher flight, which in its wording at least savours a little of Taoism, describing the equilibrium of mind in its original state before its passions have been stirred. The rest of the book is in the less pretentious style of the *Analects*. See also artt. CONFUCIAN RELIGION, CONFUCIUS.

As Socrates found a Plato and Christ a Paul who explained and further developed the teachings of their masters, so Confucius found in Mencius (372–289 B.C.), the second sage, as he was called afterwards, his ablest exponent. In longer dialogues he defends Confucianism against the objections raised against it, with great dialectical skill and in a brilliant style, strongly contrasting by its vividness with the self-control and dispassionateness of his master. Mencius is a greater philosopher, a more profound thinker, and a better theorist than Confucius. He tries to deduct from general principles the conceptions which Confucius takes as given or self-evident. So he derives the four cardinal virtues—benevolence, justice, decency, and wisdom—from the feelings of compassion, shame, reverence, right and wrong. These virtues are innate in man, but he must preserve them by constant practice. Human nature is the gift of heaven, and therefore originally good, but it can be corrupted. Mencius himself originated a theory of passion-nature, dealing with human passions. His political views were much more democratic than those of Confucius. He ranked the sovereign below the people, and even admitted that a bad ruler might be assassinated by a 'minister of heaven.' See, further, artt. MENCIUS.

With Mencius Confucianism was practically completed. Later Confucianists of the Han period, like Tung Chung-shu, Lu Chia I, Chia I, Pan Ku, and Yang Hsiung, did not carry it much farther. For many centuries the question of the goodness or badness of human nature was hotly debated.

Hsün K'uang of the 3rd cent. B.C. held that the nature of man at his birth is evil, and that virtue is artificial, not natural. Otherwise he laid the

chief stress on the ceremonial side of Confucianism. He was of a practical and unimaginative turn of mind. Before Mencius was, so to speak, discovered by Chu Hsi, and raised to the rank of a sage, Hsin K'uang was on a level with Mencius in public estimation.

The philosopher Kao-tse, a contemporary of Mencius who quotes him, held that there is no difference between good and bad. Tung Chung-shu (2nd cent. B.C.) and Yang Hsiung (53 B.C.-A.D. 18) both assert that human nature is partly good and partly bad, and that the development in either direction depends upon environment.

2. Taoism.—Between Taoism and Confucianism there is the greatest possible contrast; they are, as it were, two different worlds. Whereas Confucianism teaches a practical morality, insisting on the different virtues, assigning to man his position in the family and the State, regulating his life in his diverse spheres by strict rules, and eschewing all speculations on the essence of things, Taoism turns away from this busy world, evincing a distinct ascetic tendency and endeavouring to grasp the primary cause of existence by intuition and mysticism. Hence it is not proper to maintain that both systems logically run together. A Confucianist may believe in the old philosophy of nature already in existence before the two schools were established, but this agreement does not remove the fundamental differences between the two rival philosophies, just as an idealist does not become a materialist by accepting the natural sciences based on materialistic principles. The Taoist writers themselves show their antagonism to the Confucian doctrine by their violent attacks on Confucius.

The Taoists claim the legendary emperor Huang-ti as the first advocate of their dogmas, and they often couple his name with that of Lao-tse. No sayings of Huang-ti are recorded, but it is not impossible that Taoist thought existed before Lao-tse, the founder of Taoism. Lao-tse is supposed to have been born in 604 B.C., so he would have preceded Confucius by half a century. The genuineness of his work, the *Tao-teh-king*, has been called in question by some sinologists, but on insufficient grounds. Many scholars regard Lao-tse's book as the most wonderful production of the Chinese mind; others hold that its value has been greatly exaggerated. Judgments will vary according as the critics themselves lean to pantheism and mysticism or are sober-minded and matter-of-fact. At all events the book seems to have a fascinating influence, which is shown by the fact that we have about fifteen or more translations, and they have not yet stopped. The best translations are those of Julien, Chalmers, von Strauss, and Legge.

Lao-tse's system is pure pantheism and mysticism, and is fully treated under the title MYSTICISM (Chinese).

The fundamental thoughts of Lao-tse were developed by later Taoist writers. The oldest of them is Lieh-tse, who lived in the 5th century. His existence has been denied by some sinologists, but it is well established by utterances of many ancient authors and by his work, which is much too original to be a later forgery. Lieh-tse is concerned with the philosophy of nature, and his doctrine has been characterized as naturalism. He regards nature as an eternal circle of growing and decaying caused by an occult force. Life and death alternate, but there is no absolute annihilation, no beginning and no end. Lieh-tse was aware of the so-called antinomies of time and space, and in contradistinction to Kant he holds that infinity alone is possible. All living beings, being created from the same primordial substance,

are nearly related, and there is no fundamental difference between man and animals. In a somewhat fantastical theory on the descent of man Lieh-tse gives a list of all our animal ancestors. He assumes an intuitive knowledge, independent of the senses, but the highest knowledge of *Tao* cannot be expressed by words. Through a concentration of will-power and a mystical community with *Tao* one may obtain magical forces, transcend the natural laws, and become an immortal.

Whereas Lieh-tse is chiefly interested in the philosophy of nature, Chuang-tse (3rd cent.) deals with the philosophy of mind. His writings are a mixture of mysticism and doubt, of seriousness and humour. He is as much a poet as a philosopher, a most ingenious thinker, more idealistic and abstruse than Lieh-tse, and consequently much harder to understand. According to Chuang-tse, our common judgments are wrong. A wise man discards all the contrasts based on sense-perception, even the difference between the perceiving subject and the perceived object. 'The ego and the world are one and the same. All contrasts are blended in *Tao*. This is what Chuang-tse calls the 'identity of contraries'—a theory scientifically developed in Schelling's philosophy of identity. If by mystical intuition the sage becomes one with *Tao*, he sees that a difference between subject and object does not exist. He severs himself from his own self and becomes a passive vessel of *Tao*, the mirror of the eternal. Knowing that *Tao* alone has real existence, he looks upon life as an empty semblance, as the phantasmagoria of a wild dream.

Han-fei-tse (3rd cent.) tried to utilize Taoist principles for the theory of government and the management of State affairs. His ideal is an irresponsible despotism. The ruler is not to act himself; he may enjoy the *vue-voir*, but he must have responsible organs to mete out rewards and punishments.

The work which goes under the name of Huai-nan-tse (2nd cent. B.C.), but perhaps was composed by Taoist adepts in his service, deals with the activities of the primary force and natural phenomena, and is our oldest source on Taoist cosmogony, astrology, and alchemy. In later Taoism these sciences are cultivated chiefly, and purely philosophic disquisitions are not much appreciated.

3. Heterodox philosophers.—During the latter part of the Chow dynasty there existed in China a very active literary spirit and many more schools of thought than Confucianism and Taoism, which alone survived and supplanted all the others. Of most of these heterodox philosophers only scanty remains are preserved, and it is difficult to know what their teachings really were.

Yang Chu (4th cent. B.C.) founded a school of pessimism and egoism. His bitterness is the result of the miseries of life, which in his opinion by far outweigh its charms. This world, where the virtuous are unhappy and the wicked thrive, cannot be governed by any higher ethical principle. Man should not strive for unattainable ethical ideals, thus losing the little enjoyment left him, but should live in accordance with his nature, making the best of his poor existence. He may help his fellow-creatures, but not to the excess of self-sacrifice, since his own sufferings are already hard enough. Yang Chu teaches the Horatian 'Carpe diem,' but, like Epicurus, deprecates all excesses and advises moderation and equanimity.

Mé Ti (4th and 5th cent. B.C.) was the counterpart of Yang Chu, an extreme altruist and optimist. He admitted the evils of the world, but held that their root was the want of love and sympathy for one's neighbours. Universal love

and self-sacrifice would cause all the calamities to disappear and re-organize society. Mè Ti attacks aggressive wars with the same arguments as are used by the pacifists of our time. The argumentation throughout his work, which has come down to us, is logical and well to the point. Owing to this doctrine of universal love, Mè Ti has been designated 'the Christ of China.' Like Yang Chu, he was vigorously condemned by Mencius, who feared that this doctrine would loosen the family ties, Confucianism according more love and sympathy to blood-relations than to strangers. Mè Ti favours equality of all citizens, and shows socialistic tendencies. He objects to luxury and extravagance, especially as often shown in funerals, and recommends economy. Rejecting the theory of a predetermined fate, he has a strong faith in the just rule of gods and spirits rewarding good actions and punishing bad. The school of Mè Ti split into three branches, but we do not know anything more about them.

Another school of thought that flourished between the 6th and 4th centuries B.C. was that of the dialecticians, or logicians, if we may use this term. The Chinese never have developed a complete science of logic, but we find some germs from which it might have been evolved. Yin Wên-tse (4th cent. B.C.) made some investigations on the parts of speech and their logical functions. With the dialecticians (*ming-chia*) the Chinese class the sophists (*pien-shih*). They are famous for their love of argument and for their strange sayings or paradoxes, which, however, hide deep truths. The earliest seems to be Têng Hsi (6th cent. B.C.), whose paradoxes do not differ much from those of the Taoists. He professes a peculiar theory of knowledge: instead of using one's own senses, one ought to see with the world-eye, to hear with the world-ear, and to think with the world-intellect—i.e., a mystical knowledge should be acquired by a complete identification of one's self with *Tao*, or the absolute.

The sophist Hui Shih (4th cent.) is known to us from Chuang-tse, who frequently disputed with him and speaks of him with great respect. Hui Shih must have been a prolific writer; his works are said to have filled several carts; it is the more to be regretted that a number of paradoxes recorded by Chuang-tse are all that we know of his work. From these aphorisms it appears that Hui Shih denies the reality of time and space, and attempts to dissolve all contraries. His starting-point, however, is not *Tao*, but the infinitely small and the infinitely great, from which Zeno and many other idealistic philosophers have tried to disprove the reality of our world.

We can form a fairly good idea of how Chinese sophists would argue from the few chapters of Kung-sun Lung (3rd cent. B.C.) which are still extant. In question and answer, thesis and antithesis, he proves that a white horse is no horse. His treatise on the 'hard and white' touches an important question of the theory of knowledge. He holds that the qualities of things, such as hard and white, have only an intermittent existence. When not perceived by us, they are in abeyance, they separate, or hide.

The last great thinker of the early epoch of Chinese philosophy is Wang Ch'ung (A.D. 27-97), who far surpasses Confucius and Mencius as a metaphysician. He regards himself as a Confucianist, but the Chinese usually take him for an eclectic, and we shall not be far wrong in calling him the greatest Chinese sceptical philosopher. He shows his scepticism and brilliant critical genius in exposing the errors and superstitions of his countrymen. His own philosophy is a kind of materialistic monism akin to that of Epicurus and

Lucretius. In his system the *yin* and *yang* are material substances, as water and fire. Their movements are spontaneous, subject to certain laws, but there is no intelligence, no superior being holding the universe in his sway. The *yin* forms the human body, the *yang* the soul. At death they are scattered again. The human soul is no more immortal than that of animals. Many reasons are given against the belief in immortality. Nevertheless, Wang Ch'ung believes in ghosts and demons as an effluence of the fiery *yang* fluid, and in other portents and omens produced in a natural way. He still clings to fate and predestination, but he has materialized fate, regarding it as a quantity of the original heavenly fluid with which man is imbued at his birth. Wang Ch'ung is much more critical and scientific than other Chinese philosophers, and, as far as possible, bases his arguments on experience.

From the time of Wang Ch'ung Chinese philosophy was in a state of torpor for nearly a millennium. Some philosophical books were written, but the writers contented themselves chiefly with expanding and commenting upon older works. It was the age of commentators, devoid of new and original ideas. Independent thought was smothered by the authority of Confucianism, which passed for the acme of wisdom, and which nobody dared to oppose. At last a new impetus was given to mental philosophy in the 11th cent. A.D. by the Sung philosophers.

4. Sung philosophy.—Chou Lien-ch'i (1017-73) was the first to revive the study of the philosophy of nature. Taking the commentaries of the *Yi King* as a basis, he wrote a very short monograph on the primary cause or the first principle, *t'ai-chi*, from which *yin* and *yang* were evolved, which produced the universe. Chou Lien-ch'i's ethics are quite Confucian, whence this school has been denoted as Neo-Confucianism. Chang Ming-tao and the two brothers, Ch'êng Hao and Ch'êng I, followed in the same line of thought, but were eclipsed by a pupil of Ch'êng Hao, Chu Hsi (1130-1200), the most illustrious of the Sung philosophers.

Chu Hsi began his work as a commentator. His commentaries on the four classics are excellent, and enjoy almost as much fame as the old texts themselves. His annotations on the writings of his four predecessors became the nucleus of his own metaphysical productions. He did not make a systematic digest of his system, but his disciples were in the habit of noting down the conversations that they had with their master, and Chu Hsi himself wrote innumerable letters to his friends and pupils, in which he discusses philosophical questions, replying to their inquiries, setting doubts at rest, or refuting objections. From these notes and letters we gather the impression that there was an active philosophical life in China during the Sung dynasty similar to that of the Greek philosophical schools. It was only after the death of Chu Hsi that all these notes and letters were collected and published. In 1713 all the philosophical writings of Chu Hsi were revised and systematically arranged by order of the Manchu emperor K'ang Hsi.

Chu Hsi's philosophy is dualistic and has been compared with Cartesianism. He supposes two fundamental principles, matter (*ch'i*) and reason (*li*), of which the latter takes precedence. They were already united in the primary cause or the absolute, from which the *yin* and *yang* and the whole universe were evolved. Wang Ch'ung knows but one materialistic principle; Chu Hsi acknowledges a spiritualistic one too. It produces life and the human mind, at least its superior part, intelligence. Death causes a dissolution of

the body and the mind, the one returning to earth, the other to heaven, whence they came. Immortality is out of the question.

This philosophy is known by the name *hsing-li*, 'human nature and reason.' It found so many adherents that in 1415 the third emperor of the Ming dynasty could make a collection of the principal writings of this character—a systematic digest embracing the works of 120 scholars. It is a complete philosophical encyclopædia with the following sections: cosmogony, spiritual powers, metaphysics, first principles, sages, literati, education, philosophers, successive generations, principles of rule, principles of government, poetry, and literature. This somewhat unwieldy compilation was revised in the 18th cent. by an imperial commission and abridged. The new publication may be regarded as a handbook of the official philosophy of China. It is Confucianism as interpreted by Chu Hsi and supplemented with metaphysics, in which the original system was deficient.

5. Opposition to the Sung philosophy.—The authority of Chu Hsi did not remain unchallenged. His opponents averred that he had misunderstood and misinterpreted the Confucian classics. Lu Chiu-yüan (1140-92) opposed him on the ground that Chu Hsi had exaggerated the importance of education from without and mere learning, and that the rectification of the heart was the chief thing. Self-cultivation and subjective education were alone essential. It must be admitted that Chu Hsi's highly-developed metaphysical system is alien to primitive Confucianism, which is only ethical.

The dispute went on, some scholars taking the side of Chu Hsi, others opposing him, others again endeavouring to reconcile the two conflicting views. Among all the antagonists of Chu Hsi, Wang Yang-ming (A.D. 1472-1528) is the most successful. He holds that the great learning of Chu Hsi is of no use, that he merely explains the words of the classical texts, but misses the meaning. His own purely idealistic philosophy is founded on the original nature of man as described in the *Doctrine of the Mean*. He vindicates for man a sort of intuitive faculty which may be obscured temporarily by passions, but is always there. It is the source of all knowledge, for it creates the external things and thus resembles the absolute of modern philosophy.

Both Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming were acquainted with Buddhist thought and to some extent were influenced by it. Their writings are much studied in Japan, where they became the heads of two rival schools of philosophy.

With Wang Yang-ming the productivity of Chinese philosophy again ceases, and it is passing once more through an ebb-tide at present. Signs of another renaissance, however, are not wanting. In recent years the Chinese have become interested in European philosophy, and it is to be expected that the many new ideas derived from this source will prove to them a stimulus to original research.

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PHILOSOPHY (Egyptian).—1. The tradition.

—The Greek writers, from Homer and Herodotus downwards, are almost unanimous in their praise of the wisdom of the Egyptians, thereby perpetuating a firmly-rooted opinion of which far earlier testimony may be found in the Hebrew literature. At first, it is true, this wisdom is of a very ill-defined quality; in the book of Kings (1 K 4³⁰) it means proverbial lore, while to Homer (*Od.* iv. 229-232) it signifies skill in medicine. In later times, however, it becomes increasingly clear that what is meant is not merely mental attainments of a superficial and practical kind, but the possession of profound philosophical views. We have the authority of such writers as Diodorus, Plutarch, and Strabo for the fact that eminent Hellenic philosophers and statesmen like Solon, Thales, Pythagoras, Democritus of Abdera, and Plato sat at the feet of Egyptian priestly teachers, some of whose names have been handed down (conveniently collected in G. Parthey's ed. of Plutarch, *de Iside et Osiride*, Berlin, 1850, pp. 182-186); and in the works of Plutarch and Iamblichus we find many philosophical explanations that are attributed to the priests of Heliopolis, Thebes, and Sais.

2. The native evidence.—The study of the hieroglyphic literature cannot fail to dissipate completely this cherished illusion concerning the profundity of the Egyptian philosophy, though it must not be denied that the surviving evidence is exceedingly scanty and one-sided. To take an instance from a quite different sphere, it is known for certain that the Egyptians codified their laws: and yet not one scrap of a law-book has come down to us. Why, then, it may be asked, is it not justifiable to suppose that the Egyptians did possess profound philosophical systems, of which the written record, if ever there was any, is now lost? This supposition, it may not unreasonably be argued, is required to explain the Greek tradition.

No hypothesis of this kind is likely to win much support from hieroglyphic students, for, judged by Greek standards, the texts which we possess cannot conceivably be placed on any very high level. Most scholars would agree with the verdict that the Egyptians show no real love of truth, no desire to probe into the inner nature of things. Their minds were otherwise oriented: a highly gifted people, exhibiting talent in almost every direction, their bent was towards material prosperity and artistic enjoyment; contemplation and thought for their own sake—necessities to the peoples of Greece and India—were alien to the temperament of the Egyptians. Plato once liberates himself from the prevailing tradition to say, with much truth, that love of knowledge was the characteristic of the Hellenes, while the characteristic of the Phœnicians and Egyptians was the love of wealth (*Rep.* iv. 436).

This generalization, of course, is merely comparative; the Egyptians possessed a didactic

literature, which no doubt satisfied the same kind of need in Egypt as the works of the Greek philosophers and scientific men did in Greece; but it never rises above the immediate requirements of everyday life. There is nothing earlier than the Middle Kingdom; but from that period onward we possess books of maxims and counsels addressed by aged Pharaohs to their successors (*The Instruction of Amenemmes*, *The Instruction of Akhthoi*), advice to magistrates about to take office (*The Installation of the Vizier Rekhmerē*), more general books of precepts (*The Instruction of Ptahhotpe*, *The Maxims of Any*), praise of the scribe's vocation, based on disparaging descriptions of other professions, books on medicine and mathematics, and lists of words classified according to sense. There are poems of sceptical tendency, dwelling on the brevity of life, and exhorting men to eat and drink, for they must soon die; and poems of opposite tendency, exalting death and the west, where deliverance from suffering may be found. One class of composition bears a superficial resemblance to the Platonic dialogues: a short narrative introduces a certain situation, the problem of which is then treated in rhetorical speeches. Among these are the conversation between a nisanthrope and his soul on the value of life, the reflexions of a robbed peasant on human injustice, and the admonishments addressed by a sage to a lax king reigning over a ruined Egypt. None of these writings inspires us with a very great respect for Egyptian profundity of thought, though they display a certain practical perspicacity and worldly wisdom. Above all, they have often considerable poetical merit. In a word, they are to be compared with the Wisdom literature of the Hebrews, though they cannot be said to rise to the same heights of grandeur and spirituality.

The religious literature of Egypt shows a stronger leaning to speculation than the secular works, due to a confusion of contradictory myths and attributions which must have been intolerable to the more learned priests. Cosmogony has the same purpose as philosophy—an explanation of the universe; and in Egypt it might, under more favourable circumstances, have resulted in true philosophy. We have one exceptional inscription from Memphis, the late copy of a very early document, in which Ptah appears as All-creator: out of him arose Horus as 'heart' or 'understanding' and Thōth as 'tongue' or 'speech'; and from the interaction of these two, explained in some detail and with some subtlety, all things came into existence. This account has been recently shown to be only the variant of the old Heliopolitan dogma that received Atūm, the sun-god, as the Creator, aided by Hu, 'commanding utterance,' and Sia, 'understanding'—deities who were emanations of himself (see art. PERSONIFICATION [Egyptian], §(b) 3f.). Again, sporadic passages in the texts identify Osiris with water or vegetation, Seth with evil, Rē with light, and so forth; these rationalizations might, in more systematic hands, have become stepping-stones towards a philosophy like that of earlier Ionia.

About the year 1375 B.C. a religious revolution took place which completely contradicts all that has been said above concerning the Egyptian temperament, and which, unless the baseless theory that it was due to foreign influence prove true, can only be ascribed to the individual genius of a very exceptional man. Akhnaton, as he called himself later, was the son of Amenophis III., one of the most powerful of the Pharaohs, and of Queen Tiyl, the daughter of a priest; his portraits represent him with an abnormally-shaped head on a deformed, emaciated body, whence some have imagined that he may have been an epileptic.

Already in the time of Amenophis III. we can detect a growing reverence for the sun as a celestial body, distinct from the traditional sun-god Rē-Atūm of Heliopolis; nor is it impossible, as J. H. Breasted has suggested, that the extension of the Egyptian rule both in Syria and in Nubia may have made felt the need of such a universal, omnipotent deity. Be this as it may, the propagation of the new cult was due to the fervour of the young king Akhnaton; not long after the beginning of his reign he broke completely away from the faith of his forefathers, forbade the worship of any other god than Aton, the solar disk, changed his name from Amenophis to Akhnaton ('pleasing to the Aton'), and moved his capital from Thebes, the town of the hated but powerful deity Amūn, to a new site near the modern village of Amarna in Middle Egypt. The suppression of all other gods thus created an exclusive monotheism, but the new religion was far more than the mere exaltation of the old sun-god in the place of a complex pantheon. Though temple-worship and certain externals of the old rituals persisted, the anthropomorphic form of the god was replaced by a mere symbol representing the ball of the sun spreading its rays, which are furnished with hands, in all directions; in the magnificent hymns addressed to the Aton all mythological traits are given up, and deep emphasis is laid on the life-giving attributes of light and warmth, to which all creation and all existence are ascribed. The intellectual character of the new faith is indicated by the name Sbōye, 'the doctrine'; never, perhaps, in the world's history, except in the French Revolution, has so radical an attempt been made to enthrone a philosophy in the place of religion. But the time was far from ripe, and 'the doctrine' barely survived its author; a generation later Theban Amūn is again all-powerful, and Egyptian religion has reverted to its traditional groove.

The Ramessid dynasties show no new rationalistic developments; the Theban priesthood grows steadily in power, and theology appears to submerge all secular interests. About 1100 B.C. the high priests of Amūn wrest the temporal power from the feeble hands of the Pharaohs, and under their weak rule is prepared a series of foreign invasions. At last Egypt becomes united again under a dynasty from Sais (XXVIth dynasty, 663-525 B.C.); this is a period of revival, when the art, the religion, and the political organization of the Old Kingdom are consciously copied, with little or no sign of innovation. Then comes the period of the Persian rule, followed by a momentary flickering up of the old native culture; after which Egypt passes under the sway of Alexander and his successors, when new intellectual influences are brought to bear on her.

Thus there was little scope, in the last centuries of Pharaonic rule, for the development of more truly philosophical standpoints. On the other hand, there are ample traces of a growing mystical tendency, due no doubt to the desperate difficulty felt by the exponents of so irrational a religion in keeping a hold on the popular faith. Enigmatic writing, increased symbolism, and the recrudescence of early animal cults are symptoms of the times; all these must have tended to enhance the awe with which the priests were regarded.

3. Explanation of the tradition.—The Greek tradition as to the wisdom of the Egyptians has its roots in the very real cultural achievements of that people in early times, coupled with the glamour of a high antiquity. Though our authorities for the facts may not be very trustworthy, it is quite possible that a number of Greek men of note went to Egypt and studied there. They could hardly fail to learn much, but what they

learned was less philosophy than the materials out of which philosophies could be constructed. The Egyptian religion, in particular, commanded the admiration of the Greeks, who mistook its crudities for disguised truths and its contradictions for paradoxes expressive of a deeper harmony. The wisdom of the Egyptians was mainly the wisdom of the Greeks read into the Egyptian myths. It has been truly remarked that, when the eclectic Plutarch discusses the character of the Egyptian gods, this agrees miraculously with the philosophy of Plutarch, and, when it is the Neo-Platonic writer Iamblichus, his account accords strangely with the philosophic outlook of Iamblichus. It is highly probable that the best-educated Egyptian priests of the Ptolemaic and Roman periods were imbued with Greek ideas, and imported these into the interpretation of their inherited religion. Thus Manetho (*q.v.*), who wrote a book in Greek about Egyptian religion (the *Ἱερά Βιβλία*), was, according to Plutarch (*de Is. et Osir.* 28), actually consulted by the first Ptolemy about matters connected with the introduction of the new god Sarapis. The introduction of this god was clearly an astute political move, an attempt to weld together Greek and Egyptian in a common worship; the outward appearance of Sarapis was entrusted to the skill of the celebrated Athenian sculptor Bryaxis, and similarly, it would appear, the determination of his spiritual characteristics was settled in co-operation by Manetho and Timotheos, a Eumolpid of Eleusis. About 300 years later the sacred scribe Chaeremon, an Egyptian, became the tutor of Nero; he wrote much on Egyptian topics, and is known to have been a Stoic.

The evidence that philosophy ever became, even in the Graeco-Roman period, a characteristic attainment of the Egyptian priests is very slight. Clement of Alexandria, quoting from an apparently trustworthy source, quotes 42 books of Hermes, which, he says, were absolutely necessary to the training of the priests, and comprise 'all the philosophy of the Egyptians' (*Strom.* bk. vi. ch. iv.); among these are hymns and rituals, astrological, medical, and scientific books, and also works relating to the laws and the gods; there is nothing to indicate that they differed in their intellectual level from the books that have come down to us from this time in hieratic and demotic. In the temple of Edfu an inventory of the library is written upon the walls (see H. Brugsch, *Aegyptologie*, Leipzig, 1897, pp. 156-158), and proves even more disillusioning; most of the books named are magical treatises, together with a few rituals, catalogues, and astronomical books. The temple walls at this period are covered with masses of inscriptions, hymns, mythological matter, lists of places, lists of festivals, lists of temple property—nothing indicating a departure from earlier custom; indeed, the language of many of the texts suggests that they are transcriptions or adaptations of books dating from the New Kingdom.

4. Conclusion.—The depreciatory view of Egyptian intellectual achievement taken in this article has been imposed by the exaggerations of Greek tradition and the unfounded claims which modern occultism has based upon it. But for these, the luxury of a more sympathetic appreciation might have been permitted us. The proper standards of comparison are Babylonia and early Syria; here Egypt can hold her own. It is true that Babylon displays more method, more accuracy, more purely intellectual preoccupation; but she lacks the poetry and the artistic genius of ancient Egypt, and, in the sphere of religion, she has no such momentous event to record as the reform of Akhnaton.

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ALAN H. GARDINER.

PHILOSOPHY (Greek).—The drift of the pre-Socratic philosophies of nature was towards rationalism, positivism, and the mechanical explanation of the universe. They sought to replace anthropomorphic gods by material causes. They asked, as Grote would put it, not 'Who rains?' but, 'What is the cause of the precipitation of moisture?' The principle, 'Naught can come from or return to naught,' rigidly applied, excluded direct divine intervention. And the physician Hippocrates speaks in the spirit of this early 'positivism' when he objects to the term 'sacred malady' on the ground that all diseases are equally 'divine.' The open avowal of agnosticism or atheism, however, was reserved for the more forward disciples of the age of the 'sophistic enlightenment.' The chief pre-Socratics seem to have left room for the gods in their mechanical constructions, or at least to have 'accommodated' their language to popular religion. The saying, 'All things are full of gods,' is attributed to Thales (Aristotle, *de Anima*, 411^a 8; cf. Plato, *Laws*, 899 B), and Cicero (*de Nat. Deor.* i. 25), doubtless wrongly, ascribes to him the doctrine that God is the mind which fashions the world out of water. Cicero and the doxographers, indeed, make gods of the first principles of all the pre-Socratics. For them the successive worlds that issue from Anaximander's infinite are gods, and likewise the *acr* of Anaximenes, the fiery *corona* of Parmenides, and the reason (*νοῦς*) of Anaxagoras.

The name of Pythagoras (*q.v.*) is for us a mere symbol, standing in its higher interpretation for the ideas of immortality, metempsychosis, and the systematic, ascetic cultivation within the soul of an order, harmony, and purity, corresponding to the like qualities in nature and God, while to the populace it signifies mysticism, thaumaturgy, and the survival of primitive prescriptions and tabus in respect of food, dress, and the conduct of life. We know little or nothing of pre-Platonic Pythagoreanism beyond the allusions in Heraclitus and Xenophanes, and the undeniable influence of Pythagorean ideas upon Plato. But the subject has been hopelessly confused by the forged literature and tradition that attribute to Pythagoras himself all Platonic developments of possible Pythagorean suggestions.

The philosophic poet and satirist Xenophanes of Colophon is the first to assail popular anthropomorphism directly (J. Freudenthal, *Ueber die Theologie des Xenophanes*, Breslau, 1886). He will hear nothing of the mythological 'fictions of former men,' which are no fit theme of rational discourse:

'If horses and oxen had hands to carve and paint, they would represent their gods in equine or bovine shapes' (*Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*³, i. 60). 'Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods all acts that are a disgrace and reproach among men—to steal, to commit adultery, and deceive one another' (*ib.* p. 59 f.).

With securing verbal inconsistency he proclaims 'one god supreme among gods and men,' whom he describes in language that wavers between monotheism and pantheism. This deity may be variously conceived as the world, the unity of 'being,' or a monotheistic idealization of Zeus. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to reconcile, either in Xenophanes or in his successor Parmenides, the Eleatic pantheism and abstract monism with the retention of mythological language or the recognition of gods. But Parmenides' poem, like

Shelley's *Queen Mab*, begins with an imaginative flight through space under the guidance of a goddess. He speaks of love as first-born of the gods (cf. Hesiod), places at the centre a daemon who governs or guides all things, and, according to Cicero, gives the name of 'God' to the *corona* of fire that girds the heavens (*de Nat. Deor.* i. 11). See, further, IONIC PHILOSOPHY, vol. vii. p. 417 f.

The pregnant rhetoric of Heraclitus (*q.v.*) stimulates the modern imagination to the most varied interpretations. The third book of his work on nature is said by Diogenes Laertius to have dealt with 'theology.' He celebrates the eternal process, law or reason (*Λόγος*). He describes God in pantheistic Emersonian antitheses as the identity of contraries (Diels³, i. 90 ff., frag. 67). He contrasts the relativity and weakness of man with the divine to which all things are always fair and good (*ib.* frag. 102). He personifies eternity (*αἰών*) as a child playing at draughts with the world (*ib.* 52). He declares that the eternal wisdom is willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus (*ib.* 32). Sprung from a priestly family and depositing his book in the temple of Artemis, he speaks with respect of the Delphic Apollo (*ib.* 93) and the Sibyl, whose enigmatic style resembles his own (*ib.* 92). But, without attacking anthropomorphism in the uncompromising spirit of Xenophanes, he fiercely denounces the ceremonial purification of sin by the blood of victims (*ib.* 5), and the orgiastic rites of the new Asiatic Dionysiac cults (*ib.* 15). And he expresses infinite scorn for the false teachers Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hecataeus (*ib.* 40, 57).

Empedocles (*q.v.*), as a philosophic poet, deified the four elements, the cosmic forces love and strife, and many other personified abstractions. His chief divinity seems to be the Sphaeros, or globular unity of the elements, from which all things are evolved, and which the Neo-Platonists accepted as a symbol of the absolute One. Some fine lines on the spiritual nature of the godhead, however, are referred by our sources to Apollo (Diels³, i. 274, frag. 134). In his character of medicine-man, hierophant, and Pythagorean mystic, he taught doctrines of thaumaturgy, metempsychosis, and ceremonial purification, the compatibility of which with his philosophic system cannot be made out from the fragments.

The atomic philosophy of Democritus (*q.v.*) leaves no place for the concrete supernatural, and his explanation of the origin of religion in misunderstood allegory or in primitive man's fear of the thunder and the storm (Diels³, ii. 30, frag. 75 f.) presupposes the unreality of the popular gods. Conventional references in the ethical fragments to God and the divine and to the love of the gods for just men are of no significance (*ib.* frags. 175, 217). More difficult to understand is the doctrine attributed to him of daemons or real aerial beings, beneficent and maleficent, long-lived but not immortal, from whom emanate images that penetrate the minds of men (*ib.* frag. 166). 'Telepathy' could as easily be explained by the atoms then as it can by the analogy of wireless telegraphy to-day. And it may be that Democritus, unable to reject the evidence for supernatural visions and prophetic dreams, invented this way of reconciling them with the atomic physics and psychology. Lucian (*Philopseudes*, 32), however, praises Democritus as the thinker whose adamantine faith in natural law rejects *a priori* the possibility of supernatural apparitions. And it is extremely probable that our authorities have given a superstitious colouring to some purely psychological theory of casual combinations of atoms finding their way into the mind. The interpretation of the prayer 'to meet with propitious visions' is

doubtful. In any case Democritus' daemons must not be confounded with the Epicurean gods who inhabit the interspaces of the worlds.

In contrast to these 'random speakers,' Aristotle (*Met.* 984^b 15) praises as the first sober utterance the proclamation of Anaxagoras (*q.v.*) that *νοῦς*, or reason, originally set in motion and reduced to order the indefinite homogeneity of chaos. But he concurs with Plato (*Phædo*, 98 f.) in the criticism that Anaxagoras failed to deduce the teleological applications of this principle and continued to explain all things by mere mechanism. In spite of this, attempts have been made to refer directly or indirectly to Anaxagoras the arguments from design attributed to Socrates in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (F. Dümmler, *Akademika*, Giessen, 1889, sect. vi.). However this may be, the Athenian jurors who voted for the exile or death of Pericles' philosophic friend saw in him the representative of atheistic science which dethroned Helios and Selene and pronounced the sun merely a red-hot stone. And Plato, both in the *Apology* (26 D) and in the *Laws* (967 C), makes regrettable concessions to this prejudice.

In the loss of the writings of the sophists, we cannot reconstruct in detail the history of the 5th cent. enlightenment. But from Euripides, Aristophanes, Thucydides, and Plato it is amply apparent that all the ideas and tendencies of what we call an 'age of transition' were present.

The national and local festivals, cults, shrines, and oracles, the religion of the dead, and the worship of heroes still retained their hold upon the people. The immense place occupied by these things in the history of Herodotus may be held to indicate that the crisis of the Persian wars temporarily stimulated the popular faith in the supernatural. But the mythology of Homer and Hesiod was no longer credible to educated men. It offended the developed ethical sense of the pious. It had never really met the needs of personal and emotional religion. In response to this need the 6th cent. had witnessed, side by side with the development of philosophic rationalism in Ionia, a revival or new birth of mysticism and enthusiasm associated with the names of Orpheus, Musæus, and Pythagoras, and the union in the Eleusinian mysteries of the worship of Demeter and Dionysus (cf. J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to Greek Religion*, p. 646 ff.). Modern critics style this movement a recrudescence of superstition or a spiritual awakening according as they are swayed by distaste for its irrational accompaniments or by sympathy for the underlying conceptions of salvation from sin, reconciliation with God through dramatized and emotional forms of worship, and faith in the revelation of a judgment after death.

The criticism of its fragmentary and doubtfully authentic literary remains must be left to the philological specialist (see Diels³, ii. 163 ff.; E. Abel, *Orphica*, Leipzig, 1885; E. W. Maas, *Orpheus*, Munich, 1895; Rohde, *Psyche*; Harrison, *Prolegomena*², p. 455 ff.).

The great extant poets of the first half of the 5th cent. are neither philosophical rationalists nor corybantic revivalists; they are conservative reformers. Their endeavour is to preserve and purify the essential spirit of reverence and religion rather than either to encourage or satirize superstition, or to display their ingenuity in the attack or the defence of the mythological letter. This is the temper of Pindar, Æschylus, Sophocles, and Simonides, whom Gomperz (*Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr., ii. 13) therefore calls 'trimmers' and Matthew Arnold 'prophets of the imaginative reason.' In the next generation, more consciously and philosophically, this is the temper of Plato.

Meanwhile the 'enlightenment' proceeds, de-

veloping every shade of critical and sceptical opinion. The chorus of Æschylus' *Agamemnon* (370) barely alludes to one who denied that the 'gods deigned to regard those by whom the sanctities of holy things were trodden under foot,' and the confident free-thinking of Sophocles' Jocasta seems to heighten, if not to motivate, the dramatic irony of the *dénouement*. But the disputatious personages of Euripides have all received the new education and, with little regard to dramatic verisimilitude or unity of æsthetic and religious impression, they bandy like shuttlecocks all the ideas which the philosophers, the mystics, or the sophists had put in circulation (P. Décharme, *Euripide et l'esprit de son théâtre*, Paris, 1893; A. W. Verrall, *Euripides the Rationalist*, Cambridge, 1895).

It is superfluous to demonstrate, after Grote, that the sophists (*q.v.*) were not a school of professed atheists, or that they often used conventional and edifying language about the gods. It is enough to observe that the general effect of their teaching was to unsettle the old bases of moral and religious conviction, while putting nothing in their place (Plato, *Rep.* 538 f.).

This was the practical outcome both of their philosophy of relativity and of a higher education devoted wholly to rhetoric and the plausible exploitation of opinion (H. von Arnim, *Dio*, Berlin, 1893-96, *Introd.*). In recognizing this fact and the reaction which it provoked in Plato, we need not apologize for their persecution by Athenian orthodoxy, or deny that their writings, if we possessed them, might reveal the elements of a constructive treatment of ethics and law on a purely scientific and positive basis. In fact, we have only fragments, titles, and conjectures. A treatise of Protagoras began with the words: 'Of the gods I cannot know that they are or that they are not' (Diels³, ii. 229). Tradition adds that the book was burned and the author exiled; and a fragment of Euripides' *Palamedes*, sometimes uncritically referred to Socrates, has been plausibly interpreted as an allusion to Protagoras (Gomperz, i. 440). In the Platonic dialogue which bears his name, however, Protagoras represents justice as the gift of Zeus to mankind, and says that man by reason of his divine kinship is the only animal who knows and worships gods. From this Gomperz (i. 449) infers that he doubted not the existence of the gods, but the alleged proofs of it. Similarly Prodicus, who speaks with edification of the gods in the apologue of the *Choice of Hercules*, attributed to him by Xenophon, is credited with a purely rationalistic theory of the origin of religion. Men personified and defied all that helped and hindered them (Diels³, ii. 274). From this it is but a step to the doctrine of Critias expounded in a fragment of the *Sisyphus* (Diels³, ii. 320). Religion is the invention of a prudent statesman who, perceiving that law restrains men only from open wrongdoing, devised the idea of gods who know our inmost thoughts and purposes. And in a similar vein a chorus of Euripides, while expressing scant faith in miracles, adds:

'But dreadful myths are conducive to the worship of the gods' (*Electra*, 743 f.).

'The younger wits teach,' says Plato, in effect (*Laws*, 889), 'that religion, ethics and law are late products of convention and do not belong to the nature of things.'

Law so analyzed ceases to coerce. The history of Thucydides exhibits naked human nature demoralized by war and pestilence and incoercible by any restraints human or divine. The intellectualism of the author views with cold contempt all appeals from the calculus of political forces to invisible and ideal realities. Or at any rate he represents this hard positivism as the prevailing temper of the age, and so prepares us to understand

the intensity of the reaction in Plato (see P. Shorey, 'Implicit Ethics and Psychology of Thucydides,' *Trans. of the American Philological Association*, 1893).

Of the religion of Socrates (*q.v.*) we know nothing except that he was condemned to die for corrupting the youth and introducing new gods, that he acknowledged the guidance of a familiar divine voice or inward monitor, and that by the testimony of Xenophon and Plato he worshipped the gods according to the law of the city and approved the consultation of the oracles in matters beyond the scope of human foresight. Xenophon's account is coloured by his apologetic purpose, and attributes to Socrates his own favourite beliefs and somewhat old-fashioned religiosity. The *δαίμωνιον* is a positive private oracle available for the practical concerns of friends, and not, as in Plato, the negative check of an inner spiritual tact. Socrates not only repudiates, as he does in the Platonic *Apology*, special doctrines of Anaxagoras, but holds that prying into the secrets of nature is offensive to the gods. And he elaborates the evidences of design in the cosmos and in the body of man, in discourses the details of which Xenophon may have transcribed from some follower of Anaxagoras or Diogenes of Apollonia (*Mem.* i. 4, iv. 3).

To the cheerful, conventional, and somewhat vague piety and the mainly ethical religion of Socrates, exhibited in his earlier dialogues, Plato (*q.v.*) adds as the years go on an ever-deepening aversion to the irreverent and irreligious spirit of the age. The feeling culminates in the formal refutation of materialistic atheism set forth in the tenth book of the *Laws*:

Religion is an essential bulwark of law and morality; no one who possesses a sound and vital faith in the gods can voluntarily sin. The conscious sinner must either deny their existence or their providence or believe that the divine justice can be corrupted by sacrifice or prayer. Atheism, however, is not always the offspring of licentiousness. It is in Athens the product of old books (886 Cff.) that teach false conceptions of the gods, or of new philosophies of nature that affirm that matter is the primal reality and that morality, law, and religion are not nature but art—secondary conventions of man. The argument from design is not in itself sufficient to refute this form of scepticism (880 A). It must be met by a demonstration that the first causes of motion, soul and the functions of soul, are necessarily prior in the order of nature to matter and its qualities. This principle established, we may remind the sceptic that atheism, a malady incident to pert youth, has never retained its hold on any man through life. Doubts as to the moral government of the world are to be cured by reflexion on our own insignificance and the small part of the total order which we behold. And the minute providence and unswerving justice of God may be deduced from the very idea of the divinity.

These pages contain the germs of all future theodicies, Stoic and Christian, from Cleanthes to Malebranche, Leibniz, Shaftesbury, and Pope. The honest sceptic who remains unconvinced by these arguments is confined five years in the House of Reformation and required to submit to instruction for the 'salvation of his soul.' If then still recalcitrant, he is put to death. This boutade is hardly to be taken seriously, though it has greatly agitated modern liberal Platonists such as Grote, Mill, and Gomperz. More significant is Plato's deliberate affirmation that the doctrine that the gods may be bribed by worship is worse than atheism. In the *Republic*, where the existence of the gods is assumed, the mythological religion of Homer is purified by theological canons to which all poets and teachers must conform: God is good and the author of good only (379 C; cf. Cleanthes' *Hymn*). God is unchanging and never deceives (380 f.). Plato will accept any 'accommodation' to popular religion that does not compromise essential ethical truth. In both the *Republic* (427) and the *Laws* (738 B-C) it is assumed that his city will have a polytheistic cult with temples, precincts, ritual, festivals, and hero-worship of good men

approved by Delphi. He himself speaks of the Hesiodic gods with thinly veiled irony in the *Timæus* (40f.), and in the *Phædrus* (246 C) pronounces the very notion of an immortal animal a figment of the imagination. It is not true, as matter-of-fact interpreters affirm, that he believed in the literal divinity of the sun and the moon. He insists only that this universal frame, of which their ordered motions are so conspicuous a part, is not without an author:

'Either the soul which moves the sun . . . resides within the circular and visible body . . . or the soul provides herself with an external body . . . or thirdly she guides the sun by some wonderful power. . . . And this soul of the sun . . . whether taking the sun about in a chariot . . . or acting from without, or in whatever way, ought by every man to be deemed a god' (*Laws*, 898 E-899).

From this the Neo-Platonists easily deduced three solar divinities. But the plain meaning is that Plato would rather leave the people their naive faith in Helios and his chariot than have them imbibe virtual atheism from Anaxagoras' teaching that the sun is merely a red-hot stone. His temper is that of Matthew Arnold telling us that, 'compared with Professor Clifford, Messrs. Moody and Sankey are masters of the philosophy of history' (*God and the Bible*, London, 1894, p. x). His religion, if not the 'religion of all sensible men,' is that of all cultured latitudinarians from Plutarch to Schleiermacher and Matthew Arnold himself. He is not a dogmatic monotheist only because his 'accommodations' are to Greek polytheism and not to historical Christianity. He employs theistic language in the fluid rhetorical manner of Seneca and Emerson. His God is in ethics the transcendental sanction of morality, and in cosmogony the limited deity of Mill's posthumous essays—a demiurgic principle of order and harmony contending with recalcitrant 'necessity.' It is customary, however, to connect Plato's theology more closely with his metaphysics than is here done. God is identified with the idea of good or with the One (see Shorey, 'The Idea of Good in Plato's Republic,' *University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology*, i. 183, n. 2; T. Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*, Cambridge, 1901, p. 37). The goodness of God is the first canon of theology, and the Demiurgus transforms chaos to cosmos out of his ungrudging goodness (*Tim.* 29 E; Boethius, *Cons. Phil.* i. 8: 'insita summi forma boni'). It is entirely possible, then, that in mystical or emotional passages the 'good' in Plato may be intended to suggest God. But the idea of good has a definite logical meaning for ethics and politics (see SUMMUM BONUM), and it is confounding two different lines of thought to identify it with God. So of the One. The absolute metaphysical unity of the *Parmenides* resembles both the supreme god and the pure being of the ideas in that it is ineffable and admits no predicates unless it be 'existence.' But the identification of this One with Plato's God in Neo-Platonic speculation is wholly uncritical. To metaphysics also belongs the 'problem' of evil. God being the author of good only, evil must be derived from metaphysical (*Theæt.* 176 A) or from physical necessity (*Tim.* 48). The *Politicus* describes mythical cycles in which the world is guided alternately by God and, in reverse motion, by innate desire (272 E). A passage of the *Laws* (896 E) admits the Manichean conception of an evil world-soul side by side with the good, and this is accepted by Plutarch as the authentic teaching of Plato. The freedom of the will is treated by Plato ethically, not metaphysically or theologically. 'Virtue is free' (*Rep.* 617 E), but vice is involuntary (see *AJP* x. [1889] 77). For the purposes of legislation he is a determinist (*Laws*, 861-864 C). Immortality is a rational hope (see Shorey, *The Unity of Plato's Thought*, Chicago, 1903, p. 41). The eschatological

myths of the *Gorgias*, *Phædo*, and *Republic* serve to confirm the hope and as supplementary sanctions of ethics (J. A. Stewart, *The Myths of Plato*, London, 1905). Immortality is 'proved' in the *Phædo* and *Republic* by supersubtle dialectic and in the *Phædrus* by the same argument that establishes the existence of the gods in the *Laws*—the priority of soul as the first cause of motion. The doctrine of daemons—first appearing in Hesiod, and elaborated by Xenocrates, Plutarch, the Christian Fathers, and the Neo-Platonists—is for Plato a mythological fancy (*Symp.* 202 E). Lastly, the ever-recurrent gloss that the ideas are thoughts of God is merely a plausible evasion of the difficulty of recognizing more than one form of absolute being, and a convenient syncretistic device for reconciling Plato with Aristotle.

That Aristotle (q.v.), like Shakespeare, recognized religion as a great fact, and that he paid formal respect to the established cult, hardly need be said (Dèclarme, p. 233; Zeller, *Aristotle*, Eng. tr., London, 1897, ii. 334 n.). His lost dialogues, composed under Plato's influence, dealt with the immortality of the soul (*Eudemus*) and the truths of natural religion. The origin of the belief in gods was traced to the phenomena of dreams and enthusiasm, and the argument from design was illustrated in a brilliant passage quoted by Cicero (*de Nat. Deor.* ii. 37). In the extant writings, however, there is little of Plato's unction, and nothing of Plato's fervent preoccupation with the reform of religion and its defence against the scepticism of the age. Personal immortality is nowhere affirmed (Zeller, ii. 133 f.), and, while the universal belief of mankind from of old is accepted as confirmation of abstract theism (*de Caelo*, i. iii. 6, ii. 12, *Met.* 1074^b), the 'rest,' he says almost in the tone of Critias, 'is mythical addition for the persuasion of the multitude and as a useful aid to the laws.' Aristotle's own 'scientific theism' (Zeller, i. 399) is an inference from his theory of the soul, his metaphysics, and his theory of the heavens. The key to his philosophy is the recognition of the irreconcilable conflict in his thought between empirical postulates and Platonic principles. The psychology of the logical works and of the *Parva Naturalia* is inductive and sensation-alistic. Both the conceptual major premisses and the highest regulative 'principles' of syllogizing are derived by (a perhaps unconscious) induction from the impressions and memory-images of sense. The highest reason (*νοῦς*) is in fact practically identical with this faculty of generalizing induction peculiar to man. The *de Anima* rests the possibility of a separable soul (not the mere entelechy of an organic body) on the existence of a thought that is not thus dependent on sense, or on images derived from sense. As the analysis proceeds, this problematical thought is hunted from chamber to chamber of the subdivided soul, and finally takes refuge with the active intellect, which in the very act of thinking converts the passive intellect or potentiality of ideas into the direct contemplation of them. We may still ask whether the active intellect is anything more than a paraphrase for 'man thinking' and whether images of sense are not still the indispensable matter of the passive and, by consequence, of the active intellect. But, whatever our interpretation of the third book of the *de Anima*, there emerges from it the vague notion of a separable pure activity of thought, whether personal or pantheistic. So in the metaphysical theory of the universal. The empiric Aristotle rejected the Platonic ideas *in toto*: the universal does not exist before the particular, but in it, and is drawn thence by the inductive *νοῦς*. This suffices for logic and ethics. But Aristotle is unable or unwilling to apply this anti-Platonic

view consistently to the ultimate problems of metaphysics. The name 'first essences' (substances), no longer reserved for individual things, is now sometimes applied to abstract ideas. The universal, the abstract, the 'first essence,' is the 'form,' or actualization, the union of which with matter or potentiality is the particular. A doctrine of associationist nominalism might conceivably be stated in this terminology. But the scorned Platonism takes its revenge, and leads Aristotle in his search for the absolute to postulate a form divorced from matter—an actuality correlative to no potentiality. We need not ask whether this actuality belongs to certain ideas only or to all universals taken as pure abstract essences. We have at any rate the problematical conception of the absolute and unrelated existence of ideas, forms, or thoughts. Lastly, in his theory of the world Aristotle postulated an eternal finite order in opposition to the infinite series and the cosmic evolutions of the pro-Socratics. He is sometimes called an evolutionist. But this is a misconception or an equivocation. Every individual thing, institution, and art-form is indeed for him the highest development contained in its germ. But the germ itself is a product not of evolution, but of an antecedent perfected individual. His mind was closed to any conception of development which presented the picture of a different world from that which he had constructed. The chain of causation is limited by a finite space and a fixed eternal order. Within this order all changes are confined to the region below the moon, and are caused by the great revolution of the heaven and the obliquity of the ecliptic. The cause of these is the first and ultimate cause. Operating eternally and unweariedly, it cannot be material. It is pure actuality unmingled with potentiality. The convergence of these three lines of thought in the idea of God is indicated and assumed rather than explicitly stated in the *Ethics* and *Metaphysics*. God is pure thought and pure activity. His bliss from everlasting is the happiness of the thinker in the rare moments of highest contemplation (*Met.* 1072^b, *Eth. Nic.* 1178^b). The content of this thought is Himself—the pure essences of the thoughts that constitute Him. There is nothing else that He could think without derogation and subordination of the thinker to the purpose of his thought (*Met.* 1074^b 34). The universe is a harmonious whole, and, as Homer says, 'the rule of many is not good. Let one be ruler' (*ib.* 1076^a 4). The mode of God's operation on the world may be illustrated by love (*ib.* 1072^b 3). The beloved object moves, though unmoved itself, by the power of desire in the lover. God is the prime mover because He is the *primum amabile*. He is, in Dante's phrase, 'L'amor che move il solo e l'altre stelle' (*Paradiso*, xxxiii. 145). This is Aristotle's theism. Neo-Platonic syncretism identified it with Platonism by the interpretation that the Platonic ideas are the thoughts of God. To trace its further influence on mystic and speculative theology would exceed our limits. Nor can we do more than glance at the difficulties that it presents (*Cicero, de Nat. Deor.* i. 13). What is the relation of God, who moves the outer heavens, to the independent motor principles assumed to explain the movements of the planets? What ground is there beyond the system-building instinct for identifying the first cause of physical movement with the active intellect of the *de Anima*, or that with the 'first essences' of the ideas? Is God ignorant of particulars? Aristotle implies that He does not love man as man loves Him—the disproportion is too great (*Eth. Nic.* 1138^b 35). If His operation ceases with the rotation of the heavens, how can benevolent design be attributed to Him or to nature? But to ask these questions is to confine all metaphysical

theology within the limits set by the empirical understanding.

The post-Aristotelian philosophies are of more significance for the diffusion than for the origination of ideas. In the age of Epicurus and Menander the mythological religion of the city-State retained so little vitality that the populace of Athens could lodge a Demetrios in the Parthenon and welcome him to the city with a hymn that contrasted his present divinity with the dubious gods who dwell afar or heed us not. There remained for the populace foreign superstitions, mysteries, and coterie cults (*P. Foucart, Des Associations religieuses chez les Grecs*, Paris, 1873), and for the educated class moral philosophy, vague poetic religiosity, or scepticism. The comparison of Alexander to Bacchus, who also conquered India, and the various apotheoses of his successors provoked a formulation of scepticism which is of slight philosophy, but of considerable historical significance. About the middle of the 3rd cent. Euhemerus published his tale of the island of Panchaia, and the 'sacred inscription' there discovered in which Zeus and all the house of Kronos are revealed as mortal kings deified by the gratitude or fears of their subjects. Euhemerus may have been, as Gruppe suggests, a mere romancing precursor of Lucian. But Euhemerism became for Greek sceptics, their Roman disciples (Ennius translated the book), the Christian Fathers, and the rationalizing philology of the 18th cent. a favourite 'key to all mythologies.' A second school of scepticism was the New Academy, which provided a convenient formula for noble Roman augurs who punctiliously performed every ceremony of the cult that made Rome great, but dismissed the dogmatic affirmations of natural theology with a smile (*Cicero, de Nat. Deor.* i. 22). But in the popular estimate the great school of irreligion was the Epicurean. The extant fragments of Epicurus manifest little of the passionate hatred of superstition which animates his Roman disciple, Lucretius. Yet it is perhaps implied in the reiterated affirmation that the only use of physics is to free us from the terrors of false religion. These terrors could not have been very real if we may accept Cicero's assertion that no old woman any longer feared the mythological hell from which the Epicureans promise to deliver us (*Tusc. Quest.* i. 21). Cicero also makes merry with the ingenious theory of faintant gods possessing a *quasi-corpus* and inhabiting the *intermundia* (*de Nat. Deor.* i. 28). And it is probable that few Epicureans took it seriously, though some found it a convenient defence against the charge of atheism, while to others it provided a refuge for the idealizing imagination and an object for the natural instinct of worship. Real impiety, they said, consists not in rejecting the gods of the vulgar, but in thinking unworthily of the divine. True and disinterested worship could be paid only to the gods of Epicurus,

'who haunt
The lucid interspace of world and world,—

Nor sound of human sorrow mounts to mar
Their sacred everlasting calm'

(Tennyson, *Lucretius*).

And thus they too composed formal treatises 'on piety' (Gomperz, *Philodemus περὶ εὐσεβείας*, Leipzig, 1886). But for all later antiquity the Epicureans, as opposed to the Stoics and Platonists, remained the great irreligious school of philosophy. If they did not reject the existence, they denied the providence, of the gods, which for emotional and practical religion amounted to the same thing. Lucian's Platonists, Stoics, and Pythagoreans treat them as pariahs, and his religious charlatans incite the populace against the atheists, the Christians, and the Epicureans.

Stoicism (*q.v.*) in the course of its secular development became all things to all men. The pantheistic world-god, the artisan fire working in the veins of all creation, could be virtually identified with the Platonic soul of the world, or could be described in the language of purest monotheism. The allegorical method whereby the gods of the mythology could be interpreted as parts, aspects, or functions of 'Zeus' or 'nature' veiled prudent accommodations, contented genuine, if not very perspicacious, orthodoxy, and gratified the permanent instinct of ingenious exegesis. Personal immortality, while not strictly compatible with the theory, was not explicitly denied. A temporary survival was sometimes conceded to great souls until the expiration of the cycle and the reabsorption of all things in the fiery world-god. This enabled Stoic writers of consolations (as, *e.g.*, Seneca) to portray the future bliss of the liberated soul as vividly as their Platonic rivals. The designation of the fiery world-god as Zeus, Providence, Destiny, Nature, the λόγος, made every topic of religious rhetoric or philosophic theodicies available to the long series of Stoic authors from Zeno to Cornutus who wrote on religion or on 'the nature of the gods.' In addition to this, Stoicism was an ethical religion tinged with 'cosmic emotion.' It became the expression of an absolute faith in divine providence and manly resignation to the order of nature that, however fatalistic in expression, never paralyzed the will. Of this ethical gospel the chief texts still vital for edification are the *Hymn* of Cleanthes (translated as a psalm in W. Pater's *Plato and Platonism*, London, p. 42), the *Letters* of Seneca, the diatribes of Epictetus, and the *Meditations* of Marcus Aurelius, which have been hyperbolically praised as the absolute religion—that which results from the sole fact of a high human consciousness face to face with the world (Renan, *Marc-Aurèle*, Paris, 1885, p. 272). But in these later developments Stoicism was already tinged with Platonism; and, with the revival of Greek literature in the second half of the 1st cent., Platonism tended more and more to become the religion of all educated men who did not adopt Christianity. This Platonizing religion has three forms.

(1) In the later Stoics it is the gospel of Socrates as set forth in the *Gorgias*, *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phædo*. The only certain good is the virtuous will. There is no terror for the wise man in the roar of the mob or the threats of the tyrant. For he is strong in the faith that Anytus and Meletus may kill him, but cannot harm him (*Apol.* 30 C). He is by definition a rational animal, and can obey no other principle in his soul but the voice of reason. Though he has good hope of immortality, he does not require that assurance to live and die secure in the conviction that the gods will permit 'no harm to come to a good man here or there.' These and similar Socratic sayings constantly quoted by Epictetus are the chief texts of all his preaching. The life of Socrates, he tells us, is proposed to us as a pattern, and in temptation or doubt we need ask only: What would Socrates have done?

(2) The more literary and avowed Platonists, of whom Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, and Maximus of Tyre are the types, harp less insistently on these chief notes, and are more broadly interested in the Platonic philosophy as a whole—its refutation of materialism, its demonstration of the fundamentals of natural religion, its tolerance of all cults, its idealization of all symbols that can be dissociated from immoral suggestions. Plutarch toys with mysticism and allegory and his doctrine of daemons, but his personal religion is that of the broad church literary man who believes in God, hopes

for immortality, and, whether in the Roman empire or in the parliament of religions, deems it more edifying to dwell on the underlying unity of the religious spirit than with a Lucian or an Ingersoll on the incredibility of the mythological letter. And this, if we read between the lines, is the religion of Dio's discourse on the first idea of God, and of Maximus of Tyre's discussion of the lawfulness of image-worship.

(3) To a third type of mind the mystical and metaphysical side of Plato appeals most strongly. Beginning with the Neo-Pythagorean revival (see NEO-PYTHAGOREANISM), this form of Platonism developed until as Neo-Platonism (*q.v.*) it became the chief philosophy and religion of paganism in its final struggle with Christianity. Historically it is a form of Platonism; psychologically it is the expression of at least three permanent instincts and tendencies of the human mind: (a) thaumaturgy and the lower mysticism; (b) the higher mysticism and the delight in symbolism, allegory, and the ingenious exposition of sacred texts; (c) the dialectical analysis of the ultimate ontological presuppositions of religion.

(a) Superstition and miracle-mongering remain the same in every age and still conjure with the names of Plato and Pythagoras. We cannot stop to discuss the forged literature of Neo-Pythagoreanism or to describe the miracles of Apollonius of Tyana (*q.v.*), of the charlatans satirized by Lucian, and of the degenerate successors of Plotinus. It is to be noted, however, that the higher mysticism of the best writers was less infected with concrete superstition than we should infer from their language.

(b) The allegorical interpretation of sacred texts was a literary form common to the Stoics, Philo Judæus, and the Platonists, and by them transmitted to the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. It is incompatible with sound philological criticism, but not necessarily with sane and elevated morality or severe and ingenious dialectic. It is essentially the same whether applied to the text of Homer, the OT, or Plato; and the patient reader will find that in Philo, Plutarch, and Plotinus it is merely the fantastic garb of a Platonizing natural religion, associated with acute metaphysical speculations and accommodations to the symbols of historic paganism. To set forth Philo's doctrine of the λόγος, Plutarch's theory of the daemons and the evil world-soul, and the trinity of Plotinus exceeds our scope (see ALEXANDRIAN THEOLOGY, LOGOS, PLUTARCH, NEO-PLATONISM). One thought derived from the *Timæus* dominates Neo-Platonic theology. It is the idea that the ineffable supreme God delegated the work of creation (or a part of it) to His inferior ministers. In later developments these divinities in turn are elevated above contact with 'base matter' by a similar delegation to beings below them. Creation is further conceived as a timeless overflow and emanation of the plenitude of being, as the going forth of one that 'remains' (μένει, μόνη), as the radiance of a light that loses nothing by communicating itself. The application of these ideas by the allegorical method to the divinities of the Greek pantheon and the abstractions of Platonic metaphysics yields the various orders and hierarchies of gods, daemons, and angels multiplied by the piety and ingenuity of successive generations of Gnostics and Platonists. And in the lower plane of the 'surnatural particulier' the worship of these deities suggested or veiled theurgy and miracle-mongering. How far the successors of Plotinus yielded to this weakness is a difficult question. There are traces of it in Iamblichus, the emperor Julian, and Proclus. But the stories told by Eunapius are to be received with caution.

Even in his account the students are always clamouring for a miracle, while the professors evade the test. Julian combated Christianity as the irreconcilable enemy of the mythology that had created Greek art and literature and the cult that had built up the empire of Rome. Their interpretation as allegories of Neo-Platonic philosophemes satisfied his heart and his imagination. But the rhetoric of his discourses on Apollo and the Mother of the Gods is perhaps no more to be taken literally than that of Renan's prayer to Athens on the Acropolis.

(c) However this may be, the more philosophic Neo-Platonists continued to speculate on the relations of the unknown God to the highest terms of Platonism—the Demiurgus, the One, the Good. Greek subtlety easily proved that these and all terms of human speech connote limitations and relations that cannot properly be predicated of the ultimate and absolute. God can be described only in negations, which, however, are to be understood in a honorific and not in a privative sense. As Thomas Browne puts it, 'Nothing can be said hyperbolically of God' (*Christian Morals*, pt. iii. sect. 2 [*Works*, ed. C. Sayle, London, 1904-07, iii. 483]; cf. Plato, *Rep.* 509). The outcome of this line of speculation is Damascius's doctrine of the unknowable, which differs only in its superior subtlety and consistency from that of Herbert Spencer. The predicate of unity, at least, he exclaims, is never denied by Plato. But even unity is in human speech a relative idea, and, as the *Parmenides* shows, transforms itself into multiplicity under close inspection. We cannot name or define God at all. We are conscious only of a travail of soul—*ôôis* (cf. *Rep.* 490 B). This is the end of Greek philosophy.

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PAUL SHOREY.

PHILOSOPHY (Iranian).—It has been asserted by more than one competent scholar that Buddhism is not, strictly speaking, a religion, but a philosophy. Conversely, it may be maintained with still greater reason that Mazdeism, or the national cult of the ancient Iranian people and their descendants, is not a philosophy, but a religion. To put it otherwise, the Mazdean system, at least in its earlier forms, is a pure theology, which interests itself not at all with philosophical speculation. This has been well put by the most recent Parsi writer, M. N. Dhalla:

'The religious system of Zoroaster is theological rather than philosophical. . . . Philosophy attempts to give a rational solution, based on human observation and experimentation, of various problems, which religion claims to solve on the authority of prophetic revelation. . . . Religion has fixed canons, binding traditions. Its tendency is to put a lasting stamp on the doctrines for all times. It rests upon the teachings of a prophet, and nourishes them as an unchangeable heritage. Philosophy, on the other hand, progresses with the times, and ever encourages fresh inquiry. It always revolts from every kind of dogmatic teaching. . . . The utilitarian genius of the Persians led them to disparage metaphysical speculation as a vain attempt at the impracticable. Religion should be such that its ideals can be applied to our workaday world. Its

teachings should be applicable to the exigencies of daily life. . . . This is the characteristic of Zoroastrianism through its very simplicity' (*Zoroastrian Theology*, pp. 356-359).

These sentences express excellently the very genius both of the Mazdean faith and of the Iranian habit of mind. The ancient Iranian thinkers seem not to have troubled their minds at all with such problems of being or knowledge as underlie the Indian concepts of *māyā*, *karma*, *ātman*, *samsāra* ('metempsychosis'), *nirvāṇa*, and the like. Indeed, few things are more surprising than the direct opposition which exists between the mental attitudes of the two most closely connected of all the members of the great Indo-European family—the Indian and the Iranian. The former, as is well known, is distinguished among all other peoples by its ineradicable love of metaphysical speculation, its groping after and brooding over the most abstruse problems of being, of knowledge, of psychology, as well as by its endless multiplication of philosophical schools; for, as Dhalla observes, 'there are as many philosophies as there are philosophers,' and 'these come and go, and with them the cradle of the speculative thought is ever swinging to and fro' (p. 357). The inevitable tendency of the Indian philosophizing is towards pantheism or monism, on the intellectual side, and towards pessimism, on the moral side. The Iranian tendency is the very opposite. Against the Indian pessimism we must set the irrepressible optimism of the Iranian mind. To the Indian thinker existence itself is an evil, and all his spiritual philosophy is directed towards deliverance from an endless series of re-births by a final cessation of all conscious personal existence, or even of existence itself. The Iranian looks for the full enjoyment of an active life here and a still happier continuance of life, conscious and intelligent, beyond the tomb. Against Indian pantheism is set the monotheism of the Mazdean system, tempered as it is in a peculiar way by a dualistic tendency (see DUALISM [Iranian]).

1. Earlier times.—In the Avesta itself, whether in its older or in its more recent strata, it is difficult to lay hold of anything that may be strictly called philosophical speculation, if by philosophy we understand, according to the definition of one authority, 'the science of the principles of being and of knowledge.' The Avestan system is presented frankly as a revelation from a supreme intellect to the human mind and heart. In the *Gāthās*, indeed, there are broodings and speculative questions concerning fundamental verities and moral problems. But they are all referred for solution, as in the ninth *Gāthā*, to the divine giver of revelation ('This I ask thee, tell me truly, Ahura' [*Yasna*, xliii. 1]).

(a) *Being*.—As regards the problem of being, the Avestan teaching is simplicity itself. Ahura Mazda is the one supreme eternal being, the creator of both worlds, the world of spirit and the world of matter. It is not necessary to dwell upon this first dualism of 'the two worlds,' but mention must be made of that other dualism which, at least in the later stages of Avestan development, so curiously modifies the characteristic monotheism of the Mazdean belief—the problem of the origin of evil. In the art. DUALISM (Iranian) the present writer has already set forth what seems the only tenable view of Zoroastrian dualism, and, although modern Parsis and even several Western scholars vehemently deny that Mazdeism is dualistic, he finds that the high priest, M. N. Dhalla, so often quoted, is at one with him in his interpretation of the theology in both the Avestan and the later periods. Dhalla writes:

'The arch-fiend who disputes the kingdom on earth with the Holy Spirit, Spenta Mainyu, or with Ahura Mazda, who intro-

duces discord and death in the world, who strives to thwart the purposes of God, is Angra Mainyu, or the Evil Spirit. *He does not owe his existence to the Good Spirit. He is independent. Consequently he is co-eternal and co-existent, if not co-eternal with the godhead* (p. 48).¹

Moreover, this rival spirit has one distinct attribute of divinity in that he also is a creator. Not only moral and physical evils of all kinds, but also evil beings, whether demons (*daēvas*) or noxious animals (*xrafstras*), are his creatures. This dualistic teaching is the Mazdean solution of the perennial problem of the origin of evil. It has ever been one of the difficulties of reconciling the Avestan religious system with that of the Achæmenid kings, as preserved in their inscriptions, that there is apparently in the latter no mention of a dualistic creation or creator. Auramazda holds precisely the position of his namesake in the Avesta, i.e. that of supreme deity, creating and ruling all his creation by his free will (*vasnā*). Latterly, however, J. H. Moulton (*Early Zoroastrianism*, London, 1913) has suggested, not without plausibility, that the Angra Mainyu of the sacred books actually appears in the inscriptions under the term *Drauga*, meaning literally 'the Lie,' perhaps personified.

(b) *Asha*.—There is one transcendental concept in Mazdeism which suggests analogy with an Indian one—that of *Asha* (Old Pers. *Arta*), most frequently personified as the genius *Asha*, one of the Amesha Spentas, or archangels of Ahura Mazda's court. There is no doubt that we have here a concept which Dhalla rightly calls 'basic' in the system, and which corresponds even etymologically with the Sanskrit *ṛta*, or, again, is akin to *dharma*, i.e. the 'right order' both in the physical and in the moral universe—whether or not conceived as independent of the divine will it is difficult to determine. In the Avesta, whether as an abstract or as a personified name, *Asha* is almost exclusively conceived in the moral sense, as 'righteousness,' 'holiness,' the 'justice' of both the OT and the NT.

(c) *Fravashis*.—The only other Avestan concept which gives rise to some degree of direct philosophical speculation, especially in the later writings, is that of the mysterious *fravashis* (q.v.). These enigmatical beings have played a widely diversified part in the Zoroastrian system, and one which has constantly varied at different periods. As we find them, at least in the post-Gāthic period, they are something very different from the other spiritual beings of Ahura Mazda's celestial court. Whatever be their origin, whether originally conceived as spirits of the dead, or from whatever other source, there is little doubt that in the Later Avestan system they were conceived as celestial archetypes and antetypes of all good beings, somewhat after the style of the Platonic *idéas*.

'The Fravashis constitute a world of homonyms of the earthly creations, and they have lived as conscious beings in the empyrean with Ahura Mazda from all eternity. The multifarious objects of this world are so many terrestrial duplicates of these celestial originals. The Fravashis constitute the internal essence of things, as opposed to the contingent and accidental. Earthly creations are so many imperfect copies of these perfect types. The Fravashis are not mere abstractions of thought, but have objective existence and work as spiritual entities in heaven, like the angels and archangels, until they come down to this earth voluntarily, as we may infer through later statements in the Pahlavi texts. They migrate to this world, and are immanent in the particular bodies that come into being after their divine images. Everything that bears the hall-mark of belonging to this good creation has its Fravashi. Every object which has a name, common or proper, is endowed with a Fravashi. Ahura Mazda, the father of all existence, has his Fravashi, and so have the Amesha Spentas and the Yazatas. Even the sky, waters, earth, plants, animals, and all objects of this kingdom of goodness, are not without their

special Fravashis. Thus beginning from the supreme godhead down to the tiniest shrub growing in the wilderness, every object has this divine element implanted in it. It is only Angra Mainyu and the demons, who are evil by nature, that are without it' (Dhalla, p. 143f.). Moreover, 'when a child is born its Fravashi that has existed from all eternity now comes down to this earth as the higher double of this child's soul' (p. 144).

The latter concept strangely recalls one of the curious conceits of Maeterlinck in *The Blue Bird*.

(d) *Daēna*.—The last-quoted teaching forms the bridge by which to pass over from what we may term the ontology to the psychology of the Avestan teaching. Indeed, in so far as psychology is concerned with the analysis of the component elements of the non-material part of the human compound, Iranian thought seems to have been much addicted to such analysis at all epochs. As W. Geiger puts it, the psychology of the Avesta cannot be called either simple or primitive, but presupposes a certain amount of philosophical speculation.

'It is based upon the observation that man's spiritual activity expresses itself in manifold ways and that hence there exist in man a multiplicity of forces, each of which has its individual limited sphere of action. Moreover [this doctrine] is a specific product of the Iranian mind and scarcely admits any fundamental connexion with pre-existing conceptions and doctrines' (*Ostiränische Kultur im Altertum*, p. 293).

In the Avesta we find four or five such spiritual powers referred to. Of one of these, the enigmatical *fravashi*, we have spoken above. A scarcely less enigmatical term is that of *daēna*. In one sense this term indicates 'religion,' specifically the true faith, the Mazdean faith, like the Persian and Arabic *dīn*. But, in another and quite different sense, it is one of the human faculties, and is generally translated by modern scholars as 'conscience' (Moulton, 'self'). It has this peculiarity, which it shares with the *fravashi*, that it would appear to be, if not pre-existent, at least to some extent independent of the individual soul, and to live on after the dissolution of death. Moreover, as Moulton points out, perhaps a crucial difference between the two elements lies in the fact that the bad man as well as the good man has a *daēna*.

The conception was probably suggested to Zarathushtra by his own philosophic analysis of man's personality: if he knew of the *fravashi*, apart from its connexion with ancestor-spirits, he presumably used another word to emphasize the fact that each man had his own individual responsibility, and an immortal ego within him which would pass on to weal or woe. The *fravashi* was too much entangled with mythology to suit him, and he had no use for a system which would not apply to all men' (Moulton, p. 264).

Geiger, on the other hand, looks upon the *daēna* as a kind of divine force, existing eternally, which cannot be affected in any way by the sins of man or by his death, though still able to exercise an influence on the soul after death. In a well-known allegory, perhaps the most beautiful passage in the Avesta, the *daēna* is presented in a manner somewhat reminiscent of the Indian *karma*.

The soul (*urvan*), wandering for three days after death, on the third day meets (in the case of the just soul) a wondrously beautiful maiden, stately, robust, and graceful, who in reply to his question declares, 'I am thine own good thoughts, words, and deeds, thy *daēna*': and, when he asks her, 'Who hath made thee so great and fair?', the damsel replies that it is the man's own good life, his good thoughts, words, and deeds that have made her grow in greatness and beauty; and then proceeds to lead him into the celestial abode. The wicked soul similarly wanders for three days, but we do not find it meeting its *daēna*, at least in the Avestan texts, though in the later Pahlavi traditions a hideous old hag is represented as replacing the beautiful maiden described above. Possibly the latter conception has been excogitated subsequently for the sake of symmetry, as it does not appear at all in harmony with the original conception of the *daēna* (see *Vendidad*, xix. 20-34, and *Yasht*, xxii.).

(e) *Urvan*, *baodah*, and *ahū*.—Apart from the two powers or faculties so far described, we have the *urvan*, which seems to correspond specifically to our English word 'soul' (Dhalla, 'the ego proper, the real I-ness' [p. 144]). It is a moral power, by which man exercises his free choice

¹ Italics are the present writer's. On p. 88 Dhalla speaks of the 'highly developed type of dualism of the Younger Avestan period.'

between good and evil; it shares with the following element his responsibility, and so must undergo judgment and consequent reward or punishment after death. The *baodah* appears to indicate 'consciousness,' or perhaps 'intelligence,' and shares the responsibility of the *urvan*. Lastly, the *ahū* in its most general sense seems to mean 'life' or 'vital force' (or again 'nature'), which apparently comes into being with the body and perishes with it, and thus ranks as the lowest among spiritual faculties (see Geiger, p. 299 f.).

(f) *Man*.—The ethical conception of man in the Mazdean system through all epochs is clear and simple. Placed by the creative act of a supreme power in a universe in which exist both good and evil, whether in the moral or in the physical order, man has the power of choice—as we should say, free will—and according as he chooses and works in this life for the one or the other of these opposing forces he will have his reward or punishment, his happiness or misery, in the heaven of Ahura Mazda or in the hell of Angra Mainyu, in the former case at least, for all eternity. But here we touch upon a purely theological topic which need not be further pursued.

2. Later times.—During the post-Avestan times variously known as the mediæval, patristic, or Pahlavi epoch—or, to be more definite, the Sasanian and post-Sasanian periods—a considerable amount of philosophical speculation appears in Zoroastrian literature. This is only natural, for it is well-known that Greek philosophers played no inconsiderable part at the royal court of Persia. Hence Greek speculation must to some extent have leavened the Iranian mind, and, indeed, we have many traces of this in the religious literature of the epoch. We have, moreover, direct evidence of it in the Syriac writings of Paul the Persian, who flourished at the court of the greatest of the Sasanid kings, Khosrau Anosheravan (more commonly known as Chosroes the Great, A.D. 531–578).

'There are some,' Paul writes, 'who believe in only one God; others claim that he is not the only God; some teach that he possesses contrary qualities; others say that he does not possess them; some admit that he is omnipotent; others deny that he has power over everything. Some believe that the world and everything therein have been created; others think that all things are not created. And there are some who maintain that the world has been made *ex nihilo*; according to others (God) has drawn it from a *ἄλγ* (pre-existing matter)' (Paulus Persa, *Logica*, fol. 56 [ap. J. P. N. Land, *Anecdota Syriaca*, iv., Leyden, 1870]).

It might be suspected that in this passage, amidst general remarks on philosophical theories, Paul was speaking of the various doctrines scattered over the world, especially as he was a Christian and had studied the Greek philosophers in the schools of Nisibis or Jondishāpūr. But it must be remembered that the writer is directly addressing King Khosrau and quoting details which must have been familiar to him. It is therefore more probable that the author is describing opinions current in his time in the bosom of the Mazdean religion itself, and the existence of numerous schools of thought at the time is also manifest from the *Mainōg-i-Xrat* (i. 17). But, apart from Greek influences, this diversity of doctrine is a necessary consequence of the Zoroastrian dualism itself. This dogma, as we have seen, teaches the existence of an evil principle, distinct from and independent of the good principle—i.e. God, as we should say. Now this conception of the co-existence of two eternal principles, distinct from each other and possessing independent powers, is as repugnant to the human mind as polytheism itself. Sooner or later the mind will push its theories further until it finds repose in an original unity of principle. If this is generally true, how much more so for the Iranian mind, so passionately fond of systematization? Different schools had recourse to different

means of evading the difficulty. Some found the solution in a pre-existing indifferent and immutable being, from whom are derived both the good and the evil principles—a source of being, rather than a personal being, an eternal, divine source, an *Ur-gottheit*, as Spiegel calls it. This is Zrvan Akarana, 'Unlimited Time,' not infrequently confounded with destiny or fate. It is he who has begotten both Aūharmazd and Ahriman. This system is therefore monotheistic. Other philosophers maintain that the primeval principle is Aūharmazd himself, and attribute to him the two spirits, one good, the other evil. In this hypothesis God 'possesses contrary qualities,' according to the expression of Paul the Persian. As regards the Pahlavi writings, we seem to find in the *Dinkart* a real monotheism, possibly developed under Christian or Jewish influences; on the contrary, in the *Mainōg-i-Xrat* destiny and eternity play a preponderating part. Finally, in the *Ulamā-i-Islām*, a small treatise of much later date, it is said that some consider Ahriman as a reprobate angel, but we do not know that this Christian idea can be traced to Sasanian times. Generally speaking, it is not easy to distinguish time (Zrvan) from destiny. The Armenian writer Eznik, a contemporary of the Sasanids in the 5th cent., writes:

'When there was as yet nothing, say the Magi, neither heaven nor earth, there existed a certain Zervan, whose name, when translated, signifies Fortune or Glory' (tr. ap. J. A. Gattegrius, *L'Arménie et les Arméniens*, Paris, 1882, p. 40).

Here Zrvan and destiny (Bakht) seem to be identical, as Theodore of Mopsuestia also affirms (Zapovēd . . . *δν καὶ Τυχὴν καλεῖ* [ὁ Ζαπάδης], ap. Photius, *Bibliotheca*, ed. Berlin, 1824–25, p. 63). The *Mainōg-i-Xrat*, as just said, develops this doctrine of eternity and destiny. Sometimes, however, they are separated.

'The affairs of the world all proceed through Destiny and Time and through the supreme decree of the self-existing Eternity, the king and lord of Long Time' (xxvii. 10).

Elsewhere it is said of Zrvan Akarana:

'He is imperishable and immortal; he is without grief, without hunger, without thirst, without affliction, ever living, sempiternal, whom no one can stay, nor remove his control from his affairs' (viii. 9).

Again:

'Destiny is that which is supreme over every person and over all things' (xxvii. 11).

One is tempted to believe that this Zrvan was considered by certain sects, not as the eternal source of all being, including Aūharmazd himself, but as a vast chaos, an infinite pre-existing matter, the *ἄλγ* of Paul the Persian, 'out of which Aūharmazd has formed all his creatures.' In these speculations we seem to hear an echo of some of the Indian philosophical schools. That the idea of this primeval principle was mingled with that of destiny need not astonish us. Destiny plays a prominent part in all Oriental religions, all more or less inclined towards fatalism, and its effect is everywhere to disturb the idea of divinity. The notion of an inevitable *fatum*, a blind power which is even above the will of the gods, is not reconcilable with that of a true supreme being, especially like that of the Mazdean religion. But we must not expect to find too much consistency in these theories, because in that case we should have to exclude dualism itself. Nor can we be surprised to find this power, vague, mysterious, and shapeless, confounded with that other equally intangible and misty entity, Zrvan. The transition from one to the other is quite natural. From another point of view, that of the Avesta, which we also meet in Sasanian times in the *Bundahishn*, this infinite time is neither the source nor the creature of Aūharmazd, but rather one of his co-eternal attributes, for he is spoken of as 'endowed with boundless time' (*damān-i-akanārak-homand* [i. 3]). There is also a concept, which already appears in the Avesta as *Thwasha* (or infinite space), to which

likewise the idea of destiny seems to have been attached, and which appears to be identical with the Pahlavi *spñhr*, indicating the celestial sphere and even used in the *Mainōg-i-Xrat* to signify destiny, just like the modern Persian word.

It is somewhat surprising to find that not only Ezriq, but also—if we may believe another Armenian historian—the celebrated official edict of the prime minister of Yazdagird II. affirms that Zrvan existed before heaven and earth and begot two sons, the good and the evil spirits. If this edict is authentic, we must suppose that Zervanism had assumed the proportions of almost a State religion. Parsi writers, however, do not accept the testimony of the Armenian writers, though Dhalla adds:

'Be this as it may, it is certain that a sect of the Zarvanites, who evidently aimed at resolving the Zoroastrian dualism into monotheism by the apotheosis of Time, did flourish for a long time in Iran. Shahristani, who wrote in the early part of the twelfth century, attests . . . that he met the followers of this sect in his day' (p. 205).

The same writer points out that in several of the Pahlavi writings time and fate are indissolubly linked together:

'The movements of the heavens regulate Fate, and the planets and constellations are the arbiters of man's fortune. The good and evil stars determine man's lot, which is linked with the course of the stars' (p. 205 f.).

Among the various divergent philosophical schools of the period to which we are referring, two stand out conspicuously, because they are known by the names of their founders, who have ever been regarded by orthodox Zoroastrians as heresiarchs. The more famous of these was Mani, or Manai, who suffered death in A.D. 276, and whose eclectic system, based on materials drawn from Mazdeism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Gnosticism, was destined to play such an extraordinary part throughout the Roman Empire and even within Christianity itself, under the name of Manichæism. The other heterodox philosopher was Mazdak († 528), whose system was social and economic rather than metaphysical, and amounted to pure communism. See artt. MANICHÆISM and MAZDAK.

There is abundant material in the various books of the Pahlavi period for a study of the divergent schools of philosophic thought during the golden age of Zoroastrian faith. We may here condense a few of the principal notions. The *Dinkart*, in particular, frequently seems to develop a system of its own, especially on the side of cosmology. According to this, being (*yehevūnīshn*)¹ is the foundation of all creatures. From this indifferent foundation animated beings are formed in three stages: (1) the four elements, which are the basis of all matter; (2) a sort of vitality given to a mixture of these elements, which are organized in the form of bodies, and thus become living, though mortal; and (3) the spiritual parts, the *fravāhar* and the soul; these are added to the power of the creator, and so the human or animal compound is formed. This compound lasts till its dissolution by death, when the material portion, or body, dies by separation from the spiritual parts, the existence of which still continues.

Passing over the various theories concerning what we should now call 'natural science'—astronomy, meteorology, geology, botany, and zoology—as not strictly falling within our subject, we must say a word or two on some curious notions concerning anthropology. It is first laid down that man rules over the rest of the world (*Dink.* ii. 77. 2), and was the last of the creations of Aūharmazd. He was, in fact, the work of the sixth epoch of the creation (*Bund.* i. 28). Aūharmazd formed Gāyōmart, a solitary male being, from the

¹ Or *yehevūn*; see the curious diagram reproduced in art. DUALISM (Iranian).

earth. He being eventually put to death by the evil spirit, Ahriman, there was after a time produced from his semen, which had been absorbed by the earth, a double plant (*rivās*) having but one stem, and this plant, passing from vegetable to human form, became a male and female couple known as Māshya and Māshyoi, 'the reasoning faculty which is the soul (*nismo mano aūt rūbān*) spiritually entering into them' (*Bund.* xv. 5). The subsequent history of the primeval pair, their fall and progeny, so singularly like the account in Genesis, must not detain us here. Suffice it to say that the principal points that stand out in the whole legend seem to be (i.) the original unity of the race, (ii.) the mortal nature of man, (iii.) his original innocence, (iv.) his fall by the influence of the evil spirit, and (v.) his successive progress in the arts of life.

Psychological analysis is very greatly developed during the Sasanian and subsequent epochs. The spiritual part of man is the subject of predilection of the Pahlavi treatises. Lists of the spiritual faculties or powers are very frequent, but the number of them varies in quite a remarkable manner. Mention is made of three, four, five, six, eleven, or even more. These lists are exceedingly varied and, strangely enough, sometimes include what we should consider material elements, such as the senses, or speech and action. The longest list is that of the *Dinkart*, in which we find enumerated wisdom, development, knowledge, discernment, faith, and belief, reasoning, sense, intelligence, etc. From a general review of the various treatises, we may conclude (i.) that these philosophers were very fond of making psychological distinctions as to the spiritual elements of the human compound; (ii.) that they had no very fixed principles in their divisions—which thus vary greatly and often overlap; and (iii.) that the terms cited, though we may try to translate them by identical terms in our language, have probably not always the same sense in every treatise or in every passage.

One or two of these terms require special consideration. The faculties properly called intellectual are the *khart*, *vir*, and *hōsh*. *Khart* is divine wisdom, and is spoken of as the being who holds his place next to God, and with whom the whole of the *Mainōg-i-Xrat* ('The Spirit of Wisdom') is occupied. But *khart* is also a human faculty and is specifically said to be of two kinds—*asno khart* and *inmate intelligence*. The innate intelligence is 'the root of red intelligence' 'commences in the marrow of the finger—i.e. from experience of the material world—and then settles in the heart. Innate intelligence expresses outwardly what exists in the interior of man; acquired intelligence communicates to the interior that which is outside. All our sources agree in representing the *vir* as the faculty of reason, or deduction. *Hōsh* is generally associated with *vir*. It is perhaps the memory, or else prudence, practical good sense (like the modern Persian *hōsh*), which would explain the fact that it makes man the possessor of strength. It is also said that no one can buy *vir* and *hōsh* at any price. Among other non-material elements we ought also to record *bōi* or *bōd*, in which we meet again the Avestan *baodah*, apparently self-consciousness, by which a man knows himself, but, according to one source (*Shīyast lā-Shīyast*, xii. 5), this element on the death of man passes to the nearest fire, then to the stars, to the moon, and finally to the sun. Elsewhere this faculty, the soul (*revān*), and the *fravāhar* remain together after death to meet reward or punishment. Not so the *jān*, or vital force, which apparently perishes with the dissolution of the body. In *dīno* we find scarcely altered the Avestan *dāna* in both its senses. A word which in the Pahlavi characters can be read either as *ahū* or as *akho* is more embarrassing. In the former reading it corresponds with the same word in Avestan and perhaps means 'nature.' *Akho*, however, is a mysterious power which recalls the *δαίμων* of Socrates, because it has to warn both body and soul to act virtuously and avoid evil. The *fravāhar* or *frāhar*, is of course the Avestan *fravashī*, but it has descended much lower in the scale of dignity. Thus in the *Dinkart* (iii. 123) its duty is to purify the air in the body by means of fire and thus to maintain life (probably the animal heat); while in the post-Sasanian *Saddar Būndahishn* it has become a mere principle of digestion.

It is somewhat surprising that, although the whole system of Zoroastrian ethics rests upon man's free will, we do not find in these Pahlavi texts lists

a specific term which may be translated 'free will.' The doctrine, however, is plainly expressed. It is said in the *Dinkart* that man is distinguished from other creatures in this that he is master of his wishes (*kām khūtai*) and that for this reason he is termed in the Avesta 'lord of the material world.' It is also said that 'except God, the only master is man.'

The fatalist doctrine that every man has his star (*star*), which he is bound to obey, is found only in the *Mainōg-i-Xrat*, to whose tendencies we have already referred.

The eschatology of Mazdeism, whether as regards the individual soul, its judgment, and future happiness or misery, or as regards the end of the world, the final resurrection of the dead, the *frō-kardstaais*, or ultimate regeneration of all things by the great fire and the river of molten metal, belongs to the theology rather than to the philosophy, and need not detain us here.

3. Modern times.—We are indebted to Dhalla for a great deal of interesting information concerning the developments of Mazdeism in later centuries, much of which has not before been known by Western scholars. Of course the works entitled the *Desatir* and the *Dabistān* have long been known and even translated. The latter, written in India in the 17th cent., is founded on the former, and recalls the existence of some fourteen sects.

'We meet with some attempts in them to explain the primordial principle from which creation came into being, and we have some sort of crude metaphysics grafted on physics. . . . Others still preach a strict monism, and assume that the world of phenomena was caused by illusion' (Dhalla, p. 312).

Here we have already the Indian *māyā*; and other sects had taken over the doctrine of metempsychosis as well as the belief in asceticism and rigorous austerities. Mysticism also, with its esoteric doctrines, claimed its devotees, and Parsi mystics composed treatises in the Persian language (see Dhalla for a complete account of all these extraordinary developments, so entirely opposed to the real spirit and teachings of Zoroastrianism). We must conclude with Dhalla that all these strange movements were the direct outcome of the Hindu Yogism, with which the Parsis had been brought into contact during their centuries of residence in India as exiles from their fatherland.

One result of the introduction of Western scholarship to the Parsi mind has been, as we learn from Dhalla, the growth of *theosophism* among a certain number of Indian Zoroastrians. The chapter devoted to this subject is probably in one sense the most interesting in the book, as it gives information not found elsewhere. The movement, we are told, began in the early eighties of last century. Its adepts profess to invest Zoroastrianism with a philosophical garb and to construct for it a scientific basis. They reject philological methods of interpreting the sacred texts and attribute occult significance to the Avestan prayers, however unintelligible. Strangely enough, these theosophists claim to be the champions of orthodoxy, though both their doctrines (such as that of metempsychosis and of the primeval impersonal principle *Zrvan Akarana*) and their practices (such as asceticism and celibacy, 'held to be the primal virtue') are singularly at variance with the whole spirit of the Mazdean religion. Dhalla augurs nothing but disaster to the Parsi community from any considerable growth of this fantastic theosophism in its midst.

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PHILOSOPHY (Japanese). — 1. Mythology and philosophy.—Mythology everywhere precedes philosophy, but the latter is often an outgrowth of the former. The Japanese people came under the influence of an elaborate philosophical system before they had emerged out of naive mythological thought on the world and human life, which made an independent development of their own philosophy impossible. We need not inquire whether they could otherwise have developed a philosophy out of their inherited thought alone, whether or not they were by nature a philosophical people. Philosophy, properly so called, began in Japan in the turn of the 6th and 7th centuries, when Buddhism was introduced and a dialectic analysis of human knowledge stimulated its thinkers. But this Buddhist philosophy hardly touched the mythical ideas of the spontaneous generation of the world, of the production of many things by the generative acts of the primeval couple, of the origin of death, etc. These mythological traditions found a more congenial partner in Chinese cosmology, which found its way into Japan in the early centuries of the Christian era, and which taught the two cosmic principles (*yin* and *yang*), the five physical elements (wood, fire, earth, metal, and water), and the orderly circulation of these principles and elements in the formation of things, in the seasons of the year, in human life, etc. The combination of Japanese mythology and Chinese cosmology was, especially since the 9th cent., rather an addition to the methods of divination than anything to be called philosophy. Yet, since Confucianism played a great part in the political and institutional life of the Japanese, the combination produced a certain system of political theory and its associate ethics. The chief stress was laid on the monarchic principle of the State constitution, which was based on the divine origin of the ruling family—the Japanese counterpart of the Confucian theory of the heavenly sanction bestowed upon the sovereign. The authority and dignity of the ruler, according to this theory, were a consummation of his patriarchal dignity, and the relation between sovereign and subjects was that between father and children, in an enlarged sense. Loyalty was thus a manifestation or a higher form of filial piety; and other virtues, such as benevolence, justice, propriety, wisdom, and faithfulness, were regarded more as civic than as personal virtues. This ethico-political theory played an important part in Japanese ethics throughout its history.

In the later years, especially in the 14th and 15th centuries, an age of eclecticism, the combination of Japanese mythology (called *Shintō*) and Chinese cosmology embraced Buddhism and Taoism to a certain extent, and enlarged its scope to an ethico-political philosophy based on the idealistic philosophy of the latter systems. The Buddhist philosophy of the oneness of the individual and the cosmic soul was combined with the Chinese parallelisms between the individual life and the cosmic vitality. The most noteworthy representative of this eclectic tendency was Ichijō Kanera (1402-81), who tried to establish a system of *Shintō* philosophy and ethics by harmonizing it with all other systems then prevailing in Japan. The sole principle ruling the universe was, according to him, nothing but the primeval essence of our own soul, which, in spite of its changeable manifestations, was co-eval with the all-embracing divinity. Although Kanera did not explicitly teach a doctrine of emanation, he explained all existences of the world through analogies between mental and

material phenomena and by ethical and psychological interpretations of physical elements and occurrences.

To take one instance, the three insignia of the throne—the mirror, the jewel, and the sword—were explained as symbolizing the virtues of veracity, benevolence, and justice, which were manifested in heaven as sun, moon, and stars, and on earth as fire, water, and metal. The life of an individual as well as of a nation, especially of the Japanese nation, was, or ought to be, an embodiment of these virtues in consonance with the qualities and powers manifested by those material elements and celestial phenomena. Naturally, various theories were adduced to support these analogies, in which Buddhism played the greatest part in metaphysics, Taoism in physics, Confucianism and Shintō in ethics.

This is a typical specimen of Shintō speculation on cosmological and ethical problems, and the eclecticism continued to exert its influence until the revivalist Shintōists of the 18th cent. attempted to exclude alien ingredients and to explain the ancient myths along the lines of a Euhemeristic historicism.

2. **Buddhist philosophy.**—Philosophical thought, properly so named, was started by the Sanron¹ branch of Buddhism, which was based on the Mādhyamika system of Nāgārjuna. The philosophy of Nāgārjuna consisted in dialectically analyzing every finite concept into a thesis and its antithesis, in showing their incompatibility, and in reducing the concept to an illusion, when taken by itself alone. The culmination of the dialectic process, and therefore the aim of the philosophy, amounted to realizing in a spiritual illumination the absolute which transcended, and at the same time embraced, all finite conception and things.

This system of transcendental idealism opened a way to philosophical thought in Japan and helped to awaken the most enlightened minds of the 7th cent. to the vanity of naive realism.² Although this idealism did not exercise a wide influence at the time, it laid the foundation of the Buddhist thought of all coming ages, and, to a certain degree, of the Japanese habit of looking at things 'beyond their appearances,' as manifested in art and poetry.

The philosophical system which brought to Japan more systematic, and more or less realistic, ideas about philosophical problems was the Yuishiki (Skr. Vijñāti-mātrā) school of Buddhism, initiated by Vasubandhu in India and elaborated by Yuan-Chwang in China. The system, in its ultimate basis and goal, was an idealism teaching that the ultimate reality consists in the innermost soul³ of each individual, and this was identified with the cosmic soul. But, it was taught, the soul has in itself an inexhaustible store of the 'seeds' (*bīja*), which may be called 'vitalons' on the analogy of 'electrons.' By the innate virtues of the vitalons the innermost soul manifests itself in the soul-activities of the lower grades, seven in number, as well as in the external phenomena which are nothing but projections of the soul-activities. Thus we have before us a kind of emanation theory, in which cosmology and physics were always closely interrelated with psychology, allied to a system of mystic contemplation. The latter had in view the practical purpose of arriving at the innermost essence of the soul by penetrating the entanglement of mental and physical phenomena.

¹ Sanron meant the 'Three Śāstras,' because the system was founded on the *Mādhyamika-śāstra*, *Sata-śāstra*, and *Dvādaśādvāra-śāstra* of Nāgārjuna. For the first of these see Max Walliser, *Die mittlere Lehre des Nāgārjuna*, Heidelberg, 1911; S. Yamakami, *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, Calcutta, 1912, ch. v.

² The most prominent of them was Prince-regent Shōtoku, for whom see A. Lloyd, *The Creed of Half Japan*, London, 1911, ch. xviii.; M. Anesaki, *Religious and Moral Development of the Japanese* (in preparation), pt. ii.

³ Called the *ālaya*, or 'store,' soul. For this and other points see artt. ASAŌA, VASUBANDHU; S. Lévi, *Mahāyāna-Sūtrā-lamkāra*, Paris, 1907-11; Yamakami, ch. vi.

Thus the physical and psychological analyses were intended in the Yuishiki philosophy to be the means of getting through the phenomenal world; and yet studies on these subjects induced this school of philosophy to dwell much on minute details of the physical and mental processes, with the result that the system manifested realistic traits more than any other branch of Buddhism. In other words, things (*dharma*) were classified under five categories: (1) the soul, or mind-essence (*chitta*); (2) the mental functions (*chitta-vṛtti*); (3) the material phenomena (*rūpa*); (4) the relationships arising out of neither mind nor matter alone (*viprasamyukta-dharma*), such as attainment (of a new acquisition by the mind), universality, vitality, annihilation; (5) the unborn and unchangeable (*asankṛta-dharma*), the state of the ultimate universality. We shall not enter further into the minute classifications of these categories, but the designations alone show how the system deserved its other title Hossō (Skr. Dharmalakṣaṇa), i.e. the treatment of the 'signs of things,' including physics, psychology, ethics, and religious philosophy.

As the foundation of these speculations and discussions, the Hossō system emphasized the importance of logic and epistemology, called together Hetu-vidyā, the 'science of the ground.' The origin of this system of Indian logic is traced to Akṣhapāda, believed to have lived before Buddha, but it was further systematized by the Buddhist philosopher Dignāga, who is said to have lived in Andhrā in the 6th cent A.D. The logical system was further elaborated in China and Japan, and flourished in the latter for many centuries from the 8th, being cultivated even by the court nobles. The nature of the whole system may be seen from its general divisions: (1) the theories of concepts and propositions, both intuitive and inferential; (2) a system of syllogism, consisting of three or five propositions; (3) the theories of fallacies, inherent in one of the three main propositions. This system of logic attained its utmost subtlety in Japan.

Closely connected with the logical theories is the part of grammar treating of the eight cases (in Sanskrit, but applied to Japanese) and the formation of compounds (six in kind). Although Japanese philosophers did little to develop their original theories or systems in these respects, they succeeded in applying them to their own language, and in greatly elaborating them according to its possibilities. Indeed, it was the adoption of the Indian system of logic and grammar that made the philosophical thought of the Japanese possible, and overcame, to a great extent, the defects of their language as to precise expression of philosophical thought.

When the Hossō school had laid the foundations of Buddhist philosophy in Japan, another system akin to Hegelianism was introduced there, in the beginning of the 9th century. It was a system of Buddhist idealism attempting to explain the different forms of Buddhism as the tactful steps of Buddha's educative method (*upāya-kauśalya*) adapted to the various needs and capabilities of his disciples. The system is known by the name Tendai (Chinese, Tien-t'ai), because it was formulated by Ch'i-i (536-597) of Mount Tien-t'ai, in the province of Chekiang.¹ The man who introduced it into Japan and made use of it for unifying Japanese Buddhism under its banner was Saichō (767-822).² In Saichō's thought, again, we see little originality; his work consisted in translating the idealistic system of the Chinese philosopher into religious practice, and the Tendai philosophy

¹ Cf. J. Edkins, *Chinese Buddhism*, London, 1893, ch. viii.

² Lloyd, pp. 228-235; Anesaki, pt. iii.

pragmatized, so to speak, ruled Buddhist thought in Japan throughout centuries, parallel with another school of pantheistic mysticism, Shingon (see below).

The philosophy of the Tendai school is founded essentially on the same basis as that of the Sanron school, and amounts to denying reality to a finite conception, or thing, taken by itself. But it is further urged that reality in the full sense consists neither in an abstract vacuity nor in a phenomenal actuality alone, but in the synthesis of both—the doctrine of the Middle Path. In other words, reality means a concrete being seen under the aspect of the universal, or a universal seen in a concrete existence. To realize this truth of reality, first in meditation, and then in moral and religious life, is the kernel of the Buddhist religion.¹

Now the Tendai philosophy of religion proceeds, upon this basic conception of the world, to explain the various branches of Buddhism as the stages of the necessary development of thought, which were taken into account by Buddha in leading his followers to the ultimate truth of reality. The first stage, to speak in a general way, was to instruct the people in the lawful order (*dharma*) of existence, and therefore in the realistic traits of the Hinayāna and the Hossō schools. Then the necessity of breaking down the exclusive adherence to actualities was shown in the teaching of vacuity (*śūnyatā*), as expounded at length in the Prajñā texts. The higher synthesis of these two extremes was carried out in the sermons of the *Lotus of the True Law* [*g.v.*] *Sad-dharma-piṇḍarīka*, given during the last eight years of Buddha's ministry, according to Buddhist legend, and Chi-i claimed to have based his system on the teachings of that book. Chi-i distinguished five stages in Buddha's educative process and eight kinds of doctrines therein expounded, and he further elucidated these stages and doctrines as the successive steps in Buddha's instructions as well as the gradual development of spiritual enlightenment in individual psychology. But the gist of this religious philosophy was the consideration of the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis which, as stated above, were applied to all philosophical theses and to the instructions in moral and religious life. Thus, after all, we have here a splendid counterpart of the Hegelian idealism, and the contribution of the Japanese mind to the system consisted in applying this synthetic idealism to practical life. In this respect Japanese Buddhism produced not a few men of more or less originality, not only in religion and morals, but also in the arts and poetry; but this belongs to religious history rather than to the consideration of philosophy.

The pantheistic mysticism known as the Shingon (Skr. Mantra) school was promulgated by Kūkai (774-835), a younger contemporary and great rival of Saichō.² The philosophy of Shingon was a significant combination of materialism and idealism, viewing the universe as the very body of the Buddha Great Illuminator (Mañi-Vairocana) vitalized by his soul. The five material elements, together with one 'mental' element, consciousness, are enlivened by the soul consisting of the ninefold stages or strata³ of soul-activities. And in every one of these material existences, even in dust or sand, and in every one of our thoughts and utterances, is embodied the all-pervading vitality of the universe. This was a mystic consummation of the cosmological, physical, and psychological specula-

tions elaborated in India, Central Asia, China, and Japan; and its religious practice consisted in the mystic acts of prayers and rituals. In this respect Kūkai simply imported what he found in China, but the grand scale of his world-view may be seen in his theory of the ten stages of spiritual development, in which he surpassed the achievements of his predecessors.

Kūkai's scheme arranged the various systems and ideas in a series of spiritual development, tracing the gradual illumination of the individual soul from beast-like stupidity up to the full realization, chiefly through mystic practices, of the cosmic life of the Great Illuminator. Not only the various branches of Buddhism but also Hinduism, Confucianism, and Taoism, were included in the scales of the progressive development which culminated in the mystic pantheism of Shingon. Here we shall simply enumerate the ten stages: (1) the stage of the soul, living and dying like a beast absorbed in the thoughts of food and sex—common men without religion; (2) the state of the soul like a stupid child scrupulously sticking to moral rules and social conventions—Confucianism; (3) the state of the soul like an infant living without fear, being nursed in the mother's bosom, i.e. in the belief in the heavenly life—Brāhmanism; (4) the state of the soul which is convinced of the sole reality of the five constituents (*skandhas*) of existence and the non-entity of self—Hinayāna; (5) the state of the soul which, having realized the evil of existence, has eradicated its root, *karma*, and attained an absolute tranquillity—the enlightenment of the Pratyekabuddha (*g.v.*); (6) the state of the soul awake to the oneness of existence and proceeding to the illumination in the truth of the illusoriness of external existence—the Yuishiki, or Vijñāti-mātrā, school; (7) the state of the soul fully enlightened as to the ultimate reality which transcends all relativities—the Sanron, or Mādhyamika, school; (8) the state of the soul in which the all-embracing sole way of reality is grasped, the reality universal and eternal identified with our own soul—the Tendai school; (9) the state of the soul freely moving in the world of living force, which is neither a chaotic mass nor a static entity, but exhibits its whole vitality even in a particle—the Kegon school, based on the book *Avatamsaka* (Chin. *Hwa-yen-king*); (10) the state of the soul which has fully grasped the glories of cosmic mysteries and lives the life of the cosmic Lord even in an individual body—the Shingon mysticism.

The complete embodiment of cosmic mysteries in the individual life is more a matter of religious mysticism than of philosophical speculation; but we have to note that the mystic ritualism of Shingon had in its background, or rather as its systematic expression, this view of a vast spiritual development going on in the individual soul as well as in the cosmic life. The final aim of every finite existence, according to this view, was participation in the full life of the cosmic Lord and attainment by this means of complete mastery over the cosmic mysteries.

The Shingon mysticism was, in fact, a culmination of Buddhist philosophical thought, which tried to unite in a harmonious whole not only the different schools of Buddhism, but also all other religions and philosophies with which it came into contact. What the Tendai school regarded as the steps in Buddha's educative method was modified by the Shingon system to mean the successive stages of spiritual development, guided and illumined by Buddha's wisdom and mercy. Thus the general trend of thought in these philosophical systems was idealistic in their philosophical foundation and pantheistic in their religious bearing.

¹ Cf. the appendix to M. Anesaki, *Nichiren*, Harvard University Press, 1916; Yamakami, ch. viii.

² For Kūkai and Shingon mysticism cf. Lloyd, pp. 235-240; Anesaki, *Buddhist Art in its Relation to Buddhist Ideals*, Boston, 1915, ch. ii.

³ One higher stage, called *amala*, 'purity-consciousness,' is added to the eighth, the *ālāya* (for which see art. *ASAŌGA*).

3. Confucian philosophy.—In the early stage of its influence in Japan Confucianism was a system of civic morality and social institutions, and left the field of philosophic thought to Buddhism, never attempting to rival it. But the characteristic feature of Buddhism—its linking of ethics and metaphysics through psychological self-introspection—made more and more impression upon Chinese Confucianists, and resulted in the Sing-li school of the 12th cent., represented chiefly by Chu-Hsi (Jap. Shu-shi).

Sing means literally 'nature,' the universal nature of all existences identified with the ultimate principle of cosmic existence; and in this sense *sing* is identical with *li*, 'reason' or 'universal principle,' like the Stoic *λογος*. Besides this, the Sing-li school postulated the existence of another principle called *k'i*, literally 'air,' which meant the particularizing and vitalizing principle—the source of concrete physical existence. Thus the antithesis between *li* and *k'i* may roughly be characterized as a dualism of the metaphysical and spiritual on one side and the physical and concrete on the other. The Sing-li school emphasized in its metaphysics the all-pervading rule of *li* as the wisdom and will of heaven, while in physics it elaborated the theory of the differentiation out of *k'i* of mental and physical conditions, which were pervaded by the positive and negative principles (*yin* and *yang*) and composed of the five material elements.

Though the chief interest of the school was in ethics, its thinkers had to face the problem of psychologically examining human nature as reflecting the heavenly reason, on the one hand, and as being disturbed by physical conditions, on the other. The intricate problems of human nature were treated along psychological lines—e.g., the relation between the fundamental nature of the mind and its emotional agitations, the difference of temperaments caused by the preponderance of the various elements in the physical life, the close link existing between control of moral will and intellectual investigation into the nature of things, etc. These discussions were directed towards moral problems and applied to the methods of mental culture and control. This system of metaphysics and ethics was introduced into Japan in the 14th cent., but was cultivated chiefly by Buddhist monks, until it was adopted as the orthodox teaching of the State by the dictatorial government in the beginning of the 17th cent. and took the upper classes under its sway. The story of how the orthodox teachings of the Shu-shi philosophy moulded the moral life of the ruling classes is an important chapter in the moral history of the Japanese, but cannot be treated here.¹ We may, however, point out an important feature of the Sing-li school in Japan: it emphasized the virtues of sincerity and obedience perhaps more than benevolence and justice, the cardinal virtues of the original Confucianism. This was a consequence of the Shu-shi ethics adapted to the needs of the time, when the Japanese nation was ruled by a strong military government and enjoyed a peace lasting over two centuries. Sincerity, thus emphasized, verged on religious devotion—a pious obedience towards the heavenly reason as well as towards social order. This was a characteristic point of Japanese Confucianism, distinguishing it from the same system in its native land; and, in fact, some Japanese Confucianists of the 18th cent. organized a Shintō-Confucian cult.

A system of ethical teaching thus dictated by

¹ See Anesaki, *Religious and Moral Development of the Japanese*, pt. v. On Confucianism in Japan in general see R. C. Armstrong, *Light from the East*, Toronto, 1914, and its review by Anesaki in the *Harvard Theological Review*, viii. [1915] 563-571.

the government and emphasizing obedience inevitably aroused reaction from men of ability and originality. One of the reactions was the 'Old Learning' (Jap. Ko-gaku-ha), which claimed to purge Confucianism from later admixtures and proposed a more dynamic view of the world and life. Speaking in general, the result was a monistic philosophy identifying *k'i* with *li*, i.e. attributing the concrete vitalizing force to the very nature of the cosmic principle. In this system the partition between metaphysics and physics was partly abolished, and likewise the antithesis between the universal nature and the actual life. Every thing is a direct manifestation of the universal vitality, and what the Shu-shiists call the 'reason' or intelligence is nothing but the reign of law to be detected in the processes of the cosmic and individual life. The ethical consequence of this monistic philosophy was that not obedience but an actual realization of the universal life in the individual was the virtue of human life—a self-realization in which the individual embodies the all-comprehensive vitality of the universe. The cardinal virtues are, therefore, benevolence and justice, the virtues which represent the love and law of the cosmic existence in the individual and social life. In short, the 'Old Learning' school was, in spite of its claim and title, a product of Japanese genius, which cared not so much for metaphysical abstractions as for the realities of life. In its teaching we see a close tie between metaphysics and ethics, to the exclusion to a large extent of physical theories and psychological subtleties.

The second of the heterodox schools consisted of the followers of Wang Yang-ming (Jap. Ō-Yōmei), the intuitionist of the 16th century. This school identified conscience, when unstained and fully alive, with the primeval conscience of the universe. The main distinction of the school was that it abandoned all theoretical subtleties and aimed at realizing the primeval conscience in the individual life, first in intuitive insight and spiritual drill, and then in actual life. This feature had its best manifestation in the moral attainment of a select few, who also favoured democratic ideas and practices. The Yōmei school was eminent and efficacious in its practical effects more than in philosophic thought as such.

4. Review and present conditions.—Viewed as a whole, the philosophic thought of the Japanese never manifested originality, but was always influenced by the philosophical systems of the Asiatic continent. Yet the impression made and the modifications wrought by the Japanese upon these imported systems cannot be overlooked. Pragmatic application and attempts at unifying those systems characterized the history of Japanese thought, and it bore its best fruits in religious and moral life rather than in theoretical elaborations.

The change in philosophy going on at present is chiefly due to Japan's contact with Western civilization. Auguste Comte and J. S. Mill were the first European philosophers introduced, in the seventies of the 19th cent., soon after the reform of 1868, and some Confucianists found in Comte's positivism an ally of their own ethical and social theories. Herbert Spencer followed, and the sway of agnosticism lasted during the eighties. The English philosopher exerted his influence in dispelling, more or less, mystic or religious ideas handed down among the Japanese, but a peculiar point in his influence was that his agnosticism was brought by some Buddhists into connexion with the Buddhist transcendentalism of the Sanron school. This was due to the fact that the Unknowable of Spencer showed kinship to the over-coming, in Sanron, of all finite conceptions in

the search for the ultimate reality. This alliance is also found in Lafcadio Hearn's¹ appreciation of Buddhism through his Spencerian agnosticism, though independently from the Japanese thinkers. While agnosticism was prevailing, Hegel was gradually introduced, and soon some young Buddhists realized the kinship between Hegel's metaphysical dialectic and the Tendai philosophy of Buddhism. This discovery, in conjunction with various other circumstances, gave a strong impetus to the revival of Buddhist philosophy during the later years of the eighties. Since then nearly every one of the European philosophers has found his exponents in Japan, and the philosophical thought of modern Japan is in a melting-pot of Oriental and Occidental philosophies. Nearly twenty chairs of philosophy and philosophical sciences in Japanese universities represent all possible combinations of these philosophies. Although it may be premature to speak of any definite tendencies or predominant features, we may perhaps safely say that all these streams of Western thought are being correlated with either Buddhist idealism or Confucian positivism.

LITERATURE.—This is cited throughout the article.

M. ANESAKI.

PHILOSOPHY (Jewish).—Jewish philosophy may aptly be designated as the conscious attempt of Jewish thinkers to reconcile the teachings of Judaism with the results of their studies in the fields of the secular sciences. The literary products of the Jews in this line of thought are not the continuation of either the Bible or the Talmud, nor do they represent a spontaneous manifestation of the Jewish mode of thinking, as was the case with the philosophy of the ancient Greeks; they are the outgrowth of foreign influences which were fundamentally antagonistic to the religious spirit of Judaism. A people begins to philosophize only when, for one reason or another, it becomes suspicious of the value and truth of its inherited ideas and national beliefs. The Jews of ancient times, with the exception perhaps of some individuals, of whom, however, we have no sufficient records to warrant conclusions, never entertained any doubt as to the truth and the ethical worth of their religious teachings. Looking upon the Bible as a sacred book, the contents of which were revealed or inspired by God Himself, they felt themselves in the possession of all truth, and it did not occur to them that they were in need of some new system of metaphysics which would reveal to them verities not contained in their religious documents. It was only when the Jews came in contact with other nations, first with the Greeks and then with their disciples, the Arabs, that some of their scholars, who in their quest for knowledge had ventured beyond the boundaries of their own national literature, began to notice the discrepancies between what they had hitherto considered as eternal verities and the new truth which was heralded with so much clearness and certainty in the works of foreign philosophy. This realization of a conflict of ideas is already reflected in the book of Ecclesiastes, whose author, however, makes no attempt at any philosophic reconciliation of the opposing views.

The first Jewish author of prominence who tried to harmonize the Jewish and the Greek world-conception was Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 B.C.—A.D. 50). Starting out from the point of view of a pious observant Jew, such as he was, that the Law of Moses is the source and standard of all truth, religious and philosophic, and being at the same time an enthusiastic devotee of Greek thought, Philo set himself the task of proving

that Judaism and Hellenism not only are not antagonistic, but actually teach the same divine truth, though each in a different form. In order to achieve his purpose he, on the one hand, resorted to an elaborate and often fantastic system of allegorization of the Bible, whereby the text could be made to mean anything desired, and, on the other hand, selected from the various writings of the philosophers those views which in his opinion could be best adapted to the teachings of the Bible. Philo, though far from being a mere compiler, is thus to be classed with the philosophic eclectics. The doctrines of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and others were all made to contribute to his system, the main purpose of which was, as already noted, the defence and justification of the Jewish religion (see C. Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandria*, Jena, 1875, p. 137 ff.; James Drummond, *Philo Judæus*, London, 1888, i. 257 ff.). Philo's influence on the later development of Jewish philosophy was comparatively small (cf. Siegfried, pp. 299–302), but was an important factor in the construction of the Christian dogma by the Church Fathers. See, further, ALEXANDRIAN THEOLOGY, § 2.

In the literature of the Jews that originated during the nine centuries following upon the short Hellenistic period very little is found that can be designated as philosophy. The only work of a speculative nature is the semi-mystic Hebrew treatise known under the name of *Sefer Yetzirah* ('Book of Creation'), which was ascribed to the Mishnic teacher 'Aḳiba (2nd cent.) and even to the patriarch Abraham, but is no doubt a product of the Saboraic or the earlier Geonic period (5th–7th cent.). Apart from some philological paragraphs dealing with the Hebrew language, the treatise is a speculative attempt to solve the mysteries of God and nature in short sentences which are partly very obscure. The number-symbolism of the Neo-Pythagorean school and some Gnostic ideas are the most conspicuous elements of the book, which exercised an immense influence on later Jewish literature, particularly the *Kabbālā* (q.v.). It appeared in several hundred editions, was frequently translated into Latin and all the leading European languages, and was variously commented upon by the most prominent Jewish and also Christian authors (see for the literature *JE* xii. 606; M. Steinschneider, *Die hebräischen Übersetzungen*, Berlin, 1893, p. 395, n. 181).

With the general advancement and scientific progress which mark the 9th cent. in the history of Islām a new period of literary activity and productivity was inaugurated also among the Jews living under Islāmic rule. Among the various secular sciences then cultivated philosophy, too, was given careful attention. The numerous Jewish philosophic writers who represent this period (which lasted about four centuries) are properly classified according to the prevalence in their works of the doctrines and ideas which they adopted from one or the other of the three main divisions of contemporaneous Muhammadan philosophers. The latter are usually grouped as Mutakallimūn, Neo-Platonists, and Aristotelians, or Peripatetics, the three schools following one another in chronological succession, although we meet with adherents of the Kalām, e.g., also during the period of the Peripatetics. The Jewish philosophers who looked upon the Arabs as literary models naturally adopted with the external literary form and method also the essential contents of the Arabic philosophy of their time—that is, in so far as the latter was found to be compatible with the principal tenets of Judaism. We find, therefore, the same three philosophic divisions among the Jews as among the Arabs. Often, however, religious

¹ Lafcadio Hearn, *Japan: an Attempt at Interpretation*, New York, 1904, pp. 229–230.

scruples prevented individual thinkers from abandoning themselves entirely to the influence of the school to which, in the main, they belonged. In such events they would adopt single doctrines from some other system of thought, graft them upon their own, and thus obtain the chief result aimed at, namely, the harmonization of reason and belief, of philosophy and religion. With a few exceptions, Jewish philosophers are accordingly, as are indeed most of the mediæval Muhammadan and Christian philosophers, more or less eclectics. Their writings, nearly all composed in Arabic, but some preserved only in early Hebrew or Latin translations, cannot be properly understood without a sufficient knowledge of the kindred Arabic literature upon which they drew (see PHILOSOPHY [Muslim]). It would be a mistake, however, to think that owing to these facts Jewish philosophy is but a repetition or slight modification of that of the Arabs. For, as we have seen, the Jewish mind, when it made acquaintance with philosophy, whether Greek or Arabic, was not a *tabula rasa* capable of accepting anything that offered itself for acceptance, but, on the contrary, had been fully indoctrinated with a system of religion involving, if we may say so, a philosophy of its own which was totally different from the one that now presented itself. A thorough revision of the entire stock of their religious ideas as well as deep penetration into the real meaning of Græco-Arabic metaphysics was required in order to make possible a mental readjustment and a complete blending of the two heterogeneous elements. The Jewish thinkers succeeded fairly well in this task of combining the secular and the sacred, the human and the divine, and by this combination gave to Greek (especially Peripatetic) philosophy, as taken over from the Arabs, a distinct religious character, transforming the whole into a system of ethics and theology. From a scientific point of view, all this activity may have been uncritical and wrong, but, as a stage in the development and manifestation of human thought, it was of no less importance and originality than the philosophy of the Muhammadan theologians and Christian scholastics, which likewise culminated in the attempt to reconcile pagan thought with the tenets of their respective religions. It should also be noted that there were some Jewish thinkers who did not enter upon the field of philosophy with a view of harmonizing it with their religious belief, but tried to solve the problems without considering the consequences from the point of view of religion.

An author of this type was Isaac b. Solomon Israëli of Kairawān, N. Africa († 953, as is reported, at the age of over 100 years), the first known Jewish philosophic writer of the Arabic period, and recognized as the greatest physician of the Middle Ages, mediæval Christian authors referring to him as 'eximius monarcha medicinae.' As a philosopher, Israëli cannot be rated very high; he was altogether an eclectic, taking his material from any source with which he happened to be acquainted; hence he cannot be classed with any of the three groups mentioned before, although on the whole he inclines more towards Neo-Platonic ideas. Israëli deserves recognition, however, for having first introduced the study of philosophy among the Oriental Jews of his time. His influence on the development of Jewish philosophy was very small, but Christian scholastics, like Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and others, made prolific use of his writings (see Steinschneider, *Arabische Literatur der Juden*, Frankfurt, 1902, § 28; J. Guttman, *Die philosophischen Lehren des Isaak ben Salomon Israeli*, Münster, 1911, esp. p. 17 ff.).

1. The Jewish Mutakallimūn.—The earliest

Jewish writer who is known to have followed the philosophy of the Kalām is David b. Merwān ibn al-Muḥammad (JQR xv. [1903] 682) of Rakka, Mesopotamia, who flourished towards the end of the 9th and the beginning of the 10th cent. and is the first Jewish author to mention Aristotle by name (ib. xvii. [1905] 357). He wrote a philosophic work under the title *Ishrūn Maqāla* ('Twenty Chapters'), dealing with the various philosophical and theological problems current in those days. Fifteen chapters of the work were not long ago discovered in the Petrograd Library, while some portions of it were embodied in a Hebrew translation in the work of an author of the 12th cent. (Steinschneider, *Arab. Lit.*, § 25, p. 338 f.; Schreiner, *Der Kalām*, p. 22 f.; JE iv. 466).

Of far greater importance for the history of Jewish philosophy is the famous Gāṓn Sa'adya b. Joseph al-Fayyūmī (892-942), who is generally recognized as the inaugurator of a new epoch in all branches of Jewish learning, and who was actually the creator of mediæval Jewish philosophy. While in general following the method and the ideas of the Mutakallimūn, he shows himself in many essential points an independent thinker, who paved the way for the work of harmonizing reason and religion. It is impossible here even to mention the problems discussed in his very numerous writings, especially in his main philosophic work, *The Book of Philosophic Doctrines and Religious Beliefs*, which was much read in the Hebrew translation (*Emūnōt we Dē'ōt*) of Judah ibn Tibbōn (1186). The Arabic original was published by S. Landauer (Leyden, 1880). See art. SA'ADYA and literature there cited; cf. also H. Malter, *Life and Works of Saadia Gaon*, in the press; Steinschneider, *Arab. Lit.*, § 31; Guttman, *Die Religionsphilosophie des Saadia*, Göttingen, 1882; Schreiner, pp. 5-22.

Among the Jewish followers of the Kalām shortly after the time of Sa'adya (c. 950) special mention is made by a prominent Muhammadan

author of one Abu-l-Hayr (خبر) Dāūd ibn Mūsā

(diminutive of Mūsā), who defended the doctrines of the Kalām in learned meetings of Muhammadan Peripatetics in Baghdād and Basra (see Goldziher, *REJ* xlvii. [1894] 41-46).

Sa'adya was taken as a model also by the Geonim Samuel b. Hofni († 1034) and his son-in-law Hai († 1038), both very influential scholars (see Schreiner, *MGWJ* xxxv. [1886] 314 ff.), as also by their contemporary Nissim b. Jacob, head of the learned community of Kairawān, who in his *Clavis* (*Maftāḥ*, ed. J. Goldenthal, Vienna, 1847), as well as in other writings (Goldziher, *REJ* xlvii. 179-186; Steinschneider, *Arab. Lit.*, § 59), frequently set forth various doctrines of the Mutakallimūn.

An anonymous Arabic treatise in Hebrew characters dealing, as far as the recently discovered fragment goes, with the question of the divine attributes likewise represents the school of the Mutakallimūn. As supposed by Goldziher, who edited the fragment (*Harkavy-Festschrift*, Petrograd, 1908, pp. 95-114), the author lived also in the period under consideration (11th century).

In this connexion mention must be made of a distinct group of Jewish Mutakallimūn—the sect known under the name of Karmites (q.v.). Having broken away from the solid ground of traditional Judaism with its Haggadic theology, which formed a strong barrier against heretic tendencies, they were thrown into a state of religious confusion which inclined them to be blown about by any wind of theological doctrine that happened to be prevailing in their days. The Karmites, especially

those of the 11th and the 12th centuries, therefore adopted the philosophy of the contemporaneous Kalām in its entirety, so that some of their works might 'almost as well have been written by a Muhammadan author' (Steinschneider, *Übersetzungen*, p. 453). The most prominent of the Karaite philosophic writers are: Abu Jūsuf Ja'kūb al Kirīsānī (c. 930 [*ib.* p. 451 ff., and *Arab. Lit.*, § 43]); Joseph b. Abraham ha-Kohen, known under the euphemy al-Baṣīr (Hebrew 'ha-Roḥ', 'the seeing') because of his blindness, the most important Karaite philosopher of the 11th cent. (P. F. Frankl, *Ein mutazilitischer Kalām*, etc., Vienna, 1872; Steinschneider, *Übersetzungen*, §§ 265-270, and *Arab. Lit.*, § 50; Schreiner, *Der Kalām*, pp. 27-32); Jeshū'a b. Jehudah (11th cent. [Steinschneider, *Arab. Lit.*, § 51; Schreiner, *Studien über Jeschua ben Jehuda*, Berlin, 1900, who gives a full presentation of Jeshū'a's philosophy]). To these Karaite philosophers may be added the famous author of a Karaite encyclopædia (*Eshkol ha-Kofer*), Judah Hadassi of Constantinople (Schreiner, *Der Kalām*, p. 33 f.), and the Bible exegete Aaron b. Joseph of Constantinople (*ib.* p. 57; cf. Kohler, *JE* i. 14), both of the 13th century.

2. The Jewish Neo-Platonists.—In the works of Isaac Israēli (mentioned above) we find for the first time a decided influence of the Neo-Platonic school, but the real representatives of Neo-Platonism among the Jews did not appear until over a century later in Spain. Of these the first and foremost author is undoubtedly the famous poet Solomon ibn Gabirol of Malaga, who, up to 1846, when Solomon Munk discovered his identity, was known as a Christian scholastic under the corrupt name of Avicenna. His main philosophic work, *The Fountain of Life*, which is preserved only in a Latin translation of the 12th cent. (C. Bäumker, *Avenebrolis Fons Vitæ*, Münster, 1895) and in the Hebrew extracts made from the Arabic original by Shem Tob Palquera (13th cent.), has exercised the greatest influence on the development of Neo-Platonism in the Christian Middle Ages. Ibn Gabirol shows himself entirely independent of Jewish religious dogma, treating the philosophic problems without any theological bias. His work was therefore attacked by some of his successors and had comparatively little influence on Jewish thought. See, further, art. IBN GABIROL.

To the 11th cent. belongs in all probability also the anonymous Arabic work *Ma'āni al-naḥs* ('Essence of the Soul'), whose author is entirely under the influence of the Neo-Platonists, especi-

ally the so-called 'Sincere Friends' (أخوان الصفا), a fraternity of humanitarian philosophers who had established themselves at Baṣra during the second half of the 10th cent. (cf. Goldziher, in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, i. 5, p. 309 f.). The work was published by Goldziher (*Kitāb m'āni al-naḥs*, Berlin, 1907), who gave also a thorough analysis of its contents.

During the first half of the 12th cent. Jewish Neo-Platonism is represented by the astronomer and mathematician Abraham b. Hiyya of Barcelona in his ethical work, *Meditation of the Soul* (*Hegyon ha-Nefesh*, Leipzig, 1860; cf. *JE* i. 108-110), and by the poet Moses ibn Ezra of Granada († 1139), in his *Garden* (حديقة), of which only fragments are preserved (see Steinschneider, *Arab. Lit.*, p. 150, no. 3).

Moses ibn Ezra's prominent contemporary, the philosopher Joseph ibn Ṣiddīk (or Ṣiddik) of Cordova († 1149), in his *Microcosm*, preserved only in a Hebrew translation (*Olām Kaṭān*, ed. S. Horovitz, Breslau, 1903) likewise propagates Neo-Platonic

ideas (cf. M. Doctor, *Die Philosophie des Josef ibn Zaddik*, Münster, 1895; Schreiner, *Der Kalām*, p. 27 ff.; Kaufmann, *Attributenlehre*, pp. 255-337; Horovitz, *Die Psychologie*, pp. 147-207), as does also the famous Bible exegete Abraham ibn Ezra of Toledo († 1167) in his numerous Bible commentaries and independent works (M. Friedländer, *Essays on the Writings of Abraham ibn Ezra*, London, 1877; for his relation to the Kalām see Schreiner, *Der Kalām*, pp. 35-41).

Altogether in the spirit of Muhammadan Neo-Platonism is the philosophic work *Bustān al-'Ukūl* ('Garden of Intellects'), in seven chapters, by Nathanael al-Fayyūmī of Yemen (12th cent.), published with an English translation and notes by David Levine, New York, 1908 (Steinschneider, *Arab. Lit.*, § 147).

In the very popular ethical work, *Duties of the Heart*, by Bahya ibn Pakūda of Saragossa, which in the Hebrew translation (*Hōbōt ha-Lebābōt*) of Judah ibn Tibbon (1167) has gone through about 50 editions, and has been translated into several European languages, Neo-Platonic and Ṣūfī doctrines are frequently met with, though the author shows a marked inclination towards the Kalām (see Kaufmann, 'Die Theologie des Bachja ibn Pakuda,' in *Gesammelte Schriften*, ii., and especially Schreiner, *Der Kalām*, p. 25). The Arabic original under the title *Al-hidāya ilā farā'id al-qulūb* has been edited with a learned introduction by A. S. Yahuda (Leyden, 1912).

Apart from the authors of independent works here enumerated, there were several others who, through translation into Hebrew of non-Jewish Neo-Platonic writings, have largely contributed to the spread and popularization of Neo-Platonic doctrines. In some instances the works in question have been preserved in the Hebrew translation only, as, e.g., the pseudo-Empedoclean treatise on *The Five Substances*, edited by D. Kaufmann in *Studien über Salomon ibn Gabirol*, Budapest, 1899.

Through the influence of this literature various doctrines of Neo-Platonic origin gained entrance into Hebrew Bible commentaries and other works of later authors, who were not always aware of the real origin of their ideas. The main stream of Neo-Platonic ideas, however, emptied into the wide sea of mediæval Jewish mysticism, the *Kabbālā* (q.v.).

3. The Jewish Aristotelians.—The philosophy of Aristotle reached the Arabs and the Jews only after having undergone considerable changes. Aristotle's early interpreters, especially Porphyry, took great liberties in reading into the text certain ideas which were foreign to Aristotle's system. In the following centuries a number of pseudo-Aristotelian writings came into existence, the doctrines of which would have been vigorously repudiated by the great Stagirite. The lack of historical criticism, however, which was common to those ages, made the Arabs as well as the Jews believe in the genuineness of these writings. Obvious contradictions of the system of Aristotle were represented as later views of the philosopher, or difficulties were smoothed over in some other artificial way. Thus a combination of Aristotelian, Neo-Pythagorean, and Neo-Platonic doctrines was attributed to Aristotle, the influence of which makes itself felt even among the keenest and staunchest Peripatetics.

The first Jewish writer to refer to Aristotle by name is the above-mentioned David al-Mukammās (Steinschneider, *JQR* xvii. [1905] 357), while his younger contemporary, the Gāṣn Sa'adya (892-942), though never mentioning Aristotle by name, at times adopts some of his philosophic theories, and at others assails him bitterly. By this time, then,

al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, and other Arabs had made the name of Aristotle familiar to Jewish thinkers, but, as Kalām and Neo-Platonism were predominant among the Arabs, the Jews, too, were held under their influence, and for nearly two centuries no representative of Peripateticism appeared among them. The famous poet Judah Halevi (*q.v.*) of Toledo († 1140) shows thorough acquaintance with the philosophy of Aristotle in his apologetic work known under the title *Kuzari* (*Chazari*), which is a philosophic dialogue between a Hebrew scholar and the king of the Chazars, and which was translated into Latin and the leading European languages (Steinschneider, *Arab. Lit.*, § 103). Being likewise a strong opponent of philosophy, he cannot be counted among the Jewish Aristotelians. It was not until about the second half of the 12th cent. that a real champion of Aristotelian philosophy appeared in Abraham ibn Dāūd of Toledo († c. 1180). In a work called *The Sublime Faith* he made the first attempt at reconciliation of Judaism with the doctrines of Peripatetic philosophy. Ibn Dāūd's chief interest was the problem of free will *versus* predestination. He also discusses at some length the problem of *creatio ex nihilo*. Here he deviates from the Aristotelian assumption of the eternality of matter, adopting instead with certain reservations a theory similar to the Neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation. Neo-Platonic ideas find expression also in some other parts of the essentially Aristotelian work (see Guttman, *Die Religionsphilosophie des Abraham ibn Daud*, Göttingen, 1879; Horowitz, *Die Psychologie*, p. 211 ff.).

Of much greater consequence was Moses b. Maimūn, commonly called Maimonides (*q.v.*) 1135-1204), the greatest Jewish philosopher of the Middle Ages. Like Ibn Dāūd, whom he frequently follows, he started out with the conviction that reason, being a gift of God, cannot possibly conflict with true religion, which emanates from the same source. Aristotle is to Maimonides 'the prince of philosophers' whose theories he opposes to those of the Mutakallimūn. In his main philosophic work, *The Guide of the Perplexed*, he tries to demonstrate the identity of Aristotle's teachings with those of Judaism. The apparent contradiction between Aristotle and the Bible is due only to a too literal interpretation of the latter. A large portion of the work is therefore devoted to explaining away the anthropomorphism of the Scriptures. In connexion therewith he discusses the divine attributes. Maimonides does not admit any positive attributes in the description of God, except those referring to God's actions. God's essence can be described only negatively. The last chapters of the first part offer a history of the Kalām and a trenchant criticism of its methods and teachings, which until recent times was the most important source of our knowledge about the Kalām. The main philosophic problems, as *creatio ex nihilo*, unity and incorporeality of God, and the nature of prophecy, are admirably treated in the second part of the *Guide*, while the third is devoted to questions of a more theological character, such as the origin of evil (theodicy), the extent of divine providence, which, contrary to the opinion of Aristotle, Maimonides holds, embraces all human individuals, and, finally, the meaning and purpose of the revealed law, which is treated in much detail. Maimonides identifies religion, as expressed in the divine precepts of the Pentateuch, with ethics, and tries to show that the precepts, if properly understood, have a moral purpose.

The main results of his philosophic investigations were formulated by Maimonides in short paragraphs at the beginning of his famous code, called *Mishneh Tōrah*. Peripatetic philosophy of Aristotle thus appears here as an integral part of a

code of Jewish law. See, further, art. MAIMONIDES.

Of the immediate pupils of Maimonides special mention is to be made of Joseph ibn 'Akūn († Aleppo, 1226), to whom Maimonides dedicated his *Guide*. He is the author of several philosophic treatises, some of which were published (see Steinschneider, *Arab. Lit.*, § 170; J. L. Magnes, *A Treatise as to Necessary Existence*, etc., Berlin, 1904; W. Bacher, *Sepher Musar*, do. 1910).

Maimonides' works exercised great influence on Christian scholastics, especially Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and others (Kaufmann, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ii. 152 ff.). Among the Jews many of his doctrines were strongly opposed as incompatible with traditional Judaism. This opposition led to a wide-spread internal strife and to a decline of philosophic studies within the ranks of Jewry (see H. Graetz, *Hist. of the Jews*, Eng. tr., London, 1891-92, iii. 522-545, 623 ff.). The numerous philosophic writers of the 13th cent. merely repeated the ideas of previous authors. Some of them, however, displayed great literary ability and industry as translators of foreign works into Hebrew (Steinschneider, *Übersetzungen*, pp. 42-500), as compilers of general encyclopedias (*ib.* pp. 1-42), or as commentators on the works of others. Among these writers mention should be made of the Provençal Shem Tob Palquera (1225-90), a profound scholar and keen literary critic (Malter, *JQR*, new ser., i. [1910-11] 151-181, 451-501); the Italian physician Hillel b. Samuel (1220-90), translator into Hebrew of several works, among them the pseudo-Aristotelian *Liber de Causis*, from Latin, and author of an independent philosophic work (*Taḡmule ha-Nefesh*, Lyck, 1874; see Steinschneider's letter in the introd. to this work); Isaac Albalag of S. France, an unreserved follower of Aristotle, with some leaning, however, towards the Kabbalā (H. Auerbach, *Isaak Albalag*, Breslau, 1906); Joseph ibn Caspi of Argentières (1340), the most prolific writer of that period (see E. Renan and A. Neubauer, in *Hist. littéraire de la France*, Paris, 1893, xxxi. 477-547), and his contemporary, the poet Jedaiah Penini of Béziers, whose *Examen Mundi*, an ethical work in a highly poetical Hebrew style, was one of the most popular books of the Middle Ages. It was translated into Latin and most of the modern languages (Eng. by T. Goodman, London, 1806), and very frequently published with various commentaries (Renan-Neubauer, pp. 359-402).

During the first half of the 14th cent. Jewish Peripateticism once more came into great repute through Levi b. Gershon (*q.v.*) Gersonides, Magister Leo Hebræus, † c. 1344) of Bagnols, after Maimonides the keenest and the most consistent Jewish Aristotelian of the Middle Ages. Levi is the author of numerous philosophic commentaries on books of the Bible and on the works of Averroes as well as of a comprehensive independent work called *Milhamōth 'Adōnai* ('Battles of the Lord'), which established his fame (Renan-Neubauer, pp. 586-644; Kellermann, *Die Kämpfe Gottes*, Berlin, 1914; cf. Hnsik, *JQR* vii. [1917]).

Of great interest for the history of philosophy are the works of Moses Narboni of Narbonne, † c. 1362), surnamed Maître Vidal Bellsom (Belhomme). Like Gersonides, he was an ardent exponent of Peripatetic - Averroistic philosophy. He wrote valuable commentaries on the works of Avicenna, Ghazālī, Ibn Tufail, Averroes, and Maimonides (*Guide*), as well as several independent works on philosophic subjects (Renan-Neubauer, pp. 666-681).

A philosopher of great originality was Hasdai Crescas of Barcelona and Saragossa (1340-1410), author of a profound work entitled *Or 'Adōnai*

('Light of God'). Hasdai marks a decided turn in the history of Jewish philosophy. Far from continuing the Peripatetic doctrines of Maimonides and Gersonides, he, like Ghazālī among the Arabs, tried to demolish the whole structure of the philosophers' world-conception, showing the inadequacy of reason to establish the truth, which, he claims, can be obtained only on the firm basis of revealed religion. Hasdai's work exercised great influence on Spinoza, many essential points in the latter's system having been taken from the former (M. Joel, *Don Chasdai Crescas' religionsphilosophische Lehren*, Breslau, 1866, *Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinoza's*, do. 1871; J. Wolfsohn, *Der Einfluss Gazālī's auf Chisdai Crescas*, Frankfurt, 1905).

The Karaite Jews of the period under consideration also produced a philosopher of prominence in the person of Aaron b. Elijah of Nicomedia, Asia Minor, whose *Tree of Life* (finished in 1346) compares fairly with the *Guide* of Maimonides, after which it was modelled (see F. Delitzsch, *Ahron ben Eliä's . . . System der Religionsphilosophie*, Leipzig, 1841; Schreiner, *Der Kalam*, p. 57 ff.).

Towards the end of the 14th cent. Profiat Duran (Spain), commentator of Maimonides' *Guide* and author of several other works, arrests attention as a man of philosophic learning and critical acumen (S. Gronemann, *De Profatii Durani Vita ac Studii*, Breslau, 1869). He is greatly excelled by his namesake, Simon Duran of Majorca (1361-1444), a man of keen intellect and vast Jewish and secular learning, who wrote numerous works, among them one of an encyclopædic character, in which he shows perfect familiarity with the problems of philosophy and all the sciences of the Middle Ages (see Guttmann, *MGWJ* lii. [1908] 41-72, liii. [1909] 46-79, 199-228).

The best known philosophic writer of the 15th cent. is Joseph Albo († c. 1444), a pupil of Hasdai Crescas. He is the author of the very popular book, *Ikkurim* ('Principles'), which is characteristic of the change that took place within the ranks of the Jewish thinkers during the 15th cent. (see A. Tünzer, *Die Religionsphilosophie Joseph Albo's*, Frankfurt, 1896). Partly owing to the sharp criticism of Hasdai, Peripateticism had gradually given place to doctrines which were more in keeping with the spirit of Judaism. Among the writers of this period worthy of mention are Joseph b. Shem Tob and his son Shem Tob, both in Spain, the former a very independent writer and critic, the latter a strict follower of Maimonides and commentator of his *Guide* (see Guttmann, *MGWJ* lvii. [1913] 177 ff.); Abraham Bibago of Huesca († c. 1490), author of commentaries on Averroes and of *The Path of Faith*, a valuable philosophic presentation and defence of the Jewish religion (Steinschneider, *Übersetzungen*, § 38, p. 168); Judah Messer Leon of Mantua, author of several works, among them a compendium of logic and a commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics* (Husik, *Judah Messer Leon's Commentary on the 'Vetus Logica'*, Leyden, 1906); Elijah del Medigo of Crete (1450-93), the famous professor of philosophy at the universities of Padua and other Italian cities, author of *Behinat ha-Dat* ('Investigation of Religion') and of several commentaries in elegant Latin on works of Aristotle and Averroes, some written at the request of his pupil and friend, Count Pio de Miranda (Steinschneider, *Übersetzungen*, p. 973); Isaac Arama of Zamora († 1494), author of the very popular philosophic homiletical *Offering of Isaac*, part of which was translated into Latin and made the subject of an academic dissertation by Anton J. von der Hardt (1729; see Steinschneider, *Übersetzungen*, p. 214 f.; *Zeitschr. für hebr. Bibliographie*, iii. [1899] 17, no. 209; *JE* ii. 66); the Catalan Abraham Shalom († 1492),

translator of Albertus Magnus's *Philosophia Pauperum* and of a treatise by Marsilius Ingenus, and author of the learned work *Neveh Shalom* (Steinschneider, *Übersetzungen*, pp. 465, 469); Don Isaac Abravanel (1437-1508), treasurer of Alfonso V. of Portugal, the most prolific writer of that period, author of voluminous Bible commentaries and other works, which were much studied and highly esteemed also by Christian scholars (Guttmann, *Die religionsphilosophischen Lehren des Isaac Abravanel*, Breslau, 1915); Judah Abravanel (son of the preceding), called Leo Hebreus, a Neo-Platonist of the Italian Renaissance period, who has made himself famous as a philosopher by his work *Dialoghi di amore*, which went through many editions in the Italian original and in various translations (Munk, *Mélanges*, pp. 522-528; B. Zimmels, *Leo Hebraeus*, Leipzig, 1886, *Leone Hebreo Neue Studien*, Vienna, 1892).

With the expulsion of the Jews from Spain (1492) the centre of Jewish mediæval secular civilization was destroyed. A considerable number of Hebrew authors were busy writing on religious philosophic subjects also during the following centuries, especially in Italy, where many of the Spanish exiles had settled, but none of their writings can be considered as an original contribution to Jewish philosophy. The Jewish philosophers of great prominence that still appeared on the scene, such as Baruch Spinoza, Moses Mendelssohn, and others of more recent times, were not the continuators of what is known as 'Jewish' philosophy, and are, therefore, not to be discussed here. They belong to the history of philosophy in general.

In summing up it may be said that, while on the whole the Jews as philosophers play only a secondary rôle, 'they indisputably share with the Arabs the merit of having preserved and propagated the science of philosophy during the centuries of barbarism, and of having exercised for a certain period a civilizing influence on the European world' (Munk, *Mélanges*, p. 511).

LITERATURE.—Works on individual authors have been referred to in the text, we quote here only works that deal with Jewish philosophy in general: W. Bacher, *Die Bibelexegese der jüdischen Religionsphilosophen des Mittelalters vor Maimuni*, Strassburg, 1892 (cf. his *Bibelexegese Moses Maimuni's*, do. 1896); S. Bernfeld, *Da'at Elohim*, Warsaw, 1897; P. Bloch, *Die jüdische Religionsphilosophie*, in Winter and Wünsche, *Die jüdische Literatur*, Berlin, 1897, ii. 699-704, also separately; M. Eisler, *Vorlesungen über die jüdischen Philosophen des Mittelalters*, 3 vols., Vienna, 1870-83; I. Goldziher, in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, i. [1913] 301-337; S. Horowitz, *Die Psychologie bei den jüdischen Religionsphilosophen des Mittelalters*, 4 vols., Breslau, 1898-1912; I. Husik, *A Hist. of Mediæval Jewish Philosophy*, New York, 1916; D. Kaufmann, *Gesch. der Attributenlehre in der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie des Mittelalters*, Gotha, 1877; P. J. Müller, *De godskleer der middeleeuwsche Joden*, Groningen, 1898; S. Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, 2 vols., Paris, 1857-59 (cf. B. Beer, *Philosophie und philosophische Schriftsteller der Juden*, Leipzig, 1852); D. Neumark, *Gesch. der jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Berlin, 1907-10; M. Schreiner, *Der Kalam in der jüdischen Literatur*, do. 1895; J. Splegier, *Gesch. der Philosophie des Judenthums*, Leipzig, 1891.

HENRY MALTER.

PHILOSOPHY (Muslim).—I. The earliest attitude of Islām to reflective thought.—The heathen period of Arabian history, 'the time of ignorance' (*jāhiliya*), came to an end when Muḥammad received his divine revelation from the hands of the archangel Gabriel. The Qur'an contains everything that man needs to know. In point of fact, however, it supplies but scanty materials for the philosophical spirit; and of such materials already in existence it was the wisdom of Luqinān alone (cf. Qur'an, xxxi.)—a body of religious and practical ethics that might be compared to the book of Proverbs—that found admission into the bible of Islām. Had Muḥammad known of philosophers in the Greek sense of the term, he would doubtless have doomed them, as he doomed the poets, to the

al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, and other Arabs had made the name of Aristotle familiar to Jewish thinkers, but, as Kalām and Neo-Platonism were predominant among the Arabs, the Jews, too, were held under their influence, and for nearly two centuries no representative of Peripateticism appeared among them. The famous poet Judah Halevi (*q.v.*) of Toledo († 1140) shows thorough acquaintance with the philosophy of Aristotle in his apologetic work known under the title *Kuzari* (*Chazari*), which is a philosophic dialogue between a Hebrew scholar and the king of the Chazars, and which was translated into Latin and the leading European languages (Steinschneider, *Arab. Lit.*, § 103). Being likewise a strong opponent of philosophy, he cannot be counted among the Jewish Aristotelians. It was not until about the second half of the 12th cent. that a real champion of Aristotelian philosophy appeared in Abraham ibn Dāūd of Toledo († c. 1180). In a work called *The Sublime Faith* he made the first attempt at reconciliation of Judaism with the doctrines of Peripatetic philosophy. Ibn Dāūd's chief interest was the problem of free will *versus* predestination. He also discusses at some length the problem of *creatio ex nihilo*. Here he deviates from the Aristotelian assumption of the eternality of matter, adopting instead with certain reservations a theory similar to the Neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation. Neo-Platonic ideas find expression also in some other parts of the essentially Aristotelian work (see Guttman, *Die Religionsphilosophie des Abraham ibn Daud*, Göttingen, 1879; Horowitz, *Die Psychologie*, p. 211 ff.).

Of much greater consequence was Moses b. Maimon, commonly called Maimonides (*q.v.*) 1135-1204), the greatest Jewish philosopher of the Middle Ages. Like Ibn Dāūd, whom he frequently follows, he started out with the conviction that reason, being a gift of God, cannot possibly conflict with true religion, which emanates from the same source. Aristotle is to Maimonides 'the prince of philosophers' whose theories he opposes to those of the Mutakallimūn. In his main philosophic work, *The Guide of the Perplexed*, he tries to demonstrate the identity of Aristotle's teachings with those of Judaism. The apparent contradiction between Aristotle and the Bible is due only to a too literal interpretation of the latter. A large portion of the work is therefore devoted to explaining away the anthropomorphisms of the Scriptures. In connexion therewith he discusses the divine attributes. Maimonides does not admit any positive attributes in the description of God, except those referring to God's actions. God's essence can be described only negatively. The last chapters of the first part offer a history of the Kalām and a trenchant criticism of its methods and teachings, which until recent times was the most important source of our knowledge about the Kalām. The main philosophic problems, as *creatio ex nihilo*, unity and incorporeality of God, and the nature of prophecy, are admirably treated in the second part of the *Guide*, while the third is devoted to questions of a more theological character, such as the origin of evil (theodicy), the extent of divine providence, which, contrary to the opinion of Aristotle, Maimonides holds, embraces all human individuals, and, finally, the meaning and purpose of the revealed law, which is treated in much detail. Maimonides identifies religion, as expressed in the divine precepts of the Pentateuch, with ethics, and tries to show that the precepts, if properly understood, have a moral purpose.

The main results of his philosophic investigations were formulated by Maimonides in short paragraphs at the beginning of his famous code, called *Mishneh Tōrah*. Peripatetic philosophy of Aristotle thus appears here as an integral part of a

code of Jewish law. See, further, art. MAIMONIDES.

Of the immediate pupils of Maimonides special mention is to be made of Joseph ibn 'Aqūn († Aleppo, 1226), to whom Maimonides dedicated his *Guide*. He is the author of several philosophic treatises, some of which were published (see Steinschneider, *Arab. Lit.*, § 170; J. L. Magnes, *A Treatise as to Necessary Existence*, etc., Berlin, 1904; W. Bacher, *Sepher Musar*, do. 1910).

Maimonides' works exercised great influence on Christian scholastics, especially Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and others (Kaufmann, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ii. 152 ff.). Among the Jews many of his doctrines were strongly opposed as incompatible with traditional Judaism. This opposition led to a wide-spread internal strife and to a decline of philosophic studies within the ranks of Jewry (see H. Graetz, *Hist. of the Jews*, Eng. tr., London, 1891-92, iii. 522-545, 623 ff.). The numerous philosophic writers of the 13th cent. merely repeated the ideas of previous authors. Some of them, however, displayed great literary ability and industry as translators of foreign works into Hebrew (Steinschneider, *Übersetzungen*, pp. 42-500), as compilers of general encyclopædias (*ib.* pp. 1-42), or as commentators on the works of others. Among these writers mention should be made of the Provençal Shem Tob Palquera (1225-90), a profound scholar and keen literary critic (Malter, *JQR*, new ser., i. [1910-11] 151-181, 451-501); the Italian physician Hillel b. Samuel (1220-90), translator into Hebrew of several works, among them the pseudo-Aristotelian *Liber de Causis*, from Latin, and author of an independent philosophic work (*Tagmule ha-Nefesh*, Lyck, 1874; see Steinschneider's letter in the introd. to this work); Isaac Albalag of S. France, an unreserved follower of Aristotle, with some leaning, however, towards the Kabbālā (H. Auerbach, *Isaak Albalag*, Breslau, 1906); Joseph ibn Caspi of Argenteire (1340), the most prolific writer of that period (see E. Renan and A. Neubauer, in *Hist. littéraire de la France*, Paris, 1893, xxxi. 477-547), and his contemporary, the poet Jedaiah Penini of Béziers, whose *Examen Mundi*, an ethical work in a highly poetical Hebrew style, was one of the most popular books of the Middle Ages. It was translated into Latin and most of the modern languages (Eng. by T. Goodman, London, 1806), and very frequently published with various commentaries (Renan-Neubauer, pp. 359-402).

During the first half of the 14th cent. Jewish Peripateticism once more came into great repute through Levi b. Gershon (*q.v.*) Gersonides, Magister Leo Hebraeus, † c. 1344) of Bagnols, after Maimonides the keenest and the most consistent Jewish Aristotelian of the Middle Ages. Levi is the author of numerous philosophic commentaries on books of the Bible and on the works of Averroes as well as of a comprehensive independent work called *Millāmōth 'Adōnai* ('Battles of the Lord'), which established his fame (Renan-Neubauer, pp. 586-644; Kellermann, *Die Kämpfe Gottes*, Berlin, 1914; cf. Husik, *JQR* vii. [1917]).

Of great interest for the history of philosophy are the works of Moses Narboni of Narbonne († c. 1362), surnamed Maître Vidal Bellson (Bellhomme). Like Gersonides, he was an ardent exponent of Peripatetic - Averroistic philosophy. He wrote valuable commentaries on the works of Avicenna, Ghazālī, Ibn Tufail, Averroes, and Maimonides (*Guide*), as well as several independent works on philosophic subjects (Renan-Neubauer, pp. 666-681).

A philosopher of great originality was Hasdai Crescas of Barcelona and Saragossa (1340-1410), author of a profound work entitled *Or 'Adōnai*

('Light of God'). Hasdai marks a decided turn in the history of Jewish philosophy. Far from continuing the Peripatetic doctrines of Maimonides and Gersonides, he, like Ghazālī among the Arabs, tried to demolish the whole structure of the philosophers' world-conception, showing the inadequacy of reason to establish the truth, which, he claims, can be obtained only on the firm basis of revealed religion. Hasdai's work exercised great influence on Spinoza, many essential points in the latter's system having been taken from the former (M. Joel, *Don Chasdai Crescas' religionsphilosophische Lehren*, Breslau, 1886, *Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinoza's*, do. 1871; J. Wolfsohn, *Der Einfluss Gazālī's auf Chisdai Crescas*, Frankfurt, 1905).

The Karaite Jews of the period under consideration also produced a philosopher of prominence in the person of Aaron b. Elijah of Nieomedia, Asia Minor, whose *Tree of Life* (finished in 1346) compares fairly with the *Guide* of Maimonides, after which it was modelled (see F. Delitzsch, *Ahron ben Eli'a's . . . System der Religionsphilosophie*, Leipzig, 1841; Schreiner, *Der Kalam*, p. 57 ff.).

Towards the end of the 14th cent. Profiat Duran (Spain), commentator of Maimonides' *Guide* and author of several other works, arrests attention as a man of philosophic learning and critical acumen (S. Gronemann, *De Profiatii Durani Vita ac Studiis*, Breslau, 1869). He is greatly excelled by his name-ake, Simon Duran of Majorca (1361-1444), a man of keen intellect and vast Jewish and secular learning, who wrote numerous works, among them one of an encyclopedic character, in which he shows perfect familiarity with the problems of philosophy and all the sciences of the Middle Ages (see Guttmann, *MGWJ* lii. [1908] 41-72, liii. [1909] 46-79, 199-228).

The best known philosophic writer of the 15th cent. is Joseph Albo († c. 1444), a pupil of Hasdai Crescas. He is the author of the very popular book, *Ikkurim* ('Principles'), which is characteristic of the change that took place within the ranks of the Jewish thinkers during the 15th cent. (see A. Tánzer, *Die Religionsphilosophie Joseph Albo's*, Frankfurt, 1896). Partly owing to the sharp criticism of Hasdai, Peripateticism had gradually given place to doctrines which were more in keeping with the spirit of Judaism. Among the writers of this period worthy of mention are Joseph b. Shem Tob and his son Shem Tob, both in Spain, the former a very independent writer and critic, the latter a strict follower of Maimonides and commentator of his *Guide* (see Guttmann, *MGWJ* lvii. [1913] 177 ff.); Abraham Bibago of Huesca († c. 1490), author of commentaries on Averroes and of *The Path of Faith*, a valuable philosophic presentation and defence of the Jewish religion (Steinschneider, *Übersetzungen*, § 38, p. 168); Judah Messer Leon of Mantua, author of several works, among them a compendium of logic and a commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics* (Husik, *Judah Messer Leon's Commentary on the 'Vetus Logica'*, Leyden, 1906); Elijah del Medigo of Crete (1450-93), the famous professor of philosophy at the universities of Padua and other Italian cities, author of *Behinat ha-Dat* ('Investigation of Religion') and of several commentaries in elegant Latin on works of Aristotle and Averroes, some written at the request of his pupil and friend, Count Pico de Mirandola (Steinschneider, *Übersetzungen*, p. 973); Isaac Arama of Zamora († 1494), author of the very popular philosophic homiletical *Offering of Isaac*, part of which was translated into Latin and made the subject of an academic dissertation by Anton J. von der Hardt (1729; see Steinschneider, *Übersetzungen*, p. 214 f.; *Zeitschr. für hebr. Bibliographie*, iii. [1899] 17, no. 209; *JE* ii. 66); the Catalan Abraham Shalom († 1492),

translator of Albertus Magnus's *Philosophia Pauperum* and of a treatise by Marsilius Ingenus, and author of the learned work *Neveh Shalom* (Steinschneider, *Übersetzungen*, pp. 465, 469); Don Isaac Abravanel (1437-1508), treasurer of Alfonso v. of Portugal, the most prolific writer of that period, author of voluminous Bible commentaries and other works, which were much studied and highly esteemed also by Christian scholars (Guttmann, *Die religionsphilosophischen Lehren des Isaac Abravanel*, Breslau, 1915); Judah Abravanel (son of the preceding), called Leo Hebræus, a Neo-Platonist of the Italian Renaissance period, who has made himself famous as a philosopher by his work *Dialoghi di amore*, which went through many editions in the Italian original and in various translations (Munk, *Mélanges*, pp. 522-528; B. Zimmels, *Leo Hebræus*, Leipzig, 1886, *Leone Hebreo Neue Studien*, Vienna, 1892).

With the expulsion of the Jews from Spain (1492) the centre of Jewish mediæval secular civilization was destroyed. A considerable number of Hebrew authors were busy writing on religious philosophic subjects also during the following centuries, especially in Italy, where many of the Spanish exiles had settled, but none of their writings can be considered as an original contribution to Jewish philosophy. The Jewish philosophers of great prominence that still appeared on the scene, such as Baruch Spinoza, Moses Mendelssohn, and others of more recent times, were not the continuators of what is known as 'Jewish' philosophy, and are, therefore, not to be discussed here. They belong to the history of philosophy in general.

In summing up it may be said that, while on the whole the Jews as philosophers play only a secondary rôle, 'they indisputably share with the Arabs the merit of having preserved and propagated the science of philosophy during the centuries of barbarism, and of having exercised for a certain period a civilizing influence on the European world' (Munk, *Mélanges*, p. 511).

LITERATURE.—Works on individual authors have been referred to in the text, we quote here only works that deal with Jewish philosophy in general: W. Bacher, *Die Bibelepik der jüdischen Religionsphilosophen des Mittelalters vor Maimuni*, Strassburg, 1892 (cf. his *Bibelepik Moses Maimuni's*, do. 1896); S. Bernfeld, *Da'at Elohim*, Warsaw, 1897; P. Bloch, *Die jüdische Religionsphilosophie*, in Winter and Wünsche, *Die jüdische Literatur*, Berlin, 1897, II. 699-704, also separately; M. Eisler, *Vorlesungen über die jüdischen Philosophen des Mittelalters*, 3 vols., Vienna, 1870-83; I. Goldziher, *in Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, I. [1913] 301-337; S. Horowitz, *Die Psychologie bei den jüdischen Religionsphilosophen des Mittelalters*, 4 vols., Breslau, 1893-1912; I. Husik, *A Hist. of . . . jüdischen Religionsphilosophie*, New York, 1916; D. Kaufmann, *. . . jüdischen Religionsphilosophie*, F. J. Müller, *De godeler der middeleeuwsche Joden*, Groningen, 1893; S. Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, 2 vols., Paris, 1857-59 (cf. B. Beer, *. . . Schriftsteller der Juden*, Leipzig, . . . jüdischen Philosophie des Mittelalters, 1892); Schreiner, *Der Kalam in der jüdischen Literatur*, do. 1895; J. Spiegler, *Gesch. der Philosophie des Judenthums*, Leipzig, 1891.

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PHILOSOPHY (Muslim).—I. The earliest attitude of Islām to reflective thought.—The heathen period of Arabian history, 'the time of ignorance' (*jāhiliyya*), came to an end when Muḥammad received his divine revelation from the hands of the archangel Gabriel. The Qur'ān contains everything that man needs to know. In point of fact, however, it supplies but scanty materials for the philosophical spirit; and of such materials already in existence it was the wisdom of Luqmān alone (cf. Qur'ān, xxxi.)—a body of religious and practical ethics that might be compared to the book of Proverbs—that found admission into the bible of Islām. Had Muḥammad known of philosophers in the Greek sense of the term, he would doubtless have doomed them, as he doomed the poets, to the

Fire. The Tradition ascribes, to him the characteristic saying, 'The devil is found upon the way of the solitary,' and philosophers are, as a rule, solitary men. As time, however, reconciles all opposites, the Prophet, according to the Tradition, likewise said that the first thing created by God was knowledge ('ilm) or reason ('aql). His son-in-law, 'Alī, the fourth *khalīfah*, who was regarded by many heretics of a later age as the first Arabian philosopher properly so called, is reported to have said, 'Philosophy is the lost sheep of the faithful; take it up again, even if from the infidel.' Further, the Socratic maxim 'Know thyself'—in a somewhat mystical or pantheistic sense—was put into the mouth both of the Prophet himself and of his son-in-law.

To the mind of Muhammad Allāh was pre-eminently the Powerful, the Wise. Primarily, indeed, he is the Powerful, who can do all things, and does as he wills, and it is rather in a secondary sense that he is the Wise—an attribute that here properly means 'all-knowing,' for primitive thought dwells more upon the compass than upon the content or the mode of knowledge. Allāh's wisdom might, in fact, be characterized as shrewdness or sagacity. Just as the merchants of Mecca enter their transactions in their books, so Allāh notes down the deeds of men; he is quick at calculation; he is something of a schemer. His 99 beautiful names or attributes do not include reason. We need not wonder, therefore, that his *rasūl* should speak as time and circumstances demand, or according to the changing moods of his own soul.

2. Islām in contact with Hellenistic and Christian thought.—A change ensued when Islām, in the first century of its existence, spread to Syria, Persia, and Egypt, and came into touch with the Hellenistic and Christian culture of these lands. To begin with, it had to come to terms with Christian theology. The Christians whom the Muslims had subjugated were far above their new masters in the dialectic art, and the sons and grandsons of the latter became the pupils of the subject peoples. The polemical and apologetic activities of the Christians brought to view certain naive inconsistencies and defects in the religious law and the Tradition of Islām. The problems of theological metaphysics which above all others gave occasion to disputes and so led to the formulation of doctrines and systems were as follows: (a) divine righteousness and man's freedom and responsibility; (b) the eternity of God's word; (c) the unity of God and His attributes; and (d) the relation of God to man and to the world.

In the discussion of these problems, more particularly during the first three centuries of Muslim development, political faction played a part sometimes of decisive, sometimes of merely secondary, importance. We cannot enter into this here; the attendant disputes concern us only in so far as they led to the development of logical or dialectic methods (see art. KALĀM, vol. vii. p. 637 ff.) and prepared the way for the progress of philosophic thinking.

The results of the conflict between the Mu'tazilite Kalām and the Kalām ranking as orthodox in Sunnite Islām may be summarized as follows. The Christian doctrine of human freedom (a) was rejected, as was also a doctrine that had been developed in various ways under philosophical influences, viz. that the attributes of God are not to be differentiated at all, or are to be differentiated only in the slightest degree, from the unity of His being (c). On the other hand, the doctrine (b) of the eternity of the divine word (the Logos) was applied to the Qur'ān and became a Muslim dogma; while, finally, the relation of God to the world and to man (d) received various interpretations of either a rationalistic or a mystical type.

The more rationalistic explanation predominates in the orthodox Kalām of the early centuries, just as it does in the Qur'ān. It starts from the view that the world is the work of Allāh, and that man is his slave. It accordingly makes little inquiry regarding natural causes or human motives, and refers all that takes place in the world and in the soul to the omnipotent and inscrutable will of God. Every change is therefore something absolutely new. There is no causal connexion, no continuous procreation, in the world; every occurrence is a fresh act of creation. A peculiar modification of the atomistic philosophy on these lines was adopted by orthodox Islām (cf. art. ATOMIC THEORY, vol. ii. p. 202 f.).

Among many Muslim sects, however, and especially in the Shi'ah, and in all schools of Sūfīite mysticism, the divine is brought into closer relations with man and the world, or, conversely, men and the world are deified.¹ Like the Greek and Arabic Neo-Platonists, these sects adopted a thought expressed in the *Theatetus* (176 B), viz. that the great object of our reflexion is to become as like God as is possible for man. By a mystical overstraining of this idea the desiderated 'likeness' (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν) is sometimes conceived as complete unification. For the most part, however, the idea is expressed in a more cautious form; thus, under the influence of Christianity, man was regarded as the image of God, and from this point of view it was asserted that one who knows himself knows also his Lord. Servile obedience, moreover, gives place to love, and the devout servant becomes a fellow-worker with God. In minds of an ecstatic cast, however, an extravagant mysticism tends ever to pass into a pantheism for which the human ego becomes God and the world an empty show (cf. art. HALLAJ, vol. vi. p. 480 ff.). The merit of having been the first to reconcile the rationalistic or scholastic trend of thought with the mystical in a fashion that proved satisfactory to the Islām of subsequent times belongs to al-Ghazālī (cf. art. ETHICS [Muslim], vol. v. p. 508 f.). In reality both tendencies were at one in the view that it is Allāh who *works* all in all, while a more extreme form of mysticism added that he is all in all.

3. Early influence of philosophy upon Mu'tazilite thinkers.—The extent to which the Mu'tazilite thinkers of Basra, even by the 9th cent. A.D., had allowed their teaching to be influenced by philosophy is best seen in the writings of al-Nazzām († A.D. 845) and his pupil al-Jāhīz († A.D. 869).

According to al-Nazzām, man has in virtue of his reason the capacity of knowing that God exists. God, in His essential nature, is not will, but knowledge. Nor is He able to do all things; on the contrary, He can do only what is good, i.e. what He knows is best for His servants. From the goodness of God's character, moreover, it follows that He could not have created the world better than it actually is. Creation is to be regarded as, in its divine aspect, a single act by which all things were brought into being simultaneously; in other words, one thing is contained in another, and the whole variety of existing things—minerals, plants, animals, men—are in the process of time evolved from their original state of latency (*kumūn*). Thus, e.g., all the generations of mankind were potentially existent in Adam, the first man. This doctrine of creation as a single act stands in direct opposition to the view that God creates all things afresh every moment, as was taught in the atomistic Kalām.

Al-Nazzām likewise maintains that, while God,

¹ In what degrees this mystical phase was conditioned by native asceticism and by Persian and Indian influences need not be discussed here.

by the necessity of His nature, wills and does what accords with His wisdom and goodness, and while nature can work only in conformity with the constitution given to it at the creation, the human soul, with its freedom of volition and action, stands midway between the two. The human body and its physical activities are certainly subject to natural law, but the soul, which resides in the body as in a vessel, or interpenetrates it in every part and so makes it an instrument, is free. Somewhat obscurely al-Nazzām speaks of the soul as the real and veritable man; it would seem that here certain Pythagorean-Platonic and Stoic elements were mingled together in his thought; and we are reminded also of Qusṭā b. Lūqā's speculations regarding the soul and the life-spirit (*πνεῦμα*, Arab. *rūḥ*), which owe much to the influence of Galen.

Al-Nazzām, in his theory of the material world, stands opposed to the atomistic view. He maintains the continuity, or rather the complete interpenetration, of all material things (the Stoic *κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων*?). This accords admirably with his doctrine of involution (*kumūn*; see above), according to which every thing is contained in every other. The so-called atom, he holds, is infinitely divisible. Then, with a view to explaining how infinitely divisible spaces can be traversed, he advances his fantastic doctrine of the 'spring' or 'leap' (*taḥra*).

Al-Jāhīz, the pupil of al-Nazzām, while he devoted himself more to literature than to philosophy, yet played an important part in the diffusion of philosophic culture in Islām. What is usually ascribed to him in the way of philosophical doctrine may be traced almost wholly to his teacher, as, e.g., his theory that God, having once created the world, cannot annihilate it again, that the only real activity of man consists in the inward exercise of his will, etc. His most effective work is probably found in his compilations in the philosophy of nature, in which he cites not only Pythagoras, Plato, Democritus, and Aristotle, but also Hermes and Zoroaster, Jeremiah and John the Baptist. Like al-Nazzām, al-Jāhīz belongs to the older school of philosophical thought in Islām—the school which Arabian tradition traces back to Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and other pre-Socratic or even mythical thinkers.

4. Influences of an older emanational and redemptive metaphysic.—It is a widely prevalent tradition in Arabic literature that the earliest philosophy, which was traced back to Hermes, Agathos Daimon, Asklepios, Pythagoras, Thales, Solon, Empedocles, Balinūs (Apollonius of Tyana), and others, found its way from Alexandria through Antioch and Harrān to the countries lying farther east. In this movement an important rôle was, as it seems, played by the Ṣābians of Harrān (cf. art. HARRANIANS, vol. vi. p. 519 f.). During the Muslim period Harrān was for centuries the centre of a Hellenistic community which combined certain elements of the ancient Babylonian astral religion with the Hermetic *γνῶσις*. The knowledge of divine mysteries was said to have been conveyed to them by the primitive revelation given to the Uranians, especially Hermes and Agathos Daimon, who were identified with the prophets Seth and Enoch (Arab. Idris). This revelation, or philosophy of enlightenment, consists in a graduated system of emanation, the principal stages being—with some variation in the order—(1) God, or the First Cause, (2) reason, (3) the soul, (4) matter, and (5) nature. These proceed successively from one another, and each higher stage, even after its emergence from the antecedent one, still continues to influence the lower. The highest being is usually conceived as light, and the action of the higher upon the lower is represented as being

mediated by light. This metaphysic of light likewise may have been compounded from speculations of Hellenistic philosophy and Persian religion. Connected with it at every point is a species of mathematics that plays fancifully with letters and numbers, as also astrology, alchemy, and magic, or the science of talismans. Nevertheless, the leading idea—the thought that stands at the centre of all these speculative exercises—is that of the salvation of the soul, which longs to escape from the evil (or, at least, imperfect), sensuous, and material world to its original source; and it is upon the path of asceticism and meditation that the soul seeks re-union with the spiritual or divine world.

Among the adherents of this philosophy of revelation and redemption, as also among the extreme mystics, a spirit of eclecticism and syncretism was largely prevalent. Among all peoples and in all religions and philosophies these thinkers found one and the same truth—the same divine light—though in various gradations of purity. Even those who externally gave their adhesion to Islām did not regard that religion as the highest and final revelation. The anthropomorphic and crudely sensuous language of the Qur'ān was interpreted allegorically without the slightest misgiving, for to these thinkers truth lay solely in the inner sense.

Elements of this philosophy of revelation, combined with Persian and Indian wisdom, are even yet more popular in the East than the systems formed more or less on Neo-Platonic models by the so-called Aristotelians of Islām. Directly or indirectly, the intellectual life of Islām had been permanently influenced by Pythagoras and Plato long before it opened the door to the thought of Aristotle.

5. The introduction of the Aristotelian philosophy.—Not only among the Ṣābians of Harrān, but also in the Christian schools and monasteries of Syria, as well as in the medical school instituted by Khosrau I. in Yundai-Ṣābir, a beginning had been made with the study of Greek writings and the translation of Greek scientific and philosophical works into Syriac, even before the Muslim conquest. Besides the works of Hippocrates and Galen, a large number of mathematical and astronomical writings, and at length nearly all the works of Aristotle, were thus translated. This work of translation was greatly encouraged by the Abbāsīd *khālifas* Maṣṣūr and Hārūn al-Rashīd, and especially Ma'mūn. Most of the translators were Syrian Christians, though Jews, Ṣābians belonging to Harrān, and now and again Muslims (e.g., al-Kindī) did their part. By profession they were generally physicians, their great aim being, of course, to promote their own special study. From the 4th to the 8th cent. the Greek books were translated into Syriac; from the 8th to the 10th, into Arabic, either from Syriac versions or directly from the original. Probably the more eminent Arabian translators of the 9th cent., such as Qusṭā b. Lūqā (c. 835; a Christian of Bal'abak), Thābit b. Qurra (a Ṣābian resident in Harrān; †901), and especially the Christian physician Hunayn b. Ishāq (809–873) and his pupils, worked in part directly from the Greek. From the end of the 9th cent. the work of translation was confined almost entirely to Aristotelian or pseudo-Aristotelian writings, with their paraphrases and commentaries.

Neither the natural philosophers nor the theologians received the works of Aristotle without opposition. Till well on in the 9th cent., when the Hermetic *γνῶσις* or the Pythagorean-Platonic wisdom was still in the ascendant, Aristotle was known almost solely as a logician (*ṣāhib al-mantiq*)

—a fact the most convincing proof of which is found in the work of the celebrated physician Rāzī († A.D. 923 or 932). The physical, and even more the metaphysical, teachings of the Stagirite met at first with vigorous resistance. This was especially the case with his doctrine that the world was eternal, i.e. without beginning—a view probably at first identified with a doctrine widely current in the East, viz. that of the Dahrites.¹ It was but natural that theologians of different schools, as, e.g., the Shi'ite Hishām b. al-Haḡam (a contemporary of Nazzām), the Mu'tazilite Abū Hāshim of Basra († 933), and the orthodox al-Ash'ari (873–935), should issue polemical pamphlets against the encroaching philosophy. These writers often found support in the arguments of Aristotle's Christian commentator, Johannes Philoponos (Yahyā the grammarian), whose writings were well known in the East.

On the other hand, al-Kindī and al-Fārābī, the first so-called 'philosophers,' or Peripatetics, in Islām, following the example of the Neo-Platonists, sought to demonstrate the essential harmony of Plato and Aristotle. This task was greatly facilitated by the fact that the Arabic translations included numerous pseudo-Aristotelian writings some or all of which they regarded as authentic. Among these pseudographs were the so-called *Theologia Aristotelis* (an abstract of the *Enneads* of Plotinus), the *Liber de Causis* (an abstract of the *Στοιχειώδης θεολογική* of Proclus), the *Book of the Apple* (a Hermetic imitation of Plato's *Phædo*), the *Secretum Secretorum*, etc. Even in a later and more critical age, as the *Politics* of Aristotle was still unknown in Islām, a great mass of Platonic material from the *Republic* and the *Laws* was incorporated (e.g., by Ibn Rushd) with the Aristotelian philosophy.

The line of more or less Platonizing Aristotelians in Islām begins with Ja'qūb b. Ishāq al-Kindī († after 870). As the earliest Muslim philosopher of Arabian descent—previous thinkers having been Syrians or Persians, and, later, Turks, Berbers, etc.—al-Kindī is styled 'the philosopher of the Arabs.' In theological matters he belonged to the Mu'tazilite school. One great article of his teaching was the righteousness of God, and he also laid stress upon the unity (i.e. the absence of properties) of the divine nature. Doctrines common to various religions, and especially the general belief of mankind in a Creator who reveals himself in prophecy, al-Kindī recognized as expressing the truths of reason. His philosophical syncretism enabled him to descry everywhere traces of a divine truth which flows in various channels from a single source.

Al-Kindī was known to mediæval Christendom mainly as an astrologer and a student of medicine. In the East, however, his significance rests upon his having been one of the first to engage in a thoroughgoing study of Aristotle's works. It was owing to that study, as perhaps also to his sound understanding, that he could so strongly inveigh against alchemy and various forms of the belief in miracles. It was also of importance for the development of philosophy in Islām that, with the support of Alexander of Aphrodisias's commentary on the *de Anima* of Aristotle, he introduced the doctrine of a manifold *νοῦς* (Arab. *'aql*). Here he distinguished four types of reason, viz. (a) the ever actual or active *'aql*—the source or essence of all spiritual entities in the world, and thus probably equivalent to God and the pure spirits who direct the celestial spheres;² (b) the *'aql* as the constitu-

tion or potentiality of the human soul; (c) the *'aql* as those properties or faculties of the soul of which she can at every moment avail herself; and (d) the *'aql* in the state of outward manifestation. The passage from (b) to (c), i.e. the development of the potential into the habitual reason, is usually regarded as effected by the prime, ever active reason. This doctrine of *'aql*, somewhat modified as time went on, is found also in the greater philosophers of Islām (cf. artt. FĀRĀBĪ, vol. v. p. 757 ff., AVICENNA, vol. ii. p. 272 ff., AVERROES, vol. ii. p. 262 ff.).

6. Difference between the older and the newer type of thought.—The difference between the older philosophical movement, with its Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonizing tendencies, and the logico-metaphysical school of the Aristotelians receives its most apposite illustration from a comparison of the encyclopædic system which the Iḥwān al-Safā ('The Faithful of Basra'), about the middle of the 10th cent., imposed upon the data of their knowledge with the classification of the sciences found in al-Fārābī († A.D. 950). The Faithful of Basra arranged the 52 treatises composing their philosophical encyclopædia as follows:

i. The first part comprises the propædæutic sciences: first (in conformity with the precedent of the Platonic school) mathematics, and then logic. Mathematics they divided into (1) arithmetic, (2) geometry, (3) astronomy, or rather astrology, (4) geography, (5) music, and (6) the doctrine of arithmetical and geometrical proportion (with much trifling). In all these six treatises the great object is to rouse the soul from 'foolish slumber and careless sleep,' and to lead it from the sensuous to what lies beyond—the spiritual. The transition to logic is made in the next three treatises, viz. (7) on the theoretical sciences, (8) on the practical sciences, and (9) on the various customs or characteristics of mankind. Logic, again, in conformity with (10) the *Isagoge* (of Porphyry), (11) (12) *peri epimeliai*, (13) the *Prior* (14) *Analytics*.

ii. The second part, the *epimeliai*, is the science of nature on its physical side, but, as the Iḥwān regarded the physical as of little value, their theme here—not only for purposes of edification, but quite directly—was often the soul itself. This section consists of seventeen treatises (nos. 15–31), viz. (15) elucidation of the fundamental conceptions—matter and form, space, time, and motion, (16) the heavens and the earth, (17) genesis and dissolution, (18) meteorology, (19) mineralogy, (20) nature in general, (21) botany, (22) zoology, (23) the structure of the human body, (24) sense perception, (25) development of the human embryo under the influence of the heavenly bodies, (26) man as a microcosm, (27) the development of individual souls, (28) the faculty of cognition, (29) the contemplation of death and life, (30) pleasure and pain, (31) the diverse languages of the nations.

iii. The subject of the third part is the spiritual world—the soul (*nafs*) and the reason (*'aql*)—which is dealt with in ten treatises (nos. 32–41), as follows: (32) spiritual principles according to Pythagoras, (33) spiritual principles according to the Iḥwān al-Safā, (34) the world as man on a large scale, (35) thought and its object, (36) theory of the spheres, the genesis and dissolution of the world, (37) the soul's love and longing for God, (38) resurrection (in a spiritual sense), (39) the kinds of motion, (40) causes and the caused, and (41) definitions and descriptions of things. The leading thought of all these treatises is that the spiritual is the essence and cause of the physical, and that the soul, which stands midway between reason (*'aql*) and nature (*tabi'a*), yearns for its primal source.

iv. The fourth section deals with the supreme, divine world, the world of divine law (*nāmūs*=νόμος), and contains eleven treatises (nos. 42–52), viz. (42) the various religions and philosophies (their common object being the welfare of the soul), (43) the way to God, (44) the Iḥwān al-Safā's profession of faith in the immortality of the soul, (45) the life of the Iḥwān al-Safā in loyal fellowship for mutual aid, (46) faith, (47) the divine law (*nāmūs*), or prophetic revelation (interpreted allegorically, of course), (48) homily and exhortation, (49) the practice of the spiritual life, (50) communal life (in the State and other associations), (51) the order of the world, (52) miracles and the magic arts, angels and demons.

Al-Fārābī, in his *Enumeration of the Sciences*, arranges the material in a somewhat different order, thus:

i. The science of language, in seven parts, discusses (1) the word, (2) the sentence, (3, 4) the rules of their formation and construction, (5, 6) correct speech and writing, and (7) the technique of verse.

ii. Logic, which is closely associated with linguistic science, is divided into eight parts, corresponding to the six books of the *Organon* (*The Categories*, *Interpretation*, *First and Second Analytics*, *Topics*, *Sophistical Arguments*), together with (7) the *Rhetoric* and (8) the *Poetics* of Aristotle. While rhetoric

¹ Cf. artt. 'Dahr,' 'Dahriya,' in *BE* i. 894 f.

² The term *'aql fa'āl* was, after al-Kindī's time, applied principally to the spirit emanating from the lowest heavenly (i.e. the lunar) sphere.

and poetics belong, on their technical side, to linguistics, they are here treated under logic as the theory of representing and imitating the real. According to this view, which came to have great importance in the East, the sequence of the subjects—topics, sophistics, rhetoric, poetics—forms a descending scale of the probable or the false which gradually declines from the high level of certain and demonstrative knowledge dealt with in the *Analytics*.

iii. Mathematical science consists of seven divisions, as follows: (1) arithmetic, (2) geometry, (3) theory of perspective, (4) astronomy, (5) music, (6) theory of measure and weight, and (7) technique.

iv. Natural science is divided into eight parts, viz. (1) doctrine of the principles of all material things (*φυσικὴ ἀρχαίολογία*), (2) the earth and the sky, (3) genesis and dissolution, (4, 5) meteorology, (6) mineralogy, (7) botany, (8) zoology, with which is conjoined psychology (as a natural science).

v. Metaphysics, or (likewise in Aristotle's terminology) theology, has the following three provinces: (1) the doctrine of the existent in general, together with its accidents, (2) the principles of the special sciences (logic, mathematics, physics), and (3) the doctrine of purely spiritual beings and their gradation, with God as the highest stage.

vi. Politics.—In this section, as the Aristotelian writings on practical philosophy were not as yet translated, or were translated only in part, there is a considerable representation of Platonic elements, though al-Fārābī seems to have been acquainted with the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

vii. Legislative science, i.e. the science of faith and of religious duty.

Such agreement as is found between the classification of the *Ihwan al-Safa* and that of al-Fārābī is due to the introductory treatises of Ammonius and Johannes Philoponus. Characteristic differences, however, appear both in the arrangement and in the exposition; as regards the former, the foregoing outline will enable the reader to compare the two systems, while, as regards the latter, it is impossible here to go more fully into detail. The material distinction may be briefly expressed by saying that the longing of the soul, which, according to the *Ihwan*, aspires to return to its celestial source, gives place in Fārābī to a more tranquil and broader contemplation of all things in the light of reason.

7. Muslim philosophy in the West.—The progress of Muslim culture in the West—in N. Africa, Spain, and Sicily—was in many respects a duplicate of the Oriental development. What Iraq and the city of Baghdad passed through in the 8th cent. was in the 10th repeated in Andalusia and its capital, Cordova. Conditions in the West, however, were of a more simple kind; gradations of culture were fewer; and Spain, true to its orthodox bent both before and after the Muslim invasion, was only superficially influenced by any of the sects and factions of the East. Nevertheless, some of the main currents of Muslim thought made their way to the West. As a result of pilgrimages to Mecca, and even more of scientific journeys extending as far as E. Persia, Andalusians became acquainted with the science and philosophy of the East, and those who travelled brought home books. Oriental scholars, again, frequently moved westwards in order to find employment. In the first half of the 9th cent. Abū Bakr Faraj b. Salam, a physician of literary attainments belonging to Cordova, made a journey of the kind indicated to Iraq, and, e.g., attended the lectures of al-Jāhiz in Basra. On his return to his native city he disseminated there the writings and the theology of that Mu'tazilite teacher, and also the first germs of Greek philosophy.

Somewhat later in the 9th cent. the Neo-Pythagorean philosophy found its way into Spain under the mask of Sufiite and Batinite (see below, § 8) mysticism. It purported to rest upon the authority of Empedocles. Its chief representatives here were Muhammad b. Masarra, a Muslim of Spanish descent, and the Jewish thinker Ibn Gabirol (q.v.).

Ibn Masarra, who was born in Cordova in 833 and died in 931, and whose father had studied Mu'tazilite and mystical theology in the East, lived the life of a devout ascetic. He eventually retired, with his pupils, to the solitude of the monn-

ains, and was on this account styled al-Jabali. In his place of retreat he instructed his pupils in the Mu'tazilite doctrine of freedom combined with a form of esoteric wisdom, this being in reality the emanation theory of the pseudo-Empedocles. From God, the One, the original principle—he held—proceed all things, each stage deriving from the antecedent one in the following order: (1) first or spiritual matter; (2) reason; (3) the soul; (4) nature or second matter, which forms the substrate of all finite existence in the physical world. Of God Himself, exalted as He is above all predicates, nothing can be said; He is unknowable. He reveals Himself, however, in His emanations; the first emanation, i.e. the spiritual matter from which all spiritual and material things proceed, is symbolically named 'the throne of God.' God, moreover, is so exalted above all things that He has no knowledge of these emanations. His emanations, however, are cognized by reason—by that which arises out of the primal matter; and from reason, again, is derived the soul, which, while bound to the physical, yet seeks to deliver itself from it by asceticism and so to rise to the high plane of the spirit. It was at first only in the West that Ibn Masarra succeeded in forming a body of adherents, but the fact that his ideas were adopted by Ibn al-Arabi (1165-1240), Islam's greatest mystic, made them eventually the common property of the Muslim world.

Towards the end of the 11th cent. the philosophical writings of al-Fārābī and the medical teachings of Ibn Sīnā became known in the West, and the first of the Western Muslims to apply himself actively to their lines of thought was Abū Bakr Muhammad b. Yahyā b. al-Sā'igh b. Bājja, who, born in Saragossa, lived in Seville and Granada, and died at the court of the Almoravids in Fez in 1138. This Ibn Bājja, with al-Fārābī as his model, composed elucidations of the Aristotelian and other philosophical writings. He felt very keenly the isolated position of the philosopher in the world at that day—a fact reflected in the title of his ethical work, *The Guidance of the Solitary*. The ideal of self-culture portrayed in that book was embodied by his disciple Ibn Tufail (q.v.) in the figure of 'Hayy ibn Yaqzān,' and his doctrine that the human intellect attains to a general (i.e. not individual) immortality by union with the intellect of the lunar sphere was further developed by Ibn Rushd (cf. art. AVERROES, esp. p. 264); this found a place in the literature of mediæval Christianity as the bingaboo of philosophical heresy.

8. The reconciliation of philosophy with religion.—One of the main problems of Muslim philosophy was naturally the definition of its relation to religion, as presented in the Qur'an and the Tradition. Many theologians, more or less conscious of this problem, were already working towards its solution by spiritualizing the letter of the law, having taken over from Hellenism the allegorical method of interpreting sacred writings. Those who applied this method in thoroughgoing fashion were called Bātinites (adherents of the 'inner sense' [*bāṭin*, 'interior,' 'inside']); and the endless variety of attempts to harmonize their own speculations with the word of God and of His Prophet developed at length into sheer contempt of the external word. Extreme mystics, rationalists, and free-thinkers all came in this way to the same results. Another theory common to them all was that the inner sense of the word—the truth—was revealed to only a few, whether by divine enlightenment (mystics) or by one's own reflexion (rationalists and free-thinkers).

Now, in the main, the Muslim Aristotelians agreed with this view. They propounded, however, a mediating theory, expressing the matter less crudely and with finer gradations of meaning. With the aid of scholastic distinctions, they tried to show that the different modes of expression used by theologians and philosophers respectively were but varying phases of the one changeless truth. They did not claim that the truth was confined to their philosophy alone, but they held that that philosophy was the highest form of truth attainable by man. It is in the light of this hypothesis that we are to interpret the philosophic endeavours to rationalize the doctrine of prophetic

revelation. Al-Kindī himself had defended prophecy i.e. had sought to show that it was in harmony with reason; at all events, like the Mu'tazilite theologians generally, he regarded the contemplation of revealed truth as a religious duty. Such was also the view of al-Fārābī and Avicenna. Al-Fārābī, in particular, even identifies the philosopher and the prophet. Taking Plato's ideal of the king-philosopher, he furnishes it with various traits of the Stoic sage in such wise that the faithful Muslim, in reading al-Fārābī's works, might well substitute the name of Muḥammad himself. Prophecy is here made intelligible by means of the 'aql theory, the doctrine of the *voûs*. As Plato had set forth in the *Republic*, human beings vary greatly in their intellectual endowments, and the majority require a guide; it is only the most gifted of men, in fact, whom the superhuman *voûs* (the *intellectus agens* = 'aql fa'āl) enables to receive and assimilate the truth, and so to impart it to others in a form that varies with the stage of their mental development.

We may discern here not only the resemblance but also the difference between the so-called Aristotelians and the other schools of thought in Islām. The mystics, too, had all their theory of grades—a doctrine of the several stages to be successively traversed on the way to God. The stages are variously enumerated—as many as eight, or even more, being given—and variously described by different thinkers; and few men reach the highest. In similar fashion the Iḥwān al-Safā distinguish four grades of initiation within their society, these corresponding to the stages of divine emanation.

The principle of the philosophical theory of stages in the narrower sense, however, is made to rest upon distinctions in mental endowment, and here there is no transition from one stage to another. In al-Fārābī the doctrine still rather follows the psychological scheme of Plato's *Republic*, while in Averroes it leans more to the outward form of the Aristotelian logic. Each distinguishes three grades of intellectual capacity. In al-Fārābī they correspond respectively to (1) sense-perception, (2) ideation, or perception, which operates with remembered (mentally perceived) images, and (3) pure reason, or the capacity for thought. In few men is the last of these (potentially) present in such measure that by union with the active intellect (the spirit of the lunar sphere) it can rise to actual reason. It is on this highest plane that the philosopher and the prophet join hands. The philosopher, however, receives or wins the truth in a pure form, and in that form, too, he utters it for those who are able to comprehend it; while the prophet, receiving it in figures and similitudes, likewise makes use of these in order to accommodate his thought to human conception; in this way, too, he becomes a guide to those who either cannot rise at all or can rise only with difficulty above sensuous perception. We find similar views in the writings of Avicenna and Maimonides, and in the romance of Ibn Tufail.

Averroes deals with this theory of the harmony of philosophy and religion in a special work. He holds that there is no ground for conflict between reason and faith, since the doctrines of religion are simply symbolical expressions of philosophic truth. That our scientific and philosophical modes of expression might likewise be of a symbolical character seems never to have entered the mind of this Aristotelian thinker; he was satisfied that in Aristotle *par excellence* he had found the pure truth. Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics* (1004^c 15 ff.), had said, however, that the Sophists and the dialecticians deal with the same object as the philosophers, although in a different way. The

knowledge professed by the Sophists was at best fictitious, and even the probability of the dialectician—dependent as it is upon generally recognized principles—fell below the philosophical plane of apodictic certainty. Now Averroes finds in these statements the doctrine of the three stages. The sophistic-rhetorical mode of argumentation is successful with the multitude; the procedure of the dialecticians finds favour with the more cultured classes, and especially the theologians (*mutakallimān*); finally, the thoroughgoing apodictic method of the philosophers—the heritage of the few—presents the truth in its pure and consummate form. Thus, to take a concrete instance, the simple-minded believer of the lower class will say, 'God is in heaven.' The man of trained dialectic, again, knowing that God must not be represented as a physical entity in space, will read that statement as meaning that God is exalted above all that is earthly and human, and will say, 'God is everywhere, and not merely in heaven.' But, if the omnipresence of God be taken in a physical and spatial sense, that formula too is liable to be apprehended wrongly, and accordingly the philosopher more adequately expresses the purely spiritual nature of God when he asserts that God is nowhere but in Himself; in fact, rather than say that God is in space he might more justly say that space and matter are in Him.

This example suffices to show us that in the view of Averroes the three stages or forms of knowledge have a common basis in one fundamental principle, viz. that there is a God. He believes that the existence of God is a fact to be recognized by every man, God being either figured more or less sensuously or conceived in a purely spiritual way, according to the grade of one's intellectual capacity. To deny the existence of God is forbidden, and such denial should be punished. But the blurring of intellectual distinctions is also an evil thing: the uneducated must not venture to engage in allegorical interpretation, nor shall the philosopher seek to popularize his higher intelligence of things. Hence Averroes censures al-Ghazālī for having diffused philosophy too widely through his popular writings. The masses should believe in conformity with the text of the Book; the theologians must not read more into the Book than is compatible with the Arabic language and diction; absolute liberty of thought is the exclusive prerogative of philosophic genius. Thus the Peripatetic movement of Muslim philosophy ends in what may be called an aristocratic rationalism.

9. The influence of Muslim philosophy. — The development of philosophy in Islām was of importance, in the first instance, to the Muslim peoples themselves. Its influence made itself felt in all branches of science and general culture, though chiefly, no doubt, in the study of theology—a study which still maintains an outstanding place in Islām. In the theological sphere we can trace various currents of thought. In general, it may be said that the mystics of all periods have imported many Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic elements into their systems, while thinkers of a more rationalistic type owe much to the teachings of Aristotle in the form given them by Avicenna. Avicenna ranks in the East as the prince of philosophy, and, in the conflict regarding the influence of philosophy upon theology, the watchword for centuries has been 'For or against Ibn Sīnā.'

The right of applying philosophical or logical methods to the treatment of theological problems in philosophical discussions is not generally contested. The theologians, in their works dealing with the *Kalām* (g.v.), usually begin with a section discussing questions in the logic of language and the theory of knowledge, and then, in the body of

the work, set forth their scheme of speculative theology.

From the time of al-Ash'ari (q.v.) a moderate and partly mediating orthodoxy has succeeded in coming to terms with speculation on theological problems. To the rigid orthodoxy that clung uncompromisingly to the letter of the law al-Ash'ari made the following rejoinders: (1) the Prophet did not condemn those who speculate; (2) the Prophet was cognizant of the speculative problems, and the Qur'an and the Tradition have furnished us with the principles of their solution; (3) his not having dealt with them singly is to be explained on the ground that in his time they had not yet emerged—otherwise he would, of course, have spoken definitely regarding them. The second of these rejoinders furnishes a vindication of the more or less liberal modes of interpretation to which the Qur'an and the Tradition were subjected in the subsequent period. It is impossible here, however, to deal more fully with the process of theological development in Islām; much useful material will be found in the works of M. Horten.

Secondly, the influence of Muslim philosophy was in some measure augmented when at length, more particularly by means of Latin translations, it came to be known in Western Christendom. The best-known translators during the 12th cent. are Johannes Hispanus and Gerard of Cremona; and the work was prosecuted by other students in the century following. Likewise many Jews took part in the process of mediation. The various mutations of Arabic learning were all shared in, either actively or receptively, by the Oriental Jews (cf. PHILOSOPHY [Jewish]); and at length Maimonides (q.v.) 1135-1204, working under the influence of al-Fārābī and Avicenna, made an attempt to harmonize Aristotle with the OT. In this endeavour he availed himself of the device of interpreting the sacred text allegorically and restricting the scope of Aristotle's teaching to this world, while maintaining that everything of a supramundane nature is known only by divine revelation.

Such was also the view of the Christian scholars and theologians of the West. Their knowledge of the world, including a great deal of astrology, alchemy, etc., was borrowed very largely from the Arabs, while at first they gave a ready welcome to everything of a Neo-Platonic cast. The most permanent of the Oriental factors in the West, however, were Avicenna's medical teachings and the Aristotelian tradition from al-Kindi to Averroes. In that tradition the Scholastics found abundant incentives to philosophical discussion, and to it they also owed in part their abandonment of the Neo-Platonic ontology for the purer form of Aristotelianism represented by Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century. It was therefore upon good grounds that Dante placed Avicenna and Averroes among the great figures of classical antiquity in the forecourt of hell.

LITERATURE.—1. GENERAL.—S. Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, 2 vols., Paris, 1857-59; T. J. de Boer, *Gesch. der Philosophie im Islām*, Stuttgart, 1901, tr. E. R. Jones, London, 1903; D. B. Macdonald, *The Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory*, New York, 1903; I. Goldziher, 'Die islamische und die jüdische Philosophie' (in *Kultur der Gegenwart*, i. 6, Leipzig, 1909).

II. SPECIAL.—Of the numerous monographs dealing with the various phases discussed in the paragraphs we can mention only a few:

1. and 2. D. S. Margoliouth, *The Early Development of Mohammedanism* (H.L., 2nd ser., 1913), London, 1914 (cf. lect. vii. 'The Philosophical Supplement'); C. H. Becker, 'Christliche Polemik und islamische Dogmenbildung,' *ZA* xxvi. (1911) 175 ff.; R. A. Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*, London, 1914; Carra de Vaux, *Gazali*, Paris, 1902.

3. Cf. M. Horten, *Die philosophischen Systeme der spekulativen Theologen im Islām*, Bonn, 1912, pp. 169 ff., §20 ff.

4. Cf. T. J. de Boer, 'Urāni,' in *ZA* xxvii. (1912) 8 ff.

5. M. Steinschneider, *Die arab. Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen* (Beilage zum Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen,

xli.), Leipzig, 1893; T. J. de Boer, 'Zn Kindi und seiner Schule,' *AGPA* xlii. [1899] 153 ff.

6. Cf., besides the writings of the Iḥwān al-Safā (various Arab. edd.; Germ. tr. F. Dieterici, Leipzig, 1865-79), esp. L. Baur, 'Dominicus Gundissalinus de divisione philosophiae,' *Beiträge zur Gesch. der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, iv. 2-3 [1903].

7. M. Asín Palacios, *Abenmasarra y su Escuela; Orígenes de la Filosofía hispano-musulmana*, Madrid, 1914.

8. M. Steinschneider, *Al-Fārabi; des arab. Philosophen Leben und Schriften*, Petrograd, 1869; Carra de Vaux, *Avicenne*, Paris, 1900; L.-G. Lévy, *Maimonide*, do. 1911; E. Renan, *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*, do. 1882; L. Gauthier, *La Théorie d'Ibn Rochd sur les rapports de la religion et de la philosophie*, do. 1909.

9. M. Horten, *Die philosophischen Ansichten von Rāzi und Tusi*, Bonn, 1910, *Die philosophischen Probleme der spekulativen Theologie im Islām*, do. 1912. A considerable amount of material relating to the influence of Muslim philosophy on medieval Christian thought will be found here and there throughout *Beiträge zur Gesch. der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, ed. O. Baumeister and G. von Hertling, Münster, 1891 ff. (still being issued), in which (iii. 2 [1903]) will also be found C. Baumeister, 'Wilelo, ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des XIII Jahrhunderts'—especially important for its excursions on the metaphysics of light and the proofs for the existence of God in Christian and Muslim philosophy.

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PHILOSOPHY (Roman).—I. Introductory.—The Romans made no claim to originality in philosophy. Here, even more than in other fields, the work of Roman literature was mediation (*Vermittlung*). From this point of view, however, it is impossible to exaggerate the significance of such names as Lucretius, Cicero, and Seneca, not to speak of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, who wrote in Greek. It is from Lucretius that the modern world received not only the system of Epicurus and the atomic cosmogony of Democritus, but something of the spirit of the pre-Socratic nature philosophy.

Cicero taught the history of older Greek philosophy and the controversies of the post-Aristotelian schools not only to his contemporaries and the Christian Fathers, but for many centuries after the Renaissance to all modern Europe (see the excellent, though incomplete, history of Cicero's influence in T. Zielinski, *Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte*, Leipzig, 1912, pp. 89 ff., 211 ff.; there is a convenient English résumé of Zielinski's in *English Literature and the Classics*, Oxford, 1911).

Seneca transmits to the modern world the ethical religion of later Greek philosophy, the precepts that would make invincible the heart that conformed them, the half-Christian sentiments of a Stoicism more than half Platonized.

When the Roman tardily turned his attention to Greek literature, it was, Horace tells us (*Epist.* ii. i. 161 ff.), to ask what profit there might be in the Attic stage. Horace does not here mention philosophy, the refuge and religion of his later years (*ib.* i. i. 25).

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'Atque haec quidem ejusmodi ex veteris Graeciae fama collecta sunt: quibus intelligis resistendum esse, ne perturbentur religiones' (*Cic. de Nat. Deor.* iii. 23. 60).

Ennius, the Roman Homer (Fowler, *Rel. Exper.*, p. 351), translates Enchiridion (see EHEMERISM),

revelation. Al-Kindī himself had defended prophecy i.e. had sought to show that it was in harmony with reason; at all events, like the Mu'tazilite theologians generally, he regarded the contemplation of revealed truth as a religious duty. Such was also the view of al-Fārābī and Avicenna. Al-Fārābī, in particular, even identifies the philosopher and the prophet. Taking Plato's ideal of the king-philosopher, he furnishes it with various traits of the Stoic sage in such wise that the faithful Muslim, in reading al-Fārābī's works, might well substitute the name of Muhammad himself. Prophecy is here made intelligible by means of the 'aql theory, the doctrine of the *voīs*. As Plato had set forth in the *Republic*, human beings vary greatly in their intellectual endowments, and the majority require a guide; it is only the most gifted of men, in fact, whom the super-human *voīs* (the *intellectus agens* = 'aql fa'āl) enables to receive and assimilate the truth, and so to impart it to others in a form that varies with the stage of their mental development.

We may discern here not only the resemblance but also the difference between the so-called Aristotelians and the other schools of thought in Islām. The mystics, too, had all their theory of grades—a doctrine of the several stages to be successively traversed on the way to God. The stages are variously enumerated—as many as eight, or even more, being given—and variously described by different thinkers; and few men reach the highest. In similar fashion the Iḥwān al-Safā distinguish four grades of initiation within their society, these corresponding to the stages of divine emanation.

The principle of the philosophical theory of stages in the narrower sense, however, is made to rest upon distinctions in mental endowment, and here there is no transition from one stage to another. In al-Fārābī the doctrine still rather follows the psychological scheme of Plato's *Republic*, while in Averroes it leans more to the outward form of the Aristotelian logic. Each distinguishes three grades of intellectual capacity. In al-Fārābī they correspond respectively to (1) sense-perception, (2) ideation, or perception, which operates with remembered (mentally perceived) images, and (3) pure reason, or the capacity for thought. In few men is the last of these (potentially) present in such measure that by union with the active intellect (the spirit of the lunar sphere) it can rise to actual reason. It is on this highest plane that the philosopher and the prophet join hands. The philosopher, however, receives or wins the truth in a pure form, and in that form, too, he utters it for those who are able to comprehend it; while the prophet, receiving it in figures and similitudes, likewise makes use of these in order to accommodate his thought to human conception; in this way, too, he becomes a guide to those who either cannot rise at all or can rise only with difficulty above sensuous perception. We find similar views in the writings of Avicenna and Maimonides, and in the romance of Ibn Tufail.

Averroes deals with this theory of the harmony of philosophy and religion in a special work. He holds that there is no ground for conflict between reason and faith, since the doctrines of religion are simply symbolical expressions of philosophic truth. That our scientific and philosophical modes of expression might likewise be of a symbolical character seems never to have entered the mind of this Aristotelian thinker; he was satisfied that in Aristotle *par excellence* he had found the pure truth. Aristotle, in his *Metaphysics* (1004^a 15 ff.), had said, however, that the Sophists and the dialecticians deal with the same object as the philosophers, although in a different way. The

knowledge professed by the Sophists was at best fictitious, and even the probability of the dialectician—dependent as it is upon generally recognized principles—fell below the philosophical plane of apodictic certainty. Now Averroes finds in these statements the doctrine of the three stages. The sophistic-rhetorical mode of argumentation is successful with the multitude; the procedure of the dialecticians finds favour with the more cultured classes, and especially the theologians (*muta-kallimūn*); finally, the thoroughgoing apodictic method of the philosophers—the heritage of the few—presents the truth in its pure and consummate form. Thus, to take a concrete instance, the simple-minded believer of the lower class will say, 'God is in heaven.' The man of trained dialectic, again, knowing that God must not be represented as a physical entity in space, will read that statement as meaning that God is exalted above all that is earthly and human, and will say, 'God is everywhere, and not merely in heaven.' But, if the omnipresence of God be taken in a physical and spatial sense, that formula too is liable to be apprehended wrongly, and accordingly the philosopher more adequately expresses the purely spiritual nature of God when he asserts that God is nowhere but in Himself; in fact, rather than say that God is in space he might more justly say that space and matter are in Him.

This example suffices to show us that in the view of Averroes the three stages or forms of knowledge have a common basis in one fundamental principle, viz. that there is a God. He believes that the existence of God is a fact to be recognized by every man, God being either figured more or less sensuously or conceived in a purely spiritual way, according to the grade of one's intellectual capacity. To deny the existence of God is forbidden, and such denial should be punished. But the blurring of intellectual distinctions is also an evil thing: the uneducated must not venture to engage in allegorical interpretation, nor shall the philosopher seek to popularize his higher intelligence of things. Hence Averroes censures al-Ghazālī for having diffused philosophy too widely through his popular writings. The masses should believe in conformity with the text of the Book; the theologians must not read more into the Book than is compatible with the Arabic language and diction; absolute liberty of thought is the exclusive prerogative of philosophic genius. Thus the Peripatetic movement of Muslim philosophy ends in what may be called an aristocratic rationalism.

9. The influence of Muslim philosophy.—The development of philosophy in Islām was of importance, in the first instance, to the Muslim peoples themselves. Its influence made itself felt in all branches of science and general culture, though chiefly, no doubt, in the study of theology—a study which still maintains an outstanding place in Islām. In the theological sphere we can trace various currents of thought. In general, it may be said that the mystics of all periods have imported many Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic elements into their systems, while thinkers of a more rationalistic type owe much to the teachings of Aristotle in the form given them by Avicenna. Avicenna ranks in the East as the prince of philosophy, and, in the conflict regarding the influence of philosophy upon theology, the watchword for centuries has been 'For or against Ibn Sīnā.'

The right of applying philosophical or logical methods to the treatment of theological problems in philosophical discussions is not generally contested. The theologians, in their works dealing with the *Kalām* (q.v.), usually begin with a section discussing questions in the logic of language and the theory of knowledge, and then, in the body of

the work, set forth their scheme of speculative theology.

From the time of al-Ash'ari (q.v.) a moderate and partly mediating orthodoxy has succeeded in coming to terms with speculation on theological problems. To the rigid orthodoxy that clung uncompromisingly to the letter of the law al-Ash'ari made the following rejoinders: (1) the Prophet did not condemn those who speculate; (2) the Prophet was cognizant of the speculative problems, and the Qur'an and the Tradition have furnished us with the principles of their solution; (3) his not having dealt with them singly is to be explained on the ground that in his time they had not yet emerged—otherwise he would, of course, have spoken definitely regarding them. The second of these rejoinders furnishes a vindication of the more or less liberal modes of interpretation to which the Qur'an and the Tradition were subjected in the subsequent period. It is impossible here, however, to deal more fully with the process of theological development in Islām; much useful material will be found in the works of M. Horten.

Secondly, the influence of Muslim philosophy was in some measure augmented when at length, more particularly by means of Latin translations, it came to be known in Western Christendom. The best-known translators during the 12th cent. are Johannes Hispanus and Gerard of Cremona; and the work was prosecuted by other students in the century following. Likewise many Jews took part in the process of mediation. The various mutations of Arabio learning were all shared in, either actively or receptively, by the Oriental Jews (cf. PHILOSOPHY [Jewish]); and at length Maimonides (q.v.) 1135-1204, working under the influence of al-Fārābī and Avicenna, made an attempt to harmonize Aristotle with the OT. In this endeavour he availed himself of the device of interpreting the sacred text allegorically and restricting the scope of Aristotle's teaching to this world, while maintaining that everything of a supramundane nature is known only by divine revelation.

Such was also the view of the Christian scholars and theologians of the West. Their knowledge of the world, including a great deal of astrology, alchemy, etc., was borrowed very largely from the Arabs, while at first they gave a ready welcome to everything of a Neo-Platonic cast. The most permanent of the Oriental factors in the West, however, were Avicenna's medical teachings and the Aristotelian tradition from al-Kindi to Averroes. In that tradition the Scholastics found abundant incentives to philosophical discussion, and to it they also owed in part their abandonment of the Neo-Platonic ontology for the purer form of Aristotelianism represented by Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century. It was therefore upon good grounds that Dante placed Avicenna and Averroes among the great figures of classical antiquity in the forecourt of hell.

LITERATURE.—I. GENERAL.—S. Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, 2 vols., Paris, 1857-59; T. J. de Boer, *Gesch. der Philosophie im Islam*, Stuttgart, 1901, tr. E. R. Jones, London, 1903; D. B. Macdonald, *The Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory*, New York, 1903; I. Goldziher, 'Die islamische und die jüdische Philosophie' (in *Kultur der Gegenwart*, I. 5, Leipzig, 1909).

II. SPECIAL.—Of the numerous monographs dealing with the various phases discussed in the paragraphs we can mention only a few:

1. and 2. D. S. Margoliouth, *The Early Development of Mohammedanism* (HL, 2nd ser., 1913), London, 1914 (cf. lect. vii. 'The Philosophical Supplement'); C. H. Becker, 'Christliche Polemik und islamische Dogmenbildung,' ZA xxvi. [1911] 175 ff.; R. A. Nicholson, *The Mystics of Islam*, London, 1914; Carra de Vaux, *Gazeli*, Paris, 1902.

3. Cf. M. Horten, *Die philosophischen Systeme der spekulativen Theologen im Islam*, Bonn, 1912, pp. 189 ff., 320 ff.

4. Cf. T. J. de Boer, 'Urani,' in ZA xxvii. [1912] 8 ff.

5. M. Steinschneider, *Die arab. Übersetzungen aus dem Griechischen* (Beilage zum Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen,

xli.), Leipzig, 1893; T. J. de Boer, 'Zu Kindi und seiner Schule,' AGPA xlii. [1899] 153 ff.

6. Cf., besides the writings of the Iḥwān al-Safā (various Arab. edd.; Germ. tr. F. Dieterici, Leipzig, 1865-79), esp. L. Baur, 'Dominicus Gundissalinus de divisione philosophiae,' *Beiträge zur Gesch. der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, iv. 2-3 [1903].

7. M. Asín Palacios, *Abenmararra y su Escuela; Orígenes de la Filosofía hispano-musulmana*, Madrid, 1914.

8. M. Steinschneider, *Al-Fārābī; des arab. Philosophen Leben und Schriften*, Petrograd, 1869; Carra de Vaux, *Avicenne*, Paris, 1900; L.-G. Lévy, *Maimonide*, do. 1911; E. Renan, *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*, do. 1882; L. Gauthier, *La Théorie d'Ibn Rochd sur les rapports de la religion et de la philosophie*, do. 1909.

9. M. Horten, *Die philosophischen Ansichten von Rāzi und Tusi*, Bonn, 1910, *Die philosophischen Probleme der spekulativen Theologie im Islam*, do. 1912. A considerable amount of material relating to the influence of Muslim philosophy on mediæval Christian thought will be found here and there throughout *Beiträge zur Gesch. der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, ed. O. Baumeister and G. von Hertling, Münster, 1891 ff. (still being issued), in which (iii. 2 [1903]) will also be found C. Baumeister, 'Witelo, ein Philosoph und Naturforscher des XIII. Jahrhunderts'—especially important for its excursions on the metaphysics of light and the proofs for the existence of God in Christian and Muslim philosophy. T. J. DE BOER.

PHILOSOPHY (Roman).—I. Introductory.—

The Romans made no claim to originality in philosophy. Here, even more than in other fields, the work of Roman literature was mediation (*Vermittlung*). From this point of view, however, it is impossible to exaggerate the significance of such names as Lucretius, Cicero, and Seneca, not to speak of Epictetus and Marcus Anrelius, who wrote in Greek. It is from Lucretius that the modern world received not only the system of Epicurus and the atomic cosmogony of Democritus, but something of the spirit of the pre-Socratic nature philosophy.

Cicero taught the history of older Greek philosophy and the controversies of the post-Aristotelian schools not only to his contemporaries and the Christian Fathers, but for many centuries after the Renaissance to all modern Europe (see the excellent, though incomplete, history of Cicero's influence in T. Zielinski, *Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte*, Leipzig, 1912, pp. 89 ff., 211 ff.; there is a convenient English résumé of Zielinski's in *English Literature and the Classics*, Oxford, 1911).

Seneca transmits to the modern world the ethical religion of later Greek philosophy, the precepts that would make invincible the heart that condescended them, the half-Christian sentiments of a Stoicism more than half Platonized.

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Ennius, the Roman Homer (Fowler, *Rel. Exper.*, p. 351), translates EnheMERUS (see EUHEMERISM),

adapts with Roman illustrations Euripides' diatribes against priestcraft and augury (Cic. *de Div.* i. 58), and sums up for the populace in three racy lines the Epicurean doctrine that the gods are careless and the traitorous doubts of the moral government of the world long since formulated by Thrasyllus (H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*³, Berlin, 1912, frag. 8) and eloquently repudiated in the theodicy of Plato (*Laws*, 905 B; cf. Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* iii. 32, *de Div.* i. 58):

'Gods there are, I've always said it, and that will always be my view:

But they little reck, I reckon, of what we race of mortals do,
For if they did the good would flourish, the bad would
perish, which is not true.'

Many such quasi-philosophic and critical utterances occur in Plautus (Fowler, *Rel. Exper.*, p. 352; F. Leo, *Plautinische Forschungen*², Berlin, 1912, pp. 129-131; Ranke, *Periplecomenus*, Marburg Dissertation, 1900) and in the fragments of early Latin tragedy (Reid, *Introd.* p. 20, n. 1). The beginnings of more direct study of Greek philosophy are known mainly from the allusions in Cicero (*Tusc.* iv. 6, *Acad.* i. 5), Seneca (*Ep.* c.), Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.* x. i. 123), and Aulus Gellius (vi. [vii.] 14, xv. 11).

The famous embassy to Rome in 155 of the three representative Greek philosophers—Carneades the Academic, Diogenes the Stoic, and Critolaus the Peripatetic—is the obligatory introduction to the history of Roman philosophy, and has often been brilliantly, if somewhat conjecturally, described (see C. Martha, *Etudes morales sur l'antiquité*, Paris, 1883, p. 61 f., 'Le Philosophe Carnéade à Rome'; A. W. Benn, *The Greek Philosophers*², London, 1914, ch. xii. sect. i.).

Cicero himself can name no Roman student of Greek philosophy prior to Lælius and Scipio (*Tusc.* iv. 5), though he sometimes alludes to Pythagoreanism in Italy (*ib.* iv. 1 f.).

The culture of the 'Scipionic circle,' and its possible indebtedness to Polybius and the Achæan exiles, we must dismiss with a reference (Mommesen, bk. iv. ch. xii.; P. Wendland, *Die hellenistisch-römische Kultur*, Tübingen, 1912, pp. 34, 58; J. B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians*, London, 1909, p. 191; Fowler, *Rel. Exper.*, p. 363 f.; Cic. *de Fin.* ii. 8; Polyb. xxiii. 10). Elsewhere Cicero admits that sceptical readers have doubted the erudition in Greek philosophy displayed by the interlocutors in his dialogues, and defends himself lamely (Reid, on *Acad. Prior.* ii. 2). It is not likely that any Roman, except Cicero himself, and possibly the learned Varro or Brutus, could have delivered the systematic expositions which Cicero puts into the mouths of his personages. But the general truth of Cicero's idealized representation of this Roman culture remains.

In the 1st cent. B.C. the educated Roman nobility did often maintain in their households Greek scholars who might be philosophers (see A. Hülsscher, in Fleckeisen's *Jahrbücher für class. Philol.*, suppl. xviii. [1891-92] 353-444; Cic. *Brutus*, 90, 97, *de Or.* i. 22, *de Fin.* iv. 26, v. 3, 25). In their youth, or later en route to Asia, they heard at Athens (*de Or.* i. 18, *de Fin.* v. 1) or Rhodes (*de Or.* i. 17) lectures from which they acquired, if not expert knowledge, a sufficient conception of the attitude towards life and experience represented by the three chief post-Aristotelian schools—the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Academic sceptics. They knew the names and personalities of the leading representatives of these schools and took an amused interest in their controversies (*Acad. Prior.* ii. iv. 11 f., *de Or.* i. 11, 18 f., *de Leg.* i. 20). Their villas sometimes contained libraries in which a scholar could find almost any treatise that he happened to need (*de Fin.* iii.

2 f., *Topica*, i., *ad Att.* iv. 10). They sometimes professed personal allegiance to the Epicurean, the Academic, the Stoic, or the Peripatetic school as the case might be (*de Nat. Deor.* i. 6). This often meant little more than the assumption of a playful partisanship (*de Fin.* v. 3, 26, *Acad. Post.* i. iv. 14, *de Leg.* i. vii. 21). It was sometimes, as in the case of Cicero's friend, the Epicurean Atticus, the expression of a temperament and an attitude (G. Boissier, *Cicéron et ses amis*, Paris, 1883, p. 137).

In a Cato and in a Brutus it was thought to be a religion and a rule of life:

'Neque disputandi causa, ut magna pars, sed ita vivendi' (Cic. *Murena*, 30, of Cato); 'Scias eum sentire, quae dicit' (Quintil. x. i. 123, of Brutus).

And it is customary in this connexion to affirm a profound affinity between the Stoic philosophy and the old Roman virtue (Fowler, *Rel. Exper.*, p. 362; E. V. Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, Cambridge, 1911, ch. v., is an excellent history of the 'Stoic sect in Rome'; per contra, F. W. Bussell, *Marcus Aurelius and the Later Stoics*, Edinburgh, 1910, p. 185, says: 'The Stoic school nearly spoilt the nobles of the Romans').

Cicero's complacent portrayal of this philosophic culture of the Roman nobility suggests Burke's and Matthew Arnold's idealization of the similar culture of the English nobility of the 18th century. Whatever the precise historical facts, it is in some such setting and against some such historical background as this that we must view the two great extant monuments of that culture—Lucretius's poem on the nature of things and Cicero's philosophical dialogues. In asserting his own essential priority, Cicero laments that the earliest Roman expositions of Greek philosophy were the cheap and superficial popularizations of Epicureanism by a certain Amalinius and his followers (*Tusc.* iv. 3, 6). This recalls the deprecation by old-fashioned college presidents of the diffusion of cheap Voltairism in America by Ethan Allen's *Reason the only Oracle of Man* (New York, 1784), and Paine's *Age of Reason* (London, 1795). But what chiefly offends Cicero is not the irreligion of popular Epicureanism, but its crudity. Epicurus and, with rare exceptions, the Epicureans were hostile to the encyclopedic liberal culture that was Cicero's life-long religion (*de Fin.* i. 5, 7, 21, iii. 12, *Acad.* i. 2, *de Nat. Deor.* i. 22, 26, ii. 18 f., 29). Their writings lack the literary charm, the mastery of dialectic and rhetoric, the conception of man as a social and political animal, the wealth of historic illustration, that attracted him in the disciples of Plato and the 'great and copious' Peripatetics (*de Leg.* iii. 6, *Orator*, 3, *Brutus*, 31, *de Fin.* ii. 23 f., iv. 3, 9, v. 3). The Stoic system and terminology as a subject of study command the respect even of their opponents (*de Fin.* iii. 1). But any educated man can get up the entire Epicurean philosophy in a few days (*ib.* i. 5, 8: 'perdiscre ludus').

So Macanlay marvels that the 'silliest and meanest of all systems of moral and natural philosophy' inspired in Lucretius the finest poem in the Latin language. Cicero does not raise this question, or indeed mention Lucretius at all, except once in the much discussed letter to his brother Quintus. But the coincidences of diction in the exposition of the Epicurean philosophy are too numerous and precise to be due solely to the use of common sources. The parallels collected by Martha (*Mélanges de littérature ancienne*, Paris, 1896, pp. 157-177) are only a small proportion of those that an attentive reader will discover. For Lucretius as a whole see art. LUCRETIVUS and the well-known book of J. Masson, *Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet* (2 vols., London, 1907-09). We can only glance at

a few of the traits that differentiate him from Epicurus. He is a true poet and transmits to the modern world the spirit not of Epicurus on *Nature*, but of the pre-Socratics and Plato's *Timæus*. He 'denied divinely the divine'; and Aphrodite, Phaethon, the fauns, and the cult of the great Mother of the Gods are more real and vivid in his negations than in any hymn of their worshippers. His atheism speaks the language of the deity answering Job out of the whirlwind; and the expression of his honest doubt always preserves that high seriousness the lack of which makes the petulant boutades of Euripides so disconcerting to the lovers of Æschylus and Sophocles, so unedifying to the disciples of Plato. In him Epicurus's placid repudiation of superstition is transformed into a passionate conviction that historical or institutional religion has been a curse to humanity. This distinction, often overlooked, has never been explained. It may be conjecturally attributed to something in the poet's own temperament or experience, or perhaps to the religious experience of the Roman people during and after the Hannibalic wars (Carter, p. 144; cf. G. Murray, *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, New York, 1912, p. 53).

We may perhaps find further confirmation of his sincerity of feeling in the fact that Lucretius never redeemed his promise (v. 155) to lead his

Memmius in a train
Of flowery clauses onward to the proof
That gods there are, and deathless

(Tennyson, *Lucretius*).

The positive theology of the Epicureans was certainly chimerical, and their opponents plausibly pronounced it insincere (Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, III. 1.², Berlin, 1880, p. 399). The speakers in Cicero refuse to take seriously the *faintant* gods who have a *quasi-corpus* and a *quasi-sanguis* (*de Nat. Deor.* i. 26), and take refuge from the cosmic turbulence in 'the lucid interspace of world and world' (*de Div.* ii. 17), where they entertain their infinite leisure with conversation in Greek.

The populace, the false prophets, the mystic or religious philosophers, and the intelligent essayists of later antiquity were agreed in regarding Epicureanism as virtual atheism (Posidonius, in *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* i. 44; cf. iii. 1).

Lucretius has little to say—perhaps there was not much to be said—of the practical aspects of the Epicurean ethics. Satire of Roman luxury and ennui, the praises of sober, sweet, simple Epicurean life, depreciation of the mad race of ambition and the pursuit of wealth, the gospel of renunciation and acquiescence in the law of death—death 'that is more peaceful than any sleep'—that is about all.

2. Cicero.—Cicero was obviously not a professional scholar. But his knowledge of Greek philosophy was extensive, if not always critical. Greek was for him a living language, and he had heard lectures on Greek philosophy, read books about it, and debated the points of controversy between later schools throughout his life (see Reid, *Introd.* pp. 1-9; J. B. Mayor, *de Natura Deorum*, Cambridge, 1880-85, i. p. xxxv, and, for an unfavourable view of Cicero's work, iii. p. xiv). The substance of his chief philosophic treatises he could at any time have written out of his head (*de Fin.* i. 5; not, of course, the 'History of Philosophy' in *de Nat. Deor.* i. 10 ff., for which he had no Diels or Zeller to copy). In the actual composition he freely adapted, translated, paraphrased, or epitomized whatever suited his purpose in the writings of Panætius, Posidonius, Clitomachus, Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater of Tyre, Antiochus, and Philo. Like many of his modern censors, he often took his quotations at

second hand. But it is quite idle to deny that he read Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Crantor, Dicaearchus, and others of the older philosophers, and could consult and quote them independently when he chose. He sometimes speaks of himself as a translator and sometimes protests that he does not follow his authorities slavishly. The determination of his precise procedure in any given case is a problem that philology can neither solve nor renounce (see the Introductions to Reid, *Academica*, and Mayor, *de Nat. Deor.*; R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zur Cicero's philosoph. Schriften*, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1877-83; and the more recent literature in Hans Uri, *Cicero und die epikur. Phil.*, Munich, 1914). He achieved his design of illuminating by Latin letters every topic of (recent) Greek philosophy (*de Div.* ii. 2, *Acad. Post.* i. 1. 3). And, in the loss of the Greek 'sources,' this hastily composed philosophical library remains one of the world's chief storehouses of ideas and suggestions and of the great commonplaces of ethics and natural religion. It is no impairment of the value of his writings or disparagement of his intelligence that he did not invent a system of his own, or swear superstitious adherence to the words of any one of his teachers (Boissier, p. 340). The philosophy of the post-Aristotelian schools centred in two or three large topics of controversy still under debate—the criterion of truth, the absoluteness and autonomy of the moral law, the identification of 'virtue' with happiness, and the reality of natural religion and its accommodation to institutional and historic religion. Towards all these questions Cicero's attitude was that of not a few of the best minds of the 18th and 19th centuries. The Stoics maintained that certain states of consciousness are infallible witnesses to their own truth. Cicero held with the New Academy that probability is the limit of our knowledge and the guide of life (*Tusc.* i. 9, v. 11, *Acad.*, *passim*; *de Offic.* iii. 4 *in fine*). This is still a perfectly rational position in relation to all absolute systems, and was in Cicero's as in Plato's day an entirely reasonable view of physical science also (*Acad. Prior.* ii. 39; Plato, *Tim.* 29 B, C). The Stoics insisted that nothing is good except the virtuous will, and that virtue alone ensures not only a happy, but also the happiest possible, life. Cicero admired this fine moral gesture and the ingenious elaboration of terminology that justified it (*de Fin.* iii. 22). He would like to believe it:

'Ego vero volo in virtute vim esse quam maximam' (*ib.* v. 25).

He is not sure that he can find any valid sanction for the moral life without it. But in other moods he doubts its conformity to common sense or its confirmation by experience, and sees in it only the pedantic and paradoxical elaboration of truths better stated by Plato (*de Fin.* iv. 11 f.). Virtue on the rack is still happiness perhaps. But why say the highest possible happiness? 'Would it not be a little happier without the pain? It is our modern problem of the sanction. Unless you go the whole length of paradox, how find a logical sanction for the extreme case of entire self-sacrifice? Cicero's waverings and self-contradictions on this point find their precise parallels in the literature of the modern utilitarian debate from Mill and Grote to Leslie Stephen, and in the associated discussions of the main thesis of Plato's *Republic*. He prefers the Stoic position to the Epicurean of course, and even to the laxity of Theophrastus on the happy life (*ib.* v. 5), and perhaps to the Aristotelian over-emphasis of external 'goods' (*ib.* v. 25). But he does not prefer it to the finer tact of Plato's expression of the same ideas (*Acad.* iv. [*Lucullus*] 44, *de Fin.* iv. 24, *Tusc.* v. 12). And he fears that it may

prove to be only a magnificent rhetorical defiance to experience and human nature :

'Dicuntur ista, Cato, magnifice' (*de Fin.* iii. 3), 'repugnante natura' (*ib.* iv. 20).

He had probably often debated the question with Brutus and Cato, and a large part of bk. iv. of the *de Finibus* reads more like the reflexion of these discussions than the copy of a Greek treatise, for which it is generally taken. The alleged contradiction between bk. v. of the *Tusculans* and bk. iv. of the *de Finibus* practically disappears on a careful consideration of the respective contexts (*Tusc.* v. 11; cf. *de Leg.* i. 20: 'Probe quidem sentis, si re ac non verbis dissident,' *de Offic.* iii. 7: 'Mihi utrumvis satis est: et quum hoc tum illud probabilius videtur').

Space fails for the study of the *de Natura Deorum* and the *de Divinatione* as storehouses of material for the history of the post-Aristotelian philosophies of religion. The 'noble eclectic deism' which Cicero transmitted to the Renaissance and the 17th and 18th centuries is summed up in a concluding paragraph of the *de Divinatione*, which says in effect :

'We ought to conserve religion without encouraging superstition. The wise man will respect and maintain the religious rites and institutions of his ancestors and he will keep his personal faith in a supreme and eternal nature to be revered and admired by man as the author of the beauty and order of the world' (*ib.* 72).

Those who read between the lines could find mingled with this edifying doctrine many suggestions of the statesman's or the policeman's view of the utility of religion (*de Rep.* and *de Leg.*, *passim*, *de Leg.* i. 7, ii. 7, *de Nat. Deor.* i. 27; cf. A. Collins, *ap.* Zielinski, *Cicero im Wandel*, p. 223; *de Nat. Deor.* ii. and iii.) and hints of economies and reserves (*de Nat. Deor.* i. 22, *de Div.* ii. 12, 'sed soli sumus,' *de Leg.* i. 13) and of accommodation (the word, *de Nat. Deor.* i. 15 [41]) legitimate or illegitimate to popular and institutional religion (*ib.* i. 28, iii. 15 f., 23; Warde Fowler, *Roman Ideas of Deity*, p. 54). The Platonizing Dream of Scipio and bk. v. of the *Tusculans* have been the chief channels by which the Platonic hope of immortality was transmitted to the Middle Age and the modern literature of natural religion. The *de Finibus* deals with the theory of ethics (see art. SUMMUM BONUM). The *Tusculans* are, like Seneca's *Epistles*, the practical application of the religion of Greek philosophy (*Tusc.* v. 2: 'O vitae philosophia dux,' etc.; cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 90, both conjectured to be derived from Posidonius's *Protrepticus*) to conduct and spiritual guidance. They exhibit the philosopher as physician of the soul (*Tusc.* i. 49, iii. 1), healing the perturbations, diseases, or passions of the mind, and combating the fear of death and pain and other 'accidental evils,' or maintaining the Stoic thesis of the all-sufficiency of virtue for the happy life. The *de Officiis*, based in the main probably on the *περί τοῦ καθήκοντος* of Panætius, is a practical treatise on the ethics not of the ideal sage but of fallible men. It became in turn the model of St. Ambrose's Christian ethics, and, until the rise of the 19th cent. 'science' of evolutionary ethics, it remained for such readers as Locke, Hume, Voltaire, and Frederick the Great almost the definitive treatment of the subject. The wide-spread opinion that Cicero in the *de Officiis* seriously compromises the ethical ideal is a vague impression left in the minds of hasty readers by his discussion of the Stoic casuistry of *caveat emptor* and similar questions (*de Offic.* iii. 12 ff.). In nearly every case Cicero himself rejects the casuistic compromise, the 'capitulations of conscience' which even John Stuart Mill attributes to him (*de Offic.* iii. 13 *in fine*; Mill, *Three Essays on Religion*, London,

1885, p. 107). Apart from a few possibly prejudiced political and historical judgments, the derogations of the *de Officiis* from absolute, ideal, Platonic, or Christian ethics are rare and doubtful. On the authority of Panætius, Cicero justifies the advocate in maintaining a merely plausible case (*ib.* 14). He twice permits himself the non-Platonic expression that a good man will harm no one 'nisi lacessitus invidia' (*i.* 7, iii. 19), for which Lactantius and Ambrose rebuke him. He once incautiously generalizes a sound principle of legal equity in the unqualified statement that promises need not be kept 'si plura tibi noceant, quam illi prosint, cum promiseris' (*i.* 10). That is about all. The tripartite scheme of the *de Officiis* distinguishes the topics of the right (*honestum*), the useful (*utile*), and the (apparent) conflict of the two. The admission of a real conflict, Cicero insists, would destroy ethics altogether, which must rest on the Socratic-Platonic postulate of their identity (*ib.* 3, iii. 3). The elaboration, for which Cicero himself apologizes (*ib.* 6), of Chesterfieldian prudential morality in bk. ii. is natural in a father addressing his son and not inappropriate to the literary kind which is allied to the 'paraenetic discourse' (see art. ISOCRATES). Transcendental and ascetic ethics are treated in the *Tusculans*, which are essentially akin to the literature of 'consolations.' These and similar distinctions, which cannot be developed here, are indispensable to the discriminating criticism of the *de Finibus*, the *de Officiis*, and the *Tusculans*. The *honestum* of *de Officiis*, i. divides into the four Platonic cardinal virtues. Emphasis is laid on their derivation from 'nature,' the primary instincts, and the social nature of man. The *ius gentium* is sometimes equated with nature (*ib.* 5: 'natura, id est, iure gentium'). Beneficence as a social virtue is placed side by side with justice. And there are many other divergences from Plato and Aristotle due to the elaboration of ethical terminology in the discussions of the schools, the accumulation of political and social experience, and the imperfect equivalence of Greek and Latin ethical terms. Much industry that might have cleared up all these complexities has been wasted on the conjectural philology of Cicero's lost sources.

Cicero boasts that his philosophical treatises had inspired many emulators of his example. Two only require mention here: Brutus, with whom he evidently had often debated the Stoic ethics (Boissier, p. 320), and Varro, for whose vast erudition he felt a certain awe. Varro (*Zeller*, iii. i.² 669) apparently accepted the eclectic compromise of Antiochus between the New Academy and Stoicism. Whatever his private creed, his chief literary interest in Greek philosophy was its service to his interpretation of Roman religion and antiquity. We know him mainly through the Christian Fathers, who sought in him illustrations of the absurdity of the pagan religion.

3. Roman philosophy after Cicero. — Roman philosophy acquired few if any new ideas after Cicero. An exhaustive monograph would study the not inconsiderable traces of Epicureanism and Stoicism in the poets Horace, Vergil, Lucan, Juvenal, and Persius (C. Martha, *Les Moralistes sous l'empire romain*, Paris, 1865, p. 100 ff., 'Perse'; Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, ch. xvi, merely glances at the topic), the relation of the 'science' of Seneca and Pliny to their Greek sources, and the Latin reflexion of incipient Neo-Platonism in Apuleius. But, broadly speaking, post-Ciceronian philosophy merely amplified that conception of the philosopher as physician of the soul and director of conscience which we have already met in Cicero's *Tusculans*. This, with some admixture of asceticism and Pythagoreanism, was the philosophy of the

school of the Sextii to which Seneca alludes with grateful enthusiasm. And this is the chief function and content of philosophy for Seneca himself (Zeller, III. i.³ 696 ff.).

This ethical culture religion of moral philosophy in the literature of the Græco-Roman empire is of enormous human, though of slight scientific, interest. There are few shades of modern moral sentiment which the ethical culture of to-day cannot find already eloquently expressed in Seneca, Plutarch, Epictetus, Musonius, Dio Chrysostomus, Maximus of Tyre, or Marcus Aurelius—to mention only the best-known names. And under the combined influence of Platonism and cosmopolitan humanitarianism this pagan preaching sometimes approximates so closely to distinctively Christian sentiment as to provoke perpetual renewals of the hypothesis of its direct indebtedness to Christianity (Zeller, III. i.³ 714, Wendland, p. 95, with bibliography; Boissier, *La Religion romaine*, Paris, 1892, vol. ii. ch. v., 'Sénèque et St. Paul'; C. R. Haines, *Marcus Aurelius*, in Loeb Classical Library, 1916, p. 383). It would be futile to try to summarize this literature in a paragraph. It is better to refer the reader to the articles on the authors named and to the many readable and accessible studies of the subjects (W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of European Morals*, London, 1890, ch. ii.; Boissier and Martha, *opp. cit.*; L. Friedländer, *Sittengeschichte Roms*, Leipzig, 1910, III. iv., 'Die religiösen Zustände', v., 'Die Philosophie als Erzieherin zur Sittlichkeit'; E. Renan, *Marc-Aurèle*, Paris, 1882, ch. iii.; W. Pater, *Marius the Epicurean*, London, 1888, ch. xv.; T. R. Glover, *The Conflict of Religions in the early Roman Empire*, do. 1909, chs. ii. f., vii.; R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, do. 1910, ch. iv.; Arnold, *Roman Stoicism*, chs. v., xiii.-xvi.; J. Oakesmith, *The Religion of Plutarch*, do. 1902; O. Gréard, *De la Morale de Plutarque*, Paris, 1874). The theology associated with this gospel of Greek moral philosophy may be described indifferently as natural religion or 'morality touched with emotion.' Matthew Arnold's sharp distinction between the two meant little to Cicero, Plutarch, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius, who, though, like Plato, they would affirm the autonomy of ethics, were, like Plato, willing to supplement it with the sanctions of natural religion. Discriminating scholarship finds distinctions in the extent and character of their accommodation to popular religion, but no such contrasts as that which Glover discovers between the essential rationalism of Seneca and the superstition, as he deems it, of Plutarch:

'The ancient world rejected Seneca, as we have seen, and chose Plutarch' (*Conflict of Religions*, p. 111)—an exaggerated, not to say a false, antithesis.

Nor ought we to catalogue the entire ethical and religious literature of these centuries under the indiscriminating rubrics, 'orientalism,' 'recrudescence of superstition,' and 'failure of nerve.' There was doubtless a drift towards superstition in the populace, in third-rate writers, and finally in the later Greek literature of Neo-Platonism. The decline of ancient science and scholarship left these tendencies without a check:

'If the old civilization had not been on the wane, if a supply of instructed, critical, cool, indifferent minds had continued,' etc. (M. Arnold, preface to *God and the Bible*, London, 1888, p. xvi, after Renan).

And the accommodations of the Stoics and the ecqueries of the Platonists with mysticism may be thought to have encouraged them. But in the better writers, down to and including Pletinus, neither the accommodations nor the half-serious literary mysticism went farther in concession to the 'concrete supernatural' than many of the most respectable and respected writers of the last fifty

years have done.¹ It is only from the avowed standpoint of a Velleius (Cic. *de Nat. Deor.* i. 8: 'fidenter . . . ut solent isti'), a Lincian, or a Haeckel that modern criticism is justified in deprecating the supernaturalism, the superstition, the failure of nerve of the Græco-Roman ethical teachers of the first two centuries. The later Greek literature of Neo-Platonism is an independent question and does not concern us here.

LITERATURE.—See the works mentioned throughout.

PAUL SHOREY.

PHENICIANS.—Phœnicia lay at the eastern end of the Mediterranean and extended from the Nahr-el-Kabir to Mt. Carmel. It included the maritime plain and the adjacent portions of Jebel Nnsariyeh, Mt. Lebanon, and the highlands of Galilee. Its chief cities in the order from north to south were Arvad (Arados), Simir (Simyra), Arka, Gebal (Byblus), Birutu (Berytus, Beirut), Sidon, Sarephath (Sarepta), Šur (Tyre), Kana, Akzib, and Mahalliba. The name is derived from the Gr. *φοινίς*, which means first 'purple' and then the land that produces purple. It is found as early as Homer (*Il.* xxiii. 743 f., *Od.* xiii. 272, xiv. 288 ff., xv. 415 ff.). The natives named themselves Tyrians, Gebalites, etc., after their individual towns, which were originally independent; or called themselves Sidonians from Sidon, the principal city. Thus Hiram, king of Tyre, calls himself 'king of the Sidonians' (*CIS* i. 5), and on coins of the Greek period Tyre is called 'mother of the Sidonians' (E. Babelon, *Cat. des monnaies grecques: les Rois de Syrie*, etc., Paris, 1890, i. 86). This is the usual name for the Phœnicians in the OT (*Jg* 10¹² 187, 1 K 11¹.²³ 16²¹, 2 K 23¹²) and also in Homer (*Il.* vi. 290, *Od.* iv. 618, xiii. 285, xv. 118).

The Phœnicians also called themselves by the broader racial name of Canaanites, as we know from coins of Laodicea (Babelon, i. 84, 162, 172). We have also the testimony of Herodian and of Stephen of Byzantium that the ancient name of Phœnicia was Χρᾶ, which corresponds to a shorter form *𐤇𐤏* (Kinabhi in the Amarna letters) over against *𐤏𐤋* (Kinabhi in the Amarna letters). Philo Byblius (in Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* i. 10, ed. E. H. Gifford, Oxford, 1903) names as the ancestor of the Phœnicians Chna, who had his name changed to Phœnix (39d); and in I. Bekker, *Anecdota Græca*, Berlin, 1814-21, iii. 1181, Chnas is the father of Phœnix, whence the Phœnicians are called Oclna (=𐤏𐤋). Augustine states that the Phœnician colonists in N. Africa called themselves Canaanites (*Exp. Epist. Rom.* 13). The OT frequently calls the Phœnicians Canaanites (*Gn* 10¹⁵.¹⁹, *Nn* 13²⁰, *Jos* 5¹ 13², *Jg* 1³¹, 2 S 24⁶, *Is* 23¹, *Ob* 2⁰, *Zeph* 2⁵; cf. *Mt* 15²², *Mk* 7²⁶). In the OT Canaan (*Zeph* 1¹, *Ezk* 16²⁹ 17⁴) or Canaanite (*Zec* 14²¹, *Job* 40³⁰, *Pr* 31²⁴) is the standing term for 'merchant,' but in the early days trade was wholly in the hands of the Phœnicians.

With this testimony in regard to the racial affinities of the Phœnicians their language agrees. It is identical with the proper names and Canaanite glosses in the Amarna letters (see J. A. Knudtzen, *Die El-Amarna-Tafeln*, Leipzig, 1907-15, ii. 1545 ff.), and differs only as a dialect from Meabite and Hebrew, which *Is* 19¹⁸ calls 'the language of Canaan.' In civilization and in religion also the Phœnicians and the Canaanites were one people. Accordingly, we must regard the Phœnicians as a branch of the Semitic race which under the names

¹ This caveat is intended not as a criticism of the indispensable book of Franz Cumont (*The Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism*, Chicago, 1911) or the brilliant sketch in Murray (ch. iv., 'The Failure of Nerve'), but in deprecation of the impression which the present generation of readers will receive from the exclusive emphasis of this aspect of the religious life and thought of the Græco-Roman empire.

of Amorites and Canaanites settled in Palestine about 2500 B.C.

A. PERIOD BEFORE THE HEBREW CONQUEST (2500-1200 B.C.).—During this period the Phenicians were undistinguishable from the other Canaanites. Accordingly, the account of the religion of the Canaanites (*ERE* iii. 176-188) is at the same time an account of the first period of the Phœnician religion.

B. PERIOD FROM THE HEBREW CONQUEST TO THE BEGINNING OF GREEK INFLUENCE (1200-400 B.C.).—The sources for this period are scanty compared with those for the preceding and the following periods. They consist of two native inscriptions, that of Limassol and that of Hassanbey-li; theophorous personal names in the Assyrian records, in the OT, and in Menander's list of the kings of Tyre; and a few statements of the Assyrian annals and the OT in regard to the gods of the Sidonians.

The inscription of 'the servant of Hîrôm, king of the Sidonians,' on fragments of a bronze bowl found at Limassol in Cyprus (*CIS* i. 5) is commonly regarded as belonging to the reign of Hîrôm I., the contemporary of David and Solomon (c. 960 B.C.). This is the view of Lidzbarski (*Handbuch der nordsem. Epigraphik*, pp. 118, 176); but Von Landau (*Beiträge zur Alterthumskunde des Orients*, i., Leipzig, 1893) and E. Meyer (*EBi*, col. 3753) think that the king mentioned was Hîrôm II. (c. 740 B.C.). In either case this is the oldest known Phœnician inscription. It is a dedication to Ba'al Lebanon (*ERE* ii. 287^b). The name Hîrôm (Gr. Ἡρώμ) is an abbreviation of Ahi-rôm, 'brother is high' (=Heb. Hî-râm; *ā* in Heb. is regularly represented by *ō* in Phœn.). This name is a witness to the continued use of the primitive Semitic divine title Aḥ (*ERE* iii. 179, § 6; cf. i. 387, § 1). Josephus (*Ant.* viii. v. 3) quotes from the Greek translation of the annals of Tyre made by Menander of Ephesus (see C. Wachsmuth, *Einleit. in das Studium der alten Geschichte*, Leipzig, 1895, p. 404f.) the information that the father of Hîrôm I. was Abibalos=Abi-ba'l, 'father is *ba'al*,' which contains the divine title Ab (*ERE* iii. 179, § 5) as well as the title Ba'l (*ERE* iii. 179, § 2). Of Hîrôm Menander says that he built temples for Herakles (=Melkart, *ERE* ii. 293) and for Astarte (=Ashtart, *ERE* ii. 117, § 5), and that he dedicated a golden pillar to Zeus (=Ba'l-Shamim, *ERE* ii. 288, § 8). He also instituted the festival of the awakening of Melkart. A wise man who flourished in his reign was Abdēmounos (read Abdēsmounos)='Abd-Eshmun, 'servant of Eshmun' (see below, p. 892, § 33).

The successor of Hîrôm, according to Menander, in Josephus (*c. Apion.* i. 18, ed. B. Niese, Berlin, 1889, v. 21), was Balbazeros (or Baleazeros)=Ba'l-azôr, 'the *ba'al* has helped.' His son was Abdastartos='Abd-Ashtart, 'servant of Ashtart.' He was dethroned by Methousastartos=Methn-Ashtart, 'man of Ashtart,' the son of Leastartos=Le-Ashtart, 'belonging to Ashtart.' His successor was Astharumos (or Aserumos)=אשרום, 'Osiris is high' (see below, C. i. 65; cf. *ERE* iii. 184f.). He was slain by his brother Phelles=פֶּלֶס (*CIS* i. 40. 1, 356. 2f.), an abbreviation of Ba'l-pelles, 'the *ba'al* has levelled the way' (J. and H. Derenbourg, *Insc. ph. dn temple de Seti à Abydos*, *Rassay* i. [1885] 81-101, no. 24). He in his turn was slain by Eithōbalos, the priest of Astarte=Ittoba'l, 'with him is the *ba'al*.' He is the same as Ethba'al, king of the Sidonians (1 K 16³¹). His daughter Jezebel (=יזעבל; see below, p. 890), the wife of Ahab, introduced the cult of Melkart, the *ba'al* of Tyre, into Israel; and from the narrative of the book of Kings we gain some information about his worship (*ERE* ii.

292^a, 293). His son was Balezdōros=Ba'l-azôr, 'the *ba'al* has helped.' He was succeeded by Mettenos=Metten, Heb. מֶטֶן (2 K 11¹⁸), an abbreviation of Metten-ba'l, 'gift of the *ba'al*,' (*CIS* i. 261. 3, 303. 1, 406. 4, and often). His successor was Pygmalion, in whose reign Carthage was founded. On Pygmalion see below, p. 893, § 49.

Here the list of Menander closes, but for the period immediately following we have a number of theophorous names of Phœnician kings mentioned in the Assyrian inscriptions. In 854 B.C. Shalmaneser III. names Matinu-ba'li=Matten-ba'l, 'gift of the *ba'al*,' king of Arvad (*KB* i. 172. 93; cf. ii. 20. 60) and Adunu-ba'li=Adon-ba'l (*ERE* iii. 179, § 8), king of Shiana=the Sinite of Gn 10⁷. On Ba'li-ra'si=Ba'l-rosh, '*ba'al* of the promontory,' in Shalmaneser III., see *ERE* ii. 287, § 4. Tiglath-pileser IV. in 738 B.C. mentions Hîrôm II., king of Tyre, and Sibittibi'li, 'seven is *ba'al*,' (*ERE* iii. 184, § 8), king of Gebal (*KB* ii. 30. 51; cf. 20. 57). On Ba'al-Zephon in Tiglathpileser IV. see *ERE* ii. 288, § 8. In 725 B.C. Shalmaneser V. attacked Elulaios=Elu-eli (Heb. אֱלִילָיוֹס, 'El is my god,' king of Sidon, as we know from Menander, in Josephus (*Ant.* ix. xiv. 2). In the inscriptions of Sennacherib he appears as Lnli (*KB* ii. 90. 35). On the divine name El see *ERE* iii. 178, C. i. In 701 Sennacherib mentions Tuba'lu=Itto-ba'l, Eth-ba'al, 'with him is the *ba'al*,' king of Sidon; Minhimmu=Mēnahēm, 'comforter,' an abbreviation of a theophorous name such as Ba'al-menahēm (*CIS* i. 55. 1, 57. 2, 87. 3; 2 K 15¹⁴), king of Samsimuruna; Abdilīti='Abd-elōt, 'servant of the goddess' (i.e. Ashtart), king of Arvad (*CIS* i. 243. 3, 244. 4; *ERE* ii. 115, § 1); Urumilki, 'light is my king' (*ERE* iii. 181, § 8), king of Gebal (*KB* ii. 90. 48-50). In 676 B.C. Esarhaddon names Abdimilkutti='Abd-milkūt, 'servant of the queen' (i.e. Ashtart; *ERE* vii. 433, § 4), king of Sidon (*KB* ii. 124. 15). He also mentions Ba'lu=Ba'l, king of Tyre; Milkashapa=Milkasaph, 'the king has gathered' (*ERE* iii. 179, § 7), king of Gebal; Matanba'al=Metten-ba'l, 'gift of the *ba'al*,' king of Arvad; Abibaal=Abi-ba'l, 'father is *ba'al*,' king of Samsimuruna (*KB* ii. 148. 13-17). Ashurbanipal names the same persons mentioned by his father and also Yahimilki=יְהִימִלְכִי, 'my king makes live,' son of Ba'l, king of Tyre (*KB* ii. 168. 58); Yakīnu=Yakin-el, 'El causes to be,' king of Arvad (*KB* ii. 170. 63); and the following ten sons of Yakin-el: Azibaal='Azzi-ba'l, 'my strength is the *ba'al*'; Abibaal, 'father is the *ba'al*'; Adunibaal, 'my lord is the *ba'al*'; Sapatibaal=Shopheṭi-ba'al, 'my judge is the *ba'al*'; Pudibaal, 'the *ba'al* has redeemed'; Ba'alyashubu, 'the *ba'al* returns'; Ba'alhanunu, 'the *ba'al* is gracious'; Ba'almaaluku, 'the *ba'al* is king'; Abimilki (Abimelech), 'the father is king'; Ahimilki (Ahimelech), 'the brother is king' (*KB* ii. 172. 82-84). On Melkart, Ba'l-Malki, Ba'l-Shamim, Eshmun and Ba'l-Saphon, and the gods of Tyre mentioned in the treaty of Esarhaddon with Ba'al, king of Tyre, see *ERE* ii. 293^a; and on Ashtart in the same treaty see *ERE* ii. 115^a.

The Phœnician inscription found at Hassanbey-li near Zenjirli in N. Syria (*SBAW*, 1895, p. 122; H. Winckler, *Altor. Forsch.*, Leipzig, 1896, iv. 305) stands next in age to the inscription of Hîrôm, king of the Sidonians, referred to above. Its allusion to 'the king of Assyria' shows that it is older than the fall of Nineveh (606 B.C.). It mentions אֱלִילָיוֹס וְיָמִין, 'Ba'l-shamim and the gods' (*ERE* ii. 288, § 8), יְהִי, 'and Ramman' (*ERE* iii. 183, § 2).

Ashtart, 'the goddess of the Sidonians,' is mentioned in 1 K 11²³, 2 K 23²³.

In the Neo-Babylonian period Josephus again

quotes from Menander a list of kings (c. *Apion*. i. 21). He says that Nebuchadrezzar besieged Ithobalos = Ethba'al II. His successor was Ba'al II. Then came a series of judges: Elknibalos = (H)ekinni-ba'l, 'the ba'al caused me to be' (cf. Yakin-el above), the son of Baslêchos (or Balsachos) = Ba'l-Sakkun (?), 'Sakkun is the ba'al'; Chelbês = כֶּלְבֵּס, 'dog of Isis' (cf. כֶּלְבֵּס; *CIS* i. 50. 1, 'servant of Isis')—interesting as the first appearance of the Egyptian goddess Isis (*ERE* iii. 184 f.); son of Abdaïos, apparently = 'Abd-Yahu (Obadiah), 'servant of Jahweh' (Abdaïos is the transliteration of Obadiah in the Greek version according to Q; other recensions read Abdeïos; on Jahweh among the Canaanites see *ERE* iii. 183, § 17); Abbaros (Lat. Abalus) = Ab-ba'l, 'father is ba'al'; Muttunos = Metten-(ba'l), 'gift (of ba'al)'; and Gerastros = Ger-Ashtart, 'sojourner of Ashtart' (frequent in Phœnician inscriptions), sons of Abdêlimos = 'Abd-êlim, 'servant of the gods.' They were followed by a king, Balatoros = Ba'l-a'tôr, 'the ba'al has crowned.' Then came Merbalos = Mar-ba'l, 'the ba'al is lord'; and after him Eirômos = Ĥirôm III., under whom Babylon fell before the arms of Cyrus (539 B.C.).

During the period of Assyrian and Babylonian rule the Phœnicians must have felt the influence of the Assyro-Babylonian religion. This is shown by survivals in the next period (see below, p. 893, § 53 ff.).

During the earlier part of the period of Persian rule we have no information in regard to the later Phœnician religion. No trace of the Persian religion appears in the later Phœnician religion, so that we may assume that it exerted no influence upon Phœnicia during this period.

Our sources, meagre as they are, for the period from the Hebrew conquest down to 400 B.C. show that the Phœnician religion remained practically the same as it had been during the previous period. Nearly all the old gods are mentioned, and no new ones appear, except Isis and Osiris.

C. PERIOD OF GREEK INFLUENCE (FROM 400 B.C. ONWARDS).—As sources for this period we have a considerable body of inscriptions from Phœnicia and from the Phœnician colonies in Cyprus, Carthage, etc. The oldest of these date from the end of the Persian period (c. 400 B.C.). The majority come from the Greek period (333 B.C. onwards). The inscription of Yehaw-milk of Gebal (*CIS* i. 1) belongs to the end of the 5th or the beginning of the 4th century. Those of Tabnit of Sidon (Lidzbarski, p. 417) and of Eshmun-azôr (*CIS* i. 3) are assigned by some to the end of the 5th, by others to the end of the 4th century. All the other inscriptions found in Phœnicia belong to the Greek period. The Cyprian inscriptions date mainly from the end of the 5th and the 4th century. The Delos inscription (*CIS* i. 114) is from the 4th century. The older inscriptions from Carthage, Sardinia, and other Phœnician colonies in the west belong to the period before the Roman conquest (146 B.C.). The Neo-Punic inscriptions belong to the Roman period, and have frequently Latin translations that are useful for determining the pronunciation of the personal names. These inscriptions contain names of gods, theophorous personal names, and some information in regard to religious beliefs and rites. In many respects the Phœnician religion was preserved in a more primitive form in Carthage than in the homeland, where it was subjected to Greek influence.

Two Phœnicians, Mochos and Sanchuniathon, are reported by classical authors to have written accounts of the Phœnician religion. Mochos of Sidon is named along with Sanchuniathon by Athenæus (iii. 126A), and with Sanchuniathon is said by Strabo (xvi. ii. 24) to have lived before the

Trojan war (cf. *Jos. Ant.* i. iii. 9). He wrote a cosmogony of Sidon, which was translated into Greek by Eudemus, a pupil of Aristotle, from whom a fragment was borrowed by Damascius (*Quæst. de Primis Principiis*, 125, ed. J. Kopp, Frankfurt, 1826, p. 385). It is also said to have been translated by Lætus at the end of the 1st cent. B.C. (Tatian, *adv. Græcos*, 37 = Clem. Alex. *Strom.* i. xxi. 114). Our only knowledge of this cosmogony is from the fragment in Damascius. Another much more extended cosmogony, that of Gebal, is said to have been composed by Sanchuniathon (= Sakkun-yathôn), and to have been translated by Philo of Byblus (Gebal), from whom it is quoted by Eusebius. On the contents and historical character of this document see the artt. PHILO BYBLIUS and SANCHUNIATHON. It is probable in the case both of Mochos and of Sanchuniathon that genuine Phœnician records are preserved by the Greek writers, although the names attached to them may be apocryphal.

Besides these native historians we have as sources the incidental references to the Phœnician religion in Greek and in Latin authors, particularly Herodotus, Lucian (*de Dea Syria*), Origen, Jerome, Theodoret, Tertullian, and Augustine.

From these sources it appears that the characteristic of the period from 400 B.C. onwards was ever-increasing Greek influence upon the Phœnician religion. Even in the Persian period Greek civilization began to invade Phœnicia. King Straton (= 'Abd-Ashtart?) of Sidon maintained a thoroughly Greek court. He established a Sidonian colony in Athens which has left a number of Phœnician inscriptions, and permitted Athenian merchants to settle at Sidon. He joined with the Athenian embassy to Artaxerxes II. in 367 B.C. (Athenæus, xii. 531; *Ælian*, *Var. Hist.* vii. 2). The anthropoid sarcophagi from Sidon of the later Persian period show strong Greek influence, and the splendid monuments known as 'the Alexander sarcophagus' and 'the sarcophagus of the mourners,' which belong to the end of the 4th cent., are masterpieces of Greek art (see O. Hamdy-Bey and T. Reinach, *La Necropole royale de Sidon*, Paris, 1892-97). After the battle of Issus in 333 B.C. the Phœnician cities submitted to Alexander, except the island of Tyre, which was captured by constructing a mole from the mainland. It then became a Macedonian fortress, and from this time onwards the Hellenizing of Phœnicia went on apace. The bilingual inscriptions and Philo Byblius show us that the Greek gods were identified with the old Phœnician deities, and in the classical writers the Phœnician gods are habitually called by their Greek or Latin equivalents. Close relations with the Greek dynasty of the Ptolemys in Egypt encouraged also the adoption of new elements from the Egyptian religion in addition to those that had already been borrowed in the days of the XVIIIth and XIXth dynasties (*ERE* iii. 184). This period, accordingly, is one of unlimited religious syncretism.

1. THE PANTHEON.—(a) *General titles.*—**I. EL.**—The generic name for 'god' in Phœnician, as in the other Semitic languages, is ʾl, ʾl (for this and for the following names of gods see the alphabetically arranged Phœnician vocabulary of Lidzbarski, pp. 204-388, where references are given to all the occurrences of the names in the inscriptions; see also *ERE* iii. 178 ff.).

In the inscriptions this word is never used as a personal name like Heb. ʾl, but is always generic like ba'al. It was the favourite title of the chief god of Gebal, just as ba'al was the title of the god of Sidon. What his real name was, if he had any, is unknown. Hence ʾl is found as an element in personal names chiefly in inscriptions from Gebal—e.g., El-amon, 'Amon is god,' or 'the god is faithful'; El-barik, 'the god has blessed'; El-janôn, 'the god is gracious'; El-pa'ûl, 'the god has done'; El-rôm, 'the god is high'; Na'ôm-el, 'the god is good'; En-el,

'eye of the god'; Tamōk-el, 'the god has supported.' Philo Byblus (in *Eus. Præp. Evang.*, ed. Gifford, i. 10, 36c, 37b) says that Elos (the El of Gebal) is Kronos, that he founded the city of Gebal (37a), that he gave Gebal to the goddess Baaltis (=the Ba'alat of Gebal), and Berytus to Poseidon (=Ba'l-Bērūt) (38d). He had four eyes, two open and two closed; four wings, two spread and two folded; and two feathers (like the Egyptian gods) upon his head. This figure seems to be represented on certain Phœnician seals (M. de Vogüé, *Mélanges d'archéologie orientale*, Paris, 1895, p. 109). On the myth of the El of Gebal see SANCHUNIATHON, O. 2.

Other towns called their chief god *El*, as we know from the Punic name El'am, 'the god is uncle' (*CIS* i. 147. 6); Metten-el, 'gift of the god'; and numerous place-names in Palestine compounded with *El*. Philo also knows another *El* besides that of Gebal (38a). The Greeks were unable to distinguish between these various *els*, and therefore assumed one god Elos whom they identified with Kronos. Through Greek influence the idea of one god El was gradually developed by the Phœnicians.

The plur. of *El* is *Elīm*, which occurs in numerous inscriptions and in the personal names 'Abd-Elīm, 'servant of the gods'; Kelb-Elīm, 'dog of the gods'; and Metten-Elīm, 'gift of the gods.' A favourite honorific title in Carthage is *Elm* אֵלִים, 'establisher of the gods.' Philo (37b) says that the allies of Elos were called Elōim. This Hebrew form cannot come from either Sanchuniathon or Philo, but must be a modification by Eusebius or a Christian transcriber.

2. *Ēlōt*.—The fem. form corresponding to *El* is *ēlōt*, 'goddess,' which is used as a title of 'Ashtart (cf. Arab. al-Lāt). It occurs also in the fem. name *Hōt-lōt*, 'sister of the goddess.'

3. *Allōn*.—Another name for 'god' is *allōn*, which in Hebrew means 'holy tree.' It occurs in the personal names Yehaw-allōn, 'may the god cause to live'; and Aḥ-allōn, 'the god is a brother.' The plur. is *allōnim* and fem. *allōnoth* (cf. *alonim ualonuth*, Plautus, *Pæn.* v. i. 1).

(b) *Celestial gods*.—4. *Shamim*, 'heaven,' occurs in the name [Sa]mēmroumos, 'heaven high' (Philo, 34d); also the name of a district in Sidon (C. C. Torrey, in *JAOS* xxiii. [1902] 162). More commonly we meet Ba'l-Shamim, 'owner of the sky' (*ERE* ii. 288^b, 293^a). Philo (34c) calls him 'Beel-samēn [the Aram. form], which in Phœnician means lord of heaven, but in Greek Zeus.' In the same passage he incorrectly identifies him with the sun. In 36b he calls him Ouranos. In the treaty of Hannibal with Philip of Macedon he is called Zeus (Polybius, vii. 9).

5. *Zebul*, 'dwelling,' or Ba'l-zebul, 'owner of the dwelling,' i.e. the abode of the sky, seems to be an alternative name for the foregoing. It occurs in the fem. name Shem-Zebul, 'name of the dwelling' (Lidzbarski, p. 420. 3), and in the fem. name Ba'l-azbul (cf. Askun for Sakkun), 'dwelling is owner' (*CIS* i. 158. 1 f.); also probably in I-Zebel, the Tyrian queen of Ahab, where *i* cannot mean 'not' any more than in I-Tanit (*CIS* i. 542. 3), or I-Saphon (Lidzbarski, p. 214), or the Heb. name I-kabod (*ERE* ii. 287^a, 289^a, and art. BAALZEBUB).

6. *Saphon*, 'north,' or Ba'al-saphon, 'owner of the north,' in Bod-Saphon, 'member of Saphon'; Abd-Saphon, 'servant of Saphon'; I-Saphon and perhaps Saphon-ba'l, 'Saphon is the *ba'al*' (see *ERE* ii. 288, § 8, 293^b).

7. *Shahar*, 'dawn,' in 'Abd-Shahar, 'servant of the dawn,' and Shahar-ba'l, 'dawn is the *ba'al*' (cf. the Heb. name Ahi-Shahar, 'dawn is a brother').

8. *Ur*, 'light,' in Ur-milk, 'light is king' (*CIS* i. 1. 1; see *ERE* iii. 181, § 8).

9. *Shemesh*, 'the sun,' in Adon-Shemesh, 'Shemesh is lord'; Abd-Shemesh, 'servant of Shemesh'; and in the place-names Shemesh, on coins of Boccos III., and Mekōm-Shemesh, 'place of Shemesh,' on Mauretanian coins (see *ERE* iii. 180, § 1). Philo (34c) says that the sun was worshipped by the first parents of the Phœnicians.

10. *Yerah*, 'the moon,' in 'Abd-Yerah, 'servant of the moon' (see *ERE* iii. 180, § 2). In view of the fact that Phœnician personal names are nearly always theophorous, Hōdesh, 'new moon,' in Ben-hōdesh is probably to be regarded as a god, in spite of the Greek translation *νομήριος* (*CIS* i. 117. 1).

11. *Star-worship*.—*Mazzol*, 'constellation,' 'sign of zodiac,' 'fate,' occurs in the phrase מַזְלוֹ נָסַח, 'good fortune' (*CIS* i. 95. 8). The same word occurs in Assyrian, Hebrew, and Aramaic. In 2 K 23⁵ we read of those who sacrificed to Ba'al-Shamini, to the sun, to the moon, to the constellations (*mazzā. lōth*), and to all the host of heaven. The identification of 'Ashtart with the planet Venus is also implied by Philo in 38c (see *ERE* ii. 116^b), and of El with the planet Saturn in 40c.

12. *Adōd* (=Adad, or Hadad), the storm-god, does not happen to be mentioned in the inscriptions, but Philo (38c) knows him as Adōdos, king of the gods, who ruled the land with 'Ashtart and Ba'al-Tamar (see *ERE* iii. 180, § 4).

13. *Resheph*, the lightning, appears as Reshephes, 'Resheph of the arrow' (*CIS* i. 10. 3, 4); Resheph-Mukol, 'Resheph of the city of Mukol in Cyprus' (*ib.* 89. 3); Resheph-'*l-h-y-t-s* (in the Cyprian transcription *a-lo-si-o-ta-i*=Alashia, 'Cyprus,' in the Amarna letters; *Tamassus inscr.* 2. 4 f.); Resheph-Elit (name of a city); also in the personal names 'Abd-Resheph, 'servant of Resheph' (*CIS* i. 93. 4); and Resheph-yaton, 'Resheph has given' (*ib.* 44. 2, 88. 2, 4, 6). A variant form of the same name is *Arsheph* (*ib.* 251. 2), occurring also in the personal name 'Abd-Arsheph (*ib.* 393. 3), 'servant of Arsheph.' He probably appears also in the name of the Palestinian town Arsuf (=Apollonia). In the bilingual inscriptions just cited he is equated with Apollo. Hence Philo probably means him by Apollo, the brother of El-Kronos and Belos-Zeus (38a). He also is probably meant by Apollo in the treaty of Hannibal (Polyb. vii. 9). Reseph in Melkart-Reseph (M. A. Levy, *Siegeln und Gemmen*, p. 18) is possibly only a variant of Resheph (see *ERE* iii. 180, § 5).

(c) *Terrestrial gods*.—14. אֶרֶץ=Heb. *eretz*, 'the earth.' Philo calls her Gē, the sister-wife of Ouranos (36b). She is mentioned also in the treaty of Hannibal (Polyb. vii. 9). It is possible that אֶרֶץ in עֲרִיכָא and other Punic names is only a variant of the same.

15. The *ba'als*.—Not only the earth in general but every important object upon the earth was animated by a divinity. The generic name for these nature-spirits was *ba'l*=Heb. *ba'al*, 'owner.' There were *ba'als* of water, *ba'als* of trees, *ba'als* of mountains, *ba'als* of holy stones and of their surrounding sanctuaries, and *ba'als* of places (see art. BAAL, vol. ii., particularly pp. 293 f. and 297, where the Ba'al cult in Phœnicia and the Phœnician colonies is discussed; also *ERE* iii. 179, § 2). Philo alludes to these when he says that the first men consecrated the productions of the earth and regarded them as gods (34b).

16. *Dagon*.—One of the most important of the *ba'als* was Dagon, or Ba'l-dagon, which Philo (36c) correctly translates 'corn'=Heb. *dāgān* (see DAGON).

17. *Sacred animals*.—Philo (41a) asserts that 'Taúthos (Thóth) himself regarded the nature of the dragon and of serpents as divine. . . . For which reason this animal has been adopted in temples and in mystic rites. . . . It is immortal, and is self-consumed, as is stated before; for this animal does not die by a natural death, but only if struck by a violent blow. The Phœnicians call it "Good Daemon." In 42b he says: "Having built temples, they consecrated to him shrines the primary elements represented by serpents, and in their honour celebrated festivals, and sacrifices, and mystic rites, regarding them as the greatest gods, and rulers of the universe." Hawk-worship is also mentioned by Philo (41c, 42a). The cult of horses may be indicated by the name 'Abd-usim, 'servant of the horses' (*CIS* i. 46. 1, 49, 63, 93. 3). 2 K 23¹¹ speaks of the horses dedicated to the sun, and the Hebrew names Sūsā, Sūsī, and Hāsar-sūsīm seem to indicate a totemic cult of this animal. The winged horse is a Carthaginian religious emblem. Akkor, 'mouse,' is one of the commonest Phœnician personal names. It appears also as a Hebrew personal name. Is 66¹⁷ speaks of people who sanctify themselves and purify themselves to go into the gardens to eat swine's flesh, and the abomination, and the mouse. In Lv 11¹ the term 'abomination' includes mice and similar small creeping animals, and in Ezk 8¹⁰ we find these as objects of worship.

One can hardly escape the conclusion that the mouse, like the serpent, had demonic qualities for the Canaanites, and that this is the reason why it was 'unclean' for the Hebrews. The swine was sacrificed once a year in the worship of the Cyprian 'Ashtart' (Lydus, *de Mensibus*, ed. I. Bekker, Bonn, 1837, p. 80), and the sacrifices of a sow is depicted in a rock sculpture (E. Renan, *Mission de Phénicie*, pl. 31), but ordinarily it was not eaten (Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, 54; Athenæus, iii. 49; W. R. Smith, *Rel. Sem.*, p. 290f.). This shows that it was a sacred animal, as originally among the Hebrews (cf. the priestly clan of Hezir, 'the swine' [1 Ob 24¹⁵, Neh 10²¹]). The sanctity of the dog is indicated by a statement of Justin (xix. 1) that Darius commanded the Carthaginians not to sacrifice men and not to eat the flesh of dogs, the latter being evidently a sacramental rite (cf. the Hebrew clan of Oaleb, 'the dog'). On the sanctity of the dove in connexion with the cult of 'Ashtart see *ERE* ii. 117^b, 185^b. On the cult of animals in ancient Canaan see *ERE* ii. 286, § 3.

(d) *Tribal gods*.—Powers presiding over tribes, clans, or families were called by names expressing kinship or authority, which described them as owners of men in the same way as *ba'al* described them as owners of things. In the primitive matriarchal stage of social organization the chief tribal gods were feminine. When subsequently the family assumed the polyandrous form, a male 'father-uncle' was worshipped alongside of the mother-goddess. When finally the patriarchal family was introduced, the tribal god began to be called 'father.' The Phœnicians stood upon the patriarchal stage of development, but survivals of more primitive conceptions linger in their personal names.

18. Em, 'mother.'—In *CIS* i. 177 a goddess אִמַּם is invoked along with כַּלָּה חַרָּה, 'mistress of the cella' (*ERE* ii. 288, § 6). This goddess is meant we do not know. In *CIS* i. 380 we meet 'the mother, the mistress of Pnē-ba'l.' She is identical with Tanit of Pnē-ba'l, who is named in many inscriptions (see below, 31). We find also 'mother of the *dshērāh*' (*CIS* i. 13, read אִמַּתִּיר instead of אִמַּתִּיר). This must be 'Ashtart, who is frequently identified with her symbol, the *dshērāh* (*ERE* iii. 186, § 2). Evidently the title 'mother' could be applied to any goddess. It occurs also in the fem. personal name Em-Ashtart, 'Ashtart is a mother.'

19. 'Amm, 'father-uncle,' the designation of the tribal god in the polyandrous period, still survives in Eli-am, 'the god is father-uncle' (*CIS* i. 147. 6; see *ERE* i. 387 f., iii. 179, § 3).

20. Ab, 'father,' as a divine title is common in personal names—e.g., Ab-ba'l and Abi-ba'l, 'father is *ba'al*' (used for both men and women); אֲבִי-בַעַל, 'our father is *ba'al*'; Ab-halol, 'father has begotten'; Ab-milk, 'father is king'; Ab-kōm, 'father has risen' (see *ERE* iii. 179, § 5).

21. Ah, 'brother,' occurs in Ahī-nadōb, 'brother is generous'; and Ahī-allōn, 'brother is god.' Frequently the word is abbreviated to Hī, as in Hī-rōm, 'brother is high,' Hī-milk, 'brother is king.' In the name Hī-milkōt (Lat. Himilco) we cannot translate 'the queen is a brother,' nor 'brother of the queen,' since in every other case in Phœnician and in the Semitic languages in general Ah in personal names is a divine title (see G. B. Gray, *Studies in Hebrew Proper Names*, London, 1896, p. 75 f.). Possibly in this isolated case Hī = 'r, 'life,' and the name is to be translated 'life of Milkot' (cf. the Heb. name Hī-el, 'life of El,' and the Phœn. Mari-ḥi). On the other hand, (a) *hot*, 'sister,' is used exclusively in fem. names, and is not a divine title, but expresses the relation of the worshipper to the god (see below, p. 895*). On these names of relationship as divine titles see the literature under 'AMM, and also *ERE* iii. 179, § 6.

22. Adon, 'master,' is used in Hebrew and Phœnician for the owner of a slave. It describes the god as a proprietor of a person, just as *ba'al* describes him as a proprietor of a place. In the dedicatory inscriptions and in the personal names the term is applied to nearly every god and goddess

of the pantheon. This shows that, like the foregoing terms, it is not an individual name, but a title. Every town could have its *adon* as well as its *el* or its *ba'al* (see *ERE* iii. 179, § 8).

The most famous of the Adonim was the Adon of Gebal, the consort of 'Ashtart, the *ba'alat* of Gebal, whose cult was transplanted to Paphos in Cyprus along with that of the Gebalite 'Ashtart. For the Greeks his title became a true proper name, Adonis. The real name of this 'lord' is uncertain. Several of the classical writers identify him with the Bab. Tammuz—e.g., Jerome, *Ep.* lviii. 3, and Comment. on Ezk 81⁴; Cyril of Alexandria, *Comment.* on Hos 41⁵; Melito, in W. Cureton, *Spicilegium Syriacum*, London, 1855, p. 44. This view is favoured by the facts that Ezk 81⁴ speaks of 'women weeping for Tammuz' in the Temple in Jerusalem, and that Is 17¹⁰ speaks of 'planting shoots of the Pleasant One [a title of the Adon of Gebal], and stocking [gardens] with scions for a foreign god' (a rite of Adon-worship). These passages seem to identify Tammuz and Adon. The difficulty with this evidence is that it is late. The Adon of Gebal may easily have been identified with Tammuz in the Assyrian or the Neo-Babylonian period, although his Canaanite name may have been different; or he may have had no name at all. Tammuz has not yet been found in the early Canaanite period. Adonis was also identified with Osiris (Plutarch, *de Is. et Osir.* 15; Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, 7; Apollodorus, ii. 1. 3); but this does not prove that Osiris was his original name, since Osiris appears as a distinct deity in the Phœnician pantheon. Philo mentions neither Adon nor Tammuz, but connects the myth of Adonis with 'Elyun, 'the high,' which was evidently another title of Adonis.

In character Adonis was a personification of the spring verdure that withered in the dry heat of summer. He was the Canaanite variant of a deity that, under the names of Dumuzi among the Sumerians, Tammuz among the Babylonians and Assyrians, 'Ate, or Attis, among the Syrians and peoples of Asia Minor, and Osiris among the Egyptians, was worshipped from the earliest times. His death occurred in the month of Tammuz (June-July), and his resurrection in December-January, when vegetation once more flourished after the early winter rains. According to the Babylonian myth, he was the child (later the husband) of Ishtar; and, when he died, she descended to Sheol to bring him up (see *ERE* vii. 430, §§ 2, 4, and art. TAMMUZ). In the Phœnician version of the myth, as preserved by Greek writers, Adonis was a beautiful boy who was loved by Aphrodite ('Ashtart). In order to keep him for herself, Aphrodite placed him in a chest and gave him into the keeping of Proserpine (= Allatu, the Babylonian goddess of Sheol). Proserpine fell in love with the child and refused to surrender him. Zeus thereupon decreed that Adonis should stay half of the year with Proserpine in the underworld and half of the year with Aphrodite in the upper world. According to the local Gebalite form of the myth, Adonis was slain annually by a wild boar while he was hunting at Apheca (the modern Aḥḥa) in Mt. Lebanon, and the desecolation of the waters of the Adonis river (Nahr Ibrahim) was due to his blood (see Philo Byblius, 86b; Lucian, *de Dea Syria*, 61; Apollodorus, iii. 14. 4; Bion, *Idyl.* i.; Ovid, *Metam.* x. 503 ff.). A rock relief representing the death of Adonis still exists at Ghineb in the valley of the Adonis river (Renan, pl. xxxvi.; A. Jeremias, *Das AT im Lichte des alten Orients*, Leipzig, 1906, p. 90).

The cult of Adonis consisted in bewailing his death round a bier on which was placed an image of the dead god, which was then deposited in a tomb, and remained there until, six months later, his resurrection was celebrated. Another interesting rite was the planting of Adonis gardens. These were pots, or baskets, filled with shallow earth, in which the seeds of quickly-growing plants were sown and tended by the women for eight days. The plants were allowed to wither at the time of the death of Adonis, and were carried out along with small images of the god and cast into the water. This custom seems to be referred to in Is 17¹⁰. It is a witness to the primitive character of Adonis as a vegetation-god (on Adonis see *GB*, pt. iv., *Adonis, Attis, Osiris*, London, 1907; W. W. Baudissin, *Adonis und Esmun*, with copious bibliography).

23. Mar, 'master,' synonyms with Adon, appears in Mar-barik, 'the master has blessed'; Mari-ḥi 'my master lives'; Mar-sammik, 'the master has sustained'; 'Abd-Marnai, 'servant of our master.' Marna is the name under which the chief god of Gaza (Dagon?) was worshipped (see *ERE* iv. 387^b). A Tyrian lamp (*CIS* i. 111) bears the dedication θεῷ Βερεμάρη, 'to the god Ba'l-Mari.'

24. Milk, 'king' = Heb. Melek (Moloch), is one of the commonest Phœnician divine names.

It occurs in Adon-Milk, 'the king is master'; Ohel-Milk, 'tent of the king'; Ahot-Milk, 'sister of the king'; Ur-Milk, 'light is king'; Bod-Milk, 'limb of the king'; Ger-Milk, 'client of the king'; Han-Milk, 'the king is gracious'; Hī-Milk, 'the king is a brother'; Hot-Milk, 'sister of the king'; Yada-Milk, 'the king knows'; Yehaw-Milk, 'may the king cause to live'; Yaton-Milk, 'the king has given'; Mīkne-Milk, 'possession of the king'; 'Abd-Milk, 'servant of the king'; 'Az-Milk, 'the king is strong'; Šadok-Milk, 'the king is righteous.' This also is not an individual name, but the title of many different tribal gods (see *ERE* i. 390 f., iii. 179).

25. Melkart. — The most conspicuous of the Phœnician Milkim was Melkart = Milk-kart, 'king of the city,' the chief god of Tyre.

This compound becomes practically an individual name, and is used in forming other proper names—e.g., Amot-Melkart, 'handmaid of M.'; Eshmun-Melkart; Bod-Melkart, 'limb of M.'; Ger-Melkart, 'client of M.'; Han-Melkart, 'M. is gracious'; Hot-Melkart, 'sister of M.'; Kabod-Melkart, 'M. is honourable'; Mot-Melkart, 'handmaid of M.'; Abd-Melkart, 'servant of M.'; Sid-Melkart; Rosh-Melkart, 'head of M.'; Melkart-hallu, 'M. has saved'; Melkart-han, 'M. is gracious'; Melkart-hanno, 'M. has favoured him'; Melkart-mashol, 'M. has ruled'; Melkart-Reſeph; Melkart-shama, 'M. has heard.'

Apart from compounding in personal names, Melkart is often mentioned in the inscriptions both in the east and in the west (Lidzbarski, p. 311). In the bilinguals he is equated with Herakles Archēgetēs. Philo (38*) calls him Melcathros, the son of Demarous (Ba'l-Tamar), who is also called Herakles. Polybius in the treaty of Hannibal (vii. 9) calls him Herakles. This identification was the one commonly accepted in Phœnicia and throughout the Greek world (on the cult of this god see *ERE* ii. 292 f.). A feast of 'the awakening of Melkart' was kept annually at Tyre (Menander, in Jos. c. *Apion*. i. 18).

26. Milkot, 'queen,' is a title for goddesses. It is used absolutely in *CIS* 193. 4, and in the personal names Ahot-Milkot, or Hot-Milkot, 'sister of Milkot'; Hi-Milkot, 'life of Milkot'; Mot-Milkot, 'handmaid of Milkot'; Na'om-Milkot, 'Milkot is good'; 'Abd-Milkot, 'servant of Milkot.' This designates no particular divinity, but is used as a title of 'Ashtart, 'Anath, Tanit, or any other goddess.

27. 'Elyun ('Ελιοῦν), 'high,' is mentioned as the father of all the gods by Philo (36a), who translates the name by Ὑψιστος.

He 'died in an encounter with wild beasts, and was deified, and his children offered to him libations and sacrifices' (36b). This identifies him with the Adonis of Gebal. The name seems to occur also in Pygmalion = Pame-'Elyon (see above, p. 888^b). The element *ly* in Punic names is commonly interpreted as a mistake for *ky*—e.g., *ly*-nk, 'brother is god'—but it is possible that it represents this title (see *ERE* iii. 180, § 13).

28. Adir, 'mighty,' seems to be a divine name in the place-name Rosh-Adir, 'head of the mighty one'; also in Adir-bal (Lat. Adherbal), 'Adir is owner,' and Adir-milk, 'Adir is king.' The same name appears apparently in Adrammelek, the son of Sennacherib (2 K 19³⁷; cf. 17³¹; see also *ERE* iii. 180, § 11).

(c) *Departmental gods*.—These were deities who presided over various sections of the life of their people. In distinction from the gods just mentioned, who were called by general titles, these had individual names.

29. 'Ashtart, the goddess of love and of reproduction (see 'ASHTART, and *ERE* iii. 182, § 1).

30. 'Anath, the goddess of war, appears in the Idalion inscription (7), in 'Anath-han, 'Anath is gracious,' and in the inscription on a helmet, nyz, 'with the help of 'Anath' (Lidzbarski, p. 172b; see *ERE* iii. 182, § 2). In the bilinguals and in Philo (36d, 38d) she is identified with Athene.

31. Tanit (conventional pronunciation; the vowels are unknown) appears in a Sidonian inscription from Athens (*CIS* i. 116. 1) in 'Abd-Tanit, 'servant of Tanit' (cf. 501. 4). Here she is identified with Artemis. In Carthage she appears in an immense number of inscriptions as 'the lady Tanit of Pne-ba'l.' Some historians have tried to find a mystical meaning in the name 'Tanit of the face of Ba'al,' but Pne-ba'l is probably only a place (cf. Penuel) where there was a famous sanctuary of the goddess. Perhaps she is represented by Hera in the treaty of Hannibal (Polyb. vii. 9).

She appears also in Bod-Tanit, 'limb of Tanit'; 'Abd-Tanit, 'servant of Tanit'; Sid-Tanit, and I-Tanit (see P. Berger, 'Tanit pene-baal,' *JA* vii. ix. [1877] 147-160). The origin of the name and the functions of the goddess are unknown. Perhaps she was only a local form of 'Ashtart. She is not found in ancient Canaan.

32. Edom (אדם), 'maker,' seems to be a god in Edom-yaton, 'Edom has given,' and 'Abd-Edom (= Heb. Obed-Edom), 'servant of Edom' (see *ERE* iii. 182, § 3).

33. Eshmun, the god of healing = Asklepios, appears alone and in a great number of Phœnician and Punic personal names as אשמון (Lidzbarski, p. 229). This is transliterated into Greek as Esmun, Asmnn, and Usmun. These forms imply that the original pronunciation was Ashmun.

As to the etymology of the name, the current opinion is that it is derived from the root *shaman*, 'to be fat.' It is then an elative, meaning 'the very fat one.' What a god of this sort should have to do with health is hard to see, and the etymology is more than questionable. A number of Phœnician gods have names ending in *un* or *on*—e.g., Allon, Eshmun, Sakkun, 'Elyun, Sidon, Shalmun. This fact suggests that the *n* in Eshmun is not radical, but is a masc. ending. Moreover, the prefixing of the vowel *a* is common in Phœnician; cf. Arsheph and Resheph, Askun and Sakkun, Azbul and Zebul. This makes it probable that *a* in Ashmun is prosthetic, and that the root is *sh-m*. If this be so, then Eshmun is only a variant of Shem, 'name,' which is widely attested as a title of deity among the Semites (see *ERE* iii. 180, § 12). It is interesting to note that, although Shem appears as a divine title in the Canaanite period, it disappears in the later period, evidently because its place is taken by Eshmun. The fem. counterpart of Eshmun is Ashima, the goddess of Hamath (2 K 17³⁰), who appears also as Ashima-Bethel, the consort of Jahweh, in the Assuan papyri. The series Shem (undifferentiated), Eshmun (masc.) and Ashima (fem.) exactly corresponds to the series *el* (divinity), *alil* (male god), *elot* (goddess). In this case Eshmun was originally only a title, like so many other Phœnician divine names (see Lidzbarski, 'Der Name des Gottes Esmun,' *Ephemeris für sem. Epigraphik*, iii. [1912] 260).

At least two kings of Sidon in the late Persian or the Greek period bore the name Eshmun-azor, 'Eshmun has helped.' Eshmun-azor n. relates that he and his mother built a temple for Eshmun (*CIS* i. 3. 17). In 1800 the site of a great temple near Sidon was excavated, and a number of inscriptions were found in which Bod-'Ashtart states that he built this temple for Eshmun his god (see Lidzbarski, *Ephemeris*, ii. [1903] 49; O. O. Torrey, *JACS* xlii. [1902] 163; F. O. Eklens, *Sidon*, p. 143 ff.). It was probably the temple begun by Eshmun-azor. Two fragments of votive inscriptions from this temple also contain the name of the god (*MVG* ix. [1905] 34, 39 f., note). The worship of Eshmun in Cyprus is attested by the compound deity Eshmun-Melkart and by proper names, and in Carthage by the compound deity Eshmun-'Ashtart and proper names. A temple of Eshmun in Carthage seems to be mentioned in *CIS* i. 252. 41. In Sardinia he appears in a trilingual inscription as the equivalent of Asklepios-Esculapius (*CIS* i. 143. 1). Philo (37d, 39c) knows Asklepios as the eighth son of Sūdūk, which suggests that he derived Eshmun from אשם, 'eight.' He states also that he was the brother of the Cabeiri, which seems to connect him with Berytus (cf. 38d).

In all the bilingual inscriptions and in many statements of classical writers Eshmun is identified with Asklepios, and this is maintained with a consistency that is not found in the identifications of other Phœnician gods. This shows that Eshmun as a god of healing must have possessed such marked resemblance to Asklepios that he could not be equated with any other Greek deity. The inscriptions themselves yield no information in regard to the healing character of the god, except that the trilingual mentioned above says of Eshmun, 'He heard his voice and healed him.' None of the objects discovered in the temple of Eshmun at Sidon suggests that he was a healer. Several of his temples were near mineral springs, and these may have been connected with the curing of diseases. The title אשם, Μηρηρ, applied to the god in the Sardinian trilingual, is of uncertain meaning. Philo (36a) says:

'From Sūdūk came the Dloseuri, or Cabeiri, or Corybantæ, or Samothracæ. . . From them have sprung others who discovered herbs, and the healing of venomous bites, and charms.'

This brings Eshmun into a remote connexion with medicine through the descendants of his brothers,

the Cabeiri. The proper names compounded with Eshmun contain the familiar predicates that are applied to all the gods, but no special terms that connect him with the art of healing. Still, in spite of this lack of direct evidence, there is no reason to doubt that the character of Eshmun is correctly indicated by his identification with Asklepios (see Baudissin, *Adonis und Esmun*, with full bibliography for Eshmun, p. xvii f.).

34. Gad, 'fortune,' is found in Ba'l-Gad, 'Gad is owner' (*CIS* i. 107), Gad-na'om (Lat. Giddencme), 'Gad is good,' and the synonymous Na'om-Gad (see *ERE* iii. 182, § 6).

35. Dayyog, 'fisher.'—Philo (35b) names Halieus, 'fisher,' with his brother Agrens (=Sid), 'hunter.' He seems to represent a Phœnician name similar to Heb. Dayyāg, 'fisher.'

36. Do'm, in Do'm-hanno, 'Do'm has favoured him'; Do'm-shallih, 'Do'm has prospered'; and Do'm-milk. In the Greek parallel he appears as Δομ.

37. Harōsh, 'smith'=Chrusor, 'goldsmith,' or Hephaistos (see SANCHUNIATHON, C. 2 (2)).

38. Y-'l (יאל) is the name of a god in *CIS* i. 132, 4, 5, 7, and in the personal name Y-'l-pa'ol, 'Y-'l has made.' It occurs also apparently in Iolaos in the treaty of Hannibal (Polyb. vii. 9). The origin and character of the god are unknown. Perhaps יאל = על, 'profit.'

39. The Kabbirim, or Cabeiri, כבירים, 'the mighty,' according to Philo (36a), were the children of Šuduk, and first invented a ship. They were the same as the Dioscuri, or Corybantes, or Samothracæ. See KABEIROI.

40. Muth (מוט), 'death.'—Philo (38d) calls him the son of Kronos and Rhea, and says that the Phœnicians call him Thanatos, 'death,' and Pluto (see *ERE* iii. 182, § 10).

41. Mellih (= Heb. מלח, 'sailor') was evidently a patron-god of fishermen and sailors.

'He invented the hook, and bait, and line, and raft, and was the first of all men to make a voyage. Wherefore they revered him as a god after his death, and he was also called Zeus Meilichios' (Philo, 38c).

42. Meni, 'fate,' is not mentioned in any of the inscriptions, but seems to be meant by Eimarmene, 'fate,' in Philo (37c) (see SANCHUNIATHON, C. 3 (15)).

43. Miskar (מסקר; Lat. Mescar, Misicir, etc.) appears in Ger-Miskar, 'client of Miskar,' Hator-Miskar (a compound with the Egyptian goddess Hathor), 'Abd-Miskar, 'servant of Miskar.' Nothing further is known about this divinity (see Cooke, *N. Sem. Inscr.* 42).

44. M-'n-k (מנק) appears only in the Neo-Punic mase. name M-'n-k-ba'l, 'M-'n-k is owner.'

45. Mishor (מישר), 'justice,' is named by Philo (36a) as Misor, 'straight' (see SANCHUNIATHON, C. 2 (6)).

46. Sankun, in Sanchun-iathon (= Sankun-yaton), 'Sankun has given,' is generally written, with assimilation of the *n*, Sakkun. He appears in Sakkun-yaton, Ger-Sakkun, 'client of Sakkun,' and 'Abd-Sakkun, 'servant of Sakkun'; also in the form Asknn (*CIS* i. 118). The meaning of his name and his functions are unknown.

47. 'Esau (עסא), 'maker' (or 'subdner'), appears in Ousōos of Philo (35a):

'He first invented a covering for the body from skins of wild beasts which he was strong enough to capture. And when furious rains and winds occurred, the trees in Tyre were rubbed against each other and caught fire and burned down the wood that was there. And Ousōos took a tree, and, having stripped off the branches, was the first who ventured to embark on the sea; and he consecrated two pillars to fire and wind, and worshipped them and poured libations of blood upon them from the wild beasts which he took in hunting. But when Hupsour-anos and Ousōos were dead, those who were left, he says, consecrated staves to them, and year by year worshipped their pillars and kept festivals in their honour.'

He is evidently a patron-god of hunters. His name probably appears also in Ushn, or Palætyrus

(Sennacherib, 'Taylor Cylinder,' col. ii. line 40; see *ERE* iii. 183, § 12).

48. 'Ate (see SANCHUNIATHON, C. 3 (16)).

49. Pu'me (פומע) appears as a deity in the names עברפומע (*CIS* i. 112, c 1, c 2), 'servant of Pu'me,' עברפומע, 'Pu'me is good' (J. Euting, *Sammlung der carthagischen Inschriften*, Strassburg, 1883, p. 263. 2), in Latin inscriptions *Namphame*, *Nampame*, etc. (*CIL* viii. 1030^b), פומע, 'handmaid of Pu'me,' עברפומע, 'servant of Pu'me,' and פומע-ה, 'Pu'me has given.' Here belongs also Pygmalion in the list of kings of Tyre as given by Josephus (c. *Apion*. i. 18). An amulet discovered in a Carthaginian grave by Delattre and published by P. Berger (*CAIBL* iv. xxii. [1894] 453-458) contains the dedication לישתרת לנפילין, 'to 'Ashtart, to Pygmalion.' Here Pygmalion is a deity. In spite of the archaic writing, the form seems to be written back into Phœnician letters from the Greek or Latin. The original is apparently פומע-ה, Pu'me-El'yun. The letter *y* is often represented in Greek by γ—e.g., Atargatis for עברפומע. On 'Elyun cf. *ERE* iii. 180, § 13. This, then, is one of the numerous Phœnician compound deities (see below, 8x, and P. Berger, 'Le Mythe de Pygmalion et le dieu Pygmée,' in *CAIBL* iv. vii. [1880] 60-68).

50. Sid, 'the hunter' (see *ERE* iii. 183, § 14).

51. Šuduk, 'righteousness,' is mentioned by Philo (36a, 37d, 38c) as the brother of Misor, 'justice' (see above, 45). He married one of the Titanides, or Artemides, the daughters of El and Astarte. He had seven sons, the Cabeiri, and Asklepios, or Eshmun (see *ERE* iii. 183, § 15).

52. Šaddidos (= Heb. Shaddai?) is mentioned by Philo (37b) as a son of El (=Kronos), whom he slew with the sword. He seems to appear also in 'Abd-Shaddai, 'servant of Shaddai,' and Gad (read Ger)-Shaddai, 'client of Shaddai.'

(f) *Babylonian and Assyrian gods*.—53. Nergal.—An inscription of the Sidonian colony in Athens (*CIS* i. 119; *CIA* ii. 119) states that the tomb of Asephat, daughter of Eshmunshilleh, the Sidonian, was built by Yaton-bél, son of Eshmunshilleh, chief priest of Nergal. Here the Babylonian god Nergal is worshipped by a Phœnician family even in far-away Athens (*ERE* iii. 184, § 7).

54. Bēl.—Bēl in Yaton-bél is the Babylonian form of the name rather than the Phœnician ba'l, as in numerous other Phœnician names (Lidzbarski, *Handbuch*, p. 236). On the cult of the Babylonian Bēl see *ERE* ii. 290, § 2, 295, § 6.

55. Bēltis.—The form Bēltis for the ba'alat of Gebal (*ERE* ii. 117^b) in classical writers shows the influence of the Babylonian Bēltu (construct Bēlit; see *ERE* ii. 296 f.).

56. Ishtar.—The connexion of 'Ashtart with a star by Philo Byblius and others also shows the influence of Babylonian astral religion (*ERE* ii. 116^b, vii. 432, § 13). The spelling of the proper name נישתרת instead of נישתרת (*CIS* i. 871. 6f.) suggests the Babylonian Ishtar rather than the Phœnician 'Ashtart (see *ERE* vii. 433, § 4).

57. Tammuz.—The cult of the Adon (Adonis) of Gebal was strongly modified by the Babylonian cult of Tammuz (see TAMMUZ).

58. Ashur.—The name אשור in *CIS* i. 65. 1 f. is commonly interpreted as a mistake for אשירא, 'Osiris has sent,' but it is quite possible that it contains the Assyrian god Ashur.

59. Ninib.—The identification of El=Kronos=Saturn with the planet Saturn by Philo (40c) also points to influence by the Babylonian god Ninib (see *ERE* iii. 183, § 3).

60. Shalman appears in the Sidon inscription 4.2. This is the Assyrian form of the name rather than the Canaanite (see *ERE* iii. 183, § 16).

61. Nebo is perhaps found in נבאלי (*CIS* i. 102d). Whether these Babylonian influences date from

the Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian periods or go back to the old Babylonian period is difficult to determine (*ERE* iii. 183 (e)).

(g) *Egyptian gods*.—62. Bast.—In the form אֲבַסְתָּ, with prosthetic א, Bast appears in the names אֲבַסְתָּ, 'Abd-Bast, 'servant of Bast,' and אֲבַסְתָּ, Paol-Bast, 'Bast has made' (see *ERE* v. 245).

63. Amon appears perhaps in אֲמֹן, 'Amon is god,' and in נֵיִתְאֹמֶן, 'Neit-Amon' (see *ERE* iii. 184^b, § 5, v. 247).

64. Isis (אִסִּי) occurs in the name 'Abd-Is, 'servant of Isis,' and perhaps in סֵבִי=Seb-Isis; perhaps also in אִסִּי־אֲשֶׁת־אֵת, 'Isis-Ashtart,' and אִסִּי־תַנִּיט, 'Isis-Tanit' (see *ERE* v. 246).

65. Osiris (אֲסִירִי) is found in the names Osir-badil, 'Osir is terrible (?)'; Osir-gan, 'Osir has defended (?)'; Osir-shamor, 'Osir has guarded'; Amot-Osiri, 'handmaid of Osir'; Milk-Osiri, 'Osir is king'; 'Abd-Osiri, 'servant of Osir.' Possibly Philo means Osiris by Eisiros (39d), the inventor of the three letters, the brother of Chna (Canaan) (see *ERE* v. 246, § 38).

66. Hāthor (חַתְוֹר) appears in the inscriptions only in the compound deity Hāthor-Miskar (*CIS* i. 253. 4, 254. 3 f.). As early as the XIXth dynasty she was identified with 'Ashtart both by the Egyptians and by the Canaanites (see *ERE* iii. 182, § 1, 184, § 1, v. 247 (1), viii. 182^a). The stele of Yehaw-Milk represents the ba'alat of Gebal in pure Egyptian style, like the goddess Hāthor, with the horned disk on her head (see Perrot and Chipiez, *Hist. of Art in Phœnicia*, i. 69).

67. Horus (חַר) is named in *CIS* i. 46. 1; and by Derenbourg, 3a (see *ERE* v. 247^a).

68. Neit appears probably in the compound deity נֵיִתְאֹמֶן=Neit-Amon (see *ERE* v. 247^b).

69. Seb is found in the personal name 'Abd-Seb-Is, אֲבַדְסֵבִי= 'servant of Seb-Isis' (see *ERE* v. 248^b).

70. Ptah (פְּתַח) occurs in 'Abd-Ptah, 'servant of Ptah' (*CIS* i. iii. 1; see *ERE* v. 249^a).

71. Khnum (כְּחַנּוּם) occurs in several inscriptions (Lidzbarski, *Handbuch*, p. 363; see *ERE* v. 245^b).

72. Thōth is not mentioned in the inscriptions, but was evidently a popular god because of the amount of information that Philo has to give about him. In 31d Philo says that the Egyptians call him Thōth, the Alexandrians Thōth, and the Greeks Hermes. He first invented writing, and his history was the beginning of the work of Sanchuniathon. He was the adviser of El in his war against his father Ba'l-Shamim, and devised magical charms by which he succeeded (36d). Here he is called by the Alexandrian name of Hermes Trismegistos. He invented the letters of the alphabet by imitating the forms of the gods, and devised the insignia of royalty for El (39a). El gave him the land of Egypt (39b; see *ERE* v. 246^a, vi. 380^b).

In all these cases it is an open question whether these gods found their way into Phœnicia at the time of the Ptolemaic dominion or were adopted in the period of Old Egyptian rule of the XVIIIth and XIXth dynasties (see *ERE* iii. 184 (f)).

(h) *Compound deities*.—A peculiar feature of the Phœnician religion is the compounding of two divinities to form a new god, who then develops his or her individual traits. Analogies are found in 'Ashtar-Chemosh in the Mesha inscription, Atargatis (= 'Attar-Ate), and such Hebrew forms as El-Shaddai and Jahweh-Elohim.

73. Eshmun-'Ashtart (*CIS* i. 245. 3 f.).

74. Eshmun-Melkart (*ib.* 16. 23-28).

75. Ba'l-Addir, in Bal-Addiris, who was worshipped at Sigus in Numidia (*CIL* viii. 5279, suppl. 19121-19123).

76. Gad-Ate (*CIS* i. 93. 3).

77. Milk-Osiri (Molech-Osiris; *ib.* 123b. 1f.).

78. Milk-Ba'l (*ib.* 123a. 1f., 147. 1f., 194. 1, 380. 1).

79. Milk-'Ashtart (*ib.* 8. 1, 250. 3, *Ma'sub Inscr.* 2f.).

80. Melkart-Rešeph (= Resheph) (Levy, *Siegeln*, p. 18).

81. Pu'me-'Elyon (Pygmalion) (see above, 49).

82. Sid-Melkart (*CIS* i. 256. 3f.).

83. Sid-Tanit (*ib.* 247. 5, 248. 4, 249. 4f.).

In the cases where a male and a female deity are combined one is probably the consort of the other. Where two male deities are united, they are probably identified with one another.

ii. THE MYTHS OF THE GODS.—On the cosmogonies and theogonies preserved by Mocho and Sanchuniathon see art. SANCHUNIATHON.

iii. THE CONCEPTION OF THE GODS.—The way in which the Phœnicians regarded their deities is known to us almost exclusively from the predicates that they apply to them in personal names. Most of these express the supremacy and authority of the gods.

The titles ba'l, 'owner,' adon, 'master,' mar, 'lord,' milk, 'king,' mitkot, 'queen,' and 'elyon, 'high,' have been discussed already. Titles of kinship such as em, 'mother,' amm, 'father-uncle,' ab, 'father,' and ah, 'brother' (see above), bring the gods nearer to men and describe them as friendly powers. As among all the Semites, the predicate קָדוֹשׁ (Heb. *kādōsh*, 'holy') is frequently applied to the gods (Lidzbarski, *Handbuch*, p. 361). The original meaning of this word is 'set apart' or 'tabu.' It describes the gods as charged with a mysterious energy that made it dangerous for men to come into contact with them, and that communicated itself to the objects in which they resided, the phenomena in which they manifested themselves, and the persons whom they possessed. This primitive meaning, rather than the late Hebrew ethical one, obtains in Phœnicia. Other predicates that express the divine transcendence are rom, 'high,' in Ab-rom, El-rom, Ba'l-rom, Rom-Ba'l, and Milk-rom; kabod, 'glorious,' in Kabod-Melkart, 'oz, 'strong,' in 'Oz-Ba'l and 'Oz-Milk.

In regard to the powers of the gods the predicates affirm that they know (יָדַעַת), in Yado-Milk; that they hear (שָׁמַעַת), in Shamo-Ba'l and Melkart-shamo. In regard to their character many personal names state that they are good (טוֹב)—e.g., Na'om-El, Na'om-Gad, Gad-na'om, Na'om-Milkot, Na'om-Pu'me. In relation to men the predicates say that the god has created (בָּרַא), in Bano-Ba'l; that she has made, in מְנַוָּה (a hypocoristic form of a name beginning with 'Ashtart); that he has wrought (עָשָׂה), in Ba'l-pa'ol, El-pa'ol, and Pa'ol-Eshmun; that he causes to live (חַיָּה), an apoc. impf. 3rd sing. Piel from חָיָה, in Yehaw-Alon, Yehaw-Ba'l, Yehaw-Milk; that he has given (a child) (חָנַן), in Yaton-Adon, Eshmun-yaton, Yaton-Ba'l, Ba'l-yaton (Lat. Ballatho and Ballahon), Yaton-Milk, Milk-yaton, Sakkun-yaton (Sanchuniathon), 'Ashtart-yaton, Pu'me-yaton, Yaton-Sid, Sid-yaton, and Resheph-yaton. Because children have thus been given by these various gods, they bear names compounded with metten, 'gift'—e.g., Metten-Elim, Metten-Ba'l—or with mi'ne, 'possession,' as in Mi'ne-Milk. The gods appear as the apportioners of human destiny in Eshmun-hallik, 'Eshmun has assigned,' Eshmun-y'a'od, 'Eshmun has appointed,' and Ba'l-shilek, 'Ba'l has cast' (Lat. Balsillec). The name Yamlik-Ba'l (Jamblichus) affirms that Ba'l has made king.

A great number of names describe the gods as helpers of mankind. Thus the god has arisen (קָם), in Ab-kom; he has judged (שָׁפַט), in Shaphot-Ba'l and Ba'l-Shaphot; he has redeemed (פָּדָה), in Ba'l-pado; he has saved (חָלַץ Pl.), in Eshmun-hallig, Hallig-Ba'l, Ba'l-hallig, Milk-hallig, and Melkart-hallig; he has delivered (פָּלַס), in Adon-pallig; he has helped (עָזַר), in Eshmun-azor, Ba'l-azor, 'Azor-Ba'l, 'Ashtart-azor; he is gracious (חַנּוּן), in El-hannon, Ba'l-hanno, Hanni-Ba'l, Hanon-Ba'l, Do'm-hanno, Han-Melkart, Melkart-hanno, Melkart-han, Han-Milk, and Han-Sid; he has blessed (בָּרַךְ Pl.), in El-barik, Barik-Ba'l (Lat. Baricbal), Mar-barik; he has sustained (שָׁמַר), in Mar-samok; he has carried (נָשָׂא), in Eshmun-amos; he has guarded (שָׁמַר), in Osir-shamor, Eshmun-shamor, and Shamor-Ba'l; he has protected (שָׁמַר), in Saphon-Ba'l; he has prospered (לָבַט, Pl.), in Eshmun-gallih, Do'm-gallih, and Ba'l-gallih; he has rewarded (שָׁלַט, Pl.), in Eshmun-shallim and Ba'l-shallim; he has smoothed the way (שָׁלַט, Pl.), in Ba'l-pallis. The curious title of אהל, 'tent,' or 'shelter,' appears in Ohel-Ba'l and Ohel-Milk. These titles show a lofty conception of the character and the activity of the gods.

iv. THE RELATION OF MEN TO THE GODS.—Corresponding to the fact that the gods were called mostly by names of authority is the fact

that men described themselves usually (1) as the slave (*abā*) of some god.

Thus we meet 'Abd-A-b-a-t (Bast), 'Abd-Adon, 'Abd-Elīm, 'Abd-Isā, 'Abd-Osīr, 'Abd-Eshmun, 'Abd-Ba'1, 'Abd-Ba'1ot, 'Abd-Hanmon, 'Abd-Yerah, 'Abd-Milk, 'Abd-Milkot, 'Abd-Melkart, 'Abd-Miskar, 'Abd-Marna, 'Abd-Seb-Isi, 'Abd-Susim, 'Abd-Azor, 'Abd-Ashtart, 'Abd-Pu'me, 'Abd-Ptah, 'Abd-Sid, 'Abd-Saphon, 'Abd-Resheph, 'Abd-Shaddai, 'Abd-Shahar, 'Abd-Shemesh, 'Abd-Tanit. The corresponding fem. form is *amot* (אֲמוֹת), 'female slave,' which is often abbreviated to *mot*. Thus we find Amot-Osīr, Amot-Ba'1 (Lat. Amobballi), Amot-Milkot, Amot-Melkart, Amot-Ashtart, Mot-Milkot, Mot-Melkart. Another name of submission was *kelb*, 'dog,' 'hierodule.' This appears in the name Kelb-Elīm, and in the hypocoristic Kelba. A similar name was *ger* (גֵּר), 'client.' This appears in Ger-Ba'1, Ger-hekal, ('client of the temple'), Ger-Milk, Ger-Melkart, Ger-Miskar, Ger-Sakkun, Ger-Ashtart, Ger-Sid, Ger-Shaddai, and in the hypocoristic Gera. Similar in meaning probably was *bod*, 'member' (of the family?), which appears in Bod-Eshmun, Bod-Ba'1, Bod-Milk, Bod-Melkart, Bod-Ashtart, Bod-Saphon, and Bod-Tanit.

(2) *Ben*, 'son.'—Much less often do worshippers call themselves by names of kinship to the gods. *Ben*, 'son,' occurs in Ben-Ur, Ben-Ate (?), Ben-Ba'1 (?), Ben-Hodesh, and Ben-Melek.

(3) *Bot*, 'daughter,' is found in Bot-Ba'1, Bot-Na'om, and Bot-Shelem.

(4) *Ahot*, 'sister.'—Women are also called 'sister' of a god, although the term 'brother' is apparently applied only to deities; e.g., we have Ahot-Milkot, Ahot-Melkart, and abbreviated Hot-Milk (Lat. Otmilc), Hot-Lot (= Ahot-Elot), Hot-Milkot, and Hot-Melkart.

v. PLACES OF WORSHIP.—x. High places.—The location of a sanctuary was determined by the presence of a sacred natural object, such as a spring, holy tree, etc., in which dwelt a *ba'al*. This was fenced off from the surrounding territory by a wall or a line of stones. The Canaanite and Hebrew name for such a *temenos*—*bama*, 'high place'—does not happen to occur in the inscriptions, but was doubtless in use. Remains of open-air high places are still found in Phœnicia and in the colonies (see *ERE* iii. 185). Tacitus (*Hist.* ii. 78) informs us that, when Vespasian consulted the oracle on Mt. Carmel, he found neither statue nor temple, but only a much venerated altar (cf. Suetonius, *Vesp.* 5).

2. Temples.—In the larger towns permanent structures were erected over or around the sacred object, which served to protect it, to shelter the priests, and to guard the treasures that were deposited in the sanctuary. Such temples were known as *bet* (בֵּית), 'house' (Lidzbarski, *Handbuch*, p. 235), or *hekal* (הֵקַל), 'temple' (a loan word from the Sumerian *e-gal*, 'great house'), which appears in the personal name Ger-hekal, 'client of the temple.' Another common name is *mikdash*, 'sanctuary' (*ib.* p. 361). The holy of holies where the god dwelt was called *heder* or *hedrot*. All these names are used in Hebrew (see *ERE* iii. 185).

No remains of temples earlier than the late Persian period have come down to us. The majority are of the Greek and Roman periods. The oldest of these temples was the one built by Bod-Ashtart at Sidon, which was excavated by T. Macridy-Bey and H. Winckler in 1903 (see F. von Landau, in *MVG* ix. [1905] 5, x. [1906] 1; and T. Macridy-Bey, in *RB* xii. [1903] 69-77, xiii. [1904] 390-403). A number of other temples of the Greek and Roman periods were investigated by Renan (*Mission de Phénicie*). The temples of Cyprus are described by L. P. di Cesnola, *Cyprus: its ancient Cities, Tombs, and Temples*; and many of the monuments are reproduced in *A Descriptive Atlas of the Cesnola Collection of Cypriote Antiquities* (see also M. Ohnefalsch-Richter, *Kypros*). Coins of Phœnicia and of Cyprus give rude representations of temples that aid in reconstructing their architectural features. A number of fine ruins of the Roman period are still to be seen in

the Lebanon—e.g., at Brummana (see Baderker, *Palestine and Syria*, Leipzig, 1906, p. 283), at Niha near Zahleh (*ib.* p. 292), and at Afka at the source of the river Adonis (*ib.* p. 336). The last is the famous temple of 'Ashtart described by Lucian, where the death of Adonis was annually bewailed. Near Neba' el-Lebn is a remarkable ruin known as Kal'at Fakra. It stands in a hollow among jagged pinnacles of rock that must have been a haunt of some ancient *ba'al*.

From these remains it appears that the earliest departure from the primitive high place was a monolithic structure such as the *ma'abed*, 'temple,' at Amrith (Renan, *Mission*, pp. 63-68). This is constructed of three upright stones that rest on the solid rock and a monolithic roof. It served as a shelter for the cult-object. The style of architecture suggests Egyptian influence. The next step was to construct a platform about the tabernacle and enclose it with a portico. This is the stage depicted on coins of Byblus, where we see the fetish-stone of the god in its shrine surrounded by a large court and portico (Perrot-Chipiez, i. 61; cf. the similar coin from Cyprus, p. 276). Finally, a roofed building was added on one side of the court (see the coin of Byblus mentioned above). Some idea of what an old Phœnician temple was like may be gained from the description of Solomon's temple (1 K 5-7), since this was built by Phœnician workmen. The later temples all show the Greek style.

3. *Maššebhōth*.—Standing stones which served as dwelling-places for the deity were the central objects in all the sanctuaries. They were called either *maššebhōth* (מַשְׁבְּהוֹת) or *našib* (= Arab. *naṣīb*) (see Lidzbarski, *Handbuch*, p. 325). Philo (35b) says that two pillars were consecrated by Ousōos (the eponym of Palætyrus), and that other pillars were consecrated to Samim-rom and Onōōos (see *ERE* ii. 117, § 4, iii. 186, § 1, viii. 487). A common Phœnician name for a variety of the *maššebhōth* was *hammon*=Heb. *ḥam* (see *ERE* ii. 287, § 5). These are probably mentioned by Philo (32b) as the inscribed *ammoneis* from which Sanchuniathon derived his records; also in the name Amunos (35d). Such *hammonim* are depicted in *CIS* i. pl. viii. Fetish-stones were called *beth-el*, 'house of a god,' by the Phœnicians, as by the Hebrews. Philo (36c) speaks of a god Baitalos, the son of Ba'1-Shamim, and the brother of El, Dagon, and Atlas. The same deification of the holy stone is found in the god Beth-el of the Assuān papyri, and is analogous to the deification of the *dšherāh* (see *ERE* ii. 288*).

4. *Asherim*.—Wooden posts that served as dwelling-places for deities, particularly for the goddess 'Ashtart, were as common among the Phœnicians as among the Canaanites and the Hebrews. The word probably occurs in the *Mašub Inscription*, 4, 'Ashtart in the *dšherāh*.' A clay figure from Cyprus represents a goddess sitting within the trunk of a tree (Ohnefalsch-Richter, *Kypros*, i. 171). Such poles are depicted on the stelæ from Carthage. They are mentioned by Philo (35b) along with the *maššebhōth* (see *ERE* iii. 186, § 2).

5. Images.—In the oldest sanctuaries the standing stones were the only emblems of the gods, and these lasted down to the latest times in some of the temples. With the advance of civilization, however, images were developed out of the primitive fetishes. They are implied by Philo's description of 'Ashtart (38c) and of El (39a). The images that have survived show strong Egyptian influence in the artistic treatment. 'Ashtart is represented with the attributes of Hathor, or else as a nude female holding a dove. Ba'1-hammon is represented with ram's horns (see *ERE* iii. 186,

and, after completing his medical studies in 1804, became associated with Gall in his work, and continued with him until 1813, when they separated. There is no doubt that it was to Spurzheim that the great if temporary success of phrenology, towards the end of the first quarter of last century, was due. Gall died in 1828 and Spurzheim in 1832. The latter travelled with Gall through Germany, where they inspected prisons and indicated the characters of the prisoners with great success, to Holland, and to France, where they strove with Cuvier and the doctors, and were at length prohibited from lecturing; Spurzheim also visited England and Scotland, France again, and then America, where he died. One of his demonstrations in Edinburgh in 1816 was attended by George Combe (born 1788), who was attracted by a bitter criticism of the new science that had appeared in the *Edinburgh Review* for June 1815. The demonstration tended to alter his opinion, and he attended the next course of lectures, became a sympathetic student of phrenology, and, finding that his own observation confirmed its truth, became its staunch supporter. Unjust criticisms of phrenology led him to accept the invitation of the editor of the *Literary and Statistical Magazine for Scotland*, who offered a free discussion of its merits. He wrote four papers in its defence, which were afterwards published as *Essays on Phrenology; or an Inquiry into the Principles and Utility of the Systems of Drs. Gall and Spurzheim, and into the Objections made against it* (Edinburgh, 1819). Largely through his efforts a Phrenological Society was started in Edinburgh in 1820, of which he was president, and a *Phrenological Journal* was published by this society from 1823 onwards. Many other societies arose in different parts of the British Isles, in the colonies, and in America, in one of the universities of which a professorship of phrenology was even established. Combe published numerous works, of which the best-known was *The Constitution of Man* (Edinburgh, 1828). It attracted Richard Cobden, who was instrumental in forming one of the societies in Manchester, 1835 (see J. Morley, *Life of Richard Cobden*, new ed., London, 1910, ch. iv.). Several well-known scientists in Britain, as in other countries, defended phrenology—including Dr. J. Elliotson and Archbishop Whately—while more recently Alfred Russel Wallace has spoken in its favour. But its opponents were far more numerous and persistent. One of the strongest defences of the system was that in the *Foreign Quarterly Review* (vol. ii. [1828] no. 3). The *Phrenological Journal* came to an end in 1847, after 20 volumes had been published. Combe died in 1858.

The name 'phrenology' is due to Spurzheim, but was made popular by Combe's adoption of it. Gall's studies had been called 'craniology' or 'cranioscopy.' The change of name is important as indicating that emphasis was to be laid in the new science upon the mental and moral aspects rather than upon the purely physical; unfortunately, it became synonymous in this country and elsewhere with the art of 'reading bumps,' which is quite a caricature of its original intention. Gall had naturally taken notice in the first instance of outstanding personalities, capacities, or peculiarities of disposition, and had sought to connect these with exceptionally large or prominent portions of the head; or, on the other hand, noticing prominent features in heads, had tried to connect these with striking characteristics of the individuals; moreover, in demonstrations, and especially in public demonstrations, it was only the prominent portions of the skull or cast or head that could be brought to the attention;

hence perhaps the unfortunate association in question.

2. *Theory.*—The theory may be stated somewhat as follows. Individuals differ mentally as well as physically from each other; their characters, intellectual and moral, are largely independent of their environment and education, and are more or less constant and uniform; education may repress the manifestation and therefore hinder the development of powers, but it cannot originate new ones. Such differences, therefore, are natural or congenital; they are transmitted from parent to child; there are family and national similarities in mental character, as there are family and national similarities in face and in other physical structure. In the same way, different animal species show different mental powers, which are inherent in all the members of each species. The young differ from the old, and there is a regular progression in the development and decay of the mental powers from birth to death. These mental powers are exercised in the first instance through the brain, which is their physical condition. But the brain is not a single organ, uniform throughout, or capable of conducting *any* mental operation in any of its parts. It consists of a number of distinct and separate organs, each of which has some specific mental function which it subserves, and which depends for its energy and its development upon the relative size and vigour of the organ in question. Three problems are thus before the phrenologist: to divide the intellectual and moral character into its separate powers or faculties; to mark off the separate organs in the brain, or rather on the external skull of the living man; to connect each faculty with its corresponding organ in the brain and its corresponding protuberance or portion of the skull. Spurzheim laid down the principles according to which a faculty is regarded as natural and primitive: if it exists in one species of animals and not in another; if it varies in the two sexes of the same species; if it is prominent or deficient as compared with the other powers of the same individual; if it appears or disappears earlier or later in life than other faculties; if it is active or at rest separately from other powers; if it is inherited by children from parents; if it shows health or disease in its exercise apart from the other faculties. A faculty is 'a specific power of feeling in a certain way, or of forming ideas of a certain kind'—the power being distinct from the feelings or the ideas which are thus produced or formed; it is independent of the will; one faculty cannot manifest the same feelings or form the same ideas as another; each has some definite relation to the objects of the external world; each may be excited from without by these objects, but also from within. The faculties are either propensities, which are both animal and human, such as 'amativeness' and the 'love of offspring,' or sentiments, some of which are peculiar to man, or, finally, intellectual powers, perceptive and reflective. On the other hand, such terms as 'sensation,' 'memory,' and 'imagination' do not correspond to 'faculties' in the phrenologist's sense, but are merely general names for the products of the different faculties either singly or in combination. The connexion between a faculty and its physical organ was determined, as already indicated, by a study of the living heads, of the skulls, of casts from the heads, or of pictures and sculptures of men distinguished beyond their fellows in some specific ability; practice increased skill in noticing the differences in the shape of the head and in the proportionate size of its different parts; heads of animals, of striking mental characteristics, as ferocity, cunning, timidity, etc., were compared with those of man;

differences of skull in the two sexes were compared with the supposed mental differences; the heads of the insane, of the mentally defective, of criminals, etc., were studied and again compared with their peculiar mental or moral aberrations or defects. The results were verified, as far as possible, by reading the heads of unknown individuals, finding how far their actual characteristics coincided with those inferred by the phrenologist from their heads. It was this practice that led to the ridicule and ultimately to the contempt and neglect under which phrenology fell; yet it had a perfectly practical and useful aim. Apart from the verification of the organs, it was hoped by this means to be able to forecast the vocation for which a child was best adapted; to indicate the lines along which a child's education would most successfully proceed, the dangers to which its character was liable, the treatment by which criminals or the insane might best be brought back to human and normal courses; and even the beginnings of eugenics are to be found in the phrenological writings—life-partners are to be selected on its principles. The objections brought against the new doctrine were from various standpoints—anatomical, philosophical, and theological; it was objected that the brain is homogeneous throughout, that there is no evidence that it is the organ of mind, that the size and shape of the brain cannot be argued from that of the head, that great injuries have occurred to the brain without corresponding effect upon the mental powers, that the shape of the head is artificially altered in many savage tribes without affecting the intelligence; that the mind or consciousness is a unity, and cannot consist of separate faculties, or that it is a *tabula rasa* on which impressions are made through the senses and associated together into ideas and thoughts without any innate powers; that there is nothing to fix the number of the faculties, and, indeed, that phrenologists disagree as to their number; that, if phrenology were accepted as true, it would destroy religion, remove responsibility from man, and reduce mind to a purely material process. Gall and Spurzheim were able to show the possibility of studying the structure of the brain, and of proving that differences actually exist in its different parts; in particular, they pointed out the true condition of the brain in hydrocephalous subjects; they were the first to admit that the inner and outer plates of the skull are not parallel throughout, but they showed that this deviation amounts to not more than one or two-tenths of an inch, whereas the difference in heads is from one to two inches; and in general they proved that the shape of the skull is certainly determined by the prior growth of the brain. As to the argument from the effect of injuries or loss of substance of the brain upon the mind, and the striking cases reported by Sir Everard Home from Haller and others, they pointed out that this argument would apply equally against any theory as to the brain functions, that the observations were not always accurately made, and that in describing the resultant effects upon the character only vague general terms were used, such as 'intelligence,' whereas some quite limited and specific ability might disappear or be reduced in its activity without the *general* intelligence being appreciably affected. Analogy with other organs and organisms suggests that each part of the brain has a separate function; the brain becomes more complicated in animals in proportion to their place in the scale of intelligence—insects, fish, birds, mammals, and, highest among them, man; the same is true of individuals in the human race; the different parts of the brain do not grow simultaneously, but in succession; each appears as its faculty appears;

and both organ and faculty are developed when they are necessary for our existence; intense application of the mind fatigues not the whole brain but only some part of it, for a change of work or occupation brings rest; the states of sleep, dreaming, somnambulism, and the like can be explained only on the assumption that the organs of the brain are different in activity and in position. With regard to the philosophical objections, it was pointed out that the same arguments will apply to *life*, which is also a unity, but acts differently in different circumstances, and through different organs; that, in any case, phrenology takes no concern with the ultimate nature of mind or of body, but deals merely with facts of observation and experience, whose truth will not be affected by the truth or falsity of idealism or any other philosophy. This answers the objections from theology also. Phrenology will give us knowledge of ourselves and others, of our characters and tendencies; this will lead to higher morality, not to lower; by preventing the manifestation of bad tendencies, their development will be hindered, and corresponding encouragement may be given to the good. The vices and defects, the virtues and talents, of each particular race can be learned, the former suppressed, the latter cultivated; and a rational treatment of insanity may be adopted, etc. Popular belief has always favoured the idea that persons differ in their natural tendencies—one covetous, another cruel, another kind, another proud; that one has a talent for music, another for mechanics, another for painting, and another for poetry; that these tendencies cannot be changed by an effort of will; that a genius for music cannot be acquired by study or practice; that there is a natural growth in the powers and a certain order in their development with which we cannot interfere without danger; and that no obstacle will prevent a genius from showing and from cultivating his superior powers. At the same time it was admitted that the division of the faculties, being founded upon observation alone, could not be regarded as finally settled; still less was it certain that the particular organs adopted by Gall and Spurzheim were really those of the faculties in question. It cannot be said, however, that the phrenologists were fortunate in their choice of faculties as the primitive ones in human nature, nor are the results of their observations with regard to the position of the organs in the brain in the least degree satisfactory. The following is Spurzheim's latest arrangement of the powers of the mind, with the numbers of their corresponding organs:

AFFECTIVE.—I. *Propensities*: (1) desire to live, (2) assertiveness, (3) destructiveness, (4) Amativeness, (5) philoprogenitiveness, (6) adhesiveness, (7) Inhabitiveness, (8) combativeness, (9) secretiveness, (10) acquisitiveness, (11) constructiveness; II. *Sentiments*: (12) cautiousness, (13) approbation, (14) self-esteem, (15) benevolence, (16) reverence, (17) firmness, (18) conscientiousness, (19) hope, (20) marvellousness, (21) ideality, (22) mirthfulness, (23) imitation.

INTELLECTUAL.—I. *Perceptive*: (24) individuality, (25) configuration, (26) size, (27) weight and resistance, (28) colour, (29) locality, (30) order, (31) number, (32) eventuality, (33) time, (34) tune, (35) language; II. *Reflective*: (36) comparison, (37) causality.

Of this classification it may be said (1) that it is quite inadequate for the complexity of the case; experimental psychology is only at the beginning of the real analysis of mental phenomena; while there is no doubt that there are certain innate powers of the mind, it is quite uncertain at present which of the functions actually manifested by the mind of man are primitive and simple; even the apprehension of colour or of form is probably a very complex process. (2) We are only at the beginning also of a scientific effort to measure and therefore to compare the manifestations of these

different powers in different individuals, so as to have some real knowledge of the extent to which one individual differs from another. (3) We are only beginning to know what are really the changes in the behaviour of individuals that occur after brain injury or disease; or, again, the differences in behaviour between the child born with defective brain and the normal child, etc. (4) A similar limitation obtains in our knowledge of the capacities of different races, sexes, ages. (5) The hundred years that have passed since Spurzheim demonstrated in Edinburgh have not brought anatomists much nearer to an understanding upon the limits of the different areas or regions in the brain; while it is almost universally admitted that there are separate regions, which are intimately connected with different mental phenomena, still it seems improbable that such regions have hard and fast boundaries; a part of one may under compulsion take over the work of another; the destruction of a comparatively large part of an area does not involve the total disappearance of any mental capacity; and in particular the true nature of these regions seems to be that all are connecting systems between sense-organs, on the one hand, and muscles, glands, and viscera, on the other, rather than initiating sources of special activity. (6) Finally, there is even yet no sort of agreement as to how the different portions or areas of the brain are connected with the mental powers (see also art. BRAIN AND MIND).

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PHRYGIANS.—I. The religion of the Phrygians as old Anatolian.—It is impossible to write any sketch of Phrygian religion without continual reference to the history and ethnology of the Phrygian people. These subjects are still under discussion, and opinion differs; but it is not possible here to discuss the differences. The present writer will merely describe his own views and the historical assumptions on which they are based. It is assumed that certain European tribes entered Asia Minor across the Dardanelles earlier than 1000 B.C., and spread eastwards and southwards. Gradually the eastern branch called Phryges, or Briges,¹ occupied the country which was called after them Phrygia. We trace their history by scanty references in the ancient historians, by archæological remains, and by inscriptions, the sources being all very inadequate. The Phrygians took possession of a country which already enjoyed

a civilization distinctly superior to that of the invaders; but the latter seem to have imposed their language on the country, just as the Gauls did in Galatia, when they conquered it in the 3rd century B.C. The Phrygians, however, like the Gauls, adopted the religion of the country in which they settled, and, though this religion was often called Phrygian, it was really much older than the Phrygian conquest. It represents a prevalent type of religion, which was very widely spread over the countries adjoining the Aegean lands and the south coast of the Black Sea. This widespread type may be called Anatolian, pre-Hellenic, or Pelasgian. It presents close analogies to certain Syrian cults, and the Mosaic Law presupposes the existence of an older cult of the same general type.

2. Influence exerted by the Phrygians on the older Anatolian religion.—It must be supposed that the conquering European race exercised some influence over the old religion, but it is not easy to distinguish the elements which belonged to the different peoples. On one point alone comparative certainty can be attained. As mentioned below (§§ 13, 18), the goddess in the older religion was the most important person in the divine family, but in the subsequent history of Phrygia there are many cases in which the god is apparently dominant. There must have occurred a change, and the probability is that this change was due to the natural relation between conquerors and conquered. In war superior force is exercised by the male sex. It is true that, according to legend, the old Anatolian or Phrygian religion used the services of armed priestesses, who were called Amazons, and Greek art delights to picture the conflict between armies of Greek men and Amazons. To the Greek artist this conflict became symbolical of the great conflict between civilization and barbarism, between Europe and Asia, between good and evil. There is no reason to think that Greek soldiers ever came actually into conflict with a force of Amazons, but the explanation of this artistic form must lie in the fact that the Greeks were aware of the existence of such warriors, at least in the past, and that they pictured the European Phrygian conquerors as being in a sense kindred to themselves, at the early time when they were engaged in the war against the Anatolian system with its armed priestesses.

The Phrygian conquest of the country was achieved by men, and they inevitably tended to put a god rather than a goddess in the position of dominance, and to picture the contest as a fight between men and women. Hence in the *Iliad*, iii. 187, Priam alludes to the battles which he had fought as an ally of the Phrygians against the Amazons on the banks of the Sangarios in the heart of the country which was afterwards known as Phrygia. An allusion so early as this cannot be set down as mere legend; it must have some historical basis such as has been described, and it implies also an approximate date. Homer associated this conflict with a comparatively late stage in the history of that city of Troy which was captured and demolished about 1184 B.C. The last king of that city had in early youth taken part in those battles, which implies that the Trojan race was closely akin to the Phrygians, and was allied with them in their conquests towards the east. It is, however, remarkable, and yet perfectly explicable, that the war between Greeks and Trojans in the old age of this last king should have been regarded in the later historical view as a stage of the conflict between Europe and Asia, for mythology is never logical or self-consistent, and the Phrygians are sometimes considered as Europeans fighting against Asiatics,

¹ On forms and derivatives of the name used in Phrygia see Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, ii. 382, 616.

bnt at other times, after being settled for generations on the Trojan coast, came to be regarded by Europeans as typical of Asia; and similarly the branch which settled in Phrygia became rapidly identified with their new country, and ranked as an Asiatic stock in their relations with European Greeks. In this, as in almost all similar cases, there is the strongest tendency for the conquering people to adopt, at least in part, the religion of the conquered, because the belief lies deep in human nature that the local gods must be able and powerful to protect or to harm all human beings that are settled in their country (2 K 17²³⁻²⁵). It was therefore necessary for the Phrygian conquerors of Troy and of Phrygia to pay court to the gods of the land, and there is no way of paying court to a deity except by worshipping him as such.

Yet the conquerors, who must have consisted largely of men, generally married the women of the country. But, while they married them, they did not regard them as superior in rank or dignity. They were taking the women of a conquered race, and it was inevitable that they should regard themselves as the superior, conquering caste, who were conferring honour on a certain part of the subject population by marriage.

3. *Mysteries in the Phrygian religion.*—Now the character of pagan religion always reflects the social and economic circumstances of the people who profess it, and the result appeared in the aspect which was imparted to the religion of this more or less mixed Phrygo-Anatolian race. A god generally appears as the superior and dominant figure, at least in outward show, in the most typical Phrygian cities. The coins are struck in the name of a god at least as often as in that of a goddess, and the foundation legends often speak of a god. On the other hand, in the cities to which the Phrygian domination never spread, or where there is reason to think that it was weaker, the goddess remains the more outstanding and characteristic figure. In all cities alike, however, Phrygian and non-Phrygian, of inner Asia Minor the religion remained fundamentally as it was before. This result was attained through the mysteries (*g.v.*), in which the real character of the religion was displayed to the initiated. The religion was not shown in its entirety to every person; only those who fulfilled certain tests, or performed certain preparatory rites, were admitted to see its true nature. A good example of this fact is revealed in the Phrygian city which is generally called Antioch of Pisidia, and which was one of the great religious centres of Phrygia. On the coins and in the inscriptions the god Mên Askaënos is the ruling figure. He appears in them as the hereditary deity (*πάτριος θεός*).¹ Strabo² speaks of the two centres of Phrygian religion near Antioch as being seats of the god Mên, not of any goddess. No form of the native goddess is mentioned by Strabo as known at Antioch; and she appears far less frequently on the coins. One of those two sanctuaries was discovered in 1911. It stands on the top of a mountain, 5000 ft. above the sea and 1300 ft. above the city, from which it is distant about four miles by a steep and difficult path. In and around the great sanctuary there were found numberless dedications to the god Mên, but not one single dedication to the goddess. There was a small chapel of the goddess in one corner of the great sanctuary, if we may judge from the discovery of several statuettes representing Cybele or Artemis. It is apparent that in outward show, just as Strabo says, the sanctuary was obtrusively and pre-eminently that of the god,

while the goddess was relegated to a small chapel in a corner. There were also at least two small temples dedicated to a goddess, one of the Cybele type, and another of the Aphrodite type, outside the sanctuary, on the summit of the same mountain, forming part of a large complex of buildings of various kinds, which composed the Hieron. In none of these small temples was any dedication to the goddess found, but there were statuettes representing her. It is very evident that in outward aspect the Hieron as a whole was characterized to the public as the seat of a god, and that the goddess had quite a secondary place.

On the other hand, when a building which seems to have been the hall of initiation, close to the central and great sanctuary and evidently standing in close relation with it, was excavated, it became apparent that the ceremonies which were there celebrated were the old Phrygian or Anatolian ritual of a goddess, and not the novel ritual of a god, although (c. A.D. 300) the throne of a god was added to the scene. Now those rites which were celebrated in the Phrygian mysteries are described by all ancient authorities as the rites of a goddess, viz. of the Phrygian mother—a goddess who was the impersonation of the earth, as the great mother of all life, who gives birth to all things, and receives back to herself all things at death. Demosthenes describes those rites as celebrated mainly by a priestess.¹ The priestess was the chief figure in the ritual, while a man was the assistant of the priestess. The man acted as the teacher of the ritual; he recited from the books the words of the sacred formulae; he helped those who were being initiated to go through the ritual; he taught them the proper words to use, and showed them how to perform the rites in orderly succession.

In the Hellenic religion, which developed through various external and internal influences out of the pre-Hellenic, Pelasgian, or Anatolian type, many cases are observable in which a prophetic centre was apparently under the presidency of a god, and the prophecy appeared as the expression of his soul or his knowledge. This is especially the case with the god Apollo, a purely Hellenic idea, in whom the highest tendencies of Hellenism were manifested to the world. To take two great centres of Apolline teaching, Klaros on the Asiatic side of the Aegean and Delphi on the European side—at Klaros we know that mysteries were celebrated, and even the scanty allusions to their ritual show that they were fundamentally of the Phrygian or Anatolian type;² at Delphi, as Æschylus expressly says,³ the deity who presided was originally the earth-goddess; she was succeeded by Themis, who is merely a moralized expression of the same divine idea; only in the third place did Apollo come in to replace the successive goddess-ideals in the presidency of this prophetic centre; a woman was always the medium through whom he expressed himself; and in popular statement this prophetess Pythia is mentioned as the source of revelation almost as frequently as 'the god' himself.

4. *God and priest.*—In the rite which Demosthenes describes⁴ the man acting as priest was the director of the ritual, while the woman as priestess was the centre and head of the religion; and all the evidence, scanty though it be, tends to show

¹ The description is given by Demosthenes, *de Corona*, 258 f., where he inveighs against Æschines. The mother of Æschines was a wandering priestess of the Phrygian goddess, who carried the rites about Attica, and the son acted as her assistant and ministering priest.

² Makridi, in *Wiener Jahreshefte*, 1905, p. 155 f., 1912, p. 26 f.; also *EAH*, 1906, p. 349, 1915, p. 33 f.

³ *Eum.* 1 ff.

⁴ G. Foucart, *Assoc. rel. chez les Grecs*, p. 67.

¹ M. M. Hardie (Mrs. Hasluck), in *JHS* xxxi. [1912] 111 f.; J. G. C. Anderson, *JRS* iii. [1913] 63 f.; Ramsay, in *BSA* xviii. 2 xli. 657, 677.

that this is one instance of a general principle. The god is represented by the priest in this religion; he teaches mankind what are the proper rites and words with which they should approach the divine power. The god was himself the first priest, and all subsequent priests are considered as successively taking his place, wearing his dress, bearing his name, and filling his part in the religion. In a sense it is true to say that the goddess is the chief figure. It is she who is the source of all life and the giver of all good things to mankind, while the god is a sort of accident in her life. But this is not the whole truth. The god is in practice the most important figure in the natural relations between the deity and human beings, because he shows, partly by example and partly by teaching, the ritual through which alone man can appeal to the goddess, who is the ultimate embodiment of the divine power. It was therefore quite easy to lay emphasis on the functions of the god, without really altering the character or ritual of the religion. The divine life was in a sense a reflexion of the life of society, or, rather, a model for human life.

Further, this human life was not regarded simply as the relation between individuals or as the picture of a single family. The family is regarded in the religion as the unit in the social organism; and the divine life, as shown in the relations of the god and the goddess, sets forth for the good of men the foundation on which society rests, viz. the mystic marriage of the god and the goddess as the symbol and pattern of earthly marriage. The gods in their mutual relation form the model which human life in society must reproduce. The gods have taught men, and are always teaching men, what they ought to do in their relations to one another and to the deity.

5. The holy marriage.—The theory has been advanced, and seems to the present writer fundamental in the subject, that the holy marriage as celebrated in the mysteries was intended to convey the full teaching about the perfect completion of human life; and the marriage ceremony of the old Phrygian or Anatolian religion consisted in the performance by the pair who were married on earth of precisely the same ceremony as took place at the holy marriage in the mysteries. There is also good reason to think that the marriage ceremony was performed at the sanctuary. One of the rites was that the pair drank from a common cup, and this rite passed into the Greek ceremony of marriage as it is still celebrated down to the present day under Christian forms. At the common meal which formed part of the religious ceremonial constituting the bond to hold together any association in ancient life the crowning rite consisted in drinking from the common cup, and the same was the case in the celebration of the mysteries. Each *μύστης* had in turn to say, 'I have drunk from the holy vessel' (*κύμβαλον*). But in the celebration of the marriage it was only the married pair who drank from the same cup; they alone were united in this social bond; all others present at the marriage feast drank from their own separate cups. Such was the character of the ceremony which was performed in Athens on the second day of the Anthesteria. At that festival the marriage of Dionysos was celebrated, and the fact that all the celebrants drank from separate cups on this occasion marked out the ceremony so distinctively that the name 'Cups' was given to the second day of the festival. Seen from this point of view, the mysteries presented a picture of the nature of civilized society and a contrast between the rude savagery of human life without the divine guidance and the higher civilization which came through that divine example.

One of the formulæ that were repeated in the mysteries by the person who was being initiated consisted of four words: 'I escaped evil; I found better.'¹ It is mentioned that the same formula was repeated as part of the ritual of marriage in Athens, and the divine marriage must be taken to be typical of the old form surviving from pre-Hellenic times. The identity of the formula in the two cases implies the marked similarity of the ritual in both.

6. Two stages in the mystic initiation.—Judging from the arrangements of the Hall of Mysteries at Pisidian Antioch, where was an old, wealthy, and powerful religious centre, there seem to have been two stages in the mystic ritual (just as there were at Eleusis).² But there is no reason to think that the two stages were celebrated at different seasons (as at Eleusis); on the contrary, they seem to have succeeded one another practically without any interval. The first stage was called initiation (*μύησις*); the second stage was called by a name as yet unknown, but the verb denoting the act was *ἐμβατεύειν*, 'to enter' or 'to set foot upon,' and the idea expressed in this stage of the ritual seems to have been the entrance on a new life; possibly the noun *ἐμβατεύσις* may have been a technical term; but no term has as yet been discovered in actual use. The phrase used in the inscriptions at the temple at Klaros near Colophon (where similar mysteries were celebrated) is 'those who had been initiated entered on' (the new stage), and it is certain that at Klaros the stages followed immediately after one another. Those mysteries might be celebrated at any season, like a church service, and were not restricted to a single occasion in the year.³ Similarly at Antioch the arrangements of the hall seem to imply that the *μύστης* passed through the first stage on one side of the hall, and thereafter entered through a sort of gateway in the middle of the hall after purification into the immediate presence of the god, and then began a new series of rites before the throne on which the god was supposed to be sitting; but we may imagine that the high-priest sat on the throne which is dedicated to the god by an inscription of late date. The rites described by Demosthenes took place probably as the first moment of the ritual in this second stage before the face of the god. In the first stage there had taken place an act which is described as the 'reception of the mystic things and words,' and the *μύστης* who had passed through this first stage (*παράλαβὸν τὰ μυστήρια*) immediately was free to enter into the presence of the god, and pass through the second stage of the ritual. The ceremonial of the higher grade symbolized the approach of man to the presence of the god, and its subject was the identification of the initiated person with the god, and the promise was probably given to him in the ritual words, 'Happy and blessed, thou shalt be god instead of mortal.'⁴ This identification of the human being with the divine life is the proper goal of human life. That goal was attained at death, as is shown in many epitaphs, for the dead man returns to the mother who bore him. But the same goal was attained as the result and perfection of the initiatory ritual. In the mystic rites at Antioch the culmination lay in the enactment of the perfect scene of human life—the fundamental rite on which society rests, viz. the mystic marriage of the god and the

¹ *ἔφυγον κακόν· εὗρον ἀμείνον*. The same formula was used in the marriage ritual (see § 8).

² See Ramsay, in *BSA* xviii. 37 ff., and *HDB* v. 127*, 129b.

³ Envoys sent by cities and States were initiated, evidently at a special service for their convenience. They usually brought a chorus with them (Ramsay, *The Teaching of Paul*, p. 289).

⁴ *Θεὸς ἔσσεαι ἀντὶ θρόνου*, known only in the so-called Orphic funeral formula (most recently in J. E. Harrison's *Prolegomena*, Cambridge, Appendix); we take them to be closely connected with the mysteries.

goddess as the warrant and guarantee of earthly marriage.¹

7. The choice between good and evil.—The question presents itself whether the two stages of the divine life were shown in the mysteries as two steps in a development from the worse to the better or in the form of a choice between good and evil. If the answer to this question could be made with certainty in favour of the former opinion, it would be extremely important; but there is no positive evidence to support that view; and all analogy is distinctly in favour of the other opinion, that there was simply presented in the religious ritual a choice between two alternatives, one good, the other evil. Such a choice is frequently presented in ancient religion and in ancient moral teaching. It appears in advanced Hellenic literature in the form of the *Choice of Heracles*; but that is only a literary apologue, elaborating in moral form a choice which, according to religion, is always being presented to mankind. In this religious choice there is not merely a presentation of the alternatives; there is also always the advice and counsel given by the gods to men to prefer good rather than evil and life rather than death. A fundamental idea in the religion is that good and life are aspects or names of one fact, and similarly evil and death of the opposite. The probability therefore is that in the drama of the mysteries the gods of the divine family are represented as choosing between the two courses—good and evil, or life and death—and that the divine choice is the model for human nature to follow. Accordingly, the formula which we have rendered, 'I escaped evil; I found better,' which seems to suggest in that translation the idea of development, is more correctly to be rendered, 'I rejected or avoided evil; I found better,' so as to suggest that the formula is an expression of choice between alternatives both equally open at the same time. Further, the formula is certainly an example of parataxis and really implies, 'I rejected the evil, because the opportunity of better was presented to me.' The idea that men are always placed in a position to choose between good or life and evil or death, and that religion exemplifies and teaches the preference of life rather than death, lies at the basis of the Anatolian religion, which in all departments of conduct shows men what they should do, in agriculture, in household economy, in hygiene, etc. So it is the basis of the Hebrew teaching, 'The fear of Jehovah is the chief part of knowledge; but the foolish despise wisdom and instruction' (Pr 17 9¹⁰ 15³³, Ps 111¹⁰, Ec 12¹³); Moses said to the people, 'I have set before thee life and good, and death and evil, the blessing and the curse; choose life' (Dt 30¹⁵, 19); and the same is expressed in the beginning of human history (Gn 2 and 3), for in the garden that was in the land of Eden there were two trees, the tree of life and the tree of knowledge (which immediately produced death); the instruction given to the man and the woman who lived in the garden was that they must not eat the fruit of the tree of death; but after they did so they were sent forth from the garden, lest they should have access to the tree of life and eat and live, and the angel with the flame of a sword was placed on guard to prevent approach to the tree of life. In this account we have the expression in primitive thought of the idea that from the beginning of human existence the choice between good or life and evil or death has constantly been presented to mankind, and the divine advice has always been given in the most positive form of absolute prohibition, to avoid the act which will 'bring death into the world.'

If the point of view taken in this article is

¹ BSA xviii. 371.

correct, there would probably be presented to the *μύσταις* in the first stage of the mystic ritual the choice between good and evil, and, when he chose rightly and in the proper mystic words, he was admitted on the second stage.

8. The divine teaching.—The 'holy marriage' of goddess and god is only one example of the general principle that the gods are always teaching and advising men what to do and how to behave. There was indeed no formal teaching in the way of discourse or theoretical instruction. There was only (1) the teaching by example in the divinely instituted ritual, and (2) the occasional advice by signs and omens, chiefly those seen in the air, which needed interpretation and application to the individual case. The theoretical basis of the ritual is expressed, e.g., in a relief found in E. Lydia on the Phrygian frontier. This relief is arranged in two zones; in the upper zone the god is represented as performing on an altar the same act of ritual as the priest is performing on an altar in the lower zone.¹ Every act of religion on earth has its counterpart in the performance of the same rite on a higher level in the divine life; and so the marriage celebrated on earth between the man and the woman has its counterpart in the marriage that is always taking place above between the god and the goddess. The teaching lies in the example and model which the divine powers set forth to all their worshippers. But earthly marriage is not merely a relationship between two human beings; it is a rite which concerns the entire society to which they belong. On this rite and on the family relationship organized society is built up. The unit of civilized society is not the individual, but the family. Accordingly we find it recorded that, according to Greek religion, the married pair celebrate the sacred marriage in honour of the god and goddess.

9. Relation of the conquerors to the ancient priesthood.—We have no information about this relation in the case of the old Phrygian conquerors, and we can only speculate with regard to it from the analogy of two later cases. (1) When the Gauls conquered and settled in that part of the old Phrygian country which afterwards was called Galatia, they soon adopted the religion of the country which they had won. Not merely was it necessary for them (as stated above) to worship the gods of the country where they now dwelt; they had also to face the problem of governing the people whom they had conquered. They could not and did not try to exterminate an entire race; all that they could do was to take a portion of the land for themselves, and to employ the conquered race as a subject caste which should till the land for the new owners of the great estates. The conquering caste, then, must govern the subject population according to some method or other. With the ancient views about religion and its fundamental importance as the governing principle in any organized society, the method of governing must be through the use of the already existing forms of religion. Hitherto the priests of the great religious centres had been the rulers of the god's land. The simple and easy way for the Gauls to rule the old inhabitants was to become the priests, and to fulfil the same religious forms and duties as the Phrygian priests had fulfilled. We know from an inscription that at Pessinus the conquering Gauls took only half the places in the priestly college. What was the exact situation at other great religious centres is unknown, but this may be taken as exemplifying the general principle. The chiefs of the new conquering caste allied themselves with, or even wholly displaced, the priests of the old colleges and centres; in con-

¹ Ramsay, *Letters to the Seven Churches*, p. 63.

junction with or instead of the ancient ruling priestly families, they administered the government of the mass of the population.¹

(2) When the emperor Augustus, by the will of the deceased Amyntas, last king of Galatia, came into possession of Pisidian Antioch and the whole territory attached to it, he put an end to the old ruling dynasty or families, in which the priesthood was hereditary, and himself became owner of all the land of the god. His procurator, who represented him in the district and managed his interests for him, was priest in his place, and therefore lord over the cultivators of the estate. This lordship over the cultivators was not applicable to the free citizens of the Græco-Roman cities, and in this way a highly complicated situation arose, according to which the priest-procurator was in the city only an official of the emperor, while on the estates he was the embodiment in human form of the distant god-emperor. Something of the same kind must have existed under the Greek kings in many parts of W. Asia. Those kings were identified with the god, and regarded as the embodiment in human form of the god on earth. This convenient religious fiction was utilized practically as a means of governing the country. It gave to the god-king or the god-emperor the sanction of religious awe, and this obedience to the emperor took the place of loyalty to the empire. The same fiction was widely practised throughout the Græco-Roman world; but we know more about the details only in the case of the Roman empire, because the evidence is clear that in every district and in every city of the Eastern world the emperor was supposed in the cult to be identified with the chief god of the district, and even free citizens, though not actually the serfs on the soil of such estates, yet regarded the emperor as the present god, on whose power they were dependent for defence, and to whom they owed the peace and prosperity of the whole empire. In the 4th cent. those formerly free cultivators became real serfs, because the law regarded the owner of the soil as having a right to their labour.

The same principle that underlies these later historical cases may be applied to the Phrygian conquest of the old Anatolian population of the country which afterwards was called Phrygia; but the details are not yet discovered.

ro. Varying accounts of the character of the mystic ritual.—In the fact that the mystic ritual presents a choice and a contrast between good and evil, between violence and order, and that it places human life under the guidance of religion, lies the explanation of some serious difficulties which are presented by the records about the mysteries. Christian writers describe them as presenting a series of incidents of violence, deceit, and horror. The question has been much debated whether this account is correct. The answer would seem to be that it is perfectly correct so far as it goes, but it was not the object of the Christian writers to give a complete picture of the mysteries or to inquire into the possible truths and ideas that might be suggested by those rites. Their method was simply to show that from the contemplation of such hideous incidents presented in the form of a sort of drama there must result evil to those who contemplated the spectacle. Their object was to contrast the horrors and abominations which were presented to the initiated with the order, simplicity, and beauty of the Christian ceremony. It must always be remembered that they were replying to the misrepresentations of their own ritual which were current among their opponents, and their purpose was to paint in lurid but necessarily true colours the hateful character of the pagan

ritual and the evils that must result from it, while they maintained and described the beauty and purity of their own ritual. They were not antiquaries; it was sufficient for them to point to the horrors which formed a real part of that ritual. False statement or even exaggeration would have been fatal to their purpose. We must therefore accept as correct all the details in the picture that they give, remembering that that picture needs to be looked at from a certain point of view; and we must also remember that the mysteries were intended to exhibit the placing of human life on a higher level through the influence of religion and the example set in the divine life. The use of the formula, 'I escaped evil; I found better' (§§ 5, 8), proves beyond dispute that some such idea formed the fundamental truth underlying the religion presented in the mysteries, and the further fact that the same formula was repeated in the marriage ceremony proves also that the social 'better' which those who chose in accordance with the divine precept found lay in the institution of true marriage. These facts make it clear that we can and ought to accept as true also the opinions expressed by Plato and Isocrates and other Greek philosophers and thinkers that the mysteries shown at Eleusis were an educative and elevating influence in life; and, if it is true, as we must also admit, that part of the ritual of the mysteries was of extremely repulsive character, it follows inevitably that a strong contrast (or even possibly a process of development) in moral and social relations formed the real subject of the mystic ceremony. Thus in one stage of the mysteries the birth of the god-son (or daughter, as the case might be) originated from an act of violence and fraud, and in the other stage the holy marriage was set forth as the rule and basis of society. In both cases the scene was fully presented to the eyes of the initiated; and the details of violence or fraud, as enacted in the divine drama of life, furnished full justification for the attack of Christian assailants; but the apology was that religion should speak straight out, concealing nothing, and that it shows the naked truth to devout eyes. In the process of degeneration to which the Anatolian religion was exposed the ugliest and most repellent parts of the mystery were emphasized and made more prominent. The effect was seen in respect of both sexes. The devout, both women and men, felt bound to live the life of the goddess and the god in every act and every detail. Hence originated the custom of ritual prostitution, in which women voluntarily imitated the fate of the goddess; and this custom was carried out in a series of ingenious perversions and developments which constitute the most abominable and socially degrading side of the Anatolian religion. Similar in origin, and carried out with the same ingenious perversion, was the strange and remarkable rite of self-mutilation among men, which constituted the supreme sign of devotion to the goddess, and which was performed from time to time by devotees at, or even standing upon, her altar. In modern time certain sects of dervishes practise extraordinary rites of mutilation or of personal wounds, which seem to be perhaps an expression of the extremest asceticism (though it is difficult to make any assertion with regard to the original nature of their ritual of self-devotion). But the Phrygian rite seems clearly to stand in close relation to a common part of their economic ritual. It was known that mutilation was prescribed in the divine ritual as a necessary part of the treatment of domesticated animals, and that involuntary self-mutilation also formed a noteworthy fact in the life of the bee; and there were doubtless other analogies,¹ some well-founded and

¹ HDB ii. 83b note.

¹ HDB v. 116a, 123.

some purely fanciful, which seemed to establish the divine origin and character of the rite, so that the devotee who consecrated himself to the observance in the most perfect degree of the religion of the land practised this extremest act on himself, knowing that the god had set the example (as the *ἑρδὸς λόγος* declares) by performing it on himself and thus consecrating it for his human followers.

11. Other examples of the analogy between the divine life as shown in the mysteries and human life.—It would also appear that the purificatory ceremonies which formed part of the mysteries were practically identical with some of the marriage rites, and this identity further confirms the close similarity between the rites in the two cases.

A formula which was uttered by the initiated person at a certain stage in the ritual of the mysteries was, 'A kid I have fallen into the milk.'¹ It is generally recognized that the kid is the mystic form of Dionysos as the god-son in the divine nature. In these words the *μύστυς* expressed the same meaning as the goddess of the world of death uttered to the dead when they came before her already initiated and pure, 'Thou hast become god instead of mortal.' In both the idea is that death is the entrance on life. The initiated dead come back to the goddess from whom they originated. Life comes from her and death also, and the two facts of life and death are different aspects of one idea. The formula about the kid declares that the initiated person has assumed the divine form as Dionysos. Each *μύστυς* in death is merged in, or finds his perfection and completion in, the personality of the god with whom he is identified.² The formula under discussion evidently belongs to the religion of a pastoral people, and places us on the great central plain of Phrygia and Lycaonia, where a god called Zeus Galaktines or Galaktios is mentioned in inscriptions. The variation in the form of the adjective and its non-Greek character show that it is an attempt to express in Greek an epithet of the god which had the same meaning in the Phrygian or Anatolian ritual. We are reminded of the instruction which was three times impressed upon the Israelites in the Mosaic Law, 'Thou shalt not seethe a kid in his mother's milk.' Comparing the two expressions, we must infer that W. Robertson Smith's suggested explanation of the Hebrew commandment is correct. This commandment has formed the subject of much controversy, and Robertson Smith³ interpreted it as forbidding the performance by the Hebrews of a rite which belonged to a forbidden religion. J. G. Frazer⁴ objects that there is no proof of the existence of any such rite, but the formula now under discussion, as taken from the mysteries, seems to allude to symbolism derived from a rite of this kind. The *μύστυς* is now Dionysos; he becomes a god through entering the gate of death, and symbolically in pastoral religion the death is expressed in this form of words; and the words were the prelude to a rite having the religious form which is forbidden by the Mosaic Law. The rite of the kid goes back to a pastoral religion, which has been united in the fully formed mysteries with an agricultural religion.

12. Progressive assimilation of mysteries through the Græco-Roman world.—By the Christian apologists the mysteries are generally described as practically a single uniform institution

¹ The formula occurs several times on gold tablets found in graves of Italy and Crete, which stand in close relation to the Orphic mysteries; see App. to J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena*, and bibliography there.

² This conception of the nature of death is more fully treated below.

³ *OTJC*, p. 433, *Religion of the Semites*², London, 1894, p. 221.

⁴ *Anthropological Essays presented to E. B. Tylor*, Oxford, 1907, p. 154.

at all mystic seats. Now there can be no doubt that the mysteries as celebrated in different regions were originally distinct and showed different rites, although there was a generic similarity. The Eleusinian mysteries were originally different in character from the Phrygian, for the Eleusinian mysteries were the drama of a purely agricultural religion, whereas the Phrygian were not. It has therefore been maintained that the Christian writers who neglect this difference are really misrepresenting the character of this religious institution by mixing up in a single picture details which belong to diverse religions. But the objection is not valid, for there was a marked tendency in the history of Greek and Græco-Asiatic religions to assimilate to each other the various mysteries; and the assimilation was effected by incorporating in each ceremonies and rites taken from the others. Thus the picture presented by the Christian apologists must be accepted as reasonably accurate in details, though incomplete. On this there is agreement.

13. The ultimate supreme deity and the mediator.—The goddess was the fountain and source of human life. The principles on which that life must be lived emanated from her. The god is instrumental in making those principles known to men; they are made known in practice, not theoretically. The god does what he teaches; he is the worker who by his toil shows principles in operation. This idea, that there is an intermediary in carrying the knowledge of divine truth to the world of men, appears in many forms which are in the last resort almost identical expressions of the same fact. There is a supreme divine power, the source of all truth and all good, and there is an intermediary divine power; and these two divine personages are in the Phrygian religion conceived usually as the goddess who is the mother and the god who is her son or priest or paramour or companion; in these various ways of expressing the relation lay the seeds of much evil in the divine drama as presented in the mysteries. Yet these envisagements as female and male are not universal in early Anatolian or Greek religion. In the first place, as we have already shown, the goddess is often displaced, at least in outward show, by a male embodiment; in this case the two personages are the supreme god and an assistant or ministering god. When names were given to these embodiments of the divine power, the most characteristic were Zeus and Hermes. The embodiment in two persons was necessary to the complete presentation of the divine action (as, e.g., in the striking story recorded in *Ac* 14⁷⁻¹³). It has already been explained (§ 2) how the variation between the presentation of the supreme divine power as male and as female is to be explained. In the second place, while the ministering god is almost invariably presented as male and especially under the name Hermes, there is one striking exception in the *Iliad*, where for certain purposes the goddess Iris is presented as the messenger of the father of the gods. Iris—the rainbow—seemed in certain points of view to be the line of communication by which divine truth was introduced to the world, and this thought is elaborated into the picture of Iris in the *Iliad* (though never in the *Odyssey*). A similar thought appears in the book of Genesis, where the bow is set in the cloud as a symbol of the covenant which is concluded between the supreme God and His people.

14. The ritual expressed the self-protecting instinct of collective society.—The ancient Anatolian religion originated from the self-defending and self-protecting instinct in early society. The instinct and tendency expressed itself through the voice of prophets, and assumed the form of a series

of regulations for the better organization and management of society, mainly in its economic aspect. But it is useless to make rules for an ignorant people, unless there is some powerful sanction for these rules enforcing their observance by the dread of punishment. The rules, therefore, being the expression of the divine interest in the welfare of human society, took the form of religious law; and they were obeyed because the power of the goddess was offended by violation and ready to punish it. Thus, *e.g.*, it is urgently necessary for the welfare of a primitive society, which practises agriculture and lives by its results, that proper times and seasons and methods should be strictly observed. It is not, however, safe to expect that a simple and uneducated population, which is only learning the importance of these things by experience, will observe strictly the rules of sound method; men are lazy, slow to learn, and ready to procrastinate; but, when the rules are embodied in the form of a ritual by which divine protection and help are to be gained, then they enforce themselves, for violation brings punishment by suffering. The gods live in the life of nature; the times and seasons are crises in that life, and the due observance of the ritual brings its reward in the gifts which the gods are always tendering to the use of man. Similarly in respect of domestic economy, or the wise conduct of the family life, or the proper management of domesticated animals, all the rules come from the divine power and are enforced by that power because they are expressed as the ritual or religion. To go into this in detail is impossible here, for it requires elaborate treatment, and it depends on only scanty evidence. It remains really the simple orderly statement of the facts so far as known, but yet only a hypothesis.

In a region where agriculture is the main business of the population the religion is agricultural, and the episodes in the divine life as exhibited in the ritual are the stages in the farmer's year.

So, *e.g.*, 'Demeter, that bright goddess, lay in loving union with the hero Iasion in a thrice-ploughed fallow-field in the fertile land of Crete, and bare goodly Ploutos' (Hesiod, *Theog.* 968 f.; *Odyssey*, v. 126 f.).¹

The marriage of the goddess-mother to the heroized envisagement of the race takes place in the rich field newly opened after long preparation, and her son is Wealth. The rule of times and conduct, as fixed by divine power and revealed in practice to men by the god as priest and head of the ritual, brings in orderly course prosperity, happiness, and life; but, if violated or neglected, it causes suffering and death.

Similarly in a country where flocks and herds constituted the chief source of livelihood the religion was pastoral and the god was the god of milk, who granted the produce on which the life of the people depended. As it happens, we have practically no records of this type of religion, with the exception of the titles 'Galaktios' and 'Galaktinos' applied to the supreme deity. A pastoral people is, as a rule, rude and uneducated, and there therefore remain hardly any memorials of their ritual or even of their life. It is, however, certain that the great plains around the salt lake Tatta were always a pastoral country, in which, *e.g.*, Amyntas, the last king of Galatia, possessed more than 300 flocks.² There can be no doubt that these flocks were very large, as we may judge from the immense size of some of the flocks which shepherds lead about over the plains at the present day. We can understand how the principles of

attending to the welfare of domesticated animals were consecrated in a series of rites fixed according to the seasons of the year.¹

The sacred character of useful domesticated animals was a device for the benefit of men, and it seems probable that the arts of domestication of animals may have in some degree originated on the great Anatolian plateau,² where conditions are exceedingly favourable, and where indubitably a high degree of skill was reached. Valuable breeds were artificially produced by intelligent cross-breeding. Of these the Angora goat still survives, and the secret of its breeding is carefully treasured and concealed. The present writer is unable to accept the view advocated by some distinguished German writers that the Angora goat was introduced from Central Asia and is a naturally distinct species. There is some authority for believing that the secret of preserving the fine character of the wool of the Angora goat lies in a system of breeding. Strabo mentions other fine breeds—*e.g.*, the Colossian sheep with its glossy violet-coloured fleece, and the glossy black-fleeced sheep of Laodicea. These have entirely disappeared, and the reason is that the breeds, being artificial, were through carelessness and ignorance allowed to degenerate.³

The worship of the Ephesian goddess Artemis seems to have been closely related to the practice of bee-keeping. The goddess was the queen bee, and it is noteworthy that in the religion of Anatolia the sex of this supreme official among the bees was correctly known, and its life-history was properly understood, whereas Aristotle and the Greeks generally thought that the queen bee was a male and called it *εσθήρ* or *βασιλεύς*. The image of the goddess has only the slightest resemblance to a human body, but in outline is roughly similar to the body of a bee. As the queen bee she is indicated literally as the great mother of all life in the community. The facts of nature pointed out the queen bee as the natural analogue to the goddess. She is attended by a body who are called Essenes, bearing the same name as the male bees or drones who do no work, while another body of her followers are the Melissæ, the female working bees, in whom the sexual character is undeveloped. These two bodies of followers, the male and the female, constitute the priests and priestesses of the goddess.⁴

An example of the self-protective character of the religious law which ruled the conduct of primitive Anatolian society is found in the conduct of social life. The idea is that the divine power must be localized at each point where the safety of the family or of society is involved. In the construction of the house, where a pillar or column is an important structural member, it is regarded as sacred and as a home of the divine power, in order to impress on all persons the respect with which it must be treated; and this sacredness leads to the institution of a ritual by which the religions awe is impressed on all minds. The roads which led from town to town were placed under divine protection by sacred pillars (in which the divine power finds its home) along their course. These stones were sometimes made useful to human needs as measures of distance, and thus became mile-stones. Under the Roman empire mile-stones were dedicated to the god-emperor. In modern Mediterranean countries the shrines of Christian character which are found at important points,

¹ Ramsay, *Impressions of Turkey*, London, 1897, p. 272 f.

² Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, I. p. xv.

³ On this subject see Ramsay, *Impressions of Turkey*, p. 272 ff.

⁴ HDB v. 117a. The male bee perishes after consorting with her, like Iasion.

¹ The statement is identical in the two poets, which shows that it expresses the religious myth (*ιερός λόγος*). Hesiod alone specifies Crete, Homer alone the resulting death of Iasion (*Ιάσιος*). The latter fact is essential in the *ιερός λόγος*.

² Strabo, xii. 6, p. 568.

especially at meeting-places of roads, originated in this feeling that the divine guardianship has to be impressed upon all persons at all important points in social life. In the city the streets are similarly placed under the same protection, and, as the number of the people who pass along the streets by day and by night is very much greater, the symbols (usually *Hermæ*) of the presence of the divine power are very much more frequent. The permanence and health of society depend largely on the safety and cleanliness of the streets, and these purposes are ensured by the presence of so many pillars or altars or representations of a god. In the presence of God cleanliness and purity are exacted. No one is free to come into the presence of God unless he is pure both physically and morally. By insisting upon requirements like these the salvation and health of society were attained. The clearest and most explicit declaration of this principle is contained in the Mosaic Law (see Dt 23¹⁴): 'Jehovah thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp, to deliver thee, and to give up thine enemies before thee; therefore shall thy camp be holy, that he may not see an unclean thing in thee, and turn away from thee.'

When the right conduct of people in society was hindered by some catastrophe or some serious change in external conditions, then serious dangers resulted. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, e.g., the entire population of Attica was crowded within the walls of Athens. There was not room for them to live according to religious law and custom. The ordinary rules of life were inevitably neglected. The presence of the god could not prove a sufficient restraint, and the result was speedily evident in a terrible plague through which (as popular religion believed) the divine power punished the violation of the laws which God had laid down for human conduct.

The religion of the Phrygians, therefore, must be regarded as springing from a simple enough type of religious feeling which was widely spread throughout the *Ægean* lands and the great peninsula of Asia Minor. This religion shows marked similarity to certain cults which are characteristic of Syria, and some of the best illustrations expressed in brief and clear terms are found in the Mosaic Law. The sacred Law of the Hebrews evidently was adapted to a state of society similar in certain ways to the social conditions implied in the Anatolian religion. This religion in its original character was one of ideas rather than of ritual; that is to say, we can envisage it at a stage early enough to see the ideas which are expressed in the ritual. All of this religion is in origin an expression of ideas and principles designed for man's good.

15. The religion of organized society and the family religion.—Obviously the religion of the mysteries is a religion of an organized society adapted to the conservation of social welfare by enforcing upon all members of the social organism such conduct as is to the benefit of the entire society to which they belong. The individual and even the family are secondary to the society. But behind and beneath this there lies another stratum of religion on which the life of the family is founded. In religion of that older type the guiding principle was not to subordinate the interest of the family to that of the social organism: it was directed to the purpose of conserving the family as an organism complete in itself; the family must not be suffered to come to an end; in life the father works for the sake of the children, in order that they may continue as a family; after death he is still able to aid in conserving it through the right conduct of survivors. In this primitive religion there is no thought of or provision about

work for the purely selfish advantage of the individual. Work is done for certain ideals, not perhaps understood clearly by the individual worker, but impressed upon him by some guiding power. So far as an individual looks merely to selfish advantage, he is not driven to work for the distant future benefit of children or children's children. But religion impresses upon him the importance of the family and the duty of working for it, and moulds his mind into conformity with this salutary purpose; and, while his intellect does not fully grasp the principle, yet his natural emotions lead him to guard and work for his children, at least while they are young. With these two motives in co-operation, an immensely strong force is brought to work on the conduct of the individual. Religious custom in the *Ægean* lands was in its origin the wise guidance of nature.

16. Family cult of the dead members.—The way in which religion guarded the permanence of the family was through the idea that the living members have much to gain from, and serious duties to fulfil towards, the other members of the family who have died. The dead ancestor or parent continues to live as a deity. He is strong to help his family so long as his family give him strength to help them. It is in the mutual relation of each party to the other that the strength of both lies. The dead help the living, provided that the living help the dead. God helps man, but man must co-operate with God. In the modern superstition of Asia Minor, as it appears under Turkish forms, the divine influence which expressed itself at many places all over the land is called 'ancestor' or 'father' (Turkish *dede*), in so far as it is associated with any personality at all. There is no other word in the colloquial language of the uneducated peasant to express his recognition of a vague divine power except this term taken from the family religion. The idea is primitive and fundamental; the dead man becomes god, going back to the goddess-mother who bore him. This idea might develop, and in some minds did develop, along the line of an Oriental pantheism—that the dead is merged in the impersonal divine power; but the typical development was in W. Asia and Greece—that the dead becomes a god, personal and individual.

In the later stratum of the Phrygian religion as a device of social organization there is effected a sort of identification of the family ancestor and god with the god who guards and preserves society. In that later stage or stratum of religion names for the gods came into existence (as Herodotus relates),¹ and the possession of a name indicates growth in the personality of the divine conception, which begins by being simply 'the god,' 'the goddess,' 'the mother,' or 'the father,' and develops into a personal conception moulded only too closely on human personality. The divine prototype in heaven is similar to the human antitype on earth.

Epitaphs belonging to the Roman period give some information about the fashion in which the ordinary uneducated or slightly educated peasantry of Anatolia conceived the relation between the living man and the dead man who has become god. The making of the tomb to a dead person is at the same time the discharge of a vow to the god. The dedication to the dead person is also a dedication to a certain envisagement of the divine nature, whether indefinitely as 'the god' or anthropomorphically as a divine person possessing an individual name and character and local relations. Since the dead person is regarded as identified with the god, he or she is so described in some epitaphs.

¹ At first the Pelasgians had no names for the gods; most of the names came from Egypt, and the oracle ordered the Pelasgians to use them (Herod. ii. 62).

The dead is the god, and the grave-stone is the altar on which this god is worshipped.¹

It is a custom which has persisted throughout every period of Anatolian history and under every religious external form that it requires a grave to impart consecration to a shrine or a locality. This idea is as powerful still under Muhammadan influence as it was in the earliest traceable period of Anatolian history. There are throughout the country innumerable localities which are at present regarded as sacred, sometimes because they are seats of ancient society and sites of dead cities, sometimes as being places where the divine power manifests itself in some striking natural phenomenon. In almost all those places there is a grave of some *dede*, or ancestor, and a sort of worship is maintained in irregular fashion at the shrine. People seek here the cure of diseases and make vows and prayers, and tie a rag from their own clothing on a tree. The sufferer and the unfortunate come here for help. Those who are healthy and prosperous do not need to have recourse to such a way of invoking the divine help and protection. The whole custom is antipathetic to the spirit and the teaching of Muhammadanism, but it rules the conduct of the people, as an imperishable survival of an old religious view, engrained in the popular mind. It is evident that in the earliest Phrygian religion a grave was the means of ensuring the divine presence at a particular spot.² The shrine of a deity was also marked by a grave, and thus shared in the awe arising from both the older and the more developed type of religion. Wherever there was a need for consecration, so that a certain locality should be preserved for general safety or advantage, a grave intimidated the presence of a god and warned off violators or intruders. This custom stands evidently in close relation to the worship of ancestors and to the family religion. It is a device to extend the protection of the deified ancestor beyond the circle of the family for the benefit of others.

17. Two strata in the Anatolian religion.—We must therefore regard the Anatolian religion as having come into existence in two different periods from two different causes. The older stratum is the family religion, i.e. a certain group of rites holding the family together in the performance of common religious duties; for, according to ancient religious ideas, no unity and no social body could have a common existence except through the performance in common of certain religious duties. The later stratum was the religion of an organized society, knit together for the common advantage.

18. The divine power as the mother.—In both the older and the later stratum the conception of the existence of the gods as a divine family having certain relations with each other necessarily existed. Especially the conception of the goddess as the mother lay at the basis of the family religion. While it is evident that there was a certain growth in the conception of the divine family between the older and the later religious stratum, it is not easy to distinguish the elements which belong to each period; but in the beginning the goddess-mother must have been the principal figure, for the family exists in virtue of the mother. In old Anatolian custom, as is agreed by the great majority of scholars, the human family kept its continuity through the idea that the influence of the mother was the determining power. To this old custom the name 'matriarchate' is commonly applied in English, but the name is not correct, and the German term *Mutterrecht* is more suitable to the real character of that

early family system. It was not the case that the mother was the ruler, but it was the case apparently that right, law, inheritance, and descent were reckoned in terms of the mother and not of the father,¹ and that influence and freedom of life were a birthright of the women. The introduction into Phrygia of the developed Hellenic religion was unfavourable to the continuance of this early idea of the family; and all those legal and social relations came to be reckoned in terms of the father rather than the mother, as we see in the Græco-Roman period. Yet still the ordinary custom of the land continued in the old habit of assigning prominence to the female element: women magistrates appear frequently in the records of many cities in Phrygia and Anatolia generally, and women are mentioned as performing public duties much more freely than was the case in Greece. Even among the Phrygian Jews—though Jewish feeling was always extremely hostile to the prominence of women—one finds examples of Jewesses not merely filling magistracies in the towns, but actually holding the position of chief of the synagogue (*ἀρχισυνάγωγος*); and this religious fact can hardly be explained otherwise than as due to the influence of the custom of the country on them.²

19. Persistence of the conception of the divine mother.—The deep-seated tendency of the people to look for a conception of the divine nature in a feminine personality was a strong influence on early Christian system. The people sought for something in the new religion to satisfy their craving for such a female element in the divine nature. In all probability the first form of the Thekla-legend as it was composed [by a presbyter of Asia, not later than the third quarter of 2nd cent., was an expression of this craving; the Orthodox Church, while condemning presbyter who gave literary form to the book over the figure of St. Thekla and the legend so as to make it harmless ecclesiastical point of view. Yet there still in the tale slight traces of the idea that in the rights of women find a heroine; women who sat as spectators in the arena where she was exposed to wild beasts. her as their champion and appealed to her behalf, throwing spices and balsam. It is because of this quality in St. Thekla, sort of heroized impersonation of Anthea and ideals, that she gained for her an important place in the hagiography of the Eastern Church.

The Anatolian custom, however, a fuller expression of its nature, found at last in the idea of the Virgin Mary. It was at Ephesus, the city of the earliest proof is found of an the Virgin Mary as the Mother of the Council held at Ephesus in A.D. 431 was definitely established as a Orthodox ritual, while Nestorius because he held that the title 'Mother' ought not to be applied to the Virgin, only the 'Mother of Christ,' was condemned at Ephesus 'in the most which is called Maria' (a title rather than official); and there can that it was the force of popular imposed on the Orthodox Church of the Mother of God. There is a Acts of the Council of Ephesus in A.D. 429 by Proclus, bishop of Constantinople.

¹ Ramsay, *Studies in the Hist. and Art of the Eastern Roman Provinces*, London, 1906, pp. 271-278.

² *Ib.*

¹ For the important bearing on inheritance *ib.*, pp. 147-151.

² Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics of Asia*.

³ Ramsay, *Pauline and Other Studies*, pp.

expresses in Christian form the popular idea. The subject of this sermon is 'to celebrate the glorification of the race of women': for 'the glory of the female' is due to her 'who was in due time Mother and Virgin': 'earth and sea do honour to the Virgin.' It seems impossible to mistake or to deny the meaning implied in this and much similar enthusiastic language. The Anatolian religious feeling craved for some clearer and more definite expression than it could find in Christian rites and language of the honour, the influence, the inevitableness in the world of the female element in its double aspect of purity and motherhood. 'Purity is the material,' but purity that is perfected in maternity. The Virgin, the Mother, the purity of motherhood, was to the popular Anatolian religious sentiment the indispensable crown of the religious idea.

Muhammadan religion, on the other hand, with its stern hostility towards this point of view, was not affected by it in Anatolia. Muhammadanism probably originated from the seed sown in the mind of Muhammad by Christian refugees who had been expelled as heretics from the Orthodox empire, because they were opposed to the worship of the 'Mother of God' and had fled into Arabia. Springing from such seed, which grew up amid Semitic surroundings hostile to the prominence of women, Muhammadanism has always assigned an extremely humble place to the feminine element in society and religion, and it extirpated the old ideals of feminine place and duty from the popular mind in Phrygia. Islam was unable to extirpate so deep-seated a feeling, and had to satisfy it in other ways; and some light is thrown on the nature of the ancient religion by observing how this was achieved. It was partly done through the orders of dervishes with their ritual and enthusiasm,¹ and in recent years the personality of the Prophet himself has come to exercise a profound influence over a large number of devotees, especially among the Arab-speaking peoples, but also among part of the population of Anatolia.

'The Moslem's devotion to his Prophet, his admiration and enthusiasm, nay, his personal love for him, are intense realities. . . . Sometimes he points simply to "the fact of Mohammed," he feels a personal relationship to him, he is conscious of a personal gratitude for the ineffable services he rendered.'²

Another writer says:

'The devout Mohammedan is never so enthusiastic as when he calls on his Prophet. . . . Hymns to the Prophet are sung most enthusiastically on the birthday of Mohammed and on the day of his Ascension. . . . Pious men and women are never so full of devotion as on these occasions. Their whole nature is stirred up and their whole heart goes out in worship and adoration when these hymns are sung.'³

One line of a popular hymn runs thus:

'In every flower and in every plant the light of Mohammed is visible.'⁴

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In rites and words like these impassioned religious feeling appears which is similar in tone and words to that which is expressed by Bishop Proclus in the sermon quoted above. The life and joy of nature is expressed now to the Muslim mind in the person of Muhammad. In the Orthodox Church of the 5th cent. and later it was expressed in the Mother of God, 'the sole bridge by which God passes to man.' The idea is the same in both, 'Purity is the material,' but in the Muslim form it is wholly disconnected with any relation to sex. Muhammad is the intercessor between God and man, and the only intercessor. But there is a price to pay for the narrowing of the scope of this idea, which results in the Muslim position of women, and in the growing dissatisfaction of many Muslims with the position that their religion assigns to women, almost excluding them from the higher departments of life. The Mariolatry of the Orthodox Church was an attempt to express in form comprehensible to an uneducated populace an idea which was latent in Christianity, but which seemed to be not clearly enough expressed to the vulgar mind. It was the purification and Christianization of the mother-worship of the old Anatolian religion. The enthusiastic devotion with which the mother-goddess was served expressed itself in forms often indeed repulsive, but corresponding to the strongest and deepest feelings of human nature.

20. Outstanding characteristics and social effects.—In this old Phrygian or Anatolian religion certain characteristics especially arrest attention.

(a) *The land is divine property.*—There is no pretence that land is national; human ownership cannot exist in any form, when the Earth herself is the supreme goddess; the divine nature cannot be the property of men. Accordingly, the land is the deity's, just as the people on it are her slaves. In this principle is found a guarantee for what practically amounts to possession by the cultivator as distinguished from ownership and dominion; and the implication of the principle becomes clear when one looks at the parallel case of the freedom of the individual. The individual is necessarily free in all human relations, in so far as he is the slave of the god; the slave of the god cannot be the slave of a human owner; and the commonest form of enfranchisement of slaves throughout the Greek world lay in the purchase of the slave by the god. According to human law, the slave could not possess any property; all that he earned was the property of his owner and master; but, if the slave earned anything, he could safeguard it by giving it to the god, who kept it for him; and in process of time, as the money accumulated, the god purchased the slave from his human master, and thus enfranchised him. The god in this way came to act as banker and money-lender on a large scale; the temple held money in trust not only for slaves but for free citizens; and it lent to land-owners and probably also to States. Similarly, when the land is owned by the god, it in practice is held on the tenure of cultivation. He who used the land was, practically speaking, its temporary owner; for he could sell the possession but not the *dominium*. The modern Turkish law in Asia Minor recognizes something of this principle, for it contains the enactment that land which has not been used by an owner for a certain short term of years ceases to be his property, and lapses to the common good; and the same law is very favourable to the acquisition of waste land by any one who undertakes to cultivate it, and whose ownership lasts only while he is actually using it.

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The dead is the god, and the grave-stone is the altar on which this god is worshipped.¹

It is a custom which has persisted throughout every period of Anatolian history and under every religious external form that it requires a grave to impart consecration to a shrine or a locality. This idea is as powerful still under Muhammadan influence as it was in the earliest traceable period of Anatolian history. There are throughout the country innumerable localities which are at present regarded as sacred, sometimes because they are seats of ancient society and sites of dead cities, sometimes as being places where the divine power manifests itself in some striking natural phenomenon. In almost all those places there is a grave of some *dede*, or ancestor, and a sort of worship is maintained in irregular fashion at the shrine. People seek here the cure of diseases and make vows and prayers, and tie a rag from their own clothing on a tree. The sufferer and the unfortunate come here for help. Those who are healthy and prosperous do not need to have recourse to such a way of invoking the divine help and protection. The whole custom is antipathetic to the spirit and the teaching of Muhammadanism, but it rules the conduct of the people, as an imperishable survival of an old religious view, engrained in the popular mind. It is evident that in the earliest Phrygian religion a grave was the means of ensuring the divine presence at a particular spot.² The shrine of a deity was also marked by a grave, and thus shared in the awe arising from both the older and the more developed type of religion. Wherever there was a need for consecration, so that a certain locality should be preserved for general safety or advantage, a grave intimated the presence of a god and warned off violators or intruders. This custom stands evidently in close relation to the worship of ancestors and to the family religion. It is a device to extend the protection of the deified ancestor beyond the circle of the family for the benefit of others.

17. Two strata in the Anatolian religion.—We must therefore regard the Anatolian religion as having come into existence in two different periods from two different causes. The older stratum is the family religion, *i.e.* a certain group of rites holding the family together in the performance of common religious duties; for, according to ancient religious ideas, no unity and no social body could have a common existence except through the performance in common of certain religious duties. The later stratum was the religion of an organized society, knit together for the common advantage.

18. The divine power as the mother.—In both the older and the later stratum the conception of the existence of the gods as a divine family having certain relations with each other necessarily existed. Especially the conception of the goddess as the mother lay at the basis of the family religion. While it is evident that there was a certain growth in the conception of the divine family between the older and the later religious stratum, it is not easy to distinguish the elements which belong to each period; but in the beginning the goddess-mother must have been the principal figure, for the family exists in virtue of the mother. In old Anatolian custom, as is agreed by the great majority of scholars, the human family kept its continuity through the idea that the influence of the mother was the determining power. To this old custom the name 'matriarchate' is commonly applied in English, but the name is not correct, and the German term *Mutterrecht* is more suitable to the real character of that

early family system. It was not the case that the mother was the ruler, but it was the case apparently that right, law, inheritance, and descent were reckoned in terms of the mother and not of the father,¹ and that influence and freedom of life were a birthright of the women. The introduction into Phrygia of the developed Hellenic religion was unfavourable to the continuance of this early idea of the family; and all those legal and social relations came to be reckoned in terms of the father rather than the mother, as we see in the Græco-Roman period. Yet still the ordinary custom of the land continued in the old habit of assigning prominence to the female element: women magistrates appear frequently in the records of many cities in Phrygia and Anatolia generally, and women are mentioned as performing public duties much more freely than was the case in Greece. Even among the Phrygian Jews—though Jewish feeling was always extremely hostile to the prominence of women—one finds examples of Jewesses not merely filling magistracies in the towns, but actually holding the position of chief of the synagogue (*ἀρχισυνάγωγος*); and this religious fact can hardly be explained otherwise than as due to the influence of the custom of the country on them.²

19. Persistence of the conception of the divine mother.—The deep-seated tendency of the people to look for a conception of the divine nature in a feminine personality was a strong influence on early Christian system. The people sought for something in the new religion to satisfy their craving for such a female element in the divine nature. In all probability the first form of the Thekla-legend as it was composed [by a presbyter of Asia, not later than the third quarter of the 2nd cent., was an expression of this craving; but the Orthodox Church, while condemning the presbyter who gave literary form to the legend, took over the figure of St. Thekla and modified the legend so as to make it harmless from the ecclesiastical point of view. Yet there still remain in the tale slight traces of the idea that in Thekla the rights of women find a heroine; and the women who sat as spectators in the amphitheatre where she was exposed to wild beasts regarded her as their champion and appealed to God on her behalf, throwing spices and balsam towards her. It is because of this quality in St. Thekla, as a sort of heroized impersonation of Anatolian custom and ideals, that she gained for herself such an important place in the hagiography and the ritual of the Eastern Church.

The Anatolian custom, however, aspired towards a fuller expression of its nature, and this was found at last in the idea of the 'Mother of God.' It was at Ephesus, the city of the goddess, that the earliest proof is found of an established cult of the Virgin Mary as the Mother of God; and in the Council held at Ephesus in A.D. 431 this cult was definitely established as a feature of the Orthodox ritual, while Nestorius was condemned because he held that the title 'Mother of God' ought not to be applied to the Virgin, who was only the 'Mother of Christ.'³ The Council assembled at Ephesus 'in the most holy church, which is called Maria' (a title apparently popular rather than official); and there can be no doubt that it was the force of popular feeling that imposed on the Orthodox Church this recognition of the Mother of God. There is prefixed to the Acts of the Council of Ephesus a sermon delivered in A.D. 429 by Proclus, bishop of Cyzicus, which

¹ Ramsay, *Studies in the Hist. and Art of the Eastern Roman Provinces*, London, 1906, pp. 271-278.

² *Ib.*

¹ For the important bearing on inheritance see John Fraser, *ib.*, pp. 147-151.

² Ramsay, *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, II. 649 f.

³ Ramsay, *Pauline and Other Studies*, pp. 125-159.

expresses in Christian form the popular idea. The subject of this sermon is 'to celebrate the glorification of the race of women': for 'the glory of the female' is due to her 'who was in due time Mother and Virgin': 'earth and sea do honour to the Virgin.' It seems impossible to mistake or to deny the meaning implied in this and much similar enthusiastic language. The Anatolian religious feeling craved for some clearer and more definite expression than it could find in Christian rites and language of the honour, the influence, the inevitableness in the world of the female element in its double aspect of purity and motherhood. 'Purity is the material,' but purity that is perfected in maternity. The Virgin, the Mother, the purity of motherhood, was to the popular Anatolian religious sentiment the indispensable crown of the religious idea.

Muhammadan religion, on the other hand, with its stern hostility towards this point of view, was not affected by it in Anatolia. Muhammadanism probably originated from the seed sown in the mind of Muhammad by Christian refugees who had been expelled as heretics from the Orthodox empire, because they were opposed to the worship of the 'Mother of God' and had fled into Arabia. Springing from such seed, which grew up amid Semitic surroundings hostile to the prominence of women, Muhammadanism has always assigned an extremely humble place to the feminine element in society and religion, and it extirpated the old ideals of feminine place and duty from the popular mind in Phrygia. Islām was unable to extirpate so deep-seated a feeling, and had to satisfy it in other ways; and some light is thrown on the nature of the ancient religion by observing how this was achieved. It was partly done through the orders of dervishes with their ritual and enthusiasm,¹ and in recent years the personality of the Prophet himself has come to exercise a profound influence over a large number of devotees, especially among the Arab-speaking peoples, but also among part of the population of Anatolia.

'The Moslem's devotion to his Prophet, his admiration and enthusiasm, nay, his personal love for him, are intense realities. . . . Sometimes he points simply to "the fact of Mohammed," he feels a personal relationship to him, he is conscious of a personal gratitude for the ineffable services he rendered.'²

Another writer says:

'The devout Mohammedan is never so enthusiastic as when he calls on his Prophet. . . . Hymns to the Prophet are sung most enthusiastically on the birthday of Mohammed and on the day of his Ascension. . . . Pious men and women are never so full of devotion as on these occasions. Their whole nature is stirred up and their whole heart goes out in worship and adoration when these hymns are sung.'³

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proprietorship. The man who made use of the land and worked it knew that no person could interfere with his right to use the land. This security of tenure by the actual cultivators was the main cause of the improvement of the land and the gradual subjugation of the soil for the benefit of their families. They gathered up the stones, and piled them. They stored up the water that fell from heaven—the gift of the god—or they brought water¹ a great distance in artificial channels from some bountiful fountain which also they recognized to be the gift of the god. They planted trees which would not begin to be useful until a number of years had elapsed. Under the divine guidance they planted and improved the crops. Thus gradually they transformed the Mediterranean lands from their natural rather sterile condition into a great series of gardens that ring round the central sea.² With war and conquest began the system of great estates belonging to owners from a ruling caste, and of cultivators attached to the soil with growing strictness.³

(b) *The influence of the goddess a guarantee of peace.*—The divine life is at once the reflexion of human life and the model or ensample for human conduct, and the influence of women tended towards a state of international peace, whereas war among the nations inevitably tends to diminish the importance of women and to increase that of the male sex. The general character of the Anatolian religion is adapted towards peace, and presupposes a state of peace as its basis. It makes use of the earth and its products, plants and animals, for the benefit of mankind, but the usefulness depends upon security of tenure. As soon as uncertainty begins whether the family of the cultivator will enjoy the fruits of his toil, he ceases to be disposed in the same degree towards cultivation. The influence of habit and the chance that he may gather the fruits lead him to continue his attention to the soil for a time, but, in proportion as uncertainty of enjoyment increases, his attention to the soil is lessened.

(c) The goddess is the revealer of principles and the teacher of ideals to her worshippers through her prophets. Through her influence domestic, economic, and international law are gradually established. The god in the divine family is the worker. He imparts to men the knowledge of the right way to approach the divine pair through the establishment of a ritual which he performs as the first priest, and which men imitate from him. He is the first cultivator of the soil, because cultivation of the soil is the putting into practice of the principles which are revealed, and which constitute the ritual of agricultural religion. It is the same with every department and every form of human life; the god exemplifies by his practice the way of carrying into action the principles which come from the goddess.⁴

Certain principles of international law were observed in early warfare. The goddess, who lived in peace and through peace, was striving to mitigate the sufferings and the tears of that state of war to which her ritual was opposed. There was

in Hellenized Greece a sacred month during which war was suspended, in order that the combatants should be free to celebrate the sacred festival of the summer and should be able to travel safely back and forward between their homes and the scene of the festival. There can be no doubt that the custom goes back to a very early time, and that it was a means to ensure a safe time for the gathering or the sowing of the crop—two supreme duties of the ritual marked by festivals and rites, impressive and sacred. Thus were limits set to the excesses of war. The water supply should not be interfered with, because the life of the earth depended in the Mediterranean world on the proper distribution of the water. The year's harvest, in so far as it was secured by a year's labour, might be destroyed, and thus the enemy might be vexed and overcome through scarcity and high prices, but the fruit trees were not allowed to be destroyed, because to recreate them is a matter of many years' growth, and their destruction would imply too serious an interference with the ritual of the divine command. This law of war is expressed in Rev 6⁸ 'A measure of wheat for a shilling, and three measures of barley for a shilling; but the oil and the wine thou shalt not touch.'¹

(d) Another characteristic of the Anatolian religion which specially impressed the Greek mind was the strong hold which it had on its servants and the enthusiastic devotion with which they were affected by it. This was due partly to mere difference of temperament: the people of Anatolia were nearer the Asiatic than the European type; and in Asia religion, as a rule, has had stronger hold of its people than in Europe (though from this we may except the Turkish races, who are usually too insensitive to be much dominated by religious enthusiasm). But the effect of the Anatolian religion on its people was due partly to its nature. It touched closely the greatest facts of ordinary life, as connected with the family, with a simple type of society, with the food supply, with the returning seasons and duties of the year. The people could not but feel that their life was staked on the observance of the ritual duties which an agricultural or pastoral religion imposed upon them. The custom of mutilation already referred to was the most striking example of this fact, and it was of such a character as to impress strongly the Greek mind by its absolute contradiction to some of the deepest feelings of the Greek nature. The religion of the mother-goddess was essentially one of enthusiasm and strong emotion.

(e) The old Anatolian cult is essentially a religion of ideas, and the ritual comes into existence for the sake of embodying ideas in the form of acts and ceremonies, which are a method of appealing to God, as kindly and all-powerful, to benefit His creatures. We have here to deal with what is in its essence and original character a religion, and not a system of magical rites whose object is to compel the deity to act according to the desires and caprices of a worshipper possessed of the requisite knowledge. Such is the true character of the Anatolian worship. Yet the general principle on which it is based, viz. that there are certain fixed acts and verbal formulæ through which the deity ought to be approached and to which the deity will certainly respond, is one that lends itself readily to be perverted into magic. The principle is a necessary part of the religion, in which is involved that the whole system of domestic, agricultural, pastoral, and national economy must be fixed, and that the desired result will certainly ensue if the system of acts and rites is followed

¹ Is 52 5811.

² Ramsay, *Luke the Physician and other Studies in the Hist. of Religion*, pp. 179, 191, 195-197.

³ The change of free peasants into *coloni adscripti glebæ* was accomplished when Roman law formally recognized the right of the landlord to the labour of the cultivators (A.D. 415). A big step in this change was made when Augustus recognized that all persons had a proper home (*lúa*) and must return to it periodically (Lk 22); the same principle was known in 118 B.C., and explicitly stated by Roman prefects of Egypt (e.g., A.D. 154) (Ramsay, *Bearing of Recent Researches on Trustworthiness of NT*, pp. 258-272, quoting from Rostowzew, *Stud. zur Gesch. des röm. Kolonates*, p. 305, and Zulueta, in *Oxford Essays* (Vinogradoff), 1909, p. 42).

⁴ See preceding note: also the influence of the writer's Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, 1916-17, pervades (a) and (b).

¹ Ramsay, *Cities of St. Paul*, p. 431; cf. Dt 28; less definite in Persian rules (see E. L. Hicks and G. F. Hill, *Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, Oxford, 1901, p. 20).

out with perfect accuracy. This is easily perverted into the magical idea that the performance of certain acts gives to the performer a hold on, and power over, the deity. But this magical perversion is a stage in the degeneration of the religion, and not essential to it. It is not the case that the religion originates out of the magic, but that the magic is a perversion of the religion (though certainly this perversion began very early).

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THE END OF VOL. IX.

